Indonesia: Internal Political Situation, Attempted Coup against Sukarno [15] (FO 371/180324, 1965)

=== [PDF page 1] === [Cover/decorative page: brown archival file folder cover (TNA) with file number, red label and green "CLOSED UNTIL" release sticker; no further text] === [PDF page 2] === FROY ae, *Sa- 74 bc frvl Yoharta, No. 77 8 t Dated 4 Afosen A (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) 180324 - (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action - completed) | (Main Indexed) (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT NDONESIA D H.: / 0 / o/ oe O/ supyect: Goretega: WM Cnn reperts Actiahix calm “0K wih Dae. Sa, lim, Way, ) fe ha pelabinky GUC; but yy lerce thet Ati. Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: MINUTES === [PDF page 3] === | CONFIDENTIAL INWARD SAVING "TELEGRAM FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE f) fi (01$ /3ol “By Bag DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist No. 7/ Savin 7, November 1365 R. 13 November 1965 CONFIDENTIAL Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. /7 Saving of 4. November Repeated for information Saving to POLAD Singapore. Her Majesty's Consul, Surabaya, reports situation there fairly quiet with Army, Navy and Police very firmly in control. Relations between these three services good = but they do not have much trust in the Air Force. DISTRIBUTE News Dept. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 4] === FROM tes t Cefwrot (Bahari) No. 2524 Dated /3 Veverhe Received )5 Joven (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) (Main Indexed) (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT INDONESIA D, It /3, Jon suBJECT: Yulee babrac f ren Sulbainia 79 Aecombat ap eck: anand) fn MMs Cilio i Lyi “Cornlins! Lig cena, ed a arog ag td right Che haa’ feytio £ rake a thing Lh Ot Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: MINUTES === [PDF page 5] === hts tne; 1 S J inaonesian OLUTLON Ud 10uv DE Nat it iS al could not it religious, Ne 2O0CLaLIst “NOSeeceee de ntin treéi [Unreadable] nice wy 2 UWd tO, === [PDF page 6] === ee a ae re eae re a aie ee Dijakarta telegram.0. 2524 to Foreign Office action " sy AL 74 +i, #41 UU 2ULUU Wi tn === [PDF page 7] === D SECRET SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT See D H. [01S 7303 FROM SUBJECT: Mik Ig ortPind canst taé ah Ke KQv< Grice if de tity Ce of Ti 2 VOCS Trenck / Wjardag le.) “aale,. 7 CJOS7. hap 1 Ga bebe a tee a cas « ofc f° ba & 6h Méinby grt 1). ze: 0 re y) an — “Cet! Arocla » one 4G rT? ta heme > a th Gra. J tl. f weg pt ta: ld Lats i, Dated 42 Ween b Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received / 7 Wevewb- (Outward Action) A) S56 bomdrdeu/ dokode) ior2/, Vhy Toh. f % si ye — (Printing Instructions) J et 1s “s a a a py NN wei (Referred to Legal Adviser) Mi Cony mM, sane (Main Indexed) === [PDF page 8] === CONFIDENTIAL BRITISH EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, D.C. 12 November, 1965. Eule (Cie. yen ) Ditto / 304 Vie Shame. oF I understand from Cuthell, the Director of the Office of South-West Pacifie Affairs, that the State Department think that they have tracked down the source of Sukarno's accusation in his speech on Heroes Day that he had been offered a bribe of 150 million Rupias. This bribe refers to money given for the provision of English language text books. 2 If the State Department are right, they hope to be able to make use at a later date of a letter of thanks for this money sent by Sukarno to, I think, Howard Jones. They are saying nothing at present, in the hope that Sukarno will involve himself further with this story and consequently look all the bigger fool if they publish his letter of thanks. ‘io ie Oe ie y roanteoker (N.C.C. Trench) rote H.S.H.Stanley Esq., Joint Malaysia/Indonesia Department, Foreign Office/C.R.0. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 9] === BRITISH EMBASSY (1032/65) DJAKARTA 2 December, 1965 aaa Dit 155/203) a " M, ade St (6a, Nigel Trench's letter of November 12 to Stanley about the 150 million rupish bribe. American Ambassador the other day sent ukarno letter. You might be amused Please treat with discretion. Even more entertaining is the statement put out about ago by the six political parties who back the Army "... Welcomed President Sukarno's revelation during his Heroes Day speech on November 10 that there was a foreign embassy which had bribed an Indonesian dignitary to the sum of Rp. 150 million to carry out propaganda for Necolim... Urged the President, however, to openly name the dignitary concerned so that he could be kicked out of Indonesian political life." The American Em this themselves, Le I am sending a copy of this to Washington. Nw3s Ww (S.J.G. Cambridge) D. Tonkin, Esq., South Hast Asia Dept., Foreign Office, S.W.l. === [PDF page 10] === PRESIDEN REPUBLIK INDONESIA E. Howard P. Jones American Ambassador D jakarta. My decision about the Rp. 150,000,000 you offered to We accept your offer of Rp. 150,000,000. 1 use the money for printing textbooks English for our schools. hal for We shall arrange the printing and we shall distribute the books to the users. c¢ is an imperative condition. We are grateful for your offer. With kind regards, Soekarno Djakarta 25/6 1964. We = Indonesia. Ve shall print on the books "this is a contribution of the U.S.A." === [PDF page 11] === FROM 4 A Gbchewrt-( debate) No. P5237 Dated /3 Veven be Received (6 Arcven bt. (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) | (Main Indexed) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT SUBJECT: (dia, ha fies acu Ofarabers o haar a Una report! i MY ong 7 fo 24D hcl ge Lek ceonlne Encloses Copy of: (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) D 4 10/5 /30% ralkia Got winnrl Eleh PY A ebtitt Yj z hate Gavnw7 POM Cn frort CHA Amclk Le clink, * hago SLVR fa ASG Mt nt ai References and Relevant Papers: MINUTES === [PDF page 12] === 12 TOP COPY - FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE oe OS ee ee En Clair; F.Q./C.R.O./WH. Sir A. Gilchrist DISTRIBUTION No. 2523 ——D,. 0225 14 November 1965 13 November Di tors Soud* 0910 14 November 1965 . Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No; 2523 of 13 November Repeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur B.H.C. Singapore NF, CBB POLAD Singapore My telegram No. 2493. Indonesia. Antara, 11 November, reported a decision issued the day before by Major General Umar, War Administrator of Djakarta. After referring to Sukarno's revocation of the state of war it said that all regulations and measures taken by the War Administrator remained valid and would continue to be effective. 9, The naval commander of the Djakarta port area said on 12 November that although the State of war had been revoked the situation had not returned to what it was before 30 September and security operations would therefore continue. 3. The military commander of North and Central Sulawesi has reported that Gestapu gangs in the area possess and are using arms. For this reason there could be no let-up in physical operations against them. === [PDF page 13] === ——————_————_———————== (Security Grading—to be Up-graded is Pa where Appropriate) * SE, ASIA SECRET 1965 INDONESIA H (015/305 /G ee A. Gil aoe 4 fal L bb On. jo" Morender. lotrcaeeayt EH Fu. hL abl ae i: ag apt Cobol apocibdeh es ~~ a Received in Kept 6 ft Jos Oh. ee A (Outward Action) Kom S Of (Referred to Legal Adviser) completed) \ === [PDF page 14] === fsi01 inf sos)sva Hd nis! === [PDF page 15] === 10.11.65 w/X /374 SEORET/IMMEDIATE I have heard Sukarno speak on many occasions, but I have never hear@ such a ranting and insane performance as he turned on this morning, My feeling that he is prepareé to pull his country down in ruins rather than admit that he eould esonceivably ever have been wrong in building up the State philosophy of NASAKON is considerably strengthened. 2. He devoted considerable time to the machinations of the Nekolim, saying quite openly that the 150 million rupiahs of bribes that he mentioned on Saturday were related to the events of September 30th. He further said that very much more than this sum of money had been Gisbursed subsequent to these events, but this d4i4 not cost the imperialists moh as everyone knew how cheaply they could come by their rupiahs. 3. The burden of his speech, however, was to reiterate that the unity of Indonesian society can enly be restored under the umbrella of Nasakem. He began by defining KOM as socialism, Marxism and Communism, but as the speech progressed socialism and Marxiem came a very bad seoond and third to Commaniem, He said that it was a fact that Indonesian society considted of groups from these three tendencies, and that the society would destroy itself if it did not recognise this and protect these three tendencies. He said that there was a witeh-hunt going on which must be stopped. He would give fis solution as seon as security had been restored, but he made it pretty clear what his solution would be. 4. Even if Sukarne ean be forced te ban the PEI, whieh is quite possible, he is clearly trying to build up a situation in whieh Communist activity can contime relatively unaffected. I do not think that the Army is going to accept this, and Sukarno himself by his attitude of sympathy towards the Communists and his attempts to lay the blame for September 30th elsewhere, i.e. on the imperialists, may be building up a situation where eivil war becenes probable rather than possibthe. I got the nasty impression this morning that we are in fact now dealing with a madman. seat/ === [PDF page 16] === 5- I was sitting next to the Pinance Minister Sumarno and Suharte. The latter made no attempt to disguise his impatience with what was going on, and his distagte for the Presidet‘s comments. Another Minister after it was over said that he found it hard to see how things were going to be solved if the President went on as he is. === [PDF page 17] === eee Va MARCA No. o2 ow Dated lift Received iin (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) | (Main Indexed) (Security Grading—to be Up-graded 17 | where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT INDONESIA 6 4 Ghat Sel S Vamwwis % 5 li D H 10/8/3506 me Noack by febone wi Nowrler slyal 204 fol sheet sidveciie neleed, Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: ‘Sree fk MINUTES Werden’ ( Sekono Cor clot. nah === [PDF page 18] === op COPY! INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM oo FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE By Bag DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist No. 82 Savin B. 13 Nevenber, i968 1 OU tec eee IY November, 1965 a Addressed _to Foreign Office telegram No. 82 Saving of 11 November, Repeated for information Saving to: Kuala Lumpur Canberra POLAD Singapore Wellington B.H.C. Singapore Washington ‘Following are extracts, as reported in Antara, of a speech made by President Sukarno on 10 November: The September 30 Movement was a "condemnable affair which has seriously harmed our revolution. - I as great Leader of the Revolution will truly know what to do and decide to punish the elements of the Movement". Aware of popular demands for the dissolution of the PKI and its affiliated organizations, Sukarno said: "I will think about the matter’. Listen; I will think about the matter’!" There was now a kind of demand for dissolution and persecution. Those to be made the victims of this were not only the PKI, but also others. "Let us not stay this way and merely fan emotions and sentiments. Our revolution will be harmed. I will not hesitate to take firm action against whatever group which engages in fanning these emotions afd causes present tension to mount," Sukarno said he was angry ‘ecause there were some groups which had been acting wilfully with steps and measures harming the national revolution. "I am angry not because of personal interest but because of our revolution." There had been groups who had harmed the revolution. "If there is a party, I don't care which party, which continues to fan emotions and sentiments, that party will be dissolved by me. If this fanning of emotions continues and causes the Indonesian people to fight each.other, to slaughter and beat each other, then I will dissolve the party concermed". Sukarno warned the Ambassadors present "not to carry out subversive activities against the Indonesian people and state". "To speak frankly, there.is an embassy in Djakarta which is now engaged is subversion. An Indonesian was offered Rp. 150 million as a bribe to carry out propaganda as desired by the official of this foreign embassy." What was the purpose of this? "Nothing more than that the person offered the money should propagate the ideology of a "free /nation' === [PDF page 19] === Dijakarta telegram No. 82 Saving to Foreign Office & a oe nation' in our country". Addressing the Ambassadors Sukarno said, "I am happy you are here in the country as representatives of your respective countries, but once again, don't engage in subversion: it will not succeed", He warned the Indonesian people to be on the look out for the ill designs of necolim who, after the attempted coup, were actually intensifying their subversive activites. "We must take care that our revolution is. not steered in a direction desired by necolim," DISTRIBUTED TO: Ve eeAele J ML sDe Lehens adel dole === [PDF page 20] === 20 (Security Grading—to be Up-graded D where Appropriate) "i i i SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT INDONESIA D, lols [307 FROM y SUBJECT: “< ifoort On MELA ne Anilevis nua. /rfiaster f /Aant KW. Wi FORD. (Eric ) le. Ecoteyy (Feroyal Jane, Groth: ty VQne 4 rye or ewe, % ch oe igi os A /Yr Mendy CT ws Via zz née < oO c ee ): a COnIme V4 “Mistg cp foe f Cony? Ne aivd Ae relia lnlus atte, 4 24 o> Aap Mace Cnet Crre ~< Ard mesea. Dated 9 Went/ Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) meas (Main Indexed) 79 === [PDF page 21] === CONFIDENTIAL Office of the Britist pares d'Affaires, EIN q ° 2 November;/1965. ante In the course of a recent tour I found myself having lunch at the Nanking Hotel with an Indonesian. The et was 10 October. Addressing us in Gnglish he discloss that he was a Professor of plant Ecology who was on a lecture tour ef China. He must be one of the top men in his subject in Indonesia and described his reguli ir visits o London to see the people at Kew and how he had a number f students working for higher degrees in ingland. 2. After we had discussed plants for a while I asked if he had had any news of recent events in Indonesia. Said at once that he had and that he was a brother of Jani, the Army Chief of Staff. Not knowing whether he aware that his brother had been murdered I proceded rather carefully, but it soon became clear that he did know. He went on to give me what he clearly believed to be the genesis of the revolution. I should interpolate that at this date nothing was known publicly in China of the revolution and that he must therefore have got his information either from Indonesian sources or by listening to the radio. ithout any prompting he said that in his view the Communist Party (P.K.I.) were responsible for the Untung coup. He did not blame the P.K.I. as such however, but said that it was the work of a wild element in the P.K.I. led by a Minister in the Government. When I asked who, he could alas, remember the name. But he described the P.K.I. as being split into three factions. He said that Aidit was a personal friend of his and that he did not believe that he was in any way involved in the co oup. It was a group of wild men who had taken advantage of the illness of Sukarno and who clearly thought that he would not survive long and that the moment to act had come. 36 I report this for what it is worth. Clearly it is only one of the possible geneses of the Indonesian revolt. Nevertheless it comes from a source which is at least indirectly concerned with the events and who showed little or no sign of emotional involvement. Thus he described the death of his brother as being merely one more death in the family to add to those which had occurred since as rebels the Indonesians took up arms against the Dutch. Le Since I returned to Peking I have heard one other snippet which may be of interest. This is to the effect that the former Indonesian Ambassador in Peking, Mr. Kartodiwirjo, is now under arrest. I do not know whether he is suffering & la McCarthy for having been /Ambassador H.S.H. Stanley, Esq., Joint Malaysia/Indonesia Department, Foreign Office. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 22] === CONFIDENT IAL Ambassador here. As I recall he was a good deal less violent than the present inhabitant whom I believe to be a party member and who, I am guite certain, would not survive long if the Generals really got control in that unhappy country. om I am sending copies of this letter to Andrew Gilchrist in Djakarta and to the Chanceries at Kuala Lumpur and POLAD Singapore. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 23] === No. 448 2 Received (2 Avent. (Outward Action) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) (Main Indexed) 23 (Security Grading—to be Up-graded D where /A ppropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT RIP SSAIP CC] wit Dk JESSE R o 12 Ghd wed hb Views fs % 2 AX 4 S96 SUBJECT: Sa, NOt i Captinteas Elahtony 4 otherte: S* neyo Ke fed /:: - Lp ; fo / WU a oS Y Jo el. Meyerrs A References and Relevant Papers: === [PDF page 24] === SAVINGRA No» 51 SECRET September liovement week has been completely dominated events set in motion by the Movement towards the end of nee t of. these events, which ar etail below, it is inc creasingly 33 Generals Nasution ani Suhzrto od to take decisive political action ‘.I., Omar Dani, Subandrio, anc ao takeable restrictions on Sukarno’.e Latter. somehow wrisgle out of waich he is deeply implicated, end sort of eens Pont iy with NASANOM in otinuing in being. in such circunstances political and economic crash would only The cracks cannot really de papered \ Sven Sukarno cannot in future produce even & senblence of real cordiality between the P.x.le and AURI, on on ide, end the amy, Navy, Police and most political parties on the other. For the monent he may be operaving in some kind of isolated pool of au hority in Bozor, and his empire of power has certainly vastly contracted. The amy must aim to keep it this way. Taney must not let him use KIAPIA ° for instance as it takes place, to impose his cherns on the people. 3z7ain. It is worth specul- ting but no attempt has ¢ een made to analyse this, that Suksimo * is by no mce.ns e free agent and is aware, even in his Bogor apla= bowl, thet rather close +o his neck there is @ co sl Gune 20 So = © as security is concermmedc, ‘the Army so far seem. vo have done well. Djekart: is superficially secure and the situstion in Central Java settling down. But from other angles they are not. === [PDF page 25] === rss sett 4 pc2 O ct ee sais t Sd “ ECaAc, TESWAISOLY: O% yan tea 44 nan oer amare san luivtwels Ls SUiGCCN Cas ales wee dein + av) de 4 oye vent dete -o confusion, they, W1ts [Unreadable] coh wld Ue. SB UbULL Whi dos ass elAswMe 17 ‘4 ‘ a eae aie Viittaty At 4 Viet Wee Svs ~ ba Airs ace Sha 9 A ‘ dn te le dee Ve. ‘ ane ae [Unreadable] homods pACLY VI aan [Unreadable] ent Gs ne bett cr. 3 OT Deu of Goncral Hokoginta eth Ae State bic HBAVLLI« vile Loe + i De WLLL NcVEer U0 BIG Oe ii Duliinirno ant: rts gov e saddle (HY aALl ab 35 FOLSS; c and ‘+3651 cri OLLVLCat - Loeturc put ALS SOMG uUvVL Koon === [PDF page 26] === A. OTs Wehr SA0447 6 anentey sua enATrTT NOU (322° me ro S8Ttscq H TET Lot 020 04 Sutaurod 9q 02 ponoes OON AWIY WS JO PUTTUITH [Unreadable] OLOUW wORW KLOTOUT O44 a UOTAEZTUON ‘ZO UOT ATS O tee A oud 7 2 es TUL ULL ATTA 9 UTOq week TANT PORTS pey "Tey ‘ ath LGMLLE UOT 20% ror Lewor, Ww bi Ss Sere pe OC meet IOAT Qe ew aU. t 8 I04 Vu tO Ua. oud 044% Cu Ww OTO fuouooa “Dan Ane STAY} no0ead £¢ ons TeTansT bs EO SUOTT TIC ONESTH-OLOU Aq WoOTT TIS TC aA [Go o SUD LUT CELTS OOUS oUt 7. TAT T ter oy Cy SUuUrvdav IVNUada. ww btete STAT AT” co cr. 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CNSA if using estion of the mov A. ; Aces ichting unit Yds thoir mectins donath. it too, ditions eer vmiov, nie - eo aks Gl ") FS He pe mac — on mare ewe Siow alps yt a Card we oe wl fin SeA) Al WX... SOS SNS WH MISIA hI [Unreadable] COMMON RhAhHAAvV Kn now ww»wowss—sssso» NANNERL, »—»__A_ALE CNNNAAAAAUAAAN MOON LOO === [PDF page 28] === Ue Leeder f mae aaa te bP ACede © Sa laaAs Vike FSaALGCC,. ATARMASMOWVAL CMe Lite, maint ena rider pL lS POL tock he urs nunser near eu o BOs A oye anme otaers, PUUoe © Lite Was av NORC. cut devwn on mutilated. trai ning ht bt camp number Lot oT also ndeen, who ae ee Cao =} Cord 75 e of r was Pavelly Saas been The family were ge i &G UsUG si ao 2K AES - PARAS vole ge wo - Ye “er ee hKMaR S204 ssn Council coun was a ie CAs354 Uli pesn -momber Oo cto Sts Fy FS ution's t emerged Was Ww a Ss eS ie the od that i planned by The planned -Lutionary announced with j Col. Untung ererence SAA 4s amas a a ta REE 3 on 2h not mentic connecti Council. 20 « \JLVONCZOLO Oe aat ula shay forms. o9an pod eee a te Ayes central veil taro now Au: President which is raised en at several other at Headquarters ters on the ees oa SAM Ra MNOMNAN MOO WRAL RU QWwiOoH6oi4 WANS WSs Wis mest KU) vel + MARR AY SAN ele MRMQAAA aoe VGQHQAA SANSA AAS === [PDF page 29] === DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS Bs INWARD SAVINGRAMPEY® Banal dod a, west UEC) FOL BVLNZ Ss ¢ pe rk oy + mas A Pee Unt xrgops C 930 Raider Battalion SET i e@ said they did net understand all uv Lone Le Sa1d ring oon ut shey were there to »rotect iy MMLC Oru. el! nag DF 4 Fe Ne ate one A te mw ei ey: We “; ae ‘ ' ae RRQ HNN Rio ®8Ww w6wiionw»oon RMA Gone 5 3 J a ’;, eee wee tone YELS wUussind U' Wea we 3, “ ef Loyaltd Fa Le. 3 nthe on “hat ~V VCore Teveleci. ocd ve i444 Amens a mA. WOLCH ey [Unreadable] ahs eLy = 3 Lv Se ve. Dst Jv mi 4-4 z in addi 7 and 203 3 Sopevter artillery units ordered cz numbe ott TA Aer acti LLery [Unreadable] [Unreadable] SPSGLPUsLLRUe I smmand Si Liwons re [Unreadable] ina veLy 2100: S; PLiGay lst IQ Qs Os sa eek a ome WY syn cond ing: vee SVOMCNt Qnaciino:4 {> reg es CouUntSsr-reve tisonar? surrcenacr ed Shek Ty FA OW manny A vow arr Vo vee Lomas ~ aq ce tantwiede YC. « === [PDF page 30] === SOOO SOOO OnNTor wosq Raconn Caersre Juiliv? Sk {Kniss sss QUOVO OOLT ZOPUN TITAS sve Wad ok SInNzu nies vILTIIINY mmUEccunt AAT ATTA iimt{Nn» >» TattR TA ret MOH RB QAQUAWsy WAN Ant. ¢ “ontes | COU 49 agTTT > Aner ST 4 [ NIGOO WAS UDOT OUTS pci Lc DTN AIINTIO AS NRW NMNOWw’ Was mer WAX 2G ATY ory Teil NMNATTIMAS os Anke wm UY ES ord CUTME LTOUMTZ: ‘roar DOWNLOAD DOV TOT 842° MIICAIILO() DIE POPALOONT STY TEU S _ oO U MUD,.DOATS TO QUSMOAGT U4 'UT SALUSA6 SSS gen a94re> 4 STOToOUuSy VALVE E | te wd) St, Lv OL Z) yo Teqoungq ogvae omy f29qQ0200 4 apsony uo AAAS TNS 4 339) TY AT. UATM DoLOSUMY 9LOU. 22Vy. fracaus AANA SAN WVYDNIAVS CGY SUIVAAV IVNUALXA LO === [PDF page 31] === WON Ma awk nnn RVQQ Qa faa. aaa asout FO ) vazexel eroues Aw QUOMOA CET ou x: ‘xoquoygdas uy mm Q vey ADK O TONTTAQ OD DUE vo ne eet 3TI4 G OlNa.7 Lt T an YW Lot 19 4c ( Ld ANY Tu UOT ArT Xe IT @ of DVOT c uw [Unreadable] Oe a oe ie Tie sz ‘sauoAo NSS 44" LIvOTT: 2, * IT c Aart veu pei the 4; vyu~ TING moot eqns ‘kepuns omy uO "Se hails i hai area y nin ‘Nrrn sone >t we nd he one CAA be bee bt CbGE OOLIT r pue ‘zoacn200 pa? SAY *OrOU WIT NOTUP? wud i Fe ed RPI.0 3 “=TOCESVS Z fk Ys, ae .WIUD LITOMO 1S 9.8 [MIDAGE 7 HTSOTT ATTA ( 1% re Le ee Li ep ee LAG ata” - Onsst ou4 TO4TV SUTATS CSTs (ZOQS990 copro0er 4sa2 fake ite Seamiee ace ae vh vA VELCUCSL a 14.7 SUres Cli,, poumMeE: a s\ooTT Nc “TT Amt poptes Kt Jou wit Yow e _ —ente T A954 Ag OTT 7; 7 topes of “us 39 ATTeAaTeeyw ot I Vie eS LONG = AANA ARRAS WVYONTIAVS aduv T M1 SUIVdAV TVNUALXA JO === [PDF page 32] === DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFPAIRS INWARD SAVING KAM DLL AWS Bric nde. Aga Me ytpst ane Dux asians oe’ Vor MOXY NVaac A ee a ke MV ON Law & Weil MK S MY AQAA QOH re wo ele nm public scupprrt ei RS Ta “3 Ae} AURL Lé Yon dod, eed A a deans ans +} Issam oc} hee tracted) sieb & e tie a4. ae i D ce deal Mts jot" on 2nd Octeber. Av Sukrene given public ner nas he directly c cated the murdercrs «na & Revelutionary Ccuncil. SOQ Per moist Ay aC: CCr rolusas acticn of wae wes the resul “the (presunabl 3 te cight gu paralle the carl _victins wncther | e or dead, t> 3c actue. ly parties (6 out of 8 Gonerals at ne when the telephenes ning of “uite hign ipperting action rf on the morning AANANS WOON QQ iw maccdiately avails 3,;is that ess tween the pesitions 6113 ng picces enmnectiozn are the burial sof g syounds of guppert given by |e|-aymane “Anvia, OUOULMLL por Cl « wv he Howes ofa ley THS; oo oon an Rakjat" cn rongly that the Pe this === [PDF page 33] === RSS VQVQaaasgaw~ws MQ To wey 2 qc082ns (€-TGTT SurczSoTO4 ano) zoqua sendtunrni00 PIOTA STUY Pues eee sate a ae LY p *g een au. zo DUTTT EA OUD 2TOAG ‘TOADMOP “UstTsdireo LOUTH #49 fT 2nq Jo PLVONA STY MorT 27309 DaDUTL- aE too Ps Fes ad aac AT [Unreadable] WON MTEC a ro ‘ 7 OA! et. +2 Ut ma 44 OT 2! mt BS TT ‘poqvTor aq eAvge ey UTIL AGT IOUT” WUOTT 043 4 ATWas OTT Ss ATA AIDE Mee ors. are Dud au; a DOUTOALS ats SDTeAv4 [Unreadable] SOONATALG YUoMUITO ALD DUST P AETASZD Wood AATAUOPT WTQSHAVWOT 2 SF WlOTGs 1}, OT “ wu Oro ALVON ZSTuMEMIGO FU S4v ou4. 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SCTsoucpurl wv $INQ0! 290) ASOT eepy tu Cae ag OAS DUA §9UG4 DA vias Gace Cov ILIre; RRR» SOs BMH [Unreadable] ZONOTISy We AUMITZOY I any f Tv *? 