Losing a Revolution: The PKI versus the Army in Indonesia, 1949-1965

=== [PDF page 1] === LOSING A REVOLUTIpN: THE^PKI VERSUS THE ARMY IN INDONESIA, 1949^1965 STEWART K. SUTLEY * MCGILL UNIVERSITY, MONTREAL JULY 1988 A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH IN *PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIRMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS STEWART K. SUTLEY, 1988 Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 2] === ABSTRACT The study Between applies 1949 situation. a ^'political and conflict" 196b)^Indonesia faced The Communists attempted to approach developing the subject.* revolutionary make th e transition from th is situ ation to a revolutionary outcome by accumulating resources within th e context three successive social contracts. Although, they were in itia lly unopposed in th e ir acquisition of a governmental apparatus, adherents, te rrito ry, and sovereignty, the Army increasingly attempted to block th e ir growth. However, as th e Anry was in itia lly unsuccessful, th e cammunist party remained th e world's largest nonruling comunist party a t the time. In 1965, under the protection o f the President, the Communists attempted to complete th e ir revolution through attempt flagged an "accelerator" possible the seeming transition strength, the This — a decisive event\J h a t would make a revolutionary Communists acquiring weapons. were outcome. extremely Despite th e ir dependent upon th e the staged p o litic a l power the President. Therefore, Army "decelarator" against the communists by strik in g f ir s t a t the President. Thereafter, th e defenceless Omnmunist state-w ithin-a-state was destroyed and the revolution was defeated. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 3] === RESUM 7E1etude adopte la su je t. perspective du Entre 1949 et 1965, revolution. l'Indonesie faisant face a un debut de Dans l e contexte de tro is contrats sociaux successifs et par 1 'accumulation de 'resources, les cammunistes ont essaye de transformer c e tte, situation en re su lta t de revolution. aucune opposition d 1adherents, pour aborder leur du te r rito ire, Au debut, i l n'y avait pas acquisition d'une structure gouvemementale, e t de la' souverainete, mais eventuellement, I'armee a te n te de plus en plus d 'a rre te r leur developpement. Cependant/ carane I'armee n'y re u ssissa it pas au debut, le p a rti camrnuniste demenera le p a r ti ccrnmuniste non-dirigeant le plus grand du monde d 'alo rs. 1965, sous d'achever le u r signala protection du President, revolution ‘en accumulent 1'element "accelerateur" les cximrriunistes des armes. ont te n te C'est cela qui evenement d e fin itif qui rend possible la tra n s itio n au resu lta t de la revolution. Malgre l e pouvoir qu'on leur supposait, les caranunistes devaient compter beaucoup sur l e pouvoir du President. Done, I'armee a monte un "decelerateur" contre les" cxramunistes en portant d'abord un coup au President. Des lo rs, sans protection, 1' etat-dans-l 'e ta t communiste t u t demoli e t l a revolution f u t dejouee. iii Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 4] === ACmmEDGEMENTS I wish to acknowledge the tremendous contribution made by my thesis advisor, Professor Baldev Raj Nayar. Nayar gave guidance, From the very outset, clarity, and firmness to my thoughts. Professor Throughout the course of the study, he imparted to my work the elements o f rigour and discipline, which reflect his honest in tere st in the field and in th e ^ undertakings o f his students. -— the quest science, and However, i t is with respect to intangibles to understand matters to a tta in the goal from the perspective of p o litic a l of a b e tte r comprehension o f human behaviour — th at Professor Nayar gave th e greatest possible kind o f assistance. Accompanying me throughout the study, as w ell, was Andrea. I wishto acknowledge the love and dedication that she has woven throughout th is study. One's effo rts are always better with a companion's help. The coaching, encouragement, and constant moral support she has se lfle ssly given th is study brought successful conclusion. members th e Her assistance, too, exceeds the measurable. would like acknowledge the Dissertation Committee for th e ir prompt and thorough examination of ry proposal. ' well, X would like to thank one member of the committee in particular, Professor Noumoff. Professor Noumoff provided to me several sources o f information th a t contributed in important ways to th is study. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 5] === TABLE OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS AMPAI: American Motion Picture Association o f Indonesia Berdhcari: Berdiri d iatas Kaki Sendferi; Stand on One's Own Feet BKS: Badan Kena Sama; Cooperation Body BKSBUMIL: Body Badan Keria Sama Buruh Mil ite r: BKS-Pemuda-Militer: Badan Keria Cooperation Body Sama Labour-Military Cooperation Femuda Mil i t e r; Youth-Military BKSTAMIL: Body Badan Keria Sama Tanl M iliter; Peasant-M ilitafy, Cooperation BK5WAMIL: Badan Keria Sara Wanita M iliter; . Body Wamen-Military Cooperation BPI: Badan Pusht In tel iie n s; Central Intelligence-Body BPEK: Badan 'Pembina Potensi Karva; Bodies for th e Fostering of Functional BPS: Badan Pendukum/Perivebar Sukamoisme: Body for th e Support/Spreading of Sukamoism BTI: Barisan Tani Indonesia; Indonesian Peasant Front OGMI: Consentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Students Movements Indonesia:■ Indonesian University Depemas: Dewan Perancancr Nasional; National Planning Board DPA: Dewan Pertimbanaan Acrum; Supreme Advisory Council DPR: Dewan Perwakilan Bakvat; People's Representative^Body DPR-GR: Dewan Perwakilan Rakvat-Gotonc Ravoncr; Mutual Assistance People's Representative Body Dwikora: Dwi-Komando? Dual Command FN: Front Nasional; National Front FNPIB: Front Nasional Pembebasaan Irian Liberation of West Iria n Barat; National Front for the Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 6] === r»GeCTani: Gerakan Wanita.Indonesia; Indonesian Women's Association. . Gestanu: Gerakan September Tiaamluh; September 30 Movement Golkar: Goloncrah Karva; Vocational Group f HANSIP: Pertahanan S ip il? Civil Defence Organization HMI: Himounan Mahasiswa, Islam; Islamic University Students Association IMF: IhterriationaJ. Monetary Fund IEKI: ' Ikatan Pendukuncr Kemerdekaan Indonesia; league of Upholders of Indonesian independence IPPL:. Ikatan Pemuda Peladiar Indonesia: leaguegof Indonesian High School 0Yguth Kabir: K anitalis-birokrat; Capitalist-bureaucrat KBKC: Kesatuan Buruh Kerakvataan Indonesia: United Popular labourers of Indonesia KNXP; Komxte Nasional Committee Indonesia Pusat; Central Indonesian National KD3A: Komando Siacra; A lert Command KOLAGA: Komando Mandala Siacra; Area A lert Command KDRAMIL: Komando Ravon M ilter: Military Rayon Command Lekra: lembacra Kebudavaan Rakvat; league of People's Culture LVRI: Ieoiun Veteran Reoublik Indonesia; Veteran's Legion of the Republic of Indonesia Manipol: Manifesto P o litik; Political Manifesto Masjumi: Madielis Siuro Indonesian Muslims Moslimin Indonesia: Consultative Council MTLTAG: Military Training Advisory Group MER: Maiel i s Pennusvawaratan Rakvat: People's Deliberative Assembly MERS: Maie l is Permusvawaratan Deliberative Assembly Rakvat Sementara; Provisional People's' Nasakom: frasionalisme-Aoama-Koinunisme; Nationalism-Religion-Omnmunism Nasakomil: Nasionalisme-Aoama-Koinunisine-Militer; Ccmmunism-Military National ism-Religionvi R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 7] === NEFOS: Newly Emerging Forces NU: Nadhatul Ulama; Ulama Association OUOEFOS: Old Established. Forces OEPI: Oroanisasi Persatuan Perkeria Indonesian Workers Indonesia; United Organization of Ormas: oroanisasi Massa; Mass Organizations PANGAB: Paixrlina Amkatan Berseniata; Commander of th e Armed Forces Partindo; Parfcai Indonesia; Indonesia Party Pepelrada: Pencruasa ^ Pelaksanaan Executive A uthorities Pvikora Daerah; Regional Ewikora Permestaf:' Piaaam Periuaman Permesta; Charter-of Common Straggle PKE: Partai Komunis Indonesia; Communist Party of Indonesia EKPI: Persatuan Karvawan Penaarana Indonesia; Union of Indonesian Writer Karvawan ENI: Partai Nasional Indonesia; N ationalist Party of Indon^ia FNX-Staatsoartii: P artai Nasional Nationalist Party-State Party Indonesia-Staatspartii; Polkar: Pol i t ik-Khrva: Vocation-Politics ERRI: Indonesian Pemerintah Revolusioner Republic Government of the Republic of Indonesia Indonesia; Revolutionary PSI: Partai S osialis Indonesia; Indonesian S o cialist Party PSH: Partai Serikat Islam Indonesia; Islamic Association Party PIK: Persatuan Tenaca Karvawan; Union of Karvawan Forces PWI: Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia; Indonesian Jo u rn a lists Association PTC: Round Table Conference Sarbuori: Serikat Buruh Perkebunan Renublik Indonesia; Plantation Workers o f the Republic o f Indonesia Union SESKQAD: Sekolah S ta f dan Komando Amkatan Darat; Army Staff and Command School SESKDAL: Sekolah S ta f dan Komando Amkatan Laut? Navy Staff- and Command School v ii Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 8] === SESKDAU: Sekolah S taf dan -Komando Anakatap TTda-ra: A ir Force Staff -and Command School SOB: Reaelina op den Staat van Oorlog en van Belea: State of War and • Siege SOBSI: Sentral Oroanisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia; All Indonesian Central Labour Organization ’SOKSl: Serikat ‘Droanisasi Karvawan S osialis - Indonesia: Indonesian S o cialist Karyawan Organizations Union SUAD: Staf UnrumAnakatan Darat; Section of the Army General S taff TNI: Tentara Nasional Indonesia> Nationalist Amy of Indonesia USDEK: Undana-Undang Dasar 1945 - Sosialisme Indonesia — Demokrasi Terpimoin Lkonomi Teroimpin Kepribadian Indonesia: 1945 Constitution - Indonesian Socialism - Guided Democracy - Guided Economy - Indonesian Identity ‘USIS: United States Information Service UUPA: Undancr-undancf Pokok Aoraria; Basic Agrarian law UUPEH: Undang-undang Feriandiian Baoi H asil: Sharecropping Law v iii Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 9] === TABLE OF CONTENTS RESUME TABL^E OF ACRONYM Chapter I A OONCEpTUAL FRAM ORK FOR THE FATTED INDONESIAN REVOLUTION. Theories of Revolution E arlier Scholarship A SOCIAL CONTRACT WITHOUT PURPOSE:..LIBERAL DEM OCRACY IN INDONESIA ANDTHE COM The Rise and Consolidation o f Liberal Democracy in, Indonesia, 1945-1949.......................................................................... The Era of Liberal Democracy and th e Rise o f Contenders, 1949-1957...................................................................................................................... Party Behaviour, 1950-1957.................................................................................. Building a State-w ithin-a-Stater The PKI's United National The Thwarted Chances o f Communist Power: The Collapse of Liberal Democracy, 1956-1957........................................................................ ' The Communist Party I ll THE SOCIAL CONTRACT OF GUIDED DEMXRACY: ARM Y INITIATIVES AND COMMUNIST RESPONSES, 1957-1962............................................................................. The Foundation of the New Social Contract: Sukarno' s Konsepsi and the Army's Revolutionary Heritage Party Reactions to Early Guided Democracy In itia tiv e s, Late 1957-Miu— 1958.................................................................................................. The Army as th e Pioneer of Guided Democracy, 1957-1960... Communist Strategies: The Alliance with Sukarno, Ideological Reformulations, and New Forms of C ollective E ffort.... Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 10] === The Army in Retreat and Differences with Sukarno, 1959-1962 From within the Confines of Guided Democracy: The PKI's FutureProspects.........................................................................................................., 109 IV THE POLARIZATION OF GUIDED DEM OCRACY: NASAKPMVERSUS GOLKAR. IAIE 1962 TO LATE 1964.......................................................................................... 110 The Army's Government-Building and Conceptual Refinement Initiatives, 1958 to Early 1963 Whither the Indonesian Revolution? Choosing a "Programme" in 1963.................................................................................................................. , An Indirect "Revolutionary Offensive": Comnturiizing th e State, Late 1963-Lath 1964...................................................................... The Amy in Retreat in 1964: The Consolidation of th e The Balance of Forces in 1964 and the Paths o f Revolution and Counterrevolution. 154 V THE LAST YEAR: REVOLUTIONARY STATE LEADERSHIP, THE "RED 157 111“ 122 129 144 - . Sukarno and the Nasakom-ization of the Indonesian State: The International Realm The PKE and the Nasakom-ization of the Indonesian State: The The Fifth Force: Arming theRevolution..................................................... The Amy Destroys the Social Contract: The Decelerator Against Sukarno andth e Communists. 174 182 159 162 167 197 239 Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 10 === [PDF page 11] === CHAPTER I A CQNCEFIUAL FRAM ORK FOR THE FAILED The Research Problem The purpose of th is study is to examine the factors th a t le d to the collapse of th e Indonesian Ctemmunist Party in 1965. Towards th at end, i t considers the period from 1949 to 1965, focusing on the development of a revolutionary situ atio n Indonesia, especially after 1957. While demonstrating the existence of th is revolutionary situation, th is study also investigates why a revolutionary outcome did not re su lt from the polarized relationship Indonesia (PKE) that existed and the Army (TNI) between the in 1965. Communist Party More sp ecifically, th is study attempts to examine and explain why th e PKI — the actor w ith the revolutionary intentions th is situ atio n and the world's largest nonruling communist party a t the time — fa ile d to secure i t s goals and was destroyed by the Army. For its th eo retical framework, co n flict" model of revolution, th is study adopts th e "p o litical drawn from th e works o£ T illy and Aya.1 Within th is context, revolutionary situ atio n s, and ultimately outcomes, re su lt from a quest for power resources among characterized by weakened or "unstuck" sta te power. actors polity The quest must be Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. === [PDF page 12] === coupled with an "accelerator" favourable to th e revolutionary contender.2 To presage what follows la te r, i t is necessary to indicate why th is case study of Indonesia is approached from th e perspective of revolution. In terms of a widespread change in p o litic a l rulers, structures, values, and roles, a national revolution had occurred in Indonesia between 1945 and 1949. The period under study f a lls a fte r the la tte r date. This does not, however, diminish the relevance of the perspective o f revolution. Although the transfer of sovereignty in 1949 to the new Republic put an end to th e most obvious signs of revolution change), Indonesian "penetrate" the society s ta te.3 continued, Subsequently, highly (great, rapid, and violent according Indonesia politicized Anderson, faced a developing revolutionary situ ation: engaged in an increasingly sta te. Until 1957 th is heightened p o litic a l activ ity manifested its e lf intensive fashion in and active citizenry the p o litics through p o litic a l p arties, which numbered a t least seventy. o f the Thus, the r is e of the FKE during this period can be understood as a revolutionary phenomenon. revolution When Indonesia o ffic ia lly "returned to the ra ils" 1959, there was accelerando mass of its p o litic s penetrating ever more widely down and across Indonesian society."4 This situ atio n was one of great in sta b ility, of a revolutionary outcome, normally a prerequisite and lasted u n til 1965, when one of the two main contenders, the PKE, was pulverized. Theories of Revolution This study based on the premise th a t p o litic a l theories of revolution, as opposed to other conceptions o f the phenomenon, are b etter suited the explanation the kind o f developed in Indonesia from 1949 to 1965. p o litic a l situ a tir n that This study, therefore, f ir s t Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 13] === argues the general and th eo retical m erits of the p o litic a l model by demonstrating the inadequacies of the altern ative conceptions. Then, i t demonstrates the m erits of a p o litic a l framework, and th e b etter and more insightful explanation i t may yield, through a discussion of the status of e a rlie r and existing scholarship on Indonesia. Recent approaches to revolutions typically follow the disciplinary divisions however, a ll the social sciences. approaches Despite th e ir differing emphases, sociological, socio-psychological, and p o litic a l — claim to be concerned with the same social phenomenon of, revolution. unites Ironically, no common and concise d efin itio n of revolution the diversity of approaches. 5 Answering th e*question "Why do revolutions occur?" seems to be the only concern binding these th e o rists. Beyond th is, they strik e out in d ifferen t directions, the in te lle c tu a l to ols, constructs, guided mainly by and assumptions of th e ir respective disciplines. Whether o f the "functionalist" and Skocpol) subapproaches, (Johnson) or "class conflict" sociological theories f i r s t on the dynamics of social interaction. (Moore of revolution focus S tab ility or in sta b ility in society is analyzed and explained (according to Taylor) by concentrating notions s tra tific a tio n. For certain social quo. revolution, functions social systems, adherents in stitu tio n s, the "functionalist" and social subapproach, functions have to be fu lfille d in defence of the status instances o f system failu re, overthrow of the social reconstituted subapproach, however, system, order. mass mobilization can lead to and fulfillm ent of the req u isite One major criticism th is relates to i t s high level of abstraction: Johnson failed to operationalize his own arguments. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 14] === The alternative subapproach - proceeds assumption th a t possession of power resources in anpng individuals and groups. from th e society is contested Here, authors undertake an "analysis of the relations between groups competing for resources in the context of how.these influence ‘the a b ility of dominant groups to contain co n flict."6 Moore and Skocpol, methodological error: performing such an th e ir case analysis, studies are commit th e only same instances revolutionary outcomes, examples of revolution validated by an ex post facto technique. revolution, one th e o rist^ o f\^ th is reason for this was genre th e ir failed "neglect explain causes revolution which lay beyond the ambit of sociological theorizing, causes which some analysts psychological dimensions revolution would revolutionary suggest included behavior."7 the short, sociological theories p f revolution suffer from reductionism. From the socio-psychological perspective, th eo rists emphasize how individuals (normatively) perceive th e p olity and conditions prevailing within rather than an "objective" analysis of the same. These th eo rists seek „ the causes of individual discontent and, by simple extension, the aggravations of "society" as a Collective, action becomes collective behavior, the abnormal, 'antisocial activ ity of disaffected persons driven to violence by pent-up frustrations with the status quo A whole society erupts in revolution Therefore, "in order to produce adequate explanations of revolutions, i t was necessary changed time, over specify and th e the perceptions mechanisms by individuals, which eventually manifested in revolutionary behaviour."9 three major weaknesses, delineated by Taylor. such how these changes were These models share F irst, th e relationship among individual perceptions, psychological processes, Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. and aggregate === [PDF page 15] === p o litic a l violence is not substantiated by d irect evidence-.- - From this follows second weakness: counterparts, fam iliar. emphasize Lastly, these th e o rists, only the factors like with ought to approach functionalist" "p olitical conflict" representative o f the former, could sustain consensus through either approach, Huntington the subapproaches. asserting th a t revolution "the degree to which p o litica l meeting new functional requirements generated by economic or social modernization.1,11 th is the Revolutions are more than revolution be examined by reference to in stitu tio n s most th eo rists Huntington is are Hence, these theories illum inate only one component o f the phenomenon. "p o litic al which they the concept of revolution as a d iscrete phenomenon is rendered meaningless.10 P o litical sociological approaching revolution by embedding i t general notion o f p o litic a l violence, .p o litical violence. th e ir id en tifies, revolution Through outcome.12 His definition "marks o ff an extremely narrow range of outcomes — so narrow, in fact, th a t depending on how we interpret 'ra p id ' and 'fundamental,1 i t doubtful whether a re a l revolution ever happened."13 functionalist approach seems le s s relevant to than older ones, Further, his contemporary revolutions a weakness perhaps redressed by T illy 's alternative subapproach. The th ru st the "p o litical conflict" model, T illy 's approach, i s to view the p o lity o r state as "an arena within which groups carpeted fo r power, and through th is wealth and statu s, and where the outcome of such competition was determined primarily by the balance of resources available to contending groups.1,14 The emergence of multiple sovereignty, by which is meant th e struggle between contenders for sta te Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 16] === power — th a t is, a revolutionary situation — relates mainly to "the in ab ility of the government and polity members to incorporate new s tra ta into the polity and provide adequate coirpensation for loser groups."15 Thus, three proximate causes flag the onset of a revolutionary situation: the appearance of contenders (new or loser groups within the p o lity ); "the development o f cammitment to the claims of these contenders by a significant section "normative resources," the which, subject population" when coupled with (these to ols are called coercion, constitute an ac to r's "capabilities"); and government's loss of coercive power. Unfortunately, Tilly confuses the causes of revolutionary situations and revolutionary outcomes with these events them selves.... [In actuality] the causes of a revolutionary situation were whatever variables explained why contenders had appeared, why substantial sectors of the population had transferred their* allegiances to such contenders and why the government was deprived of coercive control.16 Further, he rejects socio-psychological and in stitu tio n al variables on the (weak) basis of his hypothesized relationships between the above longer-term cause and the proximate causes of revolution. In general, T illy "failed to validate the p o litic a l co n flict approach employed...by providing adequate alternative explanations to those stemming from sociopsychological functionalist\ perspectives."17 overcome these weaknesses, yet preserve the th rh st and insights T illy underscores, one can turn to Aya's b rie f study. Sensitivity to the d istinctio n between a revolutionary situ atio n and a revolutionary outcome, which have different determinants, for both Aya and T illy. th a t revolution i s disaggregated. is crucial One should be aware, according to these w riters/ a complex phenomenon, the nature of which must; be Thus, a revolution is only "same minimum combination of Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 17] === revolutionary situation and Other th eo rists have erroneously collapsed the two stages in to one, seemingly unaware th a t revolutionary situation revolutionary outcome. may never re s u lt Working from th e Bolshevik notion o f "dual power," a revolution is, for Aya, re a lly the result of a " tr ia l by b attle" that involves • th e seizure (or attempted seizure) o f a governmental apparatus ( i.e., th e concerftrated m aterial means of coercion, taxation, and public administration in society) by one contender (or coalition o f contenders) from another. The revolutionary situation its e lf i s one o f "multiple sovereignty,"...in which public authority is divided between two or more power centers, each attempting to ru le people and te rrito ry previously subject to a single regime multiple sovereignty begins when state power comes unstuck; i t ends when — by th e victory of one, th e defeat of another, or a settlement between warring contenders — one sovereign polity exerts a monopoly o f violence, taxation, and ju s tic e.19 This d efin itio n is shared by Aya and T illy, yet th e former overcomes th e l a t t e r 's near participants exclusive emphasis th is in stitu tio n al context. on p o litic a l within variables certain placing functioned, and This innovation is summarized by Aya as follows: "To explain why people do what they do, you make a simple model of th e ir choice situation, including th e ir intentions, ca p a b ilitie s, and opportunities to a c t." 20 Thus, the in stitu tio n al o r structural variables emphasized by Skocpol play a decisive r o le,21 and one should consider revolution by f ir s t focussing upon these larger and system-determining variables: Changes in th e social structure and composition of a human setting, obviously enough, a lte r the id en tity of contending p arties as well as th e ir organizational bases of collective action — hence,'’ too, th e ir bargaining power vis-a-vis other groups.... This...points up the organizational link between grievances and the capability to act on them. Individuals are not magically mobilized fo r action, no matter how aggrieved, h o stile, or angry they feel. Their anger must f i r s t be s e t to co llective ends by Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 18] === the coordinating, directing offices of organization, formal o r. inform al.... in any event,...there must- be some kind of organization on hand to orchestrate discontent and convert i t into collective action. Now th e question becomes, how do structural changes of society — by reshaping organizational means fo r acting on common claims arid grievances — affect the ta c tic a l power of aggrieved groups? The issue, then,, is not only how -stru ctu ral changes a lte r the identity, aims, and options of contending forces, but how they mdclify th eir respective bases o f solidarity and collective effort? how, in a word, they red istrib ute social power chances.22 To effectively trace "social power chances," an analyst must perform an additional task. ' There must be a careful trace o f the various pathways to multiple sovereignty — in p articular, the in tric a te riv a lrie s,^jifamuvers, and realignments of governing groups -whose failed consensus [may have] opened the door the revolutionaries ran through..., 23 Aya neatly summarizes th is modified "p o litical conflict" approach in three analytical components. These components must be examined in th e ir en tirety: (1 )...the prevailing terms of social contract — to which various sets of people are party and which, once violated, make for grievances; (2) note, too, with regard to capabilities and opportunities, the ta c tic a l power resources'' available to aggrieved groups — th e ir economic basis, community organization, p o litic a l connections with outside a llie s, and (most important) fissures in the power structure th a t may open from above. The combined re s u lt is (3) a focus on th e social distribution of power chances, on ta c tic a l coalitions between various contenders, and on the occurrence of top-level power struggles [among members of the state] th a t, without warning, may open th e p o litica l arena to popular intervention.24 Therefore, in- instances revolutionary situation where no revolutionary outcome ensued, much attention must be focussed upon the "capabilities" of the actor endowed with revolutionary intentions and why these "capabilities" failed resu lt th e neutralization destruction of the "coercive control" of the existing government. I t is important to know under what conditions a revolutionary power contender Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 19] === with a favourable social contract, diversified and large ta c tic a l powerresources, and even coerdive cap ab ilities, "breakthrough," and i s crushed. f a ils to make the desired Seemingly, those factors emphasized by both T illy and Aya in th e ir explanations of revolutionary outcomes — mainly those resources consisting of commitments o f members of th e polity and coercive resources — were meaningless, a t le a s t, in the case of the PKE. Johnson th is calls example what really needs to be explained is th a t which the "accelerator." This notion, although originally ensconced in th e theoretical milieu of structural-functional ism, may be extracted from the same and used to explain the c r itic a l moments when an advanced revolutionary situation can lead e ith e r revolutionary outcome (in which case the accumulated cap ab ilities count for success), o r be crushed by nonrevolutionary contenders. Johnson sta tes th a t the su ffic ie n t context cause revolution, in' th e existing revolutionary situ atio n same ingredient, usually contributed by fortune, which deprives th e e lite [or government] of its chief weapon for enforcing social behavior..., or which leads a group of revolutionaries to believe th at they have the means to deprive the e lite o f i t s weapons of coercion...1, such f in a l...causes of revolution are referred to as "accelerators."25 short, already accelerators real though are events which "suddenly make apparent the la ten t situ atio n," effectiv ely captured by the applied concept o f a revolutionary situ atio n.26 The concept th e accelerator has only been lite ra tu re as an explanatory factor o f revolutionary outcomes. has asserted, the Johnson "The event that trig g ers revolution in a society th a t is disequilibrated and th a t has a discredited base of authority is called ajn 'a c c e le ra to r'."27 Accelerators, as decisive events, are framed in the Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 20] === 10 lite ra tu re such th a t revolutionary outcomes are the only consequences when such events occur. This, however, does in justice the real p o ssib ilitie s faced by contenders — revolutionary or nonrevolutionary - in a revolutionary situation. fully theoretically paralyze The concept does not seem to have been articulated. government's revolutionary outcomes. Accelerators coercive can capability, thus events that leading Accelerators'favouring a revolutionary actor can lead to a revolutionary outcome only i f th^t actor also possesses those other capabilities (normative resources) such capabilities are also subject to decisive favourable events discussed e a rlie r. liquidation. revolutionary outcome, can For th a t reason, nonrevolutionary neutralize a revolutionary contender's capabilities, called However, contender that and thus thwart a "decelerators. 1 From the perspective of a " tria l by b a ttle," the nonrevolutionary contender has the easier task and is not obliged, as is the revolutionary contenderinterested in success, to build up capabilities, although th a t option is open. Hence, th is study proposes to adopt the notion of the "decisive, event" (within Aya's three component scheme) and its double-edged nature: can topple both revolutionary and nonrevolutionary contenders in a developing or fully developed revolutionary situation. To see how th e works of Aya and T illy complement one another, i t is necessary to complete Aya's larger framework by superimposing on i t T illy 's notion of time perspectives and including within that the genuine proximate causes a revolutionary situ ation. The "careful trace" proposed Aya also revolutionary situation. determines the c rite ria for the onset Here a certain time dimension must be added. .T illy states that there e x ist three time perspectives th a t ifay be adapted Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 21] === 11 with regard eith er revolutionary situ a tio n leading revolutionary situ a tio n th at revolutionary outcome, complete th e "breakthrough.1 production" In the long-run, fa ils "the reorganization of — and how th is "creates th e chief h isto rical actors, the major constellations of in te re sts, the basic th reats to these in terests, and the principal conditions for the transfers of power" — becomes the centre of the analysis.28 The h isto ric al time frame of th e present study, however, precludes th is longer-term time perspective; th e mediumand short-run perspectives, however, are quite appropriate vantage points from which to approach the Indonesian case. I t is th e medium-run perspective th a t best encapsulates th e c rite ria of a revolutionary situ atio n, for i t is herein th a t th e analyst focusses upon the presence o f mobilised contenders. In short, here one attempts to overcame Taylor's criticism of T illy and explain "why contenders had appeared, [and] why substantial sectors o f the population had transferred th e ir allegiances to such contenders."29 These are, of course, the f i r s t and second genuine proximate causes of a revolutionary situ atio n. Hence, examining th e Indonesian case from th is time perspective will constitute the bulk of th e study. With^ regard to contender and that the f i r s t proximate cause — the appearance of a its claims amounted to an a ltern ativ e to those in power — th is study seems to be somewhat weakened by the- exclusion of the longer-term time perspective wherein the origin o f the chief h isto ric a l >actors explained. To be sure, th is study w ill n ot be taking th e existence of the PKT as a contender for granted. Indeed, while th e study excludes the questionable assertion th at a reorganization of production explains the ris e of the EKE (as T illy would presumably argue), i t must Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 22] === 12 explain th e appearance o f the PKI and i t s development into a contender. This because 1948 the EKE was almost destroyed as p o litica l entity in an abortive uprising in Java. a viable By 1949 the PKI was s t i l l indistinguishable from a myriad of p o litic a l organizations in terms its accomplishments, claims, membership, appurtenances of a nascent contender. any Thus, th e study w ill, the other in essence, be concerned with explaining, in the medium-run perspective th a t has been adopted, what is meant to be explained in the long-run perspective. Illuminating the second facet of the contender, alternative claims, PKI's ideology. is to advanced be accomplished by a b rie f analysis of the The evaluation of aspects of the p a rty 's ideology covers the entire h istorical period under consideration. w ill be argued, that i t Even to the end, i t the EKE sustained fundamentally alternative claims to power and legitimacy in th e Indonesian Republic. I t is true th a t almost every government has faced a t le ast one riv a l to i t s claims of power and legitimacy. However, th is study w ill examine the Ctammunist Party of Indonesia on the basis of a demanding standard: - the contender can be measured by same "gauge of seriousness."30 The means hy which one can distinguish between a marginal challenger and a.ing o r full-fledged contender is by measuring not only i t s claims, but also whether "some significant part of the subject population honors the claim."31 This is th e second proximate cause o f a revolutionary situation. In th is vein, Tilly affirms th at the revolutionary moment arrives when previously acquiescent members of th a t population find themselves confronted with s tr ic tly incompatible demands from the government and form an alternative body claiming control over the government, or claiming to be the government...and these previously acquiescent people obey the alternative body. They pay taxes, provide men to Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 23] === i t s armies,'* feed i t s functionaries, honor i t s symbols, give time to i t s service, or yield other resources despite the prohibitions of a s till-e x is tin g government they formerly obeyed. Multiple sovereignty has begun.32 This d efinition is, however, rather rig id in th a t the riv a l demands being made are " s tric tly incompatible." Furthermore, th is definition is only su itab le to situations of open civ il war when "armies" are in existence. T illy 's d efinition seems to f i t only one type of revolutionary situation, th a t which Huntington has called the "Eastern" model o f revolution. Examples of th is type of revolution are characterized by mobilized armies and,' frequently, o f people.33 " s tric tly incompatible" demands being made on the mas^ The Indonesian case does not f i t th is definition of the "beginning" of a revolutionary situation. th a t th is definition situ atio n. However, d efin itio n, and ground i t Moreover, revolutionary one were to situ ation modify certain can be argued peaceful features of th is in the essen tially turbulent b ut nonviolent domestic p o litic a l circumstances of the Indonesian example, a case could s t i l l be made fo r a developing revolutionary situ atio n. A modified definition encompasses the existence conflicting demands between the contender and th e government, th is riv alry carried out effectively and in a competitive fashion. th e former "lean to oneEside" The supporters of in the context of domestic p o litic s and w ill act despite the prohibitions of the existing government. In place of T illy 's zero-sum tra n sfer o f resources from the government to the contender, the modified version ""of a revolutionary situ a tio n envisages citizen s surrendering resources to both actors but increasingly more to th e contender as the revolutionary situ atio n develops. The particular resources in th is case are taxes, in the form of party dues, donations, and so forth; members of the party and i t s front organizations Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. and === [PDF page 24] === 14 au x iliaries; the honouring its symbols parly congresses, anniversaries, special events, and so forth; giving time to its service; and votes during elections. The la s t resource becomes the single most crucial element in determining the difference between a mere claimant and a fu ll contender.' In the absence of elections, the number of members in th e organization and i t s a u x ilia rie s ^ in relation to the size of the adult papulation, becomes a reasonable substitute. T illy emphasizes th a t "commitments to some alternative, claimant must be activated in the face of prohibitions or contrary directives f r om the government."34 In the Indonesian case, two instances of such activation' occurred through. PKI orders',' one in 1957 and the other throughout the period from 1963 to 1965. In 1957 negotiations with the dutch over the fa te of West New Guinea (West Irian) collapsed and prospects for the peaceful transfer of sovereignty to Jakarta dimmed. demonstrate Indonesia's national commitment to the In an effo rt to attainment of the te rrito ry, PKI cadres and members of its labour and trade union fronts ille g a lly seized Dutch commercial enterprises •throughout the country. Curing the period from 1963 to 1965, the PKI again demonstrated its organizational s k ills and challenge to the established order'by directing th e seizure of "feudalists" B ritish and, commercial enterprises, la te r, American the commercial land holdings of enterprises. These occurrences brought multiple sovereigrlty nearest to the point of the two.warring govemmentlike o r statelik e structures, to which T illy alluded. This medium-run analysis, increasingly statelik e nature therefore, the permits us to PKI. Much lik e focus on the th e' legally empowered Indonesian sta te, the PKI, and to same degree the Amy as well, came acquire q ualities, capabilities, and Resources Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. normally === [PDF page 25] === 15 associated with a s ta te. - to a lesser extent, te rrito ry, people, Xt can be demonstrated that both the EKE and, the TNI exhibited sta te lik e properties: government, and sovereignty. motives behind becoming sta te lik e can also be argued th at th e arise not only from the endogenous in tere sts of the actor, but that th e environment within which i t operates p o litic a lly determines to significant degree the in ten sity process as w ell as success in its attainment. of th a t Here one can measure th e true nature o f the relationship between the PKI and th e TNI. applying the concept of being sta telik e is useful in Thus, determining the s a lie n t features of th e ir interaction. The fin al time perspective, th e short-run, compels the analyst to scrutinize "tactics and the balance of forces." More specifically, the u tiliz a tio n th is approach brings the fore "the available m ilitary force a t the control neutralization of th e center of the short-run conditions fo r the tran sfer of power. "3^ to c ite th is [or could have been] approach explains "why the government was deprived of coercive control."36 cause revolutionary This i s situ atio n and Taylor again, the th ird genuine proximate constitutes th e sole between a revolutionary situation and a revolutionary outcome. th e th eo retical device of th e accelerator adoption of th is time perspective. and short-run time perspectives bridge Use of (or decelerator) permits the Finally, when combined, the xnediumdelim it useful approach the ^Indonesian experience. Thus >the development of th e revolutionary situation in Indonesia can be divided into four tim e blocks: (1) 1949 to 1957; la te 1962 to la te 1964; and (4) 1965. (2) 1957 to 1962; (3) The f i r s t th ree time blocks fa ll w ithin th e purview of a medium-run time approach, whereas the year 1965 Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 26] === 16 f a lls within th e time frame o f a short-run approach. Accordingly, the analysis of developments from 1949 to late 1964 w ill accent three areas: th e appearance o f the PKE as a contender; th e advancement o f alternative claims to power and legitimacy by the EKI; and the increasing commitment 'to these claims by a sig n ifican t segment of th e population. the final section of the historical With respect analysis, there will be an examination of th e conditions in 1965 that prompted both th e EKE and the Army to tr y to stage a favourable decisive event. What d ifferen tiates each of th e f ir s t three time blocks a re the demonstrably different terms o f the social contract that characterized each period. laws) th a t By a social contract i s meant the explicit ru les (usually govern who included or excluded from leg al p o litica l a c tiv itie s, the general form and content of those a c tiv itie s, and their in stitu tio n a l embodiment. Consequently, actors th at are included within th e contract can be expected to act in a certain manner th a t conforms w ith the agreed norms. Contrariwise, actors that are excluded can be expected to act in a d iffe ren t fashion and attempt "either to overthrow th e whole contract or t o revise i t in such a way tha(Cthey are included. Thus, th is study will argue, in accordance with Aya, th a t the social contract affects an a c to r's identity, aims, options, bases o f solidarity, and collective e ffo rt. With particular regard to the EKI, i t can be stated th a t from 1949 to 1957 th e social contract (which was lib eral democratic in orientation and featured p o litic a l p arties, lit th e vehicle to power) was characterized by tolerance government) from across the p o litica l continuum, as toward mobilization and collective action (attaining (various acts (on th e part o f the resources and capabilities) such as strik es, demonstrations, Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 27] === 17 meetings, o r even publishing a newspaper). contract (which was authoritarian From 1957 to 1962, th e social and featured corporatist tenets and organizations based on function, n o t class or ideology) was characterized by repression of th e FKI's collective action and fa c ilita tio n mobilization and collective social contract (which action. From late was, authoritarian 1962 to and of Army late 19&4, th e featured national revolutionary struggle of a largely ideological nature) was characterized by fa c ilita tio n of Communist Party collective action and mobilization, while the Army endured tolerance o f its own mobilization and co llectiv e action. it within which i t functions can be more clearly demonstrated by reference to the stra te g ie s of p a rtic u la r actors. In the f ir s t time block, the IKE was mobilizing, o r acxarmiLating greater resources or capabilities a s well as enhanced potential for co llectiv e action. This a b ility to accumulate for any actor) depended, part*, delineated by Aya. upon th e (which holds true fissures the power structure, Within th is context, th e d istrib u tio n of " p o litic a l power chances" can be evaluated. Also in 1957, th e dramatic appearance o f the Army on the p o litic a l stage served to intensify the revolutionary situ atio n. In December 1957 a state of near multiple sovereignty b riefly came into existence as the PKT tr ie d recover the p o litic a l emergency powers. in itia tiv e lo s t due to th e TNI's This was an opportunity for th e Communists to make p o litic a l capital — when conscious w ill and good fortune were combined and something was actually done to t r y to benefit from th is rare nexus,— b u t i t became a primary concern for both actors: Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 28] === 18 Hie appearance of [near] multiple sovereignty [put] in to question the achieved position o f every single contender [and acto r], whether a member of the polity or n ot, and [this tendedl to in itia te a general round o f mutual testin g among contenders.3' Hie second time block witnessed reactive action by the EKE (a response to protect i t s accumulated resources then being claimed by the Army, which was in a de facto duumvirate w ith President Sukarno) mobilizing strategy on the p a rt of th e Army. and a Hie block's social contract expired toward the end of 1962 as the FKE displaced th e Army as the P resident's favourite partner. This compels an examination o f' the distrib u tio n of th e "p olitical power chances” at th e end of the contract. la s tly, from la te 1962 la te 1964 the FKI was engaged in a "•proactive" or offencive strategy (both designations for plans of action th a t see a group lay been considered claim "to resources from which i t had previously ineligible, and [be] resisted by a t le a s t one other group"-58), while the Army was thrust into a reactive sta te, in which i t attempted to retain control over resources acquired under the previous contract. It is fe lt th at th is specific combination bf stra te g ie s, one deployed by a risin g actor and the other by an actor th a t had recently enjoyed substantial p articu larly v o latile. power, especially over In th is situation, i t its current riv a l, is not d iffic u lt to imagine e ith e r acto r attempting to act decisively against th e other. I t i s this p o litic a l environment th a t led inexorably to the events of 1965. H yp oth esis Hie present study, which i s based on th e aforementioned framework, culminates in an examination o f the situ atio n in 1965 between,th e Army and the EKE, when each attempted to (accelerator or decelerator) stage a favourable decisive event and vanquish its riv a l. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The underlying === [PDF page 29] === 19 hypothesis th a t a Indonesia, owing revolutionary outcome was "on the agenda" the EKI's successful attainment for diverse c a p a b ilitie s in th e context of a developing revolutionary situ ation, but th a t the nonrevolutionary .contender, the Army, neutralized these ca p a b ilitie s by preempting the staging o f an effective accelerator. tra n sitio n from a revolutionary situation The a revolutionary outcome depended upon which contender was able to destroy the capabilities of the other. In other words, only i f there had been an effective accelerator could the revolutionary revolution 1965. situ atio n This Indonesia have culminated in hypothesis can be restated terms variables: Dependent variable: A revolutionary situ ation failin g to re su lt in a revolutionary outcome. Independent variable: The absence o f an accelerator and the usex ' of a decelerator. E arlier Scholarship The importance of the decisive event in th e Indonesian case, which has been called th e "abortive Cammunist coup attempt of September 30October 1" in the lite ra tu re, has been vastly misunderstood, ^owing to the lack o f a th eoretical orientation and undue focus upon the two contenders in iso latio n from one another. There are, however, several excellent works relatin g e ith e r exclusively to the PKE o r to the TNI. The two most outstanding works on the Amoy — Crouch (1978) and Sundhaussen (1982) — comprise scholarly e ffo rts to understand an acto r th a t, the EKE, has been greatly understudied.39 th e Army's development in relatio n to Crouch, for h is p a rt, focusses p o litic a l in te re sts and p o litic a l orientation since th e revolution. Army's philosophy o f p o litic a l His study valuably delineates th e involvement y e t fa ils to connect th is Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 30] === 20 seemingly autonomous.process to the needs of acto r survival, especially in th e face o f the EKI th rea t th a t emerged in the mid-1950s. Similarly, Sundhaussen argues th at the Army takeover in 1965 relates to the m ilitary leaders' attitudes c iv ilia n adversaries. of th e and perceptions, o f th e ir Once again, one witnesses the autonomous process Army's p o liticizatio n th a t supreme power. not those ineluctably resu lts in i t wielding The major weakness of these, and ancillary, works on th e Army stems from the methodological assumption th a t th is actor is b est understood in isolation from others in th e Indonesian p o lity. 40 The dynamism that the EKI opposition, a t least in p a rt, fostered in m ilitary c ircle s has been erroneously attributed to the Army's own a b ilitie s and nature. 41 The same general argument made about studies of the Amy may be applied to the larger number of studies conducted on the EKI. studies, the FKE, too, has been shorn of the effects of its p o litic a l environment. From th e perspective of domestic p o litic s, been studied with a strategy In several (Hindley, focus on the 1964) capabilities were secured, — which the party has implementation of a national fron t very a t le a s t up u n til useful detailing how 1963 — but, again, th e countervailing force of i t s contender, the Army, i s absent. 42 Van der Kroef (1965), fortunately, considers the p a rty 's th eo retical principles and organizational structure within th e context of i t s place in th e polity. 43 This approach permits one to gauge, a t least p a rtia lly (up to mid-1964), th e effects of th e Army, as a contender, upon the EKE. The observer i s also able to determine how the party reacted w ith regard to ta c tic a l co alitio n s, namely with President Sukarno. Both Mortimer (1974) and Tomquist (1986) concentrate on ideology. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 31] === 21 For th e former, th is was''the re a l expression o f the p arty 's especially i t s "ingenuity and fle x ib ility. " 44 survive ' p o litic a lly independent strength, Mortimer argues that to Indonesia, th e PKI had "Indonesianize" its Marxism-Leninism and work within the natural cultural bounds of the p o lity. The party could afford to ignore i t s capabilities: there was to the leaders a "seeming irrelevance of the size o f [their] following to th e problem of gaining power under Indonesian conditions."4 5 Thus, th e in teraction between Sukarno’s brand o f ‘nationalist — which f e ll in to disrepute after the coup attempt in 1965 — and th e PKI’s ideology is, according to Mortimer, the major facto r to which the p arty 's immolation may be attrib u te d. Tomquist argues a t th e level: the HCC is b e s t understood In terms of i t s owes i t collapse. same abstract ideology, to which i t "Unable to mate a correct analysis" i s the sole reason given fo r the FKI's demise. 4 6 The real factors behind th e p a rty 's ris e and f a ll '— organization, leadership, the stru c tu ra l environment, and decelerator — are never mentioned. Those studies international th at communist attempt setting are analyze the inherently PKE within the lim ited th eir explanation of the most important forces impinging upon th e party: those domestic forces represented by Sukarno and th e Array, and the "in tricate riv a lrie s, maneuvers, and realignments" in which they a ll engaged. Simon (1969) considers the PKI only m thin th e larg er context of the process of alliance formation between the two rad ical-n atio n alist regimes Indonesia and th e People's Republic of China in th e mid-1960s.47 The p a rty 's significance as an autonomous actor i s completely underestimated in his study, a s is.the case in Date (1973).48 study of the p arty 's drive to stage an accelerator, While making a fine Date i s unconvincing Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 32] === 22 in his argument th a t th e attempted coup in 1965 was a plot by China — in concert with i t s local minion cultivated since 1955 (the EKI) — and Sukarno to have the party seize power. Again, very l i t t l e is mentioned in terms o f the Army's role in the failed coup. The la s t study under consideration in th is category is by Corsino (1982).49 This author understood possible • essential elements of sovereignty. contends th a t the "state-actor," state: EKI can be 'beneficially v irtu a lly " possessing a government, te rrito ry, the people, and What is o f interest here is not the p o ssib ility of th e PKI engaging in international relations inside o r oi/tside the international communist system, but rather th at, when considered as a domestic actor, one is presented with a pristine image of m ultiple sovereignty. Thus, although the Army has been emitted from the Corsino study, i t is s till possible fully draw upon this unique and in sig h tfu l piece that illum inates the breadth and depth of th e PKE's capabilities. I t i s evident thus far th a t the existing body o f literature suffers from a woeful neglect o f study of the dynamic interaction between th e EKI and TNI, although studies of each actor separately are plentiful and, on th e whole, well executed. There remains one la s t study, by Reeve (1985), th a t attempts to put same perspective on the interaction between th e two contenders. 50 Reeve's approach is novel: he wishes to explain, other how things, th e traditional Indonesian concept among social organization — functional representation — came to be implemented, and why only p artially, in stitu tio n s. from 1959 1962 Indonesian p o litical He provides an indirect window on th a t most important element in Aya's framework: the prewailing terms of the social contract expressed in stitu tio n ally. The r is e (qf functional representation, Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. === [PDF page 33] === 23 'which denies th e relevance of class, was sponsored by th e’ Army 3 s a ta c tic a l means o f neutralizing the class-based ideology and party system o f p o litic a l representation espoused by the PKI. failu re o f the Army a f te r 1962 to sustain This struggle, and the favourable in stitutional expression of the social contract, o ffers a ra re opportunity to examine those elements o f the "p o litic a l conflict" approach th at are not found elsewhere in the lite ra tu r^. This lite ra tu re Indonesian review may affirm the importance o f approaching p o litic a l developments from the perspective of revolution. There are many explanations of the two main actors, yet l i t t l e comprehension oKth e two acting dynamically and d iale ctica lly. be a need to redress th a t understanding. occurred importance, 1965, and what could have a t th e very le a st, enough There may A proper appraisal of what occurred, fundamental i f one i s to understand Indonesia a fte r 1965. Organization of th e Study The delineation of th e contents o f the remaining chapters follows. Chapter situation appears Indonesia. analysis The analysis the developing focuses upon profusion o f p o litic a l p arties in Indonesia u n til 1957. revolutionary the nature and I t examines the , c o s t s of th e failu re of parliamentary democracy to the functioning oi: the Indonesian polity and what effect this had in th e ir strategies. Additionally, a lte rin g the actors, and i t delineates th e success o f the PKI as a product of the period of mass party p o litic s, and i t s changed prospects in th e wake o f a new social contract. In Chapter I I I the focus i s social** contract and how i t on the nature of th e new Army-Sukamo affected both the Army and the PKI in th e ir Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 34] === 24 quest for cap ab ilities (and in th e ir p o litic a l manoeuvring. This chapter concentrates on th e in stitu tio n a l expression o f the new social contract and accents the continued development of th e revolutionary situation. particular concern is the increasingly s ta te lik e nature of both the EKI and the TNI. Chapter JEV examines the changed situ atio n in 1962-1963, when the social contract was once again redrawn, th is tim e in favour of the PKI. Its effect on the international two contenders is disputes and issues, evaluated and prim arily the the salience "Crush Malaysia" campaign, i s analyzed with regard to the quest for ca p a b ilitie s between the actors. The examination of developments takes us to th e tw ilight days of Indonesia in la te 1964. In Chapter V th e centre of attention is the drive by each actor for the opportunity to stage a favourable decisive event in the year 1965. An intensive study social distribution manoeuvres and is made of th e capab ilities available to, of power chances o f, ta c tic a l alliances each actor. emphasized and the The in tric a te the "p o litic al conflict" approach a re also analyzed. In Chapter VI conclusions are drawn on the basis of the Indonesian case. Conclusions situation to are made about the movement from a revolutionary a revolutionary outcome, and how th e theoretical framework eith er helps hinders our understanding th a t transformation. Finally, th e d ifferen t requirements facing revolutionary nonrevolutionary contenders are assessed. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. and === [PDF page 35] === CHAPTER I I A SOCIAL CONTRACT WITHOUT RJRFQSE: LIBERAL DEM OCRACY IN INDONESIA AND THE OCMMUNIST PHOENIX Even Indonesian negotiating the tra n sfe r remained divided. revolutionaries succeeded collectively of sovereignty from th e Dutch ip 1949, they On the important issue of the in stitu tio n a l expression of th e ir newly won freedom, the n atio n alist movement ■was badly s p l it. 1 The adoption th e national social contract — the philosophical imdergirding th at stru ctu red and ordered th e legitim ate participants, s e t the tenor, and specified the lim its of cleaved Indonesian n atio n a lists p o litic a l interaction — had into two d is tin c t groups even from the very outset o f th e ir common struggle in 1945. Adherents of a lib eral democratic contract challenged the adherents of a corporatist contract. The nature o f that- division and the manner in which the schism was resolved affected post-independence p o litic s in an important fashion. The p articu lar s e t o f conditions th a t led C ^ th e predominance of lib e ra l democracy from 1945 to 1949, based on the need to Dutch, ceased to e x is t a f te r 1949. As well the fissiparous character of the suppressed p o litic a l revolution, acto rs, came to p a rtia lly conditions the fo re a fte r the same year. change was toward national disintegration, fight th e armed The direction o f and th e p o litic a l order was 25 Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 36] === prone to attack and abuse by its adherents, from within, and by i t s detractors, from without. From within the contract, disaffected p o litic a l parties defected from the lib eral democratic order in th e wake of th e 1955 national elections; preferred th e f rom, without, those p o litica l forces th a t displaced corporatist norms, and hence were excluded from the outset of the erection of lib eral democracy in 1949, agitated during the lifetim e of the weak lib eral democracy in an effort' to overthrow i t. The la tte r forces consisted mainly of President Sukarno and the Army. Increasingly, beleaguered by challenges to its legitimacy, the weak lib era l democratic order also provided optimal conditions within which the HCC could assert rival claims to power and secure adherents and'resources. With a lack of consensus among Indonesia's top p o litical leaders on important matters of state — the p o litical nature of the sta te, th e economy, and development policies — the task o f contenders to assert themselves became easier during liberal democracy. understandable p o litical framework. spectrum From the Within th is context, why there could emerge from both ends sustained right, existence separate from the challenges th e lib eral of th e democratic the Army struggled to retain a p o litica l liberal democractic politicians, and when dissension arose among the p oliticians, the Army served to reinforce th e cleavages. In destroying lib era l democracy, the Army a llie d its e lf with the President, who had his own reasons for agreeing to cooperate, which related h is personal politicians a fte r 1949. ignominy of i t s movement just loss power From the le ft, attempt in prior th e hands the PKI had to the same overcame the 1948 to seize control of th e independence impending Dutch m ilitary Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. attack on the === [PDF page 37] === Republic. 27 In attanpting to make its e lf respectable, th e EKI helped to polarize domestic p o litic s by allying its e lf with the N ationalist Party o f Indonesia (Partai Nasional Indonesia — PNI) Javanese p o litic a l and economic in te re sts. weaken the leadership. fabric lib e ra l democracy in the This and advancement of strategy served to divided the nation's More importantly, the failure o f others to govern (which the PKI exacerbated but did not create) provided th e Omrnunists with an opportunity to demonstrate th e ir leadership q u alitie s. th e good fortune irrevocably (from th e divided perspective national leadership, the the However, despite PKI) of haying an collapse liberal democracy was to have damaging consequences fo r the party a fte r 1957. The Rise and Consolidation of Tliberal Democracy in Indonesia, 1945-1949 Perhaps more than any other factor, was th e concern for appearances th at led to the r is e of a lib era l democratic form of p o litics in the early days of independent Indonesia. 2 In th e ir common struggle against forces, th e Dutch and th e ir allied B ritish th e nationalists quickly surmised that th e ir greatest strength was n o t to be found in the m aterial sphere. The resources because they Indonesians could n o t rely upon any coercive were.largely nonexistent. 3 Thus they had to emphasize the intensity of the convictions o f the Indonesian people for independence, and convince sympathetic foreign powers of the sincerity of those convictions. Insofar a s i t was necessary to convince powerful foreign sta tes of the Indonesian desire for independence, and have them help to prevail over the Ditch on the p o litic a l and diplomatic fronts at th e international level, a social contract th a t would be acceptable to th ese same powers was adopted. The co rp o ratist social contract and its Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 38] === 28 embodiment, the constitution in place since 17 August 1945, were pushed aside by November 1945.4 In the process, th e "Syahrir group" — the defender of the lib eral democratic order — was not detained by excessive theorizing on the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the in stitu tio n s they envisaged creating for Indonesia. The looming b attle with th e Dutch had ensured th e unimportance of such tasks. As Anderson has argued, Given Syahrir's long standing commitment to 1democratic' processes, [and] th e wish to demonstrate ordered and democratic government to the outside world... i t must have seemed to Syahrir and h is colleagues th a t th e existence of several p arties would be an appropriate response to the p articu lar situation and, in the longer term, a democratic and legitimate expression of the diversity of Indonesia's highly plural society.