The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation of Java, 1942-45

=== [PDF page 1] === THE CRESCENT AND THE RISING SUN: INDONESIAN ISLAM UNDER THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF JAVA, 1942-5 A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Cornell University for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Harry Jindrich Benda, M.A. June, 1955 === [PDF page 2] === was born on Octhover where he received “ls In early 1939, ne let counter on Lhe eve at ile oamapoation Lise >» and took up roagidence in iadonesia. “aril Tnvag LO ul Vy Maren, 2G Was Porras breortl MoE TEMOPant. “ahead bri Mo “yoo Ness eartivisy until He Jef bt inadenes*’a in early Vue mm Lo, ne receive: nic o.h. from Jirteria versdisy To lie ve ta Vellineton ang was avarcun. a Seniors Seholarsnaks on cdebion of that ce. "rete Ax pe or Lecturer in polite ror Mniversiscy of New @ealand ia LiGe. davine Travel Grant to the United otahes, he fy ase ‘ Mh + nN edvee + Sg de o mv. i fies in She “raduahe Sehool of Sornell "Tt oy midar aa a 7 TV nves -} a «ko tet. ti. 73 Myigars ite as a Fellow in the Gontneash Asia ‘crosram La se nte === [PDF page 3] === PO tye: eas operas AOR UOW LE DUE ody io [Unreadable] Phigs wee MO Pea. dea ck Gow Le ‘ on, or ae Dot Rack i CUTE Da oe mt wey Fa cm a at het Tee ky LO Tet LS VEIN Lah rodual | Ta LY SR Sos sb nl foe Gy Wii === [PDF page 4] === The weiter is <ieenI|s Southeast Asia Procram in 1353. Li? fm thn - s yf oP lings etn 2 LG nea woe lee os ~t 7% ative of the ori vilege oe Mav Mem AA A Tab LPs Tesearc. aw awlees at dewe-j ‘se thease inyabua’ le nod owes, Taeeely one WOYWELPS A: 2OWG. GQ UNOS? INVEL IA Ae yg aA BH WG 6 ae af Leyes r} it. f bye + s ovetos 2 ft he Sx WL IIMET, GOILLTCeES « tL tne 3a 2iMe, he wishes tnt state nis data and infurmation. Tne author woaldy rurtheracre, Like to thank his many acalaintances and friends, both Jutch and Iudonesian, whe helved him to love and =<- nowever inade-juately — to unuerstand the country and people of Indonesia in the eventful vears 193 to Whe. Amone these, his scold friend, Louis Crarles Damais of Diakarta, deserves svecial anc orate ful mention. Several Indonesian visistors to Cormell University have, in the course oF the vast two yoars, contribubed to the writer's understandins of islamie develonments suriasc ani afcer che Tapane woe ocenpation of Java. eloh many of his fellowestudents, he will lone cherish the memory of the late Uacj}i Avvs Talim, wi while visitin: professor at Sornell in 1°53, caides us towards a betber understanding of his country's islamic problem. Binally, tne author must tnank his wife, whose material nelp and cheerful patience have very substantially contributed to the writine of the present work. To her, as a small trizute he wishes to dectcate this Laperfect result a? his youn, seh. lure === [PDF page 5] === shin. Needless to say, neither she nor counsellor should be heli responsible for anc judement eneountered in the followin: === [PDF page 6] === Cpe le a ie - VOT TIA te 8 ret i Al ae dd 4 vm outs: ee Ds: TA 4 ta bake oe 1 Jo UD RLY ran ale. a Tyee Sars yorte. yo. atk: GOONS. GAP Mo Doli VALCO wearin.. ige tela my yey a _. Lo 4 We _« UN. yg ae Vee were oF TD yer Te fs 2 OTaPas Nivq vey yee ae 1 TUG ee; i tld === [PDF page 7] === hase === [PDF page 8] === v. Dan tat in. yoo, oe bots: +. wt ‘ cneaes 4. faa Shoe ~. Lea pb way yon t,. bores SR fas wae, > ft 2 [Unreadable] te uae 7 -* why wit [Unreadable] [Unreadable] as ee oe 2 1: aa! ate: Lan yt: to. ytetay - oe ton.. La. ie! 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Althourh the oricinal incumbent tad , very little real rower, his cuccesser was in a position of Sar -reater authority; bs that ooime, acreoyer, the Lasjuni had virtuclly beenme a governmental aveney, emrustes with the administration of relizious affairs. It is, furthermore, sicnifieant that the “astumi vas the only ‘mportant Indonesian orvanization to eseanre the merrzer into a Japanese jJecreed all-em-racine mass ~ovement in late 1943, which even claimed the nationalist Pute a movement as its victinu. Its continue. indepencenre was resented py the nationalist elite, but tieir endeaver to curtail or abolish the *Yasjumi came too late tu prevent the Islanic movement's oreanizational survival after the collause of Jananese mile. The fact, finally, that the -asjumi is the only orranization of the Jamanese era to retain its orisinal name in independent Indonesia is jin ttself the best proof of its nower and influence, oth durin= anc nSter whe cecupation. The writer's choice of the Islamic problem was vreatly facilitated by the consideration that, ov all the developments of the ocmipation years, the Islamic aspect ranks anons the most completely documenten: Not only were looslem toneis fairly frequently discussed in newsrapers an: verio Gcals, but1 special mavazine, devoted to these questions, was cunlished by the two successive Indonesitan Tslamic rederations on Java. “y contrast,tne nationalists === [PDF page 12] === a o.4t ~ cae. wet - ye: ee so. : a eof say see eo. 4. aoe - we sy tet.: roe G vee [Unreadable] so ns. ce:: - [Unreadable] [Unreadable] CLUS Eh eh ae yg tee, +, wey i. 3 cons Loe -. hoo Phe oy, oe: ws:: [Unreadable] . pt rei -:. ot fete: eT ne.: bout ee: Le ne -. [Unreadable] : es poe + - ot eee heey [Unreadable] re nat Le Loose ae oe “ eke Le Nong ra se y Lt 3 ‘ tte Ls he [Unreadable] a Te, “ ae Foun eto. Le a Day a is odo --. beat.. es sole an [Unreadable] nays === [PDF page 13] === [Faint typescript page; most of the text is too faded to read. Legible fragments only:] [Unreadable] ... political scene.... [Unreadable]... the Indonesian... [Unreadable] [Unreadable] === [PDF page 14] === will, for better or worse, very likely continue to play a [Unreadable] significant, if not crucial, part. [Unreadable], [Unreadable], that his interest in the formative [Unreadable] of this [Unreadable] many-sided political phenomenon -- a period [Unreadable] -- [Unreadable]. [Remainder of page blank; faint typescript, partly illegible] === [PDF page 15] === PART ONE THE COLONIAL HERITAGE === [PDF page 16] === CHAPTER I THE FOUNDATIONS OF DUTCH ISLAMIC POLICY It is possible to view the Islamic problem in Indonesia from three aspects, and to see the Islamic influence operating on three levels in Indonesian society. The first and most basic level is conditioned by the fact that the overwhelming majority of Indonesians are Moslems. On this grass-roots level, Islam, like no other force until the most recent times, has been the great unifier: The long history of revolt against Christian dominance, especially that preceding our century, was largely written in terms of Moslem uprisings and wars. On the second level, however, the Islamic problem presents itself in a far more complex position than the basic factor would lead us to believe. While it is true that most Indonesians are (1) and have been Moslems — for over five centuries in Sumatra, for over four in Java (2) — the victory of Islam has never been more than partial. It has converted the Indonesians only to be converted (1) No recent, exact data are available on this point. The Moslems are usually stated as comprising above ninety per cent of the total Indonesian population. Cf. Report on Indonesia (New York), V, 14 (May 25, 1954), p10. (2) Cf. ©. W. Stutterheim, Cultuurgeschiedenis van Indnesie, II: De Islam on zijn komst in de Archipel (Growingen/Djakarta: “J. Be Wolters, 2nd impr., 1952), pp.33 ff. === [PDF page 17] === itself, as an observer has recently put it (3). The problem on this second level is that of the socio-religious balance between Islam and pre-Islamic custom within Indonesian society, and the deman¢ of Moslem spokesmen to make Indonesia more truly into a society guided by Islamic principles. On the third level, finally, we find Islam as a political force within the framework of the Indonesian mtionalist movement, in which it has Played an increasingly important role. As is true of most artificial classification and segmentation, this division of the Islamic problem should not be pushed too far. It should not obscure the fact that Indonesian Islam — whether viewed as a grass-roots problem, as a religious demand for greater adherence to the Mohammedan law, or as part of the political independence movement — is a living reality which has permeated Indonesian life at almost every level. But it may be easier to study our problem under these three headings, in order to show Dutch and Japanese policies in better perspeciive, and also, perhaps, in order to understand Islam's role in the independent Inconesian Republic of today. Dutch Islamic policy on all the three levels was of needs dictated by the situational logic posited by the demands of enlightened Christian rule over Moslem subjects. Such a policy could only be negative in its overall ramifications, consisting of a commingling of half-hearted tolerance, benevolent vigilance and active (3) Cf. G. H. Bousquet, "Introduction & l'étude de 1'Islam Indonésien," Revue des Etudes Islamiqes (Paris), 1938, II-III, pp.135-359, Pe22>. see also K. P. Landon, Southeast Asia, Crossroad of Religions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1919), p.163. === [PDF page 18] === interference. Confronted by the hard fact of ruling Moslems, the European colonial rulers could not be expected to grant more than a color= less guaranty of relizious freedom to the vast majority of Moslems and to the insignificant minority of Christians alike; they could never expect more than sullen acceptance of their "generosity" in matters religious, nor did they ever seek more than just such acceptance, acquiescence, and public peace. Umpiring between the explicit demands of Islamic would-bereformers and those of the Indonesian traditional social reality, colonial policy tended to strengthen the latter, and finally to encroach on two vital areas within the Islamic domain in the last few years of Dutch rule. It was on these two levels only, in fact, that a distinct Dutch Islamic policy as such existed. On the third, political level, Islam, as part of the nationalist movement in the twentieth century, was a political preoccupation in no significant way different from that of the so-called tnative movement" in its entirety. If much of Dutch Mohammedan policy was dictated by the logic of the basic confrontation between Islamic subjects and Christian masters, it owed its philosophical ramifications, its aims, its vision ——- and its lack of vision also -= to one man of great stature and great nobility of mind: ChristiaanSnouck Hurgronje, the noted Dutch Arabicist, and first Adviser for Native and Arabian Affairs to the Netherlands East Indies’ Government ()). === [PDF page 19] === Snouck's influence was perhaps more lasting than that of any other individual man in modern Dutch colonial history. This is the more remarkable since his principles in the course of hO-odd years outlasted fundamental changes in overall colonial policy (5). Yet at the close of Dutch rule in Indonesia, it was still Snouck Hurgronje's Mohammedan policy which by and large guided the administration. As will be seen, this fact to some extent accounts for some of the difficulties, not to say dilemmas, which beset Dutch policies in later years. An examination of Holland's Islamic policy must, then, com= mence with the direction given to it so lastingly by its founder (6). Snouck Hurgronje's basic assumption was, that Indonesian Islam had two clearly separate aspects which called for two entirely different governmental attitudes. On the one hand, he recognized the grass-roots fact of a religion, as yet firmly embedded among the masses of the people. (4) Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1857-1936) was Adviser to the Indies! Goverment between 1889 and 1906. (5) For an excellent survey, see J.S. Furnivall, Netherla@ ds India, a Study in Plural Economy (New York: Macmillan, 19h), Chs.Vi-Vlil. (6) The summary of Snouck Hurgronje's views is based on three important works, all re-printed in the colk ction Verspreide Geschriften, 6 vols. (Bonn & Leipzig: Ke Schroeder, 192, and Leiden: &. J. Brill, 1926): "Over Panislamisme" (1910), I, pp. 364~80; "La Politique musulmane de la Hollande" (i913 IV; 2, pp»225-306; "De Islan in Nederlandsch-Indie," (1913), ibid., pp.361-91. For a brief summary of his principles, see also the article on "Islam" in Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch Oost Indi&, ed. by S. de Graaff and D. 7. Stibbe (The Hague/ Leiden: M. Nijhoff & E. J. Brill, 1918), II, pp.160-73, esp. pp.172=-73. === [PDF page 20] === In spite of the impurities of Indonesian Islam — which had often misled Christian missionaries and others into the erroneous assumption that Islam in the Archipelago was as superficially believed in as it had been easily assimilated to local custom — Snouck recognized its pervasive hold on the population as a social fact of importance. Since.reedom of conscience was guaranteed in the Dutch Constitution, the colonial goverrment was honor-bound to respect the religious beliefs of- its Moslem subjects: it "must remain neutral vis-a-vis the purely religious precepts of Islam." And, since the same Constitution likewise acknowledged the freedom of the individual, no appreciable barriers should be placed in the way of the Mecca pilgrimage. On the other hand, however, Snouck Hurgronje insisted that the government could not "platonically envisage another aspect of the question, viz. all those trends that bear, or tend to bear, a political character" (7). If it had to tolerate an alien religion, the government could not acknowledge the existence of an imperium in imperio, challenging the loyalty to colonial political authority. In describing these two guiding principles of Snouck Hurgronje's Moslem policy, we have apparently encountered two of the three levels of the Islamic problem initially posited in this chapter. Yet in fact Snouck's political enemy was not that (7) "La politique musulmane...", ppe269-79, passim, and see the conclusion in ibid., p.287. === [PDF page 21] === politically organized Islam which was to merge with the growing Indonesian nationalist movement of the present century. The eneny against whom the barriers had to be erected in 1910-12 was primarily external: it was the Caliphate and Pan-Islam wh, from abroad, were potentially at least capable of attracting the allegiance of Indonesian Moslems. Only one local "political" factor -—- the preaching of Holy War against the infidel government -- had to be guarded against, as the most dangerous local expression of pan-islamic sentiment. Snouck admitted that the Ottoman Empire was not using Pan~ Islam as an active principle of its foreign policy (8). Yet he feared its grip on the illiterate peasant masses of Indonesia, "which have absorbed /its7 ideas just sufficiently to doubt the contimous legality of the European administration" (9). It was, however, a serious misreading of the nature of Islam to imply, as Snouck Hurgronje did, that the ‘continuous & gality' of Christian rule over Moslems would ever by psychologically and ethically acceptable to Moslems left free to enjoy a measure of religious freedom. Indonesian Moslems — as Dutch colonial history only too readily shows -= had not only been doubting the ke gality of European rule, they had bitterly fought against its very estab- (8) "Even in Turkey," he wrote in 1910, "... it could almost be said that the political leaders have deposited the paniglamic program in the musewm of their political antiquities." "Over Panislamisme," pp.372~73. === [PDF page 22] === lishment and continued existences (10) It was, perhaps, a basic failure of Snouck's not to realize that this widespread sentiment was latent in Islam rather than in Pan-Islam, and to search for the political center in Islam exclusively in Constantinople, Cairo, or Mecca (11). Pan-~Islam, in other words, was a political phantom, while the threat of holy war belonged to grass-roots Indonesian Islam proper. To seek a dividing line between religion and the anti-Christian sentiment was, at best, a pious hope; at worst, it was political blindness (12). It is, however, when our discussion of Snouck Hurgronje's principles turns to what was initially termed the second level — viz. that of the place to be accorded to Islam anc Islamic law in the evolving Indonesian society ~~ that we arrive at a fundamental insight into the causes of friction which beset Dutch- (10) For a brief survey, cf. M. Dimyati, Sedjarah perdjuangan Indonesia (Djakarta: Widjaya, 1951), ppe - On the last Targe-scale struggle, the Achin War of 1873-1908, see F. S. de Klerck, History of the Netherlands Indies (Rotterdam: W. L. & J. Brusse, 1938), II, Ch.xVi, pp.ou2 ff. (11) "Islam," as a recent writer puts it, "has been a political religion from its inception ee. and/t he all~embracing demand of religion tas, indeed, remained an essential characteristic of Islam up to the present day." Richard Hartman, "Islam und Naticnalismus," Abhandlungen der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Phitoso hisch-historische Klasse, (12) Cf. Charles 0. van der Plas, "Mededeelingen over de stroomingen in de Moslimsche gemeenschap in Nederlandsch-Indie en de Nederlandsche Islampolitiek," Indisch Genootsc (The Hague), 193k, pp.253-72, on p.269:; "AIT classical authoritative texts, all commentaries, and even the Koran itself contain parts... which are capable of abuse for purposes of agitation." === [PDF page 23] === Moslem relations up to the very end of the colonial era (13). To Snouck, Islam was, briefly put, a matter of the past as much as it was a matter of the common people only. It was a spell-binding superstition for the masses of Indonesian peasants, to be broadly tolerated, if euarded against excesses. But Islam contained, in Snouck Hurgronje's view, no seeds for growth, development and evolution towards a more modern, not to say higher, Western-style civilization. Its Indonesian believers were illiterate and ignorant; its leaders — particularly at the village level — backward-looking teachers of orthodox, lifeless dogma, capable of inciting their flock to rebellion, but incapable of leading it towards an enlightened future. In the light of 19th Century liberalism, such a view was not necessarily vicious. Snouck Hurgronje did not ridicule Islam in order to extoli Christianity. To him, the alternative lay not between Moslem pesantren-education and the missionaries' Sunday school, but between Moslem dogma and the modern education of the secular, Western school, which held the key to the future solution of the Islamic problem: "It is by means of education and instruction," so he asserted, "that the Moslems can be freed (13) Criticisms and comments on this problem can be found in many Islamic writings during the Japanese occupation. See in particular Sanusi Pane's articles, "Islam dan keboedajaan Asia Raya," Asia-Raya (Djakarta), May 12, 1942, and "Islam dan zaman baroe,' ibid., September 17, 1942; Harsono Tjokroaminoto, "Menghormati dan melindoengi Agama Islan," Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia (Djakarta),II, 10 (May 15, 19h), ped. === [PDF page 24] === from the narrow confines of the Islamic system /sic/." And triumphantly he added: "All over Java one can observe the pesantren's losing ground: today everybody wants to go to school." This observation was pertinent to Snouck Hurgronje's alma t exclusive pre-occupation with the native, aristocratic priyahielite. He correctly stated that the pan-islamic idea had not "obtained an important hold over them," and that this fact might, by a judicious colonial policy of association through assimilation, deprive Islam of the chance of prominent leadership in the future (1)). It would thus, socially speaking, disintegrate from the top downward. If Islam was the loser on the educational level, then nothing should be done to arrest its inevitable decline in other areas of the life of the Indonesian masses. And next to the hold of primitive village education and worship, Islam's strongest institutional bulwark lay in the province of the law. Indonesia, it is true, neither was, nor is, an Islamic country proper, if judged by the very limited range in which Koranic law is operative. Islamic law in matters pertaining to property and succession had been virtually incapable of supplanting the traditional communal Adat, or (Us) Snouck Hurgronje, "La politique musulmane...", op.cit., pp.290, 294, and 304, resp. — Th conflicting claims of Islamic and Western education were in later years often hotly debated among the Indonesian nationalist elite. Cf. Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana's essay, "Didikan barat dan didikan pesantren. Menudju ke masjarakat jang dynamisch," heraja ey Polen in 1935, sen (D4aka in Achdiat K. Mihardja (ed.) Polemik kebudajaan (Djakarta: Balai === [PDF page 25] === 10 customary hw (15). But Islamic jurisdiction has for centuries regulated matrimonial and family affairs in Indonesia, and in these matters Islamic judges have always dispensed religious justice among the islands! Moslems. In the envisaged evolution of the Indies towards a modern, Western pattern, jointly to be effected by enlightened Dutch officials and by assimilated native aristocrats, Islamic law was doomed to atrophy, to be ultimately replaced by a Western legal code. Snouck Hurgronje persuasively and successfully counselled against the codification of the existing Islamic law in Indonesia, which would in his opinion have ensured its legal,and therewith ethical, survival (16), Striking a blow at the admittedly anomalous institution of the "priestly councils" /priesterraden/ (17), the Adviser urged out and out abolition of the existing (15) On this point, see inter alia, Jan Prins, Adat en Islanjetische plichtenlear (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1948), esp. ppe9-10 and 110 ff., and the same writer's "Adatlaw and Muslim Religious Law in Modern Indonesia," Welt des Islams (Leiden), N. S., I (1951), pp.283-300; also H. Westra's — earlier "Custom and Muslim Law in the Netherlands East Indies," Transactions of the Grotius Society (London), XXV (16) Snouck Hurpronje, "La politique musulmme...," op.cit., pe273. No such codification was ever undertaken, in spite of the fact that Islamic law has persisted. "Religious justice," in the words of a noted Dutch expert, "seems to be too firmly entrenched in its limited sphere to be displaced. Perhaps the solution will be a complete codification of the Islamic law... in Indonesia." B. ter Haar Adat Law in Indonesia, ed. by E. A. Hoebel and A. A. Schiller (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1948), p.28. (17) These councils had been created by the colonial government in 1885. Since Islam knows no collegiate tribunals, the new === [PDF page 26] === Islamic judicial machinery; in his plan — the only important part of his policy never to be translated into fact by the colonial government -— the Islamic judge was to be abolished as such, and be henceforth limited to his secondary task, that of adviser in matters Islamic to the regular native law courts, or land- _raden (18). Snouck Hurgronje's conception of a proper Islamic policy for the Netherlands East Indies, outlined at the turn of the present century, was thus rooted in two assumptions. The first concerned the negative role which Islam was destined to play in the islands, the second the positive and increasingly important role which westernization would come to play among the Indonesian aristocratic elite. Snouck Hurgronje was as consistent and noble in his intentions as could be expected of a liberal architect of colonial policy, who was convinced that Holl@md had "assumed the moral duty of teaching [the Indonesians/ and of making them participants in our own /i.e., Dutch/ political and social life" (19). institutions militated against traditional concepts. Moreover, since there are no priests in Islam, the Dutch term -- deriving from an early misconception of the Moslem religion -~ was incorrect. In Indonesian usage, the councils were called Rad Agama or Religious Councils. Cf. W. J. A. Kernkamp, "Regering en Islam," in Daar werd wat groots verricht..., ed. by W. H.4Helsdinzen and H. Hoogenberk CAmstewam: Elsevier, 191), ppe191-207, on p.202 f. (18) C. Snouck Hurgronje, "Rapport over de Mohammedaansche godsdienstige rechtspraak," Verspreide Geschriften, op.cit., IV, pp.90 and 95, resp. —~ The question of Islamic law was again raised in the 1930's. See chapters 3 and h, below. Op-co”. === [PDF page 27] === Conceiving of Islam as a static, if not moribund, social factor limited to grass-roots importame, Snouck Hurgronje's policy was, however, singularly ill-equipped to grapple with the unexpected Mohammedan developments which characterized Indnesian history in the coming decade. The more surprising to find that no substantially new policy was to take its place until the end of Dutch rule. No general re-appraisal or revision was considered necessary in spite of the great changes in the three most fundamental factors which had lent coherence to Snouck's edifice. First, Indonesian Islam developed an unexpected and remarkable resilience and became a social factor of ever-increasing importance in Indonesia. Second, Dutch colonial policy soon veered away from Snouck Purgronje's ideal of assimilation and thus from rapid westernization of the Javanese aristocracy (21). Lastly, new Indonesian elite-groups came to challenge the aristocracy's claims to leadership with a certain measure of success. (20) Unquestioning adherence to Snouck's principles can be found in almost all later Dutch writers on Islamic policy. Cf. Kernkamp, op.cit., pp.199-200; add Van der Plas, op.cit., p.266. For an exception to this rule, see H. J. Nautats brief comment, "De Mohammedaansche wet in Nederladsch- Indi#," Kolonial Tijdschrift (The Hague), XXVII (1938), ppe372-77, where he warns against complete reliance on Snouck's observations dating back to the 1890's, which may be in langer of becoming obiter dicta. (21) For an interesting comment, see G. H. Bousquet, La politique musulmane et coloniale des Pays-Bas (Paris: Paul Ratan O/ )s Pp. fe === [PDF page 28] === 13 CHAPTER II THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDONESIAN ISLAM, 1918 - 1931 The last quarter-century of Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia witnessed drastic changes in the Islamic scene on all the three levels under discussion. The village population was profoundly stirred by over-zealous interference from the benevolent, paternalistic executors of the colonial government's Ethical Policy (22), as well as by the unsettling intrusion of capitalist economy. The unprecedented prosperity of the first few years following the end of the first world war further helped to weaken the traditional material and psychological isolation, in particular that of the Indonesian peasantry (23). Not only did peasant risings occur in those years in which grass-roots Moslem incitement played an importat part, but, for the first time in modem Indo- (22) For a brief yet lucid comment on the Ethical Policy, announced by Queen Wilhelmina in 1900, see Amry Vandenbosch, The Dutch East Indies, Its Government, Problems and Politics 7Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 3rd ed., 19k), ppe63-733 and J. S. Furnivall, Netherlands india, A Study in Plural Economy (New York: Macmillan, TOLL), pp. 226 ff. (23) An illuminating analysis of this impact can be found in B. Schrieke's "Native Society in the Transformation Period," in The ®ffect of Vestern Influence on the Native Civilizations in the Malay Archipelago, ed. by B. Schrieke (Batavia: G. Kolif & Cov, 1929), pp.237-l7. See also the same author's Het commnisme ter Sumatra's Vestkust (Weltevreden: Landsarukkerlj, 1908), Part ll. === [PDF page 29] === mon nesian history -~ and for the only time wmder Yutch rule — this general discontent flowed over into a semblance of political mass action. Prodded by external and mostly invisible forces, Indonesian society was coming of age (2h). If the peasant base had und>rgone disturbances which rendered it more easily susceptible to change, the equally important rise of a new, and largely urban, Islamic elite likewise modified the character of the Indonesian Moslem problem. The emergence of the Sarekat Islam movement just prior to the outbreak of the war ana its meteoric rise in manbership and popularity in the immediate post-war years formed the dramatic opening of a new era (25). The leaders of this new movement were neither Javanese aristocrats nor traditionalists —- as had been those of the earlier, originally non-political movement, Budi Utomo — nor were they the product<« of an associationist educational policy: They were, indeed, the first prominent political spokesmen influenced by Islamic modernism and reformism in Indonesia. For grass roots support, it is true, the Sarekat Islam during its early and phenomenal period of growth still depended on the "political," yet primitive, Islam of the orthodox villagers (2h) cf. J. Th. Petrus Blumberger, De nationalistische bewegi: in Nederlandsch-Indié (Haarlen? Tjeank Willink & zooms T93L), [Unreadable] (25) Membership of Sarekat Islam was estimated at 800,000 in 1916, and at over two million in 1919. Cf. A. K. Pringgodigdo, Sedjarah pergerakan rakjat Indonesia (Djakarta: Pustaka Rakjat, rd ede, ’ PPelo~lbe === [PDF page 30] === 15 and their local leaders. But now for the first time this Moslem undercurrent was linked with a modernistic central leadership (26), and the resulting political aspect of Indonesian Islam constituted a new phenomenon. Yet in spite of this fact, and in spite of the new movement's name even, it would be misleading to assign the Sarekat Islam a primarily Islamic significance (27). Umar Sayed Tjokroaminoto, Hadji Agus Salim and the movement's other leaders belong more correctly to the political elite of the nascent Indonesian independence movement, than to the leaders of the Islamic renaissance proper. Sarekat Islam derived its strength, that is, not so much from the new religious forces at work in Indonesian Islan, but primarily from the social malaise, created by the impact on the Indonesian peasant of Western, capitalistic forces over many decades, and aggravated by the disturbing developments durind, and immediately following, the first world war (28), (26) This new factor distinguished Sarekat Islam from earlier Moslem grass-roots commotions, such as the Samin-movement which was finally suppressed by the colonial government in 1917. Cf. George McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution In Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press/I.P.R., > PPS. (27) Hadji Agus Salim, Cormell Seminar, February 25, 1953. -- In this connection it is also significant that in Indonesia's Who's Who?, compiled during the occupation, Salim as well as Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, chairman of the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia since 1932, are listed among politicians, not ye leaders of the religious movement. Cf. h.datta, ed./ Orang Indonesia jang terkemoeka di Djawa (vjakarta: OtnseTkanta, 19LL)> ace and 470, resde === [PDF page 31] === With Sarekat Iglam commenced not only the history of an organized, political Indonesian nationalism, but at the same time, and as a distinct part of this movement, Islamic political action. It is, finally, of some significance that in Tjokroaminoto — against his will, and to his surprise —~ Indonesia found its first charismatic leader (29). From this brief consideration of two facets of the changed Islamic scene in the early 1920's -- mass agitation and a new leadership -—- we may now turn to the third factor in the developing new configuration, the rise of the modernist religious movement proper, and its effects on Indonesian Islam. Compared to the dramatic and at times near-explosive events which had heralded in the popular commotions accompany— ing the first years of the Indonesian mtionalist movement, Islamic reformism, especially on Java, started on its career (28) Qn this point, cf. Schrieke's "Native Society in the Transformation Period," loc.cit. -—— Itis interesting to note that Snouck Hurgronje enthusiastically welcomed the appearance of the new movement as a lanimark in Indonesia's political maturation, without attaching any religious importance to it in spite of its name. "It may sound para~- doxical at this moment," he wrote in 1916, "but before another quarter of a century will have passed, it will be a generally accepted truth that in retrospect... the Sarekat Islam was one of the great rays of hope." C,. Snouck Hurgronje "De Sarekat Islam in het crediet van koloniaal bestuur" (1916), in Verspreide Geschriften, (29) Cf. Robert Van Niel, Development of the Indonesian Elite Cent (Unpublished doctoral disin the Early Iwentieth sertation, Cornell Galversity. Ithaca, N.Y., 1954), p.209. === [PDF page 32] === 17 without the noticeable sounds of fanfares. Organizationally and officially, reformism did not work at the political level, and its part in the nationalist movement is consequently often limited to a grudging footnote in the histories of that movement. In retrospect, however, there can be little doubt that its development and the repercussions to which it led belong among the most important milestones in modern Indonesian history. The inspiration of the reform movement came predominant— ly from Egypt, at the turn of this century, and thus, indirectly, from Islamic contect with the West (30). To a large extent, reformism was an attempt of Islam to adapt itself to the modern world; its spread in the Indies therefore provided parts of the Indonesian elite with a viable, but far more acceptable alternative to the "solution of the Islamic problem" than Snouck's short-lived hope of assimilation to a de-Islamized, Western civilization (31). The principal impact of the reformist movement on Islam has been summarized under these four headings: 1) Purification of Islam from corrupting (30) cf. Hartmann, op.cit., pp.20-22, and H. A..R. Gibb, Mohammedanism: An Historical Survey (London: Oxford “Univeraity Press, 1953), pp-177 ff. See also Alfred Guillaume, Islam (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 195), Che9. (31) Cf. Kahin, op.cit., pp.87 ff. and Djamal Udin /pseud. for Adi Negoro7, "Zur Kulturpolitik Indonesiens," Zeitschrift fir Geopolitik (Berlin), V (1928), pp.258-6h [Unreadable] === [PDF page 33] === 18 influences and practices, 2) Reformation of Moslem education, 3) Re-formulation of Islamic doctrine in the light of modern thought, and h) Defense of Islam against European influence and Christian attacks (32). It thus brought both a deepening of Islamic awareness and a meaningful program of action to Indonesia. A huge, and by no means easy, task awaited the reform movement in purifying Indonesian Islam from its overgrowth of pre-Moslem practices which were accepted by many orthodox villagers and teachers alike. More important still, the re-affirmation and strengthening of Islamic law was 2a concomitant of far-reaching consequences. In school education -- Indonesian reformism's most significant and most successful field of action -- and in its vigorous missionary appeals in villages and towns alike, modernism could crusade for a synthesis between religion and the demands of a changing society, without abandoning the unifying Islamic bond spurned by the "secular" and largely urban=-centered nationalist movement. Finally, in defending religious activities against interference from the colonial goverment, and particularly in countering renewed Christian missionary activities in Java (33), reformism of needs (32) H. A. R. Gibb, Modern Trends in Islam (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1947), pe53. For a critical appraisal of this work,see also the review article by ‘Abdul Razzq in The Islamic Review (London), 39, No.9? (September, 1951), ppel9-23.=~°=~°~*S (33) After the elections of 1909 in the Netherlands, "there was === [PDF page 34] === 19 deepened religious-national consciousness without for many years participating in overt political action (3h). Muhammadiyah was -—- and has contimed to be -= the most important and most successful reformist organization in Indonesia. Founded in Jogjakarta in 1912 by Kyahi Dahlan, a man of great sincerity, ability and tenacity, the organization gained ground gradually yet steadily; nine years after its founding, the Dutch authorities allowed Iuhammadiyah to expand its activities beyond its original seat. In 1923, there were twelve branches and 32 schools in Java (35); by 1937, Muhammadiyah counted over nine hundred branches, well over one-half of them in the Outer Islands (36). In the course of time, hun- @ growing emphasis on Christian principles in government and an increased support of missionary activity." Van Niel, opecit., pel70. -- “he importance of Christian missionary activity in those years, particularly in Central Java, was also stressed by Hadji Agus Salim, Cornell Seminar, February 20, 1953. (3h) On the connection between Islam and nationalism in general, see Hartmann, op.cit., p42. “It is not at all surprising," wrote an expert in those years, "that nationalism ee. has, as it were, conquered Islam, and that vice versa tslam is endeavoring to attain the ideal of unity, which inspires the Moslems of the new /reformist/movement, by means of nationalism." E. Gobée, "De Islam," in Gedenkboek voor Nederlandsch-Indié ter gelegenheid van het regeeringsjub- Tleum van T. i de Fonigin, TOOU-1903 (Batavies G- Roll? EK Coes 1923) PPe291-90, ON Pr29d. (35) Gobée, op.cit., p29), and cf. Blumberger, op.cit., ppe90- 101 and S39-L7. (36) Pringgodigdo, op-cit. » pp-105-08. Bousquet gives the following figures for the growth of Muhammadiyah over the years: 1927: 176 branches, 1932: 463, 1935: 809, 1936: 851, and 1937: 913. La politique musulmane et coloniale des Pays-Bas, op.cite, peld. === [PDF page 35] === 20 dreds of thousands of Indonesians joined this and other reformist organizations (37). Soon the Muhammadiyah Congresses by far outdistanced in attendance those of even the largest polit— ical parties, and the discrepancy kept increasing during the last years of colonial rule (38). This statistical record is more impressive still if viewed against the great and manifold difficulties which Indonesian reformism had to overcome. In the first years of its existence, and particularly during its fairly close connection with the Sarekat Islam in the annual Al-Islam Congresses, Muhammadiyah was suspect to the govermment. Only in the later ‘twenties, when the link with politics was much weaker, did Muhammadiyah's social welfare and educational work, especially on Java, gradually win the grudging approval of the authorities (39). (37) A reformist group among Indonesian Arabs, Al Irsjad, was founded in 1913. In late 1925, the Jong Islamieten Bond, a reformist movement for young Moslems, came o exis— tence. Hadji Agus Salim, Cornell Seminar, April, 1953. (38) Thus in 1936, Parindra, the largest Indonesian political party at that Time, claimed a membership of only 3,500 members, distributed over 53 branches. "Kroniek," in Koloniaal Tijdschrift (The Hague), XXV (1936), p.339. -= WCongresses of the P.N.I., Partindo,... later /those/ of Parindra and Gerindo were only small meetings compared to the enormous crowds which Muhammadiyah Congresses used to attract." J. M. Pluvier, Overzicht van de ontwikkeling der nationalistische bewe in Indonesi# in de jaren 1930 tot 1942 (The Hague/Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1 3 Del. (39) Cf. Gobbe's review article of Bousquet's La politique musulmane et coloniale des Pays-Bas, in Koloniaal Tijd- === [PDF page 36] === 21 In the second place, reformism's puritanical zeal, directed against sterile orthodoxy no less than against the impurities and the clusters of mysticism surrounding much of the age-old Moslem practices in Indonesia, led to violent reaction from the orthodox religious teachers (0). Muhammadiyha's attempts at "secularizing" Islam by means of services held partly in the vernacular, its championing of an improved status for women, its use of missionaries /muballigh's7 in the propagation of the faith, its holding of open-air prayer and propaganda-meetings ftabligh's7 and finally its revolutionary educational methods, all of these "dangerous" innovations -- which incidentally betrayed how successfully the Indonesian reformists had learned from the Christian missions in the Indies — constituted a presumed threat to orthodoxy. schrift, XXVIII (1939), pp.325~35, on pp.326-37: "The very fact that the appearance /oF Islamic modernism/ and the founding of local branches.. brought unrest with it, sufficed to make Muhammadiyah appear undesirable in the eyes of the administration. Only after a long time.. was this prejudice abandoned." For a similar comment on reformism in Sumatra, see Blumberger, op.cit., pe3l9, and Schrieke, op.cit., p. 19. Cf. Hamka's /pseud. for Hadji Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah/7 biographical work, A jahku; Riwajat hidup Dr.Abdul Karim Amrullah dan juangan Kaum Agama Djakarta: Widjaya, 1950), Ror passim. (40) Cf. W. J. As Kernkamp, "De invloed van den Islam," in C. W. Wormser (ed.), Wat Indié ontving en schonk (Amsterdam: Indisch Institaut/ Weroldvibliothesk, T9L6), pp.77- 108, on p.107, and Pringgodigdo, op.cit., p.106. === [PDF page 37] === 22 By 1926, this threat, together with the added fear that reformism would lead Indonesian Islam into the heretical Wahhabi fold of Ibn Sa'ud (41), finally led the crthodox leaders to set up their own organization, Nahdatul Ulama. Originally centered in East Java, the movement soon spread throughout the island, to follow its rival in later years beyond Java (2). Thus reformism had succeeded in creating a serious rift in the Indonesian Islamic world; yet, of greater long-term importance, by organizing its own supporters, it had likewise caused See also the article on "Wahhabiya't in Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam, edited on behalf of the Royal Netherlands Academy by H. A. R. Gibb and J. H. Kramers (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1953), pp.618-21. Ibn Sa'ud completed the reconquest of the former Wahhabi realm, lost in 183k, by the occupation of Mecca in late 192). Unlike the Egyptian reformist movement, the Wahhabi sect is puritanical rath-~ er than modernistic. Although neither directly fostered nationalism, both contributed to its rise. This cornnection is interestingly discussed by Hartmann, op.cit., pl. Cf. Pringgodigdo, op.cit., pp.185-86. Starting as a loosely-organized movement among kyahi's and ulama's /religious teachers and expounders of the Koran/ of limited membership, Nahdatul Ulama in subsequent years built up a proper membership, which by 1935 had reached 67,000, distributed over 68 branches. Cf. Bousquet, La politique musulmane coos OP-Cits, pe2l, and F. Gobée's review article of that work in Koloniaal Tijdschrift, op.cit., p.330. It is not impossible that the colonial government may have aided the orthodox party in this organizational move; Gobde (ibid., p.327) does speak of aid in general having been extended to them against the reformists, “until it was /Tater7 realized that the sharp opposition between old and new.ewould automatically diminish and disappear as soon as the orthodox would lose the possibility of makinz their views prevail by means of governmental help." === [PDF page 38] === 23 its opponents to organize on a nation-wide scale. As a result, Islam as such was strengthened and deepened; for the first time it became a focal problem in moder Inconesian developments. It was also fortwmate for the future of Indonesian Islan that the originally deep cleavage between orthodoxy and reformism did not lead to a lasting split of serious dimenfsions. Four factors may have combined in bringing about a gradual rapprochement between the two wings of the Islamic movement: One had its origin in a lessening of the religious controversy itself; Secondly, orthodoxy and reformists found common ground in successfully challenging the influence of the Sarekat Islam in religious affairs after 192). In the third place, the rise of the non-religious, Western-educated nationalist elite tended to unite the two wings of the Islamic movement in self-defense. ‘he last factor, finally, can be traced back to actions of the colonial government which will be discussed in the next chapter. Although the differences had by no means entirely disappeared in the hte 1930's, Indonesian Moslems were by then stronger and far more united on basic principles than they had ever been before. The links between Indonesian reformism and Ibn Satud soon weakened and finally disappeared. In June 1926, the young Wahhabi king convened an Islamic World Congress at Mecca, which was attended by two Indonesian delegates (43). This was the (43) Pringgodigdo, op.cit., p.49. The delegates, Tjokroaminoto of the Partai Sarekat Islam and Kyahi Mas Mansur of Muham- === [PDF page 39] === first and last of its kind; confronted by insuperable divisions in the Moslem world, Ibn Sa'ud speedily lost interest in his short-lived attempt to revive Pan-Islam (ih). With the disappearance of the Wahhabi influence, reformists and orthodox xeased to be divided by burning questions of doctrine, and it became easier for these essentially lowermiddle class movements to combine in the defense of common objectives against the political radicalism of the Sarekat Islam no less than against the nascent "secular" nationalism of the Western-oriented Indonesian elite (5). madiyah, were elected at the 6th Al-Islam Congress of September 1925, which proclaimed itself on that occasion Indies! Branch of the Islamic World Congress. (M.A.1.4.S.) At the P.5.I. Congress o' September-—October 1927, this M.A.I.H.S. was changed back to Al-Islam Congress, seeing that the World Congress had ceased to exist. Cf.Blumberger, opecit., p.318. pe53, and cf. &. cobée, "Religieuse en religieus-politieke bewegingen," in Daar wérd wat ots verricht, op.cit., ppll6-59, on pp.457-55. This was the last "serious" panislamic episode in the history of Indonesian Islam under colonial rule, although interest in overseas Moslem affairs was apparent at many subsequent Al-Islam Congresses: Thus in 1931 a resolution called for a boycott of Italian goods because of Italian actions in Tripoli; the next year, an invitation to a Congress by the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem was accepted. The Palestinian issue figured as a minor item on the 1938 azenda of the Konzres Al-Islam, which one year bter sent a delegation to the Islamic world congress at Tokyo. For a brief summary, see Taufiqurrachmm, "Sekitar kisah perdjuanganIslam Indonesia," Mimbar Agama (Djakarta), I, h (October, 1950), pp.29-32. (45) cf. W. *. Nertheim, Effects of Western Civilization on Indonesian Society (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 10503; mimeo.), pe62, and Gobée's review article === [PDF page 40] === 25 In the course of time, Nahdatul Ulama not only came to pay grudging respect to the earnestness and dignity with which “uhammadiyah served the cause of Islam, but it also copied some of the eminently successful methods of that reformist organization, such as creating women's and youth organizations (46). The reformists, on their part, sought to diminish their criticism of the orthodox and to convince by wrk rather than by controversy. We may now turn to the second factor unifying Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama, which is intimately linked to the history of the Sarekat Islam. The twmltnous agitation which had swept that movement into prominence during the hectic and unexpectedly prosperous (7) post-war years was gradually ebbing away as erass—roots support diminished. The earlier radicalism of the movement's original leaders had spent itself. The Commnists, in Koloniaal Tijdschrift, op.cit., p.327. Cf. also Charles QO. van der Plas, Nationalism in the Netherlands Indies. (8th Yonference of the Institute of Pacific Relations at Mt. Tremblant, Quebec, 19)2; mimeo.), p.8. (46) Cf. Bousquet, op.cit.e, pe2l. On the youth organization of Nahdatul Ulama, see Pringgodigdo, op.cit., pp.186 f. (47) It is interesting to note that, in colonial times at least, popular unrest in Indonesia appeared to coincide with economic prosperity, while radical grass-roots agitation was less successful in times of crisis. Exports from the Indies reached an unprecedented peak of over two thousand million guilders in 1919 and 1920, the high tide of the Sarekat Islam. Cf. Central Kantoor voor de Statistiek, Statistical Pocket Book of Indonesia, 191 (Batavia: === [PDF page 41] === 26 at first working through the Sarekat Islam, but after their expulsion from that party in 192), independently, henceforth claimed the dwindling allegiance of the uprooted and revolutionary elements in Indonesian society (4@). In two centers — Banten Residency, and the West Coast of Sumatra -- Commmnist-led rebellions broke out between November 1926 and January 1927; with their suppression, the grass-roots tremors of the post-war era came to an end(h9). These rebellions also marked in a way the end of the first phase of Indonesian nationalism which remained unique in the measure of grass-roots support it had been able to elicit or to exploit. The complete failure of the easily suppressed rebellions led to a sharply decreased interest in political agitation among the rural masses. Moreover, colonial policy sought to obviate its recurrence by a strengthening of the traditional adat authority at the expense of too rapid Westernization in the villages which had -~ through the Ethical Policy -—- contributed to the vaguely felt anomie of the Indonesian peasant. (48) Cf. Kahin, opecite, pp.75 f. (49) For a detailed discussion see J. Th. Petrus Blumberger, De commmistische beweging in Nederlandsch-Indid (Haarlem: Tjeenk Willink & Zoon, ond ed., 1935), Ppel0-l03. Cf. also the present author's article, "The Communist Rebellions of 1926-27 in Indonesfa," which will appear in Pacific His- +,.ical Review (Los Angeles, California), during 1955. === [PDF page 42] === 27 The Sarekat 4slam leadership, losing revolutionary initiative to the Communists, had turned to Islam as a rallying point for the masses as early as 1922 (50). In that year the party with the cooperation of Muhammadiyah succeeded in convening the first Al-Islam Congress at Tjirebon (51). Ten such congresses were held until 1932 and they registered rather faithfully the decline of the Sarekat Islam. No doubt the party was made to suffer for the echec of the 1926-27 rebellions; although it had not been directly implicated in the revolts, it had originally contributed to the radicalism which had ultinately bred the outbursts under Commmist leadership. If the earliest two congresses had seen factional strife between reformists and orthodox, the third witnessed the first serious estrangement between the Partai Sarekat Islam and Muhammadiyah, caused by clashing views concerning the Caliphate. The fourth, held at Jogja in 1925, showed that the decline of the movement as a political party was as certain as the fact that it wuld have to cede leadership of the religious forces (50) Gobée, in Daar wérd..., opecit., pel58, Pringgodigdo, op. cit., pp.lG ff., and Blumberger, De nationalistische be- Weging in Nederlandsch-Indid, opecit.e, pp.o2 ff. (51) The brief history of these congresses is in the main based on Pringgodigdo, opecite, pp.48, 54, and 140-41, According to Hadji Agus Salim, one of the driving forces in the Sarekat Islam at that time, the Al-Islam Congresses were intended to counterbalance the "secular" nationalists, and to create greater unity among the contending Indonesian Islamic movements. Cornell Seminar, May 13, 1953. === [PDF page 43] === 28 to others; in particular the P.S.I. lost political, "pan-islamic" initiative after the failure of the above-mentioned Islamic World Congress to materialize at Mecca in 1927 (52). The eighth Indonesian Al-Islam Congress of 1927 saw increasing cooperation between Nahdatul “lama and Muhammadiyah. Together they opposed the spread of Almadiyah teachings from India, which had the support of the Sarekat leadership (53); together they vetoed a Koran translation by Tjokroaminoto, based on the English Ahmadiyah version. In late 1926 the P.S.I.1. forbade its members to belong to Muhammadiyah, imposing on that religious orvanization the same party-disciplinary excommunication which had expelled the Communists from the Sarekat in 1924 (54). After a lapse of four years, two more conzresses were called at the initiative of the now re-named Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia in (52) “Many people felt attracted by this movement /Muhamndiyah/ because it did not propagate attacks on others, not even Christians or agitate against imperialism, restricting itself to protests against governmental interference in mate ters religious," Pringgodigdo, op.cit., p.l07. This was particularly the case after 1926/27, when many Indonesians became weary of radical agitation. (53) On the Ahmadiyah, see Blumberger, op.cit., pp.102-05, and 348-50, and in particular G. F. Pijper, "De Ahmadiyah in Indonesia," in Binzkisan Budi. Ben bundel opstellen aan Dr.Philippus Samuel yan Ronkel, published under the auspices of eae Gennootschap (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1950), pp. 27-54. (54) Pringgodigdo, op.cit., p.l08. Two successive congresses of the P.S.i. and Muhammadiyah, both held at Jogja in February 1928, already revealed the latter's membership to exceed that of P.S.I. quite considerably. === [PDF page 44] === 29 1931 and 1932. They marked the end of the party's role in the Islamic movement proper, while Sarekat Islam was simltanecusly wacing a furicus but losing battle against the non-religious political parties. It fell to Muhammdiyah and Nahdatul Ulama, not to the original sponscr, to resuscitate the Al-Islam Congress after an interval of five years, when Dutch policy -- as we shall see -- seemed to threaten the Indonesian Moslems. Unity in Indonesian Islam was also considerably strengthened because of a third, important factor which from its beginnings in the mid-1°°0's remained of outstanding importmce. In 1919, a Dutch observer had found it natural and almost inevitable that Islam should be the carrier of the nascent Indonesian nationalism (55). Four years later, yet another noted scholar had arrived at a similar conclusion, notins especially the mutual interpenetration of reformism anc the rising tide of nationalism (56). Yet from the second phase of Indonesian nationalism onwards, Islam as an overtly political force tended to be almost completely overshadowed by the "secular" nationalism of the Western-oriented intellicentsia (57). At times, agreement be- (55) See the article on "Islam," in Encyclopeadie van Nederlandsch Oost Indié, opecit., ITI, SOS, on Pelloe (56) Gobée's article, "De Islam," in Gedenkboek van Nederlandsch-Indié, op.cit., pe29s. (57) Cf. Kahin, op.cit., pp.