Indonesia: Political Detainees in Indonesia (FCO 24/1701, 1973, Folder 5)

=== [PDF page 1] === FC 4420 (N.B. The grading of this jacket must be the same as that of the highest graded document contained in it. The appropriate upgrading slip must be affixed whenever necessary.) Contents checked for transfer to CONFIDENTIAL..,,, | cm H.M. DIPLOMATIC SERVICE DEPT 7 Bayern Weer TouGic \OL-1GO FILE Ne, FOO WZ occ (Part nee Wess teSIOMLEIA ccc cecccccscsessene | REFER TO REFER TO REFER TO NAME TO NAME TO NAME TO ee cs SEE: ene “ a cats ee) SEE: ane RETURN THEM TO REGISTRY FOR B.U. Or P.A. Registry Address YEAR STAMP CONFIDENTIAL,,.,,, MAES (N.B. The grading of this jacket must be the same as that of the highest graded document contained in it. The appropriate upgrading slip must be affixed whenever necessary.) FILE No wD! ste eeeveeeeseeeees === [PDF page 2] === (N.B. The grading of this jacket must be the same as that of the highest graded document contained in it. The appropriate upgrading slip must be affixed when ever necessary.) H.M. DIPLOMATIC SERVICE FILE Nok WD 1/2 TITLE: POLITICAL DETAINEES INDONESIA. REFER TO NAME (and dept. when necessary) REFER TO (and dept. when necessary) Contents checked for transfer to DRO. ed). Se Date AAs Ie DEPT. or POST —h imc PACI. i SOU vi -W i T a i ‘Kequshy Register Wer Che the «..}o=> MR... CHICK MR CHick ME io mM 2 PA Vie Mk Gite («Rds 0.5. bir Slab, XIN FILES AND PAPERS UNNECESSARILY IM TO REGISTRY FOR B.U. OR P.A. Registry Address Room No. we oF. (N.B. The grading of this jacket must be the same as that of um., \« graded document contained in it. The appropriate upgrading slip must be affixed when ever necessary.) CONFIDENTIAL King Charles Street. YEAR STAMP 1973 === [PDF page 3] === Covering CONFIDENTIAL Mr Wilford Parliamentary Yffice PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION: SHCRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO INDONESIA 1. Nr Davidson has put down the attached Question for oral answer by the Secretary of State on 24 October. I submit a draft reply Notes for Supplementaries, a background note and a note on the position of the political detainees in Indonesia. J K Hickman South-West Pacific Department 22 October 1974 pr~A Sra TIP CoPy on Rad 2o/| Covering CONFIDENTIAL TETRA oe === [PDF page 4] === REFERENCES Hansard 18 October 1973 fVarliamentary Office: please attach/ Hansard 23 Uctober 1972 (Cols 777-8) Hansard 11 December 1972 (Cols 22-3) NOTES FOR SUPPLEMENTARIES STATE VISIT 1. Her Mlajesty The Queen is making a tour in the early part of next year which will include visits to Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands Protectorate and Indonesia. The State Visit to Indonesia was announced on 22 August. MINISTERIAL VISITS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND INDONESIA 2. I last visited Indonesia in July 1972. Before that my Rt hon Friend the Minister for Overseas Development paid @ Visit and since then my Rt hon and noble Friend the Minister without Portfolio and my Rt hon and noble Friend the Defence Secretary have both visited Indonesia. Last year we received visits from the Indonesian Minister for Administrative Reform and the Minister for Defence and National security. ‘The Minister for Research pays a visit at the beginning of November. === [PDF page 5] === CONFIDENTIAL BACKGROUND NOTE le There were a number of Questions during the last session about Ministerial visits to Indonesia or about visits by Indonesian Ministers to Britain. MPs who put down questions of this nature about Indonesia are generally concerned about the plight of the large number of political prisoners in Indonesia who have been detained without trial for seven years. A separate background note on the political detainees is atached. 26 Mr Davidson may wish to probe the Secretary of State about the forthcoming State Visit to Indonesia which was announced on 22 August (during the Recess). He might suggest that it would be inappropriate for Her Majesty The Queen: to pay a State Visit to Indonesia, a country which continues to hold so many people in detention. There: are notes for supplementaries to cover these aspects. Ze The question of outstanding claims for compensation may be raised; possibly by Mr Edward Taylor who has asked many questions in the House about this subject. 4, The Indonesian Government sequestrated a number of British properties, many of them rubber estates, during Confrontation (1963-65). President Soeharto's government had admitted liability to pay compensation. Many of those British nationals who had property in Indonesia have now had these properties returned to them. Those who did not wish to take the properties back were invited to submit claims. The Indonesian authorities have assessed these claims and offered compensation to the individual claimants. The claimants are still considering this offer. There is a further category of claimants, namely those British nationals whose property was taken over prior to Gonfrontation. The Indonesian authorities have offered comments on those CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 6] === CONFIDENTIAL claims but have not so far admitted liability to pay compensation. The owners of the property are alleged to have contravened Indonesian laws about maintaining their estates. The Indonesian authorities' comments have been put to the individual claimants and we are still awaiting their response. SOUTH WEST PACIFIC DEPARTMENT 19 October 1973 CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 7] === CONFIDENTIAL BACKGROUND NOTE POLITICAL DETAINEES IN INDONESIA l. The Indonesian Government, the leaders of which have strong and bitter memories of the attempted communist coup of 1965 and who are in consequence much preoccupied with security matters, continue to detain a large number of political prisoners. Many have been in detention since 1965; few have been brought to trial although a substantial number of those whose connections with the attempted revolt were tenuous are said to have been released. We do not know for certain how many prisoners still remain in detention. ‘The Indonesian authorities have informed us that they number some 18,000. The Times correspondent claims to have been told by the same authorities that they number 36,000 and Amnesty International have put the number at 55,000, althoup they recognise that this figure should be treated with reserve. 26 The moving force behind this lobby is Mrs Carmel Budiardjo the wife of a former member of the Central Committee of the Indonesian Communist Party who has been in detention with trial since 1966. Mrs Budiardjo was herself in detention for 5 years. We able to establish that she had UK citizenship and she was released in 1971 and now lives in this country. Since then and despite the fact that she gave an undertaking to the Indonesian authorities before being released that she would not engage in political activities, she has attempted to secure HMG's support and assistance in her campaign to have her husband, who is an Indonesian citizen, released, and on behalf of the detainees generally. We understand that she is now writing book about the detainees. 36 (Strictly not for use] We have been in correspondence with Mr: at the official level. We have consistently taken the line CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 8] === CONFIDENTIAL Parliament that we have no locus standi in this matter. Although we have not admitted this publicly, we have in fact talked to the Indonesians in confidence about the Budiardjo case, and about the plight of the detainees generally. The Indonesians have indicated to us privately on a number of occasions that they do intend to bring those in Class A to trial and are looking into the possibility of releasing a large number of those in Class B. They have told us very confidentially that President Soeharto himself has decided that those in Class B must either be released or brought to trial soon. But they find daunting the prospect of trying 2,000 people: at present the machinery of the Seung is so slow that they claim to be unable to try more than 200 a yeas The Indonesians resent interference in their internal affairs, but they have been prepared to listen to us when we have spoken in confidence. But they would certainly dislike any public announcement of the fact that we have discussed or intend to discuss this affair with them. They might well decline to listen to anything further on that issue. 4, The Indonesians have classified their detainees under various headings: Class A: Those against whom they possess evidence of their implication in the 1965 abortive coup which would enable the Government to prosecute in the courts (Mr Budiardjo belongs to this category); Class B: Non-communists whose implication in the coup could not be proven; Class 0: Those who have been sympathetic to the Indonesian communis party (many of these have subsequently been released); Class X: Those not classified. The numbers in each class fluctuate as the prisoners are re-classified, released and sometimes re-arrested. SOUTH WEST PACIFIC DEPARTMENT LY October 1973 CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 9] === POLITICAL PRISONERS IN INDONESIA 3. The Indonesian authorities have confirmed that there are approximately 18,000 prisoners still in detention (2,000. in Class A, 13,000 in Class B and 4,000 as yet unclassified). The total is very much lower than the "not less than 55,000" quoted in the report by Amnesty International in March this year. ressed to make representations to the Indonesian Government The Indonesian authorities are aware of the concern felt in this country about the detainees in Indonesia. None of those in detention there, so far as we are aware, is a national of this country and we are not in a position to take further action in a matter of internal Indonesian affairs. ressed to raise this during state Visi A State Visit is essentially a ceremonial occasion. THE BUDIARDJO CASE 4. We were unable to make representations to the Indonesian authorities in respect of the one British subject ZMirs Budiardjo7 in detention and she was released in 1971. If pressed to take action in respect of Mr Budiardjo/ Mr Budiardjo is an Indonesian citizen. ACTION BY HMG AT THE UN 5. We take the initiative in raising these matters only when we are directly involved, when we have adequate evidence and when we are satisfied that our intervention will benefit the victims of the actions in question. These criteria are not met in this instance. AID PROGRAMME 6. For developmental and other reasons Indonesia is among the two largest non-Commonwealth beneficiaries under the UK Bilateral Aid Programme. The aid pledged by the UK in May this year (£12 million) represented about one-twentieth of the total offers made by Western donors and Japan to Indonesia. The Aid Programme does not give us grounds for intervening in internal affairs. === [PDF page 10] === COMPENSATION 7. In March this year the Indonesian Government made proposals for the settlement of British claims which they considered eligible under their existing compensation scheme. ome of the claimants are still considering the proposals. We are pursuing with the Indonesian authorities the question of certain remaining claims by British companies. INTERNAL SITUATION 8. General Elections were held in Indonesia in 1971 for the first time for 15 years. President Soeharto's administration secured a comfortable majority. In March this year the President was unanimously re-elected by the People's Vongress for a further term of five years. === [PDF page 11] === PAKLIAMENTARY QUiSTION The draft reply should ' Sor Ri tou? Reet Get eats eae ete ee reach the Parliamentary ~—7 Office through your Under-Secretary by for ORAL answer on.......o4... October..1973 - Witel “La Mr Arthur Davidson (Acorington): To ask tha—2> 00? '™73 Secretary of State for Foreign and Comnonwdalth Affairs, what plans he has to visit Indonogia. fap 1/2. I shall accompany Her Najesty The \ueen during Her State Visit to Indonesia in March next year. [Unreadable] === [PDF page 12] === CONFIDENTIAL Foreign and Commonwealth Office Gat. London S.W.1 29 October, 1973 Indonesian Political Detainees Thank you for your letter of 2 October enclosing a copy of a letter from Mrs. P to The Queen together with a copy of your reply. You asked for information about the political detainees in Indonesia. I attach a background note for your information. The Indonesian authorities are well aware of the concern which is felt in this country about the detainees. We have made successful representations in the one case where a British subject was concerned and obtained her release, though her husband, an Indonesian citizen, is still detained. But as there are no longer any British subjects in detention, HMG are not in a position to take further official action in what is, after all, a matter of internal Indonesian affairs. In our replies to correspondence on this subject from members of the public we propose to emphasise that a State Visit is a ceremonial occasion which is not in any case appropriate for the discussion of matters of this kind. W. Heseltine, Esq., CVO, Buckingham Palace. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 13] === Political Detainees in Indonesia ewe eee eetariece in tnaonesla The Indonesian Government, the leaders of which have strong and bitter memories of the attempted communist coup of 1965 and who are in consequence much preoccupied with security matters, continue to detain a large number of political prisoners. They have been in detention since the quashing of the attempted communist coup in 1965; few have been brought to trial although a substantial number of those whose connections with the attempted revolt were tenuous are said to have been released. We do not know for certain how many prisoners still remain in detention. The Indonesian authorities have informed us that they number some 18,000. The Times correspondent claims to have been told by the same authorities that they number 36,000 and Amnesty International have put the number at 55,000, although they recognise that this figure should be treated with reserve. Ze The plight of the detainees in Indonesia is a matter of concern to a small but fairly vociferous group in this country who have persuaded Amnesty International to espouse their cause with some vigour. MPs such as Mr. Ivor Richard, QC. who are involved with Amnesty have asked Questions in the House of Commons and have written to FCO Ministers. 3s The moving force behind this lobby is Mrs. Carmel Budiardjo, the wife of a former member of the Central Committee of the Indonesian Communist Party, who has been in detention without trial since 1966. Mrs. Budiardjo was herself in detention for five years. We were able to establish that she had UK citizenship and she was released in 1971 and now lives in this country. Since then and despite the fact that she gave an undertaking to the Indonesian authorities before being released that she would not engage in political activities, she has /attempted CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 14] === attempted to secure HMG's support and assistance in her canpaign to have her husband, who is an Indonesian citizen, released, and on behalf of the detainees generally. We understand that she is now writing a book about the detainees. 4. The question of detainees in Indonesia seems to provoke relatively little interest in this country outside the circle mentioned above. It is also probable that the hard core of the detainees - Category A (see below) - who number apparently about 2,000 were behind the 1965 abortive coup and can with some justification be considered still a threat to the present régime in Indonesia. 6 We have been in correspondence with Mrs. Budiardjo at the official level. We have consistently taken the line in Parliament that we have no locus standi in this matter. Although we have not admitted this publicly, we have in fact talked to the Indonesians in confidence about the Budiardjo case, and about the plight of the detainees generally. The Indonesians have indicated to us privately on a number of occasions that they do intend to bring those in Glass A to trial and are looking into the possibility of releasing a large number of those in Class B. They have told us very confidentially that President Soeharto himself has decided that those in Class B must either be released or brought to trial soon. But they find daunting the prospect of trying 2,000 people: at present the machinery of the courts is so slow that they claim to be unable to try more than 200 a year. The Indonesians resent what they regard as interference in their internal affairs. They have been prepared to listen to us when we have spoken in confidence. But they would certainly dislike any public announcement of the fact that we have discussed or intend to discuss this affair with them. /They CONFIDENTIAL © === [PDF page 15] === They might well decline to listen to anything further on the issue. Otherwise the Indonesians are well aware Of the concern felt in this cotintry for those still remaining in detention. Oe The Indonesians have classified their detainees under various headings entitled: Class A: Those against whom they possess evidence Of their implication in the 1965 abortive coup which would enable the Government to prosecute in the courts (Mr. Budiardjo belongs to this category); Class B: Non-communists whose implication in the coup could not be proven; Class C: Those who have been sympathetic to the Indonesian communist party (many of these have subsequently been released); Class Xs Those not. classified: The numbers in each class fluctuate as the prisoners are re-classified, released and sometimes re-arrested. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 16] === | REGI ae \e Tic Wye {1 30/. J t-novirs | It P a | hty Private ew teade wee hy | +p INDONESIAN POLITICAL DETAINEES 13S ae 4 Mr. Royle has seen Mr. Slatcher's submission of 19 October and has made the following comment One1b's "T agree with the submission and Mr. Wilford's comments. I will see the Indonesian Ambassador, woo 15 an.old Inriend. Paragraph 3(e) and paragraph 4 in my judgment are right." Da Mr. Royle has also made the following comments on the body of the submission: Paragraph 3(a):- the last sentence - ''Yes" Paragraph 3(c):- the last sentence - "I agree" Paragraph 3(e):- "This is right in parliamentary terms." 29 October, L973 Me Ry ds Guest 60,500s MOS Wiliord r. Hickman CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 17] === xy Ce ” Preee bs ba taads Mr Hickpén ni Ui lez eae ee dry Mr WA | es Son. [+ heasaae \ ones la 2 Lett Geuel eg batie 3th POLITICAL DETAINEES IN INDONESIA Mh, g. 1. Mr Reg freeson MP has written to the Secretary of lev state expressing unhappiness that The Queen should be paying a State Visit to Indonesia next year in view of the large number of political prisoners still held in detention there without trial. The Private Office have asked that Mr Royle should reply. 2. Since the State Visit to Indonesia was announced on 22 August members of the public have written to The Queen about political detainees in Indonesia in the context of the forthcoming State Visit. Already two Parliamentary Questions were put down for oral answer, one by the Prime Minister, one by the Secretary of State, about visits to Indonesia. In the event, neither Question was reached, and written replies were given. The intention behind these Questions may have been to probe in supplementaries the State Visit and to raise the question of political detainees. 3. <A number of MPs, notably Mr Ivor Richard QC and Mr Peter Archer, both of whom are involved with Amnesty International, have written on numerous occasions to FCO Ministers about political detainees in Indonesia. Mr Hreeson did so on 12 July when he, as have the other MPs interested in the matter, concentrated on the case of Mr Suwondo Budiardjo, whose wife, a UK citizen,was herself released from detention in Indonesia in 1971 after we had been able to establish with the Indonesian authorities her national status. However, in his latest letter Mr Freeson is concerned with the plight of the detainees in general and has linked the question directly with that of the State Visit. A background note on political detainees in general and the Budiardjo case in particular is attached. In Parliament and in letters to the public, we have consistently taken the line that we have no grounds for intervention. 4. I submit a draft reply to Mr Freeson. Protocol and Conference Department concur. 26 October 1974 W K Slatcher South West Pacific Department oe heise Ge fe uy BAS Attire ec: lie Walrond & 7 Lo tak Mr Curle (P & CD) hor beer Lela wa eee 78 flee oe ee H palo ba haves Cound fish Ce 30 CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 18] === = ~ ela Ly — 4 CONFIDENTIAL _ Fil. INDONESIAN POLITICAL eee 1. In his Minute of 9 October Mr Grattan recommended that we should reply in rather more forthcoming terms to members of the public who have written to The Queen drawing attention to the fact that there is to be a State Visit to a country which continues to hold a large number of its nationals in detention without trial. He has asked for comments on the question of our attitude to the Indonesian political detainees as a whole. 2. The real point of issue is how far we should allow our improving relations with Indonesia - and the forthcoming State Visit is an indication that we now consider them to be good - to be soured by this issue. Admittedly the number of detainees is large; even the Indonesian authorities put their numbers at 18,000 and the conditions under which they are held may be unacceptable by Western European standards. On these grounds it is understandable that Amnesty International should consider it legitimate to try to bring the plight of these detainees to the attention of the British public through Parliament and through the Press. There is already a Parliamentary question down for oral answer on visits to Indonesia on which we can expect supplementaries on the issue of political detainees. The aim of Amnesty's campaign is to bring pressure on HMG to take up, and to be seen to take up, this question with the Indonesians with a view primarily to expediting the process of bringing the detainees to trial. This at present is extremely slow. 3. There are, however, good grounds for not becoming involved: (a) for all its faults, and I do not:deny that the continuing detention is one of them, the present Indonesian Government is a considerable improvement on the regime of President Sukarno. It is so for the South East Asian region as a whole and for British interests there. It is certainly more humanitarian and pays more than lip service to the quasi-democratic constitution of 1945 on the basis of which Indonesia proclaimed its independence. There is an Assembly which is partially elected and the President is obliged to seek re-election every five years and have his programme endorsed. President Sukarno in his later years never used this device. President Soeharto has used it twice in the seven years he has been in power. In the democracy league in Asia, Indonesia stands reasonably high. It is probable that, had the 1965 pro-communist coup succeeded, the number of Indonesians at present in detention would be considerably larger. === [PDF page 19] === CONFIDENTIAL Although the Indonesian Government are very much in control they continue to be preoccupied with security matters and consider that there is still a security problem, in some parts of the country at least. They believe t A detainees constitut if released would engage in activities hostile to the State possibly culminating in a further attempt at violent revolution. (For this reason alone Amnesty International's right to take up cudgels on their behalf is questionable; they profess to have no truck with groups of persons dedicated to political violence. ) The Indonesians understandably resent intervention by foreign governments on the issue of detainees. They are aware that detention is bad for their image, but nevertheless they regard the threat to security which these people constitute as a more important consideration. ‘The present Indonesian Government has been established for seven years, is internationally recognised by all the main countries (including the Soviet Union). ‘The position of the Indonesian Government is thus much stronrer than that of Chile where the Junta must still feel relatively insecure. For this reason, and also because the differences in outlook between the two governments is very different, I do not regard Mr Grattan's comparison with Chile as being particularly apt. Now that Mrs Budiardjo, formerly a detainee and whose husband, an Indonesian, is still detained, has been released there are no British subjects remaining in detention in Indonesia and we have no locus standi to make formal representations to the Indonesian Government. It has been suggested that as an aid donor we are in a position to intervene. But the threat to cut off aid would be idle and I suspect that the Indonesians know this. We would stand to lose quite a lot of money and in any case it is recognised that an economically stable Indonesia conforms more to our interests in the area than an unstable one - and the Indonesians know this as well. In any case the British public as a whole is not interested in the question of Indonesian political detainees. The campaign for their release is small in scale and in the members of those involved. It is unfortunately vocal. Were it nor for Mrs Budiardjo I doubt whether this issue would have raised more than a ripple. === [PDF page 20] === CONFIDENTIAL 4, There is plainly no question of The Queen even mentioning this subject during the State Visit; but we need to consider whether the Secretary of State should take this up in his talks with the Indonesian Foreign fimistver. If he did it would certain received. the case for introducing this difficult topic into the discussions and thus risking introducing a sour note into what promises to be a reasonably successful State Visit, is to my mind not strong enough. There is also a particular difficulty in the Secretary of State's mentioning the subject as a whole and the Budiardjo case in particular to Mr Malik. The “mbassador believes that during the mid- 60s Mrs Budiardjo worked closely with Mr Malik when the latter was in charge of the Antara News Agency. The whole Budiardjo case is therefore personally sensitive so far as Mr Malik is concerned. 5. If we were to reply to members of the public who have written to The Queen along the more forthcoming lines that Mr Grattan suggests in paragraph 4 of his Minute we give two hostages to fortune. If we describe the significance of State Visits this inevitably provokes the retort: "how could we have good relations with a country like Indonesia which keeps thousands of people in detention without trial?" I am sure we do not wish to become involved in public discussions along these lines which could lead to an extension of the discussion to include detainees in Commonwealth Countries e.g. Singapore and Malaysia. If we mention that the Secretary of State will be having talks with the Indonesian Foreign Minister we can expect that the "Detainees Lobby" will press him into making a firm commitment either by correspondence or in Parliament to raising this matter. 6. There remains the question whether we should not in fact do something about the detainees between now and the “tate Visit. If we do so the ground will need to be carefully prepared and we shall need to consult the Embassy in Jakarta. Any approaches which we do make to the Indonesians will have to be informal and private. Our objective should be no more than to try to encourage the Indonesians to bring the detainees to trial more rapidly and perhaps even to suggest that they might release before the State Visit some of those in Category B whom the Indonesians were planning to release anyway. But to announce any such intention would cause resentment among the Indonesians which would Simply be counter-—productive. 7. in these circumstances I do not consider that we should go as far in our answers to members of the public as Mr Grattan suggests. In doing so we should be going further than we are recommending that the Secretary of State should go in answer to a Parliamentary Question on 24 October (on which we are submitting separately). Our experience has been with these people that if you give them an inch they /take === [PDF page 21] === CONFIDENTIAL take a mile. The formula to which we have adhered so far has stood the test of time and in the light of the above I do not consider that we should discard it. I have recast it slightly to try to make it sound less “curt and stuffy" I have also expanded the background note for Buckingham Falace. L(y Shab 19: October: 19773 W K Slatcher South West Pacific Department cc: Mr Curle i. I think that we should consider with the Ambassador in Jakarta the possibility of making further strictly informal approaches in Jakarta about the treatment of the detainees generally. However, I fully agree with Mr Slatcher's paragraph 6 that we should keep any such efforts strictly to ourselves. To announce that we are making them, or even to hint at this, would be counter productive. I agree also that we should avoid any suggestion at this stage that the Secretary of State would pursue the matter with the Indonesians at the time of the State Visit. Ce I have also slightly amended the draft letter to the: Palace and the proposed stock ee to members of the public. I think that they are now forthcoming as we can safely make them. PK [Hike J K Hickman South West Pacific Department 23 October 1973 j take th cs eoecey ee wee tee Se wie by mM: Rey be w~ ct & {eae Pr—leewn Dy, US CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 22] === dere Dare oa d_ Boag /* Sre1S7 Sw" Joon} es oe ee 2 dea > a) “mr En, a ed SO am ee Ss ana nn + ~~ Ax) -\A Sa, = [Unreadable] —~m eo gman mf at hk — =F ors spore oe Gs) eo Fs ee Me yaenyo ba ju nai ~~ Oo t ee Hus aq © =~ leg. eet nrg sad a 4 dee RY ode sy “Tt co eyo nel mia LSS oa ca Dy a nog we werd s Cys weed gn _sy ee Se Oa wy 1 fe ko Sry eon hee ee ed Bat jp === [PDF page 23] === HOUSE OF COMMONS LONDON SWIA OAA 8 October 1973 deo Le Alee have been ised by the announcement that i 1 state visit to Indonesi in March year. This clearly the Government attaches bs et ee ict that more than 55,000 under politica etention y that a visit ld have beer 1 eC [t will certainly be rpreted by international opinion as indic i if thi lling situation, view thi isit should not take place;overnmen iven firm assurances released immediately ir comments on this Rt.Hon. Sir Alec] Douglas Home M.P., Foreign & Commonwealth Office, === [PDF page 24] === Reference fos iV (33 [CG SUOCK reede on Wie of time AON «Ot land. GO Ss in involve jure desig LULL: S' Ms Voting ' hse Spot: | Sine ves “(ko Cowes parr tUce “ tres lew |: 4 tte State \resek te Tocticy (a ir tot. place ere tle We prbuesse) nv im par lite: Shane es lapedy Oleg. hat © ow wil tb Rutan: 4 { 4 X 3 we \ Cote Corns OOS i Ypeutten ‘ 3 { Sa both ee 0 rt WU. ‘ |; |; Li ‘t 9. os Cw. at g Kagothen, It iu etiw long kt wie % — | my Senne) = Stntte 1 me bb hy to oleeth wit Mus Usuc ap Whole Oe) “ue shoo Sue Ge + A Sa. ey re & s Cry Qe me GC Spee be @ Thus Coma Ler probl ae tte Atyo att—p a’ ree tide of Me Steak Kutter,: J 145177 219242 500M 4/73 GM 3643/2 === [PDF page 25] === CONFIDENTIAL Eve (132) +74 = Indonesian Political Detainees I do not feel very happy about the draft stock answer to letters asking The Queen to intercede on behalf of political detainees when she visits Indonesia. I think it tather curt: and stuffy’. ne Equally it is not easy to see what kind of reply should be sent. The Queen is of course going to Indonesia on the advice of the Secretary of State and as the number of comments about the political situation in Indonesia increase and The Queen's name becomes involved, Buckingham Palace will expect carefully considered advice from the Secretary of State himself. I would like to put the papers to the Secretary of State before we write to the Palace. I am not sure that we can get away with simply saying that the matter is one of Indonesia's internal affairs and that it would be inappropriate for The Queen to mention it. A State visit is about the most significant way in which bilateral relations between Britain and Indonesia can be emphasised and inevitably The Queen's name becomes involved with the nature of the country she is visiting giving it an element of support for its political way of life. For example, in the discussions about a possible American State visit it is automatically assumed that a State visit by President Nixon here implies a degree of support for his political position. 53 Also the statement that it is inappropriate to raise the matter could be criticised. It is true that our responsibility ends with British subjects abroad. But in Chile we have taken up the general question of humane treatment of political prisoners and received an assurance from the new Chilean Government which we have done our best to publicise. If there is going to be much criticism of The Queen should we be doing the same thing in Indonesia? Is there any reason why we should not! pat the fact that we have made some representations (The Budiardjo Case)? 4. I think that the conclusion is that we need a rather fuller letter. This might refer to the purpose of state visits and go on to explain that the British Government have made represenations where British subjects have been detained in Indonesia in the past and that as a result they have been released. At the same time we have urged on the Indonesian Government that they treat political prisoners humanely and tbat the Indonesian /authorities CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 26] === CONFIDENTIAL authorities have been made well aware of the feelings in some quarters in Britain. However, this is a matter for the Indonesian Government and the British Government is not in a position to take further action, though of course at the time of the state visit Sir Alec Douglas-Home will be discussing the whole range of matters involved in Anglo/ Indonesian relations. oN I shall be grateful for comments. (P.H.. Grattan) 9 October, 1973 Copied to: Mr. Curle Mr. Youde CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 27] === faAD\/>_. with some impunity. So far, the nativ Ibans (who form another third of t | to join the communists, perhaps b of their Chin | the ITbar Christians mists, are no xacthy enamo Mal vy therefore L orientated f Kuala Lompu The ¢ of psy g, mostly red of the Muslim — moment Kuching and vert sAending in teams perts to try wid minds of the viving talks and showmaintain that this is Ihe only way, say crmment could get Chiis by convincing them they ¢ in the country. Military ry Ku hing and Sibu are painsre of the th yee los are e@) and win the people, main! ing films. Cri the wrong appy crifies, the ¢ nese suppor have a st; officials fully ay and {Jol mich problems involved, ! an Iban headman who sr travelled by canoe for days nights the nearest ice Station fo yeport the presence of KCP guerillas at his longhouse. mod five ana to [Unreadable] Legal puzzle By S. Iskandar Jakarta: Many peo- | ple were startled by | the death sentence pronounced recent: ly by a military ourt on the man who was chief of statf of the Indone sian Central Intelligence Bureau under Sukarno. It was thought that it would be lenient with involvethe 1965 coup attempt. The ex-Police Brigadierlas asked President Suonmmite the sentence. President the Go political prisoners erin accused of ment in condemned nian, General Sutart harto to + The tial way particularly interesting to those who are trying to gauge the feelings of the Suharto government towards former leaders and followers of the Sukarno régime, because the role played by Dr Subandrio, who was Sukarno’s deputy, formed an important patt of the proceedings. The first charge against Sutarto was that he conspired against the lawful Government of Indonesia between May and September 1965 with # Communist Party member, Soejiwo Hordjowisastro, LtGen, Anirud: (in Svat, the prosecutor, sald that in May 1965 Sutarto received from Subandrio, then head of the intelligence bureau (HPL), a document later known as “the Gilchrist letter,” with Specific instructions to check on its authenticity, FAR CAT E vtec Patch aot Sutarto did not follow the order. Instead, he made copies of it and gave them to.Soejarwo and to Brig.-Gen. Sabur, Police Gen. Soekarno Joyonegoro and Lt-Col Heruatmojo, who were among the leftists in the armed forces. Sutarto did this because the letter which according to Subandrio’s infortant was written by the then British \mbassador, Sir Andrew Gilchrist, to ir Harold Cassia, Under-Secretary at ‘he Department of Foreign Affairs in Whitehall contained a reference {o “our friends in the army.” The letter supposedly referred to a “council generals,” which Sutarto assumed consisted of those who were later killed on the night of September 30, 1965. As chief of staff of BPI, Sutarto al- Irgedly often discussed the “council of sonerals” with Soejarwo. 1! was. said hata military putsch was planned for \imed Forces Day, October 5, 1965. It was alleged that Sutarto told Soejarwo i! was imperative that leftist forces should) stage their own coup before October 5. When the September 30 coup was staged, Sutarto’s name was in cluded in the “revolutionary council.” The second charge against Sutarto was that he knew of the movement by the leftist faction in the army to gain power, The third charge was that Sutarto used BPI facilities to train Chinese com munists from Sarawak without the knowledge of Subandrio, his superior. Indeed, the most amazing factor emerge from the Sutarto trial was Su handrio’s apparent innocence of ctimes of which he was convicted at his own miuitary trial in 1966. Subandrio’s death sentence ~ later commuted to life imprisonment ~ had rested largely on the prosecution’s claim |that i{ was Suto r Srey a Dr Subandrio: Blame shifted OO FORER &, 1979 LConromre. yeta Pe: tpg Review E es [2 === [PDF page 28] === bafidtio, and no one cise, Who circulated the Gilchrist letter without checking its authenticity, Now it seems that Sutarto was the guilty one. ty a Strange coincidence, an Indonesian trinsiation of a book called The Deception Game, published by Syracuse University Press, is said to contain the confessions of a former Czechoslovakian agent, Ladislav Bittman is a lecturer at Indo lifary academies. The book chapter on the way Soviet intelligence groups tried to promote »nti Western feelings in Indonesia in (965, The book said the Gilchrist letter was conaocted by a Mayor Louda in Prague, and that Subandrio’s real crime was that he wanted to believe such “evidence.” To add to the confusion, a Dutch newspaper has just published letters said to have been written by Sukarno to hi wife, Ratna Sari Dewi, in early October 1965, which said that Sukarno did not believe the Communist Party initially staged the coup, and that he was not aware of what had happened to Gen. Yani. one of the generals killed at Lubang Buaya on September 30. Whatever the result of these developments, what is not yet clear is why the Indo nesian Government is presenting such a dramatic picture to the public. Tne Judas risk“ Ay Frances Starner intelligens: Ihe tran nesia’s mm lator contains and Czec! that Ihe arrest of Sibu Urban District Council’s Vice Chairman Kee Ho Soon, 2-year-old timber tycoon Hii Kah Tung ‘and a number of other prominent Sibu citizens for allegedly aiding the Maoist insurgency there has once again turned the spotlight on Sarawak’s worrlsome Third Division. Among the 29 people arrested in the recent four-day sweep — whimsically designated Operation Judas were an architect, a lawyer, at least one doctor and several prominent businessmen from the Third Division capital; one of the 29 was a woman. And significantly, all are of Chinese ancestry. Over the past dozen or so years, Sibu and the Third Division have frequently been in the news. The immediate reasons for this attention have been varied: student activism in the Chinese-language schools; demonstrations, largely by trade unionists and students, against He TOBER B, 1973 terrorist incidents if to the town. And, Tyaities arrests under aD) security statutes aii ties between the tigh, munity and what th more, than 1,200 as subversion. id another 20,000 Sibu and the s's. Rahman says 93 community would filled in the past year, to be an unlikely pynificant numbers of of communist insts. The total put out about a century agct decade represents, sionaries and thein half the communist from China’s Fukiet, jang River settlement has not brought a dominantly descendants of the ver must lie in the combination of Chi, the communists Protestant work~ et/5m among the Saratiming in reachingform one-third of the abled a handful of ‘on people. amass substantial fortarti ularly prone to rubber. And it is hardlyhyecause of theit members of the origina »king-orientated themselves generally illi. of the Federal high priority on provigment. In Sibu, with the education Sve state, kinship rajahs did not provide. eater role than But there were other file, no one will larly after World War!ntive by telling disaffection among the ys — his where- . Chinese population. The ment’s policy of reservinnt can provide land for the indigenouscurity, most who continued the wastdl provide whatslash-and-burn cultivatiothe guerillas to limited the land availabled livelihood ining rural Chinese populatinment force of both the world price ajozen helicopters production of rubber —rea almost equal soil in the Rajang area YOO square miles, od dn the feat place wecuiity, Meats, the men’s coonomy, fb fungle vith ie provided at such sadles of ronds, travel munity became an infivers and streams. post-war unrest. Conthe Government is Mandarini by youthful tinilitary presence from the Chinese mai able to operate HA YE yh EAN Foochovommunist activity. === [PDF page 29] === future. UOIN 1 1) Eun a AL === [PDF page 30] === Covering CONFI D@NTIAL where the writer has something more substantial to say, or where the letter requires a more detailed answer you will no doubt wish to refer each case to us for consideration. W K Slatcher South-west Pacific Department 8 October 1973 P&CD Covering CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 31] === Foreign and Commonwealth Office London SW1 Your reference J L Beaven Lsq JAKARTA Our reference Date 4 Uctober 1974 1 LIC Wal 2 iy TN isles > sent you under compliments slip a copy Otten wilacchem =s lejter om 25 wveptember to Mrs Budiardjo. I I9S 8 CODY On hem BED Ly. ; We are not intendine answer it. Ly Laps al LLMLER ~outh-West Pacific Dept === [PDF page 32] === adriu soorar iin Ci BUCKINGHAM PALACE 2nd October, 1973 qt § fay f MAA SUA UA Ch, This is the fourth or Tifth letter of - this kind to have been received here in the last few days. I should be grateful if you could let me have a line or two on the allegations contained in it. Patrick Grattan, Esq. === [PDF page 33] === 10 they Mages ty ey ae Cheon | Byoleing houw Pa hoe, Wa A Ri Nm pr: Horn misty Sanh enor eal af wh, J Aan a wenden” ) ane Nea +, are Mem de Clon, auler which - Poomucs a} Unwrnenn Are hielh fy Jraloyeyia he thew Anal for mmoleftadde partes: Jn pte J tae WO Chum my aA 4 wt rine har ferrncng ~ Jon now Umre Ay de precept fry Mba- And 96 f) {uk the ry apeeiel oly ho Baas === [PDF page 34] === ; ht. yerel ont cing We ! rane Vy Tyan, wr < mA wc ye oy Hy le Array el yormsdle ay Ree eo. Panel. lait ak Ne Sra wi | Wayeint wp meter Chany ishigy, ~womeny, ayer pope ayy fe ribo Nas; ry py Ma oy yah We === [PDF page 35] === 2nd October, 1973 I am commanded by The Queen to acknowledge your letter of 30th September about conditions in Indonesia. Her Majesty undertakes a State Visit of this kind on the advice of her Ministers, and I have accordingly sent a copy of your letter to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. W. HESELTINE lirs. Kaethe Schlesinger, === [PDF page 36] === 181 Yr. olatcher, st Pacific Department, and Commonwealth Office, SoWele ys peen NOVeEMpNer, fer tl LG WL ate classify and re-classify comment on their arbitrary nd until I am assured 4 ia ermitt a 1 : leet === [PDF page 37] === Foreign and Commonwealth Office London S.W.1 2 October, 1973 From the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State Av » ) In my letter of 30 July, I told you that, according to our information, Mr. Budiardjo's classification had been changed and that he had reverted to being a category "B" detainee. The Indonesians have subsequently informed us that he has been moved to the Jakarta area following his further re-classification as a category "A" detainee. As you know, the classification of Indonesian detainees in subject to change as fresh evidence is obtained. We have, of course, also passed on this information to Mrs. Budiardjo. Anthony Royle Ivor Richard; ods. QiCcy MP. j House of Commons, London, Datleds === [PDF page 38] === ewd rz - amnesty int aaa International Secretaria: 53 Theobald’s Road Telephone: 01-404 5831 Telegrams: Amnesty London Mr. Chick The Indonesia Desk The Foreign and Commonwealth Office Downing Street London, SW1 Dear Mr. Chick, bare 5, le (XLA/AKX Avra b hope this pamphlet may be useful to you in briefing the Brit ish ERoeeay in Jakarta about Amnesty. Yours sincerely, : ee At: 7 UR bx UAH’ A. Cnt Lo Bo @ Stephanie Grant if f nha Deputy Head of Research Chairman of the International Executive: SEAN M ACBRIDE, S.C. Secretary General: Martin ENNALS PATRONS: The Archbishop of Canterbury, Great Britain - Roger Baldwin, President of the International League for the Pablo Casals, Puerto Rico - Danilo Dolci, Sicily - Professor Erich Fromm, New York and Mexico - Lt.-Gen. Sir Brian Horrocks, Great Britain Jean-Flavien Lalive, Switzerland Professor Salvador de Madariaga, Spain + Yehudi Menuhin, Great Britain Professor Gunnar Myrdi ul, Sweden Pablo Neruda, Chile - Alan Paton, South Africa - Dr. Martin Niemoiler, Germany Sean MacBride, S.C., Ireland - Professor Giorgio La Pira, Italy - Professor Julius Stone, Australia AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL HAS CONSULTATIVE STATUS WITH THE UNITED NATIONS (ECOSOC): UNESCO THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE: THE ORGANISATION OF AMERICAN STATES: AND IS RECOGNISED BY THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY Rights of Man, U.S.A. === [PDF page 39] === t Ee ne er eS Fem SE A Be. A Cael bo pub fae e 18 ew CH AGE ion === [PDF page 40] === Amnesty International.e. In Quotes oo» instrument of Communist terrorism’ - Brazilian newspaper "... in a leading position among organisations which conduct anti-Soviet propaganda" - Soviet newspaper eee this imperialist body’’ ~Ghanaian newspaper Amnesty International is none of these, although the subject of all the above charges in recent years. Amnesty International is a worldwide human rights movement which is independent »4f any government, political faction or religious creed. In its work for prisoners of conscience it excludes only those who have used or advocated violence — although it opposes the use af torture and death penalty in all cases and without reservation. The men and women throughout the world for whom Amnesty International works prozess avarietr of political, social eccnomic and religious beliefs - many often sharply contrasting. Amnesty International itself, however, is politically and ideologically neutral: it does not defend what people say, only their right to say it freely. It is perhaps, inevitable that this distinction is often overlooked. Since its foundation in 1961 Amnesty International has been the subject of attack from nearly every band in the political spectrum - right to left - from Eastern bilees Western and so-called Third World. The following is a selection of some of the statements made about Amnesty International by newspapers of the world and government officials. The selection is by no means comprehensive, but we believe it reflects accurately the broad range of often critical and occasionally favourable things that have been said about the organisation in recent years. The quotations are arranged alphabetically according to the country of origin. In each instance the quotation is preceded by a line or two about the circumstances which gave rise to it. A juxtaposition of some of the comments might tell its own story. === [PDF page 41] === BRAZIL In September 1972, Amnesty International issued a major Report entitled "report on Allegations of Torture in Brazil". Subsequent trials of alleged terrorists have occasionally tried to link them with Amnesty International, The Ministry of Justice's censorship board also ordered Brazilian newspapers to ignore all Amnesty statements on Brazilian issues. "20 the famous 'Amnesty International', instrument of Communist terrorism which, from London, aids guerrillas throughout the world. This 'Amnesty' promotes campaigns around the world for Amnesty terrorist criminals by means of lies and defamations against democratic governments. It has conducted a systematic campaign against Brazil, inventing tortures, assassinations and acts of violence, in order to promote communist objectives." - O Cruzeiro, Rio de Janeiro, September, 1972. "eee a Campaign has been organised by the organisation 'Amnesty International’, which has been organising its agencies in Europe, as wel] as other multinational agencies that operate in Western Europe, in order to agitate public opinion against Brazilian authorities..." - Report on trial in Fortaleza of accused of guerrilla activities, Jornal do Comercio, September 21, 1972. ".0 Ss ‘Wn, native of Czechoslovakia... of the terrorist organisation called VSRSP... Was in league with ‘Amnesty International', collaborating actively in the defamation campaign against Brazil undertaken abroad by this OLENGH association o. ci! sts - Report on six alleged terrorists, Diario de Pernambuco, Recife, Janvarvarllne 1973 > i. BRITAIN Amnesty statement on the estimated numbers of political prisoners in the world. "seo the prisoner of conscience, as adopted by an organisation such as Amnesty International, is a real object of concern, and the evidence is that governments can sometimes be shamed into releasing people they hold. "Amnesty has done this by behg politically impartial, by === [PDF page 42] === Page 3 collecting its facts as fully as possible, and by concentrating the efforts of its membership... Thus a small group of people can concern themselves over one particular prisoner. He can be told of their interest. This gives him:the first thing every such prisoner needs — hope co.": ~ Editorial, “Behind the Bars", The Times, London, December 24, 1968 The 10th anniversary of the foundation of Amnesty Internatiomal. "seo Amnesty's contribution must be reckoned, however, in more than the arithmetic of freed prisoners; it is more enduring and subtler; is found in a network of intangibles; the dilution of bitter attitudes; the flares of hope lit in the minds of the prisoners; the residual memories of past help in the hearts of the new men of power; the permanent friendships between released prisoners and Amnesty group members throughout the world... Amnesty's impartiality brings with it a kind of coolness. Hot heads can't last. There is too much at stake, in terms of other people's lives, for tub-thumping, sensation-seeking, or impetuous publicity..." - Pat Williams in The Observer Magazine, May 23, 1971 was adopted by a Swiss Amnesty Group as a Prisoner of Cons science, after being sentenced to two year's imprisonment in Britain for possession of copies of pro-Irish Republican Army leaflets offering money to British soldiers who deserted or handed over their officers to the IRA. ".2. MBB, only the second English prisoner to be adopted by Amnesty International, is presumably seen as a suitable candidate for martyrdom. But the organisation's sympathy is monstrously misguided... J might be as mucha fool as a villain. But he is not worth shedding any tears over. And if Amnesty International champions undeserving causes like his it can only devalue the organisation's efforts to help victims of repressive regimes like Russia and Brazil. If Amnesty International is looking for martyrs in the United Kingdom it might consider more than 100 soldiers who have been killed in Northern Ireland." ~ Editorial entitled "The Unlikely Martyr" in The Chatham, Rochester & & Gillingham News, ‘Kent, England, “December 8, ore. === [PDF page 43] === Amnesty report 'Political Prisoners in South Vietnam'. "The motives of those who claim to be defending human rights become suspect when they resort to selective outrage. Many of the charges assembled in the Amnesty report on political prisoners in South Vietnam are pretty wobbly in themselves. But the most striking thing about the report is that only 24 of its 36 pages are devoted to the question of Vietnamese civilians in communist hands. Twice as much space is given to to charges that South Vietnamese interrogators have used torture, but there is no hint of the well-established fact that the Vietcong certainly have too. "Tt is not good enough for the compilers to excuse them— selves on the ground that there is an ‘imbalance of information available' ~ although the fact that it is easier to find out about tiger cages on Con Son Island than about what happens to Quang Tri villagers taken captive by the North Vietnamese says a lot about the difference between the two Vietnams. To begin with, there are few signs that the Amesty investigators have bothered to check their very limited sources 2... Second, the Amnesty team applies a double standard for evaluating information coming from each side..." ~ "Numbers Game'', The Economist, London, July 14, 1973 Allegations were made in July 1973 that Portuguese troops had massacred African villagers in Mozambique. The widespread publicity, which came at the time of Prime Minister Marcello Caetano's official visit to Britain in connection with the 600th anniversary of the Anglo—Portuguese alliance, resulted in a debate on the question in the House of Lords. "Lord WADE: My Lords, would the Portuguese Government allow a body such as Amnesty International to make an inquiry in a case such as this? It is precisely this kind of case where a body known not to be ideologically biased, should, if possible, be called in. I think that that would set at rest the uneasiness felt by a great many people." - From the official record of the ‘House of Lords debate, July 11, 1973 GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (EAST GERMANY) _ Simultaneous publication of. series of Amnesty International reports on prison conditions in Portugal, East Germany and other countries. "eo The report on Portugal is excellent, but it is absurd to focus on East Germany, as there are no political prisoners in East Germany; anyone looking for violations of human rights in that part of the world should concentrate on West Germany.oo" ~ Berliner Zeitung, Bast Germany, 1966 === [PDF page 44] === GHANA Statement by Amnesty International Secretary General, Martin Ennals, expressing concern at large-scale detention without trial in Ghana and reminding the present head of the regime, I. K. Acheapong, of a number of suggested improvements in the treatment of prisoners which Amnesty International had sent him three months earlier. "..We know of no previous effort on the part of Amnesty International to advise any previous government cn the best way of treating political detainees. That this imperialist body now feels it dite duty to prescribe che manner in which our present Government should treat political detainees not only amounts to a wanton interference in the internal affairs of Ghana, but also proves that Ren, Gusted head of the previous government is pulling stringssomewhere within the framework of Amnesty International... Ghana does not frown on advice but advice of such diabolic nature can only breed confusion and disaffection and must therefore be rejected outright with deserving contempt..». Imperialists offer advice and services only when their selfish ends are at stake. The Government must be aware of the wolves that come in sheep's clothing." — Editorial entitled “Keep Out Amnesty", in The Weekly Spectator, Accra, Ghana, November 18, 1972. Mr. Ennals' official visit to Ghana in May 1973, when he again raised the question of detained members of the previous regime and discussed relief payments by Amnesty International Groups to their families. "...One may ask:"What interest is the Amnesty International serving? If it is a recognised international organisation, as its name suggests, why does it favour a particular group of politicians and cannot be bothered about the fate of others and their families? Can the Amnesty International be correct in its claim that it pays the families of the detainees because the politicians are 'prisoners Or conscience'? oe. By its action the Amnesty International has shown a bias for Busia's followers and has thereby identified itself as a dangerous international political organisation which pokes its dirty nose in the affairs of other countries..." ~ Editorial entitled "Amnesty and Detainees", one Dally Graphic, Accra, Ghana, May 7, 1973.6 GREECE An Amnesty International news release reported from reliable sources in Athens that at least nine Greek naval officers involved in an alleged mutiny attempt had been tortured. === [PDF page 45] === "Amnesty has repeatedly lied and does so shamelessly again. The matter is an unbridled and malicious figment of imagination.": - Mr. Byron Stamatopolulos, the Greek Government's Press Undersecretary, quoted in The Athens News, June 8, 1973. HONDURAS An unidentified Amnesty International publication. "Throughout the Western world an organised campaign of attack and slander is being organised against three Latin American countries: Brazil, Bolivia and Paraguay. Now and then the emphasis and theme change, but the denunciations and accusations are levelled against one country after another. The magnitude of the operations, the language used, the front organisations that do the denouncing, reveal the communist origins of this campaign, which is constructed along lines spread recently through fellow-traveller circles or by useful puppets, and which is financed from funds originating in Moscow. For some years, an organisation calling itself ‘Amnesty International' has existed, whose mission consists of publishing each year a report about torture inflicted on political prisoners... According to Amnesty International's report, torture in Brazil is not inflicted by police stooges, but by army generals and colonels. The accusers present no proof of this, and their assertions boil down to curses, insults and abuse, without any manner of evidence to support the truth of the truculent stories contained in the report..."