Social Conditions Leading to Military Dominance: The Case of Indonesia

=== [PDF page 1] === Social Conditions Leading to Military Dominance: the Case of Indonesia Kahane, Reuven Contributions to Asian Studies; Jan 1, 1974; 5, ProQuest pg. 50 Contributions to Asian Studies, Vol. V Social Conditions Leading to Military Dominance: The Case of Indonesia® REUVEN KAHANE The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel In RECENT years many of the developing countries have passed through coups d’etat into regimes controlled by the army! whose rise as a dominant group usually develops in a three-stage process. In the first stage, upon the attainment of independence, many of the post-colonial countries construct a quasi-democratic system, supposedly organized according to civic universalistic principles imposed on a given primordial diversity. In the second stage, the pressures for unification tend to accentuate the society’s primordial and class differences and to politicize them.? Under the new conditions of an independent center controlling the allocation of resources within a manifest egalitarian framework, primordial differences become a focus for “diffuse” antagonism among the various groups in the society.? Consequently, many of the “New States” enter into processes of multi-dimensional power struggles which lack institutional or “pre-contractual” boundaries. In the third and final stage, when the “legitimate” rulers of the society have become unable to maintain order and to integrate the country, the army takes over the governmental institutions through a coup d’etat. This whole process may be defined as one of disintegration and transfor- * The author is grateful to Prof. W. Kornhauser, Prof. S. N. Eisenstadt, Prof. N. J. Smelser and Dr. M. Rudner for comments on an earlier version of this article, but accepts full responsibility for its contents. 1 See, J. P. Lovell and C. I. E. Kim, “The Military and Political Change in Asia,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. XL, Nos. 1 and 2 (Spring and Summer, 1967), pp. 113-132. They show that 70% of what may be defined as developing countries are under military rule (pp. 114—115). 2 See, C. Geertz, “The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiment and Civil Politics in the New States,” in Old Societies and New States, ed. C. Geertz (New York: The Free Press, 1963a). 3 See for example, S. N. Eisenstadt, Modernization: Protest and Change (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1966); Geertz, (ed.), Old Societies and New States; L. W. Pye, “Insurgency and the Suppression of the Rebellion,” in Aspects of a Political Development, ed. L. W. Pye (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966); L. W. Pye, “Armies in the Process of Political Development,” Ibid. These writers emphasize the problems of discontent and protest in some groups as the main sources of rebellion and revolution. This approach, however, does not sufficiently distinguish between the various sources of discontent, nor does it explain how and why these can lead to different results. Copyright (c) 2005 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Brill Academic Publishers === [PDF page 2] === SOCIAL CONDITIONS LEADING TO MILITARY DOMINANCE 51 mation from a political “center” which operates through collective symbols, controlling the members of society through the media of commitment and influence, to a more closed neo-“patrimonial”! center which controls the members largely through power and/or by allotting economic benefits.? In this process, a coup d’etat is not merely an “unexpected forceful unconstitutional substitution of one ruling group for another,”? but is probably a transfer to a special type of social order based on negative legitimation,4 based on the assumption that the cost of being ruled by a non-legitimate or less legitimate government is lower than the cost of not being ruled at all.5 Many developing countries are in a process of transition in which there is a shift in the principles of legitimacy. In this shift, society has to perform under conditions of duality or multiplicity in which two or more conflicting value systems exist simultaneously and governmental institutions have, therefore, to be legitimized by antagonistic principles.6 The inability to fuse these contradictory principles produces social anomie and a high potential for internal wars.’ To some degree society may be defined as a “delinquent community”, that is, a community in which the major groups have no common identity, in which there are no precontractual premises, and in which each group defines the other as its enemy. These relationships can be perceived as zero sum.8 1 On the concept of a neo-partimonial center see S. N. Eisenstadt, “Traditional Partimonialism and Post-Traditional Neo Patrimonialism” (The Hebrew University, Department of Sociology, 1972) (mimeo). 2 On the concepts of value commitment, influence, power and money as generalized media of interchange in the process of social interaction, see T. Parsons, “On the Concept of Value Commitments,” Sociological Inquiry, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Spring, 1968), pp. 135-160. 3 See, D. C. Rappaport, “Coup d’Etat: The View of the Man Firing the Pistols,” in Revolution, ed. C. J. Friedrich (New York: Atherton Press, 1966); and C. Leiden and K. N. Schmidt, The Politics of Violence: Revolution in the Modern World (Prentice Hall: New Jersey, 1963), p. 227 ff. 4 In this sense coup d’etat is essentially an instrumental transformation i.e. it brings about a social change in which there is a low level of commitment to sets of values and symbols. While revolutions can occur under the same conditions, they are distinguished from coups d’etat by the availability of an alternative group able to control the society by mobilizing commitment and influence rather than by mainly using organizational means. See for example, J. F. Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1966). G. Ferrero, The Principles of Power (New York: Putnam and Sons, 1942), p. 217. Ferrero defined this situation as one based on “quasi-legitimacy” Ferrero, p. 217. See also L. G. Seligman, “Political Mobility and Democratic Development,” in Social Structure and Mobility in Economic Development, ed. N. J. Smelser and 8. Lipset (Chicago: Aldine, 1966). 7 See, H. Eckstein, “Introduction: Toward Theoretical Study of Internal War,” in Internal War: Problems and Approaches, ed. H. Eckstein (New York: The Free Press, 1964), who emphasized social control mainly through power as an important possibility in this situation. W. Kornhauser, “Rebellion and Political Development,” in Eckstein, p. 142, defines rebellions as “ways of making demands of authority whether for the change of specific acts or rulers or as structures of authority. They are alternatives to established ways of making demands of authority...” The problem here is under what conditions such non-institutional alternatives emerge. 8 See, E. C. Banfield. The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (New York: The Free Press, 1958), Ch. V; Eisenstadt, 1966; S. R. Pitts, “Continuity and Change in Bourgeois France,” in Copyright (c) 2005 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Brill Academic Publishers === [PDF page 3] === 52 CONTRIBUTIONS TO ASIAN STUDIES It seems reasonable to assume that under such anomic conditions the most powerful group will take over the society’s rule. The rise of this group is based on the assumption that the cost of the lack of social order is greater than the cost of being ruled by a government which, though not very legitimate, is able to provide some sense of order. This paper is an attempt to analyse sociologically, within the above framework, the Indonesian case until the 1965 coup d’etat. 1. The Pre-Conditions for Social Disintegration in Indonesia The military coup combined with mass murder in Indonesia in September 1965 ended approximately 23 years of the “quasi” — legitimate Sukarno regime. This was a regime partly backed by some symbolic acceptance and political support, and highly useful as a tool to prevent anarchy. Once Sukarno was no longer able to prevent anarchy, the army, as the major power in Indonesia, became the mechanism of control. Two main explanations are given for the Indonesian military coup. One explanation is in terms of a split and a struggle between the different elites within the center in the course of which the military elite took over the control of the country.! The second explanation is that it was a “green revolution” of the landlords of the Islamic elite under the leadership of the army, against the peasants of the Communist Party? — both explanations seem to be applicable. In Search of France ed. S. Hoffman et al., (New York: Harper and Row, 1963). In an extremely anomic situation, when a zero sum relationship exists among individuals or groups, the whole concept of society is questioned. The phenomenon may be defined as the breakdown of the political community and not only of the regime or of the governmental agencies. On the concept of political community, regime and government see: D. Easton, “Political Anthropology,” in Biennial Review of Anthropology (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 229. 1 This explanation takes into account some general social factors. However, it does not emphasize the method by which social conditions and various types of elites combined, leading to the military coup. See for example, G. J. Pauker, “Indonesia in 1964: Towards a People’s Democracy?” in Asian Survey, Vol. V, No. 2 (February, 1965), pp. 88-97; and H. Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (New York: Cornell University Press, 1962). 2 See, W. F. Wertheim, “Indonesia Before and After the Untung Coup,” in Pacific Affairs, Vol. XX XIX, Nos. | and 2 (Spring and Summer, 1966), pp. 115-127. He claims that the gap between the poor peasants and the other groups in society had widened in relation to the manifest land reform law and the policy of political cooperation between the three different forces in Indonesia: Islam, Communism and Nationalism (NASAKOM). As tensions increased, one of the forces acted. Wertheim says, “Indonesia now enjoys a green merdeka as opposed to a red one. The color stands for the alliance of Muslims with the feudal forces.” 3 Some writers look at the 1965 coup as partially an internal army affair. But, even if this was the case, it does not fully explain the social background leading to such a military coup. See, for example, D. Hindley, “Political Power and the October 1965 Coup in Indonesia,” in Social Research and Problems of Rural Development in Southeast Asia (UNESCO, Technology and Society Series, 1967); and D. S. Lev, “Indonesia 1965: The Year of the Coup,” in Asta Survey, Vol. VI, No. 2 (February, 1966b), pp. 103-110. Copyright (c) 2005 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Brill Academic Publishers === [PDF page 4] === SOCIAL CONDITIONS LEADING TO MILITARY DOMINANCE 53 However, neither connect the coup to a long and broad social process in Indonesia. Our concern here is not with an analysis of the facts surrounding the coup as such, but rather with the structural background of the process that led to a military dominance in Indonesia, and especially in Java. In Indonesia, as in most of the developing countries, “objective” preconditions make unification difficult for a country which is fragmented both geographically and ethnically. It has over 300 islands scattered throughout an area of 3,000 miles although 75% of its inhabitants live in Java. There are 30 major language groups, 300 local dialects, and numerous religious groups and sects, including animism, and various versions of Islamism, Hinduism, Catholicism, and Protestantism. Three ecological divisions have existed since the thirteenth century — the commercial cities, the regional cities, and the villages.! Even in Java, the political nucleus of Indonesia, the religious and ecological differences are very acute. Equally important is Indonesia’s structural “plurality”, various traditional and modern principles, sectors and patterns of activity being “mixed but not combined”.? These phenomena are not peculiar to Indonesia; however, the degree of diversity that does exist and the pattern of that diversity are specific'tto Indonesia and contains a high potential for social disintegration. 