37 Ouro 7; /, TT LT OT ‘so, OT 3UUY 208 oy Oma Fe a ) eT ie ah ToCtENs OWA GALA Go INV Wor OWA GGUS *} oun LOFT UCTATULTta axo *QUOTIdAT JAUT +9OR ES Ot c SATLLEOTOUE Tr ov (9. $ re, ‘6 °¥ one oF amy A SUTLTe - wav SUIVddVY TVNUALXA JO LNAWLYUVdS [Unreadable] === [PDF page 34] === WOO DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS at Nay INWARD SAVINGRAM ~ GARR oe inflated anbiticn, [Unreadable] We sdeibhacN.; aida ie DOO AIO at aie ae ale WAY ARS Sn His *puUuscone SUp SLTLAPS ct SV4e5 aa Ant 4 de< Set tery 2 Cro [Unreadable] * 42 +. oa + ‘ ASARGI) See Rsvelutionery Councils" tar uge 2 st Fy, 7% Niven to reduce all senir mmm such as this, ; Se oe eet ea Htho' Establishicnt” ' a eo Sa ae Pe GLiLLEZICULTLcCS; as st & nm anee vue Cede 24 i as.smwleiw de hee > ee ee ve UL, 2 t; a A peta me nc = Ss sstul ion ogeins ine NNR hhh hihi MO Oo solar View IXY PAYS aCDiLGien @ atts a, te \ Vel Jest WaAwIOromnN ViUG¥Yue TA OY 322 nye ric > these survices thrus 12 veice of Oner Deni, pliced Uli Ad ae NRA NOH NAVA’ sot a ie 2 eae Se iuks =n ling [Unreadable] de ee SA v bal sdcrb ates ~ a Y os of rides “tele \Vnanr 4 a tle AAW ARNG } eoLPcunCccs dice AD we te a EE te edn Vd YH WOW QQAQQAQ@ Uiieow Lisa eyereviting this be jig ee a > As, Ga;ude tk? ce tne Vsle - wit ML SZevLe nh Riisyn »w©»aauiuxmwown 215 MSS iebe es i cm Cilwou nine ilu wes AN AAA RRA RRNONHOMAAAA 2 HO RS CXR AAAS MAAR AAA === [PDF page 35] === SQGG|_|QOiQ MOY om UT uso SOEs SUTALTE S OTT UA! VAs boty rot eee ¢ UTTLY OALEHy, UA CUTAN Arthn tsa ITY genni ont (zou Os TNO OTOL ont dee MAA "ore, Lvs Oud. r42" 4un) s 1 PT.o UT a TA OG4 a "QT 92 ZUTONTOUT SPOULTT Iu = ) wr DUT gr0TDTOS ts ION Woot i sun uaa "p: pe reed > PQQQAY -TyvV\ wees MAA te ee AY —; + PD ot oe > MITOSL SUT omy ag PTAGE poTapenos years J liek EAL EL poe Fa. ‘SO AT! + betwee YOMIAT IU UOUN |} Lew ene; ne et SE Tis: SU ile f OTe E: ITNiA OUTS SSG STIrl. Qu ai SUTAUTTSS oud fa dnvo pus 39. ANI wo ee We we ‘WoT LLM | AOTTOG CU TOYOTA OALTE PTNOM anos ve 4S22LV vg. DUO or aun gt £TD o4 oTocgsqe Coq4 OUL 29 "sSSortnp LVe WVYON!I ArtTreorYT OU a SUIValV TVN2 mae 4 AAZUNG Tes: Teer TOL 407 ae? WwW aArteTT Tit ¢ OTE -O2 “nae 3 Sat ‘StU Yous lat *s OTUSLO BY Ont BrOATA 4h bee ATTO we by UTUDAD 2004) 820790 nen ie mes Vuerweves { ve A 9Csat ved weal tied ae OU Cit mee Ter arr C Le RU oy le "TTA MDOSNIOT 9d nT oyu poqan “ere 8 ke Ge 495% reer Ts act facrs levee & LL PH Sun4aun ve \o wonbasans ‘ysop (US “(onze Anas ahhh oT. U() Tee we ge XTC TT ES eee p94 OTSTIlY "pod en a 3 Mt os cae Toa oun wees corr Tae UTA we Los WOT yey VUITTON AGTY (19% 27 74: Wear opal. 3 a é Oy ope 119° 2 Pap ao a wots. wie Pe Leeds TA Atau 9 uss Oo “= “A AVS GUVMNI INAWLUVdaAd ALXA dO === [PDF page 36] === rie tap; WHAT APPAIP NWARD SAVING RAM~" A oe jve + 6 £ x ae aan ol ~ seeba Wecan in Gny Viiv ShAk iS vd sak Re ca US Dovn canturcd: sukterne boon persuaded to? anncunce his susp the Neverent might net have turned cut eee; cS et ae ace eS te bu s riere"® ené we might new be in tho nidedle & bleed-bath we ney net yeu ; aioe 3, We dared o Ss Aca geeass;.:;; rs [Unreadable] i caren pirec Dis: NeutrolLize sees at the cru ee rere [Unreadable] 38% nd in Roc tieead. meé dcgcnoratce; and the promuls: 1 ¢f a now ms 1S hoc il Sg LNs WNeLe Sale ‘;; cay ee ae ga ie HOLLY Lovo: vi &sGerea vy vile 2% Major Dead ) Ss fantaAs} isiderabi 2 an deubtful whether the ¢.k.I. Lvadershin (as cpposed te their youthful gcens) Onar Dé Gra: wore unworriead when they learncd taken place, end th..t Hosutien Still et large. The subsequent PRs leaders fer ee. TE tien: of Oner iti lengthy all tena é&.cerrect “f murders must : “ted in advance, tuiesccnce F the 30th Sc’ ©. merc cernprehcnsive theery, sotensian rf <br 4 sheuld ~lse: WF ots VN £S0D cle’ H a L te ave, U ct ve bP a a Purse tts A nek hz oo dos vuls point. Grand Plan" essecictes [Unreadable] in Sunctre where he Lees oe Crim:nnacrs [Unreadable] axrrests/killings hac been successful, AUR, = 2 J ~- ee ere afta the Chinese, wae had snuggled exus inte disguised os CULsHO pea. bedg netoricls, aoe SRFEDEES fe it: Cad en sKeiciais mare ~ ot ok WwA!A é 7 -) et: We. ever yrreery a padi atwy “ Ds Te and Mew Zoelend jo urncli Soeur e GiS.t cuore nc hinese "had suryx rise? their (Chincse) nztirnel oe ottenticn te -.14/ RASS SSS ay°wowmwewes Wns MASANSASAAN Sow PIPTACM SSS nr nay RLDDLELEKE[_RQLDERLA PW GGG QAGQ@{@B[Q GGG_G|G@ RWYYYYQ®WQ RVQ@&QQq’ VQGG === [PDF page 37] === YO G naa 29 Hies LL] a1ToI mn eee Jick ALL MVitd) NTN} NN LAY LEIS 3 BYP (YY. ’'"'’’. i TTA TS Wb, eve & athe Ace a2. LADT 2 skaranoes Wav > SuTe Tacame qnuge Hips tarda DDINITYO Se Wy 2 USFROTALLO TOTATUtT ST 4 U9 TA ita oer 29 Leaps b rots Leu 37937 EAL cl “2 nr a Zh T q % sugedT at 3 a 20. UU a DA erect Ja ral 3) 39 wrt OTOASOE AIUD ATuART st TdT AGAGAAUOEsK UT pe SULT PCOTIT Mi BW wWowwwIyqo&8oowoo han wrere*s > *Kuizy ayy gsuteLve Utes LUT wlan + G Al CHESS [Unreadable] SuyVddV moo of dnso One Ms Ter; “8crl". 8 poupe taxa paggodima Ms a Crt Gis 2 %154 0 OTIN Debus ATR wow ~ 04% sr tges 10 <IT ATTA WOAO >INLO ALLY taper: S "“SUTLLY aaUATE gu TOLWES $TOAOM a SOU eT TTA GbLeweory WV bees 7 ‘aanoxt Id OUL Ero 2d pASTSL9G ITOG "A TPS Cit oo aura WlAUt Usd AOL we ee fb aac tT TIDOL a ted Te SOY bd ety F - 79 LUTE. oul lal 1 IVNUALXA JO LNAWLUVd dC === [PDF page 38] === ONT - Miougvoo oy Sutssozd oy t AT *OTSOUUPUT Vv -uoo pue ‘Id ou q0c of onuTqAU UCAS YOUI Slreort —INTUAIT J eh omert: inn UPTeN Tacs Teavaecdy fu & ASITS peaowe3 oyg go sootad y To [Torus oun pue aUONT IIe oud. ASUTose ROT OTMOULOA TTOUZ Buta DPE QO Va VS ADIT TT QACF OTA doy 9y4 an oz woo SULTSOUCPUT Ju SUCTTIt ‘KTPOLQnevuy Jo sev oyy Fo qusttd OU ENWTIOS U4 ‘SutnuTguoo ATUTeagnyZS pur ruCGW LAT NOY R ASAT MOQ RLS g,ureyMg CUTUAOpuM 99 OATOS «Tru Ues WOT A st Au mw LA bees 3 wat puu' *oos o4 {Te Tees I ‘UTEI aes oF “934 TAAOU [Unreadable] SOAOTYOR OF XT Weag ‘TomUud TOF PTQ 8 ouonbesttu ern ae Og DoF aT qtsn eek. pure Sxoy ucvus TTT OFUTOLOUD Aww RVQQygy RYYVQAAY Netty PITS StU Tr. TH IT OT I [Unreadable] ouu puc ‘(atofog Uys: yS 0 omy OYZuIS o4 Pues Tire oe oq a te A zs SLlou ae Ss hh AL ob SOAT: MOHAN ISS} oTq23 NO CARS MAOH ON RR A&Q °°» AW rsa duav yg US UTLOOL POUTGEO pOLVTGSNTT?E Sv pucrmi0od TINE ut é uorsdde mt ‘ATsnoTaqe *oeoyy Fv SIT NNO 4 AOUAPTOS Queen qvey OATS to< oD HULLS — SIOLOTT Uo CivA SAU.: GEG ore ) $ TOACAMUT Wort. 422 rauogodut AT TONZITA QoLoT DTRGA 2p AST pus Ter3H09 UT oe ong 9gt go Acizy ou AG oangceo Tae [Unreadable] : PIM 10449eT ME, DOdaT Te gust peutaico ety UWoty fire doer 9OU PTMCAM COTT¢, ONT PS * eu, ‘uqgauerys polite DATAETOR TO Cie n 2 aon haa a QT TTTA qmg “MOU OT FE FOdus r2oTat we S2 [Nd ou} seus vf 90, Ot Q||Q_EGN ‘st, TATION TSUYO Vv bap ne AS wwe Uae ae ts suivda IVNWALXA tO LNAWLMVvdad + AAS AAA AAEM AEE IAIN. SNCS SWANN a a pgm SEN ROE RE HE NOE 8 ae NR p oe ee === [PDF page 39] === EPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS WARD SAVINGRAM WAM MMA 1D Annee oe FEYNMAN SBS fmattss onywnere MOL At mn Aes mA tions, ACW eT iene so, it would bo equa [Unreadable] CAE ait atkts +1 La hard cningst of tucse OavEeLye GCS. MWY ip ne an Aa lawp not gcing GO go. OW} mri 4cus mass 11 its for > ey osyansionisn and scciol uphe 5 oe 214. 0i4 ~~ WOON for many meons. WAASAAAAAAN Q__ HHH iH6diwW Hi Hp» MOO SOAS SSS SQOOWN oA WAN \ IMM NANAANS AAS Wii’ === [PDF page 40] === boo DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS N WARD SAVINGRAM ifarRl Ssl Nisan OH ererence to paragraph 36 above, spaps on Heris; Se Ty i. vr; <= - Oct ober Dehe HORPENCOR UiSE BING 11th October, 1965. eI MM haw Sy i [Unreadable] DL INT UN PACAM AMSP EA EAMEC E ICR PIO PPO MT ER BANGKOK KUALA LUMPUR LONDON MANILA NEW DELHI NEW YORK(UN) SINGAPORE TOKYO WASHINGTON WELLINGTON === [PDF page 41] === FROM — e da Ab Leheol dyakirta) No. 2.568 Dated 77 Vevernbv Received iG vie Sibi (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action | completed) | h ql’ (Main Indexed) (Security Grading—to be Up-graded 44 where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT INDONESIA NH /018 4309 SUBJECT: Ko pork on reonaeln, ctl Ueam Pati al 0-5 Cntasaan HM cepghor; onalony: ‘eratlus nated Lees Cernaal Cnn kane: (cthiaf ually on ao Kegeere mit wat not AK 4 ae “Toome Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: MINUTES Oo Wu-) jeri lconsivionennesl === [PDF page 42] === @ _— Tor COPY FROM DJAKARTA TO FORBIGN OFFICE Cypher/OTP DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Sir A, Gilchrist Noe 2568 D. 1258 17 November,—-1965/. 17 November, 1965. R. 0028 18 November, 196 SECRET ‘Addressed _ to Foreign Office telegram No. 2568 of 17 November Repeated for information to:- Kuala Lumpur POLAD Singapore B.H.C. Singapore and Saving to:- Washington Canberra Wellington At a reception at the American Ambassador's last night, 16 November, I talked with Adam Malik for some time in the general circle and hinted a reminder of his promise to see me before I left for London. Later he caught me by myself and spoke as follows. It would be dangerous for him to see me anywhere in private now. From our discussion earlier in the evening it was clear that I fully understood the political position. Sukarno and the Generals were like two Japanese wrestlers locked in a clinch. Sukarno kept trying to make a throw (political solution with survival of P.K.I.) but the Generals would not give way. They were not trying to throw Sukarno: but they would never recede. Cabinet changes must come. But not immediately: there was no sign of an early open once-for-all political victory for the Generals. Political stability was urgently necessary for economic reasons and there already existed a crying need for speedy foreign aid, which he hoped "The West" would not be unwilling to give. 2.- I asked Malik (in the presence of Mr. Green who had joined us) when there would be an Indonesian Minister with whom we could deal, on matters of international importance, instead of the present anomalous position, when we had to choose between Subandrio and dangerous secret contacts (i.e. dangerous in the sense that their revelation would injure the prospects of "the right people"). Malik was unable to give a clear reply except that a better situation could not be expected immediately. ye Knowing. Malik as I do, I was impressed both by his friendliness and BY"His confidence. But it is worth noting that he does not apparently consider it dangerous to have confidential talks with the Americans; these are now foreseen. Foreign Office pass Saving Washington 539, Canberra 160, Wellington 156. i? [Repeated as requested. ] DISTRIBUTED TO:- Fer let sB: C.R.O. F.E. and P. Dept. SSSSS SECRET === [PDF page 43] === TOP Copy SECRET INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM Du) sr FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE pe By Bag DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist . No. 95 Saving R. 20 November 1965 18 November 1965 DH 015 30 SECRET ) Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 95 Saving of 18 November Repeated for information Saving to: Kuala Lumpur POLAD Singapore B,H.C. Singapore Washington Canberra Wellington My telegram No. 2568: Adam Malik. Since my conversation with Adam Malik was incomplete, I had some questions put to him later through a secure channel. He has replied in writing, text in my immediately following telegram. === [PDF page 44] === SBCRET INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE By Bag DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION _ Sir A. Gilchrist No. 96 Savin; fv November 1965 R. 20 November 19 dr! SECRET TOK (01 | =) Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 96 Saving of 18 November Repeated for information Saving to; Kuala Lumpur POLAD Singapore B.H.C. Singapore Washington Canberra Wellington ot s/3ea(B) My immediately preceding Saving telegram: Adam Malik. The following is the text of the questions and answers, BEGINS: 1- While the two Japanese wrestlers are in a clinch, it seems useless for the spectators to try to throw biscuits to one of them. Is this right? Answer: Yes, this is absolutely right. The spectators can only watch while eating the biscuits themselves, And eventually they can shout as hard as possible. We have to consider the Sukarno power as follows: formerly he got the sympathy from the army as well as from the people. But at this very moment the power support has moved against hin, Can he still withstand this?. This is the big question. 2. But what attitude, public and private, should be taken by us at this moment which would help the right people? What things should we say, and not say? Or do? Answer: On the attitude of publicity what can be taken; (a) demolition of Malaysia (b) considering a new high level talks of peaceful settlement of the problem (c) Stewart's gesture on reconsidering the fact of abolishing the foreign base in Singapore should be made wide public, as to drawgmore attention to the people. 3. Given good will on the Indonesian side, as there is on our side, have recent events made an end of Konfrontesi’ more likely? SECRET /Answer === [PDF page 45] === SECRET & Djakarta telegram No. 96 Saving to Foreign Office he aad Answer: On this problem we cannot make any clear decision yet. Because the wrestlers are still fighting and we do. not know who will gain the victory. In case that the army side will win then it is more likely that the solution of this Konfrontasi will be peacefully. 4. Looking at the short term and small beginnings, when will it be possible for the Indonesian Government (i.e. a single, responsible Indonesian Government) to make some move or indication (overt or tacit) which might enable us to make some reciprocal move? Answer: Again we have to watch first at the wrestlers. For the time being we cannot make any estimation nor judgement. We have to watch the wrestlers movements. Only after the final game then we can make any decisions or some move or indication or thinking of any reciprocal move. At the present state it is still too early to make any judgement. be Any comment on Singapore and barter trade? Answer: On this question we do not consider any comment, Since it is for the present moment still a too sensitive and delicate problem. For the time being we keep silent and may be we can consider it later as the situation has reached a more clearer state. ENDS, UTED TO: === [PDF page 46] === FROM ~:. 2 otal,. du fA Seifert ( 4 hata ) No. IT 7. 7 Dated /7 Jive deh Received /F/leyen by # (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) 23 * 57 (Main Indexed) 46 (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT INDONES SUBJECT: fon hy 4 lipy £ Encloses Copy of: H. fors [3/0 me IhwAe A eyreder sehen SOs regen ov Jifterre Ae SoD 6 acide elem cud los. ae ollie ( AW sh al: NMesuta WEL then ¥0 eb ook” Aypertar: Aft cial 7 A the fore Jy the ae ereely ‘fe x Unie free, Lewarted References and Relevant Papers: dH. ee MINUTES === [PDF page 47] === od TOP COPY FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE En Clair FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist D a (Ole RIG Noe 2578 D. 0358 17 oy euhee 1965 1/7 November 1965 Re 1103 17 November 1965 Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2573 of 1/7 November Repeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur POLAD Singapore BHC Singapore and Saving to: Washington Canberra Wellington Indonesia Internal developments. From Antara 16 November. (a) The Gotong Royong House of Representatives has requested Sukarno to take a political decision immediately against the 30 September movement "consistent with the demands of the people." Sukarno was asked to dissolve the P.K.I. and its affiliated organizations. (b) General Nasution has instructed the Armed Forces to purge themselves of "elements implicated in the 430 September movement"; special teams will be set up for this purpose. The penalties will range up to dishonourable discharge. 2. Angkatang Bersenjata, 17 November, reports a similar Command issued by Major-General Soeharto in his capacity as Chief-of-Staff of K.0.T.I. and on behalf of Sukarno, to all compartents [sic], departments and Government agencies to purge themselves of counter-revolutionary elements. 3. The vernacular Antara, 1/ November, reports that there was a meeting yesterday of the Armed Forces Commanders "to pave the way towards restoring unity among the Armed Forces." One of the subjects discussed was "the change of leadership of the Air Force in accordance with the written report by Nasution to the President on cooperation and unity within the Armed Forces," Foreign Office pass Saving Washington 540, Canberra 161, Wellington 157. === [PDF page 48] === 48 (Security Grading—to be Up-graded D where Appropriate) | rat SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT coe ac INDONESIA D. (O Su SUBJECT: eypatel Wo./6 ford adathines portiiular? on ch Coup dA lélal JX ae Ap bmte, VF SS” F Medebral (Yyekert) No. Dopelid Wo. 1b (ews) Dated (F Movewtber Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: -kais Received 2.2 phen bet, (Outward Action) Yili t T. Mun Sx f t. Coke 4°” res Cones = Sem port, bane eek & Tie, Oe Vos > (de Gondeanegh br Burt, ha Retvie ) TR ana si(2) A -hod. A copy for pret, Cubuccvo. Mate dso” [Unreadable] Wore dolEdet and Gun Meng tote” eparath. AttCeegl i A: Qrilebeis™ u (Referred to Legal Adviser) caauet (Main Indexed) Wt? all be ea) es {oo fan on te entra Wgua 7 i === [PDF page 49] === diawa, Houehy, ly, ee leer Ge. og. can OO Loolak wu Ke Coup > lo dees wale Ok" iageny Cae agausd” Gulearmo pro lalale Counpli ecty. drape (tte. — ulru! Uaol >. Series: [Unreadable] Tu « bacdien — erenege sh os, prated. IR SWLYe a.a Kai D> De === [PDF page 50] === se fal J \ [ Lj" [ Mawhe hw Ey === [PDF page 51] === Reference Conf Pend uf lu Fo uss.’ A fetbe wpet am The tinph? coup 2 cheta SM ieee Te ren Pet ee Sobens ou od vote or of, be A. Cllanls Desph& We. Ib of 1€ Nowwher, ahewt Ha wap ee ye ee Ths. Despubr. ‘lao, 2 ders 4. lft | aa tt. juin Ani guna of =” Dicaba * oly tee Pk és su vebrt? Mn ciel. YG cafffeir | gt oc J0e8 q Ve om ferent, Ci Pence. 4 Des: Dek Swleorud 5 cough al [e- Q oss. b4% | cawiphi cele ) oad sug gee oy he baie: art wiost whih> tar estore fet wo bene rolak-ous cote a. 3. Wee Despubl vs sf eb wlan ha t We eure res Fe foes Ks “s rt ica me 2 * phouwt shor of “a cout a o [Unreadable] | sukity prin Pots. ES bade = G tas, ncRs Faowrt. sud copy = (preity ) pls (onthe te ey er’) WA Ed (1627) | | a === [PDF page 52] === 52 [Handwritten minute in blue ink, transcribed by eye:] may wish to recommend priority printing. === [PDF page 53] === CONFIDENTIAL THIS DOCUMENT IS £!HE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT DH 1015/311 ARCHIVES COPY. NOT FOR CIRCULATION, Foreign Office and Whitehall Distribution INDONESIA 22 November, 1965 Section 1 A FURTHER REPORT ON THE ATTEMPTED COUP D’ETAT Sir Andrew Gilchrist to Mr. Stewart. (Received 22 November) SUMMARY Further particulars about the events in Djakarta on the night of the attempted coup, and their bearing on relations between President Soekarno and the army authorities who now control Indonesia. (Paragraphs 1-2.) An account from one of General Nasution’s staff officers of the attempted murder of the general. It was only later that morning that Colonel Untung and the PKI rebels at the Halim Air Base realised that this vital part of their plot had failed. (Paragraphs 3-8.) An investigation into Soekarno’s movements at that time. The evidence shows that he was very probably at the air base when the other generals were murdered. (Paragraphs 9-15.) This will further encourage General Nasution and his colleagues to tolerate Soekarno only so long as he is of use to them. (Paragraph 16.) (No. 16. Confidential) Djakarta, Sir, 18 November, 1965. I have the honour to submit the following additional particulars relating to the coup détat of the 30th of September(’) in Djakarta. They are of interest in themselves and have a bearing on the question of President Soekarno’s attitude during that night. 2. In my despatch No. 13 of the 8th of October I said. that I believed it was the news of General Nasution’s escape which decided the President against throwing in his lot with the Communists and joining them in Central Java. 3. In one of my first telegrams reporting the coup, I said that I had had a talk the previous evening with one of Nasution’s staff officers, Major Hassanoedin. I have now had an opportunity of finding out from him what happened after we parted company about 9 p.m. I may add that Hassanoedin has been responsible for the personal security of Nasution and his family ever since the events of the 30th of September and may have had some such responsibilities before that date. 4. After leaving the party where we met. Major Hassanoedin went quietly to bed but was called out by an emergency message brought by hand from army headquarters at about 4 a.m. All he was told was that something was wrong, that attempts were being made to murder or kidnap certain generals. He moved fast and went first to Nasution’s house, arriving there at precisely 5 o’clock. There was a junior officer present who gave a somewhat confused account of events but insisted on the principal point, that the general had escaped. Mme. Nasution, he said, had left the house, on foot, carrying her wounded child in her arms, but had found transport to take her to the nearest hospital: the officer described her departure, and quoted her in support of his statement that Nasution was safe.(’) This satisfied Major Hassanoedin, who therefore went quickly to the houses of Generals Yani and Parman, where the news was much worse. 5. Major Hassanoedin then returned to headquarters,(*) where the only man of any seniority on duty was Brigadier-Genera! Moersjid. The reports from the Palace about CONFIDENTIAL 20109—375 6350—6 === [PDF page 54] === 2 CONFIDENTIAL Untung’s Tjakrabirawa (Bodyguard) troops having taken control had now come in, and the scene was one of distraction and confusion. Major Hassanoedin’s news of Nasution’s survival was grasped at once as a vital and encouraging factor, and General Moersjid decided that the best means of saving the situation was to obtain support from loyal formations at Bandung. All attempts to reach General Adjie of the Siliwangi Division by normal methods failed, the rebels having control of the Post Office and telephone centres; but at 7 a.m. someone made contact on the microwave link (a recent manifestation of American technical aid) and Adjie was briefed on the Djakarta revolt. He agreed to give all possible support and to establish control points at Bogor and on the Bandung— Djakarta highway; what was perhaps more important, he sent a message to his three battalions then in Djakarta for Armed Forces Day that they should obey implicitly and without question the orders of the Djakarta Command.(*) 6. Up to this point nothing had been heard of General Suharto, and at first it was not certain whether he was alive or dead. He appeared at Kostrad Headquarters in the middle of the morning and assumed full control and responsibility as from noon that day. 7. As for Nasution, Major Hassanoedin was somewhat reticent; the impression I got was of a man in great pain and distress whose survival was of more importance at the moment than any other contribution he might make. I gathered that on the Ist of October Nasution in the main continued to draw breath, that he spent most of the 2nd of October at the hospital with his daughter(*) (the surgeons were trying hopelessly to save her life with blood transfusions), and that it was only on the 3rd of October that he began to count again as a military and political factor. 8. At this point I asked Major Hassanoedin the following question: when did “ the people at Halim Air Base ” (I kept the language vague) know that Nasution was not dead? I think he saw the implications, but answered quite frankly. It was at 7.45 a.m. on the Ist of October that the dead bodies of the generals were thrown down the famous well at Halim and tamped in with earth and rubbish. It was during the previous hour, or perhaps rather less, that the revolting mutilations with knives and scissors had taken place (I enclose as an Annex* a few paragraphs on this subject from the Djakarta Daily Mail of the 5th Be November), and that the lives of those of the seven who had retained consciousness up to that moment were finally extinguished. One might estimate, thought Major Hassanoedin, that about 7 a.m., when the bodies, living and dead, were handed over to the women with the scissors, was the time when “ the people at Halim ” learnt that the seventh man, whose body had been delivered there as that of General Nasution, was in fact his ADC(*)—a man who, though resembling Nasution, was so much younger as to be easily distinguishable by daylight. 9. Where was Soekarno at 7 a.m.? In my earlier despatch I suggested that the President spent the Thursday night with Ibu Dewi, his Japanese wife; that he returned to the Palace and was seen there, among Untung’s troops, between 6 and 7 a.m. the next day; and that he left for Halim later in the morning. 10. There is confirmation for the first point in remarks which Ibu Dewi herself has since let fall; and we have some corroboration from the Turkish Ambassador who was entertaining Ibu Dewi to dinner that Thursday evening when she was summoned to leave. The Ambassador escorted her to a waiting car in which he is almost positive he saw Soekarno. The second point—that the President was seen in the Palace some time after 6 a.m.—is now more doubtful. The report about this first came to the American Embassy from “a reliable source”. However, they have now had conflicting reports from other sources which insist that Soekarno was not in the Palace as late as that. The point is important, as will become clear from what follows. 11. Further evidence of the President’s movements have since been provided by the man himself. In an informal Press conference on the 14th of October he said— and I quote the Antara report—“ that of his own free will and not because of pressure or force of arms by whomsoever he left Merdeka Palace on the Ist October in the morning headed for the Halim Air Base. His personal security was in the hands of units of the Tjakrabirawa Regiment, and carried out well ”. * Not printed. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 55] === 12. That same Antara article concludes with what are called “a few notes” by the Tjakrabirawa themselves. This is the crucial passage: “On the Ist of October in the morning troops in army guard were stationed around the Palace, as if the Palace was surrounded. The Tjakrabirawa regiment at 0600 in the morning decided to take President Soekarno out of the Palace to another safer place. From that place on President Soekarno’s own request he was taken to Halim Air Base escorted by a Tjakrabirawa unit—with the purpose of being able to fly out President Soekarno to a safer place if some undesirable incident might happen. The Tjakrabirawa Commanders stressed that at that time nothing definite was known about the real situation. Only afterwards, when the President /Great Leader of the Revolution was in a safe place, it was understood that there were elements in the Tjakrabirawa that were involved in the counterrevolutionary *‘ September 30 Movement ’. President /Great Leader of the Revolution arrived at Halim about 0930 in the morning.... The Tjakrabirawa commandos conclude that President Soekarno was never for a single moment under the authority of the so-called ‘ September 30 3:99 Movement ’. 