Brig. Gen. Supardjo's 1966 analysis, addressed to 'comrade leaders', of why the 30 September Movement failed, published by John Roosa in 2008. The only first-hand assessment by a movement leader.
RAND memorandum RM-5753-PR (Feb 1969), Guy J. Pauker, 'The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Indonesia'. Argues, from trial records, that Aidit planned the 30 September action against the generals and traces PKI strategy, the Chinese turn, the agrarian 'unilateral actions' and the killings (up to 300,000), and th
Internet Archive compilation on the 1965 events whose main text is Anderson and McVey's Cornell 'Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965 Coup' (1971), with source documents. It says Gerwani and Pemuda Rakjat trainees at Lubang Buaya were drawn into the killings (pp. 22-23) while stressing the army-fed 'orgy' storie
Internet Archive compilation on the 1965 events whose main text is Anderson and McVey's Cornell 'Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965 Coup' (1971), with source documents. It says Gerwani and Pemuda Rakjat trainees at Lubang Buaya were drawn into the killings (pp. 22-23) while stressing the army-fed 'orgy' storie
Official Army history (Pusjarah TNI, Jakarta 2009), vol. IV of 'Komunisme di Indonesia', presenting Gerwani as a PKI mass organisation in the 1960-65 build-up and the G30S. It reports Gerwani's Nov-Dec 1964 housewives' seminar (p. 70), 'unilateral actions' (p. 122), the 27 Sept 1965 Surabaya governor's-office raid unde
Official Army history (Pusjarah TNI, Jakarta 2009), vol. IV of 'Komunisme di Indonesia', presenting Gerwani as a PKI mass organisation in the 1960-65 build-up and the G30S. It reports Gerwani's Nov-Dec 1964 housewives' seminar (p. 70), 'unilateral actions' (p. 122), the 27 Sept 1965 Surabaya governor's-office raid unde