! ~ Editorial entitled "The Communist Campaign Against Brazil, Bolivia and Paraguay", Lavkrensa, Honduras, March 23, 1973). INDONESIA Memorandum sent by the Chairman of Amnesty International, Sean MacBrniider i onGa. who had visited Indonesia in October 1970 to the Indonesian Government drawing attention to 90,000 political prisoners detained since the 1967 coup attempt. "Sean MacBride S.C. is the Chairman of Amnesty International and the Secretary General of the International Commission of Jurists, a front organisation of the new left, which has its seat in London. Their work is to defend political detainees, especially the communists who are imprisoned in various countries outside the Communist bloc, on the excuse of humanitarianism, human rights and the rule of law, norms which are customarily not needed by the communists themselves, Nevertheless, in order not to be too transparent, now and again they also defend political detainees from non-—communist trends. Even though they make a fuss about the fate of political detainees, in various countries, (what they do) shas === [PDF page 46] === “more the nature of interfering in internal affairs; but it can be understood they never mention a single word, but remain 'silent in a thousand languages! about the political detainees in communist lands..." - Editorial in Angkatan Bersenjata, Indonesian Army Newspaper, Indonesia, May 29, 197i. An Amnesty International statement on March.14 urging Indonesia to free 55,000 Civilians still detained without trial after seven years. ",.. Amnesty is an organisation of jurists which rather obstinately and constantly focuses attention on the question of political detainees in Indonesia... (Its) reports to the international world on the situation on Buru or on the correspondents (involved in the 1967 coup attempt) show that Amnesty has its own specific view according to its own norms, without any readiness to understand the history and reasons that have given rise to the problem of political detainees in Indonesia." - Editorial in Pedoman, Jakarta, Indonesia, March 17, 1973. "The Hague, March 19 (Antara). "Indonesian Ambassador to the Netherlands, H. Alamsjah Ratu Perwiranegara, has said in an interview with Antara that the efforts and concern expressed by Amnesty Internatinnal towards the Indonesian Government on the. fate of political prisoners should be welcomed and appreciated. "00 Lt should also be pointed out that the Indonesian Government very: much appreciated the struggle of Amnesty International for the upholding of humanitarian values, but this should not only be done by criticism but also by. ‘conceptional and material contributions for the solution of the problem of improvement of political detainees in "00 Indonesia will appreciate it very much if. efforts and attention from Amnesty International would not only be directed to one country only, but her concern and efforts should also be directed to other countries in the world where there are political detainees..."' ~_ Interview carried by the Indonesian news agency Antara on March 19, 1973,. === [PDF page 47] === Page 8 one of the most active student leaders in Indonesia, published an article in a leading weekly news magazine on the subject of the increasing attention being paid outside Indonesia to the question of its political prisoners. ".ooWhy has the problem become popular now? The reason is of course that there are individuals or groups that campaign against it. It can be assumed that they are Communistsor Communist sympathisers but there are also those who agitate about it purely on grounds of humanity. The latter includes Amnesty International which campaigns against political prisoners in Indonesia and also in other countries, including the Communist countries... “If the Indonesian government is hostile to this organisation and regards it as a Communist group, then this attitude will bolster the Communist groups which campaign for political purposes. In Europe everybody knows that Amnesty International is a non-political organisation which is viewed with enmity by both the Spanish and Greek governments and the governments in Eastern Europe. ‘' - ‘Problem of Political Prisoners and How to Handle It', by x, dempo, June 9597/3) MEXICO General article on the whole issue of political imprisonment, by one of the best known journalists in Latin America. "In as much as these prisoners of conscience would not be in jail if governments did not believe that what they say "eee Only one organisation functions in order to defend prisoners of conscience: Amnesty International... It maintains solidarity with the voluntary sections of the silent masses who feel represented by those who have voiced their opinions and been imprisoned for doing so, have suffered, and frequently are untried, exiled or held incommunicado. “To donate one's time or money to Amnesty International does not necessarily mean that one agrees with wat such and such a prisoner of conscience may have expressed, but that one upholds his right to expression.... To persecute someone for volcing his opinions isan injustices It is, possibly, the great injustice of our age and the need to speak out is probably the greatest necessity of our times. “Many prisoners of conscience have either been released, or their prison conditions ameliorated, or their execution postponed: thanks to the campaigns of Amnesty International. Torturers of every kind fear publicity. Amnesty International uses this one weapon: publicity...' - ‘The Idea as a Crime’, article by Victor Alba, Siempre, May 23, 1973 === [PDF page 48] === NETHERLANDS A special report called ‘Indonesia Special" published by Amnesty International's Dutch Section in March 1973, containing a detailed and illustrated review of. the history and suffering of the 55,000 Indonesian'civilians detained without trial for more than seven years. "Amnesty International, -a laudable organisation that defends the rights of political prisoners all over the world, is doing great work with its action for the tens of thousands of political prisoners in Indonesia» “This action deserves all-out support because the only chance for improvement lies in, the permanent attention of the public opinion in Indonesia and the whole world for this question. "In its special Subldcetien on’ he fate of politica prisoners in Indonesia, Amnesty International-—Holland gives useful and generally reliable information. It is regrettable, however, that the role the Communists played in the coup of 1965, is portrayed rather one~sidedly." - Het Parool, Amsterdam, March 9, LOTS. se best Widespread use of torture in the world and what people can do about it. “ee eekvery country that engages in these activities finds some committee in Holland which wants.to use if for publicity. Therefore we prefer the worldwide type of action of Amnesty International, an organisation working beyond ideological frontiers. People often view it as over-zealous. It is accused of easy protest from a distance. But it is indispensible for a vital democracy...'' - Editorial entitled "Torture", Trouw Amsterdam, June 5, 1973 NORWAY. Amesty International's 10th anniversary. "Annesty is a permanent warning to the tyrannical regimes of the world. The political prisoners are not going to be forgotten. ~In the long run this might influence the regimes to make prison conditions betters or release the prisoners. "Because the organisation does not deen towards the left or right, and clearly acknowledges that tyranny is not limited to one or the other areas in international politics, this makes it able to speak out forecfullyess” - Editorial in Dagbladet, Oslo, > sunen ts wove. === [PDF page 49] === PORTUGAL In November, 1972, a demonstration was held in front of the Portuguese Embassy in The Hague, led by the head of the Portuguese Social Democratic Party, Dr. Mario Soares, to protest against the detention of political prisoners in Portugal. The following is a commentary on the Reuter's report of the incident. " 5. The anti~Portuguese demonstrations which took place in The Hague about a week ago, in front of the Portuguese Embassy, gathered about 700 people in a simulated, symbolic ‘concentration camp'. The demonstrators carried banners calling for amnesty for the prisoners. "This sad, inconceivable spectacle, whose 'star' was Dr. Mario Soares (Professor at the University of Rennes), was dreamed up by Amnesty International, whose headquarters are in London and whose brains are in Moscow ooo" - Diario de Noticias, Lisbon, November 19, 1972. SOMALIA Letters sent by various Amnesty International Groups to the Government of the Somali Democratic Republic on behalf of Somali prisoners. The following is an extract of a stencilled reply sent to the Groups. "see L avail myself of this opportunity to express my personal amazement at the interest shown by your Organisation and similar institutions for cases which certainly involve an interference in the internal affairs of the Country, whereas no evidence can be found of your equally strong interest in mobilising the world opinion against crimes which by-pass national frontiers, such as in the case of South African apartheid or in the case of genocide affecting - like in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, for instance ~ the future of mankind and world people. I wonder how you could forget, or rather tried to forget, what is happening in Guinea Bissau, Angola, Mozambique, French Somaliland, Rhodesia, where thousands and thousands of civilians (undiscriminately whether aged people, women or children) are being day after day killed by the colonialists, a synonym of criminals, just because of safeguarding malignantly their sinister interests, while denying the rights of the legitimate peoplesof Africa. The same tragic events are taking place in the Middle East to the Palestinians. use “Why should you therefore betray your conscience and give consideration to the political issues, rather than to these human ones. "To say the‘least, the time and resources of your institution could find much better investment and more profitable returns in pleading for the removal of such factors of human hatred and of open violation of the basic human rights, rather than in moving after and worrying. for the future of a few individuals who have been taking advantage of their political power to betray their country and to deceive their poeple. === [PDF page 50] === Page 11 “Hoping that you will give due and right consideration to these my reactions, I wish you good luck. May God illuminate you to the right and just path. Yours faithfully," - Captain Geilani Sufi Mudhir, Secretary to President of the Supreme Revolutionary Council of the Somali Democratic Republic, August 29, 1972. SOUTH. AFRICA Letter sent by Amnesty International Secretary General, Martin Ennals, to Prime Minister John Vorster of South Africa protesting against the forced resettlement of Black Africans. "Dear Mr. Ennals, “T have been instructed by the Honourable the Prime Minister to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated 27th July, 1972, and to reply as follows:; "Tt is interesting, although typical of Amnesty International, to note that exception is taken to the resettlement of black people in South Africa but that the murder of 80,000 black people in the Sudan, and elsewhere, is apparently condoned or shrugged off. ‘If. you are really concerned about the Toto underprivileged and oppressed peoples, it is suggested that you approach certain prominent member-— states of the Organisation of African Unity and your friends behind the iron curtain oce"’ REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIETNAM Amnesty International statement urging the International Conference on Vietnam and Indo-China to place the estimated. 100,000 political prisoners in South Vietnam under United Nations control. - "On Thursday, 22nd February, 1973, Amnesty International has issued a news release concerning the question of s civili@a prisoners in South Vietnam. The Embassy of Vietnam, while it does not question the good faith of Amnesty International, deems it necessary to make the following reservations regarding the memorandum published by that organisation on this subject oc. Furthermore, by urging the International Conference, which is mostly made up of foreign countries, to take action regarding a purely internal matter of South Vietnam, well before the expiration of the above mentioned limit of 90 days, Amnesty International shows an unexpected disregard of the right to self-determination of the South Vietnamese people...'' - Press release issued at specially convened news conference by the London Embassy of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam on February 23, 1973. === [PDF page 51] === SPAIN Tenth anniversary of Amnesty International. “Amnesty was founded ten years ago,.. Since then Amnesty has in fact achieved renown, although not love, in many countries throughout the world. But it has also had its internal problems: people who have tried to use the organisation for obvious political motives. But, generally speaking, Amnesty's behaviour has been clearly correct and its denouncements impartial: South African and Israelis, Englishmen and Indians, Spaniards and Russians have all been subjected to its statements... - Judice, Madrid, July~August 1971 TURKEY Amnesty International twice sent missionsto Turkey in 1972 to investigate allegations of torture of political prisoners. The second mission reported to a news conference in London in December 1972 that efforts to see all but one of 32 prisoners on a list previously agreed with the Turkish Government had failed. “Ankara, January 25. "A group of Conservative members of Parliament tonight tried to beat up the Chairman of Turkey's main opposition party on the House floor as he was accusing the Prime Minister of lying on the issue of torture of political prisoners in Turkey. ‘Mr. Ferit Melen, the Prime Minister, had been telling Parliament that allegations of torture by Western newspapers, "Amnesty what's~its-name International' and some parliamentarians at the Council of Europe were part of a gyander campaign against Turkey. The accusations were 'all lies,.all false', he said. ‘Mr, Bulent Ecevit, Chairman of the Republic People's Party, rose and shouted: ‘You are lying'. He was promptly attacked by about 15 members of the conservative National Reliance and Democratic parties. "RPP members defended their leader, and curses and punches were exchanged with Mr. Ecevit in the middle of the scrimmageo "Tt was Mr. Ecevit who first publicly alleged the torture of political prisoners in Turkey. Continuing his rebuttal today after order was restored, Mr. Melen said that a representative of Amnesty International who had seen leftist prisoners in Istanbul 'has betrayed us'. Such a mistake would not be repeated. "300. Newspapers, Amnesty International and such members of Parliament who alleged torture were participants in 'a campaign of slander directed against Turkey'." - Report in The Times, London, January 26, 1973 === [PDF page 52] === Page 13 e Commenting earlier on a related statement by British Foreign Secretary, Sits ee Douglas Home. ooo carefully documented report giving evidence of the torture of political prisoners in Turkey. It does not attack the political motives of the Turkish Government, but only WES judicial methods. Sir Alec expresses no concern for the victims but instead has the effrontery to tell a Turkish newspaper that he deplores such allegations because they ‘encourage disruptive tendencies' 2..." uy Amnesty International has produced an authoratative and -— Editorial in The Observer, London December 13, 1972. UcSoAo Letter sent by a member of a Swiss Amnesty International Group to the U.S. Soluicicor General, Mr. Erwin Griswold, urging him to investigate the case of Larry Cleveland Vann, imprisoned for refusing military service. “oo6 Lam familiar with Amnesty International and have known about its useful work in many countries. For that reason, I am rather puzzled about the rather indiscriminate number of letters which have recently been coming from various places in Switzerland, and which seem rather obviously not to be based upon the sort of careful groundwork which I have come to associate with Amnesty International. "oe It is my understanding, confirmed by a conversation with an official of the Swiss Embassy here, that there is no provision in Swiss law for exemption from military service on the ground of consciencious objection. In this situation, it is particularly puzzling to me that many letters about cases such as this should be originating from Switzerland. I wonder it this represents the policy of the responsible officers of Amnesty International, or whether it may be that some of the groups are off on what we call 'a 2BIKOIL ALS of their own' coco" - Letter from Mr. Griswold, dated July 26, 1972. News conference/panel discussion held by the American Section of Amnesty International on April 30, 1973 to launch its national drive in the Campaign for the Abolition of Torture. "While the flowers ‘ were blooming in Bryant Park on a nice spring afternoon last week, a hundred or so grim-faced people across the street. on the third floor of the Graduate Center of the City University of New York were devoting nearly three and a half hours to a discussion ¢ torture. The meeting was called by Amnesty International, a dogeoding organisation we have long admired because it does good ooo" - Article in The New Yorker, May 12, 1973 === [PDF page 53] === ont @) ee Amnesty International's publication 'Political Prisoners in South Vietnam', and the Campaign for the Abelition of Torture. "35. A sort of Red Cross of political warfare... Amnesty International makes an almost sanctimonious effort to remain politically neutral; individual cases are carefully investigated to prevent the organisation from being used for essentially nonpolitical crimes..o" - "Amnesty for the Defense", Time Magazine uly, oO), VOC U.SeSoRo Letters sent by Amnesty International Groups appealing on behalf of various political prisoners in the Soviet Union. The following article called the letters "provocative" and the senders ‘'do—gooders''. ",,.The persons who send such letters are ordinary clerks in the local organisations of this so-called 'Amnesty International', which even according to the bourgeois press is in a leading position among organisations which conduct subversive anti-Soviet propaganda. "In order to appear a philanthropic organisation, Amnesty International on all its official stationery stresses the fact that it is not involved in either politics or parties. But this camoflauge is destroyed as soon as one peers into the sanctum sanctorum and becomes familiar with that stands behind the splendid words. "Amnesty International emerged in England in DIG At that time the sadly labelled cold war had already made some breaches. Imperialist circles began adopting the most subtle methods of anti-Soviet propaganda, began searching for channels of penetration into the socialist camp. “The headquarters of the new orgaisation were set up in London, while subordinate sections and groups were created in 65 countries. They are not at all concerned with the racist regime of apartheid in South Africa, nor the bloody war of the USA against the Vietnamese people, nor the persecution of Catholics by Protestant extremists in Southern Ireland. "Instead, Amnesty International, is concerned with former Banderites, Vlasovites, persons who violate Soviet laws on religious cults. “Amnesty International disseminates falsified materials in capitalist countries which are expected to convince the public that believers are persecuted in the USSR, that in our country the church allegedly to be found in the catacombs, and so on. In addition, the philanthropists resort to crude slander. === [PDF page 54] === "In order to distract attention, to misinform the public, Amnesty International, sends numerous petitions, appeals, and letters into our country. Truly.it is not by chance that the leaders of Amnesty International are closely allied with the secret services of the USA and England." - Article entitled ‘Wrong Address, Gentlemen", Pravda Ukrainy, November 1, 1970, reprinted in the Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press, December 1970. Parcels and letters sent to Soviet prisoners of conscience confined to mental hospitals, and publicity on the subject. The reference to issue No. 64 of Izvestia concerns an unfounded allegation that Amnesty International had used the signatures of Danish Communists without their permission. "Especially zealous is the notorious 'Amnesty International', whose unscrupulous methods we have already related to you in the pages of Izvestia (no. 64). One of the reports of the British Section of this organisation states that representatives of the intelligensia in the Soviet Union are sent off to psychiatric hospitals 'without any trial’. Tales of 'psychiatric isolation cells for healthy persons' are unfailingly accompanied by a hypocritical refrain from 'martyrs', condemned, apparently, to spend the rest of their days behind impenetrable walls. In reality, we are dealing with persons who have committed socially dangerous actions while of unsound mind, or who have, during the course of the investigation, the trial, or after the sentence has heen passed, become mentally ill,-thus making it impossible for themselves to take account of their own actions or control them... The Western ideological saboteurs who babble all kinds of rubbish about mentally ill persons, do not even notice what a ridiculous position they are putting themselves in..."' ~ Article in Izvestia, entitled ‘Zealots of Falsehood in the Slough of Slander", signed by MJ, October 24, 1971. Inquiry by West German Group of Amnesty asking for information about Ukrainian author 9M who was mistakenly thought to have been arrested. [, who wrote a number of pamphlets attacking Ukrainian nationalism and who is alleged to be a member of the KGB, heard of the inquiry and published an indignant reply in pamphlet form. "The Amnesty International Organisation was founded in the first place to carry out anti-Soviet propaganda, by means of treachery and hypocrisy (and) beneath the mask of Pharisaic charity and humanity, to penetrate with the === [PDF page 55] === "repulsive espionage feelers the internal affairs of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries. If this international organisation really concerned itself with the fate of the repressed, the adjudged, of all who need protection, then it would not seek prisoners in our country, but rather where they really are, where the persecution of the individual forms the basis of capital(istic) state policy..." - a, “Ts roymakhu daly makhu", Visti z Ukrainy, Kiev, No. 23, June WTS AMNESTY. INTERNATIONAL PUBLICATIONS 53 Theobald's Road London WC1X 8SP England August 1973 === [PDF page 56] === liaz jainee 1sions, apna Cer unfortunate Snore mpacac de So Rh -Pather slons sucn 5 longer time s 1asS noe enc tnv JENTTIAT and pron wD Ltcen June GO: Mr ivor Rachaccd Indonesian political Ministers on severa by Mrs Budiardjo linent HCO GOw:s have yeu vc in the Jakarta —assified held 23 2d this a informed Mr Richard (and t Mr Budiardjo had been scts are marpropriate to inform therefore consider Mr Xichard 2 crab Lence ele nel WS MOYLe Pudi ay ainee may fly to )I mie G nfi shoruly< Tes al: Cees Yecially lonesians to use near future" to cover ourselves envisage. i Goa bcher Jest facific Department yp apne Bet Of wnt ome tees UES ee Ole wr. COP fetF parr at Oo, FOE : fickanbs WAY Aid fa roto “fe oe hey 4 (A om 6 ag EL doo now Out bend UCT Slat 0uth— === [PDF page 57] === CONFIDENTIAL horsoenesrateasoneensessosnen Mr Youde Mr Guest INDONESIA'S POLITICAL DETALNGES s [iy (F hevie wrove on i> une and. 30 July to. Mn iver. Richard MP about Mr Suwondo Budiardjo, a prominent Indonesian political detainee. Mr ichard has written to FCO Ninisters on several occasions, having; been encouraged to do so by Drs Budiardjo and her supporters in imnesty International. 2. vince Mr hoyle last wrote, the kmbassy in Jakarta have informed us that hr Budiardjo has been re-classified yet avain as a Category A detainee and that his is now being held in the Jakarta region. Z, Lah Lat ae minh? ddan on em dm é ots a TAKA Ged as se TA panty ant sa.: i eat atte os LU LO “Unt OruUunace thas we Should have learned this news a relatively short time after Mr Koyle had informed Mr Richard (and uv. vu we had separavely informed Mrs Sudiardjo) that Mr Budiardjo had classified as a Category 38 detainee for wi prospects are imar- ‘inally less blexk. iowevel fe considered it any Drate TO. Mire Sudgara;o: of Uhis. fur LtUsappropriate that LOY Le SiiOouded):w inporiung him of ils Latest developmer aoCordinely... Ihe Indonesians have coud Budlardjo is expected to be brought to nsider that Mr:-hoyle need mention thi: the smbassy have advised that the Indonesians tend expresSions such as "shortly" and "in the near future rather longer time spans than we would ourselves envisa;s w * Slatcher vouth-west tacific Department 28 veptember 1973 Ona TN TIT WT CONF L Dig TT AL === [PDF page 58] === RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 52] Foreign and Commonwealth Office 26 London SW1 Telephone 01- 940-844 Poo 20-0 t D 1/2 BXtn 755 9.) ee teas ee our reference Our reference = ||) 4/2 Date 25 ~eptember 1973 on Your letter of august, you expressed some doubts abcut the information which the indonesian authorities had Given us and which I conveyed to you in my Letter of 2 August. The Indonesian authorities have since informed us that your husband has been moved to the Jakarta area following his further re-classification as a Category "A" detainee. ft am sorry that I should have to break to you this news. WK ~latcher youth-vest Vacific Department cc: british umbassy, Jakarta === [PDF page 59] === Foreign and Commonwealth Office London S.W.1 26 September, 1973 I have been asked by Sir Alec Douglas-Home to reply to the letter of 7 September which you addressed to Her Majesty The Queen and in which you draw attention to the question of the political detainees in Indonesia. The Private Secretary to Her Majesty referred your letter to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. The Indonesian authorities are well aware of the concern felt in this country about the detainees. However, the matter is one of internal Indonesian affairs, and it would be inappropriate forthe Sovereign of another country to raise it in the course of a State Visit to Indonesia. Ci; Di Be HOLt) Private Secretary === [PDF page 60] === CONFIDENTIAL BNE NG ACLS EO NINE secretary to The Queen has referred to the letter from Mrs Ambrun of 7 September in which Majesty for Her forthcoming tion co, the polrurcal announcement about the State Visit was pubxpect a number of enquiries of this coming months articularly when Parliament is in attach a draft reply which adheres to the line which far maintained in public. ougl to be aware that enquiries have been addressed to us of Parliament ee Mr Jivor Richard @6 Me: and Mr Feter Archer QC0 MP about the case of Mr Suwondo Budiardjo, an 4+ndonesian who is a political detainee in Indonesia. They have argued that the facts that his wife is a UK citizen and that Indonesia occupies an important position in our aid programmes us in a position to raise his case with the Indonesians. We have resisted the arguments but have talked privately to the Indonesians in Jakarta about the case without admitting as much in public. 5. There is very little prospect of the Indonesians releasing Mr Budiardjo. They have expressed their intention to bring him to trial "shortly". But the rate at which trials are being held and thelr anverprevaviaon Of the word "Shortiy” 1s so EGlastic that at i6 /probably CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 61] === held be e the Stave Visiu. note on the question of the detainees and Vv & Slatcher West tacific Department CC. Tir Loude P&CD CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 62] === DAUKRGIL r various evidence roven; ian Communist - v Ya er Clase poe ssified, released a Sometimes Indonesians are ntly con- 1e detainees, and are looking numbers of those in Cla Vek Foo 8 === [PDF page 63] === VOovernment s on in correspondence CONFIDENTTATL === [PDF page 64] === @ BUCKINGHAM PALACE. Sl) fe eft reply fro~ Ls, Muth ° Wr Vhelip: Woored Complimen tS === [PDF page 65] === BALMORAL CASTLE Fup V2 The Private Secretary to The Queen is commanded to thank Mrs. IJ for her letter of 7th September and to say that it has been forwarded to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Comnonwealth Affairs. 12th September, 1973 === [PDF page 66] === 7 Th 6 ot tine La wma Mya? Mn I a Ah hoy ol t 0 7th) moh hin drt Wibe Ve pean fA ee, Viavh to Ton ff pnd t Me anwe Pe Ee tha | Font Wil 20. U) D pha tert LA Wath aav( The wl f- yw © by 4) Te a ik a tH Th, A hte EP 7 [7 uw My Iie ay a nef Kav ah fie. === [PDF page 67] === Mh fe} an Mt a Metis ee With Ve oS fee 7 Uqyi_. Muy TP )AL === [PDF page 68] === CONFIDENTIAL cence WK SigrChex 1. I have thought that it would be as well to take some time in putting up a reply to Mrs Budiardjo's letter of 4 August (Folio 111). Her letter is more in the nature of a statement than a request for further assistance. At the same time I think that we ought to tell her about herhusband's re-classification. We should be in a very delicate position if it emerged that we had withheld information about this. I attach a draft which is consistent with the line suggested in Jakarta telegram no 655 (Folio 118) eam Z a Aw 21 September 1973 J 8S Chick South West Pacific Department 1 ClO ahs nmoy ins, & See Ke Prof v Yo Pes Bucs oud jo befor *F fe ee Ge dee oe uct. if Aree We Aref ©. Dis te 1S8ur Ve Che on = BA Pte Flay Very OD 145177 219242 500M 4/73 GM 3643/2 === [PDF page 69] === curd >4| BUCKINGHAM PALACE the: With the Compliments f Me, Willan Fhscbine === [PDF page 70] === Bn ee eer ee eee ee eee ee BUCKINGHAM PALACE 24th September, 1973. Wo Vv (Rlaetee, I write to acknowledge your letter of 18th September, about The Queen's State Visit to Indonesia next year and to say that this has been laid before Her Majesty. Her Majesty undertakes a State Visit overseas on the advice of her Ministers and I have accordingly sent a copy of your letter to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. WiXA Sim “ols Rabbi Dr. David Goldstein. === [PDF page 71] === IS Solow 3 D wore artehy sae ts Sela ee county bo Ube re “4 Couc en Pet tw prow’ ele UAC ko he plein thn,; ee tee 2o ny wnrh Ceanen d hk eentaes oS om ~~ Chere owe te Sc ew cate, Peo ake fs ao, Ser how axe ot Ke pront Cus or ha SO 000 prc leak pain “ thon ¢ New howe uw « See swuaety Dee laeba! al Gs porGen Cor prec 4, vue a roker y fire ¢hitotn rhe Cre Ge (ofr be fae fu Ken pe Gee saee ord gle eet Fan Cathars Sor Cote Cmpnsne a were rr = === [PDF page 72] === | a CR GEN ER ere fu o. walt Gog i aN atta lie, Fave Cee Ih 2% ¢ Cores wrk wo s}fee | o Aor bs whee aon hee wr ek: hace, Zh efere rt ewtel « Ke jor “<< eS te Cire | ua Ae ne 4 a to. wate iat a ete he Gee Ae shetete he cree SR SLHAR TH Le ( L. OCrrsuk w Oh-ead o [Unreadable] oS: gence de 6 (te Carel Ar vine eae re Mar wnlreS see, S ans eae po oe ho yor, fon ering Dos Sale (Raaac oR. DALt‘2 Gok Ost ) === [PDF page 73] === BUCKINGHAM PALACE. Mth Z br Vhelip Mines Con themenls === [PDF page 74] === 2 | Enotes oe To oie ees mH eae letha: BALMORAL CASALE. September, 1973 Foro Lyn 24] I am commanded by. The Queen to thank you for your letter of Sth Septeaber and to say that it has been forwarded to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, since Her Majesty will be visiting Indonesia on the advice of her Ministers. === [PDF page 75] === Te Tapecte oe Meith; Nope uae lea po - Mote Ureck ts ln VouCete Vas | emg tea pee Bully Siro Pos Tajisty's a te wth ba oe Ptr et tke Hebe Mr paltc et Diicauwin< Lat S Lolo Trot a Charcot omg laud Y agqauet tla. Le base loc Wr btus tos, eon Citra tren hi 8 Be Heo tao; === [PDF page 76] === Cok, for abl Ss long oe DUS BA, [ea owe at de be Ly Peet te bew cf) Nea Ort fares, veto se i kL. aufonre Cob i wruet arta. i hs Mopeetable | m Olin te Arccwr boall abprobahon Ont cues Thapeat ic Vig ue eg Catan cfet re das poled. Be TLeteaby tc Ceuctna at ia, PAGedirct of bar hioldee ad is US out WA ao emit broalS Lou Surt, iaflrcne t oe Loaple mentor a ob a bre Dometratie Gu} bum ane ae [Agra (Yous — LL Sicblect. === [PDF page 77] === AIos = (I ams CVM) GV 6/r2 OLSL NOW Dag aNa SSINOWILSAL GYVYSH ONY LSNSAVY HLy NO SNOISSA3S SLI GSN3d0 ‘SIVNNSIYL AYVLITIW WLOSdS SHL *ALSSNWY WILNSGISSYd YOS Wa3ddv¥V JO LHDIY SIH 3SN TIIM 3H LVHL GIVS 3H *LOIGHYSA SHL DNIYVSH NOdn CaLWwS SHL WOYS GSAISO3Y GVH 3H STVGSW ANV AVIdSIGC GNV NMO OL LHDIY SIH MSYQHLIM ONV S304¥O4 GSaWYVY SHL HLIM SAYSS OL LHDIY SIH M3YNGHLIM “S3040d GSWYVY JHL WONS WIH GSDYVHOSIG IWNOASINL ANVLITIW TWIOSdS SHL *ALIYOHLAVY LNAWENONT SHL LSNIVSVY NOI7739939y4 VY DNILLOTd JO GNY O1718nNdaHy SHI JO LNAWNYSAOS ALVWILISS7T SHL MOYHLYSAO OL SNILYOSNOD JO ALTINS GNNOS SVM SH *AONSSVY SONSSITISINI IVYINSO SJHL JO 44VILS JO J31HOD YSWuOs SHL ‘ Hivaq ol acaonsings Avaol [Unreadable] nga g YOO ZOZ NNNN === [PDF page 78] === SOUTH WEST PACIFIC DEPARTMENT ROOM 271 nae KING CHARLES STREET === [PDF page 79] === FE/4387/B/1 1 Sept 73 B. INTERNAL AFFAIRS AFGHANISTAN King Mohammad Zahir Shah’s abdication (Text of letter datelined Rome, 21st Asad 1352 (12th August 1973) In the Name of Allah the Compassionate, the Merciful. My Brother HE the President, ever since I have heard the news about the recent events, my homeland has been very much in my thoughts and I have been disturbed about its future. However, I have realized that the majority of the Afghan people have welcomed the republican regime for the future running of their national affairs and, as a mark of respect to the will of the people of my homeland, I have decided to abdicate from the kingship of Afghanistan, and I hereby inform you of my decision. While my cherished hope remains the happiness and greatness of my dear homeland, I place myself as an Afghan citizen under the shadow of the Flag of Afghanistan. I pray that the Almighty God will continue to be the protector and succourer of our homeland and compatriots. Mohammad Zahir. (Kabul in Dari for abroad 1230 gmt 29 Aug 73) BANGLADESH Joint call to resist communalism (FE/4384/B/1) (Text) Leaders of the Awami League, the National Awami Party (Muzaffar Group) and the Communist Party have called upon the people to resist all attempts at aggravating the problems and crises of the country by creating lawlessness and reviving communalism. They were addressing a meeting of various trade unions at the Awami League office in Dacca last night. [27th August] The organizing secretary of the Awami League, Mr. Abdul Razak; the General Secretary of the National Awami Party, Mr. Pankaj Bhattacharjee; and the Communist Party representative, Mr.Saifuddin Ahmed Maniq were among those who addressed the meeting. The three parties are holding a joint rally at Baitul Mukarram in Dacca this afternoon. (Dacca home service in English 0145 gmt 28 Aug 73) INDONESIA WM trial adjourned (FE/4379/B/2) The press were informed on 27th August that former Foreign Minister Subandrio would give evidence that evening. He is at present held in a prison in Bandung pending the execution of the death sentence passed oh him in 1966 (Antara in English 1402 gmt 27 Aug 73). The trial has been adjourned until 4th September. The defendant has expressed his regret to the court for having neglected to perform his duties as an intelligence officer, saying that he was influenced by the situation and circumstances prevailing at the time (Jakarta home service 0700 gmt 28 Aug 73). Marriage bill before parliament _ Explaining the Marriage Draft Bill to a plenary session of parliament on 30th August, Umar Senoadji, the Minister of Justice, said it had been drawn up with the aim of curbing polygamy. In order to practise polygamy, a man will have to obtain the consent of his wife, (Jakarta home service 1200 gmt 30 Aug 73) New head for export organization Admono Suryo was installed as Chairman of the National Export Promotion Institute on 28th August. He replaces Prof. Subroto, who is now Minister of Manpower. Admono Suryo was formerly an official in the Directorate-General of Foreign Economic Relations at the Department of Foreign Affairs (Jakarta home service 1200 gmt 28 Aug 73) === [PDF page 80] === FE/4387/B/2 1 Sept 73 MONGOLIA ge” New head of peace organization The executive committee of the Federation of Mongolian Peace and Friendship Organizations has released D. Adilbish from his duties as Chairman of the Federation in connection with his transfer to other work and has appointed N. Luvsanchultem in his place. (Montsame in Russian 0522 gmt 28 Aug 73) NORTH VIETNAM Protection of historical relics An editorial in the 30th August ‘Nhan Dan’ broadcast by Hanoi home service (2230 gmt 29 Aug 73) said that many historical sites and cultural relics had suffered during the war. It was clear that many local authorities had not paid due attention tos their protection. Administrative bodies at all levels must now take practical measures to remedy the situation. Those bodies and enterprises which used areas containing cultural relics for air-defence and evacuation purposes during the war must now turn over the sites to the supervisory bodies concerned. The body responsible for the supervision of cultural work must continue to zone off historical sites for their protection and gradually restore damaged relics. Local cultural branches must quickly take stock of all the historical and cultural relics existing in their districts, and formulate comprehensive plans to look after, classify, preserve and restore them. Death of Ngo Tu Ha Peter Ngo Tu Ha, former member of the Standing Committee of the first National Assembly of North Vietnam, former Deputy Minister for Veterans and War-disabled, member of the nation-wide liaison committee of patriotic and peace-loving Vietnamese Catholics, died on 29th August at the age of 93. (Hanoi home service 1431 gmt 29 Aug 73) Socialist man campaign,The General Confederation of Trade Unions of central bodies recently launched a campaign to build socialist men, The campaign involved, among other things, establishing equality between husbands and wives, increasing the responsibilities of parents for educating children, and studying and working satisfactorily. (Hanoi home service 1030 gmt 25 Aug 73) Education During the war over 400 schools were bombed out and over half the schools in the provinces south of the 20th parallel were destroyed. Despite this, during the 1972-73 academic year over 4,882,000 youngsters went to school regularly. Compared with the previous year, the number of primary school students increased by 5 per cent. There was also an increase of 10 and 21 per cent respectively in the enrolment of the junior high and senior high schools. In the mountain provinces, attendance at primary and junior high classes increased by 15 percent. There were in all 218,000 children in kindergartens and 933,000 others in infant classes. Complementary education for adults was maintained with 386,000 students. Among them 18,000 persons followed full-time complementary courses.. (VNA in English 1525 gmt 21 Aug 73) SIKKIM New political party: Indian report The Sikkim Congress party has been established after a merger of the (?Jensa) Congress party and the National Congress party. Kazi Lhendup Dorji has been elected president of the new party. (New Delhi in English for abroad 2200 gmt 25 Aug 73) === [PDF page 81] === CONFIDENTIAL : BRITISH EMBASSY 1/18 JAKARTA 27 August 1973 J S Chick Esq SWPD FCO Dew ssn, Political Detainees ae a At a meeting held at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (part of the Government's "think tank") on 14 August I was told that there are as 500 Category "A" prisoners and 13,600 in Category "B". 2. The Government was working on a plan to solve the detainee problem and the CSIS itself would produce a booklet on the subject. They thought that all the detainees would be off the island in about five year's time. De The basic points in considering this complicated problem were:- (a) It could not be denied that the detainees were Indonesian and part of Indonesia. Therefore it would be best if they could be reabsorbed by society. This was why students resident in Moscow could now come home; this also related to the Category "C" group; Much depended upon how stable Indonesian society really is (the recent Bandung incident made the question all the more relevant) and it was also important to consider if the prisoners were reliable and if they were confident in themselves; The PKI and the detainees were a problem which involved the emotions of senior generals, notably the President. The PKI had challenged the Javanese tradition of the basic notion of harmony and balance upon which Indonesia operates by their alien ideology and had compounded this by murdering colleagues of the present Government of Indonesia in cold blood. Communism had put itself beyond the limits of Indonesian tolerance because of its violence - there was then a real element of repugnance in official Indonesian thinking about it. This meant that the detainees could consider themselves lucky to be alive at all in such circumstances, but nevertheless the Government wanted to solve the problem by reabsorbing as many of the detainees into society as possible. There was no doubt /whatever CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 82] === CONFIDENTIAL whatever that the President felt strongly on this issue and behind his smile was a very strong will; (ad) The Indonesian Government was aware that the detainees attracted criticism from bodies such as Amnesty International and appreciated the attitude of Governments, like the British, who took the view that this was an internal Indonesian matter. Nevertheless it was felt that the detainees problem had to be solved as quickly as possible as they attracted hostile foreign comment. Ke LZ ho ey R J Field CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 83] === CONFIDENT: PV LIED ~ 9 Ir G Yt HE hOOAG RQ Da ant 655 OF 24 AUGUST 73. POLITICAL DETAINEES WE HAVE SPOKEN TO BAKIN, THEY DID NOT SPECIFICALLY ADMIT [Unreadable] INFORMATION THEY GAVE US ON 17 JL ARA a1 C) MY GRAM 569) WAS INACCURATE, c THEY CONFIRMED THAT THEIR REPORTED IN AGRAPI OF BEAVEN’S LETTER aos ke ae WAS CORREC EY SAID THAT MI WOULD SEE NO OBJECTION TO INFORMATION FOURTH SENTENCES OF PARAGRAPH 1 ae AND THAT GIVEN MARUI: nA XN AD! 4 cVve ’ in ACT OrR At WEAVER PARAGRAPH 1 EXCLUDING LAST SEN WGe F BEAVEN? W BEING PASSE] ‘NONE S INE STAN FURTHE ABOUT THE TRIAL, AND O} (E QUE: ON OF ACCESS BY. FAMILY LAWYER, 3s | SUPPOSE MRS BUDIARDJO AND HER FRIENDS ARE AWARE THAT ALTHOUGH WE HAVE a ae oo rt aeA AT Te ony ALGe ere eairy cae 1 THI A PAOr rO US, WE REALLY HAVE NO LOCUS STANE UNDERLINED THiS CASE. cea Cus eyes NEWS D MR ROSE RESEARCH D ME P ARSONS PS MR SCOTT pa /Mp D7 2 LEV sere (kN IN FC I eek SULA ele ky {PD SIR ER ) rAd eR ees Se Qi CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 84] === CONFIDENTIAL BRITISH EMBASSY JAKARTA IIB 23 August 1973 W K Slatcher Esq SWPD FCO Nee low POLITICAL DETAINEES ds Please refer to my letter 1/18 of sust.. (118) 2e On 21 August the Ambassador attended a small lunch party at the American Embassy where the Australian and Netherlands Ambassadors were also present. There was some discussion about prisioners and our Ambassador told his colleagues about the recent Parliamentary Questions and spoke generally on the lines of my letter under reference. The Americans appear to have had a number of enquiries from people in the United States, which they have tried to answer by ensuring that the Indonesian side of the problem was understood. There seemed to be general agreement that publicity was unlikely to do the prisoners any good and that it might be useful to try and concentrate on getting some improvement in conditions on the lines suggested in paragraph 11 of my letter under reference. The point was made that it would be best if this could be done without any publicity and I should be grateful if you could bear this in mind in any action you may take as a result of my letter under reference. You may like to know in addition, for your own information, that the Dutch Red Cross have sent a cheque to the Indonesian Red Cross to cover the cost of providing comforts for the prisoners on Buru Island. The Dutch Ambassador did not yet know whether this operation has been successful. He stressed that it had been done without publicity of any kind. The American Ambassador seemed disposed to have a word with the Head of the Indonesian Red Cross to see if he has any ideas on how bodies outside Indonesia might be able to relieve the position of the prisoners. This again should be treated as confidential for the moment since on subjects like this the Indonesian Red Cross could be in a fairly delicate position. J L Beaven CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 85] === CONFIDENTIAL CYPHER CAT A .. 175 [Unreadable] CONFIDENTIAL R TO ROUTINE F.C.0,. FELNO. 659 OF 22 AUGUST 73. Le D tA CHICK’S LETTERS FWD1/2 OF 9 AND 1@ AUGUST TO BEAVEN POLITICAL DETAINEES, Ae WE SHALL TRY TO DISCOVER FROM BAKIN REASONS FOR APPARENT DISCREPANCY BETWEEN INFORMATION THEY GAVE US IN JULY ABOUT MR . BUDIARDJO’S STATUS AND LOCATION (PARAGRAPH 1(C) MY TELEGRAM NO 569) AND THAT GIVEN IN MRS BUDIARDJO’S LETTER OF 4 AUGUST. TO SLATCHER,, Ze MEANWHILE { THINK THAT THE LESS SAID TO MRS BUDIARDJO THE BETTER, SINCE (A) THERE MUST BE DOUBT ABOUT ACCURACY OF INFO= RMATION I NDONESIANS HAVE GIVEN US ABOUT HER HUSBAND AND (B) NOTHING WE CAN SAY AT PRESENT SEEMS LIKELY TO SATISFY HER. m6 | SUGGEST: SHE BE TOLD MERELY THAT WE HAVE PASSED ON TO HER THE INFORMATION WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM THE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES AND THAT WE CANNOT ADD ANYTHING TO {T AT PRESENT EXCEPT THAT WE KNOW THAT HER HUSBAND’S CLASSIFICATION COULD BE SUBJECT TO CHANGE SINCE MOVEMENTS BETWEEN CATEGORIES STEM FROM EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE INVESTIGATION OF OTHER PRISONERS (PARAGRAPH 1(C) OF MY TELEGRAM NO. 569). COMBS PouEes SWPD MR ROSE PUSD MR PARSONS UND MR scoTT IRD CONSULAR D GIPD NEWS D RESEARCH D PS/MR ROYLE SIR E NORRIS; eee CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 86] === mrrs HE TI cutting dated __ 31 AUG 1973 19 gp TS Indonesian prisoners From Miss Sarah Leigh Sir, In an article on Indonesian political prisoners published in your special supnlement on Indonesia Stewart Harris, quotes figures given to him by President Suharto’s office in July, adding up to a total of 36,221 political detainees, or 46,119 if the prisoners on Bru are not included in the figure given for “B” category prisoners. (Mr Harris is ambiguous on this point.) As even the lower of thesé two figures is more than double that given by President Suharto in March this year, Mr Llarris concludes that the big increase suggests a significant stepping up of communist activity leading to many arrests. This conclusion does not tally with the facts. Although there is a constant trickle of new arrests, nothing has been ré¢ported in the Indonesian press recently to suggest that nearly 20,000 people have been arrested in the past five months. The huge discrepancy between the March and July fcures, both supplied by President Suharto, is only indicative of tie utter confusion that has consistently characterized Indonesian official pronouncements on this subject. A publication issued in March this year by Amnesty International contains noo fewer than eight conflicting sets of figures announced by the Indonesian authorities over a period of only 15 months. haw ae AM La of) Pug Cn ming The Indonesian Government has throughout displayed, an alarming disregard for the need to keep itself and others accurately informed on a matter which concerns the lives and rights of so many people. Perhaps the most sinister reflection of this disregard was the statement made by the former Indonesian Attorney General who jokingly compared the figure with the floating rate of the ven vis-a-vis the dollar. The Jesson surely is that little credence can be placed in Indonesian official pronouncements about the number of political prisoners in detention. There is, we believe, no reason to doubt that the estimate of 55,000 made by Amnesty International in March still holds good and may in fact understate the problem. It is abominable that nearly eight years after the 1965 events, so many people are still being held without trial. In view of this continued violation of human rights on such an enormous scale, we were amazed to hear that the Queen has announced that she wil] be making an eight-day state visit to Indonesia early next year. Clearly.ais will be construed as condonation at the very least of the continued detention without trial of so many people. Yours faithfully, SARAH LEIGH, Secretary, TAPOL, the British Campaign for the Release of indonesian Political Prisoners, 114 Mansfield Road, NW3. Haw it 4 ¢ AnnudV I le rit *) ene === [PDF page 87] === THE TIMES FRIDAY. AUGUST 17 _ The great problem: bringing work to the millions of unemployed by Stewart Harris I do not pretend to have helped very much with the rice harvest in central Java, but gradually, outside a village only 30 miles from Kemusu, where President Suharto was born, the one great problem of Indonesia was becoming clear. The woman had shown me how to hold a smal! sliver of wood between the second and third fingers of my right hand. Embedded in the wood is a sharp piece of metal so that the thumb and forefinger are left free to take hold of the stalk just below the ear of the rice. Then, as the right hand noves to put the ear into the Jeft hand, which does the collecting, the metal naturally cuts the stalk. It was not difficult. just simple sensible work, quite hard in the hot sun but not so hard as the work of the men who cut the stalk near the bottom with a sickle then bunch the stalks for cattle feed After a while I walked along the little dykes to an old man hoejing the heavy earth around some young tobacco plants, In this way he killed the weeds with his changkul and his tobacco was able to grow. The veins stood out from his old brown body which glistened with sweat. I was happy to be in the country, where men and women worked hard and skilfully because their work affected their lives and their reward seemed just. It was different in Jakarta, where I had spent one private hour with President Suharto and many hours with other leaders of all kinds. I had decided to get away among less important people because the problems of Indonesia, so vast and complex a country, had seemed in Jakarta both legion and insoluable. I escaped on the day train to Jogjakarta, a cheap 13-hour journey which was very hot, with a hard seat. The train began by ripping through the private lives of the shanty dwellers who come to Indonesia’s capital looking for work and hope. Inside the train I also “got the lot” including beggars and hawkers, when it stopped. Kasir, a young clerk from Sumatra, was sitting beside me and told me what was going on. For example, a soldier and a policeman on the bench opposite did not have tickets. The uniformed collector settled for third of the fare, which he kept without giving any ticket. “Tt always happens”, said Kasir, who also explained that his children’s school fees which are meant to pay for new schools tend to stay with the teachers, underpaid like everyone else, including generals. Indonesian secretaries in foreign companies get more than a_ senior general, at least in salary. Hence the so-called corruption, “ We don’t feel we have enough value and therefore we dont work too hard”, Kasir said, with a smile, and later he came with me into the country where the one great problem of Indonesia became clear: how to get its most powerful and least developed capital into action. If the millions of unemployed and the many millions more of underemployed in a nation of 120 million, the fifth biggest population in the world, were to work as they could, being paid and taxed properly, then all the other problems would go away. The gnp would leap, and so would social justice, both together. But the reality is that the future of Indonesia and its second five-year plan have little daily interest for a people who must scrounge for the needs of their families, now and in precarious days ahead. Will foreign investment, a stable currency, even the miracle of peace and order in the world’s largest archipelago (3,400 miles from east to west and 1,000 miles from north to south), and all the other plans get Indonesia’s people into action fast enough? ‘Do you see Indonesia stable and peaceful for the next 10 years?” Tasked Amir Daud, editor of Pedoman.