€8 ff. === [PDF page 45] === tween the religious and non-religious Indonesian parties was difficult to achieve. Many intellectuals viewed the Islamic problem in terms not too dissimilar to those used by Snouck Hurgronje. Wherever Islam -- in particulzr Islamic law — in their eyes tended to impede the Westernization of the indies, they saw in it an enemy of nationalism (58). If they attacked the bigotry of orthodox teachings and of pesantren education on the one hand (59), they had little sympathy for Nuhammadiyah in the years to come, on the other, because of its unwillineness to participate, as an organiation, in the political struzgle for independence (60). (58) The orthodox groups often did oppose nationalism, holding that Islam was international. As late as 19)0, “the 15th Nahdatul Ulama Congress made the joining of the Indonesian youth federation Persipi by its own youth group, Ansor, conditional on the federation's deletion of the acceptance of Indonesian netionalism in its statutes. Cf.Pringgodipdo, op-cit., p.186, (59) Thus Dr. Sutomo in February 1928 attacked the Islamic attitude towards women, in particular blaming Islam for allowing child-marriages, easy divorces at the bidding of the husband, and polygamy. This aroused bitter protests. Cf. Blumberger, op.cit., p32. (60) "If the development of Muhammadiyah is allowed to proceed freely," to quote one typical P.S.I. resolution of 1928, "then it will bring in its wake a weakening of the national struggle... /and/ of the nationalist spirit..." Quoted by Van der Plas, "Mededeelingen over de stroomingen...," onecit., p.263. —"Muhammadiyah was not only attacked by the P.S.I.I. and /the orthodox Moslems/, but the nationalists had no sympathy for it either, because the organization insisted on keeping outside the struggle for independence, and because it furthermore even accepted aid from the colonial government." Pringgodigdo, op.cit., p.182. This aid will be discussed in some detail in our next chapter. === [PDF page 46] === 31 Over the next decade the nationalists' attention became increasingly focused on Batavia, while a vigilant and often repressive colonial policy from without, and interminable party-atomizgation from within, largely prevented them from establishing the indispensible links with the mass of the people outside the capital city (61). Particularly during the years of the economic recession, the hardest ever to hit Indonesia under Dutch rule, political agitation in Batavia stood in sharp contrast to the apathy of the mass of the Indonesian people (62). The nationalists, therefore, tended to underestimate the invaluable if slow task (61) The writer does not in-end to develop either of these factors -- the history of the nationalist movement or Dutch colonial policy -- in this study. The early 1930's saw the rise of the Partai Nationalis Indonesia (P.N.I.), and its decline after vigorous government action against Ir.Soekarno and some of its other leaders. The same party also sponsored the P.P.P.K.I., a short-lived federation of Indonesian political groupings, which started to break up after the prohibition of the P.N.I., and finally collapsed when the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia left the federation. Cf. Blumberger, op.cit., ppe272-274. On the history of the "secular" nationalist movement, cf. Kahin, op.cit., pp-90 ff. — It is not suggested that no grass-roots support was elicited by the nationalist parties, but rather that that aspect was given secondary attention. On the socio-economic activities of the largest Indonesian party during the depression years, see R. Mi. Margono Djojchadikoesoemo, "De Parindra en haar economische organisatie, '! Koloniale Studi&n (Batavia), XXII (1939), pp.16L-79. See also Cob€e, in Daar wérd wat groots verricht, op.cit., p.lSu. (62) On this point, see a Volksraad speech by R. Sutardjo Kartohadikusumo, quoted by W. Boegardt, "De Votie-Soetardjo," De Indische Gids (Amsterdam) LIX (1937), pp.1057-66, on p.1063,and Gobée, op.cit., p.l52. See also Note 7, above. === [PDF page 47] === 32 which feformism in particular (63) was performing outside Batavia, and other urban centers, and outside the political battle, in educating a reservoir of Indonesian citizens of the future. Thus, for many years, and long befcre reformist Islam entered the political scene with a political party of its own, Muhammadiyah had done political work of the first magnitude. It is true that, broadly eonceived, Indonesian nmtionalism was strengthened by this politico-educational work, since the increase in numbers of conscious Moslems helped to weaken the mystiqie of colonialism (6))$ the strange dualism between nationalism and Islam maintained in colonial policy was, therefore, at best unrealistic (65). On the other hand, however, the rift between "secular" notionalism and Islam-inspired nationalism was very real and of great importance to the future development of Indonesian politics. (63) As Gobée correctly observed, it was only a question of time for Nahdatul Ulama to follow in the footsteps of the modernists in this respect. See his review article in Koloniaal (6) cf. Kahin, opecit., pp.8&7-88. (65) It was Bousquet's strongest criticism of Dutch Islamic policy not to realize the danger to colonial rule inherent in its somewhat benevolent attitude of later years towards Islamic reformism. la politique musulmme et coloniale..., ppe53 f. === [PDF page 48] === CHAPTER III DUTCH ISTAMIC POLICY IN TRANSITION, 1926 - 1931 In analyzing the growing strength of the Islamic movement, and in particular also its increasing unity in the years following the Communist~led rebellions of 1926-27, we have so far briefly explored the Moslem doctrinal factor, the emergence of both reformist and orthodox organizations as leaders of the Islamic movement, replacing the old Sarekat Islam, and, at some greater length, the position of that movement vis-a-vis the "secular," Western-oriented, Indonesian nationalism. To conclude this part of our analysis, we have to turn to the attitudes and actions of the colonial government in those years. The road will then be clear for an examination of the Tslamic problem durinz the last years of Dutch rule in Indonesia; this will be discussed in the concluding chapter of this part of the present study. Three factors may have been responsible for the changed attitudes of the administration towards Islamic problems in the years under discussion; it will be seen that their combined influence resulted in significant modifications of Snouck Hurgronje's policy which yet in toto was neither re-appraised === [PDF page 49] === 34 nor replaced by a coherent alternative. These factors stemmed, first, from the internal developments discussed in the preceding section; and second, from the rise of Ibn Satud's kingdom in Arabia; and, finally, from the persistent and successful influence exerted by the school of Dutch Adatlaw experts on the colonial government. Tovether, these factors ultimately affect-— ec every sphere of the Islamic problem, already rendered far more complex by the rise of the modernist movement in the early years of the century. The agitation and discontent of the post-war years, culminating in the unexpectedly violent outbursts of the years 1926-27, forced on the authorities the realization of the new dangers of Islam as a grass-roots problem. Although -- as was already stated —- the central leadership of Sarekat Islam owed its inspiration to Islamic reformism, it was the orthodox kyahi's and ulama's in the villages, who had taken a very substantial part in inciting dissatisfied villagers to rebellion. By 1926 27 the dividing line was, in effect, sharply drawn: Communist agitation, both on Sumatra's West Coast and in Banten, had succeeded in working with and through these orthodox yet often primitive local leaders, while reformists had, by and large, been immune against the Communists! rather crude Islamic propaganda (66). (66) Cf. Schrieke, Het communisme ter Sumatra's West-Kust, op. cits, ppelh3-l9, and Rapport van de comissie van onderzoek, === [PDF page 50] === 35 In order to curb the danger of Islamic-inspired rebellions, the goverment had already before the revolts decided to place Moslem village education under administrative control. The so-called furu-ordinane of 1925 —— replacing a previous regulation in force since 1905 -—— obligated not only pesantrenteachers but also muballigh's, the missionary evangelists of Muhammdiyah,to register their intention to give religious instruction to people other than members of their own families, with officers of the Inlandsch Bestuur /i.e., the Native Administrative Corps7 (67). At the outset, therefore, the colonial authorities were suspecting orthodox and modernists alike (68). By 1931, however, when the attitude towards Islamic reformism had changed to one of benevolent tolerance, restrictions against its missionaries were removed: on the other hand, for the first time the humble Koran-instructors in the villages were now in- «+. ingesteld by Gouvernmentsbesluit van 26 Januari 1927, Nodxk /the so-called Banten Report/7 (Weltevreden: Landsdrukkerij, 1928), pp.17-22. “ee also H. Kramer, "Beschouwingen met betrekking tot de Indlandsche beweging," (67) Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indi#, 1925, #219. ‘hen the government proceeded to enforce this ordinance in the Minangkabau region of Western Sumatra in 1928, it met such stubborn resistance under the spirited leadership of Dr. Amrullah that it was ultimately withdraw. Cf. Hamka's Ajahku, opecit., pp.106-10. (68) See Note 2, above. === [PDF page 51] === 36 cluded in this cumbersome procedure (69). Understandable though the motivation for these steps may have been, the inroads into Moslem education showed clearly the artificiality between religion and politics in Islam. No sooner, that is, had Indonesian Islam ceased to be dormant in Java -—- it rarely ever had been quiescent in parts of Sumatra — than Snouck Hurgronje's dividing line between the tolerable and the repressible became blurred, if not obliterated. The consequences of this interference were negative in all respects. As a competent Dutch critic of the measures remarked, not a single religious agitator was ever apprehended as a result of obligatory revistration, which only burdened native administrative officers with an undue amount of paperwork (70). And, as far as the Moslem community was concerned, the Guru-Ordinance was bitterly resented: Year after yearf, Islamic Congresses — of the P.S.I.I., of Nahdatul Ulama and of Muhammadiyah alike (71) —~ condemmed governmental intrusion into religious education. Yet the bureaucratic machine was allowed to roll on under its own momentum until the end cf Dutch rule. As we shall see in the second part of this study, the Japanese contimed, and even (69) Cf. W. J. A. Kernkamp, "Regering en Islan," in Daar werd wat groots verricht, opecite, pp»191-207, on pp.20h-05, (70) Van der Plas, op.cite, pp.267-69. (71) Cf. Pringgodigdo, op.cit., pp.132 ff., and Bousquet, op. cit., PPe 28-29. === [PDF page 52] === 37 tightened, this control: to the chagrin of the Moslems on Java, its abolition was still alleged to be "under consideration" by the Japanese military administration in mid-19h) (72). While these cumbersome regulations were concerned with the control of Islamic education at the village level, parallel ordinances limited and restricted the freedom of private schooleducation alonz Western lines from 1923 onwards (73). These measures, aiming at strict control of the so-called "‘wili" schools, culminated in 1932 in the new "Ordinance Regulating the Control of Private Schools" (74). It is true, of course, that the stringent new regulations were not motivated by concern with Moslem education alone (75); but in Sumatra, in particular, it was bit- (72) According to a speech by Dr. Husein Djajadiningrat, at that time head of the Religious Affairs Office of the Japanese Military Administration on Java, reported in Asia-Raya (Djakarta), May 23, 19h, and Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia (Djakarta), II, 11 (June 1, 1940), pp.1-2. See Part Two, Ch.6, below. (73) Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indi#, 1923, #136 and 1925, 260. (7) Thid., 1932, #49. (75) On Java, the non-religious Taman Siswa schools of Ki Hadjar Dewantoro were particularly affected by this ordiname,. Cf. the article on this organization in Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch Oost Indi&, op.cit., Suppl.VIII, ppelOo-Ol. See also J. M. Pluvier, op cSient van de ontwikkeling der nationalistische beweging in Indonesié in de jaren 1530 tot Toke, ° ocite, PPed2 +. In 1937-30, there were 1960 private, Western-type Indonesien schools in the Indies, with almost 5,000 teachers and nearly 130,000 pupils. Cf. Sg. Djojopoespito, "De taak der Wilde Scholen," De Locomotief (Semarang), December 20, 190. === [PDF page 53] === 38 terly resented by bellizerent orthodox and reformists alike (76). Motives similar to those leading to intervention in matters educational underlay, to some extent, also the government's changed policy vis-a-vis the Mecca pilzrimage. After 1926, writes a Dutch historian, "completely new elements" entered into the up to that time fairly abstentionist policy (77). If pilsrims had in the past only been examined with regard to their health and financial resources, new regulations issued in 1927 and 1928 sought to exclude politically dangerous applicants from entering the hadj (78). In 1930, control over returning pilgrims was transferred to the priyahi officials of the Inlandsch Bestuur (79). These officers — Regents in particular -—- had already exercised supervisory powers over Mohammedan education since 1925, while control over mosques and relizious taxation [zakat7 had belonzed to their prerozative for many decades (80). “oreover, the 1932 Ordinmce (76) On the Islamic reaction in Sumatra, see Hamka, op.cit., pp.108-10. (77) Kernkamp, in Daar werd wat groots verricht, p.202. SS EE ET 1928, #11719. (80) On the Regents! control over Islamic affairs, see the fol-~ lowing articles in Encyclopaedie yan Nederlandsch Oost Indié: [Unreadable] kap," IV, p.662. Prior to 1882, the Regents had even controlled the administration of Islamic justice (Kernkamp, opecit., p.203). In parts cf Java, the Regent in later years === [PDF page 54] === 39 likewise assigned to Regents on Java an important role in the new control machinery regulating private educaticn. This accretion of duties in matters Islamic to the priyahi's was in line with overall colonial policy. “ut with it, the native aristocracy, always regarded by Moslems as executors of a gentile policy of unwarranted religious interference, became a still more frequent target of attack (81). With the establishment of Ibn Sa'ud's govermment, the Mecca pilgrimage also appeared in a new light. In 192h, Indonesian Noslem leaders had accepted an invitation for a Caliphate Conference at Cairo which, however, never took place (82). This short-lived pan-islamic phantom had barely cisappeared when it threatened to re-appear in the shape of the energetic Wahhabi king in Mecca. No wonder that the Indies! auchorities felt alarmed by these events, so evocative of Ottoman precedent. In spite of the suspicions entertained by many leaders of orthodox Indonesian Moslems against the Wahhabi sect, the emerwas still the nominal local head of the Moslem cult; sometimes prayers were said in his name under Dutch rule, although Bousquet (op.cit., p25) reported that the custom was dying eut, under attacks from Moslem leaders. (81) This friction continued under Japanese rule; ultimately the priyahi'ts lost some of their authority under Islamic pressure on the military authorities. Cf. Part Two, Ch.8, below, passim. Islam Yongress, was held at Surabaya in December 192k, sponsored by Sarekat Islam, with Muhammadiyah collaborating, at which the invitation to Cairo was discussed. === [PDF page 55] === mence of a powerful new ruler in Arabia, and in particular the subsequent reign of the Pax Wanhabica, acted as macnets in attracting ever-increasing numbers of hadji'ts to the Holy City. Statistically, the annual Indonesian contingents by far surpassed those of all other Mecca pilgrims from abroad (63): However lax the observance of many other Islamic duties may be in the archipelago, the hadj has remained a sine qua non for all (83) Cf. D. van der Meulen, "The Mecca Pilgrimage and Its Importance to the Netherlands East Indies," The Asiatic Review (London), XXXVI, 127 (July, 190), pp.588-97, and G. H. Bousquet, "Introduction & 1'étude de 1'Islam indonésien," op., cit., pp.186-87. The following table illustrates the great importance of the pilzrimage to Indonesian Moslems: Year Total Cverseas Pilgrims Whereof Indonesians 1925726 26/27 123,052 52, h12 27/28 98,635 43,082 28/29 86,021 31,05 29/30 8,810 33,213 30/31 40,105 17,057 31/32 29, 065 h, 385 32/33 20,026 2,260 34/35 33,898 3,693 35/36 33,730 4,12 36/37 49, 864 5,403 37/38 67,224 10, 327 38/39 59,548 10, 883 Cf. Centraal Kantoor voor de Statistiek van het Department van Economische Zaken, Indisch Verslag 191 (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1941), Part Ti, = 150> whore atatistical data on the pilgrimage are given, going back to 1878. The average cost of an individual pilgrimage is there estimated at over Fl. 856 (including Fl. 225 for the passage both ways). In the peak year of 1926, an estimated Fl. 5 million was withdrawn from the Indonesian economy by the pilgrims: by 1939, this amount was estimated at over Fl. 8 million. Af'ter the depression years, the percentage of Indonesian hadji's never returned to the impressive figures of the first years of the Pax Wahhabica. === [PDF page 56] === 41 Indonesian Moslems, even though the fulfiliment of the holy duty often entailed penury in Arabia and burdensome, perennial debts at home (8). His rule barely established, Ibn Satud set out to convene the previously mentioned World Islamic Congress at wecca in 1926, Two Indonesian delegates were -— surprisingly, but as events proved, wisely -—- allowed to attend this meeting in Ibn Satud's capital. But the world congress, like its Cairo predecessor of 1925, never took place, because of the jealousies and disunity among the rulers of independent Moslem countries who refused to send delegates (85). Thus the threat of a reviving Pan-Islam very quickly receeded (66), and the relations between Ibn Satud (81) An extremely revealing article by Hadji Omar, "El Hadjz," appeared durin: the occupation in Pandji Foestaka (jakarta), XXI, 17/18 (June 1, 1943), pp.638-L0. The author paints a gloomy picture of the ruthless exploitation of the often bewildered and poor Indonesian pilgrims in Mecca. He also shows how prospective hadji'ts evaded the tests of financial solvency demanded by the N.E.I. authorities -- to their own detriment. In effect, the colonial government occasionally granted very limited financial aid for the repatriation of stranded Indonesian pilgrims. Cf. Kernkamp, op.cit., p.202. According to Wiwoho, in the 192 budget only FI. 2,100 had been set aside for this purpose. "Soal Islam di Indonesia sebeloem dan sesoedah 8 Maart 2602," Asia-Raya, "Nomor Peringatan" /Commemorative issue/ of September 19h2 (unpaginated). For a recent comment on the problems facing Indonesian pilgrims in Arabia, see Hamka, PenuNtun naik hadji (Djakarta: Gapura /19817), espe pply ff. (85) Cf. Blumberger, De nationalistische beweging..., op.cite, - pp.88 and 318, resp.3; and see also Notes 3 and 4h, above. (86) In a letter written to the Dutch daily De Telegraaf in 1928, Snouck Hurgronje ~~ at that time teaching at Leiden University —- insisted that Ibn Sa'ud did not aspire to === [PDF page 57] === and the Netherlands became henceforth almost cordial (87). While the affairs of overseas Moslems continued to appear on the agenda's of the annual Islamic congresses in Indonesia (88), interest in these mtters was rather less profound than might appear at first sights Pan Islam thus again became a phantom of little importance to Indonesian Moslems under colonial rule. Yet the vigilance of the colonial government towards the pilgrims was not relaxed; the danger that rebellious Indonesian Noslems might take their grievances to an Islamic center, even without any encouragement from the liecca authorities, was and remained too creat. As it was, Moslem eyes, in Egypt at least, had occasionally expressed a critical interest in Islamic developments in Indonesia (89). The hadj policy in the Indies, the Caliphate. Quoted in "De Mohammedaansche weJt in Indie," a controversy between professors H. J. Nauta and H. T. Damsté in Koloniaal Tijdschrift, XXVII (1938), pp.138-2, 372- 77, and 370-Ol. Damst was still in 1938 convinced that the danger of Pan-Islam waS/a matter of the past. and Van der Meulen, OPpeCites Pe » vee also “nouck Hurgronje's short article commenting on the state visit of Tbn Sa'ud's elder son to the Netherlands in 1926, "Prins Faisal bin Abdal-Aziez al-Sa'oed," Verspreide Geschriften, VI, pp «467-70. (87) Cf. Gobée in Baar werd wat groots verricht, op.cit., peli57, 590 now (88) For a brief summary, cf. Taufiqurrachman, "Sekitar Kisah perdjuangan Islam Indonesia," Mimbar Agama (Djakarta), I, l (October, 1950), pp.29-32, on Sp tO=ST. (89) On Egytian interest in the affairs of Indonesian Moslems, see Gobée in Koloniaal Tijdschrift, op.cit., p.330. === [PDF page 58] === while officially continuing to adhere to Snouck Uurzronje's ruling on non-interference, could no lonzer complacently conform to it after the internal and external events of tne mid- 1920!s. Needless to say, like the encroachments on Islamic education, those restricting the Mecca pilsrimage met with increasing resistance, vituperative from the Sarekat Islam, more moderate yet no less insistent from Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah in the years to come (90). The govermmental policy towards education and the vilgrimage so far discussed concerned Islam on the broadest, the grass-roots level. They both demonstrated that the distinction between the religious and the political (in Snouck's term of reference at least) was tenuous at best. The third factor to be discussed here, that of the influence of the Adatlaw school, on the other hand, touched the Islamic problem on the even more vulnerable second level; it ultimately came into direct conflict with the reformist, and to a lesser degree also orthodox, propaganda efforts to remold Indonesian society closer to the pattern of a truly Islamic community, which were the concomitants of their ever-increasing organizational strength. The study of the Indonesian customary Adatlaw, of which Snouck Hurgronje had been one of the earliest expounders, is one of the proudest, and justifiably proudest, achievements (90) Cf. Gobée, in Daar werd wat groots verricht, p.359. === [PDF page 59] === of Dutch oriental scholarship. While neither the "discovery" of that law (91), nor the great disputes between Adat—experts and the proponents of European law in the Indies are of relevance to the present study, it is imperative to recognize the enormous influence which was wielded by the doyen of Adat scholars, professor Van Vollenhoven, at leiden University — perhaps the most importmt individual to shape the direction of Dutch colonial policy since Snouck Hurgronje (92). Van Vollenhoven and his many talented and even outstanding students conceived of an Indonesian society evolving under Dutch guidance, not by rapid transition to a Western pattern, but by the organic and necessarily slow growth of self-contained, traditional Adat-comminities all over the archipelago (93). The new trend could already be detected in the Reorganization Act of 1927; by the mid-1930'!s, the Adatlaw schoolts colonial philosophy was, in part at least, translated into the administrative reforms for the Outer Islands of the Indies (91) The standard work is C. van Vollenhoven, Het adatrecht van Nederlandsch-indi#é, 3 vols. (Leiden: E. Je Brili, 1933) and the same abthor's La decouverte du droit indoésien, transl. by N. Pernot (Paris: Les Editions Domatn Wontchrestien, 1933). (92) Amry Vandenbosch, The “utch East Indies, op.cit.e, p.108. (93) Cf. Van Niel's dissertation, Opecites ppelo3 ff. For an excellent Indonesian discussion of the connection between the new emphasis on adat and Indonesian Islam, see Sanoesi Fané's| Sislan dan zaman baroe," Asia-Raya of September 17, 1942. === [PDF page 60] === goverment (9h). Whatever the merits of the new policy, it is not surprising that this new vision of Indonesia's future, with its return to indirect rule and local autonomy for small Adat groups, met with increasing hostility from the nationalist elite. At the same time, the new trend in colonial policy offended the Islamic leadership, while it also -— more unexpectedly perhaps — to some extent helped to widen the rift between nationalist and Moslem leaders. The attempt to restrict the field of Islamic jurisdiction and to re-define the role Moslem penghulu-—judges constituted an attack on one of the most complex Islamic issues; it also testified to the strength and influence which the Adatlaw school had gained by the late 1920's, which — as we saw -- were crucial years in the colony's modern history. In 1928, one of the most prominent Adatlaw scholars significantly wrote that governmental policy towards the Indonesian community could be summed up in the one word, "re-orientation" (95). ‘he problem of limiting the sphere of Islamic jurisprud= (94) Cf. i.a. Ae Jansen, "Voortzetting van de Bestuurs¢hervorming," Koloniale Studién, XX, 4 (1936), pp.88-108; Vandenbogh, op.cite, p.l35, and in particular Rupert Emerson, Malaysia, A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule (New York: acm y 2 » PpeLl5—o5. (95) Be ter Haar, "Een keerpunt in de adatrechtspolitiek: Toekomstbeschouwinzgen,"' Koloniale Studi&n, XV, 1 (1928), pp. 245-53, On Pe 2h5. === [PDF page 61] === ence and the concomitant re-definition of the task of Moslem penghulu judges in Java (96) formed admittedly but a minor aspect of this re-orientations it contrasted strangely to the on the whole rather benevolent attitude towards Islamic refornism of those years. The measure thus betrayed a failure to assess the increasing strength of Indonesian Islam, and, more than any previous action taken by the colonial government, this blow tended to convince the Moslem community that "neutrality" in matters religious was nothing more than a hypocritical and spurious claim of their Christian rvlers (97). Islamic jurisdiction in Indonesia, more particularly so on Java, has for long existed in the twilight created by the incomplete victory of Islam over native custom. Traditionally, the competence of Moslem law had been unquestioned in matrimonial matters, while in the at least equally important legal problems connected with succession and inheritance, the individualistic Islamic law has always been in conflict with the communal Javanese Adatlaw, which has prevailed among Indonesians (96) The colleziate penghulu-tribunals are typically Javanese institutions. In many of the Outer Islands, religious jurisdiction is exercised by individual kadi's or judges, in conformity with general Islamic custom. Cf. J. Eisenberger, "De godsdienstige rechtspraak in de Zuider- en Oosterafdeeling van Borneo," Koloniaal Tijdschrift, (97) See, for example, Kyahi H. Moenawar Cholil's previously cited article, "Pemandangan sepintas laloe," in the unpaginated jubilee issue of Sinar Baroe (Semarang) of July, 1943. === [PDF page 62] === to this day (98). Unique among Moslem Jands, Java has moreover never had especially trained Islamic judges /gadhi's or kadi's7 the judicial function being exercised by the penghulu, the official in charge of mosque affairs and simultaneously also the Moslen mariage clerk. The competence of these Islamic ad hoc judges had stood in dire need of definition, ever since the Indies' basic law had created the so-called Priesterraden, or priests' councils, in the late 19th century, which were to continue the adjucication of legal disputes among Moslems on the very vague basis of their competence in 1885 (99). These councils were instituted side by side with regular Superior Native Courts in principal tormships. In addition, the penghulu served as adviser to the lower native courts, or landraden, in all litigation among Moslems. The problem of re-defining and clarifying the place of Islamic jurisprudence vis-a#vis the native customary law had been exhaustively discussed by a succession of counsellors, (98) The most complete recent treatment can be found in Jan Prins, Adat en Islamietische Plichtenleer in Indonesié (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, B), ppeleo ff. (99) Indisch Regeerinzsreclement, Art.78. Cf. C. van Vollenhoven, litek ontwenp op de Vohanmedaansche rechtspraak in Nederlandsche-Indi#," in Het Adatrecht van Nederlandsch- Indi#, op.cit., ITI, ppe77i-7b, and Kernkamp, in Daar werd wal groots verricht, p.203. === [PDF page 63] === 48 including Snouck Hurgronje himself (100). In 1920 he advised to abolish the Priesterraden and thus d away with separate Moslem tribunals -—— and a dual system of jurisdiction — altogether; instead, the penghulu was to serve as advisa@rin all ordinary native courts. This radical measure was never implemented »v the zovermment, but the anomalous position of both Islamic justice and judges came repeatedly under review during the next decade (101). Of the three aspects of religious jurisdiction which called for reform, th first, the definition of the competence of religious tribunals, has already been briefly referred to. Second, if Moslem jurisdiction was to be maintained, then the very unsatisfactory semi-official position of the Islamic judges on Java urgently required reforms. The penghulu, as a@ rule possessed very insufficient training in the law, and was, therefore, a very inadequate Islamic judge. This unsatisfactory legal base made a third reform mandatory, that of instituting a competent Islamic court of appeals from the judgements of the penghulu-tribunals. To begin with, the status of the penghulu as Moslem magistrate was exceptionally low (102). Receiving no fixed income (100) Cf. Snouck Hurgronje, "Rapport over de godsdienstige rechtspraak," Verspreide Geschriften, op.cit., IV, 1 @SPe PPe90-950 (101) For a summary, see Kernkamp, opecit., p.203. (102) The exposition in thetext is largely based on H. Westra, "Custom and Muslim Law in the Netherlands East Indies," === [PDF page 64] === 49 from presiding over the "priests! councils," he had to depend on dues in inheritance matters brought before those tribunals; as marriage clerk and mosque director, the penghulu again had to rely on fees and voluntary contributions. The humiliating irony of the dignitary's position was, however, most strikingly illustrated by the fact that his only function salaried by the government was that of Islamic adviser to the ordinary native law tribunals (103). Yet it was in this pitiful role that the penghulu was degraded to an impotent participant whose Islamic counsel was regularly flouted in criminal or civil cases alike, since both the penal code and mtive customary law would prevail over Koranic precept. By objective standards, the need for reform of penghulujurisdiction was therefore self-evident. It was no less fervently -- if less audibly to official ears — pleaded by the Islamic movement itself, be it for different reasons. From the Moslem point of view, the penghulu's semi-official status rendered him eo ipso suspicious. They saw in him, not a Transactions of the Grotius Society (London), XXV (190), Ppel5l-07, on pp.lol-62, and on the detailed discussion by B. ter Haar, “Halverwege de nieuwe Adatrechtspraak," koloniale Studién, XXII, 2 (1939), pp.113-hl, esp. pp. (103) Demands to make the penghulu a properly paid official were again voiced during the occupation, at a meeting of these functionaries at Djakarta in mid-19\l. Cf. the nat "Xedoedoekan Penghoeloe" in Asia-Raya, May 26, 194i. === [PDF page 65] === properly trained Islamic judge (10), but rather a tool in the hands of the Javanese nobility of the Inlandsch Bestuur, whose loyalty to Islam was as doubtful as was that to their gentile overlords apparent (105). Penghulu's were not only appointed by Regents, they were also the Regents! subordinates, responsible to them for the administration of mosques and mosque funds (106). In 1929 the penghulu was made a public official in his capacity as marriage clerk, and was pro tanto again placed under the supervision of the Regent, who also henceforth controlled the levying of fees for this Islamic ceremony (107). The situation was, therefore, deteriorating (104) Tension always tended to exist betwean penghulu's and ulama's who, in many cases, coulc rightly claim greater knowledge of Islamic law. Cf. Wachid Hasjim's important article "Melenjapkan jang kolot," Soeara Moeslimin Indnesia, II, ll (June 1, 194), p.3:”" "formerly, in the Dutch era, we used to live divided... ulama's opposed penghulu's fand7 administrative officers..." In 1935, the 10th Nahdatul "lama Congress at Solo passed a resolution urging the colonial government to establish proper training courses for penghulu's. If this were not done, the organization would set up competing ulama-tribunals and demand official recognition for them. Pringgodigdo, Sedjarah pergerakan rakjat Indonesia, ap.cit., p.185. (105) Cf. Cholil, loc.cit., and see Note 80, above. (106) According to Hadji Agus Salim, Regents in West Java in particular frequently appointed members of the families to the position of penghulu, thus contributing to the dissatisfaction in the Islamic movement. Cornell Seminar #7, May, 1953. (107) A. D. A. de Kat Angelino, Staatkundig beleid en Bestuurs- Zorg in Nederlandsch-Indié, 3 vols. (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 9 )s Part IT, Yol.Ili, pe27h. === [PDF page 66] === 51 in the eyes of the Islamic movement, orthodox no less than reformist. This is the more understandable if we realize that the last-mentioned resulaticn constituted the first direct attack on Moslem marriage law in Indonesia, the one province in which its validity had never been in doubt. The Marriage Ordinance of 1929 (108) introduced the "conditional talak," or repudiation, into Islamic marriage law, by which a wife can obtain an automatic divorce if the husband defailts from his contractual promises to her (109). Aimed at enhancing the position of women, this ordinance was passed by the Volksraad and met with the approval of most Indonesian nationalists, who consistently propagated for improvement and modernization in the status of the Indonesian wife (110). On the other hand, the reaction of Moslem spokesmen, both orthodox md reformist, was outspokenly hostile to such (108) Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indié, 1929, #348. (109) Cf. Bousquet, "I,troduction A ltétude de l'Islam indonésien," opecit., "De 235-36, for a good analysis. (110) See Note 59, above. Such amelioration was doubtless urgently required. "The husband," writes Jan Prins, "can repudiate his wife at any moment he likes without any formal complication... /During/ 1929, 1930, 1931... more than 50%, almost 60% of all 1“flosien? marriages ended by deliberate dissolution eee it will be extremely difficult to find a country in the world with such a high divorce rate. This situation presents Java's severest socio-~ juridical problem."' As the author says, the situation has not significmtly changed since then. "“Adatlaw and Muslim Religious Law in Modern Indonesia,” op.cit., pp.290-92, === [PDF page 67] === 52 dictation (111). The rift between the Islamic movement and the government widened, and at the same time the difference between Indonesian Islam and the "secular" nationalists were becoming ever more apparent. The Islamic protests, not heard in the legislature which had no members representing Islamic groups, were as yet too weak sufficiently to impress the authorities, who were thus totally unprepared for the storms of the future (112). Had it not been for the depression, the more fundamental onslaught on Islamic law might have found its way to the statutebook in January 1931, when a new ordinance at long last emerged from the criticisms of the Adatlaw protagonists, and from the recommendations of the Djajadiningrat-Commission (113). Since, (111) Cf. Pringgodigdo, op.cit., p.183 for Muhammadiyah protests, pel@5 for those of Nahdatul Ulama, and pp.10-l2, for resolutions of the P.S.S.I. and successive Al-Islam Congresses. It is regrettable that these justified protests were never accompanied by an equally vigorous and courageous Moslem attempt to improve the existing unfavorable conditions. Prins (loc.cit.,p.292) quotes Wiwoho's statement in the Volksraad of 1935 to the effect that "the conjugal as well as the social rights of the Muslim woman are an inexhaust—- ible source of disputes in the Muslim Indonesian world." (112) Cf. the breakdown of Volksraad representation in the years 1916-31, in Pringgodigdo, op.cit., pp»96-97. The only Islamic-political party, the P.S.I.I., was "noncooperative," and thus had no spokesman in the Conncil. (113) See Kernkamp, in Daar werd wat groots verricht, pp.203-Oh. The commission had been set up in 1927, with B. ter Haar —- an Adat expert -- as its only European member. The writer has not been able to ascertain the membership of the commission or the exact contents of its recommendations. It is unlikely, however, that either branch of the Islamic movement was represented -- if, indeed, it was heard in testimony. === [PDF page 68] === 53 however, the proposed reorganization called for considerable expenditures, the government indefinitely postponed the issuance of the proclamation needed to give the ordinance legal effect. While the more far-reaching reforms envisaged in the ordinance thus never became reality, six years later some of the important changes contained in the original proposal were put into effect. A more detailed discussion of the new jurisdictional division will be found in the following chapter; but we should note that, from 1931 onward, the threat to Islamic justice, uncertainly hovering over the heads of the Moslem comminity, added defiant strength to its leadership. === [PDF page 69] === CHAPTER IV INDONESIAN ISLAM DURING THE CLOSING YEARS OF DUTCH RULE By the mid-1930's, the contours of the Islamic problem in Indonesia had unjJergone significant, if not revolutionary, changes on all the three levels which have been analyzed in the preceding pages. If, at the grass-roots level, the agitation and tumult of the early post-war years had subsided, and had given way to a large measure of rural apathy during and after the economic crisis, Moslen consciousness and awareness had been kept alive and strengthened by both Islamic reformist and orthodox organizations (11). As for the political aspect of Islam, the decline of Sarekat Islam was a misleadins barometer to indicate the political potential of the religious movement, and of reformism in particular. In addition to the important educational work already (114) In the words of C. Hooykaas, "... it is certainly a fact that in the Netherlands Indies we have at this time not only a far larger Moslem population than at the time /of7 ee. onouck Hurgronje...; these Moslems are now, more—- over, spread over a far wider area, in addition to being partly /at least7 better Moslems, both in the observance of their religious duties and in the knowledge of the teachings." Algemeen Indisch Dagblad (Bandung), January 15, 1941. === [PDF page 70] === 55 analyzed above, politics and reformist religion came into ever closer contact; not only could and did individuals — including leaders of religious movements — take an increasingly active part in politics, but, as we shall see, a new Islamic party, representing the reformists, came into being during the period under discussion. Finally, looking at Islam as a socio-religious factor in those years, the growinz Islamic insistence on not only retaining Moslem positions, but on vdushinz out the frontiers of the Islamic influence within Indonesian society, cane into increasing conflict with policies of the colonial government. We already mentioned in passing the friction between "secular," Western-oriented, nationalists and the tslamic leadership which developed in spite of the fact that the new Adat trend in colonial policy offended both, though for different reasons. Before entering into a scrutiny of the events of the last years of Dutch rule in Indonesia, a ceneral introductory orientation may be useful. “here can be little doubt that in later years the Islamic problem was accorded a subordinate place among the colonial government's preoccupations(115); that, in other words, its importance tended to be underestimated in comparison to the admittedly thorny questions posed by the vocally strong, (115) cf. Xernkamp, op.cit., pp.199-200, and in varticular Bousquet, La politique musulmane e. coloniale des Fays- Bas, DDeix=Xe === [PDF page 71] === 56 if mumerically rather weak, nationalist movement. One sux.zestive indication of this attitude can be seen in the decline of the prestige of the Kantoor voor Inlandsche Zaken, the administrative azency in charge of Islamic affairs, from its preeminence under Snouck Hurgronje, who had been the first Adviseur, or: head of this advisory bureau. At one time an independent and important post, whose incumbent had direct access to the Yovernor—teneral and all department heads, its independence came under attack in later years. Althouzh the Adviseur still fulfilled important intermediary functions, some critics even advocated abolition of the bureau in the conviction that its task in matters Islamic had shrunk to relative insignificance, while in all other matters the government could rely on information contained in newspapers, political speeches -=- or in reports of the political information department of the regular police (116). (116) On the Kantoor voor Inlandsche Zaken, see Kernkamp, op. cit., p.206, Bousquet, op.cit., pp.li8 ff., and Gobbe's review article in Koloniaal Tijdschrift, op.cit., pp.333- 34. Needless to say, the Islamic movement always resented the fact that Moslem affairs were entrusted to Christian Adviseurs; cf. A. Salam Yahja, 'Islam dizaman Belanda," Soeara \.1.A.1. (Djakarta), I, 15 (August 15, 1943), p.10, and Sanoesi Pané, "Islam dan zaman baroe," Asia—taya, September 17, 1942. Dr. Husein Djajadininzgrat, an outstandinz Indonesian Islamic scholar, was appointed Assistant Adviser in 1920. Although this was an important appointment, it must be added that Dr. Djajadininzrat is a member of one of the most influential aristocratic Priyahi families. In the eyes of the Islamic movement, the appointment therefore lost much of its significance. === [PDF page 72] === 57 In point of fact —- and as the Japanese understood only too well -—= it was as yet Islam rather than modern mtionalism which could claim the allegiance of the Indonesian rural masses (117). Dutch policy in those last few years, however, alienated both the nationalist and Islamic elites, the one by a partial blindness anchored in the early principles of its Moslem policy, the other by a policy of calculated aloofness. We might add parenthetically that it would have been far easier to satisfy nationalist demands by a grant of dominion status, than to construct a new, more positive, Islamic policy: The continued presence of a Christian government as such formed the most formidable obstacle in the way of a reinvizorated Indonesian Islam (118). (117) As far as rural Indonesia is concerned, this may still very largely be true today. Cf. Paul N. Kattenburg, A Central Javanese Village in 1950 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Southeast Asia Progran, Data Paper #2, 1951), pp.15-16. (118) Writing in 190, the former Adviseur Dr. Gobbe stated the problem as follows: "™... A colonial, non-Moslem government easily becomes suspect of being prejudiced against Islam in favor of Christianity... It would show a lack of understanding and an underestimation of the difficulties confronting the government to misjudge the feelings aroused in a Moslem community living under alien rule, once it feels that its religion is endangered. In assessing the importance of /Noslem/ complaints and demands we should never lose sight of the fact that the very feeling of dependence and impotence alone makes matters often appear in a /wrong/ light..." "Folitieke en relizieuspolitieke beweginzen," in paar werd wat groots verricht, p59. === [PDF page 73] === 58 As has been shown in preceding pages, the principle of neutrality had over the years been repeatedly infrinzed, with regard to such matters as education, the pilsrimage and marriage law. Quite apart from these specific examples of violation of an oft-proclaimed principle, Indonesian Moslem equally strongly resented the observance of neutrality towards their religion in practice. Not unjustifiably they argued that neutrality meant indifference to the point of offense in matters Islamic, while Christian missions could operate with official approval and receive financial aid from public funds in a predominantly Moslem country (119). Compared with governmental subsidies granted to Christian worship, for example, Islamreceived aid anoumting to less than a pittance (120). A similarly unfavorable balance could, again, (119) Motions urging the government to withdraw Art.177 of the Basic Law, governing the admission and work of Christian missions, were repeatedly adopted at Islamic congresses during the late 1930's. Cf. Yringgodigdo, op.cit., pp. 186-88, and Taufiqurrachman, op.cite, p30. (120) Over a four-year period, the following subsidies to religious worship were paid, according to budgetary entries in Staatsblad voor Nederlandsch-Indié: Staatsblad Protestant Catholic Moslem [Unreadable] 1937, #410, pp.25/26 683, 200 290, 700 7,500 1938, #511, pp.27/28 696,100 296,100 7,500 Wiwoho (Asia~Raya jubilee volume of September 192, loc. cit.) and Moenawar Cholil (Sinar Baroe jubilee volume 0: of July 1943, loc.cit) alleged that the 1941 budget provided for only F1.U, 600 for Islamic norship, as against a total of almost ¥1,. 13 million for the two Christian denominations. Wiwoho added that of the F1.4,600, one-half was set aside === [PDF page 74] === 59 be drawn up in the case of government-subsidized private schools (121). ‘In the field of the Mecca pilgrimage, finally, neutrality insufficnetly protected poorly-informed hadji's against the financial pitfalls which only too often befell them after their arrival in the Holy City -—~ and after havinz paid the rather expensive fares charged by the Dutch shipping lines who held a monopoly on transporting Indonesian pilgrims to Arabic (122). for financing the return trip of destitute Mecca-pilgrims, the other half going to the salaries of the mosque-personnel at Kutaradja (Atjeh, Northern Sumatra). This was the only mosque thus financed in all Indonesia; during the Achin wars, the original house of worship had been destroyed by the Dutch who had then built a replacement, which, according to this informant, was not visited by the faithful! (121) During 1940, 115 private Moslem native-language primary schools received governmental subsidies compared to 2,470 similar Christian (1803 Protestant and 667 Roman Catholic) schools; for Western-style "Dutch-native" and for socalled "link"-schools, the figures were 7 for Islamic institutions, O for Protestant and 21 for Roman Catholic schools receiving subsidies. Cf. Indisch Verslag 191, Part II, pp.18-22. For an Indonesian comment, see Dr. Subardjo's article, "The Muslims in Indonesia," Mimbar Agama, (Djakarta), I, 2 (August, 1950), pp.65-68. Meager though the subsidies were, the "secular" nationalists could not forgive Muhammadiyah for accepting governmental aid at all. Cf. Prinszodigdo, op.cit., p.109. (122) Hadji Agus Salim, Cornell Seminar #6, May, 1953. Cf.Hadji Omar's article in randji Poestaka, loc.cit., where a comparison is draw with E-yptian pilgrims, well~looked-after by their Moslem government, accordinz to the author. By contrast, Indonesian pilgrims were nicknamed "Djawa bagar" (Javanese cows) by their con€mptuous Arabian hosts who, aided by non-intervention of the Netherlands’ consular of-~ ficials, took pride in filching their hapless and inexperienced victims. === [PDF page 75] === More fundamental still, the colonial government's overall attitude of "benevolent aloofness" towards Islam left it at best on the fringe of the tolerable, without encouragement, and without a positive and constructive task to fulfill in the islands, It is against this general hackground that later developments must be viewed. Another preliminary observation needs to be made. The non- Islamic nationalist movement, in spite of the continued vehemence of its criticism of the goverrment in- and outside of the Volksraad, aspired towards the attainment of “estern-style democracy in Indonesia. Its international orientation was increasingly influenced by the growth of Euroman fascism, and particularly after the outbreak of World War I1 -- anc more strongly still after the German occupation of the Netherlands in May, 19)0 -- officially at least, most nationalist parties sided with the democracies (123). No doubt this -partisanehip partisanship was in many instances only skin-deep, if not solely dictated by politico~-stratesic considerations; but by some of the Indonesian leaders, like Mohammad Hatta and Sutan Sjahrir, for example, the defense of democracy against fascism was profoundly and sincerely felt to be a matter cf life and death to (123)0f. