Current Intelligence Weekly Summary (12 November 1959)

=== [PDF page 1] === Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 CONFIDENTIAL SECRET COPY NO. 56 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY Say SUMMARY Mie Document No, No Change In Class. [7]: ( Declassitied Class, Changed te: TS § @ 25X11 Hext Review Bate: -199@ Auth: HR 70-3 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CONFIDENTIAI 25X11 25X11 -_ so ARCHIVES & RECORDS ENTER -State Dept. and PACOM review(s) completed. rT ome. yop 22.22 7. BOK INA Q S/ Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 / f === [PDF page 2] === Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT- ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS- SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence. Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 === [PDF page 3] === 25X14 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 25X1 Next 5 Page(s) In Document Denied 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 === [PDF page 4] === nw i / SS Road constructed by -—~ JAMM } inese in 1957 ND KASH meena Boundary shown on Indian maps 7) (Status in dispute) _ —— —— Boundary shown on recent oo CEASE., ~Fipg Ee 2 w Chinese Communist maps [Unreadable] “ ‘a Boundaries are not necessarily those The Stivagar e recognized by the U.S, Government. fi Gartok A y TIBET YH CHINA Ac Lhasa Z > ys Zhikatse [Unreadable] RA r NEW DELHI Nas 6 PUNAKHA \ NEPAL (KKIM BHUTA \ Location of. @ last two clashes -——-- Selected road A BURMA Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 Novem ber 1959 PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE New Delhi's negative reaction to Chou En-lai's proposal for a demilitarization of the Sino-Indian frontier on the basis of the "status quo” appears to leave little prospect that negotiations can be arranged in the near future. The Chinese Communist premier's 7 November letter to Nehru calls for "prompt" border negotiations and contains a note of urgency suggesting that Peiping wants a quick opportunity to display its "friendly" willingness to settle the border disputes. The Chinese probably hope such a meet-— ing "in the immediate future" would partially counter the effect of President Eisenhower's visit to New Delhi--a visit the Chinese may view as a part of —- — — Selected trail 12 NOVEMBER 1989 MILES 200 an "American plot" to shift India from its policy of nonalignment: by "exploiting" the border situation, Despite the concern Chinese leaders recently expressed over Nehru's "swing to the right," Chou's letter shows no inclination to buy negotiations with substantive Chinese territorial concessions damaging to Peiping's ultimate bargaining position. Chou suggested that both Indian and Chinese troops mutually withdraw some 12 miles from the Mc- Mahon line in the east and from present frontier positions in the west--the Ladakh area. This proposal does indicate a desire to prevent encounters similar to the 21 October Ladakh incident which inflamed Indian opinion. However, as far as concessions Shillong» Patna’ EAST PAKISTAN SECRET PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 1 of 5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 30790 === [PDF page 5] === Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 November 1959 are concerned, Chou's proposal is nothing more than a refinement of his earlier call for return to the "status quo" which existed along the border before the Indians established outposts closer to the actual frontier during the Tibetan revolt, In this "status quo" situation, the Chinese nominally "respect" the McMahon line without acknowledging its legality, and they remain in unchallenged possession of northeastern Ladakh. The Chinese have refused to accept Nehru's stipulation that Chinese troops must withdraw from disputed outposts before negotiations begin. Chou's letter appears an attempt to break this impasse and puts Nehru in a position where he is faced with the choice of agreeing to the Chinese proposals or appearing to be the intransigent party to the dispute. Nehru's immediate reaction was that, while "the spirit of the Chinese letter was not bad," the demilitarization proposal would benefit China, not India. After conferring on Chou's letter, the Congress party's executive committee on 10 November issued a resolution--reportedly drafted by Nehru himself-~-stating that adequate steps should be taken to prevent further border clashes but such steps should not "affect the integrity of India" or imply any "acceptance of aggression,” This has been interpreted as signifying India would accept Chou's proposal only on condition that the Chinese first "vacate their aggression," that is, withdraw from territory regard-— ed by New Delhi as traditionally Indian. 25X1 In order to keep the door open for eventual negotiations, Nehru may counter with his own demilitarization proposal. However, the Indian prime minister, who recently vetoed a Chinese suggestion that Vice President Radhakrishnan visit Peiping, probably will consider Chou's proposal for a meeting premature, 25X1 MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS Iraq Iraqi Prime Minister Qasim is still in the hospital, but he looks well and appears cheerful. Qasim told the American ambassador on 7 November that he expected to leave the hospital in about ten days. Preparations for celebrating his release are proceeding,although security authorities remain concerned over possible disturbances. Iraq's internal situation has undergone a perce )tible change since Qasim escaped assassination on 7 October. His popularity had diminished considerably following the 20 September execution of a number of officers implicated in the Mosul revolt of last March, but the assassination attempt made him a martyr in certain quarters. It remains to be seen, however, whether the activities being planned to celebrate Qasim's release from the hospital will be effective in retaining this popularity. SECRET PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 2 of 5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 === [PDF page 6] === Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 SECRET. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 November 1959 The Communists appear to feel less sure of themselves, despite the increase in their overt activity since early October, and are placing their hopes on a new series of treason trials and on dominating the demonstrations celebrating Qasim's recovery. They have been put on the defensive, however, by rumors that Qasim intends to form his own party after 6 January, when a return to party politics has been promised. Anti-Communist elements including some elements of the influential leftist National Democratic party, are proceeding with plans to form a united front without the Communists. They hope this front will dominate Qasim's party, but the premier appears to envisage a single party embracing both Communist and anti-Communist elements. The Communist press has charged that demands for the new party are based on "nondemocratic principles," that they contradict Qasim's statements, and that the idea is one inspired by Nasir's example. To date Qasim has thade no public comnent regarding the establishment of such a party, although he has sent up tiial balloons on the subject. These have been warinly welcomed by nine of Iraq's provificial governments, all five army divisional commanders, and other prominent officials. Qasim also has apparently decided since the assassination attempt to retaliate by instigating trouble for Nasir in Syrber that "Syria and Iraq should be united"-~-~an allegation that is sure to arouse Nasir and will not be lost on dissident Syrian elements. Should Qasim succeed in stabilizing conditions in Iraq, while Nasir makes only slow progress in Syrian economic and political matters, sentiment for union with Iraq could grow in Syria. UAR Cairo's attention, which has been largely devoted to Syria and Iraq, last week was focused again on the threat of Israeli military action. The 4 November clash between Israeli and Egyptian fighter aircraft over the Sinai, apparently arising out of an Israeli reconnaissance flight, probably contributed to the UAR's uneasiness. The Cairo press had made the most of the situation, hurling allegations at Ben- Gurion, the French, and Qasin, all of whom are accused of being linked in a plot against the UAR and Arab nationalism. Israel probably is pleased at Cairo's show of apprehension over its intentions, and this may deter Nasir from taking any action against the Qasim régime in Iraq. Israel has consistently maintained that Qasim Should be stipported by the West, since his rivalry with Nasir tends to perpetuate Arab disunity. Ben-Gurion publicly warned the UAR on 3 November that any attempt to interfere in Iraq would compel Israel to “reserve freedom of action." ia.. Qasim stated on 6 Novem- SECRET PART TIT OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 3 of 5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 === [PDF page 7] === 25X11 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 November 1959 Iran President Ayub of Pakistan arrived in Tehran on9 November for a state visit and talks with the Shah. They will be joined on 16 November by Turkish Premier Menderes, Menderes, in commenting on the planned tripartite talks, told an American official, "We (Turks) are doing what we can to bring Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan closer together." The Shah, while welcoming Ayub's visit as a politically useful event, is less enthusiastic over Menderes' visit, fearing the meeting will give credibility to Soviet and Iraqi propaganda that plans are be~- ing coordinated against Iraq. 18 November, Ayub will accompany Menderes to Ankara for a two-day visit. Sudan The group of dissident junior army officers which had postponed earlier plans against the Sudanese Government launched a coup attempt in the early hours of 10 November, The Abboud military government evidently was forewarned; its loyal forces took swift and effective counteraction: to nip the coup in the bud. A few hours after the initial move by the dissidents, the government had the situation under control and announced the arrest of several of the ringleaders of the plot. The regime is still under pressure from strong religious and political elements demanding a return to civilian government and the restoration of civil liberties. Among these elements are the head of the powerful, conservative Ansar religious sect, many leaders of the major political parties, and those officials of the Sudanese Communist party who are not in jail. Their campaigns of agitation and propaganda have stressed the allegation that the Abboud government's favorable Nile waters agreement with the UAR, signed in Cairo on 8 November, is a sellout of Sudanese interests. These civilian groups have been behind a small walkout of railroad workers and widespread strikes by university and secondary-school students, The Sudanese Ministry of the Interior is: making preparations to cope with a possible general strike on or before the 17 No- 25X1 vember celebrations of the anniversary of the military regime's assumption of power, SOVIET ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION Soviet statements and commentary on 7 November marking the 42nd anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution developed the main theme of a new era in internationai relations and were devote. largely to Moscow's present campaign for "peaceful coexistence" and "universal disarmament." The peace