Dossier of a slaughter (Tribune, 29 Juni 1966)

Tribune (1966-06-29) - Dossier of a slaughter Source: Trove, National Library of Australia - https://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article236350367 Date retrieved: 2026-10-17 OCR text (uncorrected) follows. 29 Jun 1966 - Dossier of a slaughter Tribune (Sydney, NSW: 1939 - 1991), Wednesday 29 June 1966, page 5 Dossier of a slaughterReports from Jakarta j last week were. jof the militarist regime further consolidating its grip on Y-:&laquo;innesia's state appara-tus, with the election of -General Nasution as chairman of the Provisional People's Consul- 5 tative Council. Attacks on President Sukarno as Head of State. are becoming more and/! more open and continu-1 oils.. At the same time, major organs of the press' < in Australia are cotoduc- j ting a sustained campaign j to make the Jakarta regime appear respect-; able. ' ' Thus the Sydney Morning Herald has featured articles by Denis Warner exalting the military strong-man, General Su-y harto, and claiming that: i there is a general air of freedom in Jakarta. The purpose of this campaign is to expunge from the public mind the fact that this regime has been built on the sole basis of an enormous; massacre of left-democratic Indonesian people. No other regime since Hitler's Third Reich has actually risen to power in; such a massively criminal fashion. As if to set the seal on the white-washing campaign came the words; last week in Canberra of General Jesus Vargas who, as general secretary, is the authentic voice of JSEATO. " The shooting of thousands of com-; munists in Indonesia was:; a blow struck for free-t dom," he said. Vargas' inhuman words -would never have been spoken had they not ac-corded with the views of his SEATO principals, the government of the United i States and others, includ-' ing Australia. The massacre- and the militarist "trials" are still continuing. As in the time of Hitler, the task of exposing, protesting and ultimately. ending the ' brutal regime and the; danger that it represents, both internally and externally, must be undertaken by the democrats of all countries. To assist in this task, Tribune on this page republishes froni the Brit-Mi "New Left Review" a reconstruction of the attempted coup last October and the subse-, <Ptent counter-revolution. While. not necssarily correct in all respects, the article throws a more con < vincing light on these terrible events than any that has so far appeared; I i i"THE mainspring of the forces which briefly seized power in Djakarta on October 1 last year were dissident officers and. troops from the Seventh (Diponegoro) Division of the Indonesian Army, stationed normally in Central Java. A group of junior officers from this Central Java Division had apparently become disenchanted with the conduct of the top army command. They accused them of corruption, falling into decadent and luxurious habits and, most seriously, dragging their heels over Confrontation with Malaysia. They also suspected undue American influence. Accordingly they determined to rid the nation and the Revolution of these parasites. The junior officers concerned were not necessarily left-wing; some of them appear to have definite anti-communist records. They were however highly conscious of what they considered the proper duty of the army and its role in the Indonesian Revolution. They bore some resemblance to the Young Officers in Jap-. an or, say, their counterparts in Turkey today. However, it is one thing to sit and plot in Semarang or Jogjakarta, another to be in a real position to act. But opportunity presented itself. One of the junior officers, Lt. col. Untung, was transferred to the Presidential Guard (Tjakrabirawa Regiment) in Djakarta, as a Battalion Commander. More than that. He was put in charge of arranging a historical pageant for the marchpast on Army Day. This was crucial; it enabled the plotters to move battalions sympathetic to their aims into the capital for the parade. They now had troops available on the spot, not hours away in Central Java. The plotters set about perfecting their plan. In particular, they won to their side the Commander of the Guard at the Halim Airbase, just outside Djakarta, Plight Major Sujono.Control over the Halim Base would give them both a secure operations centre and a means of keeping contact with Central Java. They also involved a Brigade Commander from the local Fifth Division of the Army, Colonel Latief. Finally they made preparations to use armed auxiliaries being trained at the Halim Airbase as part of the projected Fifth Armed Force. These auxiliaries were mostly volunteers from the Communist People's Youth; the Fifth Armed Force, inaugurated about three months previously was designed in effect to give the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) a military presence. In the event, this unauthorized involvement in the affair was to cost the PKI dear. The plot was put into action in the early hours of October 1. The first stage had three parts. First, action was undertaken to seize seven top army generals at their villas and bring them to Halim Base. These generals