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, pp.96 ff.: J. de Kadt, De Indonesische tragedie: het treurspel der gemiste kansen (Amsterdam: &. A. ‘'an Oorschot, TLD, Chapter I; J. 4. Mulder, "Yan Nederlandsch-Indié tot Indonesié," in Wordend Indonesid, ed. by 7%. L. Tichelman % 4. van Neurs (Haarlem: De Spaarnestac, 1948), pp.13-6h, esp. pp. ff., and Pluvier, op.cit., pp.167 ff. === [PDF page 76] === 61 the cause of Indonesian naticnalism itself (12h). No such ties of intellectual and emotional allegiance bound most Indonesian Moslems or their leaders to the victory of Western democracy. On the contrary, the Western record in “Moslem countries of the Micdle East anc India, together with the still-remembered Turko-‘erman alleziance of the first World ‘lar, perhaps also the voluntary exile of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem in Berlin ~-- all these factors tended to make the Indcnesian Islamic elite at best lukewarm spectators in the war (125). Thus the Moslem leadership, alienated by old rrievances and new inroads on Indonesian Islam, remained aloof from the short-lived and disappointed hopes for collaboration in the war effort, and concessions to their demands, which many Indonesian nationalists had entertained during the last two years of Dutch rule (126). The year 1937 brought two developments of crucial importance to Indonesian Moslems (127). First, the long-threatened (12h) See especially Soetan Sjahrir, Out of Exile, transl. by Charles Wolf’, Jr. (New York: The John Day Co., 1949), pp.217-65. (125) Sjahrir recollected the followins reaction on Banda Neira (in the Moluccas) in late 191: "... Each evening I was vexed by the sentiments that the people voiced. The Moslems were for Hitler and anticipated the comin); of the Japanese, while the Christians, though anti-Japanese, were often not opposed to Hitler." Ibid., p.223. (126) Pluvier, opecite, pp.167 ff. (127) Interestingly enough the otherwise very discriminating and intellivent observer, Professor Bousquet, who visited === [PDF page 77] === 62 reorganization of Islamic jurisdiction was -—— be it incompletely -- put into effect in the early months of the year. Second, in mid-1937 an unsuccessful attempt was made at introducing a new marriage law for Moslems, which would have abolished polygamy. These onslaughts led Islamic organizations to unite in an endeavor to regain the lost ground, and to demonstrate the strength of Indonesian Islam to the zovernment. The 1931 draft-ordinance for the reorganization of Islamic jurisdiction had comprised three separate reforms. in the first place, a higher oslem tribunal was envisazed, to be styled Court for Islamic Affairs /Wahkamah Islam Tinggi7. to fill a long felt need of a court of appeals from the lower religious courts. This tribunal was finally set up and commenced its activities on Jamary 1, 1938, not without criticism from some Islamic quarters (128). the Indies during 1937, maintained that no serious problem occupied Islamic leaders at that time. Cf. La Politi musulmane et coloniale des Pays-Bas, p.53. See also Gobee's comment on this statement, Koloniaal Tijdschrift, opecit., p28. (128) On the setting up of the Court, see Kernkamp, op.cit., pp.203-0h. The first president of the Court was Raden Eadji Mohammad Isa, a pesantren-educated aristocrat who had studied at Mecca for eight years. Cf. the obituary notice in Nieuws van den Dag (Pancung), Jamary 7, 19h1. The P.5S.1I.1I. protested against the establishment of the tribunal, urging its replacement by a judicial body appointed, not by the -overnment, but by fslamic organizations themselves. See Pringgodizdo, op.ecit., pp»lih-L5. Kyahi Mas Mansur, }eading figure in the ifuhammadiyah executive, refused appointment to the very remunerative post of the Court's presidency in 1937, according to a biographical sketch which appeared during the occupation in Agia-Raya of December 26, 192. === [PDF page 78] === 63 Secondly, the collegiate Priesterraden were at long last to be abolished. The penghulu, assisted by at most two advising members, was to be sole judge in the proposed new tribunals, or Penghulu Courts. Furthermore, the penchulu-judge was to draw a fixed and even relatively high salary for what was to become his main function, while no emoluments would henceforth be attached to his services as Islamic adviser to the ordinary native law courts, hitherto his only income from governmental funds: In the proposed scheme, the penghulu retained his posts of mosque director and marriage clerk. This measure was not only long overdue, but the improved position of the penghulu might also have met Moslem claims, to some extent at least. It was, therefore, doubly unfortunate that it was not incorporated into the decree of 1937. Instead, the old and anomalcus Priesterraden were kept in existence, and with them the unsatisfactory status of the penghulu's continued (129). The third and pivotal measure included in the earlier draft-ordinance, and the only one to be enacted in early 1937, dealt a severe blow to the prestige of Indonesian Islam, by removing all inheritance and succession matters from the competence of Islamic jurisdiction (130). Seeing that in Indonesian (129) Cf. Kernkamp, op.cit., pp»203-0h, and Westra's article in Transactions of the Grotius Society, op.cit., pp.157-58. (130) Staatsblad, 1937, #116. === [PDF page 79] === 64, Indonesian legal practice Adatlaw as a rule prevails over the religious law in these matters, this far-reaching decision may have had certain logical and legalistic merits. But from the political point of view it constituted a major strategic blunder. A victory for the Adatlaw school, and an indication of its increasing influence on Dutch colonial policy (131), it came at a time of growing Islamic strength of which the government was either insufficiently aware or which it chose to ignore at the risk of alienating Moslem opinion. Tumultuous meetings and congresses of all Islamic organizations immediately protested in unusually vehement language against what was felt to be an unforgiveable assault on Indonesian Islam (132). Indeed, in one technical respect the removal of inheritance matters from the purview of the Priesterraden added humiliation to offense: the penghulu, no longer competent to adjudicate on these matters in his capacity as member of that tribunal, had not only lost a source of income because of this loss of competence; to make matters worse, he was nowcast in the ornamental role of "Mohammedan Acviser" to the ordinary native law courts, on which exclusive inheritance jurisdiction had devolved. These tribunals were thus henceforth compelled (131) "Muslim law has been further pushed back by the school of customary law," wrote Westra in 190, significm tly adding, "the question is whether the authorities have not gone too far along this road." "Custom and Muslim law in the Netherlands East Indies," op.cit., p.166, (132) Cf. ia. Pringgodigdo, OpeCite, p.186, === [PDF page 80] === 65 solemnly to listen to the penghulu's opinions, based on Islamic law, which they invariably would set aside in favor of Adatrulings. Yet, bound to this unenviable and frustrating task by the only goverrmental income, the penghulu was, and remained, his own prisoner (133). Only a few months had passed when a new, and no less fornidable, attack threatened the only major province to which Islamic law was now confined. Having -- as was previously mentioned —-crafted on the Indonesian Moslems' marriage law the so-called "conditional talak" in 1329, the colonial government now attempted to put a virtual end to polygamous marriages which Islam allows. While the new reform might have further immroved the by no means satisfactory status of Indonesian womanhood, polygamy as such, mainly perhaps on account of ecynomic reasons, occurs very infrequently among Indonesian Moslems (13h). But irrespective of the objective desirability of improving and reforming Islamic marriage law, it will be recalled that ths (133) Far an excellent, detailed discussion, see B. ter Haar, tHalverwege de nieuwe Adatrechtspraak, op.cit., esp. poel27 ff. This important article sho be regarded as a sequal to the same author's discussion of the future of adatlaw. Cf. Note 95, above. (134) According to Prins, "'simultaneous! polygamy is not frequent, about 2% of all /Indonesian/ males /having/ had more than one wife accordinz to the census of 1930; but what may be called successive polygamy is truly a social cancer." See his article in Welt des Islams, op.cit., p.292. "Successive polyzamy" is caused by the easily effected repudiation by the msband. See Note 110, above. === [PDF page 81] === 66 interference by an however benevolent Christian government in 1929 had already aroused bitter and profound resentaent. The colonial government was apparently not unmincful of this earlier reaction; moreover, the vehement protests over the very recent diminution of the competence of religious jurisdiction had certainly counselled caution. The new draft-cordinance —~ styled "Ordinance Concerning Registered Marriages" -- was, therefore, not introduced into the Volksraad by the government spokesman} instead, it was proposed by the Department of Justice, and the Adviseur voor Inlmdsche Zaken acted as intermediary in preliminary discussions with Indonesian parties and organizations (135). The reaction of most "secular" nationalist groupings was on the whole as favorable as it had been in 1929. On the other hand, a cry of indignation greeted the draft-ordinance from all Islamic groups. Stormy congresses and special meetings of orthodox and reformists alike voiced their hostility to this latest abandonment of an alleged governmental neutrality in Moslem religious affairs. And, for the first time in over three decades, the by now impressiw and united protest of Indonesian Islam was heeded: The draft-ordinance, having been only tentatively launched without a priori committing the colonial govern- (135) The text is largely based on a detailed account by G. F. Pijper, "De strijd om de monogamie," Koloniale Studién, XXI (1937), pp.76-90. or.Pijper was at that time Assistant Adviser on Native Affairs. === [PDF page 82] === 67 ment, was withdrawn (136). At long last, as one of the most competent Dutch observers admitted, the strength of Indonesian Islam had to be recognized (137). That strength was soon after the "battle for polyzamy" organizationally expressed. The most impressive Islamic federation under Dutch rule, the M.I.A.I. /Madjlisul Islami] a'laa Indonesia, or Indonesian tslamic Council7 was set up at Surabaya in September, 1937 (138). This new organization was charzed with the convening of the annual Al-Islam Congresses, the last of which had actually been held as far back as early 1932. The significance of the new Congresses lay in the fact that they were thus no longer sponsored by the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, whose influence in matters Islamic had been steadily declininz (139). The initiative for the formation of Mi.I.A.I., and for the calling of future Al-Islam Congresses, had primarily come from the leaders of Kuhammadiyah (especially from Dahlan and Kyahi Yas Mansur) and from Nahdatul Ulama (especially from Kyahi Abdul Wahab) (140). The predominance (136) Kernkamp, opecit., p.20k. (138) Pluvier, De ontwikkeling der nationalistische beweging..., opecit., p.130. The new organization had an Arabic, not an indonesian, name. (139) Cf. Pringgodigdo, op.ecit., p.ll2. === [PDF page 83] === 68 of the leaders of the "non-political," religious movement was, as we shall see, challenged by the more radical P.S.I.I. leadership in the early stages of the Japanese occupation. Admittedly this federative body was no monolithic colossus, any more than were the federations of Indonesian political partjes of those and of earlier years. Jt is also true that, in spite of the unity of orthodox and reformists vis-a-vis the colonial government's policy, disagreements amone them still occurred, as was proved at the 12th Al-Islam Conazress of May, 1939 (11). Yet the imnortance of the achievement should not be underrated. Where, in the middle and late 1920's, and for many years thereafter, Indonesian Moslems had been represented by a shrill though powerless spokesman, the '.5.I.1I., now the two largest and far more responsible Moslems organizations, with hundreds of thousands of members, had themselves assumed the leadership of Indonesian Islam (12). Ironically enough, it was in answer to governmental policy, and to some extent also as a demonstration of strength directed against the P.S.I.I., that the new Islamic federation cane into (1,1) This Congress was actually boycotted by Nahdatul Ulama because of disagreements over missionary work among Javanese colonists settled in Sumatra. Cf. Pringgodizdo, op.cit., pp.186-88. (1\2) cf. W. Wondoamiseno, "Sikap M.J.A.I. terhadap peroebahan djaman baroe," Pandji Poestaka, XX, 28, (October 17, 19l2) pp.973-76, where also a listing of the organizations adherinz to the new federation can be found. === [PDF page 84] === 69 being. The strength and relative unity of Indonesian Islam, as represented in M.I.A.I., stood in marked contrast to the dwindling influence of the P.S.I.I. which paralleled its waning popular support by a series of self-inflicted purges among its leadershiv between 1937 and 1940 (113). The party joined the M.I.A.I. in 1939, but by that time it was, as we shall see, no longer the only openly political group with strong Islamic tendencies which it had been since 192k. The driving force within the new federation was doubtless Muhammadiyah, which imprinted on its program not only the em~- phatic and repeated protests against governmental intefference, and in particular against the insufferable losses in the province of Islamic law, shared by modernists and orthodox (14); but, going beyond criticism and protest, Muhammadiyah itself took the lead in positive action. The Islamic movement had, at long last, reached the point at which it felt strong and responsible enough to build safeguards for the Indonesian Moslen comminity. In 1937 a beginninz was made with the formation of a (143) For a review of these successive blood-lettings, commencing with Hadji Salim in February, 1937 to Kartosuwirjo's expulsion in January, 190, see Pluvier, opecit., pp.71-72, and 113-17, resp., and Pringgodigdo, op.cit., pp.16-L9 and 166-67, resp. ~~ (144) In 1937, both leading organizations invited the government to cease subsidizing Moslem education, on condition that subsidies to Christian education be likewise discontinued -~ a bold and unprecedented challenge. See on this point Pringgodigdo, opecit., p.186, and Gobée's review article in Kolonia Tijdschrift, op.cit.e, p.328. === [PDF page 85] === 70 pank and a shipping company, in order to provide credit as as well as cheaper passages for Indonesian Mecca pilgrims. Of greater importance still, Muhammadiyah led in the agitation for the establishement of an Islamic University far the training of expert personnel to staff religious law tribunals (145). The strong and unmistakable Islamic protests of 1937 and the forceful, constructive initiative shown by the religious movement in the period following this agitation did not fail to impress the colonial authorities. Gradually and hesitatingly a mumber of steps were taken, obviously designed belatedly to placate Moslem opinion. Needless to say, amy one of these quasiconcessions constituted a departure from Snouck Hurgronje's principles, if not an admission of the failure of the basis on which tslamic policy had contimed to operate. When plans for an Islamic College began to be seriously mooted in 1938, the colonial government -- far too late in the opinion of one Dutch editor ~-=- promised to subsidize the new venture, recognizing the importance of /nigher training center to replace Cairo's Al Azhar, hitherto the only such educational institute in the Islamic world (15). (146) Cf. newspaper comments in Le Java Bode (Batavia) of May 17, 1938 and Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad (Batavia) of March 11, 19,0. With governmental aid, an Islamic hizh school was opened in Solo during August 1939, whose students were to enter the envisaged Collere with some preparation and specialized knowledge. === [PDF page 86] === 71 Further measures followed at a somewhat faster rate after the occupation of tre Netherlands in May, 190, when, on the one hand, the local authorities were freer to take decisions Without the jealous control of the strong Christian faction in the States-General at The Hague, and when, on the other, it may have been found advisable to court Moslem goodwill in the difficult days ahead. Jt is not without interest to note that these in themselves minute gestures were yet made at a time when no signal concessions were granted to nationalist demands. In November of 190, the first special training school for penghulu's was officially and ceremoniously opened at Tjibeureum in “est-Java (147). Earlier in the same month, the government announced -—- after a previously sranted relaxation of exchange restrictions regardinz money transfers to Indonesian pilgrims in Mecca -- the granting of rather considerable public funds to support indigent hadji's in the Arabian capital (148). (147) Algemeen Indisch Dagblad (Bandung), November 12, 190. As was mentioned in passing, Nahdatul Ulama had urged the goverrmment to provide for such training at its 10th Congress in 1935. Cf. Pringgodigdo, opecit., p.185. (148) De Java Bode, November, 190. Fl. 8,000 per month were to be provided for this purpose. To appreciate the importance and magnitude of this decision, budget provisions for the whole year should be kept in mind. For these,see Note 120, above. -- The Moslem community collected funds for needy pilgrims, but some of these funds were not remitted to Mecca in time. In late 192, the Japanese authorities promised to have them transferred through the intermediary cf the Swedish government. Cf. Asia-Raya, Octoher 26, 192. === [PDF page 87] === 72 A few months before the outbreak of the Pacific War, finally, the colonial zovernment took an equally unprecedented step, wm.en it announced the issuance of a series of five special postage stamps with a charity surcharge for Muhammadiyah; similar issues for the berefit of “hristian missions had been repeatedly issued in previous years(1l9). While nothing was done to return inheritance matters to Islamic jurisdiction and thus win wider Moslem approval, to some extent at least a measure of respect to Moslem wishes and feelingsWas thus belatedly shom. Indirectly, therefore, the strength of the Islamic movement had finally been acknowledred by the makers of Dutch colonial policy in the last years of Dutch rule in Indonesia. Our concluding comments concern islam on the third, political, level durinz these years. The general political significance of the steadily zrowing Islamic movement as such has already received passing attention in previous pages. More, perhaps, than the as yet far more limited nationalist appeal, the deepened Islamic consciousness which had spread among broad layers of the Indonesian community ~~ especially also in the youth and scouting organizations of both orthodox and reformists -- had contributed to a growing anti-colonial sentiment. (149) Cf. the special issue, "Franco 'Amal Moehammadijah® of Soeara Moehammadijah (Jogja), XXII, 7 (August 15, 194T). === [PDF page 88] === 73 At the center of the political scene in the carital city, on the other hand, Islam was by contrast conspicuously anc ludicrously under-represented, partly because the only Islamic political party, the F.S.I.I., did not participate in the work of the Volksraad and of regional and Regency councils, It was only with the dismemberment of that party that a new "cooperating" Partai Islam Indonesia (P.I.I.) came into being in late 1938; one year later, one of its leaders was appointed to the central legislature, there to represent in effect all the political interests of millicns of Indonesian Moslems (150) t The new party marked the entry of Indonesian Islamic reformism into the political strugzle: the dividing line between politics and religion was thus, in the final analysis, shown to be une real as well as undesirable (151). If for no other reason than to make its voice clearly heard in protest against governmental assaults on its domain, Islam had to choose the political arena, In fact, it had to enter it also in self-defense against the non-religious nationalist parties who, as we saw, had not objected to the (150) Pluvier, opecit., p.133. There were, however, two Volksraad members representing 14 million Indonesian Christians. Dr. Sukiman became president of the new party, with Wiwcho, Ke Bagus Hadikusumo, Wali Al-Fatah, FariZd Ma'ruf, and four more members making up the executive. Cf. Pringgodigdo, Opecite, pell9. (151) Significantly, vyahi Mas Mansur, chairman of the "nonpolitical" MNuhammadiyah, held the post of adviser to the executive of the Pii.i. TIbide, pelli?. === [PDF page 89] === government's attempts at restricting the competence of Islamic law in Indonesia. The contours of the future political constellation with its basic polarization can thus — however roughly -- be discerned from 1938 onwards. In another perspective we can likewise observe the significant political coming-of-age of Indonesian Islam in those years. After the failure of the first attempted federation in 1930 (152), the heightened pulse of organized nationalist action demonstrated itself in an endeavor again to unite all Indonesian political groupings in the late 1930's. This political coordination took place a few months before the outbreak of the War with the creation of Gapi /Gabungan Politiek Indonesia7 in May, 1939 (153), in which the unity of Indonesian nationalism, temporarily at least, triumphed over the divisions among "cooperators" and "non-cooperators." With the achievement of this alliance, the road was clear for a more far-reaching agreement among Indonesian groupings, which international developments made appear desirable. The Islamic federation M.I.A.I., antedating the Gapi by several months, and representative of a far greater number of (152) On the disintegration of this earlier federation, or P.P.P.K.I., see Note 61, above, and Cf. Blumberger, De nationaiistische beweging in Nederlandsch-Indié, op.cit., oats Fi 33730 apt 13839, resp-, and Pluvier, op. cit., pp.63 ff. (153) For a brief summary, see Kahin, op-cite, ppe96-97. Cf. also Pluvier, op.cit., ppel3u ff. for a more detailed discussion. === [PDF page 90] === 75 Indonesians, formed the indispensible second pillar in the structure of an all~Indonesian united front which its founcers hoped would convincingly present the demands for zreater autcnom, to the colonial government. Thus, on the eve of the Pacific war, the call for an Indonesian parliament, and the adoption of a national language, anthem and flag, came from a united Indonesian federation (15). This united front passed through two stages, the rather cumbersome Kongres Rakjat Indonesia, founded in December, 1939, which transformed itself into the far more promising Medjelis Rakjat Indonesia in September, 1941 (155). In this rather impressive, if loosely—disciplined, body, the three elites of pre-war Indonesian society significantly combined to demonstrate the basic unity of anti-colenialism: The executive of the Madjelis consisted of representatives from the political federation Gapi, from the association of Indonesian zovernment employees, and from the 1.1.4.1. (156). (154) Cf. Kahin, op.cit., pp.97-100. (155) In the Kongres, each participating group had been given one vote, irrespective of its size or membership; in the Madjelis, representation and voting was proportional to the number of registered branches. Cf. Nationale Commentaren (Batavia), IV, 39 (September 27, 19U1), p.2827. (156). The executive committee of the Madjelis Rakjat consisted of the following members: Representing Gapi: Abikusno Tjokrosujoso (P.S.I.I.), Sukardjo Wirjopranoto (Parindra), Otto Iskandar Dinata (Pasundan), Mr. Sartono (Gerindo), and Kasimo (P.P.K.I.)3 === [PDF page 91] === In the light of this unifying tendency, it is instructive to look at the two most widely discussed political moves in the Batavia legislature of those important years: In 1936, Volksraad-—member Sutardjo Kartohadikusumo, representing the association of the native administrative corps, had petitioned the Netherlands government to convene an imperial conference for the purpose of providing for Indonesian autonomy in a reorganized Dutch Empire. In 190, Wiwoho, the legislature's only member speakins for Islamic rroups, pressed for similar concessions (157). Althoush both petitions were rejected, their origins underlined the political unity of aims achieved among Indonesian nationalists, officials and Moslems in the last two years of Dutch rule. Representing M.I.A.I.: Wachid Hasjim (Nahdatul Ulama), W.Wondoamiseno (F.S.1.1.), Dr. Sukiman (P.I.I.), K. H. Mas Mansur and Umad Hubejsj (Muhammadiyah); Representing P.V.P.N. (the government employees): Soeroso, Atik Soeardi, Mr. Hindromartono, Rooslan Wongsokusumo, and Drijorongso. Cf. Pringgodigdo, op.cit., pp.l66. It is interesting to note that both Islamic political parties, P.S.I.I. and the new P.I.I., had joined M.I.A.I. as well as Gapi. Of the former party, one member, Abikusno, sat on the committee of the new "ederation as a political representative, while another, Wondoamiseno, participated as a religious delegate of M.I.A.I. On December 25, 191, the P.S.I.I. left both the Gapi and the Madjelis Rakjat in protest against planned negotiations with the colonial government. Cf. ibid., p.167 and Van der Plas, Nationalism in the Netherlands Indies, op.cit., p.lb. (157) cf. versiag van de Commissie tot bestudeering van staatarechtt ijke hervormingen, inzesteld bij Gouvernementsbesluit van *f September 1940, NOe No e1x/KAD ToS Tthe so-called Visman-Report/ (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1942), Part I, ppel07-10. ~ === [PDF page 92] === 77 In the span of two decades only, Indonesian ‘slam had tms risen to national prominence. Its importance on all three levels — as a mass sentiment and unifier, as a conscious socio-religious force, and as a participant in the political independence movement -- had increased in those years far beyond the expectations of the makers of Sutch Islamic policies in the Indies. As the next chapter will show, the new colonial mas-— ters had from the very outset an excellent understanding of the potential strength of Indonesian Islam and of its importance to their plans. Partly because of conscious Japanese policies, but in a large measure also in reaction to these policies, the position of Islamic groups within the internal power pattern of Indonesian politics underwent changes of the most far-reaching importance for the future of the country. === [PDF page 93] === PART TWO THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION === [PDF page 94] === THE REBIRTH OF 1i.1.A.I.: APRIL TO DECEMBER, 1942 Indonesian Islam had confronted the colomy's European rulers for many a decade with a perplexing variety of problems. No better recognition of the delicacy of these problems can be imagined than the fact that some of the best minds in the Dutch colonial administration had over the years been assigned to the task of advising the government on Moslem affairs. Nor should it be forgotten that Snouck Hurgronje and his successors brought to this task an unusual amount of learning and specialized training in matters Tslamic (158). The Japanese discovery of Islam, on the other hand, only dates back to tie mid-1930's. It was patently motivated by the expansionist plans of Dai Nippon, since hardly any Moslems lived on Japanese territory at that (158) Bousquet criticized this over-specialization and the office of Advise, in La politique mus ne et coloniale des Pays-Bas, po.47-l5. In point of fact, the independence of the Kantoor voor Inlandsche Zaken considerably decreased after the mid-1920's according to a private communication to the writer by Hadji Agus Salim (Ithaca, May, 1953). === [PDF page 95] === 79 time (159). In 1933, several groups started an agitation aimed at makinz Japan the protector of Islam, and two years later, the first group of four students were sent to Arabia and Egypt to prepare them for propaganda work (160). In 1935, the first mosque was built at Kobe, to be followed in 1938 by a more impressive place of worship in the capital city, which was ceremoniously opened in the presence of many foreign muests (161). A Japanese Islamic Association -- Dai Nippon (159) The writer has not been able to find references to Isl in Western-language Japanese periodicals of those years. The information in the text is largely based on the Netherlands Indies! government publication, Tien jaar Japansch gewroet in Nederlandsch-Indi8 (Batavia: tonisdrukkerij, 2), CSP. Ppecy—o5, and passim. Apart from a few bona fide Japanese Moslems, a small colony of exiles from Soviet Turkestan formed the nucleus of the Moslem comminity in Japan; one of these, Amin Islami, was in charge of the Tokyo mosque. Cf. Asia-laya (Djakarta), June 16, 1942. (160) Tien jaar Japansch gewroet..., p24. The venture was financed by R. Uchida, leader of the "Black Dragon Society." In late 1939, two Islamic "experts," Go Suzuki and Kobayashi, were attached to the Japanese consulate at Batavia (ibide, p60). As will be seen, a "Hadji'tt Suzuki later played an important role in the planning and execution of Japanese Moslem policy onJava; the writer could not ascertain whether Hadji Suzuki was the former consular employee. (161) Tbid., p.2h, and cf. Hadji Abdul iMuniam Inada, "Agama Islam dan Nippon," Pandji Poestaka, XX, 28 (October 17, 1942), pp.9h7-50. —= In this and all subsequent references to occupation sources, the Western calendar has been substituted for the Japanese year shown on the original. Thus 192 appears as the year 2602 of the Sumera calendar (i.e., 660 years have to be added to the Christian year, 660 B.C. being the date when the first Tennd —~ according to Japanese mythology — became === [PDF page 96] === 80 Kaikyo Kyokai —- was formed in May, 1938, with General Senyuro Hayashi — "Father of Japanese Islam" ~~ as its president (162). By September, 1739 this new organization officially commenced its activities by inviting overseas Moslems to attend an Islamic Exhibition in lokyo and Osaka an November 5-29 of the sane year. For the first time in the history of Indonesian Islam, its attention to Moslem problems abroad shifted from the Moslem Near East to the Land of the Rising Sun. A special conference was called by M.I.A.I. at the beginning of emperor). While the Sumera year was the one zenerally used, official proclamations and decrees were usually dated by the respective year of the present emperor Hirohito's reignz; which commenced in 1925. According to this system, introduced after t Meiji Restoration, 192 wags Year 17 of the Showa Era. ‘he “hristian and the Japanese year are in all other respects identical, having the same months and beginning on January 1. ~- Since the earliest days of the occupation the Japanese had also replaced Java Time by Nippon Time, advancing the local clock by 13 hours. Cf. Decree #6, dated March 27, 192, in the Djakarta daily Berita Oemoem of that day. (162) Hayashi became a convert to Islam at the age of thirty, after having become acquainted with that religion in Turkey. He died on February ), 1943. Cf. the biographical article and obituary notice in Soeara M.I.A.I. (Djakarta), I, 4 (February 15, 1943), pp.3—5, and long article on Hayashi in Asia-Raya, February 23, 193. Prayers for the deceased were said in all mosques on Java, with a special service in Djakarta's Kwitang mosque on February 12. Ibid., February 13, 1943. The late general was only one of the sponsors of these Islamic enterprises; Vice Admiral Ogasawara and the Pan~Asiatic leader M. Toyama are mentioned as other active promoters, while the government undoubtedly backed their efforts. Cf. Tien jaar Japansch gewroet..0, p25. === [PDF page 97] === October, at which the Tokyo invitation was accepted (163). The sponsors of the exhibition made excellent use of the presence of the many Moslem delevations from abroad — whose expenses were paid by the hosts -— by arranging for a round table conference which constituted itself the first World Islamic Congress (141). This was a shrewd move, seeing that a similar congress, planned by Ton Sa'ud for 1927, had, as we mentioned, failed to materialize. A Japanese Islamic "expert," professor T. Kanaya, was despatched to the Indies shortly after the Congress, with the aim of strengthening the bonds with Indonesian Moslems. He was, however, deprived of the fruits of his mission through the vigilance of the colonial government, which had little reason, indeed, to prefer a Japanese pseudo Pan-Islam to its politically far less harmful predecessor (165). In the absence of Indonesian comments on the Congress, (163) Het Nieuws van den Dag (Bandung), October 3, 1939, ani ef. Tavfiqurrachman in in Mimbar Agama, loc.cit. (16) The M.I.A.I. delegation consisted of H. Abdul Kahar Muzakkir (principal of a Muhammadiyah school), Ahmad Kasmat (P.I.I.), H. Machfud Siddiq (Nahdatul Ulama), Farid Ma'ru€ (Muhammadiyah and P,I.I.), and A. D. Almdi (?). Cf. Inada, op.¢it., p.949. See also the detailed article, "Japans Politiek en de Islam," Alzemeen Indisch Dagblad (Bandung), February 1, 190, for the program of the Kaikyo Kydkai and for reports on the resolutions of the Congress, which was attended by 100 delegates, a Foreign Office spokesman was also present. (165) Cf. Tien jaar Japansch gewroet, pe25. === [PDF page 98] === 82 it is difficult to estimate the impression which this sudden Japanese interest in matters Islamic made on the overseas visitors (166). No doubt interest in Indonesian Islam — springing from whatever motives ~- may to some extent at least have been welcomed because of the prestige factor. Japan's anti-Western propazanda may also have struck a simpathetic chord, in particular among some orthodox Moslems (167). Although from a purely relicious point of view, Japan could never successfully aspire to become the real center of the Islamic world, its veopolitical proximity to Indonesia could not be underestimated. Jt is not impossible, therefore, (166) The suests were lavishly entertained and welcomed by several cabinet ministers. No effort was spared to impress them with the industrial and military strength of the host country; besides excursions to army and navy training grounds, government offices and factories, visigts were, interestingly enough, paid to places of Shinto worshir. ‘the visistors also bowed respectfully towards the Imperial falace -- a scurce of considerable consternation to Indonesian Moslems two years later. Algemeen Indisch Dagblad, loc.cit. (167) Orthocox Islamic suspicion against the "secular" Indonesian nationalists oftem stemmed from the fact that their nationalism was in effect rooted in ‘iestern education and alien concepts. During the occupation, this argument was often made. Cf. Sanusi Pané's "Islam dan zaman baroe," loc.cit., and e.g. Asa Bafagih, "Perbedaan antara Timoer dan Barat," Soeara ifl.1.A.1., I, 6 (March 15, 1943), pp.10-11. For a particularly strong statement see the address by the Masjumi-President and leading orthodox spokesman, Has jim Asj'arie, reprinted in Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia (Djakarta), IJ, 16 (August 15, I5LL), PPel-2. Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, chairman of Muhammadiyah during the occupation, was by his own admission likewise stubbornly anti-Western in outlook. Of. the biographical sketch in Asia-Raya of December 26, 195112. === [PDF page 99] === 83 that to some Moslem leaders a Yapanese liberation from Chris-~ tian rule may have appeared to be neither impossible nor altogether undesirable. This factor, tozether with the international orientaticn of Indonesian Islam previously discussed, may account for an attitude of hopeful, if very vacrue, expectation which may have been a partial result of Japan's Islamic offensive in the late 1930ts (168). As far as can be ascertained from the meager printed pre-- invasion record and, more significmtly, from the events following in the wake of the occupation, the Japanese Islamic offensive appears to have been more successful in Sumatra than in the political center of Indonesia, Java. The Indies! goverrment, it is true, claimed in 19] that a Moslem organization in Java, as well as a nationalist group, had been "approached" by Japanese agengts (169). tet the only published accusation of pro=Japanese activities was not laid avainst an Islamic party, but avainst jiusein Thamrin, leader of Parindra, the largest pre~war nationalist party in Indonesia, in early 1941 (170). (162) Cf. Part 1, Chapter h, and Note 125, above. (169) Tien jaar Japansch gewroet..+, De25. (170) De Java Bode (Batavia), January 7, 19k1, carries an account of the police search in Thamrin'’s hosse, which for many months became the subject of heated discussion, particularly so when Thamrin died of heart-failure a week later, and while the investivation was under way. Thamrin's alleged Eurasian accomplice, E. F. E. Douwes- === [PDF page 100] === In at least two important regions of Sumatra the coming of the Japanese was facilitated by apparently well-organized Islamic resistance groups, some of which had been set up with considerable Japanese aid. In Achin, the traditionally nost fanatical anti-colonial Islamic stronghold, tre so-called "Organisi F" played an important role during the invasion, and was well rewarded during the occupation (171). Two similar groups -- Indonesia Berserak and Islam Raya -- operated in the Minanskabau recion of Western Sumatra, where tslam Dekker, was exiled from the Hast Indies. On Thamrin's guilt no concensus has yet been reached. Cf. Pluvier, opecit., p.J6L. A top-secret Japanese document, dated Tovanbos 16, 192, seems to indicate that Thamrin had not been in the pay of Dai Nippon. This report, of which the writer possesses a Dutch translation —- Indonesia mu en straks -- without having been able to ascertain its author or origin, says of the deceased: "He was very unreliable and exclusively concerned with his own advantages. He was distrusted by the /nationalist/ movement, since he was suspected of being @ silent helpmate of the Dutch government." As the document contains fairly accurate sketches of most other prominent Indonesians, dead or alive, this information should not be lightly dismissed. -— On January 15, 194, three years after Thamrin's death, a memorial plaque to him was officially dedicated at Djakarta. Asia-Raya, January 16, 1942. (171) CL. the article "Pasoekan-mati Atjeh" in Asia—taya, June 2, 19h2. For a detailed and well-documented account, see A. J. Piekaar's ott eh en de oorloy met Japan (The Hague: W. van Hoeve; eSp. Poel?) 1755 and 2h, resp. In February, Th, on Japanese erected a memorial at Keniru to three Achinese killed by the Dutch on the eve of the cecupation, and on December 8, 194, another monument to 153 Achinese was dedicated at Kutaradja. Cf. Asia-Raya February 8, 193, and Pandji Poestaka, XXII, 24 (Decenver 15, 19h), pp.78-85. === [PDF page 101] === 85 had for decades been a rallying point for opposition to Dutch rule, second in importance only to Achin (172). Although we must be cautious to take at their face value contemporary statements, the following testimony of one of the most noted Minanekabau reformists may have some significance: ",.. In spite of all the /Dutch7 prohibitions and obstacles we always clandestinely listened to the broadcasts from Nippon, so that we might know when they /the Japanese/ would come here... /And when they did come/, _ thousands of us gathered in front of the Great Mosque /at Medan7 and welcomed them with shouts of 'Banzail'" (173). In Java, on the other hand, neither Islamic nor "secular" nationalist elements had organized active resistance to the very short-lived Dutch military operations against the invader. The fall of the colonial zovernment left a bewildered, if to some extent expectant, political vacuum which was aptly expressed by a nationalist editor, Dr. Ratu Langi, two days after the fall of the capital city: (172) Cf. Ir. Soekarno's article, "Djiwa Ksatria dan djiwa boedak," in the Asia-Raya commemorative booklet of September, 19,2. (173) From a speech to the important Moslem Congress at Medan on June 20, 1943, given by Hamka: "Sikap dan kewadjiban Kacem Moeslimin dizaman baroe,” reprinted in Moeslimin Soematera Baroe (Medan: Badan Penjiaran Bunka-Ka, 1943), Ppe2u—20, on p.25. In mid-1943 the Japanese Governor for West Sumatra permitted the flying of the Moslem flag (the Crescent on a green field) side by side with Japan's Rising Sun, on Islamic holidays. See the Domei report from Padang in Asia-Raya, June 15, 1943. Hamka became chairman of the newly formed Sumatran "Poesat Fimpinan Pergerakan Islam" /Central Leadership of the Islamic kovement/ on December 6, 193, according to a report in ibid., January 15, 19hh. === [PDF page 102] === 86 "The question now arises..., what is awaiting us,... the Indonesian people? This people, in its entirety, has lived through this war passively. It would be wrong to assume that the millions of the 'silent masses! in the towns, hamlets and villaces... have been actively interested in the present conduct of the war... The same can be said of the majority of the intellectuals .-- And /even/ the politically organized groups «. have /fot7 had part in the conduct of the war" (17h). It is true that the population in many parts of Java enthusiastically greeted the invading troops with Indonesian and Japanese flags dropped from Japanese 'planes (175); but this reception was -—— as the writer can testify from his own experience —— not by any means universal, nor was it to any marked dezree tinged with Moslem fanaticism (176). One of the most famous and revered Sumatran Moslems, Ur. Amrullah, who lived in Dutch-imposed exile at Sukabumi in Western Java, neither (17h) Editorial in Nationaile Commentaren (Batavia), V, 10 (March 7, 1942), pp.1-2. This was the last issue of this Dutch-~ language nationalist weekly; it appeared as an emergency issue of very limited size owing to the destruction of printing works by Dutch destruction squads, prior to the fall of the city. (175) Cf. Roeslan Abdulgani, Propaganda Djepang (Series: Pendidikan Pegawai Stat Kempen; Djakarta?; Kementerian Penerangan, nede), ppeo-0. (176) Seeing that Japanese propaganda would have fully wilized the freeing of Moslem leaders jailed by the Dutch for pro- Japanese sentiments, it is simificant that only one such incident was reported in the press. In July 192, the military authorities released from prison at Banjumas Kyahi Hadji M. Zawawi and some of his frienas, according to a Domei report in Asia-‘aya, July 31, 1942. According to the same newspaper of August 17, however, six other persons implicated in the affair were still held for further examination. === [PDF page 103] === 87 indulged in a cordial welcome to the invader, nor did his release result in Islamic, pro-Japanese demonstrations (177). Thus while the attitude of the conscious Moslems on Java —~ or at least of some of their leaders -— may have contained a grain of benevolent expectation, they shared their general lack of enthusiasm for Dai Nippon, as well as their unpreparedness for the new regime, with the majority of Indonesian officials and nationalist leaders (178). Before we proceed to discuss the developments which marked the beginnings of the new and important chapter in Indonesian Islam, an endeavor should be made to analyze its situational background. the coming of the Japanese suddenly ecnfronted the Moslems in Java with colonial rulers actively interested in winnine their support. The bitterly-resented stone wall of Dutch quasi-neutrality had crumbled in the span of a few days only, to be replaced by immediate and insistent interference of a ruthless and victorious occupation army. The rapid transition from Dutch "imperialism" to Japanese "liberation" barely left time for the realization that hence- (177) Cf. the detailed story of his exile and release in Berita Qemoem (Ljakarta), April 8 and 10, 194.2, and an interview published in Asia-Raya of June 3, 1942. See also the very moving account in Hamka -—— Dr. Amrullah's son -- Ajahku, opecit., pp.1h9 ff., ane of the few Indonesian post-war accounts of Islam during the occupation. (178) For a revealins comment on this Moslem attitude, written in the earliest days of the Japanese occupation, see Anwar Tjokroaminoto's article "Sikap diam" in the Djakarta daily Pemandangan of March 25, 192. === [PDF page 104] === 88 forth the choice — for nationalist and Moslem leaders alike -—- would no longer be between cooperation and non-cooperation: The issue of collaboration was, by and large, decided by the mere presence of naked military power; to refuse such col= laboration required unusual moral courage, while non-cooperation under European rule had only called for prudence. Where once imprisonment or exile had been the worst punishments for radical agitation, now torture or death could be meted out to those suspect of disobedience only. Although this sudden, iron reality confronted all Indonesian elite-grouns alike, the \oslems on Java had at their disposal potentially greater defenses than had either government officials or the non-relizious nationalists. They had, first of all, a religious creec. It could be -- and at times was — compromised by some of its believers, it is true; but it offered a moral refuge and became a source of strength unlike any other Indonesian sentiment. In the eyes of the true beliver, the Japanese remained in the final analysis barbarian idolators equipped with military force. The Moslems thus had a moral weapon which could be used, and he could make cooperation conditional on respect for his religion. Whatever political or moral opinions other Indonesian inviduals mizht have held, they could not sinilarly use them as weapons against the new regime. === [PDF page 105] === The second Islamic source of strength — closely linked to the first -= lay in its wide vopular support...oslem leaders, that is, had bargaining power because they, rather than any other element in Indonesian society, could claim the only wider allegiance of the tani. While in the eyes of the population even the administrative village heads, though locally elected, had remained officials and tax-collectors under colonial rule, the religious teachers and Koran expounders to be found in every hamlet were their counsellors and educators of their children. Untainted with any connection with the zentile sovernment, the man of od was yet the villasers' only link with the outside world. In many cases he had made the pilvrimage to Mecca and was thus the symbol of the distant overseas Moslen community living in their midst. To win the acquiescence and, beyond it, the active support from the mass of the Indonesian peasantry, the Japanese could thus be made to pay a price. The military administrators obviously realized the importance of Islam as a power factor in the Indonesian villavze. Although lacking in the academic expertise and scientific apparatus of their predecessors, the Japanese came to Jave with a blueprint of a policy aimed at winning Mosian supporte This policy — in part a crude reversal of VYutch aims -- was primarily concerned with the grass-roots level of the Islamic problem. The deep-seated, centuries old resentment against Chris- === [PDF page 106] === 90 tian rule was to be mobilized ~ at the outset to increase production for the benefit of the "“liberators and defenders of Indonesian Islam," later to defend religion and fatherland avainst the threatening return of the gentile rulers. This basic aim of their policy the Japaneses hoped to achieve, as we shall see, with a fairly shrewd combination of flattery and pressure; but even thouvth it was successful in many respects, its very success involved a quid pro quo and Japanese recornition of the reality and strenreth of Islam, well beyond the limits which the inader had to all intents and purposes originally intended. And, successfully though the policy was, it did not altogether prevent the recurrence of grassroots disturbances in the later stages of occupation. The blueprint gave far less consideration to Islan on the second level; in particular, it contained neither redress of the unfavorable balance between Adatlaw and religious jurisdietion, nor originally a zreat willingness tc yield to some of the most insistent ‘ioslem demands under Dutch rule (179). (179) An excellent, thouch perhaps unwittiny, illustration of this point can be found in Vunawar Cholil'ts article "Pemandangan sepintas laloe," in the commemorative issue of Sinar =aroe (Semarang), of July, 1943. The author draws up seven Soint ts of indictment avainst the Dutch rule and eight points of praise for Dai Nippon. Yet in several items of the indictment no chanve had occurred. -— The issue of Islamic law was publicly discussed in “jakarta at a Lioslem m-etince attended by several Japanese in mid~ July 1942. Cf. Asia-Rava, July 14. Its restoration headed the list of ‘'.I.4.I's official aims as listed in the === [PDF page 107] === Nonetheless, in the course of the occupation some important concessions to Moslem demands were:ranted; these concessions were partly the result of Japmese policies towards the priyahi officials in general, and partly they were dictated by the increasinz importance which the Islamic movement assumed when the threat of Allied invasion became ever more likely. The most interesting development occurred, finally, on the third, or political, level. As we shall presently see, the divorce of Islam from politics was to all intents and purposes an important desideratum in the original Japanese blueprint. Like their predecessors, the Japanese therefore kept close control on Moslem education, On the other hand, however, the new rulers not only themselves provided greater representation of Moslem leaders in the new quasi~political organs than had existed in the colonial institutions which they replaced; more important still, in their endeavor to mobilize Indonesian Islam the military administration forged an unprecedentedly close first issue of that organization's new publication, Soeara M.I.A.I., I, 1 (January 1, 193), p.19. The first part of an article on the restoration of Islamic inheritance law by Emohardjo, "Menrstoegat hoekoem waris Islam," appeared in the same journal (I, 3 /February 1, 194,37, ppell-13); but two issues later the editors regretted that "because of certain circumstances, the continuation of this article cannot be published." Ibid., I, 5 (March 1, 1943), p.2. Cf. also Oerip Kartodirdjo, "De rechtspraak op Java en Madoera tijdens de Japansche bezetting, 1942-1945," Indisch Tijdschrift van het Recht (Batavia), I (April, I9h7), pp.3-21. === [PDF page 108] === 92 link between the Islamic elite and its rmral following. Ultimately, the Moslem organization thus became a political force par excellence and a serious rival to the non-religious naticnalist movement. Eager to rally all major anti-Dutch forces from the outset, the Japanese yet apnear to have realized that to ensure Voslem soodwill was a matter of zreater urgency than to satistry the demands of the naticnalist elite. In addition to a correct appreciation of the unicue srass-rects imnortarce of +slam by the Japanese, they may have singled out Moslem leaders as perhaps the most reliable and "kastern-ortented" zroup. Neither priyahits nor other government officials could, on the other hand, as a group easily escape the stigma of their previcus loyalty to the colonial government. Lastly, although the new masters may not have attached undue weight to the demccratic and liberal principles loudly proclaimed by so many nationalists in the recent past, the ideological orientation of the Western-educated Indonesian intelligentsia may yet have originally rendered them allies of somewhat dubious reliability and, more important still, of little political influence outside the few major urban centers. With these important, if necessarily to some extent speculative, factors in mind, we can now resume the examination cf the available record. The priority given to the Islamic problem by the occupying === [PDF page 109] === 93 army was startingly demonstrated as soon as Fatavia had fallen into Japanese hands (160). Lonr before the Army's Parisan Propaganda /Propaganda Corps/ had started its first campaign, the "invasion" of the Islamic world had commenced. Only a week after the fall of the capital city, worshippers in several Djakarta mosques were astcnished to find Japanese Moslems in army uniform attending and participatine in their services (181). A few days later, a Colonel Horie made his first appearance jn the capital's Kwitang Mosque; he was accompanied by a Japanese lioslem, Muhamad Abdul Munian Inada, and delivered an address in Japanese (182). The era of lectures, exhortations and admonitions had started. Towards the end of March, the Religious Affairs Office was already reporied to be operating, with Colonel Horie at its heals its first actions included the posting of signs, which apneared on all houses of Moslem (180) The capital city continued to be officially called Ratavia until December 8, 1912, the first anniversary of the outbreak of the racific jar. An announcement of the Military Administration stated three days later that approval for the change, lone desired by Indonesians, had finally been received from the Tokyo authorities. Cf. Asia-Raya, December 11, 192. As of August 6, 1942, the city had been proclaimed the only Special Municipality /Tokubetsu-Shi7 in Java which gave it a separate administrative status. Cf. Asia-Raya, August 13, 19l2. (151) Pemandangan (Djakarta), March 12, 1942. This earliest report did not mention the names of the visigtors. For later, similar reports, see i.a. Berita Cemoem, April 1, and 17, and Pemandangan, April 20 and Way 16. (182) Berita Jemoem, March 16, 192. === [PDF page 110] === worship, placing them under the control of the Dai Nippon Amy (183). The cccupation army left, indeed, little doubt that it had arrived with a fairly well-thought-out program of action in Java. While contacts with the religious world were established (183) Tbi.e, March 28. The writer has not been able to ascertain all the Japanese members of this agency. While Horie himself was not a Moslem, other staff-members included, hext to Inada, Sayido Wakkaas, Hadji Abdul Hamid Ono, and later Hadji Muhamad Saleh Suzuki, all of whom introduced themnselves as Moslems. See also itas Slamet, Japanese Machinations, Part II, "The Holy Jar Made in Japan" (Batavia: NeEey 196), pel3. The office (Shimubu in Japanese, Kantor Urusan Kgama in Indonesian) was divided into two secuions. tne first, Shtmuka, was in charge of studying religious activities and worship, and Islamic law and culture in particular. ‘the second, Kantokuka, controlled places of worship and maintained contacts with relicious leaders. Cf. A. A. Zorab, De Japanse bezetting van Indonesié en haar volkenrechtelijke zijde (Leiden: Universitaire Pers, 195i), p.l05. The Shtinubu had close links with the Propaganda Department (Sendenbu), whose ubiquitous, Indonesian-speaking member H. Shimizu repeatedly promised to become a Moslem. (Cf. iea. Asia-Raya, June 11, 1942). Officers attached to the Education Section of the Internal Affairs Department (Naimhbu), as e.g. Professor Ozaki, Miyamura and Minami, also maintained liaison with the Shimubu, and often participated in conferences with Moslem leaders. Five Indonesians were originally appointed as officials to the Shiimubu: Dre Re Prijono (lecturer in Indonesian languages in the Batavia Law School under Dutch rule; now Dean of the Arts Faculty of the University of Indonesia); Raden.Hadji Husein Iskandar, Abduallah Aidid and Mr. Subagio Djowidagdo (all former officials of the Kantoor voor Inlandsche Zaken); and las Suwirjo. The appointments were partly made durine 1942, but only published in the first general list of all government officials in late 1943. Cf. Kan PO, #28 (October 10, 19h3), pell. Significantly, the original appointees were, therefore, not recruited from among members of the Islamic movement. === [PDF page 111] === 95 (18), all Indonesian political activity was almost immediately prohibited by a decree of Lt.-Seneral Imamura, first Commanderin-Chief on Java (185). This decree, forbiddin: "any discussion or organization.e. concerned with the political administration of the country," put an abrupt end to the hectic political speculations which had followed the entry of Japanese troops into the capital (186). The interdict did not have the automatic effect of extinguishing the existing political parties (187), but it condemmed them to the fate of gradually (18h) Some attention was also paid to Indonesian Christians. The Christian movement under the occupation was at first headed by Amir Sjarifuddin, who, besides his leading role in the Gerindo, had played a prominent part in that movement during the last months of Dutch rule. Cf. Nationale Comentaren» Iv, 46 (October 15, 1941), pp.3958-59, and Pandji Poestaka, XX, 11 (June 20, 1942). Later the moveaS was led by R. L. Tobing, a hatak Christian and rovernment employee. See also Note 199, below. (185) "Nendang-oendang 7/3", dated Liarch 20, 1942. See the collection of decrees in the official publication of the Gunseikanbu /Military “overnment Of ficd, Boekoe pensoempoe lan oendang-ocendang (Ujakarta: Kokumin Tosyokyoku poelai Poestaka/, 19L) p.&. By recree #23 of July 15, 192 (ibid., pp.22=23), social, sportive and cultural meetinys were allowed, subject to prior registration. Failure to comply was punishable, and by "Osamu Seirei" /Decree of the C-in-C/ #25, sec. 52, of May 10, 19h, life imprisonment could be imposed for non-compLiance. (Ibid., p.170). (186) For a detailed discussion of early political and administrative developments, see the writer's article "The Dawn of the Rising Sun: The Beginnings of the Japanese Occupation of Java,"t scheduled for publication in early 1955 === [PDF page 112] === 96 “witherine away," until they were, one year later, supplanted by a new, Japanese~sponsored unitary movement. While the new rulers were apparently content to leave the nationalist movement in ceneral ina state of semi-dissolution, they made it clear that they would not tolerate the to them unholy wedding of Islam and politics. Of all political groups, Islamic political parties were singled out for explicit prohibition: the Partai Sarekat Islam Indcnesia announced the closing of its Djakarta head~cffice as of May 9 and ordered all branches immediately to follow suit (188). On May 20, the reformists' Partai Islam Indonesia had to publish a similar suicidal announcement (189). (187) Thus on way 17, 1942, Parindra Head Office issued a circular to its branches specifyinse that the party's political action had to cease, inclu:ting in such action the acceptance of new members, the issuance of membership cards and the sale of party insignia. See the news—item in Pandji Poestaka, XX, 8 (May 30, 1942), p.281. By contrast, Indonesian political parties in Sumatra voted themselves "voluntarily" out of existence at a mass meeting in Medan on June 2, 1942. Asia-Raya, June 10. Sumatra stood at that time under the Japanese army command at Singapore. (188) Asia-Raya, May 12, 1942. Interestingly enough, Indonesian Christian parties do not seem to have been specifically prohibited. (189) This item only appeared in Asia-Raya of June 5. On June 1, the saue newspaper had announced that P.S.I.