theme was emphasized by the routine nature of Moscow's military parade. It featured only gun artillery, rocket launchers, and an assortment of vehicles. No guided missiles or tanks SECRET PART T OF IMMEDIATE INTERNST Page 4 of 5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 25X11 === [PDF page 8] === Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 November 1959 were shown, and only one new weapon~-a multiple rocket launcher-~was observed. The traditional: keynote speech on the eve of the anniversary, delivered by party presidium member Averky Aristov, contained a review of Soviet economic and technological achievements and an outline of the present situation in international relations. The relatively short speech stressed contained no new foreign policy proposals, and was little more than a condensed version of Khrushchev's speech to the Supreme Soviet on 31 October. Aristov made numerous flattering references to Khrushchev, praising him as leader, policy maker, and "indefatigable fighter for peace." He pointed to’ Khrushchev's visit to the United States as "a model” in the practice of peaceful coexistence. Portraying the visit as a personal triumph for Khrushchev, Aristov claimed that the trip had won the USSR many new friends and that Khrushchev had received a "sympathetic response" from the majority of Americans. Defense Minister Marshal Malinovsky, ihn a short speech following his review of the troops on 7 November, adhered to the same general line by stressing the peaceful intentions of the Soviet Union but ended with the statement, "until such time as our disarmament proposals are adopted and until the numerous American military bases set up around the Soviet Union are liquidated, the Communist party and the Soviet Government consider it their sacred duty to maintain the country's armed forces in a condition of high military preparedness." In Peiping,statements by Chinese Communist leaders in connection with the October Revolution anniversary contained strong reaffirmations of solidarity with the USSR and expressed willingness to "work for the complete realization" of Moscow's peace initiatives. Politburo member Peng Chen told the Peiping rally that lasting peaceful international environment is necessary to develop China's "socialist construction." Signs that the Chinese do not intend to moderate their criticism of the United States, however, appeared in Peng's call for continued struggle against the "warlike imperialist circles in the US" which "continue to create international tension in Turkey, Laos, and many other places." Chervonenko, the USSR's new ambassador to Peiping, told the rally that the Soviet Government fully supports Communist China on the question of the "liberation of Taiwan" and will continue to do so until the question is “thoroughly settled." Like Khrushchev, however, he avoided specific endorsement of Péeiping's "right" to usé any means, including force, to seize the offshore islands and Taiwan. 25X1 SECRET PART I OF {MMEDIATE INTEREST Page 5 of 5 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 === [PDF page 9] === Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 November 1959 PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS NUCLEAR TEST CESSATION TALKS S. K. Tsarapkin, Soviet delegate to the Geneva nuclear test talks, continues to insist that the only purpose of technical talks on detection of underground tests, which he proposed on 3 November, should be to determine the criteria for on-site inspections within a predetermined annual quota. He emphasized the USSR's "concession" in agreeing to con- -Sider the new American data on undergound test detection problems, but he has continued to eppose Western demands that the terms of reference for the proposed talks be broad enough to ensure that the group's final report reflect the implications of this information. In abandoning his opposition to a discussion of the new data, the Soviet delegate proposed that a conference of experts be held to determine what type of instrument readings would qualify a "suspicious event" for an on-thesite inspection as well as to consider the new US information. Moscow's proposal was probably intended to avoid the appearance of obstructing progress in the negotiations and to forestall growing Western pressure for a limited treaty confined, at least temporarily, to atmospheric, high-altitude, and underwater tests. On 4 November a member of the Soviet delegation told Ambassador Wadsworth that the Soviet proposal had been thoroughly prepared during the conference recess, although Moscow had hoped to side-step these talks if possible. He asserted that American insistence on introducing new data had forced the Soviet delegation's hand and that it was proceeding along the "planned fall-back course," The Soviet delegate prefaced his proposal on 3 November with statements aimed at undercutting any Western efforts to use the proposed new talks to modify basically the conclusions and recommendations of the 1958 experts' talks on a control system to enforce a nuclear test ban. He made it clear Moscow still maintains that the "so-called" new seismic data will not modify the experts' conclusion which pertains to the possibility of concealing explosions, He pointed out that all parties have agreed on the definition of adequate control and asserted that the USSR therefore did not interpret US insistence on discussing new data as a desire to revise or review the 1958 experts' report itself. He called the Soviet move an. effort to move the negotiations out of the "deadlock" caused by "this artificial: obstacle" which the American delegation had raised. The Soviet draft proposal of 4 November, defining the terms of reference for the new technical working group, provides for consideration of the new data but appears. to separate it frm "technical data relating to the development of criteria for inspection." The proposal seeks to play down the significance of the new American information and studies by making the determination of "objective criteria" the sole task of the working group. This Soviet call for talks to work out the "objective cri- -teria" to be considered before sending inspection teams to investigate unidentified events is not entirely new. In letters to President Eisenhower and SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 1 of 14 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 === [PDF page 10] === 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 November 1959 Prime Minister Macmillan on 23 April and again on 15 May, “hrushchev mentioned sending out inspection teams at the vequest of any of the original parties to the treaty "whenever instrument readings of the control posts give reason to suspect any phenomenon as being a nuclear explosion." On 22 May, Foreign Minis-— ter Gromyko told Secretary Herter and British Foreign Secretary Lloyd that the USSR was willing to undertake a discus-~ sion cf "technical criteria limited to readings of instruments." On 12 June the Soviet delegate to the test-ban talks expressed "surprise" that the United States and British delegates had not followed up this idea; he suggested that technical discussions on criteria be held parallel with the talks -on high-altitude’ detection | problems, (Con-*~ 25X1 ‘curred in by OSI) MOSCOW RESTRAINS EAST GERMAN FLAG DISPLAY IN WEST BERLIN The decision to ban any display of East German flags in West Berlin.during the 7 November celebration of the Soviet revolution suggests that Soviet Premier Khrushchev wishes to avoid serious incidents ‘which would conflict with his iefforts to achieve an international detente. In his foreign policy address on 31 October Yhrushchev called for a "firm decision" by all states to refrain from any measures which could worsen the international Situation before a Summit meet-— ing. Fe stated that the Soviet Union “will do everything in its power" to improve the 1#..- international atmosphere, The Kremlin may also feel that any repetition of the violence which accompanied the display of the East German flags on 6-8 Octchber would have had the effect of bolstering Western determination to maintain the status quo in Berlin, point ing up the necessity of Western forces in Berlin and underlining East German ambitions to take over West Berlin. More-- over, any incidents would have been in sharp contrast with the seneral stress on the peace campaign evident in the 7. November celebration in the USSR. 25X11 The concurrent Western warning against renewed attempts to fly the flag left Ulbricht little or no leeway 25X11 25X11 He thereupon issued 25X1 special instructions to all government offices to avoid anything contrary to the Soviet line, 25X11 -Bahn (elevated) trains — 25x1 in West Berlin limited their: display to small metal flags carried on the first and last cars of each train. Furthermore, the East Germans did not show their flags at a ceremony SECRET PART II | NOTES AND COMMENTS Pere 2 of 14 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 === [PDF page 11] === 25X11 25X1 25X11 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 November 1959 at the Soviet war memorial in West Berlin, just 200 yards inside the sector border, To’ cover its retreat, however, the regime has launched a propaganda cam- 25x1 paign calling for a ban on display of the West German flag in West Berlin, GOMULEA MOVES TO TIGHTEN CONTROLS IN POLAND Polish party First Secretary Gomulka apparently has decided that tighter party control is essential, at least in the economic, cultural, anc educational fields. The removal of politburo and party secretariat member Jerzy Morawski, a liberal and long a close supporter of Gomulka, from his party responsibilities for agitation and propaganda suggests that Gomulkats decision to adopt tougher policies met with some opposition in high party circles, The recent changes May point to a trend away from the liberalization which has characterized the Gomulka re-- gime, but Gomulka's basic polieies regarding collectivization, church-state relations, and police controls probably will remain intact. The prolonged meat shortage apparently forced Gomulka to take a close look at Poland's general situation, he came to realize that, in spite of the optimistic and ernco:raging reports he nad been receiving, She general economic situation ia fact was far from satisfactory and that he had not been kept fully informed, His anger was directed largely at his trusted friends, who he felt had let him down and had sabotaged his program either by design or through incompe= tence. poor planning, Iack of coordination, inadequate administra- JERZY MORAWSKI tion, and general inefficiency, and described Polish planners and administrators as inflexible and reluctant to admit errors or take steps to correct them, Many officials virtually ignored party and government directives aimed at correcting shortcomings. All of the new appointees are well known for their antiliberal attitudes and for their advocacy of centralized economic controls. They have reputations as tough administrators, Gomuika apparently believes they will obey party directives and, even more important, see to it that others also obey them. While Gomulka is moving in the direction of firmer controls and greater discipline, he probably has not decided how far he will GOMULKA go or what the scope of the changes will be. There is no indication at this time that the changes were the result of Soviet pressure or of factional disputes within the top echelons of the Polish party. However, the necessity SECRET PART IT NOTES A. CONMENTS Page 