Killing off the communists (South China Morning Post, 17 Juli 1999)

=== [PDF page 1] === Killing off the communists: Once secret records reveal how during... South China Morning Post (1946-); Jul 17, 1999; ProQuest pg. 37 ation for the bloody suppression of: the 1965 funeral ofthe six... Chief of the Jakarta PKI Communists and their supporters. generals, Above left,the mittee and former head:of SOBSL =’: <munist campaign. ry little. turmoil that followed... (PKI-led labour federation) was ar- ‘resistance, despite the army's claims yotog APand tested by the army along with sev- ~ hat it had been preparing an armed’ Tophi t eral members of Pemuda Rakjat ising. In-just fi hun= - and. Gerwani (respectively, PKI reds of thous were slaughtered. The US and youth and women’s auxiliaries). and an undeter- Australia came out strongly behind Mr Suharto. mined number of lesser PKI officials. There is less’ st when the army first decided to exploit the.. reliable information that firing squads are. being September 30 affair, to purge the PKI, is outlined in formed to execute captured: PKI members.” a cable from Green to Washington five days after But a day later Green warned Washington he 1e generals’ murder. The cable, dated October 5, was worried that: “Extent army determination to shows Green is still unsure of the evidence for the stand up to Sukarno still not (repeat) not clear.” s role. He telegrams that: “inclusion of Sukar- However, he informed them: “Army has: begun dor PKI leadership not certain although there extensive sweeps in Jakarta lower-class suburbs to s considerable evidence that bo! ‘probably in- round up communist para-military elements ‘aclved in some way.) 2. tive in September 30 violence.” ee But Green stresses: “ er the background By October 8, Green cabled Washington optiarmy in: control,’ an important instru- ~ Smistically: ‘Communists are now on the run for ments of power. such s press, radioand TV. Italso’ the first time in many years in Indonesia.” The: has a cause {to act] in murder of six top leaders if “most encouraging developments, he reported, y chooses to use it and it has already begun to’ were: “PKI organisational apparatus has been dis- _, Muslim groups and others (except com-.. rupted and party documents dispersed. This munists-and: their stooges) are lined-up behind. capped today with burning of PKI headquarters 1y:.. » PKI has suffered a seri tback for its: in Jakarta.”’ os nae - endorsement of, and perhaps participation in, dis: At the same time, Green reported, the US de- “credited September Movement... Army, now has’. fence attache, colonel Willis: Ethel, met a ‘senior “opportunity to move against PKI if it acts quickly “aide to Nasution who informed him that the gen- -... Momentum is now at peak with discovery of eral: ‘is calling shots which Suharto is implementbodies of murdered army leaders, ing_{and] encouraging religious.groups.to. take ~ “in short, it’s now.or never...: Then he advises: ‘Despite all its shortcomings, © meanwhile is staying in background politically. e believe odds are that army willacttopin blame, By October 13, Green vould report that. the or recent events on PKI and its allies, Much re-”: purge was going well: “Anti-communists continmains in doubt, but it seems almost certain that ue [to] make most of their present ascendancy. : West mair 4 the” agony of ridding Indonesia of effects of Sukarno... Today's tally included closing of communist uniin attempted coup master-. has begun. a *. -versities, banning of leftist student organisations ee _ Green‘s recommendations to Washington were: and. still more. attacks on PKI premises.": ber 30, 1965, a small © “Avoid overt involvement as power struggle un- ‘Around this time, the embassy was dealing not ~ folds... However, indicate clearly to key people in’ only with senior army officers but with key Musarmy such as Nasution and Suharto our desire tobe lim political leaders who were working with the ‘of assistance where we can... Maintain and if pos- army in the purges, as Green revealed ina cable to sible extend our contact with military [and] spread Washington:on October 15: “Army and Muslim \ the story of PKI's guilt, treachery and brutality (this. sources have discussed. with [embassy. officers] ¢ of its main targets, Nasution, priority effort is perhaps most-needed immediate.. strategy they hope army will follow. They hope | counterattack with General Su-__ assistance we can give army if we can find way to. army will proceed in step-by-step campaign not f the army’s strategic command, do it without identifying it as solely or largely US. only against PKI but against whole commueat confusion at the time