13. It is hard to accept that conclusion. First, we know that Halim was in the hands of the Untung faction until Saturday. Second, it can hardly have been a coincidence that took the President to the very place which Untung had chosen for the torture and murder of the generals. So we must ask, was the President there at Halim at that time? If the Tjakrabirawa account is to be believed the answer is no: he arrived some two hours later. But what are we to make of that “ other safer place ”? No one has ever explained convincingly where it might be. In fact, so suspect is the whole story that the attempt has not even been made. It is hard to believe that in a country so given to rumours and gossip as this, the President could actually have spent two hours hiding out somewhere in Djakarta on that fateful morning, without someone—a servant, a driver, a passer-by—- blowing the gaff. 14. There are other grounds for doubting the veracity of anything which emanates from the Tjakrabirawa. At one time we thought that only a few elements in it were actually involved in the coup, and that the CONFIDENTIAL rest were innocent. This now looks to be only a half-truth: it is becoming clear that, although only a section of the Tjakrabirawa may have been wholly informed of the plot, all of them, including their commander, Brigadier Sabur, probably had a fair knowledge of what was afoot. 15. I am, nevertheless, inclined to believe the Tjakrabirawa report about the 6 a.m. departure from the Palace, if only because this would be a detail which could not easily be distorted. But those few hours between his reported departure at 6 a.m. and his reported arrival at Halim at 9.30 a.m. begin to look more and more suspect. As soon as the timing of the generals’ murders at Halim had been established, it became imperative for the whitewash merchants to delay the President’s arrival at Halim until well after the event. So the tale of “another safer place ” is cooked up. 16. No one yet is saying outright that the President himself was an eye-witness of the atrocities at Halim. No one is even saying publicly that he was actually there at the time, aware of what was going on though quite possibly at some other part of the base. But this is what more and more people are beginning to think. And this is what may yet stiffen the determination of the generals to continue with Soekarno only so long as he eventually carries out their wishes. He may be an accessory to a most hideous crime; but the generals may well believe that their present difficulties will only be intolerably increased if President Soekarno were to be removed from office. 17. I am sending copies of this despatch and the enclosure to Her Majesty’s Representatives at Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Washington, Canberra, Wellington and to the Political Adviser to the Commander-in- Chief Far East, Singapore. I have, &c. A. G. GILCHRIST. NOTES (*) In reality it was only on the Ist of October, in the early hours of the morning that action began; but the rebel forces began to assemble on the evening of the 30th of September, hence the assigned date. (*) In point of fact, the unfaltering Mme. Nasution, having saved her husband, and trying desperately to save her child, paused on her way to save the CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 56] === 4 CONFIDENTIAL Indonesian Army: her warning, though imperfectly understood, was the first notification of trouble which reached the authorities and led to Major Hassanoedin’s reconnaissance. I should like to take this opportunity of re-recording the fact that on the 18th of October, 1963, Mme. Nasution with her husband’s approval took into her own house for protection a number of British children from neighbouring houses which were being sacked or destroyed by the mob. (*) It seems likely that this was Kostrad (Strategic Reserve) Headquarters, since Untung’s troops obtained control of the main army headquarters at some stage in the morning; it is known that staff officers from main army were working at Kostrad under Suharto later in the day. (*) Though Hassanoedin did not say so, it is known that Adjie did not carry out troop movements with any great enthusiasm until his orders were confirmed by Soekarno (under pressure from Suharto) two days later. Adjie’s excessive loyalty to Soekarno, which has caused uneasiness in recent weeks to Nasution and Suharto, was thus manifested at an early stage. (°) Some confusion was caused by Press reports of the death of Nasution’s second daughter, as if “® of his daughters had died. He had two: only the younger was shot. A story has recently been put about that the first daughter is an adopted child. This is untrue but for some Indonesian reason or other it is causing the most intense pain and distress to the Nasution family. (°) The story in my earlier despatch about Nasution being mistaken for his own servant is not confirmed; he owed his escape to the alertness of his wife and to his own physical fitness. As for the ADC, it is not clear whether he was casually shot in the general mélée or whether he died in defending his master or whether he actually and deliberately impersonated Nasution. I think the second explanation is correct, but many people believe the third. One may safely assume that he was a brave man. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 57] === Confession of Participation in killing the Generals: WE WERE SUPPLIED WITH SMALL KNIVES AND RAZOR BLADES TO CUT GENERALS KILLED AT LUBANG BUAJA Djakarta, Nov. 5 (ABRI) - One of the principal killers in the massacre of the Generals, Heroes of the Indonesian Revolution, confessed frankly having been commanded by superiors to participate in that inhuman act. Among the women arrested, pecause of participation in the unspeakable mutilations, was | — who in her confession admitted frankly to be among those "honoured" with the label of “Lubang Buaja Heroine" by People's Youth (Pemuda Rakjat) comrades at the time. This, because | ~~ took part in the cutting up, together with other People's Youth comrades. In her confession she said she was porn 15 years ago in Patjitan, Bast Java. In January she married H., employed in the telephone central of the Gaja Motor State Trading enterprise at Tandjong Priok. Both are members of the People's Youth while He was chairman of the Tandjung Priok branch of the SBPP union..cceecs In her confession further states that on the 30th of September around 07.00 a.m. all members were made ready and a roll-call was taken, and the platoon leader reminded them to be on the alert and that the crushing of necolim and bureaucrat capitalists would shortly commence. The atmosphere that night was loaded, and turns were taken at standing guard, each house being assigned nine People's Youth members armed With G.3 rifles. Said, further: “Around 3 o'clock a.m. all were commanded to bathe and attend roll-call rightaway. During rollcall the platoon leader issued instructions to crush pureaucrat capitalists and tne necolim. »But we did not know which ones because that was not clarified". Thus 7 At 05.00 acl. roll-call was held and at 6 o'clock some 500 people were assembled, among them 100 members of the Indonesian Women's Movement. To the TWil/Gerwani members including small knives and razor blades were distributed. “I just got 4 razor blade", thus 1 “who went on to say; “From afar we saw a heavy set person Wearing sleeping clothes like a duster with Ganefo-like print, hands bound with red cloth and eyes also covered with red cloth. The platoon leader commanded them to beat up that person, then the persons private parts with the small knives. The first to start the cutting and beating we saw to be leaders of the Tandjung Priok Iw/Gerwani. Then followed otner comrades, among Whom Si. and A. are known to me. Then I myself joined in the torture. All of the 100 women members did likewise ana were Witness. Then we saw the victim being taken near a well py people in camouflage uniform with crooked red insignia of rank, some with three crooked bars, some with two bars on the shoulder patch, in all four members of the pat/ Air Force paratroopers. / The victim === [PDF page 58] === The victim was shot three times then fell down, but was not yet dead. A green-uniformed person wearing three crooked white bars on the shoulder patches ordered the IWii/Gerwani members to advance. All repeated the earlier actions, stabbing at the victim's private parts, and cutting these parts and the body until he died. I was asking my comrades who~ the one killed had been, but got hit on the mouth so I did not dare to inquire any further. Afterwards the corpse was thrown into the well. In a state of fear and anxiety we ran to the front of the house and whispered among us that it was a general who had just been killed.ccoce Thus the confession by a Gestapu terrorist taking part in the counter-revolutionary adventurisn, This person was caught on the 30th of October, 1965. is now in custody: ---- -- -- ene === [PDF page 59] === CONFIDENTIAL SUMMARY Further particulars about the events in Djakarta on the night of the attempted coup, and their bearing on relations between President Sockarno the Army Authorities who now control Indonesia. (paragraphs 1-2) An account from one of General Nasution's staff officers of the attempted murder of the general. It was only later that morning that Colonel Untung and the PKI rebels at the Halim air base realised that this vital part of their plot had failed. (paragraphs 3-8) An investigation into Soekarno's movments at that time. The evidence shows that he was very probably at the air base when the other generals were murdered, (paragraphs 9-15) This will further encourage General Nasution and his colleagues to tolerate Soekarno only so long as he is of use to them, (paragraph 16) === [PDF page 60] === . 2) BRITISH EMBASSY, AP RLLOY _ 16 ae DJAKARTA, 1011/65 18 November, 1965. nH ors/aut I have the honour to submit the following additional particularg, re lating to the coup d'etat of the 30th of September inDjakarta. They are of interest in themselves and have a bearing on the questim of President Soekarno's attitude during that night. dit vers | 215 2. In my despatch No. 13 of the 8th of October Yoo 4 I said that I believed it was the news of General % Nasution's escape which decided the President against throwing in his lot with the Communists and joining them in Central Java, Sir, oa In one of my first telegrams reporting the coup, I said that I had had a talk the previous eveni with one of Nasution's staff officers, Major Hassanoedin. I have now had an opportunity of finding out from him what happened after we parted company about 9 p.m iI may add that Hassanoedin has been responsible for the personal security of Nasution and his family ever since the events of the 30th of September and may have had some such responsibilities before that date. 4. After leaving the ae where we met, Major Hassanoedin went quietly to bed but was called out by an emergency message brought by hand fran Army Headquarters at about 4 a.m, All he was told was that something was wrong, that attempts were being made to murder or kidnap certain generals, He moved fast and went first to Nasution's house, arriving there at precisely 5 o'clock. There was a junior officer present who gave a somewhat confused account of events but insisted on the ere point, that the General had escaped. Madame Nasution, he said, had left the house on foot, carrying her wounded child’in her arms, but had found transport to take her to the nearest hospital: the officer described her departure, and quoted ber in support of his statement that Nasution was safe(2), This satisfied Major Hassanoedin, who therefore went quickly to the houses of Generals Yani and Parman, where the news was much worse, 5 Major Hassenoedin then retumed to HeadquarteS> where the only man of eny seniority on duty.was Brigadier General Moersjid. The revorts from the Palace about Untung's Tjakrabirawa (Bodyguard) troops having taken control had now come in, and the scene was one of distraction/ The Right Honourable Michad Stewart, M.P., etc., etc., etc. FIWTTT TANTU TAT === [PDF page 61] === CONFIDENTIAL distraction and confusion, Major Hassanoedin's news of Nasution's survival was grasped at once as a vital and 7 ee factor, and General Moersjid decided that the best means of saving the situation was to obtain support from loyal formatims at Bandung. All attempts to reach General Adjie of the Siliwangi Division by normal methods failed, the rebels having control of the Post Office and telephone centres; but at 7 a.m. someone made contact on the microwave link (a recent manifestation of American technical aid) md Adjie was briefed on the Djakarta revolt. He agreed to give all possible Support and to establish control points at Bogor and m the Bandung-Djakarta highway; what was perhaps more important, he sent a message to his three battalions then in Djakarta for Armed Forces Day that they should obey ek and vreeet question the orders of the 6. Up to this point nothing had been heard of General Suharto, end at first it was not certain whether he was alive or dead. He appeared at Kostrad Headquarters in the middle of the morning end assumed full cantrol and responsibility as from noon that day. r As for Nasution, Major Hassanoedin was somewhat reticent; the impression I got_ was of a man in great pain end distress whose survival was of more importance at the moment than any other cotribution he might make. I gathered that on the lst of October Nasution in the main continued to draw breath, that he spent most_of the and of October at the hospital with his daughter(5) (the surgeons were trying hopelessly to save her life with blood transfusions), and that it was only on the 3rd of October that he began to count again as a military and political factor. 3; At this point I asked Major Hassanoedin the following question: when did "the people at Halim Air Base" (I kept the language vague) know that Nasution was not dead? I think he saw the implications, but answered uite frankly, It was a 7.45 a.m. on the lst of ctober that the dead bodies of the generals were throw down the famous well at Halim eid tamped in with earth and rubbish, It was during the previous hour, or perhaps rather less, that the revolting mutilations with knives and scissors had taken place (I enclose as an annex a few paragraphs on this subject from the Djakarta Daily Mail of the Sth of November), and that the lives of those of the seven who had retained consciousness up to that moment were finally extinguished. One might estimate, thought Major Hassanoedin, that about 7 a.m., when the bodies, living and dead, were handed over to the women with the scissors, was the time when "the people at Halim" learnt that the seventh man, whose body had been delivere¢ there as that of General Nasution, was in fact his A.D.C$ - & man who, though resembling Nasution, was so much younger as to be easily distinguishable by daylight. CONFI DENTE IAL === [PDF page 62] === 9. Where was Soekarno at 7 am.? In earlier despatch I Sree eee that the President spent the Thursday night with Ibu Dewi, his Japanese wife; that he returned to the Palace and was seen there, among Untung's troops, between 6 and 7 a.m, the next day; and that he left for Halim later in the moming. 10. There is confirmation for the first point in remarks which Ibu Dewi herself has since let fall; and we have some corroborration from the Turkish Ambassador who was entertaining Ibu Dewi to dinner tha Thursday evening when she was summoned to leave. The Ambassador escorted her to a waiting car in which he is almost ee he saw Soekarno. The second point - that the resident was seen in the Palace sometime after 6 a.m. - is now more doubtful. The report about this first came to the American Embassy fran "a reliable source", However, they have now had cmflicting reports from other sources which insist that Soekarno was not in the Palace as late as that. The point is important, as will become clear from what follows. dass Further evidence of the President's movements have since been provided by the man himself. In am informal press conference on the 14th of October he said - and I quote the Antara report — "that on his own free will and not because of pressure or force of arms by whomsoever he left Merdeka Palace on October 1 in the morning headed for the Halim air base. His persmal security was in the hands of units of the T jakrabirawa Regiment, and carried out well", a2. That same Antara article concludes with what are called "a few notes" by the Tjakabirawa themselves. This is the crucial passage: "On October 1 in the morning troops in Army = were stationed around the Palace, as if the Palace was surrounded. The Tjakrabirawa regiment at 06.00 in the morning decided to take President Soekarno out of the Palace to another safer place. From that place on President Soekarno's own request he was taken to Halim air base escorted by a Tjakrabirawa unit - with the purpose of being able to fly out President Soekerno to a more safer place if some undesirable incident might happen. ‘The Tjakrabirawa Commanders stressed that at that time nothing definite was known about the real situation. Only afterwards, when the President/Great Leader of the Revolution was in a safe place, it was understood that there were elements in the Tjakrabirawa that were involved in the counter-revolutionary ‘September 30 Movement’. President/Great Leader of the Revolution arrived at Halim about 09.30 in the morning... The Tjakrabirawa commandos conclude that President Soekarno was never for a single moment under the authority of the so-called "September 30 Movement'", ser === [PDF page 63] === CONFIDENTIAL Ss It is hard to accept that conclusion. First, we know that Halim was in the hends of the Untung faction until Saturday. Second, it can hardly have been a coincidence that took the President to the very place which Untung had chosen for the torture and murder of the generals. So we must ask, was the President there at Halim at that time? If the Tjakrabirawa account is to be believed the answer is no: he arrived some two hours later. But what are we to make of that "other safer place"? No-one has ever explained convincingly where 1t mi be. In fact, so meee er is the whole story that the attempt has not even been made. It is hard to believe that in a country so given to rumours and gossip as this, the President could actually have spent two hours hiding out somewhere in Djakarta on that fateful morning, without someone - a servant, a driver, & passer-by - blowing the gaff. 14, There are other grounds for doubting the veracity of enything which emanates from the Tjakrabirawa, At one time we thought that only a few elements in it were actually involved in the coup, amd that the rest were innocent. This now looks to be only a half-truth: it is becoming clear that, although only a sectio of the Tjakrabirawa may have been wholly informed of the plot, all of them, ee commander, Brigadier Sabur, probably had a fair knowledge of what was afoot. 15. I am, nevertheless, inclined to believe the Tjakrabirawa report about the 6 a.m. departure from the Palace, if a because this would be a detail which could not easily be distorted. But those few hours between his reported departure at 6 a.m, and his reported arrival at Halim at 9,50 a.m. begin to look more and more suspect. As soon as the waaing of the generals’ murders at Halim had been established, it became imperative for the whitewash merchants to delay the President's arrival at Halim until well after the event. So the tale of "another safer place" is cooked up. 16. No-one yet is saying outright that the President himself was an eye-witness of the atrocities at Halim. No-one is even saying publicly that he was actually there at the time, aware of what was going on though quite possibly at some other part of the base. But this is what more and more people are beginning to think, And this is what may yet stiffen the determination of the generals to continue with Soekarno only so long as he eventually carries out their wishes. e may be an et to a most hideous crime; but the generals may well believe that their present difficulties will only be intolerably increased if President Soekarno were to be removed fron office, CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 64] === ye I an sending copies of this despatch and the enclosure to H.M. Representatives at Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Washington, Canberra, Wellington and to the Political Adviser to the Commander-in-Chief Far Kast, Singapore. I have the honour to be, With ere respect, Your obedient Servant, gerne CONFIDENT IAL === [PDF page 65] === CONFIDENTIAL NOTES (1) In reality it was only on October 1, in the early hours of the moming that action began; but the rebel forces began to assemble on the evening of 30 September, hence the assigned date. (2) In point of fact, the unfaltering Madame Nasution, having saved her husband, and trying desperately to save her child, paused on her way to save the Indmesian Army: her wets though imperfectly understood, was the first notification of trouble which reached the authorities and led to Major Hassanoedin's reconnaissance. JI should like to take this opportunity of re-recording the fact that on 18 October 1963 Madame Nasution with her husband's approval took into her ow house for protection a number of British children from neighbouring houses which were being sacked or destroyed by the mob, (3) It seems likely that this was KOSTRAD (Strategic Reserve) Headquarters, since Untung's troops obtained control of the main Army Headquarters at some stage in the morning; it is known that staff officers from main Frees were working at KOSTRAD under Suharto later in the (4) Though Hassanoedin did not say so, it is known that Adjie did not carry out troop movements with any great enthusiasm until his orders were confirmed by Soekarno (under pressure fran Suharto) two days later. Adjie's excessive loyalty to Soekamo, which has caused uneasiness in recent weeks to Nasution and Suharto, was thus menifested at an early stage. (5) Some confusion was caused by press reports of the death of Nasution's second daughter, as if two of his daughters had died. He had two: only the younger was shot. A story has recently been a: about that the first daughter is an adopted child. his is untrue but for some Indonesian reason or other it is causing the most intense pain and distress to the Nasution family. (6) _,the story in my earlier despatch about Nasution being mistaken for his own servant is not confirmed; he owed his escape to the alertness of his wife and to his own physical fitness. As for the A.D.C., it is not Clear whether he was casually shot in the general melee or whether he died in defending his master or whether he actually end deliberately impersonated Nasution, I think the second explanation is correct, but people believe the third. One may safely assume that he was & brave man, === [PDF page 66] === Confession of Participation in killing the Generals: WE WERE SUPPLIED WITH SMALL KNIVES AND RAZOR BLADES TO CUT GENERALS KILLED AT LUBANG BUAJA aici adidas neato mT Nov. 5 (ABRI) - One of the principal killers in the massa of the Generals, Heroes of the Indonesian Revolution, confe ankly having been commanded by superiors to partici- Sate es that inhuman act. Among the women arrested. because of participation in the unspeakable mutilations, was who in her confession admitted frankly to be among those “honoured" with the label of “Lubang Buaja Heroine” by People's Youth (Pemuda Rakjat) comrades at the time. This, because 7 took part in the cutting up, together with other People's Youth comrades. In her confession she said she was born 15 years ago in Patjitan, East Java. In January she married H., employed in the telephone central of the Gaja Motor State Trading enterprise at Tandjong Priok.. Both are members of the People's Youth while H. was chairman of the Tandjung Priok branch of the SBPP union...ceee In her confession further states that on the 30th of September around 07.00 a.m. all members were made ready and a roll-call was taken, and the platoon leader reminded them pe on the alert and that the crushing of necolim and bureaucrat capitalists would shortly commence. The atmosphere that night was loaded, os turns were taken at standing guard, each house being assigned nine People's Youth members armed with G.3 rifles. further: “Around 3 o'clock a.m. all were to bathe and attend roll-call rightaway During roll- Sealed leader issued instructions to crush bureaucrat and the necolim. But we did not know which ones was not clarified". Thus roll-call was held and at 6 o'clock some 500 t led, among them 100 members of the Indonesian Women's Movemen To the IW /Gerwani members including _ small knives and razor blades were distributed. “I just got a razor blade“, thus | who went on to say; "From afar we saw a heavy set person wearing sleeping clothes like a duster with Ganefo-like print, hands bound with red cloth and eyes also covered with red cloth. The platoon leader commanded them to beat up that person, then the persons private parts with the small knives. The first to start the cutting and beating we saw to be 5 leaders of the Tand jung Priok IWM/Gerwani. Then followed other comrades, among whom Si. and A. are known to me. fhen I myself joined in the torture. All of the 100 women members did likewise and were witness. Then we saw the victim being taken near a well py people in camouflage uniform with crooked red insignia of rank, some with three crooked bars, some with two bars on the shoulder patch, in all four members of the peT/ Air Force paratroopers. === [PDF page 67] === The victim was shot three times then fell down, but was not yet dead. A green-uniformed person wearing three crooked white bars on the shoulder patches ordered the IWM/Gerwani members to advance. All repeated the earlier actions, stabbing at the victim's private parts, and cutting these parts and the body until he died. I was asking my comrades who the one killed had been, but got hit on the mouth so I did not dare to inquire any further. Afterwards the corpse was thrown into the well ih ll. In a state fear and anxiety we ran to the front of the house and whispered among us that it was a general who had just been killed...... Thus the confession by a Gestapu terrorist taking part in the counter-revolutionary adventurisn, This person was caught on the 30th of October, 1965. is now in custody: === [PDF page 68] === With the Compliment [Unreadable] British Embassy MANILA. === [PDF page 69] === CONFIDENTIAL ov ceeasiatienomaansentoe | BRITISH EMBASSY, (1022)(1I) MANILA. 