8 The traditional value system of Java, the dominant island in Indonesia, is structured around the old tribal religion, the Hindu and Mahayana Buddhism, imported from India before the twelfth century, and the Islamic religion, imported from India between the thirteenth and the fifteenth centuries.4 Disregarding their content, the major problem is that these religions are neither fully divided nor totally fused into one unified system, thus resulting in only some degree of a “mixture” of contradictory values. The tribal-kinship orientations of the Abangan religion, the hierarchical diver- 1 See, J. Fischer, “Indonesia,” in Education and Political Development, ed. J.S. Coleman, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965). 2 See, J. S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice, (New York: New York University Press, 1956). 3 The potential for disintegration in society depends on the structure and content of the social diversity. The structural aspect can be measured in terms of the social distance between major groups, the degree of centrality or importance of the differences between them. A wide scope of polarized diversity of important differences is perceived here as having a high potential for disintegration. With regard to content, one can distinguish between four ideal types of social diversity: one which concentrates on differences in values; another that centers around differences in norms; a third that focuses on organizational division; and a fourth which deals with the split caused by the way in which resources and rewards are allocated. When social diversity contains all of the types mentioned above, it has the greatest disintegrative effect. The above classification is based to some degree on N. J. Smelser, The Theory of Collective Behavior, (New York: The Free Press, 1962), pp. 24~—25. 4 The spread of Islam over all Indonesia (except Bali) is still an unexplained phenomenon. It might be explained as some kind of protest against the princes and prijaji. Copyright (c) 2005 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Brill Academic Publishers === [PDF page 5] === 54 CONTRIBUTIONS TO ASIAN STUDIES sification of the Hindu religion, and the more universalistic orientations of the Islamic religion are all parts of the value system of the society. The three religious components have never been fused and a central common value system in Indonesia has never been established. Instead, there is a nominal beliefin the Islam religion and a clear focalized split among the various sub-religious groups. With some overlapping in the religious division, one can de limit three well stratified groups: The Abangans, who are usually peasants and organized around household rituals rather than around any definite religious doctrine.1 The Santri, the “superior” Islamic groups, is organized about a system of broader social circles of “wider and wider communities” having a definite doctrine, rather than a cult, and influenced by the urban orthodox center of the “Ulama.”2 This group may be divided into two sub-groups: the urban sector of merchants who are committed to a modern Islam,? and the Ulama and its peasant group, committed to a more orthodox Islamic doctrine.4 The Prijaji, the traditional aristocracy, is organized around the Hindu hierarchical doctrine. This group is mostly composed of bureaucrats, clerks, and some landlords. They live mainly in the urban and semi-urban centers.5 Ecologically, the Abangans are concentrated in the poorest villages in Java,® the Santri peasants in the wealthier areas and the merchants dominate the commercial cities near the coastal areas. Finally, the regional semi-rural cities are controlled by the Prijaji. Thus, to some degree, there is an overlapping of ecological, class and primordial differences in Indonesia.” As a result, each group has, to some degree, a separate collective identity. Few common values exist among the groups and therefore one can expect that there will be only few limitations to arising conflicts. Regarding the impact of the colonial forces — the Dutch and the Japanese — they both contributed both economically and politically to the increase of social antagonism in the Indonesian society in three main stages: 1 See, C. Geertz, The Religion of Fava (New York: The Free Press, 1960a); and R.R. Jay, “Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java” in Southeast Asia Studies, Cultural Report Series No. 12 (Yale University Press, 1963). See, Geertz, 1960a. See, S. Kotab, Social Justice in Islam, translated from Arabic by J. B. Hardie (Washington, 1953); and R. C. Smith, Islam in Modern History (New York: Mentor Books, 1963). See, Geertz, 1960a. See, Geertz, 1960a; and L. H. Palmier, Social Status and Power in Fava (University of London: The Athlone Press, 1960). See, A. C. Dewey, Peasant Marketing in Fava, (New York: The Free Press, 1962); and C. Geertz, Peddlars and Princes, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963b). The ecological block which has developed since the thirteenth century has been described by: Dewey, 1962; H. Geertz, “Indonesia, Cultures and Communities,” in Indonesia, ed. R. T. McVey (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963); R. R. Jay, “Local Government in Rural Central Java,” in Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol. V-2, (1955/56), pp. 215-219; Jay, 1963; B. Shrieke, Selected Writings, Indonesian Sociological Studies (The Hague and Bandung: W. Van Hoeve, Ltd., Part I — 1955, Part 2 — 1957); and W. F. Wertheim, et al., The Indonesian Town (The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve, Ltd., 1958). “I a On on Copyright (c) 2005 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Brill Academic Publishers === [PDF page 6] === SOCIAL CONDITIONS LEADING TO MILITARY DOMINANCE 55 The dual stage, in which traditional and European principles and sectors were mixed but not combined;! the “universalized” stage, in which the liberal European principles became formally dominant and provided an open arena of conflict for the primordial groups; and the counter stage of the Japanese, in which some parts of the weak “center”, built by the Dutch, were destroyed and were not replaced. In the first stage, between 1602 and 1870, the Dutch built their dominance upon the old aristocracy, the Prijaji, which was organized both as a bureaucracy and as a traditional quasi-feudal group, two standards being meant to be adopted simultaneously.? Economically, the Dutch commercialized agriculture and utilized the traditional structure in an open-market method.? Thus, the traditional economic system was mixed, but not combined, with a modern one. The policies of the colonial powers began with Governor T. S. Raffles’ policy, in the beginning of the 19th century, of “land rent,” in which about two-fifths of the production of all cultivated land had to be paid as taxes, and, starting from 1830, Van der Bosch’s policy of “cultuurstelsel” (cultivation system), a compulsory cultivation under which peasants had to produce export crops. Both contributed in the same way of commercializing the villages and of making the problems of the “plural” system more acute. Bosch’s cultivating system reflected a policy of “remission of the peasant’s land taxes in return for his undertaking to cultivate government owned crops on one-fifth of his field, or, alternatively, to work sixty-six days of the year on government owned estates.”5 This policy, combined with the development of 1 In this stage it was not “indirect rule that leaves the traditional system untouched, at the lower echelons,” as Kerstiens describes it, but as Furnivall claimed a mixed system which was based simultaneously on contradictory standards. See, T. Kersteins, The New Elite in Asia and Africa: A Comparative Study of Indonesia and Ghana (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 45; and Furnivall, 1956. 2 See, R. van Neil, The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite (The Hague and Bandung: W. Van Hoeve Ltd., 1960); R. van Neil, “The Course of Indonesian History,” in R. T. McVey (ed.), 1963; Palmier, 1960; W. F. Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition (The Hague and Bandung: W. Van Hoeve, Ltd., 1956); and W. F. Wertheim and S. Ghiap, “Social Change in Java 1900-1930”, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 35 (1962), pp. 223-248. 3 See, J. H. Boeke, Economics and Economic Policy of Dual Societies as Exemplified by Indonesia (Haarlem, 1953); J. S. Furnivall, Netherlands India (London: Cambridge University Press, 1944); Furnivall, 1956; Meilink-Roelofsz, Ancient Trade and the European Influence in Indonesia Between 1500 and 1630. (The Hague, 1962); and “European Influence in Southeast Asia 1500-1630”, Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. V, No. 2 (September, 1964); and Schrieke, 1955, 1957. 4 See, J. H. Boeke, The Structure of Netherlands Indian Economy, Institute of Pacific Relations (New York, 1942); Boeke, 1953; Kerstiens, 1966; J. M. van der Kroeff, Indonesia in the Modern World (Indonesia; Bandung, Masa Baru, Part I — 1954; Part II - 1956); GC. P. J. van der Kroeff, Indonesian Social Evolution (Amsterdam, 1958); L. H. Palmier, “Indonesian Dutch Relations”, Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. 11, No. 2 (July 1961), pp. 24-34; L. H. Palmier, Indonesia and the Dutch (London: Oxford University Press, 1962); and van Neil, 1960. 5 See, C. Geertz, Agricultural Involution (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963c). Copyright (c) 2005 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Brill Academic Publishers === [PDF page 7] === 56 CONTRIBUTIONS TO ASIAN STUDIES sugar, rubber, palm olive, coffee, tea and other plantation products,! brought about the commercialization of agriculture without making a corresponding change in the social structure. This led to a market-oriented society, which was not based on market principles but rather centered around traditional groups and relying on external bureaucratic supervision. It, therefore, could not fully develop into a “modern” economy.? Furthermore, in a later period the process of industrialization or commercialization of Indonesian agriculture produced, what Mintz has called, a “rural proletariat” - a hapless coolie labor force which, while undergoing the agonies attendant upon industrialization, did not achieve its cultural, social and psychological fruits.