^ In contrast to th is positive image were the negative connotations associated with the Sukarno leadership and the attendant corporatist contract, not only in th e minds of th e Dutch and th e ir A llies, but also, some degree, revolution bodies was in opposition groups at h am ^ undemocratic, inherited from the its Japanese, p oten tially authoritarian or th a t the that That th e Indonesian in stitu tio n s that its were highest actually unrepentant "fascist"6 leaders were collaborators, 7 and Indonesians could n o t govern themselves were a l l perceptions, same of which were based on fa c t, th a t had to be dispelled from th e minds o f those powers that could make up fo r the material weakness of th e new Republic. Grafting lib era l democratic characteristics on to the texture of the Indonesian revolution was a matter of survival. th a t by bringing Syahrir in to the p o litic a l The Indonesians believed establishment, and by introducing the trappings of a lib eral democratic social contract, the Republic would have b e tte r chances o f success at th e negotiating table Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 39] === 29 with th e Dutch. Later, 'when the Dutch pursued a,n immensely successful strateg y of m ilitary occupation, S yahrir's presence and influence in the uppermost echelons of the Republican leadership afforded much diplomatic and behind-the-scenes support fo r the im perilled Republic. 8 remainder of the struggle with the Dutch, For th e lib e ra l democratic norms and p o litic a l forms — the p o litica l p arties — continued to gain ascendancy over th e co rpo ratist vision and its p o litic a l vehicles, despite constitutional provisions safeguarding the la t t e r. 9 The reasons fo r the ultimate Indonesian success ^ g ain st th e Dutch, Anderson sta te s, "had l i t t l e to do with the Republican state": The prime factor was a highly localized popular resistance, above a l l in Java and Sumatra, expressed through a myriad of extrastate. p o litico -m ilitary organizations, locally recruited, financed and le d ' What linked these myriad resistances together was not th e sta te, but a common vision o f a-free nation. 10 The success of the revolution, "therefore, involved the "freeing up" of of the new nation from November 1945 onward. Sukarno's the p o litic s proposal, on th e day a fte r independence was proclaimed on 17 August 1945, to ere c t a monolithic organization called the FNI-Staatspartij Nasional. Indonesia-Staatsoartii — Indonesian N ationalist CPartai Party-State Party), which would have invariably resulted in a one-party s ta te, would have jeopardized or retarded the revolution by s tiflin g the expression of p o litic a l b e lie fs. 11 The necessity of winning the revolution compelled th e abandonment of a potentially stymieing co rp o ratist social contract. The problem of revising Indonesia1s sty le p o litic s seriously addressed during the la s t clim actic year of i t s save in revolution, supplanting th e defunct 1945 Constitution with a new document th a t coincided with existing conditions. was not promulgated 27 December 1949, Indeed, th e 1949 Constitution, the time the Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. tra n sfer === [PDF page 40] === 30 sovereignty from th e Netherlands to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (PUSI)✓^was'less a positive attempt to create new ideals and in stitu tio n s ^tenan a negative attempt to forms and organizations. supplarffc— disliked corporatist In th is sense, the 1949 Constitution could not but feature lib eral democratic norms and in stitu tio n s. In contrast to the 1945 Constitution, the document drafted in 1949 as th e highest law of th e Indonesian parliamentary "Democracy" democracy, _ individual was to responsible to the be attained nation was an endorsement rig h ts, and the party system. 12 and safeguarded by making ministers (provisional) Parliament (the People's Representative Body, or Dewan Perwakilan Rakvat — DPR) that comprised a te rrito ria lly based senate and a chamber of representatives. The members of both bodies were to be freely meaning th a t party competition would Indonesia. 13 General elections were to be called within one year of th e and popularly elected, th e primary form p o litic a l activ ity date when th e provisional Constitution became operative, and from th is resu lt there would be created a Constituent Assembly fkonstituante^ th a t would be charged with drafting a permanent constitution. Although th e 1949 Constitution lasted less than a year, a victim of the u n ita ris t movement to undo th e Dutch-created fed eralist structure of KUSI, 14 replacement, the 1950 provisional elements the lib era l unitary s ta te. Constitution, democractic contract retained for th e th e its major reconstituted Democratic Contract The defects. new constitutional order suffered from several important The new order had created "losers" who had no place in the new contract; these actors could be considered extra-contract challengers. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. === [PDF page 41] === 31 These were actors a t the themselves in to the such as the Army, margins of power who could not transform "proper" p o litic a l vehicle — a p o litic a l party— or whose personal inclinations disfavoured lib e ra l democracy (President Sukarno). 15 These two actors were not disgruntled with th e success of lib e ra l democracy so much as they were with th e ir own fa ilu re to ere ct a new p o litic a l order. Their p o litic a l fortunes during the course o f the armed struggle with th e Ditch seemed to herald future p o litic a l power. During the revolution Sukarno had enjoyed wide powers within the framework of a contract of h is own making, and the Army had assumed for its e lf th e position of "savior of th e nation." Both actors were relegated to marginal o r subservient roles a fte r 1949. The new Constitution, for example, rudely demoted Sukarno from th e position of foremost nationalist leader with wide powers to figurehead. 16 Furthermore, lib e ra l democratic p o liticia n s unprepared to the appreciate th e Army's sense of p o litic a l a mere were independence. When th e p artie s and the p o litician s acted in unison in relatio n to th e two actors, l i t t l e prevented them from talcing th e ir preferred course o f action. Neither the Amy nor the President possessed su ffic ie n t power alone to change lib e ra l democracy. lib e ra l speeches, democracy during th e especially a fte r Even though Sukarno noisily attacked course 1952,17 h is annual Independence Day and th e Army demanded a larger p o litic a l ro le, 18 lib e ra l democracy was not weakened. The new order also created "victors." styled in h erito rs of the revolution. inner workings of parliamentary democracy, The p artie s became th e s e lfth is however, the couple^/with the temporary nature o f the Constitution, created d iffic u ltie s. related to cabinet formation. capacity, The major d iffic u lty The cabinet was to be selected from the Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 42] === ■32 unrepresentative and unelected delegates the Central Indonesian National Committee ('Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat — KNIP19), which had served as th e temporary parliament during the revolution. The problem was th a t u n til preparations for national elections were complete, cabinet could not dissolve the DPR or change its composition. the Thus, from 1949 until 1956, when national election results were f i r s t used as the basis of cabinet membership, cabinet formation and p o litic a l action a t the highest levels became a matthr of balancing the demands of the original formulators of th e lib eral democratic contract — the parties based in the old KNIP. After 1949 these parties took control of the nation; they were confident that th e ir demonstrated a b ility to defeat a former colonial power could be successfully translated into a capacity to ' govern. Thus began the postindependence experiment in lib eral democracy. The> Rra o f lib eral Democracy and the Rise of Contenders, 1949-1957 The contract fonnulators, coexisting mainly on, the basis of a shared b elief in an unqualified freedom, had very l i t t l e reason to struggle fo r nationwide goals a fte r 1949. Instead, p a rtic u la rist goals that reflected the specific set of interests on which th e party or group was founded came to the fore o f its p o litic a l demands. The Constitution of 1949 provided for p o litic a l interaction, and allowed for a l l but a very few p o litic a l actors. 20 The guidelines of legitimate p o litic a l participation were assumed, but not clearly defined. the contract defined solidarity, operation, theoretical and th e th e terms used by Aya, actors* collective id e n titie s, effo rts. liberal- democractic the aims, its Indonesian lib era l democractic options, manner bases p o litic a l leadership was almost R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. === [PDF page 43] === 33 united. On the matter of lib e ra l democracy in Indonesia, p o litic a l e lite was - substantially united too, "the fundamentals. " 21 This homogeneity of orientation and action prompted Feith to assert th at, the basis of six measures, Indonesia and i t s leaders upheld a lib era l democracy: C ivilians played a dominant role. P arties were of very great importance. The contenders fo r power shewed respect for "rules of the game" which were closely related to the existing constitution [entailing "options," "bases of so lid a rity," and "collective e ffo rts"]. Most members of th e p o litic a l e l ite had some s o rt of commitment to symbols connected with constitutional democracy [entailing "identities" and’ "aims"]. C ivil lib e rtie s were rarely infringed. Finally, governments used coercion sparingly. This represented, a t th e very least, an attempt to maintain and develop constitutional democracy. 22 The political parties appeared to be the dStenders of liberal democracy, able and w illing employ i t s machinery the pursuit of th e ir p o litic a l in te re s ts. Importantly, F eith 's definition of lib e ra l democracy excludes the fundamental p rinciple of representation. put forward by Gah, if a In accordance with th e argument "complete" d efin itio n F eith 's six ch aracteristics plus the principle of democracy includes of representation, then lib e ra l democracy existed 1957, "when the in Indonesia only from March 1956 to April only elected Indonesia held o ffic e."23 cabinet government in the history Unfortunately, Goh does not attempt to explain why i t took, five years and six cabinets to fin a lly election. stage a national Instead he sim plistically asserts th a t "the idea of democracy came naturally to th e Indonesian n a tio n a lists."24 Prior to national elections, there existed in Indonesia no basis of determining which partfes groups ought the seat government, th e cabinet, save the p articu lar group's or p a rty 's a b ility to manipulate i t s way into power o r opportunistically deprive i t s riv als Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 44] === of th e same. Generally, in terms of the p o litic a l "rules," th e p arties did indeed have common id e n titie s (they were p o litic a l p a rtie s), aims (they wanted to be in the cabinet and Parliament), options (they reverted to opportunism, coalition building, and coalition destroying), bases of solidarity (they a ll collective effo rts struggle). $ claimed to represent (they concentrated th e ir contrast th is particular group), effo rts uniformity, and on parliamentary lib eral democracy .onesia had no purpose, no definitive and constructive end towards ich i t steered th e nation. Liberal democracy in Indonesia was merely a /structure; Although th is was an arena without p o litic a l can be said of a l l substance or direction. lib eral democracies, the Indonesian example is extraordinary because its adherents were almost unanimously opposed to elections — the very hallmark of such contracts. Party Behaviour. 1950-1957 Hie patterns of politicking that were to la st u n til 1957 were evident when the task qf governing Indonesia began in 1949: the imminence of national elections served to Pauker te lls recognized us th a t sovereign accentuation foster destructive p o litic a l patterns* "the f ir s t sta te were years of th e young Republic as marked by a of group co n flicts. " 25 Trouble continuation began and even soon as the composition of the f i r s t unitary cabinet, under Natsir, was announced on 6 September 1950. Hie centre of the coalition was N atsir's Masiumi party flMadielis Siuro Muslimin Indonesia — Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims); an alliance with seven other p arties cemented N atsir's grip on power. In building a workable coalition, however, th e second largest party in the country (after Masiumi^, FNI, was conspicuously absent. The manner in which the PNI was not included in the cabinet, and i t s R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 45] === 35 reaction to i t s predicament, set the sty le of cabinet formation — and destruction — th a t was to characterize further endeavours in th is area p rio r to national elections: Hie INI declined to jo in the cabinet because i t was not offered as many seats as i t f e lt e n titled to.... Five members of Parliament.— two non-party members acting in behalf o f the INI and three others from smaller parties-jpresented a motion calling on the President to name three formateurs for a new cabinet, one from the Masjumi, one from the INI, and one from another group. N atsir and h is cabinet refused to accept the self-liquidation im plicit in th is demand and called fo r a vote of confidence. The INI voted with the various Communist groups against the government. In th is i t was joined by, two other groups which had hitherto been counted in the government's c o a litio n... [In addition, one party which had] previously..supported the government, abstained from voting. 26 In th is p articular vote, the government survived, but lib e ra l democracy i ts e lf could not in th e long-run weather th e strategy employed by the INI in th is confrontation. der Kroef has opportunism."^ fiv e The strategy was wholly self-serving and, as van remarked, By 1954, constituted little more than "rank fo r example, th e INI had "twice in th e past y ears...brought down a cabinet, though i t had helped to form and occupied seats in th a t cabinet." 28 What Kahin has dominate Indonesia's called "irrespo nsib ility p o litics" came to experience with parliamentary democracy. 29 There existed, even in "1951, when Kahin was w riting, a ...tendency toward social irresp o n sib ility among the leaders of some p o litic a l p artie s, and th e ir obsession [was] with the struggle fo r personal power fo r its own Irresp on sibility and the stre ss on personal power to considerable extent resu lt from th e fact th a t th e competition for leadership i s generally not exacting enough.... There i s also aft ingrained psychological reason for the dangerous so cial irresp o n sib ility shown by a number of Indonesian p o litic a l leaders, and p articu larly in the behavior of certain p o litic a l p artie s in Parliament. This a rise s in part from th e ir long conditioning to the p o litic s of opposition. They were against colonial ru le, against th e colonial government' s policy in th e Volksraad (parliament), against negotiations with the Dutch. During most of th e ir careers they have been an opposition Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 46] === 36 without responsibility and with l i t t l e or no opportunity to p articipate in th e positive development of policy. 30 Soedjatmdko has asserted th at instead o f developing into organs mediating — between the needs, problems and wishes of the electorate, and the purposes, lim itations and problems a t the level of the national government, th e p arties became mere instruments in the power play of th e ir leader. 31 There is no b ette r illu stra tio n of th is than the INI:' "The opportunistic nature of-the N ationalist P arty's behavior and program," says van Niel, w riting in 1953, "suggests a complete lack of discipline and principle. Many o f its members might be as w illing to cooperate with the Ckmmunists as with the Masjumi. Many others are simply waiting to, see which w ill emerge the stronger in the coming months." 32 Examining the situation a t -a general level, van Niel sadly concluded th a t there was a.... a lack of a common base of understanding o r point of general Leaders seem to have only the vaguest notion of th e ir social and cultural objectives. One leading Indonesian has aptly said th a t his country stands between a shattered myth and an unformulated one. P olitics has not made way fo r sta tec raft. The principles of s ta te th at were advanced during th e revolution, the P antjasila, remain vague signposts of direction, but nothing has been done to bring about a solid understarding of the aims and goals to be pursued. 33 The incomplete Indonesian lib e ra l democratic social contract thus served to fo ster unfounded hopes of attaining power among a multitude of p arties and groups th a t ostensibly adhered to its rules. When an elections act was fin ally passed in April 1953,34 fo r example, i t had the unanticipated effect o f causing yet more p o litic a l divisions. Hatta has succinctly traced out the devastating logic th a t the act had on the p arties: The party chiefs draw up the l i s t of candidates for Parliament. Indonesians vote fo r a party, not for individu als: X votes elec t th e top leader on the l i s t, 2 X votes elect the f ir s t- two, 3X jrotes elec t the f i r s t three and so on. I f the twenty a t the Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 47] === 37 bottom of a p a rty 's l i s t o f candidates fe e l they have no chance of election they form a new party and put themselves a t the top of i t s l i s t. In a big constituency o f many m illions even a [weak] party can manage to elect th e top two or three candidates. The one-chamber parliament elected in 1955 subsequently included fifte e n p arties with five members, or less. This fosters parliamentary irresp o n sib ility. 35 The elections law was drafted so as to subject the p o litic a l p arties to th e principle of representation, and presumably simplify th e p o litica l landscape by reducing th e number of p o litic a l p a rtie s, yet i t lacked the criteria for the formation of^parties. Under these conditions, i t became almost natural for those p o litic a l p artie s election lucky enough to convert power in th e cabinets preceding privilege postelection preelection into the power. Anderson has remarked th a t building nationwide p arties in a nation of roughly 100 m illion people was naturally an expensive proposition. The leaders found th a t a cheap way to develop th e ir organizations was to enroll supporters inside th e s ta te apparatus. Thus, th e c iv il bureaucracy sw elled.... An economically weak s ta te was in no position to pay th is vast body adequately (and so maintain same inner in stitu tio n a l d iscip lin e). The inevitable consequences were spreading corruption'■‘(same personal, same fo r party coffers) and declining efficacy. And insofar as a l l governments of the 1950-1957 period were co alitio ns of p a rtie s, departmental segmentation under patronage p o litic s became even more serious. 36 The ENI, fo r example, employed a government scheme designed to fo ster the development of" an^indigenous class of benteng programme) import and export traders in a self-serving manner. (the According to Glassbumer, "under the m inister of economic a ffa irs, Mr. Iskaq Tjokrohadisurjo, the issuing of licenses became primarily a means of financial support fo r the N ationalist Party. " 37 N ationalist stronghold, The Department o f Information was regarded as a while th e Masiumi and the Ulama Association (Nadhatul Ulama — NU) succeeded in commanding the loyalty of the members of th e Department o f Religious A ffairs. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 48] === 38 Hie conduct th e p o litica l parties was illu s tra tio n Indonesian lib eral democracy's lack of p o litic a l c iv ility. large number of p o litic a l actors had to grapple, The extremely more so than in the 1940s, with each o ther's demands in the new era of peace and independence when positive p o litic a l action, policy formulation, and implementation came to be expected of them by the Indonesian citizenry. made in 1949, however, The promises failed to se t the nation on an orderly schedule and deleteriously served to set party against party, resulting ultimately in. the polarization of failure society. cabinets. and. the The main consequences of th is we government to take action ‘ on important issues, th e collapse of successive cabinets on relativ ely minor matters, and increasingly b itte r purges of the decreasingly autonomous organs of the state as parties moved in and out of the cabinet. these tasks, the lib e ra l democratic ^Lcties Failing to f u lf ill drew the extra-contract forces of the Army and President Sukarno into the p o litic a l arena, while ensuring th e PKI's rise to power from within. Building a State-Within-A-State: The PKI's United National Front The EKI reacted differently from the other p o litic a l p arties to the conditions of lib era l democracy and the challenge of national elections. To the PKI, lib eral democracy in Indonesia became th e ideal environment within which to pursue i t s p o litica l in terests. With the exception of the time period a t the beginning of lib era l democracy (1949-1950), the Communists respected in stitu tio n s. solidarity, contract, and upheld lib eral democratic norms and At one level, the PKI's identity, aims, options, base^ of and collective effo rts were set by the lib era l democratic was true the other p o litic a l p arties. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The party === [PDF page 49] === 39 respected th e "rules of th e game" and upheld the tenets of constitutional democracy, especially from 1951 to 1957? in th is regard th e p o litic a l counterparts. 38 indistinguishable from i t s FKE was By u tiliz in g the existing p o litic a l stru ctu re and, in time, exposing and exacerbating i t s weaknesses, the EKE strove to develop an alternative ideological claim to power and acquire a governmental stru ctu re, te rrito ry, and people. Even from the outset o f lib eral democracy in 1949, the PKI benefited from the new contract more so than other p arties. 1948, when the PKI's attempt to seize control of the independence movement a t Madiun failed, was discredited. 39 Not only had th e EKI struck when the Republic was inperilled by an impending Ditch m ilitary attack, but i t s actions seemed to be part of a wider Moscow-inspired p lo t to cammunize Southeast Asia. In 1948 th ere had been Oommunist uprisings in Burma, the Philippines, and Malaya. perceptions However, regardless of these events, many Indonesians about the PKI's external and the tie s, the "Madiun A ffair" became le ss important in the face of th e renewed Dutch m ilitary th rea t and, la te r, in the conditions of hope and goodwill th a t surrounded th e tran sfer of sovereignty. While th e PKI was destroyed as an organization — i t s top leadership was decimated, i t s away, and i t s representation front organizations nearly gutted — i t in the DPR. In th e conditions cadres scared retained strong of lib e ra l democracy, therefore, the PKI appeared to be "forgiven" and was largely l e f t alone to contend for power. Nevertheless, from 1949 1951 th e EKI remained marginal p o litic a l sect, a lowly sta tu s guaranteed by its treachery in 1948. The damage th a t th e Republican forces had in flic te d upon the party, however, had caused i t to lose many o f its top leaders and "most f i r s t and many Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 50] === 40 second echelon leaders." 40 Hindley adds th a t the inprisoned numbered approximately 30,000 Communists and other le f tis ts. In the following months [a fte r September 1948] what Communist or Omnmmist-syjipathizing officers there had been in the army were carefully weeded out. The Communist-led trade union federation, S.O.B.S.I., lo st i t s president, while its membership fe ll from about 1 1 /2 million a t the time of the rebellion to 220,000 a year la te r. 41 In fact, party membership was about 4,000 in 1948,42 and, according to Hindley, "must have been below 5,000" in 1951.43 The nadir of th e p arty's existence seemed to came in 1956 when i t s effo rts to merge with two other Marxist p arties, the labour Party (Partai Buruh) and the S ocialist Party CPartai S osialis), failed. The PKI ensured i t s lack of p o litica l success throughout th is period standing outright opposition the Hatta [December 1949- September 1950], Natsir [September 1950 - March 1951] and Suleiman [April 1951 - February 1952] cabinets," which i t "had strongly and consistently attacked...as reactionary governments and instruments of ' imperialism, and sonetim ^ as f a s c i s t. F e i t h adds th at the party "aade l i t t l e attenpt to associate its e lf with th e symbols of the n atio n alist revolution."45 Indeed, the PKI during th is period of "oppositionism" "scorned the symbols of Indonesian nationalism, arguing that the United States, not the Netherlands, was Indonesia's chief enemy, and even [issued] : Indonesia1s claim for th e,entry of West The PKI had its e lf to blame for its abysmal performance u n til early 1951. The extant p o litic a l order presented the party opportunities fo r both mobilization and collective action. many of its with wide Furthermore, cadres and sympathizers who had been incarcerated a fte r Madiun were soon set free and participated in the closing stages of the Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 51] === 41 revolution. Thus, despite much la ten t support consequence of Indonesian lib e ra l democracy its e lf — the EKI remained indistinguishable • from th e multitude of other p o litic a l p arties. Hie year 1951 marked a decisive break for the EKI: a new, vibrant, and creative leadership embarked upon the road to the construction of a sta te lik e organization and th e creation o f a revolutionary situation. Tired of the EKI's seemingly self-imposed p o litic a l obscurity, a group of young revolutionaries — the Saiao Lsninis. or Leninist Wing — took over the party Nusantara leadership A idit, the in January party 1951. effected Under the guidance preliminary and Dipa promising reintegration into the mainstream of Indonesian p o litic s by engaging in parliamentary a c tiv itie s. The Cbrarnunists1 renewed in te re st party p o litic s marked the beginning of a profound reassessment of th eir role in Indonesia and in the prospects of building socialism. the most fundamental lev el, the ideology th a t the Aidit leadership created for the party, rig h t up to 1965, was a riv a l claim to power and legitimacy designed to serve a revolutionary contender. At the most basic level, the organization and the ideology meant to serve i t, "represented a challenge, a lb e it for many years an [in d ire c t], circuitous one, to th e ruling government": To EKI leaders they were the sole inheritors of th e correct technique fo r nationbuilding, th a t of Indonesian socialism based on th e tru th s of Marxism-Leninism. As communists,' the EKI leaders viewed themselves as the vanguard of th e working class that was predestined by th e objective force of history to effect the revolutionary transformation of Indonesian society. The clear implication was th a t the FKI leaders regarded themselves as, inexorably, the future governmental rulers of a s o c ia lis t Indonesian s ta te. The Indonesian n a tio n a list revolution (against the Dutch) was deemed but th e f i r s t part o f the envisioned to ta l overhaul of th e socio-economic and p o litic a l order. EKI Chairman Dipa N. A idit, in fact, viewed the- EKI as the 'h e ir" to th e Indonesian revolution. 4 '7 Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 52] === 42 While the party respected the "rules of the game" and the symbgls of th e lib eral democratic contract, from 1951 v to 1957, th is conformity must not confused with revolutionary goals. the p arty 's distinctiveness and u lte rio r As Corsino has asserted Aidit desired an active EKI overtly defined by i t s communist identity. While moored to the sty le o f the peaceful parliamentary road, the EKI would stress not i t s uniformity with, but distinctiveness from, other parties as well as i t s separate base of legitimacy v is-a-v is the government as a whole. Unlike Tan [Tan Ling Djie, the p arty 's major leader from la te 1948 to early 1951], Aidit would more consciously address the question of gaining power in Indonesia by stressing the EKE's rig h tfu l claim to,leadership over the en tire Indonesian n ationalist movement.... Under A idit, the PKI was to remain, a communist revolutionary. movement. And as such, i t inexorably plotted a road toward gaining power, actively envisioning its e lf as a future s ta te ruler, through faith in M arxist-Ieninist dialectics, long before the goal, fo r practical purposes, was attainable. 48 The united national front strategy was based on the realization by th e EKI leadership th at the other p o litic a l parties had no intention of sharing power with i t or permitting i t to control th e ir members, and also th a t its past p o litic a l behaviour concentrating on parliamentary work was an incomplete mechanism to achieve power. 49 Thus, the united national fro n t strategy was to coordinate the EKI's parliamentary a c tiv itie s and dealings with other p o litic a l above"). parties (called the "united front from I t was also to build an organizational foundation for the party among the groups and classes as yet unpoliticized and unrecruited by the other p o litic a l parties found within Indonesian society (called the "united front from below"). The most important assumption of the national united front strategy — that Indonesia was a semicolonial, semifeudal country50 — guided a ll major EKI ac tiv itie s throughout the period Indonesia had internal and external enemies, respectively. covered by th is study. feudalism and imperialism Party analyses proclaimed th e importance o f destroying Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 53] === 43 im perialism f i r s t, for i t was th e sponsor of feudal Indonesian elements. A idit argued, I f viewed from the ta c tic a l angle o f the p artic u la r conditions of the present moment, th e head of the revolutionary spear should in the f i r s t place be pointed a t the foreign enemy (imperialism) and those feu dalists and bourgeois who have became the agents of th is foreign enemy we must concentrate a ll our e ffo rts fo r a blow against imperialism in order thus to be able to s e ttle th e f ir s t contradiction, the contradiction between the Indonesian nation and imperialism. 51 From th is analysis i t neatly followed as to which classes in society constituted the motive forces o f the revolution, f e n e m ie s. 5 2 A idit p ro le taria t and "the basic However, as was clearly period from 1948 to other force party and which were th e ir theoreticians pushing recognized the.} revolution the forward. " 53 demonstrated by the disastrous events of the 1950, the p ro le ta ria t had to haye a llie s struggle against imperialism and feudalism. victim ization by these two enemies, th e in the Therefore, because of i t s peasantry "can be, for the working class, not only th e most numerous a lly but also the most loyal and most tru sted a l l y. " 5 ** revolution was th e Also liste d among th e driving forces of the p etty bourgeoisie the urban poor, the in tellec tu a ls, the small trad ers, the handicraft workers, the fishermen, and th e independent workers. 55 The bourgeoisie n atio n alists. was seen s p l it between The compradors could become a llie s compradors the and revolution because they were subject to several im perialist masters; the PKE counted the pro-American Masiumi and the pro-B ritish S o cialist Party o f Irdonesia fPartai S osialis Indonesia the — PSI), struggle which was against led by Syahrir, ^imperialism, these compradors. parties constituted ta rg e ts. inclined to struggle against imperialism and feudalism but lacked th e The nationalist bourgeoisie was more naturally Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 54] === 44 courage to do so, according to th e EKE. Lastly, the landlord, class was perceived to be "a ta rg e t o f the revolution, " 56 but only in the longer-term struggle against feudalism its e lf. On the basis of these classifications predicted th at fo r the revolution to succeed, th e EKI leadership "the working class, the peasants, the p etty bourgeoisie and th e national bourgeoisie must unite in one national fro n t."5 7 Building such a fro n t was undertaken.a t two levels: among the p o litic a l p arties and other extant p o litic a l forces, and among th e "masses." The "United Front from Abovd' Ostensibly, th e purpose of the EKE's "united fro n t from above" was forge an alliance between the "progressive" groups (the urban p ro le ta ria t and peasantry) and th e "middle" groups (the petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie) in the p o litic a l arena defeat the reactionary "pig-heads" ("the feudal and comprador class working hand in hand with foreign imperialism"). 58 On th e basis th is simple characterization o f the extant p o litic a l forces, and despite the seeming ideological vehemence of its terminology, th e party proceeded a fte r November 1951 to effect several important policy changes. These greatly moderated, while masking, the PKE's revolutionary intentions. There were three primary policy s h ifts. F irst, the EKE agreed to support the Wilopo Cabinet (April 1952 to June 1953) despite the refusal of i t s Masiumi members,to permit the entry o f Ctommunists o r Cammunistsupported persons. Second, th e p arty 's categorization o f p o litica l forces necessitated an alliance with the "middle" group, which had as its representatives th e PNI, NU, the Islamic Education Party (P e rti), and the Islamic Association Party (PSII). The EKE went t o such Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. lengths === [PDF page 55] === 45 cementing an alliance with these groups t h a t th e ir front was "o f \ which involved no insistence on Qamnunist hegemony. " 59 type I t was hoped th a t together these p arties would stand against Masiumi and the ESI. PSX. The firmly in the category of th e ’’middle" group, thus compelling th e party gain his support, too. Thirdly, the EKI "infused a new type o f national ism in to its propaganda, namely th e nationalism o f the existing regime. " 60 attain an aura respectability vis-a-vis th e other major p o litic a l forces, the PKE undertook to mute its revolutionary demands; th is, turn, led to NU, and Sukarno. spectacular gains in its relations with th e INI, In making demands o f a cabinet o r government, o r over th e m atter of i t s composition, the party tr ie d hard to be reasonable. 61 Feith h as remarked th a t the unprecedented extension o f EKI support "involved not merely public proclamations but also th e imposition o f some degree o f re stra in t on i t s supporting labor organizations."6^ p a rty 's lessening disruption, seemed rhetoric ahd that'’ the th reats EKI's reentry labour into Given the and economic th e p o litic a l mainstream was irre s is tib le even for the o th er p o litica l p a rtie s. The outcome o f this policy reorientation could be sedn as early as late 1952: The measure o f the P.K.I.'s success in establishing i t s nationalist respectability could be seen from th e fa c t that on August 17 [1952], th e seventh anniversary of the proclamation o f the Republic, the P.K.I. had positions of g reat influence in celebration committees throughout the archipelago. J u s t twelve months e a rlie r the P.K.I. leaders had been arrested on th e grounds that th a t they were planning to overthrow the s t a t e!63 other area of p o litic a l life lib e ra l democracy was (bmmmmist success with i t s "united front from above" more evident than in ReprocJucecJ w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n e r. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n. === [PDF page 56] === 46 i t s alliance with the INI. Owing to several socio-ec5namic and cultural factors th a t exceed the bounds of discussion of th is study, the FNI was same degree a natural ally of the PKT, 64 Moreover, from a p o litical perspective, the ENI-PKX alliance was a product of th e Indonesian lib eral democratic contract. I t had became evident to FNI leaders early in the l i f e of th e contract th a t the ™1T’s position as the preeminent p o litical p arty was seriously threatened by the electo ral success of Masiumi in the 1951 regional elections Jogjakarta, th e heartland Javanese civ iliza tio n — Central Java — whence the N ationalists drew almost all support. 65 their The p o ssib ility therefore, a daunting prospect fo r the INI. national electiofis was, To prevent what was expected to be a disastrous election, th e INI delayed holding the exercise when i t was in a position of power in cabinet. In the meantime, i t actively searched fo r a llie s and, naturally, th e support that the Communists (and th e Java-based NU, which broke away from Masiumi in 1952*) offered was duly accepted. The consolidation of the FNI-FKE alliance was effected after* the elections act was passed •in April 1953, and •was largely a by-product of the Masiumi-FNI leg islatio n rivalry. passed, the Indeed, almost p o litical parties immediately after ' the began th e ir quest fo r the ’^/inning" platform, which led to a dangerous p o litic a l polarization. Hie Masiumi advocated an Islamic sta te, while th e INI propounded erstwhile revolutionary ways that mutually antagonistic focussed on nationalism. and made d if fic u lt These demands were contain preelection p o litical irresponsibility and, la te r, respect the decision. Blis L s especially th e case since many of the nation's extrap o litical cleavages came to be reinforced by the appeals o f Javanese- R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. electorate's === [PDF page 57] === 47 centred "nationalism" and "continuing revolution" on th e one side, and, on th e other, by th e need for an Islamic sta te advocated most strid en tly by orthodox Muslims in Sumatra, Kalimantan (Borneo), Aceh, and West Java. In th e ir effo rts to sway the voters, were reasonable. neither the INI nor Masiumi For example, accusations by a radical FNI leader th a t Masiumx^was a ssistin g the effo rts of an armed band, Darul Islam, which was terro rizin g West Java, prompted a Masiumi leader to respond equally tactlessly, "In Indonesia a t the present time there is a cold war between Islam on the one hand and on the other those who c a ll themselves Islamic and a r e n 't."6 6 In September*'1953 th e FNI chairman stated th at h is party desired to cooperate with "the extreme le f t and th e extreme rig h t. 1167 October 1954 th e INI-led cabinet of Sastroamidjojo lo st a smaller p arty 's crucial support and had to rely entirely on the FKI to stay in power. The INI repaid the favour when i t s chainpan issued the order to a ll o f i t s branches to "establish close relations with th e P.K.I.," stating, "I am confident you w ill carry out th is task fa ith fu lly."68 When the September 1955 parliamentary election returns were announced in March 1956, the success of the Oammunists' alliance with the FNI and NU, was immediately and unmistakably obvious. 68 The FKI not only ' polled th e fourth larg est number of votes nationwide, a fte r FNI, Masiumi. and NCJ, but i t also secured a te r rito ria l base in Central and East Java upon which i t could count fo r solid support, resources, and adherents. The FKI obtained 8 8.6 per cent of i t s vote from Java, th e papulation of 70 which represented 6 6.2 per cent of th e country's to ta l. 111 Java' t *ie EKI obtained 74.9 per cent of its vote from Central and East Java, where 45.6 per cent o f the Indonesian population liv ed. 7 1 in East Java and Central Java, after th e INI. 7 2 The EKI was second In the seven residencies in East Java, th e FKI came f i r s t in two (Kediri and Madiun), second in Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. === [PDF page 58] === 48 one (Bodjonegoro) and third in two (Besuki and Surabaja), 73 In the seven .residencies in Central Java, the EKI placed f i r s t in three (Surakarta, Jogjakarta, and Semarang) and th ird in the re st (Pati, Kedu, Pekalongan, and Banjumas). 74 However, the PKE's success in West Java was abysmal: in Greater Jakarta, th e EKE was a poor fourth. That the EKE had made such an unprecedented showing in Central and East Java nonetheless affirmed its ro le as a major actor in Indonesian p o litic s. The parliamentary returns were not mere happenstance: seemed to enjoy sim ilar support in the returns (held in December 1955). 75 th e party Constituent Assejnbly election General voter trends indicated a r is e in INI support and EKI support in Java. Meanwhile, the Masiumi continued to fare poorly in Java, thus making i t more a representative of th e outer islands, primarily Sumatra. 76 "The very electoral successes the communists had achieved in 1955," Lev asserts, "contained the seeds of destruction for the united national front policy. 1,77 The EKE drew most of its support from the same areas as did th e ENI and NU — Central and East Java. Thus, despite EKE claims th at i t had achieved its success a t the expense of Masiumi. INI leaders p articu lar, Nevertheless, reassessed th eir relationship with the Communists. by 1956 the EKI's p o litic a l fortunes seemed irreversible: very l i t t l e could be done by ENI or NU to a lte r th e situation. By 1956, the EKE stood triumphant over the parties with which i t had previously allied: I t was without competition as a well organized, unified, active, and sp irited p o litic a l party. The ENI, NU, and Masjumi,...were under attackNlor th e ir in ab ility to govern, fo r the deterioration of th eir party organizations, for th e ir corruption; th e ir demoralization was progressive. 78 The FKE did not rest in such opportune conditions, but chose to Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. === [PDF page 59] === 49 in ten sify its appeal to th e Indonesian people. Programmatic revisions designed to widen th e p arty 's appeal to a l l elements in society were issued. For example, in July 1956 A idit stated on behalf of the EKI, "We also agree to cooperate with the an ti-im p erialist landlords, but a t the same time we fig h t to reduce rents fo r rice lands, and to ensure th a t the landlords do n o t exploit the peasants too much. 1179 Again, i t th e was in most the context of elections th a t th e EKI's policy yielded success. Regional electio n s councils in th e provinces and second-level for d is tr ic ts representative (kabupaten) were staged from June to December 1957 in Java and South Sumatra. 80 elections constituted a "great leap forward" for the'EKE. 8 1 election, for th e d is tr ic t The 1957 In th e f ir s t o f Greater Jakarta, th e FKI rose from its fourth place showing in 1955 to second place, supplanting the INI. The next election, held in Central Java, witnessed a ro u t of th e ENI and all other p arties a t the hands o f EK±. second-level d is tric ts In th ir ty out of th e thirty-four fkabupatens] o f central Java, Lev sta te s, th e FKI increased its vote proportionally more than any other major party. 82 East Java the pattern o f increased EKE support a t th e expense of th e ENI was repeated. Although NU remained the roost popular party, th e displaced ENI from second place, which was much place fin ish in 1955.83 third In West Java th e EKI also enjoyed soma success, displacing the ENI from second place. second-level d is tric ts, b e tte r than i t s EKI In nearly a l l of the twenty-three Communist strength increased.8^ Although this pattern was repeated in the South Sumatran elections, the main impact of th e 1957 election was th a t the EKI emerged as Indonesia's largest party, a t le ast in those parts of the country that staged electio ns. succinctly concluded, Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Lav has === [PDF page 60] === the ENI had slipped in le s s than two years from f i r s t place to third in the five d is tr ic ts considered. Masjumi and th e NU had declined, but retained th e ir relativ e positions in the provinces. Die ominous thing fo r these la st two p arties was less the fa c t ■they had declined slig h tly than th at th e EKI had made such a startlin g advance. What was most disturbing was th at th e EKE was the only party to have increased i t s support since 1955. I t was a growing party, while the others were apparently shrinking; and all th e evidence pointed to the likelihood of th e EKE continuing to grow and th e others continuing to shrink. 85 With regard th e other extant p o litica l cultivation of President Sukarno began in 1952. forces, the p arty 's However, th is "important and striking change in th e p arty 's a ttitu d e.. -has never been admitted explained." 86 Again, a s was true o f its re la tio n s with the ENI, success o f the PKE's effo rts to ally its e lf with th e President was, in p a rt, a consequence of Sukarno's own needs. dislike the spokesmen. lib e ra l Sukarno had personal reasons democratic sty le of p o litic s and its leading Not only had they deprived him o f the preponderant position of leadership embodied in the 1945 Constitution, b ut these same lib eral p o liticia n s were insulting h is own concern fo r Indonesia. by f u lfillin g the premises of the revolution and independence. not By 1952 he was no longer expressing hope th a t each successive cabinet would s e t the nation on course; programmes and composition. attacked "those completed— who more."87 rath er he began to who don't act On 10 mention voice his opposition to th eir November 1952, for example, the national revolution were the words 'national revolution' any On the matter of West Irian, the only p a rt of th e Netherlands Indies th a t had not been transferred to the Republic by the Dutch in 1949, he urged a renewed aanmitment to its attainm ent. When the Wilopo cabinet curtailed the P resident's powers, and resources during its term in power, the incident could not but reinforce the P resid en t's desire to ag itate against th e lib e ra l democratic contract. 88 Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 61] === While President Sukarno was moving independently into a collision with lib era l democracy by 1952, th e PKE increasingly drew h is support on the rJtetual concern of Indonesian nationalists — West Irian and sundry p o litic a l and economic remnants of Ditch "imperialism" embodied in the Netherlands-Indonesian Union and the Round Table Conference agreements, 89 both documents being p art of th e tran sfer of sovereignty agreement of 1949. Sukarno had, as early as 17 August 1950, declared that West Iria n i s not a tr if lin g question, th is a i s major issue T h is'is a national task fo r us which cannot be evaded: Because we have pledged th a t we w ill fight t i l l the end of time a s long as one p a rt of our country — however small th at p a rt may be — is not jy e t fre e d.... e w ill continue fighting, we w ill keep on fighting whatever may coma u n til West Irian has been returned to our fold. 90 return o f West Irian eluded Indonesia in 1950, and throughout the period of lib e ra l democracy. After fu tile attempts to negotiate with the Dutch, and repeated fa ilu re s at th e United Nations to force th e Dutch to accede to Indonesian demands, Sukarno became more strid e n t in reasserting Indonesian control o f the disputed te rrito ry. the EKE, a profoundly useful p o litic a l From th e perspective of environment had been created within which i t could ag ita te and secure adherents. The PKE's "lusty use of nationalism 1191 conveyed more than th e message th at th e party was th e foremost n atio n alist group. support for th e Republic, the West Irian cause, The PKE's ardent and "of almost every proposal put forward by President Sukarno," served an u lte rio r motive: The P.K.I....endeavoured to remove suspicion as to its n a tio n a list integrity, and by u ltra-n atio n alist ag itatio n to en ter the mainstream o f Indonesian nationalism and to become id en tified as the staunchest defender, along w ith Sukarno, o f the Indonesian Republic. 92 In April 1956 th e unilateral, abrogation by Indonesia of th e Netherlandsc Indonesia Union, and th e ETC agreements, thus le n t the impression th a t Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 62] === 52 the Communists had fa c ilita te d what were in essence the actions of other actors to defend Indonesian interests. Thus, the EKI's "united front from above" had provided i t with an unrivalled power position within the framework o f the lib eral democratic contract. Liberal democracy had permitted identifiable te rrito ria l base, th e which may have EKE to allowed secure to govern Indonesia in any future elections. Ironically, i t had also opened up the p ossib ilities weaken for the party the performance lib eral democracy as ’a form of government for Indonesia and, hence, make the transition to a "People's Democracy" easier. The EKI's adept cultivation of positions of extremism among established p o litic a l parties not only furthered i t s fortunes as a party, but permitted i t to enhance the growth of i t s supporting apparatus located in the "united front from below." Hie "United Front from Below" The "united front from below" was designed to permeate the whole of Indonesian society and to united “ p r ise create base of from amongst party the support. divisions in the 'This front was to th e workers' front, th e peasants' front, the cu ltu ral front, the youth fron t, the students' front, the women's fron t, the poor urban people's front, the ex-armed fig h ters' front, the peace front, the Irian struggle front, the p a rtie s' united front, and th e national in d u stria lists' front. 93 The consequence of welding significant segments o f society was that "the FKI leaders s e t the party the task of uniting th e masses through the Party's own mass organizations roroanisasi massa — ormasl. 1,94 Primary emphasis, therefore, had to be placed on enlarging the party f ir s t, such that the p arty 's own front organs could pursue a p arallel programme of expansion. By building th e party, the leaders purposely Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. chose to === [PDF page 63] === 53 accamolats fo r themselves and th e ir organization the s ta te lik e qualities government adherents. and, conjunction with its n ational united front, A fter 1951 the party was to take advantage of th e p o lity 's tolerance for i t s mobilization and collective action programmes. the success achieved By 1957 in acquiring government, peqple and, a t election time, te rrito ry, was to se t the basis upon which th e p arty would attempt to a sse rt its sovereignty. The EKI apparatus has been called "a quasi-government with branch agencies."95 Van der Kroef has argued th a t, with A idit in control, th e party undertook to forge an organizational weapon — something which A idit was fond of expressing by means of h is slogan "Membolsewikkan EKI" ("Bolshevize the EKI!"): establishment of b e tte r cadre control, more thorough and continuous ideological tra in in g, development: and routinizationv o f effective in tern al adm inistrative procedures, inposition o f a sense of individual subordination'and party discipline, a constant reevaluation of ta c tic s, and the creation of new fron ts and organizational conduits as they became necessary. 9 6 The penchant fo r building an organizational weapon occurred both at the national level undertook the and th e task regional level. In Ju ly reestablishing party 1950, when Aidit organization, branches were to be found only in Java and Sumatra. its active By October 1950 other branches were reactivated in Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi, Kalimantan, and Timor. Several months la te r, in May 1951, A id it declared th a t party organizations were also being erected in Nusatenggara. 9 7 year la te r, partybuilding. th e EKE could claim Madura and Maluku le ss than a s ite s The p a rty 's geographical growth“Was consciously planned in accordance w ith the two membership drives th a t i t launched in March 1952 and March 1954. At th e beginning o f 1952, Hirdley sta te s, th ere were 7,910 fu ll and Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 64] === candidate members of the ‘PKE. 98 The p arty 's plan in March 1952 was to ambitiously expand i t s membership to 100,000 within a six-month ppriod and hence create a "mass p a rty." " 100,000 members. 100 As early At th e end of 1952, 126,671; b7 March 1954, 165,206.101 May 1952, the EKI claimed the number of members was Aidit optim istically stated in May 1954 th a t 'jit w ill n o t be simply luck if EKI a t th e end o f th is year Farty w ittJa million members and candidate members." 102 Ey October 1954 therp w ere'half a m illion members and candidate members, and by February 1956 one mil l ion members phenomenal success. were claimed. 103 The PKE had met with I t s huge organization constituted th e citizenry of a riv al government. The organizational structure functional equivalents [of] the PKE shared "same basic the structure of a national government." 1-04 Corsino states that "in the workings of th e party apparatus certain key functions... [were] performed: law-making, law-enforcing, and lawadjudicating functions": The national congress served as a combination o f a constitutional convention and highest le g isla tu re.... The central committee was a kind of parliament with a b u ilt-in executive: the politbureau. The various departments as well as the secretariat o f the central committee, being d irectly controlled by the politbureau, performed the functions associated with the executive departments of regular governments. The control commission performed sore - judicial functions for the EKI's constituency.... The central committee, of course, "passed laws" while th e politbureau [was]...th e highest [administrator] directing the execution of such "laws."105^ These functions came to be implemented on a local level as well, in consonanc^. with the needs. the top P arty 's increasing membership and organizational The Party advanced a fiv e-tie r organizational scheme. foyr conferences. tie rs had its separate organizations, Each of committees, and The lowest level of organization was called a group and Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 65] === 55 usually consisted of approximately ten people who liv ed or worked closely together. The organizational scheme i s illu stra te d in Table 1. In July 1956 the party had a branch in about 34 per cent of the 21,047 villages Java, and a ketiamatans. 106 subsection in almost seventy per gent o f the 1,449 The EKI struck deep roots wherever i t could. TABLE 1 PARTI ORGANIZATIONAL SCHEME Level of organization Organization structure Provinces (including Jakarta and Jogjakarta) Major D istrict Party organizations, conferences and committees, or Island(s) organizations, conferences, and committees Districts/Autonomous regions Party Section organizations, conferences, and committees Subdistricts Party Subsection organizations, conferences, and committees Factories, mines, v illages, offices, businesses, schools, and other institutions Mhjor Party Branch organizations, conferences, and committees Groups I ts SOURCE: Justus M. van der Kroef, The Communist Party o f Indonesia. History. Program and Tactics (Vancouver: University of B ritish Columbia, 1965), p p. 166-171. To give the established its organization own school and i t s system, adherents coherence, coordinated through the party th e Central Committee's Department of Culture (Departemen Kebudayaanf, and published various Marxist-Deninist illu s tra tio n s tr a c ts. of co lle ctiv e action. Both these a c tiv itie s are The school system was in stitu ted both a t the national and regional levels. The pinnacle of th e p arty 's Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 66] === 56 educational enterprise was "people's university," /established Jakarta, which also had branches in provincial capitals. Party central schools (Sekolah Partai Central), schools under major d is tr ic t committees (Sekolah Partai CBD), schools P o litic ), _-and "out-of-school" under subsection committees fSekolah courses for groups CKursus Rakvat) were and a l l Indonesians also established. Party members, students, alike could obtain Communist publications in ever-increasing numbers and variety. Kroef remarked in 1965, while the PKE - s till Van der existed, th a t "no single p o litic a l party in Indonesia i s so intensively concerned w ith publishing i t s views as is the PKE." 107 Red Star The p arly 's notable publications included (Bintam Merah)? PKE Bulletin (FKE-Buietin), which in January 1955 was renamed Party Life (Kehiduoan Partai); the weekly New Era fZaman Baru), based in Surabaya? translations of th e Ctominform journal For a Lasting Peace. For a People's Democracy!; several low quality Central Committee and major branch committee publications? and the appearance in mid-1954 of the English-language journal Monthly Review, Review of Indonesia in January 1957. renamed the While th e party had enjoyed success in the exercise of disseminating printed material, nowhere was th is more" evident than in the growing influence of the party newspaper, People's Daily (Harian Rakvat), published in Jakarta. The party daily was f ir s t issued on 1 July 1951 with 2,000 copies. The d a ily 's circulation grew over the years. phenomenon. Table 2 illu s tra te s this In February 1957 Harian Rakvat had attained a circu lation of 60,000 compared with a to tal Indonesian of 747,250.^08 circulation 75 daily newspapers in In relatio n to th e size of i t s Harian Rakvat was unrivaled\by( other p a rtie s' papers. readership, In January 1956, Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 67] === 57 when circulation fo r Harlan Rakvat was 55,0C0, the comparable figures for other newspapers were: "48,000 for th e s o c ia lis t newspaper Pedaman. 40,000 fo r ENI's Suluh Indonesia. 38,000 for th e independent but pro-ENI Merdeka. and 34.000 for Masiumi1s Abadi. 1,109 TABIE 2 HARIAN RAKYAT dROJIATION Date October 1953 February ”1954 January 1955 January 1956 March 1956 February 1957 circulation 12,500 15,000 23,000 55,000 58,000 60,000 SOURCE: Donald Hindley, Ihe Communist Party of Indonesia. 1951-1963 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 77, and 82. The PKE also undertook to educate, prim arily, i t s own cadres in the classics of Marxismrfeninism. Under th e d irect influence of Aidit, March 1951 the Central Committee arranged to begin th e translatio n Communist c la ssic s, chiefly those of Lenin and Mao Tse-tung. Intensive translation programmes were launched in both 1952 and 1953, and the PKE publishing company, Jaiasan "Pembaruan"? was established to disseminate the m aterial. Thus, these features of collective action, coupled with /the p a rty 's huge and deeply-rooted organizational stru ctu re, amounted to ... a complex apparatus having-;a h ierarchical structure and performing functions akin to thosh of a sovereign government. I t operated its various agencies from th e national to the village levels, and sought to consolidate (and indoctrinate) i t s vast constituency as a government would. The PKE in th is sense was no ordinary p o litic a l party. Even i f i t was leg al and operated with th e consent of the government, i t was a v irtu a l government by its e lf. 110 Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 68] === 58 From 1951 to 1957, in its effo rts to ~ united national fron t strategy, the secure adherents through i t s FKI was extremely successful. Although the largest p o litic a l parties such as FNI, Masiumi. and, la te r, NU also possessed a wide n et of allied attempted to create Notwithstanding the social groups, the FKI alone fronts that went beyond mere a llie s of th e party. fronts' habitual assertions that they were "non partisan" and "nonK^ommunist, 11 th e ir organizational stru c tu re...is closely modeled afte r the FKI's and; the la tte r 's principle of organizational "democratic centralism "...the top leadership of th e fronts consists of FKI members o r known fellow -travellers, and...known cadres are in command in* the c ritic a l lower echelon p ositions. 111 The FKI was th e only p o litic a l party, therefore, th a t had its own members leading fronts or groups with which i t was a llie d. No other party employed a strategy th a t would in s till in its a llie s as much commitment and loyalty to i t as did th e FKI. Ihe p arty 's ormas included a l l major social groups,and especially those classes that th e united front strategy considered to be the most revolutionary. The PKE's "united front from below" was a p o litic a l constellation th at included workers, peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, youth, students, and women. is inappropriate here to discuss in d eta il each of th e fronts erected by the PKE/for these groups; nonetheless, th e ir growth, a s an cillaries to the FKI "state-w ithin-a-state,".confirms the th eo retical supposition th a t the party secured large numbers of adherents. Hie labour front, 112 the All Indonesian Central Labour Organization (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia — SOBSI), was not only large but also strategically placed in th e (see economic structure: SOBSI's a ffilia te s were present "in a ll major phases of the country's production and services processes [which made i t ] b etter balanced, and Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 69] === potentially none dangerous, than other non-Communist or anti-COnmunist labor federations. 1,113 TABLE 3 SOBSI MEMBERSHIP Date Claimed membership 1949 1952 January 1955 1,561,750® 2,661,970 2 2 0, 000? Donald Hirdley, ''Communist Party Strategy in Indonesia 19481959, VIhe Australian Outlook 13 (December 1959):254. Justus M. van der Kroef, Ihe Communist Party of Indonesia. I ts History. Program, and Tactics (Vancouver: University o f the B ritish Columbia, 1965), p. 203. c." Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia University of California Press, 1964),- p. 135. Ihe fBarisan Communist peasant organization, th e Tard enjoyed Indonesia membership (see Table 4 ). had branches — BTI), also (Berkeley: Indonesian Peasant Front large increases In terms o f the BIT'S penetration of society, _n 84 per cent of th e 162 kabuoatens in Indonesia, and subbranches in IS per cent of the 43,249 v illages in 1955.114 In late 1957 i t had subbranches in 32 per cent of a ll v illages. 1-L5 TABLE 4 BTI MEMBERSHIP Date Early 1953 September 1953 March 1954 April 1955 End o f 1955 September 1957 Claimed membership 240.000 360.000 800.000 2,627,500 3,315,820 3,390,286 SOURCE: Donald Hindley, Ihe Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-1963 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 165-166.. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. === [PDF page 70] === 60 Hie youth front, People's Youth (Pemuda Rakvat), was alone among EKE fronts in th a t i t was openly a branch o f the PKE, as stated organizations' constitutions. 116 Thus, the immensity youthfollowing (see Table 5) was very important to the PKI. in both th e Other, more specialized youth groups, such as th e league of Indonesian High School Youth (Ikatan Pemuda Peladiar Indonesia — IPPI), and th e Concentration of Indonesian University Student Movements (Consentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia OGMI), fared poorly numerical experience b efell the league of People's terms. Culture A sim ilar fLembaoa Kebudavaan Rakvat — Lekra) that, as a petty bourgeois front of about 6,000 persons, nevertheless brought "a wide range of cultural workers,...into contact with PKI and in to work of benefit [to] the Party." 