=chairman Dre Sukiman would leave Jogja and take up the position of adviser on religious affairs to the military zovernment. This was either a misunderstanding, or Sukiman refused the position. === [PDF page 113] === 97 This implementation of the political as: ect of the new Islamic policy actually contained a goodly grain of retrospective irony with regard to the veteran enfant terrible of the nationalist movement, the F.S.I.I. In January, 1942, that stubbornly non-cooperative party had refused to participate in a conference between representatives of the colonial government and those of the newly created federation Madjelis Rakjat Indonesia at Jogja. At that conference, closer cooperation hetween the government and Indonesian groups in the face of the rapid Japanese advances in the Pacific was to have been discussed (190). The P.S.I.I.'s refusal had, on the one hand, doomed the, from the outset very problematical, conference to failure, while the party's decision to leave the political federation Gapi as well as the Madjelis Rakjat -- in both of which it had occupied key positions -—- had, on the other, wrecked Indonesian unity in the last weeks of Dutch rule (191). As ore of the party's spokesman, however, put it a few months later, this action now entitled the P.S.I.I. to the claim of having rendered "moral aid" to Dai Nippon even before her troops had entered Java (192). (190) Charles 0. van der Plas, Nationalism in the Netherlands Indies, op.cit., pelh. For a P.5.1.1. testimony, see We Wondoamiseno, "Sikap M.T.A.I. terhadap peroebahan djaman baroe," Pandji Poestaka, XX, 28 (October 17, 193), pp. 973-76, on peI The (191) Cf. Pringgodigdo, Sedjarah pergerakan rakjat Indonesia op-cit., pp.166-67. See also part 1, Note » above. (192) Wondoamiseno's article in Pandji Poestaka, loc.cit. Wondoamiseno made this claim on behalf of the whole === [PDF page 114] === 98 In the first days of the occupation, Abikusm Tjokrosujoso, chairman of that party, had therefore, understandably enough, endeavored to reap tne fruits of this obstinate, recent cast, by prematurely offering his services as Indonagian premier to the "liberators" (193). Althouzh on the political plane these hopes were speedily extinguished ny the previously noted teneral ban on political activity, followed by the specific prohibition of Islamic political parties, Ahikusno was for some tine successful in exertin: some influence on such Moslem activities as the new rulers were eazer to encouraze. These activities were vlanned to be part of the first large-scale movement which had to all intents and purposes been"prefabricated" by the Propagania Corps prior tc the landings: The "Triple-A"-Movement, launched in early 4pril (19h), was intended to embrace all Asians, and to supplant Islamic federation Vi.T.A.I. The writer has not been able to find substantiation for this assertion. (193) The Djakarta daily Tjaja Timoer on March 13, 192 — ieee, 8 days after the at of the capital city -- announced that Abikusno was "premier-designate", For a detailed discussion of this episode, see the writer's "The Dawn of the Rising un," loc.cit., and P. Pakpahan 1261 hari dibawah sinar Matahari Terbit (Djakarta?: [Unreadable] 19h) The "Three A's't were derived from the letter "A" in Asia, used as a propaganda slovan, which appeared for the first time in the jakarta dailies Berita Oemoem, Pemandangan and Taja Timoer on April 2. For references to this movement see Nillard H. =lsbree, Japan's === [PDF page 115] === 99 all existing political, cultural, and religious organizations on Java. The leadership of "AAA" — the Japanese propagandaexpert Shimizu and Samsiddin, a young Parindra leajer -- used the following months to organize intellectuals, religious groups, Moslem and Christian, government officials and priyahi's in several meetings, while broadcasts and newspapers appealed for public support (195). Interestingly enough, while no separate organizational subdivision within the "Trivle-A' [iovement was set up to house either nationalist vroups or tovernnent officials, preparations were taken to create an all-emoracing Moslem body which was to become a part of the new movement. Jud-:tinz by the available record, it would appear that this body was orizin-~ ally meant % supplant the L..T.A.T.$ like all pre-invasion organizations, the Japanese may have wished to abolish the existing Islamic federation. Yet it was, as we shall present-— ly see, to survive this first onslaught ~=— a remarkable enough exceotion to what undoubtedly was a chief aim of Japanese policy. Role in Southeast Asian “ationalist Movements, 1942-5 (Cambridge: Hardvard University Press/1.P.R., 1953), pe?79; Kahin, op.cite, pel93; and Pakpahan, op.cit., ppel3 ff. (195) cf. Sutardjo's radio speech, "Prijaji-Mestuur dan Gerakan 3-A," reprinted in Berita Oemoem Aoril 21, ive. In early May unemployed intellectuals were asked to apply for jobs with the movement (Asia-Raya, May 4); in June, a meetings of its leaders with leadine go-ernment officials and nationalists took place at “jakarta, Ci. ibid., June lL, 1942. —— === [PDF page 116] === 100 In fact, the M.I.A.I. executive had in early way eatablished contacts witn the ocecuvation army's Office of Relisjous Affairs (196). These talks led to a tour of the main Islamic centers on Java by a three-man L.I.A. 72. delevation, accompanied by Colonel Horie and Hadji Inada. which culminated in an impressive meeting at Surabaya, attended by about ten thousand people (197). This joint enterprise did not constitute offical recognition of the Islamic federation; but the zreat prestige of its executive was skillfully used by the Shumubu which, as it were, by this move identified itself with the national Islamic leadership while at the same time building a direct bridee with the local leaders of Indonesian {fslam, This sudden and striking departure from Dutch aloofness, aided by the vresence of the accompanying Japanese Moslems, could not fail to make a profound first impression -- especially on the main targets of the official tour: the leading nlama's anid kyahi's of the smaller centers who were invariably asked to attend the meetings in the cities. (196) The delezation consisted of Kyahi Mas Mansur (chairman of Muhammadiyah), W. Nondoamiseno (F.5.I.1.), and Fachruddin Al-Kahiri (an Arab Moslem, of the modernist Al-Irsjad organization, also represented in M.I.A.1.). See Asia~Raya, May 8, 1942, and Wondoamiseno, op.cit., DeP Te (197) Asia-Raya, May 21, 1942, and Pandji Poestaka, XX, 8, (May 30, 1942), p.281. This meeting tock place on May 17; the previous day, Horie met with ulama's and representatives of forty-six /slamic organizations. === [PDF page 117] === As far as the Japanese were concerned, the task of 1.1.4.1. was apparently terminated after this inspection and reconais-— sance trip. it is not impossible that Horie, havine established direct contact with the lower echolon leaders on Java (198), was content to leave the task of establishing a new Moslem organization to Shimizu's initiative. At any rate, for several months M.I.A.I. suffered an eclipse, for reasons which were in part explained by the very name of the new Islamic organization, "Preparatory /Committee/ for the Unification of the Islamic Commmnity" /Persiapan Persatoean Oemmat Islam/, which was a sub-division of the "Three-A" Movement. The intention was clearly to mold Indonesian Moslems into one, unitary body which should take the place of the rather loose preinvasion federation. Launched some time durinz July, 192, this new Japanese creation was housed in a rather impressive building in “jakarta (199). (198) Horie and his lieutenants paid repeated visists to Djakarta mosques and to places outside the capital in the following weeks. Horie was e.2. in Bandung on July 27. Cf. Asia-Raya, July 31, 1942. (199) The building, styled Balai Permoefakatan Oemmat Islam» had previously belonged to the Patavia Arts Council. An Islamic library was also established at Djakarta in August, to which Inada promised to contribute several hundred volumes. Cf. Pandji Poestaka, XX, 13 (July 4,19h2), peliS1. In mid-September, a "Christian Meeting House" /Gedoeng Pertemoegan Kacen Kristen7 was opened, under the auspices of the "Triple-A" Movement. A Japanese Christian, Normachi, of the Education Office attended the opening, together with Shimizu and Ir. Soekarno. See ASia- Raya, September 23, 192. ~~ === [PDF page 118] === 102 The new committee was headed by F.S.!.I.-chairman Abikusno Tjokrosujoso who, for a brief moment, acted as the Japm ese-sponsored spokesman of Indonesian Islam on Java (200), After several meetings, in which Inada and Gno participated (201), the committee, in conjunction with the "Triple-A" executive, called a three-day meeting of all Moslem leaders, to be held at Djakarta between Aucust 21-23 (202). (200) It is interestin> to note that Itrahi Mas Mansur, chair= men of Luhammadiyah, remained at Joqja until September 1942, The military administration, very likely on the advice of Ir. Scekarno, called Mansur to Djakarta in August; he resigned from his chairmanship in late September, to be followed in that position by Ki Bazus /adikusumo. Cf. Pandji Poestaka, XX, 20 (Aurzust 22, 19412), pe7l3, and agtactaya, October 3, 1942. Siansur, who later became a key figure in Masjumi, was thus temporarily removed from the Islamic movement. See also Note 217, below. (201) The most important of these took place in the new building on July 13. On that occasion, Islamic hopes for a revision of Islamic jurisdiction were voiced, together with far-reachinz proposals for its reorganization. It was, in effect, rather typical that Moslem spokesmen continued to focus their main attention on what we have terned the second level of the Islamic problem, which the Japanese proceeded to ignore. For a report on that meeting, see Asia-Raya, July 14, 1942. A previous informal conference between Shumubu officials and Moslem leaders was reported in ibid., Jun 1) and 12, 192. (202) Ibid., August 13, 1942. The committee undertook to pay all travel expenses of the participants. The Persiapan Persatoean was an organization limited to Djakarta only, as Was explained in Abikusno's radio address to Java Moslems, reprinted in ibid., Aurust 13, 192. Actually, the capital had never been the center of Islamic astivities: «.I.A.I.'s headquarters and those of Nahdatul Ulama were established in Surabaya, while that of ifuhanmadiyah was at Jogja. This veogsraphical factor may have been one of the reasons for the leading role assigned to Abikusno, who was domiciled at Djakarta, in the beginnings. === [PDF page 119] === 103 Some days before that first and important conference was to open, Abikusno explained its aims in a lon: address over Kadio Djakarta (203): "Viewed in the light of the present era of change /Abikusno said/, it is apparent that Indonesian ‘slam cannot be considered..eto be united as lonz as there exist several organizations, even though a unifying center, ).I.A.i., may have been formerly establisned... This is the oe. reason why the word "preparatory" [is used for this organization’, in which many vacancies still exist..." The conference of all leaders of the existinz major Islamic groups on Java was called in the hope of filling these "vacancies," and of proceeding with the setting-up of a new, unified organization. The difficulties of such a sudden merger were, however, greater than the Japanese had apparently realized: The ease with which the comparatively small nationalist parties with their few thousand, mostly urban, followers could be de facto abolished and accomodated in the "Triple-A" Movement did not prove a precedent in this larger task of mersing the orsanized modernist and orthodox Moslems. Abikusno recognized the problem, and advocated a carefully planned procram of explanation to the hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of members of the existing relizious organizaticns (20), which were to lose (203) See Asia-Raya, Auzust 13 and 19, 19h2. (20) Nondoamiseno estimated tne total membership of the Islamic groups federated in M.I.A.1. at over five millions. See hig article in Pandji Poestaka, op.cit., p.973. This figure may have been rather too high. A monitored Tokyo === [PDF page 120] === 10h their identity: "Tf the Islamic proups are simply dissolvec, their former members would be automatically deprived of their membershin... With a view to this fact, the word tabolition' must be taken to mean that such former members... will eo ipso become members of the Fersatoean eee: the executives could, perhaps, in their announcements concerning /their orsanizations'7 abolition instruct their branclres to transfer all their members to the Persatcean" (205). Tf this was the original intenticn cf the sponsors of the conferance, it was never fulfilled. ‘he meeting itself was, perhaps for technical reascns, delayed for a few days; preliminary discussions took place in late August, but the vlenary sessicn, attended by thirty leaders of Islamic organizations, officially opened on September (206), under the auspices of broadcast in Urdu on September 11, 19, zave the combined membership of Nahdatul Ulema and Muhammadiyah as 1.7 million. Cf. Gffice of Stratezic Services, Prosrams of Japan in Java and Bali, compiled by Research and Analysis Branch (Honolulu, 7.1., 1945), pel:S (205) Asia-Raya, Auvust ly, All funds were to be transferred to the new organ, which was to make particular efforts at enrolling local relizious teachers and Koran expounders, as well as mosque personnel, many of whom had hitherto remained outside the old Islamic organizations. (206) The conferees were, indeed, the most outstanding Islamic spokesmen on Java; among them were such orthodox leaders as K. H. Hasjim Asj'arie, Wachid Hasjim, Abdul Wahab Hasbullah, while the reformists were i.a. represented by Mas Mansur, Kasmat, Dr. Sukiman, Ki Ragus Hadikusumo, Farid Matruf, and Moh. Natsir.?.5.I.I. leaders present included Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, Harsono Tjokroaminoto, and Wondoamiseno. For a camplete listiny see Asia—‘aya, September 2, 19)2,. === [PDF page 121] === 105 "Triple-A" headquarters, in the new building. At the conclusion of the outwardly very successful three days' talks, the capital's first Moslem mass meeting was held, where thousancs of “jakartans were introduced to the alliance between Java's religious leaders and their new overlords. This unprecedented spectacle for the capital's populace was paralleled by a similarly novel honor for the participating Moslem leaders, who were entertained by Colonel Horie in vjakarta's world famous Hotel des Indes — an event undreamt of under Yutch rule (207). These siens of benevolence and co-operation sirnalled the end of the Preparatory Committee, and that of its chairman, Abikusno, as spokesman for the new Islamic unity on Java. Surprisingly enough, however, no new organization came into existence as a result of the conference. Instead of creating a monclithic Persatoean, the conference -~ after what must have been a fairly animated and by no means entirely subservient discussion —— decided to retain M.I.A. 1., and to vest it with the functions of central spokesman (208). More (207) Cf. news items in Asia-Raya of Auzust 31, and Pandji Poestaka, XX, 21 (Aurust 3 1942), p79. The opening session was attended by Shimizu ana Samsuddin, Soekarno anc the Japanese staff of the Shimubu. Fora full report on the public meeting see Asia-Raya of September 9, 1912. (208) Wondoamiseno, op.cit., p.975. W.I.A.7. was declared to be the Central Leadership of Indonesian Islamic Unity, and the followin, tasks were allotted to it: 1) To obtain for Islam its proper place within Indo-~ nesian society, and 2) to harmonize the position of === [PDF page 122] === 106 surprisingly still, no real merger took place, since the participating groups, with the exception of the two dissolved Islamic political parties, retained their identity and con=- tinued their activites (209). The conference decided to move the organization's head office from distant Surabaya to the seat of the military administration, Djakarta; it also elected a new 1.1.4.1. executive, of which W. Wondoamiseno became the chairman. The importance attached to the position of the new head of Indo nesian Islam was emphasized by an audience granted to him by Lt.-Gen. Imamura, first Japanese Commander-in-Chief on Java, on September 9 (210). Tslam with the requirements of the changing times. For an interesting comment on the conference, see the edit-— orial, "Pertemoean Pemoeka Islam," in Pandji Poestaka, (209) As we shall see, the two most important Islamic organizations, Nahdatul Ulama and ifmhammadiyah, were given official recognition, and thus legal status as national organizations, as late as September 1913. Cf. Djawa Baroe (Djakarta), I, 19 (Ontober 1, 1943), p10, and Pandji Poestaka, XXI, 2h (September 15, 1943), p.861. But both had continued to exist before that date, very often with permits issued by regional or even local authorities. Thus in October 192, e.g. the Japanese Head /Shtchdkan7 of Djakarta Residency granted Muhammadiyah such a permit, as reported in Asia-taya of October 23, 1942. Again, the Nahdatul Ulama branch at Semarane (capital of Central Java) had been closed on August 1, only to be granted rermission to re-open on October 7, 1942. Cf. Asia-llaya November 27, 19h2. For a similar report on tefiatal Viana in Banjumas Residency, see ibid., April 10, 1943; the permit had actually been issued on October 30, 192. === [PDF page 123] === 107 The most significant fact in this reconstituted Islamic federation lay doubtless in the victory of the radical P.¢.1].]. leadership over that of the two largest Moslem organizations, Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama. It was the latter who, as we saw, had taken the initiative in forming the 1i.I.4.I. in late 1937. Now, however, control was, temporarily at least, wrested from them in the first major Islamic development under the occupation (211). When the new functionaries for the central organs were elected two months later, it is true that these two major organizations were represented by two members each on the executive committee; but two F.S.I.I. — leaders occupied the decisive positions of chairman and secretary. Twenty-two distinguished Moslems -- including four Arabs -—- sat on the board of management (212). While, finally, the (210) Wondoamiseno, op.cit., p.975. The audience was arranged by Shimizu and Sendenbu-chief Machida. It was granted to Wondoamiseno and Ir. Yoekarno, in their respective capacities as religious and national leaders. (211) After the war, a Dutch observer ascribed the Japanese failure to establish one central fslamic organization to NWdisunity in Islamic circles in rezard to religious principles." Cf. Klaas A. de Weerd's testimony to the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo, The Japanese Occupation of the Netherlands East Indies (International Prosecution Section, Wetherlands Division Ppe39. See also Note 227, below. Wondoamiseno, the new chairman, was not an Islamic scholer, but a “lesternschooled accountant and typical party-man. ‘te had never made the pilgrimage to Mecca. Cf. Orang Indonesia jang terkemoeka di Djawa, p.li!6. (212) The complete list can be found in Asia-Raya of November 16, 1942. Wondoamiseno was confirmed as chairman of the === [PDF page 124] === 108 handling of day-to-day affairs was thus outwardly entrusted to Indonesians, an Advisory Body /Badan Penasehat/ — more properly perhaps, a steering committee -~ was attached to the M.I.A.I., in which five of the most distinguished Moslems on Java were joined by three Japanese Moslem officials of the Shiimbu (213). By the end of 1942, then, a Nioslem organization had been established. At that time, the "Triple~A" Movement, of which the Persatoean was to have become a part, had itself been abandoned by the authorities (211); as a result, u.I.A.I. continued as an "independent" organization without any links to other movements. As we shall see, the military authorities never thereafter endeavored to undo this early separation. executive, with Harsono Tjokroaminoto (P.S.I.I.) as secretary and R.H.O. Djoenadi, (publisher of the daily Pembangoen) as treasurer, and Mr. Kasman Singodimedjo and Farid Matruf (Muhammadiyah) and Machfud Siddiq and Wachid Hasjim (Nahuatul Ulama) as members. Included anong the board members were i.e. Nuhammadiyah-chairman Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, Dr. Sukimm, and Raden Adnan, president of the Islamic High Court. (213) Ibid. Chairman of the Badan Fenasehat was Kyahi Mas Mansur, and its members: Hasjim Asja'rie (an outstanding orthodox teacher in East Java); Dr. H. A. %. Amrullah (the modernist Minangkabau leader exiled by the Dutch to Java); Sayed Ali Alhatsji (half Indonesian, half-Arab orthodox preacher of Djakarta's main mosque); Sjech Achmad Soorkati (chairman of the modernist Arab Al~-Irs jad); and Inada, Ono, and Abdul Hasan of the Shtimubu. (21l,) See the rather scathing comments on the demise of the AAA Movement and the eclinse of the importance of its Indonesian head, Samsuddin, by the editor of Asia-Ra (October 23, 1942), in his daily column "Sambil Laloe." === [PDF page 125] === 109 While the Japanese had not entirely succeeded in ereating an entirely new and unified organ, they had secured the collaboration of the Islamic leacership, eliminated Islamic political parties, and had placed Moslem affairs under their direct supervision at Djakarta by attaching three Japanese officials to the controlling board of *‘.J.A.I., which was in charge of determinins overall policy. This arrangement seemec, by end large, to mcet the requirements of Japanese policy in the first year of the occupation. The re-establishment of M.7.4.7. antedated by six months the creation of the nationalist Putera Movement. Originally planned to commence its activities in Tecember, 1942 (215), it was only inaugurated cn March 6, 193, because permission for this movement had to be obtained from Tokyo (216), while (215) The first official notice concerning the planned new movement appeared in Asia-Raya of November 21, 192, where its inaucuration an Vecember 6 -- first anniversary of the outbreak of the Pacific Yar —- was announced. "Ry now," so it was said, "the Triple-A" “ovement may be said to have completed its work ana to have acquitted itself of its task as pioneer or pathfinder in this era of change." At the impressive December 8 celebrations in “jakarta, Soekarno spoke as the leader of the new movement which, was, however, still in statu nascendi; its preparatory committee was appointed on December ll. Cf. ibid., December 3, 9, 11 and 12, 1942, and Djawa Baroe, I, 1 (January 1, 1943), for biographical sketches of the members of that committee. Thereafter, nothing was published on the new movement until late February (Asia-Raya, February 23 and 26, 1943). For Soekarno's very interesting inaucural address as chairman of the Putera, see ibid., March 9, 1943. (216) Cf. Elshree, opecite, p82. === [PDF page 126] === 110 the Tslamic organization apparently needed no such approval. An analysis of this movement and its importance curing tre early occupation period lies outside the scope of this stucy; but three brief comments should be added in connection with our main topic; First, the top-leadership of Putera consisted of the "Empat 3erangkai" /the *our-Leaf Clover/ which included the veteran political leaders Ir. Soekarno, ‘Mohammad Hatta, the beloved educator Ki Hadjar Dewantoro, chairman of thc Taman Siswa organization and, finally, Kyahi Mas Mansur, the hizhly esteemed former chairman of Muhammadiyah (217). Thus, while organizationally “.7.A.I. and Putera remained distinct, one of Java's most prominent Moslems occupied a leading position in the nationalist orzanization; wansur's importance was still further underlined when he temporarily became vicechairman of W.I.4.1. in early 1943 (213). (217) For a brief coment on "The Bis Four," see Asia-Raya, Noveaber 5, 1943. On Mansur, see the biographical sket-— ches in ibid., October 27, and December 12 and 26, and the interview by *anzo Zuzumi in Dgawa Baroe, I, 3 (February 1, 1943), p.6. Or. Amru'llah allegedly warned Nansur in forceful languace of the dangers to Indonesian Islam inherent in close collaboration with the infidel Japanese. Cf. Hamka's Ajanku, opecit., p.156, and sce Note 43, above. (218) Asia-Raya, January 20, 193. Judging hy later develop-— ments, this temporary appointment may have been intended as a check on Wondoamiseno's leadership; up to that time, Mansur had been a member of the Advisory Body of M.I.A.I. (See Note 213, above). He stepped down from the new post on March 10, 1943, perhaps because of disagreements with Wondoamiseno. Cf, ibid., Warch 11, 1943. === [PDF page 127] === lll Second, both organizations were officially under Indonesian manavement, but, like the ii.I.A.7., Putera also had its Japanese Nadvisers" in a "shadow cabinet," the so-called Consultative Council /Madjelis Pertimbangan/, created in May, 193 (219). Finally ~- and of greater significance still — M.I.A.I. and Putera, as we shall see, ceased to exist at approximately the sane time in late 1943; both, that is, came into being as tne result of a policy dictated by early Japanese hopes of victory, and both were abolished when these hopes had to sive way to material and psycholosical defense preparations on Java. While the new policy, as will ne seen, diminisned the scope of nationalist action, it enhanced the further rrowth of the Islamic movement. One last, important, point of difference between the two movements should be added at this juncture. Since early in the occupation, the nationalist elite had no publication of their own (220); neither the "Triple-A" Movement nor Putera (219)For a complete listing of the Council's membership, see Asia-Raya of May 27, 1943. It had 28 Indonesian and 6 Japanese members, including Shimizu and Myoshi, former Japanese consul at Batavia. Interestingly enough, Putera-chai rman Soekarno officially "appointed" these Japanese members himself -- to the writer's knowledge, a unique occurrence. (220) The writer has discussed the fate of the Indonesian Press after the invasion in his paper, "The Dawn of the Rising Sun," loc.cit. === [PDF page 128] === 112 were allowed to print their own periodicals. In spite of repeated requests, permission for a nationalist weekiy was in fact only granted some three months before th: collapse of Japanese rule (221). By contrast, Indonesian Islam on Java possessed a fortnightly magazine as from January, 1943 onwards, when the M.I.A.I.'s journal, Soeara N.I.A.I., commenced publication. Thus the Islamic elite enjoyed an important advantage over other Indonesian groups from the outset (222). Japanese Moslem policy was, however, not exhausted with the creation of a central Islamic institution which, as we saw, even so retained more of its "federal" characteristics than had been to all intents and purposes envisarzed. For one thing, that volicy aimed beyond the Islamic elite at the thousands of kyahi'ts and ulama's on Java; these should have joined the Persatoean, according to the blueprint originally announced by Abikusno in Auzust 1942 (223). In point of fact, the com- (221) Cf. the leadinz article in Indonesia Merdeka (Yjakarta), I, 1 (April 25, 1945), pe2, where the (anonymous) editors say, "The birth of this journal... has been awaited for a long time. In fact, ever since the "Triple-A" Movement and since Putera /came into existence7, the publication of a journal has been eazerly anticipated, as a platform for our leadership...." For information on the new publication, see also the bibliography at the end of this study, and Note 522, below. (222) It must be borne in mind that no independent press was allowed, the few existing publications being produced by Japanese~sponsored and ~controlled agencies. To the writer's knowledge, lMi.I.A.i. had not published a journal under Dutch rule: under the occupation the Soeara replaced all the marazines previously published by Moslem organizations on Java. === [PDF page 129] === 113 promise solution of resuscitating the \!.I.A.I. involved the continuation of the status quo of the existing Islamic organizations. The Japanese, therefore, sought to establish contact with the village-teachers and Koran expounders (22h). On December 7, 192, thirty-two ulama's from all over Java were honored by a reception by the C-in-C at the gubernatorial palace in Ujakarta “— a move shrewdly calculated to invress these religious leaders with their own dignity and with the official recognition of their importance by the military authorities (225). This meeting ~- unprecedented (223) Cf. Asia-Raya of “ugust 1h, and Note 205, above. The importance of this group is well expressed in the words of a Dutch authority: "The ulama's enjoy/their local sphere well-nigh unlinited spiritual authority... among the ordinary villagers..., not infrquently tinged with an element of magic." C. A. O. van Nieuwenhuijze, Mens en vrijheid in Indonesié (The Hacue/Bandung: YW, van Hoeve, > Pehle For a brief reference, see also Justus van der Kroef, "Society and Culture in Indonesian me aoe) The American Journal of Sociology, LVIII, 1 (July, 1952), [Unreadable] (22h) The claim has even been made -— though without proof — that this"direct approach to the masses instead of through the several Moslem organizations was the result of a noncooperative attitude of some of [the/ religious associations." Janus Poppe, Political Developments in the Netherlands East Indies During ana Immediately After the Japanese Occupation (Unpublished doctoral dissertation: Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, 1943), p.58. (225) The group included many leaders of orthodox and reformist organizations; among the former, tiasjim Asjtarie, Wachid Has jim, Machfud Siddiq, Sayed Al-Habsji; amone the Etter, “as Mansur (spokesman for the group), Ki Bagus Hadikusumo and Jumus Anis. For a complete listing with biographical data of each participant, see Asia-Raya, December 26, 28 and 31, 192, and Sinar Baroe (Semarang), January 11 and === [PDF page 130] === 11h and unthoughtof under Dutch rule — was arranged by the Shumubu, without the intermediary of M.I.A.I., whose executive was, significantly, not in attendance at the reception. In an important address by the Gunseikan /Head of the Military Government/ (226), Maj.-Gen. Okasaki, the government's intention of regarding the ulamats, rather than the M.I.4.1., as the leaders of Islam, was clearly implied (227). He concluded 16, 1943. Orthodox participants -- including those outside amy organization ~- outnumbered reformist members or sympathizers by oct 2: 1. (226) In the Japanese administrative pyramid, the Commanderin-Chief, or Saik0-“hikikan,delezated his zovernmental authority to the Chief of Starr, acting as Gunseikan or Head of the “ilitary Government. In fact, the real dayto-day governmental work was in turn dele sated to the fanseikan's deputy, the Somubucho, or Head of the teneral Affairs Department of the Military Administration. See also Zorab, opecite, pp.33 ff. (227) The speech is fully reported in Soeara M.I.A.I., I, 1 (January 1, 1943), po.l-5. “or a Dutch summary, see zorab, Opecite, p.106. Interestingly enough, an advance release published by Domei of an outline of this speech (Asia-Raya, December 7, 192), varied significantly from the off icial text. The outline stated iea. that the military zovernment wished to end the differences between the various Islamic schools --— orthodox and reformist -—- by unitinys them in a unifying organ (the M.I.A. 1?) which would soon be given official recognition. In fact, Okazaki did say that it was "very difficult to unite them /tne different schools7, and we will not attempt to unite them during the Yar, as lonz as each of them will independently collaborate with Dai Nippon... Zefore long all relizious organizations will be officially allowed to resume their activities..." op.cite, 2.5, === [PDF page 131] === his address by confirming that his -uests were "the leaders of religion, who are honored by the people" (223). As the coming months were to show, the Japanese authorities carried this policy beyond the first representative group of distinzuished Moslem leaiers to the thousands of ulama's in the villazes, whose collaboration was later to he rewarded with imvoortant accretion of their local power and prestige at the expense of the priyahi-officials. The direction of Jananese Moslem nolicy likewise foreshadowed the replacement of i..I.A.7T. as the central Tslamie orcan at Djakarta. ahah === [PDF page 132] === CHAPTER VI The series of rapid Japanese victories in Southeast Asia, culminating in the lightnine conquest of Java, had coubtless made a deep impression on most Indonesian leaders. Dai Nice pon's military micht and the deadly “low it had struck at Yestern colonialism thus became two of the most important factors in the thinkine of the Indenesian veanle, especially durine the first two years of the Japanese occupation. hile it is diffienlt to vsauge the depth and sincerity of pro-Japanese sentiment, fostered by a combination o* admiration and fear, it would be misleading to underestimate its importe ance, particularly amonz the younyer generation undervoinz a new and dynamic experience. Post-oecupation developments have, as we know, often shown the strenzth of this Japanese legacy. Again, the imprint of the Japanese conquest on many, if not most, members of the various Indonesian elite-groups should not be minimized. The zreat majority of these leaders kcked sophistication and political intecrity, and were thus almost totally unprepared for the sudden chane of colonial ruler. The nevative role assisned to them under Dutch === [PDF page 133] === 117 rule had only equipped them with the weavons of criticism, While they had been denied the indispensible schooline which only political responsibility could have provided. These factors may, partly at least, account for the phenomenon of Indonesian "collaboration" in which, as far as tne writer can judge, most members of the political, administrative, and Islamic elitds participated -~ be it with varying devrees of conviction and enthusiasm. It is probable that the Japanese were more successful amons the often rootless Westerneducated intellectuals actively envaved in politics than they were amon? the conservative and tradition=conscious aristocracy. Against the background broadly sketched in these introdurctory comments, the attitude of the Islamic elite durin’ the occupation, and Moslem resistance to Japanese claims and policies must be viewed. If it may not unjustifiably be claimed that Japan's Mohammedan policy ultimately attained many of its chief objectives and that Islamic collaboration was far from negligible, then it must be kept in mind that Moslem resistance played an important part in the modification of some aspects of that policy, which, in turn, resulted in more willing Islamic cooperation. It seemed, therefore, appropriate to devote a short chapter to an account of this “loslem resistance, before resuming our chronolovzical study of the Islamic problem on the three === [PDF page 134] === 118 levels under examination, which is continued in subsequent chapters. The at best partial success of the initial Japanese organjgational efforts concerning the t:oslems on Java durin the first eight months of the occupation, discussed in the fore7oing chapter, mirrored, in fact, to some extent the di ficulties which beset the execution of Dai Niopon's Moslem policies durinz the first phase of the occupation. From the available documentary record it is easier to state that such diffieulties were encountered than to list Moslem srie’ances in detail, and to show Japanese steps in meeting or isnorin. chem; but in three specific fields -~ the clash between Japanization and Tslam, the pan-islamic problem, and education -- it may be possible to delineate the nature and sources of lonz-Lasting disayreement. Ever since cominz to Java, the new rulers had repeatedly proclaimed their intention of "resvecting and esteemince Islan," and the record of their early concern with it leaves little doubt about the priority assigned to proper collaboration with Islamic forces in the country. Yet difficulties must have arisen almost from the outset, increasing in importance -- if not in frequency -= to a point which not only made Japanese admission necessary, but -- far more significant still -= led to public Japanese apologies. Seen in the context of a ruthless occupation, bent on destroying every shadow of opposition === [PDF page 135] === 119 by brute force, these pronouncements are in themselves a testimony of the strength of Indonesian Islam. In the preceding chapter we already mentioned the audience eranted by Lt.-Gen. Imamura, highest Japanese dienitary on Java, to the then newly-elected M.T.4.72. chairman Wondoamiseno. Terminating the audience, His Excellency requested his visitor to communicate a message to his fellow-believers: "Please ask the Moslem community /so Imamura concluded/ to forgive any mistakes which the “Dai Nippon Army might be unwittinely committing, in particular those touching on Islamic matters! (229). In his address to the ulama's assembled in the palace three months later, the Sunseikan specifically returned to the same theme, when he commenced by sayinr, "As you know, ventlemen, it has been ong of our aims to protect and pay due respect to Islam. Yet, some problems have arisen as the result of mutual misunderstandin’s. The [Indones ian/ people know too little about the customs of Dai Nippon, while we, on the other hand, are as yet insufficiently informed about the islamic religion and way of life, because only a very few Moslems live in Nippon. We shall now /therefore/ institute a thorouzh study of Isdam, with a view to arriving at a better (229) Quoted by Wondoamiseno, "Sikap Y¥.I.4.1. terhadap peroebahan djaman baroe," in Pandji Poestaka, op.cite, psJ75- (230) Soeara M.I.A.I., I, 1 (January 1, 1943), p.53 cf. Zorab, opecit., pel06, and Me Slamet, "The Holy War, Made in Japan," opecit.e, p.10. Addressin2 a mass meeting at Djakarta attended by 50,000 Moslems, Sdmubuchs Col. Nakayama said on behalf of the dunseikan on March 3, 1943, "... The Nippon Government promises that it will study the Islamic religion and the laws and customs of its believers with the utmost care and thoroushness, in order to enable the Sovermment to pay the best possible attention to the wishes === [PDF page 136] === 120 Doubtless the principal difficulty in the way of sucha better relationship with Indonesian Moslems was tre suveriority which the Japanese claimed for their own culture and relizion. far from envisazing a partnership with Islam, they originally regarded it as a mere tool, capable of subjection to the "Japanese Spirit," and of manipulation for Japanese ends. This was, as events proved, as shortesighted an assumption as it was unvise. But only slowly and incompletely did the Japanese realize that Indonesian Islan was both sufficiently anti-Western and sufficiently powerful to be treated as an ally. The Japanese concept of a Chosen Race, superior to all others, was difficult to accept for all Indonesians, who resented the racial suveriority arrovantly exhibited by their "Liberators."" But the Japanese insistence on the divinity of the emperor in particular clashed head-cn with the Moslem relivion. Bowing in the direction of the imperial palace was, therefore, widely resented, tne more so since the deep bow ~~ the Sai- Keirei —- prescribed for this ceremony very closely resembled the prayer-bow performed by Moslems. Yet for many months the Japanese refused to subordinate their desire to Nivponize Indonesia to considerations of winning preater Islamic support, proclaiminz the near-identity of er — Coy, of the Indonesian people," Asia-Raya, March 3, 1943. Note that ®fslam' is here identivied with the 'Indonesian people.! === [PDF page 137] === 121 the Japanese Hakko Ichiu fWorld Brotherhood7 ideal and Islam: "The spirit of Dai Nippon and that of Islan [aro te the leading Japanese Moslem in Java/ are very close to one another, and ne small degree of identity prevails amonz the principles of the two. The Indonesian people must come to underst..1d this point..." (231). Distasteful though such dictation may have been, in the face of Japanese force few Moslems possessed the moral courage to oppose it openly at the outset. Once ainused, however, Islamic opposition became increasinzly vocal and a source of srave concern to the Jananese. As far as can be ascertained, the spiritual leader of that opposition was the venerated iinanskavau modernist, ‘ir. Abdul Karim Amru'llah. Preed from Yutch-imsosed exile in West-Java, he figured prominently in early Japanese Moslem propazanda, beinz anoointed a‘iviser to the ShUmubu soon after his liberation. It was Amrutllah who fearlessly exposed the irreconcilability of emperor worship anc Tslamic monotheism when Col. Yorie requested his opinion on an important book, explaining (231) Hadji Abdul Muniam Inada (Head of the Shimubu's First Section}, "Agama Islam dan Nippon," Pandji Poestaka, XX, 28 (October 17, 1942), po.9k47-5O and 954-55. See also the unsigned article "Penindjauan Islam Hakkoitjioce...," Asia-Raya, May 7, 1942, and Ae R. “aswedants 'tPensharapan Pemerintah terhadap para Kijahi," Soeara M.I.A.I., I, 3 and ("ebruary 1 and 15, 1943), pp.3-7 and IJ-12, resp.: Te have to search for points in our reli-zion which coincide with the essence of Ninponese culture, so that we can find a compass to suide us in the fulfillment of the government's hopes...e" (pell). Of. Ahmad Jusuf, "Dasar perdjoearsan Moeslipin," Pandji ioestaka, MiT, 25 (October 1, 1913), pp.€47-68, for a similjer statement. === [PDF page 138] === 122 the Japanese spirit to Indomesians (232). The Japanese, having themselves promoted the author of such criticism to prominence, apparently dared not punish him anc incur wicespread Moslem dissaffecticn, even when, in an act cf heroic daring, Amru’llah openly challenzed Tai Nippon and its emperor. In early 1943 a zreat moetiny of fiftyenine kyahi's from all over Java was convened at Fandung, at which Horie anc Amru'llah were to preside (233). Most imrortent of all woslems present, and the only Indenesian to be placed ancn= Japanese officers on the tribune, Amru'tilah remaine:) seated wren all others roze to perform the Sai-Nedrei (23a). (232) C£. S. Osu, wadjah Semanzat /Contours of the Spirit7 anc his later book Hjiwa Taroe /The Vew Soul7 (Randunc: Perporstakaan Tjahaja, 1912 and 1903, resp.) Dr. Amru'lleh's uncom promisins criticisms of the first book were contained in a letter to Horie dated April, 1943. Copies of this ruthie ss exposition were privately circulated among “Moslems; the writer is fortunate in possessiny one of these. The letter appeared as an appendix in Hamka’s biogravhy of Ur. Amrutliah, Ajahku, op.dat., pp.ec03-16. For a Dutch transla tion see J. i. Swellenzretel (ed. ’ transl.}, "'iod en de Keizer,! een Batwah van Dr. Abdul~Karim lamrullah," Indonesi¥® (Amsterdam), JI (1952-53), pp.77-92. On the incident itself see Ajahku, pp.153 ff. (233) Cf. the Domei announcement in Asia-Raya, Jamaary 23, 1943, listing Dr. Amrutllah as a member of the Shumubu. As far as the writer could ascertain, the press did not comment on the results of the meeting. (23) Hamka, opecit., p.l51. Hamka adds that after the incident the Japanese politely sent Amru'llah back to Djakarta, instead of continuing the previcusly planned propaganda tour through Java with him as leader. Or. Amru'llah fell sericusly il] a few months later and no lonrter appeared in public. He died during the occunation on June 2, 1945. The Sai-Keiret, oblieatory at the commencement of every === [PDF page 139] === To judge by the available record, opposition to the ceremony must have become more widespread as a result of this impressive and indelible defiance. Again the Japanese preferred explanation, apolosy and admonition to the kind of drastic measures unhesitatinely used azainst other offenders. Instead of again insisting on the similarity between Hakko Ichiu and Islam, the difference between emperor-worsip and that rerdeedAy iioslems to Allah was now emphasized in the paternal advice of Hadji Abdul Hamid Ono: "T think that many /“oslems7 are very reluctant to cbserve the /ceremony of/ rendering honor. ‘hey believe that it is identical with the ruku! (235), which is part of the [Islamic7 prayer. Such thouchts and doutts are altogether wront. The honoring /of the emperor/ is completely different from the ruku', and in fact they have hardly anything in common at all. Honoring is not praying..." (236). official Japanese function -= including the daily brief morning ceremony in all government offices in Indonesia during the occupation =~ should not be confused with the “Nordinary" Keirei, or slight bowins, in use among the Japanese, and required of al) inhabitants, free or jailed, vis-a-vis any Japanese. (235) On the ruku', see the article on "Salat," in Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam, pp.l91-99, on pel93. (236) See Ono's article, "Tentyo Setsu" in Pandji Poestaka, XXI, 9-10 (March 8, 193), pel86. The same issue of this journal containSan unsigned, detailed and illustrated discussion of the different bows prescribed for the Japanese and Islamic rituals respectively: "Tentang Sai Keirei: Perbedaan antara sembahjang dan memberi hormat," ibid., ppe297-98. Another article, "Menzenali saudara toea," was written by Mr. Sudjono (ibid., pp.495-97); a Dutchtrained Indenesiar Lawyer who had tautht at Tokyo, he had returned to Java as a Japanese officer with the first detachments in Warch, 19142. He pleaded for Moslem understanding of the fact that "... the people of Nippon love their country, and their love is based on the belief that === [PDF page 140] === 12h The Japanese did, however, not vet cecide to at@lish the ceremony for Moslems: The Sai-Keirei marked, for example, the openin: session of the training courses for kyahi's and ulama's in July 1943, which will be later discussed in some Getail (237). The increasing Moslem resistance to this imposition, and the irritation of their rulers at Islamic "separatism" are well illustrated by a surprisingly free exchange of opinions during a meeting between Indonesian ‘Joslems and Japanese officials of the Education Office; it was held at Djakarta in mic- 193, one day after the first larve-scale Allied air attack on the city of Surabaya (238). Openine the discussion, the leading Javanese speaker, professor Ozal:i, blamed Moslems for "apparently wishine to occupy a special and unique position" in Indonesian the land of Nippon was created by gods and is ruled by their successors, the Emperors." Quod non erat demonstrandum in this very sensitive connection! Jt is interesting to note that these articles did not appear in the I!,I.A.1I. journal, which, in fact, never made any reference to the Sai-Keirei. (237) Cf. the rpport on the ceremony in Asia-Raya of July 1, 1943, and see also Note 288, below. (238) A stenographic report of the July 23 meeting was reprinted in Pandji Poestaka, XXI, 20-21 (August 1, 1943), pp.731-38. The meeting was apparently convened by the Education Office; it was attended by its Head, professor Ozaki md three of his subordinates, by Ir. Soekarno (who remained silent most of the time), and by Kyahi Mas Mansur, Abdul Kahar iuzakkir, Raden H. Ac..an and wrs. Sitti Nurdjannah, representing Tslamic -- reformist —- interests. Indonesian and Chinese merchants were also present, since the conference,attended by eleven journalists, was partly devoted to problems of industry and commerce. === [PDF page 141] === society, He then asked: "In order to achieve final victory, can the Moslems not aid the Dai Nippon Army, even if there are certain points -- in themselves not touching the essence of the islamic religion — which, because of the extraordimry conditions prevailing, cannot be granted?" (239). The answer to this probing question was startlinsly simple and straightforward. Kyahi iias iansur, the same man who had already pledged the Moslems' support for Nipponts war in the presence of the tunseikan eight months previcusly (240), now made their support ecnditional. lie said that the Indonesian ifoslems, "especially these who have a clear realization of all preblems, holc that we can work tosether /with the Dai Nisnon Arn 7; but on condition that a way be used which does not offend religion, If /their7 relizion is, however, offended, then it should be realized that ‘Joslems belive in defending their relifion, wherever this may lead them, and this matter is understood by all /of them/" (2h1). Abdul Kahar Muzgzakir, prominent luhammadiyah youth leader, countered Japanization by remindins Ozaki that " yee quite a few Nipponese have studied the principles of Tslam eee They must [therefore/ know that it is not only a relipion, but a whole way of Tife pervading all of society vee The struggle against Western imperialism has for long been knovm to us, so that we accept Nippon's aim of fighting it... /Sut/7 the principle which should be strictly observed in order to bring about this [desired] cooperation should be: ‘We have our religion, you have yours.* The (239) Ibid., p.735. “he discussion on Islam takes up pp.735- 37 of the printed report -- more space than is devoted to any other single topic. (240) See Wansur's reply to the Junseikants address on December 7, including the oath of loyalty and support to the Japanese Army, in Soeara M.1I.A.7., T, 1 (January 1, 1943), vp.5-6. (2h1) Report of the meeting in Fandji Poestaka, op.cit., p.736. === [PDF page 142] === 126 difference between our two creeds need not stand in the way of our collaboration in wiping the Allies out of Asia, which is the home of all religions" (242). Although Indonesian Islamic leaders could not, by the nature o? this vexing problem, hope to achieve a secisive victory azainst iNirponization, they were at least successful in navins i.oslems ultimately freed from the performance of the humiliatine 3ai- Keirei during relivious meetings. Moslem recalcitrance anvart, the Japanese willingness to compromise was obviously also the result of Tokyo's changing policies which were didated by the to Japan unfavorable course of tne Facific Nar. Thus, shortly after Indonesian participation in the military csovernment had been promised oy Premier Tojo in the 82nd session of the Japanese Diet (23), the first Indonesian was appointed to a high position in the administration. it is significant that the first top-level position to be vacated hy the Japanese was that of Head of the Relivious Affairs Office; it was ziven to fusein (2).2) Ibid., p.737. (Emphasis added). ‘“uzakkir saw in the ficht avainst the Allies a comectinz link etween Jlakk6 Ichi and Pan-Islamism. The third Moslem speaker, Mrs. Nurdjannah, was far less aseressive, and Ozdi singled her out for thanks in his concluding comments, remarkins that "although the answcrs of the various entlemen are not quite clear yet, still they are worthwhile..." (Ibid., p.738). (243) For a report on Tojo's speech of June 17 and the corresponding communication of the C~in-C to Indonesian leaders on the next dav. see Djawa Baroe, IT, 13 (July 1, 1943),pp.3 and 10, resp. The promise was repeated during Tojo's brief visit to Djakarta on July 7; cf. Pandji toestaka, XXI, 20-21 (August 1, 1913), po.691 ff. See also Kisbree, op. cit., 84-85. The Islamic part in the newly-created soltbical organs will be discussed in the next chapter. === [PDF page 143] === 127 Djajadininerat, who followed Horie as the first Indonesian Head of the Shiimuibu in October, 1943 (2h). While the new Shumubuchd may have been given little executive power (245), his insistence, as much as Mansur's earlier defiance, may have ultimately persuaded the Japanese to grant this, to Moslems go all-important, concession. vhortly after assuming office, Djajadininerat told a distineuished visitor from Sumatra: "The Ninpon Military Jovernment has now realized that the Keirei militates against the Islamic belief. Consequently the keirei ceremony is no lonzer required in meetings of Moslem believers" (2,6). While it had, then, taken a relatively short time to wina partial Islamic victory over one aspect of Japanization in Java, it was far more difficult to overcome the deep-seated Japanese suspicion and fear of the spiritual, and tmis partly ideolo-ical, links binding Indonesian Moslens to the center of their (2h) The appointment was dated October 1, 1943; it was published in the official zazette, Kan fo, #28 (October 10, 1943), peli5. A special article on Djajadiningrat appeared in ibid., #31 (November 25, 1943), pel. (245) According to de Weerd, the two sections of the office were still headed by Japanese (op.ecit., p32); see also Zorab, opecit., p.105. 