® The “cultivation” policy generally accentuated Indonesia’s problem of economic “duality” or “plurality”, contributing to the development of two contradictory sectors and of structural inconsistencies, without providing the necessary mechanisms to connect them. In the following stage, beginning in 1870, the above properties served to exaggerate the primordial conflicts. The Dutch now developed an “ethical policy” based, economically, on the principles of laissez-faire and, politically, on quasi-democratic principles.4 In the economic sphere, this policy opened the way to competition and conflicts among various groups on a primordial basis. Furnivall defined the situation in these words: Tensions between conflicting economic groups were reinforced by corresponding splits on racial lines. The various groups met only in the market as competitors or opponents. There was even an absence of common standards of conduct between the groups in the economic sphere, each group behaving according to standards particular to itself. In the political sphere, the main result of the Dutch “ethical policy” was the emergence of national movements divided to some degree according to primordial differences. Traditional diversification was encouraged by the new 1 See, K. J. Pelzer, “The Agricultural Foundation”, in R. T. McVey ed. (1963), pp. 148- 2 See, Furnivall, 1956, p. 311. For an analysis of the problems of the market system in socalled traditional countries, see: C. S. Belshaw, Traditional Exchange and Modern Markets (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1965). 3 See, Geertz, 1963c, p. 143. 4 C.P.J. van der Kroeff, 1958; and van Neil, 1960. We are not going to analyze the external causes of this change. See for example, Furnival, 1956, p. 289; Kerstiens, 1966, p. 51 ff. It is clear that from an inner Indonesian point of view the Dutch did not need to use a compulsive system for their purposes since the peasants used to sell their crops to them any way. Furthermore, the Dutch had an economic superiority even in terms of free competition and therefore did not need to use bureaucratic methods for economic control. However, in fact, the Dutch interfered in the Indonesian economy much more than the British did in India. The extent of their interference can be seen by comparing the number of westerners in both countries. While in 1934 in India there were 2750 Indians per single Britisher, in Indonesia there were only 244 Indonesians for every Dutchman. Palmier, 1962, p. 139. 5 See, Furnivall, 1956, p. 311. Copyright (c) 2005 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Brill Academic Publishers === [PDF page 8] === SOCIAL CONDITIONS LEADING TO MILITARY DOMINANCE 57 opportunities of semi-democracy, quasi-representation, elections and free struggle, and it shaped a political system in which the primordial groups competed.? The attempt to construct an “open society” and universalistic principles in a primordial-based society only served to accentuate its diversity, which subsequently was transformed into diffused antagonism. The religious-ecological groups became the focus of economic and political conflicts... Dutch policy in the second stage had contributed to the establishment of some kind of Indonesian “center” or authority, by operating the aristocracy of the Prijaji as a “traditional” bureaucracy.? In the third and final stage, the Japanese destroyed this semi-center by relying on other groups. Though they brought Islamic leaders and the Indonesian secular nationalism into the political arena,’ they reduced the importance of the Prijaji and of the former administration without offering any legitimate substitute. In this way, the Japanese encouraged Indonesia’s anomic trends and, indirectly, the rule of power.4 One may conclude that, while the Dutch policy contributed to the development of a “plural” antagonistic structure in Indonesia, the Japanese encouraged the erosion of the existing weak authority and administrative tools which had been able, to some degree, to provide an institutional mechanism of control in the divided society.’5 The basic problem in this context was the lack of a central group. From the internal point of view, the problem becomes why Indonesia did not develop a central elite which was able to lead the country. More specifically, why were the Prijaji not able to become a neo-traditional or modern center for the society?6 The Indonesian society had not been a single unit before the Dutch rule. Even the Majafahid Kingdom (1292-1525) and the late Materam in the sixteenth century included only small parts of Java. Of no less importance were the influences of religious differences. The Hindu religion was adopted by the 1 See, Feith, 1962; H. Feith, “Dynamics of Guided Democracy”, in R. T. McVey ed., 1963, and van Neil, 1960, p. 244. 2 The traditional prijaji group was divided into two main echelons: the higher prijaji or pure aristocracy, and the lower prijaji, which included the children of the concubines. Since most of the male members of the aristocracy had more than one wife, this latter group was relatively large and was defined as the underprivileged aristocracy. A third group which was sometimes affiliated with the Prijaji were the officials in the local administrations. These three groups included only two percent of the population. Van Neil, 1960; C. Geertz, 1963b.. 3 See, Kerstiens, 1966, pp. 112-113. 4 See, J. H. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam Under the Fapanese Occupation 1942-1945 (The Hague and Bandung: W. Van Hoeve, Ltd., 1958). 5 See, D. S. Lev, “Structure and Values in Indonesian Law” (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California, 1970), mimeo; and Wertheim, 1956. 6 Kerstiens thinks that it was the Prijaji group, “self-conscious of its status, that provided cohesion to Javanese society... and supplied the political, intellectual and cultural religious leaders.’”? However, they show that his group was not the core of societv. See, Kerstiens, 1966, pp. 35-36. Copyright (c) 2005 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Brill Academic Publishers === [PDF page 9] === 58 CONTRIBUTIONS TO ASIAN STUDIES Javanese nobility, the Prijaji, in the twelfth century, or even earlier, but was never fully diffused within the society. This resulted in an increased contradiction between the rulers and the ruled, and in the decreased legitimation of the aristocracy. In the fifteenth century, when Islam became more widespread in Indonesia, many of the Prijaji used the strategy of nominal conversion to Islam in order to preserve or to increase their legitimacy. However, a competing elite, which included the Ulama and the Hidajis, also emerged with the spread of Islam. This elite, more universalistic and less hierarchical than the Prijaji, soon became a value elite. As a result, there were two elites: the Muslim elite, having some legitimation but no political power; and the Prijaji elite, having political power but no significant legitimation. That is why the Prijaji were not able to use their traditional prestige for constructing a political center. There is another problem, namely, why the Prijaji were incapable of forming a new more modern center for the Indonesian society. Although the Prijaji were the first to enter the Western educational system in Indonesia, in the first decade of the twentieth century,! they did not constitute the new modern elite in Indonesia. Hence, why did the “intellectual” Prijaji fail to become a central elite? Two facts can perhaps answer this question: the shortage of educated people in Indonesia, and secondly, their fragmentation. There has always been a lack of a widespread educational system in Indonesia. Harbison and Mayers? grade Indonesia on the “composite index” of education at the lowest level, at 10.7, as compared to 35.2 for India, and 111.4 for Japan. In 1933/34, as in 1939/40, the total percentage of students at all levels of education did not represent more than 3.5% of the population.? In 1950/51, the percentage of students in the population was 7.5% and in 1959/60, 10%.4 In 1950, only 10% of the 6-14 age group were in elementary school; only three-tenths of one percent of the secondary school age group were in secondary school; and only four-tenths of one percent of the age group were in higher education. Although the situation had improved by 1960, Indonesia still has one of the lowest levels of education in the world. In 1945, there were less than a thousand graduates in higher education (200 in Engineering, 400 in Medicine, and 400 in the Humanities and the Social Sciences);6 in 1950 only 1,164 students were in higher education,’ but in 1960, there were 49,773.8 1 Ibid. See also, Palmier, 1960; van Neil, 1960; and P. W. van der Veur, “Education and Social Changes in Colonial Indonesia (I)”, in Papers in International Studies, Southeast Asian Services, No. 12 (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, Southeast Asia Program, 1969). See, F. Harbison and C. A. Mayers, Education, Manpower and Economic Growth (New York: McGraw Hill, 1964), p. 33. See, SPBI, Statistical Pocketbook of Indonesia (Batavia, 1941). See aust, United States Economic Survey Team to Indonesia (New Haven: Yale University, 1963). Ibid. See, Fischer, 1965; SPBI, 1941, pp. 20-22. See, Fischer, 1965. For further details on the educational circumstances in Indonesia see: M. Van den Bosch, bho Onno He 09 Copyright (c) 2005 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Brill Academic Publishers === [PDF page 10] === SOCIAL CONDITIONS LEADING TO MILITARY DOMINANCE 59 In the fifties, this situation had several primary causes. First, the Dutch policy had not encouraged the educational system until the first decade of the twentieth century.! Secondly, the Islamic educational system was very influential in preventing the development of Western education: some of the potential of the Indonesian people for education was directed into non-Western educational channels.2 Thirdly, the Indonesians were enjoying the advantages of a modern economy and administration without being required to acquire Western knowledge. The “plural structure” had made it possible to remain “traditional” while enjoying the fruits of “modernity.” In addition, the few Western-educated Indonesians, mostly Prijaji by origin, were, at the beginning of the century, largely absorbed into the Dutch establishment? and so did not develop into a popular-oriented national movement. Only some of them, especially those in the lower echelons of the Prijaji, attempted to organize themselves on the basis of an independent national movement.