were named as members of the clandestine Generals' Council, which had been prepared to take over the State in the event of Sukarno's death or, indeed, should any other favourable opportunity suggest itself. There are strong signs of the existance of at least a close clique; the exclusion of the KOSTRAD Army HQ Commanded, General Suharto, from the list of seven was due to the fact that such a clique did exist but he was not a member of it. His omission was to prove disastrous to the plotters; it is hard otherwise to imagine why he was overlooked. Those to be arrested included almost every other top staff officer, including the chiefs of intelligence, finance and political activity. Second, key installations in the city centre were to be seized: the Presidential Palace, the Radio Station, the Telephone Exchange, crucial road intersections. (For some reason, the KOSTRAD Supreme Army HQ was neglected). Thirdly, various other personalities, including Sukarno himself, were to he brought to Halim.The Coup Moves into ActionAT about 3. 1 5 a.m. seven armed groups, ranging in size from roughly twenty to a.hundred men, left the Halim Base for Djakarta. They proceeded to the villas of the seven generals and, in all cases, succeeded swiftly in overpowering the guards. After, that, however, they met with uneven success. Three pf the generals werekilled during the raids. General Yani, Minister-Commander of the Army, lost his temper when refused permission to bathe and change out of his pyjamas. He stormed hack into his bedroom and was shot down through the glass door. General Harjono heard the intruders coming, switched off all the lights and tried to overpower the first man to come through the bedroom door. He was shot. General Pandjaitan lived in a two-storey house, unlike \the others. After a great deal of shouting up and down the stairs he eventually agreed to come down when his family was threatened. Besides his sten-gun had jammed. However, he put up more resistance in the front yard and was shot. Three more generals were successfully bundled into trucks and taken off to Halim. General Suprapto had recently had some teeth out; he was unable to sleep and, hearing dogs bark, went down to the front door, where he was seized. General Parman thought the next-door house was being burgled and went down into the garden to investigate. He was seized in the front yard. General Sut-ojo was arrested in his bedroom and blindfolded before being taken to the waiting truck. These arrests were completed shortly after four o'clock. But by far the most important general, Abdul Haris Nasution, the Minister of Defence, managed to escape. The intruders successfully disarmed his look-outs and quite extensive guard, as well as the guard of his neighbour, Dr. Leimena, the Second Deputy Prime Minister. They then entered the house. General Nasution's wife, hearing the noise &laquo;f doors opening and shutting, went to see what was happening. When she opened the bedroom door she saw a soldier standing there.with a gun. She slammed the door shut and told Nasution. He insisted on looking for himself and nearly got shot. The soldiers outside started to try and break the door down. While they were doing this, Nasution's sister appeared with his daughter and asked to go into the room herself. When the door was opened, the soldiers opened fire again; the young daughter was fatally wounded. Meanwhile Nasution had made his getaway and managed to scramble over the garden wall into the next-door Iraqi Embassy. He was shot at as.he got over the wall and fell down the other side, breaking his ankle. He then lay still, in the Iraqi Embassy garden, for about three hours until the coast seemed well clear. The second part of the plan was achieved without incident. By the time the three still live generals and Lt. Ten-dean arrived back at Halim. the crucial installations of Djakarta were in the hands of the plotters. The third part also went well. Sukarno was at the house of his Jap-enese wife, Dewi. Untung went there, told the President that the top generals had launched a coup and asked him to come to Halim for the sakeof his safety; the Air Forcq and the Presidential Guard had remained loyal. Sukarno agreed. The second personality asked to come to Halim was Omar Dhani, Commander of the Air Force; he himself was disliked by the top army staff and regarded as a creature of Sukarno's; tension had got worse since the Air Force was supposed to be in charge of tho North Kalimantan action, from which the Army was suspected of withholding its full co-operation and also since the Air Fdrce had agreed to train and officer the Fifth Armed Force, seen as a direct PKI threat by the army staff. Dhani eventually agreed to go to Halim. As well as Dhani, Brig. Gen. Sabur, Commander of the Presidential Guard, was also fetched. The fourth personality seized was D. N. Aidit, Chairman of PKI. Spme mystery surrounds Aidit's presence. It seems that the plottersmust have calculated as follows: since our military support is, in fact, relatively thin &mdash; two paratroop battalions, elements from the Guard, elements from the Air Force, some armed