3 of 14 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 === [PDF page 12] === Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 November 1959 of dismissing Morawski because of his disagreement with the harder approach suggests that the new line will stimulate the development of factionalisn. The agricultural program will probably continue in the direction already announced, with perhaps an intensified drive to get the agricultural "circles" operating as planned. The general tightening of central controls will affect wages especially and will te designed to ensure that Gomulka's future investment plans for the ~ development of Poland will not be impeded by inflationary pres~ SOVIET BLOC INTENSIFIES The USSR and Rumania have recently intensified their pressure on Greece to improve relations with bloc countries. In addition to suggesting exchanges of visits with Greek leaders, bloc overtures to Greece--and, toa lesser extent, to Yugoslavia--have emphasized proposals for a conference of Balkan leaders to discuss outstanding issues and schemes for prohibiting nuclear and missile weapons in the Balkans. Concentration on Greece distin-~- guishes the current campaign from earlier bloc proposals for a Balkan "zone of peace." Since the announcement in early August of the exchange of visits between Khrushchev and President Eisenhower, bloc officials have urged Athens to make a contribution to "dispelling the spirit of the cold war." Soviet Ambassador Sergeyev used this line in an attempt to elicit favorable actioh by Greece on Moscow's requests for increased cultural exchanges and for permission to reroute Soviet air service sures or by other disturbances in the economy such as have occurred in 1959. Wage norms may be revised, but public antagonism toward wage-norm revisions will probably retard this until the economic situation has improved. In the meantime wage rates have been frozen, employment cut back in some cases, and supplementary payments such as bonuses and overtime reduced. The recent developments have had disturbing effects among the populace, and the regime probably will be sensitive to public opinion in gauging the effect of lying correc= - 25X1 PRESSURE ON GREECE The current spate of overtures to Athens, however, appears to have been planned during talks in Bucharest from 19 to 25 October between Khrushchev and Rumanian party boss Gheorghiu-Dej. The day after Khrushchev's departure, Bucharest renewed its 1957 appeal for a Balkan summit conference. Rumanian propagandists began to emphasize that conditions are favorable for intra-Balkan collaboration in all fields--including the creation of a Balkan atom-free zone as the logical application of the "spirit of Camp David." The Rumanian regime also utilized an invitation by the Athens Academy to Deputy Premier Joja to sound out the Greek attitude and to gain publicity for its views on a Balkan detente, Joja's cavalier behavior in ignoring. the primary purpose of his visit by fishing in political waters was resented by Greek leaders; Prime Minister Karamanlis refused to see him, and Foreign Minister Averoff, in a brief to Cairo through Athens in- talk, declined to discuss polistead of Albania. tics. However, this did not SECRET PART If NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 4 of 14 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 === [PDF page 13] === Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 November 1959 deter Joja from calling an informal press conference on 6 November to extend an invitation to Karamanlis to visit Bucharest. Moscow also stepped up its overtures. The Soviet Embassy in Athens put owt a feeler for an invitation from the Greek Government for Khrushchev 'to stop over for talks in Athens on his way to visit De Gaulle, according to Averoff, who said that the proposed visit was rejected as "not opportune." Averoff told Ambassador Briggs on 2 November that he had also rejected an invitation from Sergeyev for him and Karamanlis to visit Moscow, whereupon the Soviet ambassador asked what are "you Greeks afraid of" now that the Khrushchev-Eisenhower exchange has been agreed upon. On 6 November Sergeyev also held a press conference-- his first during his six-year tour in Athens--at which he renewed the invitation to Karamanlis, suggested that Balkan leaders should hold meetings, and explained that the USSR's proximity to the Balkans- is a legitimate reason for its interest in Balkan affairs. As was probably anticipated by bloc leaders, the Greek Government rejected the call for a Balkan summit meeting. However, Moscow probably intends to cite Athens’ refusal, announced on 8 November, as additional justification for the countermeasures the USSR has threatened to take to offset Turkish accept= ance of NATO missile bases. Bloc leaders, who appear to regard Greece as a potential weak link in the Western defense system, may also believe that, by eliciting a negative reaction from Athens to their suggestions, pressure can be brought to bear on the Karamanlis government as a perpetuator of cold=war policies and that Athens' determination to resist bloc over- A longer term aim of this sort is also suggested by indications that Moscow is making a serious effort, aided by the European satellites, to expand trade relations with Athens. The trade protocol covering Soviet-Greek commerce during 1960, signed on 31 October, calls for total trade of about $50,000,- 000. The Soviet bloc accounts for about 10 percent of Greece's trade, a figure that appears to be on the rise. Athens is in favor of increased trade with bloc countries, primarily since it can exchange surplus agricultural commodities for a variety of 25X11 Mediterrane 30788 goods, including oil and machinery, which are normally purchased from hard-currenty countries. The bloc campaign has also been directed against Yugoslavia. Bloc propaganda attacks on Yugo- Slavia--except from Albania-- have been sharply reduced since late May, when Khrushchev reintroduced proposals for a Balkan "gone of peace” during his visit to Albania. Politika, an authoritative Belgrade daily,noted on 2 November "realistic possibilities" in the Balkans for "the stabilization of relations and development of cooperation." Belgrade's position remains essentially the same as it was in respect to earlier bloc overtures. While demariding improved bilateral relations with bloc countries as a prerequisite to a Balkan danfenence they would sprobably be tures in the future can thus willing.to participate if Greece 5,,, be weakened. or Turkey were to respond favorably. SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 5 of 14 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 === [PDF page 14] === Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 November 1959 WEST GERMAN FOREIGN The debate in the Bundestag on 5 November spotlighted the divergence among West Germany's political parties on the proper conduct of foreign relations, especially over the impending East-West negotiations. The debate itself--the first in 18 months--was relatively calm but indicated no significant change in long-established party positions. Presentation of the government's statement on foreign policy by Foreign Minister von Brentano led Social Democratic leader Erich Ollenhauer to assail Chancellor Adenauer's failure to do so himself as indicative of his “contempt for parliament." Ollenhauer also complained that Adenauer's policy of "personal-letter diplomacy” prevented the Bundestag from being properly informed on vital issues. He said the chancellor's positions on reunification and diplomatic relations with the European satellites were “inflexible,” The government's statement called disarmament the chief goal of international politics and expressed German willingness to "accept any kind POLICY DEBATE upon themselves." The Socialists countered by demanding that the German problem be kept on the agenda of international discussions--a reference to Adenauer's recent suggestion that the summit agenda be limnited to the topic of disarmament. Adenauer's stress on disarmament, coupled with his efforts to delay the date of the summit meeting, has given rise to strong press criticism of his "new independence of action." The widely read Die Welt said the chancellor's “inflexible" insistence on maintaining the status quo threatens to block progress toward an international detente and has alientated Washington. The newspaper called for a “realistic reappraisal" before Germany finds itself "diplomatically isolated." of arms control that other nations would be willing to take 25X11 NEW COMMUNIST ATTEMPTS TO The Communists are likely to increase their influence in the large and politically powerful Cuban Workers' Confederation (CTC) during its national congress from 18 to 21 November. Although the revolutionary 26th of July Movement claims sweeping victories, Communists are believed to have gained substantial representation among DOMINATE CUBAN LABOR the 3,000 delegates elected to the congress by local unions on 8 November. Their efforts to infiltrate the CTC will be facilitated by the actions of extremists who now virtually control the Cuban Government. The CTC has long dominated the Cuban labor movement, considered one of the strongest and best organized in Latin America. SECRET PART IT NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 6 of 14 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 === [PDF page 15] === 25X1 25X11 25X11 25X11 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 November 1959 Communists controlled the CTC in the mid-1940s during the first Batista regime but were ousted in 1947. Raul Castro, considered leader of the extremists in the government, nority in the labor movement a disproportionate behind-thescenes voice in the election of national CTC leaders during the 25x1 congress. ordered the expulsion of five non-Communists from the CTC directorate They evidently refused to agree automatically with government actions they disapproved. The new labor minister, Augusto Martinez Sanchez, who is closely identified with Raul, has already suggested that he will not give non-Communists the tacit government support which, early in the Castro regime, enabled 26th of July labor leaders to resist Cuban Communist party (PSP) efforts to dominate the CTC. The labor minister's influence and the PSP strategy of discrediting individual anti- Communist leaders while not challenging labor officials who do not openly oppose Communist efforts will give the PSP mi- Officials of the Catholic Christian Workers' Union (UTC) recently agreed with other church leaders that the Cuban Government now is being run by Communists and that it controls the entire economy. UTC officials hope to thwart Communist activities at the labor congress, but probably are not sufficiently strong and well organized to be effective. Other reportedly non-Communist labor leaders like Conrado Becquer of the Sugar Workers' Federation, Cuba's most powerful labor group, may have decided that they must go along with the Castro government or be ousted. Becquer, for example, is already organizing the workers' militia originally recom- 25xX1 mended by the Communist party and endorsed ” Fidel Castro on 26 October. MORE ANTI-US INCIDENTS LIKELY IN PANAMA Further demonstrations pro+ voked by ambitious politicians seeking to exploit Panamanian grievances over the Canal Zoné may follow the violent outbreaks of anti-US rioting on 3 November. Plans have already been announced for a new demonstration in the zone on 28 November--the anniversary of Panama's independence from Spain. The