29 December, 1965. FH tog 3 i have just seen ih the print Djakarta ponaee ch the 18 November (not covied te us) which points about the 30th September coup of paper and perts that t is possible “Singapore of not to the your Chancery when This Aside telercram conta (one of a series of Max Seoliven, ea first=—class Times. i attach a I have since had an ¥ 5 2 as in Djakarta x5: m Indonesia well and speaks asa) whey able eye witness" saw Sukarn rive into Helim | a3 etween 1.00 a.m. 1250 Geom mor? ” r in the company Un tun, md Aid 3 ven hes told me that is absolutely; sh refused, if in fact Soliven is right, and if Sukarno wes Air Base at 1.30 a.m. (or, indeed, at any time in early hours of 1 October) the argument of para. t€ Despatch No. 16 is even further strengthened. ga copy of this letter, w South-East Asia Departmen Political Adviser's Office at (L.M. Minford) ’ MUTTAY » ESQ s» British Embassy, Le JAKARTA. CONPIDENTIAL === [PDF page 70] === TTT rwiT as AY. WU VA »ST 94 nd Ne HVA TITIT 0 NNONNV rATr *wwotgcc r Pa mW INV ave UNTAX Hand? LVHad TAOUC 1Ouw Cab TOG LW tds NOT; smouod XVA A Hod Tidy » iti Se Odo VAANED TONGD Gist GaWeV THO: LO TIONQGAO TT TSE NT CY KT Lage Cer r ‘TIUITT. V Ov (OH Oo iu VY TT oJ IM LI whos wed rTAr uw AILOYUY LUO HIGH. Ta rag +.iti NO w& " wid LV CN V oc*t a ON TV AC T WT) y 4). wv Jiu “AVG TOAEL VL , 1 z V WL ot Vi | ni V Va-TTI Yio eminy [Unreadable] Mm Ut wc SANIL VIINVA WN YAGOLOO CTT TeTCT dla Lith iV ONY VAD unos aA0U oa TT AATYE Si dNOAL TOILEVY WOkd Lo AOMHDYTAO Od ihe TT CTNW CL SLINY 3S'TV faua etki Ligh . AMMIWY OL ONYVS ater HHNAYD TIyV dd ¥ aa CHAO! Havas oO ‘OLONVHa NLA ZMVNOT ae NLL TAIN NLi TIO U9 M4 aa keh ¥ ATIVIOL j " Tw Heit) Al Lay TI LOATOATE TOO Loy Lvdas ITIVT TAY aC Y Ld corr wes T w OaTAr Giusti V ‘NOT Aare oer ‘i 12% H Risk rT TTS INVA SV ‘ITH TATITOW cTWTT ZIYOHINY TOC Wv¥r a AanNTry ONEV AN: tr rei TAT IVELNEO TATA ova wv i rer rT Lehi YaTgOTLOO Ac va Jul Vz. T Wer aT DVULXe STI ‘TAT (NNT VIVO CNV VLEVAVEC [Unreadable] MT ATITO BP ONT NYO W [NVA HAE CEONTA NTAO vital TOT Thebes btO0Td Salo TIOS TTo0W Nel NT qsacy adqcisv === [PDF page 71] === CONFIDENTIAL FROM SINGAPORE TO COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE 2 ee e (British High Commissioner) Cypher/OTP A DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Mr. Rob No. 663 D2? 07.07 23 November, 1965 23 November, 1965 \ ol Ra} x08 93 November, 1965 Vv IDHIOS/SI! (ff CONFIDENTIAL Addressed to C.R.O. telegram No. 663 of 23 November. Repeated for information to: Djakarta And Saving to: POLAD Singapore Kuala Lumpur. Sir Andrrew Gilchrist's despatch No. 16 of 165 November. Grateful for permission to pass copy of Gilchrist's despatch No. 16 to Lee Kuan Yew. C.R.O. please pass Djakarta No. 104. DISTRIBUTED TO: C.R.O- Far East and Pacific Dept. SeEeAeDe J MID. CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 72] === Lb, se - le Alb, lee i. as ee Wes OT ee ie ede Lite ae wel ee se flea : yy Sle ahpalll Lad Up, lll ot Za4b === [PDF page 73] === sd FRO Mig’ KA PTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION My. Murray ty No. 2620 UM toi] 34) 25 Nevember 1965 | D. 0330 25 November 1905 R. 0737 25 November 1965 Addressed B.H.C. Singapore telegram No. 275 of 25 November Repeated for information to: Foreign Office. Your tele gram No. 663 to C.R.0. No ebjection here. fA swias Si@® DISTRIBUTED TO: FO. S.E.A. Dept. J M.1I. Dept. C.R.O. F.E. & P. Dept. === [PDF page 74] === CONFIDENTIAL FROM COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE TO SINGAPOR British High Commission Cypher/OTP and By Bag: DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Nos 958 D. 1145 26 November 1965 25 November 1965. CONFIDENTIAL pred DH 105/311 ( Addressed _ to B.H.C. Singapore telegram No. 958 of 25 November Repeated for information Saving to: Kuala Lumpur No.260 dye lo “ Pr) Djakarta No.e216 egy oe POLAD Singapore No.602 Your telegram No. 663 [of 23 November] We would prefer you not (repeat not) to pass copy of despatch to Lee Kuan Yew. DISTRIBUTE CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 75] === PRIORITY MARKINGS Enter Imme: ity tine Deferred SECURITY MARKINGS Top Secret Secret Confidential Restricted In Confidence Unclassified DEPARTMENT TELEGRAM/SAVINGRAM (Delete whichever is inapplicable) Parly. U.S. of State Minister of State Secretary of State (SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS) DGRAINOO fo a Distribution and Addressed No. ___ further action | Repeated i fe. IG IME ne (Insert appropriate ae priority marking ) / ( Insert apprbpriate priority marking) Kral barf) Si NV AP ORE eer Se File |References security marking) tepiiiccd ue 5 SOS, Tent tetsvetbuky WALA (UMPOR DIAKAETA Docas Bhd Cours 6 Byes P23 [ule x) You iat. x ee Wwe ‘QoL 5 (REFER REPERT “DE SAT CH atid chee ies ~€ode/Cypher 19.6 > === [PDF page 76] === CONFIDENTIAL GOMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE DOWNING STREET, LONDON + Ss o W. Le I am sorry if our refusal to autho to show Lee Kuan Yew Djaharta despatch No. seemed rather odd (our tel. No.958). The more so as Murray in Djakarta saw no objections (his tel. No.275 to you). ___ - /2y, 2. We ourselves (and initially Poreign Office) saw no obstacles, and a telegram was about to go telling you to go ahead. However Sir A. Gilchrist let us know that he did not like the idea - and had told John Rob so. He was doubtful of Lee's security and felt that if his views on Sukarno's complicity ever got back to Djakarta, he, Gilchrist, might find life awkward to say the least. 3- We found his reasoning convineing. You will, no doubt, be able to use the information in the despatch without passing it on. (CG. F. HILL) Far East and Pacific Dept. F. titaeo SINGAPOR CONFIDENTI === [PDF page 77] === SECURITY > MARKING £ y v7 ae Ge a (Lh tL ne 975 bg) 2. We exrabotr ok tl dro) JOuT Yo kG ia a : tas wo bawe tad Lb eth === [PDF page 78] === hole cand bad Ll ole Kb oo e° Ye om Kee’, ned rh eo om a === [PDF page 79] === 7 Clchrl{, 4 efarté) No. 2K93 Dated {fo Wovente Received 5 Mloyerntu (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action baaae completed) (Main Indexed) wae, 13 (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT INDONESIA H./ 0/8 fila suBsect: home 4 reve-bed A ha ao of tena Afpte! Aetfes POC fo * 70 7. ane hebondvs Cacctiany CLh ret no latbrr Anus” nol ge te th roghl Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: MINUTES === [PDF page 80] === TOP COPY (a(« FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE hy We En Clair FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist No. De 1206 10 November 1965 21,93 10 November 1965 Re 1146 11 November 1965 Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2493 of 10 November Repeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur POLAD Singapore BHC Singapore Following from Antara 10 November: (a) In view of the improved security conditions Sukarno has revoked the state of war in the Djakarta area. The evening curfew has been put back one hour and now begins at 10 Pelle (b) From a statement by Subandrio, where he referred to Sukarno's remark that the attempted coup had set the Indonesian revolution back by eight years (my telegram No. 2471) "the setback also means that the leftist progressive revolutionary forces which form the backbone of the Indonesian Revolution are split topsy-turvy, jeopardizing the course of the revolution which is itself progressive revolutionary. We must be cautious not to let the course of the revolution veer to the right". === [PDF page 81] === Dah idol yell No. 7 Sug. Dated 24 (teber Received 23 Nwembex (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) (Main Indexed) (Security Grading—to be Up-graded 3 i L where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT Deck: supsect: f/f—/ 4 flag. ju. Mok oye o- Jo Lhts sc Anctonsscdins net- Ae Fatma Lac the fe Neco lew pee op Aura. Gfamee Gea... weteea en a V Goal Jn "5 Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: MINUTES === [PDF page 82] === INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM TO COP x | > FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE A By Bag FO/CRO/WH/DISTRIBUTION Sir A. Gilchrist No. /5 Saving Nit 101</ 313 21. October 1965 R.20 November/ 1965 82 Addressed to Kuala Lumpur telegram No. 1131 of 24 October Repeated for information Saving to: POLAD Singapore Foreign Office Conditions in Sumatra, According to Antara of 2) October, Major-General Mokoginta, Commander of the Mandala Command, on 20 October, issued a warning to the people of Sumatra "not to let themselves become the victims of Necolim lackeys now trying to play off Asians against Asians." He called for special caution against the "Gestaru' elements who were "helping the Necolim free-of-charge to undermine the national struggle". Ze Antara commented that the announcement was made in connexion with the mounting reports which tend to a kind of psy [sic: psychological?] war, aggravating the situation into possible disturbances among the society. === [PDF page 83] === FROM Mv Haney (; 4 <Aorte] No. 2 S93 Dated 2.9 Wouverb-K Received 23 Moen ts/ (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action: completed) | (Main Indexed) oe A ae n | Poa 83 (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) [Unreadable] SUBJECT: Moy: for: Ceepee! L a. PH ~ol vfetleay Op eet adea latin a*’ haa Cee GES wilath. he Coincot by SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: MINUTES === [PDF page 84] === > TOP COPY FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE Det tos fec4 En Clair FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION Mr. Murray Noe 2593 De 0822 22 November 1965 22 November 1965 Re. 1255 22 November 1965 Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2593 of 22 November Repeated for information to; Kuala Lumpur POLAD Singapore BHC Singapore and Saving to: Washington Canberra Wellington Indonesia: Internal Developments. In a decree dated 17 November Major General Adjie, West Java Military Commander, banned the PKI and its affiliated organisations in his area. 26 On 21 November Adjie explained to the Press that two thirds of the PKI in West Java had already dissolved themselves, implying that they were thus in any case no longer an effective party. Asked if this step would be followed by other Regional Military Commanders, he said I don't know, it depends on the Situation in the respective regions. He was asked what the ci god thought. I don't know, but the President already knows about it. oe, A number of newspapers and political groups have welcomed Adjie's move as resolute or patriotic, and the general comment is that it should now be followed in other parts of the country. Foreign Office pass Saving to Washington, Canberra and Wellington as 549, 168 and 164 respectively. === [PDF page 85] === FROM: Mr. Muses ( dyoharts) No. 26/3 Dated 24 Voverl+v¥ Received 28 (loves. (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action; completed) (Main Indexed) \s i | gl 0 (Security Grading—to be Up-graded 8 5 where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT INDONESIA D MoS /ar7 SUBJECT: Lnlora refert: Frons Lda, Minister f Marta Yfrirs dad Lidoliber ES gues see al ath pr Le. hee cl dich PKC/ at ane, a Chey Q@re Covints suet denay Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: MINUTES === [PDF page 86] === 6 | TOP COP? FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE A ters: En Clair papal” 3 _ DISTRIBUTION Mr. Murray No. 2613 2). November 1965 D. 0619:2) November 1965 R. 1103 2 November 1965 Addressed to Foreign Office telegram:No.. 2613 of 2) November. Repeated for information to: Kuala Lumpur POLAD Singapore B.H.C. Singapore and Saving to: Washington Canberra Wellington Antara, 2 November, reports Frans Seda, ‘Minister for Plantation Affairs and a leading member of the Catholic Party, as saying that the dissolution of the P.K.I. was now merely a matter of time; and that President Sukarno "will certainly dissolve the P.K.I. and its satellite mass organizations because it is very clear now that the PKI. and its organizations are counter revolutionary." Foreign Office please pass Saving to Washington 553, Canberra 172 and Wellington 168. DISTRIBUTED TO:- F.O. S.E.A.D. J.M.I.D. I.R.D. J.1.P.G.D. News Dept. C.R.O.F.E. & P. Dept. News Dept. === [PDF page 87] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded 8 @ where Appropriate) SECRET 1G OD O NDONES! Ju (015/318 ae ceiv IG FROM Januar SUBJECT: Fed “a Addl fo 2 a CopHaned fadintscan No. 2631 old 4: ge Dated a 7/4 Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received 2A/il (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) completed) Cr Vv ik Mawes ew MVAN! GE hve evel rant a vat ava hee ee, ee RODD YR a RAO ee Ee RE et dec end === [PDF page 88] === SECRET » FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE Cypher /OrP IK rvs] DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Mr. Murray No, 2631 27 November 1965 D. 0455 27 November 1965, R. 1004 27 November 1965 SECRET Addressed Foreign Office telegram No, 2631 of 27 November Repeated for information to: POLAD Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, and Saving to Washington, Aidit. The American Embassy have learnt from a source which in the past has proved reliable that Aidit was captured on 20 November and, having refused interrogation, was shot by the army on 21 November. Sukarno has been informed by the army but has insisted on the impertance of secrecy. Foreign Office pass Saving to Washington No. 558. DISTRIBUTED TO: SE.A. Dept. JoM.I. Dept, I.R. Dept. News Dept. F.E. and P, Dept. === [PDF page 89] === FROM My Mune ( dy ekacts) No. JC7 Dated 30 i nh Received | \ ee (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) (Referred to Legal Adviser) (Action completed) i oe (Main Indexed) (Security Grading—to be Up-graded 8 § where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT ESIA Be [Unreadable] SUBJECT: pe Gs Yoherle dul Ma JA e fo; AMPED — a Le hape 4 Wastes. «. 24 pperen Av Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: MINUTES === [PDF page 90] === Dy ae TOP eapY FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE En Clair Mr. Murray No. 2617 Wr Novex D. 1154 30 November, 1965 emeremner, 1855 Be; 13595 November, 1965 PRIORITY Addressed_to Foreign Office telegram No. 2647 of 30 November, Repeated for information to; Kuala Lumpur POLAD Singapore B.H.C. Singapore and Saving to; Washington DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION The Djakarta Daily Mail (an armed forces newspaper) to-day, 30 November, reports some remarks made yesterday by General Nasution in the course of a lecture. Following are extracts. The PKI not only master minded the 30 September Movement but actually planned it and executed it. Based on documents and facts obtained from the PKI Central Committee itself it has been discovered that they would launch a stab in the back at the revolution, the great leader of the revolution and the Indonesian people, in the event « war was launched by the Necolin. Such an imperialist-initiated war was to beexploited by the PKI to get the political upper hand. But they advanced the hour of betrayal because according to their evaluation the health of the President was "serious", Our primary enemy are the Necolim. To step up our confrontation against Necolim, therefore, the stab in the back of [? words offiitted] our enemy must be annihilated first and order restored. Foreign Office pass Saving Washington No. 559. DISTRIBUTED TO:- F.O. S.H.A.D. JM.1I.D. Inf. Res. Dept. Jd adek <Gets News Dept. CRO. Faber abe === [PDF page 91] === 91 (Security Grading—to be Up-graded D where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT: NDONESIA D HH 1013/ 3a [Unreadable] eae lambiays (dake) |e hindbre aes peol —_ hulreme ar toc harre 'n kb mt see 2 Att ceber: oe litho. [(<<“peE 4 Miflcepen eeede oe me Aacly- No. 1012/5 Dated OS Nwerky Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received, JeceSw- (Outward Action) seeds (Main Indexed) “ISG [Unreadable] === [PDF page 92] === CONFIDENTIAL lovember 1 succeed Sukarno? tobe hi a taxe Nis place iligence naro 5 OWT AT ENTTA T WUN J) TaN tA do === [PDF page 93] === CONFIDENTIAL not know to what extent Sukendro' ead ‘cat aoe “* ee ee on read by the other generals. ste ' 7 4 Sultan really itional d iim acceptable and to ignore it whirl >, toO% ag wolecn may gO towara tolerate Sukarno fo emergence of someone LI engkul uWwOoNnO. nding copies of and UKREP $ é piatsas <a L mpur, £ JLAD JKREP Singapore, and hinegt Was MAaTo CONFIDENTIAL === [PDF page 94] === (Security Grading—to be Up-graded D where Appropriate) SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT 9c Nc Le D H. (O1S/323 FROM suspect: ALcha. Keri ~ piper ~ eclorele, < Gotan ao £H/ Abtrent) Hrouslot Mh eect é. Sto hambrdys (dyehorts) Ae oe ah No. /01//6x Dated 25 NWoverstar. Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: Received 2. decemb (Outward Action) (Referred to Legal Adviser) Some (Main Indexed) 4 A } j V === [PDF page 95] === BRITISH EMBASS) UNCLASSIFIED ee a eet DJAKARTA (1011/65) For the past week or so we have not been passing on all the many news items about actions against the PKI and Gestapu elements up and down the country. But here is a selection of some of the more interesting recent reports. (a) Antara, November 23, reports an accusation against Lukman of embezzlement. He used 250 million rupiahs of official fumds to buy a house. Antara, November 23, reports that Sudijono, a prominent member of the Djogjakarta chapter of the PKI, had been captured and confessed that the PKI had master-minded the September 30 Movement and had been behind the murders and kidnappings. The East Java Military Commander announced that up to November 15, 2,476 people in the Malang and Besuki areas had been detained in connection with the Gestapu events. Documents had been found with details of the launching of further terrorist ections as soon as Sukarno dissolved the PKI. Hundreds of tons of rice had been found in a forest south of Banjuwangi. The Minister of Home Affairs has "approved" the demand for the dismissal of Sitepu, the Governor of North Sumatra. Antara, November 17, reported a clash with Gestapu terrorists near Kediri in East Java. Fifty of them were killed and 580 wounded. \ tr Ray Egy, /(f) Twenty South East Asia Department, Foreign Office, S.W.l. === [PDF page 96] === Twenty four more bodies of Gestam victims were unearthed at a place near Klaten on November 17. All of them had been mutilated, and were buried upside down. Antara, November 19, reported that it looks as if some of the PKI rebels penned up in Central Java are infiltrating into West Java. The watch on the border has therefore been increased. Finally, an extract from a report dated November 22 from the Consul in Medan: "The current security situation gives absolutely no grounds for complacency, nor is there in fact evidence to suggest that the Army view it other than extremely seriously. Though a "state of war" and curfew have not yet been declared, it is thought that the possibility is by no means to be ruled out. "Fears are being expressed about what appears to be a general movement of PKI elements towards Medan from Tebingtinggi, Kisaran and Siantar. I have heard of a move (probably Army-inspired) of Pemuda Pant jasila in the pposite direction, i.e. from Medan to the South, which may be designed to counter this. There is concern, too, about the situation in Belawan where, despite the cordon drawn round the village, port and maritime area between 10 pM. and 6 a.m. every night, Communist elements are apparently far from inactive." ‘ I am sending copies of this letter to Kuala Lumpur, POLAD and UKREP Singapore. ws Ww Jibs (S.J.G- hashes) === [PDF page 97] === ae 4 ~.! y oa _ 2 ea ‘ No. A - 300 Dated 2afto Received 2/12 (Outward Action) (Printing Instructions) "Y 539 (Referred to Legal Adviser) completed): : 97 (Security Grading—to be Up-graded where Appropriate) [Unreadable] 5.E. ASIA INDONESIA DH (oid [22H / G Encloses Copy of: References and Relevant Papers: 4 teufel aries Met, Cok Wig LHW wt wit seAd itd dicognee. Ge euly Mane pout? > jaekas be sugges Cat uke { eoge 271» 4 fi, “coups forlose. 1 tee UUG donc” for eek § leanne s voll Ace. lbAcl, Une t6 Oubung ae. a Graal Ota Qunol porary forad a” lathe & mprewig === [PDF page 98] === Number of copies of enclosures === [PDF page 99] === DEP RQ OF STATE Pol 23-S padron fE- o_ RM/ AN a TON RM/ ral ner ALY sis 2 Dist RIB 9 g roe hy eg tke ONLY SECRET GROUP 2 - EXEMPT HANDLING INDICATOR COPY NO. AS SERIES E DEPARTMENT “OF Si PASS“USTA, DOD, CLA, WHITE HOUSE CINCPAC FOR POLAD; AMEMBASSY CANBERRA, AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR, AMEMBASSY LONDON, AMEMBASSY MANILA, AMCONSUL MEDAN, AMCONSUL SINGAPORE, AMCONSUL SURABAYA, AMEMBASSY TOKYO, AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON, (MANILA FOR FELG/RSO), HONG KONG, PARIS Amembassy DJAKARTA DATE: October 22, 1965 SUBJECT: The September 30 Affair Embtel 1184(Transmitting Summary) introduction 1. The history and interpretation of the attempted coup in Indonesia which has become know as the September 30 Affair will probably be the subject of study and speculation for years to come. The present paper is designed to present within the short perspective of only three weeks, the story of this extraordinary Affair in the light of the Embassy's best current information, while the recollection of it is fresh and its effects are critical though not fully clear factors in current political ii fe. 2. As the world now knows, the coup struck in the early morning hours of October 1 with raids on the homes of seven members of the Amny's general staff in Djakarta, six of whom were murdered. One, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces General Nasution, escaped, and together with his deputy General Suharto managed during the following critical day to recapture the city and turn the tide. Instigator of the coup, insofar as the public was told, was an obscure officer in the President's palace guard, Colonel Untung, who announced the formation of a Revolutionary Council to govern the country and save the President from alleged usurpation of authority by a "Generals Council." 