auxiliaries&mdash; we need Sukarno's backing. For this reason, he must be brought to Halim. Once he has agreed to back- us, presumably over the radio, we shall need street demonstrations in support. We therefore need Aidit too. Mbre-over, it will also be as (Veil to have him safely at Hhiim in order to paralyze the Pkl until Sukarno has ophnly backed us. Otherwise x we might be pre-empted by iin-planned-for PKI action. However, two things went wrong. First, General Suharto swiftly seized command of the Army and acted with considerable competence. Second, Sukarno, casting around for a suitable new Army Commander &mdash; obviously Untung himself was out of the question&mdash;picked on General Pram oto instead of General Suharto.The Alarm is GivenCJUHARTO was waken- 1 ed by neighbours at about half past five, told shots had been heard and a number of generals and other personalities appeared to have been abducted. Soon afterwards, a colleague came and confirmed the news. Suharto got in his jeep and drove himself to the Kostrad headquarters, ariving about 6.30. Having confirmed that Yani had been abducted he assumed command of the army and set about contacting fellow officers and representatives of the other armed services. General Umar, the Djakarta Territorial Commander, had already been alerted by Nasution's family and had done some rather listless reconnoitring. He. was able to tell Suharto that the Presidential Palace was under the control of troops commanded by Brig. Gen. Supardjo, Commander of the 4th Combat Command from Mandau, West Kalimantan. (Supardjo had flown in to Djakarta on receiving a go-ahead telegram saying that his daughter was gravely ill. However, he had not reported his arrival in Djakarta to anybody. It was now clear to Suharto that junior officers were acting illegally). Umarput himself under Suharto's command. Suharto also got itt touch with the First Deputy to the Navy Commander and the Djakarta Police Conim-ander. They agreed to keep their troops confined. Suharto next set about indentifying the whereabouts of all the various army battalions supposed to be in Djakarta. Most of them, he ascertained, had turned up as expected at Senajan for a rehersal for the army parade. However, parachute battalions 454 and 530, from CJen-tral and East Java respectively, were missing. These also, judging from insignia, seemed to be the battalions holding Merdeka Square, the Presidential Palace, etc. Suharto also ascertained that the Air Force was being evasive when he contacted them. He did not yet know however the whereabouts of the President, the status of the coup de force or the role being played by the Halim Base. At 7.00 a.m. the first Untung broadcast came on the air. (They had to wait till 7.00 because it was only then that national broadcasting began). Ih this broadcast, the 30th of September Movement, under the command of Lt. Col. Untung, was- credited with saving the President from a Generals' Council coup. In particular, generals were accused of the fact that Continued on Page 8Continued from Page 5 they 'lived in luxury, led a gay life, insulted our women ana wasted government funds', as well as plotting to overthrow Sukarno.However, However, the broadcast laid very little stress on Suk: arno himself. Nobody hearing it would imagine that Sukarno had thrown himself behind the 30th September Movement. Evidently he was playing for time. His first priority was to re-establish contact with the outside world; information at Halim, all sifted through Untung, was inadequate for making vital decisions. Accordingly, a number of messengers were sent out, summoning advisers to confer with the President. Most of the top civil officials of the State were out of Djakarta at the time. Subandrio, accompanied by Njoto, one of the top PKI leaders, was in Sumatra. Charul Saleh and Ali Sastroamidjojo, leaders of the Murba and Nationalist parties, were in Peking, Lukman and Sakirman, the other PKI leaders, were in Semar-ang, Central Java, Abdulghani, the second leading Nationalist, was also out of town. But Sukarno did manage to get in touch with Leimena, the Second Deputy Prime Minister, about mid-morning. He also managed to accumulate at Halim the Minister-Com-mander of the Navy since dismissed by Sukarno and the Minister-Commander of the Police. It now began to look as if things might go the way the 30th September Movement hoped. At 9.30 Omar Dhani signed a statement throwing the Air Force behind the coup. Although this was not then released it was a strong card. Sukarno was beginning to feel his way towards a diplomatic outcome. At 1.15 p.m. a broadcast went out announcing that the President was in control of the situation, read by Sabur's Deputy Commander of the Presidential Guard and signed by Sabur himself. About the same time, the President issued an order appointing General Pranoto Acting Commander of the Army, under the President and on a day-to-day basis. Pranoto was a former commander of the Central Java Division/ whose term of command had been cut short by Nasution. He was now 3rd Assistant to Yani, with responsibility for personnel. All this pointed to a situation