* The first national organization, led by the educated in 1908, — the Budiutomo — was at first under the influence of the Prijaji, but later became relatively loyal to the Dutch. The Muhammadijah Muslim reformist society, established in 1912, was a religious movement that was directed against the Dutch but did not provide national leadership for Indonesia. Only the Sarekat Islam, established also in 1912, was a mass movement which contained many Indonesian streams. How- The Dutch East Indies (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1941); L. Castles, “Notes of the Islamic School at Gontor”, in Indonesia I (April, 1966), pp. 30-45; K. 8. Cunningham, The Educational System in Indonesia: Outline of Structure and Terminology (U.N. Technical Assistance Mission to Indonesia: Djakarta, 1957); K. H. Dewantara, “Some Aspects of National Education and the Taman Siswa, Institute of Jogokarta, Indonesia, No. 4 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project, 1967); L. (Raden) Djadiningrat, From Illiteracy to University: Educational Development in the Netherlands Indies (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942); Fischer, 1965; B. Glassburner, “High Level Manpower for Economic Development: The Indonesian Experience”, in Manpower and Education, Country Studies in Economic Development, eds. F. Harbison and C. Mayers (New York: McGraw Hill, 1965); R. T. McVey, “Taman Siswa and the Indonesian National Awakening,” Indonesia, No. 4 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project, 1967); A. Marasaban, “Indonesia,” in Education in Southeast Asia, ed. T. W. G. Miller (Sydney: Ian Noval, 1968); R. M. Thomas, “Who Shall be Educated: The Indonesian Case,” in The Social Sciences and Comparative Studies in Educational Systems, ed. J. Fischer (Scranton: International Textbook Co., 1970); and P. W. Van der Veur, 1969.. See, Van der Veur, 1969. See, Furnivall, 1956, p. 261; Van der Veur, 1969. Ibid.. Between 1931 and 1940, the number of Indonesians in civil service, including the police, reached 28,676 (SPBI, 1941, p. 60). By 1938, 7.5% of the high officials and 38.1% of those in the middle echelons of the bureaucracy were Indonesians (Jbid.). In 1957, there were 415,627 Indonesian government employees, excluding the army and the police, and by 1961, 806,863 plus 226,000 who worked in government enterprises; SPI, Statistical Pocketbook of Indonesia (Jakarta: Biro Pusat Statistik, 1963), pp. 269-270. Hh OF Ne Copyright (c) 2005 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Brill Academic Publishers === [PDF page 11] === 60 CONTRIBUTIONS TO ASIAN STUDIES ever, in the early twenties, the Sarekat Islam was divided. Subsequently, three major political powers were established: the Nahdatul Ulama, the orthodox Muslim organization which was based on the Santri population and the Muslim teachers;1 the National Party (P.N.I.); and the Communist Party.? 2. The Political Focus of Indonesia’s Diversity The major outcome of these developments was to a great extent a process of political polarization through which various particularistic centers were established.? Since there had been very little social mobilization4 in Indonesia, every group had to organize itself around traditional bases in order to gain more from the “national pie.” 1 For additional details see: C. Geertz, “The Javanese Kijaji: The Changing Role of a Cultural Broker,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. II (1960) pp. 228-249; and van Neil, 1960, p. 21. 2 For more details on the emergence and development of the political parties in Indonesia, see: S, T. Alisjahbane, Indonesia in the Modern World, translated from Indonesian by R. R. Anderson (New Delhi, India: Office of Asian Affairs, 1961); Feith, 1962, 1963; D. S. Lev, “Political Parties in Indonesia,” Journal of Southeast Asian History, 8/1 (March, 1967), pp. 52-67; S. Sawmordi, “Some Aspects of the Social Origins of the Indonesian Political Decision Maker,” in Transactions of the Third World Congress of Sociology (London: III International Sociological Association, 1956), pp. 338-348; V. Singh, “The Rise of Indonesian Political Parties”, Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. II, No. 2 (1961), pp. 43-65; and Wertheim, 1956. 3 See, Feith, 1962; and Jay, 1963. 4 A brief look at some indices of social mobilization (see K. W. Deutsch, “Social Mobilization and Political Development,” American Political Review, Vol. LV (1961), pp. 462-513) shows little change in Indonesia since the end of the 19th century. Examining cities of more than 10,000 citizens, we find that in 1882 only five percent of the total Indonesian population lived in cities of this size as compared to 9.5% in India and 37.5% in Japan. In 1950, 9.1% of the total Indonesian population lived in cities of more than 10,000 inhabitants (as compared to 9.5% in India and 18% in Japan). In the 60’s approximately 16% of the total population was in urban areas. Thus, in the 68 years from 1882 to 1950, the growth in city population was only 4.1% (see, SPBI, 1941, p. 13; Wertheim, 1956, p. 83; and B. D. Milone, “Contemporary Urbanization in Indonesia, Astan Survey, Vol. IV (August 8, 1964), No. 8, pp. 1000-1012). Moreover, between 1930 and 1941 more than half of the urban population was either European or of a non-Indonesian minority group (SPBI, 1941, p. 13). However, between 1930 and 1961, the urban population grew from 2,300,000 to 9,300,000 or by 231% in comparison with the growth of the total population by only 60% during the same period, (Milone, 1964). Two more facts must be noted: first, some parts of the urban population were only semi-residential. Many villagers came to the cities for one season of the year to sell their goods and then returned to their villages (Milone, 1964; Pelzer, 1963; Wertheim, 1958). Second, the Indonesian town is characterized by some scholars as “formless” or “shapeless”, mainly because of the high isolation of its main groups, these having no connection with each other and no common organizations. (H. Geertz, 1963, and Wertheim, 1958). Another index of social mobilization is changes in the gross national product and in the occupational structure. Unfortunately, here we have very little relevant data. The average yearly growth of the GNP in the years 1953-1960 in Indonesia was only by 0.02% (as compared with 3.5% in India and 13.5% in Japan), (Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East 1963), p. 35. Changes in the occupational structures were very slight. The agricultural Copyright (c) 2005 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Brill Academic Publishers === [PDF page 12] === SOCIAL CONDITIONS LEADING TO MILITARY DOMINANCE 61 On the eve of independence there were four major parties: the Masjumi, which drew its support from outside Java and from the urban merchants; the Nahdatul Ulama, which received its support from the relatively rich Muslim peasants, landlords and village teachers; and the Communist Party, which was supported mainly by urban workers and the poor Abangan peasants. Only the PNI, led by Sukarno, was not clearly tied to any definite group,} this being its main strength during the years following independence. However, at the time of the political split in Indonesia, in the sixties, this strength became a weakness when the party was not able to mobilize support from any single, relatively well-organized traditional group. The attempt to construct a system of political representation in Indonesia encouraged the class-primordial split. Looking at the distribution of the “representatives” or appointees in the Parliament between 1951 and 1965 (Table 1), one can see that until 1956, there was a tendency to concentrate around the major parties, but after 1956, there was an increase in representation of small “functional groups” vested in particularistic interests.2 Among the functional groups, the only one that was not tied to any party® and did not represent particularistic interests was the army which had 29 representatives in 1960-65. Thus, in the House of Representatives, which is supposed to represent the real power distribution in the country, one of the major powers was underrepresented. But, on the other hand, the parties were over-represented in various ways. The position of the army as a group standing beyond particularistic interests was salient also because all the parties, including PKI, mobilized support by using traditional loyalties.4 This was, as mentioned, because the cheapest way to mobilize support was to rely on given groups, and the most effective popular appeal was to the existing ethnic-religious loyalties. As a result, social diversification was rather accentuated and crystallized. labor force represented approximately 70% of the labor force in 1930; by 1953 this had dropped to 60%. But by 1961 it had again increased to 72%, if the statistics are reliable. The rate of the labor force grew from 10.5% in 1930 to 13.3% in 1953 and, as far as we can rely on the data, dropped down to 7.9% in 1961, including mining and quarrying, manufacturing, construction, electricity and gas and water. (E. D. Hawkins, “Labor in Transition,” in R. T. McVey, ed., 1963, p. 250, and SPI, 1963, p. 372). Moreover, many industries in Indonesia cannot be considered as real industries and are located near the villages, as sources of raw materials. Therefore, they cannot be used as an index of physical mobility. See, D. S. Lev, 1967. 2 D. Hindley, The Communist Party in Indonesia: 1951-1963 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964), p. 279, reported that by August, 1962, over 200 political parties, political organizations and functional groups had joined in the Guided Democracy, representing altogether 33 million members.: 3 Every party has had sub-organizations. For example, the PNI’s Youth Organization has been GMNI (for university students) and GSNI (for secondary students). The Muslims have had the HML (Islamic student organization) which has enjoyed the protection of the army and of most Islamic groups (Lev, 1966b). The Communists have had their peasant organizations BTI, and so on. The same is true of the trade unions. 4 See, Hindley, 1964, pp. 238-239. 5 See, D. Lev, 1967. Copyright (c) 2005 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Brill Academic Publishers === [PDF page 13] === 62 CONTRIBUTIONS TO ASIAN STUDIES What seems to be very important is that one of the dimensions of the polarization was religious (Santris against Abangans), this explaining why it was so easy for one group to murder the members of another. Primordial diversification, especially when it is religious, means the lack of basic agreement concerning the value premises of society and the rules of the game. In this situation there are few moral boundaries to any conflict and no group trusts the other. The coincidence of primordial sentiments and interest groups tends to transform the conflict into an extremely emotional and even violent one. A recent description by Contenay shows clearly that the conflicts between the PKI and the Islamic Parties, especially the NU, were not only concentrated in the political sphere, but were also based on religious and class differences, and resulted in basic distrust: We killed the Communists because the PKI program is opposed to the Muslims. The PKI has always led a campaign of terror against the Muslims and the Muslim landlords whose lands they seized to hand over to their organizations, and against the Muslim youth brigade. We killed the Communists before they killed us.1 In a highly divided society, where values, primordial and class differences are focused, a basic distrust among its members is unavoidable. In such a situation, the tendency to treat other members of society as an enemy is not randomly developed. In Indonesia, this basic distrust is deeply anchored in the lack of pre-contractual principles among its major groups. This fits into Furnivall’s definition of Indonesia as a “plural society”: On looking at a plural society in its political aspect one can distinguish three characteristic features: the society as a whole comprises separated racial sections; each section is an aggregate of individuals rather than a corporate or organic whole; and as individuals their social life is incomplete.? By “incompleteness” on an individual level, Furnivall means a lack of full membership in, and of “adaptive” ties to the society and its values. Each individual or family emphasizes his own narrow interests, without identification with the broader community. The “highest common factor” is the economic one, and the only test that all have in common is the “test of cheapness.” “Within the economic sphere there are no common standards of conduct ‘beyond those prescribed by law which actually do not oblige the parties.”4 Furnivall continues: ... the sections are not segregated; the members of the several units are intermingled and meet as individuals; the union is not voluntary but is imposed by the colonial power and by the forces of economic circumstances; and the union cannot be dissolved without the whole society relapsing into anarchy.5 1 J. Contenay, “Another Blood Bath”, Far Eastern Economic Review (November 23, 1967a), pp. 357-367. See, Furnivall, 1956, p. 306. Ibid, p. 310. Ibid, p. 311. Ibid, p. 307. Oe OO bo Copyright (c) 2005 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Brill Academic Publishers === [PDF page 14] === SOCIAL CONDITIONS LEADING TO MILITARY DOMINANCE 63 In such amorphous society,! any conflict of interests is transformed into overall antagonism and internal war. The problem is how any social control is possible in such a society. 