'umka, however, says that only Japanese Moslems remained in charge of the Shiimubu after Horie!'s return to Japan in mid-19)3. Cf. Ajahku, p.154. The writer has heen privately told that all official <pcuments continued to be written in Japanese; Djajadininyrat — who could not read that languave ~- was thus, in part at least, reduced to the performance of ceremonial functions. (246) Quoted in Hamka, Ajahku, p.155. === [PDF page 144] === 128 religion. In the eyes of the new rulers, ‘rab intlience was as perturbinz and alien as Dutch influence; having successfully banned the latter, they embarked on efforts to sever the second, "nan-islamic" bond standing in the way of a "New Java" under Nippon's aegis (2h7). The Japanese preoccupation with Pan-Islam basically bore an unmistakeable likeness to that of their predecessors; but where the Dutch had primaril-: souvht to avert political influence from overseas Moslem centers, the Japanese fiilitary authorities -— not threatened by this danser benause of the war (2)8) -— for a time apparently wished to change the very content of Tslamie thinking and feelin: and, if possible, to call into beinz an Asian-centered, "Titoist" Tslam. Doubtless the isolation from Arabia and Beynt, imposed on Tndonesian Moslems by the war, may have made the success of such a nolicy appear feasible. For a while, moreover, the honed-for conquest of the Tslamic (27) Cf. on this point the very interestins analysis, What the Japanese Did to Islam on Java, by ©. A. O. van Nieuwenhuijze (Undated typescript, 7 Dpe). (248) A good illustration of Japanese anxieties can be seefn in a question asked by Ozaki (Pandji Poestaka, op.cit., p.738): "Tf Mecca were to be occupied by the Anti-Axis powers, would [indonesian7 Moslems still wish to enter the hadj?" Muzskkir replied that he thought all] Moslems would in that case join Dai Nippon in an endeavor to drive the Allies out of Arabia. -- Iraq had declared war on the Axis powers on January 16, 1943; this act was ereeted with vitriolic comment in Asia- Raya five days later. Premier Tojo made caustic comments on it in his address to the 81st session of the Diet. Cf. ibid., *“ebruary 2, 1943. === [PDF page 145] === 129 countries in the Near East by the European Axis-povers could be used to bolster the aspirations of tie indonesian “oslems for a "return to normalcy." Foreign Minister lasayuki Sani, in an imoortant address to the Japanese Diet, held out such hopes for the near future in early 1943 (249). Under these circumstances, it sas even thought safe to promise an impressive zathering of prominent Moslems from Malaya and Sumatra at Sinzapore that ships for the Mecca pilgrimage would soon be provided by the Dai Nippon authorities (250) — a promise sooner still forgotten and buried (251). The witherinz hopes concerning contact with the (249) See the report of his speech, ziven on February 23, in Soeara M.I.A.I., I, 5 (March 1,1943), peli. The newly appointed Minister of Greater East Asian Affairs, Kazuo Aoki, on the same occasion made appeals for the collaboration of Asiatic Moslems. See Harsono Tjokroaminoto's enthusiastic comment on both speeches in ihid., I, 8 (April 15, 1943), pel. The trand Mufti of Jerusalem, from his voluntary exile in Verlin, cabled his appreciation to Tani, and the ¥.I.A.71. executive thanked both ministers profuse~- ly for their statements by cable one day later. See the reports in Asia-Raya of February 26 and 27, resp. (250) The meeting took place on April 5-65; it was announced in a Domei report of April 3 which added that the zathering Mwill be of exceptional importance for all the Moslems of the Southern Regions." Asia~aya, April 3, 1943. The promise revzardinz the pilerimave was reported in ibid., of April 9. (251) Apparently at first Indonesian Moslems took the promise quite seriously; at a meeting of fifty ulana's with Col. Horie at Djakarta later in April, Mas Mansur asked the Shiimubucho when the first shios to Mecca would sail. The answer was, of course, evasive. Asia-Raya, “pril 13, 1943. By July the impossibility of the hadj during the war-time had, however, already been accepted; see Muzakkir's statement at the meetinz with Ozaki, in Pandji Poestaka, op.cit., Pe 737. === [PDF page 146] === 130 Holy City were accompanied by increased emphasis on the somewhat hollow substitute of Islanic unity within the Co-Prosperity Sphere (252). Tt is understandably rather difficult to find proofs of a coherent anti-‘rabian policy, but there are some inilications of the areas of attack chosen by the Javanese. One concerned the use of the Arah lanzuaze, the other that of the Arabic serint (253). During the first vear of the ocemition, endeavors were made to ban the teaching of the language in all religious schools (254); in particular, schools of the Arab comnunity, (252) In early March an exchange of cables took place between Moslems in Java and Mongolia, in which each side sanz the obedient praises of the joyful patronage extended to Islan by the Rising Sun (Asia-Raya, March 3, 1943). A far more ambitious entervrise was a radio link-up between Moslems in Jjakarta and Tokyo on June 17. Mas wansur and Mrs. Nurdjannah spoke for the Moslems on Java, while from Tokyo N. Shioda, a Javanese Moslem ani leader of the Japanese Moslem League, was joined by an Indonesian (Omar Darak), an Indian (*. \. F. Karim, a university teacher), and by the Turkestan Moslen Amin Islan, the head of Tokyo's mosque. See ibid., June 16 and 18, the latter issue carryinz verbatim reports of the sveeches. (253) The script was not only used far writing Arabic, but it had been used for writing the Malay language before the Dutch introduced Romanization. Wost ulama's and kyahi'ts had had no Western schoolins, and thus still used the Arabic alphabet for writing Indonesian. As we shall see ina later chapter, in April 19) the Religious Affairs Office itself commenced publication of a journal for kyahi's and ulama's, which was printed in Indonesian, Javanese and Sundanese, usinz the Arabic alphabet for all three languages. (25L} Thus in September, 1942 an order of the Education Uffice of the Djakarta Special Municipality (Tokubetsu-Shi} forbade the teaching of Arabic in all primary schools within its jurisdiction. See Asia-Raya, September 22, 192. The === [PDF page 147] === 131 using Arabis as the language of seneral instruction, were initially confronted with zreat difficulties. The Arab community, in turn, avpears to have o*fered lonzer resistance to Japanese educational demands than did most Indonsian Moslems (25°). By the end of 1942, the Japanese had apparently realized that it was impossible to deny Moslems the teaching of the Koran in the Holy languaze: Admittings its use for purposes of religious instruction, they yet succeeded in making it conditional on the acceptance of their own standard curriculum in non-relizious subjects and -- more important still -- on the teaching of their ovm lanzuage in addition to Arabic (256). Thus, if Nippon had not altorether slain the pan-islamic vhanton, it had extorted a high price for its continued toleration (257). eravity of the situation may have caused the k.T.4.7. executive to place the problem of education on the azenda of a closed meetinz on November U;-15, 1942 (ibid., November 11, 1942). (255) Cf. M. Slamet, op.cit., pel0; see also Van Nieuwenhuijze, opecit., for a good account. Arado schools,like all other private schools, had closed when the invasion began. On April 29, 1942 -=- the emperor's birthday -- it was announced that private schools could reopen after obtaining a special permit; yet Arab schools were apparently amonz the last to obtain these permits, since special regulations regarding their issuance appeared in_Asia-Raya as late as October 9, 1942. Accordinz to a newsitem in the same paper of October 21, only seven Arab schools had by that date received opening permits. (256) Asia-Raya of October 30, 19142, carried an account of local Japanese approval for the re-opening of Arab and Indonesian Noslem schools in Djakarta ‘Municipality, on assurance that general subjects as well as the Japanese lanzuase would be tauzht. === [PDF page 148] === Tn fact, suspicion towards the Arabs took a much lencer time to abate; but when active Moslem support for the defense of Java urged the authorities to yet vreater concessions during 1944, the military government suddenly cranted Arabs equal status with Indonesians (258). This reztulation exempted them from the duty to register and from the payment of special registration fees imposed on "aliens," this makinz the Arabs the preferred foreign eroup in Java (259). It was certainly no coinany (257) It is not unlikely that efforts were also made to have Moslem prayers said in Indonesian or the local vernacular instead of in Arabic. While the reformists had already before the occupation advocated anc’ practised partial adoption of such a chance, it had always met stubhorn orthodox resistance. Yet late ‘in 192, the venerable Ali Alhansji for the first time read the prayer in Indonesian at Njakarta's Kwitane Mosque, in the presence of Japanese and Indonesian dimitaries ~- includins Seekarno and Hatta as well as Mansur (cf. Asia~Raya, Wovember 13 and 14, 1942). On the other hand, Viranata Kusumah, Rerent of Zandung, obviously to soothe orthodox protests, issued 2 public denial of havin been charzed with the enforcement of such a rulins on Izrahi's in his Pezency. “See ibid., January 19, 1943. (258) A special order of tie Junseikan, cated July, 19Lh, declared that "all Arabs in Java, in so far as they cdo not possess a foreien nationality, will be revzarded as 4+ndonesians /by the governnent/." See "Pengoemoeman Gunseikanbu," Kan 10, #8 (July 10, 194), pp.13-1). The writer does not know whether this rezulaticn automatically enabled ATabs to ace quire land which, according to Duch legislation valid under the occupation, could not be alienatec to non-Indonesians. (259) One of the earliest occuration decrees -=- "Oendang -oendans" #7 of *pril llth, 1942 -- ordered the registration of all adult "non-indivenous" persons, and the nayment of a rerise tration tax of Fl. 150 and Fl. €2.- by Eurcpean and Eurasian men and women, resPe, and Fl. 100.- and Fl. 50.-, resp. ty Asians. Csamu Seirei #20 of Vay 1, 1944 exempted Eurasians and Chinese reachin> the ace of 17 years as per Jamary 1 of that year from payment of the fee, while still subjectin: them to revristration. Cf. Poekce pencoempoelan ocendanr-cendan2, prell-13, and Kan i, ML?.. === [PDF page 149] === 133 cidence that this favor was accompanied -- after years of fruite less wleading by Arab and Indonesian “lioslems alike — ‘y permission to use the Arabic serivt in the only official Mcslem mblication on Java (260). Both measures, as will become aprarent later in this study, formed part of an entirely new trend in Japanese Moslem policies in Java. Japanese interference with the whcle fiela of Islamic education — partly referred to in connection with the Arak and "panislamic" problem abu ve — constituted one of the perhaps hmaviest burdens imposed cn Indonesian Moslems throughout the oacupation erae Not only was education helc to he a key to successful. Japanization, tut Tslamic education ceserved in Japanese eyes particular atLention because of the potential dancers inherent in its grass-roots significance. The problem of the contre} anc supervisien cf Islamic education had two aspects, one administrative, the other educational. Java's Islamic leavers had no adequate defenses arainst the ine trusion of the "Japanese Snirit" into either “Yestern-tyre religious schools or into orthovox villacze-pesar:tren's and madrasah's nor could they altogether prevent its spreading among the more (260) Cf. Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, IJ, 13 (July 1, 19hh), passim, and in particular He li. Muchtar's editorial, "Hoeroef Algoer'an dan bahasanja," ibid., pl. Contributors were given strict instructions to indicate clearly the exact Koran passage(s) quoted by them in Arabic. (Ibid., p.5.) A whole article in Arabic, from the pen of \asjumi-president Hasjim Asj'arie, appeared in the same issue (pn.2-3). === [PDF page 150] === unsophisticated kyahi's and other reli-ious teachers. On the administrative level, by contrast, many of the Surdens imposed on Islam were of far shorter duration. It may, therefore, »be convenient tc examine these cevelorments first. The lovic of authoritarianism, particularly in the beginning of the occupation, demanded a tightening of supervision on all levels of Islamic education and propaganda. Understandably enough, the military administration thus never revoked the muchresented Dutch "Guru-Ordinance" of 1925, which was a ready-made control of Islamic village education (261). Contrary to Dutch practices, it is true, Moslem schools did now receive some material and finacial aid from the government; yet in terms of educational and religious freedom such aid was dearly bought. What made this strict and ever-present vovernmental interference ever more irksome to Islamic leaders, however, was the fact that the Djakarta authorities —- both the Shtmubu and the Internal Affairs Devartment -—- at first entrusted the priyahiadministrators with this supervisory function at the regional and local levels. Thus the tension between religious leaders, and villave teachers in particular, on the one hand, and the native aristocracy on the other, inherited from the colonial rezime, not only continued during the early phases of the occupation, (261) See ibid., II, 11 (June 1, 19LL), pp.1-2, for a speech by Djajadiningrat on the continued validity of the ordinance. See also Part I, Note 72, above. During 19h, some modifications in its application were, however, approved, === [PDF page 151] === 135 but the added strictures and prohibitions imposed by the Jazanese increased priyahi surveillance anc thus tended to sharpen the conflict (262). Doubtless fear of Japanese revrisals drove tne priyahi's to a far more literal interpretation of their responsibilities than ever before. Now, moreover, the holdinz of publie -- including religious -—- meetinzs was subject to their approval ever since the original prohibition had been lifted. Thus the use of mosques, public meetine places anc buildines cepended on permission from these officials (263). In addition, Islamic villece schools -- pesantren's end madrasah's -~ supervised uncer uteh rule by pern2zhuluts and other Moslem personnel, were now placed under the direct administrative control of Regents and their subordinates (26h). (262) +n this connection it is interestinz to note that at the outset teachers of religious schools were required to submit testimonials from local penghulu's in order to obtain permits for the reopening of schools. Cf. Asia-raya » October 9, 1942. It will be re-called that these religious officials had often been the tarret of attacks from Moslem leaders, since they were suspect of beine allied to the priyahi's. (Cf. Part I, Notes 103 and 105, above). Towards the end of 1943, however, the position was reversed. A Shumubu Ordinance of November 26, 193, (Kan PO,#33/I /December 25, 1913/7, ppell-12) required applicants for s for the position of penghulu | to submit at least two testimonials from ulama's in their place of residence. The change was indicative of the growine reliance on Moslem leaders, which six months k ter resulted in even more drastic readjusments. (263) Cf. the announcement of the iecent of Fandung in Asia-Raya of January 19, 19.3, already referred to in Note 257, above. (26h) Educational administration was decentralized under the occupations each Residency of Shu, as well as the prircipalities /Koti7 of Central Java, had an fducation Service at- === [PDF page 152] === Though the priyahi's were obviously acting on orders from a ruthless master, they were frequently attacked by Moslem leaders who could not dare to blame the originators of a cumbersome and irritating control machinery (265). Japanese spokesmen, on the other hand, at times blandly joined in the chorus of accusation acainst the Indonesian administrative officials charged with controlling Moslem activities. Addressin: the faithful in Djakarta's Kwitane Nosque on an important lioslem holiday, Hadji Inada placed the blame squarely on the priyahi-corps: "The Government's appreciation of the lslamic relision anc of ti.e ulama's has by now been clearly and openly established, But while this is a fact, many obstacles and difficulties are /still being/ placed in the way of /that/ relizion, especially in areas far removed from ljakarta. Let me explain to you, brethren, that this is in no way the fault of ipponese representing the Government in those areas, but entirely that of Indonesian officials. Apparently they have not as yet seen fit to abandon their Dutch ways of thinking and acting. This is certainly regrettable and disappointing" (266). tached to them, whence orders were passed on tc the corresponding Regency /Ken/-Offices. On priyahi-control over Islamic education, see eee Asia-Raya, January 21, 1943 (on Randung pesantren's), and ibid., July 7, 193° (on Yjakarta's madrasah's). (265) Complaints against priyahi "obstruction" of village teachers were voiced in a Djakarta conference between local ulama's and Col. Horie, as reported in ibid., April 13, 1943. Such clear printed indictments are very rare, although allusions to friction can be found in many articles curing the occupation. It is not unlikely, moreover, that oftentimes these complaints may have been justified to a certain extent. 1 se se (266) Inada s adiress — a survey of Japanese Moslem policies durins the first year of the occupation -- apneared in Asia- Raya of “pril 3, 1943 (Emphasis in original). The speaker === [PDF page 153] === 137 Unlike the educational problem preper, however, the vexinz administrative tangle was ultimately resolved in favor of the Islamic movement durin: 19h). As a later chapter will show, its sclution was vart of a wider re-orientation of Japanese policies. It constituted a clear-cut victory for the Isiavic movement, which gained influence at the expense of the aristocratje elite on Java. The subsequent readjustment of the power-structure within Indonesian society was one of the many important changes bequeathed to Indonesia from the rule of the Rising Sun (267). We must now briefly return to the educational problem as such, which has to some extent already been discussed in connection with Arab schools. Since all Islamic education on Java was non-governmental (268) -- whether oreanized in Western-style schools or in the thousands of more or less primitive village also reminded his listeners of the siznal honor shown by Dai Nippon to islamic leaders in December 192: "Did a Dutch Sovernor “Teneral ever invite kyahi's and ulama's to his palace? i don't think there was a single iInconesian who would have believed that tne lyrahi's would be honored in such a way by the Supreme Commander of Dai Nipvon [in Java/. tt (267) cf. /Sutan/ Sjahrir, Perdjoeanzan kita (Djakarta: Pertjetakan Repoeblik Indonesia, 196), pe3. For a very similar result of Japanese policies in the Achin region of Northern Sumatra see Piekaar's Atjeh en dé oorlog met Japan, OpeCite, ppe27h-86, (268} It is intergbine to note that in ifay, 1942 Sanusi Pané had urged the abolition of Wuhammaciyah and Taman Siswa schools, and their absorption into the governrental school systen, arguing that the need for private schools had disappeared with the end of colonialism. Asia-Raya, May 22, 192. === [PDF page 154] === establishments (269), scattered all over the island -- Japanese control then was confronted by a more complex problem than was presented by the public school-system which fell a relatively easy victin to Nipponese tleichschaltuns, cften assured by puttine Japanese principals in charze of city schools. For well over a year, nce central re-ulation was anncuncec to sovern tne administration of private schools in Java. Control over non-coverrmental ecucation was decentralized, and permits for re-openin= private schools had to be obtained from the education sections cf Residency Cffices. For Islamic schools, it is true, the central authorities — mainly, it woult appear, motivated by their preoccupation with the teaching of Arabic -- prescribed the acceptance of a unified syllabus as early as mid- 1942 (270). But the fate cf all private education remained uncertain for many momths to come. Jocally, many schools were allowed to re~open (271); Indonesian Moslem schools seem, more~ (269) To appreciate the importance of the larrser pesantren's, it should be borne in mind that the orthodox training center Tebu Ireng, at Djombanz in Bastern Java, counted approximately six thousand students at the time of the Javanese invasion. (Hadji Agus Salim, Sornell Seminar #6). The head of the school, Hasjim Asj'arie, later became chairman of the Masjumi. -- An official estimate at the beszinning of 19)3 Placed the mimber of pesantren's in Pandant Revency alone at 750. Cf. Asia-Rava, January 12, 1913. (279) Thit., duly 3 and Auvust ", 1943, resp. (271) Ths e.7. a short news-item in Soeara li.T.4.1.,7, 2 (Januezy 15, 1943), 7.18, aentioned that out of a pre-war total of 135 schools operated by uhammadiyah in the Jogja principalities, 105 had by then been re-opened. === [PDF page 155] === 139 over, on the whole to have fared better than those of Taman Siswa (272). Lmacde it clear that, The pattern which ~radually cmerce? while the Japanese woul be content indirectly to control Mostenm schools at the lower levels, they would reserve all secondary education, teacher trainin-, and hich institutes of learninz to their own and direct management. Thus it is significant that in May, 1943, the authcrities forbade non-oblieatory religions instruction in zovernmental secondary schools (273). In the same month, all Islamic teachers were orzanized in a new central bow, the Pergaboengan s0eroe Islan indonesia /Federation of Indonesian Islamic Teachers/ and gr:dually inore and more Islamic — and Arab -- schools reopened their coors (27h). (272) As on all nezative asvects of Jananese policy, the record on this point is meater an? far from clear; moreover, since school administration was decentralized, the Djakarta vress does not provide an adequate victure. But to mention one interestinz example, on June 17, 1943, Asia~ vaya reported fron Dlitar that three vrivate Schools —— one Catholic and two Taman Siswa institutions -- had been taken over by the municipality. This left only ons “uhammodiyah rrade school in private hands and it was officially declared that it would remain private as a "special school, because it is devoted to the teaching of the Islamic religion." (273) Asia-Raya, May 13, 1943. Apparently permission to resune such instruction -- which had been allowed under Dutch rule -—- hac been obtained only a few days before the ban was azain imposed; it was stated that religious instruction was "not yet handled adqnately, [s0 that7 the matter was still being studied hy the authorities concerned." Similar instruction in the primary schools in jakarta ijunicipality was permitted sonewhat later, accordins to the same newspaper of June 25,1913. (274) On the foundinz of the federation, see Asia-Raya, May 21, 1943. On the re-openin: of Islamic schools in Jjakarta === [PDF page 156] === 140 Finally the military adninistration issue! a cecree revilat-— ine vrivate education on July 1, 1942 (275), explicitly limitine it to veneral primary teachin? and to seconuary business instruction £275). The decree vested all contrwl over the former in the Hesidents on Java, that over tne latter in the “ninseikan; both could veto curricula and dismiss personnel; fulldetails, including yearly budgets and accounts, had to be submitted by principals of private schvols. More important still, only officially reconized organizations were allowed to operate schools in the limited sphere assigned to private education under the new regulation. All institutions previously permitted to reopen by local Japanese authorities were provisionally allowed to carry on, but they had to file full particulars in accordance wita the new rules within one month. The era of the 'ild Schools" had thus irrevocably come te an end; 2b the same time, the moldint of the minds of Jndonesian youth in veneral, and Moslem youth in particular, beyond the primary schocl level was usurped by the teachers of the Rising Sun, Regency e.2., see ibid., July 2, 1943. Official statistics published in tbid., July 5, 1943, show 24 such schools in that Revency and ll) in the adjoining Djatinezara Rerency, including a new school opened in the vresence of 1.4. Horie and a **.1.A.T. representative on July h. (275) "Osamu Seirei" #22, dated July 1, 193. See Boekoe pengoenpeelan oendang-oendang, pp.31-33. (276) In April, 194 home science instruction was added to the province of private schools in "Osamu Seirei'" #16, dated April 8, 1944. See Kan PO, #l0 (April 10, 194k), p.5. === [PDF page 157] === 21 who also played a far from insicnificant part in thos: provinces still ostensibly left to private manavement. “loslem education in Java -- especially the reformists! Vestern-style school system -- had suffered a major defeat, Jslamic resistance was, unfortunately, not powerful enouzh to rescue Indonesian hoslem schools from the advancing wave of Japanization. Tat === [PDF page 158] === CHAPTS2 VII THE CONSOLIDATION OF JAPANESE MOSLEM POLICY DURING 1943 After the important confrontation between some fundamental Japancse aims and Islamic responses to thm, discussed in the previous chapter, we can now resume our chronological analysis of Islamic developments durin? 1943. ‘We shall first examine these develonments on the vrass roots and political levels, reserving the socio~relizious plane to the last:art of this echanter. This seqence, thouvh reversing the order hitherto ohserved, seemed indicated by the consideration that Japanese actions vrimarily concernei the first and second areas, while the initiative in the socio-reli-ious realm rested with Tslamic sroups Lnenselves. The first seven months of the new year witnessed a continued Japanese preoccupation with the mobilization of Indonesian Islam at the grass-roots level. “ut in the second half of that year, the political sienificance of Islam came to the fore, largely as a result of the first concessions vranted to Indonesians in Java. wWoslems came to occupy a far from negligible part in the new political organs created by the military administration. Of still sreater imoortance was the leadin’ role which lioslems === [PDF page 159] === 13 assumed in the newly created Indonesian defense forces. Gn the second level, finally, avart from some limited Japanese actions calenlated to meet Moslem desires, the main endeavor at expanding the area of Islamic activities stemmed from tne M.i.4. I. executives As we shall see, this boldly conceived expansion was doomed to failure when the military adninistration aboliched its Indonesian sponsor at the close of the year. Nai Nippon's preoccupation with the latent strenreth of Islan on Java, was, in e?fect, an educational preocecup.tion on the erandest imavinable scale; compared to this problem, the vreviously discussed control of private education was relatively insienificant, if for no other reasan than the fact tnat schooleducation in an organized, Western sense of the tera had made lamentably limited prozress in Indonesia under Dutch rule. In concentrating on the educators of the Indonesian peasant par excellence, the village kyahi's and ulama's, tne Japanese shrewdly reversed their predeccors! attitude of at best polite aloofness; they recognized -- and endeavored to utilize -- the ulama's key position in the Indonesian community (277). (277) For a comparison between Juteh and Yapanese attitndes towards kyahi's, cf. Hi. 2%, "Xijai dan zaman sekarang,” Asia- Raya, January 23, 193. The author concludes as follows: Certainly the kyahi occupies a most important place i: Indonesian scciety. lot infrequently a sinvle kyahi has hundreds of studen‘s. In the neighborhood of the place where he teaches religion, he becomes /everybody7's7 counsellor. The villazers come to him with their worries, revealinz to him their innermost thouchts." For a similar statement, see i.a. Umar Saidts "Ahli waris para Jabi," Soeara M.I.A.I., I, 11 (June 1, 1943), pr.9-10. a === [PDF page 160] === The Shumubu devoted considerable time and concerted efforts to this central aim of Japanese policy from the he-rinnine of the new year onwards; the objects of its unprecedenteu attention, unprepared for the unexpected onslaught and ill-equinped with any kind of knowledve beyond the linitedsphere of their restricted religious traininz, fell a rather easy prey to Nippon's siren call. Tn order to arcomplish the task of makinz? the kiyahi and ulana a Jananes? propazandist, it was, however, necessary to briny the villave teacher cut of his other-worldly isolation: The ‘nnseikan, in outlinins the sovernment's reconition of the ulanmats as a l-adin: element in Inconesian seciety caurin~ the reception in early December, 1742, had formulated the new tasks to be assigned to them succinctly: "WThile relicious education is, of course, imoortant, yet, viewed with regard to the prozress and change wrought in the lives of our youn2 /generation/, it is alsé important to teach in accordance with the demands of the new era. Everything pertainin?s to the past must now be forgotten. At the moment, our most important task is that you /ulama's/ imbibe to the best of your ability the quintessence of Nippon's culture and become acquainted with the situation in that country; equipped with this knowledre you should then educate the youth, and make them willin:s to work for a Greater East Asia" (278). (278) Okazakits speech in Soeara }'.T.A.1., opecit., peS. The Gunseikan also promised to vive vraduates from pesantren's equal opportunities with these of iWestern-style schools in covermment employment -- a promise enthusiastically creeted by uoslem commentators. Nc data are available to the writer which would allow a checkiny of the military administration's recruitment volicy vis-a-vis Modiens in subsequent years. === [PDF page 161] === This program of re-educatin:’ tne educators the Japanese would, understandably enouzh, not entrust to an Tndenesian Loner m tae had tot Islamic orsanization. The villave teachers, ¥ chosen as potential vomilor leaders, were, moreover, for the most part stubborn indivicualists, who jad seen nevlected try the Jutch no less than by the -cslanic elite (279) deg was certainly intentional an; in a war even lo -ical that the “.T.A.%., inaucurated with considerable citward acclaim by t authorities, was powerless to act as buffer or intermediary between the Lewildered villare teechers and their dynamic tutor GO). Tnstead, Norie anc his Japanese assitants in (279) Yan ‘Jieuwe vhuijze describ.s the ulamats as "a class of people all of their own, Fano are/ in zeneral rather svarsely provided with worldly goods and facilities; /€their/ education and orientation are conservative and orthodox, and they are somehwat looked cown upon by the Javanese priyahi- -officials... Amon modernists, the sreater vart of their educaticn is often, anc not unjustifiably, labelled by expressions of 'nec scolae nec vitae discimus'..." wens en vrijheid in Ins donesié, “op.cite, pel. (280) The 7.4.7. executive had anrarently assumed that sucha role would "naturally" as it were, be assigned te it, as the central ana officially sanctioned Islamic orvanization on Java. Thus at a..i.A. 2. meeting towards the end of January -- while the execution of the policy anncouncec¢ by the Tunseikan @ few weels earlier was still a matter of speculation -- it was deciced to orrcanize all ulama's under the aerzigs of “.I.4.7. See Asia-Raya, January 79, Vk3. "The Duecl: perica," stated AL. PASWEUAT "has eee Woakened the spirit of many kyahits [50 t t7 is is aifficult for them to asic. in the awakenin~ of (Gar o00 fety.e. Thus it is coed to have in the ).7.A.T. aon ediator betycen the outside verldé anc that of the ky lahdtae se! "Pencharepan remcerintah terhadar para kijahi," onecite, Pel. A gimilar assv tion ean he found in Haldgji Acus Salim's "Choetbah perajaan Fauloed," a broadcast address reorint;d in Soeara ''.J.A.Te, T, 7 and 6 {April 1 and 15, 19h3), vp.b-S and 3-0, resr., on tg i === [PDF page 162] === in the ShHnubu embarhed on @ tour of Java, nol in: 2 certes of conferences with local Inrahits and ulemets (204), sacn after Ue ~” Mae lan. Supe ye — 1. tome pers omy VS Junseitan nag preclaimed “al Nicponts aslamic vrasu-reots pelicy, which was tc make tie kyahi'’s ans ulama'ts "leacer: of the civillaway cre) e an front, charved with enswin’ public peace and awareness" ( Tn early Mav, 1943, the military acministretion announced the oreanizational measures taken to ensure the education of its chosen preparvanda tools. In Taly, the first croup cf sixty kwahite and ulama'ls -- sel etec from rach of the seventeen esidaencies /Sha7, the “jakarta Snecial cunicinvality, ana the four native Prineipalities /foti/ ir Central Java -- wovld undergo a pea. This was ony «© ° Galim's vew pro-davanese specches; his later publishe: comments were strictly limites to iSlamic exegesis. Aceordins to Namka, Or. Amrutlleh nad sincled this veteran leacer out for b Jananese sentiments. O°. Agjanim, pele. (261) The trtr commenced in “alanc, where a meetine wos arranced ver 19h2. with ulamats from all castern Java in late Decem Of, voeara M.I...0., J, 1 (January 1, 191.3), p.l. Fora report on the activities of one eacver participant -—- 2. 1. Muah. Fanan of Mjember -~ see Asia-Java, lay 21, 1913. Ace cording to this report, “anan had enbarked on a three months! propaganda tour after the conference, adcressin= some 14,000 people. An important metine was held in “jakarta in mid- January (ibid., January 15, 1913), whence Horie went to other centers in Western Java; sev esce ibid., January 15, 23 and 28, 19.3, and a news~item in Soeara M.T.A.t., Ty, 3 (February 1, 1943), p.lé. At these meetines, after prayers had been said for a speedy Yapanese victory, the Kai~eirei /the ueep bow in the direction of the imperial palace at Tokyo/7 hed to be performed, as resorted in Asia-Raya of January 15. (282) This apt para;hrase occurs in’. A. Amberi's article, "ewadjiban Alim Oelama dimasa peperanzan," Sceara -.!I.A.1., I, 10 (May 15, 1lyl3), pp.s-10. === [PDF page 163] === one-month training course at Djakarta under the auspices and direct supervision of the Shumubu (283). In August and November further groups would follow, the aim being to extend these courses indefinitely until the most important kyahi's anc ulama's would have received a rapid dose cf the New Spirit (26h). The trainees, most of them hitherto -- with varyinre devrees of thoroughness ~ steeped in the study of the Iioran and Islamic exeresis, were to be confronted with an impressive syllabus; it onlv contained two "subjects" related to Islamic religion, while ten courses in history, civies, symnastiecs, anda the Japan- (283) The announcement appeared in Asia-Raya of May 8, 1943, and was re-printed in Soeara M.l.Avi., T, IO (Nay 15, 193), pel. “he Indonesian term for sucl: courses, Latihan, soon became a symbol, if not almost a synonym, for the Japanese occupation of Java, as an increasin* number of Indonesiar eroups had to submit to this treatment in the course of time. Early in 19), Mr. Wilopo, at one time the cnly Moslem spokesman in the Volksraad, gave apt and even prcphetic expression to the si:mificance of the latihan: "We are living in the era of the latihan, the era of militariza-— tion, and the era of the rejuvenation of the spirit. We realize that all this will te cf the vreatest influence for the advancement of cour country and our people in the future...."' (Asia-Raya, January 29, 19Ll). See also W. Wondoamiseno's editorial, 'thjaman Latihan," Soeara M.I.A.I., T, 12 (June 15, 1943), p.l. For a brief reference, cf. Zorab, op.cite, pp.l06-07;.oppe, opecite, p.57; De Weerd, opecit., pp.39 f.; and Van Mieuwenhuijze, op.cit., pp.18-19. (28) As of February 1, 1944, a permanent training center for ulama's /Kaikyo kyoshi k@susho in Japanese/ was established at Djakarta, where latihan's were ziven every mcnth. See the official announcement in Asia-Raya of January 27, 19h):. Thirteen training courses had been held by the end of April 1945, with a total of 91,9 participants. See the statistical survey, includin: a revional. breakdovm, in Soeara Loeslimin Indonesia, ITI, 9 (vay 1, 195), p.20. === [PDF page 164] === 148 ese language occupied most of the study program of the latihan (285). In the two months before the first course was to commence, preparations were made for the important event: A preliminary conference between Shtmubu-officials and Islamic & acers was held at the capital's fashionable Hotel des Indes, at which the prospective Indonesian instructore were selected. It was indicative of the new policy that not a sincle member of the “,I.A.J. executive was considered for such an appointment (2°6), (285) This is the official listins of subjects, as ziven in Asia~Pava of May 8, 19h3: 1) Aim of the “reater Bast Asia var; 2) Short history of the Greater East Asia War; 3) Rasice world history, especially that of Anvlo- America imperialism Rasic history of Nippon...3 Rasic history of Java; Policies and aims of the Dai Nipoon Military Goverment; The connection between relisiocus science and enerai science $3 The duties of the faithful in this /new/ era; Japanese language; Islamic religious instruction; Hygiene and sports instruction; Excursions in order to cain useful knowledge and impres-— sions. way be YY MHP OOD ~AA01 se Ne NL ~ Se N (286) Accordine to a Domei report in Asia-Raya of ivay 19, 19L3, the original list of instructors, discussed at that meeting, contained the followin’ names: ‘r. Subazio, Dr. Prijono, Yusein Iskandar (all of them Indonesian employees of the Shimubu f/see Chapter V, Note 183, above7); Dr. Amru'llab, and Dr. Tusein Djajadinine-rat (both at that time advisers to that Office); Uadji Avus Salim, Abjul Halim, and Kyahi Achmad Sanusi (one prominent reformist and two orthodox LKoslems); FKyahi Mas Mansur, who had left the \.7.A.1. executive on March 10 of the same year (cf. Asia-Raya, March 11, 1943); and tr. 2. M. N. Toerbotjaroko, professor of Javanese lanruage and literature. shen the first course opened on July 1, the followins Indonesians were in fact lecturing: Hadji Salim, Dr. Amru'llah, Dr. Prijono, Hadji Sanusi, Mr. Subazio and Husein Iskmdar; they were joined === [PDF page 165] === Furthermore, two houses were readied as dormitories for the sixty "students," and Yapanese texthcoks were translated into Indonesian (287). On July 1, 1943, the first trainin course for kyahi's and ulamats was opened with arn impressive enough ceremony by Col. Kawasaki, representins the funseikan; Col.Horie, Head of the Shumubu and leader of the latihan, informed the assembled kyahi's that the aim of their trainin” was "to strenethen fyour7 understandins of the world situation, and to increase your spirit so that you will he able tive the fullest possible support to tre Jovernment” (OER Y, This was, then, the becinmine of the Japanese adninistration's Islamic crass-roots nelicy, foreshacewed thy the events of seven months aro; it was ultimately and lastinctly to politicize Indonesian Islam far bevone its pre-occuration level. in their search for a reliable ally close to the millions of Indonesian peasants, the new rulers hac shrewdly chosen the kyahi and ulama as an entirely new element in the Indonesian political scene (269). by Mr. Sudjono, Yol. Yorie, and Miyameto, Abiko and Togo from the Education (ffice; together with three other Japanese, they completed the"faculty." Cf. ibid., July 1, 1943. (287) Ibid., June 17, 1943. (2°8) Thid., July 1, 1943. Again, the Sai-Keirei was performed at the beginnine of the meetinz; ironically enough, it took place at &.I.A.1. headquarters, though the courses themselves were wiven in the buildin: of the Relivsious Affairs office. A complete listin of the participants in the first latinan ean be found in the same issue of Asia-Raya. (289) "The chanre in the position of the ulama has been very noticearle," commented an Isla:is observer in mid-19)3. "It === [PDF page 166] === Bypassing the islamic leadership at Dial:arta, the Javanese nad created a new — and, as they hoved, chedient -- instrument, weich they could play out azainst the rrivahi-elite no less than a7 the naticnalist leaJership (290). The effect of the trainin: courses on the ulamats is difficult to assess (291); in themselves, they could hardly have sufhas been rapid over the short span of time since the Gunseikan's address fof December 7, 194.27," i/arsono/ Tjfokroaminoto/, "al inelas a menghadapi pendidikan ra'jat,' Soeara Tekin I, 15, (Ausust 7, 19h3), p.l. (290) On the tension between ulama's and priyahi's, see the passage from Van Nieuwenhuijze, quoted in Note 279, above; cf. also Notes 262-265, above. uh. Isa Anshar, blamed Western colonialism for turnins the Western-trained invellectuals against the ulama's: "A very deep ana wide sap existed between these two leadin;: /zroups of the people eee The one pulled «.. towards the west, the other towards the Sast. "wewad jlban oelama dalav zaman baroe, " Soe ara mali, T, b (tebruery 15, 1943), pe.7-9. For a gim- Ylar exposition, see H. Pasiidi, "renzetanoean ahli avama doeloe dan sekaranz," Asia-Raya, Jul; 2, 1943. Yondoaniseno (loe.cit.) also referred to existin- tensions, claiming that Na creat many intellectuals and priyahi's do nov want to make a thorough stucy of their relision, which yet is also the relision of their people; as a result, differences often oceur among [these erouns/. " The |.7.A.I. chairman therefore urged the authorities to institute latihan's *°F these other elite-groups -- a sucgestion in part taken up by the Japanese much later. (291) The Japanese chief of the publishing house Ralai Poestaka, Kaneho, interviewed the participants before they left Djakarta. Not unexpectedly, an alinost unanimous hymn of praise greeted him, th: more so since '"adji Inada of the Shimubu was also present. Only five ulama's ventured to utter some mild criticisms, which could be summed up as: 1) languave difficulties, 2) overcrowded syllabus coupled with insufficient time, and 3) physical strain connected with sports and ~ynnastics. Meager thouwzh these comments are, they vet indicate that too mich was beings attempted too quickly, and with too little resard for what the trainees could be exrected vladly to assimilate. rart of the interview was vublisned in frandji Foestaka, XXT, 22 (Anmust 15, 1213), pr. 619-812 === [PDF page 167] === ficed for a thorouzh incubation of the "Japanese Snirit," however well administered its doses may have becn jurine the thirty cays of the latihan. On the other hand, the shock of on entirely nevel exmnertence, counled with a calculated cloenmlin: of Cspanese Slattery and nower-lisplay, couli no’ fail to leave a leet inpression on the rather uneducated sartictrants, many of whom nod never even seen th. capital city before (292), ‘Thatever tie individual kyahi and ulana may have taken back to his heme, nowever, he was Vii der no lonver allowec to see refure in his ciolistered other-eworluly aloofness: vai Vinson nad force fullsr moved him iato the day-today life of the Inconesian community. Tf the politization of the ulamats was the most important asoect of Japanese Moslem policy in 193, it was yet act its only feature. From the middle of that year onwards, concessions were (292) Cf. Van Nieuwenhui jze, What the Japanese Did to Islam on Java, opecit., and Fopne, > Qeetlte, te5;. The trainees were also taken to such stranve ani worldly places as city schools, printine works ani factories. See KH. 4. Jusaddad, 'Pendanatan selana Latihan Gelama,"t ibiu., I, 1? (September 1, 1743), pell. Accordines to a short newsitem, the visiting ivahits were siven cotton seeds, in order to make them serve as an example in the adcninistration's much advertised drive to encouraze cotton cultivation on Java. Of. Djawa “aroe, T, 16 (Ausust 15, 1943), p.?. On this woint, ses also Pr... rrilie wita, "The “state Agriculture Durine cone Japanese Cceunation,! The Rconomic Review of Indonesia (Retay ia), T (January, D3, Pbelj-l’. na Previous oecasion, ~ial:arta ulama's had liad to atsend a performance of a Japanase proparan:a film (Asia- Rava, Varch $, 1943); but since relivions prejudice frowned on this medium, the partictnants of the latihnan were anoarently spared a repetition. See in this connection, M, ‘i's article, "Hoekoem Islan terhadar seni memahat. dan mensovanbar," in Pandji Poestaka, XXI, © (February 20, 1913), 1.221. === [PDF page 168] === made to Indonesian vrouss on Java, an? in the new politicce administrative configuration the islamic elite obtained a reatme LL n@u ever occupied under er and more conspicuous share *nan Dutch rule. his is not tc say that Japanese::cliey vis-a-vis Islamic oolitieal action prover had neressaril, chan ved cince the crohibition of the former islamic volitical parties in the earl, months of the occupation. As we shall presenthlr see, the cone ecessions cranted iid not in the least involve a Liberalization of political ection. Rub Japanese endeavors to urepare the ioland for defense brought with them concomitant chanves which, however limited in scone orizinally, cid ultimately lead toa more vigorous political life. je shall now briefly examine these develonients as they bore on the Tslanie movenent. Yle have already referred to tie: spectacular appointment of an Indonesian -- tr. Husein Djajadininrrat -~ as Head of the Relivions Affairs Office in Gectober, 1743. This was the first high position in the center of the military administration to be occupied by a non-Japanese 4793), and as such it remained (293) ‘The priyahi-elite was not forvotten in this first wave of Japanese venerosity: On Noveaber 1O, \. Sutardjo Yartohadikusumo was appointed Shitcehckan, or head, of Djakarta Residency, and taden tas T. A. Suric, Revent of:avevuan, to the sane position in Ved joneroro 2esideney. C27. Man PO, 31 (November 25, 1943), 2.4. and for short bic vraphicaT” articles on the two civnitaries see Djawa Raroce, I, 23 (Necember 1, 1943), pp.5-9, and Pandji Foestaka, XXT, 28 (Novemser 25, 1943), pe?95. nly one other Indonesian was === [PDF page 169] === 153 unique until the end of the occupation (294). In itself, however, the honor thus conspicuously bestowed on Indonesian islan did not sienify a recormnition of the prestize of the Islamic elite, since the arnointee, thouvh a noted Islamic scholar, vas the scion cf one of the oldest anc most influential, Westerneducated »riyahi-families. Standinz outside the tslamic movement proper, the new Shilmibucho had at cng time already held a sinilar position under Vutch rule, as Assistant Adviser on Native Affairs. Of perhaps even sreater tong-term significance was the fact that, simultaneously, another outstandiaz Moslem -- and in this instance recruited from the ranks of the Islamic movement -- was at ached to the Shemubu in an advisory function (295). made Shichdkan durin’ the occupations On December 12, lybh, 2. IT. Suroso bename Resident of Yen. See Pandji Poestaka, XXIII, 2 (January 15, 1945), p.57, ana cf. also Note SOL, be low. £29) Two "ministerial anpointments were actually announced after the surrender of Japan: As per Anvust 27, 1945, 2. A. A. “Niranata Kusuma (former 2egent of “anduns) was anpointed to the portfolio of Internal Affaits /Naimubu7, which he azain ocerpied in the first sepublican casinet. vlrofessor Supomo, later to become fresident of the University of Indonesia and Indonesian ambassador te the Court of St. James, was at the same time appointed Shihobucho, or Minister of Justice, a post likewise retained in the first.enublican cabinet. See Kan FO, #7l (September 10, 1915), 25. (295) See Notes 115, 2h and 245, above. Ijadininerat had *een made Koton (adviser) to tue Shifmubu earlier in the year (Asia-Raya, March 26, 1943). This position was now assisned to das Mansur (Kan Po, #28 /October 10, 19437, pelS). One month later, another leadin= figure of the Tslamic movement — Muhammadiyah-member 2. ¥. Muchtar -- was for the first time appointed to an official position in the Shtmubu. Cf. ibid., #30 (November 10, 1943), p.ll. === [PDF page 170] === 154 Dre Njajadinin-rat's avpointment was, in effect, only one of the chanzes introduced after Premier Tojo's aforementioned policy declarations, both in the Jananese Diet and durinz his visit to Java in July, 1943 (296). It was the Japanese Prime Minister's promise of early Indonesian participation in the government of Java, however, which had stirred the hopes of most Indonesian leaders (297), and which were actually bein: translated into effect a few months hefore the new dimitary assumed his function. On Ausust,l, 1943, Lt.-jien, Harada, Commander-in-Chief on Java (293), announced the Japmese administration's plans with (295) See Note °%S, above. Immediately followin: Tojo's visist, an Indonesian delevation, consistin~ of twenty members -- includin7 three journalists ~— was sent on a visit to Japan. The dele vation incluced -rofessor Sicomo, Dr. Tuntaran Vartoatmoijo andl former Farindra-leajer “ukardjo Wirjonranoto. lost cf its other members belonved to the administrative anc priyahi elite's and two held positions in the Putera-executive. The delevation was led by Sutradjo Karbhadikusumo, and left Jjakarta tn early Aucust, after an audience with the C-in-C on July 31. For a complete listing, see Djawa Baroe, 7, 16 (August 15, 1943), pp.6-7. The zroup returned to Java on November 1. Interviews on their impressions can be found in ibid., I, 22 (November 15, 1943), pelO. See also Parada Harahan (one of the three journalists in the croup), Ni di masa perang! (Djakarta: Djawa Shimbun Sha, Sth) passin. (297) See e.7. Abdul Rasjid, "Perasaan pendoedoek aseli tentang koendjoengan 1. Mf. Todjo di -jakarta," Pandji Foestaka, XXT, 20-21 (“ugust 1, 1943), o>-703-70h. This special issue of Pandji Foestaka is entirely devoted to the premier's visigt. (278) Lt.-ten. Kumakiti Narada had replaced Lt.-‘en. Hitoshi Tmanura as Commader-in-Vhief on Java in way, 1943. Cf. Zoraby ODeCite,:.30 ne === [PDF page 171] === 15 rerard to Indonesian participation in the sovernnent (299): First, a Central Advisory Council /Chid Sangi~in/ was to be created at Djakarta, and Rezional Advisory Councils ‘5 Sangikai/7 in the seventeen Residencies ani in sjakerta.unicipality. Second, top-level advisers [Banyo/, to be appointed in all major departments of the central administration, were to insure out ward indonesian participation in policy decisions and execution. Sne month later, resulations settin: up the councils and new ousitions were nulished (300), anu one month later avain, anpointments of councillors (301) avec a uvisers £302) were annonce | [Unreadable] (299) 42h (Aucust 10, 13.3), rrelO-11, and Sjava Uarce, ucust 15, 193), ppeB-S. “or a sumnary of Indopartictpation, See cisbree, G.ecite, Charter TIT, especially pp.d5-35. (300) "sam: “efirei"” #36 and 37, and "Makloemat Junseikan" #16, all dated September 5, 1943, see Roekoe porzoempoclan cendane-oendang, pp.102-05 anu 266, resp. -= In a vovernment announcement dated ilovember 15, it was stated that certain functions hitherto exercised by the central autnurities would be surrendered to the rulers of the Central Javanese principalities (Kan i, #31 /November 25 194,37, pe5)e “No adgisory councils were introduced in these areas /Roti7 until Mav, 195. Sf. ibid., #65 (May 10, 1915), ppeO=7s (3C1) For a complete list of the 23 appointees to the Central Council,see Djawa Barce, I, 19 (October 1, 1513), p.4. The Gouncil's complete membership was reached towards the end of CGotober, when twenty more councillors were elected by the local Sangi-kai's. See ibide, 1, 21 (lovember 1, U3), pre LeS. Tt is interestine to note that Section 13 of the decree settin: up the Chm Sanvi-in sbiculeted that its memoers were to “receive the hichest honor amone the innahdtents of Java, with ie oxcertion cf the rulin: orinees and covernmmant officiais." Roekoe pentoemnoelan o-neanr=oonsans, v.lus. fers of tne Sentral Council — m4) rs Ss Lo ’ 1 were palo Phe 2yoCU.~ pehey Tice Of Die revional bolins === [PDF page 172] === Within the context of this study, we cannol dwell ona Jetaile?d Usecussion of these dour tless cisarnmeintin: concessions mage te Indonesian participation in the manarement of solitical affairs in Java \203), or on the wrkine of tie new instit Suh owe shoula note that, whatever rave mi: leaders in ceneral may have had soon the pate and im: olent cer, of the previcuS -- anc cven then powerlesc -~ Vol’sracc, -raciously offered to themhy Gad Winpon, for Moslems the cory dt fered in one sionittc TUS oreacecessor: 2 we noted in an earlinr vart of thic essary ondy one: sucke sr ar had represented inionesian islem amen. the sixty members of the levtislature under Gutch rule; by contrast, there were six smminent ‘loslems amcns the forty-three members af? the Chuc Sanzi- W1. 2,400.- pea., chairmen aac vice-chairmen receiving a far hieher remuneration. These were impressive salaries by occupation standards. See "Csamu Kanrei" #5 ana 7, both cated September 5, 1212, in isia., po.l)1 and 193,res;. (302) Seven acvrointments of Sanyo'ts were announced in Kan Fo, #28 (Cetober 10, 19:2), 9.2%, Trev included Ir. Soekarno, Prof. ~ HPCC » and (uhammad Yanin, tevether with four highrankine’ civil servants. (303) The disaspointment can bh clearhy reen in joekarno's comments on the institution of the Centril Auvisory Coun cil of which ne sosn became rresident. ‘f, sjawa Rarce [Unreadable] i, 18 (September 15, 1913), vel. (305 The six Moslem memsers were: Yi Farus Yadikusumo (chairman of Muhammadiyah); =. oo. A. alim (a leadin. orthodox ulama from T3irebon); ¥yahi Mas Mansur (at that time Adviser to the ‘iuhammaciyah executive ana member of "The Rie Vour'l); K. H. Vachid sasjir (a Nahdatul "lama leader, === [PDF page 173] === This importent difference 213 net 70 unnoticed v7 s“oslem commentaters (395), whe did not fail te note, moreuver, that the new covernnental machinery was insu murated durin che Muslems! holy month o° Namadhan -- verha s with a view to courting Islaaic approval (306), +slanic representation was, Surthermore, not lirited to the Central -dvisory Council;.oslems oceupied several seats in, and were nct infrequently chairmen of, the revional Shu Sangi-kai's (307). Another indication of the Jamanese cesire to place Islam in the forefront of public affairs on Java could not “ail to impress Indonesian Moslems: In Novenber, 1943 three leadins Indonesians were flown to Tokyo, where they were cecorated by the Japanese emperor. The delegation consisted of Tr. Soekarno, and elder son of the famous Tebu Ireng teacher Aasjim Asj'- arie); H. ll. Patchurachman (a xuhammadiyah-leader fron Bast Java); and“. A. Safwan (a prominent Nandatul Ulama figure in West Java). While the first four councillors were aopointed by the military zovernment, the last two members were elected by tevional Councils. oedjian," Soeara L.1.A.J.,., 21 (lovember 1, 1943), pp.t-3. (306) See the same author's "Sekitar Teeasa dan Lebaran," and ". Wondoamisenc's "Hari Raya Loear biasa," both in itid., T, 18-19, pp.11-12 and 6-9, resp. (307) The writer kas not succeeded in finding a complete list of the members of these egional Councils. Amone the religious leaders listed in Orang Indonesia jang terkemoeka di Djawa (pp.3l0-l6), seven are shown as having been regional councillors, significantly including four penzhulu's. This tabulation, however, is almost certainly incomplete. See on this point also Tjokroaminote's article "Rangsa kita dalam oedjian," loc.cit. === [PDF page 174] === 158 Mohammad Tatta and Vuhammdiyah-chairman "i Pavus Hatikusums; although the ©3.T.A.1I. executive had avain been tr-passed, a leading lMoslem had been symbolically linked with the outstandine nationalist leaders in an attempt to win Indonesian and tslanic support (308). Of far greater importance for the future of Indonesian political developments -- and of Indonesian Islam in particular -- was the creation of Indonesian military forces, in which Moslems played an outstanding role from the very bezinniny. The decision to this crucial step (309) was taken in Sentember, 1943; it mirrored the worsening stratezic situation in the Pacific War and Japanese anticination of Allied landiizs on the island. on September 7, Tatot Mangkupradja, an old friend and fellow-worker of Soekarno's, addressed a letter to the Saiko Shikikan in which he"resvectfully requested" the settin: up of an Indonesian (308) The delevation left Java by air on November 10, and returned on Uecember 3, 1943. Sea the report in Fandji Poestaka, XXI, 29 (Necember @&, 1943), p.1070, and cf. STs Kahin, opecit., p.lO?. The writer has not been able to ascertain why Hadikusumo was selected instead of Mas Mansur, who, with a view to his position in Putera alone, would have been the obvious choice. Hamka reports that his father cold-shouldered Hadikusumo on his return from Tokyo. Cf. Ajahku, p.155, (309) Indonesians had been recruited as auxiliary sol-sters /Heiho's/7 in the Japanese army since tee end of 1942. Accordinz ta a newsitem in Soeara M.1.A.1., I, 17 (September 1913), peli, many Muhanmadiyah pupils were joining the Heiho corps in Jozja. -~ Two para-military youth corps keibddan and Seinandan, had come into existence in early T93. Gf. Zorah, op.ecit.e, po.tl0-1ll, for a summary. === [PDF page 175] === 159 volunteers' corps on Java (310). Marely four weeks lster the — obviously officially inspired -- request vas granted (211). The popular response was doubtless enthusiastic; recruitment centers all over Java were, at the outset in particular, overwhelmed with volunteers, thous it is difficuit to estimte whether most of them were motivated by patriotism or by the prospect of relatively secure employment (312). For our purposes, however, it is important to note that the apneal to enter the new army was conspicuously successful amon7 loslems on Java. In particular, tne feta'ts Indonesian cfficer corps, whose trainin commenced in lte October, 1943, contained a creat number of kyahi's (313). As far as can be ascertained, the new Indonesian military (310) The letter is reproduced in Pandji Poestaka, XxXI, 2h (September 15, 1943), p.8u5. A resumé appeared in Djawa Baroe, I, 18 (September 15, 1943), pe3. Mangkupradja, a forner member of the P.N.I. executive, was then a railroad official and a member of the Bogor Shi Sanzki-kai. He was appointed to the Central Advisory Gouncil on September 10, 1944. Cf. Djawa Baroe, II, 18 (September 15, 19h), pe29. (311) The volunteers! corps, "Pasoekan soeka-rela oentoek membela Tanah Djawa" -—- usually abbreviated as Peta — was created by Osamu Seirei #44, cated October 3, 1913. See Boekoe penzoempoelan oendanz-oendang, p.122. A whole issue of Djawa Baroe (tT, 20 Tectober 15, 19.37) was devoted to the inaugural ceremonies connected with the foundin: of Peta. (312) According to De Weerd, this response was limited to the first draft, while "with the followins levies it appeared that there was insufficient enthusiasm, sc tnat with each new levy each Revency was tol? how mam’ 'volunteers! were reqiired..." Odecite, no25. %It should be recalled that the Dutch-created Indonesian militia in 19:1 had likewise been flooded with applicants far in excess of the required mimber of recruits. Cf. Prinzzodicdo, Opetite, De222- (313) In his weekly column "Gbrolan Sabtoe," the editor of Asia- === [PDF page 176] === 169 elite in effect drew its main streneth from Moslem leaders and from members of the aristocracy (314), while the Vestern-educated intelligentsia, though welcoming and applauding the new army (315), did not conspicuously contribute to its leadinz personnel. Moslem enthusiasm for military service had actually found additional exoression at the time when the founding of an Ind- Raya sonewlat ironically commented on the fact that so many kyahits had become officers that the problem of addressing them properly had to be faced; he susvested the title of "ai danchd Wahi," i.e. a com ination of the Japmese tern for officer with that of kyahi. Asta-Naya, January 22, hy, Sor otter references to wlamats as teta officers, anc also as members of “esticnal vornetis, see fandji foestaha, XXIT ay: (February 15, uh), anian inteyview with R.A. A. tifjiman “njadadinin rat, Tecant of oeranc, in Asia-Raya, Peb- (31h) No complete Llistin: of reba. “Ticers is available to the writer, so that this tentative conclusion is basea on indicative, but not entirely conclusive,evidence. Thus an early article devoted to of ficer-trainins named four trainees: hy oe. &. Furbonavore, younver son of the Susuhunan of solo, and craduate of Breda “ilitar. Academy in Hollanu; =... Surachmat, elder son of the “«sent of Tjirebon anu himself a hieh-rankin’ priyahi-official; and two well-known ‘Nuham— maliyah-leaders, K. 7%. Taris [skandar ani Junus Anise Of. ibid., XXT, 23 (November 15, 193), pe?91. A survey of one year of Peta develorments siecificallv mentioned that "local leaders [ieee priyahits?7 and +slanic leaders flooded the recruitment centers for officers ia Jetober, 1943." 