117 tabu: 5 PEM UDA PAKYAT MEMBERSHIP Date Claimed membership November 1950 November 1952 June 1953 July 1954 June 1955 End of 1955 End of 1957 30,000 46,598 70,319 202,605 450,000 616,605 800,000 SOURCE: Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-1963 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 188-191. Rounding out the PKE's "united front from below" was the women's front, the Indonesian Women's Association Gerwani]. tandem with other EKI fron t organizations, Gerwani's membership grew relentlessly from 1950 to 1957 (see Table 6 ). Gerwani's roots struck deeply in Java, where in June 1956 i t had branches in a ll Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 71] === 61 kabuoatens and ketiamatans. large and towns, organizations Aapproximately 5,000 40 per subbranches cent the all urban neighborhood and v illage level. 118 TftBIE 6 GERW aNT MEMBERSHIP Date Claimed membership 195CN — December 1951 June 1953 March 1954 September 1955 December 1955 June 1956 December 1957 500 6,000 40,000 80,000 400,000 '500,000 565,147 671,342 SOURCE: Donald Hindley, Ihe Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-1963 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 203-204. A striking aspect of the growth in membership in the PKE and its fronts was i t s rapidity. only bolster the p arty 's While the larg er numbers o f adherents'could chances of winning elections, th ere was the danger that i t s newly won converts were only su p erficially carnmited to the p arty 's ideals. Thus, a t one level, th e PKI state-w ithin-a-state was quite However, formidable. the real strength, of the party could not possibly measure up to i t s apparent strength: socialized and institutionalized i t was impossible tu have such large numbers so quickly. Ihe "united front from below" suffered from th e perverse effects o f being too successful? the large influx of members necessitated la te r party drives to increase th e ideological quality of i t s and i t s fro n ts' members. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. === [PDF page 72] === 62 The Thwarted dances of Communist Power: The Collapse nf T.ibpral Democracy 1956-X957 The lib eral democratic contract quickly unravelled a fte r the 1955 election returns were translated into the composition of a new cabinet. The election returns clearly indicated the dangerous polarization th at had occurred between the Java-based nationalists and the island Muslims during the election campaign. (mainly) outer The resu lts also reaffirmed the necessity of coalition building among the p arties. The FNI polled 8,434,653 votes; Masiumi. 7,903,886 votes; NU, 6,955,141 votes; and the PKI, 6,176,914 votes. seats; Masiumi'; In the 257-member DPR, the FNI was apportioned 57 and th e FKI, 39. As long as Parliament, remained the channel through which co nflict was managed, and the lib eral democratic p o litic a l norms were respected, post-election p o litic s were a contest among these four p a r t i e s. U n f o r t u n a t e l y fo r the p arties, pressures on lib e ra l democracy cam to be exerted not only from amongst themselves, but also by President Sukarno and the Army. Pressure on Liberal Democracy from the Parties More so than the other p arties, Masiumi had in its own estimation fared th e le a st best a t the polls. reversal in p o litic a l fortunes. Indeed, i t had suffered a sharp An eminent party leader and former Prime M inister, Burhanuddin Harahap, expected Masiumi to win 40-50 per cent of th e parliamentary s e a ts. 120 /Not only had Masiumi not performed as expected, but i t s archrival^/ the FNI, had taken over f i r s t place while 0 th e NU had near-evenly s p lit the Muslim vote with i t. problems, Masiumi *s erstwhile ally PSI, resoundingly was vanished. defeated; To add to i t s in the provisional Parliament, valuable source support the had Only reluctantly, therefore, and with assurances th a t the PKI Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 73] === 63 would not bs permitted cabinet representation, did Masiumi agree to enter th e cabinet in co alitio n with the ENI and NU in March 1956 under the premiership of th e ENI leader, A li Sastroamidjojo. Matters became worse fo r Masiumi once wab, in Illu s tra tiv e of th is was that "Ali Sastroamidjojo the cabinet. [acquired] for FNI a dominant position in th e coalition cabinet despite th e fact th at Masjumi had an equal number of seats in Parliament. 1,121 control the Speakership Constituent Assembly, Parliament, and many jobs In time th e FNI came to the irk th e Chairmanship c iv il service, the including diplomatic postings: "Whether'in the m inistries a t home or th e diplomatic missions abroad whenever he — A li could." 122 Sastroand^TO^^ot Results from the rid Masjumi supporters December 1955 Constituent Assembly elections, when 520 seats were contested, showed th a t th e ENI had secured 117; Masiumi. 112; NU, 91; and th e FKI, 80.123 ' I t became c le a r th at Masiumi l i t t l e chance o f implementing Islam as the (basis of th e Indonesian sta te in the Assembly's deliberations on a permanent constitution. the current form of lib e ra l democracy, one that In short, functioned on the basis o f proportional representation, made i t d iffic u lt for the in terests of the lesser populated regions o f the country to be represented. such, representation when i t Masiumi failed desire to change th e contract. objected to gain the absence a majority, regional and expressed the In th is regard, pressure was exerted on lib e ra l democracy by p artie s representative of th e outer islands. Pressures on Liberal Democracy from Extra-Contract Challengers Additional pressures on Indonesian lib e ra l democracy were exerted by p o litic a l forces th a t operated prim arily a t th e margins of the contract. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 74] === 64 For instance, President Sukarno voiced his dismay over party infighting about the composition o f the new cabinet when i t became evident th a t the FKI was to be excluded- Despite IN I's effo rts to include the Cammunists, Masiumi warned th a t i t would "create a situation under which communism cannot breathe and under which there is no scope for cammunism. 1,124 Apparent fle x ib ility on the p art of the PKI — whose chairman, Aidit, stated in early 1956 th a t " it is the duty of the EKE to p articipate in a cabinet but the present absolute necessity fo r problem. Thus, circumstances, the FKI"125 participation — permitted not an a resolution of the the President concluded th a t lib e ra l democracy was an inadequate form of government for Indonesia. the inaugural President argued, new parliament, jo in tly." 126 address to the new cabinet on 26 March, the "We must not think that wiih the in stallation of the the gate to heaven has been opened which we can enter Furthermore, he "expressed the hope th a t the new parliament would se t to work on th e basis of a genuine democracy, but to him the genuine democracy was ■not the Western parliamentary democracy." proposed alternative form of government, not one based individualism, as in th e West, "but o n f the system of mutual assistance (gotone royong), as members of a big family. " 127 Later, on 2 April, he decried "a democracy in which to overpower the other party and to g et the most votes is the only thing th a t counts," adding, "th is must be altered into a democracy based on ootong rovono. 1,128 ihe articulation of an alternative conception of the social contract increasingly became the subject Sukarno's pronouncements throughout 1956, especially lib e ra l democracy continued to deteriorate, while the actions of the Army accelerated the process. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 75] === 65 From la ta 1956, the Array's renewed p o litic a l a c tiv ity was ostensibly based on i t s concern for the rampant corruption th a t had beset the new cabinet. On 13 te r r ito r ia l commander of West Java, Colonel Kawilarang, on grounds of corruption. August The the Foreign Foreign Minister Minister was commission, composed was arrested subsequently chiefly of h is the cleared a ll fellow cabinet complicity by a m inisters. However, on November 16 and 19, Colonel Z u lk ifli Inbis, the Assistant Chief-of-Staff o f the Army, attempted a coup d 'e ta t in West Java. the Ihe attempt failed u tte rly, but la te r revelations th a t Lubis had support o ffic ers West Java, including Kawilarang, the te r r ito r ia l commanders of Kalimantan (Colonel Abrmanju) and North Sumatrfe (Colonel Simbolon), and the Indonesia (Colonel Warouw), former te r r ito r ia l suggested th a t th is commander East outburst of m ilitary d issatisfactio n was based on more than a d islik e for c iv ilia n corruption. According to van der divisxons within i t, Kroef, Array, l^ a st sig n ifican t had became "a weathervane for Mother and deeper grievances in national l i f e." 129 over, the Thus, when the "13 August Affair" was an opportunity had been created fo r the expression of grievances related not only to corruption but also to the country's mounting socio economic and p o litic a l problems. 130 Chief among th e former was the increasingly obvious economic re a lity th a t Java was consuming th e wealth produced by geographic islands, the outer id en tity islands, of th e large fact th a t served to p o litic a l p a rtie s. reinforce the On th e outer for example, "local, grievances centred on the sharing of export earnings. 131 To allev iate these problems, the au th o ritie s in th e outer islands, with the approval of the relevant Array o ffic e rs, began to s e t policy themselves in early 1956. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 76] === 66 The condonation, even encouragement, the regional acts defiance against the central government by parts of th e Army related to ‘"the opinion [that] had came to prevail in many levels of army leadership [by 1956] th at interference by the m ilitary in p o litic a l matters was; virtually a sacred duty."-*-32 Moreover, Army activism was in reaction to "sharply divergent p o litical opinions...in p articu lar as regards Communism and the position and ideology of the FNI; an d...a general dissatisfaction with the course of public a ffa irs, including th e...general election, corruption in government, economic stagnation and alleged inadequacies in the supply services of the armed forces. 133 The p arties' ab ility to uphold a lib eral democratic contract and preserve th e ir privileged place the p o litica l arena -was further weakened on 28 October 1956, when Sukarno asserted, In November 1945 — Let us be frank — We made a most serious mistake. e suggested the formation of P o litical p a r tie s.... That was one of the mi.stakes of November 1945. Now i t is taking i t s to ll. Ju st look a t the situation. Quite apart from the disease of ethnic and regional loyalties we are afflicted by the desire of the parties which, alas, makes usforever work against one another.... Let us act together now to bury a ll the p artie s. 134 In place of Sukarno suggested to the newly installed Constituent Assembly on 9 November th a t i t introduce "Guided Democracy" fDemokrasi Terpimoin). He argued th at the inplementation of [the] democratic conception 'one vote for every citizen* does not yet guarantee justice in every field, “and " certainly not in the fie ld of economy...our democracy must see to i t that one group should not be exploited by another. This means th a t, fo r the time being, ourdemocracy must be a guided democracy. 1,135 Leading reassertions lib eral democratic fa ith politicians democracy and .countered Sukarno fear the rise with dictatorship, 136 and the Sastroamidjojo cabinet proceeded to act against the Army officers involved in the "13 August A ffair." The rejuvenated defence of lib eral democratic norms and institutions, however, did not Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 77] === ' 67 lessen the re a lity strong external opposition. notable parliamentarian reported in December 1956 th a t "the present situation i s th e beginning of a catastrophe" because "the armed forces are no longer convinced th a t -under the present system of government the Indonesian people can be adequately protected from danger." 237 However, the Premier, reaffirmed the principle of c iv ilia n control over the m ilitary and th e necessity fo r the armed forces abstain from interfering of the Army, repulsed by Sastroamidjojo1s p o litic s. 138 Factions "form alistic thinking," began acting decisively in December 1956 to p u ll down lib eral democracy. On 20 December the Water Buffalo Division Council (Dewan Divisi Bantencr) took over the administration of Central Sumatra, and on 22 December the Elephant Division Council fDewan Divisi Gadiahf, headed the te r r ito r ia l ' Simbolon, commander of North and announced th a t government in Jakarta," Central Sumatra, Colonel had "severed connection with the central and th a t i t no longer recognized "the present government of the Republic of Indonesia. 1,139 In a Jakarta-orchestrated counter-coup th a t saw the active armed p articipation of EKI cadres and members of its fronts, Simbolon was displaced from power. The situation returned to erupt in normal in North Sumatra by la te 1956, only the d elicate further fighting la te r in 1957. The cabinet. damage had been done, however, Masiumi could now a c t to overcame its f u tile coalition post-election dilemma: Since Masjumi [had been] permanently handicapped by the existing rules of the democratic game, they decided to ask for a change in the ru les [through th e ir proposals of reform which featured th e. creation of a second, territo rially -b ased, parliamentary chamber, which the Java-based p artie s and p o liticia n s re siste d ], failin g which, they [abandoned] the game of democracy en tire ly. 140 Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 78] === 68 One la st ■attempt by Masjumi to preserve the inperilled democracy and th e ir once unchallenged supremacy within i t was a proposal to establish an extraordinary cabinet headed by Hatta, the Sumatra-born, Vice-President (un til l non-party, December 1956) of revolutionary fame.14-*- When 'H atta refused, Masjumi's proposal undermined confidence in th e legitimacy and u tility of democracy as i t appeared th at th e party believed fame was a more valid source of p o litic a l authority than the people's mandate. 142 By la te December a Masjumi conference urged the party to withdraw its support of the cabinet, th ereafter the PNI welcome."142 which stated did on 9 January 1957. th a t EKI support "would Shortly certainly The Sastroamidjojo cabinet and lib eral democracy collapsed a f te r two months, surviving only on th e goodwill of the Communists, but not before the country was wracked by further revolts, in East Indonesia (2 March) and South Sumatra (9 March), and c a lls for secession were heard from Kalimantan and even East Java. 144 The Communist Party as th e Alternative Party Ihrougbbut the period of parliamentary democracy, the PKE remained committed to the norms and in stitu tio n s of lib era l democracy, despite its own growing attitu d e s. th a t association with President Sukarno and h is antiparty Towards the end of the period, th e party was intensely aware fanatically anti-Cammunist Army leaders, such Lubis and’ Simbolon, undermined lib e ra l democracy, the free p o litic a l environment in which i t had amassed the adherents state-w ithin-a-state would end. p o litic a l standing in the and resources that constituted a The Ctmmunists, having rejuvenated th eir 1955 election, were well within reach of p o litic a l power, perhaps in the form of a toehold in the cabinet. As lev has stated, however, "the concern about the EKE which its showing in the Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 79] === general elections increased cabinet. 1'145 69 had aroused ■among hundredfold leaders Soekamo's other demand parties for was four-party The p arty 's very success made i t s progress from a marginal a c to r to a full-fledged contender fo r power increasingly d iffic u lt to a tta in. Nonetheless, th e EKT had adhered to "the rules of the game" and emerged victorious in the regional elections of 1957. The FKI would surely have won any future general elections and probably would have proceeded form Indonesia's first-e v e r, majority government. Hie co llective a b ility of th e p a rtie s toj wage an election campaign, however lack lustre, and stage popular elections a divided and, at times, 'chaotic p o litic a l environment was a testimony to th e ir own b eliefs. th is time, parliamentary. however, "the situ atio n The p arties were not President Sukarno's declaration was longer in control of meaningfully the country." 146 of a State o f War and of Siege on 14 March 1957 simultaneously terminated the lib e ra l democratic contract, (temporarily) lif e, ended the sa lie n t role of p artie s in Indonesian p o litica l and ensured his and the Army's ris e power. Moreover, the termination of lib e ra l democracy le ft th e Communist Party searching for new ways to take power. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 80] === CHAPTER H I THE SOCIAL CONTRACT OF GUIDED DEM OCRACY: ARM Y INITIATIVES AND COM UNIST RESPONSES, 1957-1962 From 1957 to 1959 the implementation of what caioe to be called Guided Democracy meant the rewriting of the Indonesian social contract. The norms” and institutions of lib eral democracy were besieged by the in itia tiv e s of the Amy and President Sukarno, who jo in tly return the Constitution. corporatist Anty net especially 1957, with the FKI, chiefly Masjumi and PSI. in la te embodied the defunct 1945 In th e ir mutual desire to transform the social contract, Sukarno and the p arties, ideology desired a s tif f resistance and the parties from the of the p o litical outer islands, In the wake of the PKI’s quest for sovereignty, and Masjumi*s and PSI's support for the PRRI-Perrresta rebellion beginning in February 1958 on the outer islands, the Army's effo rts to build fo r its e lf a legitimate place in p o litic a l life were intensified. 1959 Although the 'Amy met with success during the course of — especially its coercive effo rt re in stitu te the 1945 Constitution — to transform its e lf into the "proper" p o litic a l form of a functional group and to force the EKI into a s ta te of retarded p o litical existence, differences with President Sukarno arose th a t made inevitable 70 Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 81] === 71 its decline ~ Faced with renewed Communist vigour and drive towards Ihe end of 1962, and aware that i t s legal power base (the State of War and of Siege and, la te r, the S tate of Danger, which conferred sovereignty) was temporary, the Army leadership constructed altern ative ideological conceptions and in stitutions th a t would preserve i t s grasp on power. PKE, Throughout th is period, th e two main contenders, the Army and th e sustained adherents th e ir mutually a process th a t antagonistic, guest revealed th e fo r important resources and ideological and organizational impact each had on th e other. The Foundation of a New Social Contract: Sukamn.1s Konsepsi and the Army's Revolutionary Heritage „ When a State of War and of Siege fReceding op den Staat van Oorlocr en van Belea — SOB) was declared by President Sukarno on 14 March 1957, one day a fte r the Sastroamidjojo cabinet had succumbed to the pressure exerted by th e m ilitary forces on the outer islands, de facto power was conferred him and th e Army. Each of the seven te r r ito r ia l commanders fpanglMq) was vested with the powers o f Regional Martial law Admiiiistrators, and were only nominally Nasution, the Chief Martial placed under the control of Law Administrator and Army Chief-of-Staff. Hence, there was no disguising the re a lity th a t th e central government's control over the outer islands had been severely weakened and the TNI central command's authority over its o ffic e r brought Indonesia corps was almost non ex isten t. That lib e ra l warlordism, "1 democracy "perilously meant an opportunity had been presented to close each actor, Sukarno and th e Army, to b uild Indonesia according to i t s vision. The zeal with which each actor at tempted to remodel Indonesian p o litic a l life Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 82] === ' 72 can be understood to be a consequence of th e ir exclusion from formal, o r sufficiently powerful, p o litical ro les during th e previous contract. this regard there 0was rauch^ canon ground between Sukarno and Nasution. In erecting a new contract, the former drew upon his ear lie r criticism s of lib era l democracy while th e la tte r, under the pressure of th e success 'o f h is and h is organization's arch-enerry — the Communists — attemptedto build organizational forms that would supplant the power not only o f the PKT, but of a l l p o litica l p arties. Together, these two actors seriously threatened the p o litic a l parties by creating a new p o litic a l id en tity — th e functional group — and elevating a new set o f aims, options, bases p o litic a l actors: so lid arity, conditions and that collective action were inimical for legitim ate or ill-s u ite d to th e in te re sts of th e p arties. Although negative President, Sukarno features almost chastised from th e lib e ra l moment democracy began and i t s function Indonesia, h is views were considered neither alarming by the p arties nor did they receive much support in the p o lity. 2 The situation changed dramatically, however, when th e composition of the f ir s t elected cabinet provoked Sukarno to declare h is support fo r a gotom-rovona cabinet in March 19563 and, la te p a rtie s. " 5 in October 1956,4 fo r Indonesians to "bury th e Sukarno had chosen a suitable moment to take th e in itia tiv e: By la te 1956 there was widespread receptivity to proposals for p o litic a l reorganization in Indonesia, including feelings th a t parliamentary democracy was a failu re and unsuitable to Indonesian conditions.... far-reaching proposals fo r p o litic a l restructuring could find enthusiastic support. 6 Undaunted by negative party reactions to his plea to "bury the p arties, y et su ffic ie n tly d ic ta to ria l, p o litic a lly Sukarno cautious undertook to elaborate avoid being h is thinking Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. considered about === [PDF page 83] === 73 a ltern ativ e p o litic a l order. The breakthrough came on 21 February presented his konsepsi. or conception.® 1957 when th e President Hie President began w ith the demand th a t e [have] to set up an altogether new building. e should n ot only pull down the p illa rs, the roof, th e walls; we should p u ll down everything — not excluding th e foundation — and lay a new foundation, erect a to ta lly new building, that i s, the new-style governmental structure of th e Republic of Indonesia. 9 Sukarno targeted, in p a rtic u la r, -"'western parliamentary democracy', not only for the 'id e a of opposition', th e abuse of which le d to lack of leadership and s ta b ility, but also fo r i t s foreignness: 'an imported democracy...not an Indonesian democracy...not a democracy which accords w ith our sou l'." 1 0 Sukarno went on to make two concrete proposals th at could serve as th e basis of a new order. F irs t, he re ite ra te d his e a rlie r call fo r a gotong-rovom cabinet, to which he added thkt "a ll members o f the family should eat ai single table and work at~— a^Jsingle workbench," 11 especially since Indonesia could not "continue to ignore a group which received th e votes of s ix m illion human beings in the elections."12 The second proposal made was more far-reaching and injurious to the p arties for i t denied them the very sectioned basis in the population upon which they drew th eir support: Sukarno advocated a National Council Nasional) which sig nified "a large family relationship." 13 Ju st as the cabinet was argued, a refle ctio n Parliament, Sukarno National Council was to be a reflection of society. composition which includes discrimination (Dewan functional against groups any the e n tire group,"14 Thus, i t would have Indonesian people without divided (goloncran fu m sio nil), the and into two categories: representatives Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the === [PDF page 84] === 74 regions. Hence, "the Council was not -to be a party bcdy out was to be representative of functional groups — workers, peasants, in te llig e n tsia, national entrepreneurs, religious organizations th e youth organizations, [and] women's organizations." 15 arrived services, Whereas the parties in general evinced displeasure a t being deprived of th eir power bases, the armed forces, especially the TNI and i t s central command under Nasution, could not but give support to the notion of functional groups as th e basis of legitimacy for th e ir own p o litica l activity. Since the days of the revolution the INI had yearned for a formal role in th e nation's p o litics. Indeed, from i t s very inception, th e TNI styled i ts e lf "as unique among th e armies of th e world, never having been created as an instrument of the state, th e army claimed for its e lf a role which [transcended] the purely m ilitary and - [extended] to alt^soeial-;— p o litic a l and economic "naturally" deserved a field s. " 16 p o litic a l The IN I's role features o f the revolutionary struggle. was supposition th a t reinforced by three main ^ F irst, the failure of civilians to give direction to Indonesia's limited m ilitary efforts compelled the TNI to rely on i t s act against the own leadership. Communists a t Second, th e necessity of the INI to Madiun personal charge o f the Amy's counter-drive) 19^48 (where Nasution took and D3ru l Islam throughout West Java beginning in 1948, to preserve the Republic, gave the Army a special claim to a future p o litica l ro le. continued th e m ilitary throughout 1949, struggle Third, i t was th e INI that against the Dutch 1948 and long a fte r the Republic had been overrun and i t s top p oliticians had been captured by the Dutch in 1948. m ilitary struggle power. 17 in la te In p articular, the in 1948-1949 served to reinforce the INI's claim to As the armed struggle with th e Dutch petered out during the Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 85] === 75 course of 1949, and Indonesian independence appeared attainable through a combination o f diplomatic and m ilitary p olicies, the TNI looked forward to a bright p o litic a l future, 18 confident with i t s perception th a t i t was its •’m ilitary effo rts which ultim ately brought about th e Dutch recognition o f Indonesia's independence."1^ From the perspective of the party p o litic ia n s who inherited th e Republic afte r December 1949, however, the TNI was merely one claimant to power among many armed m ilitary u n its. Indeed, w ith 16 major "Republican Armed Organizations" in existence in May 1949,20 i t was d if fic u lt for the c iv ilia n government to grant a privileged, position to any one group. Thus, during th e period of lib e ra l democracy, m ilitary organizations were excluded from the p o litic a l arena unless they could take the form of a p o litic a l party — an unthinkable preposition fo r the TNI — otherwise they were considered "state agencies." 21 treated plaything financial neglect. the riv a l In -th is capacity the TNI was p a rtie s, 22 Meanwhile, the Army was s t i l l and suffered from called upon to defend the Republic from the Darul Islam in West Java, Aceh, and South Sulawesi, and from armed remnants from the Republic Maluku Selatan in Seram. 23 I t was not long before opposition began to be heard from within the Army about the treatm ent meted to i t under lib e ra l democracy. The former Chief-of-Staff, Nasution, having lo s t his positio n over a clash between th e PKI-FNI and Masiumi-PSi on Army reorganization in October 1952, attacked a ll p o litic a l p arties: The factor which has been of decisive importance in th e matter of relations between the m ilitary and p o litic a l leaders during th e short life-tim e of th is Republic i s internal p o litic s, that i s, the effo rts of th e politicians to ' establish a complete control over the army. Indeed our ' army was bom before the p o litic a l p a rtie s. Indeed th e battalions, regiments and divisions of th e army and i t s general s ta ff existed before there was a Minister of Defence.... Indeed i t was armed u n its which pioneered th e Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 86] === [seizure] of power, civ il as well as m ilitary power, in the f i r s t stages of our revolution. 24 When Nasution launched the League of Upholders of Indonesian Independence (Ikatan Pendukuncr Kemerdekaaan Indonesia — IEKI) in May 1954 to contest th e upcoming parliamentary, elections, not as a party but as a "movement," th e organization endorsed "Sukarno's claim th a t the Revolution was s t i l l unfinished, and [advocated] radical n atio n alist positions.... [while it] expressed h o stility to the conflict o f parties and 'isms' on which [it] blamed th e general sp iritu a l problems, i t was argued, and p o litic a l c ris is." 25 could be resolved by a The country's return to th e 1945 Nasution and Constitution. 26 With President the obvious congruence Sukarno by the mid-1950s, thought a firm basis was la id for their duumvirate under the conditions of th e SOB. Army alliance, however, between The nature of the sukamowas tempered by Sukarno's feelings about the proper ro le of th e m ilitary; h is reservations about the Army's "correct" place in p o litic a l lif e were to lay th e basis for la te r differences with Nasution. For example, Sukarno asked the Army on 29 March 1957 "not to play with p o litic s."27 E arlier, Sukarno had c la rifie d his conception of th e armed forces' role when he declared on 17 August 1953 th a t armed forces are th e s ta te 's apparatus, are weapons, are tools, once again, they a re tools. This weapon must always be sharp, must always be sa k ti (power), regardless of whoever holds th e weapon — as long as i t is in the hands o f the s ta te.... Anyone in th e armed forces practising p o litics must be blamed outright, for such action means a break in th e service due from him. 28 Thus, the wedding of Sukamd1s konsepsi and the Army's revolutionary heritage after 14 March 1957 was to same degree one of convenience; the President needed toJLegalize the coups staged by the renegade o fficers to keep! in ta c t the country he had helped create, while Nasptipn needed Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. === [PDF page 87] === Sukarno's authority and prestige simultaneously to expand the central command's control v is-a-v is the o fficer corps and to thwart the Communist drive for power. The p ra ctica l effects of the new p o litic a l alliance became evident soon a fte r the SOB was declared. appointed by Sukarno. On 9 April 1957 a new cabinet was Kahin has remarked th a t "the inauguration o f this cabinet has diminished the ro le of both Parliament and th e p o litica l p arties in approximate proportion to th e considerably increased ro le of th e President and the Army."20 Significantly, the Karva (Work) cabinet was led by a non-party p o liticia n, Djuanda, and, fo r the f i r s t time to such a large extent, the Prime Minister selected individuals as ministers who had no party a ffilia tio n s. 30 The Karva cabinet was not the equivalent of the qotoncr-rovoncr cabinet as sketched in the President's konsensi. although, " it was a step in prizing the formal machinery of government away from p arty influence, " 31 and, hence, step the direction o f creating corporatist in stitu tio ns. The second o f the P resid ent's konsersi proposals — to establish a National Council — was realized in May 1957; the occasion also marked the more o r less formal beginning of Guided Democracy in Indonesia. 32 ' From the perspective of the p arties, look upon conception, the former scholars, development with reserve. consonance with his the President legitimized th e role of functional groups in Council: armed jo urn alists, th is there was a p a rtic u la r reason to "these...were categorized as labour, revolutionaries, entrepreneurs, women, Angkatan and citizens o f national 1945 [Generation foreign extraction;" 33 the peasants, 1945], youth, a r tis ts, religious functional group representatives totaled 21 out o f a Council membership of 45. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The most === [PDF page 88] === 78 alarming aspect o f the Council ’s canposition was not th e inclusion o f the Chiefs-of-Staff, a t le ast from the vantage point of the EKE, but rather the aggressive undermining of th e p a rtie s' control aver th e ir awn ormas. Reeve has observed, that "almost al 1 the 1functional' representatives were drawn not from organizations.... party leaderships proper but from party mass As was becoming clear, Sukarno's plan was to detach these ormas from the p arties and to draw them together on the bases of common ' functional' vision."34 interests and commitment h is own grand This scheme damaged the PKI more so than other parties which placed less emphasis on building a wide net of social support groups. I t had became apparent by mid- to la te 1957 that Sukarno and the T]NI had been very successful in th e ir reconstruction of th e social contract. Lev has written th a t "the public perceived the Kabinet Karya, Soekamo, and the National form alities Council as collectively constituting the Government, notwithstanding."35 representation especially "rejected underlying express i t s le a st party The” notion antagonized the p arties, assumptions th at /functional group for i t explicitly could adequately the populace needs and aspirations through the party system or th a t at leaderships could use’ the parliamentary negotiate successfully, conflicting demands."36 framework A fin a l blow against the party system in 1957 seemed to came in November when Sukarno recommended the Council as "material" for a new constitution to the Constituent ’ Assembly, probably in an effo rt to' break its year-long stalemate on the issue of th e ideological basis o f the s ta te.37 Following an onal burst of an ti-p arty of th e ably a c tiv itie s at the hands President, supported by the Army, the in itia tiv e now lay with the p artie s. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 89] === 79 Party Reactions to Earl 7 Guided Democracy In itia tiv e s. Late 1957-Mid-1958 Hie undoing o f the lib e ra l democratic contract throughout 1957 prompted several p artie s to react in a dramatic fashion. Hie responses from th e FKI in December 1957, and from M^siumi and the PSI from February 1958 onward, were motivated dwindling p o litic a l fortunes. the same concern reverse th e ir Urns, for th e FKI th e actions o f December 1957, (see below) amounted both to the reassertio n of i t s claim as th e foremost n atio nalist group in society and, more profoundly, a cautious acquisition o f sovereignty in an effo rt to reaffirm i t s from a li the other p o litic a l forces. distinctiveness For th e Masjumi and the PSI, th e ir actions in support o f the regional rebellions signalled th e ir commitment to th e in terests of the outer islands, th e ir d islik e o f Ccmmunism and President 5ukarno, and, significantly, th e ir desire to add the basis of te r rito r ia l representation to the lib era l democratic Contract.33 W ith'very little advance warning of i t s magnitude, rocked in early December 1957 by the ille g a l seizure, SOBSI and of th e FNI's labour federation Indonesia was a t the hands of (Kesatuan Buruh Kerakyataan Indonesia — KBKE) of th e plants and offices of every major Dutch company in the archipelago, with the la tte r apparently taking the lead.39 matter o f a few days," Schmitt has observed, th e whole country. For a while i t "]ji,a "the movement spread across seemed the government had lo s t i t s power to direct events."40 The ostensible reason for th e fury was the in a b ility, time, for necessary votes the fourth the Indonesians secure th e in the United Nations General Assembly in support of a resolution callin g on the Netherlands to recommence discussions on West Iria n. With th e FKI fresh from huge regional election v icto ries, yet threatened by recent Army and Presidential drives to deprive i t Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. of i t s === [PDF page 90] === 80 claim power, the Indonesian diplomatic defeat presented unprecedented opportunity for the party to attempt to ma^e a judicious" transition from a decaying p o litic a l order to a new one. Confident that i t s actions would be s e e n as p a rt o f the regime's own agitation campaign to secure West Irian, which had begun in mid-1957,41 the Communists joined in. When th e wave of strik es and seizures ended, the government declared th a t i t had nest engaged in "nationalization" (for which i t had no law), nor had i t "confiscated" the properties; i t was merely exercising "supervision.1,42 Van der Kroef has taken th is to be an admission by the government "that i t had been unable to control the forces of extremism that i t had unleashed with its [own] campaign.1,43 The PKE's salien t ro le in the events was an attempt to reinvigorate.the two ta c tic a l changes effected in the early 1950s th a t s t i l l ' held any prospects ox Communist power, now th a t the parliamentary road was blocked subscribe to th e regime's own brand of nationalism, and to curry the favour of Sukarno. Thus, FKI actions were "a b id to regain the in itia tiv e as a widely popular and truly n atio n alistic organization."44 Hie immediate consequences were precisely what the party had desired: ' This move won th e PKE wide acclaim and i t appeared th at the We^h Iria n issue would be a means by which the EKE could develop mass support. In fa c t, soon after th e seizure of Dutch property, the FKI and other radical nationalists had organized the Central ’Action Committee for th e liberation of West Iria n. The aim was to channel the national fervour against th e Eutch through an organization led by the EKE.45 On a more important lev el, the PKI acted as a cautious revolutionary contender. A idit, in his explanation of th e events, succeeded in keeping the actions F id’s d is tin c t from other n atio n alist forces, and also alternative claims to power alive: "The',workers took over the im perialist enterprises n o t in th e ir own personal in tere st b u t to hand them over to Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 91] === 81 th e Republic of Indonesia, whose government was not yet a government of th e working c la s s.1'46 The assertion of sovereignty was very b rie f, but o f sufficiently long duration to indicate th a t alongside th e Indonesian government there was a powerful actor th at could convulse th e nation into turmoil and pose its e lf as a powerful alternative source o f authority. Hie HCT, clearly, wished to convey th is message, but acted cautiously in th e exercise of i t s sovereignty, aware th a t faced ascendant rival p o litic a l forces. Hie regional rebellions th a tabegan in February 1958 with PSI and Masjumi connivance were fa r more threatening in nature to th e Indonesian s ta te, Sukarno, and the army central command in the short-run than the • b r ie f Communist actions o f December. th e ■Sastroamidjojo cabinet early Since th e defection of Masjumi from 1957, the party had taken 1 p o litic a l positions th at increasdngly -brought ^ it- in to ~cbrfflic£~'with the Javanese p o litic a l p artie s, w ith Sukarno (whose advocacy o f Ccrnimunist entry into the cabinet angered th e p arty ), and — through i t s association with the regional m ilitary officers who spearheaded th e drive against the' central government — with the Army central command in Jakarta. I t was the government's acceptance of the Cammunist f a it accompli of December 1957 th at greatly exacerbated tensions between Masiumi-PSI and the leading p o litic a l and the the evolving p o litic a l system. Hie flig h t to Sumatra of the two p a rtie s' economic personalities declaration early on 15 February of Indonesia.47 1958 served a riv a l government to and the Republic of Hie Revolutionary Government of the Republic o f Indonesia (Pemerintah Revolusioner Reoublik Indonesia — EKRI) North cataly st to Central Sumatra and North and Central was declared Sulawesi, Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. and was === [PDF page 92] === 82 supported by th e regional m ilitary au th orities in those areas, Masjumi and PSI, plus limited Taiwanese support. o ffic ia l I ts programme was the Charter fPiacram Periuancran Perroesta), name. and unofficial American, B ritish, and of Ccamnorji Struggle whence the rebellion derived part, o f its The response of Jakarta was sw ift and decisive: m ilitary, action coordinated (although the Nasution ended PRRI lingered the u n til armed threat within 1961 under i t s new name, Republic o f Indonesia, Reoublik Persatuan Indonesia) By mid-1958 t*he ^ndonesian p o litica l parties two months ° United had reacted to the re a lity of Army and P residential ascent in th e ir country., Unfortunately, th e net benefits of th e^r dramatic actions were to accrue in the shortand long-run to.the Att^y. reaffirm i t s By attacking n a tio n a listic credentials, EXitch economic concerns to the PKI served additionally to expand th e Army's controij, over the country. As Anderson has w ritten, "quite suddenly" in 1957 tbfe Army took control of th e nbulk of th e advanced sectors of th e economy.... * [And] fo r 'th e f ir s t time i t obtained the financial means to attach the o ffic e r corps firmly to i t s e l f and to give the m ilitary as a whole a corporate economic in te re st quite d is tin c t from that o f every other sector of Indonesian society. For th e f i r s t time since 1942, th e major economic resources o f the nation were now under 1unified local control.48 The fact th a t officers who were appointed to administer the many estates and enterprises had to sever th e ir formal relations w ith th e Army, meant th a t even when th e SOB was no longer in effect, the TNI s t i l l exerted a preponderant hold over th e economy.49 I t would have seemed in 1957 that the Amy was the re a l v ic to r in rhe duel- with the PKE. The actions o f Masiumi and PSI, iro n ically, served the in te re sts of the Nasurion-led Army, th e President (who had publicized h is disfavour of these two p a rtie s), and the PKE. The President saw h is Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. two most === [PDF page 93] === 18% outspoken c ritic s silenced by th eir treadje^y.and th e stigma of defeat, while th e Army weakened and defeated i£s d issident regional elements. From the perspective o f the Army, i t s role in Indonesian p o litic a l/ life now sSemed to be without bounds. th e However, i t s t i l l had to contend with re a lity strengthened HCE, which also benefited fram\ the destruction of th e "comprador11 PSI and Masjumi. The Army as the Pioneer of Guided Democracy 1957-1960 The\ Array's determination to a tt against the p o litic a l p artie s, and especially against t^e FKI, was enhanced by th e fa llo u t of th e events of December 1957-April 1958. define fo r its e lf The Army had set o ut as early as April 1957 to a legitim ate place within p o litic a l l i f e. In this undertaking the Amy had to challenge the opposing p o litic a l forces on th re e matters: ineluctably, establishing fq r its e lf a basis of popular support which, brought i t into co n flict with the p artie s; implementing measures th a t curbed or retarded the capacity of th e p arties eith er to, mobilize support or enact collective action; and creating fo r i ts e lf a formal position within th e governmental structure. The Army leadership representation in was encouraged by the Karva cabinet and in the attainm ent of formal the National Council and sought to consolidate support fo r i ts e lf by acquiring adherents.50 i t s quest fo r supporters, the Army's choice of ta c tic s and organizational forms was undoubtedly influenced by two current p o litic a l Sukarno's increasingly vociferous advocacy the phenomena: functional group concept, and the PKI's success in building in a l l but name a nation-wide net o f CGnminist-daminated functional groups located in the "uniced front from below." Thus!, the Army acted lik e Sukarno by raiding the mass Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 94] === 84 organisations of the p o litical parries. . On 17 June 1957 Nasution established the f ir s t o f several c iv ilm ilitary "Cooperation Bodies" Military'-Cooperation Body (BKS-Pemuda-Militer consisted of Army officers party structures and CBadan Keria Sama — BKS), th e Youth- — BKSPM). The Body and personnel who circumvented the parent worked directly with members the mass organizations, including the-youth fronts of th e INI, Masiumi. NU, and the EKE.51 Pauker has written th at a t the f i r s t anniversary of the [EKSPM] " it was announced th a t Cooperation Bodies Between Youth and Army had been set up in a l l parts of the country except Atjeh (North Sumatra), West Sumatr^ and Celebes."52 acquiring a popular Clearly, following, the Army was not only keen on but i t also meant to establish its - influence throughout the archipelago. Naturally, the parties themselves were offended by th e Army's aggressiveness but.could do l i t t l e to slow the proliferation of the BKSs. Soon BKS-Labour-Military IBKS-Buruh-Mili t e r - — EKSBCMEL) was established, which was followed by a Press-Military Contact Bureau (Biro Kontah Pers-M iliter), BKS-Peasant-Military (EKS-Tani-Militer— BliSTAMEL), and a BKS-Wamen-Military fEKS-Wanita-M iliter — BKSWAMIL). the middle of 1958, eight such bodies were in existence.53 The Amy had succeeded having. its cooperative endeavours legitimized by th e establishment on 25 June 1958 of the State Ministry fo r Civil-M ilitary Cooperation.54 The second major Army thrust in obtaining a broad basis o f popular support was a consequence of the EKE's own actions in December, 1957. The p arty 's attempt to channel nationalist fervour over West Irian through the EKE-led Central Action Committee for the Liberation of West Iria n Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 95] === forced th e Army to preempt th e Ccmnunists by establishing' on 17 January 1958 a National Front for th e Liberation o f West Irian, (Front Nasional Fembebasaan Iria n Barat — FNPIB). a ll in itia tiv e s of veterans, On that date the J^pny "announced that workers, farmers and youth groups' in *connection with the struggle fo r West Irian would be channeled into" the FNPIB.55 When Nasution appointed himself £he Front's chairman, i t became evident ythat th e Army would countenance neither popular control nor Presidential cause. prerogative over the West Irian Nasution's determination to make th e FNPIB the basis of an Army quasi-governroant is clear from the fact th a t T erritorial commanders were instructed to establish branches of the National Front in thfeir areas. In various p arts of th e country the Army Chief of Staff presided himself in the following months over the in stallatio n of th e local qtananders as National Front chairmen. On August 2, 1958, th e Amy announced th a t following a review by the National Council and by the cabinet of the position of th e National Front i t had been decided to strengthen th e National Front fo r the Liberation of West Irian. I t was to be known thereafter by its abbreviated name Front Nasional and be b u ilt into a "guided mass movement" based on th e Cooperation Bodies between th^t Army and Youth, Workers, Women, Fanners, Religious leaders and Veterans. The Army Chief of S taff remained chairman of the Front N a sio n a l. The statement added that by strengthening the National Front "any attempts to revive conflicts among various groups can be prevented."... The Army Chief of S taff announced th a t within six months [from 15 August 1958] branches of th e National Front were to be in stalled in a l l d is tr ic ts.56 The BKSs and the FNPIB seemed to hold out the promise of real power accruing to the Army. Although these organizational innovations placed th e p arties on th e defensive, the Army was n o t overwhelmingly successful with its p o litic a l inventions. all was th a t the BKS a c tiv itie s conferences and meetings."57 Yang has asserted th a t "the end re s u lt of largely consisted Two factors prevented the FNPIB from becoming viable p o litical forces. working BKSs and the One factor related to the low quality of th e Amy officers in charge o f the BKSs: "Many officers Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 96] === 86 succumbed to th e temptations of c iv ilia n ’ resemble the party p o litic ia n s."58 office and quickly came to Another factor had to do with the Army's -underestimation of th e p arties' control over th e ir ormas; th e Army had great d iffic u lty in making EES member organizations pay more than lip-service to the idea th at they should channel th e ir a c tiv itie s through the BKS, The youth BKS had constant troubles w ith its member ormas, seme continuing to a sse rt th e ir separate id e n titie s and a c tiv itie s, others try in g to break away.... The labour BKS had continuing trouble with i t s constituent ormas and the peasants BKS found PKE-affiliated ormas publicly asserting themselves as the leaders of the peasant functional category.59 The p o litic a l hopes o f the Army as embodied in th e BKSs were dealt a near-crippling blow by the PKE which, " a fte r a y ear's experience [with th e BKSs],...declared that would avoid further involvement in the cooperation bodies, and other p arties were sim ilarly inclined."60 Despite th e d iffic u ltie s with th e FNPIB and th e BKSs, the Army had created a powerful claim over many and diversified aspects of Indonesian p o litic a l, economic, and social life by mid-1958. th e Army was more unified than ever, elements by A pril 1958. As a p o litic a l entity, having rid i ts e lf of i t s dissident Additionally, its success was propelled by the fervent n atio n a list d rive over West Irian, which i t controlled through th e FNPIB. In dropping the term "for the Liberation of West Irian" from its the Front, national Army sought to give the appearance that in te re sts beyond th is one issue. i t possessed Nasution confidently asserted 1958 th a t " i f I followed th e dictates of my h e a r t...I 'd suppress a ll p o litic a l p a rtie s," 61 aware th a t in th e ir place and th a t of parliamentary democracy, the FNPIB, the National Council, could possibly step in. * assigned groups"62 its e lf and th e functional groups The domestic policing role that th e Front had — "of destroying in tern al enemies and subversive — threatened all p a rtie s, especially th e FKI, Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. whose most === [PDF page 97] === 87 fundamental principles included "class struggle." strengthen^ by Ms enhanced p o litic a l position, Nasution declared on 10 Novenjber 1958 that henceforth "all other veterans ^organizations [excluding i t s own, LVRI] Thus, the EKI's fro n t, Perbepsi. dissolved cm 30 April 1958? i t seemed th a t th e party had lo s t a powerful resource — a param ilitary force useful in times of p o litic a l c ris is. By la te 1953 i t was not surprising that th e Amy was using the FNPIB and the BKSs a s the springboard for a new governmental structure of its own making. The Army's oesire launch a new governmental structure was prefaced by a renewed attack on the collective actions and capacity for mobilization of th e parties — a process which had begun e a rlie r in 1957. The April 1957, succeeded in discrediting top NU, PSI, and other party politicians (with the Army's notable anti-corruption exception drive, which in ten sified the PKE)64. This anti-party measure was followed by Nasution's 27 May 1957 regulation th a t compelled a ll persons and organizations account for th e origin th eir property.65 Throughout the regional election campaigns of 1957, th e Regional Martial. Law Administrators were empowered to and, la te r, disrupted the "prevent excesses and disorder," proceedings regional legislative assemblies.66 More devastating actions were to follow in 1958. On 9 August 1958 Nasution instructed a l l governmental agencies to report the p o litic a l a ffilia tio n s of a l l senior civ il servants.67 This was upon horrifying proposition to l^ureaucrats sympathetic to NU and FNI which depended them to finance and promote th e ir causes.68 On 5 September 1958 Nasution banned those branches o f the Masiumi. the PSI, the Protestant Party, and IPKI which had given a c tiv e support to the PRRI-Permesta.69 Lastly, on 22 September 1958 general Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. elections === [PDF page 98] === 88 scheduled fo r 1959 were "postponed.1 1 The widespread expectation that the EKE would easily emerge victo riou s, and hence make Indonesia the f i r s t country ever to vote the communists in to power, alarmed not only the Army, but also the party p o litic ia n s who went along w ith the measure.70 P o litica l in itia tiv e had passed from the hands o f the p a rtie s. They had w illingly and the lib e ra l eroded th e democratic disintegration. legitimacy contract by of parliamentary continuing th e democracy process p o litic a l While the EKE sufferred the most from th is measure, a t another level, the whole party system was weakened renew i t s legitim acy.71 as i t could no longer Having b u ilt a somewhat stab le p o litic a l foundation with the EKS^ and th e FNPIB, and having deprived the lib e ra l democratic parliamentary system and i t s adherents of relevance and purpose, the Army erected a new social contract from late 1958 to mid-1960. p o litic a l developments, Sukarno was used both by the Army to fa c ilita te i t in i t s In the course of these as a shield and as a to o l own plans. For example, i t was in part due to th e pressure exerted by Sukarno, a t th e behest of th e Army, th at th e National Council acceded in November 1958 to the l a t t e r 's demand for p articipation in the envisaged Hew Parliament and in a restructured - National Front. A fin a l l i s t of functional groups was se ttle d by th e Council which anchored the Army legally p o litic a l system of Guided Democracy. in a l l aspects of th e The l i s t formal of functional groups included the Armed Forces; th is category included th e A ny, the Navy, th e A ir Force, veterans and lo cal security bodies. The most sig n ifican t aspect of the functional group was inclusion of the Armed Forces as a th a t "the Armed Forces had worked themselves into the very grain of th e th eo retical basis of Guided Democracy, [and]the solution to Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. th e Any === [PDF page 99] === 89 leadership's search fo r a constitutionally-based, drawing to a close.72 p o litic a l role" was The parties in th e Constituent Assembly, which were being asked to legislates" themselves suggestion. into The Army, p o litic a l marginality, balked however, was not to be stalled the by leg al and constitutional niceties, and Nasution warned that "we shall see th a t the national leader w ill open sufficient channels [for the army] as there i s no other way because otherwise, like the volcano, Mount Merapi, erupting suddenly, trouble may occdr."72 The parties soon relented in the face of Army demands and informally acquiesced in a cabinet-sponsored plan th at called for return th e corporatist 1945 Constitution and the representation of functional groups, which were to be seated in the DER and the People's Deliberative Assembly (Maielis Permusvawaratan Rakvat— MER), as envisaged in the11945 Constitution. I t was agreed th a t h alf of th e seats in the future DER were to be held by th e functional groups.’ The p arties did succeed, however, in reducing the number of Armed Forces' seats from a proposed 25 per cent o f a ll DPR seats to 35 o f 260, o r 13.5 p er cen t.74 Typical o f Indonesian lib e ra l democracy, the p a rtie s in the Constituent Assembly reneged on the cab in et's proposals on three separate votes and threatened to upset the Army's drive for power. Following the Constituent Assembly's decision in May 1959 to recess, Nasution banned a l l p o litica l abroad.75 activ ity from 3 June u n til after Sukarno returned from Thus, "Nasution stepped into th e breach to rescue th e 1945 Constitution [as he] was apparently determined th a t the army should take th e c re d it and reap Constitution through."76 the p o litic a l benefit pushing th e 1945 I t was Sukarno, however, who fin a lly abolished th e Constituent Assembly and rein stitu ted th e 1945 C anstitition through Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 100] === The new in stitu tio n s of Guided Democracy were b u ilt quickly a fte r th©.events of Juiy 1959; th e Amy's formal ro le was realized ih a l l of thLm.77. In the Keria (Work) cabinet, announced on 9 July, the Armed Forces held 12 positions out of 42, including Nasution as M inister of Defence and Security-78 The cabinet's programme was s e t out on 17 August by President Sukarno Revolution” (later USDEK was la te r speech en titled "The Rediscovery renamed the P o litic a l Manifesto [Manipol]; used the basis s ta te Our Kanioolpolicy),79 his ;Presidential -Decree no. 7/1959 on "The Conditions for th e sim plification of th e P o litical P arties," Sukarno stark ly set out the conditions for the continued ^ is te n c e of p o litic a l p artie s Indonesia, a move th a t clearly favoured the Army: Every party had formally to accept the 1945 Constitution, the Panca S ila. and th e Maniool USDEK, [and] had to have a membership of a t le a s t 150,000 in six ty -fiv e d is tric ts, and must not receive assistance from outside th e country. The President was empowered to dissolve any party which opposed th e principles o f the s ta te, o r was involved in — or did not condemn — reb ellio n s."80 As a consequence, th e ESI and Masiumi were banned; only ten p o litic a l p artie s continued to dissolution. function, a l l living under th e constant th re a t o f ' Additional places fo r the Armed Forces were created an the Supreme Advisory Council (Dewan Pertimbanaan Aauna —DPA), and on th e National Planning Board (Dewan Perancana Nasional — Depemas) whose 77 members were 51 oolkar representatives representatives.81 and no among formal party When the Parliament was suspended in March 1960, and replaced by an appointed 283-seat DER-GR (where th e in itia ls GR stcod fo r Gotoncr-Rovong) (Maiel i s and th e new Provisional People's Deliberative Assembly Permusvawaratan Rakvat Sementara — ^ MERS), the Army was again represented. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 101] === July further antir-party moves, Presidential Decree no. 13/1960 of *5 1960 compelled p o litical parties to re g iste r for o ffic ia l recognition; th is included disclosing sensitive d eta ils, by 31 Decem ber ^60, a b a t t o i r constitution, to ta l o£ branches and asobers, th e nane, age, and occupatioh of each member, and accounts o f th eir funds, receipts and expenditures.32 Decree no. 14/1960 gf 12 July announced that within th e new appointed parliament, the DPSGR, the. parties were, to be organized into |&ur categories, called the N ationalist, Islamic, Christian, anc^&mmunist 'groups.' These four would face a single golkar 'group,' which was divided into, four 'sub-groups': Armed Forces; religious; spiritual development; and material, development. This was clearly the basis for future ' sim plification'. Presidential Decision restructuring of regional DPRs, whereby half th e p arties and h alf to 5/1960 golkar. 84 23 September Additionally, announced seats th e would go to th e Army.increased i t s d irect influence over c iv il administration during I960.85 Between 1957 and 1960 th e Army and Sukarno attempted to reduce th e p o litic a l parties to mere appendages of the new p o litical system of Guided Democracy and succeeded in doing so. The attacks against the p arties were most sharply f e l t by th e only successful and growing member among them, th e FKC. Thus, in establishing the new social contract by planting th e p arties, the if in one sense, singling p o litica l architects of Guided Democracy out the Ctommunists for discrimination. During th e period from mid-1960 to 1962 th e intensity o f the Army-led campaign to suppress th e collective activ ities and mobilizing potential o f its riv als was directed almost solely a t the EKE. ^The Cbiiministsi potential for mobilization, whether in the- form o f electioneering, parliamentary a c tiv itie s, o r work among veterans groups, was severly curtailed. The Army also sought to suppress Communist Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 102] === 92 collective a c tiv ity with i t s m artial law powers.86 c e n s o r s h i p, fo r example, were used Hie Army's powers of frequently suspend Pfe-Han Rakvat.88 c u t i t s circulation,89 permanently ban Politbureau and SOBSI journals,90 and end labour ag ita tio n. , Hie la s t example Arty prohibition of party a c tiv ity was the delay (of several weeks) i t caused the Ccanmunists in holding th eir September 1959. its in ten t, Sixth National Congress in Jakarta' in Hie event was sig n ific a n t not for i t s effects, but fop as i t underlined the IN I's commitment to attack th e party ina ll areas o f p o litical l i f e, including i t s most prestigious gatherings. Hie -EKT was under a great deal o f pressure to transform i t s identity, aims, mesh more options, bases of s o lid a rity, and collective e ffo rt to smoothly w ith the p o litic a l fab ric the Guided Democracy social contract.91 Communist Strategies; Hie Alliance with Sukarno. Ideological Reformulations, and New Forms o f Collective Effort As the authoritarian nature o f Guided Democracy became evident, the aims o f p o litic a l actors had to be those of Sukarno's. Only by siding '1^- with "the President and by vocalizing h is radicalism about Indonesia's "continuing revolution" could an acto r achieve the requisite id e n tity of Guided Democracy. By "returning to th e r a ils Sukarno declared Indonesia had done in 1959, of our revolution," the bases of so lid a rity became not narrow in te re sts located somewhere in the electo rate, o r in this o r th a t class, nation or "family." but rath er comprised the whole o f the Indonesian Consequently, the co llectiv e e ffo rts of th e actors no longer related to autonomous organization-building in the form o f a p o litic a l p arty, but now became channeled into th e s ta te 's (th a t is, the President's) grandiose foreign policy and internal planning schemes.92 Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 103] === 93 Thus, from 1957 to 1962 the touchstone o f collective effo rts invariably related to th e campaign to wrest West Iria n from Ditch control. Insofar as Sukarno.represented the fount o f ideas of Guided Democracy — th at is, decided the ^Lpgitimate actors' id e n titie s and options, c la rifie d the nature of th e contract's aims, bases of solidarity and co llective e ffo rt — then the increasingly intimate ideological and ta c tic a l embrace of the President between 1957 and 1962 by the Communists constituted an a ttempt to make a successful transition from a decaying contract to a new one. The support len t to Sukarno by th e EKE was to be the f i r s t, strongest, bridge b u ilt in the tra n sitio n period. with Sukarno.were already strong before 1957. and Tne FKI's relations Howevejr, when the f i r s t major th reats to lib eral democracy were heard fraa Sukarno in h is "bury the p arties" scheme. speech, even the EKE voiced i t s muted opposition to the By the time Sukarno delivered h is konseosi amidst th e dramatic events on th e outer islands in February 1957, when the threat to lib e ra l democracy had grown immeasurably, President's corporatist ideas. the PKE gave i t s support to the That a ootom-rovong cabinet, premised on corporatist ideals (the "family p rinciple"), blatantly violated the EKE's canmitment class struggle, did not deter Aidit from giving the conception h is p arty 's approval.93 Later, in 1958, when i t became apparent th a t ^the Any attempted to monopolize Sukarno's ideas,94 the EKE both lent the President i t s support and subtly reminded him of his deviation from EKE cabinet representation by calling fo r a "100 per cent implementation of the konseosi." 