3. The Limits of the Indonesian Mechanisms of Control and Integration The potential for social integration in Indonesia had been, at least from the beginning of the century, very low. With the establishment of an independent state in 1949, the external “cohesive” power of colonialism vanished and awareness of the primordial differences were accentuated. Even with such an anomic potential, the Indonesian state was able to exist until 1965 with a minimal level of coercion and violence. The problem is why, after such a long period, the army took over the rule of the country after mass bloodshed in 1965. In order to understand the 1965 coup, as well as the preceding “stability”, it is necessary to analyze the nature of the Indonesian mechanisms of control and integration until the coup. During the period before the coup (1949-1965), there were three main mechanisms of control in Indonesia: conspicuous symbols; the institutional arrangements of the “guided democracy”; and the instrument called national front. All had a paradoxical nature which simultaneously tried both to cater to particularistic diversity and to use universalistic principles. a) Conspicuous Symbols Although the use of conspicuous symbols was the most important mechanism of control in the antagonistic social situation, events following the militaristic coup have shown that their function was limited. In order to explain this, it is useful to examine some of their main characteristics. The symbolic system of Indonesia monopolized by Sukarno had five main characteristics: they were 1) abstract and non-pragmatic; 2) eclectic; 3) conspicuous; 4) cohesive i.e. emphasized unity; 5) contradictory.2 These combined qualities gave the symbols a high degree of flexibility, that is, a capacity to adjust to antagonistic pressures. 1 Insuch asociety one might expect to find a high rate of delinquency and strikes. However, using available data on social strains and delinquency in Indonesia, one finds trends of decline (SPI, 1963, pp. 55, 62, 63, 275). However, such declines should not be taken as indicative of solutions to Indonesia’s social problems, since in many cases, the solution is outside the legal system and legitimate agencies.. 2 See, B. Dahm, Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence translated from German by M. F. Somers Heidues (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1969); H. Feith, “Indonesian Political Symbols and Their Wielders”, first published in World Politics, (October 16, 1963), pp. 79-97, then in Political Development and Social Change, eds. J. L. Finkle and R. W. Gable (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966); and D. E. Weatherbee, “Ideology in Indonesia: Sukarno’s Indonesian Revolution”, in Southeast Asia Studies, Monograph Series No. 8 (New Haven: Yale University, 1966). Copyright (c) 2005 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Brill Academic Publishers === [PDF page 15] === 64 CONTRIBUTIONS TO ASIAN STUDIES One can distinguish three stages in the development of Indonesia’s symbolic “system” — the Pantja Sila; the Manipol and the USDEK (1957-1960); and the NASAKOM (1960) stages.1 The first stage, based on the principles of the Pantja-Sila, involved general ideas such as belief in one God, in nationalism, humanity, democracy and in social justice. These symbols were so vague that each group in the society was able to, at least partially, identify with some of them without negating its own particularistic symbols. The second stage of the Manipol-USDEK involved political directions such as implementation of the 1945 constitution;? socialism; a guided economy; a guided democracy; and the development of the Indonesian personality.3 The capacity of Indonesia’s symbols to bridge the gap between the Islam elites and the other groups was reduced, since God was no longer mentioned. The last stage of the NASAKOM re-emphasized general ideas such as nationalism, religion and communism, but was irrelevant to actual policy in which the trend was against the Islamic elites and the army. All these symbols were too far removed from common habits and traditions in Indonesia, and thus their potential to legitimize the regime was limited. Sukarno knew this and attempted to reconstruct traditional habits, and to symbolize and manipulate them as a unifying factor. His most important traditional symbol, during all three stages, was the Gotang Rojang (mutual assistance and co-operation, or harmony).* This symbol was based on an old Indonesian norm stipulating family consumptive interdependence and support. Structurally, it emphasized the extended family basis, in which every member shared his revenue with the other members of the family. Economically, it encouraged division of property and small land-holders, leading to what Geertz called the “shared poverty system.“5 Politically, it reflected a neo-traditional accomodation.® Mintz thinks that the Gotang Rojang was the main symbol combining both 1 Most of the documents referring to the Indonesian symbolic system have been published in Indonesian Political Thinking, eds., H. Feith and L. Castles (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970). For an analytical analysis of the Indonesian symbols, see Feith, 1966, pp. 339, 366, 368; and J. S. Mintz, Mohammed, Marx and Marbain: The Roots of Indonesian Socialism (London:Pall Mall, 1965), p. 163. 2 The 1945 constitution was a flexible one which “prescribed no formal checks on the exercise of presidential authority. It created no framework for institutionalizing political behavior.” J. D. Legge, Indonesia (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1965), p. 16 and Feith and Castles, 1970. See, Feith, 1966, p. 367. See, Weatherbee, 1966, p. 36. C. Geertz, 1963c. The “shared poverty system” is well exemplified by the decrease of land per capita in Java and Madura. From 1939 to 1962 the irrigated field per capita dropped from 0.073 ha. to 0.056 ha. per capita and the total per capita dropped from 0.170 ha. to 0.133 ha. (see SPI, 1963, Table F1, p. 66). 6 See, A. R. Willner, The Neotraditional Accomodation to Political Independence: The Case of Indonesia, Princeton University, Center of International Studies, Monograph Series, No. 26 (New Jersey, 1966). Gt ob GO Copyright (c) 2005 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Brill Academic Publishers === [PDF page 16] === SOCIAL CONDITIONS LEADING TO MILITARY DOMINANCE 65 socialism and Islamism in Indonesia. It was translated by the modernistic Islamic doctrine into a symbol of harmony and justice. However, for Sukarno, the Socialists, and the Communists, it represented a “primitive communism of a pre-feudal, pre-capitalistic variety.” This neo-traditional symbol was combined with another principle, the Musjawrah, “the deliberation of the villagers,” leading to Mufakat, “the unanimous decision that emerges from these deliberations.”? On the institutional level, these principles were the basis of the Desa (the village community), which was directed by the elders, in which “mutually acceptable decisions arrived at by compromise of all viewpoints were expressed.” More important, the above principles were at least partially supported by the Adat Law, the customary Islamic law, which required the consent of the whole village community to any decisions, especially one of land sale. The extent to which this system was really diffused in Indonesia is not known; as a symbol, however, it was very useful to Sukarno. He attempted to use old symbols in order to legitimate new socialistic ones. However: Although the Indonesian common symbolic system was very weak, the ideologists tried to use both traditional and non-traditional symbols. Without even being aware of the problems involved they attempted to combine contradictory elements into one system.* For the main problem was that no one could introduce a real alternative to the above symbolic system. The difficulty was structural; any alternative would only ruin the existing temporary balance between the Indonesian society’s antagonistic groups. Modern orientations were primarily expressed through conspicuous symbols, dealing with welfare programs and defined as the state’s obligations, such as, guarantee sufficient food, clothing, and decent housing for its citizens; guarantee the care of health and education of all citizens, to prevent them from suffering and to enable them to become intelligent citizens, thus enabling them to perform their duties and rights toward their country in the best possible way; protect all citizens at old age so that they do not live in fear and poverty when they are no longer capable of earning their living; guarantee that all citizens can enjoy and develop their culture and can bring their spiritual life to perfection, that not only their material life but also their spiritual life is taken care of; and guarantee that the Indonesian nation can contribute to the perfection of the happiness of mankind. Such “guarantees” raised the level of aspiration in Indonesia, encouraged the emergence of new needs, and increased the pressure on the political center. But, though these conspicuous symbols built new expectations and demands, they did not contribute to building any tools to cater to them. The drop of the Mintz, 1965, p. 12-13. Ibid Ibid Weatherbee, 1966, p. 84. Weatherbee, p. 24. a bwn Copyright (c) 2005 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Brill Academic Publishers === [PDF page 17] === 66 CONTRIBUTIONS TO ASIAN STUDIES “professional” leaders was the result of the situation rather than its course.1 The main problem is why this symbolic system was developed? Was it an inherent part of the Indonesian society or just a functional tool? A partial explanation can be found by taking into account that some symbols were traditional and therefore usable for integrating society.? It is also clear that their function was to justify Sukarno’s power, to regulate the relationships among the major groups in the society,? and, in general, to provide a political legitimation for the regime. However, these explanations have not connected both the advantages and the limitations of the Indonesian symbolic system. The “errors” of the system have been described as the accentuation of conflicting values and inability to