6 Djawa Raroe, Tf, 20 (October 15, LIK), ppeS-7?. In early 19u4, a Moslem writer Jrew attention to Islamic participations Miho are eee the high Peta officers? Amon: them, as we know, there are mamy yvahi's from the pesantrents, leaders of Islamic organizations and ifoslea youths..." GS. Wiroharcijono, Mencerahkan tenasa Moeslimin," Soeara soessimin Indonesia, TT, 2 (danvary 18, 2h), co. <= See also Votes 316 anc L54, helow. aye 7 wT 7 % (315) in early Nevember, 1943, Puterea in eenfuneticn with the Tropa anda Ye, artrent Flenicruf oman hres @ acnbruewide neal on behalf of the new arm. Cf. the newoltem in tant a7 Ar ve 7 7. _\ as 1 OT “Nevember L, Lo: Dy, pe?o?. === [PDF page 177] === nes ian volunteers! corps hac first teen macted. “only trres isis after Manckupardjats letter, ten crominent Moslems -- none of them, sivnificantly, on the ».:.4... exceutive -- arfixec their gnatures to a very similar letver t- the Japanese Commar der-insi? Chief, with a request te permit the foundin. * a separate os ler Volunteers! Corrs on Java (316). 9 The vetiticners arsed the cal - ine of an ulama conference tc ciccuss the prespective relistious army, declarin= that ties Pdoterz of Isla eer cone of cone Cliet with the evil o 'y oclems ali 0 pela st to ereatl the Ame n Pore diction. T vava lives unier th 2 th al x 3 Leth us, thorefore, set up a Moslem volunteer corps on Javea, se that it may becore the trailblazer in the effort to destroy americe and In spite of -- if not because of? -- the apparent srontaneity of their request, Islamic leaters were not allowed to proceed th the formation of a military corps of their own at that time, is at least probatic that the reorganization of the iioslem 16) According to the report released by Domei, the originator of the letter was Wali Al “atah (a Muhammadiyah leader who had attended the Worl: Islamic Congress in Japan curinz 1938) It was, in addition, signed by was Mansur, Vr. RX. siuhanunead Adnen {Tresident of the Court for Islanic Affairs and member of the Jjakerta Municipal Advisory Council), “r. Amrutllahk, YW. huehtar, and four orthodox lqahi's. See Fandji Poestaka, XXT, 2h (September 10, 19143), p.°61. Hamka asserts that Ur. Amru'l lah consented to military trainin: of soslems, »ecause there was no reason why the: should now learn the arts of war from the idolators. See Ajarku, celth. 317) Djawa Varoe, 7, 19 (Cctober 1, 1942), rele === [PDF page 178] === federation i.7.A.1., which foilowed the creation of the eta Volunteer Cares within a matter cf weeks, nade the Ja.anese desist from authorizing a religious army. As we shall see in the next chapter, permission for such an army was finally -ranted in December, 194L. Tn the absence cf a separate military unit, Moslems joinec the Feta, in wnose cfficer corps, as we saw, they scon occuried an important, anc perhaps even predominant, place: The retats senior Indonesian officer /Pai cancht/ was ir. “asran Sinsedimedje, a Veshtern-ecucated lawyer, teacrer and luhemnadiyan-leader Ninpon on “ebruary who swore the corps! oavh of alleriance to Dai The connection between TnJjenesia's first am and Islam was not, however, limited to the province of its personnel. Jt is dourtless true that in the course of time reta soldiers, serving under officers of their own race -- he it under Japanese overall supervision -~ became increasingly inbued with the spirit and slozans of Indenesian nationalism (319). But it must be kept in (318) Kan PO, #37 (“ebruary 25, 1944}, po.l0-11. harlier in the same month, Kasman had presided at a conference hetween Peta officers, the starf of Asia-Raya, and tie newly established Fighters' Aid Greanization /Badan pembantoe pradjoerit/, headed by Sto Iskandar Dinata, former chairman of the Sundamese Fasundan-lParty anc editor of the Bandung daily Tjahaja durins the occupation, Cf the seven other Tndonesian officers present, four were ivahits: 1. '%. Sam'un, K.ou. Rasjumi, K. 2). Abdullah hin Nuh, and K. ‘ernajas one was a priyahi, 2. 5. Latie? Nendrominsrat, while the ipfdentity of the last member, (urrain Mulminr, coulc not be established. for a report on the mneetinz, see Asia-Raya, “ehroary 7, ohh. === [PDF page 179] === mind that at the time of the foundin- of Feta, the pronayation of nationalism enjoyed little official favur. rutere, launcnes with enthusiasm in March, 1943 was —— as we shall later discuss in som: detail -—- doomed te extinction towards the close of tne year, and Indonesian nationalism, as a cropazanda vehicle with full Japanese support, suffered a serious eclipse until 'irpon's promise of Indonesian indpendence in September, 19L (320). This imvortant consiaeraticn apart, however, it should net be Porzotten chat "secular" Indonesian nationalism Jid net at that time as yet possess a grass-roots support even remotely comparable to that of Indunesian islam, Vowever creat the appeal of Putera imax have been ever at the heisht of tts of fieially sanctioned popularity, it had never bes: a solitical party prorer with a revistered membershir, nor hac it ever been ailowed to establish local branches outside the main urhan centers (321). Founded, moreover, by a predominantly “estern-trained, urban intelligentsia, it was and remained at a disadvantaes: against the two powerful Islamic organizations, whose continued existence and activites in the villazes had not been prohibited by the (319) On this point, cf. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, opecit., p.10?. (320) For a brief summary, cf. Slsbree, op.cit., pe.b7-38. (521) Cf. the Tiawa Shimbun interview with Sukardjo Nir jopranoto, revrinted in Asta-Raya of January 1°, 19), on the occasion o° the founcdin= of the Djawa Hokokai. Sukarcjo also re-~ vealed that vovernment of Picials had not been allowed to join the abclishec neticanalist movement. === [PDF page 180] === 164 Japanese (322). Tt was, therefore, logical thay in their search for an acceptable an’ meavrinvful symbol with which to endow the first Indonesian army, the Japanese authorities on Java should Lave intentionally turned to Islam: The Peta's "Daidanki"-flac, which its Moslem commander received at an impressive ceremony from the hands of the Jananese Conaincer-la-Chief in carly “ehruary, 194, did not displey the Red and White of Indonesian nationalism, bui the Islamic Crescent, superim:osed on Dai Nine pon'ts Ris wuns "The flag /read the official descrintion/ shows a Preen field, with a round sun in red in the center.ee3 its eee red beams radiate in all directions. Within this sun, a risine moon and a star apnear in white, a symbol honcred by the inhabitants of Java..." (323). Te symbol aptly expressed the desired identification of Japan's war wit:: a Holy War for the defense of Indonesian Islam avainst the Christian, imperialist West. The resmpense to this appeal, directed al ulama's an. other Tslanic loaders, deubtless constituted the most important success of Japanese lioslem policy on its trass-roots ani political levels; it also showed that (322) On dissolvin: the butera, the Japanese stated that it had failed to venetrate to the desa-vopuletion. (See Asia-“aya of January 5 and 9, 19h). “Fartiy this nay doubtless have been a pretext, as is i.a. sussested by Te Neerd, Gp.cite, p.33, Blsbree, loc.cit., and Kanin, opecit., pellO; but the erain of truth concernin« the relationship between an urbancentered Asiatic nationalism and the rural poculation should not he lightly 4:smissed. (323) Kan Po,#37 (February 25, 19)L), peli. === [PDF page 181] === the latihan's at wjokarta yielcec considerable results, once the seneral theme of islamic emiity tovards Vestern ‘mrurialism -~ often stressed in the precedin: menths 32lL,) — vave way tr. the call to arms on Java. As lons as the enemy had remain:c distant, in cther worus, the identification of treater East Asia anc Islan had been Hfoa ficult to achieve (325). Thus Islamic suppert to Wai Nippon's (32) See isa. He 2's articles, ‘Islan aan perang sekarang, " —m™ "Arama jang positif," in Asia-Raya of October 15, 192, and June 26, 1943, resp., and A. Salam Vahia, "Sekoetoe moesoeh, Islam," Soeara i:.1T.Awi., T, LL {June 1, 1943), pr.10-11. in a similar vein, —.1.A.2. chairman Wonawamiseno requested the Japanese for the calline of an islamic coneress to declare its enmity to the Allies: "Sikap /.T.A.1I. menshant joerleeloehkan Invreris dan Amerika," ibic., I, lb (July 15, 1913), De2s (325) After condemning Dutch actions in Indonesia and Pritish neliey in the ‘ear East, Yernja ( America of disrespect towards islan Rut in early 1943, a sudden theush short-lived outburst of officially inspired anti-senitie propavanda wac uscc by some Loslem writers in an endeavor to rin Jewish influence alle ved Ailied, notably Americen, ennity towards islam. This first wave of anti-semitism -- it was rollowed by a second in mid-L9)l -- was inaucura atec hy a speech of Jcurase, a “empeitai /wilitary vlice/ officer, at a meetinz with propazanda officials anc journalists at jakarta on April lh. (Cf. Asia-Raya, april 5, 1913)5 obedient echds from nationalist leaders can i.a. oe found in Sukardjo Nirjopranoto's "Pahaja Jahoedi," ibid., April 10, 193, anc in particular in the lone and detailec article "Judaisme" by Dr. Ratu Langi, in the (non-pavinated) jubilee booklet of Asia- Raya of April, 1943. Moslem contributors ts this Japanese imitation of Jerman models stressed the historical clash between Jews ann Moslems, British policy towards fFalestine, and the sinister influence of world-Jewry on the ailezed anti-Xoslem attitude of the ‘iste DCE Cele /arsono/ Tj/okroaminoto/, "Sekelilin: bahaja Jahoedif", Soeara ii.1.A.i. tT, 9 (May I, T9h3), Pe3g Umar Said, "Jahoedi dan Kejahoedian, ibid.e, 20.33 ani "Nacem naloes," by Albahry, ivide, woe liwl?. See also Hote Lh, nalowte loc. cit.) had only accused Ln some Ho. lyvool films. === [PDF page 182] === war effort, initially the sole aim cf Japanese anpeals 32°), had lacked a conerent raticnale. New, nowever, the Sate of Japan and that of Indonesian Islam could “e stuwn to be closel; Linked (327): The war of the Rising Sun avainst tne West thus hecane a Ae? ne nasman pul it, Holy Nar azainst the infidel "The relizion of the Indonesian reople... urders then to become fiehters.6e Remenber that Moslema whe ile throach participation in this war wil. iie in 2 holy ca aust, wno in the hereafter will forever live by the cide of? Allah, nhlessead with Wis favors" (322). Thus, Bimesh aA vear Vekcre in wnesian nabione?ism eoul: reo-issert itself, ‘slan had not only seon viven a rroninent and fateful place s hese a3 at an -$ a cyer boats yp tes ‘ Vedi, lh in the strutcle azstast the return of seasbern eolonialis, Lut loa £326) “hus on January 13, 1953, Sel. “erie exclaine ] to an alamaa meeting at 58) arta that the rrosecution of the war was the sole task of the vananese arw, ‘oe ulama's fiela of action he dng limite. to relisieon propor. Asiamayn, January 15, 1943; he later repeated this we lineation of funetions in Sentral Java (jpis., Tebruary S, 1212}. Gn the occasion of Tojo's visist to Java, an ortncdox kyahi wrote that MNalthough we kyahi's do not particicate in taking up arms arainst the Allies, We eee recoenize four] duty of aidins MMi Niscon with prayers...' Pandji Poestaka, XXT, 20-21 (327) See in particular Inada's apreal in Pandji Poestaka, XXI 25 (October 1, 1943), pp.875~75, and the article by the Head of the Internal Affairs bepartment /Naimubuchd/, we atarenes "Seflamat Lebaran dan selamat berdjoang!", ibid., 0865-66, in which he compares the Pacific war with that oe “the Prophet Mohammed avainsh.ecra. 325) "Semanvat Meperdjoeritan!", Asia-Rs Haya, danuary 2), 1943. For earlier comments on Holy war, see Sen rand ji rPoastaka, XXI, 29 (ecemoer 8, 1942), pn.102°%-23, and Ta perbteular vas wansur'ts "DSeranz Asia Tineer Naja, peranc Sabilallani" (Asia-faya, January 1, 19ui), a forcefill call to arms, in which Vosien and Jananese war aus are inextrica'.ly interoN WOVEN. === [PDF page 183] === role in tnat struyle deepened the iatent anti-Nestern sentiment of Inionesian soldiers ang peasants to a sivnificant uevrete The developments on the -rasceroots and cclitical levels dueine 1903 which we have so far examined owed almost entirely to Japanese initiative. ot was left to tne cenural islaaie organization to take tontative stens in the iirecoten of the second, secic-relivious, level which: we will 5035 34 $y saint’ n- 3 $onP rug n A Say ™ chews 7 t oO nen wile TeNad Ne paryw OL Gils Vai he 6 GVO wet lieet ePAW ODS Sy ab the sane time, the story of tie Poll ot Stes. Ever since its rebirtu under dananese rulo, the ‘slanie wad heen forced to Live in (he raslotroara: of Japan ose oslem polieyv. The cradsinz sanetion -iven to its contimued existence (329) was never amplified by a clearly circumscribed fairs Office had frequently, as we saw, by-passed the...T.A.J. in the major policy moves directed at winning Islamic support. lLestricted to its Djakarta Headquarters (330), with no proper momhership of its own, and without influence amons kyahi's and ulama's, the central Islamic (329) Tt is rather indicative that the Jananese refused permission to the holdins of open-air Friday vrayer-meetines whien 9.l.ael. had organized, after its inaucuration. See Asiawtava, Jecember 10, 1h?. d-19h3, the federation set up "consuls," or area reesentatives, in Cour centers: Jurabaya, Tidrenon, Sold Serant, "to Srins untty to arcag far fre c the center, ani also to serve as local centbralitinzs a-encies." See Asta-taya of Jul: 2, 1943, an..,ondoamisenc's report in Socara Ae leteley Ty el Clovember 1, 1912), 7, from vate the quovation is taken. bas === [PDF page 184] === 168 aveney was patently ill-equipped for tne task of unifyins Inaonesian Moslems. frerhans the most tellin= prof of its decreed impotence lay in the fact that tne..T.A.7. execative in vain endeavored to call a ~eneral meetin: durin: the one year of its existence: When a meetin= was ab lon: last cormivind, if was -- as will he seen -— to announce the demise sf the federation (332). It is, therefore, the mom instructive to analyze the efforts of its leadershizc to transform the orvanization into a viable socio-relicions instrument -- soomed te failure, since, on the one hand, these efforts constituted an exceptional and almost unique display of private initiative, at variance with ‘ai Nivpon's Moslem policies; and on the other, bocause these Japanese policies had in the course oi time won substantial supvort among leadiny Indonesian hoslems, wno soeeded tae downfali of the old federation. That the V.I.A.1I. was, nonetheless, allowed to remain in existence until late in 19h3 was probably Jue to the fact that Japenese preparations for a commlete overhaul of the orivinally cstablisned Indonesian orranizaticns only matured later in the year; further- (331) Wondoamiseno, loc.cit. A -teneral meetin: was scheduled to tale vlace in mid—\urust, 1943, but it did not materialize then. ssia-Naya of July 2, 13.3, ani Soeara.7.i.1., J, 13 (July I, TH), pelé. On July 5, Asia-ava carried an announcement to tne effec’ that the meeting was "postnoned until further notice." It significantly added that, when convened, the conference would not take place in Banduns, as originally planned by the executive, but in ujakarta -- under the watchful eyes of the Shffmubu. ‘he fateful conference was finally held in Sctober, 193. === [PDF page 185] === more, the direction of Moslem affairs, in particular, chanved hands shortly before the enn of L.I.A.7. was decreed (332). When the ii.T.A.I. had commenced its activities unier the aecis of Yai Nippon in Yeoterher, 1742, its main duties were to consist of "securiazt a crover place for Islam within fn jonesian [Unreadable] society," and ot “"harscaizing Indcenesian islam with ments of the chanzins times" (333). Two months later, the f+ eration annowneed its new constitution an. a pro:ran «of action ah y ne mo ee et sayy (33L)3 vet toabl prowran sicnifalanted wo the demands of “ew Java: icantly contimied to nlace its main ani most detailed emphasis on the ‘Tslamic problem on the seeond level, strivine to attain Me slem socio-religinus aims which had for decades formed the princival platform of Islamic conzresses under Tutch role (335). (332) Hadji Abdul Muniam Inada, the original chief of the Shtmubu's First Section under Horie, apparently returned to Japan together with his surerior in the fall of 193.!usein Djajadiningrat was Horie's successor, but Inadats important function was taken over by Jadji Muhammad Sale:Suzuki. On Suzuki see Zorab, op.cit., p.l07, Slamet, op.cit., p.13, and Van Nieuwenhuijze's What the Japanese Did to Islam o.. Java, passim. (333) Cf. Uote 208, above. (334) See Asiastaya, “November 16, 19h2. The prozram is reprinted in full to Soeara ‘..I.4.7., 7, 1 (January 1, 19,3), pel. The M.I.A.l. prosrani consisted of the followins points: ) Safeomnard and maintain the Jienity and advancement of the fwosien? relivion and its believers; b) Trena-ate the "new society" anons Voslens; ec) Improve all matters of vital invortanre wt. tellevers,viz. (1) Marriage affairs ) Suecession and inheritance matters ) Mosques 1) Religious endowments Payment of relirious tithes Instruction and education === [PDF page 186] === 170 M.eJehe].e thus remainted in a way a private association plecjiged to aid the military zovernnent, yet pursuins its om objectives. As such the federation could not last, in svite of the cerenonial role assiened +o it by tne military authorities Tor many months (336). The first, immediate coal wnich the?.2.A.7. executive strove to attain was at the srascs-roots level; it concerned the orvanjzation of ulana'ts all over Java «under the roof of the sentral lslamic boviv in Djakarta. Bub, as we treviously noted, the Unisjubu itself was ts establish direct control aver these, tw tie Japanese crucially important, Moslem leaders (337), so that the (7) Publicity and provazanda (8) Social affairs (aid to the poor) (9) Mecea pilgrimage; d) Aid to the Dai Nippon Government and work for “reater Asia. Soeara MM steAsiey locecite (336) “6 T AGT played a conspicuous role in the celebration of March &, 1943, the first anniversary cf the “Daten surrender on Java. A special committee was set up on “ebruary 19, and a public meeting at Viakarta took place on larch 3, Trayers for a Javanese victory were sald all over Java on the anniversary. Of, Asia-Raya, Mebruary 20, 23 ani 27 for detailed npromrams., A-ain, on the oecasion of the Praphet!s birthday on Mareh 27,.ie\.7. orvaniacd a larive vrayer-neetinz, attended by Torie, Inada, eno, "The “is Four," and outstand- [Unreadable] sn? Indonesian soslems. Of, ibid., sarch 20, 1943. A sin- Slar meetin> took rlace after 7 epeent ah Tr ls 4 So's pronts2 of Indonesian varticinntion tin the cayerrnont of Havas it S raported in full in it ible, June 20, 192. bie ers, inelagin: 3 i clan for mentniy oor Sontni tle meectin-s cf ule 3 in @)) “‘sasidenries amd even (3275 Ba se “ust 2, cles; the wr. DULG nou escereaan wnebler this trevasal Son? ton: bye. “ty Slab. is 4 mater mGily 23 01 “nail Dae ARMED Ob i nowt with pocard clade Oe the nowseley &y LO === [PDF page 187] === 171 fI.A.I., after one brief endeavor, had to ahanuon hope of malcine ltself the nediator between the arz authorities and the vil teacherse-=- of securin:, that is, a vrover raison d'€tre for its ecntinued functioning (338). Ab the sare bime, the leaters of the Soceration Jecided te concentrate on Laren more drmocnous larvets, a.) at tier dro tre Socicerclictous reals, and therefore destinca te a niomeviet rivhter -- if Linited — Muture. Mao tp oemdeavers were bo he lirueterd, First, ob the Haillilpe om" a creat Moga, t. olauni as srmbok of Tndonesian Tolan iu Javats capital city; secona, at the establishment of 2 vo len University; and thor, at institutine a centrrl Talanic crsasury Cer the reccipt of relicieus tithes and their crvantscd relie? tes Ube ecop and needy (339), (32328) Sq Januaryv 29, A9L3, the Melee ts executive ealled am eating with nine leadine ~jakarta ulana's, eniy five of whom, however, attence! “ans for an Ulema Souncil, for the uni ficasion an’ or-onigation of all ulamats on Java within Cole Leste lo ee the federation, ana for a vcreatomecting of ulamats anu xyahits at, the capive al were Giscussed, accorciny to a report ’ Maw “ 5 y ftam 4 Td os oo, in Asia-Nara of January 22, 1943. (See also Mote 22, ern [Unreadable] above). one of these three uroiects materioiized; in fact, the problematical relationsni: between.. ulama's acain anpearec on the arenda of tne 3st MT... oonference recerred to in Note 33Bl, a (239) Shese ains were deciged uron at an immortart meetin of the “siete. executive, attendea hy several cificials and three “events, Talani: leaderc cutsice tm federation and list leaders, on January 09, 1943. Three committees nations were set up to attain these ‘oals, on wnich;riyal’'s as well as intellectuals were recreserted. cor a rerort on the m-etine, see Asia-Nava, “‘ebruary 1, 1%3. The menbers of the shreefonmib bess are listed in soeara h..t.Aeiey Jy lL, (Bebruary 15, 1943), on.-7. === [PDF page 188] === Of these projects only the trird will nresentiy; receive closer attenticn; the mcsque was never bhullt curins the cocuraven any subsequent punlicity tien, nor was the project ever (340). An Indonesian Islamic University, on the other hand, hac, isc aa S as we saw, been planned towarcs the close of ~utch ruie; it was one of Dai Ninpon's favcorite promises to Indonesia's Moslems which had been mooted fram the early weeks of the cecuration of Java omards (3L1). In spite of Japanes. -‘oodwill tewarcs an Islamic institute of hisher learning, the.7.A.7.'s endeavurs were 23 short-lived as ther wern Pruitliess. on tie Piral chapter ef Shis stuck, ore settines up ce a soslem Univercitv, a Pew weeks before the tapanese surrender, will be Jciscussed in some detail. [Unreadable] (3h0} This was in a way surprisir since the Mosque Cormittee was headed by Ir. Soekarno, whese interest in sucn a or ject went back te the early 1930's. Cf. Amry JanJenbosch, Wationalism and Relivion in indonesia," Tar Hastern Survey (lew York), X¥T, 18 (December 17, 1952), poelMI-FS, on pelt. (341) On June 16, 192, Asia-Raya cerried a resort, accordim: te which the Helivious Affairs C°fice was plannim the establishment of a Moslem University modellec on Cairc's famous Al-Azhar. In ARuvust of the sane year, a "Center of Islamic Literature and Culture" was opened at “jakarta, on which occasion the promise to set ur a university was repeated. Cf. Pandji Foestaka, XX, 28 (Mctober 17, 1942), 1.953. This institution was orizinally headed by an Indonesian Moslem, Zain Djambek, but on April 1, 1913, it was reclaced by a more ambitious enterpris. under thie same name and under the directorship of a Japmese, we. Noguchi. The promise was acain repeated. See Asia-Raya, arch 27, and April 6, 1943, nd Soeara -.i.4,73., I, 10 (vay 15, 1913), 2.11, and Asal C‘afacih, "Salai Terpoestataan dan “eloedajaan islam," oy 8 3 ~ ve ’ \ 2 ihbic., T, 9? Clay 1, 19)3), ppel-. === [PDF page 189] === Rebuffed in its efforts to zain control over the ulamea's, as well as in its drives for the realization of the lonz-standinre Moslem hones resarding the creat Mosaue ani the ‘niversity, the “.J.A.7. leadership unuertook a virorous campaign for the creation of an Islamic treasury, or Rait al-Nal (312). In the teasure that hones for the attainment of the federation's other coals receded, this cvrandicsely cancetved serene came to take precedence aver ali the cther activities cf tie 0..A.T. executive (305), whose chairman even claimed that the Sato al-Valo owas "the one and only way in which we “oslems can aid the e*forto of the dad Niocon Army behind the front-line" (SLA). This proved to be a fateful svar ceration ani a misintervretaticn of the role assiened to iminnesias Moslems by the Jacanese: but for many months &.T.A.7. efforts remained keveri to this central (342) The Ind nesian spellins of shis word varies, but it. is usually rendered as "Paitul-Mal." On the nistorical development of this Islamic instit:tion, which soes back to the early Caliphate, see ©. 7. Becker's article "Rait al-Mal," in The aneyclopaedia of Islam,. Jictionary of the ecg raphy, pthnocrarry anc ana Biography of of the Suhanmedsy Peoples, ede by hw the Houtsna ete a Tetdent Be He Brill/London: Luzac « Cosy [Unreadable] (343) The only sisnificant measures taken hy the i.T.A.7T. leadershiv consisted of the creation of Youth and Women's Souncils Fladjelis Pemoeda a} sadjelis Kenoeterian/ in Vay, 1943. See Asia-naya, May 21, 19.3. ‘‘n early July of the same year, a three months! Islamic trainin: course for women was orvanized by the federation; its cpenin: session was attended by Horie. ‘(Ibid., Tune 17, Jui 2 and ", 1912). The writer has not fmini any subsequent references vo this trainings course, or to other activities sronsered hy the two Councils. (3h) W. Nondcamiseno, 'Kemakmoeran dan xesedjahteraan rakjas, Soeara } ‘eDeAeley Ty 7 (Arril 1, 1282), ur.]-2. === [PDF page 190] === cbhiective (35). It was not surprising that the disar:earance of the first central Islamic federation also si-nmalled the end of Moslem endeavors to create an 2il-embracin: social organization charsec with the alleviation «* Jaranese-arcated misery mony the people of Java. The idea underlyins the central treasury was simile; it envisaved a re-nlarized collection of the relictous tithes all over Java, primariln oo? tie come elie money or in cpeis, and the not 26 aid to aed: cays se L Mya ded: ypeonans eye TO} ovpyeyeyt Typ oN the needy, in survert of unemplove, orcnans, aun)? veoplea 7h}. Whe. thoes ofr Sadt vee bye 8. lee what marred this simplicity, nowever, was the fact that the Mes lems in most areas of Java nad ia the past been sintlarly lax in the fulfillment of this duty, netwithstandins the Tach trat it is one of the five tasks sreseribed “or the followers of Islam (347). (345) Discussion of the Raital-s.al cecupied by far tne greatest space in the waves or the ™._.4.7. journal between February ang duly, 19:3. Its first July issue (7, 13) was entirely devoted to this tunic. (346) Cf. the article on "Djakat" in Mneyelopaedie van “ederlanisch Gost Indi@, T, pred05- 06, part from this resular tax, the treasury was also to eolleect the so-called zakat fithrah, a small head tax to be paid at the end of the los lem fasts; lastly, it was intended as a receivine center Sor ales. “nd besiues cummortines the needy, Punds were 1.4 alsa G he used to vrant cflvancrs to small entremreneurs. (3u7) This was errhagised wy Viendoarisenc, loc.cit. "Cf the Live pillars of Islan," says "o.squet, Nihe gacab is louctless Une one "08% neclect ostems in feneral. In the leterlan’s Infies ib se. ee. ati in the Javanes areas /of Java7 it jis ratver covlected." "Introduction A l'étude de l'Tsla.- nuonésien," OMeCite, rel". ceamorateand De wae === [PDF page 191] === Altncuch the iuea of a central treasury van na.* alien te Tmoonesian cslam, the initiative for tre ereatiosn «7 a ait sial as sueh Tid net ster fren the 0.7.2.7. executive, wh actus a4 rpyin + 4 1 ee Mae ye -~ et he Pei yee tae | yee -. alis suovted th. sehemo froma a recionsl treacva incar the & ~ * ” ae +t bm wey ay t ” x - ANA 7) D LANA gy OuUnceu oa we ' On: Qk ib Lda ri vo 9 1 order to alleviate ‘he distrecs caused ‘x ecenem a uf whicn was particularly severe in Une -riansan Gistricts with thetr rvrevious Slecrishin: estale arriculture, The suecess of such a treasury in the traditionally strict observance o° gakat-paynents, distin-nished the Sunca-lanis from the rest of Tava for many decades (29). Apart from this arvartace, the enberrrise dotless owen tts smooth functienine te the or -anizines trilent of its ericinateor (350). pay a oe eae Cm de Lage. ao Me mel a mt = tee (345) See the speecn of the orivinator of the amon? “ait al-Jal, Re A. AY Viranatakusums, to ohe 27.4.7. sonference on “eb- 1, as Pe ay r ruiry ‘A a {remarry rats, vhis mace the leecca wore dn 7 ola, Jang terkeress had reojlerin OTE FY in teh anc moeka ag "jaw “e e a solved to “seb ip a ait al-Jals oc, Teuliqurrachman, ot. cite, 7.2%: (309) See the article on "Islam" jn Sacyclopaecie van “ederlandsch Cost Indie, Ii, pp.l60-73, on p.170. “s, also ®ousquet, OpeCibe, pp.183-8L, and the same author's La politique musulmane et coloniale des Fays-ras, opecite, 9.30, where he acds that the collection of "religions tithes in the Priangan area was well organized by noenghululs ans their subordinates. foyer ers - 1 “ers Lov de pee > os ot... . 250) In 19h9, Wiranatakusuna hal introcueed a system of elective: nee A vewal ers, or Rois, in Mandan’ nevrenev, gach === [PDF page 192] === ess of tne cancun: b al- ar, arently -.: stewtn 4: aint - Sele yet fun: tracbed the attention o7 tre islamic euers.> at akarbta (251). > < Tore 2 é Pe ws ar £ t Tn Januar, a preparatory Sait alsVal Seamiuled Per we OR La ‘ 1 > 2 574% “.. Do ote. ote ejterowas costal lished ©20°,. As Jar as can ts eo Pree baa exiotin« record, the V.ie.. 0. then exlenyors oot [Unreadable] toe “Tandem: Sreassxt un.er 125 eomut.., an. megarher to ch dom. She emoerbucnt te alsa tae 2; ava, 258 DErshoo 0 Joe hove bea tweet 5 eos 7 spt netbe eye Le a 4 A n was attaines in midstpril L?a-, wher ume Cirst Gait ale 2 ote exist wy iaderenucnt opvaniuc* icon ani a oranch a T % 4 1 a oy ~ 7 * “ey of the ornieated a.T.A.7T. Maib al-lal-Gouncit (353). Althoush 4 2. aya. - tr wy bles TRL See sae cherted with welfar: woil amon fort; oluSe this svstem eontinued during the occupation. I woent!s article, "Sikap *tanvreh Tradja ternauap ‘aitevel-Nal," Soeara, oT Os 4 ane! - _ '.T.A.2e, T, 13 (July 1, 1943), pp.teel1l, ani the ans ined [Unreadable] WM aphoehoen“an Raitoel-Jal.7.4.7. aencvan " article, Lae ibin., Pp. 1) Asgece rain to stat (June 1, 1943), 7. Neceney rece’ ves ars Uhe was cleimed that mors SONS ere recelvine 30 ys. ae any Rens tite tea Lue 2; ncernin PTECE LOUs; Pe at ote ~ > fF ae ani: nohe Sem. in Fy 12 fds dl, ped an oira ter re sae Asia-Raya of we ee | ees ‘ ’ ap th. a ~ wae i Lh Meera:..y TT, 2OnY 2) This committe: consistea oF ur. sorwan, ore Mibu Nanioah,: t ar -. ~ 1. yd ems ogy el. ani tyvelve other well-’nown toslems, inclucin: one senchulu bane SO. an: thrae Tans. Cee Asia-taya, 1, 1743. 3) Lhe transfer took place on April 13, ané was announced in Asia-taya, april 17, 1¢h3. It: Seen the tb act ina sustained affsrt to aive founier, ‘Viranatakusuma, as well as lower sriva penshuluts, of control over the } from the terent'’s coaments ess, "Sikar rangreh + at the time of ano errat 5 rad} bran the ragce fram privahi contre] monte r, /Cnamnas jqaved. treasury e in his previ ja terhadap vaitcel-iiai," the “andunt +o that of PPicially have tne ous ly eit Lo Ce treasury nas Suhannadiyah- === [PDF page 193] === aorpey 5 eyare os: at ea. - s Hoty ety en sy tye. on she F no such Aliedava crvanization was surcevuently Set ub, @ centr: Tos [git al-"al Canmmittee was months later (354). In the interven WEIS. eee Le Bae PS Natolest Little time f- spam ine the estatlisherient 7 Urvaswiegs allover tie iSlanc. The vivorors vublielity caccaitn in tne Tederatin its foarnal, continued Yor several months, elieited -- 1° we can trust published resorts -- an enorme resccnsc from made arcas Javay whien “itnerte nad been ah ue Lukewarin ahoait toe zal: a ve from vui.side fo irvactay oon: id our office with iniilries econcemin the sait el-lal. wenty localjties have -.lready requested us to send thar propavani iste cee Letters keap streaming 11...6. “Se are uotn~ cur best Inder the notte, ™Mon't talk toe much -- set to work" -- coined a Taverish activity was ais: laved at toa hnead-offiee. tn June, a traictw eourse for treasury orvanigzgers was institubed ut Sandun:, ena in She same month fawhvyor: Syd ayant" L booed. ri, Vay PS. An P35) It is interagsti move Phat when Lhe olan for an ALI- “Ia 3 7; toy: a4. oy c ait al-"al irst mentioned, Trome ot [Unreadable] _peome ite oresicent (cl. Asia-laya, famguddin was nob -~ Sor whetever reasons = ineda the coasitte, which was formed in Taine Cidi -une lv, 1943). +he new enterprise was headed by “.7...2. chairman ‘Jondoamisent, sith J». Fasman “ineodimedjo Clater senior officer of the Feta), n Ml. Fartosuwirjo (leader of the oostewar Sar'al islam), oh. Sjafel, ©. Taufiqurrachnan and Amar Tjokroaminote as committee members, ‘Tiranatakusuma Fecare "adviser" honoris casa eee Pr) of ter > 5 r - Qo: - (3°5) Soeara V.TeA. ey T, 12 Sdune 1, 19h3/, oll. (355) Tbhide, 7, 13 “July 1, l0b3/, 142. === [PDF page 194] === “MiI.Awie celevates travelled te fer with regional ani Jocal rel Centrel isious leauers anu autinistrative officials about the sett up oc new Fait al-valts. At tne sane time, uniform resulations for the new tr asuries were miblished by the ecentrel o mmittee{257). In the span 02 a Tew months, "ait aleMal's had heen established in thirtcy-five hevenetes on Java (25%). Then, as suddenly as it hat started, Ure pronacation for the new -slanie welfare orvaniaalicon oy siued f3T3*. She aiduer Silence clearl: inwieated var ane isa vrewil of (.3 60. 7.05 (357) On the trainine course, see woeara.eient., JT, 11 Clune 1, 1943), pells; on the conferences, ibiu., T, 12 (July 2, 1943) » prel5-16. The revulations envisazed local manazing committees, aided by acvisor ry bodies composed of nlama'ls and supervisory orzeans consi trative voriyahi-officiais. ins the kinus of aid to be a complete listine of .," ibiae, I, 18-19 Orta tine of the ment on Aucust &, 192, J [Ren]; buat in mid-19L3 a Japanese administration only showed 67 Hen (ct. Poestaka, XXI, 22 /Au-ust Java Led alsnursed en elie Suet nedt ete) sed oait al (Getober ejal establishment of the Military consistec of 79 Re-encies survey of 1 >’ 19h 3/, -Jalls see the revional adminisinstructions coneertiwere likewise announced. " dice, re elimDe TRerita cewan 1, 19L3), p.2l. At the Jovern= toe First year of the Pandji ppe 2-91). Thus vait al-alts existe.d in well over halt if al} Resencies toward the close of 1943; they were distributed over fourteen of the seventeen Residencies, nd in Sco, one of the native principalities in Central Java, (355) 2etveen July, 1943 -- when a social issue of Sceara LAT. had heen almost entirely ‘evoted to th: “ait al=vaT — and November, 1943, ohly one short article exacemin= the welfare oreanization anpocred in that fournét: ee “oeara TOA 17 Lie i eMeteg nin J, (Sent erl, 12,2 heie === [PDF page 195] === efforts, and it furtrermere was the hortinser of the Teseraticvn's end. it is «i f@icult to judse whetner the decision th replace T.Aele bY a new orvanization was hastened py tne vitality e which the 2..7.4.°. Ipadersrin nad iis:iaved in 73 jts acnarently successful enceavars ice budld aonetw choo Tslamic welfare crvaniaations ander betr wea juriadieti» hwo tirow-rhoul, davae Tt do omere Lively that the ¢ians Cor Se receratacn's cuc 7 yy - yee. * > ~ on eessor hac "réaGua dy mee 2 evar janes PL ELS sac =, TORT yee re a Mos oy tioned the 2.0.8 tT. ot ay ea be ee ore don., VEL, the almast similtanesus cbolibicn af cuters, te be brie tly ai cassed in our next cha:ter, woul su tion in the Islamic world forme: part of an overall reconstriuction of Japanese paliicy on davae My the other hang, the initial suecess of the “ait aleval may HAVE Seener to threaten sipments Lhosiem poliey, if mow otmer pelictes, at Sor one thinct, foncdoaumiseno an. nis collea-sues 6220) Boultless the avitation,.t least in tts printed version, must have had PY several departments of the central militar auministration, «0 least trab of the ire- Na "Gnua department, wil ' imatur the | Se. tS journal coal. not heve Y ct Powe Fest a5, 25 wil ean roacily testi Tava te bie in CAVA RW LaGOSe === [PDF page 196] === apoear t: jave noned tc. link the treasuri with locel ulama-councils, which were ~21 as advisory organs on rcints of ‘oclem law connected with wel- 71 fare work (361). 7% successful, jicvrever, such a; len woulu inevitarly rave challenvec the Giamuruts a-ntrol over *..¢ vill--ve LeacherSe he sceunu olace, and cetentiaily striking et polleymarers heyon? toe Medisdous AftCaira Office lat. a yet dee cara ephs hee tay te a OOo Qiev are mito souscht vO Mud id, Wilot ahve. > non A 74 wot ies - l > ork of.glanie eett bibs 10 fy GM Qn endeaver Loa unite [Unreadable] tee magne in like mar _ ia wo Oo Tenna TK - as ere ne “EAT g hnst reach into every villscc, every hamlet, up to the very mountain slopes, @ni create a solrit of unily... «and a powerful fortress of Islan... We will use the /treasuries7 to baild a vroutechive fence around the Moslems in the villaves, azainst the spies of the Allies... Let ati fori of us, administrators, penshula'ts, ulanma's, kyahi's, one bie family. as ‘ne a scjat nec Y AT an wt £3425 me bie family, a5 /was/ ordained by ALlant eeel (302), oucne @ threahenine arrocation «i de idershio co ula, it may Se safely surmiseuy not he tolerated. Yor, as we shall oresently see, it was exactly the tasx oo unification uncer strict [Unreadable] (351) jee the Sait el-val eonastitution in Soeara >.T.A.l., i, t x. “ soos or TAS 13 (duty 1, 1930, pe he6, anu ete 377, above. “or soreial reference to the planned viana-councils, cf. oo motos ee aw Lyn 4 7 Spe ey? fonaoamisanosts Carswell ra Deby 2, 20 Chev er 1, Ue ay at — [Unreadable] mat ton ay nny re vn ts uro- [Unreadable] pees mo OL Taney + VF === [PDF page 197] === ara [Unreadable] nvanese leadershic which former tre Soeal point of onl iow ont Rey new poliey in Java, wnich was inau-urated in «arly lvul. Tue let. i. 7. leaders were almost certainly aware of resistmS amon Lae var tel a. hoe a.; authorities 2% Ehe center: heir chan «? setion ia instit.tine Sne Uait al-Mal's vas te shtetn coo eration Prom relirtous leavers ano. from gamninistrative offietals 2% the eres vel -. Boy ye be: won? roa a Jee 235A, s ulblinctets, + vboucsreval wi as 5 Fe “ tun 7 “aN: Moe 4. ot., cyl ave Cee mo oreciired be saqetiea sn Pablousss Li a lls [Unreadable] Hy it, aA pers cnbbipa oe oe. eM tie we MTL OG rites y (353; Tn ah teast two “ WOS, rn Tach, vk. ? - Ryn on. 3 anound uo the ate Pe BPS Tee ee tn Sunt, wy te Met ae yD.:, o Yoncomrisene, vapbes tw Wirjo on. Sjalei wens bo endums, 05 x. 2s, a. ~ man fase whe pe, oa is. ry } * thant estrent nena Por permission to prupavabe and or-: ~.: et ee et veanize treasuries in all rrianvan Residency; up to that time, rait al-Val acbivities nad been restricted to jandung Revency. See Acia-~laya, Vay 18, 1943, and Sgeara h.JeA.i., T, 11 (June 1, 1913), pell. in Rogor Residency, Janeanese approval vas only -iven in late Ocboher, accordine to a newsitem ia randji Foestaka, XAT, 27 Clovenber 1, 1953), 06970. In sandins, oftainal home ot the ®ait al-Mal, the treasury remained in existence even after the cissclation ar v,7.Ad. The writer has no evigence coneernia’ the liter fate of its sictber organizations els ewhere on Java. The Jan J ERAS PEQSUTY y however, is still mentione.i in sasia-taya of Lay 26, 274h. omy cia These procedural steos were already outlined Ly wonuoamisens in the early stazes Sait alevVal agitation. Seraan Pak jetty! See his "Temalmoeran Jan!: Nad 7 24+ O feo) (2 @ 9 oF mya tesd Rigs aie tay fe aden oe a x Dlewe He repeated thea Qoabn in ts Setaber addr PSS y at [Unreadable] Oe aSt NEU TET tmp ea Me OE APA Late e ey Ty, el f: IVG 273 === [PDF page 198] === whieh hac heen i:noreu anu undermined by a.) tne malor moves of Japanese +slamie policy in the past year. ron ad The mort imcortant indication ec: these «forts -- even Chen Toresna@.oved Uo Len? an arniats stated stlenea on the tare o* ‘alt al-val -- ca jerctember, L005, when tbe milisairm wvernuen ginta it iad civen le a. status to an. Lahdabel ° laa, with all lneip branches on Java 035°), pit Save of tt, this reeacnt lien eaae only as che vrartial naa ver “ bo lwoleag dy the fimocinan co. { }4 7 ee ag ke aS sich it did eanstitute the most imrortant Japanese eontrtbutien to indonesian +s]am on the second, sociowrelis ious (367) level, the more si-vnif 366) The announcement was uated Se: tember LO. “or é fall report, see vandji loest roestaka, nae 2h (Ceptemrer 15, 19h3), pefS513; seo also ~jawa Taroc, 7, 1? (Ortober 1943), p.1o, Reesenition save renewed vigor an& inpetug to trese associatinns! activities. Thonsh not previously Panne i, they had heen hampered Ly the uneertainty of their status and the resultant vexations caused Uy regional or local interoretations concernine their toralitv. Now this relationshni: with the authorities was; laced ona firm basi seen in an order of the vahcatul ‘ branches, reprinted in Joeara * fn vat an oy} yaa 2 (veennper 15, 12.3), pei3. ¢ rren a ey of (350) G2, Toto B7b, anove. [Unreadable] 6367) Amone minor Yananese actions on tia level the followin: may be singlet oat Sor rassine avtentien: Unlike the wise, tr Military nuthorities cave sone financial aid to the relivious tribunals, as well as incidental financial ana miterial support to ag len schocls. Co. newsitemsin Asia- Raya of fecemner 17, 1913, June 15 and July S, “943. In September, lh? the G-in-G anncunced special mom tary === [PDF page 199] === 183 art still in that it avain cemonsir.tecd vie im or’anee anc .: * > 3 ee cas.. Wiary tw eyo. al m2. tena a pe viability of the two major tre-invacicn -clantc co rvantaations. That oy ay ae t, sro. fee isive: Sone pe wag eet th Seat “UY OL OFer reater an BPO LOA LI UG PNAC Ca ala La ‘vat the Shimubu, and in had increasingly allied its: ]?2 with the Leaders of these bwo organizations at the expense of te..7.2.7. lealershic, in particular with its "radical" i.0.70.7. persunanel,. This tnis last development formed the culmination of the close contact between the Yapanese and ko adine Mosleas outside vie UAT... executive, which we have repeaterty noted in previcus carts of this charter, The of fieial recosnitisn of Muhanwnadiyah anc Naidatul Vlama automatically deprived all other Islamic orsanizations -- also the central Islani:: Saderation -- ant lwo oominous omis ao, what. TMH oT OT (Yous Ty tas > + Pony "Te tal s vawlS ¢ PbS Jal wiceeoaitlg Ceeisten Lo? tiused the ragtps fyowsg to owoyest liseia haan Vans ntanperal atyp- a ~ or Sale 3g I4 WNaS. TUS. Leaw le wen a Pana aa WeePrrz, Gurr iP aon uy the dar an- “ifts and/or advances to al] Moslems = ese on the ceession of the Le aran festivities. Jhid., September 26, 1242. “hese relivious ceremonies, atteried sy tens of thousands of believers, tozether with properly attired Jananese Moslems, were filmed and broadcast all over Java, ibid., Uctober li, 1912. “inally, the sirens were sounded daily during the entire month, +o mark the bevinnins and end of tre fasts. Cf. Fembanzoen (Djakarta), Cetober 10, 1942. The dancer of Allied air raids caused the Yaranese bo withhold permission for the use of sirens one year later; this action was aprarently resented, to judze by Muhamad Jinyvati's plea for Moslem forbearance, "Voeava sebavai latihan." in Pardji Coestaka, XXT, 23 (September 1, 1943), pp.819. For similar apreals, see also Lbid., aAXT, 22 (Auvist, 10, 1913), pp.799-300 and SOG, resp. === [PDF page 200] === Lis, Ano ry? indonesian Moslem leaders curing the first zizhteen months of the Jananese occupation of Java (36%), “arely six weeks after recoznition haa been eiven to these tw: Jarre lhasglem associations, the i.2.4.7. exemmive was alowed te ncld its first, and last, zeneral meetine (369). On Getober 2h, 1943, chairman Wondoamiseno closed the first phase of indonesia Islam under the aegis of the Rising Sun: "This /The “i.7e4.i. chairman said? is the most important date in the history of Truonesian islan, ‘this meeting holds in its hands the fate of the soslents om Java..." a im 5; y ol gs Tope wigs ns We Aye That Fate, Ll snen heeame clear, involved a far more com plate break with the preeinyasion rasb than the V.T.A.). leater- - - Le + sw wy “ a 2 wT 4. reo oh Ye ge shin had heen willtn- to oontemwlate curin: une Unirteen months o ‘ et wba sei athh ™ vo a “ mies " + ae Ne Leueravlan G Gligeuencra. Pne Ve].a. ie oe Since DAT Cm ’; 5 2 no... Ca ey, oe spp le ey ee eg pe amber, 1937, an’ avain sine Seslanher. Toe -- the onmotedscin of Indonesian Islam, thus han to ecase to exist. AS its chairnan admitted, the v.T.A.7'3 objectives, as formnilated after its (355) This was acknowleesed by Wondoamiseno on the oecasion of the last M.T.A.T. meetins on October 2h, 1913. See Soeara MeLeAele, Iy 21 (November 1, 1943), p.o. The previously quoted and oft-repeated slo-an, "Don't talk too much -= set to work!" may also indicate that there had, in fact, been much talk, including rather vocal oppositidn, to vJT.A.I. initiative in leadinz -oslem circles. (369) 3ee note 331, above. (370) Soeara U.T.A.T., locecit. Vionuoamiseno resi:ned fron the ehairmansnip en! ceased to play any part in the Islamie movement curin= the remainder of the occupation. lie anuarently later becane adviser to the rrovacanda venarte mn » r f al ment. See Asia-Raya, Tune ¢, 174). === [PDF page 201] === rebirth, could not be attained (371). Moslem aeticn on the seeoend level weilst henceforth jaye tr e ocwrordinated to the new role envisares tor Tnlonesian Islan . ra Dn aaes y ope. ay Mey ye bn oD Le a? we ote;. fad yy its military rulers, who were contronhed tor toe Lrosgment 4. near ' r Mls bru ot ft yas cee rT ~ mom e oe ews emery attacks on da7a. Tres, Uae Cirtinol o.T.A. 6.98 Siscesour as maT Vel bam, ta on nn ~ ote,, ble ge ok ato aS jumi, Sib NGL we Uiid veath on tne aw) Bae, ‘al, edhe a a eat t+:: eg tet ee tye met - f moe le 1 aloe Zine ciosb ambitious umiertaiin My S60 La cy RUC pee TIS reform in thea modern histarmr of Inucnestan Islam on Java (2723, (371) Noadoamiseno, loc.cit. Tne meebtins lasted four days; the motion to dissolve °.1.4.7]. was.resented after a conference between tas Vansur (in his canacity as Ldviser to ™hanmedivan) and Abcul arab chairman of ‘iahdatul “lama). The nanie of the successor-or-onization was not immediately announced, bub all M.T.A.T. of °ielals resivned after dissolution nad been decided cn., taddji borstaxa, XT, [Unreadable] 28 Ctovemher 15, 133), eye, 74 5 oN Fey (372) No of ficial decreas srelled oul th: Jwnath sentence of the “ait al-Naloon a nation-wide basis (ef, Note 343, ahe vey bub one edmmentator mentisw. Jt indirectly when he wrote that "ft all U.i...5. activities, tne “asjumi wiil continue only one, viz, tuc publication of its 4 1 Df tk tT etal iin: ae jeurnals; rut jts name ani /elitorial/ startinz are alse chanted." Of. Rarv, "Patahtoer och, nilan --berranti,™ “oe ara Poeslinin iivionesia, fsoeara “.lei. Tey Ty 20=23/ Mecember I, i903), 7.13. Tis new cublication ameared as the official crvan of the.asjumi one month after one last issie of the “.5.4.7. Journal. === [PDF page 202] === CHAPTER VIII THE RISE OF MASJUMI: NOVEMBER, 1943 - SEPTEMBER, 194) The closing months of 19,3 opened the era of a profound Japanese transformation of Indonesian public life. The birth of Masjumi marked the first important step in this re-ordering, which proceeded in early 194) at an accelerated rate. When finally in March the new Japanese-imposed pattern of the New Java crystallized, the balance of power among Indonesian elitegroups had undergone significant changes, of which the strengthening of the Islamic leadership was of the perhaps greatest long-term importance. In order to evaluate this importance, we shall commence with a brief examination of the new Islamic organization in the context of the other contemporary changes on Java, News of the abolition of the old Islamic federation apparently found the public in general, and mamy Moslems in particular, unprepared: In the words of one commentator, "... many people either said or thought that there was no reason to change to something new, seeing that the old /organization/ had been well established and was widely knom... Fut what is at stake is not only a change of name, but rather a change of activity and effort. M.I.A.I. was part and parcel of the old order, === [PDF page 203] === 187 [and thus7 it has become out-of-date now" (373). In effect, the change signalled the end of Moslem endeavors centered around the decades! old preoccupations on the socio-religious level led by M.I.A.I. for the past six years. Its long list of objectives and demands had to zive way to the Masjumi's only goal, of "strengthening the unity of all Islamic organizations," and of "aiding Dai Nippon in the interests of Greater East Asia." This goal was announced by the new federation's most ardent spokesman, Mas Mansur (37)), in a radio address to fellow Moslems in late November, 1943: "Although my comments concerning the birth of Masjumi have been very brief /Mansur concluded/, I fervently hope (373) Rapy, loc.cit. For a similar explanation, see the official Military Government announcement, "Keterangan Pemerintah tentang pendirian Masjoemi," Soeara MoesLimin Indonesia, I, 1 (December 1, 1943), pp.elu-l5. For brief references on the founding of Masjumi, cf. also Slamet, op.cite, pel3, Zorab, op.cit., p.107, De Weerd, op.cit., pio and Van Nieuwenhuljze, What the Japanese Did to Islam on Java, passim. (374) Mansur, it will be recalled, had been M.I.A.I. vice-chairman between January 20 and March 10, 1943 (see Note 218, above). Thereafter he continued to be one of the "Big Four" at the head of Putera, without occupying,officially, a leading position in the Islamic movement, until May, when he was made Adviser to the Muhammadiyah executive. Cf. the newsitem in Soeara M.I.A.I.,I, 11 (June 1, 1943), poli. In October, he was appointed Adviser to the Shumubu (Note 295, above). It is interesting that it was Mansur, officially an adviser, and not Muhammadiyah chairman Ki Bagus Hadiku= sumo who had conducted the negotiations leading to the founding of Masjumi in October 193. (See also Note 308, above). Mansur assumed the editorship of the Masjumi journal, to- (Scoae with the vice presidency oo es new pechite Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, I, 1 cember 1, 1943/, ppe3 and 18, resp.) see also Note 378, below. ~ === [PDF page 204] === 187a that all followers of Islam on Java will fully understand this explanation... /and/ receive our new organization with joy... I call on all Moslems to aid the Government with all their efforts" (375). The creation of the new organization, Madjlis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia, or Masjumi, which was granted legal status on the very day of its founding, no doubt represented a victory of Japanese Moslem policy (376). The Shitmubu had succeeded in liquidating the shadow of a federation which, under Dutch rule, had represented a wide variety of Moslem groups, and whose retiring chairman had, moreover, been a leading member of the P.S.I.I., the largest political Moslem party in colonial times. In its stead came an organization of a far less private character, which no longer represented Indonesian and Arab Islamic groups pro tanto: Membership in Mas jumi only stood open to Moslem associations accorded legal status by the military government (377); at the time of its founding, this had only been granted to Ifuhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama, and it (375) Mansur's address is reprinted in full in ibid., pp.15-16,. For a resumé, see Pandji Poestaka, XXI, 29, (December 8, 1943), p-1036. (376) It also represented an internal victory of Mas Mansur and Abdul Wahab over Wondoamiseno and the i.I.A.I. leadership. Shumubuchd Dr. Djajadininzrat said that "all Moslems on Java owe /these two men/ a debt of gratitude..." Cf. "Samboetan atas berdirinja Mas joemi," Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, I, 1 (December 1, 1943), pel. (377) The government urged all as yet unrecognized associations forthwith to apply for the granting of legal status. Recognition would go pari passu with joining Masjumi. Cf. ntah ten "Keterangan Pemefiri ng pendirian Masjoemi," loc. cit. See also Note 382, below. === [PDF page 205] === 187 was from among the well-known leaders of these two organizations that the first Masjumi executive, nominally headed by the venerable Hasjim Asj'arie, was exclusively recruited (378). Of equally great importance was the fact that individual kyahi's and ulama's, whom the M.I.A.1. had for long unsuccessfully tried to organize, could likewise become members of Masjumi with the approval of the Shtimubu (379), which thus ob- (378) The names of the Masjumi executive can be found in Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, I, 1 (December 1, 193), p18. Hasjim Asj'arie remained domiciled at Djombang; he only came to the capital for ceremonial occasions. (On Asj'arie, see also Note 269, above). Vice-presidents Mas Mansur and Hasjim Asj'arie's son, Washid Hasjim, were in actual charge of Masjumi. The respective chairmen of Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo and Abdul Wahab, were made special aivisers to the Masjumi executive, which consisted of eight members in addition to the two Vice-Presidents: K. H. Muchtar (N.O.), Zainul Arifin (N.O.), K. H. Me Sadie (N.O.), Farid Matruf (M.), Abdul Mukhti (M.), T. Kartosudharmo (M.), K. M. Hasjim (M.), and Nachrawi- Thahir (N.O.).