“ Oh yes, no doubt about it” and he elaborated on his optimism. It was not an interview meant for publication. So this was all the more impressive. Animism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, colonialism, nationalism, communism, now capitalism —most of the world’s great movements have washed over Indonesia. The peoples of its main islands—Sumatra, Kalimantan, Java, Sulawesi and Irian jJaya—are very different, and so are the Indians, Arabs and Chinese (three million) who live with them. The ancient history of what is now Indonesia, and the ceaseless strife from 1942 when the Japanese arrived, are a part of the lives of every Indonesian leader today. The world may have forgotten what happened: they do not. Most Indonesians feel that Western parliamentary democracy was found wanting in their first decade. Then guided democracy, formally introduced in 1959; deteriorated with President Sukarno and culminated in the communist coup of October 1965 and its bloody aftermath, Today, with good reason I think, the army still sees itself as a people’s army, with barefoot beginnings and no social background. It is justifiably proud of the cautious constitutional way it finally got rid of Sukarno in March 1967 after 18 months of remarkable restraint. Yet observers from Westminster are entitled to fault the practice of liberty under one law for all men, as they see it in contemporary Indonesia. Indeed the most formid able man in Indonesia today, under President Suharto, is General Sumitro, aged 45, from East Java, the head of KOPKAMTIB, the _ operational command for the restoration of security and order. Its powers of investigation, arrest, interrogation and dismissal of people suspected of communism or of real hostility to the Government are, it seems, boundle Much is done with a nod in the Javanese way but the message is clear and generally respected. Adnan Bujung Nasution, the lawyer, told me that he had been prevented from reading a paper on legal aid to an international conference while I was in Jakarta. Newspapers are occasionally banned and The Asia Magazine was not allowed to be distributed on one occasion. There is a feeling that some sort of broad agreement must be preserved within Indonesia, and that the extremes of individual liberalism have no place in the new order. Even the students are quiet. Pak Harto (the familiar father term for the President) grows daily in authority and towers above the country, far from ‘the primus inter pares that he used to be. He and the Vice-President, the Sultan of Jogjakarta, Hamengku Buwono IX, meet the full Cabinet of 22 about once every six weeks, and only four of these men are Continued on page IT INDONESIA I photograph; Douglas Dickins On other pages An interview with the President i How many political prisoners? I Brotesath Arndt on the economy (ll Relations with ASEAN IV Scope for foreign investors IV The population explosion Vv Links with Britain Vv Ten days on holiday in Java. Vi Restoration of Borobudur Vi The oil boom Vil How free is the press? The picture shows a religious processio offerings to the temple of Besakih in Bali.. === [PDF page 88] === INDONESIA Were here, In London the Chartered Bank’s world-wide operations are controlled from our main office at 38 Bishopsgate and we also have branches in London’s West End, Liverpool and Manchester. there _. The Chartered Bank has been in South East Asia for over a hundred years. And our knowledge of the people, their needs and customs is as intimate and detailed as our knowledge of the areas economy, commerce and industry. In Indonesia we have two branches in the capital Jakarta, and that makes us a living part of the country’s business community. Before your visit to Indonesia, contact us at any of our branches, or offices of the Group in Birmingham, Leeds, Glasgow or Bristol. _ When you're there, take full advantage of our expertise and the wide range of banking services which our branches Ve Gan provide.” =); 3 and everywhere. _Throughout the world, through our membership of the Standard and Chartered Banking Group, the Chartered Bank forms part of one of the world’s’ largest banking institutions, with over 1500 offices and branches in Europe, Africa, the Middle and Far East, Asia, Australia and the U.S.A. The Chartered Bank Indonesia: Kotakpos 2655/DKT, 40 Jalan Abdul Muis, Jakarta. 24 Jalan Kali Besar Timur, Jakarta-Kota. Head Office: 38, Bishopsgate, London EC2N 4AH Telephone: 01-588 3688 A member of Standard and Chartered BANKING GROUP LIMITED The Marketing Man’s Bank THE TIMES FRIDAY AUGUST.17 1973 President Suharto lives with his family in a pleasant bungalow in Tjendana Street, near the centre of Jakarta. When Tatsuro Koto, vicepresident of Mitsui of Tokyo, left the President’s office, having told him that Mitsui would be investing US$1,000m in Indonesia in the next five years, I went in. We sat beside a low table and tea was served. The President wore a plain grey tropical suit with open neck. He wore the badge of a Cabinet Minister, the Indonesian coat of arms above the word wnajaka, which means servant. Above his desk hung a vivid painting of the brave monkey warrior Hanoman defeating the evil king Rahvana. ‘ The mystical ancient religious culture of village life in central Java, animist, Hindu, Buddhist and finally Muslim, is deep within the President. His peasant father was too poor to own a water buffalo and he did not go to school until he was eight. When he left school at 18, in 1939, he was still too poor to own a pair of shoes. Suharto’s father left his mother when he was only four years old and his childhood was spent with various relations and friends and finally with a _ religious teacher. In 1940 he joined the Dutch Army. He was a sergeant when the Japanese took over two years later and they trained him in their “Indonesian Army”. With the defeat of Japan and the unilateral declaration of Indonesian independence in 1945 President Suharto became a guerrilla leader against the Dutch. As a lieutenant-colonel he was still, much of the time, barefooted. By 1956 he was commander of the Diponegoro Division based in central Java. Later as a general he commanded the West Irian liberation campaign, 1962, and the Malaysian confrontation campaign, 1965. When the communists struck in October, 1965, Suharto was commander of the Army’s strategic reserve (KOSTRAD). His decisiveness at this stage, when General Nasution, head of the armed forces, was shocked and hesitant, started his chance progression to the presidency. President Suharto’s turbulent life, which included a night’s vigil with the mutilated bodies of the murdered generals on October 4, 1965, has not unnaturally affected very deeply all his attitudes and policies today. After so much strife and chaos he is a determined traditionalist and constitutionalist. He still makes much of the supreme authority of the People’s Congress, describing himself as responsible to it. However, because Congress meets so rarely—once in five years unless for a special purpose—the practical situation is very different, although Parliament, the legislative body, meets for more than half each year. In the course of my interview with President Suharto, I asked him to provide me with the latest exact numbers of prisoners held in Indonesia without trial for alleged communist activities. I also asked him to give me an estimate of the speed with which they were being brought to trial, and a definition of the criminal code under which they were being tried. Two days earlier, when [- had asked the Foreign Minister the same questions, Mr Malik had told me that he was now gétting the numbers from the Attorney General once a month instead of once every three months, and he undertook to get me the exact numbers. Meanwhile, Mr Malik said, there were about 10,500 such prisoners on the island of Buru. The President told me that all C category prisoners had been released. This confirms what he told Congress in March that the C category had once totalled 80,000 but that all had been released by early 1972. He said there were still about 2,000 in category A, which is also what he The great proble continued from page I generals. However, there are 13 professors. Every Tuesday a smaller Cabinet meets to watch the économy. This is always attended by General Sumitro and often by Genera] Sutopo Juwona, the head of BAKIN, the intelligence agency for foreign and domestic affairs. Also present at all Cabinet meetings are the President’s corps of personal assistants, known as. ASPRI, who are four generals, Surjo (Finance), Humardhani (Economics), Tjokropanolo (Personal Security) and Ali Murtopo (Political). I met the last two generals, separately and at some length. Ali Murtopo is also head of OPSUS, the Indonesian acronym for “special operations ”. We met at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, of which he is director. Several able young Chinese are also In the Army President Suharto was-known as “ buffalo ’ and he has a reputation for stubbornness. Many people, including foreign diplomats, have been surprised by the Presdent’s grasp of details over a wide range of subjects. He is also criticized for lacking ideas, which is said to make him vulnerable to his closest advisers, outside both Cabinet and the public service. Some of these men are perhaps only too full of ideas. However, the President does “know what is going on ”— a point which worries president-watchers everywhere because these men so often get more and more out of touch as they get older and stronger,; President Suharto © still meets a lot of strangers. He is out of Jakarta about four or five days in each month and he does not stay in Java. In general Indonesians have more time for people and conversation than do _ their western counterparts. Certainly there is a calm strength about the man, and his report to Congress in March was straightforward. “Tens of millions of people are still living in misery ”, he said, giving an account of his stewardship: In March President Suharto also reconstructed his Cabinet after Congress had appointed one of his ministers, the Sultan of Jogjakarta, to the vicepresidency and named him as President Suharto’s successor. The President himself gave up the Defence portfolio which he handed to General Panggabean, a North Sumatran and Christian, which would make him impossible presidential material. This is thought to bea shrewd choice because the General is also commander of the armed forces. Such a power would normally invite unusual ambition. President Suharto is 52 and he is expected to retire from the Army at the usual age of 55, offering himself for reelection in 1978 as a civilian. The President uses an interpreter, but he also followed my questions directly and his expression would change. Once, when I gave him some hearsay evidence of disagreement within the Government on some _ practical matter in relation to its general support for Palestine, he looked shocked and perhaps angry long before the interpreter had started. Generally, however, he would smile calmly, as Javanese do, and be composed. There is an absence of any stress or strain about his home, although it is often thronged with military men in the front rooms. The President and his“wife have three sons and three daughters. I began by asking him the significance of the recent visit to Jakarta of Mr Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore—his first since the end of the confrontation, although it is six years since the formation of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Singapore is only an hour to an hour and told Congress in March. These people, he told me, were being brought to trial, but there were not enough judges. However, the President said, the Government would try to solve the problem in “a legal and just way ”, and he invited me to attend one of the trials in Jakarta. But this was not possible because I had to leave the city. As for the category B prisoners, the President had told Congress in March that there were 13,117 of these, and many were on the island of Buru where hundreds had been joined by their families. They could not be released until the Government was convinced they had “ relinquished their communist attitude and way of thinking and turned to our own ideology Panca Sila”. The President repeated this argument to me, adding that the lives of many would be endangered if they were returned to their villages, where the people would know them. He told me that the Government was sure the prisoners had been implicated with the communists, but it did not have enough eviderice to satisfy a court. Finally, in the presence of his Cabinet Secretary, General Sudharmono, who had sat through the interview, the President said that 1 would be m: work for the associated with the centre and with ASPRI, and some feel that ASPRI“and, BAKIN have too much influence on the President. especially in political and foreign affairs. Mr Adam Malik, the Foreign Minister who never attends the weekly Cabinet, is said to have lost much of his authority. I spent some time with Mr Malik and he did confirm that General Sumitro always chaired the new special Cabinet committee on foreign policy, even in his presence. But the army’s immense influence is rarely towards military objectives. It is not, for. example, reequipping itself. There is no significant core of dissatisfaction within its leadership because the ambitious can see their way ahead in all directions—to commands, to embassies abroad and into civilian administration. As for the younger moderns like Sarwo Edhie, Dharsono a half by air from Jakarta. The President was not going to answer out of context, so he gave me a long explanation of the roots of Indonesia’s domestic and foreign policies. The aims were national and regional stability. National and regional “ resilience” would enable the whole area to meet all threats from within and without. He elaborated on the theme, which seems perhaps self-evident to a foreign observer, but is very dear to the Indonesian or rather Javanese mind, with its passion for conceptual thinking. The President agreed that ASEAN now had the selfconfidence to begin looking at the political and defence issues between its members which it had agreed to ignore in its early years. He implied that a general theme could now be worked for in these areas, too. Foreign defence agreements were matters for each nation individually, although they were not within the policy of Indonesia. I brought him back to Mr Lee’s visit and asked if he would be going to Singapore next year, which would be his first visit, “Now we can see each other any time, any convenient time”, he _ replied happily. It was like it was with Tun Razak, Prime Minister of Malaysia. But then he added: “Of course, I have got an obligation to return Mr Lee’s official visit.” It was indeed an official visit. Seldom can one have been prepared so thoroughly, for both leaders wanted to end in a ceremonial way, and without the tension caused by any sort of negotiation. The situation was one which dated back to Mr Lee’s execution of two Indonesian marines captured in Singapore during confrontation despite a personal private appeal to him from the President. Only some kind of atonement would satisfy the Indonesians, and they made sure of it in advance. The proud Mr Lee agreed to scatter flowers on the graves of the two men in Jakarta’s Heroes Cemetery before a big parade of marines. This particular scene was much photographed and well recorded in the Indonesian press but not, I understand, in the press in Singapore. Mr Lee went on to North Sumatra, and Mr Adam Malik. who went with him, told me that Singapore would be investing in tourist developments around Lake Toba. There is already much Singapore capital in oil, timber, rubber and bauxite in Sumatra, and Mr Lee must have concluded that the Japanese would have to be matched politically if they were going to be matched commercially. I then asked the President if there had been any move from Indonesia to suggest that relations with Peking, “suspended” since 1967, might be reopened. The President said that Indonesia’s experience with Peking had been sad and bit- No trial yet for political prisoners given the latest exact numbers in each category. The official figures reached me 10 days later, by which time I was in Bali. They relate to the position at the end of June: category A, 2,457; category B, 26,650; and category X, 7,114. I was also told that on the samé date there were 9,898.on Buru. Because the category A and B figures were both higher than those given to Congress in March—and in the case of category B more than double—I checked them back on the telephone to Jakarta and I am sure there was no misunderstanding. As for the category X, I presume this refers to a class of prisoners described by the President in his March statement to Congress as “ detainees who have not been classified since their investigations are stil] in progress”. He did not give Congress their number. I was not in the end given any indication of the speed with which category A prisoners would be brought to trial, nor any definition of the criminal code under which they would be tried. The big increase in the total numbers of prisoners held in categories A and B, taken with the thousands in category X still not classified eight years after the commumillions of unemployed and Kemal Idris, they have been given more time to mature, well away from Jakarta—as head of the military academy in Central Java, as Ambassador in Phnom Penh and as Ambassador in Belgrade. General Ibn Sutowo, head of the huge state oil enterprise Pertamina, has admittedly immense financial power which he has used with an arrogant independence of government, Last year, unknown to Cabinet, he raised abou $350m in foreign loans but a presidential decree in January and stricter control by Pertamina’s commission of ministers are half expected to hobble even Ibn Sutowo. There remains in Jakarta a respected but retired presence which questions the whole way of President Suharto’s new order. General Nasution, former head of the armed forces, moves and talks all over Indonesia but is not reported, by order presumably of KOPKAMTIB, He ‘the two sets of figures. There In these two articles Stewart Harris meets President Suharto—whom he finds a determined traditionalist—and considers the 36,000 in jail because of alleged communist activity Peasant’s son gives account of his stewardship President Suharto at the University of Indonesia, Jakarta. ter. During the old order there had been close relations with Peking, and yet Peking had supported insurrection against the Government and against Panca Sila—the Indonesian state philosohy resting on the “five stones” of belief in God, humanitarianism, democracy, nationalism and social justice. Indonesia would never forget the 1965 coup. There were Indonesians in Peking still permitted to attack the Indonesian Government on China’s powerful short-wave radio. President Nixon and Mr Tanaka had been to Peking, and the Chinese Govyernment had promised not to interfere in the domestic affairs of other nations, but it was still interfering in the affairs of Indonesia. The President reminded me that it was still hard to suppress the remnants of the communist guerrillas, and there was no mistaking his position on this issue. KOPKAMTIB, the command which is charged with the duty of suppressing communism, has estimated that more than a million people trained by the communists, although not cadres, are still living free in _ Indonesia. Three were killed in central Java only last month. In West Kalimantan, where a quarter of the two million people are Chinese, communist guerrillas are very active along the border with Malaysia, despite a joint command against them, Altogether, of Indonesia’s three million Chinese, about 250.000 have Peking passports and a million are stateless. I asked the President if he had evidence of nist coup, may well indicate a significant recent increase in the leve] of communist activity and a strong response by government forces in Java perhaps, as well as Kalimantan. Certainly there can be no questioning the sources of is ne discrepancy. In each case the source was the President—to Congress in March and to me only four months later. However, the simpler and more likely explanation for the difference between the March and June figures is that thousands of category X prisoners were moved into category B. In these circumstances of continuing challenge, after decades of wild disorder, I find it difficult not to have some real sympathy for the Indonesian Government’s view that the whole basis of society remains in some danger, as well as the Government. It was the kind of argument used by allied governments during the Second World War to intern many people, also without trial. As for the conditions in which the prisoners live, conditions which I have not seen, these would have to be very bad to be worse than some of the conditions outside the internment camps, which | have seen. spoke to me in his home, beneath a painting of his little daughter, murdered by the communists in 1965. Briefly, General Nasution represents a deep and perhaps broad distaste for all the trappings of foreign capitalism, from indices of gnp to luxury hotels like the President in Jakarta. The idea of Java becoming like Japan, the zenith of ambition to some, is anathema to him. He wants to get back to the purity of the old guerrilla days. Curiously, for a devout Muslim and bitter anti-communist, General Nasution represents a self-sufficient national drive. There is a yearning in Indonesia for this alternative, more dignified way ahead. It asks the question: must the ancient civilization of Indonesia follow the crude ways of western materialism, plunging its people from the poverty of unemployment into the poverty of the factory? material support reaching the rebels from Peking, and he said this was no longer possible. Minister, told me earlier that had met the Chinese {yqonesian Foreign Minister for more official] than three hours in Paris in Presumably the Jogjakarta. I asked the President if he these Peking February. Indonesian stand was made very clear to Peking on that occasion, because Mr Malik’s briefing to me was just as firm on the subject as the President's. Domestic issues bound up with Indonesian economic development still dominate influential Peking is Jusuf Adjitorop, a leading member of the Communist Party who went there for treatment just before the 1965 coup, Peking still sees Adjitorop as a sort of government in Adventure exile, and the Indonesians ever, and his fortnight were particularly infuriated in Algiers last year when the organizing aboard m.v. PRINSENDAM Enjoy an Indonesian Adventure Cruise Holiday the Holland America way. Fly from London then spend 14 days cruising in exotic luxury around the enchanting © coasts of Malaya, Sumatra, Java. and Bali - stay in Singapore or Bangkok and fly back with the beautiful memory All-inclusive fares start as low as £519. Departures from London every fortnight from January 12th. Get the details. Consult your travelagentorsendthecoupon, Maiden Voyage! Sail for Singapore from Southampton on December 1st. Call at Lisbon, Funchal, Walvis Bay, Cape Town,Medan, and <~ Djakarta..41 days of at romantic ? sights London-fromn £977 sunshine. Fares ~including return: \ Seen Please send me details of m.v, Prinsendam Maiden Voyage sash ansgesss yess ve tatsceoie Fsshooys aan poetsOneOTRCe POR isan ricorenssscitetioronececdvea rind celebrate versary of Algeria’s independence invited Jawoto from ee Ke had epee ambas- ‘ alik; sador in Hanoi, and went to Mit) -Mahiky, the) Poraiga China after the coup. The Algerians sat him next to the Government’s representative. much respected Sultan would Indonesians “Yes that would be good but it would not be a prerequisite for starting any relations”, he answered. The main thing was for Peking to stop slan- Indonesian foreign policy, dering Jakarta and taking “a and there is no real reason why Jakarta should want to move towards hostile attitude.’ he went on, it was legitimate Peking. for governments to encourage Chinese rice is coming in people fighting in a colonial through Hongkong. The most Indonesian in example, was being dominated by another country. The President much at home talking about foreign policy, where he was rather limited in the early His state visits have developed his interest, howsituation. days. November was : more than a bid for trade and committee to investment. Europe last We know | the Indonesian market. LINTASEJAKARTA A member of the SSC&B-Lintas International Advertising network ‘Call Bill Taylor in London‘on 01-583 8151 or John Pattman in Jakarta: 46916.49544.52307 Holland Ame 52 Haymarket, London, SW1Y 4RZ. Telephone: 01-930 1972. rica Cruises "Jiventure Cruises THE TIMES FRIDAY AUGUST 17 1973 INDONESIA 08% by H. W. Arndt The pest year has been a good one for oil and manufacturing production, foreign and domestic investment, government revenue and foreign aid, exports and the balance of payments. But it has been a year of serious setbacks in precisely the two areas where the Suharto regime has previously been able to claim its most important successes, rice production and price stability. And it has been another year of imperceptible advance towards the declared social objectives of the regime— social justice and the welfare of the ordinary people. Judged by most of the more Obvious criteria, the Indoriesian economy continues to perform well, in some respects better than ever. The accompanying table summarizes some of the evidence. | The high growth rates of gutput and exports reflect in Be recovery from the consion of the mid-sixties, but in several sectors—especially textiles and other manufacturing, oil and other minerals and timber, but also sugar, tea, coffee and palm oil— growth has accelerated in response to the rehabilitation and new investment of the last few years. The annual rate of growth of real gross domestic product (gdp) is estimated to have risen to more than 7 per cent in 1970 and 1971, and to have fallen back last year only because of the shortfall in rice production caused by drought. The leading growth. sector is undoubtedly the oil industry where the state enterprise, Pertamina, under its spectacular president-director, General Ibnu Sutowo, is reaping the benefits of rapid growth of output (mainly still from the old Caltex fields) and steeply rising world prices (especially for Indonesia’s- low-sulphur crude). It is reinvesting most of the profits and large new overseas credits in oil exploration, refineries, tankers, petrochemical plants and in a vast range of other projects from civil aviation to motels and hospitals. At the same time, new fields discovered by some of the 30-odd foreign companies and consortia exploring onshore and offshore under contracts with Perta- accounts for less than a quarmina are beginning to contribute to oil output, and more strikes are being announced almost every month. Foreign investment also plays the major role in two other sectors, timber and minerals. Timber last year became Indonesia’s second most important export product, surpassing rubber; and the first shipments of copper concentrates from the Freeport Sulphur mine in Irian Jaya (West Irian) added to the expanding exports of minerals (so far mainly tin, bauxite and nickel ores). But the widespread impression, based on statistics of “intended” investment which in the case of large mineral projects look 20 to 30 years ahead, that most foreign investment is of the “enclave” type in extractive industries is mistaken. Oil apart, much the larger part is in manufacturing industry and in tertiary fields such as tourism and finance. Of total capital formation— whose share in gdp is believed to have risen from 7 per cent to about 14 per cent since 1966—investment in extractive industries probably A successful rice harvest. Although production has shown a notable increase in recent SQSACRSROKASTHORAAHRSHKDT HAP EAHTKETHRSSHH ST SSSHSRESKESAREEK ERE ROS ABTS) HASSE ROR HR Oe GRA) PERETTPEITSERSRRO years a prolonged drought in 1972, combined with a worldwide shortage and several government mistakes, has resulted in steep domestic price rises. ter, the accounted for by public bulk of it being investment, much of it aidfinanced, in transport and communications, irrigation, power and water supply and public building, and by domestic and foreign private investment in secondary and tertiary industries. Despite a remarkable 41 per cent rise in export earnings last year, to which the general boom in world commodity prices as well as the further rise in oil prices contributed, Indonesia’s balance of payments deficit on current account increased further, partly because imports were swollen by emergency purchases of rice. But there was also a large inflow of foreign capital, private as well as official, so that Indonesia’s net foreign exchange reserve became positive for the first time for more than 20 years. The Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI) consortium of aid donors readily agreed in May to pledge the full amount of aid requested by Indonesia ($877m). More than half of this, however, consists of project aid which is subject to a considerable utilization lag. Last year, for the first time, the routine budget surplus contributed more than aid counterpart funds to financing the development (capital) budget of the central government. Tax revenues have been buoyant, rising by 34per cent in 1972-73, but the main source here too has been tax on the profits of foreign oil companies. Efforts to increase the efficiency of collection of domestic direct and _ indirect taxes have yielded some results, but there is still much scope for improvement. The first five-year plan which came into force on April 1, 1969, put chief emphasis on agricultural production and especially on the target of self-sufficiency in rice by 1973-74. This target, as is now acknowledged, was neither realistic nor sensible, but until last year the results achieved in rice production were remarkable, an _ estimated 29 per cent increase in five years. The achievement owed much to the fortunate coincidence of the Green Revolution and to a run of good seasons, but -the -official rice intensification programme unquestionably contributed, if only by helping farmers to use much more fertilizer. Ina country in which rice is the staple food, rice production an important determinant of rural incomes and indeed of gross national product, and the price of rice a major factor in the cost of living, the Jogjakarta INDIAN OCEAN 500 Miles MALAYSIA Bunguran 0 BRUNEI Bangka Belitung Ceeeteereeeneeeeneeel achievement was crucial to the regime’s overall economic performance. It is this that lends such importance to the rice crisis of last year. The cause was drought, an unusually long dry season. But the consequences were greatly magnified by mismanagement—on the part of the rice procurement agency (Bulog) which failed to operate its buffer stock policy effectively, on the part of the Ministry of Agriculture which persisted too long in its optimism about the harvest, and on the part of Cabinet which was reluctant to sanction foreign exchange expenditure when rice could still be imported at moderate prices. By September, as_ the domestic price of rice began to rise steeply, harvest failures in other parts of South- East Asia and huge grain purchases by the Soviet Union and China had made rice scarce. The Indonesian Government, by a great effort, succeeded in ensuring sufficient rice imports to see Indonesia through the off-season and in halting the rise in domestic rice prices. But not before it had lifted the Jakarta cost of living index by 24 per cent in the last quarter of 1972, after almost two years during which Indonesia had contained inflation to an enviable annual rate of only 2 per cent. Nor is the crisis yet over. The 1973 harvest is expected to be better than last year’s, but not sufficiently improved to make up for reduced import supplies in conditions of acute worldwide shortage. The rice import target for 1973 has had to be reduced from 1,300,000 to 600,000 tons and the target for domestic procurement raised from 600,000 to 900,000 tons. Bulog’s chances of reaching anything like the latter figure have been further reduced by an _ ill-considered scheme for rice purchase, at unrealistically low prices, by newly created village unit cooperatives, Yet adequate Bulog stocks will be needed to maintain control over the retail price in the 1973-74 offseason. The efforts of the Indonesian economic leadership to deal with the rice crisis, and to maintain a reasonable degree of price stability also against cost pressures from abroad and demand pressures at home, have temporarily diverted attention from preparation of the second fiveyear plan, due to come into operation on April 1 next. For some time past, the president and other government spokesmen have relied heavily on a proposed shift of emphasis in the second plan from economic growth towards social objectives in answer to those who have criticized the regime for its failure to alleviate the condition of the poor while allowing a minority to enrich themselves. To assess the degree of validity of this criticism is not easy. In the absence of hard facts, each observer sees the situation through his own prejudices and sympathies. So considerable has CELEBES SEA Manado * Rice crisis shifts attention from long-term plan to improve social conditions INDONESIA PHILIPPINES 3 Talaud Halmahera MOLUCCAS 3, CELEBES ep Sula BuruS> Sam LOR BANDA SEA Wetar Flores oe CP gna 2 7 DOSS sim) TIMOR SEA been the rise since 1966 in per capita consumption of rice, sugar, textiles and other essentials of life that a significant improvement in the material standard of living of most of the rural and urban population, in Java as well as on the outer islands, seems indisputable. Most observers would also agree that there has been some improvement, rather than deterioration, in the overall employment situation. But these two facts—if they are facts—are consistent with much evidence of serious deterioration in the con- ARAFURA SEA TIMOR (Port.) ditions of many rural poor, especially growing numbers of landless labourers, in the areas of greatest Malthusian pressure in parts of Java; of increasing, and politically significant, graduate unemployment; and above all of gross and ostentatious luxury consumption by a narrow class of civilian and military office holders. Nor can there be much doubt that the standard of social services, in education, health, housing and welfare, has on balance further declined rather than improved in the past five years. The official defence against such criticism, that restoration of economic stability and rehabilitation of the country’s productive capacity demanded priority over everything else, was valid enough for the past five years. It will not do for the next five, The problem, however, is not an economic one. Pessimists call it a matter of power, optimists a matter of enlightened leadership. The author is Professor of Economics at the ‘Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University. nc rn cn ne EE IEEnIEEnEIyIEnEInRSNINRSREREEEEREEEEEEE! Rate of growth Unit 1966 1971 1972 1966-71 1971-72 % pa % pa Population million 106.1 119.2 122.0 (Ze [2.3]> Gnp at constant i (1960) prices Rp *000m 430 587 [616]¢ 5.3 [Sy¢ Tax revenue (at June 1972 prices) Rp *000m 2054 446¢ 574¢ aoe 29 Exports: oil (gross) $m 215 590° 965¢ 22.3 63.3 other $m 499 784¢ 970¢ 9.4 40.7 total $m 714 1,374¢ 1,935¢ 14.0 23.7 rice (milled) million tons 9.5! 12.8 [12.5]® 5.2 [—23] sugar thousand tons 601 834 na 6.8 na textiles million metres 250 732 816 24.0 11.4 yarn thousand bales 46 210 278 35.3 32.4 fertilizer thousand tons 93 105 114 2.5 8.5 cement thousand tons 339 547 609 10.0 11.4 paper thousand tons 9.9 29.5 38 24.5 28.9 matches million boxes 2388 348° 44ic 79 26.8 tyres thousands 221 445 732 15.0 64.5 bicycle assembly thousands na 50 100 na 100 Cost of living (Jakarta) °, increase 635 2 24 [Unreadable] mic Studies. 5% assumed; 4 1967; ¢ fiscal year beginning April 1; f adjusted to new BPS series; * 1968.;. Sources: Central Statistical Bureau, Economic Indicators; Bulletin of Indonesian Econo- PERUSAHAAN PERTAMBANGAN — MINYAK DAN GAS BUMI NEGARA (PERTAMINA INDONESIAN STATE OIL ENTERPR ISE === [PDF page 89] === THE TIMES FRIDAY AUGUST 17 1973 IV INDUNESIA Economic growth the key to political leadership by Leonard Rayner Before 1965 Indonesia was the Prime Minister, arrived came to power after an donesia, Australia and New With the decline of British hard put to find the money in Jakarta on an official attempted communist coup Zealand have organized joint and American military influ. even to pay the interest on visit. President Suharto ex- in September, 1965, which defence exercises. The Ausence in South-East Asia, In- her debts. Today it is not pressed interest in Mr Whit- they believe was stage man- tralians support the Ameridonesia emerges as Pietives Ra re 7eblke OF Ind lam’s proposals to create a aged by Peking. The Indone- can view that the future gion’s political leader. It has «; ommion to talk of indone- new and wider Pacific group- sian Communist Party at prosperity of Indonesia is the achieved leadership without sia becoming a world eco- ing, but clearly he must give that time numbered key to political stability in the usual trappings of de 20mic power by the end of priority to consolidating the 4,500,000, the largest in the South-East Asia. fence pacts and power block the century. _ Economic ecinaee of South-East pene outside the. ot laadee _In recent months the friccommitments, and the growth is her key to the /slan Nations (ASEAN) and Aidit. had at eh Ind €t, tion between Singapore and achievement reflects the POlitical leadership of South- achieving a viable neutralist /10t, ni tee t teh. Malaysia has taken a turn growing success of President East Asia. Provided she can policy. sia's muitary peacers utc’: for the worse and Malaysia Suharto’s policies since 1965, Cope with the problems of a This is the year of Indone- re cctat eeettine eo nes has made further moves to IMdGnesiae, sizemandienan Srovine rural population in sia in international affairs. Bit naatere expressed by sever its economic ties with: Singapore. At the same time ral res h lways @ Stagnating agrarian econ- Political leaders from Asia:.: y Si divex her ieadeyee eer omy and the resulting lum- and as far afield as the aeek a eceae: of Pew. Singapore has moved closer tial, but political instability penproletariat this growth United States and the ples Representatives on t2 Indonesia, and in May an economic confusion wil] continue. United Kingdom haye jour- Independence Day 1972. Singapore’s Prime Minister, under Dr Sukarno denied nthe light of Aidit’s fail. neyed to Jakarta acknow- « Diplometicoretationsitbe! Mr Lee Kuan Yew, made his her this role. The Suharto ure in 1965 most informed ledging the vital role that tween Jakarta and- Peking first official’ visit to Indone: INDONESIAN NATIONAL LINES P.N. DJAKARTA LLOYD regime has brought the OPinion feels that a military Indonesia must play in the: sia. This successful visit Aeuntry politcal peace Uprising in Indonesia on future of Asia. Indonesia Bete ee taae OF tue Boome opsaes ne way for an even elo against a regional back- Maoist lines has little chance was the only Asian country ber-30-Movement/PKI in closer link-up between the round of the split between Of success. The achievements at the Paris peace talks in 4965 Wheth th " resources of Indonesia and Selaysia and Singapore, the of the Suharto Government February, apart from China tions thaw or remain as they the financial skill of Singabreakdown of democratic and the lack of any credible and the two Vietnams. are now, depends on their Pore f° the mutual advangovernment in Thailand and alternative gives little op- She is the only Asian attitude toward us. We want tage of Se countries. The the near anarchy of the first portunity for a resurrection country represented on the to open friendly relations Wem help. 1 ensure Marcos Administration in Of communism. So long as four ‘power International and cooperate with all coun- Singapore’s political survival the Philippines. None of the Suharto _ continues _4is Commission for Control and tries, irrespective of political and her economic growth. other members of the Asso- Present policy of neutralism, Supervision in South Viet- and social system, but cer- _ It could also help to break ciation of South-East Asian the East Europeans will nam and her contingent has tainly not with a country down the political rivalry Nations has been in a posi- back him and China even- emerged as the most success- hostile or showing an _un- with Malaysia that springs tion to deny the growing tually must do the same. ful in what has proved an ill- friendly attitude toward us. from communal tensions. power and effective leader- But the initiative for a starred affair. The Cana- The desire must not come Malay Indonesia has come to ship of the Indonesian Re- new link with China must dians left at the end of from us alone.” terms with her Chinese public. come from Indonesia itself. July, while the Poles and Some Indonesians have ex- minority and her link with Indonesia is a military dic- One senior Indonesian Hungarians made it clear pressed private concern that Singapore is an important tatorship, but the ruling diplomat said recently: “So from the outset that they Australia’s links with the step in breaking down ethnic junta has rejected the usual long as there is the slightest represented only North Viet- United States under Anzus discord. spoils of success. It has re- chance of the communists nam and the Vietcong, The might prejudice any future Malay political groups in duced the military establish- causing trouble again we subjective attitude of the neutralist policy. On the Malaysia have long looked to ment while concentrating on will not reestablish formal East Europeans could have other hand a senior Austral- Indonesia for leadership economic growth: Within diplomatic ties with China.” made the Indonesians jan diplomat reports that in and it could be that the goal three years of taking office In Australia’s policy to- appear, by default, to be all their negotiations with of an ASEAN common market the Government had stabil. wards South-East Asia In. Partners with Canada as the South-East Asian countries has come one step nearer ized the ruppiah, under donesia, the only country watchdogs for President their American link has reality—through the _ initia- Sukarno the weakest cur- with whom she has a Thieu. Despite their diplo- heen welcomed, and he be- tives of Indonesia in putting rency in Asia, and created an common land frontier, has Matic tles with North Viet- jieves this will continue to aside racial prejudice. Inaura of confidence which first priority. In February, 2am, the Indonesians have be s9 until the Vietnam donesia has shown the way has attracted industrialists shortly after the new Aus- Maintained a_ completely fiasco is resolved. to peace and stability in the around the world as Indone- tralian Labour Government "dependent position. There is little chance of region if the Americans and sia’s partners in new invest- had presented eight Sabre Indonesia’s neutral line in any formal link between Vietnamese can settle the ment and economic advance- jets to the Indonesian Air Vietnam has not_been easy. Australia and ASEAN for outstanding problems in ment. Force, Mr Gough Whitlam, The Suharto Government some time to come but In- Indo-China. The economy in near focus as seen by Professor Widjojo, Minister for Economic, Financial and Industrial Affairs, interviewed by Stewart Harris, and an assessment by Sue Masterman, writing from The Hague, of opportunities for the foreign investor Gentle persuasion to cure monetary ills I was lucky to see Professor Typically, Professor Wid- Minister of Finance, Profes- Widjojo told me that his Gov- course in legal aspects of Widjojo Nitisastro, He works jojo went to Berkeley, to the sor Ali Wardhana, as chair- ernment had approved pri- foreign investment, I exnect at least 16 hours a day as University of California. He man of the Committee of vate foreign investment pro- the fine print in future. con- Minister for Economic, Fin- became head of the econo- Twenty. ' posals worth $822m in 1972- tracts will spell out much ancial and Industrial Affairs mics faculty at the university _ 1 asked him about Indone- 73, In 1971-72 the figure had more unambiguously Indoand head of the national plan- in Jakarta and director of its sia’s relations with the Euro- been only $225m. On this nesia’s conditions. ning board Bappenas. He had economic and social research pean Economic Community cheerful note my interview Dr S Tinie th also been away in the regions institute. He lectured to the and he said: “We want to ended.: umarlin has ane manlooking at the critical rice staff college in Bandung and make the Association of poiier in the week while Hee of a patient teacher and situation. That night his to the defence college in South-East Asian Nations be f wigs ey ¢ BEANE my doubts with mind wag on the problem, but. Jakarta. (ASEAN) a living reality and awaiting Professor Widjojo’s real conviction. For example, ho is won eentie ac et Professor Widiojo does not "t Just officials talking. return to Jakarta, I met Dr Repelita Two, although Javanese to be harassed. seem to find the ae Swk We want to step up our Johannés, Sumatlin, Minister Gireotly concernbe: <a tte He is only 45, and patently ward. Peter Polomka writ- ¢XPorts, through the tariff. Or, SOAS ye Stone ean eee re aoe ae veneer Ee * hopes tint. ie ig ig Leo Remember that Malaysia, and deputy head of Bappenas. the next 25 years in its sights. Repelita. Two, Indonesia’s Since Sukarno (Pelican) ex- Thatand and pene me sisi tein ane Tae: ak TRE GeaRitak, bare on. ’ f:, an advantage in their signi- a, 1S a income distribution, Doth in second Bree. = wae hans eee Fan hee ficantly large seat coe of farmer’s son who did Red social groups and in regions, veae a erie ne ro ole 1d jojo sae €Y palm oil, rubber and tin. We Cross, work with the would be the factors deteriverted by t ‘a rice oie were able at last to do their 4-6 sometimes taken for guerrillas when he wasaboy. mining many decisions, oe first plan has eee e best for Indonesia. granted.” It was said gently He worked his way through whereas in Repelita One the armers are demanding more He told Polomka in 1969: but not. without determina- university in Jakarta and prime factors had been to and more fertilizer”, he said «The army has already tion. then majored in finance and rehabilitate a disordered Oey eau whe iowa brought organization to gov- Bo tales - well, sear ae from Ge Daiyereity economy and develop some: { ernment compared with that France’s former African of California. ater Profes- infrastructure. but pesticides are different. Suykarno’s amen” I asked colonies in the Yaoundé com- sor Widjojo sent him back to Would the pressures for They're precautionary. The him about the rate of inflation munity have been given some the United States to do the gnp growth finally outweigh people can’t see the differ- ang he gave me these figures: preferential treatment by the University of Pittsburgh’s the decent ambition for more ence. It’s like sickness. They 4969.70, 8.9 per cent; 1970-71, EEC, and the doyen of Indo- special course in develop- social justice? ‘There don’t mind being cured but 25 per cent; 1971-72, 25.8 per nesia’s economists, Professor ment administration. hould b onfli Th they don’t like injections tO cent; 1972-73 (first six Sumitro, now Minister for Although it is extraordin key. is- ie Sileet the” ony prevent illness.” He smiled months), 7.9 per cent. Research, has documented ary the amount of foresight instruments”, Dr Sumarlin [Unreadable] aig ig more humanity _ The ice crisis has battered 2GoResies, argument, for Professor Widjojo. had, ‘not Seid, Perhaps a litle pedant in this man than there is. per- its way through the economy i; even he was able to foresee cally. He gave me examples is man t t 1S, D Ree its OMY donesian Quarterly (January, Hee; f cl h th haps, in most of the world’s and Professor Widjojo said it 4973). the full measure of the self- of close Chaperarson fit im great economists and public Would take more than one A special committee of interested sophistication of regions and with socia servants. Professor Widjojo 800d year at home and over- ASEAN began official talks the world’s big corporations groups in drawing UP graduated from Malang Uni- Sas to repair the damage, but with the EEC in Brussels in whose lawyers are never Repelita Two. versity in East Java in 1949 he tends to be optimistic. June, 1972. I have the feel- second best. He contrasted favourably and was a student soldier As for the international ing that Indonesia will expect “Our early contracts were Indonesia’s indicative secagainst the Dutch from 1945. monetary crisis, Professor some progress soon. not so clear”, Dr Sumarlin tional planning with the less He was one of the first of Widjojo insisted that its solu- Meanwhile Jakarta is keen said.a little ruefully. So last flexible macroplanning of Indonesia’s bright young men _ tion was not one to be worked to encourage more European year back to the University India, the Philippines and to be sent to the United out by the rich countries investment to counter the of California went 20 young South Korea. The foreign States for postgraduate train- alone and he was encouraged growing American and Japan- Indonesian lawyers to take observer can only wait and ing in economics. by the election of Indonesia’s ese investment. Professor the special Berkeley short see what happens. Living down past to get capital from overseas The stabilization of the Indo- Government would attend to invest in Indonesia. The projects amounting to $441m growth of trade with the nesian economy and long- transport, communication, Dutch, he said, were being invested, followed by the colony Holland so gudgingly term efforts of donor education, public health and too careful but, considering Philippines with 11 projects, gave up after the Second countries which are Pusring rhe development.: ' their RelbEvedt EetRUE ex- mostly in forestry, valued at World War. about $700m a year into the e basic rules and regula- perience with ndonesia $260m, and Japan, with 25 ‘ chain of Shetek islands— tions for foreign investment under the old order, he could projects valued at $120m. - ube De eee eae which cover an area larger were laid down in a law understand it, The Netherlands had 11 pro- e ead Lane AG ae than Europe—makes Indo- passed in October, 1967, _ In February last year the jects valued at $20m and sto see :: =;.: 2 vs: eg ed as ruption, a word which recurs nesia an increasingly inter- although since then there Indonesian Development Britain six projects valued at €r etna Tudscoudenions esting area for investment. have been changes in many Finance Company was set up $6,500,000 aaa y ith ind oaate The Indonesian regime is sectors. Indonesia decided to in Jakarta with Dutch sup- Since the initial stages the pOeECe wi e: doing everything it can to en- return the foreign enterprises port. The Indonesian Central;, quence of both Japan and Old colonials tend to shake courage all forms of invest- which it had confiscated to Bank and the Dutch semi- p, i334 nag increased their heads in depair when ments in its richly endowed the former owners—at a State owned Netherlands sharply. Among the first the Dutch start a heated disislands, but at the same time price. Finance Company for Devel- pp” and Anglo Dutch— cussion on the accusation that maintains a firm controlling This gesture opened the oping Countries each have Remeitonreturiio THdonesia officials have to be bribed in hand on what projects are to way for many of the com- half shares in the IDFC. It is ares Unilevae “BAT cigar- order to get transactions off be launched, panies, especially the Dutch, the successor to the Develop-.it4¢ the Chloride Electrical the ground. Dutch firms are Since 1967, when President to return to Indonesia where Ment Bank for Indonesia, Storage Company battery 2°W suspected of having in- Suharto launched his scheme they still have long and well- Which was set up in Holland joa vrias and the Rentokil Sured via the NCM not only to cut back raging inflation, rooted connexions. Indone- 10 1969. Its task is to help to Grote. Aimene he Durcs the cost of their goods, but much has changed and is still sia’sy company law is still Organize and direct capital firms» mente Philips also the 10 per cent or more changing. It is therefore basically Dutch, although it imvestment in Indonesian in- Sahinainen | Naaden Chemie. “overprice”, necessary to always advisable for those is gradually being adapted to dustries or in joint ventures APSSHA Billiton Hoogovens smear the administrative considering any project in the needs of the country. with foreign firms. (now Estel) ann Tterhoron wheels. Indonesia to obtain up-to- Indonesia has agreed to The Dutch allotted F1139m. This amount, which they date information from the pay the Dutch compensation for their aid to Indone- There are many other jaturally did not receive back Indonesian representatives in totalling F1600m for the sia in the financial year 1972- Dutch firms working in Indo- jy payment but which aptheir own country or from nationalization of firms. a 73. This is a 10 per cent in- Nesta without actually estab- jeared on the invoice, was their own contacts in Indo- move which, the Dutch esti- crease over the previous year, lishing a permanent project then claimed from the insurnesia, on the rules governing mate, cost the Dutch firms and does not include the there. Many are working on ance fund. The premium was project planning and invest- concerned at the! time 20,000 tons of grain which Government-tendered _ Pro- in the order of 5 per cent of ment, and the considerable F14,500m. Damages to indivi- Holland regularly gave to J&cts. The Kemajoran airfield j}¢ value of the total project, tax concessions available. In duals have been settled in the Indonesia in past years. Half M&@? Jakarta has been en- thus well worth paying in a country in the turbulent form of 15 per cent cash and the F1139m is a gift; the larged and renovated by the order to insure the “ overstage of economic develop- the rest in obligations. to be other half a long-term low DECA, a consortium includ- price * of 10 per cent. ment in which Indonesia paid in five annual instal- interest loan. ing the Amsterdam sche Balfinds tse hings change ments between 1974 and nfiace aqui last Mij, Bredero NV, and The Suharto regime, with aoe itself things change 1978. e I In 1971 Professor Hendrik y2,, Hattum en Blankevoort, varying degrees of success, Witteveen, the Dutch Minis-.. I 4 z: “4: - A has tried to stamp out the Indonesia decided to “re- The Dutch have certainly ter of Finance who has been eee Sears corruption which waa to be habilitate ” its economic repu- returned to Indonesia with elected president of the Inter-.., I i _ be haute es egonamicgeray rerurned to Indonesia wth clested president of the IMer- the. project ig FH,280000, the regular way in which cv cqnaiderebly (Carine te lest mesiiys, have mot lost, @~gratulated Indonesia ‘on. its hae reno ated ld f fies wage Their job under years of President Sukarno’s chance to let them know that economic recovery. At the puilt ne. oi: nd eee. former regimes had more the declining power and from the they would like to see more end of an official visit to Jak- /'Gaq ‘rolline stock equip. nature of q concession under Menon RESCH, Sick ep cuvescuens 2 forestry, arta he concluded that the ent “te ntract cayees which it wae normal for them property. and., expuision of cattlefarming, general trade Indonesian economy had a th F149m.. ey vie to collect money, and pocket foreign nationals during the and the manufacture of Trip- been brought under control Shi baiidar oa dae fa By oes oe Tri necie under period of confrontation. The lex or preservation of food- and that a good start had been }} a Ao ie ie T a lions Prick Pr ‘d nts asia ie aati rehabilitation was to be by stuffs. Japan, West Germany, made on increasing rice pro- |" tl e * ola a abe ond Cee ee “th young means of an open economy, the United States, Britain and duction. on the islan mbon and economic country with a com P.T. SAMUDERA INDONESIA P.T. TRIKORA LLOYD MEMBERS OF THE EUROPE/INDONESIA AND INDONESIA/EUROPE FREIGHT CONFERENCES WITH REGULAR SERVICES TO AND FROM INDONESIA FOR FURTHER DETAILS PLEASE CONTACT: P. N. DJAKARTA LLOYD EUROPE BRANCH OFFICE GENERAL AGENTS INDONESIAN NATIONAL LINES 2000 HAMBURG 1 BRENNERSTRASSE 76 W. GERMANY _R. G. SHAW SHIPPING LTD. GENERAL AGENTS FOR U.K. AND EIRE 11/13 SOUTHWARK ST. thinking of expanding your business... your key to the INDONESIAN market. P.T. ASTRA INTERNATIONAL, INC. JL. Ir. Haji Juanda 22 Jakarta Phone: 46643 — 5, 48101 — 3, 52985 — 7 Cable: Erastra — Jakarta Telex: 011 — 4376 P.O. Box: 2934 we handle products from: CLAYTON MANUFACTURING Co., U.S.A.- -DEMAG FORDERTECHNIK, West Germany. - DAIHATSU MOTOR SALES Co.Ltd. Japan.-DE VRIES ROBBE’ &CO., HOLLAND -DOLMAR MASCHINEN FABRIK Gmbh., West Germany - EUROSTAAL Holland - EUTECTIC COR- PORATION, U.S.A. Australia, Rep.of Panama — FIRE LOCK CORPO = RATION, U.S.A — FUJI XEROX Co.Ltd. Japan - HONDA MOTOR Co. Ltd., Japan —- IMPERIAL EASTMAN Co.Ltd.,U.S.A.