make “ideology credible in terms of act,”* which were combined with their advantages and inherent in their very nature. They were abstract, vague and antagonistic, because they were supposed to connect among contradictory polarized groups. Had they been concrete it might have been impossible for most of the groups to identify with them and they might have lost their solidaric function. For, since the symbols have to represent contradictory groups and interests, they would have had to be antagonistic. Thus, paradoxically, every attempt to solve the contradiction or to make the symbols operative would have reduced the capacity to identify with them. Any translation of the symbols into action would mean a change in the balance of power, hence bringing about the breakdown of the existing consensus. However, even on the symbolic level the integrative power of the declared values was limited because of the above contradictions which were neither differentiated nor fully fused. The outcome was the strengthening of the diversified status quo, and, as a result, a political and economic deterioration. The fact that Sukarno manipulated vague antagonistic symbols explains why he was able to control the country for such a long time, but also why the boundaries for playing with them became narrower and narrower. In the sixties, when Sukarno understood that he could no longer use his symbols as a substitute for real policy, he changed course. Especially in the two years immediately preceding the coup, the “Indonesian Revolution” was becoming less distinguishable from the PKI’s view.? The symbols were made more specific and lost their abstract nature in the attempt to translate them into policy, and thus ceased to balance between the major powers in the society. b) Guided Democracy As we have already mentioned, from 1957, when the parties began to be 1 See, Feith, 1966. 2 See, J. M. van der Kroeff, “Javanese Messianic Expectations: Their Origin and Cultural Context”, S.C.C.H. (June 1, 1959), pp. 229-323. 3 See, Feith, 1966, pp. 376-377. 4 Weatherbee, 1966, p. 98. 5 Ibid., p. 97. 6 Ibid., p. 99. 7 Ibid., p. 97. Copyright (c) 2005 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Brill Academic Publishers === [PDF page 18] === SOCIAL CONDITIONS LEADING TO MILITARY DOMINANCE 67 crystallized in class and primordial terms and extra-parliamentary forces began to play a major role in Indonesian politics, the principle of guided democracy was introduced as a counter balance to the centrifugal process! and as a mechanism to prevent non-institutional power struggles.? As Lev indicated, the intensification of three major conflicts in Indonesia underlaid the establishment of the guided democracy; the conflict between Java and the outer islands which started in 1958; the conflict between the civilian politicians and the army; and conflicts among the parties themselves.® Under these conditions, the organization of a guided democracy was an attempt to at least hold all the forces together within one institutional framework.4 By “Guided Democracy,” Sukarno meant a broad cabinet in which all major parties might participate, and the establishment of a national council as an advisory body in which various functional groups might be represented. It was intended to operate through consensus rather than through voting. In fact the Guided Democracy was a mechanism aimed at bridging antagonistic elites by controlling them through a quasi-competitive system. The attempt to use contradictory principles both as a “guidance” and as a democracy, that is, for the allowance of free institutional struggles among various parties within the one regime, was never fully successful. The institution of Guided Democracy gave the main powers some opportunities for free play and bargaining, but, on the other hand, it was supposed to be under the control of a central authority. This central authority used the competition between the groups to promote its own dominance, by the principle of “divide and rule.” The political system had to contain as many groups as it could, because by this principle, it increased the center’s bargaining position. Representation of the twenty, or actually 200, functional groups was not only the result of polarization, but also an inherent part of the Guided Democracy. Thus, the Guided Democracy did not institutionalize Sukarno’s personal power but was the “logical and indispensible substitute for a discredited system that had failed to work.”6 To summarize, the Guided Democracy represented a higher stage of the process of polarization and of “decommunization” of the Indonesian society. This stage was reached when various extra-parliamentary forces became dominant.’ In the final stage, the tool of national informal fronts complemented the symbols of the Guided Democracy. c) National Fronis One of the indices of the weakness of Indonesia’s political institutional 1 See, D. S. Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics 1957-1959, Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project, Monograph Series (Ithaca, New York, 1966a). See, Lev, 1966a, pp. 1-2. Ibid., pp. 3-7. Ibid. See, Feith, 1963, pp. 319-320; Lev, 1966a; Mintz, 1965; and Pauker, 1964. Mintz, 1965, p. 219. See, Lev, 1966a. NOOB OD Copyright (c) 2005 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Brill Academic Publishers === [PDF page 19] === 68 CONTRIBUTIONS TO ASIAN STUDIES structure was the activity outside of the constitutional bodies. This trend might be explained as a result, on the one hand, of the strength of the outer particularistic forces, and on the other hand, of the weakness of the political center. The national fronts were supposedly a mechanism attempting to bridge between the particularistic groups on the one hand, and to build an operative collective tool, on the other. As Weatherbee defined it: The National Front was a sort of shadow state with formal contracts at every level of government. Though not actually a part of it, its activities were coordinated by the Government. Its main task was the intensification of indoctrination efforts. Of all the tools of the Revolution, the National Front was the most totalitarian, extending into all areas of private and public life! Clearly, the national fronts were the last strategy to save Indonesia’s unity and at the same time to give an operational meaning to the symbols. Thus, Sukarno declared in 1963: The National Front is a tool of the Revolution because the National Front must channel all political activity of the masses, both those organized in political organizations and those organized in functional organization, in order to become a simultaneous activity assisting the Revolution. (Sukarno, August 17, 1963)2 Nasution even extended the role of the national fronts’ with his definitions. The national front had two well-known alternatives. The first was to act, which meant changing the balance to the benefit of one party, in this case the Communist Party,* and the second was not to act and thus not change the balance of power. This meant stagnation and a failure to respond to the society’s needs, while the first alternative meant the accentuation of internal conflicts. In short, the National Front must create a new political man who always serves the Indonesian national identity, the Indonesian way of thinking, and Indonesia’s courses, (Nasution, April 7, 1963). Quoted from Weatherbee, 1966. As we shall see later on, Sukarno had to choosen the more active strategy; hence, a more active struggle of the society’s powers was unavoidable.5 The quasi-balance among the major forces in the Indonesian society was disturbed, and internal war and mass murder resulted. In conclusion, the mechanisms discussed pressed for unification, as opposed to being satisfied with the existence of a divided antagonistic society without enough recognition of its “plural” nature and thus the “unity out of diversity” Weatherbee, 1966. Quoted in Weatherbee, 1966, pp. 48-49. Nasution claimed that: “a new political man as meant by MANIPOL, UDDEK and RESOPIM.” (April 7, 1963.) See, Weatherbee, zbid. The emergence of the BPS (Body to Support Sukarnoism) in August, 1964, in support of the PNI and some of the Muslims (Parti Murbah) is perhaps indicative of the lack of widespread support of Sukarno. See, J. M. van der Kroeff, “Indonesia: The Mystique of Permanent Revolution”, The Southeast Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 64 (1965b), pp. 1-14. OT ON = Copyright (c) 2005 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Brill Academic Publishers === [PDF page 20] === SOCIAL CONDITIONS LEADING TO MILITARY DOMINANCE 69 became diversity without unity. Expressions like “the collective will of the people”! increased the tendency of every group to define the community in its own terms and to make the struggle more acute concerning values rather than concerning means. The conspicuous declarations and promises of an “egalitarian welfare society” raised the aspirations of the periphery. When they did not become a reality, they brought stronger pressure to bear on the balance of power and resulted in a change. Sukarno’s response to this situation was to move in the direction of the least risk. 4, The End of Quasi-Institutional Control in Indonesia: the Age of Power The lack of success of the last three mechanisms in Indonesia ended the period of quasi-institutional control and began an era of the dominance of power. By the end of 1963, it had become clear that the various mechanisms of control could no longer regulate and balance the antagonistic society. The “cobweb” process was very near to its end. Sukarno could not continue to “pay” in symbols. Hehad to presentsome realimprovement. Becarseof the earlier stagnant balance, the situation had steadily deteriorated. The economic decline was very apparent; prices had risen by approximately 25-30% per annum until the end of 1964, and have been rising at 100% per annum ever since.? Politically, the different forces organized against each other and there were small violent struggles and protests in many places, especially since 1964.8 The conspicuous mechanisms of control had only postponed the crisis but had not solved the problems. Since the society was polarized on the value, as well as on the institutional, level and since there were no mechanisms of compromise or mediation between the groups, the struggle had to be, firstly, one of physical power. There were three major alternative forces in Indonesia: the Muslims (NU), the Communists (PKI), and the Army. The important questions were: 1. Which of them had the highest legitimation in the society in terms of non-primordial, more universal terms, and were therefore more able to mobilize support? 2. Which had the highest degree of inner cohesiveness? 3. Which was the best organizational tool? 4. Which group had the greatest physical power? 1 Weatherbee, 1966, p. 35. 2 See, Higgins, Indonesia’s Economic Stabilization and Development (New York: Social Institute of Pacific Relations, 1957/9); G. L. Hicks and G. McNicoll, The Indonesian Economy (New Haven: Southeast Studies, Yale University, 1967); U. Mahajami, “Indonesia’s New Order and Diplomacy of Aid”, Australian Outlook, Vol. 21, No. 2 (August, 1967), pp. 214— 234; D. S. Paauw, “From Colonial to Guided Economy”, in McVey, 1963; Pelzer, 1963; and G. Thomasson, “Indonesia: Economic Stabilization 1966-1969”, Finance and Development, Vol. 7 (December 4, 1970), pp. 46-53. 