weak De la Guardia government is expected to continue falling in with nationalistic opposition political leaders and extremist student groups as a means of currying popular favor in anticipation of next May's presidential election. / An increasingly bitter anti- U3 press campaign, presumably government inspired, was initiated after the 3 November riots and the subsequent exchange of protests between the US and Panamanian governments. Propaganda films and publications aré apparently to be supplied to all Panamanian missions abroad in an effort to win ‘world approval and sympathy for Panama's cause. The Legislative Assembly on 10 November passed a resolutior condemning the alleged desecration of a Panamanian flag and use of force by American troops during the 3 November rioting. SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 7 of 14 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 === [PDF page 16] === 25X1 25X11 25xX1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 November 1959 the Panamanian Government first refused to help put down the 3 November riots, which resulted in injuries to more than 60 Canal Zone policemen and Panamanian demonstrators. The Panamanian National Guard broadcast instructions to its troops to stay clear of trouble areas and not to interfere in the fighting. It is extremely doubtful that the De la Guardia regime could survive if it were to oppose any efforts directed toward winning new canal conces- Sions for Panama. The government has been weakened by a foreign-based insurrection, domestic revolts, and the intrigues of opposition politicians, who are using Panama's rapidly worsening economic and social problems to overthrow the corrupt ruling oligarchy. Consequently, the De la Guardia administration is expected to redouble its efforts to appear as the 25X11 champion of Panama's perennial fight for _ increased canal benefits. THE ALGERIAN MILITARY SITUATION The military situation in Algeria--which will have a major bearing on any settlement between the rebels and the French--continues to be marked by a gradual rediction of rebel capabilities and occasional manifestations of low rebel morale. In Gran region, however, resurgence of small-scale rebel activity in an area once regarded as pacified has demonstrated the difficulties facing French advocates of total pacification. One Algiers newspaper claims that between April 1958 and July 1959 the total number of rebel troops dropped from 15,600 to 13,700 and that the supply of arms dropped by one third. It is more likely,however, that the total number of rebel effectives is slightly less than the figure of 21,600 25x11 25X11 The French offensive in the Kabylie Mountains, begun in July, has accelerated the breakup of rebel forces into small units, and the local rebel commander was reportedly killed on 5 November. This pressure, together with factors such as the rebels' chronic ammuni-" tion shortage, appears to have contributed to defections and reduced morale in some areas. SECRET PART If NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 8 of 14 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 === [PDF page 17] === 25X11 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 SECRET; CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 November 1959 Despite present maneuvering directed toward a cease-fire, the rebel leadership has assiduously avoided giving an inpression of desiring peace at any price, and appears to have stepped up efforts to obtain arms abroad. Reports from Tunis that Communist China will provide additional military:aidvalued at $10,000,000 are unconfirmed, but they serve to adver- MOROCCO _ barriers ALGERIA: + Reinforced border 12_ NOVEMBER 1959 ABYL ig ALGIERS Ain Zan& CONSTANTINE tise the rebels' will ingness to continue the war, There appears to be little prospect that the French can soon pacify Algeria to a point where there are only 200 war deaths per year--De Gaulle's prerequisite for scheduling a referendum for selfdetermination. Nonetheless, rebel military commanders meeting in Tunis reportedly have empowered the provisional government to seek a cease-fire based on De Gaulle's 16 September proposals. Continuing rebel difficulties in sustaining military operations should strengthen the hand of rebel moderates at the expense of extremists hostile to De Gaulle's program. TUNISIA The new Tunisian National Assembly is likely to be even more of a rubber stamp for President Habib Bourguiba's policies than was its predecessor, the Constituent Assembly. The 90 assembly members, elected almost without opposition by an estimated 91 percent of Tunisia's electorate on 8 November are largely Neo- Destour party men, virtually unknown on: the national scone. Simultaneously, Bourguiba was selected, unopposed, as Tunisia's first popularly elected president. woany of them The only opposition to the 17 Neo-Destour coalition slates SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 9 of 14 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 25X11 === [PDF page 18] === Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 oss SECRET. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY ft | 12 November 1959 standing for election in the 17 électoral districts came from ‘13 Tunisian Communist candidates who sought election in the first Tunis district and the Gafsa district. A third Communist Slate, which sought election in western Tunisia, withdrew, charging that it was being hampered in its election activi-" ties. An independent slate was disqualified. As in the 1956 election of the Constituent Assembly, the Communists polled their largest vote in the Tunis area--obtaining 3,229 out of 93,206 votes cast, or less than 4 percent of the popular vote in that district. At Gafsa, the Communists scored only 242 out of 64,659 votes. Having won the anticipated mandate of his people, Bourguiba will probably continue to pursue his policy of Western-oriented nonalignment, although he may permit the establishment of a second Soviet bloc diplomatic mission in Tunis. During his electoral campaign, however, he emphasized local rather than. international issues. Conscious of the threat to Tunisia's stability in the presence of several thousand armed Algerian rebels, Bourguiba reiterated Tunisia's support for Algerian independence but warned the rebels he would tolerate no internal subversion. He is likely to continue to press for a compromise settlement of the rebellion. In one of his major campaign speeches, Bourguiba paved the way for the acquisition of control over the important French-owned Sfax-Gafsa phosphate-mining complex. His government also recently moved to gain control over an important cement-manufacturing plant, again raising the. specter of possible nationalization of Tunisia's industry. - Possibly sensitive to criticism that he is establishing a benevolent dictgtorship, Bourguiba also abolished the Tunisian High Court--established in 1956 to deal with the subversive activities of his rival Salah Ben Youssef, although its competence was soon extended to other fields. Pending cases have been transferred to ordinary jurisdiction. This act was seen by many Tunisian leaders, who considered the high court a rather arbitrary body, as ending the period of transition following independence and as indicating that Tunisia 25X1 now is politically stable and mature. POLITICAL TRENDS IN SOUTH AFRICA The decline in the popular vote for the ruling Nationalist party in South Africa's provincial elections on 14 October may indicate a lack of support for new extreme apartheid proposals put forth by the Verwoerd government. The percentage of Nationalist supporters among the all-white electorate dropped from 49.8 to 48.4. and: ' the abstention rate--25 percent-- was high. Nevertheless, aided by considerable gerrymandering, the party increased its total of seats in the four provincial legislatures from 105 to 110, compared with a total of 60 for the opposition United party CUP). The most controversial issue in the elections was the question of "Bantustans"--the creation of "self-governing" African enclaves within the union to further the government's apartheid policies. The SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 10 of 14 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 === [PDF page 19] === Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 November 1959 UP, although committed to racial segregation, opposed the Bantustans on the ground that they would tend to divide the country. The UP was split prior to the elections by the defection of a liberal group favoring a clear stand against apartheid, an event which may lead to increased political activity by liberal elements. The American Embassy notes that while the Nationalist party has expanded rapidly in the past decade, the recent elections may signal a slowdown in this growth. Prime Minister Verwoerd, however, has publicly interpreted the resuits as a mandate for his policies, including the formation of Bantustans. In any case, implementation of Bantustans may be portentous in terms both of South Africa's race relations and of European support for the Nationalists. Endemic racial unrest has most recently been manifested in protests concerning the government's resettlement of a native woman labor leader. In its foreign affairs, the Union of South Africa continues to be faced with widespread opposition to its racial policies. While a muchdiscussed East African boycott of South African goods has not yet materialized, the UN General Assembly appears _likely to pass resolutions attacking the union's apartheid SITUATION Insurgent military activity in Laos continues on arelatively small scale. The Laotian Army has concluded a security sweep in northern Sam Neua Province. Other army policies and its refusal to place Southwest Africa under UN trusteeship. Britain's stated intention to prepare Basutoland for selfrule may provide an irritant to BELGIAN CONGO $ 0 MiLEB 400 TANGANYIKA 25X11 PTANGANTNG } ANGOLA RHODESIA _t AND NYASALA fo. nae a - SQUTH-WEST SOUTH o ATLANTIC OCEAN 30785 oe the union's always sensitive relations with the UK. The Nationalists have made no secret of their desire to assimilate within South Africa Basutoland and the other two High Commission Territories now ruled by the UK. South Africa has delayed renouncing dominion status in favor of a republic partly in the hope of gaining London's blessing for assimilating the territories. Britain, however, appears unlikely to agree to any solution which would involve South African control of the territories. 