& Australia - INTERNATIONAL COMPRESSED AIR CORPORATION Ltd.,: ‘BROOM & WADE Ltd., HOLMAN BROTHERS, MAXAM POWER Ltd., REAVELL & Co. Ltd., England - JOHNS- MANVILLE. U.S.A. . MACQUARRIE INDUSTRIES Pty.Ltd., Australia - * TOYOTA MOTOR SALES Co. Ltd., Japan—- VAHLE KAMEN, West Germany- WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC INTER= NATIONAL COMPANY, U.S.A. Branches & Representatives: Foreign Offices: with the emphasis on deve- Malaysia have headed the list | Whatever we Dutch Dees Contra ae pic population and 's diffi- Bandung — JI. Asia Afrika 78, Phone; 50475 Amsterdam +: Astra Holland B.V. loping the export potential of of countries which have thought of Indonesian politi- },¢ He rovided dredgitie CUIpEcgeranare Sir e. Di Brock 34. PI: 720303 the country. } _ initiated projects in Indo- cians, Professor Witteveen Qquipment © The Pantja Sila State has jepenbrockstraat 34, Phone: 72 Two types of foreign capi- nesia during the past seven said, it had to be conceded q; achieved an economic near- Medan — JI. Sisingamangaraja 8, Phone: 26751 —2 J, Singapore: Inter-Astra (S‘pore) Pte. Ltd., Surabaya — JI. Raya Darmo 103, Phone: 6532 D 134/136 Braddle Road Ujung Pandang — JI. Sam Ratulangi 77, Phone: 4803 te ae is Denpasar — JI. Sanur (Tanjung Bungkak) Hongkong: Inter-Astra (Hongkong) Ltd. vail —JI, Akhmad Yani 130, Phone: 1111 Bi 10g Gen fayaht Road Bullding 55, Connaught Road Central Palembang — JI. Dr. Sutomo 7, Phone: 20649 Phone: 5—458167—9 tal, state and private, were years. that President Suharto had a Dutch firms which deliver miracle in the past seven needed, and the knowledge A year ago Dr Harun Zien, good understanding of econo- g00ds or equipment to Irdo- years, but it cannot be exwhich would accompany the the Governor of West mic problems, and had also nesia on credit can insure pected to follow the pattern siting of foreign factories in Sumatra, paid a flying trip made drastic cuts in the bud- themselves against losses of streamlined western or far Indonesia. The Government to Rotterdam during an get of the Armed Forces as with the Nederlandse Crediet- eastern economies which are decided that the development official visit to London. He part of his campaign to res- verzekering Maatschappij, backed up by decades of ~@ of natural resources such as told the Dutch that the red tore faith in Indonesia. established with the so-called tive stability. Investors m oil prospecting and produc- carpet would be out in During the first years after Luns Credit (named after take Indonesia as it comes} ing, mining, logging and fish- Padang, West Sumatra’s the new economic policy had Holland’s former Minister of from day to day, and their eries, should be left to capital, to welcome them been implemented the United Foreign Affairs) in 1964 in faith may well be rewarded in private enterprise while the when they came back to States led the field wjth 29 order to promote the re- hard cash. by O. G. Roeder Man was the measure of all things in ancient Greece, and so he is in Indonesia today. The country with the fifth largest population in the world, 120 million, could reach 288 million by the next century. In Indonesia babies seem to grow faster than the riceplants in the paddy fields. In half a century, from 1920 to 1970, the population increased from 52,300,000 to 119,200,000. No precise data is available on the exact rate of growth of the _ population. Estimates vary between 2.3 per cent and 3 per cent a year. Such interesting problems for discussion among statisticians and sociologists are nightmares for politicians, economists and everybody concerned about the country’s future. More babies, more students, more workers, and more old people must mean more hospitals, schools, public facilities, working places, roads, and, especially, more food and clothes. According to the Demographic Department, Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia, the annual average increase in the labour force will be gs for the period 1971- More than 80 per cent of all Indonesians still live in the country or in small’ towns. Children, especially sons, are considered status symbols and a kind of personal insurance system. A large family is expected to take more care of its aged parents than a small one, which would have fewer resources. The population § density throughout Indonesia was 59 persons per square kilometre in 1971. This seems reasonable. But the distribution of the population is seriously imbalanced. More than twothirds of the people live on the relatively small island of Java. Population density in Java and Bali averages 571 persons per square kilometre. There are areas in Central Java with a population of more than 1,000 per square kilometre—and these are rural areas almost without industry or other labour intensive activities. Nine persons out of 10 earn their living entirely from agriculture. The percentage of unemployment in Indonesia was only 2.2 per cent of the labour force, according to the 1971 census. But this must be considered a typical avanese understatement. he millions of underemployed were not included in the census—hardly a way to do the problem justice. It is a wonder that social unrest is not higher. Since independence, the crowded areas of central and east Java have had their communist revolts, coups, countercoups and massacres. But intensive travelling in these areas does not produce evidence of imminent eruptions. Is this the result of the natural patience and capacity for suffering of the Javanese, who can nevertheless run amok if provocation grows unbearable? Is it the good earth of Java, which makes possible two harvests and an intermediate crop each year? Or is it that the differences between rich and poor are not as striking as in other countries, like the Philippines? Former President Sukarno, full of vision but short of insight into such trivial matters as hunger, once advised the people to eat stones if there was no rice. President Suharto, who was a child among peasants, knows that even a Javanese stomach cannot wait for ever. So the first five-year plan, which ends in April, 1974, emphasized planned parenthood. While Sukarno thought such a programme would be a national disgrace, Suharto makes hardly a speech without mentioning The Indonesian Government proudly publishes figures about the success of the programme. By April next year six million Indonesian women are expected to be practising birth control of one kind or another. The programme is concentrated, of course, in Java and its offshore islands of Bali and Madura, where the need is greatest. Much of the work is done from the growing number of general health centres, but special family planning clinics have trebled since 1971, reaching more than 2,000. These are complemented by mobile units and 4,000 field workers. In the last year alone it was said that 520,000 women had become “new acceptors” of various contraceptive methods, 50 per cent using the pill, 40 per cent IUDs and the rest other devices. Statistics are always untrustworthy, especially in Indonesia, but there has been progress despite traditional patterns of thinking and behaviour, religious scruples, and simple ignorance. There are encouraging factors. The religion of Islam, practised by 90 per cent of Indonesians, is not as strict in Indonesia as elsewhere and the status of women is quite high. Certainly family planning is not opposed by the Islamic leadership of this country, and it may be that dukun (healers and spiritual helpers) in the villages will move the péople into the planned parenthood devised for them by the guru of the fabric of our ancient culture. We’re a land of 120 million people from 300 different ethnic groups living in an area that’s the same size as western Europe, all wrapped up in.some of the world’s. oldest cultures. So it’s hardly surprising that each of us has developed a lifestyle that’s still uniquely Indonesian, Take Sulawesi for example. Often called the Orchid Set in a Sea, and the home of the legendary Muslim Buggis seafarers who still ply their ancient prahus the way their ancestors did. In the high inland mountains, in the Land of Heavenly Kings, the Toraja people live amongst misty peaks, terraced rice paddies and fertile valleys. On Flores Island people tell a different story. There’s a lake there called the Sea of Souls. Three different lakes, three different colours said to represent the various moods of a man’s soul. And on Madura Island the proud Madurese live with their own language and culture. Where the'men still work the ancient spice trade. And everyone gets dressed up for a day at the island’s unique bull races. For all the contrasts, we’re all Indonesians. And we take special pride in the fact that visitors usually leave us a little more relaxed. Not unusual when you think that every Indonesian is taught that enjoying life begins with a wide warm smile. Come and learn to live. In an adventure or in the paradise you have been missing. For more information, write to the people who know. The Directorate General of T ourism, Jalan Kramat Raya 81, Jakarta, Indonesia, Or your nearest Indonesian diplomatic mission. There's more to the Pacific now THE TIMES FRIDAY AUGUST 17 1973 vA country where babies grow faster than rice Workmen pack and flatten an earth dam being built by hand in the Batuwarno region as part of a national plan to control flooding and erosion. World Bank. The question remains: can family planning outpace the problem it seeks to solve? It is basically a problem of timing. Of course, Java, Bali and Madura are not the whole of Indonesia. There are thousands of other islands, some much bigger than Java, with fertile soil and enough water and underpopulated. Kalimantan and Sumatra, both E INDONESIA more than four times the size of Java, have population densities of nine persons and 38 persons per square kilometre respectively. Wild and undeveloped Irian Jaya (the western part of the island of New Guinea), which is almost four times the size of Java, has only two persons per square kilometre. But what Javanese would want to live in Irian Jaya? So transmigration is not yet the answer. Transmisgrasi, as the word is in the national language, is not only a technical, financial and administrative task, it is much more a social problem. Very few Javanese or Balinese are ready to leave their beloved homeplaces, their family in a _ wider sense, the old village, the place of worship, the paddyfields, the rivers, the mountains which are all part of their daily life. On the outer islands most of the new settlers find it difficult to strike roots. They leave almost as fast as they arrive. Of course, if hunger strikes hard, they arrive and stay, but transmigration made successful this way will mean that the whole national plan has failed. INDONESIA _v Links with Britain strengthen by Mark Orr The chief impetus for strengthening relations between Britain and Indonesia, outside government sources, comes from three main groups—the Anglo-Indonesian Society, which is primarily concerned with culture; the Anglo-Indonesian Association, whose chief object is to promote trade between the two countries; and the more academic Indonesian Circle formed earlier this year by the School of Oriental and j:,a¢ African Studies in London. Knowledge of the Indon- work necessary. esian language (Bahasa Inguages. is needed; tain is regarded by experts as foreigners who ever, recent efforts by the guage. can Studies have improved the situation, and the Indonesian Circle which it formed standing of the culture. the first issue of what will become a regular newsletter. Although it is an oriental language, and therefore often regarded as difficult, Indonesian is quite the opposite in the early stages. This common misunderstanding has deterred many from starting to learn the language who would otherwise find it more rewarding in a short time than many European lan- In order to master sufficient for simple conversation a short course is all only at advanced level is a lot of : Businessmen visiting the donesia) has always been country should be encouraged weak in Britain, despite the to follow some form of tuition fact that it is similar to Malay beforehand, as apart from and fluency in one would the more obvious advantages, mean immediate proficiency Indonesians show a remarkin the other. Tuition in Bri- able understanding towards are lacking in coordination, How- beginning to learn their lan- At the same level, School of Oriental and Afri- tourists would certainly find it gave them a clearer undernational The BBC has played an imrecently has just produced portant role in maintaining Indonesian links with Britain by its regular broadcasts from London, These started in 1949, four years after independence, and are part of the world service. Although the Pe are limited by roadcast time they cover a wide and well balanced range of topics, and interviews with visiting personalities or students studying in Britain give them a live dimension. It is clear from the many listeners’ letters that audiences are made up of Indonesians from all walks of life. Mutual interest between the two countries is gaining momentum in several other sectors. Forty Indonesian technical trainees are in Britain at present, the Indonesian director-general of tourism visited Britain this year as part of a promotion programme, and plenty of scope exists for British exporters to gain a strong foothold in Indonesian markets. One point is that the Indonesians drive on the left—a remnant of British influence, and one that presents an obvious opening for Britain’s motor manufacturing industry to compete with Japanese successes in this sector. Sir Alec Douglas-Home and Mr Adam Malik, Indonesian Foreign Minister, signing the British loan agreement with Indonesia in July, 1 972. INDONESIA: COME AND LEARN TO LIVE It’s really a matter of uncomplicating your life. And we Indonesians can show you how. In almost anything you want to do. From an adventure on any of our 13,000 treasure islands. Or by becoming involved in the rich === [PDF page 90] === VI INDONESIA THE TIMES FRIDAY AUGUST 17 1973 macs INSURANCE CO.,LTD. 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Subscriptions and orders for back numbers from: Bulletin of indonesian Economic Studies, Department of Economics, j Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, A.C.T. 2600, Australia. | Offering a complete banking service to businessmen | with business interest | in Indonesia... The Symbol of Reliability If you have business in Indonesia, you can rely on us for the most comprehensive banking services and facilities. We are backed by wide resources with 60 Branches throughout Indonesia and Correspondents around the world. We are also equipped with a wealth: of infor- A) Bank Bumi Daya Head Office: Djl. Kebon Sirih no. 66-70, Djakarta, Indonesia, P.O. Box No. 106. Tel: 49241, 49242, by Blanche d’Alpuget Jakarta is a big, bad, hassling town, wide awake and ready for business 24 hours a day. Although its longterm expatriate residents are devoted, its unique charm usually ‘escapes the casual visitor, who has to rise above the assaults to eye, ear, nose and throat to enjoy it. I first went to Jakarta to live in 1966, when I could only count to 10 and say thank you in Indonesian, and spent the first. three days in tears. Nothing in the house worked, notably the lavatory, the lights and the refrigerator. The food was too hot to eat, an army of cockroaches had bivouacked in the kitchen, a rat the size of a rabbit lived in the laundry, and hosts of mosquitoes waited in ambush under the bed. On the fourth day I laid murderous hands on _ the household fauna, decided it was better to burn than to starve and gave up my dependence on domestic appliances. I also gave my first, nervous laugh back to those marvellous laconic larrikins people, as they style themselves. Jakarta (for me) is a city which lives with the intensity of childhood: gay, spontaneous, inexplicable. Where else in the world does a city of five million hold an annual birthday party and invite the local transvestites to make their own float for the birthday parade? Where else has the United Nations advised that the only way to cure the traffic problem is first to fix the telephones and the postal services, since half the city’s traffic is engaged in delivering messages and party invitations? Since almost any visit to Indonesia requires 24 hours in Jakarta one is best advised to take a deep breath, pay $25 a night for an international class hotel, and be grateful for the non-stop air conditioning. Cheap accommodation in Jakarta is possible only for the strong and patient. While there, waiting to catch a plane or train to central Java, the real object of one’s visit, one can do the usual city things—see the museums, antique shops, handcraft shops, the “old Batavia” buildings downtown, the food and ornamental bird and fish markets. If one has a genius for organization one can take a boat or helicopter trip about 40 miles offshore to the Thousand Islands in Jakarta Bay and view fish swimming in and out of coral, waving palms, white sand—the whole South Seas experience. mation and data to provide you with the most up-to-date facts and figures and all that you need to know for the smooth and successful operation of your business in Indonesia. Come to BANK BUMI DAYA for banking service thet is efficient, reliable and friendly. 49243, 51685, 51686, 43332. Cable: Buneg Pusat. Telex: 0114277-0114117 iads Representative Offices: Hong Kong: 50-53 Caxton House, 1 Duddell Street. Amsterdam C. (Nederland): Frederiksplein 1. The spirit thus lulled by immersien in a warm sea, one may then be in a fit state to set out for Jogjakarta, capital of central Java, and Solo, its sister city. The trains are luxury, first and goat class, with prices from $25 to 50 cents. On the good trains one’s sleep is broken at 4.30 am by the call to prayer and disembarkation. In the third class, unless heavily sedated, one will not sleep. Not a wink. In Jogja there are plenty of clean, somewhat Spartan hotels for $8 a night, or really grim-looking, cleanish “losmens ” for about $1. The tourist information centre in Jogja is efficient and will give directions. Otherwise book in advance into the Ambarrukmo Palace Hotel and pay up. After the jangle of Jakarta Jogja is slow, quiet, dusty, soothing and relaxed. Its streets are filled with bicycles—it is a university town—and if economizing travel in a trishaw rather than a taxi. But Jogja is not just the nice country town with a lot of artists, depicted by travel agents: it is a mystic place where windows must be shut at night and lights left burning to frighten away ghosts. It is a place where seers practise charms to drive devils from troubled souls, where turtle doves coo of omens and the future, and where, on Thursdav nights, prayers are said and incense is burnt to the spirits of sacred objects. The heart of all this is the Kraton, the sultan’s palace: a dusty, holy place where time has melted and been replaced by ritual and devotion. There, beside the architecture and antiques, one can see girls with the faces of angels practising classical dance; old men _ devoutly cleaning the sacred krises; young men rapt in playing the gamelan (the Javanese orchestra) and _ craftsmen and women of every age in silent concentration on their work. At least one Kraton is necessary and another to the water palace—destroyed by the visit to the Dutch—which lies in eloquent ruins behind it. More mundanely, one should also go to the houses of some of the batik painters. Bambang Oetoro, who lives out of town, and Bagong, who lives in town, are both worth © seeing. Bagong was a famous dancer in his youth, taking the part of warriors and giants, as his broad stomach and moustache would indicate. Other things to see in Jogja are the Batik Research Centre and the silversmiths’ @ complete tion of the famous temple of Take a deep breath and be grateful for the air conditioning Surrounded by jungle and surmounted by 72 stupas, what is claimed to be the biggest Buddhist temple in the world broods at Borobudur. village, Kota Gede, but all of this should be interspersed with antique shops and markets, and getting to know the feel, smell and look of good Jogja batik. Then, by bus or taxi, one can set out for Solo, stopping en route for Mother Brek’s Chicken (Ayam mBok Brek) 12km out of town on the left. The chicken is simmered in coconut milk and spices, then deep fried and served with a sweet, hot sauce. It is the dish of central Java Behind the restaurant is a smal] eleventh century temple. Those overweight will be delighted to learn that the cuisine of Java will not add to their problems. Others may comfort themselves with Pepys’s adage “hunger is the best sauce ”. Jackfruit in coconut milk, Glory restored toa forgotten temple by Mark Orr One of the first men to establish a between Britain and firm relationship Indonesia was Sir Thomas Raffles, who became Lieutenant Governor of Java after the Dutch had been driven out, and retained the post for five years (1811-1816). Perhaps the most important of his achievements was the restora- Borobudur in central Java— one of the finest examples of religious architecture in the world. Built in the middle of the ninth century by Rakai Pikatan, a prince of the Sanjaya dynasty, Borobudur was intended to commemorate the end of the powerful Cailendra dynasty. It was abandoned for centuries, virtually forgotten, and by the end of the eighteenth century was completely engulfed by jungle. It was under Raffles that the vital restoration work began, directed by Theodoor van Erp, an officer in the Dutch Corps of Engineers. Since the original restoration work by van Erp, a number of studies have been carried out by international experts. These have confirmed some of the many factors to be taken into account before full restoration can be successful. Most of the temple is built of porous lava rock, much of which has become encrusted with lichen, caused partially by the collapse of the drainage system. Subsidence and earthquake tremors have also taken their toll. In 1970 the Government reached an agreement with Unesco to raise money for a restoration trust fund. The target is $7.75m, of which the Indonesians contributed $2.75m. Of the remaining $5m needed, less than $2m has been raised, though the response has been wide and includes Iran, Cyprus, Belgium, France, Germany, Holland, Italy, India, Australia and Japan. Though Britain is conspicuous by her absence from the Indonesian list, the Government may yet contribute. It is also worth remembering that Indonesia receives more aid from Britain than any country outside the Commonwealth. Borobudur is often compared with Khmer temples such as Ankor Vat in Cambodia. Though similar in size and with symmetrical terraces showing magnificent bas reliefs, here the likeness ends. To compare the two does justice to neither. for example, is an excellent The clowns, who appear at dish but suffers from being about 9 pm and again at the plat du jour, chaque midnight, are recommended. jour, in every restaurant in Again in Solo one can see central Java. the museum and the two Continuing after Junch Kratons—the Mangkune- To make the other essen- the ! m world’s largest lakes, tial visit of central Javya—to formed after a gigantic volthe Buddhist temple com- canic explosion some millenplex, Borobudur—one must nia ago. The people of the return again to Jogja. It is area have elegant architecbest to leave near dawn and ture, wonderful voices and one comes to Prambanan, garan (Palace of Prince arrive an hour later at Boro- an interesting cuneiform one of the two great temple Mangkunegara) and the budur, as the freshness of script. In their recent past complexes of Java. Pramba- Kesusuhunan (Palace of the the morning enhances the they practised ritual canninan is Hindu. Several art Emperor of Solo). In the serenity of the temple and balism. historians claim that Hindu grounds of the Kesusuhunan the view from its top terrace Alternatively, one could art and architecture reached is a phallic tower where across the plains of Java. go by train to the north its peak in Java with Pram- once a year in former times One can continue from coast of Java, to Surabaja, banan. From July to Octo- the emperor would spend Borobudur to Wonosobo, the and wander around looking ber, during the nights of the the night with his faery town at the foot of the at the sailing ships and eating full moon, the Ramayana wife, the Goddess of the Dieng Plateau, one of Indo- seafood. Surabaja also has a ballet is danced beneath its South Seas.:: nesia’s most sacred places good zoo. Or, one could fly majestic tower. Refined erotica is the and almost unknown to irav- east to Lotus Land—Bali- Despite its lack of a Stamp ol Solo and those who ellers. There are two clean There, while lying on the luxury hotel Solo is worth investigate such things claim but shabby hotels there, both beach drinking out of a coat least one night’s stay, if that the arts of love are charging about $4 a night. conut, one could think of only to visit the public play- Most highly developed by [If one has been struck by good reasons for not going house, Sriwidari. Here, every the ladies of Solo. Those the scenery of Java before back to work, for sailing night, there are Javanese with a fine eye will also see this, one will be spellbound around the world, or, perdance drama performances that the other arts of Solo— on seeing the Dieng. It is haps, for drinking © from from 8pm _ until midnight, cancing, wake aes tee open suggested that the another coconut. S 2 rely <. 5. jless severely classical than icaiie Gl ge Boe, HOW’ TO GET THERE: jin Jogja. Jogja says Solo is of love of money but also 4 return flight, tourist class, vulgar; Solo says Jogja is through rapture for its from London to Jakarta | dull. beauty. One understands this ©9Sts £573.50 by KLM— The really tenacious feeling, seeing Java Garuda. The Hollandtraveller can go from Solo gtretched out below the pla- America Line and KLM to Candi Sukuh, a fifteenth- teau.-On its top there are Offer a 20-day fly-cruise in century Hindu temple 37km ancient temples, sacred the Indonesian archipelago; Borobudur was built under L L from the town, dedicated to Hindu caves and wells and a Hindu and Buddhist influ- F: prices from London, includthe dark side of Bhima. There many-coloured lake. But for ing 14 days at sea and four ence, and although both these | are no signposts and most of the impious, the most fasci- Nights in Singapore (where sources of inspiration are | the people one asks say they nating is a small, fiercely the cruise part starts) or apparent in Cambodian | have never heard of ‘t, but it boiling volcanic crater with Bangkok, start from £519. temples, the many local ele-| is worth a try. The temple subterranean fires smoking They will also arrange a 22ments of Hindu-Javanese cul-|was the centre of a phallic from cracks in the earth day coach-train-air tour of ture have made Borobudur an | sect believed to have sought around it. Java, Sumatra and Bali— entity in its own right and|}purity through satiation of All this will have taken prices, including flights to without equal. The temple|the senses. Its architecture about 10 days. With what is and from Singapore and stands over a fertile valley, |and decoration are both dra- Jeft of a two-week stay one three nights in Bangkok, dominating it in complete |matic and explicit, and one could fly north-west to from £509. Details from tranguillity—a glorious sym-}has a slight frisson to find Medan, capital of Sumatra Friendship Travel Centres, bol of what the Javanese Reve }fresh offerings on the and from there travel to 73 The Street, Ashtead, derived from their religion. shrines Lake Toba. Toba is Surrey. one of Dusseldorf "5 Frankfurt a/ Main Grich i Fe Geneva an Jee San Francisco oes Qlbraiter e J 3 < % AB ranger ‘ [Unreadable] Soins: Ae. rv AbKhobar yn [Unreadable] Oranjestad/San’ Nicolas @ Kratendijik b | Willemstad Maracaibo. Panamay) Bogota, a Quito’ Guayaquil @- a { An be. A Nairobi * Mombasa Brasilia Golania oe My SAo Paulo @. @ Rio de Janeiro ySantos mein ® Scuritiba Ary My %, 80 A ed 22 @. Montevideo Buenos Aires o 4 @ Bohia Blance NS a BSE Algemene Bank Nederland is a e financing of export and import leading international bank on the transactions; European continent, placing at your — * international payments; service a network of 600 branches _—_ » short and medium term loans; in The Netherlands and 140 offices» transactions on the European and affiliations in 34 other countries. currency markets; You can rely on Algemene * securities; Bank Nederland’s 150 years of inter- « trade information; national banking experience, suchas: « business development. Algemene Bank Nederland Headoffice: Amsterdam, Vijzelstraat 32, Telephone 020-29 91 11, Telex 11417, Jakarta Jalan Ir. H, Juanda 93 P.O. Box 2950 London Chiet Office 61, Threadneedlestreet, ‘Telephone 52365 London EC 2P 2HH Telex 0114124 Telephone 016284272 Telegraphic Address: Bancolanda Telex 887366 by Roger Vielvoye Pertamina, Indonesia’s stateowned oi] company, has set itself the target of boosting national oil production to two million barrels a day by the end of next year, If-it reaches this figure, and all the indications are that it will, the company will have pulled off one of the most remarkable achievements yet seen by a state oi] company in a developing nation. ’ The two million barrel target was set in 1971 by Lieutenant-General Dr Ibnu Sutowo, president director o° Per. tamina, At the time, Indonesian production was. still below the million barre] level and to many observers doubling production in three years seemed extremely ambitious. Production is running at 1,300,000 barrels a day and by the end of the year it should be 1,500,000. A significant part of the increases in output has been achieved by the opening up of offshore fields during the past three years. There is little doubt that the Indonesian oil industry is capable of pushing production well above two million barrels a day target. The country’s estimated reserves are 10,000 million barrels—2 per cent of the estimated world reserves. In addition to, the proved onshore oil producing zones, further prospects offshore look good and there are also huge areas of virgin forest and jungle that have only be_n given the most cursory glance by the oil prospectors mainly because of their remote locations. Indonesia is ideally placed to serve the voracious Japanése market—it already takes 54 per cent. of the exports— and as demand for low sulphur crude of the type produced in Indonesia increases, further efforts will be made to open up these areas for exploration. By the end of the decade production could be running at three million barrels a day. But it is not just pressure from the consuming nations that will ensure a rapid rate of exploitation of. reserves. Oil is the biggest single industry in Indonesia, providing 60 per cent of the country’s foreign exchange, and is the backbone of plans to. develop the economy. As well as providing these revenues Pertamina is taking a more active role in the country’s development than any of its counterparts in other developing nations. The different approach to oil policy in Indonesia is partly explained by the geographical] isolation of the country from its partners in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) but it mainly stems from the historical background of the domestic industry. Free press by Rosihan Anwar editor in chief, Pedoman, Jakarta The usual image of present Indonesia is that it has a “military regime”, so the natural question to be expected from the interested visitor is: “Do you have freedom of the press here? ” My standard answer would During the 1950s. until towards the end of that decade Indonesia was known as one New petroleum pipelines being constructed at Semarang in central Java for shipments of crude oil. The fact that Indonesia did away with the concessions system of oil leases in the early 1960s has kept it out of the mainstream of the wrangles and disputes during the past three years between OPEC members and the international oil companies over prices and state participation in the oi] companies’ concessions. Indonesia was the first operating base of the Royal Dutch part of the Royal Dutch Shell group and under the old Dutch colonial rule was one of the first areas outside the United States to develop its oil resources. By the outbreak of the Second World War Shell had been joined in Indonesia by most of the international groups, all operating on the concession basis, although only Stanvac, a joint Standard Oil/Mobil venture, had production in any way to rival that of Shell. While the Indonesians gained their independence from the Dutch after the Japanese occupation, Shell, Stanvac and Caltex rebuilt the war-ravaged oil facilities but found their concession areas frozen and their activities far more closely scrutinized than under Dutch rule. ? Well, journalists can take heart of the few countries in Asia with a free and lively press. It was also a press with a strong political direction. No government under the then prevailing liberal political system could afford to ignore the press which had toppled a Cabinet, over a foreign policy issue such as happened when the Indonesian Foreign Minister in 1951 moved too closely to the American side, acting against the non-aligned policy of the republic. From 1959 until] the emer- TUNAS EXCLUSIVE TOURS BRING SOME OF THE MULTIPLE “ec f 7 A Ex NATURE AND KOMODO ISLAND Cunas 29. Ji. Tel: 47390 — Cable (@ TIMFS NEWSPAPERS LIMITED. 1973 London EC4P 4UE England briday IN 1883? Quin Forest At UU 1HF ONLY SURVIVORS OF THE PREHISTORIC GIANT LIZARDS tHE VARANUS KOMODOENSIS OUWENS ROAM PEACEFULLY ON Ondonesia Tours & Travel. Majapahit — Jakarta TUNASTOUR. WONDERS OF INDONESIA WITHIN YOUR REACH ANAK KRAKATAU STILL SENDS OUT SMOKE AND DEBRIS EVERY NOW AND THEN. HAVE YOU EVER READ ABOUT IVS MOST DISASTROUS ERUPTION 52176 — 46212 August 17, 1975 A state oil company was established in 1957 under the leadership of Dr Sutowo, and by 1963 the concession basis for the operations of the three largest producers was converted to a work contract commitment. Once this major breakthrough had been achieved the state oil company began to expand quickly and the concept of production sharing contracts was developed. These production sharing contracts were pioneered by the Indonesians, not without some opposition from the oil companies, and they are now attracting considerable attention from other developing oi] nations which are not saddled with the oil concession system. Under one of these contracts an oil company works as a contractor to the state company. It finances exploration work and brings discoveries into production, In return the operator gets a set share of the output to market. From the point of view of a developing nation it is an excellent arrangement. The contractor provides all the skills ard capital investment and makes lump sum payments at various agreed stages of the operations. Annual expenditures guaranteed in the initial contract, gence of the present new order, Indonesia was ruled under President Sukarno’s guided democracy, and for about six years the press was completely emasculated, occupied by journalists who were sycophants of the “Great Leader of the Revolution ”. Mochtar Lubis, the most famous journalist of Indonesia whose paper Indonesia Rava crusaded against corruption in the middle fifties, was by then in one of Sukarno’s prisons. Then the communists staged their abortive coup in September 1965, which re. moved Sukarno. For the press, however, a new promising era was in sight. Truly enough with the emergence of the civil-military relationship at the helm of power as manifested in the triumvirate of General Suharto, the Sultan: of Jogiakarta, Hamengku Buwono IX~ and Foreign Minister Mr Adam Malik, with a government that has pledged to restore democracy, the press surged forward with great gusto, articulating the aspirations of the new order. Again Indanesia witnessed a free and uninhibited press similar to the one it had during the early 1950s. But this situation was not to be for long. Soon after the honeymoon was. over between the civilian militants as embodied by the students, the intellectuals on the one hand, and the military officers who took the lead to push back President Sukarno on the other hand. and after the militarv had the feeling and the self-confidence that they could wéll go alone without too much reliance on civilian cnoperation, there were signs of a tightening un. Thus since 1968 after the triumvirate abolished. and General Suharto emerged as President of the Republic. the military increasingly became the dominant element in the power structure, with the concomitant that the press began to readjust itself accordingly. Yet it was not altogether total surrender The press did try to assert itself occasionally. It became the mouthpiece of the students who demonstrated in early 1970 against corruption in the higher echelons of the Government. It was vocal during the election campaign of July 1971, when the press reported daily on excesses. bulldozer tactics. intimidations by supporters ol the Functional Group (GOLKAR), the political arm of the Armed Forces (ABRI) Al) this. however, has not been to much avail. Corruption still exists despite students’ demonstrations and press criticism. The GOLKAR was THE TIMES FRIDAY AUGUST 17 1973 © iI plan puts nation back among top producers and the relinquishment of territory, ensure speedy development. Once a field has been brought into production the mechanism is available for a contractor to recover his initial expenses. His share of production is usually 35 per cent while output is between 75,000 and 200,000 barrels a day reducing to 30 per cent when output tops 200,000 barrels a day. Indonesia takes oil instead of revenues from the contract ensuring that it is not involved in disputes over prices. It can then sel] the oil to the contractor at the going market rate, which is high in the case of Indonesia’s. low sulphur crude, or it can market the crude itself or refine it and export the product in its own tankers. Over 40 production sharing contracts have been signed since 1966 and there are 30 companies exploring and/or producing under this system. In 1968 the contractors spent $45,8m on exploration work which had risen to $237m a year by the end of last year. These figures do not include expenditure by Pertamina. Indonesia differs from many of its OPEC partners in the Middle East. Unlike Kuwait and Saudi Arabia it has a massive population emerged victoriously from the general election constituting the majority in Parliament. Nevertheless the press continues to be the vigilant watchdog of society, although this sometimes has its ugly consequences. Not a few Indonesian pressmen have experienced that the farther you are from Jakarta, the centre of government, the more liable you are to become victim of all kinds of pressures, subtle as well as unsophisticated, perpetrated by the local power. Thus the press carried stories about provincial journalists getting rough physical treatment for news published that was not amenable to the local] authorities, military as well as civilian. Or they would be summoned by the police, interrogated, and taken into custody.: The saying “ journalism is a dangerous profession in Asia” is, alas, still true, as testified by the experiences of some of the journalists in thé outer regions of Indonesia But also in Jakarta all is not ideal for the journalist. Early this year the afternoon Christian paper Sinar Haranan was closed for a couple. of days by order of the Command for the Restoration of Public Order and Security (KOPKAMTIB), because the paper, thinking it had a scoon. published the figures of the state Budget before its wresentation by the Government to Parliament. How is the situation today? Let me give some data first to determine the proper perspective. In a country with a population of 120 million people the total daily circulation of the newspapers is only a million. In Jakarta alone with a population of 4,500,000 there are 21 dailies, while in the provinces there are 101 dailies. But the Jakarta dailies combined have a daily circulation of 600,000, making up 60 per cent of the total circulation in the coun try. Besides the dailies there are 265 magazines with a total weekly circulation of 2,500,000. Statistics alone do _ not reveal the whole story. In terms of circulation the Indonesian press is small in proportion to the number of population. It is also very much urbanized. [ may not yet reach the vast masses in the rural areas, but it bas influence on the official and unofficial leaders Since most of the Jakarta dailies are also national papers, they are the ones that carry weight in the public opinion making process. Economically spe..king difficulty in penny it and has no spending every earns. Pertamina is also more highly organized than any of its OPEC counterparts. Until the National Iranian Oil Co gained full contract of the operations in Iran earlier this year Pertamina was the only state company that owned all the reserves and facilities from rigs and pipelines to helicopters and computers. The scope of its operations is also broader than any other state company. It has built roads, hospitals and schools and has generally taken on the overall responsibility for improving agriculture and providing the basic materials to clothe the nation. With this in mind the company has just opened its first petrochemical operation, a polyethylene plant, and will follow this with fibre, fertilizer and steelmill projects. There are also plans to exploit and export natural gas in liquefied form probably to Japan and the United States In the early days of the century Indonesia was one of the more important oil producing areas of the world. After a long decline it is now back in the top rank of producers and seems certain to stay there. only a few papers are viable, the rest hovering on the borderline between life and death. Not all the journalists are professionally well trained. Despite these limitations the press carries on. The press has never depicted President Suharto in a cartoon, because such is the accepted rule in Indonesian society. But it does criticize the President’s policies, When recently Indonesia, like so many other Asian countries, was hit by a food shortage, and the Government used the village units to lay in stocks of rice to establish a national stock so as to be able to regulate prices when scarcity arises, some of the economically strong dailies sent out reporters to the rural areas to do stories in depth. The reports established that the peasants did not always get a fair deal over rice procurement. So many complaints were assembled that finally the Government had to modify its policy. Tt would seem that there is some latitude for the Indonesian journalists to exercise freedom of the press. In the state programme adopted by the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) in March 1973 which elected General Suharto for a second presidential term it was specifically stated that the press along with Parliament and the university constitutes one of the main channels for people’s participation in political development. The Indonesian pressmeéen when they look across the border, and observe the situation and the plight of the press in the other South-East Asian countries have certainly no reason to lose heart with their own condition, because they still retain their useful role in exercising social control, and are still relatively effective. However, with the powe: the military have in govern ment today, the generals are also able simply to ignore what the press reports or comments upon, as it does not affect the position of the generals. This sometimes creates frustration on the part of the}. journalists. In these past two years a new approach has been tried. Periodically editors of some of the leading papers would meet the generals of the KOPKAMTIB where both sides speak their minds, exchanging information. This meeting enables the editors to get an insight of what Ties behind the policies initiated by the Government, and con versely gives the generals a chance to get a glimpse of the aims and motives of the editors Printed ahd Published by Times Newsrarers Liwtreo at Printing House Square, in the Parish of St Andrew-by-ihe-Wardrohe wilh Si Ann, Blackfriars, in the City of . INDONESIA Vil — ee ma a a wap ag Se PT. First Indonesian Finance and Investment Corporation FICORINVEST A Merchant Bank in Indonesia providing full financial services Participants PT. Bina Usaha Indonesia JAKARTA Pierson, Heldring & Pierson AMSTERDAM Rothschild Intercontinental Bank Limited LONDON Amfas Groep NV. ROTTERDAM The Industrial Bank of Japan, Limited TOKYO Bank of Montreal MONTREAL Banque Lambert SCS BRUSSELS First City National Bank of Houston HOUSTON National City Bank CLEVELAND Seattle-First National Bank SEATTLE — For further information please contact: Mr. F. R. van Blommestein, President, | P.T. First Indonesian Finance and Investment Corporation. c/ojJalan Teuku Umar 56, Jakarta, Indonesia, Telephone: 42718. Indonesia and to of Indonesia our congratulations on the occasion of the 28th Anniversary of the Proclamation of Independence. We have been privileged to be associated closely with the Indonesian Insurance Industry for many years and we look forward to continuing to play a part in the achievement of the Republics aspirations... __ AN INDEPENDENT & PROGRESSIVE COMPANY Minet Holdings Limited Minet House 66 Prescot Street London EISBU _ Telephone 01-709 0707 Telegraph Minsuret London EC3 Telex No 888225 === [PDF page 91] === INDONESIA enter ten neon ceenen ben teetne Asean ee seo Mesenes te D SIME DARBY | Indonesia is, without doubt, a nation on the move. Backed by its vast natural resources and its hardworking enterprising people, it boasts a rapidly expanding economy. Considering the rich and diversified potential wealth of Indonesia, its large internal market and the achievements of the Government in creating political and economic stability, the opportunities to the foreign investor are many and varied. The Sime Darby Group is already well established in Indonesia. It has entered into partnership with many Indonesian firms and has assisted in the supply of finance, executive and technical expertise. Through the group's training facilities, both on and off the job, already” several hundred Indonesian technicians have received specialised training in a wide range of skills to enable them to fill the increasing number of job opportunities in the various companies now taking off. Here are examples of what Sime Darby is doing now in Indonesia. To speed up and simplify local manufacture of goods, Sime Darby in association with Overseas Financial Institutions and the Indonesian participant, P.T. Halmahera Kayu, have commenced construction of an extensive industrial complex. Situated at Cilandak, a rapidly developing area, just 30 minutes drive from the heart of Jakarta, the complex includes, as the first stage of development, 13.4 hectares of land, 28 buildings, plus a proposed six-storey commercial block. Built-in facilities at Cilandak include air-conditioning in all offices, electric power and water, drainage and sewerage, telephone and telex, security, parking bays etc. This project will provide the much needed facilities to both Jocal and foreign joint venture enterprises to speed up their rate of investme, Indonesia. THE TIMES FRIDAY AUGUST 17 1973 @@ Build an industrial complex to benefit both domestic and foreign jointventure firms... Mi Provide a plant hire service to conserve local capital. expenditure... » HSupply finance, “ executive and ~~. technical expertise to © Hi Provide modern agricultural equipment to increase food production facilities... Sime Darby, together with P.T. Tri Usaha Bhakti and Richards and Wallington Industries Ltd. have recently established a plant hire service throughout Indonesia. Its function — to provide earthmoving, construction, civil engineering and building equipment for all phases of building construction and industrial uses. More than merely supplying the equipment, the company also supplies the operators and the technical and advisory services. The result is that capital expenditure is conserved for expansion in other directions, and users are assured of first class performance of jobs being undertaken. Another service provided by the Sime Darby Group is the provision of substantial finance, coupled with key executive and technical'expertise, to major local companies. The Caterpillar dealer, P.T. Trakindo Utama, is one such company. The personnel assist local executives. in operation of the company. Technical experts have set up and are regularly conducting training programmes both in the workshop and in the field to ensure that Trakindo provide the the superior aftersales service Caterpillar users enjoy worldwide. Today,some.2% years after the formation of Trakindo,it has achieved the position, of the leading heavy earthmoving equipment distributor in Indonesia. With a substantial dealer network extending the entire length and breadth of Indonesia, it offers sales, service and: parts facilities second-to-none in the Republic. The vast population of Indonesia makes it essential that local food production is maintained at a high rate. Mechanisation of tilling, planting and harvesting is essential to ensure maximum usage of areas under cultivation. Sime Darby, through its association with P.T. Agtrak Utama brings this mechanisation to Indonesia in the form of the Basildon Ford range of tractors and agricultural equipment. In sizes to suit a variety of applications, the Ford ‘tractor range is enabling greater areas to be cultivated with the resultant higher yield of crop production. And these examples are only part of the story. The group’s involvement is growing as the nation progresses. Today plans are in hand for further investment into a variety of interests, all of which will contribute to the economy of the nation. Our knowledge and involvement in the Indonesian market could be of vital interest to you. If you are considering investment in Indonesia, why not talk to Sime Darby. A letter addressed to our Managing Director will receive prompt and personal attention. TheSime Darby Djalan Abdul Muis 34, Djakarta 54 Jalan Ampang, Kuala Lumpur 71 Robinson Road, Singapore 1 19 Leadenhall St. London EC3V 1NN 3rd Floor, Alexandra House, Hong Kong === [PDF page 92] === CONFIDENTIAL BRITISH EMBASSY, DJAKARTA. I4 August 1975 ) Lthey Yaka We 1/18 ‘of 31 July to John Chick I promised to reflections on the position of detainess in role of Amnesty International as seen from 9 to discover under what d political prisoners and 50 far we have had little 1 sked cts in BAKIN (the Stat -ordina { | Body) they produced a copy in re veaneiat ecision ‘No ace Tt | out te be the authority for the establishme nt of KOPKAMTIB Ct the os ymman¢ > the Restoration of Security and Order). Os BAKTN produced a copy of Presidential Decres No 1é L¥6s. This is a key docummt in that it provides for the formation of specis ilttary courts. The Decrees is ee ae be Cleiarks within the context of securing efforts for the lleve-— ent of the objecti es of revolution so that special and orn Ste cy _ fers should be taken and executed on the basis of residential Decree". It os not specifically provide the Biker Gui tor arrest and trial but it establishes the courts, sets down their terms of reference and the basis for appointment of defence counsel, and for appeals against their verdicts. Its purpose is said to te "to immedi: ue ly settle the cases" "which gravely endanger the ae of the nation". Tn Indonesia, as you know, "im diately" is a relative term. A, I enclose copies of our unofficial translation of both th Decrees. It is eae sting to. ae that they date back to the Seen era. Admittedly the | ee of 1965 was issued after the September 1965; rttempted on ne Sukarno's authority was already limited, but what seems to us the really operative _ Decree, setting up the special military courts (paragraph 3 above), was issued when Sukarno was in full control. Ve think tnat we are now unlikely to get more out of BAKIN on this subjec'i but we are still trying through other sources to establish tle legal basis for the detention of prisoners, and we shall repo. developments. CONFIDENT T AL,. === [PDF page 93] === CONFIDENTIAL o.. oe you | will know from our telegrams numbers 575, 610 and 619 ne figures of the number of politica prisoners at present under detention, riven to us in confidence by the Department of Foreign fairs down to the last possible Significe ant figure, proved to variable - at least for Category X - within a short period of time; and different figures which came ultimately from the sans ource as ours; were given at about the same time to Mr Stewart Harris of The Times. Qne suspects that the Indonesians themselves do not know exactly how many there are and this in itself is disquieting. It is nevertheless Clear that there has been a considerable reduction in the numbers over the past couple of years. In particular it seems reasonable now to accept the ndonesian statement that all Category C prisoners have been released Although some of them may well have been — or will be this does suggest that tle Tndonesians have no wish in prison simply for the sake of it. Cae oy eral Sumitro last week, the latter intention that as already rf risone rs should be tried the process will take ten j Ls ‘The Genera il added, as was point an some 9 ious Attorney Cenera, ohag the Tae mesians Simply have not g he resources, including wposecutor: oe inves igators tO go as fast as they would like. Said, howeve the Gor oflities improved the rate of trial be eae. He de on? irmed bh a it was the Governme n intention tha Category 3 orisoners should be released if ir mental attitudes changed and society at large was ready to i them. He said that in terms of changed mental attitude ne did not mean a complete change of conviction on the part of the | prisoners, which was too much to hope a“ but a clear indication) that they were ready to look after the e families. What he meant by this is not clear. On the oh hand it is consistent with the official policy of allowing families to Jorn the prisoners on Buru. On the other hand I oe not e@ a any early releases of B pris 5 z, FR > Or:O ic Ne have recently receive 2d, from ae sepa rate and we think reliable sources, accounts o the CO tions of impris onment OL political detainees. ‘The firs t of qaeee came from a German Jesuit priest who has been visiting Buru since 1971: we referred to his account briefly in paragraph 3 of our telegram NO, S66. The priest, whose name is Roffing, told the Germm Embassy here that the or isoners ae Buru were divided into camps gach conta Lining about 500 detaines Their living conditions were crude and primitive and ey were worked very hard, but they were not /tortured CONF ITRNT TAL === [PDF page 94] === tortured or roughly handled. They were however all required to work in communes and they received no payment for their labours - a lesson, ae ps unintentional, on how Communism works in practice. None 0 the - nees was allowed any contac with the outside fe. es were put to w@k side by Side with youngsters who were “in their early teens in ee ard who went to Buru only because parents were sent the The morale of all the detainees at Buru was mderstandabl YP indeed. The main oe for this were frustration and sheer boredom, and the fact that none of them saw any prospect of their leaving the island an of ape brought to trial, ‘The intellectuals were perhaps ths most hard hit. Father said that he ie d spoken LO a dete neo Oe had at one time oeen prominent I ndonesian writer. The priest asked whether he was mitted to “wri 8g, and the reply ha been that he was not; but a. t even if he were fiven pen and paper he could no longer do so since his creative powers had atrophied through lack of intellectual stimulus. : iss BBB, a British missionary who Indonesian church in Medan and teaches physics at the univers ey nere in her spare time. The Ambassador talke to her during a ea visit to Medan, and ovens she can be regarded as a reliable person. With othe gmbers of her church she has visited a prison in Medan v where detainees are held. There appeared to be no difficulty about members of the church visiting the prison, although she versonally had not been tosre for some time. There were about 120 in the prison, although some "had gone off to the isl: ands", meaning presumably the t they had been classified B and sent to Buru. some of the risoners must have been very young when arrested, as a numbar were now only in their late twenties. The practice for visitor from the church was to conduct a service in the ydard of the prison after which they could talk to individual Soe Miss had seen no signs of ill-treatment and the - oe Seemed adequately nourished. Books, soap and clothes ena 7 be sent in to them and we understand tne church and other organisations arrange this. She did not know about medical treatment, and thought that the ce aLis ere crowded with probably four to five in a room. Like Fether MINN, Miss BB thought thet the worst feature of the life of the pri ers was boredom. ; I must emphasise the importance of re ce ee the confid—- ence of these sources — not only because di sclosure would embarrass us and them, but also because it would make it more difficult for people like Father ond Miss TM to obtain access to prisoners in the future. Moreover I have no /doubt CONFT DENTT AL === [PDF page 95] === doubt that if they were identified they would be bombarded with letters from organi satiors like Amnesty International. 