3. As the story unwinds facts become tangled and, as is evident in the attached paper, there are important gaps in confirmed information. Many questions are unanswered, including the extent of participation of the Indonesian Air Force in the coup, the complicity of such an influential member of the government as Subandrio tant the full influence and roles of the PKI and the Chinese Communists. er all, perhaps forming the biggest question mark of all, is the role of le Sukarno in the whole Affair. se} SECRET FOR DEPT. USE ONLY eon (DSB Min (7) Our rafted by: ontents and assification Ppproved Dy: Political Section POL: EEMasters DeM FiGalbraith ARMA - Col, Ethel Cf f \ 2 ai ses Clearances: === [PDF page 100] === From Djakarta 4, The present paper takes a look at the background of the Affair, traces what is know of its facts, and offers considered speculation concerning some of the gaps mentionec above and the prospects for the future now offered by the amazing events which will continue to be felt and assessed for a long time to come. SECRET === [PDF page 101] === SECRET Page 3, A-300 From Djakarta THE SEPTEMBER 30 AFFAIR Contents Section 1 ~ Background Attack on the Moderates Growing Political Tensions The Post-Takari Revolutionary Offensive Section 2 - What Really Happened: A Summary |; The Attack The New Order The Retreat The Troops The Field Commanders The Generals and the Strategists The Plot What Went Wrong Section 3 = Role of the PKI The PKI Before the September 30 Affair Indications of PKI Involvement Some Evidence Against PKI Instigation of the Coup Conclusions Section 4 - Role of Sukarno Theoretical Background The Bare Facts of Sukarno's Actions Other Circumstantial Evidence Reservations Section 5 - What Might Have Been Successful Elimination of Senior Generals Capture of Army Leadership Alive, Without Executions Section 6 = Future Prospects The Army The PRI The Army vw the PKI Conclusions === [PDF page 102] === SECRET A~300, Djakarta Page 4 1. BACKGROUND Attack on the Moderates, 1964-65 a. Aware of his declining health and afraid that gradual evolution in Indonesia would not permit the ‘accomplishment of his grand design, the establishment * fof a communist totalitarian state controlled by the PKI ‘after his death, President Sukarno over the past year has speeded up the process of neutralizing or liquidating all independent power centers obstructing achievement of this goal. As these centers were removed or reduced, the PKI moved quickly and deftly to control them, within the context of a vicious anti-American campaign designed to sow ae psychosis under the threat of a “foreign enemy." Assisting the PKI and Sukarno in this task was the Indonesian Air Force, First Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio, and a host of communist sympathizers, as weil as an increasing number of opportunists who hiisted on the bandwagon with alacrity once it got rolling. b. The process of eradicating opposition proceeded by stages, directed by Sukarno and implemented vigorously by the PKI. After rumors became current in the fall of 1964 that Sukarno was suffering increasing disability from his kidney disorder, a movement supported behind the scenes by Third Deputy Prime Minister Chae. rul Saleh began a major polemic with the PKI. Known as the "Body to Support Sukarndsm," or BPS, the movement's major . public leader was Minister of Trade Adam Malik, Although Murba Party involvement was obvious, at the beginning, the BPS was treated purely as an Asaocistion of non-communist newspapers attempting to "preserve the true teachings of Bung Karno.”" c. Upon Sukarno’s return from overseas in the late fall, he banned the BPS, setting off a domino-game of subsequent bannings and purges each of which strengthened the status and power of the PKI. On January 8, after withdrawing from the United Nations, Sukarno banned’ the Murba Party. On February 24, following a dramatically heightening anti-American campaign in Djakarta, Sukarno ordered the, SECRET === [PDF page 103] === SECRET A-300, Djakarta Page 5 closing of the newspapers which had supported the BPS, which he characterized as a CIA plot to "kill Sukarnoism and Sukarno." The bans on these newspapers enabled the PKI to complete its hold on the informational field, and crypto-communists rapidly took over the direction of the Indonesian Writers Association, Antara, the Publishers Guild, and other communications media. A few days after these papers were banned, Sukarno ordered the retooling of the '45 Generation, another Saleh political vehicle which also, however, had widespread connections among government and military officials. d. In April, a largely PKI governing board was installed in the '45 Generation organization, and by the summer, Murba-ites Saleh and Adam Malik, had effectively been "re-tooled" by losing control of most of their operational governmental responsibilities. Saleh himself had made a bad mistake by disavowing his membership in Murba and by allowing PKI Chief Aidit to accuse him of spreading a "PKI false document" without rejoinder. In September, Sukarno announced that the '45 Generation was completely under his control, and Saleh publicly begged him for forgiveness. The emasculation of Saleh was complete. Growing Political Tensions a. Following the banning of the BPS press, what had been a steady attack on the banned Masjumi’s HMI youth group was stepped-up strikingly in the now-communist controlled press. This campaign among other things appeared to have the effect of partially solidifying resistance to the PKI in the Moslem community in general. The PWI Congress in Malang March 7 was broken up by a large group of Moslem students, and following the Afro- Asian Islamic Conference later in the month, all major Moslem parties except the PKI-controlled Perti issued a joint statement which in effect declared that an attack on one Moslem group would be considered an attack on the religion. A pro-HMI demonstration was held at Kotrar and the NU attacked Antara for being "one-sided." Concurrently, throughout Java and particularly in East Java, a burgeoning SECRET === [PDF page 104] === SECRET A~300, Djakarta Page 6 series of incidents between Moslem and pro=PKI peasants, deriving from energetic efforts to implement land reform laws, heightened tensions between the two groups, By July, a number of new Moslem newspapers had appeared in Djakarta which, although initially treading gingerly on PKI toes, gave promise of eventually wplacing the BPS papers in attacking the PKI. b,. Faced with this resistance--which would remain ineffectual in Djakarta as long as its leadership remained weak at the top--Sukarno decided to neutralize the Moslems, while he concentrated his forces for the attack on the two most important citadels of anti-PKI power-=the PNI right-wing and the Army leadership. In @ series of Kotrar decisions, the HMI was placed under the supervision of Subandrio, who incidentally thereby increased his own power position by giving the impression of having Moslem support. In effect the Moslem-PKI issue had been dampened by September, and peasant incidents apparently stopped completely, although there were still reports of high tensions between the two groups in Surabaja. Cc. Although over the past several years, Sukarno nas been working to convert the PNI into a virtual mirror of the PKI in terms of espousai of pro-communist positions and attitudes, in March of 1965 the tempo was stepped up to the point where it was obvious that purges were soon to occur, Although the PNI had gone along with the pro-communist orientation of the GOI, there was considerable footdragging on the part of a small group of moderates in the leadership, identified nationally with First Chairman Hardi, and specifically in Central Java, the main base of PNI support, with anti-communist Central Java Chairman Hadisubeno,. Opposing this group of moderates was the erypto-communist PNI Secretary General, Surachman, assisted by opportunistic Chairman Ali Sastroamidjojo and several central board members, as well as PKI agents and sympathizers planted within the part at all levels and in most regions. ad. On March 25 and 26, Sukarno addressing an extraordinary PNI meeting in Djakarta pointed out that "recent es SECRET === [PDF page 105] === SECRET A-300, Dijakarta Page 7 events" had cleared the road into the socialist stage of the Indonesian revolution--i.e. the situation wherein all independent centers of power have been exterminated and totalitarian controls can be applied without fear of resistance--and called unequivocally for the ouster of "false Marhaenists" from the PNI. These elements he identified implicitly as anti-communists. e. On May 4, the first “false Marhaenist” was ousted. A special meeting of the PNI central board removed Hadisubeno from control of the Central Java PNI. Im an effort to sweeten this pill, Mrs. Hardi was named by Sukarno as a Deputy Minister of Basic Education and Culture, but the moderate leadership was not placated. Hardi and his followers rejected Hadisubeno’s ouster, and reportedly issued a letter ordering Hadisubeno to retain his position until the convening of a party congress. Surachman and others continued the pressure against the right-wing, however, and at the PNI anniversary celebration on July 26, Sukarno again called for the ouster of false Marhaenists. About ten days later, a specially-convened meeting of the PNI leadership council officially purged Hardi and his followers from the party, and gradually thereafter replaced them with either pro-communists or communist sympathizers. The PNI had collapsed as a political force without a chance of resisting Sukarno. f. The Army began to generate a stiffening to the continuing Sukarno-PKI thrustin January, when Yani appointed a “brain trust” to advise the Army on political matters. Among the members of this brain trust were/the Generals later slain on the morning of October l. A few weeks before the hanning of the BPS newspapers, the Army secured control/one of them, Berita Indonesia, which it reissued as Berita Yudha (War News). When the BPS Merdeka was banned, the Army reopened it as Angkatan Bersendjata (Armed Forces) with names of Nasution and the four military Chiefs of Staff on the masthead. Also, early in the year, two important events took place; the killing of the Sulawesi rebel Kahar Muzakhar, permitting return of === [PDF page 106] === SECRET A-300, Djakarta Page 8 Siliwangi division troops to West Java, and Yani’s success in removing the leftist CO of East Kalimantan, General Suharjo, from his post. g. In late January, one direction of the thrust against the Army was revealed when Aidit announced that he had requested Sukarno to arm peasants and workers in order to fight against Nekolim, Although this proposal was. publicly rejected by Sukarno, only a month later Yani ordered Sumatran Regional CO Mokoginta to begin arming one:.company of peasants and workers in each military district. Mokoginta was to ensure that the arms, however, remained firmly,in Army control. h. Following the BPS newspaper bannings in Djakarta, the communist-led PwI attempted to have a number of provincial BPS papers closed. West Java cO Adjie, however, was able to protect the BPS paper in Bandung. This ‘success may have encouraged the Army to relax temporarily, and in April Sukarno himself began the process of crushing the Army. Calling a special meeting of Military Commanders, Sukarno ordered the Army to get into step with the revolution and completely revise its defense doctrine to be directed against Nekolim rather than against Communist China. Army officers were deeply concerned at these changes, which they believed opened the way for disintegration of the Army's anti-communist posture. Con currently, it became increasingly apparent during these months that Omar Dani, Chief of the Air Force, had sold out to the PKI and was actively assisting its advance. Although the Army held a series of conferences to “turn the wheel toward the left" as Sukarno demanded, Yani himself and a number of senior Army officers--many of whom were in the "Drain trust"--quietly formed a "Generals’ Council" to provide political guidance. i. In early May, Sukarno ordered that the newly created National Defense Institute be effectively placed under civilian control and that its course have a high SECRET === [PDF page 107] === A-300, Djakarta 2 Page 9 pro-communist content. A few days later, Aidit proposed that Nasakom councils be formed to advise the Military Commanders from the top echelon down to the military districts. A PKI functionary later revealed that what the PKI desired by this proposal was the institution of a political commissar system, similar to that of Communist China. Sukarno himself then cited the example of Communist China and proposed the creation of a "Fifth Force" of volunteers in order to implement the Army's new anti-Nekolim defense doctrine. Both Yani and Nasution squirmed on this hook but succeeded in avoiding formation of the Fifth Force. Seizing on the killing of a warrant officer by PKI peasants in North Sumatra, Yani attempted to display Army resistance to the Fifth Force plan. By September, it appeared that although the Army had been forced to mouth support for Sukarno’s pro-communist attempts to crush it, it was still largely integrally sound and had successfully resisted implementation of the two main proposals which would have destroyed it as a political as well as an anti-communist force. The Post-Takari Revolutionary Offensive a. As of early August, Sukarno’s balance sheet of his success showed a mixed picture. On the one hand, he had crushed the Saleh forces and removed the anticommunist strength in the PNI. He had circumvented and neutralized the Moslems, making it possible to crush them at a later date. But the Army had faltered and then, apparently held. At this point, on August 3 and 9, Sukarno suffered two apparent physical seizures of unknown origin, and conveniently went into hibernation to prepare his August i7 speech. b. In his August 17 "Takari" speech, Sukarno made it clear that the “revolutionary offensive" was to be heightened in all fields in the near future, and particularly against the Army. After warmly praising the countries of Eastern Europe for having established "People’s Democracies" after World War II, he listed Indonesia along with North Viet-Nam and Communist China as the logical SECRET === [PDF page 108] === SECRET A-300, Djakarta Page 10 allies of Indonesia, which had also "liberated" themselves in the same period. He called for the creation of a Djakarta-Phnom Penh-Hanoi~Peking-Pyongyang axis as a fulfillment of the demands of history. ce. A few passages later, Sukarno warned that ne had always maintained that the class struggle had to give way to the national struggle. Now, he said, "I warn corruptors that if they continue their operations, the people will burn them up." ‘Two paragraphs later, Sukarno continued, “Even though you were Generals from the Peta’, wno boast of your revolutionary services, if now you try tc upset the Nasakom offensive, you are reactionary forces$" Pinally, Sukarno expressed his annoyance at Army resistance to the Fifth Force concept, saying in part: ‘"Every time I suggest something, there is always a reaction...in this case, they accuse me of copying others. But our Constitution gives every citizen the right to defend the nation. After stucying this matter further, I as Supreme Commander will make the decision." His mention of the accusation of copying others referred to the tniniy-veiled remarks in the Army newspapers linking his proposal to Communist China's militia system--and in fact, Sukarno originaliy stated that Chou En-lai had suggested the Fifth Force system. A further warning to the Army came in a speech on September 1, when! he told Yani (by name) to straighten ‘things out, or risk being “left behind by the people" if he, Sukarno, invoked his charismatic powers. - Building on the Takari attacks on economic e WNO are called "capitalist bureaucrats" in rminology and are identified with army officers’ ositions in Government and state enterprises, as ith the remnants of Saleh'’s empire, the PKI began hrieking campaign of invective and abuse against ta was a self-cefense force of Indonesians organized the Japanese cccupation. The "Peta Group" in the icluded@ Generals Yani, Suharto, Parman, and other of the “brain trust" and the "Generals’ Council." WIT Ip we fund === [PDF page 109] === SECRET A-300, Djakarta Page 11 these elements. Toward the end of September, the point had been reached that a Chicom-influenced paper directed the "people" to drag such elements out of their offices and shoot them in the street. Concurrently, pressure was stepped up on the former members of the BPS, who were hauled successively into police headquarters for questioning. The Police Commander of Djakarta indicated that any of the expelled PNI elements who attempted political activities would be jailed, and the PKI again stepped up its attacks on the HMI. Pressures were accelerated across the board against non-communist elements until the Indonesian informational environment reached a fever pitch of pro-communism hitherto unmatched even in Indonesia. e. This was the frenetic picture within the political arena on the eve of September 30. In somewhat less rarified atmosphere there was the general continuing economic deterioration which plagued the lives of the “people at all levels. This was reflected in the skyrocketing price of rice which soared to unprecedented heights during September. The situation affected the staple food supply of practically every Indonesian, and was the standard topic of conversation in every market place and kampong. It was exploited by various PKI front organizations, which carried loud protests to the doors of the Minister of Trade, and in Surabaya even invaded the Governor's dining room and upset the food on the table. These inspired mob actions represented manipulation by a small well-disciplined minority, dedicated to the early attainment of the socialist state and viewing attacks on the economic corruptors, whom the President/Great Leader of the Revolution had condemned, as a part of the psychological preparation. === [PDF page 110] === SECRET A-300, Djakarta Page 12 2. WHAT REALLY HAPPENED A Court of Inguiry. It is unlikely that we shall ever know the full facts of the September 30 affair. The maxim "the truth will out" has never had much validity in Indonesia, where the final and official account of important political crises describes not past events but subsequent political accommodation tothe@ events. As Sukarno works towards a “political solution” for the September 30 affair, the process of obfuscation will speed up. It is, thus, perhaps not too early for the Embassy to hold its own court of inquiry. This inguiry will move from the known to the suspected, describing first the attack itself, the new order proposed by the Movement in its Decree and Decisions, and the retreat as documented principally in news reports. It will then attempt to sort out the cast of characters, first identifying the Movement's troops and its field commanders, and then ferreting out the generals and hidden strategists behind the affair. From this evidence, some speculation will be advanced on the nature of the original plot and the reason it failed. The Attack. The September 30 Movement’s attack in the early morning of October 1 possessed aspects of both a standard coup d'etat and a simple act of terror. in the space of approximately five hours organized Army units seized those key points which are normally targets of coup attempts while several small bands of terrorists attemptea to kidnap the top Army command. Although not a complete success, the maneuver came dangerously close to obtaining all of its first objectives, suggesting that it had benefited from reasonably expert planning and ccordination. a. Something less than three battalions of Army troops began to move at 2 a.m. By 4 a.m. they had sealed off the palace and assumed positions around Merdeka Square on which the palace, the Embassy and one of the city’s largest railway stations face. Other units quickly took over the telegraph office, the telecommunications building and perhaps the National Bank, from which several billions of rupiah were reportedly taken. SECRET === [PDF page 111] === SECRET. A-300, Dijakarta Page 13 b. Many other key objectives were obtained largely through the use of “inside men." The railway lines into the city were blocked by communist rail workers. Telephone exchanges in all key suburbs were shut down between 3:40 and 4:30 a.m., by their communist attendants, members of the SOBSI affiliate P.N. Postel (later suspended for this act). In one case, at least, the telephone workers received help from armed men in uniform, c. The attacks on the Generals’ homes occurred between 3:30 and 5:00 a.m. by several teams (perhaps one per house). Reportedly the first to be hit was General. Soetojo. After his door was battered down, he was pulled from the house and taken away in a jeep. (Some sources have emphasized that Soetojo was not important in the Army hierarchy, but was killed because he signed the order to execute the principal communist leaders in the Madiun rebellion in 1948.) General Yani’s guards exchanged shots with his attackers. The Army Chief of Staff was wounded as he attempted to escape and then carried away. General Suprapto went with his assailants without a struggle apparently under the impression that they possessed a genuine order for his arrest from those in authority. General Pandjaitan apparently fired on his attackers but in the exchange of fire he was killed and his nephew _ mortally wounded. General Harjono was shot, wounded and carried away at 4 a.m. General Parman was kidnapped half an hour later and carried away in a truck. d. The terrorists also, fortunately, had their failures. Nasution’s attackers pretended to be summoning him to the President. Profiting from the attackers’ mistake as to his identity, Nasution managed to jump over a garden wall and, despite an injury to his foot or leg, succeeded in reaching the home of an Army officer who carried him immediately to a "safe place," perhaps in Bogor. His aide, Lieutenant Pierre Tendean was, however, captured and Nasution’s six-year old daughter fatally wounded. General Suharto, who was later to command the SECRET === [PDF page 112] === SECRET A-300, Djakarta Page 14 forces suppressing the Movement, was at a local hospital visiting his sick daughter and his would-be attackers were unablé to learn his whéreabouts from his household. There are unconfirmed reports that Minister of Veterans Affairs General’ Sattiini, and Generals'Moersjid and Taswin were also terror targets’ but received prior warning and were able to escape. Police Minister Sutjipto’s house was reportedly visited by armed civilians. but he was out of town. Second Deputy Prime Windstek/Wei™ ee Barent ly (and unaccountably) the only civilian on the Movement's first death list. His guards managed to beat the attackers off after losing one police officer. e. The Generals and Nasution's aide were taken to Lubang Buaja on the grounds of Halim Air Force Base where they were reportedytaunted and humiliated by members of the PKI women’s organization Gerwani, then tortured and put to death. The bodies were dumped into a 12 meter deep well and covered with trash and earth. They were not’ discovered until the night of October 3. Although it is conceivable that the Generals were killed only after it had’ become clear that the September 30 Movement had failed, the facts seem to point to a preconceived assassination plot. (See Section 3) £f. The Embassy has as yet only fragmentary accounts of what occurred in the provinces at the time of the’ September 30 affair. With the possible exception of Central Java, however, there appears to have been no closely ‘coordinated action in the regions. In Jogjakarta, the Movement’s troops as of October 2 were known to have been in possession of the radio station, post office, bank and other centers although it is not known when they moved -into these positions. Three Diponegoro officers were reported abducted by these troops and at least two were later killed. Their bodies were not discovered until October 19. (During the day of October 4, however, the Movement’s troops were expelled from Jogja). In Semarang, Madiun and perhaps smaller Central Java areas the Movements forces appeared to have held some points for a time, but none were in rebel hands for more than two days. © Diponegoro Division headquarters in Semarang remained in the hands of its commander who chose Suharto'’s side when the Movement's chips were down. SECRET === [PDF page 113] === a A-300, Djakarta i Page 15 The New Order. If it is difficult to distinguish whether the September 30 Movement's attack constituted a coup d'etat or a simple act of terrorism and revenge within the Army, the radio announcements during October 1 on the nature of the Movement only served to highlight these contradictory attributes. a. The Movement's first words were a terse 7 a.m, radio announcement claiming that the September 30 Movement under Lieutenant Colonel Untung had saved the President from a coup planned by a CIA-sponsored Council of Generals to come off during the Army anniversary celebrations begin- Aing October 5. This and a more lengthy 10 a.m. announcement n6tead that the Movement was totally within the Army and directed against the Generals who were announced as having been arrested. b. Although the morning radio announcements haa mentioned the formation of a Revolutionary Council, it was only with the reading of the Movement’s Decree Number One at 2 p.m. that it became clear that this Council was to replace Sukarno’s Dwikora Cabinet, which was placed in “demissionary status." c. The Revolutionary Council as outlined in the Movement's Decision Number One issued immediately after its sole Decree was anything but an internal Army affair. Its membership of 45 included a wide range of prominent figures, most of whom were quite clearly never connected with the insurgents and whose inclusion was a rather obvious attempt to curry support. (The Council’s membership was transmitted by Embtel 796.) The list, however, had an overall leftist-cast. At any rate, the Council's make-up seemed to be of little importance since all authority under Decree Number One was relegated to the Presidium which was allegedly identical with the September 30 Movement’s top command and included Untung as its Chairman. The Revolutionary Council was never convened. ¢ wwkdrd teo Pet ce toutets +: Sukafuo Gol Sula Sunol, SECRET wo S0% 5. |= |+ aa C4 lod Wee plaunrol be rty ef (@ Cetup.) prvor & Ss ties === [PDF page 114] === A~300, Djakarta Page 16 a. Decree Number One also included an appeal for the formation of Revolutionary Councils at the provincial, Gistrict (Kabupaten) and sub-district levels, thus indicating that the entire structure of the national government was to be replaced. (A Jogjakarta Revolutionary Council apparently ruled for three or four days and it is possible that other Revolutionary Councils were formed in smaller Central Java localities. There was even a Djakarta newspaper report that an "Indonesian People’s Republic" had been proclaimed in Central Java. Although there is a report of the formation of a Revolutionary Council in a North Sumatra District even before Untung'’s first announcement, it would appear that the September 30 Movement appeal for a new revolutionary structure drew little response outside Djakarta and Central Java.) e. Dramatic changes were also envisaged for the Armed Forces. Untung appealed to enlisted men to rise up against Generals and other officers living luxuriously on the suffering of their troops, and with his Decision Number Two he wiped out ranks above Lieutenant Colonel, promoted all enlisted ranks one grade, and raised the ranks of the Movement's enlisted personnel two grades. The Retreat. The September 30 Movement had scarcely installed itself in the capital city when it began to retreat. a. General Suharto started to assemble his troops around 10 a.m. but even before they moved, Untung’s support began to meit. At least two companies of the Movement's troops, who were perhaps at first unaware of whose cause they were serving, defected by early afternoon before contact with opposing forces. Many of these East and Central Java troops apparently were misled as to the nature of the operation in which they were participating. Minister of Veterans General Sarbini, who had once served in the Diponegoro command, was able to talk at least one company of his former troops into Gefecting while General Basuki Rachmat, East Java Commander, also reportedly brought some of his men back to the fold. err pie SECRET === [PDF page 115] === SECRET -300, Dijakarta Page 17 b. At sunset troops from Suharto's Strategic Command moved into the center of the city, capturing the radio station and telecomuunications center at 7 Pem..: A Cavalry Battalion from General Adjie's Siliwangi Division arrived in Djakarta during the evening and secured the National Bank and other points. By midnight, the Movement’s military commanders and most of their remaining troops had retreated to Halim Air Base. Colonel Untung and Omar Dani accompanied by probably no more than one company from the palace guard flew to the Hiswahjudi Air Base near Madiun around 3:30 a.m. October 2. c. Strategic Command "Raiders" moved into Halim Air Base at 4 p.m. on October 2 meeting no resistance from its Air Force defenders, who, according to press reports, were ordered by Air Vice Marshal Sri Muljono Herlambang not to resist, qd. After a week's clean-up campaign, the Suharto forces captured Colonel Latif of the Djakarta Command (KODAM V) and 86 Tjakrabirawa troops in the Jogjakarta area On October 9. Untung, himself, was captured alive