in which Sukarno would soon re-emerge, the 30th September Movement would be &mdash; presumably &mdash; rewarded and the leftward turn in Nasakom would be consolidated. However, Sukarno had not personally committed himself to anything.Suharto at the Kostrad HQAT about this time, possibly a little earlier, messsengers from Sukarno had reached Suharto at the Kostrad HQ. It seems likely they were forwarded there by Umar or were looking for Pranoto. Suharto was now able to sum up the:ituation. During the morning he had managed to subvert most of the 530th (East Java) Battalion, by sending former officers (mostly from the West Irian campaign) to talk to them. He felt confident he could do the same with the 454th battalion, given time. He now knew that the Halim Base Vas the centre of the 30th September Movement operations. This meant he would have to tread carefully as far as the Air Force was concerned; there was a possibility Djakarta would be bombed. But, on the whole, militarily speaking, he was in a position to be confident. Also he now probably knew that Nasution ( was alive, though hurt and in hiding. He must have suspected thai the other six generals were all dead. At any rate, he refused to let Umar and Pranoto go to Halim, remarking later that 'we had already lost quite enough of our generals'. Untung himself was clearly in desperate straits. At 2.00he had issued another proclamation over the radio, announcing the formation of a Revolutionary Council, made up in an apparently random fashion of the names of top armed forces commanders, various political personalities, youth leaders, journalists, a university rector and so on, all mixed up promiscuously with some of the actual plotters. This proclamation, strangely, did not mention Sukarno at all. Then at 3.30 they released Dhani's morning statement of Air Force support: this appears something of a last throw. It was clear the crunch was coming. At 4.00 Sukarno sent for his children and had them flown to safety in Bandung. By 6.00 much of the 454th Parachute Battalion had followed the 530th into Suharto's hands.By By 7.00 p.m. Suharto had all key installations in Djakarta under his control. About this time further messengers left Sukarno; their aim, in effect was to find out what Suharto's conditions were. He indicated that Sukarno must disassociate himself from Untung; in fact, he must leave the Halim Base. Accordingly Sukarno left Halim for his out-of-town palace at Bogor. Suharto asked a colleague to check Sukarno's arrival. At 9.00 Suharto himself went on the air announcing his full control.Flames in Central JavaAT the Halim Base, things must have looked gloomy indeed. However, there was still some hope for the 30th September Movement. Following the 7.00 a.m. broadcast, a number of their colleagues, including Col. Suherman, head of army intelligence in the Diponegoro division and probably the brains of the coup, had seized control in the principal cities of Central Java. By evening Semarang, Jogjakarta and Surakarta were all in the hands of junior officers, associated with the September 30 movement. The stage was now set for the second, brief, eventually tragic act. At about midnightthe President's Jetstar flew into Halim Base. It contained the Air Force Second-in-Com-mand, who had been with Subandrio in North Sumatra (Subandrio himself had sagely decided to stay put). More consultations took place. Soon afterwards two planes left Halim for Central Java, both Hercules transports. One, which landed at Semarang about 1.30, contained Untung. The other, which arrived at Jogjakarta at about 2.00, contained Omar Dhani and D. N. Aidit. By dawn the Halim Base had fallen to Suharto. Untung went into hiding. Some days later he was arrested. Dhani, on the other hand, could still save himself... he flew from field to field, having talks, finally returning to the Semplak Airfield, near Bogor, at 4.00 that afternoon, immediately proceeding to the Palace to be with Sukarno.The PKI is compromisedyIDIT was in by far the most difficult position. How far was the FKI compromised? How far could it pull itself clear? In fact,, as we now know, all was already lost. The PKI had already been fatally compromised in the following ways: 1. The involvement of People's Youth auxiliaries in the abduction of the generals,,the occupation of installations in Djakarta and &mdash; most serious of all &mdash; the killing of the three generals who had survived arrest. These three generals had been shot at a place called Crocodile Hole, within the perimeter of the Halim Base, a few hours after their arrival there. One of them and also Lt. Tendean, mistaken for Nasution, /were beaten with rifle butts/ After execution they were thrown into a well to join the corpses of the other.three generals previously killed. Involved in all this were auxiliaries, undergoing training at Halim Base, from both the Communist People's Youth and the Communist Gerwani women's movement. The executions were given a kind of ritual character by singing and mass firing at the dead bodies. There is no hard evidence however of disfigurements or other atrocities. The auxiliaries involved definitely appear to have not been acting under any kind of PKI instructions, but merely to have been obeying, in a blind way, the Air Force officers who were their military superiors at the Halim Base. 2. The involvement of People's Youth elements in the rising in Jogjakarta, where they demonstrated against the Generals' Council, covered the town with pro -September 30 Movement placards, seized the radio and so on. Again, they do not seem to have been acting under any kind of PKI instructions. More serious, in some ways, was the support given.the coup by the Communist mayor of Surakarta, Utomo Ramelan. This was a stupid mistake. The PKI paid the price for backing a 'popular' man for mayor instead of a more politically trustworthy cadre.3. 