10. In principle, according to our notions of law, the political detainees in Indonesia should clearly either be tried or released, However, it can hardly be argued as being in our interest - or in the interest of peace and pes in Indonesia - that the Indonesian ee ent should release them unless they are | satisfied that they will not be a threat to secur Uy, At the moment they are convinced that the orisone rs would be a threat to security and this is something on which it would be difficult for us to oppose their judgment, even if it were our busines tO cdo so, li. We camot expect Amesty Interna itional and other wellintentioned organisations to accept the inevitabili ty of this Situation. ut J think that they fiont serve tls opisoners' interests better if they were to accept this, and were then to concentrate their efforts or urging upon the Indonesian Covernment (preferably without publicity 7) the need to relieve the hard Ships or ins pri eis in So far as this can be done —- to ensure, for in adequate food and medical treatment, access to books, fa Ly oi eee and the right to receive and send letters ban ieh in this last respect the Indonesians would probably be concerned about the security implications. [% could also be argued tht it would be in a Indonesian Govern— ment's Ps to ae detainees visits from the International Red Cross and similar dies, and to take a “cons ructive attitude to i io ence S by such bodies. TI ee that Amne sty International have made this point in the pas But i doubt if they would have much prospect of making pros ores on this point as I imagine the Indonesians would not regard them as impartial. le. I have no doubt that Amesty International are well eaning: this is brought Out in ths papers enclosed with Chick's Late WD 1/e of 2 August to me; I do wonder, hewever, whether they are hot being exploited by less well-meaning bodies 10 have seen for example an artic ‘Le in the June issue of "ion 1an's Journal" about Amnes ty International's work generally: this refers inter ¢ alia to the budiardjo case and quotes lirs Carmel Budiardjo's story in some detail. I am sure that Mrs Budiardjo& conditions of imprisonme ent were pretty austere, but her account as quoted in this article 16 dishonest in Gist io. contains inaccuracies and omits to mention some of the more favourable aspects of her treatment. She does not, for instance, say that, she was allowed visitors: we do know that she had visitors /while CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 96] === was in prison, although it is not clear how frequent ae were. She said that "Amnesty International had that a lawyer would be taking up her case on behalf ‘Britigh Government". This implied that the lawyer was e for getting her release; whereas in “fact. as Mrs rselt recognised in a letter addressed to the ry of | ate on 22 November 1971, she would not have got ehout une etforts made by HMC. note incidentally that Mrs Budiardjo and her lawyers now claim that the undertal ‘ing she gave on her olease, that she would not ep eeee in activities hostile to the Indonesian Governa was signed by her under duress. This does not allow 10) act hee her sister sent to us through her solicitor, a ment (copy enclosed) confirming an assurance given by | rs diardjo_ 40 her daughter that in the event of her being allowed ia lea donesia for the United Yingdom she would not involve herse alr a. any political activi&és hostile to rae Tndonesian Government. 14. If there were an opportunity I would see no objection, apart from Di information in the first two sentences of para graph 5 and 1 paragraphs 6 and 7, to the above being u used in discussi ion ith well disposed people in Britain such as MPs who 5 enuinely concerned about the fate of political prisoners m the information in paragraphs 6 and 7 you could state is no evidence of physical ill-treatmmt and that some prisoners at ts JASE do receive parcels, including booke. sit evidence SUE gests oo the conditions and Vv “standards we would das a SLacuony: the Indonesians have suggested ha should t shor of resources make ings atter. thing from which pris aurrer most One final point about Amnesty International. The article in the ‘Toman's Journal states the release of men and women who have used or advocated political ee I think it would be difficult to deny those who oo part in or were behind the attempted cour Septe amber 19 were prepared to see violence used in Tndonesia. tates that they do not work f Gol LET DE \ === [PDF page 97] === July, 1971. To whom it may concern, This is to confirm the assurance given by my sister, Mrs. Carmel Budiardjo, to her daughter, PD prior to the latter's departure for the United Kingdom, that in the event of my sister leaving Indonesia for the United Kingdom, she would not involve herself in any political activities hostile to the Indonesian Government. Furthermore, I might add that this guarantee was given by her children, Tibetari and WS) sbefore their departure for the United Kingdom in 1969 and this has been rigidly adhered ALOAN Pe OLS ee OSoVE === [PDF page 98] === vas (PERAST THR 2 IIGGL _ SAETNAN ce OOO SS:: el een ee AIRSEND IATA REPURLIK 4. Porlunja menjesueiken ergenisasi Komandg Pemuliaxan Keamanar, do. Katertibhes dengan Lsauntusan Prosiden/Panglimsa Tertinggi An kates, Bersendjata Republik Indonesia/Kemande Operasi Pertinggi Nuucr 3 2,rPerlunja Kemando Strategis Angkatan Darat divebasken dari tugesos tersebut diatas, hingge depat lebih penuh dihadapkan untwuc tugas-tugas Dwikera; Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia No. 345 Tahun 19653 Keputusan Presiden/Pangiine Nertinggi Angkatan Bersend jata blik Indonesin/Komando Cparasi “ertingel Yo. 162/20TI/19655 Keputusan Presiten/Panelima Sertinggi angkatan Bexsendjata Slik Indonesia/domindo Cperasi ertingel $o0l42/KORT/19653 KFUTUS KLAN: ienbentuk Kouande Cperasi Femulihan Keamanan dan xetertiban jang ai masud pada Keputusan Presinen/Panglima Tertingei Angkaten Bersenc 3 Republik Indogesia/Komando Cyoerasi Tertingei to. 162/KOTI/1955, da. - ngen tugas pokok menulibken keamanean dean ketertivean dari alsibatee iz - bat perictiwa "Gerekan 3C Sentember", serta mendvduken kembali ke ~ wibawaen Pemerintah vada umumja, dengen djalen Cperasi 2isik-mil:- tex dan mental. Hengangka t Henteri/Panglima Angkatan Darat sevagai Panglina Komar.< Operasi Pemylihan Keamanen don vetertiban jang bertangow~g djaweo Jangsung kepada Presicen/Panglima Merting7zi Angkatan Bersendjata Acpublik Indonesic/Panglina Besar Kouendo Cperasi Tertingzi. fepundjux Staf Unum Angkatan Darat sebagai Staf Xomando Operasi Pemilihen Keamanat (Ah Ketertiban, jang dilengkapi dengan Perbantusn Uneur-Unsuz dari /Angkatan Uaura 168 Angkatan Kepolisian, guna he" djamin espek geabungann ja. / Anekatan Laut, Untuk melaksnaan tuges-tugus chusus dapat dibentuk Stel Chuzt.: sesvei dengan kesuturan jang davet disusun dari tenaga-tenaga abl: ari Departemen-Devartemen lainnja.: Komando Cperasi Pemulihan eamanan dan Ketertiban ini menguasal uh gur-unsur pelaksansa chusus, §akni: (1) Semua ‘Pepelrada/Peper.de: untuk dan didaerah masing-mising. (2) Satuan-Satuan Tug?s, garungan atau chusus, jang sesuai deneen kebutuhan depot disiapken dan dan diperbantulon. © KOENAN Pere eere sere ese CL NS Sig na nenmcenns === [PDF page 99] === ‘ORM ETON AW eon. 4 LTP Or CATTOM MARL LU US ori Tay, ol Da RY COURT ‘saident of the Republica of Indonesia: ‘aay Still ouses which gravely endanger the security of the Nation ( Peocecs ox Acvolution to establish an Indonesian socialist Lt is deensd necessary to immediately settle the cases an ‘or this purmose, 2 special court capable of investigating into and’. ases to court siculd bo set up without any further delay;; Je that due te the close relatio iships of the cases with security and defence, °- vile Court to be set up will be under the Military judicial system; j-e thet this decrees is designed/stipulated within the context of securing ivorts for the achievement of the ob cctives of revolution, so that special and invcency Measures should be taken and executed on the basis of 3 Presidential vecrec Ho.I/APRS/1i960 and Article 10 of WOel-, 1962, dated December 22, 1962; a:is FORMATION OF SPECIAL NMOLTTARY Article 1, court, aboreviaved iMJ2ilUB, is a court within the Armed oy. to investigate into and tiv’, on the first and final ine ro will be decided ub: the President of the Rei, #rticle 2, vepital of R.I. and its Jurisdiction will cover vourt ay be held outside its domicile if it is deemed NOCessarye article 3, session vith one Presiding Judge, two or more liember 1G one Secretary; they are all officers from one of the three Graduate Officers with the miniman i be a Law Graduate of: LC @1"4 Judge shall be Junior O?ficer, 4» The Offieers shal2 be installed dy the President upon the proposal of the itinister/Commender in Chief of the x Spective Forces ag Arvicle 1. ne ed eee er as. ae te fohdone Shall be assisted vy one or nore defendents and/or Advisors, 2. In case the accused is unable to choose e Defendent, the Prididing Judge shall enpoint one or nore Defendents, Article 5, The Court shall investigate into and try the case in accordance with the prevailin= /lilitary crimine2 code with the following conditions: hall be handed over oy the iinister/Conmander in Chief decided by === [PDF page 100] === 2, trial shall be based upon the letter of indictment drawmm up by the Prosecutery 3, the Prisiding Judge shall give opportunities to the Proseeutor and Defendent, in an orderly way, to question the accused and witnesses directly; le evidence shall be based upon the evidence law which is valid in the Supreme Court; 5. written information of the witnesses made under oath and read out in Court sneall have the same value as oral information given under oath; 6. evidence can be in the form of written statement made under eath by an office ené- containing the kind, amount, place and time an evidence was confiscat@iy) «; Article 66 +. Before a verdict is read out and executed, it should be put forward to the Hinister/Commander in Chief who submitted the case to obtain his approval for execution, 2. In cease the Minister/ Commander in Chief concerned refuses to grant his apprey. as well as his cpinions or reasons for his refusal shall be forwarded te yceme iilitary Court, rene Lilitary Court shall be in session and announce its verdict Article 7. the execution of the Court's verdict which is not death penalty shall not be suspended due to em-eppeat the request for amestyfclemency. 2e in case the verdict is death penalty, the execution shail be carried out afte? the President has made a decision concerning the clemenoy. Article 8. Yate requested, Secretary of the Court shall submit documents ‘eile halitary Court. Court shall inform the President its opinion after Prosecutore Article 9. ti reulations concerning the Special Military Court pnall be issued WCCOUTIVe re e tee on the basis of a Presidential Decree, Article 10, is Decree is effective as from the date of its promlgation. order to inform the public, this Presidential Decree should be published [Unreadable] n tne State Gazette of tne k,l, Promulgated in Djakarte Stipulated in Djakaria on 2h. Desenber 1963 ‘on 2 December 1963 Stete Secretary, President of the R.I. signed signed MOCH ICHSAN SUKARNO an AT Oo. yymnmMm 4Q0f 7 YY 4 SLA GAcslius 1905 No.i19 === [PDF page 101] === aweD OF THE PRESIDENT/CO: WANDER IN CHIE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE RE- : INDONESTA/C O: LANDER IN CHIMF OF TH SUPLEME OPERATIONS COMMAND 10:4 79/KOTI/1 965 vondisaering: “ne necessity of adjusting the organization of KOPKAMBIB with the Decree of the President/Commander in Chief of the Armed Foroes of ReI./Supreme Operations Command No.162/KOTI/1 965; The necessity of relieving the Strategic Command of the Army from the afore-mentioned, so that they can be fully assigned te oarry out the Dat tasks; é View of: The Presidential Decree No.345, 1965; The Decree of the President/Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of Ret. é Supreme Operations Command No.162/KOTI/1965; iN}4 The Decree of the President/Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of R.I./ Supreme Operations Command No.142/KOTI/A1 965; iL 1973 tt ry. IT HAS BEEN DECIDED: STRY to Lay Down: Pairstly to form KOPKANTIB referred to in the Decree of the President/ Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces/Supreme Operations Command NO... 162/KOTI/1965, with the principal tesk to maintain security and ee order as the results of the "30 September Movement", and to ree instate the Government's nrestige as a whole by means of mental, military and physical operations; Secondly to appoint the llinister/Coumander of the Army as the Commander of OPKAMYIB who is directly responsible to the President/Commander in Chief of the Armed ¥orces/¢emaeméer Commander in Chief of the Supreme Overations vVommands appoint the General Staff of the Army as the Staff Command of iiOPKAMTIB supplemented (assisted) by the Elements from the Navy, Ler Fi id Police Foree in order to maintain its joint operations; formed to carry special tasks in conformity revailing r ea(li eat ten and made up of personnel (experts ) ier Departments Piet le will supcrvise special executive elements, nanely: etl PREPELRADA/P ee for and in the repestive areas; : ‘ i yher g Operation nd bse | Jointly eaé= or specially organised, which can be in accordance with the requirements or assigned us supporting units; the finaneing of KOOP. IB may be obtained from the Revolution Judget through the Supreme Operations Command; men the #seteenee issuance of this Decree, the Decree of the Presiden’ Commander in Chie! of the Armed iorces of R,1./Supreme Operations Commend No.t42/KCTI/A 965 hes, therefore, been revok this Decree is effective as from the date of its issuance, Issued in Jakart On 6 ee r Gb) er oh. J sg A al DER Lis CH nik - lei ify Wh )e 5 OF R axl, r 5 CUT AE ANT GOLMALAND === [PDF page 102] === 22. ~ evolusi, mela | nion kepada Anggeren BR ini cibedd ini, meka Kevutusan presiden/Pangi:" - +a Repuolix inacnesia/Xomando Operas kenbali. cae angxeten Bersordja ai Nomer 342/£0TI/2989 ditjaout Keputusan {ni berlaku sedjak tanggal, ditetapkan- $ Djekarta Ditetapken di f moexr - 2965. Pada tanggal 6 Dese PRUSIDSN /PANGLINA TORTINGGL AIGKATAN BRRSINDIATA REPUB LIK TD OKESTA/PANGLIMA BDSAR KOMANDO OPPRASl TERTINGGI © Hee GieGea “.Ss0 Bok A HG Disalin sesuai dengan aselinja ZOLIMDO OPMRAST PSRTINGGL WAKED. Loose WU, Sesuai dengen aselinja Dsap/t.t.djong menjalin ke 11.%.d BRIGLDIR DI DSRAL-POL - BNDAKG STE KCDRATUEE ANGGLUGA. SUA =e:: lace pa Sesuai dengan aselinja selinen-jang ke cu jeng mes jalinnja7 Coes Vt Eat eee — [Unreadable] MI.S-tra nar; > A baa i ANGG PAS AN V/SUAD -2 === [PDF page 103] === EWCIDATION | [Unreadable] “CSD SNOTAL DECLGN NO.16, 1963 CONCERNING THE FORMATION OF SPECLAL MILITARY © COURT GH TRAL “herve have been many events which derupted the State and Natien since the establishment of the Unitary Repebaik State of the RoI. The cases, however, have been decreasing along with the progress of our Revolution, v4 As long es our Country is still in an Hmergeney Situation, those cases can imiediately settled without disregarding the prinoiplea of justice, As it has. been generally known, in order to try the cases the Supreme Authority under the amergency Situation has set up special courts, namely Military Court Under The viar Condition, ONG Since our country Bee nov back to normal, reguletions pertaining to the Courts above mentioned are no longer valid, But due to the fact that the cases still constitute a srave danger to the Netion and the State, it is deemed necessary j stigating into and try the vO establish a special judicial body capable of inve immedi < / relisted to the Governnent's policies in the y and Jefence. Accordingly, the special Judicial body formed Decree should be within +! 13 Heverlee ww wee TOT tT 'T YIN AMT A amet LUSTY PRY Moi LULL BLO CIDATION, article i e and Article 2 article 3, Juages should be in odd number, for examples three or five per= cer is defined as an Officer who has had a Bachelcr Degree liy anc graduated from the Gerege Collere/Acedeny operated 01 approved oy the Government, EXPlENatory. article 5 to Article TOG elf explanatory, IT OMT > r SUPPLANT TO THE STATE GAZETTR NO.2605 Copied from the original PAUR RE PaD SEIUSAD; signed SOEJONO T LWT. Noe: 213654 === [PDF page 104] === 2S RS Fe SANS Sink 4st July, 1971. To whom it may concern. This is to confirm the assurance given by my sister, Mrs. Carmel Budiardjo, to her daughter, Re prior to the latter's departure for the United Kingdom, that in the event of my) sister leaving Indonesia for the United Kingdom, she would not involve herself in any political, activities hostile to the Indonesian Government. Furthermore, I might add that this puenantes was given by her children, I onc EE MS «sbefore their departure for the United Kingdom in 1969 and this has been rigidly adhered [Unreadable] === [PDF page 105] === "yang OPEAAST THRITIGGT ee. SALTNAN te ry eee ae Pine. Scares . REPUTUSA: PLUS IDSK/PANCLINA SARTINGGI ANGICN Tg BORSDNDIATA REP KONANDO QPERAST TERTINGGT Ose Lakes tsis8s : prtghet _ 4 4, Porlunja menjesueiken orgenisasi Komandg.Penuliyan Keamanary 483; |. [ptortihben dongan Iisnutusan Presiden/Pang? ina Tertingss Anson Bersendjata Republik Tndonesia/Kenande Operass Tertingg’ Nuser | - 162/KOTI/1955 Ree Ss a OE aie ae 2,fPerlunja Kemendo Strategis Angkatan Darat divebasken dari tugesos tersobut diatas, hingge dapat lebih penuh Aihadapkan untuk tugas-tugas Dwikera; ey. Be ea rae . apeingat $1. Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia No. 345 Tahun 19655 2. Keputusan Presiden/Pangline Mertinggi Angkatan 3orsendjata Ropu plik Indonesis/Kenando Cparasi “ertingrd No. 162/20T1/19653 ' 3, Keputusan Presidon/Pong.ima Sertingg1 aAngkatan Bersendjata Repue. Slik Indonesia/domindo Cperasi fertingel fosld2/KOT/19653 1 RMEKUTUSKAN: : Henbentuk Komande Operasi PFemulihan Keamanan dan Xetertiban jane oi maksud pada Keputusan Presinen/Panglima Tertinggi Angkaten Bersend ji! Republik Indogesia/Komando Operasi Mertingrd No.162/KOPI/1955, ao. ey ngean tugas pokok menutirken’ keamanan dan ketersiban dari alcibateais + | bat perictive WGerakan 30 Sentember", serta menduduken kembali ke =) | wibawaan Pemerintan pada wumumnja, dengen djalan Cperasi fisik-wili-- -¢ex dan mental. “ Mengengkat Nenteri/Panglima Angkatan Darat sebagai Panglina Komare. 0) Operasi Pemy) ihan Yeamanen dan Vetertiban jang bertangiwme ajaweb) 4 langsung kepada presicen/Panglima Mertingzi Angkatan Bersend jata Re. | publ ik Indonesia/Penglina Besar Korendo Operasi Tertingmi. : Memund juk St an Darat sebagai Staf Yomando Operasd Pens mrlihen Keamanatt @an 5° iilengkapi dengsn Perbdantusn Unsur-Unsux dari /Ingkatan Vearta den An oa tan ‘Kepolisian, guna mers,.djamin easpek geyungann JO + Tangkatan Laut, ae CEN : Untuk melaksanakan tugss-wgus chusus, dapat dibentule Stet Chui: oie sosvei dengan kedutuban jang depet disusun dari tenaga-tenaga and ae dari Departemen-Departemenr Jainn ja. ae Ge ae + Komando Cperasi Pomulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban ini menguasad un gur-unsur pelaksans chusus, jakni-: is Gt SO ee (1). Semua ‘Pepelreda/Peperda: untuk dan didaerah mising-mipings am (2) Satuan-Satuan Tug*s, gebungen atau cvusus, _-kpbutuhan depet disiapkan dan dan aiperbantukon. === [PDF page 106] === PRNSDENTIAL DECREE lot, 41963 concerning: THE DORMAPIGON ON SPEOTAL MILITARY, COURT Prosident of the Republic of Indonesia: vonsicering: ee 1, that ‘thore are still ouses which gravely endanger the security of the Natiep:. ane Stabe under th: process of Revolution to establish an Indonesian soci commulity, so thet it is deemed necessary to immediately settle the oases i question; —@ wlan + for this purmose, a special court sagabl e of dnyeatlpating into om bring the vases to court sould be set up without any further delay; 3, that due to the close relationships of the oases with. security and serene the court to be set up will be under the military judicial system; ae ony this decres is designed/stipulated within the context of securing vorts for the achievement of the ob ectives of revolution, so that special aul ea cenoy meesures snould-be taken end executed on the ba’is of a Presidential Pacracs 2n¥ ViOs Vg APULOLO br sional Congress Deeree No.TAPRS/1960 and Article 10 of Provi.si our Decree io. LL/iPPRS/ AA 9503 2, Amicloe 4 0: Presidentinl Beoree Hod, 1962, dated December ea) 1962; or is 3. Presidential Decree ilo.#6 226, 1965; v Bitis DsCIDED 3 NTI tT WIPUILOS: PRESIDENTIAL DECSE COMCMRIING ‘Ti FORMATION: OF SPECLAL “MILITARY Gite Article 1. the yspecial: ee ary court, abbreviated WWiGi1U8, is a court within the Armed “orees whicn. is as: iced to investigate into and try, on the first md final in- ‘csunoe, special ceases whose nature will be decided by the President of the Rel “rticle 2, teen Court 25 gO ea iin the Capital of RI. and its jurisdiction will cover COLE atels Verrl tory e “2 Court may be held outside its domicile if it is deemed necessax article 3. 1. “he Couit will be in session +ith one Presiding Judge, two or more Member: Judges, one Prosecutor end one Secretary; thoy are all officers from one oft. the sorees or jointly from tne three Forcese 2. Yresiding Judge and Proseoutor shall be Lew Graduate officers with the. nisi rani: o:' dunior Officer, while Secretary shall be a Law Graduate ODLLc ets 3, tne lowest rank of ienber Judge shall be Junior Officer. i.e The Officers shall be installed oy the President. upon the proposal of the idinister/Commander in Cnief of the respective Forces, Kae Me Arvicle 4. i ites pete Saag Grell be assisted by one or more defendents | ‘and/or Advisors.” 2. In case the accused is unable to choose e Defendent, the paaleine Tudge. shall anpoint one or nore Derehdents. Article 5e fe: The Court shall investigate into and try the case in accordance with tha if vailing; ilitery crimins1 code with the following conditions: === [PDF page 107] === 2. trial shall be based upon the letter of indictment dram up ie the peceeect 5. the Prisiding Judge shall give opportunities to tho Prosecutor and Defendent in an orderly way, to question the accused and witnesses directly;: live eee shall be based upon the evidence law which is valia me tbe Sam * Court Hay 5e Written information of the witnesses made uhder oath and read out’ bs Court shall have the same value es oral information given under oath; 6. evidence can be in the form of written statement made: unde: ‘eath by: en ené- containing the kind, amount, place and time an | evidence, ‘was oonfisna Article be 1. Before a verdict is read out and executed, it should be put forward to the tnister/Commander in Chief who submitted the case to obtain his arrroyal ton execution. 2. In case the Ninister/ Commander in Chief concerned refuses to grant his ane tho case as well as his opinions or reasons for his refusal shall be forwarded. ae) the Supreme Milite LIMO OUI 6 Je The Supreme Military Court shall be in session and announce its verdict immediately. Article 7.;: j 1. he execution of the Court's verdict which is not death penalty shall not be: ml suspended due to em-eppeat the request for amestygclemency.: 2 in case the verdiet is death penalty, the execution shall be carried out atten the President iias made a decision concerning the clemency. Article 8, 4 oe noney is requested, Secretary of the Court shall submit aocunents ase to the supreie ialitary Court. 4 2. The Suyreme Military Court shall inform the President its opinion after consultations with tne Prosecutor. article 9, axeoutive regulations concerning the Special Military Court, eo be issued | tme on the basis of a Presidential Decrere Article 10, Tiles Decree is effective as from the date of its PEORLD Geet Ore Tn order to inform the public, this Presidential Boorse’ should ‘be | published in the State Gazette of the R.Il, Proml gated in Djaxarte " Belson as ickavte on 24. Desenber 196 on 2. December 1963 State Secretary,:. President of the R. I, signed signed MOCH ICHSAN _ SUKARNO STATE GAZETTE 1963 Ho.119 === [PDF page 108] === DECISION OF TiS PRESIDENT/COMIANDER IN CHIEY OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE RB. PULIC OF TDONESTA/GOISLANDER IN CHIMP OP TH SUPKELOE OPERATIONS COLMAND vondisdering: 1. “ne necessity of adjusting the organization of KOPKANBIB with the heesess of the President/Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of: 2 1./Supreme i: Operations Command No,162/KOTI/Ai 965; aa Os The necessity of relieving the Strategic Commant.‘of the: val x0" the 1 afore-mentioned, so that they can be fully eostenae: ¢ to Caos out the Dwi tasks; wie tary View of: The Presidential Decree No.345, 19653. The Decree of the President/Commander in Chief of the Arraeel Forces of. By Supreme Operations Command No.162/KOTI/1965; in 7f20 IN)J The Decree of the President/Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of R, 1./ Supreme Operations Command No.14.2/KOTIA 965; Z> mle brag RY IT HAS BEEN DECIDED: Nectarine to Lay Down: Firstly _: to form KOPKANTIB referred to in the Decree of the president/ Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces/Supreme Operations Command. Hay geil 162/KOTI/1965, with the principal tesk to maintain security and 3 order as the results of the "50 September Movement" » and to ree instate the Government's nrestige as a whole by'means of mental,: military and physical operations : to appoint the linister/Commander of the Army as the Commander of KOPKAMTIB who is directl:: responsible to the President/Commander in: Chief of the Armed Forces/Geomaender Commander in Chief of the supraie’ Overations VUommandy to appoint the General Staff of the Army as the Staff Command of KOPKAMPIB supplemented (assisted) by the Elements from the Navy,; Air Force and Police Force in order to maintain its joint operations;.. | : a Special Staff may be formed to carry special tasks in conformity with the prevailing requirements and made up of personnel (experts) Srom otner Departments; : KOPLAUID will supervise special executive elements, nanely: ‘4) 1] PHPELRADA/PSPERDA for and in the repeative areas;.. (2) Operation Units, kobe Jointly ené- or specially organised, which can be in Aecorasnoe with the requirements assigned us supporting units 3 Sixtaly the financing of KOPKAJITB may be obtained from the hevolution: Budget through the Supreme Operations Command; Sovexthly; with the #esteenee issuance of this Decree, the Decree of the President / Commander in Chiet’ of the Armed lorces of R.I./Supreme Operations q Commend Ho.t42/KCTIA 965 he 13, therefore, been revoked; ed get Ly this Decree is effective as frou the date of its issuance. Tssued in Jakarta On 6 December, 1965 ca Lal EOE Ii) CHIER' OF THA ARLED FOLOZS OF R.IL/ oe CANDIES. i CHYER Oi TS SUPREME OPERATIONS COMMAND signed SUPRE LENS UP mit. DaPUP YL Sit sa === [PDF page 109] === oP Oy Saag eT Tee moisjaon K Bennd Cperasi Rertinggi« es ee a3 alee juarkacss rae coi Angee ten Ber putusen ini, maka Keputusan presiden/panglit = tavee Nomer 142 »/ZOTI erajava Repuolix Indones sia/Komando Tee 1965 aitjadut kenbaii«. $ Keputusan ini beriaku seajak cee aitotapkannuns ad $ Djekerta a pada tangegal 6 Desember ~ 21965. PRD: ROSIDSE/PARCLIA 1 TIRTMNGGL AIGRATAN saRSENDIATE: REPUBLIK INDGK “HSTA/PANGLIMA BESAR KOMANDO OPERAS TERTINGG I ~s oBKARNO Disalin sesuai dengan, aselinja ee KOAIMDO OPMRAST PERTINGCL Sesuai dengen aselinja: nyep/t. iets ag menjalin ke Ii jeng mena 5 _MOCH. JASTN_ +.%.d BRIGADIR DIMDERAL-POL — ENDAKG SEH KCDRATE: ANGGLUSA. S UA 2 Sesuai dengan aselinja se linen Jang ke tt jeng Beh; jolinnja7 es ue aes M “a ge ANGG. ANT Ws ronando ini Gibebanken isepads Anggeren oveluels melani* Z A === [PDF page 110] === EW CIDATION 2 OF [ae ee SCHEN NO.16, 1963 CONCERNING ‘THE FQUIATION OF SPECIAL MILITARY COURT RO OS ge ata Ghai ie a Chere have been meny events which derupted the State ‘and Nation sdiibe the establishment of the Unitary Sepeemkk State of the Rele The cases, however, have been decreasing along with the progress of our Revelations As long as our Country is still in an Emergengy Situation, thone. ca sea a m4 imiediately settled without disregarding the principles of justice, IAS: been generally known, in order to try the cases the Supreme Authority: under Elke re cena situation has set up special courts, namely Military Court Under The’ ar Condition, - Since our country ide now baok to normal, reguletions pertaining to the oe above mentioned are:no longer valid, But fue to the fact that the cases still: constitute a grave danger to the Netion and the State, it is deemed necessary. ” so establish a special judicial body capable of investigating into and try thecases immediately, Normally, ths cases are closely related to the Government's policies in the fields of Security and Defence, Accor rdingly, the specizl Judicial body formed under tnis Decree should be within the military judicial sy stem.’ GE } (CLH BY AR? TICLE BLE CIDAS "ION » article 1 e and Article 2, Sel? explanatory. Article 3, number ox Judges should be in odd number, for examples three or five per ‘ Graduate OPficer is defined as an Officer who ‘has had a Bachelor Degree 7 av the winimu, and grahiated from the Gerepe Roly Gy cod ery operated 2s Government oi: approved by the Government. Sele explenatory. article 5 to Article 10. SUPPLEMENT TO THE STATE GAZETTR NO.2605 Copied from the original, PAUR RE PAD SETUSAD: signed FIRST LT. Now: 243654, === [PDF page 111] === cs pce a ee Ga ge ee Ith a ry ay ana VCOMmMonvweaith UTTICe Telephone 01- Your reference Our reference Date 2 ULC: POULIN COU === [PDF page 112] === Hig amnesty international e International Secretariat 53 Theobald’s Road ‘ Telephone: 01-404 5831 Telegrams: Amnesty London J. Chick, Esq, South West Pacific Department The Foreign and Commonwealth Office London, SW1 9th August, 1973 Dear Mr. Chick, I am grateful to you for sending the Hansard report (25th July) of Mr. Royle's comments on the Indonesian situation. The figure of 18,000 untried prisoners is new to us and I should be very interested to see any break-down you might have to explain how it has been reached. While we should like to accept a total of 18,000 untried prisoners, all our information suggests that this is far too small a figure. You will recall that in October, 1972, Kopkamtib gave a figure of 39,000 prisoners in 'A' and 'B! Categories, or possibly in 'B' Category alone. At no time has the Government claimed to have released detainees from either of these groups, so it is hard to see how their numbers can have fallen since October, despite the figures given by President Suharto in March. all wZ The whole question is prison statistics is e@thiney in some detail on page 13 of the Amnesty published report which I sent to you on the 27th of July. Yours sincerely, Meee Zoek Stepllanie Grant Deputy Head of Research Chairman of the International Executive: SEAN MACBRIDE, S.C. Secretary General: MaRTIN ENNALS PATRONS: The Archbishop of Canterbury, Great Britain - Roger Baldwin, President of the International League for the Rights of Man, U.S.A. Pablo Casals, Puerto Rico - Danilo Dolci, Sicily - Professor Erich Fromm, New York and Mexico - Lt.-Gen. Sir Brian Horrocks, Great Britain Jean-Flavien Lalive, Switzerland Professor Salvador de Madariaga, Spain - Yehudi Menuhin, Great Britain - Professor Gunnar Myrdal, Sweden Pablo Neruda, Chile - Alan Paton, South Africa - Dr. Martin Niemoller, Germany - Sean MacBride, S.C., Ireland - Professor Giorgio La Pira Italy - Professor Julius Stone, Australia: AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL HAS CONSULTATIVE STATUS WITH THE UNITED NATIONS (ECOSOC): UNESCO: THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE: THE ORGANISATION OF AMERICAN STATES: AND IS RECOGNISED BY THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY === [PDF page 113] === CONFIDENTIAL Foreign and Commonwealth Office London SW1 RECEIVED IN | REGISTRY No. 52 Telephone 01- J L Beaven Esq British Enbassy JAKARTA Date 9 August 1973 POLITICAL DETAINEES I attach copies of Mr Royle's letter to Mr Ivor Richards of 30 July and (1A) Ken Slatcher's letter of 2 August to Mrs Budiardjo. Also attached is a copy of a further letter dated 4 August from Mrs Budiardjo in which she questions some of the statements we have made to her. We should be grateful for your advice on what we might tell Mrs Budiardjo. J § Chick South West Pacific Department RE ASE ERE CL === [PDF page 114] === CYPHER CAT A RESTRICTED GRPS 161 FM JAKARTA 0769302 RESTRICTED Fw Dd Ve 7e ROUTING ore Ge Os TELNO, 619 OF J: AUGUSTE -73 Ney IEENO, 60@ 8 POLITICAL DETAINEES i. | SAW RM AT. THE «DFA YESTERDAY AND HE SAID HE WOULD ASK THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AT THE SECURITY COMMAND (KOPKAMTIB) ABOUT THE APPARENT DISCREPANCY SN THE FIGURES, HE TELEPHONED SUBSEQUENTLY TO STATE THAT THE FIGURES FOR A ) AND B GIVEN IN MY TEL. 575 WERE CORRECT BUT THE FIGURE FOR CATEGORY X SHOULD NOW READ 4267. THIS MAKES AN OVERALL TOTAL OF NEARLY TWENTY THOUSAND. ‘HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHERE HARRIS HAD GOT HIS FIGURE AND ADDED RATHER VAGUELY THAT CATEGORY X HAD INCREASED TO THE FIGURE ABOVE AS A RESULT OF FOLLOWING INTERROGATIONS. HOWEVER THIS MAY BE, tT THE FIGURES SHOULD BE TREATED WITH A CERTAIN DEGREE BUT | SUGGEST THAT IF. HARRIS PUBLISHES. THE FIGURES GIVEN TO HIM AND IF QUESTIONED, WE COULD STATE THAT THE FIGURE OF EIGHTEEN THOUSAND QUOTED IN PARLIAMENT WAS BASED ON STATISTICS GIVEN US BY THE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES, COMBS FILES Osis Ds PUSD UND IRD CONSULAR DEPT: GIPD NEWS DEPT; RESEARCH DEPT: Pee PS/MR ROYLE SER E NORRIS SIR G ARTHUR MR RCSE MR PARSONS Tike COU RESTRICTED === [PDF page 115] === Commonweal] have LOfaeceny whe accu have received, for I akarta was permit— Salemba Prison on 7th i not on Burrus ylans to send his could be ascerutheorities. «lt thax WOULG Uctover c 1 Fouch inform: you of to take upd === [PDF page 116] === RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 52 7 AUGIY TO ROUTINE F.C,0. TELNO. 610 OF 3 AUGUST {7 MY TELNO, 575 2 POLITICAL DETAINEES, 1, WE HAVE LEARNED FROM THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY THAT STEWART HARRIS, THE TIMES CORRESPONDENT JN AUSTRALIA WHO WAS HERE RECENTLY, WAS Alea ON THE INSTRUCTIONS OF PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, THE FOLLOWING FIGURES FOR POLITICAL DETAINEES AS AT 36 JUNE 19733- CATEGORY A 2,457 CATEGORY B 26,659 CATEGORY xX 7 tie 2e WE ASSUME THESE FIGURE ARE LIKELY TO BE SENT BY HARRIS TO THE TIMES FOR PUBLICATION, THEY PURPORT TO COME FROM THE SAME ULTIMATE SOURCE AS THOSE IN MYTEL. UNDER REFERENCE,! AM. SEEING [J ON MORNING OF 6 AUGUST FOR CLARIFICATION, COMBS Foal lees SWPD PS/MR ROYLE PUSD SIR E NORRIS UND SiR G ARTHUR | RD MR ROSE CONSULAR-—D MR PARSONS RESO» MR SCOTT CAPD News D Vey RESTRICTED === [PDF page 117] === CYPHER: GAT Reo PR Cine) FM JAKARTA 4363302 RESTRICTED TO ROUTINE F 50,0, TELNO, 619 OF 3 AUGUST 73 575_: POLITICAL DETAINEES, R. 1; WE HAVE LEARNED FROM THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY THA HARRIS, THE TIMES CORRESPONDENT JN AUSTRALIA WHO WAS HERE RECENTLY, WAS GIVEN, ON THE INSTRUCTIONS OF PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, THE FOLLOWING FIGURES FOR POLITICAL DETAINEES AS AT 38 JUNE 19738- CATEGORY A 2,457 CATEGORY B 26,659 CATEGORY X07, 114 2a WE ASSUME THESE FIGURE ARE LIKELY TO BE SENT BY HARRIS TO THE TIMES FOR PUBLICATION, THEY PURPORT TO COME FROM THE SAME ULTIMATE SOURCE AS THOSE IN MYTEL. UNDER REFERENCE, [| AM SEEING RR ON MORNING OF 6 AUGUST FOR CLARIFICATION, COMBS Fea tees SWPD PS/MR ROYLE PUSD: SiR EB NORRIS UND a Sis G ART AUR | RD MR ROSE ONSULAR-D MR PARSONS RES.» i MR SCOTT CAPD News Dd. gee RESTRICTED === [PDF page 118] === C16, 904 Z Lelt vz L/O€ NOW Osa Na ZS ON AULSIOIY NI G3A1038 ea ae *SS59YVHO SHL [Unreadable] JO SLNAW31S YSHLO HLIM YSHLSE5OL fOLYVdNS HVTINagyY ‘S96L NI LVHL GIVS SS35YVHO SIH NI LVdWON YOLNOASOYd OINGAd *AVGOL VLUVAVe NI GaN3ad0 *3SLLIWWOO TWYLNAD CIMd> ALYVd LSINAWWOO NVISSNOGNI 3HL JO Nvawng WlOsdS SHL JO AYVLEYOSS YAWHOS fOLYVdNS HVTINGgV YsaVvat LSINOWWOO SO LYNOO VLYVAVE TVYLNSO SHL AG WIL SHL COTGVY VLYVAVE) vLuvave | / NO ¥sqv3a71 LSINAWWOO 2 O7mvaekp (LUVAVE NI Wiel YsqvaT LSINn - === [PDF page 119] === UrU.YL 1k KING CHARLES STREET SOUTH WEST PaciFic DEPARTMENT === [PDF page 120] === : t ee lonvveaitn UrtTice London SW1 RECEIVED IN Telephone 01- 940-8 PGISTRY N 52 ply to your mn of. your fathe can assure you should feel s === [PDF page 121] === ndon SW1 2QRECEIVED IN REG === [PDF page 122] === Foreign and Commonwealth Offi Telephone01aly In writing of course, subject omitted. Je Paei fa: === [PDF page 123] === Foreign and Commonwealth Office Telephone 01- 930-8440 ext 758 ‘ Jie - RECEIVED IN Your reference wes arme UALALrAJO R 35 Lawns Court REGISTRY No, 52 Our reference FWD Le) The Avenue / AUG 1973 Wembley Park Date 2 August 1973 Middlesex Mr Royle has asked me to reply to_your two letters of 27 June about your husbani' i) detention in Indonesia and to let you know what we have been able to do to meet your various requests. I am very sorry that the news of your husband's classification as an "A" class detainee should have first come to you as a result of Mr Royle's letter to Mr Ivor Richard MP. We had assumed that this was known to youe The Indonesj.an authorities confirmed the classification to us shortly before Mr Royle wrote to Mr Richard on 15 June. In mid-July, they informed us that your husband had bee re-classified, that he was a Class "B" detainee and was held in detention on thr island of Buru. I hope that this relieves you of some of your anxiety. Your husband's detention as a Class "'B" detainee means, as you know, that the Indonesian authorities, whilst regarding him as having been directly involved i the events of September 1965, do not have legal evidence on which to prosecute ‘ii the Courts. Your questions concerning the nature of their evidence and the ‘jaw under which they would charge him were, of course, framed on the understanding i) he was an "A"! class detainee. The Indonesian authorities have assured us that letters which you address to yc) husband and send by way of the Indonesian Red Cross will be delivered. They ax unable to guarantee a reply. They have also told us that lawyers may have access to prisoners during their detention and that no objection is seen at present to your retaining the servici:< of the lawyer who has acted for you hitherto. We do not think we can, in th» circumstances, ask them to agree to a British lawyer acting for your husband. I am afraid that we cannot pass on the attached papers to Mr Yap Thiam Hien. J) do that would put us in breach of international agreements which restrict the wi: of diplomatic bags to official papers. W K Slatcher South West Pacific Department === [PDF page 124] === CONFIDENT TIAL BRITISH EMBASSY JAKARTA Sh ouly 1975 Chick Es DETAINEES as Please refer to your letter FWD 16/1 of 20 July. We have been informed through our usual contact that Soewondo Budiardjo has now been classified as ai A' prisener and is back in the Jakarta region. He i to have confessed that he became a member of the PKI in 195 After the [Vth Goneregs: of the in.1960 he was app¢ - sd to be. Head of the Foreign Department the Central Commi for Economic Affairs. As a tLormer Central Committee memk of the PRI he.ts stated to: have deen adbrectly anvoived in The 1965 coup. We were oe in addition that he will be brought to trial in. the near futur We have not been told that this information may not be on but we would rather you did not do so for the time unless you.are under strong pressure. In that case, could please consult us by telegram, By the next bag we hope te you have some reflections on the position of detainees here the role of Amnesty International as seen from here in” the light of articles published by them, about.them or in.their name; We hope that this may be helpful in talking to reliable contacts who are legitimately concerned about the detainee problem. ihe note we send will cover in more detail what we learnt from the German Embassy (para 3 of our tel No 563) and will include some information given to the Ambassador during his recent visit to Medan by a person who has done a certain amount of visiting of pelitical detainees, Laret/ Beaven CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 125] === RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 52 oe 7 AUG 1973 Foreign and Commonwealth Office London S.W.1 oU July, lors From the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State Cy In my letter of 15 June I told you that according t our information Mr. Budiardjo was an "A" class detainee. In mid-July the Indonesians told us that Mr. Budiir Classification had been changed and that he had apain & "B" class detainee. We have written to Mrs. Buciard, telling her this. Anthony Royle ivor Kickerd, tisg., @.0.,: MiP... louse of Commons, London, DeWalt. === [PDF page 126] === CONFIDENTIAL 17 ‘ NORRTS PS TO yh Rov Copi Consuls M&VD INTARDTO JA LED iformation about the detention of Mr Suwondo |] Lay an I lan citize1 We have to consider what should be Mr Royle's lette of 15 June to Mr Ivor Richard, MP, Mrs wrote two let; to Mr Rovle 2/7 June expressing great shock "A" class detainee in Indonesia. (2,000) includes those whom the Indonesians believe to have been : anol directly involved in the 1965 attempted coup/ag: inst think that they have evidence to sustain prosecution in the courts. However, at the present rat of trials (approximately 200 a year) some of those who have already spent eight years in detention are likely to end their days without being brought to trial. tte Mrs Budiardjo sought our assistance a number of points concerning her husband's detention. A. To ascertain nature of the evidence against her husband which warrants the "A'' classification; to ascertain which laws he is deemed to have violated; CONFIDENTIA === [PDF page 127] === Io seek agreemen Indonesian authorities to defence of r (Mr Yap Thiam Hien) - to whom >parately asked us to pass papers; t to British law correspondence between herself After obtaining the »>f the ssy, Jakarta, on her requests, we instructed s Budiardjo. Inter alia been re-classified as a "'B'' class detainee, lieve to have been directly involved in the ate evidence for a Budiardjo and Mr Ivor be what more difficult in future for an Indonesian citizen, we have Mr Richard that we made the trouble us for a long while to come. be 50 jeopardy our ability to fall back on in the matter. ful about what we say to Mrs Budiardjo. k occasions for publicly challenging It could be dangerous to pass on about evidence against detainees (D of little to public knowledge ne serve > Mrs 1 ardjo to return with a request for more ENTIAL === [PDF page 128] === on the lines recommend should === [PDF page 129] === amnesty international @ International Secretariat 53 Theobald’s Road RECEIVED IN " Telephone: 01-404 5831 Telegrams: Amnesty London The Indonesian Desk 27th duly, 191/73 The Foreign Office Whitehall London, SW1 For the attention of Mr. Chick Dear Mr. Chick, At your request, I enclose material describing Amnesty and its work which you or the British Embassy in Jakarta can use in any discussion with the Indonesian Government. I am delighted that the question of political imprisonment is now being raised and very much hope that some progress can be made on this very urgent problem. Most of this material needs no explanation. I would draw your attention especially to the Statute, the legal basis for all the organisation's work, which instructs it to maintain ‘at all times...an overall balance between its activities in relation to countries adhering to different world political ideologies and groupings' (2a). You may find it useful to point out that although Amnesty has 32 national sections, none is in a communist block country; this is something for which we are often criticised, but which will no doubt go down well in Jakarta. The Chronicle of Current Events, which we discussed briefly on the telephone is prepared ia Samigdat form in the Soviet Union and published by us in English translation; you will see that it is a precise and factual record of arrests and political persecution in the USSR. I have also enclosed copies of two recent press statements dealing with events in Czechoslovakia and in the USSR. The Indonesian suspicion of Amnesty as a politically-partisan, and left wing, organisation, has been expressed on many occasions since 1965; it is rarely remembered that the organisation's first Indonesian cases were those of Sutan Sjahwir and Mahtar Lubis, both prisoners of conscience in the early 1960's during President Sukarno's time. Partly, I think, this suspicion stems from a genuine difficulty in distinguishing between humanitarian concerns and political support, and partly it is a convenient way of discrediting unwelcome criticism. An attempt to answer these criticisms is made on page 31 of the enclosed Report on Indonesia, which also quotes an attack on Amnesty in May 1972 by the Army paper, Angkatan Bersenjata, and compares it with a similar attack by Izvestia from an opposing political standpoint. However, in the last few months, we have tried to make Amnesty's work more generally understood in Indonesia, and Chairman of the International Executive: SEAN MACBRIDE, S.C. Secretary General: MARTIN ENNALS PATRONS: The Archbishop of Canterbury, Great Britain - Roger Baldwin, President of the International League for the Rights of Man, U.S.A Pablo Casals, Puerto Rico - Danilo Dolci, Sicily - Professor Erich Fromm, New York and Mexico - Lt.-Gen. Sir Brian Horrocks, Great Britain Jean-Flavien Lalive, Switzerland Professor Salvador de Madariaga, Spain - Yehudi Menuhin, Great Britain - Professor Gunnar Myrdal, Sweden Pablo Neruda, Chile - Alan Paton, South Africa - Dr. Martin Niemdller, Germany - Sean MacBride, S.C., Ireland - Professor Giorgio La Pira Italy - Professor Julius Stone, Australia: AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL HAS CONSULTATIVE STATUS WITH THE UNITED NATIONS (ECOSOC): UNESCO: THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE: THE ORGANISATION OF AMERICAN STATES: AND IS RECOGNISED BY THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY === [PDF page 130] === q will find among these papers an English translation of an article in the Indonesian weekly Tempo,explaining the distinction between the Amnesty membership in Western Europe, and the activities of various Indonesian political and exile groups. Wherever possible, we also point out to the Indonesians that the number of prisoners adopted by Amnesty in Indonesia - 150 - is less than half those taken up in the Soviet Union where we have 350 cases. Your Embassy may also find it useful in any discussions to refer to General Sumitro's statement, quoted in an interview in the Dutch newspaper Trouw, * in which he spoke about his Government's political detention policy and said of it: "from a juridical standpoint we are weak, and from a humanitarian standpoint we are even weaker". He went on to speak of the release of 'B' Category prisoners making specific reference to those on Buru Island. This, to my knowledge is an unprecedented statement by a senior military official, let alone General Sumitro himself, and indicates a completely new approach to the problem. However, it is no’ clear whether it was an off-the-cuff remark, or intended as a formal statement of intent. I hope this letter and material will provide you with the information you need; should you want more information about the Indonesian situation or about Amnesty itself, I should be delighted to provide it. Yours sincerely, Stephanie Grant Deputy Head of Research *. 23 June 19/3 === [PDF page 131] === [Cover/decorative page: magazine cover "INDONESIA SPECIAL" with a black-and-white photograph of a man's face behind bars; small line of text along the foot not legible] === [PDF page 132] === ETS international The. objectives of Amnesty International are defined in its statutes in the following manner: “Considering that every person has the right to hold and to express his convictions and the obligation to extend a like freedom to others, the objects of Amnesty International shall be to secure throughout the world the observance of the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, by: (a) irrespective of political consideration working towards the release of and providing assistance to persons who, in violation of the aforesaid provisions are imprisoned, detained, restricted or otherwise subjected to physical coercion or restriction by reason of their political, religious or other conscientiously held beliefs or by reason of their ethnic origing, colour or language provided that they have not used or advocated violence. (hereinafter referred to as ‘Prisoners of Conscience’). (b) opposing by all appropriate means the imposition and execution of death penalties and torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading penalties or treatment of prisoners and others detained or restricted in violation of the above provisions.” AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL is an independent organisation and has consultative status with the United Nations, Unesco and the Council of Europe. It endeavours particularly for the implementation of the provisions of Articles 5, 9, 18 and 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS Article 5 No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Article9 No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile. Article 18 Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, (CoH ae eMC elim Mal TMi Le (213 freedom to change his religion or belief, and bier mm TS AU TL others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practise, worship and observance. - Article 19 Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, eR OM) se Mee CCl mel Sm Uc te any media and regardless of frontiers. 1. Foreword by Sean MacBride,S.C. 2. Introduction by Dr. Herman ee eens B he van Geuns 10. The island of Buru 3. The roots of the problem ORR SET ceiloi ie 4. Who are the prisoners ime (cuts oye me:terye) 5. Detainees in Indonesia - a PAB SSO (Eile col) (arth) EA eR al 13. Indonesian attitudes 6. Numbers! Numbers! Numbers! 14. The prisoners speak Pe Sle sheep til ta 15. Memorandum 8. The geography of imprisonment 16. What can Amnesty do? wordt e Two-monthly periodical of Amnesty International in Holland and Belgium. Secretariat of the Dutch Section: Amnesty International Roetersstraat 34 - 36 Amsterdam/Holland Phone: 020 - 22 46 74 Giro: 48.92.37 Secretariat of the Belgian Section: Amnesty International Gulden Vlieslaan 1 1060 Brussels Bank: M.Wesseling, rubr. A1 Kredietbank Tervuren International Secretariat Amnesty International 53 Theobald’s Road Chairman of the International Executive Committee: Sean MacBride, S.C. Secretary General: Martin Ennals This Indonesia Special is published by the Dutch Section of Amnesty International in agreement with the International Secretariat. We wish to express our warm gratitude to all persons who spent so much of their time and energy writing and compiling this Indonesia Issue as published by the Dutch Section of Amnesty International The Editors An unknown political prisoner in Indonesia. foreword by sean macbride sc This publication presents the situation of more than 55,000 untried political prisoners in Indonesia and describes the plight of their children, wives and families. It makes clear the extent to which the rule of law has been abrogated by the Indonesian Government in its treatment of these men and women, most of whom have now been in prison, invariably in bad conditions, for more than seven years. During my own visit to Indonesia in 1970, I was able to verify not only the existence of this vast number of prisoners, but also the fact that it is Government policy to detain indefinitely many thousands of prisoners, while admitting publicly that it has no evidence against them of any criminal activity. These are prisoners of conscience and until all are free, Amnesty International will persist in its efforts to secure for them full human rights as laid down by international convention and agreement. 