on October 11 near Tegal, Central Java, when civil defense troops spotted him on a bus. By this time, 90% of the Movement's forces had been put out of action, according to Army claims. While this would appear to be true as regards the regular troops definitely committed to Untung, many paramilitary units remained at large (which were perhaps never subject to Untung's direct command but working with him) in the Djakarta area and other parts of Java and Sumatra. The Troops. The September 30 Movement's field forces were a motley group composed of Army units from three separate regional commands, Air Force elements, and paramilitary forces formed from communist cadres. The force appeared to be divided into three broad groups with separate functions: the Army troops secured the palace and certain key points, the Air Force provided passive defense of the Halim Air Base, and the paramilitary units probably participated in sabotage and terror but perhaps had a much more extensive role in later, unplayec acts of the affair. SECRET === [PDF page 116] === SECRET A-300, Djakarta Page 138 a, Untuny had three Army battalions at his disposal in Djakarta, the 530th Battalion from the Brawidjaja Division in East Java, the 454th Battalion from the Diponegoro Division in Central Java, which Untung had commanded some X®MX months earlier, and Untung’s own First Battalion from the Tjakrabirawa Regiment, the Palace Guards. The Tjakrabirawa Battalion was the inner core of Untung's forces and may have furnished the majority of the Generals’ kidnappers, most of whom were in Tjakra uniforms, The Brawidjaja and Diponegoro units, which had come to Djakarta for the Armed Forces Day ceremonies scheduled for October 5, were used primarily to secure the palace and some nearby key points and, according to newspaper reports, may also have provided defense for the Halim Airport on the second and third days of the affair. b. The Movement’s paramilitary forces apparently consisted of members of the PKI, the Pemuda Rakjat and even of the PKI women’s arm Gerwani grouped in Special Security Force (TIK) units. During the month of September approximately 2,700 communists, according to CAS reports, were given a 7-day training course conducted by the Air Force within the Halim Air Base perimeter near the area which was later to become one of the September 30 Movement's strongholds and the burial ground for the Generals. According to one CAS report, these cadres were called in on September 29. A few hours prior to the attack they were reportedly provided olive green field uniforms and weapons from Air Force stock at Halim Air Base and in the city. The Army now claims to have confessions and other proof that the TIK units participated in the capture and murder of the Generals. The TIK units were apparently also given other tasks in the days following the coup. A group of some 35 TIK elements reportedly was captured near the Hotel Indonesia and the telegraph office on October 2 in what might have been an effort to retake the telegraph office. Three TIK men also reportedly engaged in sniper fire from an upper floor of Djakarta's principal hotel during this operation. The Army announced on October 18 that 1,334 of those participating in the September 30 SECRET === [PDF page 117] === SECRET A-300, Djakarta Page 19 Movement had been arrested. The majority of these were probably TIK elements. There would appear to be many more TIK units at large, and the Army so indicated in its press announcement. ec. The Air Force’s Special Action Troops (PGT) seemed to have been purposely kept in the background. The provided security for the Halim Air Base during the first part of the coup. One PGT company also assisted the Tjakrabirawa in protecting the President. There appears to have been at least one small clash between the PGT and Suharto's forces near Halim Air Base during which three Air Force men were captured. ad. The number of September 30 Movement troops in Central Java is very difficult to estimate as many units purposely did not indicate a clear commitment one way or the other. A field grade Army officer estimated on October 3 that three regimental areas, Tegal, Pekalongan and Jogjakarta were sympathetic to the rebels. SECRET === [PDF page 118] === A-300, Djakarta Page 20 The Field Commanders. The anonymity of the September 30 Movement's leadership is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that several prominent Indonesians were convinced during the first days of the coup that Untung (which means lucky in Indonesian) was a fictitious name. Although there is now definite proof that Untung ° exists in flesh and blood, little other information has been offered either by the press or private sources to dispel the anonymity of the Movement'’s field commanders. a. Untung, according to a biography printed in the official Army newspaper, attended an officers’ course in Bandung in 1959, subsequently served in West Sumatra as a lieutenant during the PRRI rebellion, in Central Java as a battalion commander, and in West Irian during the anti- Dutch campaign there. He did not, as previously reported, study in the United States. Minister of Veterans /Aehebe Sarbini in a private conversation stated that Untung’s military history goes back fifteen years beyond that rinted in the Army journal and that when serving under him in 1945, Untung had displayed definite communist sympathies. Sources too numerous to be ignored have maintained that Untung also fought in the 1943 Madiun rebellion on the communist side. According to a CAS report, Untung's Madiun record was brought to the President's attention when Untung was first proposed for the Palace Guard but the President permitted his appointment as Commander of the First Tjakrabirawa Battalion in late 1963. Untung is reported to be a tough soldier, not overly bright, and devoured wi, indignation over the corruption of immoral living of /General officers. He was, in short, a perfect communist candidate for the role of an Indonesian Kong Le. b. Much less is known about the other members of the Movement's top leadership. Brigadier General Supardjo was Commander of the Fourth Combat Command in Pontianak, Kalimantan, at the time of the affair. He is still at large, and, according to Military Attache sources, is the Army's most wanted man at the present time. Lieutenant Colonel Heru was Assistant Directrof Air Force Intelligence and previously SECRET === [PDF page 119] === SECRET A~300, Djakarta a Page 21 epent a year in Air Force intelligence schools in Texas. His actual participation in the Movement is still in doubt. He has not been discharged from the Air Force and there are no reports of his being arrested.” Navy Colonel Sunardi was an administrative assistant in the Navy Minister's office and formerly commander of a destroyer. His Navy colleagues describe him as a radical who got in bad company. He is now under arrest ana reportedly has been relatively cooperative under interrogation. He also was erroneously reported as having studied in the United States. However, the career of Police Lieutenant Colonel Anwas, Chief of Staff of the Djakarta Police on September 30, was in large part sponsored by the United States. He studied under American auspices for a year in the Philippines and on two separate occasions in the United States. Although he was first publicly absolved from complicity in the Movement by his police superiors, he is now believed to be under arrest. Only a few weeks before the coup attempt Anwas had been transferred from cuties connected with, among other things, security of foreign missions in Djakarta to a post as one of Subandrio's aides. c. Two of the Movement'’s commanders most mentioned. in he press, Colonel Latif and Colonel Suherman, were not listed among its top leaders but were named as ordinary members of the evolutionary Council. Latif, formerly commander of the Second Regiment of the Djakarta military command, was shot in the left knee upon capture and has reportedly resisted interrogation. Colonel Suherman, who was intelligence officer for the Central Java military command, apparently was and perhaps still is in command of the Movement’ forces in the Jogjakarta area. The Generals and the Strategists. The Kong disguise assumed by the September 30 Movement failed tne high-level strategists behind it. The principal a in this case are not the field grade officers commanding Movement but D. N. Aidit and the Indonesian Communist &£ anc Omar Dani and the Indonesian Air Force. Communist aiso stands accused and Subandrio and Sukarno stand, although the case against tnem is less a. ‘Omar Dani was in. this affair up to.his neck. The training anda arming of rce £ the TIK paramilitary cadres, > of Halim Air Base as command center, escape route ana arrested after this was written === [PDF page 120] === use OL 2: y his troops to a k.lsc reportedly to I General Supardjo from Kalimantan to Djakarta on the eve Cf the affair, and Dani's own flight to Central Java with Untung provide enough circumstantial evidence to hang Dani. There are in addition unconfirmed reports that he moved his family to Central Java on September 29 and that he held an urgent meeting of his principal aides a few hours before the Movement began its march. To top it all off, Dani issued a statement a few hours after the Movement had made its attack lai that it had safeguard the Indonesian revolution subversive plot. This rata ter was later (but too corrected to describe the Movement as an internal Army affair in which the Air Force had msn intention of interfering. Another unconfirmed report — Dani's family in Sukarno's Bogor palace as of only a few days i this is written. This again would point the finger at Preside Sukarno. is yet clear how far the Air Force was involved as a_whole. a Air Force officers under interrogation have indicated that the training, arming and services offered the Movement’s troops was a closely held and well cloaked operation involving only a few Air Force figures. cic hehe it rr ¥ icence gainst the PKL Communist youth’ do a CoulusVt. without the knowledg newspapers have made mitteeman Anwar Sanusi said “that bjak political force and It is doubtful knew of the plot opeared to have responco announced, according Sis ok ct SS u cr Fh -O fh g had Serbia: readied a large section of the members in the pro- Movement once Nik ec O ict ct P&S 63 Di Bs Aidi r nal actions dur followed a strikingly similar course to th ani. After the Harian Rakjat o [Unreadable] io Wight he co We Coup Corse pVCAWS Gaur ts odin'ce: Pci CC. Aeiless === [PDF page 121] === SECRET A-300, Djakarta e. Page 23 had extolled the "correctness of the action taken by the September 30 Movement," Aidit issued a letter to a Surabaja newspaper treating the matter as an internal Army affair. (This letter was first printed undated on October 6 and then amended to show an October 2 date in a transparent attempt to absolve Aidit from the Harian Rakjat pronouncement. The PKI Politburo, meanwhile issued a statement on October 5 also treating the Movement as an internal Army matter.) Aidit, like Dani, also turned up in Central Java although there is inconclusive evidence prove that he accompanied X¥ Dani and Untung from Halim to Iswahjudi Air Base near Madiun. (See Section 3 for a more detailed wrap-up of PKI involvement in the September 30 Movement.) ) 9 Propogacde. e. The Army leadership is now building al[good| case against the Chinese People’s Republic based generally on — traditional anti-Chinese feeling, and specifically on the | discovery of Chinese arms in the hands of PKI paramilitary elements and in Chinese shipments disguised as construction materials for the Djakarta Conefo complex. The Chinese have not helped their defense by resolutely refusing to fly their flag at half mast for the dead Generals, a most unwise Manin festation of solidarity with defeated revolutionaries which’: cannot be excused, as Sukarno suggested, by feigned ignorange of the national mourning. vy £. The case against Subandrio is more difficult to substantiate. There can be little doubt that his Central intelligence Board provided the stories of a "Generals, Council” on which the Moveme nt justified its action, but the President’s testimony would be necessary tO -make this stick. Army officers privately and a newspaper publicly have drawn attention to the unusual number of Indonesian L_— officials absent from Djakarta on September 30. A 45-— member delegation from the People's Provisional Consultative pers nea Pah incchec Prime Minister Chaerul Saleh, &£ and Army Major General Wilujo elias, a National Datiaeion institute group of 50, no less than three economic teams including twooft Indonesia's strongest anti-communist military leaders SECRET hn, * Fae ts 4 Lg tees aie: : gies aed ea Ty a MAE RT gw dias as CORR ee 1 Bos bi I a Bae i aS a a a sagen === [PDF page 122] === A-300, Djakarta Page 24 Generals Sukendro and Jusuf Amir, and a group of 57 senior Air Force pilots who openly harbored anti-PKI feelings left for China during the month of September. Subandrio would, of course, have been the most likely person to snare so many Chicom invitations at one time. The First Deputy Prime Minister, himself, was on tour in Sumatra with 11 other ministers. The Army claims to have intercepted an October 2 cable to Subandrio in Medan, which read “objective not achieved, return home immediately," but this may well have been a forgery. It is fairly well, substantiated, however, that a Jetstar was sent from Halim Air Base, while it was still in the Movement'’s hands, to Sumatra to pick up Subandrio. g.- The President’s role in the September 30 Movement may be a puzzle for historians in years to come but that he had a role is now widely accepted (although not publicly expressed) by most Indonesians. There can be no doubt that Sukarno was thoroughly briefed on the alleged plot of the "Generals Council” and that he was a susceptible subject for such talk. Some Indonesians have spoken (in whispers) of the President’s speech to a communist student group on September 29 in which he talked of "those who were Generals but who now are defenders of counterrevolutionary elements and whom we must crush." While it would be unwise to take these words, which are similar to those he spoke on August 17, as an indication that Sukarno was privy to the plot against the generals, they are, however, a good clue as to his general frame of mind. h. Much attention has been placed on Sukarno’s actions during September 30 and October 1 which are regarded as indications of his position vis-a-vis the September 30 affair. So much so, in fact, that the palace felt compelled to publish an explanation (or as one Indonesian official suggested, an over-explanation) of his exact movements during the crucial hours. While there can be no doubt that Sukarno was in the hands of members of the September 30 Movement, that he voluntarily accompanied them (or preceded them) to their Halim Air Base center and escape route but that he did not (or refused to) accompany them to Central Java, these movements, however, do not in themselves prove Presidential complicity in the plot. sd SECRET === [PDF page 123] === SECRET A-300, Djakarta Page 25 i. Much more suspect are Sukarno’s actions after the September 30 affair. His first move was to naite a weak and reportedly somewhat leftist General. Pranoto Reksosamudera as Acting Army Chief of Staff although General Suharto was clearly in actual command of the Army. He then proferred his personal protection to those most suspected of staging the uprising. He called Omar Dani to his side from'Central Java and summoned Subandrio back from Sumatra. According to a CAS report, he released three Air Force Vice Marshals arrested by the Army on suspicion of complicity in the Movement. He perhaps harbored PKI First and Second Deputy Chairmen Lukman and Njoto in his Bogor palace and has made every effort to redeem their bankrupt party. Although he eventually disapproved the Revolutionary Council he took a noticeably long time to do so. SUch a clear display of favoritism, cannot be attributed solely to a desire to preserve national unity. (For a more detailed account and interpretation of Sukarno's role in the affair, see Section 4.); The Plot. The action and the cast of the September drama suggests that the plot nad been conceived ata high level, probably by the PKI leaders, Omar Dani and perhaps Subandrio. One can speculate that there were three levels of comprehension of this plot; that is, that Sukarno on one hand and Untung and his lieutenants on the other hand, although both deeply engagea in the plot had a different conception of what was going to happen than did the original plotters. Following is an imaginary reconstruction of what forethought might have taken place. While it is, of course, unlikely events occurred exactly as depicted, it is believed that this exposition gives an approximate picture of the principals’ relations to each otner and to the crime. a. PKI leaders, Omar bani, and Subandrio, aware that the Army leadership was in a commanding position to seize power upon Sukarno’s death, began a systematic campaign to destroy their main opponent. Even with the President's cooperation, however, they realized that a gradual strangulation of the-Army leadership might not be fast enough and that a decisive stroke was necessary while Sukarno was around to drive it nome. Perhaps afraid that the Army planned a preemptive coup during the Armed Forces. SECRET ( OK etn === [PDF page 124] === SECRET A-300, Dijakarta Page 26 Day ceremonies, or more likely simply fearful that a show of strength by the Armed Forces at that time would prolong the military's ascendancy, the plotters precipitatively advanced their stroke to the week preceding Armed Forces Day. b. By confiding the action to the Untung group, the plotters may have hoped to preserve two options: (i) The country, with the crushing inflation and the pressure built up against corruption and high living by “capitalist bureaucrats" might well lend itself to a Kong Le-type coup, the plotters may have argued. And Sukarno, himself, might be counted on to give it his blessings once success was assured. If Untung were indeed successful in setting up a "Revolutionary Council Government," the PKI and its principal allies could in short order gain control of it. There was thus the option of a total (excepting Sukarno) coup. (ii) If, however, the Untung group did not succeed in setting up a "Revolutionary Council Government" it still had an excellent chance of accomplishing its most immediate objective,, the murder of the Generals and that was a boon in itself. The plotters could then disavow Untung as an Army “internal matter" and look to Sukarno for protection. c. For Untung, the plot had only one option, the establishment of a new revolutionary government of the proletariat, under Sukarno'’s eventual aegis. Although he must have expressed some general wish for such a master stroke, which led him to be chosen as its instrument, it is unlikely that he had any real role in the hatching of the scheme. Untung and his lieutenants were probably promised sufficient military forces to give the coup a good chance of success. In event of failure, he was perhaps promised an escape route to Central Java and the PKI's full commitment to a prolonged insurgency. Untung was in short a dupe. d. Sukarno probably had only a vague comprehension of the September 30 plot. Had more details been offered he probably would have refused to hear them. In all such decisive action he has preferred to take a oe position which would allow him the greatest SECRET === [PDF page 125] === SECRET A-300, Djakarta Se Page 27 possible maneuverability. (It is well to remember at this time, that Sukarno even had to be forced to sign the 1945 Declaration of Independence.) One can imagine that Sukarno nodded in agreement when Dani, Subandrio and others told him of the Generals’ nefarious scheme and when they proposed that something be done about it before October 5, he perhaps refused to hear more, leaving the rest to his trusted lieutenants, (A stronger view of the President's involvement is argued in Section 4.) What Went Wrong. The plot perhaps failed because it climaxed somewhere between the two options. Untung gained control of the capital city and the radio station and there was during these first moments no sign of organized resistance, The coup conceivably needed only the added push that the Air Force and the PKI could give it with their announcement of support. Dani and Aidit then threw their cards on the table, but before they could get Sukarno to declare his hand, resistance had developed and the President, perhaps with genuine alarm, learned of the murder of the Generals. Instead@ of giving his blessing to the Movement and proceeding to Central Java with Dani and Untung, Sukarno went home to Bogor. Dani and Aidit then attempted, too late, to withdraw to the first option, The President's delay and Open association with the plotters had in the meantime limited his ability to offer the immediate protection which the plotters now had more need of than they had first speculated. A partially successful plot thus turned quickly into a nightmare of a defeat, * there Q5 oa; hecau& Cukanuc fon leol ( Cour ont uw Cufiplert 1 ve Toa _ as eice === [PDF page 126] === 3. THE PROBABLE ROLE OF THE PKI IN THE SEPTEM Evidence of PKI involvement in the September 30 Movement is extensive although the PKI was only one of several elements that joined the action. It is Army strategy to make the PKI the principal scapegoat for the affair as President Sukarno, who appears /£6 ‘Nave been mo@tkky guilty, may be white-washed for reasons of state policy if he is not too uncooperative. a. The PKI Before the September (i) Since 1952, the PK front strategy in which adventurist It is true that the PKI leadership has ¢ increasingly revolutionary situation but this, at least until quite recently, with the that a violent overthrow of the government was n ssary. The PKI has felt, rather, that its position within the government was constantly improving and that its enemies were being gradually reduced by non-violent action. Its prospects were improving at an even more rapid in recent months, in fact, with such acts as the purge of the PNI and the permanent ban of Murba. The: nsiderable reason to believe that a full Nasakom cabinet »% imminent and that Aidit would enter the Cabinet idi (ii) The PKI stressed that t! country was still in the "national-democratic stage" and the dominant trend of thought, at least until recently, was th the transition to the "socialist stage" would be gradual and ful As recently as during the PKI Central Committ plenum in May, 1955, Aidit displayed his usual cautious approach toward the use of violence by criticizing some local Pi pushing unilateral land reform actions too hard where the ground was not sufficiently prepared. Aidit said that strong unilateral action should be taken only in locations where the PKI had an obvious just issue that would attract mass support and where the PKI could attract a large measure of sympathy from other groups. This cautious approach locally was fully in accord with the national strategy. SECRET === [PDF page 127] === SECRET A-300, Djakarta Page 29 b. Indications of PKI Involvement Se eee ee VY CMEC Nevertheless, the PKI did become concerned about a possible threat toits position in mid-September. According to several CAS reports, the PKI began taking such security measures as destruction or hiding of documents, movement of PKI leaders from house to house, preparations to go underground on sudden notice, increased paramilitary training of selected cadres, etc. However, these measures could be interpreted as being of a precautionary or defensive nature as if the PKI saw an increased possibility of an Army coup or of the early death of President Sukarno. Numerous CAS and other reports have demonstrated some PKI paramilitary involvement in the September 30 Movement. There is good reason to believe that Colonel Untung himself was a PKI member or at least a sympathizer and a veteran of the Madiun rebellion in 1948, PKI~affiliated railroad workers sought to block the arrival of Army forces from West Java. PKI-affiliated communications workers helped to take over communications facilities in Djakarta during the Untung "coup." There are reports that some members of the goon squads that seized and killed the top generals were PKI and that the generals were killed at a PKI paramilitary training center adjacent to the Halim Air Base. ‘There is also the circumstantial evidence of the obvious sympathy for the September 30 Movement shown in Harian Rakjat and other pro-communist papers on the morning of October 2. These papers appeared after Suharto's recapture of Djakarta and the apparent failure of the Untung - coup but they may have been prepared earlier. (A local anti-communist publisher told the reporting officer that Harian Rakjat normally goes to press about midnight and is printed during the early morning. Thus, if normal practice had been followed, it would not have begun to publish until some four hours after recapture of the capital by Suharto.) SECRET === [PDF page 128] === SECRET A-300, Djakarta Page 30 There is also the apparent flight of Aidit with Untung to Central Java. Aidit's movements are by no means as clear as Sukarno’s, however. We do not yet know for sure that he was with Sukarno, Untung and Dani at the palace on the morning of October 1 or when he went to Halim if, indeed, he did go there, While several reports mention him as being on the plane with Untung and Dani to Jogjakarta, his role is much more shadowy than that of Dani, for example. The leftist complexion of Untung’s "Revolutionary Council” is another indication of PKI involvement, particularly since most of the non-communist names were apparently included as a cover and did not reflect the consent of the people concerned. According to FND 8123, Untung's Revolutionary Council list included persons who were really involved in the coup, persons believed to have grudges against the captured Army leaders but who were not consulted in advance, and some additional names to create confusion. This report seems to be borne out by the nature of the list itself, ¢c. Some Evidence Against PKI Instigation of the Coup There were several CAS reports received early in the "coup" which