95 PKE l e n t 'i t J The support in th e drive to crush the PKRI-Fermesta rebellion and- same of its most outspoken and dangerous enemies in the Army^ The Communists even reversed th e ir in itia l opposition (which had resu lted in Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 104] === th e suspension of Harian Rakvat) Jab Presidential Decree n o..6/1959, which prevented them from translating th e ir electoral victories of 1957 in to th e composition of regional councils, and la te r called th e P resident's a c t "a glorious victory for the p a rty.1,96 A v irtue was made of necessity when th e Army acted to reimplement the 1945 Constitution, and the "PKE became one of the chief advocates o f the [document], solidly supporting th e course which i t knew to be in ev itable."97 With the foundation and organizational rudiments of Guided Democracy in place by mid-1960, "the PKE could congratulate it s e l f th at i t had stayed on the right side of the government in a period of rapid p o litic a l changes, and...had become accepted p a rt increasingly monolithic and ^autocratic s ta te." 98 the agencies Its success up to th a t point could be attributed to i t s almost unreserved support for Sukarno from 1957 to 1960. The p a rty 's success sifter 1960, however, could be attrib u ta b le to the demands placed on Sukarno by the evolving p o litic a l s itu a tio n. As Peeve has argued, as party influence was reduced from 1959 to 1960, th e area of agreement between Sukarno and the Any leadership shrank correspondingly,... [and since] Sukarno lacked an organized mass following to promote h is vision o f what Indonesia should -vthe PKC was h is strongest backer.... Of the th ree surviving big parties, th e PKC could offer the b est organized bass support of the more ‘rad ical themes o f the President's"'" speeches, particularly on foreign policy..’.. ‘ [Thus] th e PKE and the President needed each other for protection against the Army.... Nasution1s h o s tility to th e continued ro le for the p a rtie s and the Army's p a rtic u la r harassment of the PKE forced Sukarno to formulate a rationale to defend th e ir existence. This he d id in [July] 1960 with a new formula, 'Nasakom1. 99 The acronym Nasakom defined the unity of th e three forces th at Sukarno perceived (Nasionalisme). dominant Religion (Agama), Indonesian and Communism society: Nationalism (Kcmunisroef.10° concept o f Nasakom. especially when i t became a sta te doctrine Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The (cn 17" === [PDF page 105] === August 1960), preserved a p o litic a l role fo r the Communists even if i t was contradiction with the P resid en t's own e a rlie r anti-party formulations. I t was th e President's own stepped up campaign to bring West Irian "into th e national fold" in 1961-1962, with the EKE in immediate tow, th a t consolidated th e latter* s id entity the foremost Indonesian n atio n a list actor, helped i t f u l f i ll the hational aim, and permitted i t engage in Sukarno's issued his mobilization. PKE with nationwide collective "command" to effo rts. ^ On 19 December 1961 th e nation ro prepare for general The hysterical and jin g o iscic environment presented the a g reat opportamty and "in the early months of 1962 no party outdid th e PKI in articu lating a quality.oft, reckless daring th a t would somehow manage to bring West New Guinea in to the Indonesian fo ld." ^ ^ Diplomatic actions and mass PKI-led campaigns, rather than m ilitary acts, eventually permitted secured the th e transfer Communists and Sukarno, sovereignty and Iria n not the Armed Forces, acquire fo r themselves the prestige of the event. Indonesian agreement th at would allow the West and Thus, when a Dutchtransfer of West Iriart to Indonesian administration on!■ May 1963 was signed on 15 August 1962, Sukarno also decided time. (in October 1962) to rescind martial law a t that The real- import of th e event was that the EKE had achieved everything i t had aimed for v is-a-v is acquiring a new identity and basis solidarity: national "The EKE enhanced devorion its reputation an atmospherewhere these for patriotism " and q u a litie s, werea llimportant in winning prestige and public acceptance. "1°3 The d irect alterations th a t the EKE made with respect to i t s "formal ideology were important i t s attem p ts Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. be associated with === [PDF page 106] === Sukarno’s actions and ideas. 96 It is in t h i s area of p o litic a l l if e of Guided Democracy th at the PKE attempted most concretely to assume a new id e n tity, new aims and options, and redefine it^ bases of so lid a rity and th e nature of i t s collective effo rt. Here, e ffo rts to mesh party theory and ta c tic s with th e various concepts o f Sukarno's mystagoguery and of the Indonesian st^fce. ideology [were] dictated not only by ta c tic a l considerations of the appeal to the masses of such a union of concepts, b u t also by the watphful eye cast by the m ilitary on a l l ideologies th a t might be interpreted as contrary to o ffic ia l policy.104 Hie p a rty 's adaptational process progressed in two clearly discernible steps and pivoted1around the changes to the o ffic ia l party constitution t th a t were effected a t the September 1959 and; April 1962 National Congresses. Lhere were three important: matters with.which'the party dealt in its constitutional changes of 1959 — the foreign nature of its ideology, the treachery a t Madiun, lia b ilitie s and the role o f class struggle — a l l potential in th e face of an ascendant, anticommunist Army. In his Report o f Chances in th e Communist Party C onstitution.105 K. H. Dukman declared th a t "we sta te now, fo r example, based on M arxist-Ieninist theory.1 ’A ll the work o f the PKE is e mention the theory only Marxism-Ieninism, and we do not mention the names o f the g re at pupils of Marx, Engels and Lenin,...Comrade S talin and Canrade Mao Tse-tung.1,106 Thus, same of th e alien offensiveness o f the PKE's theory was quickly cut ajjpay. On the m atter of Madiun, Lukman had th is to report: In reviewing the b irth of our Party as th e heir and continuation of th e heroic and revolutionary struggle of the Indonesian people, with the heroic evidences of m e people's struggle, th e Preamble to our Constitution now includes additionally th e rebellions and revolts which had a /h isto ry o f opposing Dutch colonialism and Japanese m ilitary occupationI107 The "Madiun A ffair" was now interpreted as the "Madiun Provocation," whgn R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n e r. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n. === [PDF page 107] === reactionary elements tricked th e progressives and Communists into selfA destruction. la s tly, on the matter o f /the role of class struggle, th^ PKI argued that theoretically, advancing- the matter o f the possibility of transition to Socialism peaceful means, means.... that we Marxist-Leninists do not "tie ourselves down with the problems of the form, the methods, and th e means of" effectuating th e revolution.108, Thus, the party held out'only the p o ssib ility of a peaceful transition; th e theorists and the tactician s alike preferred greater choicevA •cogether, content Taken the th r e ^ changes brougnt the PKT closer tq th e styre and Guided Democracy, prudently distancing the party from problematic theoretical positions.109 Hie stepping stone to the 1962 constitutional changes was th e PKE endorseuent of th e concept of Nasakcm. fferces to The party declared th e trilo gy of be "the most important consequence for a l l supporters of the P o litic a l Manifesto and Usdek," and broadly warned th e Army of i t s newly won protection, asserting th a t also clear that anti-Communist actions taken by anyone, whatever th e form may be. are contrary to the broad lin es of th e State policy of th e Republic of Indonesia, and are an act of h o s tility against one of th e major aroucs of ’the^T-ndonesian pedpla. 1,110 With its position strengthened, the PKE easily met the demands "The Conditions fo r the Simplification of th e P o litical P arties," which included acceptance o f Pancasila. th e f ir s t principle of which included 1'belief in God." The EKE response to Presidential Decrees no. 7/1959 and no. 13/1960 was timely in th a t the req u isite constitutional changes — acceptance of th e P o litical Manifesto/USDEK and Pancasila — were carried out in the b rie f time period permitted by th e authorities on 31 December 1960 (which Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 108] === 98 was also thfe deadline fo r compliance with the decrees' term s). 111 To the co nstitution ' s preamble was added a lengthy passage: The PKL accepts and defends the constitution of 1945 as the basic law of the Republic of Indonesia. In i t s preamble are mentioned the desire of th e People of Indonesia to liv e free, united, sovereign, in ju stic e and prosperity and the P an tjasila as the foundation of th e vnation; i t [the FKI] wants to develop a ju s t and prosperous society in accordance with th e nature of the people of Indonesia, and to base i t s work program on the P o litical Manifesto of the Republic of Indonesia and i t s detail s as determined by th e F irs t Session of the MPRS •to serve as the outline for the course to be taken by th e Republic of Indonesia. 112 The essence assertion the PKI's made A idit th eo retical subordinated to the in te re sts 1959 s h ift that was "class summarized in tere sts the must of the nation,"113 and was reaffirmed in December 1960 when the Central C o m m i t l u d e d th e national struggle we must hold f th a t "in carrying out the basic principle: place th e in terests of class and of the Party'lelow the national in te re st, or place th e national P arty."114 "concepts like in te re st above the in terests more general terms, as van der o f class Kroef and of the has 'People's Democracy' and even 'Socialism1 and 'Ctframunism' ffe^Vgiven a specific Indonesian context, the f ir s t being made synonymous w ith gotona ravong. the second and th ird being described as adapted to 'Indonesian conditions'."115 In order to advance i t s p o litic a l fortunes within th e context of "Indonesian conditions" a f te r the constitutional changes, the party had ensure the f i delity and unity its au x ilia rie s, while a ttempting at^the same time to recover from the anti party effects of Since in itia tiv e the Army's organization building. FKI had to build for been placed its e lf on the defensive by a base of popular support, the Army's a reactive strategy was put into place to re ta in control of the people and resources Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 109] === already under party control. Hie f i r s t signs of the p arty 's realization th a t its adherents were the targ et of the Array came a t a party conference held between June and July 1958. The c a ll was issued, in connectic th e ongoing "Three Year Plan for Organization and Training,11 (1956-1959) enhance party discipline and knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, and to solidify central control. These measures were designed to protect the now threatened Gommunist state-w ithin-a-stata. That the intensification of Marxist-Leninist education among party cadres was emphasized more so than in the past, and given primary emphasis in the new "Three Year Plan fo r Training and Organization" (1959-1962, unveiled in September 1959), is indicative of the seriousness with which party leaders appraised Army advances. These same sentiments also constitutional changes that found a place among the reflected "increased concern 1959 with organizational discipline and ideological pfarity."116 Amidst a ll the changes, however, one aspect of the PKE's nature remained constant: the party gave the unequivocal sign that no matter how intensely the party took "on the protective coloration of its ’-ideological environment,"117 i t remained fundamentally an ideological altern ative to both the Indonesian government and Sukarno. in September 1958. The p a rty 's signal was given Aware that same of its members had been co-opted into governmental or quasi-governmental agencies, the party warned that "there is a growing p o ssib ility that these important p o litic a l appointments and posts can, within certain lim itatio n s,. have an ideologically corrupting influence among the cadres."118 Additionally, the fa c t th a t the FKI had given Guided Democracy and the Keria cabinet i t s support was, in p a rt, to blame for the "cadres [having assumed] a ttitu d e p assiv ity."119 However, the ed ito rial continued, R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ideological === [PDF page 110] === 100 th e problem arises as a consequence of the interpretation th a t is being placed upon our Parry's position, an u nju stifiable and unreasonable interpretation th a t really clouds and besmirches what should be an accurate appraisal of our tru e position, which is no matter what the present government arrogates to its e lf, or pretends to be, i t is d efin itely not a people's government, and no matter i f th at government even appears to be firm and stable, i t is s t i l l capable of adopting measures th a t are injurious to the masses.120 To further distinguish the party from a ll other p o litic a l actors, th e a rtic le continued: Sane of our cadres are evidently forgetting th a t no matter hew peacefully one's progress along the read toward Socialism may be, the actual fact [of] the matter is -char the road is the read of revolution and i t must be conceived in terms of the principles underlying class struggle. And to th is end, we must tra in, in stru ct, organize, and mobilize the masses effectively and extensively into revolutionary fo rces.... l e t us ju s t remember th a t the more offices and posts we can put cur people in, and the more various such posts o r positions are, the closer we are to the time when the people w ill tru ly govern. So as you can see our effo rts to discourage ideological backwardness or tim idity are, in effect, p art of the larger schem^' of things and have ultim ate references to the coming sm uggle.... With the strengthening of the Party ideology there w ill follow an equally strong guarantee th a t a responsible and loyal people w ill be wen over in the days ahead.121 The problem applying the above prescription Indonesian conditions in 1960 was that the p arty 's tra d itio n al means of collective a c tiv ity had been blocked by the suffocating presence of m artial law re s tric tio n s. I f the commitment to "struggle" was to m aterialize a t a ll, th e PKI had to create new forms of collective ac tiv ity. 1962, therefore, " re a lity From 1960 to the party attempted to manoeuvre through a process of te s tin g." 122 The underlying principle the new form of a c tiv ity was to employ the FKI's mass organizations as to o ls th a t would l e t the party press its (without being d irectly involved, and hence, vulnerable) own demands, and, hopefully, adherents and accumulation of resources. d isrupt the Army's organizational continue its a ttrac tio n Thus, the party undertook to schemes, arri to acquire a renewed Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 111] === 101 p o litic a l salience with respect to other p o litic a l forces. Hie strategy of "re ality testing" was f ir s t applied in 1960 to re s is t the Array's and the s ta te 's plans to create nationwide youth and labour aolkars; i t was necessary in the interests of party advancement to place the Perauda Rakvat and SOBSI in possible jeopardy. Hie attempt to create based a n youth golkar government's youth."123 desire in February break 1960 was explicitly the hold p arties the Indonesia's Fortunately for Ferauda Rakvat, resistance to the scheme was shared with other youth orras. thus distributing evenly any retribution from the government or Array. In any event, a ll the large youth or-as emerged unscathed and (formally) unassociated with the Youth Front (Front Perauda) th a t was created in August 1960.124 On the matter of the government's desire to create a labour c o lte r. th e United Organization Ferkeria Indonesia — OPPI), proposail resembled had originally "H itler's Indonesian Workers (Oroanisasi Persatuan however, SOBSI largely stood alone. - Hie elicited Harlan Arbeiters front, "125 Fakvat's response especia lly since th a t was predicated upon the labour M inister's b e lie f th at "the labor movement should be free from international influences."!26 At a labour conference held in July 1960 i t was SOBSI, not the PKE, that continued1the polemic. The proposal was found to be compulsory elements."I22 "fascistic in character and [contained] in more diplomatic terms, SOBSI argued that such an idea was in conflict with the 1945 Constitution and international law to which the Indonesian government subscribed. I 2® Even in th e face o f pressure from the Army's EKSEUMIL,129 and attacks from other p o litica l p a rtie s,130 SOBSI sustained i t s opposition to OPPl.131 The resu lts of th is venture in "reality testin g," the ris k ie s t to date, were summarized Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 112] === 102 bv A idit in April 1962 when he "claimed the failu re of OPPI as one of the PKE's greatest successes in recent years."132 Having sta lle d the drive create organizations concept of aolonqan karva. the PKE and i t s based an the fronts pressed in 1961 and 1962 to reassert the p o litic a l salience of the PKT. Belgian actions in the eango^Jn: 1961-1962 presented the pretext fo r SOBSI's rejuvenation in the sphere of labour agitation. Throughout July and August 1961, for example, a wave of "unofficial strik es" spearheaded by SOBSI a ffilia te s swept Belgian property in North and East Sumatra.133 Presaging the PKE's campaign against feudal ism in 1953 and 1964 was the outbursu of peasant imresf. in November 1961, instigated by the SOBSI mainstay, the Union of Plantation Workers of the Republic of Indonesia (Serikat Buruh Perkebunan Reoublik Indonesia — Sartoupri). helped reassert contender. the FKI' s This new form of co llective activ ity credentials tenacious revolutionary Taken together with the other changes the party had made with respect to i t s aims, options, bases of so lid a rity, and co llective action, the PKE a t i t s Seventh Special National Congress in April 1962 could look confidently to a future role in pressing the an ti-im p erialist and an ti feudalist concerns of Indonesia's "continuing revolution." Moreover, the path to i t s own sty le of revolution a fte r 1962 was not as encumbered by the pervasive influence of the Army which, since 1959, had suffered p o litic a l reversals a t the hands of Sukarno. The Army in Retreat and Differences with Sukarno 1959-1962 From the outset, the leadership was an alliance relationship between of expediency. duumvirate grew apart in two major ways. Sukarno and the Amy Between 1959 and 1962 the F irs t, Sukarno compromised on Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 113] === the role of p o litic a l parties in the context of Guided, Democracy, and therefore resisted le ttin g the Amy expand to a size commensurate with i t s aspirations. Second, on the more profound question of the direction th a t the "continuing revolution" should take a fte r 1959, there were sharp disagreements. Several consequences followed from the President's curbing of the Army's place in national lif e, and especially Nasution's role, attempt to d irect the course of the revolution. enjoy Second, Presidential patronage regard flourish was secured\ F irst, the EKE came to positions a healthy \ environment within which i t and h is and i t s the sta te. fronts could Third, and most importantly, the recurrence of a divided leadership by 1962 heralded tantalizing prospects of rea l power. The alterations effected to m artial law legislatio n by Sukarno in December 1957 marked the f i r s t of a long series of measures enacted by the' President to apply the brake on the Army's anti-party campaigns and to ensure h is own power. The significant change made in 1957 related to the conferring on Sukarno of the powers and t i t l e of "supreme" "State-ofWar Administrator," a position "which under the der Kroef w rites, services."134 "had been shared the [March] 1957 law," van heads the m ilitary Later, in Decemjoer 1959 a ll regional commanders were made d irectly responsible to Sukarno.135 With regard to the TNI's innovations on the organizational level — the EKSs and the ENPIB — the President interfered extensively. On the f i r s t anniversary of the EKSEM in 1958, for instance, Sukarno "expressed le ss than complete satisfaction with i t s a c tiv itie s." 136 The FNPIB drew 'th e P resident's ire p articu lar, especially a fte r i t s quasi-govemmental pretensions were revealed by i t s August 1958 name change. At the time, Sukarno attached an honcurary Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 114] === 104 council the Front, consisting himself and other civ ilian proteges,137 while enjoining in other measures to control Army-dominated bodies.138 Sukarno's public criticism of th e FNPIB on 17 August 1959 was harsh: As fo r the FNPIB, I frankly say th a t I am not very s a tis fie d with £fcs actions. Do not l e t the FNPIB day by day became more and mere ju s t a body with the le a st in te re st in West Iria n 1 Do not l e t i t deal with other things which do not d irectly concern the struggle fo r West Irian, for instance, shipbuilding and shipping concerns.... Hie FNPIB...must concentrate i t s effo rts upon arousincr and s tirrin g the masses fo r the struggle for West Iria n.139 Ju s t as the FNPIB had preempted the FKI-led Central Action Cammittee for th e Liberation of West Irian, Sukarno's announcement of a new Front Nasional on 13 January 1960 undermined the Army's organization, which was fin ally dissolved in 1961.. Even when the p a rtia lly Army was responsible for interference was pervasive. represented the within direction its the government, policy, and Sukarno's Sukarno's offer of the Defence and Security p o rtfo lio in the Keria cabinet to Nasup.cn came with the insistence that he resign his post as Army Chief-of-Staff. th e President's plans and secured th e Nasution, naturally, rejected post anyway, but not without suffering the disruptive presence of a Sukarno-appointed arch-rival in th e position of Junior Defence M inister. To add to h is tra v a ils, th e Air Force's assertions of autonomy and i t s unwillingness to take orders from an Army o fficer weakened Nasution by "lim iting the powers of the Ministry o f Defence which thus became hardly mere than an adm inistrative unit," instead united strengthen the position command of the a ll serv ices."140 service Sukarno, Chiefs-of-Staff vis-a-vis Nasution," included them in the cabinet as m inisters ex o fficio cabinet revision in February I960.141 in a To add a fin a l in su lt to th e Army Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 115] === 105 and Nasution "Soekamo got in a blow by calling the a ir force th e apple o f his eye and [promised] i t new equipment."142 Several key policy decisions made by the government, and often crafted in part by Nasution or other Army officers, Sukarno to serve his purposes. were altered by Often these changes benefited th e EKE. Illu s tra tiv e of th is was Sukarno's personal intervention on behalf of the PKE to fa c ilita te staging its effo rts to quash the gathering. 1959 National Congress, despite Amy Also significant was Sukarno's crucial alteratio n of the original conditions, in p art drafted by Nasution, •for the continued existence of p o litica l p arties. Whereas the body charged with th is responsibility in itia lly called for the banning of a ll parties th a t had been or were currently engaged in rebellion (the PSI, Masiumi, and the PKE), Sukarno changed the conditions such th a t only p arties "at present" (in 1959) were to be banned.143 Nasution attemp ted to reverse th e effects of h is own policy, which now favoured the EKE, by fu tile ly urging Masiumi to denounce the ERRI in 1960 before i t was too la t e.144 Lastly, when the m ilitary commanders in South Sumatra, South Kalimantan, and South Sulawesi banned the EKE and i t s fronts in th e ir respective areas in August 1960, i t was Sukarno who made possible an early liftin g of the ban in South Sumatra and South Sulawesi. The surrender of the la s t PERI elements in February-April 1961? the capture of the Darul Islam leader, S. M. Kartcsuwirjo, on 4 June 1962; and the 15 August 1962 West Irian settlement to ta lly undermined the basis the SOB and the p o litic a l lif e. continued predominance of the Army in national Commensurate with the Army's decline in importance was Nasution's decline in prestige and power. Cnee again, th e manoeuvres of Sukarno precipitated the power s h ift. in tric a te In June 1962 Sukarno Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 116] === 106 accepted a plan to establish the position of Commander of the Armed Forces (Pamlima Anakatan Berseniata — PANGAB), with Nasution fillin g th e post. Ostensibly, the creation of PANGAB was to expedite the further integration of the Armed Forces and ensure a coordinated policy among the services. Nasution readily accepted the post of PANGAB and turned the post of Army Chief-of-Staff over to Yani. Thereafter, in Nasution's own words, Sukarno launched into a "coup from above": Sukarno now declared th at the new hierarchical stru c tu re...would consist of the supreme commander — himself — on top of the structure with fu ll operational powers, assisted by a chief of sta ff of the armed forces (Kepala Staf Angkatan Bersenjata, or KASAB).... All service chiefs were to be elevated from chiefs cf s ta ff to commanders of th e ir respective services and placed d irectly under the command o f the president."145 Within nine months Nasution's replacement, Sukarno replaced the commanders of South Sumatra and South Kalimantan, presumably as part of a wider campaign to redress the p o litic a l balance in favour of the FKE. Nasution' s loss of control over the Amy was compounded1by the less of.his seat on the Assisting Board to th e Supreme War Authority (Badan Pertibantu Feoerti) on 1 July 1963. Perhaps the most fundamental reason for the lack of continued accord between Sukarno and Nasution was th e ir very d ifferen t conceptions of the "revolution." In the early days of Guided Democracy i t soon became apparent th a t Nasution placed an emphasis on order and s ta b ility as the proper envir onment for longer-term progr amm es of which the most important is the Overall Development Plan [1961-1969] which w ill aim a t leading towards the th ree goal frameworks, of our revolution: a Unitary State, a Just and Prosperous Society, and to be friends with a l l nations; basically to create a Ju s t and Prosperous Society. I t is aimed a t building a Ju st and Prosperous Society.146 ' The commitment to Indonesia's economic development was evident not only th e government portfolios the Army controlled Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. production, === [PDF page 117] === 107 agriculture, caranunicatians, health, internal a ffa irs, and veterans a ffa irs — but in the Army's own effo rts through i t s creation in early 1961 of the Bodies for the Fostering of Functional Potentials fRedan Pembina Potemsi. Karya — BPPK). 147 In contrast to the Army's policy of quiet and patient national development was the inpatient cacophony of Sukarno's "revolution." Sukarno, For revolution meant "a national mood of excitement, drive, mass enthusiasm, and a s ta rt on moves towards 'Indonesian socialism '. " 148 The image is best summarized by his ca lls to "construct tcrrcrrow, pull down yesterday" and for "a symphony of construction and destruction," neither of which needed to heed the ration ality of economics. 149 Amidst a ll the ideological verbiage, 159 the recurring message was one of radicalism. The apparent cammitment to radicalism both in Indonesia, in the form of anti-feudal ism, and abroad, in the form of brazen foreign policy schemes, was especially favourable to reference the the "Indonesian PKE. As Sukam^ had reiterated Revolution," had been "from the beginning,... a 'l e f t Revolution, a People's Revolution. ' " 151 He also spoke connection the against out, "Communist phobia." with propagation Nasakom. Increasingly i t was th is vision of revolution and of Indonesia's character th at gained ideological ascendancy during the f i r s t half of the 1960s. such charged atmosphere, with its obvious permissiveness towards the FKI, i t became contingent upon Sukarno to draw figures from the party into the various bodies and agengies of the sta te. By 1962, therefore, the PKE was represented in the DPR-GR (where "with about 55 to 60 followers the PKE had become one of the largest, i f not the largest, party bloc"152), in the MPRS, on the nenemas (where one of three deputy Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 118] === 108 chairmen, Sakirman, was a EKE o ffic ia l), on the DPA (where A idit and Lukman had se a ts), in the National.Front, and in the cabinet (on 9 March 1962 A idit and lukman were given positions without portfolio, largely of an advisory nature). The EKE1s hold on i t s te rrito ry in Central and East Java despite remained threatened to firm undo the p arty 's became the deputy heads of Jakarta), Presidential Decree 6/1959 1957 election wins. 153 three regions Party members (West Java, the heads of eight autonomous regions which East Java, and in East Java, 154 and mayors of Semarang, Surakarta, Tjirebcn, and Surabaya. More important for the party was its own growth as well as th at of its fronts. In 1959 Lukman reported th at the EKE had a membership of more than 1.5 m illion, 155 of which more than h alf were declared to be peasants. 156 By October 1962 the party was claiming membership of 2 m illion. 157, The p arty 's au x iliaries also experienced ta p rific growth. SOBSI grew from 2,732,909 members a t the end pf 1959,158 to 3,277,032 in 1962.159 The peasant front, BIT, in April 1959 claimed a membership of 3.5 m illion (or 14 per cent of a ll adult peasants). 160 When s ta tis tic s were released in July 1962 the staggering growth of the organisation was confirmed: 5,654,974 members (25 per cent of the to ta l adult peasant population), were organized through subbranches in 43 per cent of a ll peasant v illag es, in 84 per cent of a l l keti anatan s, located in v irtu ally 100 per cent of a l l kabuoatens. 161 Pemuda Rakvat's membership increased from 1.2 m illion in July 1958,162 to 1.25 m illion in September 1961,163 and to a high of 1.5 m illion in early 1963.164 Finally, Gerwani's membership of 700,000 a t the beginning of I960165 increased to 1,120,594 December 1961, and 1.5 m illion in January 1963.166 Hindley has estimated th a t between July 1959 and October 1962, the membership of the Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 119] === 109 four major FKI fronts rose from 7.8 million to over 11.0 m illion. 167 Hie Ctmmunist state-w ithin-a-state seemed to have recovered completely from the Army siege and, indeed, had came to command a t le a st the nominal loyalty of an ever larger section of the p o lity. From Within the Confines of Guided Democracy: The FKI's Future Prospects In 1962 the EKE could commend its e lf fo r having withstood the only rea l and concerted threat to its p o litica l existence since 1948, in the form the Army, while undergoing fundamental and complex transformation fa r more significant than the changes i t made in 1951. fu lfillin g both of these tasks, the the party, fact, fa c ilita te d blunting of the strong anti-party measures of 1959 and 1960, and helped reformulate the social contract of Guided Democracy as i t appeared in its Nasakom guise. $ exclusively, No longer was Guided Democracy based on functional groups but from 1962 i t rested on an uneasy combination of the parties and th e ir ormas. united in Nasakom. and Army-inspired aolkars. As Reeve has argued, by early 1963 "the ideology of Guided Democracy became s p lit in two," with the Amy monopolizing the crolkar concept and the PKE asserting its hegemony within Nasakom. 168 Thus, ensconced in the s ta te apparatus and protected by Nasakom. the EKE a fte r 1962 sought to advance the revolution on two fronts: on th e an ti-feud alist and an tiim perialist stages erected by Guided Democracy its e lf, and in a l l areas of Indonesian l if e where the Army attempted' to mobilize support for the concept of golkar. Thus, having suffered attacks from both the sta te and Army up to 1962, the party increasingly counterattacked these two targets between la te 1962 and 1965 as i t moved from a reactive to a mobilizing strategy. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 120] === 10 CHAPTER IV THE POLARIZATION OF GUIDED DEM OCRACY: NASAKCMVERSUS GOLKAR IAIE 1962 TO LATE 1964 Between la te 1962 and la te 1964 the struggle between the INI and the PKE intensified and became essentially a contest over the very nature of Guided Democracy. By 1962 i t was evident th a t the social contract of Guided Democracy contained two mutually incompatible streams or sets of elements. In one instance, in stitu tio n a l features the collection of corporatist concepts and centred around the (golkar) was being advanced by the TNI. notion qolonoan karva Countervailing pressure was being applied most strid en tly by the EKE, with the lesser p arties o f‘FNI and NU in tow, to establish a Nasakom-oriented Guided Democracy and to repeal the harsh anti-party measures th a t were enacted in 1959 and 1960. In the' series of clashes th a t ensued between the adherents of these two visions of the p o litic a l order, one is witness to p o litic a l conflict between a declining p o litic a l actor, the TNI, and an ascending p o litic a l actor, the PKE. Accordingly, the strateg ies employed by each actor re fle c t th e ir fsh iftin g status with regard to the social contract its e lf. That is say, as the Army's resources and cap ab ilities came to increasingly depleted or weakened by, chiefly, -the PKE in i t s offensive 110 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 121] === strategy, the TNI had increasingly to revert to a reactive strategy to protect those same p o litic a l goods. A discussion of the Army's government-building a c tiv ite s and the refinement of its th is chapter. the Ihis w ill se t the stage in p art two for a discussion of developments incipient between government stabilization failu re ideological basis w ill constitute the f i r s t part of la te attenpted 1962 and have la te its 1363 when the "programme" Army's economic adopted by the government of Sukarno and Djuanda. adept a U.S.-sponsored stab ilizatio n plan, The largely a t the - hands of Sukarno — in turn, a t the Denest of the PKI — was the f i r s t indication th a t the Nasakom half of Guided Democracy would, become the predominant aspect of the social contract. A discussion of the FKI' s attempts to make its e lf the determining factor of the social contract, through a multifaceted "revolutionary offensive" launched in la te 1963, w ill comprise the th ird section. Between la te 1963 and-late 1964, the INI s ta t^ c lth in -a -s ta te Communist counterpart clashed over a variety direction. issues, and i t s each attempting to steer the polity its cwn By the end of.1964 the Army seemed to be in general re tre a t, while Sukarno's favouritism t&wards the Pltr, combined with its thrusts to assert its sovereignty, moved Guided {Democracy markedly in the direction of Nasakom. The Arw's Government-Building and Conceptual Refinement In itia tiv e s 1958 To Earlv 1963 The p o litic a l aspirations of the TNI and i t s leadership in March 1957 fa r outstripped the Amy's preparedness fo r assuming* the weighty role assigned to i t sunder the SOB., Legitimizing the ^ reality of i t s involvement with a conceptual framework or ideological base, which wculd Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 122] === 112 also perpetuate th at wide-ranging p o litic a l role indefinitely, was*- the primary - task 1958. Army Staff leadership facing th e u tiliz ed, Army leaders prim arily, the Therefore, and th e TNI Command School fSekolah Staf dan Komando Anakntan Derat — SESKQAD), and its Doctrine Committee (established by Nasution in 1958) to articu late and inculcate a concept government within the o ffic e r corps. Thus, rapid succession, the ''Middle Way" concept c f 1958 gave way 'to the Doctrine of T e rrito ria l Warfare and T errito rial Management, which in turn provided the oasis for the Civic Mission progr amme unveiled in 1962. Having arrived in government, the 1962 a t what seemed to TNI se t out to ensure th a t, be a viable basis in the m artial law to civ ilian p o litic s, Civic Missions would transition for from be practised by i t s c iv ilian supporters a t a ll levels o f the s ta te, society, and economy. To ensure the likelihood th e Army trie d to have a national development scheme, sponsored by the United States, adopted as national policy. of th is outcome, Since th e success of the C ivic Missions depended upon the n atio n's commitment to economic development, the TNl's advocacy of its programme and the plan marked an attempt to have i t s favoured form of collective e ffo rt and aims imposed on the sta te. own Indonesian Tb^oadc i t s plans, the Army protected i t s past strongholds in the economy (the s ta te enterprises) and in the regions with new forms, of organized coercion. Ultimately, what held the whole Civic Mission scheme together, however, was th e Army's a b ility to (top the members government and the convince the sta te e lite bureaucracy), p articu larly Sukarno, of the worthiness of, national economic development. Under conditions m artial law, th e Army had developed organisations before i t developed a rationale fo r th e ir existence. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 123] === 113 the TNI's quest to find same degree of popular support, Nasution rushed to subvert party ormas. By mid-1958 a multitude of BKSs, operating in conjunction with th e ir umbrella organization, Indonesian p o litic a l landscape. well the renaming the FNPIB, litte re d the In th e ir numbers and in th e ir scope, as of th e FNPIB in August 1958, these Array organizations hinted of a much broader role than that suggested by the Army's on-going demands fo r functional administrative, executive, group status, a place in the and le g isla tiv e branches o f the government, and in the diplomatic corps. Hie f ir s t real ideological ju stific a tio n for the Army's aspirations was given in November 1956. Nasution1s November 1958 speech on the TNI's "Middle Way" (Jalarj Tenciah) 1 galvanized ju stific a tio n the of i t s Army into present and future search for ideological role. In essence, Nasution proclaimed th a t th e INI was not about to typify either of the two Array "types" then in existence in the world: "We do not and we w ill not copy the s i t - v o n as i t exists in several Latin American states where the army acts as a d ire c t p olitical force," Nasution declared; "nor will we emulate the Western European model where armies are tlife deacT tools the governments] o r the example of Eastern Europe."2 consisted o f steering between th e temptation The Middle Way seize power and th e p itfa lls of c iv ilia n dominance of the Army th a t had so antagonized th e HU during th e 1950s. necessitated future The concept of philosophical the Middle Way was crude and refinement; this process occurred between 1958 and 1962. The development of th e Doctrine o f T erritorial Warfare Nilavah) and T erritorial Management (Pembinaan Wilavahl preoccupation of th e TNI and consolidated the (Perana became a major Army's vision of th e Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 124] === 114 character and direction of the ''continuing revolution.” importantly, p a ra lle l th e ongoing development of development surprisingly, the the Doctrine of an apparatus designed to body in itia lly responsible Perhaps more occasioned the implement i t. for th e Not concept T erritorial^ Warfare, th e Inspectorate-General of T e rrito ria l and People's Warfare, also created the TNX's incipient governmental apparatus: Seccicn V of th e Army General Staff (Staf Untun Ancxkatan Darat — SUAD V). contrast ■which features relating other armies, possessed intelligence personnel (SUAD I I I ), and logistics BKSs and the ENPU3, orthodox structural operations (SUAD I I ), (SUAD IV ), the TNI created a section re la tin g to te r r ito r ia l a ffa irs (SUAD V). were the the Among th e concerns of SUAD V which were established under its aegis. A fter th e advocacy of the Middle Way concept, T e rrito ria l Warfare and T e rrito ria l Management became the focal point of SUAD V a c tiv itie s. th is connection, SUAD V was ably assisted by the Army Doctrine Committee a t SESKDAD, which, throughout 1960-1962, elaborated these concepts. The concept of T errito rial Management represented, at base, a vision o f the revolution, to which Indonesia had "returned" by 1959. As such, th e concept of T e rrito ria l Management, which was to be practised during peacetime, struggle never was more important that Indonesia was to eventuated during than T erritorial Warfare, form of wage against a foreign enemy, but that Guided Democracy. The preparations for T e rrito ria l Warfare were to be laid through a vigourous and nationwide T e rrito ria l Management scheme, was minimal. Thus, th e even i f the p o ssib ility of war occurring Army derived penetrative and nationwide ro le Ostensibly, the programmatic concern th e benefits Indonesian lif e T e rrito ria l R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. playing a ll times'. Management:, === [PDF page 125] === 115 elaborated u tiliz ed "the 1962, was ensure th at " a ll national potential in a to ta l fashion, 1,4 where national potential was defined as m ilitary, political-eccnomic-social, field s. " 5 people's) s p ir itu a l, and civic Not only was T e rrito ria l Management designed to create th e necessary "war motivation" in th e sp iritu al fie ld, b ut as suggested by the references to "ensuring sta b ility, 1,6 the concept was to applied liberalism; atheism; against "antagonistic international isolationism; Communism; autarchy; and elements": negative "Individualism religious ctauvinism. label led an "aggressive ideology"8 th a t "considers i t s the starting point for the launching of a and fanaticism; crmrnnr.i.em was sta te to be only 'universal mission1 whose ultimate objective is mastery o f the en tire world."9 The warning against the FKI was put very starkly by SESKDAD and presaged an inevitable confrontation with th e party after the SOB was lifte d: "For the ag itato rs, in th e negative meaning o f the word, and diehards who support these antagonistic elements," SESKDAD warned, "forceful measures must be eliminated. "10 taken and, necessary, they must be isolated and In this regard, the Army had a ready-made indoctrination programme: At b est elimination o f these h ostile elements so th a t they can be replaced with our own national ideals and foundations;... [and]- a t least, reduction and lim itation of th e ir respective strengths and spheres of influence so that they can be supervised and controlled easily, [or] to establish immunity against th e penetration o f foreign ideologies capable o f creating disruption, revolt, and subversion. 11 SESKDAD reaffirmed a golkar interpretation of Guided Democracy by asserting that "we have in our Pantjasila and in our revolutionary ideals, one basis and objective fo r cur revolution, one national mission. There is no, need- fo r anything e ls e."12 Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 126] === 116 The concepts of T e rrito ria l Management and 'te rrito ria l Warfare had an operational aspect as well. Special m ilitary training indoctrination drives became a major part o f courses and SESKDAD's a c tiv itie s. 13 Significantly, when the Doctrine was o ffic ia lly recognized as national policy by th e MERS in la te I960, the indoctrination drive was extended getting substantial number of senior civ ilian o ffic ia ls understand the relationship between T e rrito ria l Warfare and T errito rial Management, hoping that th is would create enough consensus between civ ilian and m ilitary authorities to help them close ranks."14 the TNI attempted to fashion what Pauker has called "a pattern o f government"1^ between civilians and m ilitary figures th at would endure in th e post-SOB era. cultivation effects Here, the Array's indoctrination and focussed on th e Four-in-One bodies (Tiatur Tunccal) located in a l l seventeen m ilitary commands in the country. Decisions about T erritorial Management were taken by the Tiatur Tunacals, which consisted a committee four people: th e te rrito ria lm ilitary commander (chairman); the c iv ilia n governor; the chief o f police; and the d is tr ic t attorney. governors with Since th e chairmanships would revert to the civ ilian th e termination the SOB, SUAD organized interdepartmental "Orientation Courses on Security Problems," which a t the end of 1962 had indoctrinated 300 senior o ffic ia ls, presumably among them, T errito rial Warfare. 1 6 Not surprisingly, e ffo rts, were the governors the concepts of T e rrito ria l Management and the Army's own indoctrination "subtly intertwined with but clearly distinguishable p o litic a l in ten t from the o ffic ia l propaganda of the Sukarno regime," 17 th a t i s, Guided "the doctrine was 'generally phrased in th e current language of Democracy, except th a t th ere was no mention Nasakam." 18 Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 127] === 117 Indeed, the Doctrine was premised upon th e destruction o f Nasakom. By 1962 there was a series o f developments th a t necessitated a more active implementation of th e kinds of ideas represented by T errito rial Management and T erritorial Warfare than mere indoctrination courses. primary importance was the fact th a t by July 1962 Sukarno would no longer to lerate aggressive Army drives and in itia tiv es designed to supplant the p arties the name of the 1945 Constitution. 19 To compound the inevitable curtailr e n t of the Army's p o litic a l ac tiv ity and conrractual reformulation, Sukarno decided in lifte d on 1 May 1363. October 1962 that th e SOB would be With successes on the m ilitary and p o litica l fronts, i t was also an opportune moment to demobilize th e Armed Forces, especially th e mammoth 350,000-man Amy. afford the bloated m ilitary I t was becoming d if f ic u lt’to establishment. According to Nasution himself, in the 1962 "routine budget," th e m ilitary "absorbed 53 per cent of th e en tire revenues of th e S tate." 20 While the Amy was expected to heed the economic needs of the s ta te and revolution, th e character and direction of the revolution made th e TOT uncomfortable w ith the future. The ris e of th e concept of Nasakom. and the failu re of th e Amy to have its e lf d irectly incorporated into the evolving social contract through the adoption of concepts such as Nasakomil (Nasicnal isme-AoamaKtamunisme-Militerf o r PnTka-r (Politik-TCarva \, did not bode well for the Army's decidedly d ifferen t vision of th e revolution. As the m ilitary commander of West Java, and commander of the Siliwangi Division, General Adjie stated in the early 1960s, 11anti-Communism was not compatible with the 'p o litic a l etiquette 1 of the Sukarno regime and therefore the Amy had to compete with the Communist Party without confronting i t openly. "21 The solution to the Army's rapid displacement from the commanding heights Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 128] === 118 o f the social contract was the Civic Mission programme. Since the HU regarded i t s e l f as more than a to g l of the s ta te, i t maintained an in tere st in the experiences of several foreign armies that behaved in a sim ilar manner. 2 2 The attempts of th e TNI to mimick or duplicate the features th a t i t found favourable in th e practises o f these other armies, most notably the Yugoslavian example, were sharpened by its own struggle with the ParoL Islam in West Java. There, throughout the period from 1948 to 1962, the Siiiwangi Division consciously a ttemp t ed to go beyond a purely m ilitary v i emery by supplementing th e constructive and developmental ventures designed to populace. Efforts were made to peace with benefit the local improve canals and irrig a tio n systems, rebuild schools, mosques, houses, and so forth; a l l these measures were enacted to win the people to th e Amy's side. Soon, the experiences of th e Siliwangi Division were applied on a nationwide scale: The argument was developed th a t i f national defence policy relied on a concept of popular resistance fperlawanan rakvat) [derived from the Doctrine of T e rrito ria l Management and T e rrito ria l Warfare], then community development (pertfoanounan desa) was needed not only in areas stricken by the rebellions of p a st years but everywhere in the country. 23 An additional influence on the TNI's conceptual development was the United S tates. As early as 1953 the U.S. National Security Council had envisaged m ilitary training to th e TNI and assistance to "moderates...on the rig h t," "to prevent permanent cammunist control" Indonesia. 24 With the r is e to proninance of th e Hd in the 1957 elections and th e ban of th e Mas-hmri and PSI in late 1960, Communists f e ll mainly to the Army. responsibility for countering the From the perspective of th e U.S., as expressed by the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff in 1958, "the only nanKbmmunist force with the capability of obstructing th e...PKI" was the Indonesian Any; therefore, Nasution was to be given "encouragement" "to carry out Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. === [PDF page 129] === 119 his 'plan' related to Missions. 26 for th e control of Ccamunlsni."25 helping the Army leadership According to Scott, develop the by establishing in Jakarta a special Advisory Group) a s s is t in th e Mission programs." 2 7 concept of Civic "the Kennedy administration aided the Indonesian Army in developing Civic Mission or One form of a ssistance 'civic action' programs" U.S. MTLTftG (M ilitary inplemenrntion c f Training^ SESKGAD's Civic In a 1964 memo f rom Secretary of State Risk, to President Johnson, i t was revealed that U.S. a id to Indonesia [in the form cf th e MUHAG]...we are s a tis f ie d...is nor helming Indonesia irril itar-- ly. i t is, however, perm itting us to mairrcain seme contact with kev elements in Indonesia which are interested in and capable o f resistin g Communist takeover. We think th is i s of v ita l importance to the e n tire Free World. 28 The U.S. aid to th e INI did not simultaneously benefit the Indonesian state; rather, by expediting the TUI's acquisition of a corporate en tity, and knowledge of economics and administration through SESKOAD courses, the Americans participated 1962, in building of a siate-w ithin-a-state. the TNI, in terms o f being statelik e, had one advantage over i t s Communist riv a l: i t had a strong lin k to a powerful external s ta te actor. Moreover, in 1962 the TNI convinced the government and the other services of the Armed Forces to accept and legitimize i t s Civic Mission programme. 29 Henceforth, th e civic missions were to be known as the Work Operation of the Armed Forces (Operas i Karva Anakatan Bersendiata). The acceptance by the Indonesian state of the concept of Civic Missions was a profoundly fortunate development fo r the TNI. The need perceived by th e Army to have these ideological formulations accepted, and to ensure i t s own p o litic a l livelihood a f te r May 1963, was reflected by the deployment a t th e end o f 1962 of one-third o f the Army's 140' b atta lio n s, in a l l seventeen m ilitary commands, to engage exclusively in Civic Missions. 30 R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n e r. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n. === [PDF page 130] === 120 Several organizations -were created to defend the irrolamerrtatian of the Civic Mission programme and, more broadly, T erritorial Management. The Siliwangi Division took the lead in 1962 by establishing a m ilitary presence a t the ketiamatan level M ilitary. Rayon Commands small command posts, — KDRAM The (Komando Raven Mili t e r KDRAMZL had as th e ir f i r s t task, "mental.unrest."32 by creating according to Adjie, the prevention of Soon, several thousand ncn-ocrnassicned officers were appointed in West Java to represent the Army in the capacity o f birrtara pembina. 33 and to tra in and indoctrinate local o ffic ia ls in the E l l ’s nationwide C ivil Defence organization fPertahanan Sinil — KAN5ZP), which was established June 1963. Once again, a firm link bound the provincial c iv ilia n governors to th e TNI — they were appointed heads of the regional HANSIP headquarters. 3 4 Rounding c u t the components of the coercive and protective apparatus th a t shielded the Civic Missions wera the c iv ilia n state "regiments" (baladhika-karva) located in th e Army-dominated enterprises. 3 5 Further preparations for the return of civ ilian control included th e creation of SUAD VI. This branch of the incipient p a ra lle l governmental apparatus was designed to coordinate the a c tiv itie s of "m ilitary o fficers who had received c iv ilia n positions by v irtu e of the Army's functional group status. 1'36 Given th e in tellectu al and organizational c re ativ ity displayed by the TNI over the period from 1958 to mid-1963, prepared for the return of c iv ilia n ru le. i t was seemingly well However, its e ffo rt to compete with the adherents o f Nasakom. th e TNI's development o f an a l l encompassing, to ta l, set of ideas tended to exhibit... a curiously hollow character, a circlin g about a center th a t was not there. They appeared as a search for a formula th a t would somehow provide a single social meaning.... not provide the c la rity of purpose essential to give meaning to R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e c o p yrig h t o w n er. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n. === [PDF page 131] === th e array's broader role. 37 Indeed, as th e soldiers and officers moved from the m artial sphere to the realm of Civic Missions, th e ir resentment toward essentially civ ilian undertakings grew; incompetence and a lack of enthusiasm were manifested in the projects entrusted to the m ilitary. The Civic Mission progr amme was, nonetheless, a creative and ingenious adaptation to circumstances, ta ilo re d neatly to s u it one p articular s e t of p o litic a l conditions. was, fac t, the very uniqueness of th e circumstances for which the Civic Missions were designed th at made them a failure as a strategy of p o litic a l survival. Above a l l else, the most strik ing feature o f the Army's strategy was th at i t was contingent upon the actions of others. In th is sense, and despite appearances, the Army was quite vulnerable. In order fo r Civic Missions to succeed, development. there had to be a national commitment to economic If th is condition held, the TNI would be ju stifie d placing exclusive emphasis on a development-dependent strategy. the country, development, 1961, Sukarno had given h is commitment to national Inside economic concretely in the Overall Development Plan inaugurated in and verbally through his re ite ra tio n of a reorientation toward economic a c tiv itie s with the conclusion of the West Irian campaign. 38 Outside the country, the U.S. government and th e International Monetary Fund (IMF) pledged financial and.technical assistance. The TNI's assessment of the situation by 1962, th at the revolution was moving away fran plausible. preoccupation with the anti-im perialist struggle, seemed The Army could, therefore, declare i t s commitment to Civic Missions, as a co llectiv e e ffo rt, with the sp ecific aim o f development in mind. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 132] === 122 promise Hie IN I's However, its e lf plans seemed to reasonable chance success. as developments in 1963 were to prove, the Army had declared emphatically for one in terp retatio n the "continuing revolution" th a t i t was unprepared fo r any deviation from the path th at i t had anticipated. Whither the Indonesian Revolution? Choosing a "Programme" in 1963 Die year 1963 was a decisive year fo r Indonesia and Sukarno. expected th a t Sukarno would have select one I t was two -diametrically-opposed paths as the course th a t Guided Democracy and the Indonesian sta te would follow. Pressures had been exerted upon him by th e U.S. and the Army throughout 1962 to give his commitment to economic development. Meanwhile, the EKE and i t s a llie s agitated fo r a Nasakom interpretation o f Guided Democracy. decision was commitment. made; Indonesia Through th e greater p art of 1963, no pursued both The economic sta b iliza tio n paths plan was with half-hearted enacted while the framework o f yet another an ti-im p erialist struggle, th is time over the establishment of Malaysia, was being la id. When Sukarno did make his decision in August-September, i t was fo r profound reasons th a t related to the very nature o f Guided Democracy — reasons th at the PKI had grasped and would manipulate to i t s advantage la te r. Sukarno's importance as the a rb ite r between contending forces in the social contract Increasingly, Guided Democracy grew a fte r 1962. he was petitioned by th e TNI and the EKE to adept what amounted to "programmes" for the Indonesian s ta te. by th e U.S. markedly Sukarno was pressured and th e TNI to adopt an economic stabilization plan. objective standards, Indonesia certainly needed to pay more atten tio n to Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 133] === its 123 financial and economic a ffa irs, a point made by the Humphrey report th a t was presented to Sukarno in August 1962.39 Additional pressure was applied by Nasution himself when he sp ecifically urged the execution of a food and clothing programme. 40 The blame for th e fa ilu re th is programme in the past, Nasution argued, had to be placed unequivocally on the "state leadership,” meaning Sukarno. For th e PKE's p art, Aidit had much advice to offer th e President. The creation of a Nasakom cabinet, and the attendant rad icalizatian of the country th a t i t would e n ta il, in itia lly preoccupied th e PKC in its counsel to Sukarno. Aidit, fo r example, grimly stated on 17 December 1962 th a t "rejection of NASAKCMwould mean a denunciation of the peaceful way to socialism and lead to dissension inside the nation, and the peak of th is dissension would be an internecine war."41 The p a rty 's campaign create a Nasakom cabinet even had the unprecedented support of the ENI, and i t s radical offshoot, the Partirrio. 42 attacked the Amy's governmental "programme" d irectly. 44 At a n th e r level, th e EKE apparatus43 and its development In a major declaration in February 1963, A idit mocked the economic stabilization scheme as.ill-su ited and even hazardous to Indonesia, given the belief th at "the enemy number one and the most dangerous enemy of the Indonesian people a t the present time imperialism. 1,45: T h u s, t h e r e a l w a y o u t o f I n d o n e s i a 's e c o n o m ic d i f f i c u l t i e s i s n o t b y b e g g in g f o r lo a n s fro m a b r o a d o r m a k in g t h e I n d o n e s i a n p e o p le th e s e r v a n ts o f f o r e ig n c a p i t a l in v e s te d i n In d o n e s ia, t u t b y t h e d e v e lo p m e n t o f a n a t i o n a l e c o n o m y t h a t c a n s t a n d o n i t s o w n t w o f e e t. 46 T h a t " th e EK E h a d n o t h i n g t o g a in fro m im p ro v e m e n t o f c o n d itio n s o f t h e m a sse s" w as c e r t a i n l y a m o tiv a tin g o p p o s itio n, fo r " i t w o u ld h a v e d im in is h e d its th e liv in g f a c to r b e h in d o p p o rtu n ity Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. its m o b iliz e === [PDF page 134] === 124 them for i t s purposes."47 The e ffe c t o f these two s e ts of advice on Sukarno was mixed. Penders and Sundhaussen have suggested, Sukarno actually pursued policies more or le s s based on both "programmes. " 48 sta b iliz a tio n plan, enhanced the With regard to th e economic n a tio n 's a b ility coordinate economic a c tiv itie s by dissolving the BKKSs in May and channelling th e ir resources and expertise into th e National Front. Additionally, the President approved Djuanda’s negotiations with the U.S. and th e IMF, and allowed the implementation of fourteen harsh regulations on 26 May. 49 The regulations had immediate and painful consequences: Fares and ta r if f s rose by 300-500 per cent, increasing the burden on the populace, and the Jakarta cost o f living index ro se ' between May and July by some 7.6 per cent. This ra llie d almost every p o litic a l grouping to the banner o f the communists who could thus accelerate th e ir attacks on the cabinet. 50 There were also p o litic a l consequences to be borne in mind in th a t pursuing the economic reh ab ilitatio n programmes would en tail observing economic and p o litic a l re stric tio n s imposed by th e aidgiving West, as well as calling back into th e administration the American-trained economists and technocrats who largely belonged to or sympathized with the banned rig h tis t p a rtie s.5-*Notwithstanding th e factors th at m ilitated against the "programme," Indonesia appeared to be succeeding in reversing its downward economic sp iral by mid-1963.52 Developing in a p arallel fashion with the stab ilizatio n "programme" were th e PKI-favoured in itia tiv e s th a t promised a radicalization of th e social contract. Sukarno had spoken o ffic ia lly on 19 December 1962 of the rescission of th e SOB in the year ahead, adding th at he would act "in accordance w ith th e Indonesian people's desire th a t revolutionary people's forces be given a p a rt in th e consummation of e ffo rts to achieve the objectives of th e Indonesian revolution."5 3 At approximately th e Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 135] === 125 same time, th e President had given his approval to Subandrio, th e Foreign Minister and head th e Central Intelligence Body (Badan Pusat Inteliiens — BPI), to use the BPI to stage intelligence operations in to North Kalimantan as part of the government's policy o f "confrontation" over the establishment of Malaysia. 54 While a s ta r t was made "opposing" Malaysia, 55 Sukarno's commitment to foreign policy adventures did seem muted throughout early and mid-1963 and received less attention than the economic stabilization plan. While th e leadership a t the policy level seemed stalemated on th e question of which "programme" ought to be' accepted as state policy, th e changing internal balance of forces hinted of a swing toward the EEOC. The series appointments that Yard in itia te d consolidate h is position among the officer corps led to a "decline in the army *5 ^unity and effectiveness as a p o litica l organization." 56 In contrast to th e inner weakening of the TNI, the PKE benefited from its representation on three extra-constitutional bodies created by Sukarno: the Consultative Body of the State leadership Olusiawarah Pimoinan Negara), established in March 1962; th e Consultative Body of Assistants to the Leadership of th e Revolution fMusiawarah Pembarrtu Pimoinan Revolusi), created in January 1963; and the Supreme Operational Command (Kbmando Ooerasi Tertinaoi), which replaced the TNI-dcminated Supreme Command for th e Liberation o f West irian (Komando Tertinacri Pembebasan Irian Barat). reorganization of th e Supreme Operational Command in July 1963, Sukarno acted to weaken Nasution and increase his own power over the Army. 57 The most sig n ifican t aspect of these organizations was that they "conferred a greater respectability on th e FKC and a narrow interpretation of Nasakcm" that favoured only th e strongest p o litic a l p a rtie s. 58 Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 136] === 126 When an 17 August 1963 President Sukarno declared himself fo r the rad ical "programme," he did so from an unrivalled position of p o litica l strength. His importance to Indonesia was acknowledged by a ll major p o litic a l actors, and especially the INI and the EKI, which made him the object th e ir respective campaigns influence s ta te policy. U ltim ately, Sukarno was the fulcrum o f the balance between the Army and th e Communists. His sta tu s was in stitu tio nalized on 20 May 1963 vhen the F3RS named Sukarno President fo r Life. 5 9 unassailable strength, commitment s economic sta b iliz a tio n and embraced risk y ventures abroad. In" h is Sukarno Speaking from th is position of simultaneously Independence Day speech o f 1963, abandoned with the wrong form',, wrong structure d iffic u lt Revolution" 'already too far gone th a t we are not a Nation too far gone with the a Nation whose s o c ia l ' structure — not a lte r," and —* the further Sukarno rejoiced in.the "fact" th a t "our Nation i s not a Nation th at is a ll placed his workers national production. 