1973 is the 25th Anniversary of the Declaration of Human Rights; as a member of the United Nations, Indonesia has a moral obligation to recognise the principles contained in the Declaration. Amnesty urges the Indonesian Government to announce during the year a general amnesty for all untried political prisoners. KATA PENDAHULUAN OLEH SEAN MACBRIDE, S.C. KETUA AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL Penerbitan ini menunjukkan keadaan para tahanan politik Indonesia yang jumlahnya lebih daripada 55.000 orang yang tak pernah dituntut atau diadili serta melukiskan pula nasib anak-isteri dan sanak-saudara mereka itu. Menjadi jelas betapa jauh sudah "rule of law”, kekuasaan hukum ditiadakan oleh pemerintah Indonesia dalam cara memperlakukan para tahanan pria dan wanita itu yang jumlah terbesar rata-rata sudah meringkuk dalam penjara selama lebih dari tujuh tahun dan hidup dalam keadaan sengsara. Sewaktu dalam tahun 1970 saya mengunjungi Indonesia dapat saya menyaksikan sendiri kenyataan adanya jumlah tahanan yang demikian banyaknya serta juga fakta bahwa memang adalah politik resmi pemerintah untuk menangkap berriburibu tahanan untuk waktu tak tertentu. Pemerintah sendiri pula bahkan mengakui dengan resmi bahwa tidak ada bukti apapun yang terdapat bahwa mereka telah melakukan kejahatan yang dapat dituntut didepan pengadilan. Mereka jelas sejelas-jelasnya adalah ’’prisoners of conscience”’ yaitu ditahan karena keinsyafan batin dan pikiran yang merupakan hak azasi mereka. Selama mereka belum bebas semua, maka Amnesty akan tetap berusaha keras agar bagi mereka dilaksanakan jaminan hak-hak azasi manusia sepenuhnya sebagaimana tertera dalam konvensi dan perjanjian internasional., Tahun 1973 merupakan Tahun ke-25 Pernyataan Hak-hak Manusia. Sebagai anggauta Perserikatan Bangsa-bangsa Indonesia mempunyai kewajiban moril untuk mengakui azas-azas yang terkandung dalam Pernyataan tersebut. Amnesty mendesak peme rintah Indonesia agar dalam tahun ini mengumumkan penampunan umum bagi semua tahanan politik yang belum diadili itu. VOORWOORD DOOR SEAN MACBRIDE, S.C., VOORZITTER VAN AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL Deze publikatie behandelt de toestand van meer dan 55.000 niet-berechte politieke gevangenen in Indonesié en beschrijft het lot van hun kinderen, vrouwen en familieleden. Het maakt duidelijk in welke mate de Indonesische regering de rechtsregels overtreedt met betrekking tot deze mannen en vrouwen, van wie de meesten, over het algemeen onder slechte omstandigheden, al meer dan zeven jaar gevangen zitten. Tijdens mijn bezoek aan Indonesié in 1970 kon ik uit eigen waarneming vaststellen dat het hier inderdaad om zo’n groot aantal gevangenen gaat. Ook stelde ik vast dat de regering een politiek voert die er op is gebaseerd duizenden gevangenen voor onbepaalde tijd te interneren, terwijl openlijk wordt toegegeven dat er ten aanzien van deze mensen geen bewijzen bestaan van enig gepleegd misdrijf. Zij zijn ’gevangenen van hun geweten’’. Totdat allen zijn vrijgelaten zal Amnesty International haar pogingen voortzetten om de gevangenen hun volledige mensenrechten terug te geven, zoals deze zijn vastgelegd in internationale conventies en overeenkomsten. In 1973 is het 25 jaar geleden dat de Declaratie voor de Rechten van de Mens werd getekend; als lid van de Verenigde Naties heeft Indonesié de morele plicht de beginselen van die Declaratie te erkennen. Amnesty dringt er bij de Indonesische regering op aan in dit jaar een algemene amnestie af te kondigen voor alle onberechte politieke gevangenen. Sean MacBride, S.C., Chairman of the International Executive Committee of Amnesty International === [PDF page 133] === introduction ° by dr. h.a.van geuns The Indonesian explanation is that the judicial system is under-staffed, and an inadequate administrative machine renders massive adjudication impossible. The majority of prisoners cannot therefore be tried, but are instead screened by military intelligence teams whose brief is security not justice. Amnesty has continually pointed out that such a manner of treatment is in total contradiction to the principles laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, accepted by the present Indonesian Government not sentenced, they cannot defend them- when it rejoined the United Nations in selves nor answer the prosecution case 1966. It is all too easy to imagine how since no case has ever been brought. They many people were taken prisoner on have simply been arrested, and in this insufficient legal grounds in the atmototal loss of civil and legal rights they are sphere of mistrust and mutual suspicion Amnesty’s aim is to help political prisoners and prisoners of conscience; we are not concerned with national politics, nor do we pass judgment on the beliefs of those in prison. Amnesty’s interest in Indonesia began in 1961, long before the tragic events of 1965. Then, as now, it was motivated by a concern with the principles of human rights, had no partisan political interest, and worked for the release of individual prisoners of conscience, at that time critics of the Sukarno Government. Today its work is focused on more than 55,000 untried prisoners, detained as suspected communists after the attempted coup of September 1965. AMNESTY MISSIONS Since 1965 two Amnesty missions have visited Indonesia - in July 1969 and in October 1970. The first delegate was Professor Julius Stone, a distinguished international lawyer from Australia, and typical of their tens of thousands of fellow which succeeded the defeat of the 1965 Untung coup. the second, Sean MacBride,was then prisoners. Secretary-General of the International Commission of Jurists, and - as now - Chairman of Amnesty. Through these missions, as well as through less formal contacts, we have collected a mass of factual material on political imprisonment. The Indonesian Government deserves credit for the facilities made available to the delegates and for the unusual frankness with which it discussed its policies, and admitted the magnitude of the problem. Amnesty works for the release of prisoners of conscience in 60 countries; few Governments face graver problems of political imprisonment than Indonesia, and none has so systematically departed from the rule of law in its treatment of untried detainees. NOT SENTENCED Who are the prisoners? Officially all are described as committed marxists and prominent members of the communist movement. But, to an outsider, a striking feature is the number of those in prison who are not political prisoners in the accepted sense of the term, but are rather prisoners of accident or victims of circumstance, arrested by mistake or military inefficiency, and subsequently unable to challenge their detention. In the pages that follow several case studies are given; two are of prisoners taken into custody at the respective ages of 11 and 13 and now, seven years later, still in prison. These are extreme examples, but in one sense both are typical: they have no lawyer, habeas corpus is void; though Prisoners in Buru island returning to their quarters after a day’s work in the field. This publication has been written with a simple aim: it seeks to make known the situation of tens of thousands of political prisoners held in a single country, to show the conditions within the prisons, the circumstances of the families and the problems which people must face even after release. The Indonesian Government rests its policies on the national philosophy - the pantja sila - which emphasises the prime importance of social justice (keadilan sosial); until the Government looks again at the political detainees it must inevitably deny social justice to a large group of Indonesian citizens. Dr. Herman van Geuns,Member of the International Executive Committee of Amnesty International and until recently Chairman of the Dutch section. the roots of the problem political imprisonment A major problem haunting Indonesia today is that of the political prisoners. The speeches of President Suharto and his Government make frequent reference to it while, at a deeper level, its importance is reflected in the fact that since 1965, a new word has been added to the language - Tapol - (tahanan politik: political prisoner). In the first years after Independence, Indonesia was virtually free from political imprisonment. Then, in the late nineteen fifties, after regional rebellions had taken place in several parts of the Republic, several thousand political arrests were made; by the early 1960’s, most were released under a general amnesty and fully rehabilitated. Some few political leaders remained in prison and were joined by occasional journalists and critics of the Sukarno Government. During the nineteen sixties, Indonesian politics underwent an increasing polarisation between left and right; in October 1965, this came to a head with the defeat of a left-wing coup attempt by the army, the gradual replacement of Sukarno’s Cabinet by a military administration and the onset of a massive and violent anticommunist purge in which more than three hundred thousand died and two hundred and fifty thousand were arrestec The tapol problem has now become a permanent feature of Indonesian society. THE SUKARNO ERA Its roots date back to several years before September 1965, when martial law was promulgated in 1957 and Guided Democracy was introduced in 1959 by President Sukarno. To the outside world this period is associated with Sukarno’s flamboyant character and with his spectacular foreign policy of struggle for the re-incorporation of West Irian into the Republic, confrontation with the newly-established Malaysia, withdrawal from the United Nations and close alliance with Peking. Internally, however, the Army succeeded in expanding its powers, not only militarily but also in political and economic affairs. After the promulgation of martial law in 1957, many army officers became government administrators and in some places ruled like ’warlords’ who were almost unassailable by the central Government. With the nationalisation of Dutch enterprises in 1958, many sectors of the economy were placed under army control. There was only one serious contender for power rivalling the Army leadership during this period: the Communist Party (PKI) which claimed a rapidly expanding membership, reaching more than three million in 1965. In addition, mass organisations under communist leadership had a combined membership of well over ten million. At the Centre, the Army and the PKI worked in a shaky alliance with President Sukarno, but bitter conflicts arose between the two forces in the regions. In some places, Party committees were outlawed and their leaders placed in detention. But time and again, the President, who used the PKI as a counterweight to the growing power of the Army, protected the party and countermanded Army decisions. PKI attacks on military management of the economy were stepped up and antagonisms grew as the pro-Chinese stand of the PKI became more apparent. Tensions sharpened during 1964 and 1965 when the PKI openly supported unilateral actions by peasants to expropriate landowners in an attempt to enforce implementation of the Land Reform Law. Things reached breaking point when the PKI advocated the creation of a Fifth Force’ of armed peasants and workers to fight Malaysia side by side with the Army, the Air Force, the Navy and the Police Force. But before this Indonesian political prisoner in West Kalimantan. 5 === [PDF page 134] === could be implemented, the abortive coup of 30 September erupted, bringing an end to the Sukarno-Army-PKI alliance. THE 30 SEPTEMBER EVENTS This coup, led by Lieut.-Col. Untung a senior officer in the President’s Palace Guards, and other middle-ranking officers, was aimed at the leadership of the Army. Six top-ranking generals were kidnapped and assassinated at the Halim airfield just outside Jakarta. The coup leaders occupied several important buildings in the capital where they had the support of Central Java battalions stationed temporarily in the capital. At the time, members of some of the pro-PKI mass organisations were being trained for confrontation with Malaysia at the Halim Airfield training ground, Lubang Buaya. The coup leaders had brought the PKI chairman, Aidit, to their base at Halim, together with other political leaders, asserting that this was for their personal safety. Furthermore, the PKI daily, Harian Rakjat published an editorial in its issue on 2nd October, just before it was banned, expressing the Party’s official view that the Untung coup was ’’an internal affair of the Army”. The Army leadership advanced a very different interpretation: they saw Untung as the chosen instrument of the PKI and the coup as a first step towards a communist government. Under General Suharto, the army moved rapidly to crush the coup attempt, claiming that the entire communist and left-wing movement had been implicated in it. Army raids and mass assaults were launched on communist party and leftwing mass organisation offices which retaliated only in isolated areas, and mass arrests of their leaders were soon under way. During the course of 1966, some of those who had been arrested were investigation into the massacres, was forced to sign over his powers - though not yet his position - to General Suharto. A day after the order was signed, thirteen of Sukarno’s Cabinet Ministers were placed under arrest and a new cabinet was formed. More arrests followed and this time the net was extended to cover *pro-Sukarno elements” both in the civil and military apparatus. DEATH SENTENCES During the first months of 1966 a communist leader, Njoto, was brought for trial and accused among other things of having organised the recruitment of members of pro-PKI mass organisations to support the coup at Halim. He denied the charges but was found guilty and sentenced to death. Later that year, other trials took place, notably that of Dr. Subandrio who had been President Sukarno’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. He, too, was sentenced to death. Meanwhile, the PKI and all its mass organisations had been declared illegal and those of its leaders who had escaped arrest went underground. During the last months of 1966 and the first months of 1967, a new wave of arrests was launched against PKI members who were working to revive the party. When the underground movement in Jakarta was effectively crushed, efforts were made to create a PKI base in Blitar, East Java. This, too, was suppressed, and in 1968 there followed yet another wave of arrests. Whilst some of those arrested during the succeeding waves of arrests are alleged to have been involved in illegal activities a large number were detained simply because of their past membership of, or association with, the PKI or its mass organisations at a time when these organisations were still legal. Today, seven years after the establishment of President Suharto’s New Order, the arrest of political suspects remains a continuing feature of the Indonesian scene. Even now, after years of consolidation and after general elections in July 1971 have provided it with powerful Parliamentary support, the Indonesian Government still sees those in detention as a serious threat to its stability. Their number remains in excess of 50,000. Up to the end of 1972, only about three hundred political prisoners had been brought to court; the vast majority has never been tried and the governments has itself admitted that it has no intention of trying them. released but the numbers under detention still remained very high. In March 1966, President Sukarno who had tried in earlier speeches to stem the tide of persecution and who had instituted an While the problem of the tapols still remains unsolved, it is scarcely possible to accept the claims of the New Order that it upholds the principles of democracy, humanitarianism and justice. indonesian attitudes ”Hartono, my husband’s secretary, why should he have been detained up to six years. He is a minor figure. He is not a political figure. That’s unfair.” Mrs. Subandrio, the wife of the former Foreign Minister (sentenced to death) in an interview with the (now closed) Indonesian newspaper Proklamasi, April 1972. Basuki Effendi, film director and former member of the left-wing cultural organisation LEKRA, now detained in Buru. ”For the Indonesian nation we should truly feel ashamed that corrections have been made by foreigners who came to our country as visitors and all the more so if we are incapable of producing correct arguments to reject their opinions.... The question of political prisoners in Indonesia is an internal affair, but since it is a question that concerns basic rights and human dignity which are universal in nature, the government should not regard it lightly. ... Why has Amnesty International Committee come to Indonesia twice? Certainly because the world still considers that basic rights are not being upheld in Indonesia and that human dignity is not being properly respected.”’ Taken from an editorial published in Dwi Warna, on 8th November 1970, commenting on the visit to Indonesia of Amnesty International Chairman, Sean MacBride. ‘who are the prisoners Directly or indirectly involved in the 30th September Movement - this is the charge levelled against tens of thousands of political prisoners, the overwhelming majority of whom cannot and will not be tried. What is the official definition of this vaguely-worded phrase? A presidential instruction, No. 09/KOGAM/1966, signed on President Sukarno’s behalf by General Suharto and issued in May 1966, defines three levels of ’involvement’: ” Clearly involved directly in the 30th September Movement* those who: 1. planned, helped to plan or knew about the plan for this counterrevolutionary movement but did not report to the competent authorities; 2. being conscious of its objectives, undertook activities in the implementation of this counter-revolutionary movement. Clearly involved indirectly in the 30th September Movement: those who, after knowing of this counter-revolutionary movement: 1. displayed an attitude, whether in deed or words, of approval for this counter-revolutionary movement; 2. consciously displayed an attitude, whether in deed or words, of opposing endeavours/movements for the suppression of the 30th September movement. There are indications of, or it can reasonably be thought that there was, direct or indirect involvement in the 30th September movement: those who: 1. were members of the former, outlawed PKI or of the executives of mass organisations of like ideology/under the aegis of/under the protection of the said former party PKI, together with their activists; 2. were ordinary members of former, outlawed mass organisations of like ideology/ under the aegis of/ under the protection of/ the former party PKI, and those who, according to existing antecedents, were involved in the ’Madiun Affair’ ** who, after the occurrence of the said counter-revolutionary movement, did not categorically oppose it in accordance with reasonable conditions and abilities.” * The movement responsible for the coup called itself the 30th September movement which soon came to be abbreviated in Indonesia to G.30.S. But the coup attempt was postponed for one day and occurred on Ist October, 1965. This explains the discrepancy between the movement’s name, always used in charges made by the authorities, and references to the day of the coup. ** This incident occurred in September, 1948; it was a major clash between the PKI and the Army. OUTLAWED MASS ORGANISATIONS And what of the ’mass organisations of like ideology’ referred to above? These were listed in a Presidential Decision, No. 85/KOGAM/1966, issued in May 1966 and signed on President Sukarno’s behalf by General Suharto. In addition to all the committees of the PKI, from the * Central Committee down to the village resort committees, the list covers twenty-six mass organisations and twenty-three educational institutions; it includes in the case of the Trade Union Federation SOBSI, a sub-list of 62 trade unions, and in the case of BAPERKI, a Chinese organisation, a sub-list of two mass organisations and the BAPERKI-run Res Publica University. Immediately prior to September 1965, the combined membership of these organisations was estimated at about 15 million. Allowing for double counts in cases of persons belonging to more than one organisation and excluding those virtually non-active, the effective strength would probably have been about half this number. However, for purposes of screening and arrest, the deciding factor was nominal rather than active membership. It is therefore no exaggeration to say that the measures taken by the government and the Army in the form of arrests, dishonourable dismissals and general ineligibility to obtain employment or education has, in some way, affected well over seven and a half million people. The mass arrests that took place and still continue are thus broadly directed against communists and marxists, and their followers or supporters. In addition, a large number of people, especially members of the Armed Forces, have been arrested for being *’Sukarno-ists”’, as the New Order has been at great pains to condemn policies followed by President Sukarno in the period before September 1965. DIFFERENT CATEGORIES Prisoners are classified into three main categories: the ’A’ group, against whom there is enough evidence, in the government’s view, to warrant their being charged and brought to trial; the ’B’ group, firmly believed by the government to have been PKI leaders or activists and therefore ’traitors’ but against whom no charges can be laid because of lack of evidence, and who are to be detained indefinitely without trial; and the ’C’ group, composed of followers of the PKI and who, according to the government, are scheduled for release. In addition, there is an ’X’ 7 === [PDF page 135] === category, consisting of those who have not yet been classified as ’A’, ’B’ or °C’ or whose former classification is up for reconsideration; there is yet another category, ’F’, whose precise definition has not been clarified. PRISONERS OF CIRCUMSTANCE Thus, the prisons and detention camps are filled not only with communists but also with leaders and rank-andfile members of the host of mass organisations connected in some way with, or generally giving support to, the communist party. Many such people have been arrested merely because they had left their houses during the massacres that swept the country during the last months of 1965. Added to these, there are numerous prisoners who were arrested merely because of extremely tenuous or purely social relationships with persons who were known as, or thought to be, communists. A dispute between neighbours or a scheme to oust someone from position or home can now easily be resolved simply by one of the parties denouncing the other to the local military unit. There are also persons arrested merely because they happened to be in a particular house when someone there was arrested, or persons who insisted on accompanying a spouse or relative just arrested, simply to know where they were being taken, only to discover that they too were placed under arrest. Where detention is made on the responsibility of a local commander, where all legal formalities such as arrest warrants have been totally dispensed with, and where decisions about a detainee’s future and his classification are taken by intelligence or interrogation officers, it is easy to understand how so many people who have little or no political connections now find themselves under detention as political prisoners, in many cases for years, deprived as they are, of any legal means to challenge their detention. One extraordinary case is that of the youngest prisoner known to us on Buru island. When he was eleven, his father and mother were both arrested. Too young to survive alone, he accompanied his mother to prison. She died some time later and the boy was taken to the father in detention at Nusakambangan, the prison island in Central Java. The father was scheduled for transfer to Buru, but died before this happened. Nevertheless, the boy was sent to Buru camp, where he is now held as a ’B’ prisoner, the category reserved for committed marxists and traitors’. five of the a do To give the reader some idea of the extremely varied composition of Indonesia's political prisoners, we are describing the cases of five prisoners, all adopted by Amnesty groups. The spectrum goes from a well-known communist member of Parliament to a girl who knew virtually nothing about political affairs when at 13 years old, she was thrown into prison. sitor situmorang Age: 51 years Occupation: Writer and Poet Date of Arrest: 1967 Charge: None Trial: None Place of detention: Salemba Prison, Jakarta. Sitor was born of Christian parents, in Tapanuli, North Sumatra. After completing his education at Dutch schools before the Japanese occupation (1942), he became a reporter. After the establishment of the Republic, he worked in Yogyakarta, Central Java, where he was imprisoned at the time of the second Dutch action against the Republic. He first came to prominence in Indonesian literary circles in 1949 with a work defending the life and attitudes of the recently deceased poet, Chairil Anwar. From 1950 to 1953, he was in Europe and he spent one year working as Cultural Attaché at the Indonesian Embassy in Paris. Back in Indonesia, he established himself as a prolific writer. In 1956, he published a collection of plays and a collection of short stories; a number of his works have been translated into English. In 1959, he became founding Chairman of the National Cultural Institute the cultural organisation of the Indonesian National Party (PNI). This worked in collaboration, on certain issues, with similar organisations of the Nasakom* forum, which brought him into contact with members of the left-wing cultural organisation, LEKRA. He was the head of the Indonesian delegation to the Asian-African Writers Conference in Cairo in 1963, and visited China after the conference. Following this visit, he published a volume of social-realist verse entitled *Zaman Baru’ or ’New Era’. He also published two collections of talks on literature from a socialist perspective. By this time, his ideas had shifted considerably from his former defence of the ’art for art’s sake’ idea. He also became a Member of Parliament, representing artists. After the 1965 coup, he retained his links with the PNI though a widespread purge was carried out, both in the party and in its mass organisations, against all those considered to have been active supporters of the idea of Nasakom unity, or among the radical leadership. But neither his Institute nor his works were actually banned as had happened with LEKRA and its members. He was arrested in 1967; the authorities claimed to have discovered in his possession writings critical of the New Order”. He is believed to be still in detention at Salemba Prison, Jakarta. In 1971, the Amnesty adoption group in Germany learnt that Sitor was an ’A’ prisoner and would shortly be committed for trial. A lawyer was appointed to act for him but has never been permitted to visit the prisoner. * President Sukarno’s policy of a union between the three main streams in Indonesian society, nationalism, religion and communism. pted prisoners Age: 20 years Su i ah Occupation: Schoolgirl g y Date of Arrest: October 1965 Charge: None Trial: None Place of detention: Plantungan women’s detention camp, Central Java. Picture taken from Dutch TV film, KRO, about the Plantungan women’s detention camp. Born in 1952, Sugiyah has the doubtful distinction of having been arrested at an earlier age than almost any other political prisoner. When she was detained in early October, 1965, she was thirteen. She has now spent more than one-third of her short life in prison. Sugiyah was born in Jakarta of poor parents. She completed elementary school education but due to the circumstances of her family, she had little extra cultural activity and can now do little more than read and write. She was not involved in any political activity before September 1965, but when in the second half of 1965, a group of her friends was recruited for the campaign of Confrontation with Malaysia, she insisted on accompanying them,....not because she supported - or indeed understood - confrontation, but as a spirited girl she did not want to be left behind. Volunteer training activities were being held all over the country by the various political parties and their respective mass organisations. Pemuda Rakyat, the PKI youth organisation, was the strongest youth organisation in Sugiyah’s kampong, and it recruited the training group that Sugiyah joined. It went to a training-ground in Lubang Buaya, near the Halim Air Force base, which became the headquarters of the coup leaders in October, 1965. This was the place to which the kidnapped generals were taken on that night, there to be murdered and hidden. Anyone at the training-ground on that particular night is, by implication, regarded as having been “directly involved’ in the coup. Sugiyah was there and the charges against her are therefore considered to be serious. Soon after the coup was crushed, a nation-wide campaign was launched in the press, highlighting atrocities alleged to have been committed at Lubang Buaya, including sexual orgies on the night of the coup. The young girls there were said to have prostituted themselves and to have slashed the genitals and gouged the eyes of the coup victims. To check the truth of these accounts, President Sukarno requested an official medical report for each of the victims; the medical investigations revealed no signs of torture on the bodies of the victims. But the charges of torture and atrocities persisted and were used to whip up sentiment against the organisations whose members were said to have been responsible. During interrogations, many of the young girls who had been at Lubang Buaya like Sugiyah were forced to sign confessions about sexual orgies and atrocities. Following this,they were believed to be classified as ’A’ prisoners awaiting trial, but in mid-1971, many of them, including Sugiyah, were transported to the Plantungan women’s detention camp in Central Java where they are being held in indefinite detention as "hardcore communists’ and ’security risks’. When Sugiyah was first arrested, she wept continuously for her mother. She was kept isolated in a cell, away from older women who could have given her the sympathy, understanding and affection she needed. She was completely unaware of the political implications of the events with which she had become so tragically involved. === [PDF page 136] === 10 Occupation: Member of Parliament Date of Arrest: October 1965 Charge: None karel supit Trial: None Place of detention: Buru Island Karel Supit was born in Menado, North Sulawesi in 1917. As a young man, he worked in the oil fields at Cepu, East Java. After the proclamation of the Republic in 1945, he formed and led a nationalist guerrilla group in East Java against the Dutch colonial government. After 1950, he returned to Menado, where he took the initiative in establishing the left-wing trade union federation, SOBSI, in Minahasa and helped to build the Communist Party in the region. In 1954, he became a member of the Party’s Central Committee. He was elected a Member of Parliament for the Communist Party in 1955 and became a person of great prominence in his own region. He strongly opposed the Permesta rebellion against the Central Government which broke out in North Sulawesi in 1957 and was arrested. He was released several months later when the rebellion was suppressed by Central Government troops. Later, he moved to Jakarta to work at the Communist Party Headquarters where he became the head of the Party’s International Department. In 1963, he was appointed a member of the Indonesian delegation to the United Nations Assembly; he also participated in several Indonesian delegations to various international conferences and gatherings. Following the October 1965 coup attempt, PKI leaders and members endeavoured to evade arrest, but Karel Supit was caught within days. After being held at the Salemba Men’s Prison in Jakarta for five years, he was moved to the Buru detention camp in 1969. His wife, Mrs. Lies Supit,had gone into hiding in 1965 knowing she faced arrest because of her work with the pro-communist women’s organisation, GERWANI; their children were taken care of by relatives. Early in 1967, Mrs. Supit was also arrested and is now detained at the Bukit Duri women’s prison, also in Jakarta. Despite the proximity of his wife, while Karel was still under detention in Jakarta, they were not permitted to meet. Later, one of their sons was also arrested. When Karel Supit was transferred to Buru he was 52 years old, well over the maximum age of 45 which had been fixed by the government for those to be deported to the island. It is not difficult to imagine that he must, at his age, be finding the rigours of life in Buru a serious threat to his health. Age: about 38 years subronto kusuma Occupation: Musician and composer Date of Arrest: August 1968 atma ia Charge: None J Trial: None Place of detention: Salemba Prison, Jakarta Subronto is a well-known.musician. His first job was at the Ministry for Culture and Education, where he eventually became editor of the magazine published by the Ministry. Although he had no formal musical education until he was over 30, he developed a great interest in Indonesian music and helped to organise choral activities in youth organisations at a time when this was still a novelty in Indonesia. He joined LEKRA, the left-wing cultural organisation, and in the early nineteen sixties rose to prominence as one of Indonesia’s most popular composers. Some of his work had a political content. The most popular of all his songs was *Nasakom Bersatu’ or ’Nasakom Unite’, popularising the Sukarno Government policy of Nasakom union of the three main streams in Indonesian society, nationalism, religion and communism. From December 1962 until July 1965, he studied music in East Germany at the Hans Eisler High School of Music, part of the Humboldt University. After graduating, he returned to Indonesia, just a month before the coup attempt. The new political situation after October 1965 made it impossible for him, as a member of LEKRA, a proscribed organisation, to obtain any form of public employment in his profession. He made his living teaching the piano and the German language and also managed to train a small choir and compose several works, none of which could be performed or published because of the political stigma which was attached to him. In August 1968, he was arrested. The allegations against him are believed to be connected with visits made to his house by former LEKRA colleagues and the assumption by the authorities that these persons were involved in anti-government activities. Whether or not such allegations were ever substantiated, his position as a member of LEKRA and his fame as the composer of ’Nasakom Bersatu’ and other songs popular during the Sukarno era have been decisive in keeping him under detention. Such activities would be classified as *preparations for an atmosphere which led to the coup’ which could make Subronto open to the charge that he was “directly or indirectly involved in the 30th September/PKI movement’. As far as is known, he is still being detained at the Salemba Prison in Jakarta. ... five of thea do pted prisoners Siti Suratih (in front left) working with fellow-prisoners in Plantungan. Age: 45 years e e e Occupation: Nurse siti suratih Date of arrest: 1966 Charge: None Trial: None Place of detention: Plantungan women’s detention camp, Central Java. Mrs. Siti Suratih was born in Central Java. After completing her education, she joined the nursing profession, obtaining excellent qualifications. She continued in her profession after her marriage to B.O. Hutapea, a communist from North Sumatra who became a member of the Party’s new Politbureau established under Aidit in 1949, Siti Suratih herself was never attracted by political activity and did not join any mass organisation. She had four children and continued to work as a nurse, moving to Jakarta together with her husband, where she obtained work at the Central Army Hospital. She became chief-nurse at the Maternity Ward. After the abortive coup in October 1965, she was dishonourably dismissed. Since she herself had never been politically active, it is clear that her dismissal was because of her marriage to a leading communist. For a year or so after the coup, she lived in very difficult circumstances. She had no contact with her husband who had gone underground and had to care for her children alone. She was under continual harassment because of her husband’s position; the military kept a close watch on her to discover whether she would be contacted by her husband. She was arrested in 1966 while her husband was still in hiding and her interrogation was concerned only with her relations with him. None of her relatives was able to take care of three children still with her, and she was, therefore, compelled to take them with her to the detention camp where they stayed for several months. When she was transferred to the Bukit Duri women’s prison in Jakarta, she was not allowed to have her children there and had to leave them behind at the detention camp in the care of other prisoners, to await the forthcoming visit of relatives in the hope that they would take the children home. The children are now at school in Jakarta and are staying with their aunt. In 1968, her husband was killed during an attack on a centre of communist activities in Blitar, East Java. In 1971, Siti Suratih had still not been officially informed of her husband’s death. For the major part of her detention, she was believed to be a category ’C’ prisoner and was expecting early release. However, in mid-1971, she was transferred to the Plantungan women’s detention camp in Central Java, and so deduced that her classification had been raised to *B’. Her transfer may also have been because she was required to work as a nurse. Shots of her appeared in a film made by a Dutch TV unit of the Plantungan Camp (the accompanying photograph is taken from that film); she is shown treating prisoners. === [PDF page 137] === detainees in indonesia a lawyer’s view It is hard to know where to start an appraisal of the legal situation of the Indonesian detainees. The material in this publication suggests that the rule of law no longer exists in Indonesia in that persons may be arrested without any reason being given, without any possibility of challenging their arrest and that they may subsequently be tried for any offence and under conditions which are not subject to any regulations. They are subject to treatment which is contrary to almost every article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which relates to the rights of persons arrested and detained. WHIM OF AUTHORITY It would seem that the selection of persons for arrest and detention is in many cases arbitrarily determined. Equally, the place of detention, the terms under which they live in detention, and, most important, the length of detention, appear to depend upon the whim of authority, and possibly even the whim of a particular official. It is this quality of uncertainty and dependence on personal decision which is the most alarming aspect of the situation from the lawyer’s point of view. For example, people may quite commonly find themselves in prison for no better reason than that they happened to be present at the home or place of arrest of a suspect when the arrest is made. This is a matter for exceptionally grave concern when it happens to children, who may find themselves indefinitely imprisoned because they entered a place of detention simply to avoid being indonesian attitudes ”’Then there are the ’B’ prisoners. We know for certain they (the ’B prisoners) are traitors, that they are ideologically conscious, but there is not enough evidence to bring them before a court”. The Attorney-General, Sugih Arto, September, 1971. separated from a parent from whom they have now in any case been separated whether by death or otherwise. There is evidence to show that people have been arrested and detained for no better reason than that the local military commander dislikes them, or covets their possessions. One imagines that in the prevailing situation almost any excuse will suffice to justify an arrest to his superiors, in the unlikely event that he is called upon to do so. This state of affairs is possible because there apparently exists in Indonesia today no regulations regarding the arrest of persons which effectively circumscribe the powers of the military. Even if these regulations did exist no individual detainee would have the power to challenge his arrest. Since there is no right to challenge it in the courts nor any opportunity to do sO, since detainees are it appears never allowed to see a lawyer. Even the comparatively very small r-mber of °A’ category detainees who have been brought to trial have not generally been allowed to have the lawyer of their choice to represent them, and have not been allowed to discuss their case with their lawyer before the trial began. NO ACCESS TO LEGAL ADVICE The Government has decided that the vast majority of detainees cannot ever be brought to trial, because there is no evidence sufficient to convict them. It is therefore a horrifying fact that the avowed policy of the government of Indonesia is that tens of thousands of people will be deprived of normal life for the foreseeable future without it ever being established that they have done anything in particular to warrant it. Instead of taking steps to reduce the number of detainees, the policy appears to be to establish large encampments of detainees in exile in remote parts of Indonesia on a permanent basis. Further, in most cases the detainees are never told why they are being arrested, and sometimes never have any indication of what caused their detention. Although the government categorises detainees, it does not appear that they themselves are ever informed which category they belong to. Since there is no right to challenge detention in the courts, and most prisoners are never brought to trial, the fact that there is no access to legal advice is almost irrelevant. More important to the ordinary detainees is that from the time they are arrested to the time of their release, if that ever comes, they may have no news of their families for they may not write or receive letters and may not be allowed any family visits even if the place of detention is near enough to their homes for their families to visit. Just as there are no laws which effectively regulate the circumstances under which people may be arrested and detained, there are no regulations which safeguard the conditions under which they are kept in detention. They may be dealt with at the discretion of the military commander, and may even be used as slave labour to his profit. MALNUTRITION Accounts of the treatment of detainees strongly suggest that the authorities do not accept any responsibility for providing more than the basic minimum diet for prisoners. If this is not supplemented by parcels from the prisoner’s family (who will usually be suffering very severely financially from his arrest in any event) he may well suffer from malnutrition. Even more horrifying is the fact that if a prisoner falls seriously ill he will probably receive no medical treatment, or very inadequate treatment and may die. There is not space available for more than this brief summary of the legal situation of detainees but it may be sufficient to indicate what a totally unacceptable situation at present exists. It would appear that a very large number of people in Indonesia today are regarded by the authorities as having forfeited the right to be treated as human beings and citizens, and as having no rights before the law. fM®umbers! numbers! numbers! “It is impossible to say exactly how many political prisoners there are,” the Indonesian Attorney-General, Sugih Arto told a gathering of foreign jounalists in Jakarta in September, 1971. ”It is a floating rate, like the Japanese yen vis-a-vis the dollar.” Salemba prison in Jakarta. And why is it impossible? ”The thing is that local commanders have the power to arrest and interrogate any person under suspicion of being a threat to national security. These people can be held for an unlimited period of time. It is not always compulsory to report such security arrests to the Central Command in Jakarta, ” Sugih Arto said. More recently, in October, 1972, a senior officer of the Kopkamtib, Command for the Restoration of Security and Order, said that the number of political prisoners being held has its ’ups and downs’’. And why is this? ”On the very day we release or sentence someone, we shall probably be arresting others.” These remarks provide the setting for what many have come to call the macabre numbers game. Recently, there have been a number of official pronouncements on the question which have been confused and contradictory. We summarise below, the most important pronouncements made in the last eighteen months: @ 13th August 1971 In response to the publication of Amnesty’s Memorandum to the Indonesian Government, Foreign Minister Adam Malik told journalists that there were 90,000 prisoners”. On the same day, the Attorney-General said there were 50,000 °C’ category detainees” all of whom would be freed by the end of the year. @ 26th August 1971 After meeting the Dutch Foreign Minister, Adam Malik said that there were 45,000” political prisoners, of whom 22,000 would be freed by the end of the year. @ 20th September 1971 Ina speech to foreign journalists, when he described the number of political prisoners as a floating rate”, the Attorney-General mentioned an overall total of ’about 50,000”. @ October 1971 Brigadier-General Marpaung, speaking for the Minister of Defence and Security, gave these figures: 19,516 A’ and ’B’ prisoners; 3,112 ’C’ prisoners; 14,336 ’X’ prisoners. Total: 36,964. @ ist January 1972 President Suharto announced that ”all 22,000 ’C’ prisoners” had been released. @ 4th February 1972 General Sumitro, Deputy Commander of the Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Kopkamtib) told journalists that there were ”2,494 °A’ prisoners, 16,076 ’B’ prisoners, no ’C’ prisoners and a handful of ’X’ prisoners.” @ October 1972 A spokesman of the Kopkamtib said: ” There are 9,935 prisoners on Buru and 29,000 in the rest of Indonesia.” Total: 39,000. Re-settlement sites were being sought for the 29,000. @ 14th November 1972 The Indonesian Embassy in London issued a fact sheet, originating from the Attorney-General’s Office and the Department for Security and Defence; this stated that there were now 38,221 political detainees” CONTRADICTIONS The discrepancies in these figures are numerous. Let us concentrate only on the repeated pronouncement that all °C’ detainees have been released. A rough consensus of the figures announced during 1971 would suggest that this should have left between 20,000 and 25,000 prisoners in detention. In October, 1972 however, we are told that there were 39,000 prisoners altogether - without any breakdown according to category. In the absence of any official explanation, we offer two of our own. Either that more than half the ’C’ detainees were reclassified and are now being held as °A’ or ’B’ prisoners, or that about 15,000 people have been arrested during the course of the last twelve months. The same discrepancies appear in release announcements which were reported fairly frequently in the Indonesian press during the closing months of 1971. A typical example comes from Sumatra. In December 1971, Brig-General Jasir Hadibroto, Commander of the All- Sumatra Command, said that all 1,718 ’C’ prisoners in North Sumatra have been released. A few days later, a Jakarta daily announced that of the 1,718 ’C’ prisoners in North Sumatra, 426 had already been released and the remainder would be freed in January 1972. But in January 1972, a Jakarta paper added to the confusion by announcing that the first batch of ’C’ prisoners had been released in the middle of January.” How are we to arrive at any reasonable estimate of the number of prisoners currently being held in detention in Indonesia? The figure of 39,000 mentioned by several sources in October and November 1972 appears to be related to classified prisoners of the ’B’ categories for the Kopkamtib spokesman explained that, in addition to the 10,000 prisoners on Buru another 29,000 would be detained in ’resettlement camps’. We can therefore assume that this figure does not include unclassified prisoners in the *X’ category, and probably also excludes *A’ prisoners awaiting trial, said to number about 5,000. In view of what the Attorney-General told foreign journalists in September 1971 about the broad powers of local commanders, and in view moreover of what we know about the prolonged and often unregistered detention of prisoners by local commanders, during the initial period of interrogation, an estimate of ten to fifteen thousand in ’X’ category may not be an exaggeration. This plus an understandable scepticism about the official figure of 39,000 classified prisoners suggests that the lowest estimate must be 55,000 and the real figure may well be much greater. 13 === [PDF page 138] === political prisoners* families the fight for survival Indonesian society has always been known for its sense of social cohesion, its ability to care for those stranded by misfortune or left without a breadwinner. There is no social security system, but the traditional social cohesion has in the past managed to deal with problems which, in a welfare state, would become the responsibility of the State. Since 1965, this fine tradition has been shattered; large numbers of people have found themselves without communal sympathy and protection because of the pervading anti-communist atmosphere. They are the families of political prisoners, the wives and children of prisoners, and children deprived of parents since 1965 through imprisonment or death. SOCIAL OSTRACISM This is not simply a matter of coping with economic problems and educating children; it extends to a kind of social ostracism that has destroyed friendships, broken fraternal blood relationships and made good-neighbourliness a rare exception rather than an accepted mode of behaviour towards those related to political prisoners. It is almost as though these families suffer from a contagious disease and no one who can possibly avoid it wants to become contaminated. How then do the wives and children of political prisoners survive? Some wives have cut their relations with their imprisoned husbands altogether. They have been unable to bear the strain of prolonged separation with no prospects of reunion. Life is not easy for a woman without her husband in Indonesian society, and many prisoners’ wives have fallen prey to pressures exerted upon them by military officers. Their fear for their children’s security has made them particularly vulnerable. The vast majority of wives, however, have not succumbed to this type of pressure, and a very large number of them live on the brink of starvation. Few of them can find regular jobs, not Mrs. Pramudya Ananta Tur and four of her eight children in her home in Jakarta. Her husband - the famous writer - is detained in Buru. only because of a lack of skill or qualifications, but also because most employers demand a declaration of non-involvement in the 1965 coup” which detainees’ wives are not able to get, unless they have money to bribe local officials. Some people have been able to purchase these declarations for prices varying from two to several hundred dollars, a thing that is not uncommon in a society where corruption has become almost a way of life. NON-INVOLVEMENT DECLARATIONS Neither is it an easy matter for the children of detainees to continue their education. A major difficulty is finance; school fees are high, even for primary schools, and transportation to and from school may require even more money than the fees. Moreover, children require ’non-involvement declarations’ to take examinations or enter university; this applies even to children who were little more than infants at the time of the coup. In 1971, the press reported that children entering secondary school at the age of 14 had to produce one of these declarations, yet they were only eight years old at the time of the coup! Many wives try to make a living from dressmaking or baking cakes which eS hawk on the streets. Mrs. Pramudya nanta Tur, wife of Indonesia’s foremost writer who is now detained on Buru Island, sells cakes to try and make ends meet. She suffers from a pulmonary ailment and requires regular medical treatment. Another woman, who once ran a prosperous building firm, is now herself living in a bamboo shed in one of Jakarta’s poorest districts; her husband was arrested as a member of a left-wing trade union, and she is now supported by her son who bought a ’non-involvement declaration’ in order to get a job as a barman in a Jakarta hotel. Her youngest son died two years ago because she could not afford to pay for necessary medical treatment. There are numerous other examples of human tragedy that have occurred among these neglected families. HARASSMENT The difficulties they face are not only caused by an absence of assistance from official sources. In many cases, the families are actively harassed by local military units who force them out of their homes and deprive them of their belongings. They are defenceless against such harassment and cannot even contemplate taking legal action unless they have financial aid for the lengthy court proceedings. Another constant worry is that of finding out about the whereabouts of a detained husband. Wives who have lost trace of their husbands, either immediately after his arrest or as a result of transfer from one place of detention to another, are often treated in a very humiliating way when they make enquiries at any military unit. The only source of succour for these families in distress is a small number of private organisations, mainly the Christian churches which, in some places, have started relief programmes for the families of political prisoners. One diocese of the Roman Catholic Church took steps to bring prisoners’ wives together to share their problems and to try and solve them through communal effort. A chaplain took the initiative and worked out a plan of action; it included fund-raising by selling hand-made products, simultaneously providing the women with some form of employment. The money was intended to pay schoolfees for their children. But, inevitably, such endeavours run into difficulties and this one was suspected of providing a cover for political activities. When the women participating in this particular scheme met together at Christmas 1971 for a small celebration, one of them rose to thank the organisers on behalf of all the wives. A few days later, she was summoned to a military office, held for a whole day and questioned about the speech she had made. She was later released but the incident disturbed many women who had found some comfort in the regular get-togethers and common effort, and they decided to stay away in future. Relief projects are in progress in several major towns in Indonesia but they are still very limited in scope and can help only a very small fraction of those in need. The lack of dedicated personnel and regular sources of finance make these efforts little more than a drop in an ocean of human suffering. Perhaps the best way to conclude the above account is with the true story of one particular child who, for the purposes of this story, we shall call Narto: ”Mrs. S. had been under detention for several years because of her associations with the left-wing women’s organisation, Gerwani. Her husband had been murdered in an incident in Jakarta shortly after the coup attempt and, ironically for her, had been buried at the Heroes’ cemetery in Jakarta because his death was thought to have been the result of an attack by communist youths. When she was arrested, she took one small child with her to prison and left her other children with relatives. The relatives never visited her and she had no news of her children. One day some years after her arrest, she, together with several other women prisoners, was carrying garbage out of the prison where she was being held in Jakarta when, glancing towards the crowded streets, she suddenly began to scream: ’’Narto! Narto”. The prison commander who was guarding the women prisoners on garbage duty asked her why she was shouting. ”That’s my son,” she cried. ’’Narto, my son, over there, picking up fag-ends.”’ The Commander saw the boy to whom she was pointing, and began to run after him, The boy, seeing a soldier running after him, took to his heels and fled. Many startled bystanders joined in the chase; the boy was soon caught and the commander dragged him back to the prison. Only then did the child realise that his own mother had been calling him, He was dressed in rags and filthy from head to foot. His mother embraced him and carried him into the prison. By the time they entered the prison compound, everyone had rushed out to see what was happening, political prisoners and their military guards, criminal prisoners in the nearby blocks and the civil administrators of that part of the prison. It was a heart-rending scene, and everyone, guards as well as prisoners, wept as they watched the mother and child. The mother was torn between joy at finding her child after years of separation and anger at seeing him in such a wretched condition. Nothing could more poignantly have depicted the tragedy of so many families torn asunder by political events for which they are not responsible, After bathing and dressing Narto in her own clothes, the mother discovered that he had been staying with an uncle who had found the responsibility of looking after him too burdensome and had made his life a misery. Narto could not stand the life and ran away. He had been living on the streets for weeks, begging, collecting fag ends and sleeping under railway carriages in sidings. For some months he remained in prison with his mother, but the prison commander realised that the child must be found a home outside. With the help of the visiting Catholic priest, a place was found for him with a Catholic family and he was soon able to start going to school again after having missed several years of schooling.” Narto was saved from misery by a lucky coincidence. How many children live on as he once lived, with no escape from the wretchedness of life in a society that cares nothing - or is too afraid to care - for the children of political prisoners? === [PDF page 139] === the geography of imprisonment EAST KALIMANTAN 601 untried prisoners (September 1970) 700 untried prisoners (April 1972) 1,000 untried prisoners (April 1972) Sumberredjo, Camp Dam, Camp Pelengkung (200 in 1972) Balikpapan (800 in 1972); prison labour used to build air-strip. This map is an attempt to indicate the vast scale of political imprisonment in present-day Indonesia. It lists the known places of detention region by region, gives some figures for the number of detainees held in each and the date of each report. Official information is shown in normal print, unofficial in cursive. The final picture is far from comprehensive, and shows the extent of Amnesty’s knowledge rather than the real situation. Places of detention are not listed, and the Government does not issue precise and reliable statistics. J We have not been able to arrive at a total figure for the number of detainees; equally we have not included releases which have taken place sporadically since 1970, but which, though important, have not altered the essential size or urgency of the problem. It should be noted that although some figures are inevitably lower now than they were in 1970, others have risen - East Kalimantan and Nusakambangan are two examples. WEST IRIAN Political detainees reported to be removed to special prison in Central Java (1972) SOUTH KALIMANTAN 373 untried prisoners (September 1970) WEST KALIMANTAN 2,316 untried prisoners (September 1970) Singkawang (252 suspected guerrillas - April 1971) Pontianak (400 suspected guerrillas - August 1971) (65 untried ‘communist’ prisoners - August 1971) Tukong (650 suspected guerrillas - August 1971) 540 new arrests in August 1972 Yani prison 9 Bandjarmasin Prison (1972) CENTRAL KALIMANTAN 36 untried prisoners (1970) MALUKU 1,686 untried prisoners (September 1970) Ceram island: 126 ‘suspected communists’ arrested March/April 1972 Ternate - prisoners reported (1970) SIBERUT AND NIAS ISLANDS - under consideration as potential ’re-settlement areas’ (like Buru) 1970-72. ATJEH 102 untried prisoners (September 1970) NORTH SUMATRA CENTRAL JAVA 15,084 untried prisoners (September 1970) 23 detention camps still in existence in December 1972 Buru island: 10,000 untried prisoners deported to island (1969-71) Prisoners’ relatives deported 1972 - 4,500 JAKARTA 4,653 untried prisoners (September 1970) banadine geri, nee ae Nusakambangan island: ten camps holding 5,000 prisoners Deaths - 65 Prisoners held in Medan; extensive use of prison labour Raat Durl cies rison- 71 (1971) (1970) 7,000 - 10,000 prisoners (1972) Escapes - 5 in rubber plantations (1971) Tanggerang Prison - 450 (1970) Yogyakarta: Benteng prison (600 in 1970) SOUTH SUMATRA Nirbaya Prison - 100 (1970) Military prison (600-900 in 1970) NUSATENGGARA Wirogunan prison (2,000 in 1970) 356 untried prisoners (September 1970) Ambarawa prison (1,500 in October 1972) Bali: Den Pasar prison Plantungan women’s detention camp (600 in 1972; scheduled to rise to 1,500) Semarang: Mlaten Prison (500 in 1972) Bulu Prison (132 women in 1972) Tjandi detention camp (’some dozens’ in 1972) Kalimoto Military Prison (1972) Interrogation centres in Jalan Tanah Abang (50 prisoners in 1970), Gunung Sahari (75 in 1971) and Kebayoran Lama Military Prison in Jalan Budi Utomo (250 military and civilian prisoners in 1971) 4,053 untried prisoners (September 1970) Lampong: 130 untried prisoners (1972) WEST SUMATRA AND RIAU 6,252 untried prisoners (September 1970) Solok: 18 deathsreportedly caused by inadequate medical attention (1969/70). Four prisons in Padang (1970); prisoners held in Padang Military Prison (1972). EAST JAVA 3,971 untried prisoners (September 1970) Surabaya: several prisons and interrogation centres 100 new arrests January - August 1972 WEST JAVA Prisoners used for construction and road building work 4,389 untried prisoners (September 1970) Private house in Jalan Dr. Tjipto used as Malang: Lowokaru prison (1972) and in Teluk Bajur harbour (1970) Kebon Waru Prison in Bandung (900 in 1970) interrogation centre (1972) women’s prison (1972) Bukit Tinggi Prison (1972) Prison labour used at a tourist project Bojong camp (100-150 in 1970) Extensive use of prisoners in road-building and Riau islands: Tandjungpinang: 155 prisoners (1972) (50 in 1972) Pemalang camp (600 in 1970) prisoners used in roadbuilding other labour projects (1970) 16 17 === [PDF page 140] === how the prisoners live What is life like for the tens of thousands of political prisoners in prisons and detention or interrogation centres throughout Indonesia? The overriding feature is their deep resentment at be views or past associations, and their frustrat ing detained for their political ions at being held for so many years without trial or prospects of release. Added to this, the conditions in which they must live present continuing hazards to their health and welfare and to their peace of mind. Be yes, oe so ge OS Prisoners at work in Buru island. The Indonesian Government uses the low living standards of the Indonesian people as a pretext for doing nothing to improve the lot of the political prisoners. But by keeping them in custody, and for such a long period of time, they inevitably assume responsibility for these prisoners and are under obligation to provide them with basic minimum standards. It is not easy to describe actual conditions. Most places where prisoners are held are completely closed to outsiders and few who are released would risk their freedom by giving an account of what they experienced. Moreover, there are numerous prisons, camps and interrogation centres in both large towns and small towns, and in places remote from centres of population. There are even places of detention referred to in Indonesian as”tempat tahanan gelap” or “illegal places of detention” whose very existence is concealed from the surrounding population. The welfare of the prisoners is left largely to the discretion of local military commanders, and whatever central, provincial or regional policy may be, the officer in charge of a prison or detention centre is in practice in a position to regulate things very much as he likes and to determine how much of any official allocation for prisoners is actually spent on them. Besides the so-called ”re-settlement camp” on Buru Island, and the women’s detention camp in Plantungan, Central Java, places of detention can be subdivided into prisons and detention or interrogation centres. The latter generally cater for newly-arrested detainees and are run by the local army unit or its intelligence unit. The prisons, which accommodate prisoners after their initial period of interrogation, are in the hands of the Military Police Corps (CMP). Some are ordinary prisons taken over in part or as a whole from the civil authorities, whilst others are regular military prisons. Where general prisons are used, political prisoners are kept in strict isolation from criminal prisoners and conditions of the untried political prisoners are in all cases far worse than those of convicted criminal prisoners. ACCOMMODATION In the prisons, accommodation is grossly over-crowded, unhygienic and forbidding. In Tanggerang Prison on the outskirts of Jakarta, three prisoners are confined to a cell 1.4 metres by 2 metres. In Padang Military Prison, Central Sumatra, cells built for four persons are used for between eight and twelve prisoners. At the local prison in Lampong, South Sumatra, prisoners are herded into dormitories where they sleep packed closely together on the floor. The prison at Ambarawa in Central Java is reputed to be one of the worst of all the prisons used for political prisoners, and the building - used first by the Dutch and then the Japanese - is in a serious state of disrepair. Accommodation at detention and interrogation centres is generally far ‘ee than at prisons. These units operate peers «er ee “Hi converted old houses, and prisoners sleep in tiny, unventilated rooms or along half-exposed corridors. In some places, the prisoners have no proper sleeping accommodation at all but make use of raised stone platforms or ledges under a ceiling so low that it is impossible to sit up. All prisoners, whether at prisons or camps, sleep on the floor, which in Indonesia means upon stone or tiles. They are nowhere provided with any kind of bedding, and what mats they use have been supplied by relatives outside or by church organisations. They fold whatever clothes they have for use as a pillow, and many sleep with no cover at all. The damp, cold walls and floors and the lack of mats and bedding inevitably cause pulmonary and respiratory disorders. FOOD AND OTHER PROVISIONS The standard diet for political prisoners consists of two plates of rice a day, but this can vary in quantity from a full plate to just a few spoonsful. At the Padang Prison, the prisoners get only two handfuls of rice for each meal. With the rice, the prisoners receive a small dish of soybean cake (tempe or tahu) and occasionally a small piece of salted, dried fish. The diet is not only lacking Young political prisoner hospitalized in Buru. Prisoners marching to work under armed military guard. in quantity and quality but also variety. Meat and eggs are rarely provided, usually only on festive days when donations are received from local religious organisations. The only beverage is boiled water, twice watery vegetables, one minute piece of a day, and in many of the detention camps, the prisoners must supply the paraffin with which to boil the drinking water. The prisoners get no tea or coffee, no sugar or milk and no other kind of foad, nothing in fact but the two meals referred to above. No soap is provided, neither do the prisoners receive clothes, towels or tooth-brushes. The clothes the prisoners wear are provided by relatives outside or by fellow prisoners. Many of the men wear nothing but a pair of tattered pants and a grimy vest. MEDICAL FACILITIES Medical facilities are seriously lacking in all places of detention. Detention and interrogation centres have no medical facilities at all; there are no visits by doctors and no medicines are available. In case of sickness, the prisoners must rely on what they themselves or colleagues receive from outside, and if a visit to a clinic or hospital is required, this must be paid for by the detainee who has to pay transport expenses and give his military escort a good tip. Many detainees have no money at all and must therefore do without, even when seriously ill. The most widespread illnesses are pulmonary and intestinal disorders and skin diseases. Some prisons have a rudimentary medical service and some an ill-equipped hospital block, but doctor’s visits are irregular, and medicines are scarce and difficult to obtain. When prescriptions are issued by the doctor, they must be bought and paid for by relatives. Prisoners who have no relatives to visit them must rely on an occasional dose from the prison stock of medicine. Even medicine purchased outside must be stored at the prison office, and in many cases they are not all handed on to the prisoner. Much of the medicine used comes from private donations, particularly from church organisations, and the officers in charge take a good share before anything reaches the prisoners. indonesian attitudes ”T am against the inhuman treatment of these prisoners. We all know that most of the prisoners categorised as political prisoners are not really communists. They were starving people, very poor people who didn’t know what they joined. At the time, the communist party was the most effective party. I have to say this because of my moral sense.” Arief Budiman, Indonesian psychologist and former student leader in an interview with Dutch television. August 1970. 19 === [PDF page 141] === how the prisoners live Hospitalisation is possible only in very rare cases, and often comes at a time when the patient is beyond help. Many deaths occur in prison cells without any medical attention. No reliable figures of deaths are available but it is known for instance, that in some periods the death rate at the Salemba Prison in Jakarta, which accommodates about 1,500 political prisoners, has been as high as one prisoner a day. In Padang Military Prison which accommodates a few hundred prisoners, and which is never visited by a doctor, eighteen prisoners are known to have died during the years 1969 and 1970, due mainly to malnutrition and lack of medical attention. In Lampong, South Sumatra, many prisoners are known to have died as a result of extreme malnutrition. CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES Political prisoners are deprived of all forms of cultural and educational activity. There is a rigid ban on the entry of all reading material, with the single exception of sacred books such as the Ku’ran and the Bible. In some places, even these books are not allowed. No writing material is permitted. Cultural activities are also prohibited except, in some places, in preparation for celebrations of religious festivals, No form of educational activity is provided for the prisoners, except religious instruction which is compulsory. This is particularly frustrating for the many youngsters under detention who have been unable to complete their schooling and are thus growing up in prison, unfit for any kind of employment requiring training. Handwork is allowed only at certain places, at the discretion of the prison commander, and in many cases this is permitted largely in order to provide the comman- Dutch television. August 1970. indonesian attitudes ” As far as I know from newspapers and other sources, their (the political prisoners’) condition is very bad, very poor; there is lack of medical treatment but this is the case with all prisoners in Indonesia... Everything must be done about this, because it is a shame for Indonesia. I will take risks to help them.” Indonesian lawyer Adnan Buyung Nasution, now Chairman of the Indonesian Legal Aid Organisation, in an interview with der or other officers with personal profits. Women prisoners are somewhat more favoured in this respect, but for male persons, handwork is difficult to arrange as they may not be permitted knives or the other sharp implements required for carpentry, woodwork, sculpture and the like. As a result of the almost total absence of cultural and educational activity, prisoners spend most of their time doing nothing. Inevitably this adds to the frustrations and dissatisfactions that build up after a long period of incarceration. FORCED LABOUR Many reports have been received about political prisoners being compelled to work for officers at their place of detention for little or no remuneration. In some cases, they work as domestic servants, mechanics or chauffeurs, and are used in the offices as typists or for menial tasks. In other places, for instance, in East Kalimantan and West Java, they are used as forced labour on major construction works. In one case, prisoners have been used to repair an airstrip, in others they have been used for harbour or road construction, in others they have been used as plantation labour, and in yet others, they have provided the main labour force for the construction of tourist projects. {t is not unusual for detainees to be held under continuing detention simply because they provide a valuable source of cheap or unpaid labour for the local commander. CONTACT WITH FAMILIES Of all the factors that make life in prison intolerable for political prisoners, perhaps the most irksome is the strict constraints placed upon meetings with families. For the majority of prisoners, there is no communication at all; relatives may be living in far-away places, or may have lost trace of the prisoner altogether. With the exception of prisoners held at the resettlement camps in Buru and Plantungan, no form of written communication is permitted at any time and for any purpose, not even to notify relatives of the whereabouts of the prisoner. There are many men and women in Indonesian prisons who have had no news of their childre A for many years, and youngsters who have heard nothing from their parents, sisters or brothers since the time they were arrested many years ago. Relatives are permitted to bring provisions to the prisons; indeed, without this source of supply, prisoners’ health would be far worse than it is today. But relatives coming to the prison for this purpose must have a certificate of residence from the local Government representative confirming their relationship with the prisoners. Some are unwilling to apply for this certificate because of the stigma that attaches to relatives of political prisoners. If their relationship with a political prisoner becomes known, it may jeopardise their chances of permanent residence or employment, or education for children. In many prisons, political prisoners are permitted to meet relatives only once a year and sometimes even less. Where meetings are regulated more frequently, permits are issued on a discriminatory basis and can be denied to some prisoners though relatives are not told the reasons for this. Husbands and wives who are both in prison have no means of communication, and in the vast majority of cases never meet. DEGRADING AND INHUMAN CONTROL OVER THE PRISONERS In all prisons and detention centres, the prisoners are completely at the mercy of the officers and soldiers in charge. They have no contact with civil authorities. Prison rule and discipline is arbitrary and unpredictable, and prisoners have no redress against frequent maltreatment or injustice from prison officials. Punishment is generally collective. The arbitrary nature of individual power leads to gross violations; an example is the case of a prisoner in Salemba Prison who stole some cassava because he was hungry and who was forced to eat cassava until he died of over-eating. Most officers in charge of political prisoners adopt an attitude of extreme arrogance towards their charges whom they look upon as being guilty merely because they have been arrested. They look down upon the prisoners as *communists’, ’atheists’ and ’traitors’ and therefore unworthy of humane treatment. Prison officers and guards who may be inclined to treat the political prisoners with a sense of humanity and justice are prevented from doing so openly by the fear that this may cast suspicion on them, leading to a loss of position, or even to a loss of freedom. che island of buru In July 1969, the Indonesian Government announced the establishment of a permanent ’re-settlement’ project on Buru island for untried political prisoners. By then, the first batch of 2,500 prisoners had been transported there in conditions of utmost secrecy from prisons throughout Java. The island of Buru is part of Maluku, one of Indonesia’s most easterly groups of islands. Until 1969, when it became the site of the first long-term detention camp for political prisoners, it was a little-known island, not unduly small but with a population of only about 40,000. It had long been under consideration as a site for transmigration projects to relieve the population congestion in Java. Agricultural production is still essentially primitive. The island has no roads linking the tiny capital, Namlea, to other townlets and villages; the only form of transportation is by river. The island is covered by dense jungle; regular communications with the rest of the es fe Peet mage. * mI oh run Fo ROS 4, FR Pe Pe Sah és sa el Prisoners grow their own food. Cassave fields in Unit IV, Buru. country are non-existent, the only link being an occasional sea transport service between Namlea and Ambon, the capital of Maluku, several hundred miles to the East. The creation of a detention camp in Buru added a new dimension of permanency to the problem of political detention in Indonesia. Instead of speeding up the trials and releasing those against whom no charges could be brought, the Government had embarked on a course of long-term compulsory ’re-settlement’ for many thousands of prisoners. OTHER ’”BURUS” CONSIDERED Since 1969, the prisoner population on Buru has risen to 10,000; by October 1972, sixty-five had died. Late in 1972, the Indonesian authorities announced that ’re-settlement’ sites for another 29,000 political prisoners were being sought; two islands have been mentioned in this connection: Nias and Siberut, both lying off the west coast of Sumatra. The decision to establish the Buru project was taken by the Commander of the Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Kopkamtib); the Attorney-General was then appointed to manage the project. Thus, the Army had delegated responsibility for those political prisoners it had decided not to release to the Attorney-General’s office. This does not, however, mean that the political prisoners on Buru are in the hands of a civil authority. The Regional Military Command at Ambon is in charge of all security arrangements of the project and the guards and personnel are recruited from the Military Police Corps (CPM). Moreover, the Army is powerfully represented in Bapreru (Buru Resettlement Executive Authority), the Executive Chief of which is a senior Army Officer, Brigadier General Wadli Prawirasupradja. »THORN FOR THE COMMUNITY” What are the official motives for the project? The Attorney-General, Sugih Arto, (himself an Army general) stated in the Preface to a brochure issued by Bapreru in December 1969 that the transfer of category ’B’ prisoners to Buru is intended ’not to isolate them from the public at large but merely to provide them with a indonesian attitudes ”How long have they to stay there (in Buru)? They themselves are asking this question. Their families are asking this question and I myself join in asking it. And the answer is as dark as the sky above unit II on that December afternoon in one thousand nine hundred and seventy-one.... They are all lonely men. They are all lonely while labouring from morning to sunset. They are also troubled by the feeling of uncertainty about the future and about their loved ones far across the seas, parents, wives, children, relatives.”’ Indonesian journalist Marcel Beding in Kompas after his visit to Buru, December, 1971. 21 === [PDF page 142] === 22 new means of living together with their families, because it will only risk their own safety if they are to be returned to their original community now’’.* The impression created by this statement is that the prisoners are being held there for their own protection. But, as we read on, the contrary becomes apparent. In the very next sentence, the Attorney-General goes on to say that the men being sent to Buru are those strongly believed to have played ’an important role planning, supervising and carrying out...... the 30th September/PKI Movement either before, during or after it took place; however, we have not ample evidence to prosecute them further. We consider it still dangerous for our security if we return them to the community; they are still like a thorn for the community.” So, after all, it is the community that, in the Government’s view, needs protection and from men who cannot be prosecuted because of lack of evidence. Then, the Attorney-General, the man who heads the Indonesian judiciary, goes on to express the hope that ’with this brochure, prejudices and wrong impressions such as, notably, that the Government does not uphold fuman rights, will be avoided”. It is for the reader to decide whether the Attorney-General has made a convincing case in support of his assertion that the Indonesian Government is upholding human rights. FORCED LABOUR? The essence of the Buru project is that men who are to be held in permanent detention must work for their own sustenance and cease to be a burden upon the Government that holds them captive. Provision for prisoners on Buru is the responsibility of the authorities only for the first eights months after their arrival; from then on, they must live from their own labour. Official declarations about Buru always stress that the project is not a concentration camp but an agricultural resettlement scheme where political prisoners will be ’given the opportunity” to become self-sufficient. There is, we are told, no forced labour on Buru. The Attorney-General, in the Preface already quoted above, makes the point in the following words ”... re-settlement on Buru island is dissimilar to any olddated or recent concentration camps abroad, because in Buru Island there is no forced labour”. the island of buru The Bapreru brochure is at great pains to justify its system of labour on humanitarian grounds. It quotes a Dutch colonial regulation stipulating that detainees should ’ wherever possible, be given the opportunity to work”. It then states that, according to the Pantja Sila principles everyone should work to the best of their ability”, and then shifts ground to make the bold assertion that ’everyone whether a member of a free society or undergoing punishment... is obliged to work.” This circuitous argument is then crowned by a paragraph that proclaims the following: ”Procuring work to detainees of the 30th September Movement/PKI, therefore, is one of the Government's efforts in respecting them as human beings who, in the interest of the development of their physical and social life, have to work to the best of their ability.” A MATTER OF SURVIVAL It is one matter for the laws of any state to uphold the right of its free citizens to work; it is quite another matter for a government to assume the right to impose upon its untried captives the obligation to work for their very survival. For, indeed, to the political prisoners on Buru, survival depends on a twelvehour day of arduous labour under the strict supervision of armed guards. It is a programme that applies to all alike, young and old, sick and healthy, to writers, scientists and artists who have been deprived of any opportunity to devote even part of their energies to creative work of their own choosing. One foreign journalist who visited the Prisoner resting during hard labour out in the field. island in December 1971 and published. his impressions in Newsweek on 14th ¢ February, 1972, described it in these words: ”For those with no previous farming experience, and for the older men and the intellectuals, the gruelling manual labour is sheer physical punishment”. ”RETURN TO SOCIETY” According to a statement made by Deputy Attorney-General Sutrisno Hamidjojo, in December 1971, then in charge of the Buru project, the final stage for Buru prisoners is the stage when they are returned to society”’, the stage of ’socialisation’. ”Returning to society” sounds very much like rehabilitation or release; in other words the end of detention. But the Indonesian authorities have something very different in mind. At this final stage, said the Deputy Attorney- General, political prisoners would remain on the island, but would no longer be bound by discipline, such as, for example, attending roll-call.” They would be allowed to have their families with them, but as we shall see later, this had not meant freedom for the men prisoners but rather semicaptivity for the families. Furthermore, before a political prisoner is allowed to advance to the final stage of his life on Buru, he must change his ideology from communism to the Pantja Sila, and agree to contribute his energies to constructive effort. It is not clear how the authorities intend to verify the ideological leanings of their captives who are, anyhow, being held in Buru because they are believed to be dedicated communists” and traitors’. CONDITIONS A fair amount is known about conditions on Buru. The Government e granted permission to several oups of journalists to visit the project and they have since written up their impressions in detail. An International Red Cross mission also visited the island early in 1971 and, although, according to normal Red Cross procedure, the mission’s report has not been made public, the members of the mission took the unusual step of holding a press conference after their return to Jakarta from Buru at which they spoke of the project in terms of admiration and praise. Buru, they said, had reminded them more of a common agricultural society than a camp for prisoners. They found no traces of dejection or tenseness on the prisoners’ cheerful faces. But the impressions of the group of foreign and Indonesian journalists that visited Buru in December 1971 were strikingly different. The reports of the foreign journalists were so critical that they were not allowed to circulate in Indonesia; the Newsweek issue containing a report of the visit was allowed to circulate only after this report had been blacked out. The journalists’ reports show a deep concern for the physical conditions in which the prisoners were forced to live, but they were even more deeply concerned about the frustrations of the prisoners whom they had met. The Dutch journalist, Peter Schumacher, wrote ’’Buru is not what one would call a devil’s island, at least, not the small part we were shown” (the group saw only four of che eighteen units in the camp) ’but my general conclusion is that, despite the spiritual care, most of the prisoners are worried and some are simply desperate?’ NO HOPE FOR THE OLD AND THE SICK As is the case with political prisoners in all other places of detention in Indonesia, the prisoners in Buru are deprived of all news from the outside world; they may not read or write, but can correspond with close relatives once a month, though only a small percentage of letters actually get through. Medical facilities for the prisoners on the island are described by most visitors as being totally inadequate. The authorities state that eight doctors are in regular attendance at the camp, but the visiting journalists all spoke of a serious shortage of medicines and other medical equipment. In less than two and a half years, sixty-five prisoners have died in the camp. In 1971, the authorities stressed that they died not because of conditions they experienced on Buru but as a result of ailments they had before their transfer.Yet, the Bapreru brochure states that all prisoners transferred to Buru would be subject to medical examination first, to check their physical fitness. By December 1972, the London Embassy was claiming that deaths were due not to illness but old age - a surprising shift from original claims that no one over 45 would be taken to the island. A German Catholic missionary, who has worked among the Buru prisoners for a long time, told Peter Schumacher that *the group of old and sick people is a great problem. The younger and healthy prisoners are caring for them as brothers, but there is little hope that they will survive.” Pramudya Ananta Tur, the well-known writer, in Buru since 1969. DETAINEES’ FAMILIES ON BURU In 1972, the first group of wives and children were taken to the island. The Indonesian authorities always insist that their plans to bring the families of the Buru prisoners to the island is evidence of their humanitarianism. But the prisoners themselves, and in general, their relatives, look upon the matter very differently. When the group of journalists visited Buru, no prisoner with whom they spoke showed any desire to have his family with him. While separation from family is one of the most intolerable aspects of their life, they realise that life on Buru is totally unsuitable and far too arduous for their wives and children.(incidentally, nothing has ever been said about how the ’socialising process’ is supposed to work in the case of unmarried prisoners on Buru. They are presumably to be left to live out their lives as single men with no prospect of ever rearing a family.) In a speech to foreign journalists in Jakarta in September 1971, the Attorney-General admitted that a survey, conducted to investigate the attitudes of wives towards the prospects of joining their husbands in Buru had shown that 75 percent were not willing to do so, particularly because of problems for their children. COMMUNITY OF 50,000? But despite all this, the Government proceeded with plans to transport wives and children to Buru, and the first 102 families reached the island in July 1972. In October, Brigadier- General Wadli Prawirasupradja told a press conference in Jakarta that by the end of 1972, 4,500 family members will have been transported to the island and that eventually, families of all prisoners there will join their husbands or fathers, bringing the total population of the camp to 50,000 (including officers in charge). These facts confirm reports reaching Amnesty International that pressure was being brought to bear upon families to go to Buru. One source has reported that wives were presented with the bleak alternative of joining their husbands on Buru or divorcing them. At the October 1972 press conference referred to above, the Attorney- General made it quite clear that, although family members were free citizens, they would not be allowed to leave the Project. He admitted too that enormous social problems had arisen as a result of the arrival of the families. Some that he mentioned were: Education of the children: If this were left to the fathers, the children might grow up ‘dedicated communists’ he said. Communications with the outside world: Free rein could not be permitted as this may be a channel for ’subversive activities’. Livelihood for the families: They could not be allowed to live continually from public kitchens. But economic activity to earn a livelihood would require monetisation, yet he feared that *too much money’ in the hands of the families would be used for *subversive activities’. What better conclusion can be drawn than that contained in an article published in the Indonesian weekly, Tempo on 21st October, 1972: People can well say that, having brought the families there, the problem of the political prisoners appears to have become more complicated than before.” * this and other quotations are taken from the official English translation of the Bapreru brochure. === [PDF page 143] === a women’s detention camp In April 1971, the first batch of women political prisoners were transferred to a newly-established detention camp in Plantungan, Central Java. The camp is situated several miles to the south of the town of Sukoredjo and is approachable only by an almost impassible road. By August 1971, when the second batch of prisoners had been sent there, there were 360 women prisoners at Plantungan and the number was scheduled to increase to 600 in 1972. The prisoners are from the ’B’ cateplantungan gory whose detention will be virtually permanent. Some were originally thought to be ’A’ category but their transfer to Plantungan shows that the Government has abandoned plans to try them and has re-classified them for indefinite detention. The women at Plantungan must work from morning till night in the fields to produce their own foodstuffs. They are only provided with rice and vegetables and must rely on relatives for other food, such as sugar, tea and coffee as well as soap and clothes. Relatives are not permitted to visit prisoners at Plantungan and although food parcels can be sent, communications are difficult and costs are high. The women prisoners at Plantungan working on the fields. This is compulsory labour, and they have to live from their produce. Dr. Sumiarsih Caropeboka, examining a fellow-prisoner at Plantungan. She has no stethoscope and examines her patient by placing her ear on the chest. The daily supply of drink. Boiled water is the only beverage supplied to the prisoners. ...'Now that six years have elapsed since the notorious Lubang Buaya tragedy, a question arose: Is the nation ready to forget the bloody event and give another chance to the Communists to repeat their treachery? The answer must be in the negative lest the Communists make use of the chance for the third time. The Communist movement, though officially banned, is not quite dead in this country. The remnants of the banned PKI activists are still moving around consolidating their forces in their effort to stage a come back... The arrests of Communist remnants here and there support this position.,..(They) should never be given any more chance to participate in the nation’s politics, no matter what their comrades say abroad... Today is the time when the nation should renew the pledge to carry on the struggle of the fallen heroes and Step up vigilance’”’. From an editorial in the Jakarta Times, 30th September, 1971 Many women prisoners were pregnant when they were arrested and gave birth in detention. Others were arrested with small children. Where there are no relatives to take the children, they grow up in detention or may eventually be placed in orphanages or families willing to take them, (On the right) One of the youngest prisoners at the camp. When this Photograph was taken, she was under 20 and had been in detention for six years, She has had no contact with her relatives since her arrest. A prisoner asleep in the dormitory. The space allotted to her is about two feet wide. The mat, blanket and pillow she uses were obtained from private donations. (These shots were taken from a film made by a unit of the 25 Dutch TV company, KRO, in August 19719); === [PDF page 144] === 26 In 1971, amid considerable international pressure and concern, the Indonesian Government undertook to release 22,000 ’C’ category prisoners and since then, some thousands have been freed though no reliable figures are available. But in a society so gripped by the fear of communism’ release is by no means the end of the problem for the ex-detainee. According to official information, these prisoners of the ’C’ category in Tanggerang were recently released from prison. Let us take the case of prisoners who return to their home towns or villages to rejoin their families. After six years or more without contact, a released prisoner may return home to find that his wife has remarried or that all his relatives have left without trace. The majority, coming back after such a long absence, find a community afraid to welcome them back; alienation from friends, neighbours and even close relatives is the result. They may find that their home is now occupied by military personnel. Here is one example of the caprice with which the military authorities treat the homes of political detainees. In 1970, the Jakarta military command wrote a letter notifying the occupant of a large house in the city that they planned to expropriate it because it was large and in a ’VIP area’. His assent would be assumed unless they received his refusal in writing. The man was then - and is now - in Salemba Prison. The house was appropriated. As a political prisoner is unable to receive or send letters, he had, of course, been unable even to read the original letter, let alone to object. READJUSTMENT TO BE DIFFICULT Then comes the problem of readjusting to society. There are no state schemes to facilitate this difficult process and no private associations dare to take the initiative, except occasional Christian organisations. Even where accommodation can be found, it will not be easy to find a job in a country with such a high rate of unemployment. Few people want to take the risk of employing a man or woman with a communist’ reiease the problems past, and many jobs are firmly closed to applicants without political clearance papers. On paper, those released that are of certain professional groups have specific rights; released prisoners who were once civil servants or in the armed forces are classified into three sub-categories: C1, C2 and C3. Those in the first category are entitled to apply for pensions but may not regain their former post. Those in the second category are allowed, in principle, to return to their former office but are excluded from senior positions. Those in the third category are entitled to full rehabilitation. Impressive in theory, the practice is less secure as hardly anyone knows what category he or she belongs to and the former place of work may be quite unaware of, or unwilling to recognise, the exdetainee’s rights. In some cases, it takes time before the authorities decide upon a person’s release category and meanwhile he is bound to remain idle, trying to keep alive by doing odd jobs. Furthermore, there is no form of legal redress if a former prisoner’s rights are not acknowledged, or his house has been requisitioned. He finds himself in many cases a second-class citizen and cannot hope to take legal action because of the expense. A few legal aid institutes have recently been established on private initiative, but they dare not provide unpaid legal services to ex-detainees because of the stigma that would attach to their work. Added to all this, the spectre of rearrest is very real. Released prisoners are the first to come under suspicion if a fire breaks out or a train is derailed. Such events are immediately interpreted by the Army as ’subversive sabotage’ or the work of ’communist agents’. For all these reasons, life for the released detainee is replete with difficulties. indonesian attitudes WHY POLITICAL PRISONERS ARE A POLITICAL NECESSITY Why doesn’t the Indonesian Government release these political prisoners whose continued existence is damaging in terms of international relations? This is one answer sent to Amnesty from Indonesia. One possible answer can be found in the basic strategy of the Suharto Administration. To execute his economic development programme, President Suharto feels it necessary to stabilise political life. He has given this job to the military. It has now become clear that what is meant by political stability is the absence of any kind of conflicts in society and that any situation which produces conflicts, even differences of opinion, cannot be tolerated. The stability President Suharto wants is not a dynamic one, but a static stability, almost a repression of freedom and action. All this has been done under the banner of economic development. This slogan has become the key word to legitimise all kinds of action including action that violates human rights and is against the Indonesian legal system and constitution. Thedetention of 100,000 people is also part of this strategy. If they were released nothing might happen, but it is also possible that something would happen and the present Covernment does not want to take the risk. They argue that it is better to sacrifice 100,000 people than the 120,000,000 who still live in poverty. So it is clear that the root of the problem lies very deep in the Government’s basic concept of development. But Indonesian intellectuals are asking whether this kind of policy is a good one. Is it not better if we try to humanise the development programme, with the consequences of making it a bit slower? The essential point of this explanation is that there is an obsession with economic development resulting in a parallel obsession with social and political stability. Yet if the political prisoners continue to be held, other governments might be under pressure to stop their aid to Indonesia. There have been many moves in this direction coming not only from communists but also from non-political intellectuals, inspired by simple humanitarianism. Why has the Suharto Administration not responded to this pressure? It may be because no government has yet stopped its aid to Indonesia because of the political prisoner problem, but it may be for another reason. And here, I come to my second hypothesis. One observer has drawn a comparison between the Javanese concept of power and that of the Western world. For the westerner, power is something abstract, a way of communicating with others, but for the Javanese, power is very concrete. Whereas for the westerner, power is unlimited and can be exercised through a knowledge of the techniques and a control over material things, according to the Javanese concept, power is dispensed by a supernatural force and is subject to limitations. Where good order and prosperity prevail, the man in power can rest assured of his legitimacy. But when disorder appears, whether natural Indonesian army officer detained in a West Kaimantan prison, suspected of involvement in the 1965 coup. disaster or social conflict, this is taken as a sign that the man in power has done wrong and power is slipping from his hands. Now President Suharto is deeply influenced by the Javanese tradition which would teach him to regard conflict as a sign that power is slipping from his hands, even if that conflict is necessary for progress. Your opinions may differ from his but you must be circumspect in the way you express them. As one Indonesian newspaper editor has said, you may appeal to the government but you may not criticise. According to this hypothesis, President Suharto may well fear that if the political prisoners were released they may disturb the stability and the harmony that has been achieved, which, because of his cultural background, would make him uneasy upon his legitimacy to hold power. A third explanation concerns the Army. When Indonesia gained its independence, the military only served as a defence and security force. But in the 1960’s, the late President Sukarno used the army as a socio-political force in order to balance the growing strength of the Indonesian Communist Party. The concept of the ’dual function of the military’ was launched as the philosophical base to legitimise this new role. Military generals became ministers in the cabinet as well as directors in state companies. When the abortive coup of 1965 happened, the military, of course, were very active. The civilian force was practically crippled and at that time the military role was well received by the civilians because they desperately needed it. The situation improved and as a result of the economic development policy followed by the military themselves, a new hero emerged: the economist. Then followed the tragic fate of all military, the fate they can never avoid: in wartime people receive them with flowers; in peacetime they receive them with sour faces. But it seems that the Indonesian army are not ready to accept such a tragic fate. Under the banner of ’political stability for economic development’. they now have a new role - as the custodian of social-political stability - and to legitimise this role they have to show the people that there are enemies..... The communist political prisoners act very well as a scapegoat. The danger of communist subversion is continually and dramatically proclaimed by the military. New arrests are being made continuously in order to convince the common people that they are still active communist members. The slogan ’subversive’ has replaced the slogan of ’British-American Neo-Colonialism and Imperialism’ used during the Sukarno period. So my third hypothesis is that the political prisoner problem is needed by the present Government to legitimise the military power to rule because it creates a sense of danger. The military of Indonesia has tasted the honey of power and they want to keep it in their hands. It seems that these three factors (and maybe there are more) are interwoven, which makes the problem so complicated. 27 === [PDF page 145] === the prisoners speak ”We strongly urge Amnesty International to continue and intensify its activities to protect the interests of all political prisoners in Indonesia in accordance with Amnesty International’s principles of human rights and its objective of protecting those who are deprived of justice and human dignity, or who have been victimised by abuses of the law. ” The practice of arbitrarily assigning a 30th September/PKI Movement label to any person has become a powerful tool in the hands of the authorities to enrich themselves at the expense of the political prisoners and their families ”.. Unofficial sources have informed me that my classification has been changed from ’C’ tot ’B’ category..... As a matter of fact, a prisoner's classification can be changed at will by any team which has some authority in this matter. For example, my status has suddenly changed to category ’B’ and perhaps, after the last interrogation.....1 might become category ’A’ or ’X’! ” From a letter sent out of prison by a political prisoner who has been adopted by Amnesty. JAVA ON FORCED LABOUR The project is owned by a company of which the Military Area Commander and his family hold the majority of the shares. ”The prisoners are allowed to have their families with them but the majority prefer not to because the local population look upon them as social outcasts and there would be no future for the wives and children. The political prisoners live in wooden barracks and their labour can be used in other places as well. Now and then, families send food but only a part reaches the prisoners. There is a serious shortage of medicine and proteins, The daily wage is Rp. 15 ($0.04) which is spent mainly on soap and tobacco (the cigarettes are shared). When the prisoners fall ill, they are sent to the local military clinic but there is little in the way of medicine and medical facilities. ”To most political prisoners, the 28 monotonous camp life is very depressing. They work seven days a week from seven in the morning till five in the evening with an hour for lunch. Sometimes they work in the evenings too, from seven until ten o’clock, with floodlighting. ”They live very isolated lives, and there are no radios or newspapers. They have hardly any contact with the local population..... ”They get hardly any material aid from outside and have to buy their own clothes and shoes from their wages of Rp. 15 a day.......” Interview with a prisoner 1972 SUMATRA LIVING CONDITIONS AT A MILITARY PRISON ”Blocks A and B are each used for four persons and sometimes for five, whereas according to the regulations, they should only be used for two. From six in the morning till five in the evening, the detainees remain within the confines of an area 2m by 8m. From five in the evening till 6 in the morning, they remain within the confines of an area 2m by 4m, where they have to eat, sleep, @ urinate, etc..... Detainees are allowed out only to fetch water and food, to obtain medical treatment, to get religious instruction, for interrogation or, when permitted, to meet relatives. ”Food is provided twice a day and amounts to two handfuls per person for each meal. Vegetables consist of only boiled cabbage and nothing else....Beverages consist of boiled water only, given twice a day.... The water for bathing and washing and other purposes is dirty. Only when it rains heavily is there any clean water....... During the hot season, the prisoners confine themselves to washing their faces and eating-utensils only, and the water is very muddy. The medical facilities are extremely unsatisfactory. If a detainee falls seriously ill, his fate is in the hands of the Almighty. A fee of Rp. 25 ($0.06) must be paid for injections, but where can the political prisoners get the money from?....... Besides direct experiences, I saw many things that were diametrically opposed to the principles of humanitarianism and the law, and heard the sufferings and grief-stricken moans of the political prisoners both with regard to their own sufferings as well as those of their families and children living outside. But who hears or wants to hear, who sees or wants to see their sufferings and moans except God, the Almighty and Most Merciful?....” Released prisoner’s letter 1972. AND THE WIVES’ VIEW ”Tell Amnesty to keep fighting. The Army has promised to help me but it is only to enrich themselves. They talk and talk as they please; false promises, false inside information, all fabricated by themselves. Still many arrests, still many re-arrests and still many cases of torture, especially committed towards arrested common soldiers and lower-rank officers. Let Amnesty International go on.” From a letter sent to a relative abroad by the wife of a political prisoner. ”T feel there should be some rules (or laws) for political prisoners the world over,which somehow could give them and their families a certain feeling of security. I think revolutions against existing governments will & oe for some time in all kinds of SZintries, and I think that the status of the political prisoners has never been defined, while the status of war prisoners has already been discussed by the Red Cross. I am thinking of a fair trial, for instance, instead of a lasting detention for an uncertain amount of time; of house-arrest instead of imprisonment, which would certainly lighten the burden of the families; of regular (monthly) visits which would be able to maintain the ties between father-mother and children and prevent estrangement; of the possibility to read and write and do other constructive work..... Could not these things be discussed on a world scale, to make the best of an unfavourable situation?” From a letter written by the wife of a political prisoner to friends abroad. Political prisoners doing compulsory work at the Balikpapan airport, East Kalimantan. A CRY FOR HELP FROM 800 POLITICAL PRISONERS IN EAST KALIMANTAN The letter translated below, dated 4th January, 1972, was written and signed by one of the 800 political prisoners now being held in East Kalimantan. He was writing from Balikpapan. Dear Sir, Here in East Kalimantan, 800 political prisoners, including myself, have been held under detention since October 1965 in connection with what is generally called the 30th September/PKI Movement, without any prospect of being released. We all have suffered from extensive interrogation and investigation, far exceeding the bounds of humane treatment. We have been beaten which more than once led to the hospitalisation of the victim. Heavy tyres have been tied round our necks. We have been stripped naked and our testicles have been punched. We have been thrown into the sea and pushed into self-dug pits covered at the bottom with glass splinters. We have been given electric shocks and cigarettes have been used to burn us. I could go on like this but this piece of paper would not be large enough to describe all the hardships we have suffered. There are some among us who have been shot through the mouth. The authorities have forced us to confess to things that are not true even though we have already told them everything of importance in connection with our cases. Lately, it appears that the authorities have begun to trust us a little: we are allowed to work outside. We have been forced to work on the construction of Government buildings for meagre remuneration. Often we have to work as ‘volunteers’ and receive nothing at all. The officers use us as servants to wash dishes and clothes and to clean out the toilets. If you care to earn Rp. 75 ($0.18) a day, you can work day and night on the reconstruction of the Balikpapan Airport. There are hundreds of other odd jobs we have to do for the officers, far too many to mention them all, Because we have been imprisoned for such a long time already and no-one seems to do anything about our release, many of our families have broken up. Many wives have decided to get a divorce, and more often than not, the children of prisoners have to leave school for financial reasons. Many of my friends have died: sometimes death surprises us while we are chopping wood in the forest. There are female prisoners here too, some of whom were pregnant when they arrived. Their children have been born and raised in captivity. These are just a few of the problems I should like to stress. It is nothing more than a broad outline. Since we do not know how long they will go on detaining us and the future offers no prospects - not even exile with our families like our friends who have been sent to Buru - we ask you for your help and support as soon as possible. Perhaps it will be possible for you to ask the Government to hear us and to put us on trial. If it is proved that we have done nothing wrong, we could then be released. However, if the authorities still want to consider us as a danger to society, would it not be possible for them to exile us to a remote island, together with our families? We are eagerly awaiting your help and we thank you in advance. We are relying upon you - it is our only hope for the future. Yours sincerely,” === [PDF page 146] === 30 memorandum EXTRACTS FROM MEMORANDUM TO PRESIDENT SUHARTO AND THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA SUBMITTED BY THE CHAIRMAN OF AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (February 1971) *While fully appreciating the extremely difficult and dangerous situation which faced the Indonesian Government in 1965 and 1966, it is considered that the continued detention of vast numbers of persons who are uncharged and untried clearly contravenes the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the norms of the Rule of Law. The continuance of this situation is obviously highly damaging to the image of Indonesia in the outside world; it also tends to prolong the memory and bitterness resulting from the tragic events of 1965. From discussions we have had with both the responsible civil and military authorities in Jakarta, we believe that the Indonesian Government appreciates the necessity of dealing with this problem. ”One of the difficulties we have found in the course of our investigations is the absence of reliable public statistics as to the number of prisoners held...... esses It is strongly recommended that the Government should take steps to obtain and publish precise figures as to the numbers held. Unless this is done the Government itself and the international agencies which are prepared to help the Government will be faced with added difficulties in the formulation of release programmes. *In regard to the Category ”A”’ prisoners the problem as we see it is that even if charges and evidence are available to put them on trial, the existing judicial machinery is totally inadequate to undertake the trial of 5,000 persons. It is understood that it is the intention of the Government to appoint five hundred new judges by 1974 for the purpose of undertaking these trials. Even if the Government does find it possible to appoint five hundred new judges and the necessary ancillary legal personnel within the course of the next two or three years, the trial of some 5,000 persons is bound to take another 10 years or so. This would mean that many of those awaiting trial will probably die before they are tried and that in a number of cases trials will take place only some 10 to 15 years after the events that form the basis of charges. This is obviously most unsatisfactory. It is therefore suggested that a re-assessment of the cases of the 5,000 prisoners in Category ”A” should be undertaken with a view to the release of those against whom there is no evidence and of those who even if guilty of some offence, could be regarded as having purged their offence by the 5 years they have already spent in prison. It is believed that if such a review of the Category A” prisoners were undertaken, the number remaining for trial would be considerably reduced. The programme for the streng thening of the judicial machinery and the