25X11 IN LAOS units are engaged in moppingup operations against dissidents in northeastern Luang Prabang Province, and are exerting pressure on enemy forces in southeastern Phong Saly Province. SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page ll of 14 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 === [PDF page 20] === 25xX1 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 November 1959 Operations in central and 20X1 southern Laos are getting under way. While these operations cannot be expected to in 25x1 have conclusive results, they the view of the Soviet Governserve to bolster the govern- ment, the Laotian situation is ment's prestige among the pop- “outside the competence of the ulace and to counter the ene- United Nations." Within the my's subversive activities. United Nations, Soviet spokesmen continue to oppose Secre- The government has still tary General Hammarskjold's trip not set a new date for the to Laos and his plan to leave a twice-postponed trial of Prince | personal representative there. Souphannouvong and other pro- Soviet Permanent UN Delegate Communist leaders. Preoccupa- Sobolev informed Hammarskjold tion with the funerals of King in a letter on 9 November that Sisavang Vong and Prince his trip to Laos was "undesir- Petsarath, the coronation of -able" and that the United Nations King Savang, and the visit to should take no hand in the Lao- Laos of UN Secretary General tian situation. Dag Hammarskjold virtually precludes an early date, Hammarskjold's decision to go to Laos despite Soviet objec- The Soviet Union, while tions exposes him to charges by trailing Peiping and Hanoi in Moscow that he has violated the quantity and tone of its the impartiality associated with propaganda on Laos, continues his office, Hammarskjold told to bring diplomatic pressure Ambassador Lodge on 7 November to bear in support of a Commu- that he would rather incur the nist solution to the Laotian USSR's ire than its disrespect crisis. --"which is what I would do if I let them kick me around," Hanmarskjold plans to remain in Laos about six days and will _ probably temporarily appoint Sakari Tuomioja of Finland--now executive secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Europe-- as his personal representative in Laos. 25X11 SINGAPORE PRIME MINISTER MOVES TO COUNTER PRO-COMMUNIST INFLUENCE The moderate leaders of counter the growing influence _ Singapore's ruling People's of the party's extremists. Action party (PAP) are publicly taking 4a Stronger anti-Com- 25X1 munist line and appear to be Prime Minister Lee Kuan stepping up their efforts to Yew hopes to develop strong SECRET PART If NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 12 or 14 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 === [PDF page 21] === Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 November 1959 grass-roots support in the rural areas, where about one third of) Singapore's 1,500,000 people live. The government is planning support for an organization to rival the Rural Dvwellers' Association, which is dominated by Chan Chiaw Thor, a PAP extremist released from jail in June. Chan is a close associate of Lim Chin Siong, Singapore's most influential pro-Communist and Lee's primary rival for control of the PAP and the government. Several recent public statements by PAP leaders seem to reflect a decision to take a stronger public position against Communist China as well as local Communists. In a speech on 28 October, Prime Minister Lee reportedly warned ti.2 Communistinfluenced, all-Chinese student body of Nanyang University in Singapore that a resurgent China was becoming an "object of apprehension" in Southeast Asia and that Nanyang must not become an "outpost of Chinese dominance:’ The deputy prime minister recently told the Legislative Assembly that the government had no intention of jeopardizing the general welfare for the benefit of a small group (Communists) "whose cause we consider mistaken," CHINESE NATIONALISTS THREATEN The Chinese Nationalists have threatened to enforce their blockade of Amoy and fire on the next merchant ship which approaches Amoy harbor. Although military officials have promised to abstain from firing on a British ship now in the port, they are disturbed over the possibility of increased British shipping. Admiral Smoot, US commander of the Taiwan Defense Command, believes the next ship that enters Amoy waters will be heavily shelled. The Taichung Shan, which arrived on 25 September and was In another move to strengthen his government, Lee for the first time is seeking the support of the relatively small group of English-educated Chinese, a large portion of whom are teachers and civil servants. During the election campaign and Since the PAP came to power in June, this group, which prospered under British rule, has come under sharp attack as colonial "stooges." 25X11 25X11 Government plans appear designed to counter the pro- Communists and, at the same time, avoid alienating the mass of PAP's Chinese supporters, who are oriented toward mainland China and easily influenced by the PAP extremists. This is, at best, a difficult program to carry out and one that will be further complicated by the growing economic problems facing this overcrowded island. 25X11 25X11 TO ENFORCE BLOCKADE OF AMOY the first British ship to call at Amoy since January, was fired on by Nationalist artillery. The American consul general in Hong Kong believes that the Chinese Communists may be using the Communist-chartered British ship now in Amoy, which arrived there on 4 November to test the Chinese Nationalist blockade, to keep the Chenmen issue alive and embarrass US- British relations. Should the Nationalists open fire, the Communists will probably react promptly--they fired five rounds of high explosives at the Tai- |. chung Shah. SECRET PART Ii NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 13 of 14 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 === [PDF page 22] === 25X11 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 November 1959 AMOY - CHINMEN AREA Nationalist-held territory [J Communist-hetd territory 2 ev ‘988 se Tungan . ‘Machiang Tunnel apie’ et Killanghsu “~ PN foe TATAN.——LIEH_ HSU ENRTAN™? LITTLE QUENOY SS i Minister of National Defense Yu Ta-wei apparently is under pressure from other military officials, who are concerned that failure to enforce the port closure would impair Nationalist prestige on Taiwan and among the Overseas Chinese, as well as provide Peiping with useful propaganda. These officials bhelieve that a blockade of Amoy is an important reason for holding Chinmen Island and for maintaining outposts on Ta Tan and Erh Tan Islands. Chinese Nationalist officials are wary of the present relaxation of international tensions and are fearful that it may result in a curtailment of United States aid to Taiwan and make the Peiping regime more acceptable. Some officials also believe that inactivity in the strait or a Railroad “ON. Oo ~Vgvemor: \, © _FChinmen wf MATSU IS. “PAICHUAR IS, TENG SJ oo eR TP eee se a hoy Temes 19 || oo stature Mies i150 —rerve renunciation of force by the Communists would further formalize the present division into "two Chinas." Foreign Minister Huang Shao-ku has asked the United States to inform the British that Amoy is in a war area and that his government could not accept responsibility for damages to British ships in Amoy waters. The British Government has advised British merchant ships to avoid the offshore islands under Chinese Nationalist control. British authorities at Hong Kong also try to discourage calls at Amoy, but London believes it cannot prohibit such voyages taken at the owner's risk. The British Government probably would feel obliged to protest strongly against the shellin of these vessels. 25X11 SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 14 of 14 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 === [PDF page 23] === Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 November 1959 PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY The Indonesian Communist party (PKI) is the largest Communist party in Asia outside the bloc and, among the Communist parties of the free world, is exceeded in size only by the Italian party. In the past two years, the growth of the PKI's influence at the national level has been checked and much of its mass activity restricted by the army and President Sukarno, but party strength has not diminished. Overtly, the party continues to pursue unitedfront tactics, especially in its support of Sukarno. In anticipation of further army obstruction, however, the Communists are reportedly placing increased emphasis on developing their covert organization. Party Strength The PKI has largely overcome the stigma of having. launched an abortive but bloody revolt in 1948. The major areas of its strength are the island of Java~-where 64 percent of Indonesia's 85,000,000 people live--and the plantation areas and oil centers of Sumatra. Party Secretary D. N. Aidit claimed in late 1958 that party strength had increased tenfold since 1954. He gave total membership as 1,500,000, half of whom were candidate members. He added that over 50 percent of the candidate members--presumably about 375,000--were ready for full membership, so current full membership now may be ap-= proximately 1,125,000. At its sixth national congress in September 1959, the PKI almost doubled its central committee--from 18 to 35 members--probably a reflection of greatly increased over-all membership. Ten of the new members are non-Javanese, an indication of the party's efforts to increase its influence outside the main island. No up-to-date tally of the Communist party's electeral following is available, since national elections have not been held since 1955 and the 1957 provincial elections were not completed. The Communists, who had won fourth Place nationally and third place in Java in 1955, by 1957 had become the largest party in Java, drawing 25 percent of the vote. Their 1957 poll of 7,200,000 votes in Java and South Sumatra alone was a million votes higher than their national tally in 1955. Should the 1960 elections be held as scheduled, the Communist party's strength in Java and its growing activity in the outer islands are likely to boost its national total sufficiently to place it in second, if not first, place. Realizing this, the Indonesian Army probably will make a strong effort to postpone elections. SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 1 of 12 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 === [PDF page 24] === Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 November 1959 JAVA DJAKARTAs @ pak RIA, Populatjo oe By a P y [Unreadable] Rembang o fs cdjokerto Surabeja Sons INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PKI) 1957 Elections) Regency Vote City Vote Under 33.33 @ 12 NOVEMBER 1959 “Yo WA 33.3-50% © fe 25X1 MBB Over 50% STATUTE MILES Government Representation highly flexible document giving -considerable power to the execu- Despite its basic strength, tive, was decreed by Sukarno-- the party is not strongly rep- against the wishes of the politresented at the national level. ical parties--in order to provide One member of the 43-post cab- a legal basis for his concept of inet is believed to be under "guided democracy." Although Communist direction and two are the Supreme Advisory Council and considered susceptible to it. the National Planning Board are All three are deputy ministers, intended to provide political and two of them thus far appear and economic guidance under to have been relatively inac- Sukarno's direction, neither tive. The Communists also may body is likely to be very incontrol up to nine persons in fluential. the 46-member Supreme Advisory Council and as many as 16 in In the 258-member Parliathe 77-member National Plan- ment, elected in 1955, the Comning Board. munists hold 32 seats, control seven more, and probably influ- The cabinet and the two ence at least three others. The other organizations were ap- party is carefully watching pointed by President Sukarno progress toward the formation in July 1959 by authority of' of the People's Congress, the the readopted "1945 constitu- legislature which is to be tion," This constitution, a formed--presumably in the next 130 af PHI LuPPives! nue TALAUD ISLANDS sTarakan SANGIHE ISLANDS an orotas INGAPORE. Menado, Pakonbaru | ° Tolitali, "Tondano HALMAHERA Padang. 3.676.000 sToboli Balikpapon, Pals spose / \ SUMATRA CELEBES \ ~ 13,987.000: 6.206.000 \ crea \ NETHERLANDS ... NEW GUINEA Bandjermasin sKendatin or yee a S\uaow 2? 