60 and faith peasants the already "mainstays of eventually the increase The effo rts of the Army and o ther services o f the Armed Fortes in helping to ra ise production through th e Civic Missions were noted Nasution an aside. 61 personally not Sukarno took the reading h is opportunity "Supplement in su lt Concerning Civic Missions." 62 Ju st the "Supplement" remained printbound, socia l meaning. went unread and its ideas and th ru st the Army's Civic Missions became devoid of wider Indeed, th e Army's th eoretical concepts and strategy had been rendered u tterly obsolete by the p o litic a l developments of August) September 1963. s ta b iliz a tio n Not only plan, but had the also President jeopardized scu ttled the th e Army's Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. economic continued === [PDF page 137] === 127 existence as a fighting force when in September he formally declared a policy of konfrorrtasi against Malaysia, such th a t i t could be "gobbled raw." 63 Sukarno had th ru st the INI into a delicate situation: confronting Malaysia, the INI would have to face the B ritish — a power far more committed than the Dutch to defending its Asian in te re sts — and in this^ case no aid (arms o r otherwise) would be forthcoming from th e U.S., which had much closer relatio ns with London than with The Hague, o r the Soviet Union, which was s t i l l owed ju s t under $1 b illio n for the arms Indonesia received during th e West Irian campaign. U iis did not deter the President, who perceived the struggle against Malaysia to be only one aspect of a larger global co nflict between th e OLDEPQS (Old Established Forces, consisting of the Western countries) and the NEFOS American, (Newly Emerging and Socialist Forces, basically countries). Asian, The creation African, Malaysia was interpreted as a "neo-imperialist" plot to "encircle" Indonesia. Sukarno's guidance, "the Revolut^ton in i t s Latin With NEED aspect was to continue indefinitely the destruction of the old order, while domestic economic and social issues remained unresolved. The delay o f revolutionary rewards, however, [was] part of the Revolution's 'ronanticism. ' 1,64 At least one reason fo r Sukarno's decision to opt fo r konfrorrtasi. of course, was to check the Army's power, as Anderson has suggested: I t was not merely that th e army had greatly increased its power and inner cohesion [between 1957 and 1963]. In addition, the long-maturing, intimate tie s between the army and the United States •had clearly given the regionally dominant foreign m ilitary power a dangerous •point d'appui deep within the Indonesian s ta te. As Sukarno perceived i t, th is penetration imposed significant lim its on the sovereignty of th e Indonesian nation and an i t s a b ility to manage its internal a ffa irs with maximum autonomy. Furthermore, the army's control of the former Dutch enterprises hod now put i t into a d irectly antagonistic relationship with the popular sector — the workers and peasants employed in the mines, plantations, and other major commercial enterprises. Sukarno Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 138] === 128 thus increasingly came to fe e l not only th a t h is personal position was threatened, but th a t th e original goals of the n a tio n a list movement were endangered. 65 Whereas th e considerations of the balance of power, th e Army's re la tio n s with a foreign power, and the resources and ca p a b ilitie s th at had b u ilt up since 1957, ape certainly important in explaining the major s h if t in Indonesian p o litic s in 1963, attention must be paid to the nature o f the social contract of Guided Democracy. 66 Far more important in explaining Sukarno's actions in August-September was th e very nature o f Guided Democracy: Only thSse programs th at did not threaten the e lite could be attempted seriously, and these frequently were in th e realm of foreign a f f a ir s.... [largely due to th e fact that] th e social force mobilized by the PKI could not be matched by any of the other p arties, by th e army, or even (in organizational terms) by President Soekarpo.... i t was necessary — taking th e broadest view of social conflict — to lim it the FKE's opportunities to use i t s power fu lly. By /containing the tru ly radical WJ.,1 the e lite vhara i t challenged/both party and non-party, was able to maintain i t s hopes fo r tma fu tu re.6' The ramifications of Sukarno's decision to follow th e inevitable path th a t took the revolution abroad, and was designed to deflect th e PKE from internal concerns, were f e lt stru ctu re sh ift and Democracy. Nasution the immediately th e During a cabinet shuffle was Furthermore, excluded the from Department the the ideological the in tern al content in November 1963, newly formed Guided fo r instance, cabinet Attorney-General power and presidium. the junior Ministry o f Veterans A ffairs were detached from the Ministry of Defence, thus depriving th e Army of influence over the important portfolio of law and loosening emergency. i t s control over a useful resource in/tim es of p o litic a l To th e horror of th e Amy, in September 1963 a ll [ten] p arties gave public endorsement through th e Front Naslonal to a set o f proposals including a c a ll for a team o f assistan ts to the President 'w ith a Nasakcm p a tte rn ', th e Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 139] === 129 *nasakcmizatd.cn' of regional executive and leg islativ e bodies, th e withdrawal of the ban on party membership fo r high c iv il ‘ servants and reversal of the 1959 an ti-p arty measure an regional heads,6®. Although temporarily unsuccessful in th e ir quest to implement th e ir proposals, th e vociferousness of th e p arties' demands added to the Army's worries. An Indirect ''Revolutionary Offensive"; Ccmmunizincr the State la te 1963-Late 1964 Following Sukarno's lead, th e EKE moved between September 1963 to accommodate i ts e lf to February and the anti-im perialist struggle. Hie p a rty 's all-encompassing strategy centred on an ingenious theory of the sta te, designed between September and December 1963, which took advantage o f positions. the state movement toward l e f t i s t and radical In th is regard, the FKE superseded even Sukarno's rhetoric and ^ imparted to th e orientation; e l i t e 's th is Indonesian position, "crush Malaysia" campaign a d istin c tly bias soon pervaded a ll aspects the Communist o ffic ia l including the Amy's perception of its ro le in the co n flict and in th e revolution. Hie p a rty 's exertions on th e external front, o f its however, were only part exclusively internal a ffa irs. "revolutionary offensive," "domestication" the The already Indonesian more important plans intention apparent s ta te e lite th e the oriented p arty 's p arty 's connection with konfrorrtasi. was to press for th e adoption of Communist ideas, a t the expense of a ll other forms of thought, a r tis tic, cultural, and ideological. important areas of lif e; Rather than move against i t s chief enemy d irectly by seeking positions of power within the sta te, the party sought to push the state e lite further to the le f t, leaving the Army Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 140] === 130 vulnerable not to its attacks, but to Sukarno’s. The gains th at the party made against th e Army were, a t the level of resources, balanced by its losses campaign. the countryside associated with its u n ila te ra l action, What prevented even greater losses was Sukarno's predilection to preserve th e gains made in the name of Nasakom a t the sta te level. That the PKE's prospects could beidramatically enhanced by Sukarno's inflammatory statements of August-September 1963 was in itia lly lo s t upon the party. When Malaysia was formally established on 16 September, before the outcome o f the United Nations-sponsored plan to determine the in te re s ts of the people of North Kalimantan was known, i t was the ENI th a t in itia lly took th e lead in attacking B ritish and Malayan diplomatic posts in Jakarta. Mirroring the events of December 1957, the PKE and i t s youth and labour fronts reacted sw iftly to the IN I's action and joined in destruction of B ritish and Malayan properties and in the seizure of B ritish enterprises. The "crush Malaysia" campaign accelerated as a consequence of these actions and re ta lia to ry measures taken by Malaysia. By 21 September diplomatic relatio n s between the two countries had been severed, and the transformation. Indonesian p o litic a l scene had undergone a profound The FKI urgently needed to formulate a new strategy; i t could safely discard the unpromising national fron t strategy and give salience to more ambitious plans. period can be said th a t the PKE's strategy of th e la te was ^de^ived from A id it's theory th e 1963 to 1965 s ta te. 69 A id it's conception of the Indonesian sta te, o rigin ally publicized in September 1963, was a farsighted and ingenious in terp retatio n of the nature of Guided Democracy. The Ctommunist leader recognized th a t Guided Democracy was s p lit between the forces of ciolkar and Nasakom. the adherents of each Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 141] === having ensconced themselves in the sta te apparatus. A id it's insight thus penetrated the veneer of o ffic ia l ideology th a t held th a t the Indonesian sta te and people were united on fundamentals. tru th of the social contract: developed such unresolved Rather, i t perceived the "the ideology [of Guided Denocracy] had inconsistencies th a t, despite th e great pressures for conformity to i t, most groups could find same p arts of the ideology to which to formulations, there attach th e ir own in te re sts." 70 existed within the s ta te According to PKT and government a "propeople" ("popular") asjjfect and an "anti-people" ("anti-pcpular") aspect. The President, the PKE and i t s fronts, and sundry other p o litic a l parties and th e ir a ffilia te s former, while the secular a llie s were Significantly, were identified as Army leadership specified the major upholders of the and its civilian, religious, the key defenders the and la tte r. the neat cleavage in the s ta te and society th a t Aidit perceived meant th at the "middle forces" "had tended to disappear in the analysis," and th is presaged the polarization of Indonesian p o litic s in the years ahead. 71 This theory of the s ta te contained the inherent prescription to strengthen and consolidate the popular element of state power, th a t is, s h ift the social contract in a leftward direction. In so doing, however, Aidit was not confident of unhindered success, and counselled in September 1963, on the basis of an cinalysis o f Indonesian society and of the Indonesian revolution, the Constitution of the CPI stresses th a t the Indonesian revolution is a protracted and complex one. TO be able to guide the revolution, th e CPI must carry th e people's revolutionary struggle forward by using the ta c tic of advancing steadily, carefully and surely. In the courserof the struggle, the CPI must consistently oppose two trends: capitulationism and adventurism. 72 The p arty 's guide to action had as its foundation an essential R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 142] === 132 conservatism, which translated into an unwillingness to embark upon risky o r u n ila te ra l ventures th a t exceeded th e desires of other members o f the "popular" coalition of forces. This did not mean th a t the party would avoid dynamic actions o r decisive assertions of i t s prerogative as a revolutionary actor, but rather th at respect would be given to generallyacknowledged lim its on p o litic a l '‘behaviour. Furthermore, the caution demonstrated by th e Communists proved to be inversely proportional to the increasingly radical direction) o f events as s e t by Sukarno himself. For example by December 1963, when i t had became apparent th a t konfrontasi and the associated trend of domestic radicalization would not recede in th e forseeable future, 73 th e tone of party pronouncements became acutely b ellig eren t. A idit coptemptuously declared th at "the conceptors and m inisters responsible fo r the '26th May, 1963* deviation should feel very lucky they.are not hanged, they a re only in flic te d bodily punishment and i f they are only dismissed from th e ir positions ras senior o ffic ia ls o r ministers fo r th e ir unforgivable s in." 74 Later, on 23 May 1964, A idit warned the p a rty 's enemies'to "calm down and think twice," pointing out th a t i f they were vunable to smash.the Party in 1948 when i t had no more than 10,000 members, they would be even le ss successful now th a t "the Indonesian Communist Party has a lo t of experience, has a to ta l membership of more than 2.5 m illion, and i t s cadres have been trained in th e theory and practice of the revolutionary struggle." 76 The substance of th e EKI's strategy to "popular" aspect in enhance the power of the Indonesia was given c la rific a tio n by th e December 1963 party announcement to unleash a "revolutionary offensive in fie ld s." 76 Both th e ideological cast and the operational aspects of the a ll "offensive" indicated a strengthening o f the EKE as a sta te lik e en tity. With regard th e ideological character of the "offensive" R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. — its === [PDF page 143] === 133 phraseology and programmatic nature — i t was evident th a t Sukarno's increasingly close ideological and p o litic a l fraternization with the , Communist Chinese had been duplicated in the PKE's own ideology. 77 September 1963 "Aidit came down strongly and unmistakably on the Chinese side" in th e current polemic between th e Cttrnmunist Party of the Soviet Union and th e Camraunist Party of China. 78 For th e relationship accrued to most p art, remains the nature indeterminate; and th e intensity only tangible the PKI-CPC benefit th at the party was that the massive Chinese "Foreign Languages Press" fa c ilita te d the translation and dissemination of PKE propaganda a t home and abroad. The most immediate benefits of the alliance were sim ilar to those th at the/iirmy secured through its association with the U.S.: the a b ility of the Indonesian actor to formulate policies and to a tta in its goals through an ideology were greatly enhanced by the assistance of a foreign state actor. The Chinese could offer advice on revolutionary strategies and use th e ir and ta c tic s Sukarno to benefit the party. relationship with From a theoretical perspective, the fact th a t the party consolidated.a relationship with a foreign sta te actor meant the strengthening of the PKE its e lf, for i t acquired the resource of revolutionary experience, a lb e it Chinese. The expression of anti-imperial.ism, in the conduct of konfrontasi. was among th e f i r s t party in itia tiv e s where the ideological refinement was to reg ister. The p arty 's adoption o f a Chinese vision of revolution was, in th e f ir s t instance, means by which i t could convert the p o litic a l advantage of the leftward s h if t of the Indonesian s ta te in to a consolidation of Communist hegemony within Nasakom and over the s ta te. The party^/as not, therefore, sa tisfied with th e fact th a t th e execution Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. === [PDF page 144] === of konfrontasi was "the f i r s t time [that] with its attendant symbols Indonesian policy norm. 1,79 and ideology a Communist-initiated ta c tic [had became] o ffic ia l By superimposing a uniquely Communist outlook on an undertaking of the Indonesian sta te, only the PKI stood to gain in the long-run. The Communists attempted to take command of the Malaysian dispute ju st as they had attempted to do in the West Irian campaign. However, in contrast to i t s strategy in 1957, the party in 1963 did not seek to capture the n atio n alist mantlepiece, but to Cammunize Indonesian; nationalism. The immediate task for the PKI in December 1963, when i t appeared safe to make th e Malaysian issue the object of sustained party attention, was to a lte r th e perception of the co n flict in th e eyes of Indonesians. • The p arty ’s intention, as Mortimer has argued, was to avoid escalating the Malaysian dispute into an armed struggle. 80 Rather, to strengthen " its hand in in tern al p o litic s a t th e expense of i t s riv a ls and enemies" and to avoid le ttin g them -exercise th e ir monopoly over arms, the PKI had to use i t s absolute advantage in revolutionary ideology to inculcate a radical mogd and thus subjugate the TNI in an in direct manner. 8 1 That th is was the p a rty 's intention can be perceived by the way in which A idit spoke of Malaysia and generalized i t s significance: People may argue about where the focus o f the world revolution is today. But the fac t is th a t a t the present the most acute a n tiim perialist struggle is in Asia, especially in Southeast Asia ' where the sound of, gunfire has not stopped since the end of World War n. Conditions both objective and subjective are very favorable in Southeast Asia. The Communists and other revolutionaries in Indonesia should feel fortunate and happy th a t we are in such an area. e are in the forefront of th e struggle against world imperialism. 82 I n p a r t e d t o t h e s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t M a la y s ia, t h e r e f o r e, w a s a n e m p h a s is o n Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. === [PDF page 145] === 135 i t s global significance. Hie affin ity of Sukarno's Indonesian revolution and the planetwide NEPOS-OLDEFOS struggle to the PKE’s current views * in itia te d a process of "convergence" between the o ffic ia l sta te ideology and the Communists1 world outlook. The in itia l circumspect. o ffic ia l Indonesian response to In September 1963 the Malaysia was quite Indonesians concentrated an the specifics of the dispute, repudiated "provocative public statements" made by Malaysian leaders, and expressed indignation a t the fa ilu re of B ritain and Malaysia to properly implement the rig h ts of self-determination fo r Contrariwise, by th e end of 1963, as van the North Kalimantan people. der Kroef has illu stra te d, "a somewhat broader and transcendent view came be adumbrated in Jakarta: the 1confrontation 1 now appeared to be conceived of in terms of the supposedly 'u n fu lfille d ' objectives of the Indonesian Revolution. 1,83 Indeed, 1964 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserted, in language th at indicated the increasing convergence of o ffic ia l and Communist viewpoints, th a t the establishment of Malaysia attempted "to subvert, to deflect from i t s course and to contain the Indonesian Revolution, because th at Revolution is pledged to the complete and fin al eradication of colonial and im perialist domination." 84 beginning of 1964 By the the central fact of p o litic a l l i f e...was th at the nation and a ll i t s major and minor power centers were following or were mad** to follow the major foreign policy objective of the PKE, and th a t a revolutionary illuminism new no longer would serve as the domestic catechism of o ffic ia l ideology but was to be exported throughout Southeast Asia in lin e with th e country's s e lf conceived destiny. 85 Even the Army f e l t the pressure of th e Communist assault on the values of the I ndonesian s ta te and i t s in stitu tio n s. On 7 January 1964, fo r example, Yani declared in a speech before SESKDAD th a t Indonesia "was Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 146] === 136 new changing from a previous defense concept 'based on her own national tA r ito r y ' [the Doctrine of T errito rial Management], to a new concept which included 'international elements,' sp ecifically in th e form of 'th e country's responsibility and contribution towards security and s ta b ility Southeast Asia'. " 86 Yard's statement ir r e s is tib le nature of the Communist drive clearly indicated the had so easily and quickly begun the subversion of i t s archenemy's own ideology and separate id en tity. This fea t was a l l the more impressive in th a t th e ideology had been meticulously b u ilt up over the years by Nasution and the U.S., and was the major wellspring of the Army's d istin c tiv e p o litic a l character. Later, Nasution, 'encirclement' too, imposed could be heard to Indonesia's urge "to break through the enemies, [and] eliminate ' im perialist vestiges' in the Countries surrounding Indonesia." 87 When the favourable conduct of konfrontasi appeared to be threatened by Sukarno's negotiations with the U.S. Attorney-General, Robert Kennedy,, in Japan in January 1964, the PKI sw iftly asserted i t s sovereignty to corr ec t th is deviation. On 17 January 1964, the day th a t Sukarno and Kennedy conferred in Tokyo, A idit warned th a t " i t is our obligation to avoid e ffo rts which have the nature of compromis e." 88 PKI and i t s fronts attacked B ritish holdings. One day la te r the In West Java, sixteen B ritish rubber, te a, and coffee plantations were seized by Sarfeuori. and w ithin two days SOBSI and Pemuda Rakvat memioS^s took over Shell and Unilever offices and in stallatio n s in Jakarta. These dramatic actions were significant because they were enacted in defiance o f government regulations. The assertion Thus they were genuine examples o f p arallel sovereignty. 89 sovereignty was also important because clearly indicated th a t the party remained an altern ativ e pcwer contender: i t was R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n e r. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n. === [PDF page 147] === "the f ir s t occasion vdien i t appeared to challenge the president d irectly over the conduct of foreign policy." 90 Later, when Sukarno reemphasized the importance of heeding government regulations, Sartouori disregarded the warning and seized British-owned estates in South Sumatra in March 1964.91 These were the unmistakable signs th at th e PKI had changed the direction of Indonesian foreign and domestic policies decisively the p arty 's favour, [presenting] with opportunities so promising th at the leadership began to comprehend for the f i r s t time since the int r oduction of Guided Democracy how they might achieve pcwer within the terms s e t by th a t system. 92 The Qmnmunist in itia tiv e to supplant alternative modes of thinking with its own Symbols konfrorrtasi wore on. stated, and revolutionary verbiage intensified In March 1964 the Foreign Minister, Subandrio, "Indonesia i s now engaged in offensive revolutionary thinking, not ju s t in revolutionary thinking," and th a t " th is type of revolutionary of Indonesia-1s domestic and foreign thinking should became th e basis policy." 93 th a t Subandrio appointing Even Indicative of the s ta te 's embracing o f EKE norms was the fact permitted Communists, Sukarno, who the PKI entry in to known fellow -travellers, appeared have exhausted department94 his ideologize, 96 began to adopt Communist concepts. 97 ambassadors. 95 his own a b ility In March 1964 he declared th at "the 'crush Malaysia' campaign w ill be fru itfu l only i f a l l e ffo rts are based on offensive*revolutionary thinking. "98 Perhaps the most remarkable victory for the party was Subandrio's pronouncement on 7 July 1964 th a t "there is no cause for fear th a t Indonesia w ill become Ctimmunist, but Indonesianize the the contrary, the other way around, w ill 'Cam' element prevailing in th e community. "99 This statement, made in th e context of ideological and value convergence, says van der Knoe|f, was made "entirely accord with PKI R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e c o p yrig h t o w n er. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n. strategy": === [PDF page 148] === 138 "precisely to the extent th a t the nan-Oanmunist element believes th at the Communist party ceased to be a th rea t a major ta c tic a l advantage has been won by the party." 1 0 0 Hie other main component of the Oanmunist programme of December 1963 was to undertake a revolutionary offensive in th e countryside. lev el, the p arty 's At one support for ongoing spontaneous seizures of land— u n ilateral actions, o r aksi seoihak — by poor peasants was in defence of existing le g isla tio n. Two laws, the Shar ecropping Law flftTdanaTtmdancr Periandiian Baai Tfasi l — UUFBH) o f November 1959, and th e Basic Agrarian Law (TTndaro-imdam Pokok Aararia no. 5/1960 — UUPA), which was passed in September 1960, were promulgated as part of the "continuing revolution's" attack on feudalism. 101 However, since provisions of both laws assigned the power of execution to local government heads or o ffic ia ls, and thus beyond the control of Jakarta Sukarno, th e ir implementation was hindered by incompetence, corruption, and patron-client relationships. 102 The judicious linkage the party made between its actions and Sukarno's words provided a second layer of protection f:or its offensive. Tornquist has argued th at "the dominant communist tendency was to refer to Sukarno every time they did something." 103 National Conference on 5 July 1964, In th is case, a t the EKE when the aksi seoihak campaign secured formal party support, the argument was made th at the campaign was designed to implement "President Sukarno's appeal th at the masses must also out carry 'revolutionary gymnastics'. " 104 Even the operational aspects of the endeavour.were cautious in nature: U nilateral actions are beneficial both to the Government as well as to the broad mass of village inhabitants; th ese actions must therefore oe capable of winning the sympathy and support of more than 90 per cent of the v illag e inhabitants and the non reactionary sta te o ffic ia ls. 105 ter. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 149] === In short, the party aimed to prove th a t i t s actions were "relatively innocent and' directed defending or implementing the land reform laws." 106 At a more profound level, the p arly 's unleashing of a class struggle in the guise of land seizures was a monumental undertaking, in te nded to supplement its success preponderant power resource the e lite level located amongst th e demonstrating its peasants — the EKE peasant front, the BIT. The activation of the BTI presented the party with the use one of i t s opportunity to larg est power resources, reaffirm i t s own uniqueness as a revolutionary contender, and to press i t s sovereignty in the countryside. Indicative o f the wider significance of the offensive was the p arty 's "Four-Year Plan o f Culture, Ideology and Organization." The plan was unveiled on 17 August 1963 well before the u n ilateral actions received party endorsement and was originally intended to continue the ideological and educational training of EKE cadres. December i t underwent a transformation as the party broadened i t s scope. to include the peasantry. 107 The changes effected and the new nuances given flagged the p arty 's desire to be seen as an alternative contender. Hie peasants were embraced as revolutionaries in an unprecedented way: We must never for a moment forget th at the implementation of th is Plan must be closely linked with the lin e o f consolidating our. Jteurty's integration with the p easa n ts.... This means th a t our ^ cultural work must in the f i r s t place be aimed at. raising the cultural level of the peasants and arousing th e peasants' s p ir it and joy in the struggle. This means th a t our ideological work must in the f i r s t place be aimed a t further integrating the thoughts of a l l party cadres with the peasants and a t strengthening the proletarian ideology of th e cadres who work among the peasants. 108 la te r, in July^ 1964, Ipfean^Sta^ed although our party must with a ll i t s strength tug a t and cultivate the national bourgeoisie so th a t i t remains in the united front with pie working class, nevertheless a t no time can Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 150] === 140 i t sac rific e th e unity of the worker ahd peasant. This means th a t, whatever th e reaction, and however great the violence attending the work of th e party among the peasants, we cannot be in the le ast,,v a cillatin g in our vanguard ro le of protecting and leading tlje'p easan ts.109^ As bukman added, th e national bourgeoisie "forms an additional a lly, meaning one important as the peasantry. "110, The p a rty 's ideological s h ift to the peasantry occasioned a tangible change in the nature of the B n. .only limi^ad in itia tiv e s In the past, among th e peasantry, "small but successful" actions throughout the the BIT had undertaken embarking on so-called 1953-1963 period, aimed a t meeting the peasants' everyday needs. 111 which Luring, th is period th e BIT was b u ilt not fo r the purposes of revolution in the countryside, but rather to provide th e party with a constituency and a popular base. Moreover, in electio ns the peasantry was expected to vote as a bloc fo r th e party. However, in the significantly d iffe re n t conditions o f Guided Democracy, w ith its lack elections, passive and non-militant peasantry was ineffectual in helping the PKI's power chances. 112 The PKE's plans to employ the B n in i t s revolutionary offensive wa& profoundly resource, sig n ifican t. the ideological By aiming party wished to g rip mobilize demonstrate its sig n ifican t a previously laten t own organizational and proportion th e Indonesian population, as well as to enhance i t s statu re as a statelik e en tity by assigning i ts e lf demanding a ltern ativ e source of ’authority. new policy: the BIT would became an Margo Lyon has argued th a t while a lo cal BTI organization might be viewed as cooperative in nature, th e fact th at i t was in practice organized in the in terests o f its own members meant that i t represented, a t le a s t in th e area of land matters, a polarization of in te re sts in ru ra l society and therefore th e introduction o f an altern ativ e definition o f authority. As p o litic a l organization tended to fo ster a division o f the v illage on basic economic lin e s,.th e v illag e government could be seen as administering primarily the R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n e r. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n. === [PDF page 151] === 141 interests o f the landholders and therefore a s -representing one realm of authority. The Bn cadres and th e ir followers, an the other hand, represented an,altern ative authority based on different ideas of land distribu tio n, thereby creating a situation in which the more trad itio n al authority could be perceived as no longer legitim ately administering th e in terests of the v illage population. 113 Unis, the Comrnunist strongholds of Central and East Java, attempted to assert its sovereignty against th e the PKT establishment. The magnitude of th e venture was publicized by A idit himself when he informed th e party that the BIT had attained a membership o f 7,099,100,. "or more than 25 per cent of th e adult peasant population," organized in nearly 50 per cent of a l l agricultural v illag es. 114 short, -was an exercise of statehood. The aksi seoihak campaign, in In th is sense, th e revolutionary offensive in th e countryside was f a r more meaningful than the p arty 's e ffo rts a t the e lite level of the s ta te. Almost f rom uncontrollably th e violent. outset fiasco. the offensive, Unfortunately, fo r campaign proved disastrous. p o litic a l events the PKT and the became Bn, the There were prim arily two reasons for th e F irs t, th e PKC and the BIT revealed organizational weaknesses by failin g to control th e ir own cadres and to provide guidance to the peasants under th e ir control. In a number o f villages, especially in the Caniftunist strongholds of central and East Java, the cadres had became unreliable; they did not respect party ru le s or injunctions to correct f a c t. 115 the deteriorating even A idit acknowledged th is More significant was the lack o f direction a t the highest levels of the EKI: situ ation; "The communists hesitated and did not follow a clear [while] no one stepped those members who participated confrontations, neither was airy decisive attempt made to step in and lead them properly." 116 For th e ir part, the peasants apparently interpreted Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 152] === 142 th e PKI's erdorsairent of th e ir actions a s a signal t o expand that th e ir permitted. seizures Fairly beyond the unfairly, lim its intensify and existing blame f o r the worst leg islatio n aspects of th e campaign was placed squarely upon th e Communists. The second major aspect of th e s t rong conservative backlash offensive was that i t provoked a among the orthodox Muslims and served to reinforce v ertic a l, and not class, cleavages in the v illa g e s. 117 instances, the PKI's appeal to the poor peasants them landlords. e x p lic itly acknowledged c lass In same succeeded in uniting struggle against feudal In most cases, however, the Carrmunists1 cautious offensive, combined with spontaneous actions by same o f the peasantry, pr ompted an a n ti-c la ss counterattack.' The Muslims, especially in East Java, made the a k si seoihak an issue about Islam and sought to draw whole communities together the FKI and the BIT. 118 against communist reaction of the landlords, Thus, in allian ce the intensely with th e ir anti peasant - c lie n te le, prom pted th e Minister of Agriculture on 13 June 1964 to ban a ll peasant a c tiv itie s, 119 and Ieimena, his capacity Acting President, to formally disapprove of th e aksi two days l a te r;120 in July th e national press was forbidden to report on rural c o n flic ts. 121 Despite th e government's throughout Java and E^ili. measures, th e confrontations spread Even Sukarno's indirect support for th e aksi and the Communists on 17 August failed to reverse th e polarization in the countryside. 122 th e Throughout September 1964 i t BIT were losing th e offensive in appeared th a t the PKE and the countryside. Together they attempted to ex ert greater control.over the peasants. 122 However, the success o f the Muslim counteroffensive was acknowledged by the A id it in November. B n and That there was chaos in th e countryside and th a t the Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 153] === peasants had been sp lit was d iffic u lt for the Ccmnunists to accept*124 In December Sukarno presented th e EKE and the B n with the opportunity to abandon th e ir offensive in the name of Nasakom unity.125 communists readily accepted the offer, th eir Although the enemies remained on the offensive and carried i t into 1965. The implications of th e Cammurdst rural defeat were twofold. F irst, the p arty 's Assessment of i t s resources and its own statu s as a statelike en tity had to be reevaluated and devalued. Ultimately, th e party's enormous nominal support in the countryside proved to be a lia b ility in the p arty 's larger two-pronged offensive against the state e lite. BTX's potential to act a s the Hie leading vehicle of ru ra l revolutionary action was shattered and even th e party's assumed capacity to direct its front s was disproven. Hie unexpected consequences a s Conraunist "rule o f assertion sovereignty had brought i t fostered the development of a new, an tilaw" in the countryside. That th e party endured a year of turmoil and failed to take decisive control o f its own and BTI cadres, meant that i t could not effectively a lte r th e operational mode upon which the peasant “front was b u ilt. Thus/ th e rural Communist constituency was undisciplined in nature and unwilling to act en masse in accordance with i t s putative government's instructions. In th is regard, the Communist state-w ithin-a-state fa ile d,in i t s own defence. A second consequence o f the rural defeat was th a t -the party had to rely less on one form of collective action — th a t of a mass character— in favour o f a much greater emphasis on e lite politicking at th e national, level. the The burden of the revolution had been placed^on the shoulders of leadership and its relationship with Sukarno. In itia lly, second-best strategy succeeded immensely throughout 1964 as Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. th is the trend === [PDF page 154] === 144 toward convergence in ten sified, and the strongest actions against th e Army were not taken by the party, b ut by Sukarno. The Army in Retreat in 1964; The consolidation o f the PKT— Sukarno Alliance ' * Throughout the course 1964, the Army's endeavours to remain leader o f the aolkar interpretation of Guided Democracy and to push the *social contract in th a t direction F irs t, Army-sponsored ideological matters, support vehement for its PKT and to opposition m ilitary matters, in itia tiv e s which wefe e x p lic itly views Communist positions. d esifa c iv ilian met with fa ilu re on two accounts. weaken the concert Second, in th e the IN I's a r tis tic, cu ltu ral and designed to gather wider Communists, with Sukarno's were foiled by endorsement realm of m ilita ry -c iv ilian and own expertise was overridden by Sukarno's ensure in centre! of e n fo rc e s, esp ecially in th e operational and organizational facets o f konfrontasi. These two developments paralleled th e ongoing p o litic a l process in the countryside: le v e l. th e year 1964 was also one o f polarization a t the e lite At th e end o f 1964, therefore, two power blocs stood contention for s ta te power. As p a rt of the TNI's wider plans to ensure its p o litic a l livelihood a f te r m artial law had been lifte d, SUAD V implemented schemes throughout th e early 1960 §j4*ClJQuild a collection o f c iv ilian organizations to a s s ist in th e execution of Civic Missions. I ts intention was to use the Army's preponderant influence in s ta te and nationalized enterprises to e re c t organizations th a t embodied a co rpo ratist philosophy. th ese Army strong points were to a c t magnets, In turn, attractin g larger numbers o f people frcan elsewhere in the sta te and economy where the IN I's Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 155] === 145 T h e ideological fopnulatian fo r these plans was a power was weaker. refinement of two ideas. Hie corporatist notion of the family principle — discussed by Sukarno in the late 1950s and explicitly recognized in th e 1945 Constitution as the organizational principle of the national economy — was integrated with the Army's self-conceived ro le of enacting karva. to create a new civilian-oriented formulation: karyawan (member of a functional group). As Reeve has stated, inherent in th^pcncept was th e assumption that both manager and worker performed a function and were therefore karvawan who should cooperate in a family-like harmony.... [The Army] thus tried to define out of existence the class-based antithesis between labour and the 'c a p ita list bureaucrats', th e PKI's name for the m ilitary managers. 126 Strengthened by the cabinet's endorsement of the new concept in May 1960, SUAD V raced to erect th e organizations th at would embody i t s civ ilian adapted ideology. January 1961, Unions Karvawan Forces f P e r s a t u a n ' Tenacra Karvawan — PTK) were established in most nationalized enterprises and in May 1961 they were placed under the control of a Central Coordinating Body of PTKs. The Army's desire to use these newly formed organizations as a major resource fo r its state-w ithin-a-state was evident from the ambitiousness with which they attempted to acquire adherents; wherever labour organizations or party ormas existed, pressure was exerted on than dissolve themselves and jo in the FIKs. 127 A major step toward enhanced indirect Army control over society was taken in December 1962 when the Central Coordinating Board transformed i t s e l f into the Union of Indonesian Socialist Karvawan Organizations fSerikat Ornanisasi Karvawan Sosialis Indonesia — SOKSI) and proclaimed th a t i t would seek "to expand a ll other golkar/ormas groupings." 128 When SOKSI fa ile d to Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. gain === [PDF page 156] === 146 admittance into th e Front National, on the grounds th a t "SOKSI its e lf sought riv a l throughout 1963 Front," 1 2 9 the massive canpaign^yas undertaken expand i t s constituency in preparation for the inevitable struggle against the EKE and to influence th e Front Nasional populating with its own constituent organizations. Hie p ro life ratio n of Varyawan organizations was repressive and came a t the expense of th e p o litic a l p arties through the detachment of th e ir ormas. or 'a t le a st of th e ir members* By 1963 there were karvawan bodies for ag ricultu ral students (T ertasi), (G etsi), women (Gerwasif. Thus, fanners and youth fPeimasi, (K ertasi), in te lle c tu a ls PPII, and SOKKAFFME). 130 in November 1963, with a claimed membership of 7,500,000 shared among 146 member organizations, and with diversified support from members of th e s ta te e lite, including th e bureaucracy and th e Army, the stage seemed set fo r a SOKSI-FKI confrontation. 131 However, ju st as the IN I's Civic Missions were rendered obsolete by p o litic a l developments, so tocr"we^^S^^.I' s aspirations to carry out the *'karya revolution" th at would fin a lly "bury th e p arties" in th e service of "h isto ric a l necessity "132 (see below). An a ltern ativ e Beans by which to advance th e ideas contained in th e concepts of karyawan and crolkar had to be found. In th is case, the Communists provided the. cataly st: match the PKI's programme o f convergence, the Army's civ ilian supporters and organizations were obliged to launch th e ir own counteroffensive by trying to influence the values and ideas of th e state e lite, including * Sukarno. The most obvious m anifestation of th e contention between the two blocs was in the form of three polemics, or debates, th a t raged during 1964.. Ihey pertained, one level, a r tis tic, Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. cu ltu ral, and === [PDF page 157] === ideological matters respectively. At another, more important, level, th e three polemics were a fight over th e very nature of th e evolving social contract: "These debates were a fight for th e ideology its e lf, determine which groups would have the power to in terp ret the ideology of Guided Democracy, and therefore t o impose th e ir interpretations on th e losers." 133 Although the TNI, SOKSI, and th eir other c iv ilian supporters had been disadvantaged by ^developments at th e formal policy lev el of th e state, they zealously in itiated an anti-Canmunist a r tis tic drive on 17 August 1963. The ensuing debate was over the issuance an th a t day o f a Cultural Manifesto fManifes Kphudayaan), which embodied an in te lle c tu a l d issatisfaction with the mass character o f a rt under Guided Democracy. The M anifesto's adherents decried the lack individual a r tis tic responsibility and denounced the p o litic a l character o f current works. Such notions met th e immediate opposition of Lekra (the EKE's cultural front) and th e FKI. The grounds f o r Cammunist disapproval had been la id most clearly by A idit, who urged th a t "a rt for a r t 's sake" was wrong; th e Indonesian revolution needed " a rt for the people."1 3 4 The dispute between the opposing groups climaxed in March 1964 when plans to create the Union o f Indonesian Writer Ka-ryawan (Persatuan Karvawan Fenaarang Indonesia — PKPI), based on the Manifesto, were unveiled. The hypocrisy of the a r tis ts, who acted as "the proponents o f freedom from p o litic a l considerations" but wished to enjoy the protection of SOKSI and SUAD, embroiled the two sides in a b itte r polemic. 135 Wild accusations were traded about the p o litic a l intentions and sympathies of members of both sides. Eventually, matters became so uncontrollable and divisive th a t Sukarno banned the Manifesto on 8 May "as being an 'addition' t o Manipol Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 158] === 148 and as seeming to dculbt the Revolution. 1,136 Not only had the Canmalists scored a victory over its enemies a t the ideological lev el, but in th e "retooling" campaign in the Indonesian Journalists Association {Permtnan Wartawan Indonesia — ME), the Islamic University Students Association (Himounan Mahasiswa organizations, Islam and in HMX), th e Front Nasional. cu ltu ral same educational in stitu tio n s th a t ensued, its opponents were purged. 137 Even before the effects o f the f ir s t polemic had run th eir course, th e began. 138 second polemic unfolded: one importation related American ideological struggle th e film s, and the external ally, the U.S. Once again, p a rtic u la r and tie s two levels issue, another th is related between the Army and struggle case the its the higher foremost The effects o f the ban on the Cultural Manifesto provided the -EKE and Lekra with the incentive to urge stronger action against American films than did the government's own policy of reducing th e ir dissemination Indonesia. series boycotts and demonstrations and th e call fo r the dissolution o f,the American Motion Picture Association o f Indonesia (AMPAI), led by the Command fo r the Boycott o f American Im perialist Filins, in itia lly failed to convince the Trade Minister, Adam Malik, to take stronger action. When the M inister finally terminated AMPAI's a c tiv itie s in August, he also called upon th e Command to cease its actions, hinting that i t had lin k s with foreign powers and was p o ten tially "anarchist. 1,139 th e Command, renamed th e Action Committee, accelerated i t s encouraged others Information Service join (IBIS) th is vein, the However, demands and United States lib rary was attacked in Jogjakarta cm 15 August and other measures were taken against U.S. in tere sts by th e HCE Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 159] === 149 and i t s fronts. Other significant v ic to rie s for the PKE were attained in September 1964 when v is its by Indonesian o ffic ia ls, s tudents, scholars, and members o f the m ilitary to the U.S. for purposes of trainin g were stopped, and in early December when USIS lib ra rie s were ransacked with impunity by elements of the PKT and its fronts in Jakarta and Surabaya. The pro-Malik forces gathered support for th e ir cause too, as th e process alliance building intensified. Eventually, the film issue was forgotten and supplanted by a vaguely expressed but deep-seated mutual antagonism, articu lated by the leading spokesmen of each bloc. This polemic was never resolved, but rather came to be subsumed by the la s t polemic. The th ird nature polemic, consistent with the trend to of Guided Democracy, contra c t per se. ju s t a s pertained to the clash over th e ideology of th e social Early in 1964 th e opponents o f Nasakom realized th a t the Cbmmuitists could base th e ir arguments and actions on th e schizophrenic nature of the social contract and, importantly, Sukarno's cwn thoughts, forces, so, too, could they. In the hands of the an ti-Nasakom Sukarno's formulations were shorn of th e ir radical aspects and d isto rte d "dilute the Marxist ideology. 1,140 A compilation co rpo ratist formed th e ideas around which grew a basis overtones the President's of th e Guided Democracy conservative ideology of and "Sukarnoism," nationwide press campaign conducted by th e a n ti- Nasakom forces throughout the la tte r part of the year. Late in October 1964, SOKSI declared that i t would urge th e M ERS to ra tify Sukarnoism as th e "Doctrine o f the Pancasila Revolution," 141 undertaking simultaneously to have the karvawan concept integrated with th is corpus of thought. e x p lic itly anti-Oanmunist th ru st Sukarnoism was evident Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The from th e === [PDF page 160] === 150 headlines of th e Sukarnoism press (an indication of, the degree to which th e p o lity was polarized): "Confrontation against the PKE i s the same as confrontation Aiditism" against Malaysia" fRevolusioner); "Choose Sukarnoism or (Garuda) y^nd, in an e d ito ria l in Karvawan about th e PKE, "Does i t s t i l l have th e rig h t to liv e?"142 As mere words, Sukarnoism remained re la tiv e ly harmless to th e PKT and Nasakon forces; the situation changed, took an organizational however, when the ideology form on 9 November. Then, the Body fo r the Support/Spreading of Sukarnoism fBadan Pendukum/Penvebar Rulfflmoisme— BPS) was established and for the communist forces society f i r s t time united the diverse an ti under one formal umbrella organization. Iro n ically, the polarization th a t occurred a t the end of 1964, and which was accelerated by the founding of th e BPS, was fully consistent with Aidit*s theory of the state. Army, the Navy, Arrayed on the rig h t as one bloc were the senior officers.in th e Police, SOKSI, members o f the executive o f the Front Nasional. IPKI, Murba. PSIE, the conservative wing the FNI, th e Catholic party, ■Facing them were the PKE, its HMI, fron ts, and m inisters the th e cabinet* radical wing of the PNI, Partindo. th e Pemuda Rakvat. EWE, and also same members of the cabinet, including Subandrio. The ultim ate aim of each bloc was to have Sukarno decide the fa te of th e BPS in th e ir favour. P resident's The PKE wanted to "crush" Sukarnoism, with the approval, 143 while SOKSI desired th at Sukarno accept "the Doctrine fo r Karvawan11 as his awn. 144 Owing to the size of the alliances th a t had been p u ilt over the issue, th e potential violence with which each bloc threatened the other, and the evaporation of any middle ground between the two extremes, Sukarno's response would be a c lea r signal as Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 161] === tot 151 whi which interpretation o f Guided Democracy would prevail. Ominously, the P resident's response would also marginalize a large segment of th e /polity and weaken the position of i t s spokesmen and representatives in the government and state. I t is with th is appreciation of the crucial nature of Sukarno's decision, to dissolve the BBS on 17 December, th a t one can understand the events of 1965. Then, the anti-Cammunist forces were collectively declining: The BPS had brought together a formidable conservative p o litic a l alliance, but th a t a ll iance was stuck in a position of acute p o litic a l vulnerability, without recourse to a separate ideological basis with which to defend its e lf against the aggressive left-wing interpretation of Nasaknm. 145 To complete a general understanding of the situation in Indonesian p o litic s a t th e end of 1964, some consideration most also be given to th e Army's own p o litic a l fortunes during the course of the year. In th e realms of m ilitary and m ilitary-civilian m atters, the Amy's a b ility to exercise i t s own expertise was hindered by Sukarno's interference. the m ilitary sphere, Sukarno's discomfort with the Army's control over coercive resources was reflected in his appointment of Air Vice Marshal Qnar Ehani to lead the Alert Command (Komando Siacra — KDGA), which was formed on 16 May 1964 as part of konfr ont a s i. Given that the co nflict with Malaysia was essentially a ground operation, Sukarno's action was particularly b itte r for th e TNI. Later, when the KDGA appeared to be failin g in i t s tasks, a new Area A lert Command (Komando Wanda la -siaaa— KDIAGA) was formed by Sukarno in September, acknowledging the in a b ility of an Air Force o fficer to conduct ground operations; appointed as Ehani's F irs t Deputy Commander was Army Major-General Suharto. 146 Also in September, a "modified state of emergency" was declared in Indonesia in response to B ritish m ilitary th re a ts. 147 Again, Sukarno asserted Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 162] === 152 himself against the Army central command. Ihe positions of th e Regional Dwikora Executive Pelaksanaan Dwikora Daer^h— and by the regional commanders fpanglima) in accordance with Sukarno's orders. 148 However, Peoelradat Authorities were created on 14 September Sundhaussen observed, provinces fPenanasa th e responsible "in a l l except pancrlima were appointed d irec tly Sukarno, fille d four thus relatively unimportant Pepelrada and they try-passing were th e Apny headrpwrtvarpT»*149 As a re s u lt of "retooling," Yard's undoing of Nasution's work to enhance Amy cohesion, and Sukarno's increasing p o litic a l statu re, th e INI i t s e l f was by la te 1964 a less formidable foe of Ccamnunism. Feith observed in August 1964 th at of the vigorously anti-Ccmmunist regional commanders of 1960-62 only two (are s t i l l in th e ir, posts, Colonel Jusuf of South Sulawesi arja Brigadier General Adjie o f West Java. And of these two, Colonel Jusuf [was] overshadowed by the growing power o f the inter-regional commander for East Indonesia, now ' Brigadier General Rukman, and Brigadier General Adjie had made i t clear th a t he no longer supports arrti-Carnmunist positions in a way which implies criticism o f the President. 150 The Army's diminishing power as d istin c t p o litic a l contender, m ilitary organization, was largely th e work and Sukarno. Therefore, i t i s not surprising th a t the larg est o f the Amy's c iv ilia n organizations, SOKSI, suffered the same fate in 1964. Typical of Sukarno's sty le, h is e ffo rts to curb the growth of SOKSI and to lim it i t s ro le in p o litic a l l i f e involved making i t conform to leg islatio n and governmental policy th a t was inherently re s tric tiv e. th e second h alf of 1964, i t had became apparent th a t SOKSI was threatened with*’ extinction? the argument that only p a rty -a ffilia te d ormas should be permitted to engage in Front Nasional and ormas a c tiv itie s was gaining popularity among government o ffic ia ls. M inisterial endorsement of th is Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 163] === 153 line of reasoning in August 1964 heralded government: action that would be against SOKSI's interests. Instruction no. The f i r s t bids* to SOKSI was Presidential 002/1964, which prohibited the creation of new labour organizations a fte r 8 SS^ember 1964 and came a t a time when SOKSI was attempting to reorganize its Notwithstanding constituent FTKs in th e s ta te enterprises. SOKSI's • arguments against the provisions the Instruction, i t s activ ities were lim ited by th e regulation. 151 second, potentially more damaging, th rea t was embodied Presidential Decree 193/1964. This measure regulated organizations were to gain membership in th^s Front Nasi anal. which The Decree prompted Nasakom forces to take advantage o f the fac t th a t the karvawan organizations already in the Front were technically "unaffiliated," given the Front's rejection of SOKSI admission in wing forces pressed fo r a 1sim plification' 1963.152 Thus, "the le f tof the members of th e Front based on the Decree, arguing th at only the p a rty -a ffilia te d ormas had^he rig h t to be members. 11153 In 1960 the defeat o f the parties seemed imminent writh th e implementation of th e onlke-r concept; by 1964, however, i t was th e oolkar and karvawan forces that were threatened. Consistent with tiie reactive strategy th a t had been forced increasingly on th e Army and its c iv ilia n a llie s since 1963, SOKSI apd i t s constituent elements created th e Jo in t Secretariat of Golkar Organizations Within the National Front (Secretariat Bersama Orcranisasi-orcanisasi Goloman Karva Armota Front Nasionall October 1964. Only banding together and accomodating themselves to ascendant p o litic a l forces could SOKSI and i t s members stave off dissolution. The neutralization by th e government of the Army's largest civ ilian anti-Oanmuxiist resource was as significant a s the PKI's p arallel loss of Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 164] === 154 the BIT's revolutionary potential. By no means, however, did th e Army's and PKI's sim ilar experiences with th e ir largest constituent resources equalize the power chances of each. The prospects o f revolution or counterrevolution in 1965 had to be carefully weighed. The Balance o f Forces in 1964 and th e Paths of Revolution and Counterrevolution While apposition the Ccmdiumsts the faced countryside, groundswell th e Army and m ilitan t Muslim i t s c iv ilia n backers experienced negative ideological developments ai^the s ta te -e lite level in 1964. Moreover, the advice o f the conservatives on the d irection of the revolution andGuided Democracy was rejected by Sukarno in December 1964. Thus, Sukarno had opened th e door of opportunity fo r the PKE, consequence th a t followed from both the process of convergence practised by the PKI, and by Sukarno's own in itia tiv e. Throughout th e year, Sukarno had freely sided with the PKE on a l l major issues of s ta te. well, he had actively contributed to the sense th a t events were getting out of hSnd by not rejecting invocations such as th a t made by the Justice Coordinating Minister in September 1964: "there were laws th at not only could be, Putting but must be, broken in the service of the Revolution. the whole social contract to a te s t, strateg y, was w ilfully condoned by Sukarno. situ a tio n had entered a new, views were articulated so cial contract, The developing revolutionary and higher, form: for the f i r s t time, PKE and implemented a t and actions the essence of the PKE by the the highest PKE and its levels of the fronts to forcefully .implement them in the polity were not prevented. With unprecedented e lite support and an even larger constituency, consisting of 18 million persons or 17.5 per cent of the to ta l population Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 165] === £55 (according to figures released In June 1964155), the tra n sitio n frcm a revolutionary situation to revolutionary outcome appeared possible- The Qanmunists had consciously and steadfastly acquired adherents and resources. They had altered th e ir aims, options, and collective actions, and p a rtia lly shifted th e ir base of so lid arity toward the largest portion of the population, the peasants, or they had forced the adoption o f these contractual features cn other members of the polity, especially th e sta te e lite. The PKE offensive strategy was a complete success in a ll but two respects. F irst, there was th e nagging defeat and worsening situation in the countryside. Second, as Brackman has commented, by la te 1964 every conceivable "functional” group in Sukarno's guided democracy [had] i t s EKE counterpart e ith e r above or below ground. If an exception makes the general rule, the exception [was] the PKE1s failure since Madiun to develop a legal param ilitary f r o n t.... I f the Party could gain d irect control o f the armed forces, or failing in th a t, neutralize the army's effectiveness by encouraging "war lord ism" or by subverting ill-p a id troops, the Party would be on the threshold of power. 15*5 The logic of acquiring th e one outstanding resource — the tools of coercion — did, indeed, motivate th e PKE in 1965. p a rty 's movement acquire arms, although During the year the consistent with th eo retical framework, must be understood in the context of i t s the other actions in accordance with the general formula of revolution to which the party subscribed. Although the road ahead pointed toward Communist in itia tiv e s vis-a-vis the acquisition of coercive resources in 1965, the PKE was sensitive to the fact -that one-half of its programme — th e aksi seoihak — had failed in 1964 and th a t, as far as i t was concerned, the pro-people aspect of the s ta te had to be strengthened and consolidated further. Moreover, the support i t gained from Sukarno d id not obviate §harp differences with him. While relations with th e state e lite did not form the exclusive Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 166] === 156 means by which o Sukarno’s advance th e revolution, the p a rty ’s enemies support for the PKT was pushing Indonesia ineluctably toward crantnunism. Thus, the calculus revolution, the PKE combined Sukarno1s support with i t s own drive to move the s ta te to th e le f t, while try in g to minimize the effects o f the turmoil in the countryside. calculus s trik e of counterrevolution, against the PKE ard demands was f e l t During th e to be following the In the antiKtsnmunists were compelled to Sukarno, whose acquiescence in Communist the major facto r behind th e ir worsening lo t. year, the antiKTmmunists searched for "decelerator," while the PKE pressed for an accelerator in the form of th e Fifth Force; stage a decisive the la tte r acrtor was, however, f a r less compelled to event in times of p o litic a l fortune,.than were its opponents in times of p o litic a l misfortune. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 167] === CHAPTER V THE IAST YEAR: KEVOIDTIQNARY STATE LEADERSHIP, THE "RED DRIVE," AND REACTION The year 1965 proffered boundless p o ssib ilities for th e development o f a revolutionary situation in Indonesia. With regard to the social contract, the PKE state-w ithin-a-state was a rising power, propelled by th e revolutionary offensive directed a t the sta te e lite, and by- Sukarno's uninhibited endorsement of fjlts internal and external policies. The very success in 1964 of these ta ctics for revolution guaranteed th eir continuity implemented. 1965; each ta c tic, however, had to be more intensely That the PKE did not attain more formal power positions within th e sta te or government 1964 was immaterial to i t s leaders' assessments of th e ir power chances, because i t had forced th e expulsion its enemies from important places ex tra-state bodies. in the state and in significant Ultimately, such developments were beneficial to the PKE as they shifted the balariCe of forces incrementally in favour of the pro-people aspect of the state. The wisdom of the FKI's_alliance with Sukarno was to be proven again and again in 1965 as the President adopted an ex plicitly Cbmmunist notion of state leadership. As the President moved leftward, he ed to ensure th a t the re s t of the country followed by severing p o litic a l, economic, 157 Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 168] === 158 and m ilitary tie s with the West and the Soviet Union in favour of a relatio n s with inportantly, the United States came to be jeopardized, and, mbre forced upon i t a kind o f revolutionary identity which was incompatible with i t. These developments disadvantaged the TNI, whose Cartplenenting the pressure on the Amy exerted f rom "above" was the PKI's "red drive" from "below." The implementation of A id it's theory of the state had given the party the additional insight th a t i t could achieve power not by attacking its enemies through frontal attacks, but by iso lating them p o litica lly. In th is capacity, the party and its fronts directed the p o lity and groups within into quickening revolutionary mainstream, exposing its opponents as diminishing and disconnected islands of reaction. Thus, the , PKE intended to acquire a llie s and to deprive the Army of its civ ilian backers, thus denying i t adherents and channels, of p o litic a l expression. Amidst the "noise" of the Communists' red drive, th e Army's voice could not be heard, and the TNI could not but accede to the irre s is tib le Nasakon-izatio n of the social contract. I t was also very d iffic u lt for the Army leadership to r e s is t the jo in t Sukamo-PKI demands workers and peasants. for "F ifth The effo rts Force," of the consisting of PKI in 1965 to armed secure a m ilitary wing represented, ifi th eo retical terms, an accelerator and the culmination of, i t s.state-building a c tiv itie s. I f th e vigilance o f the forces of reaction had been high in 1964, th e PKI's proposal fo r arms raised i t s enemies' sense of apprehension to new levels'. The plan for a F ifth force made the Army aware th a t without domestic a llie s, external tie s, or a sympathetic President, revolutionary situ atio n, and hence th e secure the inten sificatio n o f the tran sitio n a revolutionary Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 169] === 15 9 cutcame, could occur in a mere matter o f time. To prevent th is, the Arm/ had to stage a decelerator th a t would strik e f i r s t a t Sukarno, whose position fa c ilitate d the success of the PKT, which constituted the secondary enemy. Sukarno and the Nasakom-ization of the Indonesian State: Tile International TtealTn One of the prevailing characteristics of Indonesian p o litic a l life in 1965 was Sukarno's concern for the international dimension o f his country's revolution. s ta te 's EXiring th at year, in a ll major aspects of the international relations — p o litic a l, economic, and m ilitary— Sukarno acted 'to ensure that relations with the "im perialist" West and i t s international organizations, as well as with the Soviet Union, were either severed or put under great pressure. In April -^.965, the President outlined the internal consequences of his international p olicies, urged the country to and seek self-reliance and to emulate the economic policies of North Korea. As the domestic scene adjusted to th e new sta te policies, i t became evident th a t the Army would be the le a st able to adapt to the changes. Thus, the President's actions heralded the complete p o litic a l marginalization of the INI as the new, more radical revolutionary identity th a t the polity was assuming, was rejected by the Army leadership. On 1 January 1965 Indonesia announced its intention to withdraw from the United Nations. 