overwho — effort).'"" Pe ieee ee nist/Sukarno clique.” original attack: was it Sukarno himself? The next day the US Embassy's Indonesian. The same day, in a cable dealing with anti- Working Group, made up of diplomats and CIA communist actions, Green wrote that confidential officers, sent'an optimistic report-to Washington: sources reported that: “Army has already execut- “The army appears now to have determined to ed 74 communists seized in connection with coup ritry, to save Sukarno from 4 Cl/ records as they were de doo ordered 990, a US lawyer, Kathy Kadane, publi A dissident military faction? Or the PKI? Despite xtraordinary account detailing how.an Ameri- ‘the contradictory evidence, Mr: Suharto and’ can diplomat provided lists of Indonesian commu- ’ Nasution moved quickly to blame the PKI and used Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. hé September 30 affair as th ifi- Dela vu... Suharto, left, at ove vigorously against the PKI. attempt, despite efforts by [Sukarno’s foreign -dy with Peking and its brand of communisny; as- “Tage headmen’in- Vietnam. On Indo-language political action which’ army will support. Army. minister} Subandrio to stop executions.” But. Green wanted no let-up in. the anti-com- Inia cable to Washington, which he asked to be forwarded to the US Information Agency, Green stressed the need to keep pushing anti-PKI'propaganda: ‘In all media, by implication as well as by repetition of bald facts, link this horror and tragesociate‘diabolical murder and ‘mutilation of.the generals with similar methods used against vilbroadcasts show: that the South Vietnamese. are ‘fighting this same kind of Gestapo terror.” Two days later, a State Department memo of conversation shows the US assistant secretary of state, McGeorge Bundy, met. the head of Australia’s Foreign Affairs Department, Sir James Plim- ‘soll, and Australia’s ambassador, Keith Waller, in Washington to discuss Indonesia and the army's strategy, ' Bundy: informed the Australians: “Army is aiming at [Subandrio] above all and that they want especially to clip the wings of his intelligence organisation,”" The. next day, Green was back with news ofa bloody, anti-communist assault. in'the northern province of Sumatra, where an army-linked Muslim youth group. was highly active: “Youth arm my up MBM) q Pemuda Pantjasila, which has spearheaded anticomimunist attack in North Sumatra, may have set “out to kill leadership of PKI youth organisation, Pemuda Rakjat. Several: Pemuda Rakjat dead, reportedly found in Medan streets after weekend demonstrations:...-Army source intimated that attacks on North Sumatran PKI have army support and army‘s ban on demonstrations simply designed to hide army’s role... “Muslims have begun attacking Chinese-communist elements in Medan and other North Sumatran cities.’ Merchandise burned, homes sacked and Chinese beaten. Consulate has noted: many fires in’ Medan-and Belawan Chinese. districts. Muslims apparently not distinguishing between Chicom. [Chinese communists] and Indonesian citizens.” mS By October 20, just 15 days after the cable which showed Green was still unsure of the PKI’s role in the September 30 events, Green summed up the success so far of the anti-Communist Party campaign: “Party has received major, though not Continued on Page 3 === [PDF page 2] === 6 MeN aft necessarily mortal, blow to its image, considerable damage to its communications and ‘command structures, and some damage to ‘its organisational strength through arrest, harassment and, in some cases, execution of PKI cadres... _Y “Some thousands of PKI cadres have repottedly been arrested in Jakarta... several hundred of them have been executed.” ’ * By October 23, however, the US Embassy was worried that thearmy was weakening in itsdrive. But four days later, Green was more encouraged ‘after another meeting between * (US defence attache) Ethel and senior Indohnesian army officers, over golf. The embassy’s high-ranking intelligence links to the army were confirmed by a CIA cable to the White House on the same day with information from the commander of the East Java - Military reporting: “he will begin a mass suppression and round-up of the PKI...” Significantly, while the embassy was - ‘feeding propaganda about the PKI's master- ‘minding of the events of September 30, a se- ‘cret CIA memo at the time admitted that “Elements of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) were involved, but the role of the party leadership remains obscure,” and: "‘Information is sketchy as to the involvement and reaction of communist leaders." A confidential CIA source had reported that: “The (PKI} party's central committee decided