777,000 ae Makassar DIAKARTA ® JAVA 55,130,000 Surabaya POPULATION Total populotion- 84,982,000. 12 NOVEMBER 1959 25xX1; Total Outer Islands LESSER SUNDA ISLANDS 29.851.000 5.205.000 _ AUSTRALIA ie a0 2 Waa { Mataram FLORES SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 2 of 12 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 === [PDF page 25] === 25X1 25xX1 25X11 25X11 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 BS 7 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 November 1959 few months--to accord with the changed constitution, This % body--the size of which has not been set--will apparently be appointed by Sukarno partly from present parliamentary membership and partly from such representative organizations as ‘labor unions and youth groups. As the result of the 1957 electoral gains, PKI strength is considerably more impressive at the regional than at the national level. In Central Java, the PKI has a plurality in the provincial council, majorities in seven and pluralities in five of 28 regency (county) councils, and majorities in four of six municipal councils, In East Java it holds majorities in four and pluralities in six of 29 regency councils, and pluralities in four of eight municipal councils, The Communists will lose some of their regional administrative strength, however, through a presidential decree, effective December 1959, which abolishes much of the local autonomy which has prevailed during the past two years and restores it to the central government, The party reportedly is using force to consolidate its ains in Central Java, the Communists have murdered “numerous” village headmen who are members of the National party. Terrorism, short of physical attack against non~Communists, has been reported throughout the "Merapi-Merbabu Complex,” a traditional Communist stronghold in Central Java.,roughly bounded by the cities of Rembang, Semarang, Salatiga, Solo, and Madiun. [the Com munists hope to develop this area as an operations base rela- ‘tively free of ¢lose government ‘supervision or interference by - anti-Communist parties. Tactics and Targets The Communists achieved their greatest influence in national politics in 1957 through a series of developments which included Sukarno's cultivation of Communist support for his "guided democracy" concept, PKI gains in the Jayanese provincial elections, and Communist exploitation of the official take-over of Dutch interests in December 1957. At this point the army abruptly seized those Dutch enterprises which had been taken over by the Communists. This period marked the beginning of Sukarno's tacit support of the army's policy of obstructing the Communists. During the past two years the army has forestalled Communist-inspired labor unrest and mass demonstrations, and from time to time it has severely restricted the PKI's polit-— ical and propaganda activities. Moreover, Sukarno's "guided democracy," by de-emphasizing political party and parliamentary activity, has been unfavorcbhle to the Communist strategy of "peaceful parliamentary tactics." Despite its setback, the PKI has continued united-front tactics, with its cardinal principle support of President Sukarno, The most revealing recent Communist document is Aidit's "Draft Theses}' presented to the PKI central committee in November 1958 and to the party's sixth national congress in September 1959. Aidit stated that the party's two most urgent tasks are support of the “anti-imperialist national front based on alliance SECRET PART IIT PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 3 of 12° Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 === [PDF page 26] === Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 So SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 November 1959 of workers and peasants" and the development of the party on as large a scale as possible with a "broad mass character." He cautioned against failing to distinguish between the party's ultimate program and the special program it must follow in light of the present situation, Despite initial reluctance, the party strongly supported Sukarno‘s decision to return to the 1945 constitution, Although it regards the present armyinfluenced Sukarno-Djuanda cab~- inet as a disappointment to "the people," it has pledged to support the cabinet's "progressive" policies but to oppose policies harmful to the people. These tactics have undoubtedly been closely coordinated with Moscow and Peiping. Aidit spent approximately six weeks in Moscow and three weeks in Peiping in early 1959. Reported dissension over tactics among the Indonesian Communist leadership has not yet appeared sufficient to affect the basic unity or the effectiveness of the party. Major Communist targets listed in the "Draft Theses" are the usual ones--workers, peasants, youth, and the intelligentsia. Apparently one result of army obstruction of Communist labor activity is an intensified PKI effort among the peasantry. Although Communist strength predominates among the organized peasantry, party officials complain of member apathy toward work among the peasants and acknowledge that only 3,700,000 of Indonesia's 65,000,000 peasants are ‘under the leadership of revolutionary peasant organiza-— tions," The priority target for infiltration apparently is still the army. The army is under strong non-Communist leadership, and less than 100 members of an officer corps of 12,000 have been identified as Communist sympathizers. Communist subversion among enlisted ranks in East and Central Java, however, is presumably growing. Estimates of Communist influence vary greatly. 25x1 25X1 8 of 14 battalions 25X11 in Central Java are Communist influenced, but the army chief of staff, General Nasution, insists that his battalion commanders are reliable and control their men. The Communists are obviously sending recruits into the Village Guard organization, while non-Communist organizations are making no deliberate effort to do so. Faced with possible increased army obstruction, the Communists are reportedly plac-— ing increased emphasis on their covert organization, 25X1 25X11 new Communist members are being brought directly into the underground party and that this has been going on since about March 1959. Front Activity The Communists have large and vigorous party-controlled organizations in every significant area of Indonesian society. SOBSI, their labor federation, is the largest labor organization in Indonesia; the Communist peasant group, the BTI, is the largest and most effective in organized peasantry. The PKI is represented among youth by Pemuda Rakjat, among women's organizations by GERWANI, is almost alone in the cultural realm with LEKRA, and has strong influence in the national veterans' organization. All of these organizations have come under a SECRET PART ITI PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 4 of 12 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 === [PDF page 27] === Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 mo, SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 November 1959 degree of army supervision through the ingenious use of the army-controlled National Front for Liberation of West Irian, However, a reorganization of the front by Sukarno, which would reduce army controls, may be imminent. A Significant facet of Communist activity which has been permitted to flourish with little or no interference is the People's University. Founded in Djakarta in September 1958, it now has branches in Surabaya, Bandung, and Jogjakarta in Java, Mataram in Lombok,, and Medan and Palembang. in Sumatra. The "university" chain, which is not accredited, appeals to those who are financially or academically unable to attend accredited institutions, Some 2,000 to 3,000 students are attending the seven branches, Marxist politics and economics and a course in the Indonesian independence movement are compulsory. Sukarno, Army, and PKI Indonesia's political orientation depends on three factors--President Sukarno, the army, and the Communist party-- and their attitudes toward one another, Sukarno, despite a gradual reduction in his prestige and his area of maneuverability, remains the dominant political factor in the nation, The army, which is under strong non-Communist leadership and has expanded its administrative and policy-making role in the past year, is the only organization capable of opposing the Communists effectively. The Communists have lost influence at the national level during the past 18 months because of cooperation between has reasserted his' good will toward the Communists in several instances, The most significant of these were his personal intercession to permit the Communists to hold their sixth national congress and his address at the congress' closing reception. Sukarno remains the key to Communist influence in Indonesia. The Communists believe they are not strong enough to oppose him in the arena of their mutual support--the minds of the peasants of Java. For this reason, support of Sukarno and identification with his policies constitute the touchstone of overt Communist tactics. Sukarno, although aware of the danger of a strong Communist party and willing to assist in restraining it, is reluctant for two reasons to challenge it personally and specifically. First, he wishes to retain Communist support for use in his own tactics of political balancing within Indonesia, Secondly, the major source of his power rests--as does that of the Communists--in populous Java, Sukarno apparently fears that a challenge of the Communist party would force the Javanese masses to choose between him and the Communists, thereby splitting his own support, Although elections may be postponed, the Communist party continues to be intensely active at the village level, in marked contrast to other parties, and its following continues to grow. It is as active in its front organizations and in the government structure as is possible without incurring stronger army retaliation. Army pressures thus far do not amount to destructive opposition but to obstruction and containment; Communist expansion Sukarno and the army. In re- into new levels of activity would cent weeks, however, Sukarno result if army pressures were removed. 25X1 SECRET PART TTT ATTRENS AND DERADECTIVE: Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79- 00927A00250004000'. 