1 This development, although not.entirely unexpected, signalled th at Indonesia was exiting the world order so as to enable i t to "build the world anew." Jakarta had hoped th a t i t s actions would be a signal to other countries, considered to be members of the Newl^i Emerging Forces, to join i t. That no other sta te was w illing to sac rific e its Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 170] === representation the fa r the Indonesian causa did not slow Sukarno's growing association with those countries th a t remained outside the international body: th e People's Republic of China, North Korea, and North Vietnam. ^ From the perspective development was favourable only to the supporters. A pril, domestic p o litic s, the PKI and other radical Nasakom However, tangible domestic consequences were not f e lt u n til when the President argued in favour of self-relian ce a ll spheres. In his ^aaress to the third general session of the MERS on 11 April, Sukarno stated th a t the ^"national democratic" phase of the Indonesian revolution was complete. Despite being censured by the PKT, which found the P resident's claim groundless and in^jnical to its unfinished a n tifeudal and an ti-im p erialist programmes, which (theoretically) should be implemented f i r s t in preparation fo r socialism, the President argued th a t "Indonesian Socialism" had begun. 3 The b e st way to ensure th$ success of second stage of the revolution was, fo r Sukarno, to "throw tfce wheel around"' (banting s t i r t and to "stand on one's own feet" (beodiri diatas kaki sendiri — berdikari). P ractically, th e President complete self-sufficiency. argued, the p o litic a l his country Thus, from striv e fo r However, more profoundly, as Hauswedell has berdikari policy "was an attempt to opponents supporters." 4 exhorted th e ir foreign iso late h is im perialist and domestic rev isio n ist on th e world stage not only were economic tie s revised to favour a l e f t i s t interpretation of the Indonesian revolution, but cultural and educational policies, m ilitary defence doctrines, and acquisition o f armaments were also made to re fle c t Sukarno's emphasis on a genuine people's revolution. 5 Among the f i r s t signs o f the P resident's Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 171] === 16 1 seriousness about the implementation of h is ideas of self-sufficiency was the opening of the new National Defence In stitu te Negara) in Jakarta in May 1965. fLenibaaa Fertahanan Hie In s titu te 's purpose was not merely to provide another rival to SESKQAD, but to create an alternative basis upon which t o. erect a wholly new kind of m ilitary establishment and m ilitary thinking. Consequently, by July the Army newspaper, Berita Yudha. reported that "certain Socialist countries" had ceased selling arms to Indonesia, thus guaranteeing armoury. 6 the obsolescence Furthermore, the Army's (mainly) Soviet the framework fo r Atomic, Bacteriological, Chemical Warfare had been established. and This development marked the increasingly intimate nature of Indonesian-Chinese m ilitary cooperation and prompted Aidit to declare th at "we shall smash Western domination in the sc ie n tific and technical fie ld."7 While the TNI appeared to losing contact w ith ^ ts main external link, the United States, the FKI was reaping the rewards of closer relations between its main external ally, Communist China, and the Indonesian state. Another salient^.aspect of the President's declaration of berdikari was th a t the terminology that he used, the policies th at he wished to implement '"in its name, borrowed from' A id it's and the that he „ envisaged, were a ll e a rlie r pronouncements regarding the "correct" style of revolutionary leadership. 8 future In December 1963, fo r example, A idit had asked "What is the use of a revolutionary leader i f he cannot bring about an improvement in the appalling living conditions of the people, i f he is not skilled a t veering the steering-wheel from rig h t to l e f t in the matter of the people's living conditions[? ]" 9 In April 1965, Sukarno not only adopted th is idea as his own, but expanded i t s meaning to include Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 172] === 162 many more areas of sta te policy than merely th e economy. The culmination of Sukarno's new revolutionary sty le of leadership on the external front was marked by his declaration on 17 August 1965 th a t "we are now fostering an an ti-im p erialist axis." 10 th e newly proclaimed which would serve,as policy. By th is he meant "E)jakarta-Pnanpenh-Hanoi-Peking-Pyongyang the axis, 11 framework for Indonesia's evolving foreign This alliance would serve as the b asis of a new p o litic a l order and — judging from Indonesia's decision in August to withdraw from the IMF, the World Bank, and Interpol — a new economic and international policing gsraer as well. While Sukarno avoided breaking a l l economic and p o litic a l tie s with the West and the Soviet Union, 11 he was keen to point Indonesia's ^way forward. His radical vision of self-relian ce, although weakly implemented by the government through internal policies, was an unequivocal endorsement of one s e t of p o litic a l forces over another. The FKI and th e Nasakom-ization of the Indonesian State: The "Red 'Drive" Like the in itia tiv e s foreign policy undertaken by Sukarno in 1965, the ones he launched or approved during the year with respect to domestic p o litic s were no le ss decisive: they constituted a natural supplement to the international dimensions of Nasakom. From January to September, he oversaw or allowed a risin g revolutionary wave to overwhelm and threaten elements and groups of the an ti-Nasakom forces. communist cadres, Millions of in th e ir "red drive," acted to close the gap between the government1s declared policy and th e PKI's immediate programme. 13 Owing to th e sim ila ritie s between the policy and th e programme, the general perception in dcfaestic c ircle s was th a t opposing th e Communists amounted to opposing the government and Sukamo. 13 With th e convergence Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 173] === 163 between the statelik e action en tity, programmes of Indonesian the primary objective o f the faith fu lly in th e name of Sukarno. the s ta te and the PKI la tte r became to act For good reason, i t was f e lt th a t the anti-people aspect of the sta te would fin ally be vanquish^ch From the onset of 1965, Indonesian Communists were heartened not only by the news th at th e ir country had withdrawn from the U.N., but also by the desire expressed by leading members of the sta te e lite (Sukarno, Subandrio) to intensify the revolution a t home. Subandrio had spoken ominously on 4 January when he declared th at 1965 is a year of cry stallisatio n of the forces of the Indonesian Revolution. Do not be astonished when I say th a t in 1965 there may be friends of our Struggle who are weak, and wham we are forced to leave behind, because they can no longer keep up with the progress of the Revolution. 14 Within cne day, the a c tiv itie s, ormas. in stitu tio n s, and members of the p o litic a l party Murba. which had led the "frozen" by Sukarno. 15 BPS campaign in 1964, were This development was profoundly important: signalled the end of the ideological argument th at had commenced in i960 with Sukarno's advocacy of Nasakom. with i t, Murba. and individuals associated such as Ministers Malik and Saleh, outspoken defenders of Sukarno's konseosi had been among the most 1957, and had actively so licited support for the President's corporatist ideas throughout the period of Guided Democracy. 16 No clearer signal could have been given by Sukamo th a t he endorsed Nasakom against i t s opponents. complete Nasakom-ization February, thus terminating He removed t h | la s t constraints to the the sta te the banning the printing rig hts BPS press twenty-nine newspapers, 17 and by adopting all-party demands for the withdrawal of the ban on regional heads, for "measures weakening central control Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. in the === [PDF page 174] === 164 regions, and fo r the Nasakam-ization of the leadership of the regional executive bodies. 18 Additionally, in a cabinet shuffle in March, two m inisters associated with Murba (Malik and Saleh) were demoted. 19 For th e remainder of the year, the President generally abstained from taking furth er decisive actions against h is, or the PKI's, opponents. Rather, he withdrew to l e t the forces from "below" continue the Nasakom-ization of the s ta te and to le t i t be "Murba-ized" (diMUrbakan), th a t is, purged o f i t s non- or antiKtatcnunist elements. 20 Hie PKI's "red drive" was launched response to the signals emanating from th e highest levels of the s ta te in early 1965.21 Communists' actions were mainly 'in d irect and d iffic u lt to indicators of th e ir "power chances." th a t revolutionary the situ ation outcome. was short, measure as Their strategy was to infuse the a ffa irs of the s ta te with th e ir symbols and slogans, impression The slid ing was and to give the inexorably necessary toward create the appearance th a t th e s ta te 's power had came unstuck. One objective of the Communists' red drive was to complete the destruction of c iv ilian organizations sympathetic to, or associated with, the Army. After the suspension of Murba. th e major remaining targets included the conservative wing of the FNI, NU, ESII, P e rti.IRK I. and the HMI. Slowly, leadership changes th a t favoured th e l e f tis ts were effected throughout the course of 1965 in the P e rti. Partindo. and IPECC p a rtie s. 22 The major v icto ries scored during the year involved th e FNI and NU executives: in each case, opponents. th e FNI, Sukamo helped th e PKE neutralize its August, for example, Sukarno, demanded the "retooling" of which meant the expulsion p o litic ia n s who refused to cooperate of Hardi and other conservative with the EKE. 23 Although the NU was Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 175] === 165 not "retooled," th e President gave notice to th e party th a t he would like see leadership. 24 too, necessary "purifying" The la st organization targeted by the FKI was the HMI. September the PKI, attention to th is Army'. Nasakcmt-ized. The c a ll Pemuda Rakvat. and the its Front Pemuda turned th eir la s t bastion of outspoken civilian support fo r the to ban the HMI was so intense th a t A idit urged its destruction, even after Sukarno had expressly vetoed th is option. 26 Further effo rts to isolate the Arqiy and to push the state to the l e f t included actions against the United States. Sukarno's pronouncements and foreign policy In th is connection, protected the PKI from accusations that i t s actions were ille g a l o r illegitim ate. Therefore, the Communists sustained th e ir attacks against the USIS and forced the government to take over its library in Jakarta on 15 February 1965, th e sane day, 16f0,000 acres of U.S.-owned rubber plantations were seized North Sumatra, again precipitating a c ris is for the government. 26 Soon, the party became more daring: on 18 February the U.S. consulate in Medan was stormed; and la te r in the month, U.S. enterprises were seized by party and front cadres. 27 Once again, the cadres of the PKI chose to attack a foreign target to demonstrate th eir potential for sovereignty. This time, however, " it confronted only a mild repetition of the o ffic ia l resistance i t had met in its actions against B ritish enterprises in 1963 and 1964.1,28 Ultimately, and indicative of th e degree to which/th e EKE statelik e entity had supplanted the poWer of th e legal Indonesian state, the reason cited fo r the withdrawal of the American Peace Corps in April was "the Indonesian government could not guarantee the safety of U.S. personnel and property involved." 29 Slowly, and imperceptibly, the EKE was coning to dominate the sta te Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 176] === 166 and p o lity. Under th e guise of th e main slogan of 1965 — "Progressiverevolutionary national unity with Nasakom as proaressip-rsvolusioner berooros Nasakomt 30 Nasakom-izatio n programme. its axis" (Fersatuan — the party extended the Indoctrination sessions, which "became a must fo ^ m in istrie s and government o ffic ia ls, " 31 and le g isla tiv e decrees th at " trie d to rake Nasakom an accepted fact, a 'liv in g re a lity ' in p o litic a l l i f e, " 33 highlighted the increasing convergence of thinking between the FKI and the state-. Practical M inister of Internal Affairs proposals, such th at made by the have representatives of the Nasakom, forces appointed to the executive councils of a l l provincial governors, although never implemented, suggested imminent formal PKE representation in government. 33 Minister for Indeed, in May a leader of the Pemuda Rakvat became ^he E lectricity and Energy. In the newly created National Defence In stitu te, A idit and Njoto were appointed professors in thus furthering the prospects of turning an ideological advantage ii/to an organizational one. 34 ju stic e were In th e important fie ld of law, orthodox concepts supplanted "progressive" and "unconventional" c rite ria, to which even the highest authorities subscribed. 35 Lastly, ift ^celebrations marking twenty years of Indonesian independence, 4he PKI's slogan on the general lin e the o ffic ia l slogan for th e f i r s t time. 36 Indonesian revolution /became an Most clearly, the languages of the s ta te and the EKE had became almost indistinguishable. 37 I t/ seemed th a t the EKE would soon be ruling the country by acclamation. In th is regard, th e President did not stop th e PKE. /At th e fortyf if th anniversary celebrations of the EKE in May, A idit cpenly proclaimed, th e tie s between his party and the President. During/the ceremonies, emboldened by Sukarno's exhortatfbn during th e ceremonies to the party to, Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 177] === ahead, onward, onward, onward, never re tre a t, 1,38 the publicly acknowledged previously undisclosed support. 39 seized th e offensive opportunity a ll c a ll fie ld s."40 for " s till one sense, Moreover, Aidit fie rc e r th is leadership revolutionary merely meant the, intensification of actions against the anti-Nasakom forces, the interests of the United States, and the Indonesian sta te. Mare importantly, Aidit had launched a new, more risky venture: to acquire arms for the PKE and to d irectly attack the Army. Since party analyses of the balance of forces had Indicated the strengthening of the pro-people aspect o f the sta te, a basis had been laid for the procurement of arms, in a measured and cautious fashion, commensurate with the PKI's wider success vis-a-vis the sta te and p o lity. 41 In i t s quest, the party had ensured that i t had the constant backing of Sukarno and, in the period of August-September, took the in itia tiv e in th e establishment of the p a rty 's m ilitary wing. The F ifth Force: Arming the Revolution terms developing revolutionary situation, the primary development of 1965 was the FKE's attempt to acquire the resource, of coercion-. In pursuing th is objective, the PKE stated its desires openly and even thanked the Chinese for th p ir support, 42 assured th a t i t would not be dismissed by other power centres as in the past. However, between October 1964, when the BTI had proclaimed its desire to acquire arms for it^ members, and August 1965, when Sukarno hinted th a t he would establish a "Fifth Force" (in addition to the Army, Air Force, Navy, afcd Police), the Cqmmunists1 proposal had undergone a profound change. retreated from i t s Hie party had original position to acquire immediately a standing a n y „ot 10 or 15 m illion members, to a slower acquisition of m ilitary might in the form of the "Fifth Force" — a project th a tvwas eventually Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 178] === usurped byoSukamo and declared as his own. Eirher way, the PKI's plans s p l i t the Armed Porces, ju s t as the issue of Nasakom had caused a schism the polity, and the respective ^ unequivocally declare th e ir positions. services were ccmpelled In th e end, only the Army stood firm ly against the plans o f Sukarno and the FKI. The Chairman of the BTI, Asmu, had in itia te d the Ckmnunist c a ll for arras October 1964, declaring necessary the conduct konfrcntasi. 43 . Ccamnunists1 Hie idea had not been regarded as preposterous, lik e the ca lls for arms in the 1950s.44 Sukarno himself had conferred in November with the Communist Chinese to secure arms for use the konfrontasi. Front’. 4.5 Thus, for the from th e 2 l\m illio n volunteers outset of th e ir venture, of th e National th e Communists had found common cause with Sukarno. The Communist proposal had an immediate and damaging e ffe c t on the Army. meeting o f senior Amy leaders on 13 January related not so much to th e Cammunistsr acquirement of arms, which s t i l l remained a distant ° prospect, as to Yani^s seeming complacency in th e face of the th reat and. his Willingness to accede to Sukarno's desires. 4 6 to Crouch, The meeting, according failed to resolve the difference o f opinion in th e highest ranks of the Army an how t o 6meet the PKI's challenge. This outcome "put the army a t a considerable disadvantage in day-to-day maneuvering with Sukarno and the FKI, 1,47 and while the Army v acillated, the issue further. the PKE pressed On 14 and 17 January, A idit declared th a t "no less than 5 million organized workers and 10 m illion organized peasants are teady to take up arms." 46 On 12 February Sukarno erdorsed the FKI Chairman's c a ll, adding, however, th a t the plan would proceed only " if n e c e s s a r y. i«49 Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 179] === 169 Henceforth, Sukarno began to overtzfke the Communists in th e ir plans' establish a m ilitary wing. 1ft may he riTairnpd th a tT tH e communists permitted th is to occur for several reasons. F irst, a spontaneous Navy strik e on 2 March by th e Revolutionary Progressive Officers ^ Movement signalled that Nasakom forces operated within the Armed Forces.5^ The Movement attempted to oust the Navy Commander, Rear-Admiral Martadinata, who was notorious for h is cooperation with the Army. The PKI’s cultivation of the Navy had ^preated a hitherto unknown cleavage — one of an ideological nature — within the armed services. be confident th at its drive to le a s t given influence the Jo^ice and Army, not the through a publication drive, 51 became evident in open and was workihg: m ilitary publications. 52 legal access The party could also the Oommunist. thinking Additionally, Armed Forces the FKI was in th e form ideological indoctrination courses, and i t was a routine Aa^ter fo r top Communists address and propagandize before audiences a t SESKOAD, SESKDAL, SESKDMJ (Sekolah Staf dan Komando Anakatan Udara — Navy S taff and Command School), and the National Defence In s titu te. 52 of Communist influence soldiery th e its e lf. asserted, 54 PKIr the Armed Forces, 1955 and 1957 nonetheless, electio ns, The bedrock remained the the Communists 30 p er cent 6 f the Armed Forces members had voted fo r the The PKE was confident that its support had not diminished since the 1950s.» Indeed, at an Army gathering in April, there were more signs th at the Army was faltering under the pressure of Sukarno and the EKE. Again, <0, there was a s p lit within th e ranks of th e officers: same argued in favour of arming the^masses and introducing p o litic a l commissars in to the. Anted Forces; others vociferously opposed these measures. Even on the central Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 180] === 170 issue of th e meeting — the Amy's evolving m ilitary strategy — there was d iv isio n. Thus, both th e old Doctrine of T e rrito ria l Warfare and the newer "offensive revolutionary" thinking were accepted as current Army strategy. 55 As Sundhaussen has argued, th e lessons of the seminar were b itte r for th e army leaders.- I t had been clearly demonstrated th at a t le ast a t the national level th e Army had almcsc completely lost i t s operational freedom. I t could n ot attack the FKI,...nor were th e officers even capable of rally in g in th e ir own defence witnout Sukarno stepping in and confining them to his p o lic ie s. 56 Meanwnile, Sukarno was pressing th e Anted Forces to endorse the proposal of arming th e workers and peasants. On 23 May Sukarno spoke of the necessity of eradicating "canmunist-phobia" from th e Armed Forces, 57 and in late May acted to implement th is idea. On 31 May Sukarno spoke of Chou E n -la i's offer, made ih,November 1964 (and reaffirmed in February and A pril 1965), to arm th e people? as a F ifth Force, and requested the armed services to submit plans for accomplishing th is ta s k. 58 From both revolutionary and counterrevolutionary perspectives, Sukarno's c a ll was\extremely important. For the Amy, the F ifth Force was a less th reatA ing proposition than A id it' s c a ll in January for th e arming of m illions of tommunist cadres. Moreover, th e th reat of a riv a l army diminished with th e realization that would take a considerable amount o f time before the F ifth Force could be moulded into an effective m ilitary organization. The Army also became aware that i t was Sukarno, not the FKI, who posed the greater immediate th re a t. For the FKI, the acquisition of arms was delayed, but was almost guaranteed by the President's sponsorship\\f the F ifth Force. Furthermore, th e th reat o f m ilitary coup, which the. party was keen to publicize so as to diminish* Its p o ssib ility, 59 became a very dangerous proposition for th e Arrry, given Sukarno Is incontestable alliance w ith-the Communists. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The, === [PDF page 181] === 17 1 revolutionary accelerator had been slowed, but the Communists were assured that i t would eventuate. The creation of a Fifth. Force, however slow, s t i l l posed a th reat to the Army as th e President d id not clarify who would eventually control the organization. The most pressing matter for th e Army was to respond to the proposed Fifth Force. Tie Army would have preferred to give a negative vresponse, but given the p o litica l climate in th e country, th at alternative would have ^/^substantiated charges incurred too much opposition, and possibly that th e Army harboured unpatriotic elements. 60 Pressure on the Army leader ship to clarify its position increased after th e Air Force commander, Cham, unequivocally urged the creation of a Fifth Force on 4 June. 61 Dhani undertook immediate xneasujges^'within h is service to lend to the idea a tangible dimension (training of members of FKI front s under Air Force auspices began outside Jakarta in July62) and an ideological thrust (courses in Marxism were given a t SESKAU and in provincial Air Force-units beginning in June63). By mid-June th e Navy commander gave his service's extraordinary consent, 64 and elements.of the Police, especially in scheme. 6 6 East and Central Java, were sympathetic to the Eventually, Yani broke th e Army's silence and gave support to th e Fi^th Force, but only under extreme conditions: "If th e NEKDUM [Neobe armed, not only the workers and peasants."66' Through, th e summer of 1965, th e issue of the Fifth Force remained unresolved. , Neither side appeared- willing to take decisive action: 'Sukarno avoided implementing th e measure; th e Army was sile n t. In the slow shifting o f the balance o f forces, however, Sukarno's Independence Day speech strengthened the hopes of th e PKI. On 17 August, Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the === [PDF page 182] === 172 President referred to force" "the concept which I and *promised a decision about launched about the soon. He gave two indicat±s«s th a t he would agree to th e creation of (th e Force. fifth broad F irs t, he attacked th e Army's economic position, declaring th a t i f th e corruptors and swindlers of s ta te wealth continue w ith th e ir tru ly anti-republic and anti-peoples "operations", then do. not be sta rtle d i f one day th e struggle between groups w ill fla re up and bum away th e luxurious lives of these corruptors and swindlers! 67 Second, th e President aired h is disapproval of the Amy's reluctance to declare i t s position v is-a-vis th e F ifth Force: These who were progressive yesterday are possibly retrogressive, anti-progressive today; those who were revolutionary yesterday are possibly counter-revolutionary today? those who were radical yesterday, are possibly s o ft and re s is tle s s to d a y.... Even i f you were formerly a bald-headed general in 1945, but i f you s p l i t. the revolutionary national unity today, i f you' create disorder in the NASAKCM front now, if you are an emeny of the main p illa rs o f the revolution today, then you have became a force o f re a c tio n!... heed iny words when when I say that th e main c riterio n.for a revolutionary i s oneness between word and every time I propose a new' idea th ere are always a number of reactions which, I am sorry to say, are sometimes influenced by Old Established Forces textbooks;... The facts a re th a t th e defence of th e sta te demands a maximum of e ffo rt from us a l l while, according to A rticle 30 of our 1945 Constitution:, Every citizen shall have the right and the duty to participate in the defence o f the S tate."60 Together, these ideas put the Army on th e defensive in an unprecedented fashion. p To add to i t s Nasakom forces to problems, the President's words encouraged the ag ita te ever more vigorously for th e ir goals. September 1965 th e country was approaching a showdown. The PKI was given two powerful incentives in August 1965 to redouble its revolutionary membership l i s t s growth of th e retaining i t s strategy. F irst, the party released its la s t th a t revealed th e continuous and seemingly unstoppable Camraunist constituency. 69 The Cctqqxunist strateg y legal, loyal, and obedient standing in th e p o lity had won Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 183] === i t 27 million members: 3.5 million (PKI); 3 million (Femuda Rakvatl,* 3.5 million (SOBSI); flekra). 70 9 million Accounting for 3 million overlapping (Gerwani); and 5 million membership, supporters numbered approximately 20 million persons, one-fifth the tremendous size, the Communist or approximately to tal Indonesian population. Recognition of its in conjunction with the second incentive — Sukarno's speech — provided the setting for the anarchical conditions in Indonesia in September. On 17 August, Aidit declared that the goals th at the party had set for its e lf in 1965,71 including attacking the "cap italist bureaucrat" - "economic dynasty" union, could be reached "fully and radically witjkj sp^d, i f th e revolution i s concrete."72 This statement signalled t L&* p arty 's desire to accelerate the destruction, and not merely isolation, of i t s remaining enemies, especially those civilians who benefited from Army protection in the economy. Indeed, on 27 August, Aidit raised the stakes by warning th e blows th a t have recently been delivered on an increasing scale to the counterrevolutionary forces are only one warning to th e adventurers that i f they try to oppose the current o f the popular masses they w ill not destroy the Indonesian people but instead w ill themselves be cast into oblivion. 73 On 4 September, so as to avoid such an outcome for its e lf, again publicized th e th reat of a m ilitary coup. 74 wracked by hyperinflation, 75 against the kabir subandrio the.party With th e economy promised th at "the operation rkanitalis-birokrat — c a p ita list bureaucrats, the PKI's term fo r m ilitary o fficials with positions Jn the economy] w ill be launched soon." To that, Aidit added, on 14' September, th at th e workers should prepare to "launch p arasite' actions." 7 6 the 'remove the cancer' and 'ex&radt the The campaign against the p arty 's domestic enemies Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 184] === 174 appeared to peak in la te September, when the headquarters of th e Psmuda Fakvat demanded the public execution of "economic criminals, 1177 and with A idit encouraging workers in sta te enterprises to "take over, take over,. and again take over. 1,78 sharp and dramatic contrast to the revolutionary exhortations th at threatafieS to force the complete disintegration of sta te power, Yard > 27 September, the Army’s firm opposition declared, fL t r the f i r s t* time on 'both t o the F ifth Force and to the Nasakom-izatio n of the Armed Forces. 79 The Army leadership was shimming against th e strong current of th e wider social contract. Indonesians prepared themselves for the outcome of th e impasse.. The Armv Dest r oys th e Social Contract: The Decelerator Against Sukarno and the Communists The ^events of 30 September-1 intense academic study. 80 October have been the subject With regard to th is study, i t is important to emphasize the nature of^the social contract of Guided Democracy in i t s most mature form and to assess th e prospects' yof the tra n sitio n from a revolutionary situation revolutionary outcome. Furthermore, atten tio n must be paid to the q ualitative and quantitative aspects of th e PKI state-w ith in -a-state in 1965. One must also understand th e Army’s position within the context o f the turbulence of the Nasakom-ized- social' contract, its tie s to the civ ilian sphere, i t s resources, and i t s sources assistance. Taken together/ these considerations w ill present a theoretically-enriched understanding o f the^so-called "abortive carp" in Indonesia. In i t s la te phase,- the social contract of Guided Democracy united th e la rg e st organized following in society (the Communist constituency) Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 185] === with th e unrivalled and seemingly in fa llib le spokesman of the s ta te e lite (Sukarno). That both proffered Indonesia's future revolutionary meant situation th at genuinely th e the revolutionary visions tran sitio n country from would In short, w ithin-a-state sta te, becoming the Indonesian increasingly pointing its direction. developing intensify ineluctably toward a revolutionary outcome. was the and lead the EKE sta te - and Sukarno was For a revolutionary actor lik e th e PKE, neither a te tte r social contract nor a more opportune alliance o f forces could be found. ^ ^ Relative to other actors or organizations in Indonesia atf-the tin e, the EKE seemed monolithic, unstoppable, irre s is tib le, and a paragon o f organizational a d a ^ b U i ^ T ^ W, the PKI had acquired'** «as in the process of acquiring a ll th e accoutrements of state power. These included sovereignty (although limited, i t was used increasingly in 19641965 to force actions otherwise unacceptable to the legal government)? te rrito ry (despite the Muslim upsurge, Central and East Java were unmistakable Communist strongholds); adherents (approximately one in five Indonesians openly sided with the Communists); government; and th e smal l beginnings of a m ilitary establishment. That the PKE had elements of each of these resources,, empirically speaking, does not necessarily mean that these were of high quality. Were th e PKI's millions constituents, fo r example, uniformly socialized and steeled to fig h t \fdr th e Communists in a ll situations? •SficVey has argued, the la te period of Guided Democracy, th ere was tremendous pressure on ordinary Indonesians to declare th e ir support for th e l e f t or th e right, such that any newly proclaimed sympathies were motivated out o f fear. 81 Additionally, as suggested in reference to the R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 186] === 176 rapidity o f the Communists' growth in the period of lib eral democracy, success in and o f its e lf is attractiv e but may breed opportunism rather than loyalty. With respect other resources, the governmental structure o f the PKE and the BIT proved inadequate in the execution of policy in th e countryside. Lastly, in the realm of m ilitary resources, only small steps had been taken to create’ a F ifth Force, and th is alone " gave the p arty cause to a c t cautiously: th e party had opted ro "slow" its accelerator. That the party was not re a lly interested in precipitatin g a m ilitary conflict: w ith' the Army is evident from the fa c t that the Presidency was allowed to,'take the in itia tiv e in creating the FKI m ilitary wing. In fa c t, th e party would have preferred to ride the revolutionary tid e of Indonesian society, to provide merely loose leadership, and to keep the onrush of ac tiv ity pointed in th e rig h t direction. Standing in th e way o f the revolution, th e Army was concerned th a t as an independent actor i t would perish in th e face of the FKPs,red drive. The Army's throughout th e year. position Guided Democracy had been eroded For example, the EKT had almost completely ruptured H ia ll th e Army's t i e s to th e civ ilian sphere and strove in September to campletlji the process. p o litic a l ascent to For the Army, which had from the very onset of i t s power in 1957 struggled to create lin ks between i ts e lf and c iv ilia n s, th is prospect spelt doom. cause had been punctured, and same of i t s Civilian support for i t s - larg est enterprises in th e c iv il sphere had e ith e r been toppled and destroyed (BPS, Coerasl Karval or were on S ecretariat). the verge marginalization The Army's stock depleted by 1965. (HANSIP, of resources SOSKI, th e Jo in t had already been badly However, the F ifth Force proposal, unlike any of th e previous th reats th a t the Army had faced, cculd not be overcame by th e Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 187] === 177 Army's genius fo r organizational creativity. Hie Array leadership, seemed, <|p 4.^Bri^rly exhausted i t s a b ility to remain a d istin c t p o litic a l en tity. Yam's declaration on 27 September reaffirmed the TNI's resistance a l l encroachments on i t, yet no constructive alternatives were provided. the This omission was not, however, an oversight on the p a rt of TNI leadership; attempt by the senior officers EKT and the BIT to were aware th a t the apply th e ir purposeful sovereignty in the countryside had’ yielded the opposite outcate. There new operated in the countryside a new, m ilitant anti-Comraunism. I f the largest organization in th e country, th e BTI, could not control th is force, then neither could the President. The emotions th a t had prompted the declaration of a iihad (holy war) against the Communists in May-June 1965 indicated th at a new ru ra l power resource had been created and was fully the Army's intention to use the Muslim fury against the PKE. 82 The TNI could also be comforted by the fact, generally unknown to Indonesians a t the time, 83 that i t s relations with the United States were expanding, despite the policy of berditor-i and the worsening of relations between th e Indonesian and American governments. The b elief th a tU.S. aid to Indonesia had been terminated i s understandable, given the fact tjxat "funding of the Indonesian m ilitary (unlike aid to any other country) [was treated] as a covert matter" by the American government. 84 In fac t, m ilitary aid for Indonesia to talled $39.5 million between 1S62 and 1965, and only $28.3 million fo r the period 1949 1961.85 Moreover, in July- 1965 a secret contract was signed whereby 200 lig h t a irc ra ft would be delivered to the TNI, not th e Air Force. early 1965 the* number American m ilitary Again, m ilita ry -a ffilia ted Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 188] === 178 personnel Indonesia actually Program and in the MILTftG. 86 increased the M ilitary Assistance Perhaps th e strongest link binding tfte^ United States and the INI was the American m ilitary training th a t th e la tte r received: While about 25p Indonesian o fficers had been trained in the United S tates by 1958, the figure rose in 1962 td \500 and by 1965 ha£ soared to 4, 000. This meant th a t a t th e time of the 1965 coup 11 ___ one-third of the Indonesian general s ta ff had sane s o rt of tra in in g from America and almost h a lf of the o fficer corps."87 I t is clear th a t, in i t s struggle against the P K I^state-^th in-a-state, the TNI was n ot b ereft of support; i t s p ast links with the Americans gave i t confidence in th e face of threatening domestic p o litic s. 88 In contrast to the kind of open and obvious confrontation th a t was expected occur between the FKI September-1 October are extremely unequivocal evidence has emerged to and the unclfear TNI, and, implicate the the events th is date, PKE in of- 30 any way. Briefly, on 30 September members of th e‘ September 30 Movement fGerakan September Tioapuluh — Gestapu), allegedly including members of th e Pemuda Rakvat and Gerwani. abducted and murdered seven members of the INI Central Command, including Yani. Ihs butchery occurred a t Halim airp o rt, where the Air Force had provided m ilitary training to members of the PKI's fronts. interna l The conspirators proclaimed th e ir army a ffa ir" and a preemptive s trik e actions against a "Council of Generals," which was charged with planning a coup against Sukarno. decree was issued to the effect th a t the government was dissolved, and assurances were given th a t the President October arrived protective custody. apparent th a t th e the conspirators' (who during the course of 1 base EXaring the course of Army was rallying a t Halim airport) was in 1 October, became* f arcund th e when i t second Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. deputy and === [PDF page 189] === 179 cximmander of the Army Strategic Reserve command (KDSTRAD), Suharto, and the nws spread th a t Nasution had escaped death, th e President attempted to assert control over the Army. the President's orders However, Suharto blatantly disobeyed relinquish control of appointee and proceeded to near-bloodlessly the Army to a new crush the Gestanu. The President dissociated himself from the whole a ffa ir and departed for Bogor. By the end of the day, the Gestanu a ffa ir was over. While the Movement was active, indicated a Ccmmunist p lot. its public statements had not Given the argument about the state of the social contract in September, and the central command's firm rejection of the F ifth Force proposal on 27 September, i t is not improbable th a t the Movement had been "an internal an y affair" by "progressives" to bring the Amy in lin e with the social contract. drive th a t characterized While th e PKE had led th e red Indonesian p o litic s 1965, could not possibly have controlled a ll the forces with which i t was allied. The basis for m ilitary action against th e EKE was being prepared, despite the unclear nature Ctommunist Revelations th a t A idit had been present a t involvement Gestanu. Halim and Harian Rakvat's endorsement of Gestapu on 2 October (the day a fte r the Movement had been crushed) were th e flimsy grounds ipon which th e Amy took m ilitary action against th e EKE. Even these facts do not substantiate the accusation of EKE complicity. While a t Halim, A idit had no contadt with eith er the President or th e intriguers, and i t not known. whether ha o r the President were even aware of the massacre. Furthermore, Harian Rakvat was only one of two newspapers to appear in Jakarta on 2 October; such an act cculd not have happened without m ilitary permission. These and other hints th a t the Army, or the faction centred around Suharto, had had Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 190] === 1 80^ foreknowledge c f a movement against th e central command, suggest tha^ the * TOE had seized^, the opportunity to stage a decelerator. 89 That the Army acted against Sukarno f i r s t, and not th e PKE, is the clearest evidence, th a t a decelerator was staged. The chief target of the INI had to be the President because i t was he who had permitted the PKE to operate and had forced the Army into a corner. defiant of Sukarno in the crucial hours c f under m ilitary Suharto was openly 1 October and proceeded to bring Jakarta concrol w hilst destroying;^the Gestanu. Later, when th e bodies of the. generals were exhumed before television cameras and Indonesians were exposed to th e b ru ta lity of the victim s’ wrong." 90 clearly, th e intention was to "put th e President the That Sukarno had been a t Halim was widely known in th e days a fte r 1 October. This campaign was necessary to break th e power grip • th a t the President exercised over th e people and elements within the Amy. Only when Sukamo’s power had been deflated could the TNI consider acting against th e PKE, its second ta rg e t. A fter Gestanu i t was extremely easy fo r the Army to dismantle the defenceless PKE state-w ithin-a-state. unaware th a t within th e space The PKE leadership was to ta lly few months, and its huge organization would vanish from the Indonesiaiji p o litic a l scene: no plans o f any kind had been la id to re s is t th e grjowing anti-EKE fur^ and no orders were given to i t s constituency. I n ' early October, Politbureau members attended cabinet meetings regularly and evinced no alarm about th e.'turn of events. tiad failed The PKE did not a c t lik e a revolutionary actor th at stage an accelerator. I t believed th at Sukamo would rescue i t from any d iffic u ltie s, a ta c tic th a t probably would have saved^ i t,had th e Army targeted i t f i r s t. By mid-foctdber, however, the social Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 191] === contract had been cast anew: the Muslims, who acted from "below, 15 were now in open alliance with the Army, which acted as the sole new sta te e lite from "above." The Army was free to proceed against the EKT as i t wished (which i t did by condoning, and contributing to, th e •murder, of a t least 500,000 members), since i t possessed th e pcpulhr base upon which to erect i t s right to rule (the millions of Muslims in Java and in th e outer islands who had the same objective as the TNI). The Army had plotted i t s survival well and, in the end, i t was not merely the possession c f ar-nc: th a t had ensured th is outcome. 'The Army had had the good fortune, the w ill, seize an opportunity th a t lent to the and the intelligence to destruction of not one enemy, but two. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 192] === CHAPTER VI , CrSNOTSICNS 'Hie aim of th is study ha£ been, specifically, fa ilu re of revolution in Indonesia in th e mid-1960s. has attempted to to understand the As w ell, th is study generally, the phenomenon of revolution from the p o litic a l perspective of T iily and Aya. Based upon th e Indonesian c a y, i t i s appropriate to draw general conclusions about revolution, and about how our comprehension of such occurrences is eith er increased or (decreased by the perspective adapted. desirable, therefore, to draw same conclusions about the failed revolution, in Indonesia, as well fts to discuss th e strengths and weaknesses o f the p o litic a l perspective and itd**relevance to other examples of revolution or failed r^tolution. Understanding the Indonesian Experience Employing th e Tilly-Aya perspective on revolution reveals a great deal about the Indonesian experience. contract" helps us understand F irs t, the concept of "social why some acto rs remained important in Indonesian p o litic s vhile others were marginalized. also helps between us understand the 1949 and transformation of 1965. changing raty re Third, I through Second, th a t concept of p o litic a l examination the nature of p o litic a l co n flict, Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. conflict the enables us to === [PDF page 193] === 183 appreciate the dynamic relationship between the TNI and th e PKI. Fourth, the p o litic a l perspective reaffirm s the importance js& support, from the top levels of the s ta te, That i s to say, the the success of a revolutionary contender. Indonesian case indicates th a t th e support of a strategically-placed individual, lik e President Sukarno, may be necessary tab make the tra n sitio n to a revolutionary outcome. Indonesian F ifth, th e failed revolution, also indicates how advanced revolutionary situ atio n must be to ensure th e transition to a revolutionary outcome. Between 1949 and 1965, there was a transformation in the number and kinds of actors on th e Indonesian p o litic a l stage. Ihe concept of the social contract helps us understand th is phenomenon. From 1949 to 1§57, a melee of p arties dominated Indonesian p o litic s. However, within the space o f only three years, th e Army and Sukarno succeeded in reducing the power and the number of p arties. Until 1965, Indonesian p o litic s was dominated by only three actors: the PKI, the TNI, ^nd Sukarno. such a sudden alteratio n in Hot could the number and kinds of p o litic a l actorsoccur? The rise to power of th e Army and the President in the la te 1950s was intim ately th e ir acsession bound up with the revolutionary process to power marked an attempt to thwart and, fact, the communist revolution. As the lib eral democratic contract disintegrated, CCmmunists benefited from th e chaos and c ris is and the o f authority, was inevitable th a t extra-contract challengers would emerge to confront the PKI. Only through the conceptual device o f the social contract can one come to comprehend th e wider significance of the events from 1949 to 1957. The contest was not merely between radical n a tio n a lists development-oriented p o litic ia n s, has been argued by others. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. and That === [PDF page 194] === argument does. 184 net. explain why corporatist norms and ccrpdfacist in stitu tio n s appeared in Indonesia a fte r 1957. m e collapse of lib era l democracy drew irtto th e power struggle new v actors, while eliminating others, n o t merely because the social contract was disintegrating, but also because 'the President and th e ita altered th e very form o f p o litica l conflict. That i s to say, part of the reason fo r th e. marginalization of p arties was th a t the transformation of "the nature of p o litica l co n flict d e ft them without necessary for th e Amy and th e President to p artie s without embarking destroying them. upon the purpose. was confront the power of the risky exercise physically In short, th e new duumvirate had to devise a strategy th a t would allow i t to 'r a le, notwithstanding the popularity of th e PKI. By 1957, the FKI was th e world's largest nonruling communist party, and was was fiercely n atio nalistic, inconceivable think loyal, and extremely popular. dest roying the Thus, i t PKI m ilita rily. TOv k understand why th e Army and th e President acted as they did in attempting to counter the Communists, and destroy the other p arties without using force, the concept of social contract is eminently useful. A fter 1957, from the perspective the Any, th e nature p o litic a l co n flict had been altered to the detriment of the PKI and other p o litic a l p artie s. The TNI created a whole new contract whereby th e kind o f conflict which the PKI preferred — parliamentary — was excluded. th is sense, the TNI did not have to worry about the accumulated resources of the party as these would not be permitted a ro le in, the kind of c o n flict the Array envisaged — * th a t among "family" members, resolved 'through "discussion" and "consensus." Therefore, th e subsequent f a l l of th e p arties, and the r is e of the Array and Sukarno, had to Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. do with the === [PDF page 195] === A ss - changing nature of p o litic a l co nflict frcm. a parliamentary guise to a corporatist guise. The a b ility, to adapt to new forms o f c o n flict was the c r ite r ia by which an actor was e ith e r pished o ff o* remained on the p o litic a l stage. After 1957, th e PKI realized th a t i t s resources were not as important as its a b ility to adapt to th e changes being effected in the contract. Bather than succumb to the TNI's vision of p o litic a l c t, however, the PKE copied th e Army by making co n flict a matter of the nature o f the contract its e lf. Again, one is witness to a remarkably nonviolent, yet p otentially explosive, situ atio n. the contenders confrontations, avoided using preferring th e ir eith er Between 1957 and 1965 accumulated resources in th e ir safeguard or expand them. The struggle was, to a large degree, more than a mere competition to acquire' more and more resources, although th is aspedt of the TNI-EKE riv alry was s t i l l important. Bather, th e two contenders more consciously atenpted to create new social contracts using th e ir accumulated resources. I t is evident from the strateg ies to transform the social contract, used by both the PKI and th e TNI between 1957 and 1965, th at these two actors had a powerful impact on each other. Use o f the p o litic a l perspective in th is study shows th a t there existed a dynamic relationship between the Army and th e (kmmuni^ts. In contrast to other studies of the TNI and the PKI, which examine each actor separately out of autonomous impulses, th is study shows th a t the basic strateg ies, ta c tic s, and aims o f the two actors were determined to a sig n ifican t degree by each others 1 presence. I t has already been noted th at with respect to countering the PKI's strength in 1957, the Army was ccnpelled to devise an altern ativ e to the m ilitary coup. The fundamental a lte ra tio n s made by the Army to Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 196] === 186 th e social contract was an Inevitable reaction to PKE power and not an example of th e TnI^ s self-proclaimed aversion to staging coups. In th is instance, the INI adapted to th e p o litic a l conditions created by the EEOC. Between 1957 and 1962, i t was th e PKC th a t was compelled to adapt to th e power of the Army. The PKE reformulated i t s ideology, embarked upon new forms of collective e ffo rt, and consolidated an alliance with. Sukarno fo r no other reason than to bend to the prevailing conditions in th e p o litic a l environment. These three changes would not have been effected in the absence of the Army's overarching p o litic a l presence. Thus, i t is quite evident th at the 'p o litic a l interaction of the TNI and the PKI was dynamic in nature. Furthermore, p o litic s incomplete to study- each actor separately. to the degree th a t these two actors dominated Indonesian between 1957 and 1965, correct understanding events requires an examination of the TNI-FKE relationship. Coexisting with the PKI Sukarno. understate p o litic a l and the TNI, course, was President Others have emphasized h is importance and i t i s d iffic u lt to th a t importance, perspective especially in th is a fte r study highlights 1957. However, th e one aspect about th e President th a t other approaches or studies may underestimate. th e President’s support grew in importance to the PKI. A fter 1960 Throughout th e period from 1960 to 1965 the Communists trie d ever harder to win favour with th e President. The alliance with the President had became so important to the party by 1965 th a t i t subordinated i t s e l f to Sukarno. The F ifth Force proposal, fo r instance, was usurped by Sukarno and the PKE did not Hes&st. significant th at by 1965 th e success or * fa ilu re of th e FKI’s revolutionary venture rested to an extremely large degree 'in the hands of the President. Sukarno’s support, Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. and h is === [PDF page 197] === xav stra te g ic ppsiuian as the nation's undisputed leader, conferred on the PKI a legitimacy that may not have been attainable through the p arty 's own efforts. Thus, the Indonesian case illu stra te s that, notwithstanding th e immense size of the PKI and i t s fronts, its power chances depended upanHSp-leVel one man. support, centred in Unfortunately fo r the Communists, th e ir alliance with Sukarno caused dangerous fissures in the power structure. w The very success of the Communist enterprise created for i t many enemies. The President's actions against the BPS and Murba alienated a large portion of the stare e lite, th e ir continued existence. including the Army, and threatened The EKE and the BTI incurred the wrath of the Muslims by undertaking what were construed to be anti-Muslim a c tiv itie s the countryside. Thus, 1965, fc r the f ir s t time pcstindependence Indonesian p o litics the grounds had been laid for a second, p a ra lle l, social contract. The Communists, a t t e m p t in g mate themselves the new rulers of th e country, and by drawing upon th e ir own constituency popular" fo r popular support, leadership the s ta te helped consolidate (the supporters of th e the "anti- BPS) while providing- i t with a popular base upon which to rule (the Muslims). longer was conflict about the nature of the social contract, as had been th e case between 1957 and 1964 when th e IKE and the TNI both attempted to recreate the social contract to favour themselves. Conflict now pivoted an which social contract would prevail in th e polity, in th is manner, Indonesia in 1965 came to resemble the situation in Russia in 1917 when th ere existed a state of "dual power." The need to have th eir own social contract prevail was ju s t as compelling to the Army (and i t s sympathetic a llie s in the state e lite ). Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 198] === and the Muslims, as i t was for the PKI and Sukarno. Each power bloc was faced with' the need to stage a decisive event as the r i s e of th e. two contracts necessitated a showdown. Hie resolution of th is p articu lar impasse favoured the counterevolutionary forces. The PKI,&new th a t to make the tran sitio n to a revolutionary outcome, i t was necessary to have in place a ll the resources i t had accumulated since 1951, p lus a m ilitary 8 arm. The TNI knew th a t to step the Cancmists, i t was necessary only to 'really th e la ten t support of th e Muslims against only two people: Sukarno, ^ a s the representative of the s ta te, and A idit, as th e representative of th e Communist constituency. th e prospects of <&e In essencfe, these two individuals h a d kept revolution alive. Without th eir exertions of 27 million PKI supporters were r&aningless. e ffo rts, the in th is case, i t was easy for the TNI to spot, or stage, i t s opportunity p o act against th e PKI state-w ithin-a-state by discrediting Sukarno and A idit. The absence of an "accelerator," or a t le ast an effective one (which th e F ifth Force was n ot), and the use of a "decelerator" prevented the tra n sitio n from a revolutionary situation to a revolutionary outcome. one level, i t did appear that Indonesia was about to make th e tran sitio n a revolutionary outcome in la te 1965. The s ta te 's power appeared to becoming "unstuck, 11 especially in the control of th e economy, and in th e, ideological temper of the p o lity. Moreover, th e PKI commanded the nominal support of one-fifth o f the population and th e actual support of the- President. In other pespects, however, th e PKI's attempts to p recip itate a revolutionary outcome in 1965 verged on adventurism. aspired to iso late the Army p o litic a lly, While th e party and to destroy its c iv ilia n supporters, i t had effected only a minor s p lit in th e Army's own inner Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 199] === 189 Gatesian. The Array was a unified actor monopoly on arms was s t i l l Intact. in September 1565 and its Hie PKI's plan to have the INI damaged or destroyed m ilitarily in the co n flict with Malaysia, certainly the intention of escalation the PKI's F ifth Force proposal which ajpad a t of th e conflict, had not came to fruition. the Hie PKI's confidence, based on its own size and Sukamc's support, imprudently led the party to believe th at the Array was prepared to be swept aside without an armed confrontation. monopoly of developed I f the party had been armed, c r the Arty had its* arms destroyed in th e kcnfrontasi cr broken by a follycounter-military (the Fifth Force) 1, only then would the revolutionary situation have been sufficiently mature to allcw for the transtion to a revolutionary outcome. However,- i t did not tu rn out th at way a t a ll. U n d erstan d in g Revolution and Counterrevolution Paramount among the strengths of the Tilly-Aya p o litical perspective of -revolution' are the consequences that follow from the distinction made between a revolutionary situation and a revolutionary outcome. that revolutionary situation necessary condition Given for revolutionary outcome, but not a sufficient condition, the observer of revolutionary phenomena is compelled to focus attention on what factors fa c ilita te contrast the transition perspective approaches strain s a revolutionary taken find the outcome. That is, other disciplines, the p o litic a l precise determinants that make the transition not only possible, but probable, and hence mere predictable. Hie p o litic a l perspective fa c ilita te s the empirical and scie n tific study o f th is form of human behaviour. I t follows th a t insights derived from one case study can increase our understanding of other revolutions. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 200] === 190 Hie d istin ctio n Slrawn between revolutionary situ atio n and revolutionary outcome also increases one's understanding of revolution by the use of empirical indicators., The focus on resources — government, adherents, te rrito ry, anus, and so v ereig n 's^ - meari§ th a t the progress1of a revolutionary acto r can be empirically gauged because each resource, with th e possible exception of sovereignty, can be quantified. can gain re lia b le ' revolutionary and situation valid and in sigh ts the power about the chances Thus, we in ten sity revolutionary contender'by examining its acquired resources. As our urxJerstanding of the situ a ric n in empirical te rn s grows, our ignorance diminishes correspondingly: re a lity can be b e tte r grasped and comprehended through a more empirical approach than a less empirical one. That is not to say t h ^ t h e p o litic a l approach explains the en tire ty of a revolutionary phenomenon. Rather, by placing resource-accumulation a t the centre of th e study, and w ithin th e context of a social cp n tract,' the p o litic a l te rrito ry, perspective' uses measures arms, and (less reliably) government, adherents, sovereignty, to indirectly assess qualitative factors also present in revolutions, such as mass grievances. th e size of a revolutionary contender changes depending’upon the s ta te of the p olity. Where there a re no grievances, there are no accumulated resources, aiXl no revolutionary contenders. When”, however, a revolutionary contender has accumulated many resources, there must have been p rio r grievances against the government or same other powerful actor in the p o lity. other, situ atio n. That is to say, the focus on resources gives one a handle q ualitativ e, factors The concept th a t contribute revolutionary so cial contract therefore, vary meaningful as i t includes within th e analysis factors th a t might not be Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 201] === 191 addressed, or may be assumed, as in other approaches. Hie concept of Social contract is important not only in helping to asse ss. the qualitative aspects of a revolutionary situation. I t is, moreover, useful in explaining why there are fewer revolutionary outcomes than revolutionary situations. Stated alternatively, th e concept of th e social contract helps us understand why there are mere m ilitary-type regimes than revolutionary-type regimes. In th e Indonesian case, the Army attempted to undoXthe bases of Cnrmtnist polir^cal support by devising a social contract to tally unsuited to the. EEC. attempted curing the period from 1957 to 1963 to That is, the INI create new aims, options, and a new identity for a ll p o litic a l actors. The EEC could not possibly have survived as a revolutionary contender had the Army's social con tract taken root: the EEC could not transform its e lf into a functional group as th is would have eliminated, by definition, the principle on which i t was b u ilt — class struggle. - What is important about the TNI challenge to the EKE is not so much the p articular rather the concepts i t general devised strategy or organizations pursued: the eliminated by destroying th e ir reason for created, Omnmunists had existence. Thus, but in one manoeuvre, the TNI attempted to to th lly destroys/the EKI by supplanting the options and aims embodied in the parliamentary road to power, and i t s parliamentary.identity. Unfortunately fo r the TNI, the Communists realized that more than one actor could attempt to revise the social contract. As i s true of other revolutionary contenders, the EKE proved fa r more dynamic than the. military' actor 1% accommodating i t s e l f to pressures that threatened its existence. Ironically, i s th is dynamism that explains why revolutions are Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 202] === ra re r phenomena than m ilitary-led counterrevolutions. during the advantage period 1963 t o ' 1965 illu s tra te s Sukarno's vision th is revolution, point. the pressures of th e early Guided Democracy contract. iha EKI's strategy EKI By taking survived th e The party went on to expand th e one contractual feature th a t allowed i t to function freely— co llective effo rts of a mass nature associated,wityi th e-w est campaign. — into idle basis for a whole hew social contrac t. Iria n Thus, between 1963 and 1965, the FKI transformed the social contract in fiv e respects, goals), id en tity altering the aims o f actors (the fulfillm ent of revolutionary th e ir options (to engage in revolutionary undertaking^), th e ir (revolutionary c rite ria supplanted commitments to f harmony and development), the bases of so lid a rity (the peasants and workers were prociaimed the p illa rs of th e revolution), and collective e frd a ^ "carplete" the Indonesian revolution). Like the INI, the EKI attempted to force upon i t s chief riv al a contract which was incompatible with i t. The PKI's strategy culminated in i t s attempt to deny the id en tity of th e Army tturough th e Fifth Force proposal. Importantly, i t i^ the m atter o f an a c to r's very identity that at th e crux of the phenomenon o f counterrevolution. any contest between revolutionary contender and, a counterrevolutionary m ilitary, the former has one advantage th a t eludes th e option to change one1s (j^dentity la tte r: peaceful there exists th e contender to an armed movement, or vice-versa. from a A m ilitary actor, on the other hand, can aspire to surround its e lf with non-military organizations, such as the TNI did, bjjfc a t base i t has only one id en tity: is th e monopolizer of arms. Thus, when a revolutionary contender attempts to acquire weapons i t also d ire c tly attacks the existence of th e Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 203] === 193 m ilitary acror by denying i t s identity. Had the Fifth Force ^xana into existence, the INI, which had already been' forced to abandoh i t s real • aims, options, and preferred bases o f solidarity and collective effo rts, would have ceased tp exist as an actor. The Indonesian case illu stra te s the dilemmas faced by a ll m ilitary establishments that oppose revolutionary contenders. M ilitary actors, lik e revolutionary contenders, prefer to have a social contract in place ^ r h a t favours them. Ideally, both types of actors would also prefer to have a ll five components of a social' contract- (aims, options, identity, bases c f solidarity, and collective effort) suited to th e ir interests. In adapting to changes i^ a social contract, or to alterations of its components, the. revolutionary actor has an inherent advantage. The revolutionary contender can keep i t s revolutionary intentions and its identity guise alive in either a m ilitary or a peaceful guise, indicated by the FKI’s success in recovering Aon i t s m ilitary defeat at Madiun. When,,however, the social contract i£ attempted to be altered by a revolutionary contender against the in terests of a ^military actor, the la tte r does not possess the option o f changing i t s identity. In such cases, th e incentives^ to use i t s monopoly o f weapons is extremely high fc r m ilitary actor. for this basic reason that counterrevolutions are more prevalent than revolutions. hil e <a_revolutionary contender may have the advantage of being able to transform its identity, the prospects of making the transition from a revolutionary situation to a revolutionary outccmji are quite lim ited. make the transition, governmental structure, sovereignty, and arms. the revolutionary adherents, contender territo ry, must sane possess measure Since the acquisition of th e la tte r resource is Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 204] === ' 19.4 th e same as denying th e m ilitary's id en tity, th e m ilitary to accept. i t i s dcubly d iffic u lt for From th e perspective of th e m ilitary, i t i s mere desirable to prevent th e revolutionary situ ation from reaching this^point of. development. Yet, from th e revolutionary contender's perspective> without arms th e transition to \ 'revolutionary outcome i s impossible,. notwithstandi.ng a l l the. other accumultated resourcesv J ii th is regard, th e Indonesian case is unusual. The PKI'S progress, fraff 1549 to F965, is paradigmatic of the tprogress th a t -any revolutionary cont ender must make, with respect to the accumulation of resources and th e creation of a social contract suitable to a revolutionary actor. - All th e components necessary to make a revolution succeed were present in the Indonesian case (except an effective accelerator and fortune) and for th is reason, despite th e PKT's evl^fcual failu re, i t can be said th a t th is case study te lls ■. cxounterrevolutian. much about revolution as i t does about Rarely does one find a more mature or self-confident (to the point of adventurism) revolutionary contender as th e EKE. , rarely does one find a b e tte r example of th e process must through contest with that^ revolutionary contender than th e IN I's strategy o f 1957-1963. Most m ilita ries never permit a revolutionary* actor to become as powerful as the/1?KI, and th is another revolutions. reason why courrterrevolutiof& are more common than Despite th e IN I's assertions of being unique, the fa c t that i t staged %. decelerator and, seized power reaffirms th e canmrjnality of a ll m ilita rie s: they a ll possess *he same id en tity as monopolizers' o f arms. Uius, the TNI's effo rts to cope with th e Communists is also paradigmatic o f the process c f counterrevolution. Ihe Indonesian case th erefo re,/ extremely useful Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the === [PDF page 205] === 195 le al appreciation not only of revolution, but of i t s understudied counterpart — counterrevolution. Given -th at the p o litic a l perspective approaches the phenomenon of revolution from an empirical angle, the benefits of which we are already familiar with, i t ' is extremely easy to understand the phenomenon of counterrevolution using th e sane theory. H e p o ssib ilities' of counterrevolution occurring increase as resources are taken from a non-revolutionary actor by a revolutionary actor, the quantity resources acquired revolutionary since contender indirectly measures th e qualitiative aspects of the situation in a polity (mass grievances, lack of consensus, and so forth) th a t may contribute to a revolution, the lack of resources informs us about the qualitative aspects of the weakening actor (his psychological state) and about his propensity to stage a coup. the reality the In both cages, the area of ignorance about situation diminished by the u tiliz a tio n empirical indicators in connection with the concept of social contract. the final revolution s t i l l analysis, however, the p o litic a l suffers from several weaknesses. does not lend its e lf to parsimony. perspective F irst, the approach At the very centre of the study is a concern about ta c tic a l alliances between' members of the s ta te e lite and contenders, and in tric a te manoeuvres that make possible the ascent to power of a revolutionary contender. th e. importance of d e ta il. study. In short, th e approach emphasizes The price of the approach is a very lengthy I t is inherent, however, to proceed slowly i f the primary benefit o f the theory — that re a lity is gauged accurately — is to be attained. A second ma<Jtor weakness of the approach is th a t rarely in p o litical M fe are revolutionary situations permitted to develop to the extremes of th e Indonesian case. That i s to say, only rarely is i t necessary to Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 206] === 196 employ a short-run time perspective (which centres on the acquisition of arms) to understand a given situ atio n, as revolutionary contender s only infrequently reach th is stage of development. Two factors m ilitate against the fu ll development of a revolutionary situation, and hence the application of a ll the elements contained the approach. F irst, m ilita rie s almost always intervene in p o litics a t a point well before a revolutionary contender has achieved th e strength th e PKI did. Second, leaders lik e Sukarno who govern for long periods and possess the power to ru le v irtu ally unquestioned are very rare. There can be no doubt that Sukarno's p o litica l attitu des greatly affected the FKI's power chances and sustained them in -Hires of d iffic u lty. A th ird weakness the theoretical approach th a t fortune p a rtia lly explains why a revolutionary situation e ith e r sta lle d or went on to develop and produce a revolutionary outcome. have been made to measure the progress of While great strid es a revolutionary contender em pirically through a focus on i t s resources, in relatio n to i t s standing v is-a-v is theS* social contract, little lig h t has been shed on the actual tra n sitio n to a revolution or a counterrevolution.' The role of fortune in counterrevolution is disturbingly large in the Indonesian case. I t is important to note, however, tfhht the mere possession of good fortune is in su fficien t bring about revolution Ultimately, an actor must exercise i t s opportunity presents its e lf. perspective outweigh th e w ill and intelligence when the Overall, the strengths of th e p o litic a l weaknesses th is study Indonesian revolution abundantly shows. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the failed === [PDF page 207] === 197 ENDNOTES — CHAPTER I 1. See Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978); and Rad Aya, "Popular Intervention jlutionary Situations," in Statemakim and Social Movements, eds. ^es Bright, and Susan Harding (Ann Arbor: Hie University of Michigan:, 1984). 2. For references to these concepts see T illy, pp. 189-222; and Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Chance (Boston: L ittle, Brown and Company, 1966), pp. 91-105. 3. Benedict R. 01(3^Anderson, "Old State, New Society: Indonesia"s New Order in Historical Perspective," Journal of Asian Studies 42 (May 1983):482-483. Ib id., p. 485. 5. Stan Taylor, Social Sciences and Revolution (London: Macmillan Press, 1984), p. 151. Ibid., p. 11. Ibid., p. 51. Aya, pp. 323-324. Taylor, p. 53. 10. Ib id., p. 8 p. 11. Taylor, p. il5. 12. A re v o lu tio n ^ identified as a "rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its p o litca l institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activ ity and policies." Samuel P. Huntington, P olitical Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 264. 13. Aya, p. 320. See also T illy, p. 193. 14. Taylor, p. 115.' 15. Ib id., p. 135. 16. Ib id., p. 145; emphasis in original. 17. Ib id., p. 147. 18. Ib id., p. 135. Jfe, Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 208] === 198 ENENOTES — CHAPTER I 19. Aya, p. 322. 20. Ib id., p. 325. 21. See Theda Skocpol, States and Serial Revolutions University Press, 1979). 22. Aya, pp. 332-333. 23. Ib id., p. 333. 24. Ib id., p. 25. Johnson, p. 91. (London: Cambridge 334; enphasis added. 26. George S. Pettee, The Process of Revolution (New York: Harper Bros., 1938), p. 91, quoted in Johnson, p. 98. 27. Johnson, pp. 98-99. 28. T illy, p. 29. Taylor, p. 145. 30. T illy, p. 189. 31. Ib id., p. 192. 32. Ib id., p. 192; enphasis in 33. See Huntington, pp. 266-274. 34. T illy, p. 208. 35. Ib id., pp. 193-194. 36. Taylor, p. 145. 37. T illy, p. 217. 38. Taylof’Kjp. 133. 194. original. 39. U if Sundhaussen, The Road To Power. Indonesian M ilitary P o litic s 1945-1967 (Oxford: Cxfcrd University Press, 1982)? Harold Crouch, The Armv and P o litics in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell Uhiversity Press, 1978). 40. Among other these ancillary works is included C. L. M. Penders, and Haris.Naa&ion, h P o litic a l Biography (St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1985); Ruth McVey, 'The PostRevolutionary Transformation o f the Indonesian Army," 2 p ts. Indonesia 11 u i f Sundhaussen, Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 209] === 199 ENDNOTES — CHAPTER X (April 1971): 131-1767 and 13 (Apr^L 1972): 147-181; Baladas Ghoshal, The Role of t he in Indonesia^fMadras: Madras University Press, 1980). 41. For an in terestin g exception, see Guy J. Pauker, e d., The Indonesian Doctrine of T errito rial Warfare and T errito ria l Management. Memorandum Rm-3312-PR (Santa Monica, C a lif.: Hie RAND Corporation, November 1963). 42. Donald Kindley, The Communist Party of (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964). Indonesia, 1951-1963 43. Justus M. van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia. I ts History, Program and Tactics (Vancouver: University of B ritish Columbia Press, 1965). 4 4. Rex Ifcrrimer, Indonesian Communism Under su k a m n University Press, 1 9 7 4 ), p. 400. 45. (Ithaca: Cornell Ib id., p. 15. 46. Olle Tomquist, Dilemmas of Third Wtorld Communism: The Destruction of the PKI in Indonesia (Inndon: Zed Press, 1986), p. 240. 47. Sheldon W. Simon, The Broken Triangle: Peking. Djakarta and the PKI (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969). 48. Antonie C. A. Dake, In the S p irit of the Red Bantem: Indonesian Communists between Moscow and Peking 1959-1965 (The Hague: Mouton, 1973). 49. MacArthur F. Corsino, A Communist Revolutionary Movement as an International State-Actor: The Case of the PKT-Aidit (Singapore: Maruzen Asia, 1982). ,50. David Reeve, Golkar of Indonesia. An A lternative to th e Party System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985). Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 210] === ENDNOTES — CHAPTER U 1. See David Reeve, Golkar of Indonesia: An Alternative to System (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 58-107. the Party 2. See Baladas Ghoshal, Indonesian P o litics 1955-59: The Emergence of Guided Democracy (Calcutta: K. P. Bagchi & Company, 1982), pp. 2-5. 3. B. R. O'G. Anderson, "Old s ta te, New Society: Indonesia's New Order « in CCTDarative H istorical Perspective," -Journal of Asian Studies 42 (May 1983):480. 4. See Sukarno, "Hie Pantja S ila"; and "Preamble to the 1945 C anstitutian," in Indonesian P o litic a l Thinking 1945-1965. eds. Herbert Feith and lance Castles (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 4049, and pp. 49-50. Reeve, p. 85. 6. Osman Raliby, Documents H istorica. vol. I, 1953), p. 5o, quoted in Reeve, p. 82. (Djakarta: Bulan-Bintang, 7. See Justus M. van der Kroef, "Sukarno's Indonesia. A Review A rticle," P acific A ffairs 46 (Summer 1973):269-288; Peter Hastings, "Hie Guide in P ro file," in Sukarno's Guided Indonesia, ed. T. K. Tan (Brisbane: Jacaranda, 1967), pp. 7-15; and J. D. legge, Sukarno. A P o litical Biography (London: Hie Penguin Press, 1972), pp. 149-180. 8. Reeve, p. 8 6. See also B. R. O'G. Anderson, Java In A Time of Fgvolytjop. Occupation and. Resistance. 1944-1946 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), pp. 168-169, 188, and 301-302; George MCTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), pp. 168-169; and Legge, pp. 206, and 217-218. Reeve, p. 8 8. 10. Andersen, "Old State, New Society," p. 481. 11. See Reeve, pp. 76-81. 12. See A. K. Pringgodigdo, Hie Office of President in Indonesia as Defined in the Three Constitutions in Theory and P ractice, tran s. Alexander Brotherton, Translation Series, Modem Indonesia Project (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1957); and Oey Hong Lee, Indonesian Government and Press EXurim Guided Democracy. Hull Monographs On Southeast Asia, no. 4 (Hull: Centre for South-East Asian Studies, Hie University of H ull, 1971), pp. 42-44. 13. Reeve, p. 90. 14. See Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 446-469. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 211] === 201 ENDNOTES CHAPTER I I 15. For general analyses of Sukarno, see C. L. M. Penders, The Life and Times of Sukarno (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1974)? and Edo Quito, "Hie Rise and F all of Sukarno: A B rief Analysis of Indonesia's P o litical Development, 1949-1965," Asian P rofile 5 (October 1977):463-474. 16. See Pringgodigdo, pp. 21-28, and 42-47. 17. See the following speeches, a l l by Sukarno: "Five Years of Indonesian Independence, 11 United Asia 4 (1952): 19-26; '"Indonesia Takes Stock," Far Eastern Survey 21 (October 1952): 142-144; and "The C risis of A uthority," and "Electioneering and National U nity," in Feith and "Castles, pp. 74-78, and pp. 78-81. 18. A. H. Nasutian, "Unity of Canmand"; and Z ulkifli Iubis, "Militarism and Clvilianism, v in Faith and Castles, pp. 416-429-^ and pp. 4^0-425. 19. See Oey HOng Lee, p. 44; and Kahin, Nationalism, p. 464. 20. Pauker has w ritten th a t "An o ffic ia l publication of th e Indonesian Ministry of Information issued in February 1950 lis te d as active in May 1949, 41 p arties in Java, 4 in Sumatra, 27 in East Indonesia and 10 in Borneo, a to ta l of 82 Indonesian p artie s, besides same 15 Dutch, Chinese and Arab p o litic a l organizations s t i l l active a t th a t time. Another publication of the Ministry, issued in July 1951, gave information on 27 p artie s of which 5 were c lassifie d as based on religion, 14 as based on national ism, 6 as based on marxism, and 2 as representing minority groups. A sim ilar publication issued in August 1954 lis te d 23 p a rtie s of which 18 had parliamentary groups." See Guy J. Pauker, "The Role of P o litic a l Organizations in Indonesia," Far Eastern Survey 27 (September 1958): 134. Moreover, when Indonesia's f i r s t parliamentary elections were 4 held in September 1955, "172 p artie s and independent candidates entered the contest," M. P. Walker, "Indonesian Elections and Party Development, 1954-1955," (M.A. th esis, Berkeley, 1957), p. 32, quoted in Gbh Cheng Tiek, "Why Indonesia's Attempt a t Democracy in the Mid-1950s Failed," Modeqa Asian Studies 6 (1972): 228. President Sukarno had to summon no l e s s / than ^"74 party leaders" in early 1957 to inform them of the dissolution of parliamentary democracy; cited in Goh, p. 243. 21. Herbert Feith,, The Wilopo Cabinet. 1952-1953; A Turning Point in Post-Revolutionarv Indonesia. Monograph Series. Modem Indonesia Project (Ithaca; Cornell university, 1558), p. 210. 22. Herbert Feith, The Decline of constitutional Democracy in Indcnesta (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. xi.4, ,.23« Goh, p. 22 24. Ib id. 25. P a u k e r, % to le," p. 139. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 212] === 202 ENDNOTES — CHAPTER I I 26. George MOT. Kahin, "The New Indonesian, Government," Par Eastern Survey 19 (22 November 1950): 210-211. 27. Justus M. van der I&oef, "Indonesia — Hie F irst Five Years of Independence," United Asia 6 (June 1954): 133. 28. Ib id., p. 134. 29. George MOT. Kahin, "Indonesia's Strengths Eastern Survey 20 (26 September 195i):161. 30. and Weaknesses," Far I b id.; emphasis in original. 31. Soedjafcrcko, "Indonesia: Problems and Opportunities," The Australian Outlook. 21 (December 1S67):274, quoted in Gioshal, Indonesian P o litic s, 32. Robert van Niel, "Indonesian P o litic a l Developments, 11 Far Eastern Survey 22 (June 1953):87. 33. Ibid. 34. See Boyd R. Ccanpton, "The Indonesian Election Law," Far Eastern Survey 23 (April 1954):62-64, and "The Indonesian Electoral Law, I I," Far Eastern Survey 23 (May 1954): 74-77. 35. Quoted in Louis Fischer, The Storv of Indonesia (London: -Harper and Brothers, 1959), p. 235," cited in Ghoshal, Indonesian P o litic s, n. 29, pp. 36-37. 36. Anderson, "Old State, New Society," p. 483. 37., Bruce Glassbumer, "Economic Policy-Making in Indonesia, 1950-57," Economic Development and Cultural Change 10 (January 1962): 125. See also Richard Rcoisan, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1986), pp. 48-57, for a discussion of p o litic a l p arties and business. 38. See the statement a t th e PKI's Fifth National Congress, held in March 1954, w hen'its parliamentary id en tity was reaffirmed, in Oey Hong Lee, p. 215. See also Mochtar Lubis, "The Indonesian Communist Movement Today," Far Eastern Survey 23 (November 1954): 161-164. 39. See Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, "The Canmunist Revolt in Java: The Background," Far Eastern Survey 17 (17 November 1948):257260; and George MOT. Kahin, "The Communist Revolt in Java: The C risis and I t s Aftermath," Far Eastern Survey 17 (17 November 1948):261-264. 40. Donald Hindley, "Communist Party Strategy in Indonesia 1948-59," The Australian Outlook 13 (December 1959): 254. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 213] === 203 ENENOIES — CHAPTER H 41. Ibid. 42. Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism Under A id it,1 1 Problems of Communism 7 (Navember-December 1958):17. 43. Hindley, "communist Party Strategy," p. 255. 44. Feith, Wilopo. p. 83. 45. Ibid. 46. Hindley, "Communist Party Strategy," p. 255. 47. MacArthur F. Corsino, A CommurrighRevolutionary Movement as Inoem aticnal State-Actor: The Case of the PKI-Aidit (In stitu te Southeast: Asian Studies, Singapore: Maruzen Asia, 1982), p. 75. 48. Ib id., p. 76. 49. See Ruth T. McVey, "Indonesian Communism and the Transition to Guided Democracy," in Communist S trategies in Asia, ed. Dcak Barnett (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, In c., 1963), pp. 149-162. 50. See D. N. A idit, "A Semifeudal and Semicolonial Society," in Feith and Castles, pp. 247-251. 51. D. N. A idit, "Fly High th e Banners of " ’Land to the Peasants' and Ficflit for One Victory sifter the Other," Review of Indonesia-. Supplement (June-July 1959): 12, quoted in Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-63. (Los Angeles: University of California, 1964), p. 38. 52. See D. N. A idit, Castles, pp. 251-257. "Indonesia's Class Structure," Feith and 53. D. N. Aidit, Indonesian Society and the Indonesian Revolution (Djakarta: n.p,, 1957), pp. 62-63, quoted in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 40. 54. Department of Agitation and Propaganda of the PKI Central Committee, Menaaoa Front Nasional. (Djakarta: n.p., 1957), p. 7, quoted in Hindley, Communist Partv. p. 41. 55. Hindley, Communist Party, p. 42. 56. A idit, Indonesian fe£ ty, p. 45. Society, 57. PKI, Program PKC (Djakarta: Hindley, Communist-Party, p. 47. 57, quoted Hindley, 1954), 21-22, Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Communist quoted === [PDF page 214] === 204 ENENOTES — COPIER U 58. D. N. A idit, "Bersatulah ^ t u k Menjelesaikan Tuntutan2 Revolusi Augustus 1945," report to the fourth pleno session of th e EKE. Central Committee in July 1956, in Pilihan Tulisan. vol. H (Djakarta: Jajasan "Pembaruan," 1959-1960), pp. 44-45, quoted in Daniel S. Lav, The Transition to Guided Democracy’: Indonesian P o litics. 1957-59. Monograph Series, Modem Indonesia Project (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1964), p. 75; and the Department of Agitation and Propaganda of the PKI Centra l Committee, Menaaoa Front National. p. 5, quoted in Lev, Transition, p. 76. See also D. N. Ai di t, She Indonesian Revolution and the Immediate Tasks of the Communist Party of Indonesia (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964), pp. 72-80, on the united national front strategy; and D. N. A idit, "For National Unity,." World Marxist Review 3 (February I960):21-26. 59. Feith, Wilooo. p. 90. 60. Ibid. See Corsino, pp. 129-134, for a discussion of the PKI's use of nationalism during the 19$0s. 61. Hindley, "Communist Party Strategy," p. 262. 62. Feith, Wilcoo. p. 90. Hindley gives as evidence of Communist goodwill the re stra in t exercised by SOBSI, the PKI’s labour front organization, which was held to have a major factor in the country's decreasing labour disruptions: "In 1950 7,784,271 man hours were lo st due to strik es compared with 3,719,914 in 1951, 878,911 in 1952, and 4,812,090 in 1953." Hindley, "Communist Party Strategy," n. 1, p. 255. 63. Ib id., p. 89. 64. See Justus M. van der Kroef, Indonesia in the Modern Wbrld Part H (Bandung: Masa Baru, 1956), pp. 309-311, and 344-346; Justus M. ^van der Kroef, The Ccnrounist Party of Indonesia. I ts History. Program, and Tactics (Vancouver: University of B ritish Columbia, 1965), pp. 55-63; Feith, Wilcoo. pp. 93-1C0; Hindley, Communist Party, pp. 236-255; and MoVey, "Indonesian Communism," p. 158. 65. See Feith, Wilooo. n. 25, p. 95, on.the Kediri residency council elections of 1946, and the Jogjakarta regional elections of 1951. 66. Quotedin Feith, Wilooo, p. 161. 67. Quotedin van der Krcef, Indonesia in ^he Modem Wbrld.p. 344. 68. Quotedin Hindley, "Ccmmunist Party Strategy," p. 264. 69. See Irene Tinker and Millidge Walker, "The F irs t General Elections in Lidia and Indonesia f»' paip fiastem Survey 25 (July 1956):97-110, for a general discussion of the elections. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 215] === 205 ENENCTES — CHAPTER I I 70. Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955. Modem Indonesia Project (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1957), p. 62. 71. Ibid. 72. As calculated from Table 4 in Feithf Elections, p. 78. 73. Hindley describes the organizational structure of the Indonesian s ta te as follows: "Indonesia is divided into provinces, the provinces into residencies, and the residencies into kabuoatens. In 1960 there were 209 kabuoatens in Indonesia, including 80 in Java: Each kabuoaten is divided in to several kewedanaans. and these in tu rn into kef: am tan s, in 1960 there were 2,936 k eh ia m a ta n s in Indonesia, including 1,455 in Java. The average ketiamatan in Java contained 15 v illages or groups of hamlets." Hindley, Communist P a rt/, p. x v ii. These rankings in East Java, and the ones for Central and West Java, and Jakarta, are calculated frcm Table 6 in Feith, Elections, p. 85. 74. "The EKI had an absolute majority of council seats in the m unicipalities of Semarang, Surakarta, and Salatiga aftd in the kabuoatens of B ojolali, KLaten, Semarang, and Sukehardjo." lev, Transition, n. 42, p. 91. 75. These resu lts can be found in Feith, Elections. pp. 65-72. 76. Gicshal has w ritten th a t "the election re su lts revealed the regional character of th e p artie s. The major support for the p arties lik e m i, NU and EKI came mainly from Java. Respectively almost five and a h alf m illion and six m illion of the EKI and NU votes were f rom Java as against seven m illion fo r ENI and four m illion fo r Masjumi. Their support in the outer islands was quite insignificant. On the other hand, Masjumi's stronghold was in outer provinces. More than 50 per cent of the Masjumi members chosen for Parliament gained th e ir seats- in the electoral d is tr ic ts of th e outer provinces. As against th is, th e FNI's percentage was 21 per ‘cent, NU's 18 per cent, and EKI 10 p er cent." Ghoshal, Indonesian P o litic s, p. 43. 77. Lev, Transition, pp. 79-80. 78. Ib id., p. 81. 79. Harlan Rakvat. 10 July 1956, quoted in ttjna^d Hindley, "The PKI and the Peasants," Problems of Communism 11 (November-December 1962):30? emphases by Hindley. 80. Elections were also staged in South, East, and West Kalimantan in early 1958; the re su lts can be found in lev, Transition, n. 69, p. 101. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 216] === 206 ENENOIES — CHAPTER H ■ 81. lev, Transition, p. 90; see Hindley, Commurfistiiirfe*. map 1, p. 226, for a visual representation of EKE te rrito ry, and A. van Marie, "Indonesian Electoral Geography tinder Orla and ©rba," in Indonesia A fter the 1971 Elections. ed. Oey Hong lee (London: raford University Press, 1974), pp. 37-59 for sore d etails. 82. Lev, Transition, p. 93. 83. Lev has w ritten th a t 'The EKE won majority control of seven second level d is tic ts, an increase of fiv e [from 1955]...in Surabaja, a major industrial c ity and the provincial cap ital, the PKI nearly won a majority, while the FNI vote fe ll d rastically." Lev, Transition, p. 94. 84. Ib id., p. 95. 85. Ib id., p. 101. 86. Feith, Wilopo. n. 20, p. 92. 87. Ib id., p. 100-.' 88. The measures found to be anathema to Sukarno are detail ed by Feith, in Wilooo. pp. 100-101. 89. A discussion of these agreements can be found in Amry Vandenbosch, "The Netherlancs-Indonesia Union," Far Eastern Survey 19 (11 January 1950):1-7. 90. Sukarno, "Dari Sabang Sampai Merauke," in Dibawa Bendera Revolusi. vol. H (Djakarta: n.p., 1965), p. 114, quoted in Ghoshal, Indonesian P o litic s. p. 16. 91. Hindley, "Communist Party Strategy," p. 261. 92. Ib id., pp. 263-264. 93. Hai-ian Pakvat. 16 August 1951, quoted in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 56. 94. Hindley, Communist Party, p. 56. 95. Corsino, p. 97. 9 6. J U s tu s M. v a n d e r K ro e f, "D. N. A i d i t — In d o n e s ia n A r c h ite c t o f S u c c e s s a n d F a i l u r e, " i n L e a d e r s o f t h e C o m m u n is t W o r ld, © d. R o d g e r S w e a r i n g e n (N e w Y o r k: T h e F r e e P r e s s, 1 9 7 1 ), p. 6 0. 9 7. D. N. A i d i t, " G a r i s - G a r i s P o k o k P e r d j u a n g a n I d e o l o g i D i d a l a m E K E," B in ta n c r M e ra h (1 5 M a y -1 J U n e 1 9 5 1 ): 2 6 5; a n d D. N. A i d i t, T h e B i r t h a n d G r o w th o f t h e C o m m u n i s t P a r t y o f I n d o n e s i a ( D j a k a r t a: n. p., 1 9 5 8 ), p. 3 8, Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 217] === 207 ENDNOTES — CHAPTER I I cited ^ji^indley, Communist Party, p. 70. 98. Hindley, Communist Party, p. 70. 99. Central Committee of the Communist Party of" Indonesia, PKE-Buletin (7 March 1952):3-6, quoted in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 74. 100. Sudisman# "Peladjaran Fundamental Selama 32 Tahun Berdirinja PKI," PKT-Buletin (20 May 1952);12, cited in Hindley, Communist: Party, p. 74. Central Committee of the Communist Party of Indonesia, PKI-Buletin iy 1953):78-81, cited in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 74. 102 P il D. N. A idit, "Perkuat Fersatuan Nasional dan Perkuat Partaii" in frn Tulisan. vol. I ([Djakarta: Jajasan "Pembaruan," 1959-1960), p. in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 80. 103./D. N. A idit, For a fasting Peace, for a People's Democracy! (19 November 1954):2? Bintana Merah (February-March 1956): 112, cited in ey, Communist Party, p. 80. 105. Corsino, p. 99. Ibid. 106. Amir Anwar Sanusi, "The Results of the F irst Three-Year Plan," mimeographed, (Djakarta, 1959), p. 3, cited in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 163. 107. Van der Kroef, Communist^arty. p. 182. 108. Harian Rakvat. 4 February 1957, cited in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 91. 109. Harian Pakvat. 21 January 1956, quoted in Hindley, Communist Party. p. 82. 110. Corsino, p. 102. 111. Van der Kroef, Communist Party, p. 221. 112. See Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesia's labour Movement, I ts Development and Prospects," United Asia 5 (August 1953):223-231, for a discussion of the early effo rts Of p artie s, including the PKI, to organize the workers. 113. Ib id., p. 204; see also John E. Mbes, "Trade Unionism in Indonesia," Far Eastern Survey 28 (February 1959): 17-24. R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n e r. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n. === [PDF page 218] === 208 ENiaroTES^^CHaPTER n 114. 165. Harian Rakvat. 5 April 1955, cited in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 115. 166. sna-ra Tam‘ (January 1959) '.6-1, cited in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 116. See S. Surgoso, "The Communist Movement and the Youth — Indonesia," world Marxist Review 4 (November 1961):66-68. 117. Hindley, Communist Party, p. 186; the figure is in van der Kroef, Communist Party, p. 217. 118. Gerwani. walnasVan Aksi-Aksi untuk Memoerkuat Tuntutan Hak-Hak Wanita-Anak-Anak dan Perdamaian (Djakarta: n.p., 1956), pp. 26-27*, cited in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 204. 119. The re su lts are taken from Ghoshal, Indonesian P o litic s. Table I, p. 42. The f if th place party was*1the Islamic Association Party of Indonesia. fPartai Sarekat Islam Indonesia — PSII), which'obtained) 1,091,160 votes, or a mere 2.9 per cent of the national vote. 120. Dawn (Karachi), 24 September 1955, quoted in Gch, p. 233. 121. Goh, p. 234. 122. Feith, Decline, pp. 462-481, passim, quotedin Goh, p. 123. Ghoshal, Indonesian P o litic s, p. 54. 235. 124. Times of Indonesia (Djakarta), 21 March 1956; Abadi (Djakarta), 7 January 1957, quoted in Ghoshal, Indonesian P o litic s, p. 50. 125. Ghoshal, Indonesian P o litic s, p. 51. 126. Times of Indonesia (Djakarta), ‘27 March 1956;Suluh Indonesia (Djakarta), 2 January 1957, quoted In Ghoshal, Indonesian P o litic s, p. 52. 127. Ib id.-, p p. 5 2 -5 3. 128. F IA. 3 A p r il 1 9 5 6, q u o te d i n G io s h a l, 1 2 9 J u s t u s M. v a n d e r K ro e f, S u rv e y 26 (A p ril 1 9 5 7 ):4 9. " In s ta b ility n e s ia n P o litic s, p. 5 3. I n d o n e s ia," F a r F asf-g m 1 3 0. O n I n d o n e s i a 's e c o n o m ic m a l a i s e t h r o u g h o u t t h e 1 9 5 0 s, s e e E v e r e t t D. H a w k in s, " p r o s p e c t s f o r E c o n o m ic D e v e lo p m e n t i n ( I n d o n e s i a, " W o r ld P o litic s (O c to b e r B e n ja m in H ig g in s, " I n d o n e s i a 's D e v e lo p m e n t/P la n s a n d P r o b le m s," P a c i f i c A f f a i r s 2 9 (J u n e 1 9 5 6 ): 1 0 7 -1 2 5; B e n j a m i n H i g g i n s, I n d o n e s i a ' s E c o n o m i c S t a b i l i t y a n d - D e v e l o p m e n t (N e w Y o rk: I n s t i t u t e o f P a c if ic R e la tio n s, 1 9 5 7 ); J u s tu s M. v a n d e r K ro e f, R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 219] === 209 ENDNOTES — CHAPTER I I "Economic Development Indonesia: Same Social and (Cultural Impediments,11 Economic Development and Cultured. Change 4 (1955/1956): 116133; Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesia's Economic Future," Pacific A ffairs 32 (March 1959):46-72; and Justus M. van der Kroef, "Colonial Continuity in Indonesia's Economic Policy," The Australian Outlook 14 131. Cited in E. Pauker, "The Failure of a Democratic Experiment: .Indonesia, 1955-1958," (M.A. th esis, Berkeley, 1 9 6 2 ) p. 114, quoted in f Goh, p. 239. Goh sta te s additionally th a t "A New York Times report said on 25 December [1958] th at from January to September [1956], 71% of the country's foreign exchange was earned by Sumatra." Ib id., n. 41, p. 239. 132. Van der Kroef,."In stab ility," p. 54. 133. Ib id., p. 53. 134. Soekamo, Indonesia. Pilihlah Demokrasi J stkt Sediati (Djakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, 1956), pp. 11-12, quoted in Ghoshal, Indonesian P o litic s. pp. 56-57, and n. 41, p. 76. 135. Times of Indonesia (Djakarta), 12 November 1956, quoted in Ghoshal, Indonesian P o litic s, p. 59; emphasis by Gioshal. 136. See Mohammad N atsir, "Restoring Confidence in Democracy," in Feith and Castles, pp. 89-94. 137. Quoted in van der Kroef, "In sta b ility," p. 50. 138. Van der Kroef, "In stab ility," p. 51. 139. 140. Quoted in van der Kroef, "In sta b ility," p. 51. Goh, pp. 240-241. 141. Sukarno and Hatta personified the two major se ts of p o litic a l opinion in Indonesia; the fcrmar was the main representative of Javanese power and revolutionary values, while the la tte r was the chief representative of the outer islands and promoted a vision of revolution th a t centred on economic development. See Justus M. van der Kroef, "Sukarno and Hatta: The Great Debate in Indonesia," P o litical Ona-H-griy 29 (July-September 1958): 238-250. 142. Ib id., p. 241. 143. Java Bode (Djakarta), " In sta b ility," p. 52. 144. 11 January 1957, quoted in van der Kroef, Van der Kroef, "In sta b ility," p. 60. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 220] === 210 ENENOTES — CHAPTER 145. Lev, Transition, p. 81. 146. Ib id., p. 102. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 221] === ENDNOTES — CHAPTER I I I Justus M. van der Kroef,."Indonesia — The F irs t Independence," United Asia 6 (June 1954): 136. Five Years o f 2. See David Reeve, Golkar- of Indonesia: AnA lternative to fee Party System (Singapore: Oxford University Press' 1985)", pp^ n 2 - 115, on Sukarno's a n ti-lib e ra l democracy a c tiv itie s during the 1950s; and J. D. Legge, Sukarno. A P o litic a l Biography (London: The Penguin Press, 1972), pp. 240-278. Sukarno's call was based on h is desire, expressed in January 1955, to see in Indonesia a aotona-mvonq democracy. Java Bode (Djakarta), 22 January 1955, quotedin Justus M. van der Kroef, " 'Guided Democracy' in Indonesia," Far Eastern Survey 26 (August 1957), n. 6, p. ‘114. See Herbert Feith, The Decline of C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Democracy in Indonesia (Itha: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 467-469. 5. See Sukarno, "Let Us Bury th e P arties," in Indonesian P o litic a l Thinking 1945-1965. eds. Herbert Feith and Lance Castles (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 81-83. Reeve, p. 108. For the major party reactions, see Legge, Sukarno, p. 279. See Feith, Decline, pp. 538-555; and Reesve, pp. 116-118. 9- Guided Democracy. A Volume o f Basic Speeches and Documents (New Delhi: n.p., 1959), p. 20, quoted in Baladas Ghoshal, Indonesian P o litics 1955-59: The Emergence of Guided Democracy (Calcutta: K. P. Bagchi &. Company, 1982), p. 79. 10. Text in H. A. Notosoetardjo, ed., Proses Tfembal i Keoada Diiwa Proklarasi 1945. Amkah Dgnokrasi Teroimoin Itu? (Djakarta: Jo in t v Publication o f Lsmbaga Penggali dan Penghimpun Sejarah Rsvolusi Indonesia-^hdang-Pemuda, 1959), p. 87, quoted in Reeve, p. 117. 11. Dewan Nasional (Djakarta: Rsmenterian quoted in Feith, Decline, p. 542. Fenerangan, 12. -Ibid. 13. Notosoetardjo, p. 90, quoted in Reeve, p. 117. 14. Notosoetardjo, p. 90, quoted in Reeve, pp. 117-118. 15. Legge, Sukarno, p. 284. R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n e r. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n. 1957), 25, === [PDF page 222] === 212 ENDNOTES — CHAPTER m 16. Baladas Ghoshal, The Role of the Mi1ita rv in Indonesia (Madras: Hie University of Madras, 1980), p. 5. 17. See T. B%Simatupang, "Hie Role of th e M ilitary in S tabilization o f Southeast Asian Nations, With Special Focus on Indonesia," (Unpublished paper), Jakarta, 1970, p. 15ff, quoting from laporan dari Renaran. quoted in Uif Sundhaussen, The Road to Power. Indonesian M ilitary P olitics 1945** 1967 (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 1982), p. 42. 18. See C. L. M. Penders and Uif Sundhaussen, Abdul Haris Nasutlon. A P o litical Biooranhy (St. Ducia, Queensland: University of Queensland;, 1985), pp. 71-77. 19. Sundhaussen, pp. *45-46. 20. Guy J. Pauker, "The Role of Political. Organizations in Indonesia," Far Fagtem Survey 27 (September 1958):133. 21. See Penders and Sundhaussen, pp. 77-127; and Sundhaussen, pp. 51-79, for th e TNI in th is capacity. 22. Especially important in th is regard was th e "17 October A ffair." See Ruth McVey, "The Post-Itevolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Any," Indonesia no. 11 (April 1971): 143-157; Penders and Sundhaussen, pp. 81-90? Sundhaussen, pp. 62-79; and Ghoshal, Indonesian P o litics, pp. 25-29. 23. See MacArthur F. Corsino, A Communist Revolutionary Movement as an International State-Actor: The Case of the FKI-Aidit. In stitu te of Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore: Maruzen Asia, 1982), pp. 64-67, on the Darul Islam and th e Republic of the South Moluccas. 24. A. H. Nasutian, Tiatatan2 Sekitar P o litik Mil ite r (Djakarta: n.p., 1955), p. 108, quoted in Ghoshal, Role, p. 4. Indonesia 25. Reeve, p. 110. See also Penders and Sundhaussen, Appendix 2, "Excerpts frcsn Nasutian's IP-KC Campaign * Speech," pp. 236-246; and Appendix 3, "Order of th e Day, " pp. 247-250; pp. 97-102? and Sundhaussen, pp. 89-90. 26. Penders and Sundhaussen, p. 98. 27. Qioshal, Indonesian P o litics, p. 60. 28. Qijoted in Nasution, Tjatatan2, Indonesian P o litic s,.pp. 60-61. 38-39, quoted Qioshal, 29. George McTuman Kahin, "Indonesia," in Maio r Governments of Asia, ed. George McTuman Kahin (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1st. ed., 1958), p. 568, quoted in Daniel S. Lev, The Transition to Guided Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 223] === 213 ENDNOTES — CHAPTER H I Indonesian P o litics. 1957-59. Monograph Series, Modem "-SUASJ!racv: I ndone sia Project (Ithaca: “Cornell University Press, 1964), p. 23? see also J. D. legge, “Guided Democracy and Constitutional Procedures in Indonesia,” The Australian Outlook 13 (June 1959):93-99. 30. Peeye, p. 118. Two individuals who did acceptcabinet posts, and were associated with th e tfasitmiparty, were expelled from th e party shortly a fte r they made th e ir choice. 31. Ibid. 32. See Poeslan Atdulgani, "Indonesia's National Year," Far Eastern S u r v e y 27 (July 1958):97-104. 33. Peeve, p. 113. 34. Ib id., p. 119. 35. Lav, Transition, p. 24. 36. Reeve, p. 121. 37. Sukarno, Dibawah Bendera Revolusi. v ol. U Penerbit, 1965), p. 293, quoted in Reeve, p. 121. Council: The F irst (Djakarta: Panitya 38. See Justus M. van der Kroef, "The T rials of Indonesian Democracy," Review o f P o litics 20 (January 1958): 70-96; Justus M. van der Kroef, “Disunited Indonesia," Far Eastern Survey 27 (April 1958):49-63; Justus M. van d er Kroef, "Disunited Indonesia I I," Far Eastern Survey 27 (May 1958):73-80; and B. H. M. Vlekke, e d., Indonesia's Struggle 1957-1958 (The Hague: Netherlands In s titu te of International Studies, 1959). 39. See lev, Transition, p. 33. 40. Hans 0. Schmitt, "Foreign Capital and Social Conflict in Indonesia, 1950-1958," Economic Development and Cultural Chance 10 (April 1962):289. 41. See van der Kroef, "Disunited," pp. 59-61; Donald Hindley, The Ccmmunist Party o f Indonesia 1951-63 (Ics Angeles: University of Calif ornia, 1964), pp. 266-268; Lev, Transition, pp. 33-35; Feith, Decline, pp. 583-585? and Olle Tomquist, Dilemmas of Third Wbrld Oomnrunism: The Destruction of th e PKI in Indonesia (Iordan: Zed Books, 1984), pp. 99-100. 42. See J. Leyser, "Indonesia's Nationalization of D utd/Enterprises and International Law," The Australian Outlook 14 (August 1960):200-210, for la te r developments. 43. Justus M van der Kroef, "Disunited,1! p. 59. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. === [PDF page 224] === 214 ENEf'fCTIES — CHAPTER H I 44. Ycng Mun Checng, "Hie Indonesian Amy and Functional Qpoups, 195759," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 7 (March 1976) f99. 45. Ibid. 46. D. N. A idit, The Selected Works of D. N. A idit. v ol. 2 (Washington, D. C.: Jo in t Publications Research Service 8886), p. 293, quoted in Tomquist, p. 100. 47. See S. Takdir Alisjahbana, "The Grievances of th e Regions”; and Sukarno, "There i s, Something Else behind This Problem of th e Regions," in Feith and Castles, pp. 320-325, and pp. 325-327. 48. Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, "Old State, New Society; Indonesia's New Order in Comparative H istorical Perspective," Journal o f Asian studies 42 (May 1983):484; emphasis in original. 49., See McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of th e Indonesian Army," Indonesia no. 13 (April 1972): 158-162, on th e Amy's economic power. 50. See Ruth T. McVey, "Indonesian Communism and th e Transition to Guided Democracy," in Communist Strategies in Asia, ed. Doak Barnett (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, In c., 1963), pp. 167-180, fo r a discussion of the Amy's ta c tic s under Guided Democracy. 51. Lev, Transition, p. 65. 52. Pauker, "Role," p. 141. 53. Yong, p. 98; see Reeve, p. 146, fo r a l i s t of ten such Bodies. 54. See lev, Transition, n. 35, p. 65. 55. Pauker, "Role," p. 141. 56. Ibid. 57. Yong, p. 99. 58. Reeve, p. 145. 59. Ib id., p. 146. 60. Lev, Transition, p. 66. 61. Louis Fischer, Thestorv of Indonesia (New York: Brothers, 1959), p. 294, quoted in Reeve, p. 120. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Harper and === [PDF page 225] === 215 ENENCTES — CHAPTER I I I 62. Manifest Front Nasional Penibebasan Iria n Barat Menahadaci Pemberontak-Femberontak Proklaroasi 17 Augustus 1945 (n.p., n.d.), pp. 11, 14, c ite d in Yong, p. 100. 63. Yang, p. 98. 64. Sundhaussen, p. 132. 65. Penders and Sundhaussen, p. 128. 66. 67. Ib id., p. 129. See Sundhaussen, p. 133. Raukser, "Role," p. 141. See Lev, Transition, n. 32, pp. 185-186. 69. Penders and Sundhaussen, p. 187-188. 129. See Lev, T ransition, n. 36, pp. 70. See Lev, Transition, n. 102, pp. 169-170, fo r th e non-Oammunist p a rtie s ' reactions. To avert the predictable postponement, the EKE had gone so far as to deny that i t would secure more than a quarter of the votes, a proportion equivalent to i t s 1957 electoral performance. Sea Lev, Transition, p. 167, for more on the Communists'self-denial. 71. Lev, Transition, p. 171. 72. Reeve, p. 126. See Penders and Sundhaussen, pp. 132-137. 73. This quote' is taken from a speech reported in Fos.Indonesia (Djakarta), 13 November 1958, quoted in PendersandSundhaussen, pp.133134. Adding substance to Nasution's remarks wasth e acuteawareness Indonesia in la te 1958 th at "m ilitary coups seemed in vogue in th e Third World; there were coups in Iraq (July), Pakistan, Burma, and Thailand ( a ll in October), and Sudan (November). 74. Penders and Sundhaussen, p. 135. See lev,Transition, 75. The ban was lifte d on 1 August 1959. 76. Lev, Transition, pp. 272-273. pp. 247-250. 77. See J. A. C. Mackie, "Indonesian P o litics under Guided Democracy," The Australian Outlook 15 (December 1961); 260-279; and Irene Tinker and M.illidge Walker, "Indonesia's Panacea; 1959 Model," Far Eastern Survey 28 78. See Sundhaussen, p. 145-146, fo r more d eta ils on the posts secured by the Amy and Armed Forces. See also Ruth McVey, "Transformation," p. 151. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. === [PDF page 226] === 216 ENENOTES — CHAPTER H I 7 9. S e e S u k a r n o, • 'R e t u r n i n g t o t h e R a i l s o f t h e R e v o l u t i o n "? a n d t h e S u p re m e A d v is o ry C o u n c il, " H ie P o l i t i c a l M a n if e s to a s a G e n e ra l P ro g ra m o f t h e R e v o lu tio n," i n F e i t h an d C a s t l e s, p p. 9 9 -1 0 9, a n d p p. 1 0 9 -1 1 1. T h e a c r o n y m USDEK n e a t l y s u m m a r i z e s t h e f i v e b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s o f t h e P o l i t i c a l M a n ife s to: th e 1 9 4 5 C o n s titu tio n fU n d a m -U n d a m D a s a r 1 9 4 5 ), I n d o n e s ia n S o c ia lis m ( S o s ia lis m e I n d o n e s i a!, G u id e d D e m o c ra c y (D e m o k ra s i T e ro u n p in ), G u id e d E c o n o n y fE k o n o m i T e r p im o in ). a n d I n d o n e s i a n i d e n t i t y (K e o rib a d ia n I n d o n e s ia ). T a k in g t h e f i r s t l e t t e r s o f e a c h o f th e f i v e I n d o n e s i a n p h r a s e s g i v e s t h e a c r o n y m U SD E K. 80. Sundhaussen, p. 146. 81. Reeve, p. 163. Reeve w rites th a t in 1959 "the term aolonoan funosionil was 1indonesianized1 in to anlonaan karva ( i. e., ggU gj), the term Varya haying the senses o f 'vocation,' 'creativ e work,' and 's e rv ic e,"' p. 148. 82. Reeve, p. 165. 83. I b i d., p p. 1 6 5 —1 6 6. 8 4. I b i d., p. 1 6 6. S e e M c V e y, " I n d o n e s i a n C o m m u n is m," n. 2 1, p. 1 9 2, f o r A i d i t 's l a t e r r e v e l a t i o n s o f th e c o s t o f t h i s m e a s u re t o t h e p a r t y. 85. M. C* Ricklefs, A History of Modem Indonesia: c. 1300 to th e Present (Iondon: Macmillan Press, 1981),Np. 255. 8 6. S e e G u y J. P a u k e r, " C u r r e n t C C m m u n is t T a c t i c s i n I n d o n e s i a, " A s i a n S u r v e y • 1 (M a y 1 9 6 1 ): 2 6 - 3 5, o n h o w t h e C o m m u n i s t s c o p e d w i t h t h e r e a l i t y o f s u p r e m e A rm y p o w e r. 87., See lev, Transition, n. 56, p. 194. 88. See Tomquist, p. 121; and van der Kroef, Communist Party, p. 162. 8 9. S e e D o n a ld H in d le y, " P r e s i d e n t S u k a r n o a n d t h e C o m m u n is ts: T h e P o l i t i c s o f D o m e s t i c a ti o n," T h e A m e ric a n P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e R e v ie w 5 6 (D e c e m b e r 1 9 6 2 ): 9 2 2. 90. R icklefs, p. 257; and Tomquist, p. 121. The seven journals were Bintara Merah, Kehidupan P a rta i. Ilmu Marxis. Mimbar Komunis. PKI dan Perwakilan. Ekonomi dan Masvarakat. and Review of Indonesia. 9 1. S e e M a r t i n E b o n, " I n d o n e s i a n C o m m u n is m: P r a m F a i l u r e t o S u c c e s s, " R e v ie w o f P o l i t i c s 2 5 ( J a n u a r y 1 9 6 3 ):9 1 - 1 0 9; a n d J U s t u s M. v a n d e r K r o e f, " D ile n a n a s o f I n d o n e s i a n C c n m u n is m." P a c i f i c A f f a i r s 3 5 (S u m m e r 1 9 6 2 ): 1 4 1 159. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. === [PDF page 227] === 217 ENENOTES — CHAPTER I I I 92. See for example, Bruce Glassbumer and Kenneth D. Thomas, "The Swing o f the Hoe: Retooling Begins in the Indonesian Economy," Asian Survey 1 (June 1961):3-12; Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesia's Economic Future," P acific A ffairs 32 (March 1959):46-72; Don D. Humphrey, "Indonesia's National Plan for Economic Development," Asian Survey 2 (December 1962): 12-21; K. Krishna Moorthy, "Indonesia's Eight-Year Plan," Far T.acrt-pm Economic Review. 13 July 1961, pp. 62-65; and T. K. Tan, "Sukamian Economics,'' in Riitamn's Guided Indonesia, ed. T. K. Tan (Brisbane: Jacaranda, 1967), pp. 29-45. 93. Support fo r the conception was formally given a t th e PKE Central Committee Fifth Plenary meeting held in July 1957. See legge, n. 51, p. 285; Feith, Decline, pp* 589-592; lev, pp. 17-18, and 75-83; and Rex Mortimer, Indonesian Communism Urde-r aitam n. Tdeoloav and P o litics. 1959-1965 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), pp. 68-7'ja. 94. Reeve, p. 120. 95. This call was heard a t the Sixth Plenary Meeting of th e PKE Central Committee (31 March-3 April 1958) and the Seventh Plenary Meeting of the EKI Centr al Committee (19-21 November 1958). See Lev, Transition, n. 136, p. 229. 96. Quoted in Justus M. van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia. I t s History. Program, and Tactics (Vancouver: Univeristy of B ritish Columbia, 1965), p. 111. See Reeve, p. 164. 97. See Lev, Transition, p. 252. 98. Van der Kroef, Communist Party, p. 116. 99. Reeve, pp. 161-162. 100. See Donald E. Weatherbee, Ideology in Indonesia: Sukarno's Indonesian Revolution. Southeast Asian Studies. Monograph Series no. 8 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 19-22, and pp. 40-41, for discussions of Sukarno's vision of revolution, and th e concept of NaaaVnm. respectively. 101. See R.C. de Ion#i, "West Irian Confrontation," in Sukarno's Guided Indonesia, ed. T. K. Tan (Brisbane: Jacaranda, 1967), pp. 102-114; and Corsino, pp. 140-152, fo r a discussion of the PKI's use o f nationalism throughout the 1959.-1965 period. See also, Weatherbee, Ideology in Indonesia, 57-82, for coverage of Sukarno's foreign policy in itia tiv e s, and Justus M. van der Kroef, "Nasutian, Sukarno and th e West New Guinea Dispute," Asian Survey 1 (August 1961):20-24, where the interactions of the Amy and Sukarno are discussed. 102. Van der Kroef, Communist Party, p. 263. R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n e r. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n. === [PDF page 228] === 218 ENDNOTES — CHAPTER I I I 103. Mortimer, p. 196. 104. Van der Kroef, Communist: Party, p. 165. 105. M. H. Lukman, Report onChancres in Communist Party Constitution (Djakarta: n.p., 1959), in JPRS 4411, 20 February 1961. 106. Ib id., p. 6. 107. Ib id., p. 15. 108. Ib id., p. 16. Lukman went on to give the formula for th e Indonesian Revolution: "Marxism-Leninism certainly does not indicate precisely the same route toward Socialism' fo r a ll countries during a ll epochs and under various international co n d itio n s.... [With regard to the form, methods, and means] one and a l l /pf these depend upon the comparison between th e forces of th e established class, on the organizational level of th e working class 'and i t s enemy, upon -the cleverness of the working class in a ttra c tin g a llie s to i t s side, participation of the peasants, and taking in to account the democratic foundations, the customs and tra d itio n s, one and a l l, of th e country.” Ibid. 109. See Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communist Policy and the Sixth Party Congress," Pacific A ffairs 33 (September 1960):227-249. 110. "Strengthen National Unity and Avoid Provocations," Review of Indonesia (September-October 1960):4; emphasis in o rigin al, quoted In Van d er Kroef, Communist Party, p. 161. 111. See Van der Kroef, Communist Party, p. 190. 112. "NjonoC's] Reaffirmation of th e Politbureau Statement Regarding P residential Regulation No. 7 o f 1959," Harian Rakvat. 4 January 1960, in JPRS 8285, 17 May 1961), p. 2. 113. D. N. A idit, Report to the Second Plenary Session o f the Central Committee. Sixth Congress of the PKI. [1959], quoted in Oey Hong Lee, Indonesian Government and Press Purina Guided Democracy. Hull Monographs On Southeast Asia, no. 4 (Hull: centre for South-East Asian Studies, The U niversity of Hull, 1971), p. 219. 114. Reported by D. N. Aidit in Strengthen National Unity and Communist Unitv! (Djakarta: n.p., 1961), p. 26,-quoted in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 126. 115. Van der Kroef, Communist Party, p. 191. 116. Ib id., p. 175. 117. I b id., p. 242. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 229] === ENENOTES — CHAPTER H I 118. "Guarding Against Ideological Timidity," Rehidupan P artai (September 19pAr51, in JPRS 2782, 15 JUne 1960, p. 51. 119. Ibid. 120. Ibid. 121. Ib id., pp. 52-54. See also, D. N. ACjit, "Ideological Work in the Communist Party of Indonesia," World Marxist Review 2 (July 1959):24-27; D. N. A idit, "For National u nity," World Marxist Review 3 (February 1960):23-26; and B. O. Hutapea, "Raise High the Banners of Party Development in the Field of Ideology," Bintancr Merah (May-June 1960), in JPRS 4442, 10 March 1961, pp. 21-29. 122. Van der Kroef, Comrnunlst P arty, p. 264. 123. Reeve, p. 168. 124. See "Indonesian Youth Front Formed," Suluh Indonesia (Djakarta), 16 August 1960, in JPRS 5717, 20 November 1960, p. 63. 125. Basis, no. 11 (August 1960), quoted in Reeve, p. 170. 126. "Guided Press, National Front, P o litica l P arties, and 0PPI," Minibar ' Indonesia (Djakarta), 23 July 1960, in JPRS 5475, 1 October 1960, p. 20. 127. Ibid. 128. "Proposal fo r Replacing OPPI with Labor Council," Suara Ibukota (Djakarta), 1960, in JPRS 5718, 2 November 1960, p. 4. 129. See ’Wan-Ccramunist labor Organizations Support Single Labor Federation in Indonesia," Pedoman (Djakarta), 5 August 1960, in JPRS 5662, 7 October 1960, pp. 1-2. 130. See "Membership of l e f t i s t Indonesian Labor Federation SOBSI Declines," Pedoman (Djakarta), 9 August 1960, in JPRS 5662, 7 October 1960, p. 3. 131. See th e "Implementation of Guided Democracy," Harian Rakyat, 12 August 1960, in JPRS 5719, 12 December 1960, pp. 7-9, on SOBSI statements; and van der Kroef, Communist P a r t y, pp. 209-211. 132. Harian Rakyat-28 April 133. See van der Kroef,communist Party, 134. Ib id., p. 112. 135. Reeve, p. 171. 1962, cited in Reeve, p. 170. pp.243-244, and 247. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 230] === 220 ENDNOTES — CHAPTER H I 136. Ib id., p. 147. 137. See Yang, p. 100; and Reeve,'' p. 147. 138. See Lev, Transition, pp. 157-158. 139. Sukarno, Indonesia's P o litic a l Manifesto. 1959-1964 (Djakarta; n.p., n.d.), p. 64, cited in Yorig, p. 101. ,140. Sundhaussen, p. 145. 141. Ibid. 142. Lev, Transition, p. 285. 143. Roeslan Abdulgani, Nationalism Revolution and Guided Democracy in Indonesia (Monash University, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1973), quoted in Reeve, p. 172. 144. Penders and Sundhaussen, p. 145. 145. Ib id., p. 157. 146. A. H. Nasution, Tuoas T.N.I. sebaoai Golonoan Karv? Rangfca Felaksanaan Maniool-USDEK (Djakarta; n.p., 1961), p. 7, quoted in Penders and Sundhaussen, p. 149. 147. See Reeve, pp. 181-182. 148. Ib id., p. 161. 149. See Herbert Feith, "P o litics of Economic Decline," in finkamo's Guided Indonesia, ed. T. K. Tan (Brisbane: Jacaranda, 1967), pp. 46-57; J. A. c. Mackie, "Tie P o litic a l Ecohomy o f Guided Democracy," The Australian Outlook 13 A. C. Mackie, "Indonesia's Government Estates! and Their Masters," Pacific A ffairs 34 anci Mohammad Sadli, "Indonesia's New Economics," Far Eastern Economic Review. 19 October 1961, pp. 154-161, on the approach th a t Sukarno took toward economics and th e economic development of Indonesia. 150. See Herbert Feith, '"Indonesia's P olitical Symbols and Their Wielders," World P olitics 16 (October 1963); 79-97; Justus M. van der Kroef, "An Indonesian Ideological Lexicon;" Asian Survey 2 (July 1962);24-30; Weatherbee, pp. 19-22, and 33-45; and Jose Arsenio Torres, "The P o litic a l Ideology of Guided Democracy," 25 (January 1963):34-63. 151., Quoted in van der Kroef, "Lexicon," p. 28. 152. Van der Kroef, Communist P arty, p. 115. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 231] === ENDNOTES — CHAPTER I I I 153. See M. H. lukman, "Use o f the People's Regional le g isla tiv e Councils fo r Defending Democracy and the People's Interests," PaVyafrr 5 April 1958, in JPRS DC-403, 28 November 1958, pp. 1-13, fo r a discussion o f the development of Communist te rrito ry. 154. See "The Victory of the Indohesian Communist Party," Sketsmasa (Djakarta), 15 February 1960, in JPRS 5295, 11 August 1960, pp. 1-10. 155. M. H. Lukman, Report, p. 1. 156. FKI, Bahan-Bahan untuk Koncrres Nasional ke-VI P artai Kommunis Indonesia (Djakarta: n.p., 1958), p. 53, cited in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 85. 157. Hindley, "Domestication," p. 917. 158. SOBSI, General Report of the SOBSI National Council to th e Ttn'rd SOBSI National Congress (Djakarta: n.p., 1960), in JPRS 7456, 10 February 1961)| p. 53. 159. Hindley, Communist Party, p. 139. 160. "Laporan Utaura Sidang DPP Pleno I I BIT," Suara Tani. Supplement (MayJune 1959): 29-30, cited in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 166. A discussion o f the a c tiv itie s of the BIT is given in Hartojo, "In Regards to the Mobilization and Organisation of th e Peasants," Suara Tani (November 1959), in JPRS 5299, 11 August 1960, pp. 1-5. 161. Suara Tani Party, p. 169. cited in Hindley, Communist 162. Pernuda Rakvat. "laporan IMn pada Sidang Dewan Nasioanl k e - m," (Djakarta: n.p., 1958), p. 13, cited in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 191. 163. Pernuda Rakvat. Setia Mencradbi Kepentinaan-Kepentinaan v ita l dan T iita -T iita Revolusi Augustus 1945 (Djakarta: n.p*., 1962), p. 50, cited in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 191. 164. Ib id. 165. Hindley, Communist P a rt/, p. 207; see also S. K. Trimurty, "History o f Gerwani's Development," Harian Rakvat. 7 June 1960, in JPRS 5298, 12 August 1960, pp. 11-17. 166. Harian Rakvat. 14 December 1961? 11 January 1963, c i t^ l in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 208. 167. Hindley, "Domestication," p. 917. 168. 'Reeve, p. 162. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 232] === 222 ENDNOTES — CHAPTER IV 1. Nasution's formulation has also bean called the "Broad Front" (Front Debar). See C. L. M. Perriers and Ulf Sundhaussen. Abdul Haris Nasution. A P o litic a l Bloaraohv (St. Lucia, Queensland: university of Queensland Press, 1985), p. 133. 2. Pos Indonesia (Djakarta), Sundhaussen, p. 133. 13 November 1958, quoted in Penders and 3. See Ralartag Ghoshal, The Role of the M ilitary in Indonesia (Madras: Hie University of Madras, 1980), pp. 28-29; and Daniel S. Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian P o litic s. 1957-59. Monograph Series, Modem Indonesia Project (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), pp. 191-192, fo r discussions on the Middle Way concept. 4. Guy J. Pauker, e d., The Indonesian Doctrine o f T errito rial Warfare and T e rrito ria l Management. Memo Rm-3312-PR (Santa Monica, C a lif.: The RAND Corporation, November 1963), p. 62. Ib id., p. 55. Ib id., p. 307. Ib W, p. 144. Ib id., p. 59. Ibid. 10. Ib id., p. 147. 11. Ib id., pp. 147, and 311. 12. Ib id., p. 270. 13. Ruth McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army," p a rt I I, Indonesia no. 13, (April 1972): 162-171, cavers a discussion of education as a source o f central control. 14. Guy J. Pauker, "The Indonesian Doctrine of T e rrito ria l Warfare a*d T e rrito ria l Management: Its Origin and Functions," in The Indonesian Doctrine o f T errito rial Warfare and T e rrito ria l Management. Memo Rm-3312ER, ed. Guy J. Pauker (Santa Monica>. C a lif.: The RAND Corporation, November 1963), p. 30. 15. Ibid; 16. Ib id., p. 31. 17. Ib id., p. 28. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 233] === 223 ENDNOTES — CHAPTER IV 18. David Reeve, Golka-r nf Indonesia: An Alternative to th e Party System (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 187. 19. Written communication from Nasution, December 1981, cited in Penders and Sundhaussen, p. 144. 20. "Supplement Concerning Civic Missions," in Indonesia 1963: Looking Back over the Year. Department of Foreign A ffairs, Republic of Indonesia (Djakarta: n.p., 1963), p. 45. 21. Pauker, "Doctrine," p. 39. 22. See Pauker, "Doctrine," pp. 7-11, and pp. 34-37, for a discussion of the influence on the TNI o f the Yugoslavian, Chinese, and Vietnamese experiences. 23. Ib id., p. 38. 24. Declassified Documents Quarte-riv Catalogue. (Woodbridge, Conn.: Research Publications, 1982), 001191, quoted in Peter Dale S c o tt,, "The "\ United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-1967," Pacific Affairs 25. Declassified Documents Quart-arl y Catalogue.. (Woodbridge, Conn.: Research Publications, 1982), 002386; and Declassified Documents Quarterly Catalogue. (Woodbridge, Conn.: Research Publications, 1981), 367A, quoted in Scott, p. 246. 26. Scott, p. 248. 27. Ibid. 28. Declassified Documents ■Quart-erly Catalogue. (Woodbridge, -Conn: Research Publications, 1982), 001786 (DOS Memo for President of July 17, 1964; emphasis in original), quoted in Scott, n. 46, p. 248. 29. Pauker, "Dotftrine," pp. 43-44. The Body for th e Coordination of the Development of F irst Level Regions (Badan Koordinasi Pembaaunan Daerah— EKPD) replaced the T iatur Tuncrcral in accordance with Presidential Decree 655/1961; they were installed in each province in January 1963. Reeve has ccranented th a t the BKPDs "continued to be referred to as Catur Tunggal and to be backed by th e m artial law administration." Reeve, p. 190. 30. Pauker, p. 42; and Reeve, p. 190. 3 1. U lf S u n d h a u sse n, T h e R o a d t o P o w e r. I n d o n e s ia n M i l it a r y 1 9 4 5 - 1 9 6 7 (Oxford: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s, 1 9 8 2 ), p. 1 7 5. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. P o litic s === [PDF page 234] === 224 ENDNOTES — CHAPTER I V 32. PiTci ran Rakvat (Bandung), 13 August 1962, quoted in Sundhaussen, p. 175. 33. Sundhaussen, p. 175. "This expression i s v irtu a lly untranslatable. Bintara = NCO; Pembina = Builder, Constructor." Sundhaussen, n. 44, p. 221. 34. Reeve has added th a t th e establishment of HANSIP, and in its organizational drives to secure volunteers throught the National Front were "ventures [that] remained largely Army-run schemes in which th e PKI and its ormas members were excluded wherever p o ssib le." Reeve, p. 191. 35. Reeve, p. 220. 36. Ib id., p. 186. 37. McVey, "Transformation," p a rt H, p. 171. 38. See Sukarno's "Economic Declaration," Department of Foreign A ffairs, Indonesia 1963. pp. 69-90; and "The Economic Declaration," Far Eastern Economic Review. 25 April 1963, pp. 211-215. 39. United States EconomicSurvey Team to Indonesia. Indonesia; Perspectives and Proposals fo r United States Economic Aid (New Haven: Yale University, Southeast Asian Studies, 1963). 40. See Penders and Sundhaussen, Appendix 5, pp. 254-256. 41. Quoted in Guy J. Pauker, "Indonesia: Internal Development External Expansion?" Asian Survey 3 (February 1963):71. 42. Justus M. van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia. Its History. Program, and Tactics (Vancouver: University o f B ritish Columbia, 1965), p. 277. 43. D. N. Aidit, Dare, Dare, and Dare Again! P o litic a l Report Presented on February 10. 1963, to the F irs t Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee, of. the Communist Party of Indonesia (Peking: Foreign languages Press, [1963]), p. 8; and Dipa Nusantara A idit, "Indonesian Communists March Forward fo r Full National Independence," World Marxist - Review 6 Aidit singled out fo r ridicule th e Army's concept of Civic Missions. On 16 July 1963 in a speech to th e Navy's S taff and Command School (Sekolah Staff dan Komando Ancrkatan Taut — SESKDAL) — a riv a l to SESKDAD — A idit called the idea o f Civic Missions "wrong and anti-people." Foreign Broadcasting Information Service, Daily Report. Far E ast. 24 July 1963, p. r r r l, quoted in Pauker, "Doctrine," p. 46. 44. See Aidit, "Indonesian Communists March," pp. 13-14; and MacArthur F. Ccrsino, A Communist Revolutionary Movement as an International State, Actor: The Case o f the PKT-Aidit. In stitu te o f Southeast Asian Studies- Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 235] === 225 ENDNOTES — CHAPTER IV ' (Singapore: Maruzen Asia, 1982), pp. 142-144. 45. A idit, Dare, p. 3^; emphasis in original. 46. Ib id., p. 34; emphasis in original. , 47. 48. Penders and Sundhaussen, p.- 164. Ibid., p. 165. 49. See "Indonesia's May 27 Reforms," Far Eastern Economic Review. 13 June 1963, pp. 600-603. 50. Sundhaussen, p. 168. 51. Penders and Sundhaussen, p. 165. 52. See Peter Christian Hauswedelj, "Sukarno: Radical or Conservative? Indonesian P olitics 1964-65," Indonesia no. 15 (April 1973): 118-121; van der Kroef, cmnunist Party, pp. 270-271; Rex Mortimer, Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno. Ideology and P olitics. 1959-1965 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), pp. 263-267; and Oey Hong Lee, Indonesian Government and Press Purina Guided Democracy. Hull Monographs On Southeast Asia, no. 4 (Hull: Centre for South-East Asian Studies, The University of Hull, 1571), pp. 105-107, for discussions of the short lived stabilization plan. 53. Text in Foreign Broadcast /Information Service, Daily Report. Far 21 December 1962, p. r r r w, quoted in Pauker, "Doctrine," p. 43. 54. Penders and Sundhaussen, p. 165. 55. Donald E. Weatherbee, Ideology in Indonesia: Sukarno's Indonesian Revolution. Southeast Asian Studies. Monograph Series no. 8 (New Haven: Ydle Uhiversity Press, 1966), p. 57. 