3. An editorial, hedging violently but nonetheless indicating support for the coup, appeared in the main PKI newspaper, Harian Rakja,t, on October 2. It had gone to press the previous afternoon. More explicit was a cartoon published at the bottom of the front page, mentioning the September 30 Movement and associating the Generals' Council wi,th the CIA. It is difficult to explain these blunders. It is possible of course that the. paper was set up, awaiting the go-ahead from some responsible PKI leader, found on the presses in that state by the Army when.they seized the works and finally printed deliberately by the Army, in order to discredit the PKI. On the other hand, it was not a suitable editorial whichever way youlook at it: there is no point in hedging for 90% of an editorial if you let slip a parti pris in the other 10%..It is all the more strange since another PKI newspaper, Debu-dajaan Baru, managed to confine itself to a short item in a box, reading: THE SITUATION IN THE CAPITAL The situation in the capital today remains calm. Life continues as usual The streets remain crowded with traffic, offices continue work as usual. So also street vendors, shops, schools and so on. 4. Later, Njono, head of the PKI in Djakarta, was to make &mdash;and withdraw &mdash; a confession to the Army, admitting PKI complicity in the coup. However,,this confession does not bear examination. It is full of obvious flaws. People were said to have been at meetings they could not have attended; others who would have attended are omitted. No concrete actions are attributed,to the PKI; all depends on the coup being a master-plan in Aidit's head. Of course, since the PKI did nothing 'whatever on the fateful day, it is difficult to invent a role for them. 5. Aidit's own presence at the Halim Base was compromising to some exten,t. However, the Army has not used it since: perhaps because they have not yet cooked up a satisfactory story; perhaps because it would be embarrassing as far as Sukarno was concerned and anyway would have to be squared with his version. Subsequently Aidit may have made a mistake in heading for Jogjakarta. He might have done better to stick like a burr to Sukarno. As it was, by the time Lukman and Njoto arrived at Bogor, the anti-PKI campaign was well under way. Aidit never made it back at all. However, Aidit immediately on his arrival set about trying to ensure (that PKI members stayed at home, did nothing to provoke the Army and confined themselves to following the political path trodden by the President at Bogor. He got immediately in.touch with Sujono Atmo, the young pro -PKI Acting Governor of Central Java, with Utomo Ramelan, PKI mayor of Surakarta and with top PKI leaders Lukman and Sakirman, who were staying in Semarang. After talks, they got into Lukman's ministerial car and drove round Central Java making efforts to put down any PKI demonstrations which had flared up. Aidit also tried to requisition a plane to fly to Ball, another. PKI stronghold, but by now opportunist officials were getting rather chary of him and he was unsuccessful. However, in his major endeavours he was indeed successful: there were no further PKI manifestations in Central Java and the renewal of control by General Surjo-. sumpeno was not resisted. On the 5th, Lukman set off by car for Bogor. Aidit tried to get a plane, failed and set out by road. He was almost cer,tainly arrested on his way back and shot.A Malign Twist of FateUNDOUBTEDLY it is unnerving that a party of the strength of the PKI can be so destroyed as a result of what seems a malign twist of fate. The main problem of course was that once Sukarno's unquestionable authority had been blemished, there was no armed shield which the PKI could rely on. Evidently the Party was aware of its potential weakness; this lay behind plans to create the Fifth Armed. Force. (Plans, ofcourse, which backfired, as we have seen, in a quite disastrous way.) Nevertheless, what is really astonishing is the lack of any contingency planning. What happened when Aidit was taken from his home by soldiers of the Presidential Guard in the middle of the night? Nothing. There seems to have been no contingency plan whereby, for instance, Njono&mdash; head of the Djakarta party &mdash; was informed and in a position to put pre-arranged instructions to effect while awE.iting renewal of contact with Aidit or else Lukman or Njoto.