appointment of additional judges should in any case be proceeded with as the existing judicial machinery is insufficient by any standards. The existing judges, while dedicated, are overwhelmed with work. In regard to the Category ’’B”’ prisoners it is suggested that in these cases too there should be a complete revaluation. It is completely contrary to the norms of the Rule of Law that persons suspected of being ’communist”’ should be detained indefinitely without charge or trial. If any of them are alleged to have committed crimes, they should ”The principal reason advanced by members of the Government for the slowness in the release of the Category ”C” prisoners is the fear of physical reprisals by the local populations. There has been no evidence of such an attitude by the population in the very substantial releases which have taken place in the last year. It is confidentl hoped that the President and membe of the Government could offset any such danger by appealing to the population to facilitate the reintegration of the released prisoners into the life of the Indonesian nation. Without questioning the well-meaning motives which may have inspired the massive transportation of untried prisoners to island detention camps, it is a policy which is fraught with grave danger and which cannot be justified under any legal concept. The transportation for life of 10,000 prisoners, mostly males, without their families to camps on remote islands is clearly contrary to the laws of humanity and to justice. What is to happen to these vast penal settlements in the future? Is this the best way of eradicating the bitterness and dissension of the past? Is it wise to create substantial pockets of population, which will not unnaturally nourish resentment against the authorities who have transported them there? If any programme of resettlement for ex-prisoners is envisaged, this should be done on the basis of reintegration of the ex-prisoners into the life of the community and, wherever possible, on the basis of family grouping... In relation to the treatment of all prisoners we would respectfully draw the attention of the Indonesian Government to the provisions of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. We appreciate that in the existing circumstances it will take some time before they can be fully put into operation in Indonesia. We would, however, urge that copies of these Rules should be supplied to the commandants of all military camps of detention where prisoners are detained. *The concern of Amnesty International in making the propositions herein set forth was to put forward proposals which might be of assistance to the Indonesian Government in the solution of a problem which is of paramount importance for the future development and stability of the Republic of Indonesia. Amnesty International and indeed the other international organisations working in the human rights field would, we feel, be more than willing to extend any assistance in their power to the Indonesian Government to secure the constructive solution of these problems.” Sean MacBride, S.C. lst February, 1971. ‘what can amnesty do? Amnesty is essentially a case working organisation; individual prisoners are allocated to groups of Amnesty members throughout the world - in Holland, America, Japan, Bangladesh or Sweden - who then plead for their release. The idea is a simple one: it is invariably misunderstood. In 1971, the Soviet newspaper Isvestia carried a strongly-worded article denouncing the ’malignant slanderers’ who were then publicising Soviet treatment of political dissenters. ‘Especially zealous’, it noted, ’is the notorious Amnesty International’. In May, 1972, the Indonesian army paper Angkatan Bersenjata, criticised Amnesty in equally hostile terms for its reports on political imprisonment in Indonesia. Amnesty was ’an organisation of the New Left? it lacked objectivity and had never ’made accusations against happenings in the Socialist countries’. The ideology was different, but the articles shared a common feature: both saw Amnesty’s efforts as directed solely against their own governments: neither understood the cardinal principle of Amnesty’s work - to press for the release of prisoners of conscience regardless of politics or belief. HOW IT WORKS How does the system work? Prisoners are selected by the International Secretariat but a case is never adopted if there seems the slightest risk that this could hamper a man’s situation or chances of release. As soon as it receives a case sheet, the Amnesty group writes to the Government asking for the prisoner’s release, and explaining that this case is only one of three for whom they work. A representative group might be working for an Indonesian, a Russian and a Spanish prisoner. The aim of this arrangement is to ensure political balance and to prevent any part of Amnesty from becoming politically partisan. In the case of the USSR and Indonesia, the group’s letters will probably go unanswered. When an Amnesty delegate raised this with one civilian Minister in Jakarta, the reply was revealing. Although the Minister normally replied to all enquiries, he had stopped even acknowledging Amnesty’s letters after he had been formally censured in a Cabinet meeting for ’corresponding with communists’; his colleagues had assumed that anyone concerned with the rights of political prisoners must be acting from a political rather than a humanitarian motive - in their view political prisoners had forfeited their claim to rights. In Spain, Amnesty’s work is better understood; since 1970, prisoners can correspond, receive parcels of books and clothing and - most important - Amnesty members may arrange to visit their adopted prisoner in prison. THREE DEFINITE AIMS Even in Indonesia there are. exceptions to the general rules of silence. Last year, the Commandant of Buru authorised a New Zealand group to correspond with their adopted prisoner. In response, the group have written to their prisoner monthly but,have, as yet, received no reply. In real terms, what, then, can an Amnesty group do? The difficulties are clear, but there are three definite aims. The first and most important is to create a growing awareness within the Indonesian state administration, military as well as civilian, that a country which imprisons its Opposition and uses political imprisonment as an instrument of government, must forfeit foreign confidence in the quality of its government. To this end, Amnesty groups publicise their cases, alerting economists about the detention of an economist, journalists about journalists, doctors about a doctor, parliamentarians about an elected MP. Amnesty groups proliferate in the major aid-giving countries - 420 in West Germany alone. Secondly, the group must arouse the conscience of people inside Indonesia - lawyers, the press, the prisoner’s former colleagues. Thirdly and of equal importance, the groups must ensure that the prisoners know they are not forgotten. It is clear that here there has been some success: Christnras cards have reached Buru; Amnesty postcards have been seen by women in Bukit Duri Prison; on one of the smaller islands, prisoners have made emblems to symbolise their appreciation of Amnesty’s efforts; in Java, a prisoner has written asking the organisation to ’continue and intensify its activities to protect the interests of all political prisoners in Indonesia in accordance with Amnesty International’s principles of human rights and its objectives of protecting those who are deprived of justice and human dignity or who have been victimised by abuses of the law.” TWO ANSWERS Criticisms can, of course, be levelled at this apparently piecemeal approach to such an enormous problem, since only a fraction of those in prison can be adopted. Is it just - or indeed desirable - to single out a hundred or so prisoners and ignore the others? There are two answers. Each adopted prisoner is a symbol of his 54,999 fellows, and while group work is providing continuing low-key pressure, it is the job of Amnesty’s International Secretariat and national sections to take general initiatives on behalf of the prisoners as a group. These can take many forms. _ The two missions in 1969 and 1970 have been mentioned elsewhere; both were led by internationally-respected lawyers and both met Indonesian legal and military officials specifically to discuss political imprisonment. Before official contacts between the Indonesian Government and the governments of other countries, Amnesty briefs Ministers of the countries concerned. Its consultative status at the United Nations enables it to draw the attention of human rights and technical agencies to the Indonesian problem. Journalists are regularly briefed and when the international press reports on Indonesia, its information on detention - whether accredited or not - has often come from Amnesty’s files. Utopian though it may seem, the aim of Amnesty’s work is thus to apply persistent, informed and courteous pressure which, cumulatively, will persuade the Indonesian authorities to look again at the tens of thousands of prisoners, now cut from society, and recognise them as men and women to whom human and legal rights are as much due as to a head of state - or to an army officer. === [PDF page 147] === eee: encatignensa Son ee eaten lees Taha OR. OE, SS ete meee © Mae meee te. - === [PDF page 148] === . [theta pubeing ee eay5 a [OG ea a: PPORIEM OF POLITICAL ea Us & HOW TO HANDLE rr wo BY: ae Budiman |: te .:: (TEMPO, June 9, 1973.- ry) I think Indonesians: who have travelled: abrohd wilt agree with me that one of the difficult things is when-we are asked questions about the volitical prisoners. Usually our arguments in defense of the government are easily refuted so that. at most we can say that they don't under- Stand the conditions and situations in Indonesia. ° Meanwhile,they continue piercing us with questions like these: “Is it human to keep people in. custody for seven years. without trlal?. What do you think about the statement of attorney general Sugih Arto that B-category political prisoners are considered muilty but since Pe cannot yet be proved they are not brought. to trial?" Interest in the political prisoners have apparently been prowinz particularly since the Vietnam warswas:nearing settlement. When formerly we were asked about Bali when ‘they knew we were Indonesians, now they, notably students, ask questions about political prisoners. Why has the problem become popular now® -The:- reason is of course that there are individuals or groups that campaien against it. It can be assumed that they are Conmunists or Commmist sympathizers but there also these who agitate. about 1t purely on grounds of humanity. The latter inciudes Anmesty . International waich camaign aeainst political prisoners in Indonesia and also in other countries, including the Commmist comtries. But Inconesia is promptty in. the focus - of attention because it has the largest. nurber of prisoners and is called "le plus grand prison du monde," the ¢ eee G prison in the world. The campaton will pEDLARAY become more. ‘Intense. Two EMehS apo, the Dutch and Belgian branch of Amesty International published a book on political prisoners in Indonesia. The book was prepared well, illustrated with pictures of the prisoners and contained stories which were so written that they were moving vhen you read them. (For exarple; the story of Suglyah, a firl who was captured at Lubang Buaya when she was thirte en and-ecrled for,her. mother when she was taken away. Since her-arrest,.she has never seen her family). Stories === [PDF page 149] === Stories like this make the ordinary peovle in Europe interested in the problem and promptly relate it to Nazi concentration cams in the second world war so that the problem 1s seen even more dramatically. Meanvhile, demonstrations were staged such as that which theater and movie artists staped in London the day before vesterday. When Pak Harto visited France, some tMelishmen, including members of Parliament, wrote a letter tc THF GUARDIAN calling attention of the British government to the problem before giving economic aid to Indonesia. In France itself there was a profusion of publications issued by leftist proups on the subject. When Pak Harto was welcored in the Paris city hall, a couple of newspapermen deronstratively left the room by piving the Nazi salute. (In France the Commmist party is very strong). There are other mitters which can be told endlessly. What interests me is our povernment attitude to the problem. It seems that the government acopts this stand: let them agitate, anyhowthey are Commmists and it is prover for Commmists to mount such a campaign. This attitude is obviously Inadequate because the problem of political prisoners is not purely a political problem but also contains humanitarian aspects. This makes the position of Annesty International strong in lts campaign and the prouns that are politically motivated also exploit them. They seek to put themselves on a level with Amesty International. If the Indonesian government is hostile to this organization and regards it as a Comrunist sroup, then this attitude will bolster the Com munist grouns which campaim for political purposes. In Europe everybody knows that Amesty International is a non-political organization which is viewed with enmity by both the Snanish and Greek governments and the pgovernments in Eastern Furope. To the Europeans, hostility to Amesty will make the country concerned unpopular and Amesty and those who ride on its bandwagon more popular. It is the latter that is a problem for us. I think the Indonesian government had better revise its attitude in dealing with public opinion in Europe. A strategy aimed at separating the groups which campaign for political ends and the proups which struggle nonpolitically is very important at this time. Having met various kinds of people in Europe, I think we can talk with those who question the problem of political prisoners on a moral basis. With those who are politically motivated it is difficult indeed to talk, but fortunately our position is at least equal to theirs, if not stronger. We can easily point to the political prisoners kept in the Conmunist coumtrtes and we can also say that ir Indonesia was a Commmist country it might not be better with regard to political prisoners. Of course, it is not enough to maintain better contacts with Amnesty International and similar institutions to cultivate public opinion in Burope. Something must be done at home. I: think it is time that the problem was settled before it is too late, that is when public opinion in Europe is as negative toward Indonesia as 1t is toward the present South Vietnanese government. The rejection of President Thieu to visit France and his unpleasant welcome in Bonn when thousands of students were demonstrating against him should be made a lesson. If the situation is like this, only the Commmist groups that are talking about the political prisoners will smile. Whether we will Jearn from the experience of others or will want to have the expericiice ov.selves, that's the question. tet === [PDF page 150] === RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 52 26 JUL 1973 whether the Secretary of State for Defence, during his visit to Indonesia PH Ardy DUDLLC! Government of that country on theix rapid achievement on domestic security Lord Avebury - To ask Her Majest) My Lords, I made no comment on domestic seCcuriuy in Indonesia during my visit to that country, which was in February. === [PDF page 151] === rChicle House of Lords Be amit nn fa PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION WY chore 1) prog Tt*The Lord Avebury — To ask Her Majesty’s Government whether the Secretary of State for Defence, during his visit to Indonesia in April, publicly commended the Government of that country on their rapid achievement on domestic security. j : aay [Unreadable] Lee - OO gt wa ee YD 2 (one ae MOO <a [Unreadable] === [PDF page 152] === BACK( yROUND nore Cea BT ND ar Lord Avebury's question may be based upon a misunderstanding of what you said in your press conference in Djakarta on 8 Februar} your opening statement you said, "I have been much impressed with all I have seen and in particular with the very evident resilience and economic progress of Indonesia." Later, in reply to a question you also said, "I have been impressed by the remarkable crowth, resilience and resurgence of Tndonesia in a very short time. You made no comment on any aspect of domestic security, nor did any question invite you to do so. It is possible that Lord Avebury may nonetheless wish to pursue matters relating to internal security, political detainees and BMG's attitude. These matters are dealt with drat supplementaries 9-13. Notes prepared by the FCO on political detainees, including one specific case which has been the subject of some Parliamentary interest are attached. === [PDF page 153] === BACKGROUND NOTE POLITICAL DETAINEES IN INDONESIA le In March Amnesty International issued a report entitled indonesia Special" drawing attention to the condition of 55,000 untried political prisoners in Indonesia. Amnesty recognised that the figure should be treated with reserve. The Indonesian authoritieg, told us Chis-nonth that there were approximately 2©7,000- in detention./* “This is still a great many, but mention could usefully be made in public of the Indonesian figure. Amnesty are on strong ground in criticising the very slow rate at which the Indonesian authorities are bringing detainees to trial. So far as we are aware, Amnesty have not accused the Indonesians of using torture on the detainees although allegations of this have been made in public. Amnesty have said that the Indonesians do not observe the minimum UN rules for prisons and detention camps which prohibit "cruel and degrading treatment". oy The Indonesians have classified the detainees under various heads, notably: Class A, those against whom they possess evidence of their implication in the 1965 abortive coup which would enable the Government to prosecute in the courts; Class B, known Communists whose implication in the coup could not be proven; Class C, those who have been sympathetic to the Indonesian Communist Party; Class X, _ those not yet classified. There is mother Class (@) about ‘which CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 154] === which little is known. The populations of all classes fluctuate as the prisoners are re= classified, released and sometimes re~arrested,. It is known that the Indonesians are currently considering how to speed up trial of the detainees, and are looking at the possibility of releasing large numbers of those in Class B, 36 We took up with the Indonesian Government the case of MNre Budiardjo, who had been held in detention in Indonesia for her association with the Communist Party there. We were able to establish that she had UK Citizenship and she was ty onncd an 197): She and members of her family, with the support of some Opposition MPs, are pressing us to take up the case of her husband, who is an Indonesian and a Class aA detainee. We have talked to the sndonesi ans in confidence Bove bro KH Cs Depo Ruck (71 about the case and ee scoreiy wee Mrs Budiardjo. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 155] === OF Vans ie course of an included a number of countries in the those who Five rangements I went and National Security. I held wide ranging discussions with my Indonesian colleagues on matters of common concern. I ned the role of HMG in the Power Defence In the course of a press c tribute to the resili and economic progress of Indonesia. I also said that if Indonesia made requests for assistance in defence matters, or put forward proposals for co-operation in this 11d be willing to consider could do within the available to then. e@7 It did not prove for me to.seée === [PDF page 156] === DEFENCE DEE ENC 4. INDONESIAN ATTITUDE TO FIVE POWER DEFENCE AR iD ° NWEUTRALISATION OF SOUTH EAST ASIA tANGEMEN TS The Royal Navy pay a number of visits to Indonesian ports each run a modest year. We programme for the training of serving Indonesian officers in this The Indonesian Government understand the role of HMG in the Five rancemanta aneetent By the Kuala Lumpar declaration of November 1971 the member of Governments of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) (indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore Thailand and the Philippines) pledged themselves to take the necessary step to bring about the recognition of South East Asia freedom and as a zone of peace, neutrality. It was proposed that the area should be neutralised and guarantees sought from the superpowers that they would not interfere in the region's affairs. The declaration was the subject of Soviet criticism on account of the role of Thailand and the Philippines in providing support === [PDF page 157] === . VISIT BY PRESIDENT OF INDONESIA ve MINISTERIAL VISITS BETWEEN INDONESIA AND UK for the US forces operat in Vietnam. The Chine made no public comment on if andicateds. thet HMG welcomes the idea of neutrality while I though I also sugges difficulties of achieving it should not be underestimated. The President of Indonesia would be a most welcome visitor to this country. It has not yet proved possible to -arrange for a visit. There have been senior Ministerial country and Indonesia over two years. On our side the in chronological order have been, the Minister of Overseas Developme Secretary, the Minister Portfolio and myself. The Indonesian visitors were the Minister for Administrative Reforn (Dr Emil Salim) and the Minister for / Security === [PDF page 158] === 8. INTERNAL SITUATION 9. POLITICAL PRI' IN INDONESIA SONERS PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION An Indonesian parliamentary delegation visited Britain in June 1972. General elections were held in Indonesia in 1971, for the first time in fifteen years. President administration secured a comfortable majority. In March 1973 the President was unanimously re-elected by the People's Congress for a further term of five years. President's Government has no serious political rival at present. They face serious problems in assuring the supply of rice following last year's drought in South East Asia. The Indonesian authorities have recently confirmed that there are approximately 1%,000 detainees (2,000 Class A, 13,000 Class B and 38,000 unclassified known as Class X). The total is very much lower than the "not less than 55,000" quoted in the report by Amnesty International in March 1974 === [PDF page 159] === 10. REPRESENTATIONS BY HMG TO INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT ai. ACTION BY SMG AT THE UN 42. MR SUWONDO BUDIARDJQ ATD PROGRAMME The Indonesian authorities are aware of the concern felt in this country about the detainees in Indonesia. But none of those in detention there, so far as we are aware, is a national of this country and we have no locus standi for raising the matter. We take the initiative in raising these matters only when we are directly involved, when we have adequate evidence and when we are that our action will benefit victims of the actions im question. These criteria are not met in this instance. Mr Budiardjo is an Indonesian citizen. We are considering what further assistance we might give his wife who is a UK citizen. For developmental and other reasons Indonesia is the largest non- Commonwealth beneficiary under United Kingdom bilateral aid programme (£7 million disbursed === [PDF page 160] === 14. COMPENSATION al Cl pl SABE 19°73 (£12M) one twentieth of total offers made by Wester donors and Japan to Indonesia. The aid programme does not give us. grounds for intervening in internal affairs In March of this year the Indonesians put proposals for the settlement of claims to most of ompanies whose eligible under their present compensation scheme. Some of the Sill considering the proposals. We have reminded the Indonesians that a number of claimants have had no response to their claims. === [PDF page 161] === Vritten Answers 127 under negotiated contracts were frozen by stage 1 of the counter-inflation programme but sales by auction or tender were not affected. Under stage 2 all Sales of unprocessed timber have been freed from price control and this will be reffected in future prices. Mr. William Hamilton asked the Secretary of State for Scotland (1) if he will ensure that home grown timber is sold by the Forestry Commission by public auclion or open tender; (2) if he will take steps to abolish longterm negotiated contracts on the sale of timber by the Forestry Commission. Mr. Gordon Campbeli: No. The method by which the Forestry Commission sells its timber varies according to the circumstances and should be left to its commercial judgment. Wood Pulp and Chip Prices Mr. William Hamilton asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will initiate inquiries into means of ensuring that wood pulp and chip prices are economic enough to discourage the waste of timber at pulp mills. Mr. Gordon Campbell: I see no need for an inquiry. The demand by pulp mills for home-grown wood for pulping and for bark-free chins exceeds the available supply, and the prices are fully competitive. Etaerly Persons (Concessionary Travel) Mr. Gourlay asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what representations he has received requesting consideration of 2 scheme whereby senior citizens be given an authority card to enable them to obtain haif price rail or sea travel, plus one tree ticket per year to any destination in the United Kingdom; and if he will make a statement. Mr. Gordon Campbell: None. Any such scheme would be a matter for the transport operators concerned. Criminal Injzries Compensation Claims Mr. Edward Taylor asked the Secretary of State for Scoltand how many claims have been allowed by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board in the most recent year for which figures are available; and what was the shortest, sEN@I 18 JULY 1973 Written Answers 128 longest and average length of time, respectively, between the submission of the claim and. the making of a decision. financial Gordon Campbell: During the year 9 19/2-755 es00) Claims arising from Scotland were resolved by the making of an award. The information required to answer the second part of the Question is not available in the form requested, but the following table gives in respect of Scotland and England and Wales information for 1972-73 concerning the period taken in investigating applications and preparing them for decision by board members. Time Taken to Investigate Cases 1972-73 per cent, Not more than 3 months.., oa 48 More than 3 months, not more than 6 months... vg Gh ie 30 More than 6 months, not more than 9 months... sie Bah ie 13 More than 9 monthis, not more than 12 months... oe Ben ae >) More than 12 months ie 4 FORKIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS Spain (Trade Unionists) 33. Mr. Golding asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he will raise at the UN Commission on Wuman Rights the question of the continuing harassment of trade unionists in Spain. Mr. Amery: No. We standing to raise this matter. have no Mozambique ronin asked the Secretary of St j i and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on the report he has sought from the British Consul General in Mozambique concerning allegations that atrocities had been committed by Portuguese troops. Royle: Mr. Anthony I have nothing to add to what my right hon. Friend said in the debate yesterday. Indonesia (Political Prisoners) 35, Mir. Ronald King Murray asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth A Afiaits wheiker he will refer are IB ALE te Or, WB: Awd ons === [PDF page 162] === 129 to the UN Commission on Human Rights the matter of the detention of political prisoners without trial in Indonesia « and if he will make a statement. Mr. Royle: No. to raise this matter Written Answers We have no standing Nuclear Tests Mr. Laurance Reed asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what action he will take to implement the resolution passed by the First United Nations Law of the Sea Conference regarding nuclear tests on the high seas. Mr. Amery: None. The resolution on nuclear tests on the high seas adopted by the First United Nations Law of the Sea Conference on 27th April 1958 did not call for any action by Her Majesty’s Government. It referred the question of nuclear tests for appropriate action to the General Assembly of the United Nations, Mr. Laurance Reed asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a proiest to the French Government about the effect on British interests of France’s breach of Article 25 of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas relating to the prevention of pollution of the seas or air space above resulting from activities with radioactive materials. Mr. Amery: No. Her Majesty’s Goyernment see no reason for such action. Law of the Sea (Breaches of Cerventions) Mr. Laurance Reed asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what protest he will make to the French Government about the effect on British interests of France’s breach of the Conventions on the Law of the Sea 1958 relating to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application cf any article of the said convention. Mr. Amery: None. If my hon. Friend has in mind the Optional Protoco! on the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, which was adopted together with the 1958 Con- ‘ventions, France has not ratified that 31 N 22 18 JULY 1973 Written Answers 730 protocol and cannot therefore be in breach of it. It has not been invoked by any party in relation to the present proceedings before the International Court. Mr. Laurance Reed asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what protest he will make to the French Government about the effect on British interests of France’s breach of Article 8 of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas relating to the immunity of from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State warships Mr. Amery: None. No action has been taken which calls for any protest by Her Majesty’s Government in respect of Article 8 of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas. Mr. Laurance Reed asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Common: wealth Affairs what protest he will make to the French Government about the effect on British interests of France’s breach of Article 2 of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas relating to the freedom to fly over the high seas. - Amery: None. No action has been taken which calls for any protest by Her Majesty’s Government in respect of Article 2 of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas. ENVIRONMENT Driving Licence Centre, Swansea 36. Mr. Hunt asked the Secretary of State for the Environment when he expects the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Centre at Swansea to attain its planned five-day turn-round time in dealing with provisional driving licence applications. Mr, P The centre is now processing 95 per cent. of current first applications within six working days, and 98 per cent. within 10 days. I hope it will soon reach the planned standard of 98 per cent. within five working days. Leeds—Exeter Trunk Road (Allestree) 37. Mr. Whitehead asked the Secretary of State for the Environment if he will now publish the inspector’s teport into === [PDF page 163] === Oral Answers Sic Alec Dougizs-Yleme: We should like to see the restoration of demecracy in Greece but I am not pianning a visit. Mr. Maclennan: Have there been discussions within N.A.T.O. about the exes pressed desire of the United States to &nd home ports in Greece for the Sixth Fleet? Have Her Majesty's Government expressed any view about this? Sit Alec Dougias-Home: I understand that the reason for asking for facilities from Greece is for American families to be near their serving sailors. I do not think that it is a matter in which we could intervene, Mr. Emery: In any conversations with Greece will my right hon. Friend bear in mind the very major réle which it plays in N.A.T.O. and the need to ensure that that flank with Turkey is properly defended?: Sir Alec Douglas-itome: Yes, Sir. This is particularly important in view of the change in the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean in recent years. United Nations Charter (Review) 22. Mr. Knox asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs when Her Majesty’s Government intend to answer the United Nations Secretary-General’s request for their views on the United Nations Charter review; and if he will make a statement. Mr. Godber: As I told the House on 13th December, the Secretary-General has invited us to reply before Ist July. It is our intention to do so.-—[Vol. 828, c. 7.] Mr, Knox: Do Her Majesty’s Government intend to consult the United States Government about this matter, including the recent Senate resolution? Ms. Godber: We are always in close consultation with the United States Government on matters affecting the United Nations. I presume that my hon. Friend is referring to a draft resolution, which has not yet been discussed by Congress. Obviously we will have this in mind. But it is the generality of the problem which we have been discussing so far with our colleagues in the United States. 19 © 20 beet fly 27 MARCH 1972 “Nit pe Ne Oral Answers 4 Spain ( Wa Ly, Mipag on Fw Dic]! 24. Mr. Roy Hughes asked the Secre- | tary of State for Foreign and Common: wealih Affairs if, in view of the civil disorders in Spain, he will now cancel his invitation for the Spanish Foreign Minister to visit the United Kingdom for, further talks. ‘ Sir Alec Douglas-Ifome: No, Sir. Mr. Miughes: Did the right hon, Gentlemen read in yesterday’s Sunday Times the details of the struggle by miners ia Northern Spain to obtain the elementary rights of free trade unionism? I[s the right hon. Gentleman content to continue his discussions with the Spanish Government with a view to handing over free Gibraitar—-where the people already enjoy the benefits of free trade unionism —to ihe tender mercies of the, Spanish Government? Six Aiec Douglas-Home: I cannot comment on the internal affairs of Spain. What i can say is that I have made clear to the Spanish Government that the pledges contained in the Preamble to the Act of Parliament governing the constitution of Gibraitar stand. Indonesia (Brifish Assets) 25. Mr. Edward YVaylor asked Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what progress has been made in obtaining compensation for British assets seized in Indonesia. Mr. Anthony Koyle: We understand that the Indonesian Government are the currently reconsidering the basis on which, the claims submitted by British firms should be settled; and that the reconsideration should be completed this month. will then be made. Mr. Taylor: How long have these We hope that better progress. negotiations been proceeding, and how’ much British aid has been given to ' Indonesia in the interim? Mr. Royle: The negotiations have been continuing for some time. The Indonesian Government have given first priority to claims for resumption of control over estates, All major British claims for the return of estates have now been settled. The last British firm concerned,’ Anglo-Indonesian Plantations — Ltd., ere ay} BATE arens>. bas Cok. Se oem tem memem me ye tng YH NNRS trerermemepmmpeeteen tn comm: BHF ami === [PDF page 164] === 25 Oral Answers signed an agreement with the Indonesian Government on 18th November. I will be happy to publist figures of aid in the OFFiciAL Rapport. Mr. Paget: Would uot the hon. Genileman agree that the development of backward countries depends to a great degree on the extent that they inspire confidence in individual traders and investors and that the way in which, in Tanzania and various other countries, assets have been expropriated without compensation does little good to the developing couniries? Mr. Royle: I agree with the hon, and learned Gentleman that expropriation without compensation does little good to any developing country. Following are the figures: ' UNITED KinGDoM \10 TO [INDONESIA The figures for the past few years are: 1968-69 Res £1:46 million 1969-70; as £2:52 million 1970-71 Ree a £2:85 million 1971-72... £3°50-£4 million (estimated) Liberation Movements (United Nations Assistance) 27. Mr. Biggs-Davison asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he will make a statement about material assistance given by United Nations specialised agencies or other organs of that body to liberation movements; and whether he will specify the movements concerned and the amount and nature of the assistance received. Mr. Kershaw: In several resolutions, which the United Kingdom has opposed, the General Assembly has urged the specialised agencies to give moral and material assistance to ile tiberation movements involved in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and the African territories under Portuguese administration, Small sums of money have been given to refugees and educational institutions sponsored by liberation movements in the territories ‘ of neighbouring African States. Mr. Biggs-Davison: Has my _ hon. Friend no word of condemnation? Is it not intolerable that United Nations agencies and our money should be used for aggression, particularly in view of the Assembly’s resolution that the territory of one State should not. be used to launch 19 G21 27 MARCH 1972 Oral Answers subversive attacks on the territory another State? My. Kershaw: As I have said to my hon. Friend, we voted against these resolutions and we consider that action to channel aid to liberation movements through the United Nations specialised agencies is tantamount to condoning violence as a means of achieving political aims. We do not support that. Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: If these racialist Governments in Southern Africa rest on violence to deny human freedom and dignity, why is it wrong for United Nations agencies to take this stand and, in particular in the case of South Africa, which is in direct violation of international law over the occupation of Namibia, why is it wrong for the United Nations io take this stand towards it? Mr. Kershaw: We consider it is unconstitutional for an international organisation to give support to any movement within a territory in circumstances where that movement has been declared unlawful by the acknowledged Government of the territory. There is no lack of opportunities to contribute. to which objection cannot be taken, such as the United Nations education and training programme for South Africa, which provides higher education for South African exiles and to which the United Kingdom is a principal contributor at £50,000 a year. Mr. Scott-Hopkins: Can my _ hon. Friend confirm that none of this money is being used for the purchase of arms? Can he also tell the House how much money is being given to the organisation for the liberation of the satellite States of Russia? Mr. Kershaw: I cannot answer the last question because it is not my responsibility. As far as we can make out, the amount of money is about 400,000 dollars, but there may be something else of which we do not know. Mis. Gladys Yang 29. Mr. Woodnutt asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what progress has been made in establishing the whereabouts in China of Mrs. Gladys Yang, a British subject, from whom relatives have not heard since 1968; and if he will instruct the British Cen ene: Sn Tt aeepepepeerneretnnn nae Pmnipm denne eon fees === [PDF page 165] === 21 Oral Answers Mr. Gor Roberts: It is a question not of siding with guerrilla movemenis but rather of taking action in the United Nations by a proper initiative to prevent the guerrilla movements from developing the situation into disast US i ‘ not only in Portugal but throughout central Africa. DWY proportions Mr. Amery: As I am sure the right hon. Member is aware, the Portuguese Government has stated that it is giving greater autonomy to its dependent territories; and before we intervene in the affairs of another country, which would be questionable under the United Nations Charter, we had better see how its new policies work out. 25. Mr. William Hamilton asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs why the United Kingdom delegate at the United Nations General Assembly, on 14th November, voted against a resolution aimed at persuading Portugal to free her African colonies. Amery: We voted against the reneral Assembly resolution because we did not think that it would help to peaceful progress towards seli-determination, Mr. Hamilton: Does the Minister recognise that that vote will be interpreted as support for one of the most repressive colonial régimes in Africa? If the Government are not prepared to condemn the révime, they will reap the whirlwind in Africa and elsewhere. Will not the Minister say that he condemns all colonial repression—a practice that we have sought to discard in some measure? Mr. Amery: I am sure the hon. Member will be the first to realise that if we were to condemn all régimes on idev. logical grounds we should have a long list of régimes to condemn in many continents. In these matters we must be guided by the principles of the Charter and our own long-established policy. Mr. Wall: Are there not more black than white voters in Angola and more black than white troops in Mozambique? In those circumstances, is it not nonsense to talk about a repressive régime holding down the people? Mr. Amery: Everyone who has studied the question is wel! aware of the 70 19 11 DECEMBER 1972 Oral Answers 22 multi-racial policies pursued by the Portuguese Government, of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what evidence is available to Her Majesty's Government as a result of discussions in the United Nations that any national government. is deliberately encouraging trade in heroin or the growth of unwarranted acreages of crops which could only be used for illegal purposes. Mr. Loveridge: In view of that answer, and now that China is a member of the Jnited Nations, will my hen. Friend invite the Chinese Government to sign the 1961 convention and thus help to combat the illicit world trade in drugs? Mr. Kershaw: Trade in drugs has been illegal in China since 1950 but I certainly join with my hon. Friend in hoping that now that China is a member of the United Nations it will see its way clear to signing the!96! Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. Inc 22. Mr. Edward Taylor asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Aflairs how much compensaticn has now been paid by the Indonesian Government to compensate British firms and individuals for their assets seized in Indonesia. Mr. Anthony Royle: All the major British claims for repossession have beer settled. We await the Indonesian proposals for settlement of the compensaticn claims to which I referred in the answer I gave my hon. Friend on 23rd October. The terms of settlement are of course a matter for the Indonesian Government and the ciaimants.—[Vol. 843, c. 778.) Mr. Taylor: Is it not rather disturbing that 10 years after the scizure of assets in Indonesia no compensation appears to have been paid to the plantaticn companies whose assets were seized? Is this not also disturbing as Britain’s aid to Indonesia has increased and is increasing? Mr. Royle: My hon. Friend will be aware that the Indonesian Government invited claims from British conipanies and al. 2S. 99-23 00800000 eeveee === [PDF page 166] === 93 Oral Answers 11 indicated its willingness to negotiate with the firms concerned. Jt would be inappropriate for the British Government to attempt to intervene, and our object is to secure the early opening of negoliations. I do not believe that a reduction in the level of our aid to Indonesia would help to secure an early settlement of outstanding claims for compensation there Mr. Maclennan: How can the Minister say that terms of compensation are a matter between the claimants and the Government of Indonesia when it is an established principle of international law that the terms of compensation must be prompt, adequate and effective—something which it is the business of the British Government to ensure? Mr. Reyle: The details of negotiations between the firms and the Indonesian Government are matters for the firms themselves. In this case the Indonesian Government’s first priority was the settling of claims for repossession. Claims for compensation were lodged three years or more ago. , asked the Secre- State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs why the United Kingdom abstained from voting on the resolution of the Third Committee of the United Nations General Assembly which concerned the status of women. sairatl Mr. Amery: We abstained on the proposal to designate 1975 as International Women’s Year because we had doubts both about its timing and about the desirability of singling out women for this kind of special attention. All the same, in view of our general sympathy with the objectives of the year we shall vote for the proposal in plenary session. Dr. Summerskili: Will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind that the Government’s attitude on the matter has been reactionary and timid, in sharp contrast to that of most countries at the United Nations, which were progressive and brave on the matter? His statement today has shown how totally illogical and uncertain the Government’s mind is on the question. If they support the eke tion on discrimination against wome 7 D 20 DECEMI 3ER 1972 Oral Answers 4 passed at the General Assembly in 1967, how can they fail to support the resolution, which deals with the same matter? Mr. Amery: On the general questi it hi 1S tech our view that if discrimi tion against women is to be elimina we must stcp singling ou women for special treatment. To turn to the particu- Jar, we doubt whether ea cational yes are an effective method of promoting human rights. The choice of 1975 is a little unwise, because the Status of Women Commission will not complete its examination of the implements ition of the declaration on discriminati against women until 1976. out Fiji 29. Mr. Dodds-Parker retary of State for Forei wealth Affairs whether asked the Sec- 1 and Commonhe will make Secretary’s visi ct 1 ) he Statement on the to Fiji. Under- Mr. Anthony Royle: During my visit to Fiji I had discussions with the Prime Ainister on a wide range of topics of mutual interest. accompani Deputy-Prime Min tour of the areas worst Rehe, 1 also j helicopt y Hurricane new Lautoka hospital, at present the largest construction project in Fiji's development plan, and one to which Her Maiesty’s Government are making a major contribution. Our relations with. Fiji remain excellent. ister on the hit b nspected the site of the Mr. Bryant € Irvine: Can my hon. Frien ry to what extent Fiji has recovered from the Rares damage? Was he able to form a view about the ape of the South Pacific expressed at the South Pacific Foruen? Seem s9anian Mr. Royle: The la not discussed in any detail between the Prime Minister and me. As the House yas told on 6th November, Her Majesty's Government made an immediate cash contribution of about £12,500 to the Fiji Prime Minister’s hurricane relief fund. We are hopeful that the damage will not prove as serious as was first feared. ter subject was Bangladesh 30. Mr. State for Foreign Dalyell asked the Secretary of and Commonwealth === [PDF page 167] === VON VR RO Cc eae . u wall cate Aavwamradnrearonrod ome 1 elnino th \ \s \ \A%S Reference TEEN cS a Wowsord Exckeck Gy Poo eo! Soe Oe a wien | i JLSBSS ouse of| Commend eather i | Colsacry INDONESIA Qi3, Mr. Peter Archer asked the Prime Minister whether he will invite the Head of State for Indonesia to visit the United Kingdom. Lie Piime Minister: The President of the Republic of Indonesia would be a very welcome visitor to Britain, However, it has not yet been possible to find ' a mutually convenient timo, es === [PDF page 168] === 18 July 1973 “La Mr John Golding (Newcastle-under-Lyme): To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, whether he will raise at the UN Commission on Human Rights the question of the continuing harassment of trade unionists in Spain. a ES. TULIAN AMERY Mo, Sir, We gave 10 standing to raise this matter. === [PDF page 169] === <1. 0 ote a wt tO tie! etre eeinhineDnieainemt Monten ie tpenntientaee a at vines & Bm) 8\44 ae Oral Answers representative's contacts with NUSAS are very sparing and slight indeed? As this is one of the few non-racial organisations left in South Africa and as the South African Government are doing their best to crush NUSAS in a highly rigged and biased parliamentary commission, will his Department do its best not only to strengthen links with NUSAS but also offer some kind of support? Mr. Kershaw: The hon, Gentleman is quite wrong. The Embassy in South ' Africa is in close contact with NUSAS and with a large number of other multiracial organisations. 1 know that the hon. Gentleman, when he was recently in South Africa, ‘took very biased information about what is going on there. . Mr. Blaker: Will my hon. Friend say what instructions are given by his Department to our representatives in Moscow about maintaining contact with organisations which the Soviet Government are ‘trying to crush? My. Kershaw: We are anxious to make contact with other organisations but we are not allowed to do so there, indonesia 23. Mr. Peter Archer asked the Secre- “tary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs when he next intends to Visit Indonesia. .. Mr. Anthony Royles My right hon. Friend paid an official visit to Indonesia in July and has no plans at present to pay a further visit. ie Mr, Archers Did the Foreign and Commonwealth Sceretary seize the opportunity to explain to the Indonesian Government that those of us who would like to sce betiur relations with Indonesia are exercised by the tact that there are probably inore political prisoners in Indonesia in proportion to the population than in any other country in the world, that this very much exercises world public opinion and that it would be an earncst of gocd intentions if the Indonesians at least released the category ‘C prisoners?. ' Ma Royle: ‘fhe question of political detainees must be a matter of Indonesian internal affairs, It would be quite ins appropriate for Her Majesty’s Goverie ment to comment, wor 23 OCTOBER 1972 "32. Mr. Eeward Tayler asked the Sece | P bute wathic Oral Answers 7718 retary of State for Forcign and Commons wealth Affairs what has now been the outcome of his discussions with Indonesia about compensation for British assets in (hat country, _ Mr Anthony Royle: My right hon. Friend told the Indonesian authorities in Diakaria in July of our concern at the delay in settling the compensation claims, The Indonesian Minister of State. for Economic, Financial and Industrial Affairs assured our Ambassadoz in writing on 21st October that compensa: tion would be paid and that his Govern: ‘ment would very soon make proposals. Mr. Vaylor: That is splendid news. Can my hon. Friend give us any indication of the sums involved in the British assets Which were seized? Are they around £200 million, as had been pre ° viously suggested? Mr. Royle: I cannot tell my hon, Friend the exact sums involved but I shall try to let him have the figures as soon as they are available. The Indonesian Government have given first priority to claims from any firms wishing to take back thir estatcs, All major British claims for the return of estates ° have now been scitled, F. O4 eme 1 can ‘ha ha Ae tae ab ec ak a, a aL UD a ik OS: Rela atta ey, Mr. David Roy Adams 27. Sic D. Renton asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he will make a statement about the loss of Mr. David Roy Adams, a district officer in the Solomon Islands, who. was reported missing on 12th September, Mr. Kershaws The High Commissioner Western Pacille reported that Mr. Adams was missing presumed drowned at sea whilst on duly on 12u1 September, A thorough search was unsuccessful, An inquiry has been held in the ters. tory. Full details are not yet availabie, verdict was death by misadventure. Siv D. Renton: I am sure that my hon. Friend will join me in expressing sympathy to the parents and relatives of Mr, Adams in this country, Bearing iu mind that the inquiry slarted over a month ago, cin he say why tho details [Unreadable] © sey a eo wemnieoenend vitae Rmapputy oosertont 110019 tm, tre! Nene HEIN DIU (AE uRRO RUIN Tmt Foamenp Are ORI Geir sikey ¢ wand mgmt Mie: dqinteninme: grtharapersgy a ab! On: i Vex ' === [PDF page 170] === 485 Oral Answers” Sir Alec Dougtas-Home: Yes. We monitor these tests in the interests of those places. They have not asked us to protest to the French. Indonesia 25, Mr. Peter Archer asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will seek to pay an official visit to Indonesia. Mr. Anihony Royle: My right hon. Friend paid an official visit to Indonesia in July 1972 and has no plans at present to pay a further visit. My right hon. and noble Friend the Secretary of State for Defence visited Indonesia in February this year. Mr. Archer: Did either the noble Lord or the right hon, Gentleman point out to the Indonesian Government the concern of people here, who would like to sce closer relations with Indonesia, at her reputation of being a country with about 55,000 political prisoners, which is probably a greater number in relation to the size of population, than anywhere else in the world? Mr. Royle: No, they did not. The Indonesian authorities are aware of the concern in this counicy, as indicated »y the hon. and learned Gentleman. Fle may be interested to know, however, that as far as we are aware none of those detained in Indonesia for alleged association with the Communist Party is a British subject. Greece (Political Prisoners) 29. Mr. Goronwy Robe.is asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what representations he has received during 1973 reflecting concern in Great Britain at the plight of political prisoners in Greece, Mr. Anthony Royle: Ministers have received a number of written representations from Members of this House and the public. Mr. Roberts: Have the hon. Gentleman and the Foreign Secretary read the letter in The Times of 30th April, signed by a number of members of the Cambridge University Economics Faculty, Protesting against the Greek Govern. ment’s treatment of Professor John GM 23; 00 enrccece ug Ww Teese eescemog COL, VOL, 9 MAY 1973 Oral Answers 486 Pesmazoglou? There are feports that for the past fortnight or three weeks this distinguished — international economist, himself a graduate of Cambridge, has been held incommunicado and has also been subjected to torture. Wi!! the hon, Gentleman make cléar to the Greek Goyernment our oflicial condemnation of this latest example of their policy of vicious political persecution, in flagrant violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of the European Convention on Human Rights? Mr. Royle: right hon, I share the regrets of the Gentleman when friends of Britain are in prison anywhere, but official representations to another Goyernment about their citizens raise difficult issues of jurisdiction, T understand that Professor Pesmazoglou has now been charged with conspiracy. I think, therefore, that it would be wrong for me to comment in detail or make a statement at this time. Sir Elwyn Jones: Is the hon. Gentle- Man aware that many political prisoners in Greece, most of whom are, I think, friends of this country, are being detained in solitary confinement in the notorious military police interrogation centre in Athens, and are denied access to their fainilics and to lawyers? Will he give due weight to these matters When arrangements are being discussed for the adhere ence of the United Kingdom to the Treaty of Association between the EEC and Greece? Indeed. will Her Majesty's Government undertake ihat unless these abominable practices are remedicd we shall carefully consider that adherence? Mr. Royle: Naturally I have noted seriously the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s statement, but he knows that under the Treaty of Accession we ire obliged to apply the provisions of the Community's agreements with third countries, including Greece. subject to any transitional arrangements or adaptations which may prove necessary. There can be no question of our saying—and I do not think that he will expect me to say—that we would seek to renege on our treaty obligations, Mr. Orme: The hon. Gentleman Says that there is difficulty in making representations. Is not Greece a member of NATO? Is there not a NATO code ten