56. Herbert Feith, "President Soekamo, The Army And The Communists: The Triangle Changes Shape," Asian Survey 4 (August 1964):971. 57. Reeve, p. 195. 58. Ib id., p. 215. 59. Ewa T. Pauker, "Has the Sukarno Regime Weakened the PKE?" Asian Survey 4 (September 1964): 1059. 60. Sukarno, "The Resounding Voice of the Indonesian Revolution," in Indonesia 1963: Looking Back over the Year. Department of Foreign Affairs,’ Republic of Indonesia (Djakarta: n.p., 1963), pp. 31-32. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 236] === 226 ENENOOES — C H A PTER I V 61. Ib id., pp. 32-33. 62. Ib id., pp. 45-47. 63. M. C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia: c. 1300 to the Present (London: Macmillan Press, 1981), p.( 261. The author points out th a t the Indonesian term "aanlam Malaysia1''has often been m istranslated as "crush Malaysia." 64. Weatherbee, Ideology in Indonesia, p. 57. 65. Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, "Old S tate, New Society: Indonesia's New Order in Comparative Historical Perspective," Journal o f Asian Studies 42 (May 1983):484-485. 66. Lev, Transition, p. 286. 67. Ib id., p. 286, and p. 171. 68. Beiriid Indonesia Reeve, p. 210. (Djakarta), 6, and 7 September 1963, quoted in 69. See Mortimer, pp. 132-140; and D. N. Aidit, The Indonesian Revolution and the Immediate Tasks o f the Communist Party of Indonesia (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964), pp. 40-43, 80-38, and 124-127. 70. Reeve, p. 209. 71. Mortimer, p. 136. 72. A idit, Indonesian Revolution, p. 65. 73. See Corsino, pp. 146-149; J. A. C. Mackie, "Indonesia: A Background to 'C o n f r o n ta tio n,The World Today 20 (April 1964): 139-147; Guy J. Pauker, "Indonesia in 1963: The Year o f Wasted Opportunities," Asian Survey 4 (February 1964): 687-694; andDonald Weatherbee, "Indonesia and Malaysia: Confrontation in Southeast Asia," Orbis 7 (Summer 1963):336351, for discussions of th e conflict. 74. D. N. A idit, Set Afire the Bdnteng S p irit I Ever Forward. No Retreat! P o litical Report to the Second Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee of the Comnunist Party of Indonesia. Enlarged w ith th e Members of the Central Auditing Commission and th e Central Control Commission (Djakarta, 23rd-26th December 1963) (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964), p. 15. 75. Quoted in Guy J. Pauker, "Indonesia in 1964: Toward a Democracy'?" Asian Survey 5 (February 1965):90. 76. Mortimer, p. 371. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 'People's === [PDF page 237] === 227 ENBNOIES — CHAFTER IV 77. Feith, "Triangle," p. 977. For asdiscussian of the relatio n s between Sukarno and the Chinese, see Justus M. van der Kroef, "Hie SinoIndonesian Partnership," Orfais 8 (Summer 1964):332-356; and Corsino, pp. 154-160, for a discussion o f the PKI's ideological s h if t. See Gey J. Pauker, "GANEFO I: Sports and P o litics in Djakarta," Asian Survey 5 (April 1965): 171-185, for an interesting analysis o f the dynamics of th e riv a lry between Beijing and Moscow to influence Indonesia. Ihe Chinese, fa r th e ir p a rt, gave aU-encanpassing^ support to Indonesia; see Pien Hsieh, "Sino-Indonesian Friendship Grows Apace," Peking Review no. 17 (26 April 1963), pp. 9-10; "China Supports Indonesia's E fforts to Smash Im perialist Subversion," Pekim Review no. 23 (7 June 1963), pp. 14-15; " 'Malaysia' — Offspring of Neo-Colonialism," Peking Review no, 40 (4October 1963), pp. 23-25; "China Supports the North Kalimantan People," Peking Review no. 14 (3 April 1964), pp. 28-29; and "Resolutely Support th e Indonesian People's Just Struggle Against 'M alaysia,'" Peking Review no. 37 (11 September 1964), p. 8. 78. Mortimer, p. 227. 79. Justus M. van d er Kroef, "Indonesian Communism and the Changing Balance of Power," P acific' A ffairs 37 (Winter 1964-1965):359; see also van der Kroef, Comtmmist Party, p. 268, and p. 273; and Corsino, p. 152. 80. Mortimer, p. 204. 81. Ibid. 82. D. N. A idit, "Gerakan Kdmunis International dan Revolusi Asia Tenggara," in Tanmt Takkan Runtuh (Djakarta: n.p., 1963), pp. 38-40, quoted in Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesia: The Mystique of Permanent Revolution," The South A tlantic Q u a r te r ly 64 (Winter 1965): 10. 83. Justus M. van der Kroef, "Exporting Indonesia's Revolution," EastemWorld 18 (July 1964): 13. 84. Ministry o f Foreign A ffairs, Republic o f Indonesia, Indonesia, vol. 3V (Djakarta: n.p., 1964), p. 47, quoted in Oey,p. 234. 85. Van der Kroef, Communist Party, p. 294.See van der Kroef, "Changing Balance," p. 379; and van der Kroef, "Exporting," p. 17. 86. Indonesian Observer (Djakarta), 8 January 1964, quoted in van der Kroef, "Changing Balance," p. 373. See van d e r Kroef, "ESqxxrting," p. 14. 87. Van der Kroef, "Exporting," p. 14. 88. Harian Rakvat. 17 January 1964, quoted in van Balance," p. 371. der Kroef, "Changing Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 238] === 228 ENCNOTES — CHAPTER IV 89. Ewa T. Pauker, p. 1064? see Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism's 'Revolutionary Gymnastics'," Asian Survey 5 (May 1965):217232; and Feith, "Triangle," pp. 975-976. 90. Mortimer, p. 240. 91. Van der Kroef, "Clanging Balance," p. 372. 92. Mortimer, p. 203. 93. Quoted in van der Kroef, "Exporting," p. 13. 94. Sundhaussen, p. 181. 95. See Feith, "Triangle," p. 974. In January 1964, Djawoto of the Arrfeara news agency was appointed ambassador to ■China,while in March 1964, A li Chanafiah of the PKE was appointed as ambassador to Ceylon. 96. Mortimer, p. 205. 97. Ib id., p. 227. 98. Van der Kroef, "Mystique," p. 11. 99. Arrtara Daily News B ulletin. 8 July 1964, quoted in van der Kroef, "Changing Balance," p. 383. 100. Van der Kroef, "Changing Balance," p. 383. 101. Oey, p. 95. 102. A idit, Bantam, p. 25.^ 103. Olle Tomquist, bilemmas ’o f Third World Communism;The Destruction of the PKE in Indonesia (Xondon: Zed Books, 1984), p. 156. 104. Indonesian Observer (Djakarta), 10 July 1964, quoted in van der Kroef, "Revolutionary Gymnastics," p. 221. 105. A idit, Banteng, p. 135. 106. Tomquist, p. 195. 107. See A idit, E&pe, pp. 86-90; A idit, Indonesian Revolution, pp. 30-34; A idit, Bantem. pp. 130-144; and A idit, "Indonesian Communists March," p. 19. 108. A idit, Bantem. pp. 130-131. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 239] === 229 ENDNOTES — CHAPTER IV 109. M. H. lukman, Untuk Ferbaikan Perkeriaan dal am Front Persatuan Nasional (Djakarta: n.p., 1964), quoted in Mortimer, p. 315. 110. Ibid. 111. See Justus M. van der Kroef, "Agrarian Reform and the Indonesian Communist Party," Far Eastern Survey 29 (January 1960):5-13; and Donald Hindley, "The EKE and the Peasants," Problems of Communism 11 (NovemberDecember 1962):28-36. 112. Donald Hindley, "The EKE and the Peasants," Problems of Commqnism 11 (Nc^ember— 113. Margo Lyon, Bases of Conflict in Rural Java. Research Monograph 3 (Berkeley: University of California, 1970), pp. 48-49, quoted in Corsino, p. 112. See also. W . F.Wertheim, "Indonesia Before and A fter the Untung Coup," Pacific Affairs 39 (Spring-Sunnier 1966): 120, fo r a sim ilar argument. 114. Aidit, Bantem. pp. 122-123. 115. Tomquist, p. 199. 116. Ibid. 117. See Jacob Walkin, "The Muslim-Communist Confrontation in East Java," Orbis 13 (Fall 1969):822-847. 118. Tomquist, p. 198. 119. Ibid., pp. 196-197. 120. M o rtim e r, p. 3 2 0. 121. Tomquist, p. 197. 122. See Reeve, p. 248? the President's remarks. andMortimer, pp. 320-321, fo r the substance of 123. Mortimer, p. 321. 124. Ib id.; and Tomquist, p. 199. 125. Tomquist, p. 199; and Mortimer, p. 322. 126. Reeve, p. 192. 127. Ib id. 128. Ib id. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 240] === 230 'ENDNOTES — CHAPTER I V * 1 2 9." I b id. 130. Ib id., p. 219. 131. Ib id., p. 220. 132. Berita Indonesia (Djakarta), 28 December 1962, and 12 January 1963; and Drs Suhardiman, Rawe-Rawe Rantas Malara-Malano Putum (Djakarta: Biro Fenerangan SCKSI, 1963?), pp. 14-15, quoted in Reeve, p. 222. 133. Reeve, p. 225. See Harold Crouch, m e Armv and P o litics in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), pp. 64-66; and Hauswedell, pp. 128-132, on the polemics. 134. See Deepa Nusatara Aidit, "Party Building and Mass Work," World Marxist Review 5 (September 1962):33; H. Yunus, "Indonesia: B attle an the Cultural Front," world M arxist' Review 6 (January 1963):65-67; A idit, Indonesian Revolution, pp. 24-25; and Njoto, Strive fo r the Victory of the Indonesian Revolution with th e Weapon of D ialectical and H istorical Materialism (Peking: Foreign languages Press, 1964), p. 1. 135. Reeve, p. 232. 136. Indonesian Herald (Djakarta), 11 May 1964; and Berita Indonesia (Djakarta), 5 June 1964, quoted in Reeve, p. 232. 137. See JUstus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism's Cultural Offensive," m e Australian Outlook 18 (April 1964):40-61. 138. See van der Kroef, "Revolutionary Gymnastics," pp. 222-224. 139. 235. Berita Indonesia (Djakarta), 140. Reeve, p. 237. 31 August 1964, quoted in Reeve, p. 141. Berita Indonesia (Djakarta), 22 October 1964; (Djakarta), 28-30 October 1964, quoted in Reeve, p. 237. and Karvawan 142. Karvawan (Djakarta), 24.October 1964; and Berita (Djakarta), 21, and 26 October 1964, and 12 November 1964, Reeve, p. 238. Indonesia quoted in 144. Karvawan (Djakarta), 24 November-7 December; and Berita Indonesia (Djakarta), 24 November-2 December 1964, quoted in Reeve, p. 238. 145. Reeve, p. 241. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 241] === - 231 ENTNCflES — 146. Sundhaussen, pp. 186-188. 147. Mortimer, p. 243. CHAPTER IV 148. Hie Dwikora was the People's Double Command (EWi Bbmando Rakvat!; i t called for the in ten sificatio n o f the Indonesian Revolution and the "Crush Malaysia” campaign. 149. Sundhaussen, p. 186. 150. Feith, '"Triangle," p. 973. 151. Reeve, pp. 242-243. 152. Ib id., p. '243. 153. Ibid. 154. 248. Berita Indonesia (Djakarta), 12 September 1964, quoted in Reeve, p. 155. Ewa T. Pauker, p. 1058. 156. Arnold C. Brackman, Indonesian Communism: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963), p. 302. A Histcrv Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (New York: === [PDF page 242] === 232 ENDNOTES — CHAPTER V 1. "Text of Dr. Subandrio's Letter to Secretary-General U Thant Formally Withdrawing Indonesia frcaa the U. N. News. Views & Features from Indonesia. Special Release no. 194, 29 January 1965. 2. For th e ir p art, the Chinese emphatically greeted Indonesia's withdrawal from the united Nations. See "Indonesian People Will Not Tolerate Insu lts," Peking Review, no. 2 (8 January 1965), pp. 24-25; "Indonesia Quits U.N. — A Just, Correct, and Revolutionary Action," Peking Review, no. 3 (15 January 1965), pp. 5-6; "Indonesia's Bold, Revolutionary Action," Peking Review, no. 3 (15 January 1965), pp. 7-9; "Indonesia Pulls out of the United Nations," Peking Review, no. 3 (15 January 1965), pp. 10-12; and "China Backs Indonesia," Pekirig Review. no. 5 (29 January 1965), p. 7. 3. On Sukarno's new policy, see Donald E. Weatherbee, Ideology in Indonesia: Sukarno's Indonesian Revolution. Southeast Asian Studies. Monograph Series no. 8 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 4344; Lance Castles, "Socialism and Private Business: The la te s t Thase," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic studiesr no. i (june 1965): 13; "Survey of Recent Developments," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, no. 1, (June 1965): 1-2; and on the FKI reaction, see Rex Mortimer, Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno. Ideology and P o litic s. 1959-1965 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974),.pp. 169-171; Peter Christian Hauswedall, "Sukarno: Radical o r Conservative? Indonesian P o litics 1964-65." Indonesia no. 15 (April 1973): 127-128. ■ Throughout 1965 Sukarno v acillated on whether or not Indonesia had actually entered the second phase of the revolution. Hauswedall, p. 141. 5. See Sukarno, "Storming the Last Bulwarks of Imperialism," in Indonesian P o litical Thinking 1945-1965. e d s., Herbert Feith, and Larae Castles (Ithaca: Cornell university Press, 1970), pp. 466-470. 6. Uri Ra'anan, "Indonesia 1965," in The P o litics of the Coup D'Etat. eds. William G. Andrews, and Uri Ra'anan (New York: Van Ncstrand Reihhold Company, 1969), p. 54; Uri Ra'anan, "The Coup That Failed: A Background Analysis," Problems of Communism 15 (March-April 1966):41. See D. N. A idit, Dare. Dare, and Dare Again! P o litica l Report Presented on February 10. 1963. to the F irs t Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party o f Indonesia (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, [1963]),pp. 74-85; Dipa Nusantara A idit, "Indonesian Cararrunists March Forward for Full National Independence," World Marxist Review 6 (June 1963): 18-19; and D. N. A idit, Set A fire the Banteno S p irit! Ever Forward. No Retreat; P o litica l Report to the Second Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 243] === 233 ENDNOTES — CHAPTER V Indonesia. Enlarged with the Members of the Central Auditing Commission and -the. Central Control Commission fDjakarta. 23rd-26th December 1963) (Peking: Foreign languages Press, [1964]), p. 20. D. N. A idit, Barrfcencr. p. 20. 10. President Sukarno's speech, 17 August 1965, p. 16, quoted in Harold Crouch, The Army and P o litics in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell university Press, 1978), p. 67. See Sukarno, "The Revolution Goes On," in Feith and Castles, pp. 119-122. 11. See Joyce Gibson, "Production-Sharing," 2 p ts. Eulletin Indonesian Economic Studies no. 3 ( F e b r u a r y 1966):52-75, and no. 4 (June „ 1966):75-100 for evidence of continued Western and Soviet Bloc contacts with Indonesia during th is tine. 12. Mortimer, p. 364. 13. Ib id., p. 365. 14. Berita Indonesia (Djakarta), 5 January 1965, quoted in David Reeve, Golkar of Indonesia: An Alternative to the Party System (Singapore: Oxford university Press, 1985), p. 240. 15. Reeve, p. 240. 16. Ibid. 17. Ulf Sundhaussen, The Road to Power. Indonesian M ilitary noli tie s 1945-1967 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 182. According to van der Kroef, th e BPS media network included "more than 70% of the national press" in Indonesia. Van der Kroef, "Indonesian Ccamnunism's 'Revolutionary Gymnastics'," Asian Survey 5 (May 1965):227. 18. Reeve, p. 251. 19. See Crouch, p. 66, and n. 42; and Mortimer, p. 377. 20. See S. M. A li, "Party Alignments and th e Role of the Ocmmunist Party," Eastern World 19 (March 1965):7-8,, fo r an interview of A idit, w h erein he assesses his p arty 's power chances. 2 1. A i d i t f i r s t u s e d t h i s te rm o n 19 J a n u a r y 1 9 6 5; s e e A n to n ie c. A. D a k a, I n. t h e S p i r i t _ o f t h e R e d B a n t e m: I n d o n e s i a n C o m m u n is ts b e tw e e n M b so o w a n d P e k in g 1 9 5 9 - 1 9 6 5 (T h e H a g u e: M o u to n, 1 9 7 3 ), p. 3 5 9. 22. See Hauswedell, n. 117, p. 139. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 244] === 234 ENDNOTES — CHAPTER V 23. See Daniel S. Lev, "Indonesia 1965. The Year o f the, Gcup," Asian Survey 6 (February 1966): 104? Stephen Sloan, A Study in P o litica l Violence: The Indonesian Experience (Chicago: Rand McNally & Ccnpany, 1971), pp. 29-30; M. C. Ricklefs, A History of MOdem Indonesia: c. 1300 to the Present (London: MacmillanPress, 1981), p. 267; andSundhaussen, p. 182; and J. Eliseo Rocamora, "TheP artaiNaslonalis Indonesia. 19631965," Indonesia no. 10 (October 1970): 143-181. 24. Mortimer, p. 379. 25. Dake, pp. 401-403. 26. Van der Kroef, "Revolutionary Gymnastics," p. 218. 27. Lev, "Indonesia 1965," p. 104? and Dr. O. G. Roeder, "The Turn of the US," Far Eastern Economic Review. 25 March 1965, pp. 544-545. 28. Mortimer, p. 244. 29. MacArthur F. Corsino, A* Communist Revolutionary Movement a s International State-Actor: The Case o f the PKI-Aldit. In s titu te Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore: Maruzen Asia, 1982), p. 142. 30. Rauswedell, p. 126, and n. 61. 31. Ib id., p. 134. 32. Ib id., n. 97, p. 134. 33. Crouch, p. 78. 34. Hauswedall, n. 113, p. 138. 35. Ib id., pp. 139-140. 36. Ib id., p. 135. Hie slogan was "Finish the National Democratic Revolution towards Indonesian Socialism with the National Front, which has Nasakam as i t s Axis, the Workers and Peasants as its P illa rs, and Pantjasila as i t s Rulcsqphical Basis I" ("Denaan Front Nasional Berooroskan Nasakcm^Bersokoouru Buruh dan Tani. id iil P antiasila..renlelesaikan Bevolusi Nasional Demokratis munudiu Sosiailsme Indonesia.") 37. Ibid. 38. Sukarno, "Indonesian Ccxnnunist Party is a Thoroughly Progressive, Revolutionary Party," Peking Review, no. 23 (4 June 1965), p. 14. 39. Mortimer, p. 376. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 245] === 235 ENENOIES — CHARIER V 40. D. N. A idit, "Intensify Revolutionary Offensive and F irs t Oppose 'Five D evils'," Peking Review, no. 23 (4 June 1965), p. 9. 41. See Mortimer, pp. 135, and assessment of the "balance of forces. 43. the p arty 's theoretical 42. A id it's public acknowledgement of Chinese support an 30 January— "I am grateful to those sta te s of the so c ia list world th a t have extended support to my proposal of arming the farmers and workers" — was censured in the Indonesian press but was faith fu lly reported by Chinese news services. New China News Aaencv, 12 February 1965; and Radio Peking Home Service, 12 February 1965, quoted in Dake, p. 360. Support for the FKE was also given in Peking Review; see "New Page in Sino-Indonesian Ocmradeship-in-Anns," Peking Reiview, no. 6 (5 February 1955), pp., 8-9; and "Ready to Bear Arms," Peking Review, no. 9 (26 February 1965), pp. 26-27. 380, Van der Kroef, "Revolutionary Gymnastics," p. 222. 44. See Amry Vandenbosch, "The Indonesian P o litical Scene," Far Eastern Survey 22 (October 1953): 148; Robert C. Bone, J r., "The Future of I ndonesian P o litica l P arties," Far Eastern Survey 23 (February 1954):20; Mochtar Inbis, "The Indonesian Cammunist Movement Today," Far' Eastern Survey 23 (November 1954), n. 3, p. 164; and Herbert Feith, The Decline ' (Ithaca; Cornell university Press, 1962), n. 93, p. 344, 45. Sundhaussen, pp. 189-190. 46. ^ c. L. M., Benders and Ulf Sundhaussen, Abdul Haris Wasution. A P o litical Biography (St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1985), pp. 173-174. 47. Crouch, p. 82. 48. Antara news bulletins, 14 and 17 January 1965; and Harian Ra3&at. 19 January 1965, quoted in Sundhaussen, p. 190., See also Guy J. Pauker, The Rise and Fall of the CQmmunistr Partv of Indonesia. RM5753 (Santa Monica, C alif.; The RAND Corporation, 1969), pp. 38-39; Crouch, p. 87; and Mortimer, p. 381. 49. Harian Rakvat, 12 February 1965, quoted in Mortimer, pp. 381-382; Sundhaussen, p. 190; and van der Kroef, '•Revolutionary Gymnastics," p. 230. 50. Crouch, pp. 84-85. 51. Hauswedell, n. 112, p. 138. 52. Hauswedell, n. 109, p. 137. Crouch, pp. 85-86, discusses the s p lit within th e Police. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 246] === 236 ENENOIES — CHAPTER V 53. Corsino, p. 103. 54. Daniel S. lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy; Indonesian P o litics. 1957— 59. Monograph Series, Modem Indonesia P roject (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), n. 16, p. 82; and Ruth MoVey, ‘The PostRevolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army," Indonesia no. 11 (April 1S71), n. 10, p. 138. 55. Crouch, p. 81. See Acfcmad Yani, "The Doctrine of Revolutionary War," in Feith and Castles, pp. 464-466. 56. Sundhaussen, p. 192. See also Penders and Sundhaussen, pp. 174-175. 57. Reeve, p. 250. 58. Ricklefs, p. 267; Dake, pp. 364-365; andCrouch, pp.88-91. 59. Mortimer has argued th a t the PKEexposedpublicly the m ilitary th reat of action against i t as a protective measure. See pp. 380. Harian Rakvat aired the story in i t s 7 May 1965 issue. See also, Penders and Sun^aussen, p. 177. See i^ jd it's remarks in Dake, p. 360. 61. Crouch, pp. 91-92; Mortimer, p. 382; and Dake, pp.378-379. 62. Crouch, p. 92; and RicJclefs, p. 267. 63. Mortimer, p. 382. 64. Ib id., p. 383. 65. Ricklefs, p. 267. 66.?ik±ran Rakvat (Bandung), 26 June 1965, quoted in Sundhaussen,- p. 193. Further discussion of the Army’s position is given in Crouch, pp. 90-91, and Oey, p. 229. 67. "Excerpts: Address by President Sukarno on August 17, 1965," News. Views & Features from Indonesia. Special Release no. 205, 24 August 1965. See also, "Survey of Recent Economic Developments," Indonesian Economic Studies no. 2 (September 1965):1; and "A Year of Self-Reliance," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies no. 2 (September 1965):64-67. 68. Sukarno, Reach to the sta rs. A Year of Self-Reliance (Djakarta: Department of Information, 1965) j pp. 21, 41, and 43, quoted in Sundhaussen, pp. 193-194; emphasis in original. 69. Ricklefs, p. 267. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 247] === 237 ENENOTES — CHAPTER V 70. Mortimer, 367. Ewa T. Pauker argues the case fo r Army d iffic u ltie s o f waging armed struggle against the PKT in these terms. See Pauker, "Has theSukarno Regime Weakened the PKT?" Asian Survey 4 71. A idit, "Intensify Revolutionary Offensive," p. 10. 72. Wa-Han R ak vat. 17 August 1965, quoted in Dake, p. 394. 73. Warden R ak vat- 31 August 1965, quoted in Mortimer, p. 386. See note 59above. Harian R a k v a t issue of 4 September 74. contained a story of an impending m ilitary 1965 coup. 75. J. A. C. Mackie, "Inflation and Confrontation in Australian Outlook 18 (December 1964):278-298. Indonesia," The 76. Indonesian Herald (Djakarta), 15 September 1965, quoted in John O. Sutter, "Two Faces of KDNFRQNIASI: 'Crush Malaysia' and t ' a GESTAHJ," Asian Survey 6 (October 1966):538. 77. Antara. 25 September 1965, quoted in Sutter, p. 538. 78. Harian Rakvat. 27 September 1965; September 1965, quoted in Dake, p. 402. 79. New China News Acrencv. 27 tfortimer, pp. 384-385. 80. See Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey, A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1. 1965. Co u p in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971); Crouch, pp. 97-134; Dake, pp. 354-423; Coen Holtzappel, "The 30 September Movement: A P o litica l Movement of the Armed Forces or an yTfrte.1 l.igence Operation?" Journal of Contemporary Asia 9 (1979):216-240; Michael Leifer, "The Process of P o litic a l Change in Indonesia," Asian A ffairs 54 (October 1967}:264-272; Mortimer, pp. 387-412, "Appendix A: October 1 A ffair," pp. 413-417, "Appendix B: Interpreting th e Coup," pp. 418-441; Penders and Sundhaussen, 178-198; Sloan, pp. 50-73; Sundhaussen, pp. 195-219; Sutter, pp. 534-546; Donald E. Weatherbee, "Interpretations of Gestapu the 1965 Indonesian Coup," World Affairs 132 (March 1970):308-316; W. F. Wertheim, "Indonesia Before and A fter the Uhtung Coup." Pacific A ffairs 39 (Spring-Suromer 1966): 115-127; and W Wertheim, "Whose Plct? - New Light on th e 1965 Events," Journal of Contemporary Asia 9 (1979): 197-215. 81. Ruth T. McVey, "Indonesian Communism and.China," in Tang Tsqu, ed., China in C risis, vol. 2: China's Policies in Asia and America's A lternatives (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 377, quoted in Hauswedell, p. 136. 82. Penders and Sundhaussen, p. 173. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 248] === 233 QO50TES — CHAPTER V 83. One example of the ignorance of th e fa c ts can be found in Rudolph.P. Hafter, "Twilight in Indonesia," Swiss Review o f World A ffairs 14 ^84. Peter Dale Scott, "The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-1967," Pacific Affairs 58 (1985):253. 85. • Ibid. 86. See ib id., p. 255. 87. Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1967), p. 377, quoted in Baladas Ghoshal, Indonesian P o litics 1955-59: The Emergence o f Guided Democracy (Calcutta: K. P. Bagchi & Ccnpany, 1982), p. 303. 88. The Americans also attempted to find a source o f support against the PKC within the Police; see Robert H. Bruce, "Foreign Training, ReferenceGroup Theory, and Paramilitary Behavior During Coups: The U.S. Attempt to Influence the Indonesian Mobile Brigade," P o litic a l Science Review 22 89. See Scott, pp. 252-257; and "The Latief Case: Suharto's Involvement Rervealed," Journal of Contempdrarv Asia 9 (1979):248-251. 90. Sundhaussen, p. 211. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 249] === SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Abdulgani, Roeslan. "Indonesia's National Council: The F irst Year." Far Eastern Survey 27 (July 1958):97-104. A idit, D.’ N. 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Indonesia's Economic S ta b ility I n s titu te of Pacific Relations, 1957. and Development. New York: R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n e r. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n. === [PDF page 252] === 242 Hindley, Donald. "Communist Party Strategy in Indonesia 1948-59.” The Australian Outlook 13 (December 1959): 253-271. ^ -Jlb e EKI and the Peasants.1 1 Problems of Communism 11 (NovemberDedjember 1962): 28-36. "President Sukarno and the Communists: The P o litic s of Domestication.” The American P o litical Science Review 56 (December 1962):915-926. The communist Party of university of California, 1964. Indonesia 1951-63. Dos Angeles: Holtzappel, Coen. "The 30 September Movement: A P o litic a l Movement of the Armed Forces o r an Intelligence Operation?” Journal of Contemporary Asia 9 (1979):216-240. Hunphrey, Don D. "Indonesia's National Plan fo r Economic Development:." Asian Survey 2 (December 1962): 12-21. "Indonesia's Economic I l l s." Far Eastern Economic Review. 28 March 1963, pp. 656-658. "Indonesia's May 27 Reforms." Far Eastern Economic Review. 13 June 1963, pp. 600-603. Iongh, R. C. de. "West Irian Confrontation." In Sukarno' s Guided Indonesia, pp. 102-114. Edit ed by T. K. Tan. Brisbane: Jacaranda, 1967. Johnson, C h almers. Company, 1966. Revolutionary Jo in t Research Service. Publications 1958-1961. chanrna. Boston: L ittle, Brown and Selected microforms, Indonesia, Kahin, George MOT. "The Communist Revolt in Java. The C risis and I ts Aftermath." Far Eastern Survey 17 (17 November 1948):26I-264. __________. "The New/ Indonesian Government." Far Eastern Survey 19 November 1950):209-213. (22 .. "Indonesia's Strengths and Weaknesses." Far Eastern Survey 20 Nationalism and Revolution University Press, 1952. Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell Krishnamurthy, s. ".The P o litic a l Role of th e Army in Burma and Indonesia." International studies 12 (JUly-Sqpteonber 1973):397-415. Kfoef, Justus M. van der. "Indonesia's Labour Movement, I ts Development Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 253] === 243 and Prospects." United Asia 5 (August 1953):223-231. .. "Indonesia — Hie F irst Five Years o f Independence." United Asia 6 (July 1954)-.133-139. .. ''Econa&ic Development in Indonesia: Same Social and cultural Hrpediments." Economic Development and Cultural Change (1955/1956) -.116-133. .. Indonesia in the Modem World. Part HE. Bandung: Masa Baru, 1956. .. "In stab ility in Indonesia’!" Far Eastern Survey 26 (April 1957): 49-62. (August 1957)^113-124. Indonesia.*" Far Eastern Survey 26 . "Hie T rials of Indonesian Democracy." Review of P olitics 20. "Disunited I ndonesia." Far Eastern purvey 27 (April 1958):49- 63. .. "Disunited Indonesia U." Far Eastern Survey 27 (My 1958): 7380. . "Sukarno and Hatta: Hie Great Debate in Indonesia." P o litic a l Quarterly 25 (July-September 1958):233-250. . "Indonesian Communism Under A idit." Problems. "Indonesia's 1959):46-72. Economic Future." Pacific of Cornmnrngm 7 Affairs 32 (March "Agrarian Reform and th e Indonesian Eastern Survey 29 (January 1960):5-l3. Communist Party." Far . "Colonial Continuity in Indonesia's Australian Outlook 14 (April 1960):5-14. Economic Policy." The • "Indonesian Communist Policy and the Sixth Party CcngreSs." Pacific Affairs 33 (September 1960):227-249. .. "Nasution, Sukarno and th e West New Guinea Dispute." ts-?n Survey 1 (August 1561): 20-24. . "Dilemmas of Indonesian Communism." Pacific A ffairs 35 (Summer 1962): 141-159. "An Indonesian Ideological 1962).-24-30. Lexicon." Asian Survey Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (July === [PDF page 254] === 244 "Hie Sino-Indonesian Partnership." Qrfeis 8 (Summer 1964):332- 356. . "Indonesian Communism's Cultural Offensive." Outlook 18 (April 1964): 40-61.. The Australian "Exporting 1964): 13-15. world Indonesia's Revolution." y-astam (July "Indonesian Ccmunism and the Changing Balance o f Pacific Affairs 37 (Winter 1964-1965): 357-383. Power." .. "Indonesia: The Mystique of Permanent Revolution." The Scaith A tlantic O uart-g-rlv 64 (Winter 1965): 1-14. Survey 5 (May 1S65):217-232. 'Eevolutionary Gymnastics'." Asian .• The Carmunist Party of Indonesia. Its History. Program, and Tactics. Vancouver: University of B ritish Columbia, 1965. . "D. N. A idit — Indonesian Architect of Success and Failure." In Leaders of th e Communist Wtorld. pp. 48-74. Edited by Rodger Swearingen. New York: The Free Press, 1971. .. "Sukarno's Indonesia. A Review A rticle." P acific A ffairs 46 "The L atief Case: Suharto's ^ Involvement Contemporary Asia. 9 (1979):248-251. Revealed." Iegge, D. "Guided Democracy and Constitutional Procedures Indonesia." The Australian Outlook 13 (June 1959):93-99, Sukarno. A P o litical Biocrraphv. London: The Penguin Press, 1972. Leifer, Michael. "The Process of P o litic a l Change in Indonesia." Asian A ffairs 54 (October 1967):264-272. lev, Daniel S. "The P o litic a l Role of th e Army in Indonesia." Pacific A ffairs 36 (Winter 1963-1964): 349-364. __________ • The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian P o litics! 195752* Monograph Series, Modem Indonesia Project. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1566. __________. "Indonesia 1965. The Year of the Coup." Leyser, "Indonesia's N ationalization of International Law." The Australian Outl<^Tfl4 210. Asian Survey Enterprises and (August 1960):200- Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 255] === 245 lu b is, Mochtar. "Party Confusion in Indonesia." Far Eastern Survey 21 (29 October 1952): 155-158. __________. "The Indonesian Communist Movement Today." Far Eastern Survey 23 (November 1954): 161-164. Mackie, J. A. C. 'The P o litic a l Economy of Guided Democracy.1 1 The Australian Outlook 13 (December 19^9): 285-292. __________. "Indonesian P o litic s under Guided Democracy." The Australian Outlook 15 (December 1961): 260-279. __________. "Indonesia's Government E states and Their Masters." A ffairs 34 (Winter 1961-1962): 337-360. Pacific __________. "Indonesia: A Background to Confrontation." The World Today 20o (April 1964)1139-147. __________. "Inflation and Confrontation Outlook 18 (December 1964): 278-298. Indonesia." The Australian McVey, Ruth T. "Indonesian Communism and the T ransition to Guided Democracy." In Communist S trategies in Asia, pp. 149-195. Edited by Doak Barnett. New York: Frederick A. 'Praeger, Inic., 1963. __________. "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army." 2 p ts. Indonesia no. 11 (April 1971): 131-176, and no. 13 (April 1972).-147-181. Marie, A. van. "Indonesian Electoral Geography under Crla and Crfca." In Indonesia After th e 1971 Elections, pp. 37+-59. Edited by Oey Hong Lee. London: Oxford University Press, 1974. Moes, John E. "Trade Unionism in Indonesia." Far Eastern Survey 28 Moorthy, K. Krishna. "Indonesia's Eight-Year Plan." Far E a s te r n Economic Review. 13 July 1961, pp. 62-65. ItortiB er, Bat. Tnrtonp-qian nnriar T d^lrev 1959-1965. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974. N iel, Robert van. "Indonesian P o litic a l Developments." Far Eastern Survey 22 (June 1953): 84-87. Njoto. S trive fo r the Victory of th e Indonesian Revolution with the Weapon of D ialectical and H istorical Materialism. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964. Oey H a n g Lee. Indonesian Government and Press Curing Guided Democracy. Hull Monographs On Southeast Asia, no. I 4. Hull: centre for SouthEast Asian Studies, The U niversity of Hull, 1971. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 256] === Pau3cer, Ewa T. "Has the Sukarno Regime Weakened the PKI?" Asian Survey 4 Pauker, Guy j. "The Role of P o litic a l Organizations in Indonesia." Far Fasrt-affl Rittvpy s>7 (September 1958): 129-142. __________. "Current Communist Tactics in Indonesia." Asian Survey 1 (May1961):26-35. . "Indonesia: Internal Development or External Expansion?" Asian Survey 3 (February 1963): 69-75. "The Indonesian Doctrine o f T erritorial Warfare and T erri■torial Management: I ts Origin and Functions." In The Indonesian Doctrine of T e rrito ria l Warfare and T e rrito ria l Management Memo Rm-3312-ER, pp. 1-49. Edited by Gey J. Pauker. Santa Monica, C a lif.: The RAND Corporation, November 1963. "Indonesia in 1963: The Year of Wasted Opportunities." Asian Survey 4 (February 1964): 687-694. "Indonesia in 1964: Toward a Survey 5 (February 1965): 88-97. ’People's Democracy1?" Aslan "GANEPO I: Sports and P o litics in Djakarta." Asian Survey 5 .• The Rise and Fall o f the Communist Party of Indonesia. EM 5753. Santa Monica, C a lif.: The RAND Corporation, 1969. ed. The Indonesian Doctrine of T e rrito ria l. Warfare and T e rrito ria l Management. Memo Rm-3312-ER. Santa Monica, C a lif.: The RAND Corporation, November 1963. Peking Review, selected a rtic le s, 1963-1965. Penders, C. L. M. The Life and Times of Sukarno. Iomdan: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1974. Penders, C. L. M., and Sundhaussen, Ulf. Abdul waris Nasution. A . P o litica l Bioaraphv. St. Lucia, Queensland: university of Queensland Press, 1985. Pringgodigdo, A. K. The Office of President in Indonesia as Defined in the Three.■constitutions in Theory and. Practice. Translated by Alexander Erotherton, Translation Series, Modem Indonesia Project. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957. Quito, Edo. "The Rise and Fall of Sukarno: A Brief Analysis of Indonesia's P o litical Development, 1949-1965." Asian Profile 5 Ra'anan, Uri. "The Cap That Failed: A Background Analysis." Communism 15 (Mardh-April 1966): 37-43. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 257] === 247 __________• "Indonesia, 1965." The P o litics of the Coup D'Etat. pp. 43-64. Edited by William G. Andrews and Uri Ra'anan. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1969. Reeve, David. Golkar of Indonesia: An Alternative to the Party System. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985. Rewang. "Fran the Experience of th e Contram ist Party in Indonesia." World Marxist Review 6 (August 1963):61-63. Ricklefs, M. C. A History of Modem Indonesia: c. 1300 to th e Present. ^ London: Macmillan Press, 1981. Rdbiscn, Richard. Indonesia: The Rise of Capital 1986. Sydney: Allen &Unwin, Rocamora, J. Eliseo. "The P artai Nasionalis Indonesia no. 10 (Occcber 1970): 143-131. Indonesia. 1963-1965." Roeder, Dr. 0.' G. "The Turn of th e US." Ear Eastern Economic Review. 25 M&rch 1965, pp. 544-545. Sadli, Mohammad. "Indonesia's New Economics." Review. 19 October 1961, pp. 154-161. Far Eastern Economic Schmitt, Hans 0. "Foreign Capital and Social Conflict in Indonesia, 19501958." Economic Development and Cultural Chance 10 (April 1962): 284-253. Scotty Peter Dale. 'The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 19651967." Pacific Affairs 58 (1985):239-264. Simon, Sheldon W . The Broken Triangle: Peking. Baltimore: Hie Johns Hopkins Press, 1969. Djakarta and the PKI. Sloan, Stephen. A Study in P o litic a l Violence: The Indonesian Experience. Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1971. Sukarno. "Five Years of Indonesian Independence." United Asia 4 (1952): 19-26. "Indonesia Takes Stock." Far Eastern Survey 21 (October 1952): 142-144. Sundhaussen, Ulf. The Pcad tc Power. Indonesian Military P o litics 19451967. Oxford: Oxford University Fress, 1982. Surgoso, s. "The Communist Movement and the Youth — Indonesia." World Marxist Review 4 (November 196l):66r63. "Survey of Recent Economic Developments." Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies no. 1 (June 1965): 1-12. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 258] === 248 "Survey o f Recent Ecanapic Developments." Bulletin of Indonesian Econcmic Studies no. 2 (September 1965): 1-15. Sutter, John O. "Two Faces of KDNFRCMASI: 'Crush Malaysia' GESTAEU." Asian Survey 6 (October 1966):523-546. and th e Tan, T. K. "Sukamian Economics.11 In Sukarno's Guided Indonesia, pp. 2945. Edited by T. K. Tan. Brisbane: Jacaranda, 1967. Taylor, Stan. 1984. Social Sciences and Revolution. London: Macmillan Preset, "Text o f Dr. Subandrio's le tte r to Secretary-General U Thant Formally Withdrawing Indonesia from the U.N." News. Views. & Features from Indonesia. Special Release no. 194, 29 January 1965. Thompson, Virginia, and MLoff, Richard. "The Communist Revolt in Java. The Background." Far Eastern Survey 17 (17 November 1948):257-260. T illy, Charles. From Mobilization Addisan-Wesley, 1978. Revolution. Reading, Mass.: Tinker, Irene, and Walker, Millidge. "The F irst General Elections in India and Indonesia." Far Eastern Survey 25 (July 1956):97-110. Tinker, Irene, and Walker, Millidge. "Indonesia's Panacea: 1959 Model." Far Eastern Survey 28 (December^l95^): 177-182. Tomquist, C lle. Dilemmas of Third World Communism: TheDestruction the PKI in Indonesia. London: Zed Books, 1984. Torres, Jose Arsenio. "The P o litic a l Ideology Review of P olitics 25 (January 1963):34-63. of Guided Democracy." United States Econcmic Survey Team to Indonesia. Indonesia: Perspective and Proposals fo r uhited States Econcmic Aid. New Haven: Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies, 1963. Vandenbosch, Amry. "The Nertherlands-Indonesia Uhlan." Far Eastern Survey "The Indonesian P o litic a l scene." Far Eastern Vlekke, B. H. M.,;ed. Indonesia's Struggle 1957-1958. Netherlands In stitu te of International £todies, 1959. Survey The 22 Hague: • Walkin, Jacob. "The MuslimrKSommunist Confrontation in East Java." Orbis 13 (Fall 1969): 822-847. Weatherbee, Donald E. "Indonesia and. Malaysia: Confrontation in Southeast As,ia." Orbis 7 (Sumner 1963):336-351. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 259] === 249 • I mSQIWY in. InflffDegiaL. gyfegUQlfi Indonesian Revolution. Southeast Aslan Studies. Monograph Series no. 8. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966. "Interpretations of Gestapu th e 1965 Indonesian Coup." World A ffairs 132 (March 1970): 308-316. Wertheim, W. F. "Indonesia Before and A fter th e Untung Coup.11 Pacific A ffairs 39 (Spring-Suramer 1966): 115-127. "Whose Plot? - New Light on the 1965 Svents." Journal o f Cont emporary Asia 9 (1979): 197-215. "A Year of Self--Reliance.11 3 ulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies ro. 2 Yorg MOn Checng. "The Indonesian Army and Functional Groups, 1957-1959." Journal o f Southeast Asian Studies 7 (March 1976): 92-101. Yunus, H. "Indonesia: Battle on the Cultural Front." World Marxist Review 6 (January 1963): 65-67. Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === CORRECTED KEY PASSAGES (proof-read by Claude, Oct 2026) === --- [page 4] --- to understand matters to attain the goal from the perspective of political of abetter comprehension of human behaviour — that Professor Nayar gave the greatest possible kind of assistance. Accompanying me throughout the study, as well, was Andrea. I wishto acknowledge the love and dedication that she has woven throughout this study. One's efforts are always better with a companion's help. The coaching, encouragement, and constant moral support she has selflessly given this study brought successful conclusion. members the Her assistance, too, exceeds the measurable. would like acknowledge the Dissertation Committee for their prompt and thorough examination of ry proposal. ' well, X would like to thank one member of the committee in particular, Professor Noumoff. Professor Noumoff provided to me several sources of information that contributed in important ways to this study. === [PDF page 5] === TABLE OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS AMPAI: American Motion Picture Association of Indonesia Berdhcari: Berdiri d iatas Kaki Sendferi; Stand on One's Own Feet BKS: Badan Kena Sama; Cooperation Body BKSBUMIL: Body Badan Keria Sama Buruh Mil ite r: BKS-Pemuda-Militer: Badan Keria Cooperation Body Sama Labour-Military Cooperation Femuda Mil it e r; Youth-Military BKSTAMIL: Body Badan Keria Sama Tanl Militer; Peasant-M ilitafy, Cooperation BK5WAMIL: Badan Keria Sara Wanita Militer; . Body Wamen-Military Cooperation BPI: Badan Pusht Intel iie n s; Central Intelligence-Body BPEK: Badan 'Pembina Potensi Karva; Bodies for the Fostering of Functional BPS: Badan Pendukum/Perivebar Sukamoisme: Body for the Support/Spreading of Sukamoism BTI: Barisan Tani Indonesia; Indonesian Peasant Front OGMI: Consentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Students Movements Indonesia:■ Indonesian University Depemas: Dewan Perancancr Nasional; National Planning Board DPA: Dewan Pertimbanaan Acrum; Supreme Advisory Council DPR: Dewan Perwakilan Bakvat; People's Representative^Body DPR-GR: Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat-Gotonc Ravoncr; Mutual Assistance People's Representative Body Dwikora: Dwi-Komando? Dual Command FN: Front Nasional; National Front FNPIB: Front Nasional Pembebasaan Irian Liberation of West Irian Barat; National Front for the === [PDF page 6] === r»GeCTani: Gerakan Wanita.Indonesia; Indonesian Women's Association. . Gestapu: Gerakan September Tiaamluh; September 30 Movement Golkar: Goloncrah Karva; Vocational Group f HANSIP: Pertahanan S ip il? Civil Defence Organization HMI: Himounan Mahasiswa, Islam; Islamic University Students Association IMF: IhterriationaJ. Monetary Fund IEKI: ' Ikatan Pendukuncr Kemerdekaan Indonesia; League of Upholders of Indonesian independence IPPL:. Ikatan Pemuda Peladiar Indonesia: leaguegof Indonesian High School 0Yguth Kabir: K anitalis-birokrat; Capitalist-bureaucrat KBKC: Kesatuan Buruh Kerakvataan Indonesia: United Popular labourers of Indonesia KNXP; Komxte Nasional Committee Indonesia Pusat; Central Indonesian National KD3A: Komando Siacra; Alert Command KOLAGA: Komando Mandala Siacra; Area Alert Command KDRAMIL: Komando Ravon Milter: Military Rayon Command Lekra: lembacra Kebudayaan Rakyat; League of People's Culture LVRI: Ieoiun Veteran Reoublik Indonesia; Veteran's Legion of the Republic of Indonesia Manipol: Manifesto P o litik; Political Manifesto Masjumi: Madielis Siuro Indonesian Muslims Moslimin Indonesia: Consultative Council MTLTAG: Military Training Advisory Group MER: Maiel i s Pennusvawaratan Rakyat: People's Deliberative Assembly MERS: Maie l is Permusvawaratan Deliberative Assembly Rakyat Sementara; Provisional People's' Nasakom: frasionalisme-Aoama-Koinunisme; Nationalism-Religion-Omnmunism Nasakomil: Nasionalisme-Aoama-Koinunisine-Militer; Ccmmunism-Military National ism-Religionvi --- [page 69] --- SOURCE: Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-1963 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 165-166.. === [PDF page 70] === 60 The youth front, People's Youth (Pemuda Rakyat), was alone among PKI fronts in that it was openly a branch of the PKI, as stated organizations' constitutions. 116 Thus, the immensity youthfollowing (see Table 5) was very important to the PKI. in both the Other, more specialized youth groups, such as the League of Indonesian High School Youth (Ikatan Pemuda Peladiar Indonesia — IPPI), and the Concentration of Indonesian University Student Movements (Consentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia OGMI), fared poorly numerical experience befell the League of People's terms. Culture A similar (Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat — Lekra) that, as a petty bourgeois front of about 6,000 persons, nevertheless brought "a wide range of cultural workers,...into contact with PKI and in to work of benefit [to] the Party." 117 TABLE 5 PEMUDA RAKYAT MEMBERSHIP Date Claimed membership November 1950 November 1952 June 1953 July 1954 June 1955 End of 1955 End of 1957 30,000 46,598 70,319 202,605 450,000 616,605 800,000 SOURCE: Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-1963 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 188-191. Rounding out the PKI's "united front from below" was the women's front, the Indonesian Women's Association Gerwani]. tandem with other PKI front organizations, Gerwani's membership grew relentlessly from 1950 to 1957 (see Table 6 ). Gerwani's roots struck deeply in Java, where in June 1956 it had branches in all === [PDF page 71] === 61 kabupatens and kecamatans. large and towns, organizations Approximately 5,000 40 per subbranches cent the all urban neighborhood and village level. 118 TABLE 6 GERWANI MEMBERSHIP Date Claimed membership 195CN — December 1951 June 1953 March 1954 September 1955 December 1955 June 1956 December 1957 500 6,000 40,000 80,000 400,000 '500,000 565,147 671,342 SOURCE: Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-1963 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 203-204. A striking aspect of the growth in membership in the PKI and its fronts was its rapidity. only bolster the party 's While the larger numbers of adherents'could chances of winning elections, there was the danger that its newly won converts were only superficially committed to the party 's ideals. Thus, at one level, the PKI state-within-a-state was quite However, formidable. the real strength, of the party could not possibly measure up to its apparent strength: socialized and institutionalized it was impossible tu have such large numbers so quickly. The "united front from below" suffered from the perverse effects of being too successful? the large influx of members necessitated later party drives to increase the ideological quality of it sand its fronts' members. --- [page 93] --- concept, and the PKI's success in building in all but name a nation-wide net of Communist-dominated functional groups located in the "uniced front from below." Thus!, the Army acted like Sukarno by raiding the mass === [PDF page 94] === 84 organisations of the political parries. . On 17 June 1957 Nasution established the first of several civil-military "Cooperation Bodies" Military'-Cooperation Body (BKS-Pemuda-Militer consisted of Army officers party structures and CBadan Keria Sama — BKS), the Youth- — BKSPM). The Body and personnel who circumvented the parent worked directly with members the mass organizations, including the-youth fronts of the PNI, Masjumi. NU, and the PKI.51 Pauker has written that at the first anniversary of the [BKSPM] " it was announced that Cooperation Bodies Between Youth and Army had been set up in all parts of the country except Atjeh (North Sumatra), West Sumatra and Celebes."52 acquiring a popular Clearly, following, the Army was not only keen on but it also meant to establish its - influence throughout the archipelago. Naturally, the parties themselves were offended by the Army's aggressiveness but.could do little to slow the proliferation of the BKSs. Soon BKS-Labour-Military IBKS-Buruh-Mili t e r - — BKSBUMIL) was established, which was followed by a Press-Military Contact Bureau (Biro Kontah Pers-Militer), BKS-Peasant-Military (EKS-Tani-Militer— BKSTAMIL), and a BKS-Wamen-Military fEKS-Wanita-Militer — BKSWAMIL). the middle of 1958, eight such bodies were in existence.53 The Army had succeeded having. its cooperative endeavours legitimized by the establishment on 25 June 1958 of the State Ministry for Civil-Military Cooperation.54 The second major Army thrust in obtaining a broad basis of popular support was a consequence of the PKI's own actions in December, 1957. The party 's attempt to channel nationalist fervour over West Irian through the PKI-led Central Action Committee for the Liberation of West Irian === [PDF page 95] === forced the Army to preempt the Communists by establishing' on 17 January 1958 a National Front for the Liberation of West Irian, (Front Nasional Pembebasaan Irian Barat — FNPIB). all initiatives of veterans, On that date the Army "announced that workers, farmers and youth groups' in *connection with the struggle for West Irian would be channeled into" the FNPIB.55 When Nasution appointed himself £he Front's chairman, it became evident ythat the Army would countenance neither popular control nor Presidential cause. prerogative over the West Irian Nasution's determination to make the FNPIB the basis of an Army quasi-government is clear from the fact that Territorial commanders were instructed to establish branches of the National Front in their areas. In various parts of the country the Army Chief of Staff presided himself in the following months over the installation of the local commanders as National Front chairmen. --- [page 118] --- Lukman had se a ts), in the National.Front, and in the cabinet (on 9 March 1962 Aidit and lukman were given positions without portfolio, largely of an advisory nature). The PKI's hold on its territory in Central and East Java despite remained threatened to firm undo the party 's became the deputy heads of Jakarta), Presidential Decree 6/1959 1957 election wins. 153 three regions Party members (West Java, the heads of eight autonomous regions which East Java, and in East Java, 154 and mayors of Semarang, Surakarta, Tjirebcn, and Surabaya. More important for the party was its own growth as well as that of its fronts. In 1959 Lukman reported that the PKI had a membership of more than 1.5 million, 155 of which more than half were declared to be peasants. 156 By October 1962 the party was claiming membership of 2 million. 157, The party 's auxiliaries also experienced terrific growth. SOBSI grew from 2,732,909 members at the end of 1959,158 to 3,277,032 in 1962.159 The peasant front, BTI, in April 1959 claimed a membership of 3.5 million (or 14 per cent of all adult peasants). 160 When statistics were released in July 1962 the staggering growth of the organisation was confirmed: 5,654,974 members (25 per cent of the total adult peasant population), were organized through subbranches in 43 per cent of all peasant villages, in 84 per cent of all kecamatans, located in virtually 100 per cent of all kabupatens. 161 Pemuda Rakyat's membership increased from 1.2 million in July 1958,162 to 1.25 million in September 1961,163 and to a high of 1.5 million in early 1963.164 Finally, Gerwani's membership of 700,000 at the beginning of I960165 increased to 1,120,594 December 1961, and 1.5 million in January 1963.166 Hindley has estimated that between July 1959 and October 1962, the membership of the === [PDF page 119] === 109 four major PKI fronts rose from 7.8 million to over 11.0 million. 167 The Communist state-within-a-state seemed to have recovered completely from the Army siege and, indeed, had came to command at le a st the nominal loyalty of an ever larger section of the polity. From Within the Confines of Guided Democracy: The PKI's Future Prospects In 1962 the PKI could commend itself for having withstood the only real and concerted threat to its political existence since 1948, in the form the Army, while undergoing fundamental and complex transformation fa r more significant than the changes it made in 1951. fulfilling both of these tasks, the the party, fact, facilitated blunting of the strong anti-party measures of 1959 and 1960, and helped reformulate the social contract of Guided Democracy as it appeared in its Nasakom guise. $ exclusively, No longer was Guided Democracy based on functional groups but from 1962 it rested on an uneasy combination of the parties and their ormas. united in Nasakom. and Army-inspired Golkars. As Reeve has argued, by early 1963 "the ideology of Guided Democracy became split in two," with the Army monopolizing the Golkar concept and the PKI asserting its hegemony within Nasakom. 168 --- [page 182] --- Even if you were formerly a bald-headed general in 1945, but if yous p l it. the revolutionary national unity today, if you' create disorder in the NASAKOM front now, if you are an enemy of the main pillars of the revolution today, then you have became a force of reaction!... heed iny words when when I say that the main c riterio n.for a revolutionary i s oneness between word and every time I propose a new' idea there are always a number of reactions which, I am sorry to say, are sometimes influenced by Old Established Forces textbooks;... The facts a re that the defence of th estate demands a maximum of effort from us all while, according to Article 30 of our 1945 Constitution:, Every citizen shall have the right and the duty to participate in the defence of the S tate."60 Together, these ideas put the Army on the defensive in an unprecedented fashion. p To add to its Nasakom forces to problems, the President's words encouraged the agitate ever more vigorously for their goals. September 1965 the country was approaching a showdown. The PKI was given two powerful incentives in August 1965 to redouble its revolutionary membership lists growth of the retaining its strategy. First, the party released its last that revealed the continuous and seemingly unstoppable Camraunist constituency. 69 The Cctqqxunist strategy legal, loyal, and obedient standing in the polity had won === [PDF page 183] === it 27 million members: 3.5 million (PKI); 3 million (Femuda Rakyatl,* 3.5 million (SOBSI); flekra). 70 9 million Accounting for 3 million overlapping (Gerwani); and 5 million membership, supporters numbered approximately 20 million persons, one-fifth the tremendous size, the Communist or approximately total Indonesian population. Recognition of its in conjunction with the second incentive — Sukarno's speech — provided the setting for the anarchical conditions in Indonesia in September. On 17 August, Aidit declared that the goals that the party had set for itself in 1965,71 including attacking the "capitalist bureaucrat" - "economic dynasty" union, could be reached "fully and radically witjkj sp^d, if the revolution i s concrete."72 This statement signalled t L&* party 's desire to accelerate the destruction, and not merely isolation, of its remaining enemies, especially those civilians who benefited from Army protection in the economy. Indeed, on 27 August, Aidit raised the stakes by warning the blows that have recently been delivered on an increasing scale to the counterrevolutionary forces are only one warning to the adventurers that if they try to oppose the current of the popular masses they will not destroy the Indonesian people but instead will themselves be cast into oblivion. 73 On 4 September, so as to avoid such an outcome for itself, again publicized the threat of a military coup. 74 wracked by hyperinflation, 75 against the kabir subandrio the.party With the economy promised that "the operation rkanitalis-birokrat — capitalist bureaucrats, the PKI's term form ilitary officials with positions Jn the economy] will be launched soon." --- [page 187] --- Moreover, in July- 1965 a secret contract was signed whereby 200 light aircraft would be delivered to the TNI, not the Air Force. early 1965 the* number American military Again, military -affiliated === [PDF page 188] === 178 personnel Indonesia actually Program and in the MILTftG. 86 increased theMilitary Assistance Perhaps the strongest link binding tfte^ United States and the TNI was the American military training that the latter received: While about 25p Indonesian officers had been trained in the United States by 1958, the figure rose in 1962 td \500 and by 1965 ha£ soared to 4, 000. This meant that at the time of the 1965 coup 11 ___ one-third of the Indonesian generals ta ff had sane sort of training from America and almost half of the officer corps."87 I t is clear that, in its struggle against the P K I^state-^th in-a-state, the TNI was n ot bereft of support; its past links with the Americans gave it confidence in the face of threatening domestic politics. 88 In contrast to the kind of open and obvious confrontation that was expected occur between the PKI September-1 October are extremely unequivocal evidence has emerged to and the unclfear TNI, and, implicate the the events this date, PKI in of- 30 any way. Briefly, on 30 September members of the' September 30 Movement fGerakan September Tigapuluh — Gestapu), allegedly including members of the Pemuda Rakyat and Gerwani. abducted and murdered seven members of the TNI Central Command, including Yani. Ihs butchery occurred at Halim airport, where the Air Force had provided military training to members of the PKI's fronts. internal The conspirators proclaimed their army affair" and a preemptive strike actions against a "Council of Generals," which was charged with planning a coup against Sukarno. decree was issued to the effect that the government was dissolved, and assurances were given that the President October arrived protective custody. apparent that the the conspirators' (who during the course of 1 base EXaring the course of Army was rallying at Halim airport) was in 1 October, became* f arcund the when it second deputy and === [PDF page 189] === 179 cximmander of the Army Strategic Reserve command (KDSTRAD), Suharto, and the nws spread that Nasution had escaped death, the President attempted to assert control over the Army. the President's orders However, Suharto blatantly disobeyed relinquish control of appointee and proceeded to near-bloodlessly the Army to a new crush the Gestapu. The President dissociated himself from the whole affair and departed for Bogor. By the end of the day, the Gestapu affair was over. While the Movement was active, indicated a Ccmmunist plot. its public statements had not Given the argument about the state of the social contract in September, and the central command's firm rejection of the Fifth Force proposal on 27 September, it --- [page 217] --- 103./D. N. Aidit, For a fasting Peace, for a People's Democracy! (19 November 1954):2? Bintana Merah (February-March 1956): 112, cited in ey, Communist Party, p. 80. 105. Corsino, p. 99. Ibid. 106. Amir Anwar Sanusi, "The Results of the First Three-Year Plan," mimeographed, (Djakarta, 1959), p. 3, cited in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 163. 107. Van der Kroef, Communist Party. p. 182. 108. Harian Rakyat. 4 February 1957, cited in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 91. 109. Harian Pakvat. 21 January 1956, quoted in Hindley, Communist Party. p. 82. 110. Corsino, p. 102. 111. Van der Kroef, Communist Party, p. 221. 112. See Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesia's labour Movement, I ts Development and Prospects," United Asia 5 (August 1953):223-231, for a discussion of the early efforts Of parties, including the PKI, to organize the workers. 113. Ibid., p. 204; see also John E. Mbes, "Trade Unionism in Indonesia," Far Eastern Survey 28 (February 1959): 17-24. === [PDF page 218] === 208 ENDNOTES — CHAPTER [Unreadable] 114. 165. Harian Rakyat. 5 April 1955, cited in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 115. 166. sna-ra Tam' (January 1959) '.6-1, cited in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 116. See S. Surgoso, "The Communist Movement and the Youth — Indonesia," world Marxist Review 4 (November 1961):66-68. 117. Hindley, Communist Party, p. 186; the figure is in van der Kroef, Communist Party, p. 217. 118. Gerwani. walnasVan Aksi-Aksi untuk Memoerkuat Tuntutan Hak-Hak Wanita-Anak-Anak dan Perdamaian (Djakarta: n.p., 1956), pp. 26-27*, cited in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 204. 119. The results are taken from Ghoshal, Indonesian Politics. Table I, p. 42. The fifth place party was*1the Islamic Association Party of Indonesia. fPartai Sarekat Islam Indonesia — PSII), which'obtained) 1,091,160 votes, or a mere 2.9 per cent of the national vote. 120. Dawn (Karachi), 24 September 1955, quoted in Gch, p. 233. 121. Goh, p. 234. 122. Feith, Decline, pp. 462-481, passim, quotedin Goh, p. 123. Ghoshal, Indonesian Politics, p. 54. 235. 124. Times of Indonesia (Djakarta), 21 March 1956; Abadi (Djakarta), 7 January 1957, quoted in Ghoshal, Indonesian Politics, p. 50. 125. Ghoshal, Indonesian Politics, p. 51. 126. Times of Indonesia (Djakarta), '27 March 1956;Suluh Indonesia (Djakarta), 2 January 1957, quoted In Ghoshal, Indonesian Politics, p. 52. 127. Ibid., pp. 52-53. 128-130. [Unreadable] --- [page 231] --- [Unreadable] April 1958, in JPRS DC-403, 28 November 1958, pp. 1-13, fora discussion of the development of Communist territory. 154. See "The Victory of the Indohesian Communist Party," Sketsmasa (Djakarta), 15 February 1960, in JPRS 5295, 11 August 1960, pp. 1-10. 155. M. H. Lukman, Report, p. 1. 156. PKI, Bahan-Bahan untuk Koncrres Nasional ke-VI P artai Kommunis Indonesia (Djakarta: n.p., 1958), p. 53, cited in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 85. 157. Hindley, "Domestication," p. 917. 158. SOBSI, General Report of the SOBSI National Council to the Ttn'rd SOBSI National Congress (Djakarta: n.p., 1960), in JPRS 7456, 10 February 1961) p. 53. 159. Hindley, Communist Party, p. 139. 160. "Laporan Utama Sidang DPP Pleno I I BTI," Suara Tani. Supplement (MayJune 1959): 29-30, cited in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 166. A discussion of the activities of the BTI is given in Hartojo, "In Regards to the Mobilization and Organisation of the Peasants," Suara Tani (November 1959), in JPRS 5299, 11 August 1960, pp. 1-5. 161. Suara Tani Party, p. 169. cited in Hindley, Communist 162. Pemuda Rakyat. "laporan IMn pada Sidang Dewan Nasioanl k e - m," (Djakarta: n.p., 1958), p. 13, cited in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 191. 163. Pemuda Rakyat. Setia Mencradbi Kepentinaan-Kepentinaan vital dan T iita -T iita Revolusi Augustus 1945 (Djakarta: n.p*., 1962), p. 50, cited in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 191. 164. Ibid. 165. Hindley, Communist Party, p. 207; see also S. K. Trimurty, "History of Gerwani's Development," Harian Rakyat. 7 June 1960, in JPRS 5298, 12 August 1960, pp. 11-17. 166. Harian Rakyat. 14 December 1961? 11 January 1963, cited in Hindley, Communist Party, p. 208. 167. Hindley, "Domestication," p. 917. 168. 'Reeve, p. 162. === [PDF page 232] === 222 ENDNOTES — CHAPTER IV 1. Nasution's formulation has also been called the "Broad Front" (Front Debar). See C. L. M. Penders and Ulf Sundhaussen. Abdul Haris Nasution. A Political Biography (St. Lucia, Queensland: university of Queensland Press, 1985), p. 133. 2. Pos Indonesia (Djakarta), Sundhaussen, p. 133. 13 November 1958, quoted in Penders and 3. See Ralartag Ghoshal, The Role of theMilitary in Indonesia (Madras: The University of Madras, 1980), pp. 28-29; and Daniel S. Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics. 1957-59. Monograph Series, Modem Indonesia Project (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), pp. 191-192, for discussions on the Middle Way concept. 4. Guy J. Pauker, e d., The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management. Memo Rm-3312-PR (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, November 1963), p. 62. Ibid., p. 55. Ibid., p. 307. Ibid, p. 144. Ibid., p. 59. Ibid. 10. Ibid., p. 147. 11. Ibid., pp. 147, and 311. 12. Ibid., p. 270. 13. Ruth McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army," part I I, Indonesia no. 13, (April 1972): 162-171, cavers a discussion of education as a source of central control.

=== [Page 3] === ABSTRACT The study adopts the perspective of 'political conflict' to approach the subject. Between 1949 and 1965, Indonesia was facing the beginning of a revolution. In the context of three successive social contracts and through the accumulation of resources, the communists tried to turn this situation into a revolutionary outcome. At first there was no opposition to their acquisition of a governmental structure, of adherents, territory and sovereignty, but eventually the army tried more and more to halt their development. However, since the army did not succeed at first, the communist party became the largest non-ruling communist party in the world at that time. In 1965, under the protection of the President, the communists tried to achieve their revolution by accumulating arms. This signalled the 'accelerating' element - a definitive event that makes possible the transition to the outcome of the revolution. Despite the power attributed to them, the communists had to rely heavily on the power of the President. Therefore the army mounted a 'decelerator' against the communists by first striking a blow at the President. From then on, without protection, the communist state-within-the-state was demolished and the revolution was foiled. iii [Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.]