to give [Sukarno’s body guard, Colonel], Untung military support only after hearing his radio announcement on October 1... - Communist leaders believed the army was about to take action against the party...” On the critical question of who had given the order to kidnap and murder the generals, the CIA admitted: “Precisely who instructed them... is not known.” But the anti-PKI campaign by the army -was now unstoppable and, on October 29, | the Stale Department sent a cable marked "Action" to Jakarta, noting that Washington was developing its policy on Indonesia and ‘wanted a military-run government. Washington said: “Sooner or later... it “will become increasingly clear to army leaders they are only force capable of creating order in Indonesia, and that they must take initiative to form a military or civilian-military provisional government, with or without Sukarno.” It urged the US Embassy to canvey this to the army: “The next few days, weeks or months may offer unprecedented opportunities for us to begin to influence people and f the communists events....Small arms and equipment may be ‘ needed to deal with the PKI... As events | develop, the army may find itself in major military campaign against PKI, and we must be ready for that contingency... We shall, of course, want to consult the British, Australians, and others as well.’ At this very time, the mass killing of PKI supporters was under way in earnest, causing even some senior Indonesian army officers to baulk, as Green reported on October 29: “Army sources report All-Sumatra Commander Mokoginta wants to stop army-inspired violence against PKI but his subordinates continuing to incite attacks behind his back... Muslim fervourin Atjeh {now called Aceh province] has apparently put all but few PKI out of action. “ Atjehese has deeapacitated [sic] PKI and placed their heads on stakes along road.” On November 13, Green reported contfidential information from Jakarta’s police information chief that: “almost all of top PKI leadership, politburo and central committce levels, had been seized by army, and further on the death squads”, and that: “fron 50 to 100 PKI members are being killed every night in East and Central Java by civilian anti-communist groups with blessing of army.” Soon after, on November 16, a cable from the American consul in Medan brutally illustrated that US officials were being informed of planned massacres: “Two officers of Pemuda Pantjasila [the Muslim youth group] separately told consulate officers that their organisation intends to kill every PKI member they can catch... He stated [they] will not (repeat) not hand over captured PKI to authorities until they are dead or near death...” Days later, the Medan consul sent a full report to Washington. With details of massacres, it included the propaganda and psychological warfare techniques being used by the army in conjunction with Muslim groups: “In mid-October the army began a determined effort to wipe out the Communist Party on Sumatra. By November 1, this army-directed drive was rapidly cutting down communist and fellow traveller resistance, and by the end of the reporting period, army authorities were saying that the PKI no longer exists as an organisation on this island, “|, PKI leaders are under arrest, in hiding, or dead. Hundreds and perhaps thousands of PKI cadre and activists are in jail or in makeshift detention areas.” The PKL, reported the consul, offered: “no meaningful resistance”. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. By the new year, just three months after the anti-PKI campaign began, the CIA reported: “Nearly every member of the PKI politburo has been arrested; many have already been executed, including the three top party leaders, The party’s mass organisations have been paralysed... The slaughter of PKI members and sympathisers in North Sumatra, East and Central Java and Bali is continuing.” The scale of the mass slaughter, whipped up by the propaganda campaigns, finally began to register in the embassy by February and ina cable to Washington, Green's deputy reported intelligence from a friendly power that: “asa result of... calculations by this embassy as well as [confidential], a total of about 400,000 killed asa result of the September 30 affair had been agreed.” But, the cable admitted, there could be many more dead. For the US and its allies, the success of the army's anti-PKI campaign was a triumph. The purge broke the power of Sukarno, who was forced to resign, and Mr Suharto’s military-backed regime took over. A year later, US scholars were estimating that between 500,000 and a million Indonesians had died in the slaughter. Sydney Morning Herald