- On January 25, 194, Mas Mansur resigned as Vice President in connection with his political activities; he continued as member of the Masjumi executive. Abdul Mukhti took his place as Vice President, but he ranked below Wachid Hasjim who was, as of that date, charged with responsibility for the federation's affairs. Cf, ibid., II, 3 (February 1, 194), p.1l, and Asia-Raya, January 6, 194h. (379) See Art.5 of the Masjumi Yonstitution in Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, I, 1 (December 1, 1943), p.17. According to Art.il, however, it is not clear whether individual members were given votinz strength in the federation's affairs; organizations of 100,000 members received ten votes, those of 50,000 members six, those of ten thousand three, and below ten thousand, one. The arrangement clearly favored small groups at the expense, in particular, of Muhammadiyah. === [PDF page 206] === 188 tained complete control over the membership of the new federation. The significance of the close link between Masjumi and kyahi's was underlined in a reception of fifty prominent Moslems, including the entire Masjumi executive, by the Commander-in- Chief in Djakarta in early December, 193 (380). While the M.I.A.I. had been grudgingly accepted as a com promise solution by the Japanese in September, 192, the Masjumi was not only launched under the auspices of the military authorities, but as the central organ of the two largest Moslem associations on Java -- and as the organizational center of the thousands of village teachers directly influenced by the Religious Affairs Office — it enjoyed from its very inception far greater prestige than its predecessor; and, unlike the M.I.A.I., which had been reduced to an anaemic center at Djakarta, Masjumi had an impressive enough membership all over the island, What added to the new federation's strength was the fact that it constituted a working agreement between Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama, rather than an enforced merger of reformists and orthodox (381). Masjumi continued to derive its main (380) The reception took place on December 6. Fora full report see ibid., I, 2 (Decepber 15, 1943), pp.1-3. It is interesting to note that on this occasion the Gunseikan again referred to "certain difficulties" which had in the past arisen between Moslems and Japanese authorities. Ibid.e, p.2. (381) The problem of "diversity in unity" may have puzalled a good many Indonesians. In late 1944, an anonymous commentator observed that "viewed from a distance, it may appear as if these... Islamic organizations... signified === [PDF page 207] === 189 strength from these two major pillars; the federation, in fact, only had to admit two other orthodox small groups which the Japanese sanctioned in February, 19h (382). Thus the reorganization in the Islamic world had resulted in a powerful alliance of Java's two most imvortant Moslem associations and many independent kyahi's, closely linked to the Shumubu. As we shall see, the strength of Masjumi continued to grow, while that of the nationalist leadership declined during the first nine months of 19h). On the one hand, therefore, there was ample justification for nationalist resentment; on the other, the enforced exclusiveness of Masjumi with regard to all the other, non-recognized Islamic groups —~ notably Arab associations (383) — disunity among Moslems. But.. if you look closely at their inside workinz, it will become clear that their different names and organizations are only used for their internal arrangements, while all their external actions are unified..." Cf. Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, II, 21 (November 1, 194), pp.L=-5. (382) On February 1, 1944, official recognition was granted tc the Persatoean Oemmat Islam Indonesia (formerly known under the Krabic name Al Ittihadijjatul Islamiyah), led by Kyahi Achmad Sanusi in Sukatand sand to he Perikatan Oemmat Islam of Kyahi H. Abdul Halim in Tjirebon. Both organizations w::e reported to have accepted the aims of the Greater Basi Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in their constitutions. Cf. Asia-Raya, February 4, 1944. Sanusi was a member of Bogor Resldomy's Advisory Council, Abd. Halim of the central Chto Sangi-in. Representatives of these two groups were officially accredited to Masjumi at its general meeting of May 25, 1944; Sanusi himself and Siddiq Zainuddin, representing the Tjirebon group, joined the federation's executive. Cf. tbid., May 19 and June 2 and 18, 19h). (383) Cf. Yan Nieuwenhuijze, loc.cit. === [PDF page 208] === 190 tended to alienate the latter from the central, Japanese-supported federation. To these antagonisms must be added that of the priyahi corps, which from early 194) onwards found itself at a disadvantage to the growing influence of Masjumi. The major readjustment on the Indonesian scene, introduced at the beginning of the new year, actually increased the prestige of the priyahi's at the expense of the nationalist elite. To judge by the printed record, Putera activities had virtually reached a standstill by the end of 1943, heralding a major change in Japanese policies. It was only after the reorganization of the old Islamic federation had been accomplished, however, that steps were announced concerning the future of the nationalist movement. While the position of Indonesian Islam on Java had been strengthened with the creation of Masjumi, Indoresian nationalism was, organizationally at least, temporarily decreed out of existence when the Commander-in-Chief instructed the Gunseikan in early January, 194 to organize a new mass movement on the island (38h). The new movement — the Djawa Hokokai, or Himpunan Kebaktian Rakjat in Indonesian /People's Service Association? — not only replaced Putera as well as the previously established (384) The announcement appeared in a special Sunday edition of Asia~Raya on January 9, 1944. Four days earlier, an unsigned editorial declared that the time had come for a new popular movement to take the place of the older, which, "as is understandable in an era of change, suffered fran serious shortcomings..." Ibid., January 5, 19h. === [PDF page 209] === 191 Chinese Association on Java (385), but it also included a few representatives of the ialand's Eurasian and Arab comnunities. This multi-racial character of the Hokokai in itself deprived the nationalist elite, in spite of the many nominally prominent positions assigned to it in the new movement's leading organs, of an exclusive nationalist forum. In addition, the Hokdkai comprised all other organizations previously created by the Japanese, in particular women's and youth groups and para-military corps. in which nationalist control and influence was as yet rather weak (386). Two further features of the Hokdkai demonstrated even mare clearly the checks placed on Indonesian nationalism after the demise of Putera. In the first place, the Japanese shadow cabinet gave way to direct Japanese top-leadership in the HdkOdkai's intricate administrative machinery (387). It should be added (385) For an account of the Chinese under the occupation, see Elsbree, op.cit., ppljl ff. The merger of the Chinese Association Hoa Chiao Chung Hui and of Putera in the new movement was jointly announced by chairman Oey Tiang Tjoei and by the "Big Four" in Asia-Raya of January 11, 19h). (386) The aims and statutes of the new movement, which will not here be discussed in any detail, were separately published in a booklet, Peratoeran-peratoeran Djawa Hookookai, Himpoenan Kebaktian Rakjat (7ojakarta/: ree Persiapan Himpoenan Kebaktian Rakjat, February, 194). Cf. also Asia- Raya, February 8, 1944. The writer has gained valuable insights into Japanese control of the Indonesian women's movement during the occupation fram an unpublished paver by Soekanti Soerjotjondro, Kort overzicht van de ontwikkelingsgang van de vrouwenbeweging in Tndonesié (typescript, Dja— karta, 197). (387) Japanese leadership, headed by the Gunseikan, was maintained in both the Preparatory Committee set up in mid-January, === [PDF page 210] === 192 that this important deterioration stood in marked contrast to the all-Indonesian executive organs of the Masjumi, which had, outwardly at least, been freed from Japanese co~determination. In the second place, unlike Putera, the Hokokai was established as a mass organization proper, with branches reaching into all Residencies, Regencies, Districtsand villages. This Significant broadening of the new movement's scope brought with it the utilization of priyahi-personnel in leading functions on the widest scale. Barred from membership in Putera, this elite group thus now came to play a prominent role in the Hokokai (388). The Japanese decision to rely on priyahi's for (see Asia-Raya of January 12, 19h) and in the definitive top organs of the Hokdkai, established in March and April (Ibig., March 1 and 2, and April 5, 194h). The Japanese occupied either the highest posts in all the branches of the executive, or they served as "advisers" or as "vicemembers" side by side with Indonesian leaders. Cf. also Note 219, above. -—= As originally announced, Japanese civilians could also become members of the HOkOékai (Ibid., January 9, 194). In early March, however, after the new movement had been inaugurated, a separate organization of Japanese citizens was established. This exclusiveness caused some Indonesians to send a number of “hela Rayne con= cerning the status of Nipponese civilians to Asia-Ra which ran a daily colum on the Hokokai. See partic arly the issues of March 14, 17 and 22, 194. The column ceased to appear on March 25, perhaps because the authorities wished to terminate this unwarranted curiosity. (388) The prohibition of the participation of priyahi's and other government officials in the Putera was disclosed in Sukardjo Wirjopranoto's previously quoted interview with Djawa ae reprinted in Asia-Raya of January 12, 19h). (See N » above). === [PDF page 211] === 193 local leadership was, in part at least, no doubt dictated by the consideration that outside the urban centers there was no other literate and experienced Indonesian group in sufficient numbers available. To some extent, however, it must have been motivated by a desire to check the growing influence of the nationalist elite, who bitterly resented their loss of power (389). But the nationalists were unable to prevent the priyahi's from assuming the direction of regional and local Hokdkai affairs (390). According to one commentator, they occupied virtually all local and regional executive posts, so that "Yone can here and there still hear the opinion expressed that the position of the administrative corps in the Djawa HoOkokai constitutes a victory for them, and it goes without saying that there are likewise many people who see in this situation a defeat for the members of the (389) This resentment was openly voiced at a series of press conferences in February 1942, where i.a. Ir. Safwan, Samsuddin, and in particular Ir. Soekarno, forcefully expressed apprehensions eoncerning the leading role assigned to administrative officials in the new movement. See Asia-Raya, February 29, and March 1, 19h. (390) Very few priyahi's occupied leading positions in the central executive of the Hokokai at Djakarta, and even at the Residency level they were not prominently represented. Other high-ranking Indonesian government officials shared the majority of these, decorative rather than executive, positions with nationalist -- and Islamic -- leaders (cf. ibid., March 1, 2, and 10, April 5 and May 23 for lists of appointees). In fact, the composition of the Hokokai executive at the center mirrored that of the Central Advisory Council. On the other hand, however, from the Regency Hokokai's downward, the priyahi's almost monopolized leading functions. === [PDF page 212] === 194, Simultaneously with the creation of the new mass movement which was to radiate from an impressive, Japanese-directed center into all parts of Java, and as an underpinning for the new organization, the military authorities instituted a grass roots control apparatus — the so-called Tonari Gumi's or Neighborhood Associations (392) -- like the Hokokai itself an importation and imitation of a Japanese institution (393). If the larger (391) See A/nwar7 Tj /okroaminoto/'s editorial, "Siapa menang?", in Asia—taya, April 6, 194%. The author did his best to argue that, appearances notwithstanding, neither side had won ~— or should win: "there is neither loser nor victor in this matter..., because there is no antagonism between them. /If it exists, however, then/ the only loser could be the fatherland." Cf. also "Hoeboengan Djawa Hokokai dengan Pangreh Pradja} ibid., March 16. -- It is interesting to note that after the inception of Putera, the nationalist leaders -—- perhaps unintentionally following an established pattern in one-party, totalitarian states -- had set up Putera departments in charge of technical services, such as agriculture and trade, e.g., which they had apparently hoped would exert control over the parallel governmental bureaus manned by officials. (Cf. the unsigned editorial "Oentoek satoe maksoed" in Asia-Raya of March 13, 1943). The writer could not ascertain how this ambitious scheme functioned, but the plan itself aptly illustrates the contrast between early nationalist hopes and their almost total eclipse one year later. (392) In Indonesian the new organization was called Rukun Tetange. Cf. the official announcement of January 8, "Pengoemoeman seikanbu tentang hal menjempoernakan soesoenan Roekoen Tetangga," Kan Po, #34 (January 10, 194), p.19. The organizational set-up of the Neighborhood Associations can be found in ibid., #35 (January 25, 1944), pp.13-14; it also appeared in Kgia- ‘aya of Yamary 12, 19hh. (393) Cf. “lsbree, op.cit., pp.126-27. The similarity between the Hok@kai and its Japanese model, the Taisei Yokusan-kai [imperial Rule Assistance Association/ was stressed in a === [PDF page 213] === 195 movement reduced the scope of nationalist activities, the vast and far-flung network of neighborhood associations came to supplant the Bait al-Mal's created by the first Islanic federation, and now apparently doomed to atrophy (39l). The Tonari Gumi doubtless constituted the most ambitious Japanese endeavor of penetrating to the Indonesian villa ve, and of mobilizing the tani for the war effort. Hitherto only the kyahi'ts, the spiritual village leaders, had been drawn into the orbiu of Japanese propaganda: now the administration went one step further in organizing the population itself in small groups within the villages and townships, which were to become the lowest units in the governmental pyramid. To ensure the smooth functioning of this cellular organism, the Japanese turned their attention to the lower-rank priyahi's and to the elected village heads, or lurah's who became ex officio heads of the Tonari Gumi's all over Java (395). Thus, on Domei report in Asia-Raya of Jamary 25, 194. Actually the Japanese organization only comprised the leaders of former political parties in the Diet; it was not a mass movement. Neighborhood associations in Java had been first instituted by the local Japanese authorities in the area of Bandung municipality in March, 1943, one year before the scheme was universally adopted for the whole island. See Soedjatits account, "Setahoen Tonari Soemi di Bandoeng Si," ibid., March 9, 19h). (39) A preliminary survey conducted by the Naimbu /Department of Internal Affaire? in mid-19l, showed a total of 508, 7h5 Neighborhood AssocTations. See Asia-Raya, June 20, 19Lh. (395) Art.2, Section ] of the regulations setting up the Tonari Gumi. Cf. Asia-Raya, January 12, 194). === [PDF page 214] === 196 the one hand, the creation of the neighborhood associations further increased the importance of the priyahi-elite; on the other, its members were simultaneously subjected to very stringent regulations (396) and a training program very similar to that previously instituted for the Islamic village teachers (397). Likewise, the lurah's, the lowest grade officials on Java, found themselves dram into the era of the latihan's (398), and at the same time severely controlled by the central govermment in a decree which (399) -— it was stated -- wrought the most (396) See "Makloemat Cunseikan" #8, dated February 11, 194h, "Peratoeran tentang kedoedoekan pegawai negeri di Djawa," Kan Po, #37 (February 25, 1944), pp.¢-S. This law made it extremely difficult for officials to resign, while it strictly circumscribed the causes for dismissals, tempor-— ary suspensions and ‘administrative punishments. ® (397) A twenty days' training course for administrators had already been held in early 1943; “f. Asia-Ra 2, March 20 and 22, 1943, amd ibid., Mareh 25-27 for ts of the participants. On January 12, 194, a series of three weeks! latihartycommenced for District—heads at Djakarta; when it was completed four months later, 177 of these officials from all over the island had received their dosage of the New Spirit. For full particulars, cf. ibid., January lh, March 9 and April 26, 19. See also Notes 283 and 290, abovee (398) See A/nwar7 Tj/okroaminoto/'s editorial, "Koetjo," ibid., February h, 1944, in which the need for training the Lurah /Kuchd in Japan ese/ is expleined; that official,writes the author, must cease to be tax collector only and become a "father of the people, being the man closest to them." The lurah alreacy occupied the position of localleader of the youth organization Keibodan (see Note 309, above), and he was also in charge of food distribution in the villages. Tjokroaminoto alleged that, under Dutch rule, elections of these village heads had often been corrupt and engineered by the colonial government. (399) "Osamu Seirei" #7, dated February 16, "Tentang pemilihan dan pemetjavan Kutyoo," Kan Po, #37 (Tebruary 25, 195k), === [PDF page 215] === 197 profound change in their status in two thousand years (00). In these ways, Japanese control was fastened and deepened over the island's population at a time when the incessant demands for increased food production (01) combined with an accelerated inflation, caused by the army's monetary policies, to render the tani'ts lot ~- in the villages or as forced laborer /romusha/ -—- Ppe3+i, and see the government's elucidation of the decree, "Pokok tindakan centoek memperbaiki sikap dan tabiat koetjo," Asia-Raya, February 17, 194). In the latter, intensive training courses for lurah's, to be conducted in all Residencies, were announced. The central coverrmment started to pay a monthly salary to lurah's, and it held out monetary and other rewards for faithful services. (00) See the unsigned editorial, "Loerah desa," in Asia—taya of February 17, 1944. The comment refers to the fact that the new decree limited the lurah's to a four-year term for the first time in the history of Java. While, furthermore, the office as such remained elective, tenure came to depend on strict conformity to the New Spirit (Sections 6 and 7 of "Osamu Seirei" #7). lections for new village heads in accordance with the new regulations are isa. reported in Asia-Raya of April 21 and July 3, 19Lh, resp. Candidates for these vacancies had to pass tests in the Three R's and give proof of their understanding of the problems confronting a lurah in the New Java. (401) The drive for increased food production was one of the first major tasks allotted to Masjumiin 19h). Cf. Mas Mansurts forceful appeal, “Angatlah tjangkoelmoe!" which appeared as an editorial in Sceara Moeslimin Indonesia, II, 1 (January 1, 1944), p.1. ‘he same issue of this journal earries several articles in which the duty of Moslems to spearhead the fulfillment of the task set by the military government is amplified by suitable Koranic quotations. Cf. e.g. Ki Dar, "Reroesaha memperbanjak hasil boemi,'" ibid., pp.7-8, and a special appeal to pupils of Moslem schools, ibid., p.l2. The main responsibility for obtaining increased agricultural yields was, however, assigned to lurah's and lower rank priyahi's, who consequently became the main targets of the villagers! rebelliousness. For an interesting comment, cf.Gandasubrata, op.cit., p18. === [PDF page 216] === 198 ever harder. As we shall presently see, agrarian unrest flared up in early 1944, in which the grass roots significance of Indnesian Islam suddenly leaped to the fore. We may now return to a stucy of the Masjumi's place in the newly created pattern of public life on Java. In this connection the most striking fact lay in the very existence of a separate and powerful Islamic organization, sponsored and cemented by the military authorities, who were at the same time bent on extincuishing all vestiges of non-religious, semi-private Indonesian associations. Officially, it is true, Masjumi -- like its predecessor — was pledged to abstain from political action of any kind (02); yet in the first place, the Japanese themselves had, as we saw, increased Islamic representation in the quasi-political organs established by them in the preceding months. Secondly, and more important still, the tasks assigned to the new Islamic associa-~ tion, and in particular those entrusted to its individual members, the thousands of kyahi's, at the grass-roots level, constituted to a large extent political wrk par excellence, which in fact assured unprecedented and lasting Moslem strength in the Indonesian political arena. In the third place, Masjumi was given a prominent place in the central machinery of the Djawa Hokokai, without thereby losing (402) See Article 19 of the federation's constitution in Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, I, 1 (December 1, 193), pp.17-I5. === [PDF page 217] === 199 its organizational independence. Masjumi-chairman Hasjim Asj'arie and Ir. Soekarno were appointed the two Indonesian top advisers /Komon/ to the Gunseikan, who headed the HOkOkai, while Mas Mansur shared ith Mohammad Hatta responsibility for the management of general affairs at the center (03). The federation's position within the new mass movement was thus quite unique in that its leaders —~ alone among the entire non-Japanese executive personnel in the Hokokai -—= represented an independent organization. Nor, it should be added, was Masjumi's participation in that movement restricted to the center (0h). Looking at the overall picture which emerges from the reordering and regrouping instituted in early 19h, there can be little doubt that the Japmese had embarked, not only on an era of tighter, direct control of Indonesian life on Java, but also (403) On these appointments, Cf. Asia-Raya, March 1 and May 23, 194, resp. A Japanese member, UES, was added to the advisers and another, Korematsu, to the General Affairs Bureau.e See also Note 387, above. On March 13, Hasjin Asj'arie visited Djakarta and was received by the Gunseikan, whom he thanked for the new office bestowed on him. Ibid., March 20, 1944. Mas Mansur, as one of the Big Four, had individually represented Indonesian Islam in the Putera. In the Hokokai, however, he appeared as a Masjumi delezate. (40h) Islamic representation on the HOkdkai executives in the Residencies was quite substantial, particularly in Bandung. Cf. ibid., March 2 and for some complete listings in the major centers. The prevailing pattern showed almost equal representation of nationalists, officials, and Moslems; often also one Chinese, one Eurasia member, and one woman were added. All regional committees were headed by Japanese. === [PDF page 218] === 200 that they were in the process of perfecting the age-old device of divide ut imperas. They apparently sought to check tha nationalist elite by addinz prestige and influence to priyahi's and Moslem leaders. This arranzement had, however, barely been made when new developments led to important modifications of the balance between administrators and the Islamic elite, to be followed by another readjustment in favor of the nationalists when Tokyo decided to promise Indonesian independence in the fall of 19h. It is not without interest to note that the Japanese sought, and obtained, explicit Islamic sanctions for both the Hokdkai and the Neighborhood Associations; particularly in tie case of the latter, this religious approval may have had some influence on the villagers' less reluctant acceptance of their new yoke. At an impressive gathering in the capital, the president of the Court for Islamic Affairs declared in May, 194, that the two organizations were in complete agreement with the teachings of Islan (05). (405) Cf. the report in Asia-Raya of May 18, 194. For earlier, if less authoritative, Mos approval of the Hdékékai and the Neighborhood Associations, see Muhammad Saleh Suaidy's "Roekoen Tetangga dalam pemandangan Islam," ibid., Jamuary 28, 19L4, and S. Wirohardjono, "Persiapan oemmt Islam oentoek 'Himpoenan Kebaktian Ra'jat'," Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, II, h (February 15, 19k), ppelO-1le Of. also N. St. Iskandar, "Tali persaudaraan," Pandji Poestaka, XXII, 16 (August 15, 1944), pp.513-15. === [PDF page 219] === 201 The establishment of the Tonari Gumi did not, however, diminish Japanese interest in the grass-roots importance of Islam. If all was said and done, the more stringent and minute supervision which formed the primary aim of the neighborhood associations could hardly endear their local leaders, the lurah's or village heads, to the population. To mae the increased demands on the tani more palatable, the govern-~ ment, having obtained explicit approval for its new measures from the central +slamic leadership in ths capital, again turned its attention to the local propagators and teachers of the Moslem religion. This renewed interest was almost certainly in part influenced by the spreading spirit of restiveness among the peasant masses on Java, in the face of steadily worsening economic conditions (406). The danger of such smouldering discontent finding an outlet in outbursts of religious fanaticism must have haunted the Japanese for a long time; in (1,06) Hundred of thousands were impressed into forced labor batallions. According to Muhammad Dimyati (op.cit., p.86 n.), the Japanese officially admitted that 29], 000 rémusha's, or forced laborers, had been sent to work outside Java, many of whom died abroad. The fourth session of the Central Advisory Council, held between August llly, 194, solemnly bestowed the honorific appelation ‘Hero of Labor" PPerfoerit Pekerdja7 on laborers of all kinds. Cf. Djawa Baroe, II, 17 TaSotenber 1, 19h), pp.366. Only as late as December 1, 19) was an Aid Organization for Labor Heroes /Badan Fembantoe Peradjoerit Pekerdja7 established, under the chai rmanship of Woh, Hatta; it apparently provided a modicum of relief to workers and their dependents in some areas. Cf. Hatta's detailed account in Indonesia Merdeka (Djakarta), I, 2 (May 10, 195), PpeSbe === [PDF page 220] === 202 spite of all propaganda efforts, kyahi's and ulama's therefore remained potentially dangerous (407). Japanese apprehension now found expression in unmistakeable warmings to Islamic teachers, these warnings significantly even accompanied the important concessions granted to them at the beginning of the new year. The first move was made when the principals of all larger Islamic schools on the island had to attend a meeting, sponsored by the Religious A‘fairs Office at Djakarta in mid-January, 19hh (408). The primary official aim of the conference was to standardize syllabi and teaching methods in the manifold Islamic schools outside the Western-style religious school system. Some initial steps towards this end were actually discussed; but of greater importance was the decision to extend training courses to Moslem school teachers. These new (407) On the other hand, many kyahi's and ulama's doubtless had become eager supporters of Dai Nippon, having profited -~ socially and materially -~ from Japanese Moslem policies. On the occasion of a visit to Java, the wellknown Sumatran reformist Hamka drew attention to this state of affairs, when he accused those kyahi's of "becoming estranged from the people, and /thus7 no longer knowing their hopes.. in the desire of attracting the attention of people of repute and influence in the country. In this way we are forgetful of the needs of the common man who yet puts his trust in us." "Pemimpin dan ra! jat djelata," Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, II, 5 (March 1, (08) The meeting took place at “asjumi headquarters on January 18-20, It was first announced in Asia~Raya of January 15, 194. For detailed accounts, see iLL, January 18 and 21, 194, and Soeara Moeslimin Indnesia, II, 3 (February 1, 19h), Pece === [PDF page 221] === 203 latihan's were to commence in April at the Shiimubu's newly established permanent Islamic Training Center /Kaikyo kyoshi kosucho/ at Djakarta (09). Addressing the assembled teachers, the Gurseikan made the first explicit reference to hostile rwners among the population, and added a pointed warning against committing "mistakes in their task of leading the young" (110). Towards the end of January, the military authorities announced that a circular had been sent by the Gunseikan to the Residents /Shichdkan/ of all provinces of Java, which contained an important concession to local kyahi's and ulama's. Henceforth -— so it was announced ——- religious leaders would be largely freed from direct control of administrative officials, whose consent was no longer required for the holding of routine Moslem services or for religious meetings devoted to the propagation of government policy by Islamic teachers. The government also promised that permits for other meetings, while still required, would in the future be granted with a minimum of delay by local authorities; it finally ordered priyahi's to render Moslem leaders all possible help in their efforts to aid the authorities in their drive for greater pro- (409) Cf. Asia~Raya, Jamary 27, 194, and see also Zorab, op. cit., p-107. In this Center, trainig courses for ulama's were regularized and speeded up. See also Note 28), above. (410) The Gunseikan's speech is reprinted in Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, II, 3 (February 1, 194), p.1. The warning Is alicizdd in the text. === [PDF page 222] === 20), duction and general cooperation in the war effort (11). This liberalization of Moslem activities in the villazes was not only a fulfillment of a long-standing Islamic demand; its granting, in effect, constituted the first important reversal in the traditional balance in mtters religious between priyahi's and ulama's, which had resulted from the whole direction of Dutch, and early Japanese, Islamic policy on the island (412). Thus, while in the Hdkdkai and the Neighborhood Associations, the hereditary aristocracy had been given increased influence and responsibilities, it almost simultaneously saw itself progressively deprived of greater part of its supervisory role in Moslem affairs. We must note the rather perplexing — yet not illogical -- fact that Dai Nippon, though fearing 7rass-roots Islam, and notwithstanding harsh words, made ever greater concessions to its representatives in the face even of overt actions of disobedience. The Japanese, then, shared their predecessors' apprehensions, but they chose diametrically opposed means for achieving their aims. The existence of such Japanese apprehensions was clearly expressed in a message to all kyahi's and ulama's, appended to the epochal circular freeing them from administrative control. In this message, the Gunseikan underlined the fact that the (411) See the official amouncement in Asia-Raya, Jamary 26, 19h). (412) This is emphasized in 5. Wirohardjono's article, "Koentoengan dan kewadjiban penting," Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, II, 5 (March 1, 194), pp.9-10. === [PDF page 223] === 205 goverrment, having removed a major cause of complaint (413), expected ever closer cooperation and a "positive attitude." The head of the Military sovernment concluded with an emphatic warning: "It is /now/ your duty to decide on the kind of aid you are prepared to render, and you must abstain from any talk which might obstruct the people's williner::ss to cooperate with the government... If, however, you go on criticizing present conditions and... the administration of the country, so that in the end the bond of unity between Army, Government, and the people is broken, then we will have to conclude that you, ulama's, obstruct the achievement of final victory in this Sacred War, and eee that you are forgetting your proper task.e., [oy] opposing the Government of the Dai Nippon Army. We shall corner ype on our guard against any such developments eee”? (41h). The Shumubu lost little time in acquainting as many local Islamic leaders as possible with both the contents of the circular and the strongly worded "advice" of the Gunseikan. It significantly used members of the ldasjumi executive as harbingers of the two messages: these embarked ona tour of the island, in (413) Apparently neither the new edict, nor later steps, entirely succeeeded in putting an end to all friction between Islamic spokesmen and local officials. Thus, during the third session of the Central Advisory Council in early May, Mas Mansur called upon the government "adequately to explain its orders, particularly those relating to the Islamic religion, to administrative officials, so that they will clearly understand the aim and bearing of these orders, lest mistakes be committed in communicating them to the people." For a verbatim report see Asia-Raya, May 9, 19h. A similar complaint concerning priyahi's can be found in Afnwar7 Tj/okroaminoto/'s editorial, "Oelama dan rakjat," in ibid., July 1, 19h. Cf. also Note 265, above. (414) This section of the Gunseikan's speech was again printed in italics. See Asia-Raya, January 26, 194h. === [PDF page 224] === 206 the course of which they held prominently publicized meetings with kyahi's and ulama's in all major centers (15). The urgency of these measures was a clear indication that Jananese preoccupations were far from academic. Discontent amonz the peasants must have been growing for several months; when in 19), the military authorities commenced with a ruthlessly enforced requisitioning of rice, this smoldering discontent —- doubtless at the root of the Gunseikan's warnings — erupted in open rebellion. Not unlixe a very similar event under Dutch rule in 1917, this violent outburst of peasant protest crystallized around local Islamic leadership (416). On *ebruary 18, 19), the population of the villaze of Singaparna, near Tasilmalaya, in Priangan Residency (417), led by kyahi Zainal Mustafa, an influential orthodox teacher and Nahdatul Ulama member in that area, took up arms against the soldiers of the Rising Sun. Once again in the history of Indonesian Islam, its srass- (415) For a report on the Djakarta meeting, led by Mas Mansur and attended i.a. by Adnan and Ali Alhabsji, see ibid. February 2; the Surabaya conference is reported in Tbid., of February 22, that held at Solo in ibid., Jamary 31, 19Lh. (416) The comparison between the events of 194 and the 1917 revolts, led by the so-called "Afdeeling B" of the Sarekat Islam, stems from Dimyati, opecit., peS. On the early upheaval, cf. also Pringgodgido, opecit.e, p15. (417) Indicative of the gathering storm was a decree of the Prianzan Shiichokan, orderings the registration of kyahi's and ulama's in the %esidency. See the newsitem in Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, II, h (February 15, 1944), pel. === [PDF page 225] === 207 roots power threatened the country's infidel rulers; apparently the commotion was, moreover, of such magnitude that it had to be officially acknowledged: Three weeks after the revolt, the military authorities, having taken dreadful local vengeance (18), released a lenzthy statement to the public (419). It is significant that the official version of the rebellion, although it bristled with righteous indignation and dire warnings to the people of Java, did not blame Islamic k aders in general for what had happened. Instead, Zainal Mustafa was officially declared insane (20): (418) Cf. Slamet's "The Holy War, Made in Japan," op.cit., pp.1l-12. ~ (419) The statement, "Keriboetan didaerah Tasikmalaja," appeared, without comment, in Asia-Raya of March 8, 19k4; it can also be found in Kan P0,#39 (March 10, 1944), ppe28-30. Another local rising, not overtly tinged with Moslem influence, occurred in late June of the same year in the village of Kaplongan, near Indramayu in Tjirebon Residency. The writer has not found any official printed comments on these occurrences, but he possesses a copy of the typewritten report submitted by the local police officer. According to this document, the revolt followed upon the government's announcement that all paddy -~ including that set aside for planting and home consumption -~ had to be sur=- rendered to the authorities. It is of interest that the village head /Turah7 had an this occasion sided with his people, who had attacked Japanese and Indonesian policemen, as well as priyahi officials. Four villagers were killed. seven -- including the lurah — were jailed by the Military Police. (20) An innocuously playful piece of philosophizing on the kinds of madness, contained in the chatty column "Sambil laloe" of Asia-Raya, several weeks after the official release, may represent a cautious indication of Indonesian response to the govermment's declaration. The column appeared under the headline "Gila" /mad7 in the issue of March 17, 19hh. === [PDF page 226] === 208 "Of late, he frequently committed acts... at variance with the true Islamic religion. Therefore, Moslem believers no longer acknowledged /his authority7, and the population came to re‘ard him as a madman. In the end he proclaimed himself the representative of Allah, charged with the establishement of a /Moslen/ society ordained by Him. In order to achieve this aim, he spread false rumors, told lies to his pupilgs and to the villagers, until he assembled a following of some five hundred people; he also collected various kinds of weapons..." (121). The governments attitude towards iojan, the announcement concluded, remained unaltered: "We trust that each of you will /now/7 peacefully return to his work. 1t is our sincere hope that the true Islamic religion will continue to grow and develop in Java. But the most severe punishments will be meted out to those disturbing the peace and misleading the people (122). Masjumi emissaries were despatched to the Tasikmalaya region ome day after the publication of the official report — obviously to demonstrate the government's trust in the leaders of "true" tslam on Java, and to impress ulama's with the good intentions of the authorities, while at the same time pacifying Moslem feelings in the area (423). During March and (421) “sia-Raya, March 8, 19hh. The report also stated that repeated warnings had been given to the villagers since August 193, thus long before the actual fighting occurred. Jt had been prolonged by the rebels’ refusal to surrender. Zainal Mustafa and several of his followers were captured and subsequently "investigated" by the Kempeitai /lMilitary Police7. (422) Toid., The report alleved that Zainal Mustafa had left the Nahdatul Ulama several months before the rebellion took place. (4.23) Between March 9-11 five meetings were held in the Regency, attended by some 1,500 ulama's, according to Asia-Raya of === [PDF page 227] === 209 April, Masjumi spokesmen, together with Japanese officials, held similar meetings with local Islamic leaders and the population in all parts of Java (1,2). These missions proved to be only the first of several important measures, which, closely following on the rebellion, demonstrated the profound shock experienced by the Japanese in this bloody encounter with grass-roots Islan. Towards the close of March, the Shumubu announced that a special fortnightly magazine would be published for distribution among kyahi's and ulamats (425). This new publication, Sinar [tight/, appeared in Indonesian, Javanese and Sundanese, and the Arabic script was used (26)3; thus the great majority of local teachers, who were incapable of reading the Masjumi's Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia — printed in Romanized Indonesian and primarily directed towards the educated Islamic urban intelligentsia —- could be directly reached by the Office of Neligious Affairs. A far more epochal step hac, in fact, been taken by the military authorities even before the official report con- March 28, 194). Indicative of the Japanese desire to seek Moslem good will in the face of the revolt is a Domei interview with Hasjim Asj'arie in his famous pesantren at Djombang, published in ibid., March 25, 19hh. (2h) See e.g.ibid., March 28, April h, 22 and 25, 19Lh, resp. (425) See the Domeireport in ibid., March 28, 19h. (426) According to an interview with Hamka in Asia—taya of April 5, 1944. Cf. also Notes 253 and 260, above. === [PDF page 228] === 210 cerning the Tasikmalaya risings wes released: On March 5, the government decreed the creation of regional branch offices in charge of religious —- i.e., Islamic -- affairs. Under this regulation, each Residency, as well as Djakarta Municipality and the Sultanates, instituted a Religious Affairs Section /Shtmuka/ in its Education Bureau (1,27). The purpose of this innovation was stated to be twofold: In the first place -- and this betrayed the measure's relationship to the recent revolt — the regional offices were to establish closer contact with Moslem believers than could be maintained by the central agency at Djakarta. Thus it was hoped that the Shumuka's would put an end to the fact that "... the population in all corners of Java is as yet not /sufficiently/7 aware of... Dai Nippon's policy of honoring Islam, so that up to now quite a few people think or talk in a way out of harmony with the present condition of society; moreover, quite a few incorrect notionsare still being held by many..." (428). The second purpose was, however, of a more crucial importance, and of more lasting and far-reaching consequences. Traditionally, so the official announcement went on, the supervision of Islamic affairs in Java — such as i.a. Moslem mar- (427) The new system became operative on April 1. See the lengthy official announcement in ibid., March5, 19hh. Cf. also Zorab, op.cit., p.107; according to this source, Religious Affairs Sections were in the course of time also set up at the Recency and District levels. (428) Asia-Raya, “arch 5, 194). === [PDF page 229] === 211 riages and the collection of religious tithes — had rested with goverment officials, in particular with Regents and penghulu's. This state of affairs had -- as we have described in an earlier part of this essay — invariably led to frictions between priyahi's and local Moslem leaders (29). In order to obviate a continuation of this age-old situation, the new office of Shumuka would virtually grant "home rule" to Moslems at the expense of administrative control: It would 4... endeavor to protect and advance the Moslem religion, together with the relivious leaders who are the foremost educators of the people... The persons to be appointed to this office will have to be sufficiently versed in Islamic law and Moslem customs and usages, in addition to showing a clear appreciation of the Dai Nippon Military Government... herefore the heads of the new office /Shumukacho7 and at least two of their aides will be recruited from among leading Indonesian Moslems..." (130). Thus apparently in response to Islamic grass-roots rebellion, the Japanese had decided on a major adjustment of the power relationship between the native aristocracy and the Islamic movement on Java. This adjustment advanced 4siam on the (429) See also Yart I, Note 80, above. "The new system," declared a Tokyo broadcaster in English on March 7, 19hh, tig expected to remove the friction which traditionally is apt to arise between Moslems and the prefectural chiefs sic/, who have been handling Noslem preaching, financial affairs, and customs..." Programs of Japan in Java and Dali, op.cit., pp.lieli2. As was mentioned in Note 13, above, these frictions persevered for quite some time, even after the new regulations had come into effect. (430) Asia-Raya, March 5, 19h. === [PDF page 230] === 212 secoml —~ socio-religious -= level far beyond its colonial status to a position which was bound to affect the subsequent development of Indonesian Islam to a marked degree. A separate governmental apparatus, entirely staffed by leading members of Moslem organizations (31), had been created by the military government: The Islamic movement, already well entrenched at the center, thus gained entry into the administrative system of the island, which it has ever since been able to retain (32). The losers in this re-ordering of religious affairs were, of course, the priyahi-elite; the Tasikmalaya officials, and by implication the entire corps, were held responsible for the grass-roots disorders of early 19) (433). In announcing the (431) No complete listing of the new officials is available to the writer, but judging by those known to have been appointed in over half of the island's Residencies, it is obvious that, in the main, prominent local representatives of Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama were made heads and subordinate officers in the Shumuka. Cf. newsitems in: Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, II, 8 (April 15, 19h), p16 (Besuki Residency); ibid., II, 9 (May 1, 19h4), p.15. (Djakarta Municipality and Djakarta, Bodjonegoro and Pekalongan Residencies); and in Asia-Raya, April 15 (Banjumas); April 27 (Semarang); May 9 (Malang); May 12 (Madura); May 13 (Surabaya), and June kh, 194) (Magelang). (432) The Relizious Affairs Office called a meeting of all the newly appointed Shiimukacho's at Ujakarta on April 17-18. On that occasion, Dr. Yjajadiningrat explained that they, in their capacity as ulama-officials, should regard themselves as "mothers" of the people, assigning continued fatherhood to the priyahi's. For a full report, see Asia-Raya, May 1, 1944. (433) The Regent of Tasikmalaya, R. T. A. Wiradiputra, together with three Wedana's and two Assistant-Wedana's in the Regency, were allowed to“resign on their own request" -~ === [PDF page 231] === 213 creation of the office of Shumuka, the government underlined this fact quite clearly: nt Afe wish/ Regents and all other officials who have in the past been connected with relicious affairs to under= stand as clearly as possible... our aim in establishing the /new office of/ Shumuka, so that they will make every effort smoothly_to carry out all governmental order pertaining to the Islamic relizion" (43h). Dissatisfaction with th priyahi's was even more strongly expressed towards the end of April, when the authorities published a statement accusin7 some of the traditional bearers of local authority of disobedience: (43h) (435) “... We very much regret to state that part of the most high-ranking officials... fall short in the fulfillmmt of their important task. They prefer to carry on in their usual way, and in the administrative routine of the former Dutch government... Consequently the government is now taking steps to deal with these /otficials7..., amd it will punish those who are inept and show Tack of entimusiasm..." (35). with forfeiture of income and pension -- while the Wedana of Singaparna itself was punished and dismissed. See Kan Po, #42 (May 10, 194), p.31, and ibid., #43 (May 25, T5Du), peu. Other priyahi's replaced these functionaries. See also Note 35, below. Asia-“aya, March 5, 19h. Asia-Raya, April 29, 19h. For_a natiomlist nod of approval, see the editorial by S/umanan/g, "Pembersihan," in ibid., May 2, 1944. Cf. also Elsbree, op.cit., p.9}, who quotes part of the statement, but without reference to the Tasikmalaya events. His conclusion that the Japanese followed their threat by "systematically com fing the ranks of appointed native officials," and replacing them by nationalist or religious leaders, does not appear to be borne out by the available record. Elsbree's statement is based on a similar presentation in De Weerd, op. cite, p50, but De Weerd dates the "combing" in February, I9LS5, after a rebellion of Peta soldiers had occurred in Blitar, claiming that one-third of the priyahi corps was === [PDF page 232] === 21), Thus, on the one hand, the priyahi-corps, as executors of harsh Japanese policies, had to bear the brunt of popular discontent (436); on the other, its responsibilities in the local Hokokai and Neighborhood Associations forced them into ever closer contact with the Japanese -- a vicious circle from which there was no escape (437). We should parenthetically note that Regents and lower priyahi's had seer their status (4,36) (437) replaced. The writer has checked all the personnel changes during the occupation recorded in the official gazette, Kan Po. As far as could be ascertained, only very few nationalist leaders were given positions traditionally held by the mtive aristocracy. One well-known mtionalist, Dr. M. Murdjani, a physician and Parindra leader, replaced a priyahi, R.T. A. Muh. Sediono, as Regent of Indramayu after the revolt in that area, already referred to in Note 19, above. This appointment was so unique that it is especially mentioned in Pakpahan's short history of the occupation (op.cit., p.158), It is true that, from late 19h), omwards, resignations and dismissals of high-rankinz priyahi's increased, but they were almost always replaced by others; only a few weeks be-~ fore the Japanese surrender were some "outsiders" appointed to positions of Regent and Patih; Cf. e.g. Kan Po, #69 (June 25, 195), ppe42-3. Nationalist and *s- Tamic leaders did, of course, oceupy many important positions in government departments and services; local administration, on the other hand, appears to have by and large continued in priyahi hands. See Note 01, above. According to Pakpahan, the rebels of Tasikmalaya and at Indramayu had killed most of the local priyahi officials, See op.cit., p.55. In this respect the similarity with the Commnist-led rebellions of the mid-1920's is striking. Cf. Blumberger, De communistische bweging in Nederlandsch-Indis, op.cit.,pp.70-91. On the difficulties confronting the voluntary resignation of officials, see Note 396, above, and M. Slamet, Japanese Machinations, opecite, Part I, "The Aftermath of the Japanese Occupation," ppel-5. === [PDF page 233] === 215 since the very beginninzs of the occupation. Their salaries were sharply reduced from the amole emoluments of the Dutch administration (38), while other elite groups -- in particular members of the central and local Advisory Councils (139), Petaofficers and, last but by no means least, some local Islamic leaders -—- became the equals, if not superiors, of the priyahi's in rank, and in several instances also in pay (hk0). This broadening "democratization" of the Indonesian elite structure was doubtless one of the most important achievements of Japanese rule on Java (441). While a closer analysis of its effects would lead us beyond the limits of this study, the shifting balance between the hereditary aristocracy and Islamic leaders in mid-19}); -- at a time when the nationalist (438) An early interim—decree of April 1, 1942, stipulated a ceiling salary for private and governmentemployees of Fl. 500.— per month. Cf. Berita Oemoem, April 2, 1942. As per July 1, 193, uniform salary scales were introduced in a goverrmment order, styled "Peratoeran tentang pengangkatan dan gadji pesawai neveri di Ujawa,'t in which the highest monthly salary was set at F1.700.—. See Boekoe pengoempoelan oendang-oendang, pp.35-56. Under Dutch rule, Soosnts had oan FL. 1,150.