indicated that the timing and nature of the action were not of the party's choosing (FND 8089) although the PKI felt it would have to support the September 30 Movement. Harian Rakjat, although it supported Untung for allegedly preventing a generals’ coup, also tried from the beginning to depict the affair as an internal armed forces matter. The PKI as such never came out into the open, never attempted to use its mass strength and never appealed to its sympathizers or to the people at large to rise against a threatened Army coup. It is indeed difficult to understand why the PKI should decide to rely on Organizations outside its own command structure and which were not numerous XHGwMaeaE while failing to employ its own SECRET === [PDF page 129] === evidence that Sukarno nimsel£ was involved although hcy: far Sukarno actually committed himself ) the PKI Diag eae. » Deni and the others not certain, E. Sui Prime mover of the plot, have i! nim even some —- eittn A wuen Sukarno was no Party. Lx the PKI tearead ana there is some evidence to think cor tencing to precinitat: e tne Ariny leadership 2Oner rather than later. probably in a state of willingness to Ooperate in f to eliminate the top Army leacership. elements wn and basic pol a such a 2onsibdbi Lity Le While ce === [PDF page 130] === A=-390, Dijakarta Paye 32 ‘tion 5) to support the second view, even if it true, the evidence will probably be obscured both by Sukarno himself and by the Army anc other non-communist elements that feel they need Sukarno as a symbol of national unity. If indeed Sukarno himself was involved in a cold-blooded decision to eliminate the Army leadership, a decision that was probably worked out in cooperation with the PKI and other top Sukarno supporters such as Subancrio and Dani, a poet ana perhaps tentative decision to "do something" against the generals may have been taken as far back as mid-summer when the Army showed it would not agree to the Fifth Armed Force and Nasakom advisory councils. A more specific commitment could have come any time later and it may be that the concept of violent action grew gradually while fears of an Army coup or Sukarno's death grew simultaneously until a climate of thought was reached in mid or late September where a plan was worked out that had been long in conception but was hurried in its details. Perhaps the details had not even been fully worked out when the atmo apiiere Micaisitton gave rise to a hasty decision. Another key question is the timing of the deci to affect the coup and the timing of the PKI decision to act, if the latter was supplemental to the former. PKI arms acquisitions, PKI military training, which seems to have been carried out on a crash basis, and other PKI emergency moves, all of which were concentrated in a relatively short period of a few weeks before Gctober 1, may show that the decision to act was taken in early September. These acts may also have been a reaction to fear of a “Generals’ plot" or to a probable early demise of the President. In either case, the PKI decision to varticipate; to have been a hurried one. sicn === [PDF page 131] === » SKCRET A~300, Djakarta 33 Page 2 4, The Role of Sukarno in the September 30 Affair Many knowledgeable Indonesians and most foreign diplomats in Djakarta believe that President Sukarno was involved in the September 30 Movement although there is not universal agreement on the extent of his involvement. CAS has reported a confession by the deputy of Colonel Latif, one of the leading "rebel" commanders, which is said to fully implicate Sukarno and there are other CAS reports from Army sources and from an official of the PKI Secretariat (Hardojo) which indicate Sukarno complicity in the September 30 plot. There were also reports that Untung implicated Sukarno although later tepexts say the contrary, possibly ee of Army willingness to protect Sukarno's reputation in exchange for a guid pro quo. There is in addition a mass of circumstantial evidence and plain Tomte that points to Sukarno's involvement and possibly/his conception and direction of the plot. This section will primarily be concerned with this circumstantial evidence. a. Theoretical Background (4) First, there is the record of Sukarno's close cooperation with the PKI merging in recent months into a virtual public identification with the PKI. Sukarno had publicly announced in March that Indonesia “had almost completed the National-Democratic stage and was now entering the Socialist stage" of the Indonesian revolution. Sukarno repeated this assertion at the MPRS session in April and on several occasions thereafter. The PKI fatimated that Sukarno was being premature and emphasized that Indonesia was - still in the National-Democratic stage and would remain so until certain tive conditions were fulfilled including a Nasakom Cabinet, completion and reform and nationalization of all foreign enterprises. Sukarno did quarrel with these conditions and, in May, also emphasized that Indonesia still in the National- Democratic stage. He did not say again that Indonesia "entering the socialist stage" until a week or so before the October 1 o"' attempt. Did this indicate a renewal of his determination to bring about soon the elimination of all important opposition to totalitarian control? (ii) After Sukar > began |! asis on “entering the e'' last Marchy oa. tone ached rwoO p Y ematen for the idation of moderate elemen peared at the time to be ated with the theoretical coneept of entry into the Socialist Irst of these was the great purge of the PNI which resulted in reo tee ite pt oe RS © rr cr tf tO aren rh oa ish) DP ie" Ga é ouster of E mode rate elements in a campaign that lasted from March gust (although mopping-up actions were continuing thereafter) The second ne of Sukarno's political offensive was aimed at the Army leadershi tps dk re important target, it was far less susceptible to attack, however. Ee Rat haa! (iii) Sukarno f denauded a reorientation of the Army's thinking (a "sharp turn of the whee Sukarno put it) which would include renunciation of the Army idea that Sileeeeta s potential enemy lay to the === [PDF page 132] === SECRET A-~300, Djakarta Page 34 North (China) and realization that Indonesia and Communist China were allies against Nekolim, headed by the United States. Internally, the Army was also to stress Marxism in its indoctrination. Aidit, with the apparent support of Sukarno, soon demanded "Nasakom advisory councils" which the Army correctly interpreted as a euphemism for a nascent system of political commissars. Aidit also called for arming the workers and peasants and Sukarno followed with the concept of a "fifth armed force" which was only a slight variation on the Aidit theme. The Army gave way to some degree but not to the point of relinquishing power over its own destiny as Sukarno and the PKI desired. (iv) The Army agreed in some areas to arm workers and peasants but tried to do so in a manner that would minimize PKI benefit. The Fifth Armed Force and Nasakom Advisory Council ideas were not expressly rejected but there was rather a recasting of these ideas by the Army in its counterproposals which would redound to Army rather than PKI benefit. The President referred to such activity as foot-dragging (plintat-plintut). Furthermore, the Sukarno-PKI offensive frightened the Army into forming a Generals Council to map political strategy. (v) In the face of Army recalcitrance and an increasing belief in a short life expectancy, Sukarno probably had come to the conclusion that some form of strong, decisive action was necessary if he were to succeed in his announced design to “enter the Socialist stage," which required the elimination of any independent political power on the part of the Army. (vi) At the PNI anniversary celebration, Sukarno began to take up a new but related theme. He praised, to a PNI audience, not the past of the PNI but rather the unsuccessful PKI revolt of 1926. He claimed that he had founded the PNI in 1927 to carry on in a new form the armed struggle against the Dutch and he excoriated those who had advocated a policy of eradualism and conciliation. He repeated this theme in a number of speeches thereafter although these remarks did not receive much publicity. On one occasion, he referred to five generations of Indonesian revolutionaries from (1) the Sa areka at Islam through (2) the 1926 PKI, (3) the Algemene Studie Club and (4) Sis '45 Generation to (5) the present generation. He then asserted that he himself belonged to the second generation based on the 1926 PKI. He attacked the third generation as collaborators and revisionists. is public identification with the violent revolutionary revolt seems to show retrospect that Sukarno himself convinced of the need for a violen from the National to the Socialist Stage. This hypo s is teglonaaa by other his August 17 or "Takari" speech, Sukarno said vt piste ot ca: taken place in Indonesia but wa that it might if and ostentatious living by the rich (cat talist Sicconctata} lonesia, “capitalist bureaucrat" is a PKI label applied SECRET === [PDF page 133] === oarticularly to the bureaucratic machine built by Chairul Saleh in the economic Departments (ministries) and to the managers of state enterprises of whom e large proportion are Army officers. (viii) cing ‘ eems to be shown in a speech Congress on Septenber 29 As q d by Harian Rakjat of October 1 has been confirmed that he actualy this) Sukarno stated that "Rarlier there were persons w ary but now they have become counterrevolutionary. And as explained in Takari, there also were loyal generals but now they have become protectors of counterrevolutionary elements. These we must crush." Even by itself this sounds like an allusion to planned violent action against the Army leadership. b. The Bare Facts of Sukarno's Actions (i) Although much has not come out publicly on the September 30 feir, Sukarno's own actions and statements show a desire to protect the PKI and initially even the Untung group itself. They are peculiar to say the least. (ii) Sukarno appointed General Pranoto-Reksosamodra--generally considered to be sympathetic to the PKI or at least malleable--to take temporary comnand of the Army under Sukarno himself Furthermore, this order was dated October 1 end was printed in Harian Rakjat, the PKI paper, on October 2 and was absent from other newspapers. It is also known that, after Sukarno went to Bogor on October 2, he favored Pranoto over Suharto indicating that his appointment or attempted appointment of Pranoto was not made under duress from the Untung group. (iii) Sukarno publicly showed no appreciation for General Suharto's Fforts to put down the Untung "coup" and has tended in fact to shun and downgrade Suharto. (His subsequent appointment of Suharto as Army commander was made only when the Army refused to accept anyone else.) He has shown no real public remorse for the murders of the generals. He has defended the Air Force role. He has indicated that his own movement to Halim Air Base was voluntary and that it was done in order to be prepared for flight if necessary. In other words he has implied that there was a generals’ plot and that the Tjakrabirawa was merely protecting him. He has thus attempted to leave the door open to expand on such charges if and when he regains control of the situation. ec. Other Circumstantial Evidence (i) A third chain of circumstantial evidence lies in the absurdity of any plot of this kind that did not involve Sukarno. It is not reasonable to believe that the PKI, which had been doing so well riding Sukarno's coattails, would attempt to seize power through such a plot if it did not have the approval of Sukarno. It is unreasonable to suppose that the PKI, if it SECRET hodus 1 Herr Ke,, only disc ouseed 6, SOL | === [PDF page 134] === SECRET Page 306 did decide to seize power on its own, would fail to employ the classic weapons of communist revolutionary action and would rely on a small group of men rather than employing the Party's mass bulk. It is also difficult to believe that the PKI would give so much control to groups not in its chain of command such as the Air Force and the Tjakrabirawa. (ii) Some apologists for Sukarno argue that Aidit insulted Sukarno at the CGMI Congress on September 29 and Sukarno then became angry at the PKI, forcing the latter to move. This explanation has been given by Ganis Harsono, the Foreign Department press spokesman, to foreign journalists for example. A recheck of the speeches that evening shows this not to be the case, however. Sukarno actually followed Aidit's speech with a speech that was very friendly to the CGMI in which he even hinted at a future ban of the HMI although he held back from actually doing so. (iii) It is also difficult to imagine an unknown minor officer like Untung seriously hoping to achieve power over a nation of more than 100,000,000 with a large standing Army and large military forces intact and far removed in other islands,through employment of a handful of men at the center. And it is hard to see how the Air Force could expect to be an effective instrument for a coup as air power is unsuited to this kind of use and, in fact, was not actually employed as such. (iv) The circumstances then point toward a plan of limited action for a limited objective--not a seizure of power but rather the liquidation Of Da ee ee See ee cs Fortunately, some key ‘officers escaped and one, Suharto, was prepared to fight and had the troops to do so. If the plot had not been bungled in the execution, it appears that the stage had been set to pretend a narrow escape from a generals’ coup. Sukarno then would have been free to step back on the stage and the last obstack to "the socialist stage" or unrestricted commitment to a communist Indonesia would have been cleared. d. Reservations (i) There are still questions to be answered, of course, that may alter this possible explanation. Why did Untung's second statement reduce all officers to Lieutenant Colonel and substitute a "Revolutionary Council" for Sukarno? Had Sukarno backed out when execution of the plot was badly handled? Was Untung left holding the bag and decided to grab power for himself if he Sere to take the main risks? Or were these red herrings designed to obscure Sukarno's role when it became questionable whether the plot would succeed? Is there also a possibility, however remote, that the PKI, Subandrio and Dani proceeded on their own in the hope that Sukarno would follow along if they were successful? This latter possibility is conceivable but seems unlikely when one recalls the overwhelming extent to which Sukarno involves himself in political intrigue. This man is a wily, suspicious political === [PDF page 135] === 1-300, Djakarta st order and it is almost impossible to imagine him ace for several hours on the morning of October 1, then im in the very center of activity and not understanding the (ii) The case is not complete but the circumstantial evidence above indicates that Sukarno may be guilty of being the chief architect or at least the central figure of the September 30 Movement. The odds seem overwhelmingly that, at the very least, he knew what was afoot and had given his tacit blessing to those who were actually executing the maneuver. aden SECRET === [PDF page 136] === A-300, Djakarta Page 38 5. What Might Have Been a. Successful Elimination of Senior Generals (i) In its pre-dawn capture and elimination of six key Army generals, the 30 September movement came close to eliminating entirely the group of Army leaders most able by position and temperament to mobilize effective counter-action. At least four additional officers are reliably reported to have been on the purge list. Nasution escaped by a hair. Major General Suharto, Commander of KOSTRAD, and Major General Mursjid, Army Deputy I for Operations were either warned in time to leave their homes or were already out. Brig. General Sukendro, Secretary General of KOTOE and Minister attached to the Presidium, was in Peking and while thus physically safe he was also effectively removed from the possibility of prompt reaction. (ii) If the elimination raids had been successful in snaring Nasution, Mursjid and Suharto in addition to the others, as planned, timely response by organized military force would have been highly problematical. The possibility of such a response would have centered around four figures: 1) Major General Djamin Gintings, Operations Officer; 2) Major General Umar Wirahadikusuma, Djakarta area 3) Major General Basuki Rachmat, East Java Commander (KODAM VIII), who was temporarily in Djakarta; and 4) Major General Adjie, West Java Commander (KODAM VI), based in Bandung. (iii) It is noteworthy that it was apparently not these four, but the three officers slated for elimination (Suharto, Mursjid and Nasution), who did mobilize action on October 1. Without them, would the political urgency of the situation have presented itself with sufficient clarity to the remaining officers in time? Probably not. Adjie would have been prepared to act firmly, but it is unlikely that at his distance he would have been sure enough of the true situation in time. It was Djakarta~-based troops which reasserted local control October 1. Only later did Siliwangi Division elements move in to assist. (iv) The success of an effort such as that staged in Untung’s name would depend heavily upon prolonging the period before the situation became clear enough for reaction to be mobilized. If the purge had been wholly successful, it is likely that Untung would have been able to hold e sca === [PDF page 137] === A-300, Dijakarta ® SECRET Page 39 Djakarta October 1. His control over communication media would have inhibited a prompt response from Adjie in Bandung. By October 2, if Untung’s forces had still presented the impression of success, additional elements would probably have gravitated to their side and the political momentum would have begun to gain real force. At this stage, Sukarno might well have come out openly on behalf of the “revolutionary council” and the opportunity for remaining Army leaders to coalesce their scattered echelons and plan effective stopping action would have been largely lost. Under these circumstances, the brutal murder of the generals would probably have been revealed only later, under circumstances in which the emphasis could be placed on the threat that this was what happened to “enemies of the revolution”, who “plot against the President.” With the Sukarno-PKI bandwagon then in high gear, the intimidation factor of the murder revelations would have overbalanced their stimulation to effective counteraction. (v) In assessing the nearness of Untung*’s success, it is necessary also to take into account the major reduction in Army troops available on Java to maintain security. Over a period of time, major elements of the Java Army commands have been moved to the “front-line” areas in Sumatra, Borneo and Sulawesi in support of confrontation. This had been a cause of concern to the senior Army leadership, which before the coup attempt had been attempting to get some of these troops back to Java. Certainly this reduction in forces available provided an unusually favorable opportunity for the type of action which was attempted and would have made subsequent terrorism by PKI mass action groups much more effective. General Umar had only two of his usual three battalions under his command in the Djakarta area. Almost all of the Siliwangi Division's infantry had been sent elsewhere. Thus only a few additional key battalion unit defections to Untung could have made a major difference in the Djakarta area. With momentum established, these could have easily been forthcoming, perhaps from the Tjakrabirawa or infiltrated elements of the Diponegoro Division, in the city for Armed Forces Day, if not from KODAM V itself. Even now, Djakarta is guarded primarily by raider, paratroop, and armored elements of the Siliwangi Division, there being no infantry to spare. (vi) The odds therefore are that only the ability to nip Untung's momentum in the bud beginning October 1 prevented the development of an almost irreversible victory for the PKI and Sukarno which would have tipped the Indonesian political balance drastically and probably definitively toward an avowed communist state, and at the least would have permanently SECRET === [PDF page 138] === SECRET A-300, Dijakarta Page 40 emasculated the Army as a united opposition political force. Without men such as Suharto and Nasution still alive in Djakarta, men who commanded prestige and loyalty and who at the same time quickly grasped the stakes of the game and the necessity to move quickly, it must be questioned whether the response would have come promptly enough. b. Capture of Army Leadership Alive, Without Executions. (i) If the Army leadership had merely been seized and not executed, the entire episode would have taken on a different character. In such circumstances, the necessity for an accompanying armed seizure of Djakarta in the name of the "revolutionary council" would not seem to be necessary, thus this possibility is somewhat more theoretical than that under a above. (ii) The logical course of action would have been to denounce the Generals for plotting against Sukarno. With Sukarno’s participation in this denunciation and denigration, the prestige of the Army would be seriously damaged; a majority of other officers would in most likelihood try to exonerate themselves personally through effusive pledges of support to the Great Leader of the Revolution. While some would have serious doubts that such a plot ever existed, it would not be politically safe to suggest this. (iii) Such a course of action would thus emasculate the Army leadership and appear to pave the way for acceptance of the PKI/Sukarno pressure to install political commissars within the Army command structure, ostensibly to prevent any further "counterrevolutionary” plotting. It would have dangers, however. Sukarno would have to be completely and irrevocably committed in advance and not subject to later persuasion by the captured generals. The detention of the generals would be a continuing problem, As long as they were alive they would be a potential nucleus o& opposition to the march of the revolution. Their families and their military colleagues would still have influence and power. An assisted escape, followed by attempts to mobilize Army elements or external opposition would continue to be possible. (iv) In conclusion, to have settled for capture and denigration of Army leaders with Sukarno’s collaboration would have entailed considerably fewer immediate risks of counteraction and would have been almost equally effective in emasculating the Army as a political force. However, it would have had some long-term instabilities and would not have clearly shaken-up the status quo and provided a clean unimpeded impetus toward the “socialist state" which Sukarno has repeatedly indicated as a goal. === [PDF page 139] === , Skeuer A-300, Djakarta &. Page 41 (v) That the easier course was not taken may have been due to a combination of factors. Among these may have been #6m@@ PKI fear that at some point Sukarno would weaken in his opposition to the generals’ group, the inherent tendency to violent action inherent in communist doctrine and propaganda, and the desire of all concerned to shift the spectrum dramatically and irrevocably toward the far left. One other important factor is not to be discounted, however. The peaceful capture of the Army leadership would have required Sukarno's own prompt denunciation of them and their "plot" to generate the necessary momentum against the Army as an institution. The more violent course of force enabled Sukarno to hold back his own overt commitment somewhat longer and thus avoid exposing himself prematurely as a partisan of a cause which might fail. Since any plan might fail, the course which allowed the safety factor of delayed commitment may have been much more attractive. It had the advantage not only of preserving the President’s own position, but also of strengthening the effectiveness of his future influence in removing the worst effects of defeat for the PKI and the Air Force leadership. === [PDF page 140] === SECRET A\-300, Djakarta Page 42 6. Future Prospects a. The future development of the situation will depend importantly on the Army's will and skill for united political action, Sukarno's ability to outmaneuver the Army (without bringing on a clear showdown in which Army power would be effectively wielded), and the PKI estimate of its chances for renewed political respectability. b. In the short run (i.e. up to about two months hence), three alternative courses are open: (i) the Army and Sukarno continue to parry for position and concessions, with one or the other succeeding in welding a position of structural strength for the future; (ii) an open Army versus PKI clash occurs involving guerrilla fighting, sabotage and virtual civil war; or (iii) a direct Army initiative is taken to circumscribe Sukarno's power and retain him only as a national figurehead. c, These developments will in their turn probably lead to one of the following three results which should be apparent in their major outline within six months: (i) Sukarno ascendency and progress toward renewed communist domination of the political scene; (ii) a condition of insurgency and anarchy with the PKI in rebellion; or (iii) Army control of the government, possibly through an Army junta, but more likely through hand-picked civilian leaders. The Army a. A key factor in assessing these possibilities is the political will and cohesion of the Army. Sukarno's own broad strategy is clear. He will try to whittle away Army initiative through apparent concessions, probably even to the extent of banning the present PKI. In so doing, however, he will try to reassert the preeminence of his own position and stop the anti-communist attacks short of long-term structural damage to the far left in Indonesia. b. The PKI has three alternatives: (i) rebuild its domination under the protecting wing of the President's influence, probably under an ostensibly new aegis; (ii) go underground and slowly begin the process of rebuilding the party; or (iii) go into active guerrilla opposition from prepared redoubts while using mass organizations to disrupt the economy and urban life as well as terrorize anti-communist elements. In