1" 5. of. 12 === [PDF page 28] === Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 November 1959 ENLARGEMENT OF MAJOR UN COUNCILS The problem of increasing the number of elective seats on major UN councils to accommodate the rapidly growing membership of the United Nations is becoming acute. The 14th UN General Assembly has again inconclusively discussed the matter, but the USSR remains opposed to any increase until Peiping represents China on the UN Security Council, Enlarging the membership of UN councils requires a charter amendment and as such is subject to ratification by a twothirds majority of member states, including all five permanent members of the Secu-~ rity Council, Pending approval of such an increase, the small Asian- African nations are already pressing to have the General Assembly re-allocate the existing geographical distribution of the elective seats to the detriment of the Latin American and Western European areas. The desire of many new UN members~-mostly from Asia and Africa--to gain elective offices, coupled with the Latin American bloc's determination to maintain its large share of such offices, will result ultimately in strong pressure for admitting Peiping to the UN. The Problem The increase in UN member states from 60 in 1955 to 82 in 1959 underscores the need to enlarge UN councils in order to afford more equitable geographical distribution of elective seats than is now the case, The 20 Latin American nations received a large share of the seats on UN councils in the early years in recognition of the fact that they mustered one third of the total General Assembly vote. The problem of equitable distribution of elective seats will become more . tribution. acute over the next five years when UN membership is expected to increase to at least 95,as UN trust and non-~-self-governing territories, mostly in Africa, attain independence, The General Assembly has since 1956 discussed the problem of increasing the number of elective seats on the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, Each year the assembly has acknowledged the need for such an increase but has deferred the question because "amendment of the charter requires a larger area of agreement than prevails at the time." Security Council Article 23 of the UN Charter provides that the Security Council shall consist of 11 members, the five Big Powers, with permament seats, and six other members elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms, Concerning the election of nonpermanent members, the charter specified that due regard shall be paid to a member's ability to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security as well as to equitable geographical dis- In practice the ' smaller states of the UN have ‘ emphasized the geographic criterion when seeking Security Council vacancies. . The so-called "gentlemen's agreement" of 1946 was an effort to define “equitable geographic distribution," and mirrored the power position of the immediate postwar period, The plan, as set up then, allocated two seats to Latin America, and one each to the British Commonwealth, the Middle East, Western Europe, and Eastern Europe. Filling of the seat for Eastern Europe has produced the most friction, The first three General Assembly sessions honored the SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 6 of 12 === [PDF page 29] === Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 November 1959 understanding in practice. The first modification of the distributional scheme, as interpreted by the Soviet bloc, took place in 1949 when the General Assembly chose Yugoslavia to replace the Ukraine. There was bitter opposition from the USSR, which felt that Tito's break with Stalin in 1949 no longer entitled Yugoslavia to the Soviet bloc seat. At the 1951 and 1953 assembly sessions, Greece and Turkey respectively were elected to the "Eastern European" seat after contests with Soviet-backed candidates. The USSR could neither command the votes in the assembly nor convince others that Greece and Turkey did not qualify as Eastern European states, In 1955 the bitter contest between Yugoslavia and the Philippines resulted in a decision to split the two-year term between the two countries, thus setting a precedent for an Asian to occupy this seat. The strong support for the Philippines from new Asian-African members reflected their desire to establish a council seat for that area. The widest departure from usual Soviet behavior in elections occurred in 1957 when Japan defeated Czechoslovakia on the first ballot, The Soviet delegation let this go without a protest, This year, the USSR has returned to the attack and has assiduously promoted the Polish candidacy by citing the 1946 agreement as well as the current detente resulting from the exchange of visits between President Eisenhower and Khrushchev, The strong support for Poland through 37 inconclusive ballots indicates the strength of such arguments among UN members who consider this council seat allocated to Eastern Europe under the 1946 agreement. In the discussion of how many seats should be added to the Security Council in the unlikely event of Soviet concurrence, most UN members are agreed on one seat each to Asia and Africa, with the Eastern European seat specifically allocated to the Soviet bloc. In the meantime, some UN members are calling the Eastern European seat a "floating seat" open to candidates from Asia and Africa. Economic and Social Council Charter provisions specify that the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) shall consist of 18 members, one third of whom are to be elected at each session of the General Assembly for a three-year term. Unlike the Security Council, retiring members are eligible for immediate re-election, No criteria have been laid down, but past elections reflect the general understanding that the council seats should represent the principal geographic regions and groupings. Three factors determine the trend in ECOSOC elections. First, the five permanent members of the Security Council-- including Nationalist China-- mave been consistently re-elected. Second, it appears that some of the smaller states which are not in a position to make a substantial contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security and consequently have not been elected to the Security Council are elected to ECOSOC, Third, an attempt is made to maintain a balance between the advanced and underdeveloped countries on the council, In addition to the Big Five, ECOSOC seats have generally been allocated as follows: four to Latin America, three to Western Europe, and two each to Asia-Africa, the commonwealth, and Eastern Europe. The Eastern European seats have always been occupied by Communist countries. Pressure to increase the number of seats on ECOSOC stems primarily from the type of work this council does, Technical UN aid programs in economic and social fields are channeled through this body. Most UN SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES > Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 Pave 7 of 12, === [PDF page 30] === = Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 So SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 November 1959 members agree that more representation for the underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa would aid ECOSOC in its planning of aid programs for these countries. Their presence would also help educate them to the realities and difficulties attendant on any aid program. Outlook It seems doubtful at this time that the USSR would consent to amending the charter to permit enlargement of UN councils, Moscow has reiterated at the current session that such changes are impossible until Peiping's "legitimate rights in the UN are restored." MOSCOW'S CAMPAIGN FOR A Since the Soviet 21st party congress last January, the creation of a "new Communist man" has been widely discussed as one of the regime's basic objectives. Voluminous propaganda on the theme has been accompanied by a series of measures which purport to aim at "increasing the Communist consciousness" of the masses, The campaign, still ACCORDING TO MOSCOW ..-Al] the ideological work of party and state is called upon to develop new qualittes tn the Soviet people... -- N. 5, Khrushchev at the 21st party congress January 1959 Thousands and thousands @ Soviet teachers, modest, unknown, datiy, hourly, forgetting rest and diverston, personal comfort, with astonishing pattence, but more important with a feeling of foyand tremendous creativity are accomplishing a great deed: they are creating the most precious thing in the world-~the new Commnist man. -- Izvestia, 25 October 1959 On 14 October during the assembly's special political committee discussion of the question, Soviet permanent UN delegate Arkady Sobolev asserted that the main problem was not the increase in the council's membership but the “nonrespect" for equitable geographic distribution. He had earlier suggested that the issue might be handled by reducing Latin American representation on the councils. The Soviet position will result in further pressure for Peiping’s admission to the UN. This pressure will come from those Asian and African members who strongly desire additional seats and the Latin American countriés, 25x1 which are equally determined to maintain their present share of allocated offices. “NEW COMMUNIST MAN" in its initial stages, is probably not expected even in Moscow to reach its grandiose goals, but it has already had some effect. In ideological terms, the creation of a "new man" is represented as a corollary of the Soviet Union's entry into the “full-scale building of a Communist society"--the material equivalent of which is the Seven-Year Plan. Despite its doctrinal trappings, the "new man" drive is primarily calculated to promote immediate political and social aims, particularly the elimination of some of the more serious ills of Soviet society and the unification of all the people in enthusiastic support of the regime and its policies. One of Moscow's purposes in declaring the "full-scale" building of Communism is to jog SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 8 of 12 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 === [PDF page 31] === Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 November 1959 the people into.renewed effort and to overcome their skepticism about the future. In seeking to recapture the elan of the revolutionary days, the Kremlin is promoting an atmosphere of national excitement and is exhorting the people to participate in a dramatic episode of history--the big push toward Communism. The Soviet leadership presumably hopes that such a spirit will result in greater efforts to achieve its immediate economic goals. The principal target of the drive is the younger generation,during whose lifetime, Khrushchev has claimed, Communism could conceivably come into being. These people are to carry out the great economic expansion projected by Khrushchev but, at the same time, they are probably the ones from The Sovtet people perform noble feats, but not for the sake of personal glory and selfishness. Thetr action ts motivated by lofty tdeology and care for the public good. This is @ Communist feature, because it ts tn concern for the comnon interests that Comminism begins. -- Pravda, 12 July 1959 whom Moscow can expect the most trouble; it is among the youth that ideological malaise seems to be greatest and the accumulated frustrations of Soviet life most keenly felt. The New Man--~A Hero Image Those characteristics which the leadership wants to inculcate in the Soviet people are not new to Marxist doctrine, but in the past the pure Communist state to which such conduct would lead was admittedly remote. Now, however, Khrushchev is trying to convince the peocple that the drive for a Communist society is well on its way; the future will belong to a new kind of citizen--the "Communist man," who is heroic not because he dies for the revolution, but because he "lives and works in a Communist way." Valentina Gaganova, a: factory worker, is*held up ‘as an example of the-new-heroism because she voluntarily took a cut in salary and transferred into a substandard shop out of a desire to help boost production. Proclaimed a "Hero of Socialist Labor" by the government, she inspired the workers' movement which bears her name. Individuals with outstanding labor records and exemplary personal lives are designated "shock workers of Communist labor" and are often further rewarded by having their photographs dis- Played on the front page of Pravda. Production teams in factories are urged to compete for the title "Brigade of Communist Labor." The regime emphasizes that the common characteristic of these latter-day Stakhanovites is their self-sacrifice