3 See, J. Contenay, “Heritage of Blood”, Far Eastern Economic Review (December 14, 1967b), pp. 509-514; Contenay, 1967a; and Wertheim, 1966. Copyright (c) 2005 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Brill Academic Publishers === [PDF page 21] === 70 CONTRIBUTIONS TO ASIAN STUDIES The relative location of the major forces, with regard to these four dimensions, during the time leading up to the coup d’etat may be expressed as follows: Power Legitimacy in Inner Degree of Physical Dimensions Universalistic Cohesiveness Organization Power Groups Terms and Capacity to Mobilize Support The NU Party Medium Medium Medium Low The Communist Party Medium High High Low Army High High High High A. The Nahdatul Ulama, as the major Islamic group, had been a secondary factor even from the first stage, since it represented a primordial and, to some degree, a class element. Its inner cohesiveness was not high since the merchants (from the earlier Masjumi Party), the peasants and the landlords were in conflict. Its organization was not too weak, due to the help of the village teachers! and of the Imams in the Mosques. Its physical power was limited, it had no weapons and human cadres, and could only rely on some student organizations. So, their strategy was to co-operate with the least dangerous group. Since the Communists were more dangerous to them than the Army, they combined with the Army. B. The Communist Party: What were the chances that the Communist Party might aggregate power and become the major factor in terms of influence and physical power?? To answer this question, it is necessary to deal with structural possibilities and with the strategies of the Communists. The lack of “social mobilization” in Indonesia, as we have shown previously, meant that PKI could not be based on the non-traditional urban masses. The relatively few mobilized people were divided among many organizations, since every party had its own unions. In its first stages, after independence, PKI had tried to build itself on the urban masses, but, on realizing that they -were small in number and dispersed according to primordial loyalties among 1 See, Geertz, 1960b. 2 The PKI was founded in May, 1923 (see R. McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965) ), but ceased to exist after a while. It was revived in 1950 under the leadership of Aidit. By 1957 it claimed 7.6 million members. These were dispersed in five organizations: 1) SOBSI (trade union), 2.7 million; 2) BTI (peasant organization) 3.0 million; 3) PKI Youth, 800,000; 4) GERWANI (women) 671,000; 5) PPDI (village officials), 350,000. By 1962 there were over 11 million members and, by 1965, 15 million. These figures, however, have not been verified by reliable sources (Hindley, 1964). For further details see: D. Hindley and S. Stromquist, “The Communist Uprising of 1926-27 in Indonesia — A Reinterpretation”, in Journal of Southeast Asian History, 8/2 (September, 1967), pp. 189-200; and J. M. van der Kroeff, The Communist Party of Indonesia (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Publications Center, 1965a). Copyright (c) 2005 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Brill Academic Publishers === [PDF page 22] === SOCIAL CONDITIONS LEADING TO MILITARY DOMINANCE 71 the political parties, it shifted its direction and was finally organized mainly around one element of the population, the peasants. As the Muslim peasants did not give it strong support, being under the influence of the Islam authorities, especially NU, the PKI turned to the Abangan peasants, who were the poorest and most “inferior and frustrated element in Indonesia.”! By turning to the Abangan Javanese peasants, the Communist Party identified itself de facto with one primordial element, overlapping with one class, thus causing PKI to be identified by all other groups as a particularistic party. The key to the strategies of PKI in its attempt to get power was its cooperation with Sukarno. The goals of the PKI-Sukarno alliance were to contribute to the former status and legitimation and to make it possible for it to get positions of power in the government, civil service and the army.? Hindley describes PKI’s strategy and its “dual” position: The power of the PKI leadership lay in its mass support and its influence on Sukarno, who considered an alliance with the Communist network essential in his competitive coalition with the army. He and the army leaders seemed to think that if the army should attempt to remove the President, the Communists would react militantly in his support.’ As we have shown, PKI actually received very narrow legitimation because of its identification with the Abangans. Furthermore, even in terms of power it apparently failed to succeed, even though its leader claimed mass support.4 PKI’s leaders had tried to aggregate physical power through three channels: through infiltration into the army, through the national fronts, and through local and municipal leaders and governors. These strategies evolved, perhaps, because the party failed in its attempt to build cadres and cells. There was also the knowledge that in the struggle that would ensue, the most powerful group would be the victor. The army also knew this and presented many obstacles to PKI in its efforts to attain physical power.® In 1964, the BTI (the Communist peasant front) began, especially in West 1 Hindley found that by 1957/58, PKI had 7.5 million voters, two million more than in 1955, the extra voters having been gained from other parties. He explained this success of the PKI as the result of mass organization, local leaders and activity, more legitimation after cooperation with the Sukarno regime and its symbols, and their success in mobilizing the Abangan voters from PNI, as opposed to their failure with the Santri electorate of the Moslem parties. Of the PKI voters, 88.7% came from Java, many of whom being Abangan ex-supporters of PNI (Hindley, 1964, p. 223). See, Hindley, 1964, pp. 282-286. Hindley, 1964, p. 243. Aidit, claimed 15 million members and stated that: It cannot be denied that the development of the political situation in Indonesia during the past 10 years and in particular during the last few years and months has been continuously shifting to the left. (Aidit, December 1963) Quoted from Weatherby, 1966, 0. 49. 5 Nasution had successfully fought off a proposal to create a fifth armed force of volunteers. The proposal of Ideological Commisars to the army was also rejected: Lev, 1966b; Hindley, 1964, p. 297. *~ GO NO Copyright (c) 2005 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Brill Academic Publishers === [PDF page 23] === 72 CONTRIBUTIONS TO ASIAN STUDIES Java, to mobilize peasants, most of them Abangans, against the NU (Muslim) landlords and administrators.1 This process was accompanied by violence and had a two-fold significance. First of all, it meant a transition from a semiinstitutional to a non-institutional struggle. Secondly, it united the Muslims, many civic officials, and the army against the Communists. Under these circumstances, PKI could not succeed. In summary, the weak element of the PKI position was its lack of both physical power and of universalistic legitimation. Even its organization was fairly weak, as it lacked cadres of able fighters. Furthermore, many of the Abangan supporters were only instrumentally loyal to PKI, that is, their loyalty was merely a means to improve their own situations. As a result, PKI was not able to win the battle.2 Thus, such evaluations as, “unless the internal and international situation will be changed, the Communist Party will not soon be broken,” or “they may well succeed in making Indonesia the fifteenth Communist state,”4 were not in place. C. The Army: The position of the military is not only the outcome of its internal properties but also is determined by the conditions under which society is operated.5 The greater the social polarization and the less the effectiveness of the civic mechanisms of control, the greater the probability that the army would dominate a country. 1 See, Contenay, 1967a and b; Lev, 1966b and Wertheim, 1966. In the spring of 1964, the PKI actively intervened in the business of government by instigating thousands of peasants in East and Central Java to dispossess their landlords, sometimes by resorting to violence. PKI legitimation for these acts was drawn from the land reform acts of 1960 and 1961 and from its success in formally ruling on the local level, three of the four provinces of Java. According to Contenay: (Despite the land reform law) the Hadjis still get over 80% of the crop in many parts of Indonesia; moreover, 50% of the peasants have no land and must hire out their services. I met one high official in Surbaya who owned more than 100 hectares in East Java, when he should have kept no more than 7!/,; the rest was held under the names of his family. A Hadji as an activist of the NU (Nahdatul Ulama — orthodox Muslim Party), he naturally hates Communists. (Contenay, November 1967a, p. 358). ~ 2 Every PKI attempt to start a revolution or rebellion in Indonesia was unsuccessful (1962, 1948 and perhaps 1965). Hindley concluded in 1964, “despite its mass support” the PKI “Gs still unable to achieve power”. (VIII) Van der Kroeff, 1965a. Van der Kroeff, 1965a. On the institutional location and intervention of the army in developing countries, see: R. E. Dowse, “The Military and Political Development”, in Politics in Developing Countries, ed. C. Leys (Cambridge: University Press, 1969); S. P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belmap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957); M. Janowitz, The Military in Political Development of New Nations (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1964); E. Liewan, Aims and Policies in Latin America (New York, 1960); M. Lissak, “Center and Periphery in Developing Countries and Prototypes of Military Elites”, in Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. 5, No. 7 (1970), pp. 136-154; and Pye, 1966, pp. 174-177. Gn + OO Copyright (c) 2005 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Brill Academic Publishers === [PDF page 24] === SOCIAL CONDITIONS LEADING TO MILITARY DOMINANCE 73 Drawing from Pauker’s! and Sundhassen’s? analyses of the Indonesian army, one can distinguish three stages in the relationship between the army and the state: 1. the interventive stage (1945-59), in which the army was regarded as a non-political power and its intervention in politics was perceived as an “external” power; 2. the participating stage (1959-1965), in which the army was legitimately one of the “shareholders of the corporate body,” and; 3. the stage in which the army monopolized the legal power in the state In the first stage, the army made few attempts to become involved in the civic structure.* As both political and military traditions and experience were lacking, the National Army had an ill-defined place and purpose in the new state. It consisted of highly autonomous and almost independent units. The armed forces were never completely under strong political or governmental control. This led to both army factions playing important roles in politics and to individual politicians interfering in the internal affairs of the army. However, since the Indonesian army was composed of three groups — those of Dutch colonial origin, those of Japanese origin (PETA), and those of guerilla origin — which were not well integrated, its power was limited and Sukarno was able to control it. Even if the army made few attempts to gain dominancy in this stage® its failure was due to the lack of cohesion.’ In the second stage, from the early sixties and especially following the Irian incident and the battle against Darul Islam in West Java, in 1962, the army became more organized, more cohesive, and more legitimized as a universalistic power, and in pure physical terms it became much stronger than it had been.8 Sukarno’s policy to gain dominance over Indonesian and Malaysian terri- 1 See, G. J. Pauker, “The Role of the Military in Indonesia”, in The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, ed. J. J. Johnson. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962). and R. McVey, “Post Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army”, in Indonesia IT (April, 1971), pp. 131-176 and; Indonesia 13 (April, 1972), pp. 147-182. 2 See, U. Sundhaussen, “The Fashioning of Unity in the Indonesian Army”, in Asia Quarterly (1971), pp. 181-212. See, Pauker, 1962, pp. 206-207. The earlier army ideological orientations and definitions of the situation and of the role of the army can befound in H. H. Nasution. We might define his value premise as populism, the demand for order, and of an anti-particularistic orientation. In spite of these trends, it might be useful to point out that Nasution had very little success when he tried to organize a political party in 1952. See, H. H. Nasution, Fundamentals of Guerilla Warfare (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 22-26; 51-54; 149-151. 5 Pauker, 1962, pp. 200-201. 6 Since 1946 the army, or some parts of it, had made at least three attempts to overcome the government or to enlarge their part in the government by force (1946, 1952, 1958-1961 Sumatra Case). (Pauker, 1962, pp. 209-212.) 7 See, Janowitz, 1964, p. 80. 8 See, Sundhaussen, 1971, p. 206. 09 Copyright (c) 2005 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Brill Academic Publishers === [PDF page 25] === 74 CONTRIBUTIONS TO ASIAN STUDIES tories gave the army a strong functional position, and as a result of their being the main instrument for carrying out this policy, they obtained power and prestige. It also contributed to the internal solidarity of the army. Sukarno’s proCimmese policy and ins alignment with the Communist Party from 1963 and with the Communist society’s world! sought to re-balance the situation. However, the army had, by this time, too much physical power in terms of weapons. At this time the army also aggregated more legitimacy in the Indonesian society. In the first place, its historical involvement and its leadership during the war of independence, gave the army some charismatic legitimation. Secondly, as an instrument of unification and of extended nationalism of the country, the army was centered on the most important manifest needs of the Indonesian society, and therefore defined as a “central” group. Thirdly, by ruling some parts of the country, as a substitute for civil authorities, on the local level? and by functional expansion into many social spheres, the army received support from the governed. Fourthly, the political experience of the army, first in its role as a political body, and later through its participation in the cabinets and in the parliament, could also have helped it to draw civic legitimation and political support. The army, with all its branches, had 36 seats in the parliament in 1963.4 Its weight in the executive area increased: while from 1945 until 1957, in the sixteen cabinets, the army had only four or five offices; in 1959 it received two of the nine positions in the inner cabinet and five of the twenty-five junior ministerial posts. The Chiefs of Staff of the branches became ministers ex-officio.5 The universalistic status of the army became far more salient in later years because the army could not be identified with any given group and, with its growth, the soldiers became less representative of any specific primordial group. The army organization was always the best one in Indonesia. However, its main problem was its lack of internal cohesion, first among its three original groups (of Dutch army origin, of Japanese army origin, and of guerilla origin), and later among its main leaders who were divided by branches, geographic location and/or political orientations. Generally speaking, after 1962, there was an improvement in this dimension.* Even if some generals were not loyal to the army “center”, as in the air force, its unity in 1965 was much greater _than ever before.’ Thus, when all the mechanisms of civic institutionalized control broke down, the army was able to gain dominance. 1 Mahajani showed that the total debt of Indonesia to the Communist countries in December 1965 was 1,404 million dollars, as compared to 587 million to the Western countries See, Pauker, 1962. See, M. Lissak, “Modernization and Role Expansion of the Military in Developing Countries”, in Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. IX, No. 3 (April, 1967), pp. 233-255. See, SPI, 1963, p. 80. See, Pauker, 1962, p. 214. Ibid, p. 197. See, Sundhaussen, 1971. NOOO Copyright (c) 2005 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Brill Academic Publishers === [PDF page 26] === SOCIAL CONDITIONS LEADING TO MILITARY DOMINANCE 75 To summarize, the success of the army was not a function of the failure of the Communist Party, or any other group, to kill some generals, such as Nasution and Suharto, but rather the result of a long structural process in Indonesian society. For, in a society in which there is some degree of disorder, the army may be the most efficient mechanism of control. As Hanna wrote in 1959, “the army is the best chance for order in Indonesia.”? If predictions can be made regarding the future of the present Indonesian regime, then one could say that if the Indonesian army will not be able to establish a strong positive legitimacy, a chain reaction of coups d’etat could be the result. The July 1971 election and the pressures exerted by the Golker party on the voters at this time may be indications of the beginning of such a process (see Table 1). TABLE 1 Members of the House of Representatives in Indonesia 1951-1965 Numbers and Percentages * 1951 1956 1960 1963 1965 1971 Total 240 100 254 100 282 100 284 100 299 100 351 100 Major Parties: Masjumi (Consultative Council of Indonesian PNI (Indonesian National Party) 36 15.0 57 223 44 156 44 15.5 44 14.7 20 5.7 [Unreadable] Nahdatul Ulama (Association of Islamic Scholars) — — 45 176 36 12.8 36 12.7 36 12.0 58 16.5 PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) 13 54 39 155 30 104 29 102 30 100 — — Total Major Parties 98 40.8 198 77.0 110 39.0 109 384 110 368 305 86.8 Other Parties 103 42.9 59 23.2 19 67 22 7.7 22 7.3 46 13.2 FunctionalGroups 39 166 — — 153 542 153 53.9 167 55.9 — — * It has to be pointed out that as the source numbers were not always consistent with the relative total numbers we have changed the former accordingly. Sources Computed from: 1, For the years 1951 and 1960, see H. Feith, “Dynamics of Guided Democracy”, in Indonesia, ed. R. T. Mevey (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), Table 1, pp. 345. 2. For 1956, see 1 Hindley, 1967, p. 246. 2 W.A. Hanna, “The Indecision of the Military”, American University Field Staff, in Southeast Asia Series, Vol. VII, No. 20 (September, 1959). Copyright (c) 2005 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Brill Academic Publishers === [PDF page 27] === 76 CONTRIBUTIONS TO ASIAN STUDIES H. Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962), Table 2, pp. 434-435. 3. For the years 1963-1965, see Statistical Pocketbook of Indonesia 1964-1967, p. 70. 4. For 1971, see Indonesian News and Views, No. 6/71 (August 26, 1971), Embassy of Indonesia, Washington D.C. Summary and Generalization The military coup of 1965 in Indonesia was the result of a long process of polarization, focused into political antagonism and strongly expressed in primordial and class terms. This antagonism was encouraged by a policy which emphasized a relatively open system in political and economic spheres. Such a situation forced Sukarno’s regime into paralysis between Scylla and Charybdis. It no longer could rely on purely symbolic legitimation that merely extended the status quo. Such stagnation prevented the resolution of social problems and the improvement of the economic situation. On the other hand, attempts to translate the symbols into an operative system inevitably would result in a change of the balance of power and therefore would increase the potential for internal conflict. Both alternatives contained the possibility of the breakdown of the quasiinstitutional order. With the lack of mechanisms of mediation, a cobweb process developed and the ability of the major groups to achieve compromises and agreements by institutional means diminished. Physical power became the chief instrument of bargaining and the most powerful group — the army — achieved dominance over the country. In such a context, it might be useful to examine how much the army is regarded as an institutional power, or how far the ruling by force, with a low degree of value-based legitimation, can operate as an institutional mechanism of control and/or of social change. More interesting is the question: Which is the best mechanism by which to control a society containing highly polarized groups and few common central values, if indeed there is such a mechanism? In general, the attempt to establish universal civic order in a society based ~ on primordial affiliation may be perceived as a transformation of the principles of legitimacy. It is a change from traditional hierarchical principles of legitimacy to more egalitarian, universalistic ones. In the transitional stage, many of the new states are in a marginal situation of legitimacy, the old principles being no longer strong enough, and the new ones not being yet valid.1 In this situation the formation of a legitimate order is faced with two problems: firstly, the government has to give more to the people than it takes from them in order to gain their support, even though it has in fact little that it is able to give; and secondly, it has to be based on two different or even contradictory principles of legitimacy. 1 See, Ferrero, 1942. This has been discussed also by Geertz, 1963a. Copyright (c) 2005 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Brill Academic Publishers === [PDF page 28] === SOCIAL CONDITIONS LEADING TO MILITARY DOMINANCE 77 It is impossible to neglect the old principles without endangering the whole system, but it is also impossible to establish a unified state without introducing new principles. In the transitional phase, it seems that the ability of society to create institutional mechanisms aimed at dealing with conflicts depends on its capacity to combine the different principles rather than to differentiate between them. In other words, neither set of principles alone is sufficient for a stable legitimacy but rather both of them are necessary; without such a fusion a legitimation gap is unavoidable. The conditions under which such a fusion might be developed is beyond the realm of this paper. 1 See, R. Kahane, “Higher Education and Political Integration: The Case of India” (Ph.D. dissertation, Berkeley, University of California, Department of Sociology, 1970). Copyright (c) 2005 ProQuest Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Brill Academic Publishers