the short run, however, the PKI has lost the initiative. Which of the three choices open to it is taken xs depends first of all on what the Army does and the success of Sukarno's tactics. Let us first look at the Army. c. The Army leadership has been emotionally aroused by the terroristic decimation of its ranks. If the Army is to act as a positive political force beyond the immediate present, it must capitalize on the yy momentum and sense of outrage. Such a clear opportunity is not SECRET === [PDF page 141] === Ge SECRET A-300, Djakarta Page 43 Likely to be offered again while the present Army leaders still lead. The Indonesian Army has always lacked the strength of a monolithic organization, however, and has lacked cohesion or unity of political action. During the years of Yani command, the territorial nature of the Army was reduced in significance and greater centralization effected, but the Army still offers something less than a smoothly unified force which its commanders can depend upon to stand behind them no matter what the situation. d, Never before has the Army been willing to force through its policies in the face of strong Presidential opposition. Nasution himself has in the past been identified with a policy of military subordination to the President's will. Now, much of the politically oriented leadership of the Army is gone. The group left lacks depth of numbers. Many middle grade officers and most in the lower ranks represent a more professionally oriented post-revolution group which views the military as properly subordinate to the President and the political scheme of things, in contrast with the older officers who won their spurs in the revolution and have always felt the Army has a role to play in determining the political order of things. e. These factors, plus recent events, indicate that it may be difficult for the Army leadership to combine for clear and effective longrange political goals and that it is even less likely that they could directly challenge Sukarno's power and prevent fragmentation of their command while doing so. Sukarno's skill in looking beyond immediate command relationships and concessions of form to problems of political power cannot be underestimated. f. The Army has moved swiftly in the first half of October to crack down on the PKI and has encouraged non-communist political groups to carry the torch further in wrecking the facilities of PKI organizations and demanding the PKI's dissolution. In a challenge such as this--a clash with the PKI as the physical adversary=-Army capabilities are most effective. The political aspects are simplified. The task reduces to the physical crushing of an opponent. On the present basis, however, the campaign may be already close to tapering off as Sukarno reasserts political preeminence and calls the Army to heel. From the Amny's point of view, perhaps the most favorable development at present (short of Sukarno's demise) would be for the PKI to go into open rebellion or guerrilla warfare. Some intelligence from Army sources speaks with ill-disguised anticipation of the imminence of such a development. The clash would enable the Army to continue to ride the wave of its present preeminence. A state of war could be declared throughout the country, instead of just in Djakarta as at present. Issues would be reduced to black and white, and the political maneuvering which the Army understandably fears, would have to take a back seat to the military prosecution of a campaign which, if successful, would reduce communist organized strength and prestige virtually te the post-Madiun period and leave the Army as the undisputed power in the country. It is not unreasonable to suppose thgt the === [PDF page 142] === A-300, Diakarta Pahoa Ah 1 age AL, violence of Army and Armyeinspired actions against the PKI in the second week of October may have been partly pursued in the hope that a violent PKI reaction could be provoked and thus settle the entire question without further talk. Now is the ideal time in some ways for the Army to be committed to a struggle to the death with the PKI. The Army starts with its elements purged and strengthened and with a record of having saved the country in the nick of time; whereas the party starts with part of its organization and communications shattered and with the onus of one ill-conceived adventure freshly laid at its door. The PKI a. Will the PKI shift to active insurgency? It may, but probably only if it concludes that Sukarno has been and will continue to be unsuccessful in reestablishing sufficient control to offer protection from continued systematic harassment of the party. Another alternative is for the party quietly to submerge underground to lick its wounds and begin the long process of rebuilding sufficient strength in secret to challenge once more the course of Indonesian political development, However, the sense of imminent success which has been developed in the party followers in recent years calls for more forthright action, The party's gospel of violence, combined with its unwieldy size and the difficulty of maintaining discipline for a long, slow and undramatic recovery after the major successes of recent years would seem to make such a choice unlikely. b. Furthermore, the party still must be considered as having the capacity for insurgency of sufficient magnitude at least to cause serious security problems and bring on economic crisis. Contingency planning for such activity is known to exist. Redoubts have been prepared. Infiltration and PKI control in unions and other mass organizations offer adequate tools for paralyzing the economy and estimates of the number of weapons in the hands of PKI cadres have constantly grown as more information has become available. Only an insignificant fraction of these weapons have yet been recovered. Thus insurgency may be the second alternative for the PKI if it is pressed, but the time to decide would appear to be short. The Army is acutely aware of the present shortage of troops on Java and is moving rapidly to bring home additional ‘units from "the border areas." By mid-November, the Army will probably be much better prepared to contain an insurgency situation. The optimum outcome for the PKI is still Sukarno's protection for its overt legal recuperation and open participation on the Indonesian political scene. : SECRET === [PDF page 143] === SECRET A-300, Diakarta Page 45 The Army vs. the PRI a. If, therefore, the Army's clearest road to power is through a direct confrontation with the PKi at such time as the party is reeling, and a prevention thereby of a return to the fuzzy concepts behind which the PKI can again hide its inimical face, then the September 30 Movement may actually have triggered the Army prematurely into attacking the PKI. If Sukarno had already died, or had died in the midst of the 30 September events, the emotional trigger of Army retaliation against the communists would proceed to a fairly definitive conclusion. But the Great Leader of the Revolution is not dead, The present wave of anti-PKI ectivity has given the PKI a serious setback, but it is not dead either. With e President's restraining hand felt increasingly strongly, the Army campaign can grind to a near halt. If then the President is later able to shunt aside those few remaining Army figures who have shown themselves most able to wield political-military command and act firmly against the communists, it will be the PKI which can bewtgh last. The “new Army would then probably be less quick to assert political leadership in the post-Sukarno era and to defy communist policies and organization. til tbest odds are 11 » therefore, that if Sukarno lives, he will be the single most important political ftoure. The Army will maintain some gain a teat temporarily and Sukarno wi not again acquire complet KI will have to be puri fi symbolically in some form ain leaders culpa! reorganizing under a "Pioneer Party” including parties, which would nists could again rise to events of early October will another rallying ery in addition be kept on the defensive for a ely any reassertion The Army would in the present === [PDF page 144] === SECRET A-300, Djakarta Page 46 Conc] usfions a. The PKI has received a seriows setback to its prestige and / structure. The task of rebuilding will be a long-one, but with Sukarno*s support, the paxyty can return to a-position of political importance if the Army permits this to\happen. b.\ Direct Army, action against Sukarno now seems unlikely. It appears that the Army\believes it \needs Sukarno\as a symbol of unity and will not attempt publicly to link him with the September 30 Movement. c. The President will not, for the foreseeable future, regain the degree of power and prestige which was his before September 30 but he will probably again be the single most important figure. d. While the degree to which the Army will stand up to Sukarno cannot be predicted with any certainty, odds are that the Army will exercise a far greater restraining influence on Sukarno than before September 30. e. Sukarno will probably be\successful in restoring communist legitimacy in some form, pérhpas as one pillar of a-united party. £< | The communist capability for insurgency which could cause seridus difficulty-is still significant, but will probably not be resorted to except in extremis. g. The Army would be most effective in a direct power confrontation with the PKI, despite the chaos which this could cause. h. \If Sukarno dies in the\near future, recent events will assist the Army in taking/over effective control-and moving against the PKI. i. The immediate future is a critical time for non-communist political forces, They must move quickly and effectively into the organizational - vacuums throughout the bureaucracy left by the PKI's disordered retreat, and establish a precedent of non-communist policy direction. j. Some changes of emphasis are likely in the foreign policy field, at least unless Sukarno regains absolute control. The Army will attempt to downgrade Indonesia's de facto alliance with Peking. Anti-western themes will continue, though new ones will not be created so facilely by an Army-influenced government. Confrontation against Malaysia will also continue, but new military adventures in implementation of confrontation are extremely unlikely for the time being. Military forces and energies will be directed primarily to the _ domestic situation. Indonesia may devote less of its energies to anti-western international conferences, particularly if Djakarta's relations with Peking worsen and Communist China becomes less willing to finance and support Indonesia's adventurism. For the Ambass@dor: e Pael ANA —. Edward E. Masters Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs SECRET === CORRECTED KEY PASSAGES (proof-read by Claude, Oct 2026) === --- [page 57] --- Djakarta, Nov. 5 (ABRI) - One of the principal killers in the massacre of the Generals, Heroes of the Indonesian Revolution, confessed frankly having been commanded by superiors to participate in that inhuman act. Among the women arrested, because of participation in the unspeakable mutilations, was [Unreadable], who in her confession admitted frankly to be among those "honoured" with the label of "Lubang Buaja Heroine" by People's Youth (Pemuda Rakjat) comrades at the time. This, because [Unreadable] took part in the cutting up, together with other People's Youth comrades. In her confession she said she was born 15 years ago in Patjitan, East Java. In January she married H., employed in the telephone central of the Gaja Motor State Trading enterprise at Tandjong Priok. Both are members of the People's Youth while H. was chairman of the Tandjung Priok branch of the SBPP union... In her confession further states that on the 30th of September around 07.00 a.m. all members were made ready and a roll-call was taken, and the platoon leader reminded them to be on the alert and that the crushing of necolim and bureaucrat capitalists would shortly commence. The atmosphere that night was loaded, and turns were taken at standing guard, each house being assigned nine People's Youth members armed With G.3 rifles. Said further: "Around 3 o'clock a.m. all were commanded to bathe and attend roll-call rightaway. During roll-call the platoon leader issued instructions to crush bureaucrat capitalists and the necolim. "But we did not know which ones because that was not clarified.". Thus [Unreadable] At 05.00 a.m. roll-call was held and at 6 o'clock some 500 people were assembled, among them 100 members of the Indonesian Women's Movement. To the IWM/Gerwani members including small knives and razor blades were distributed. "I just got a razor blade", thus [Unreadable] who went on to say; “From afar we saw a heavy set person wearing sleeping clothes like a duster with Ganefo-like print, hands bound with red cloth and eyes also covered with red cloth. The platoon leader commanded them to beat up that person, then the persons private parts with the small knives. The first to start the cutting and beating we saw to be leaders of the Tandjung Priok IWM/Gerwani. Then followed other comrades, among whom Si. and A. are known to me. Then I myself joined in the torture. All of the 100 women members did likewise and were witness. Then we saw the victim being taken near a well by people in camouflage uniform with crooked red insignia of rank, some with three crooked bars, some with two bars on the shoulder patch, in all four members of the [Unreadable] Air Force paratroopers. The victim === [PDF page 58] === The victim was shot three times then fell down, but was not yet dead. A green-uniformed person wearing three crooked white bars on the shoulder patches ordered the IWM/Gerwani members to advance. All repeated the earlier actions, stabbing at the victim's private parts, and cutting these parts and the body until he died. I was asking my comrades who the one killed had been, but got hit on the mouth so I did not dare to inquire any further. Afterwards the corpse was thrown into the well. In a state of fear and anxiety we ran to the front of the house and whispered among us that it was a general who had just been killed... Thus the confession by a Gestapu terrorist taking part in the counter-revolutionary adventurism. This person was caught on the 30th of October, 1965. [Unreadable] is now in custody. === [PDF page 59] === CONFIDENTIAL SUMMARY Further particulars about the events in Djakarta on the night of the attempted coup, and their bearing on relations between President Soekarno and the Army Authorities who now control Indonesia. (paragraphs 1-2) An account from one of General Nasution's staff officers of the attempted murder of the general. It was only later that morning that Colonel Untung and the PKI rebels at the Halim air base realised that this vital part of their plot had failed. (paragraphs 3-8) An investigation into Soekarno's movements at that time. The evidence shows that he was very probably at the air base when the other generals were murdered. (paragraphs 9-15) This will further encourage General Nasution and his colleagues to tolerate Soekarno only so long as he is of use to them. (paragraph 16) === [PDF page 60] === BRITISH EMBASSY, --- [page 66] --- Djakarta, Nov. 5 (ABRI) - One of the principal killers in the massacre of the Generals, Heroes of the Indonesian Revolution, confessed frankly having been commanded by superiors to participate in that inhuman act. Among the women arrested, because of participation in the unspeakable mutilations, was [Unreadable], who in her confession admitted frankly to be among those "honoured" with the label of "Lubang Buaja Heroine" by People's Youth (Pemuda Rakjat) comrades at the time. This, because [Unreadable] took part in the cutting up, together with other People's Youth comrades. In her confession she said she was born 15 years ago in Patjitan, East Java. In January she married H., employed in the telephone central of the Gaja Motor State Trading enterprise at Tandjong Priok. Both are members of the People's Youth while H. was chairman of the Tandjung Priok branch of the SBPP union... In her confession further states that on the 30th of September around 07.00 a.m. all members were made ready and a roll-call was taken, and the platoon leader reminded them to be on the alert and that the crushing of necolim and bureaucrat capitalists would shortly commence. The atmosphere that night was loaded, and turns were taken at standing guard, each house being assigned nine People's Youth members armed with G.3 rifles. [Unreadable] further: "Around 3 o'clock a.m. all were commanded to bathe and attend roll-call rightaway. During roll-call the platoon leader issued instructions to crush bureaucrat capitalists and the necolim. But we did not know which ones because that was not clarified." Thus [Unreadable] roll-call was held and at 6 o'clock some 500 people were assembled, among them 100 members of the Indonesian Women's Movement. To the IW /Gerwani members including small knives and razor blades were distributed. “I just got a razor blade", thus [Unreadable] who went on to say; "From afar we saw a heavy set person wearing sleeping clothes like a duster with Ganefo-like print, hands bound with red cloth and eyes also covered with red cloth. The platoon leader commanded them to beat up that person, then the persons private parts with the small knives. The first to start the cutting and beating we saw to be leaders of the Tandjung Priok IWM/Gerwani. Then followed other comrades, among whom Si. and A. are known to me. Then I myself joined in the torture. All of the 100 women members did likewise and were witness. Then we saw the victim being taken near a well by people in camouflage uniform with crooked red insignia of rank, some with three crooked bars, some with two bars on the shoulder patch, in all four members of the [Unreadable] Air Force paratroopers. === [PDF page 67] === The victim was shot three times then fell down, but was not yet dead. A green-uniformed person wearing three crooked white bars on the shoulder patches ordered the IWM/Gerwani members to advance. All repeated the earlier actions, stabbing at the victim's private parts, and cutting these parts and the body until he died. I was asking my comrades who the one killed had been, but got hit on the mouth so I did not dare to inquire any further. Afterwards the corpse was thrown into the well. In a state of fear and anxiety we ran to the front of the house and whispered among us that it was a general who had just been killed... Thus the confession by a Gestapu terrorist taking part in the counter-revolutionary adventurism. This person was caught on the 30th of October, 1965. [Unreadable] is now in custody. === [PDF page 68] === With the Compliment [Unreadable] British Embassy MANILA. === [PDF page 69] === CONFIDENTIAL BRITISH EMBASSY, (1022)(11) MANILA. 29 December, 1965. [Unreadable] I have just seen in the print Djakarta [Unreadable] of the 18 November (not copied to us) which [Unreadable] points about the 30th September coup [Unreadable] of paper and [Unreadable] that it is possible [Unreadable] Singapore [Unreadable] to your Chancery when [Unreadable] This [Unreadable] telegram contains [Unreadable] (one of a series of [Unreadable] Max Soliven, a first-class [Unreadable] Times. I attach a [Unreadable]. I have since had an [Unreadable] in Djakarta [Unreadable] Indonesia well and speaks as [Unreadable] able eye witness [Unreadable] saw Sukarno drive into Halim [Unreadable] between 1.00 a.m. [Unreadable] in the company [Unreadable] Untung, and Aidit [Unreadable] he has told me that it is absolutely [Unreadable] she refused [Unreadable] If in fact Soliven is right, and if Sukarno wes Air Base at 1.30 a.m. (or, indeed, at any time in the early hours of 1 October) the argument of para. [Unreadable] of Despatch No. 16 is even further strengthened. --- [page 111] --- General Pandjaitan apparently fired on his attackers but in the exchange of fire he was killed and his nephew _ mortally wounded. General Harjono was shot, wounded and carried away at 4 a.m. General Parman was kidnapped half an hour later and carried away in a truck. d. The terrorists also, fortunately, had their failures. Nasution’s attackers pretended to be summoning him to the President. Profiting from the attackers’ mistake as to his identity, Nasution managed to jump over a garden wall and, despite an injury to his foot or leg, succeeded in reaching the home of an Army officer who carried him immediately to a "safe place," perhaps in Bogor. His aide, Lieutenant Pierre Tendean was, however, captured and Nasution’s six-year old daughter fatally wounded. General Suharto, who was later to command the SECRET === [PDF page 112] === SECRET A-300, Djakarta Page 14 forces suppressing the Movement, was at a local hospital visiting his sick daughter and his would-be attackers were unable to learn his whereabouts from his household. There are unconfirmed reports that Minister of Veterans Affairs General Sarbini, and Generals Moersjid and Taswin were also terror targets but received prior warning and were able to escape. Police Minister Sutjipto’s house was reportedly visited by armed civilians. but he was out of town. Second Deputy Prime Minister [Unreadable] was apparently (and unaccountably) the only civilian on the Movement's first death list. His guards managed to beat the attackers off after losing one police officer. e. The Generals and Nasution's aide were taken to Lubang Buaja on the grounds of Halim Air Force Base where they were reportedly taunted and humiliated by members of the PKI women’s organization Gerwani, then tortured and put to death. The bodies were dumped into a 12 meter deep well and covered with trash and earth. They were not discovered until the night of October 3. Although it is conceivable that the Generals were killed only after it had become clear that the September 30 Movement had failed, the facts seem to point to a preconceived assassination plot. (See Section 3) £f. The Embassy has as yet only fragmentary accounts of what occurred in the provinces at the time of the’ September 30 affair. With the possible exception of Central Java, however, there appears to have been no closely ‘coordinated action in the regions. In Jogjakarta, the Movement’s troops as of October 2 were known to have been in possession of the radio station, post office, bank and other centers although it is not known when they moved into these positions. Three Diponegoro officers were reported abducted by these troops and at least two were later killed. Their bodies were not discovered until October 19. (During the day of October 4, however, the Movement’s troops were expelled from Jogja). In Semarang, Madiun and perhaps smaller Central Java areas the Movements forces appeared to have held some points for a time, but none were in rebel hands for more than two days. © Diponegoro Division headquarters in Semarang remained in the hands of its commander who chose Suharto's side when the Movement's chips were down. SECRET === [PDF page 113] === a A-300, Djakarta i Page 15 The New Order. If it is difficult to distinguish whether the September 30 Movement's attack constituted a coup d'etat or a simple act of terrorism and revenge within the Army, the radio announcements during October 1 on the --- [page 115] --- The Troops. The September 30 Movement's field forces were a motley group composed of Army units from three separate regional commands, Air Force elements, and paramilitary forces formed from communist cadres. The force appeared to be divided into three broad groups with separate functions: the Army troops secured the palace and certain key points, the Air Force provided passive defense of the Halim Air Base, and the paramilitary units probably participated in sabotage and terror but perhaps had a much more extensive role in later, unplayed acts of the affair. SECRET === [PDF page 116] === SECRET A-300, Djakarta Page 18 a. Untung had three Army battalions at his disposal in Djakarta, the 530th Battalion from the Brawidjaja Division in East Java, the 454th Battalion from the Diponegoro Division in Central Java, which Untung had commanded some [Unreadable] months earlier, and Untung’s own First Battalion from the Tjakrabirawa Regiment, the Palace Guards. The Tjakrabirawa Battalion was the inner core of Untung's forces and may have furnished the majority of the Generals' kidnappers, most of whom were in Tjakra uniforms. The Brawidjaja and Diponegoro units, which had come to Djakarta for the Armed Forces Day ceremonies scheduled for October 5, were used primarily to secure the palace and some nearby key points and, according to newspaper reports, may also have provided defense for the Halim Airport on the second and third days of the affair. b. The Movement’s paramilitary forces apparently consisted of members of the PKI, the Pemuda Rakjat and even of the PKI women’s arm Gerwani grouped in Special Security Force (TIK) units. During the month of September approximately 2,700 communists, according to CAS reports, were given a 7-day training course conducted by the Air Force within the Halim Air Base perimeter near the area which was later to become one of the September 30 Movement's strongholds and the burial ground for the Generals. According to one CAS report, these cadres were called in on September 29. A few hours prior to the attack they were reportedly provided olive green field uniforms and weapons from Air Force stock at Halim Air Base and in the city. The Army now claims to have confessions and other proof that the TIK units participated in the capture and murder of the Generals. The TIK units were apparently also given other tasks in the days following the coup. A group of some 35 TIK elements reportedly was captured near the Hotel Indonesia and the telegraph office on October 2 in what might have been an effort to retake the telegraph office. Three TIK men also reportedly engaged in sniper fire from an upper floor of Djakarta's principal hotel during this operation. The Army announced on October 18 that 1,334 of those participating in the September 30 SECRET === [PDF page 117] === SECRET A-300, Djakarta Page 19 Movement had been arrested. The majority of these were probably TIK elements. There would appear to be many more TIK units at large, and the Army so indicated in its press announcement. ec. The Air Force’s Special Action Troops (PGT)