for the common good. This is a Communist feature, according to Pravda, "because it is in concern for the interests of the whole of society that Communism begins." The wide publicity accorded the example of the selfless person, along with Khrushchev's injunctions about consciousness of one's debts to society, emphasize how important this trait is to the regime. Official encouragement of self-sacrifice, however, seems to have a more immediate purpose than "building Communism," The creation of a Communist society may be a long-term goal, but the more immediate aim is more effective work for fulfillment of the Seven-Year plan. The self-sacrifice theme may also be part of a renewed attack on the problem of incentives. Marxism recognizes the need for material rewards during the era of socialism. However, distribution of goods and services under Communism theo=- retically is to be made according to need; material incentives will be unnecessary because the SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 9 of 12 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 === [PDF page 32] === Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 November 1959 urge to work will have become fundamental. The members of the Gaganova movement represent the emergence of this characteristic in the present epoch. Their selfish wishes for material betterment are said to have been replaced by the desire to work for the common good. In the future, the ordinary worker will ideally overcome his selfishness and, like the party professional, subject himself to the iron discipline and unquestioning obedience necessary for building Communism. Remnants of Capitalism In his mental outlook, the "new Communist man" is represented as completely devoid of ‘remnants of a capitalist consciousness." This term embraces all those negative traits which the Kremlin wants to see eradicated in present Soviet society, and the struggle for their elimination is a major part of the "new man" drive. Crime, hooliganism, and alcoholism are the chief problems. Their continuing presence in the USSR is explained by the fact that many people still have not overcome the "remnants of the bourgeois past." During the past year, the struggle against alcoholism, hooliganism, and “antisocial behavior" has been turned in-~ creasingly over to volunteer militia brigades and to the so-called comrades' courts. Last month, the legislative proposal commissions of the Supreme Soviet published draft laws increasing the powers of the comrades' courts and providing for the formation of juvenile delinquency commissions at the local level. The members of these quasi-judial vigilante units are said to typify the new man's voluntary support of the law and his impatience toward lawbreakers. For example, the primary function of the comrades' courts is to summon meetings in shops, factories, and apartment houses and subject petty offenders to mass condemnation. Despite some objections to this procedure from legal circles, the fear of public embarrassment has won increasing recognition as a legitimate means of ensuring social conformity and "educating" people away from habits reminiscent of the capitalist past. Moscow evidently wants to throw the fear of disgrace into wouldbe offenders, and at the same time to fire up the "Communist’” fervor of the law-abiding citizen by encouraging his personal participation in law enforcement and in mass upbraidings of his neighbors. Religion has also come under increased attack as one of the most dangerous vestiges of capitalism, and some calls have been made for a revival of the Society of the Militant Godless, one of the regime's principal weapons against the church in the early years of Soviet rule. Minority Nationalism Fundamentally, the new man is a Soviet Russian. One of the aims of the Kremlin is to instill Great Russian patriotism in the non-Russian population. Some facets of Khrushchev's present drive against local nationalism strongly suggest that increased Russification of the national minorities is being contemplated. During the first few months of the antinationalism campaign Moscow tried to solve the problem by dismissing local party and government leaders who, in various ways, had sought to encourage the national pride of the minorities or who had discriminated against the Russians sent into their bailiwicks. SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PRESPECTIVES Page 10 of 12 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 === [PDF page 33] === Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 - SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY. SUMMARY 12 November 1959 More recently, however, direct action against some of the leaders in the minority areas has been augmented by a general propaganda attack against any form of nationalism or localism; Moscow complains about "those backward people" who still harbor hostility toward "representatives of other nations and national groups" (i.e., Russians) and who show disrespect for the language and culture of others. Increased teaching of the Russian language may be the first step in the effort to hasten assimilation. According to Moscow radio, "the Great Russian language has an important cultural effect on the other peoples of the USSR." Further, "the knowledge of Russian by all the Soviet people will make the best example of Russian culture...accessible to all." Recent Soviet articles have hinted that eventually Russian should be the lingua franca of the Communist world. Plans for the ‘Future: The Kremlin has apparently urged scientists and educators to begin thinking about how the "new Communist man" can be fostered within the existing social framework and to recommend steps to be taken in the future. Numerous reports claim that research in the behavioral sciences is being stepped up. Some Western scientists have come back from conferences with their Soviet counterparts with the feeling that Russian research may ultimately aim at achieving mass control and ‘manipulation of human behavior, Moscow's main emphasis at the moment, however, is on less grandiose schemes in the fields of education and mass propaganda work. Pravda, for instance, recently discussed a decree on the importance of assigning specific work tasks to school children, claiming that this step would help overcome the aversion to physical labor so common to the Soviet younger generation. It could also help transform work into a vital inner need. Some educators have begun to re-evaluate educational methods to determine the proper use of social pressures in rearing the new man. Among the problems with which they are seeking to cope is widespread cheating on examinations. They are also trying to solve the. problem of conflicting sources of authority in schools and homes. Boarding schools, with their substitution of state authority for parental, may be one answer. The Communist Youth League (Komsomol) has also committed itself to the ‘new nian" drive. At its plenary session last The [Komosomol/ plenum emphasized that a profound study of theoretical problems and practical tasks set by the 2lst party congress and by the central committee plenum...mst be the main content of all mass political work for the next few years. Komsomol organizations are called upon to bring up young people ina spirit of...high principles of Comminist morality, to develop in youth the features of a man of Communist society. -- TASS communiqué, 23 October 1959 month, the Komsomel central committee called for a nationwide, long-term campaign to raise the general educational and cultural level of Soviet youth, pointing out that it is the Komsomol's task to develop "a Communist world outlook and the qualities of a Communist society in boys and girls." It was proposed that this task be assigned to Komsomol commissions which would be set up in all territorial units; the plenum also enjoined the youth to follow the example of Gaganova and more actively develop shock workers and brigades of Communist labor. Prospects for Success If the "new man" drive continues to gain momentun, SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 11 of 12 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 === [PDF page 34] === 25xX1 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 - SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 November 1959 certain features of the Soviet system will work for its success. Along with the relaxations which accompanied de- Stalinization, tangible economic progress has evidently convinced Significant numbers of the population that Khrushchev's brand of Communism is indeed the “wave of the future," and has created a comforting sense of stability and security. This has helped to make the sacrifices necessary for Communism somewhat more bearable. In any event, most of the people have little hope of living under any other system; therefore they can only await changes for the better in the one they have. "the ground swell is already one of pride, optimism, and confidence ina future whose worst feature is that it comes too slowly." At the same time, the Kremlin is faced with serious stumbling blocks. Rampant opportunism has always been a hallmark of Soviet society. The same self-interest against which Moscow rails so loudly has been built into the system through the bonuses. and emoluments which are customarily awarded for good work. While incessant propaganda about the virtues of the "Communist man" may result in increased lip-service to the idea --especially when played to a captive audience--there is little reason to believe that the Soviet status-seeker will join the ranks of the Gaganova movement out of any genuinely self-sacrificial desire to build anew world. It is quite obvious that personal betterment will remain a primary objective of a majority of the people for some time to come. Unless the regime can come up with a satisfactory solution to this and the related problems of disdain for physical labor and growing class-consciousness, the "new Communist man" may evolve into something quite different from the saintly superman envisioned by the propaganda hacks. Yet this is not an immediate problem. Soviet socialism under Khrushchev is deeply committed to an elaborate system of incentives and will certainly continue to be for some time. At least over the short run, then, the regime will probably be quite satisfied if the campaign succeeds in combating some of the common ailments which beset Soviet society today. If the Kremlin continues to combine incentives and visible progress toward the better life with the proper dosage of education, exhortation, and coercion, some of the desired results might be achieved. The problem of the moment is to revitalize a society which has grown indifferent to the long-term goals of the regime; the promise that prosperity for all is just around the corner might get people to work harder and with a little more enthusiasm. Such innovations as the comrades' courts will keep the problems of antisocial behavior before the public eye and could give the people a feeling of participation in government affairs. Taken as a whole, the campaign could bring about a new sense of Russian national pride and the resultant increased loyalty to the regime, 25X1 SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 12 of 12 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 === [PDF page 35] === 25X11 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 === [PDF page 36] === Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1 SPSAET CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A002500040001-1