-— a month. Cf. Gandasubrata, op.cit., p.4. (439) On the salaries paid to Council members, see Note 301, above. (40) Cf. Gandasubrata, op.cit., pp.13 and 15. The writer has read important comments on this point in an unpublished paper by an observer with first-hand experience of the Japanese administration, Hasan Shadily: Islam In Indonesia Focussed in its Character as a Religious and National Force (Cornell University, November, 1953), Note 65, on p.dh. (441) See also Elsbree, opecit., p91. === [PDF page 234] === 216 elite was relatively powerless -——- deserves our attention. In the eyes of the villagers the waning priyahi prestize must have received a quite considerable blow, when local religious affairs were largely removed from their control. To underline this loss, the Japanese next turned to the Regents! right hand, the penghulu's: In an endeavor to "explain" the new order to these officials in actual charge of Moslem jurisdiction and ritual within the Rerencies, the authorities called a conference of all the island's Chief Penzhulu's, to be held at Djakarta in late May,19)); (42). The most striking, and twice-repeated, feature of this in itself quite unprecedented event was to impress on the Cindarella's of Indonesian tslan (443) that they must henceforth regard the Shumukacho — in most cases the leading ulama of their district, now clothed with official rank and title — as their main font of authority (lh). This important mes- (42) The conference was first announced in Asia-Raya of May 6, 19443 it took place on May 23-25 in the b TLting of the Central Advisory Council (the former Volksraad building). In June, the returning delegates held meetings with local penghulués and their subordinates. See e.g. ibid., June 12, for the Djakarta Residency meeting, and ibid., June 13, 194, for its counterpart in Surabaya. Training courses for penghulu's were another upshot of the conference, Malang Residency taking the lead on the initiative of the Malang Shuinukacho, H. M. Nachrowi Tahir. Cf. ibid., June Sy 194k. (443) On the penghulu's, see Tart I, “hapter 3, passim. (44h) A verbatim account of the opening addresses by the Gunseikan and by the Shumubucho, Dr. Djajadininzrat, can be === [PDF page 235] === 217 sage completed a definite break with a long past, in which governmental support had favored the penchulu against the kyahi's and ulama's (45); it also repeated, in this particular context, the diminished authority of the priyahi-corps in matters Islamic. Compared to this central theme, the request of the assembled penghulu's for reconsideration and alleviation of their unenviable material, legal and social position received scant -— and even then evasive —- attention (6). Two further aspects of this conference aptly illustrated the changing character of Indonesian Islam. First, the most persistent socio-religious demand of the Islamic movement since 1937 -- the restoration of religious jurisdiction over inheritance matters -——- was again voiced on that occasion. But it was symptomatic that the demand, not openly voiced by the leaders of the movement since mid-19)3 (47), now came from the pengfound in Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, II, 11 (June 1, 194), ppel-2. The latter, especially, urged his listeners to establish immediate and close contact with the new Residency-officials; he also rebuked them for finmcial malpractices, such as the charging of exorbitant fees for the performance of their duties. (45) Cf. also Note 262, above, for an earlier indication of this trend. (L4u6) For a report on these requests and Dr. Djajadininsrat's replies, see Asia-Raya, May 25, 194. An article, "Kedoedoekan Penghoeloe," in the same newspaper of the following day strongly supported the main request, advocating that the penghulu's be turned into offdcial, and properly salaried, Islamic judges. Yor an earlier reference to his address see Part I, Note 72, above. (luu6) The restoration cf the "lost provinces" to Islamic juris- === [PDF page 236] === 218 hulu's themselves, who had a personal, rather than an ideological, interest in a redress of the judicial balance; their lonely plea went unheeded (44,8). In the second place -~ and no less indicative of the direction taken by the Islamic movement -—- having been rescaled with official, paternal admonitions regarding their om station in life under the new regulations, the penghulu's were also addressed by the Masjumi's vice-president, Wachid Hasjim who repeated these admonitions and urged his listeners loyally to abide by the new rulings (49). The Islamic movement, in other words, had not only gained predominant influence in the 7 regional administration of Moslem affairs at the expense of diction had, it will be recalled, occupied a prominent place on the M.I.A.1. platform even under Japanese rule. It had, by contrast, no place on the Masjumi program. See also Notes 179 and 335, above. (448) See Asia-Raya, ay 25, 19). It is significant that the issue of the Masjumi journal reporting the meeting does not contain a single supporting article. (U9) Wachid Hasjim's speech is re-printed under the title ‘Melenjapkan jang kolot," in Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, II, 11 (June 1,194), p.3. It was previously cited In Part I, Note 261 of this essay. It is interesting to note that antisemitic propaganda, dormant since mid-19]3, received a new impetus at that time. The theme occurred in Hasjim's speech, as well as in several articles in Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia from May 19, onwards. Cf. eege M. lbmu Ali's "Ketertiban dan keselamatan" in that journal, II, 10 (May 15, 194), p10. The Jews were also attacked in the third session of the Central Advisory Council, as reported in Asia-Raya of May 8. For a short mention, see Zorab, opecite, pe99. Cf. also Note 325, above. === [PDF page 237] === 216 priyahi's and penghulu's, but it also became ever more closely identified with the central governmental leadership in matters Islamic. For the first time in Indonesian history, a leader of the Moslem movement had spoken to religious officials with the voice of authority. History was, to all intents and purposes, in the making, and the rate kept accelerating in the following months. With the establishment of the regional Shitfimuka's, the groundwork was laid for effective control of Moslem affairs throughout the island by representatives of the Islamic movement (50). In addition, contact among these officials, and between them and the Religious Affairs Office at Djakarta, was regularly maintainei (4151). The new structure was finally completed when on August 1, the Japanese authorities issued a five-point announcement concerning the reorganization of the Religious Affairs Office (52). (450) In some areas the new religious officials were not slow in making their presence felt. In the Residencies of Surabaya and Priangan e.g. they published some important regulations regarding Moslem affairs. See Asia-Raya, April 27 and 28, and Nay 6, 19h, resp. The first regional training course_for wlama's was instituted by the Banjumas Shumukacho on May 15. The opening ceremony was attended by Indonesian Shimubu-officials. Cf.ibid.,Mary 2h, 19hh. (451) The Shtimukacho's of West, Central and East Java held conferences on the progress of their work at Bandung (June 27), Solo (July 26), and Malang (July 7), respectively. See Asia-Raya June 12 and July h, l9olh. (452) 44 is reprinted in Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, II, 16 === [PDF page 238] === 220 In order to meet the wishes of Indonesian Moslems, so it read, important changes regarding both the structure and the personnel of the Office had been effected, which should ",,. facilitate and strenzthen /its/ activities, so that all matters connected with relizion, which are steadily growing in importance in /Tndonesian/ society, can be expedited and more easily dealtwith..." A crucial day for Indonesian Islam had arrived: The brief introductory comment which we quoted prefaced the transfer of part of the central vovermmental apparatus charged with the ad-~ ministration and supervision of Islamic affairs to the leaders of Indonesian Islam. Dr. Djajadiningrat resigned as Shumubuchd (453), to be replaced by Java's best-known and most influential orthodox Moslem teacher, Masjumi-president Has jim Asj'arie. The new head of the Religious Affairs Office, it is true, only lent his name to the office which he de facto did not occupy (454). But his consent to serve as symbol was as importmt (453) De Weerd alleges (op.cit.s, p40) that the Japanese held Dp, Djajadininzrat responsible for the Tasikmalaya rebellion, and therefore forced him to resizn. The time-lag between the two occurrences ——- February to August — makes this, however, appear unlikely. The writer inclines to the view that Djajadiningrat may have left under strong and prolonged Masjumi pressure. On Aucust 31, 1945 — thus after the surrender of the Japanese had been officially announced -- Djajadiningrat was again appointed to the Shimubu, this time as Adviser, a position fe had held before assuming the titular leadership of the Office. Cf.Kan Po, #74 (September 10, 1945), p.12, and Notes 295, abovey and 59, below. (454) Hasjim Asj'arie came to Sjakarta for his installation as Head of the Religious Affairs Office, but thereafter inmediately returned to his school, Tetu Ireng, at Djombang,. === [PDF page 239] === 22) as the fact that his son, Masjumi vice-president Wachid Hasjim (455), together with Abdul Kahar ‘tuzakkir (456), a prominent Muhammadiyah leader, assuned top-ranking positions in the reorganized Shimubu (157). (455) (456) (457) the Although not permanently in/capital, he frequently appeared at public functions in the main centers of Javay delivering at times very important speeches. According to Hadji Agus Salim, Wachid Hasjim acted as his aged father's permanent deputy, at the latter's explicit request. (Cornell Seminars Nos.1l and 12, May, 1943). Wachid Hasjim's influence on the overall direction of the office must have become increasingly important. His views at the time he assumed the new function are well expressed in an article, "Tjatjat kita," in Djawa Saroe, II, 16 (August 15, 19h), pp.3-5. Educated In religious as well as in Western schools, this capable Nahdatul Ulama= and Masjumi-leader maintained close contact with natiomlist circles (Salim, ibid.). In independent Indonesia, and before his untimely death in an automobile accident, Wachid “asjim was Minister of Religious Affairs in the successive Natsir ani Sukiman cabinets, from September, 1950 to February, 1952. Cf. George McT. Kahin, "Indonesian Politics and Nationalism," in William L. Holland (ed. ), Asian Nationalism and the West (New York: Macmillan, 1953), pp.65-196, on pp.135 ff. On his death, see Report on Indonesia, IV, 17 (April 23, 1953), p.5.- Unfortunately Wachid Hasjim's comments on the Relisious Affairs Office under the occupation do not shed additional light on developments between August, 19) and the declaration of independence and thereafter. Cf. his "Sekitar pembentukan Kemanterian Agama R.1.5.," Mimbar Agama (Djakarta), I, 1 (June, 1950), pp.5-6. Muzakkir had studied Islamic education in Egypt, and had been a Muhammadiyah teacher, and executive member of the Partai Islam Indonesia. He had also been one of the M.I.A.I. delegation sent to Yapan in 1938. Cf. Orang Indonesia ja terkemoeka di Djawa, p.4h0, and Note 164, above. Muzakkir's appointment may also indicate the eclipse of Mas Mansur's leading role in Masjumi affairs. These appointments were included in the official announcement, reprinted in Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, loc.cit. The Religious Affairs Office was at the same time moved === [PDF page 240] === 222 The full significance of these appointments was emphasized in the last two points of the govemment's announcement, which read: "As a consequence of this reorganization, the connection with the Masjumi will become ever closer... Now that the Religious Affairs Office has been changed, /and/ the leaders of ndonesian7 Islam have been given their proper place /in it7, let all Moslems stand squarely behind them, and aid them in serving Islam in the interests of the common welfare" (58). Mas jumi, in other words, had to all intents and purposes become part of the government itself (459). Although Japanese direction was of course not eliminated in the reorganized Shiimubu (4.60),a serious endeavor had been made to identify this branch of the military administration with the Islamic movement (458) (459) (460) to a larger and more impressive building, which in colonial times had housed the Education Department. On August 14, another prominent Moslem was appointed to the Shumubu, viz. R. H. Muhammad Adnan, President of the Court for Islamic Affairs. Kan Pu, $50 (September 10, 1944), p18. Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, loc.cit. This tendency had already been rather forcefully demonstrated at a series of impressive Masjumi meetings at Solo in late July. These included the federation's first zeneral meeting since its foundation, and an ulama-confernce with Shiimubu officials and the Masjumi executive. For full reports, see ibid., II, 13 (July 1, 1944), passim. Interestingly enough, the general meeting had originally been planned for late January, but very likely the deterioratinz situation at Tasikmalaya caused it to be podponted. See Asia-Raya, January 26, 194k. Apparently Suzuki and Ono remained as section heads. This is implied by De Weerd, op.cit., p.lO. See also === [PDF page 241] === 223 itself, and to grant an increasing measure of "home rule" to Indonesian Islam on Java (61). If, as is probable, this position was in a large measure the result of the Japanese response to the threat of Islamic grass-rpots unrest, then one cannot fail to acknowledge the sagacity, and perhaps also the courage, of Suzuki and his superiors shown in securing the support of Moslem leaders. Qn the other hand, the very strength of Indonesian Islam had been at least equally deftly used by the Islamic elite in securing substantial concessions (62), which gave them a position of lasting importance in the Indonesian political scene. Tims the dividing lines between the three levels of the Islamic problem had become blurred in the almost kaleidoscopic changes during 19h. Within the context of overall Japanese policy on Java during the first eight months of 19h), these changes, moreover, stand out as an almost unique and autonomous achievement. The (461) It is interesting to note that, while regional “elizious Affairs Offices Shtmuka/ were also instituted in Sumatra in late 194, no central Islamic movement existed on that island. Sjech Djamil Djambek, one of the leading Sumatran Moslens, urged the creation of such a movement, modelled on the Masjumi, in an interview reprinted under the title, "Masjoemi dapat mendjadi teladan di Soematera," in Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, III, 2 (January 51, 1915), pee (462) It should be recalled that the use of Arabic and the Arabic script had been -- as was mentioned in another context before — officially sanctioned in July, 194k; at the same time, Arabs were granted equal status with Indonesims. Cf. Notes 258 and 260, above. === [PDF page 242] === 22h military administration's conspicuous concession to Indonesian Islam were, that is, neither paralleled by the transfer of other high-ranking positions to Indonesians (63), nor by diminshed Japanese control in other aregs of public life. So far, there was no indication of Tokyo's willingness to promise, however vaguely even, Indonesian independence (164). 4s we saw at the beginninz of this chapter, the nationalist elite had been forced into the restrictive mold of the Japanesesponsored and -directed Djawa Hokokai. Though it had been inaucurated with considerable publicity, the new mass movement to all appearances for many months remained inert. It is not unlikely that its Japanese creators were for some time too preoccupied with the grass-roots rebellions of early and mid-l19l, to breathe real life into the Hokokai. On the other hand, the abolition of Putera had apparently — and understandably ~~ dampened the enthusiasm of many Indonesian intellectuals to collaborate in its cumbersome successor-organization (65). (1,63) Such appointments were made in rapid succession once Indonesian independence had been promised by the Tokyo government. The ramifications of these changes will be discussed in the next chapter. (464) The loss of Saipan in June, 194) caused the fall of the Tojo cabinet on July 18. Four days later, his successor, Koiso, assumed office. ‘+he new cabinet waited for almost two months before committing itself to further promises to Indonesia. Qn the background of these developments, see Elsbree, op.cite, ppe50-57 and 93 f., resp. (465) See in this connection the editorial, "Himpoenm Kebaktian Rakjat dan kaoem terpeladjar," hy S/umanan/g, in Asia-Raya of May 12, 194). The article chides intellec- === [PDF page 243] === 225 In marked contrast to the rapid development of the “asjuni, and of Islamic affairs in general, at that time, the imctivity of the HékOkai was so glaring that, in July 1944, its head-office felt obliged to issue an official appeal for patience: tt... The Dajwa Hokokai /it pleadedf/ has only been in exigstence for a few months; it is thus quite understandable that we have not as yet been able to achieve great results. We are, after all, making history! And what do a few months signify in history? It doesn't work in terms of months, but in terms of centuries... Not only we, but people all over the world, are -- as our readers know — confronted by problems as big as Mt.Semeru..." (466). The contrasting picture which emerges in this, necessarily brief, confrontation leaves little doubt that, between January and August, 1944, the Japanese had concentrated their effarts on the Moslem problem. During that period, the Islamic elite had conspicuously gained in influence, in particular at the expense of the priyahi-corps, while the area of nationalist activity had been considerably mrrowed (67). tuals for their lukewarm cooperation. For similer conmments in connection with the negative attitude of intellectuals towards the Neighborhood Associations, see ibid., May 5 and 8, resp. (466) "Sabar-sabarlah menoensgoe boeah," Pandji Foestaka, XXII, ly (July 15, 1944), pel35. The appeal ended with the announcement of the organization's first great meeting at Pjakarta, which took place on July 25. For a report, cf. ibid., XXII, 15 (Auzust 1, 19hh), pp.l69-70. (467) An excellent indication of Japanese attitudes towards nationalist leaders at that time can be gleaned from the condescending and haughty "lectures" delivered by the Gunseikan to the members of the Central Advisory Council, in reply to their resolutions. This is particularly true of his addresses marking the close of the second and third === [PDF page 244] === 226 The next chapter of our study will follow Islamic develop-— ments in the closinz era of the Japanese occupation, when the events following the promise of independence, gradually at first, and then at an ever-accelerating rate, brought the naticnalist leadership to victorious pre-eminence. THE sessions of that body. On the former, see Kan Po, #36 (February 10, 1941), pp.27-28, and Asia-Raya, February 2, 19h44; and on the latter, Asia-Raya of May 9 and 10, 19hh. === [PDF page 245] === CHAPTER IX TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE: SEPTEMPER, 19h), - AUGUST, 195 By the end of August, 194), thirty months had elapsed since the Ditch East Indies had ceased to exist, thirty months during which the clamor for Indonesian independence -—~ after a short and brutally suppressed jubilation in the first few days of the occupation =—<- had been silenced. In fact, the role assigned to the leaders of Indonesian nationalism after one year of Japanese rule on Java must have substantially dampened whatever hopes for the future the change of ruler may have raised in them at the outset (68). Deprived of an organization of their own towards tie close of 1943, the nationalist elite occupied an unenviable secondary position in the leading ranks of a Japanese controlled organiza-— tion, which gave them little scope for independent action. The part played by Indonesians in nominally advisory positions in the organs of the military administration was likewise at best (468) Thus during his visit to Tokyo in November, 1943, Ir. Soekarno in vain asked Premier Tojo for the promise of an early grant of independence. See Elsbree, op.cit., p.li?, who cites an official Japanese document in support of this statement. On the visit, see also Note 308, above. === [PDF page 246] === 228 of a very limited nature. The Central Advisory Council at Djakarta and its regional counterparts were, in effect, far less adequate forums for nationalist activities and agitation than their predecessors had been under Dutch rule. The leaders of the nationalist movement had thus to all intents and purposes been forced to exchange their previous role of ineffectual critics for that of almost equally ineffectual collaborators. Yet Japanese rule had brought with it one important change. While in terms of actual power the nationalist elite had gained very little by the end of August, 1944, it had been given official, social prestige and prominence. From its existence on the barely tolerated fringe of public life and, in several instances, from political exile, in the colonial era, it had rapidly moved to the center of attention during the military government's first thirty months on Java. However limited the scope for independent action may, therefore, have been, the members of this elite had assumed official positions. It was their spokesmen who tended to dominate what political life the new rulers allowed to Indonesians, and who invariably combined in their hands the highest Indonesian functions in the quasi-representative bodies, as well as in the various "mass movements," created by the authorities (69). (469) On official occasions, Ir. Soekarno was always styled "Representative of the Indonesian People."' He was chairman [Gichd7 of the Central Advisory Council and Head of the General Affairs Office — and thus chief Indonesian spokesman — of the HOk®kai. In addition, he was Adviser /Sanyo/ of the administration's key department, the SdOmubu /Seneral Affairs Depart- === [PDF page 247] === 229 The advantagee of this inevitable identification of the majority of the Western-educated, political intelligentsia with the rule of Dai Nippon was, to some extent at least, counterbalanced by the danger of alienation from the mass of the Indonesian people. In the measure that large-scale discontent with Japanese rule, largely caused by economic distress, increased, this danger was bound to assume graver proportions. The first lesson in responsibility was thus, ironically, taught by an occupation which found it ever more difficult to bridge the gap between promise and performance -- a legacy not unexpectedly passed on to independent Indonesia. Japanese policy up to the fall of 194 had, finally, resulted in a series of developments which potentially challenged the nationalist elite's claims to undisputed pre-eminence. In the first place, the priyahi-corps, in spite of the vicissitudes of its position under the occupation, was as yet by no means reduced to impotence. As we have seen, it had been assigned an important role in the H0kokai and in the Neighborhood Associations, quite apart from these new functions, local administration necessarily remained in its hands. The Japanese,moreover, had placed ment7. Similar combinations of lesser functions could be listed for other nationalist leaders. Of the original "Big Four," only Soekarno and Hatta retained prominence throughout the war. Mas Mansur, perhaps because of ill health, gradually withdrew fran a leading position, while Ki Hadjar Dewantara returned to Jogja in early 19k, where he again assumed leadership of the Taman Siswa school system. He was at the same time appointed chairman of the 368 Sultanate's regional HOkOkai. Cf.Asia-Raya, April 8, 19h. === [PDF page 248] === 230 an impressive number of these traditional bearers of prestige in the various advisory councils (4:70). The traditional friction between aristocratic ruler-officials and nationalists had thus far, then, not been resolved in favor of the latter, although, in terms of the general balance of prestige and influence, the priyahi-elite was doubtless losing eround. In addition, being in closer contact with the population by virtue of its traditional function, it also incurred the greater and more direct hostility of the exasperated and at times rebellisus villagers than did the nationalist leaders at the center. The second, and more serious, challenge to nationalist aspirations stemmed from the rise of the Islamic elite, which the preceding chapters have sought to trace. We shall presently return to a detailed discussion of its subsequent fate. In the vresent introductory survey it need only be added that these developments ranked among the most important events of the first thirty months of the occupation. (70) To mention one oustanding example, Rk. M. A. A. Kusumo Utoyo, one of the best-known Javanese priyahi's, at one time Recent of Ngawi and Vice-Chairman of the Volksraad, was again appointed Vice-“hairman of the Chuo Sangi-in by the Japanese. The Regent of Bandung, Wiranata Kusuma, also occupied several important functions during the occupation, as did Sutardjo Karbhadikusumo, who, unlike these two and most other priyahi's, had joined the ranks of the nationalist elite under Dutch rule. Some priyahi's, as well as several Western-trained Indonesian officials, also shared top-advisory positions with the nationalist elite in the various departments of the military administration. === [PDF page 249] === 231 The emphasis placed upon the Islamic factor in this study thus up to a point reflects one of the most significant Japanese policies of that period. Compared to other Indonesian elite groups, none had, perhaps, made more conspicuous zains by mid- 194 than the war-time leaders of Islam on Java. Yet to the extent that they, and in particular also many local Islamic leaders, had become government officials and spokesmen of the infidel rulers, they may also partly have forfeited some of the villagers! traditional veneration for their religious leaders (71). Finally, although the era of Japanese rule had, historically speaking, barely begun, its effects on Indonesian life were already startling in many respects (72). Even though the occupation was — fortunately — of too short duration vitally and lastingly to affect the nature of Indonesian politics, and the slowmoving pace of Indonesian life in general, Japanization (73) and (471) Cf. also Note 07, above, and see Van Nieuwenhuijze, Mens en vrijheid in Indonesié, op.cit., p.27. (472) For a very interesting assessment, see Gandasubrata, op. cit., esp. p.13, and passim. (473) Japanese was taught in all schools, inclyding Moslem pesantren's. Prizes were awarded in annual competitions for school children. Cf. eeg. the illustrated report on the 1943 winner in Djawa Baroe, I, 23 (December 1, 1943), p.3. Courses were also given to adults, who likewise competed in frequent examinations, since knowledge of the Japanese language was an important qualification for government employment. Thus in midWecember of 1943, over 19,000 persons participated in the fourth and fifth of these examinations: of these, 4,278 passed. The names of the successful candidates were published in a special edition of Asia-Raya on February 17, 1944. Another illustrative report in Djawa Baroe, II, 22 (November 15, 19h), pp.1i-15 mention¢s aE at a recently held Regents' conference, two participants delivered their reports in Japanese. === [PDF page 250] === 232 militarization were bound to leave a deep impression, particularly on the younger generation. In the various para-military youth organizations and in the even more important Indonesian army corps, a new type of leader was gradually coming to the fore. His emergence would assure Indonesia of a nucleus of well-trained military personnel, indispensable in the post-war struggle for independence. But con-~ trol over this new elite group, which -- as will be seen -—- in one unsuccessful attempt even dared to challenge its Japanese masters, would prove a hard task for the older generation of Indonesia's political leaders: already during the later stages of the occupation, the military claimed a measure of political codetermination. The basic factor in this intricate pattern of evolving and changing power alignments up to September, 194, lay in the harsh reality of undisputed Japanese control. The Japanese alone, that is, held all the keys to ultimate power: To a large extent, the competing Indonesian elite-groups were, therefore, if not creatures of Dai Nippon's own making, almost entirely dependent on Japanese support. More than that, their competition for influence itself was largely a result of a shrewd Japanese policy of divide ut ifiperas. Because of their unique influence on the grassroots level, Islamic leaders may perhaps have possessed a greater measure of inherent strength than the other groups; but in the final analysis, even they owed much of their newly won position to the occupying power. === [PDF page 251] === 233 It was only when Indonesian independence "in the near future" was promised by Premier “oiso on September 7, 194 (7h), that the Japanese policy-makers on Java had to contemplate a gradual -—- and ultimately, in the face of the imminent collapse, a rather rapid -—- transfer of substantive power. With this promise, Indonesian nationalisn, in a measure tolerated at first, then officially held at bay since the dissolution of Putera, was elevated to the highest official position. Thus this crucial decision =—— however vaguely and ambiruously worded originally — spelled the end of an era, and with it the end of the carefully constructed system of "checks and balances" by which the island's Japanese rulers had hitherto dominated Indonesian public life. The irrevocable, and indeed inescapable, choice of the country's future leaders was made, once the outward symbols of Indonesian nationalism were allowed to make their appearance (l\75). Even (47) The vague promise was made in the course of a policy declaration in the 85th session of the Yapanese Diet. See the special "Independence Issue" of Djawa Baroe, II, 18 (September 15, 1944), for a full pictorial review of the celebrations followin? Koiso's declaration in Java. On the day itself, the newspapers published separate pamphlets with the tidings, which had been communicated to Indonesian leaders, summoned by the Commander-in-Chief to his palace for this purpose. Cf. also Pakpahan, opecit., pp.7k ff. (4.75} Immediately following Koiso's promise, the Indonesian flag and the national anthem, Indonesia Raya, were officially sanctioned. Cf. "Makloemat Saiko Shikikan #6" of September 8, 19h, in Kan PO, # SO (September 25, 194k), poll. In this announcement, pubdlic buildines -- with the exception of Hokokai offices -- were not dllowed to fly the Indonesian flaz. Only seven months later, on the occasion of the emperor's birthday on April 29, 195, permission was granted to schools and local and regional government agencies to display === [PDF page 252] === 23h then it ook another six months before this choice began to be translated into real fact: The "divide and rule" policy only came to an end in March, 1945. The scene during the last seven months of the occupation is thus increasingly dominated by the victorious rise to ultimate pre-eminence of the Indonesian nationalist elite, and by the up= surge of the leaders of the young generation, who impatiently forced the hand of the older leadership in the last crucial days. The crowded story of this concluding phase, particularily that of its final stages, cannot be told in detail in these paces (76). Occasional references to the swiftly chanzine configuration will have to suffice, in order to relate the tslamic developments to those larger happenings which marked the transition from the pro= mise of Indonesian independence to its unexpected, sudden, and even bewildering implementation eleven months later. the Indonesian flag; at no time could it be displayed Without Japan's Rising Sun, hoisted on its right-hand side. Cf. "Makloemat Saikd Shikikan # 2," and "Makloemat Gunseikan # 2h," ibid., # 66 (May 10, 1945), pp.9-ll. On the same late date Indonesians ceased to be officially styled "natives" /gen-zylmin/, their language ceased to be referred to as "Malay? Marai-go7 and their country, hitherto called To Indé /East Tndtes/, at long last was christened Indonesia. Cf. the comment, "“Penljoeangan kita dari zaman kezaman," Indonesia Merdeka, I, 2 (May 10, 1945), pel8. (476) For summaries of these events, see Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, pp.121 ff.,; Elsbree, op.cit. an ineaonesiay, ) » OPeClle, Opecit., CSPpe ppe92 ff. and passim. === [PDF page 253] === Up to this point, we may with some justification have claimed that the subject of our study occupied a prominent, and at times indeed a unique, place in the brief history of the Japanese occupation of Java. Returning to it now within a far more complex setting, we must admit that, while several extremely important developments did take place throughout the period under discussion, the Islamic problem as swh tended to lose much of its prominence amidst the advancing and accelerating tide of independence which swept across the island. These last eleven months of Japanese rule in Java fall intc two clearly distinguishable pericds. The first dates from September to February; the second, from March till August. Premier Koiso's promise of Indonesian independence released an infectious enthusiasm, which marked the opening of the first phase. The Japanese calculation that the hope of speedy independence would further their major aim of identifying their own war with the struggle of the Indonesian leaders against the reimposition of Dutch rule proved -— to judge by the available record -- by and large correct. It is unlikely that the real strategic situation confronting Japan in late 191) was either known to, or its implications understood by, the zreat and decisive majority of these leaders. At any rate, they had no choice but to make Japan's war their own as the price for obtaininz creater auton- === [PDF page 254] === 236 omy (477). Cnce the first wave of enthusiasm and celebration subsided, it became clear that the promised indepencence was as yet rather distant (47). In the meantime the military vovernment could — and did -- use that promise as a lever for exacting from Indonesian leaders ever zreater efforts to prepare themselves and their (4.77) (478) (479) countrymen for the coming struggle (79). To the Japanese, After careful perusal of the printed record, the writer finds it difficult to agree with Elsbree's assertion (op. cite, pe€l) that, after September, 19, Indonesian spokesmen appeared to be less pro-Japanese in their public utterances. The contrary would seem to be nearer the truth. Among countless nationalist md Islamic speeches of that period, Soekarno's radio address, "Penggemblengan rakjat Indonesia kearah kemerdekaan kinj dimoelail" of December 8, 194, and his speech of March, 1945 contain exuberant praise of Nippon, together with specific attacks on Britain and the U.S.A., democracy and liberalism. Cf. for the former, Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, II, 23-2) (December 15, 194), ppelo-18, and for the latter, Djawa Baroe, III, 7 (April 1, 1945), pede See also Moh. Supardi's post-occupation comment, "Dibtawah penindasan Djepang; periawanan kita dipelbagi lapangan," in the jubilee booklet of the Djakarta daily Merdeka (February 17, 196), pp.103-0h; in that article, a few enarded anti-Nippon passavzes in Soekarno's war-time speeches are quoted. Cf, on this point also lahin, op.cit., ppe108-09 and 115, resp. The spreading disappointment with the delay is i.a.apparent in an unsigned article, "Perdjoeangan Oemmat Islam, " in Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, II, 21 (November 1, 1944), pp. 6-7, in which Wpeople with little or insufficient knowledgett are reproached for asking why independence could not be granted immediately. A special session of the Central Advisory Council had been hastily summoned on September 7, with whatever members happened to be in the capital, to celebrate Koiso's announcement and to thank the home government. When the full membership assembled for the sixth session (November 12-18) and proceeded to recommend a few measures aimed at increasing Indonesian codetermination, it was severely reprimanded by === [PDF page 255] === 237 thaw is, war came before independence; to the Indonesian leaders, the war could only be successfully waed via independence. During the latter stages of the first phase, the authorities' view prevailed, but gradually, in the measure that Japm's plight steadily worsened, and also in the measure that Indonesian bargaining power -~ implicitly bestowed in Koiso's very pramise -~ improved, the pendulum began to swing in the otler direction. This was the situation during the second phase. On the eve of these new developments, the Islamic movement had, as we saw, made considerable gains. A series of adjustments in its favor had been made, to a large extent no doubt set in motion by Moslem disturbances. In other words, events which had the Gunseikan. See Kan Ps, 55 (November 25, 194), pp. 17-18. This session also promulgated the so-called "Pantja Dharma"! /The Five Duties/, a five-point declaration of basic principles and aims. ‘hese read, somewhat abvreviated,as follows: 1) We are in this war as allies in life and death of Dai Nippon «eee 2) We shall establish a free Indonesian state, fully respecting the meritorious help of Dai Nippon and continuing as a member of the Co-Prosperity Sphere... 3) We shall endeavor to advance the highest morality.ee, and our culture... ) We shall serve with all our might our country and people, and render homage to God. 5) Based on the /Japanese principle of7 Hakko Ichi, we fight fer the establishment of everlusting peace. Ir. Soekarno interestingly enough again briefly referred to these oft-repeated early principles in his speech before the Independence Preparatory Committee on June 1, 1945. On that occasion, he explicitly disavowed them in favor of the five new principles, the so-called "Fantjasila," which since have become the accepted ideological the of the Indonesian 2) public. See Lahirnja Patjasila (The Birth of Pantjasila /Djakarta: Ministry of Informtion, 19527, p.29.. === [PDF page 256] === 236 occurred on the first, grass-roots, level, had led to a sizeable accretion of Islamic power on the second level, the socio-religious plane. At the same time, this accretion was by its very nature bound to react on the political level. It was this level, moreover, which in importance soon overshadowed the others, when the Islamic elite had to adjust itself to the changes following from the promised grant of Indonesian independence. Masjumi's answer to Koiso's declaration squarely placed the Islamic movement behind the foals of Indonesian nationalism. In mid-October, the federation's executive met at Vjakarta, and passed a three-voint resolution, calling on its members to prepare Meslems for the liberation of their country and their religion, and to make all sacrifices for the attainment of victory. The last point, equating Japan's war with the Holy War of Islan, read: "With Nippon we stand, with Nippon we fall, in the path of Allah, to destroy a tyrannous enemy" (180). This program was further explained by Masjumi-leaders at mass meetings in the capital and in allfegional centers, in which (480) The resolution is re-printed under the title, "Berdjihag oentoek menegakfan agama Allah," Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, II, 20 (October 15 19h), peo. "Noslem ideology Japanese propaganda became? so mixed up eee as to become inextricable," comments Van Nieuwenhuijze with some justification in What the Japanese Did to Islam on Java. It is also interesting to note that the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem had cabled Koiso from Berlin on the occasion of the latter's promise to Indonesia. The Masjumi executive decided to convey its thanks to him at that meeting. === [PDF page 257] === 239 they identified slam with the cause of Indonesian nationalism, which Western colonialism had allegedly sought to divide: "The result of this treacherous [Dutch7 policy has been a kind of thinking widespread among us, namely, that in our country there are different groupings: there are Mos- Jems (and you think of prayer coats), there are nationalists (and you think of Western-style trousers...), and there are priyahi's (and you think of the traditional Javanese attire). Thus we have created mutually exclusive types: You could only be one or the other, not be a Moslem and /yet/7 love your country /etc./... But actually we are all cof us nationalists and patriots, and we all of us are also Moslems!... " (81). There can be little doubt that the goal of Indonesian independence was, indeed, shared by most Islamic leaders with those of the "secular" nationalists. If this had at one time been truer of the majority of the reformists than of the thousands of orthodox kyahi's and ulama's, the capable orthodox leadership -—~ particularly its younger members ~— had already towards the end of Dutch rule moved ever closer towards the ideology of Indonesian nationalism (182). (481) From a circular of the Masjumi head-office to all bran- (432) ches, elucidating the previously quoted resolution, in the special independence issue of Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, II, 21 (November 1, 1944), pped-le Similarly, Wachid Hasjim told the Djakarta gathering that “without sacrificing one iota of its mtionalism, the Jndonesian people can attain its independence with Islam... Thus we Indonesian Moslems, without in the least looking down on those who do not base themselves on ow religion, have the duty of defending our fatherland." Ibid., II, 18 (September 15, 194k), pp.5-6. See also Muzakkir's similar speech in ibid., II, 19 (October 1, 194),pp.2-3. Thus in the short-lived Madjelis Rakjat Indonesia of 191, the M.I.A.I. had, among others, been represented by Wachid Hasjim, who, as we saw, emerged as one of the most influential Moslem leaders durinz and after the occupation. Cf. also Notes 156 and 55, above. === [PDF page 258] === 240 ‘t was Japanese policies which had, in effect, continued and deepened the division between the Moslem and the nationalist elite's, a division which had showed the first signs of disappearing when the outbreak of the war had led to repeated and ted Indonesian demands for greater autonomy from the Netherjands. On the other hand, and in spite of the substantial advantages which had accrued to Moslem leaders from these Japanese policies, the largely artificial dividing lines between "Moslems" and "Indonesians" were no barrier against the wider allegiance to an all~inclusive nationalism which was now zradually being freed from Nippon's bondage. Finally, whatever short-term dividends the politization of the mass of kyahi'ts and ulana's may have paid the Japanese, it ultimately diminished the erstwhile lethargic, other-worldly resistance to political change of these teachers of Islam. Hatred and fear of the oppressive infidel msters may, moreover, have sufficed for many of these devout if unsophisticated Moslems and their followers to pray for independence; not, perhaps, the positive independence of Indonesian nationalism, but the negative hope of being left alone in one's omm house amd worship (83). This fairly general agreement on the ultimate objective of.ndonesian iridependence did not, however, preclude either a difference of emphasis on the contents and contours of that in- (483) Cf. Van Nieuwenhuijze, Mens en vrijheid in Indonesié, ODeCibes peli2. === [PDF page 259] === dependence, nor a contest for the part which would te assigned to the organized Islamic movement in its eventual realization. In both these areas of potential contention, but particularly in the latter, the developments of the first six months after Koiso's promise indicated that independence would be frought with serious political problems. One of the first Japanese post—declaration moves gave greater freedom to tne Indonesian leadership of the Hokokai. During the third session of the Central Advisory Council in May, 19h, the members had already requested the establishment of a special youth corps which should be placed under Hdkokai com= mand (48). Now, four months later, this request was suddenly aranted: In late September the so-called Barisan Pelopor [Pioneer Corps/ was established. Standiny under direct nationilst, civilian control, this corps was at the outset merely of a para-mnilitary nature, its princival aim being to spearhead HOkOkai propaganda. Only at a later stage did this propaganda —- as we shall see — embrace an appeal to guerilla warfare, in which the youthful pioneers were to play a decisive part (85). (48k) For a report on that session, see Asia—‘aya of May 10, 19h). (485) Ir. Soekarno was made supreme commander /Sdrengotai taicho, inJapanese/ of the corps, Oto Iskandar Dinata and R. Buntaran Madpadmodjo vice-cormanders. Many well-known nationalists, including Dr. Muwardi, Mangkupradja and Mr. Rudiarto, were appointed to leading Pelopor positions in the === [PDF page 260] === The initially limited scope of this concession to the nationalist elite was an interesting indication of Japanese policies at that time. As yet, while nationalistic propaganda was allowed to spread to the Indonesian army (486), the Peta cadres themselves, as far as could be ascertained, remained umer Japanese command, without having direct contact with the nationalist elite (87). (4.86) (487) Residencies. An advisory committee, consisting of one Japanese, Korematsu, and Hatta, Mas Mansur and Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, was attached to headquarters. ‘or a conplete listinz of the regional personnel, see Djawa Paroe, II, 20 (Cctober 51, 19k), The official announcement concerning the settinz up of the corps can be found jn Pandji Poestaka, XXII, 17 (September 1, 194k), p50. On September 15, 124), a special fortnightly mazazine, Pradjoerit /The Fighter7, commenced publication at Djakarta. Its editorial and administrative staff, headed by Iskandar Dinata, apparently consisted entirely of Indonesians until May, 195, when a Japanese replaced editor Sjamsuddin St. Matmur. This magazine illustrates very interestingly the ideolozical diet of the Indonesian soldier: it consisted, right to the end of the occupation, of an about even mixture of Japanese indoctrination and Indonesian nationalism, very frequently enlivened by Islamic propaganda. For an early and typical example of the latter, see ‘usa Machfuld's historical article, "Perdjoeangan pahlawan islam Djawa," Pradjoerit, I, 3 Cf. Elsbree, op.cit., p.90.-——- After the war, Dutch propaganda made use of a photograph showing Ir. Soekarno in Peta-uniform, presenting arms to a Japanese o Yicer. This photograph originated ina one-day drill at Peta barracks, in which a1] members of the Central Advisory Council voluntaridy participated as a demonstration of unity between civilians and the army. Seethe pictorial report, "Para anggota Tyuoo Sangi-in hideep diksatrian sehari-~semalam," Djawa Baroe, III, 6 (March 15, 1945), pp.ll-17. This event followed the closing of the seventh session of the Council on February 26, 195. === [PDF page 261] === 24,3 The conspicuous trust shown by the military government in the leaders of Indonesian Islam shortly after the establishment of the Barisan Pelopor stood in marked contrast to this attituce. On December 8, during the celebrations marking the third anniversary of PearJlarbor, the Saiko Shikikan announced that, "on the unanimous request of 00,000 Moslem youths," (488) the government would immediately set up a special Islamic volunteers' corps. While in September, 193 a similar Moslem request had been, as was previously mentioned, met with silence (489), this belated compliance seened to indicate that the Japan-~ ese still placed greater hopes on rallying to their cause Moslem, rather than nationalist, enthusiasm (90), Whatever interpre- (488) The speech is re~printed in Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, II, 23-2) (December 15, 194), p.G. The C-in-C, stating that the war would only end with the Allies' unconditiona surrender, also announced that 00 youths from Madiun Residency had volunteered for service in a suicide /jibaku7 squad. For a detailed report, see Pandji Poe tabes XXII, 24 (December 15, 19h4), p.78h. — (489) See Note 316, above. For brief references to the kioslem army, see Kahin, op.cit., p.163n, Elsbree, op.cit., p.l0h, and Zorab, op.cit., p.1lh. (490) In part at least this preference may have been governed by the consideration that the arch-enemy of Indonesian nationalism, the “utch, were of no military consequence to Japan, whose far more tangible adversaries were Britain and America. At any rate, anti-British propaganda for Moslem consumption frequently found its way into several magazines from early 195 onwards. See e.g. M. Zain Djambek's, "Keradjaan-keradjaan pendjadjah Barat dan doenia Islam," Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, III, 1 (Janary 1, 1945), p.ll, and a whole series of such articles in one single issue of Pradjoerit, I, Ui (April 15, 1945), pp.19-20, 20-21, 23-25, ~and 27-23, resp. === [PDF page 262] === tation is to be placed on this significant event, it is at least probable that the Islamic leaders were placed at an advantage vis-a-vis the nationalist elite in obtaining at least outward, direct control over an auxiliary fighting corps of their own (91). "Allah's Army" -— Hizbu'tllah -~ was founded shortly af'ter the Commander-in-Chief's announcement (492). It was planned as a reserve corps to the Peta, some of whose kyahi-officers were entrusted with training the new forces. The most crucial point of Hizbu'tllah's elaborate constitution concerned, however, the (491) On the island of Vadura, what appears to have been a separate Islamic corps was founded on December 26, 19h. This minature ulama~army stood under the direct command of the local Japanese Resident. The writer has only found one brief reference to this -- perhaps shortlived ~~ enterprise, and can, therefore, not assess its significance. See the survey of events of tne year 194 in Pandji Poestaka, XXTII, 2 (January 15, 19hs), p.58. (192) In early January, 195, the members of the Central Executive Leadership of Hizbu'llah were announced by Masjumi. (See Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, III, 2 /January 15, 19)57, pel2.) its chairman was Zainul Arifin (one of the Nahdatul Ulama delegates in the Masjumi executive), with Mohammad Roem as vice-chairman, and ten other members: Se Surowijono, Sudjono, Anwar Tjokroaminoto, K. J. Zarkasji, Masjhudi, Sunarjo Mangunpuspito, Jusuf Wibisono, Muhammad and R. H. O. Djunadi, and Prawoto Mangkusasmita. With a few exceptions, these were younger men, some of whom had at one time been active in the Jong Islamieten Bond and in Hadji Salim's Penjedar (the dissenting P.S.I,I. faction of 1936). In the same issue of the journal a new Masjumi executive was -- without additional comment — amounced. Among other changes, H. A. Mukhti was replaced as the federation's second vice-chairman by Muhammadiyah-member Farid lMa'ruf, while Mas Mansur's name disappeared from the list altogether. For a complete listing of the new committee, see ibid., p.13. === [PDF page 263] === relationship between its members and the central Islamic leadership: Allah's Army was, quite explicitly, the army of Masjumi, to whom its members had to swear unswerving allegiance (93). In mid-December, representatives of the Islamic federation already embarked on a tour of Java with the purpose of inspecting the Hizbu'llah volunteers in all Residencies (49h). Only six weeks later, "somewhere in West Java" the first field training of five hundred Moslem fighters commenced, under the benevolent gaze of the Gunseikan and “asjumi vice-chairman Wachid Hasjim (495). An important chapter in Islamic history on Java (4193) The constitution of the Hizbu'llah can be found in Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, II, 23-2) (December 15, 194k), pp.2l- 206 Mas jumi was charged with setting up the central and area commands; it was also entrusted with clothing, equipping and victualing its troops. ‘They were to be trained for periods of three months, and then serve as local leaders of Moslem students in pesantren's. The officially listed aims of Hizbu'llah significantly do not allude to either nationalism or independence. Needless to say, the creation of this Islamic army was greeted with loud approval, i.a. also by Dr.cukiman, before the occupation chairman of the Partai Islam Indonesia, and later for a time Prime Minister of the Republic. To the writer's knowledge, Sukiman occupied no official position during the Japanese era. In his appreciation of Hizbu'llah, he specifically referred to the fact that "the leadership of the Peta way be said to be /already7 in the hands of Islamic youths, and the spiritual basis of our fighters is /thus/ anchored in Islam." Ibid., III, 1 (January 1, 1945), ppe7-8. (49h) Ibid. On this tour, the Masjumi also conducted a propaganda crive for the voluntary surrender of interest accruing from Post Office savings accounts. On this somewhat strange feature, see a newsitem in Pandji Poestaka, XXIII, (February 15, 1945), p.121. oo (495) Tbid., XXIII, 6 (March 15, 195), p.201, and ef. Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, III, 5 (March 1, 195), p.16, where === [PDF page 264] === had commenced. If the creation of the Hizbutllah was the most spectacular event in the Islamic movement during the first phase, another, and entirely different, measure taken by Masjumi early in the new year showed that the leaders of the federation were girding themselves for the silent battle for the alleciance of the Indonesian peasant (96). A closed meeting of the entire Mas jumi-executive, held at Djakarta between January 28 and 30, decided on a very detailed course of action directed at obtaining a secure Islamic foothold in the village Neighborhood Associations, or Tonari Gumi's. As a result of this meeting, a fourteen-point prosram was circulated to all the branches of the four Moslem organizations linked in the federation (497). It commenced by calthe uniform of the new unit is described in detail. See also the special reference to Hizbu'llah in Pradjoerit, I, 11 (March 1, 1945), p.39, and H. Tjokroaminoto's art= icle, "Anak pesantren, pahlawan moeda," ibid.e, I, 13 (496) HOkoOkai-leaders had perhaps taken the initiative in taking the message of independence to rural areas as far back as early October, 1944, when five Indonesians, including Mr. Sartono and Sukardjo Wirjopranoto, together with Shimizu, made a tour of the island. See Pandji Poestaka XXII, 21 (November 1, 19h), p.€90. By the end of the first phase, the Hokokai claimed a membership of over one million, according to a report in Djawa Baroe, III, 6 (497) It is not without interest that this document was —~ hardly by coincidence? —- only published some ten weeks later, in Soeara Moeelimin Indonesia, III, 8 (April 15, 1945), pp.19-20. The document itself is dated February 12, and bears the signature of Zainul Arifin. === [PDF page 265] === 27 line on these Islamic associations to orpanize in the first place a concerted membership drive: " Alfe need/ more members, the more, the better. It is true, of course, that members alone do not suffice, but an increased membership can be used to influence the thinking of the people... This action is /tims/ not only urgent — it will not brook any delay! A nation can only advance, if an inner change takes place among its people..." The executive suggested that local Islamic work brigades /®risan Pekerdja7 of the most active members be set up, and proceeded -~- in the best Leninist tradition ~-- to outline a method by which these "agitator-propagandists" could seek to infiltrate the Tonari Gumi: "The best way of achieving our aims lies in the utilization of the ares existing Neighborhood Associations, for whose succes$/are fafter all7 also responsible. The work brigades should thus select and educate one person in each Tonari Gumi, who volunteers to spread among its members... the teachines of Islamic brotherhood, at the same time personally settin: an example. In this way, and thanks to our endeavors, excellent results may be obtained in a very short time..." (98). The effectiveness of this progran cannot easily be gauged; but even if — as is very likely — only part of its instructions were carried out, Islamic agitation among the Indonesian peasantry must have considerably increased. The Masjumi thus, as it were, prepared its first election campaign in early 1945 (498) Ibid. Another recommended course of action was aimed at invoking the aid of relatively well-to-do Moslems in lessening the misery of the poor, and thus to mitigate the dangers of social friction in days to came. === [PDF page 266] === Page 248 lacking in numbering only. UNIVERSITY MICRCFILMS === [PDF page 267] === it may still hope to reap the harvest ten years later... (99). On the whole, the period from September, 19); until the end of February of the next year remained — from the Indonesian point of view -~ disappointingly uneventful (500). Governmental spokesmen, instead of stressing the early realization of independence, continued for several months to emphasize the need for more Japanization (501). Apart from the somewhat ereater freedom of action cranted to the HOk@kai and the creation of the Hizbu'tllah, the most important signs of chance took (499) For a recent analysis of pertinent contemporary Indonesian developments, in particular of the results of some local elections, demonstrating the strength of Masjumi partly as a result of war-time developments, see the perceptive article by Herbert Feith, "Towards Elections in Indonesia," Pacific Affairs (New York), XXVII, 3 (500) Typical of that period are Moh. Hatta's sober appeals for hard work, patience, education of the people and amelioration of their suffering caused by the war. See eeg. "Kemenangan, kemerdekaan dan kemakmoeran," Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, II, 20 (October 15, 19h), p.6, and his later article, "Pendidikan bagi rakjat oentoek ment japai Indonesia Jierdeka," re-printed from Asia- Raya in ibid., III, 1 (January 1, 1945), pp.9-10. On the causes of Japanese caution and inaction see the illuminating discussion by Elsbree, op.cit., ppeS0 ff. (501) Thus on November 7, the C-in-C appealed for increasing Indonesian efforts to imbibe the Nipponese spirit, and to learn the Japanese language. The appeal came rather typically at the end of a series of announcements enlarging the sphere of Indonesian participation in governmental affairs. (See Note 50), below). Cf. an interesting Islamic comment on this appeal, "Reladjar bahasa Nippon dilihat dari soedoet Islam," by H, Abubakar, in Pandji:oestaka, XXIII, 1 (Jarmary 1, 1915), pp.7-8. === [PDF page 268] === 250 place at the administrative level (502). Appointments of some new Indonesian mayors (503) in late 19h) were overshadowed in importance by the establishment of the office of Vice-Resident, the appointment of additional Indonesian top-level advisers in government departments and an increased membership in the Central Advisory Council. A training institute for young leaders was likewise to come into being. These steps were announced by the Commander-in- Chief in early November; at the same time, all the advisers [Sanys/ were to form a permanent "upper chamber," equipped with somewhat vreater powers of inquiry and advice than had been sranted to the Chuo Sansi-in (50h). (502) A conference of all Regents and burgomasters met at Djakarta on November 1, rollowed the next day by a rally dedicated to the purpose of demonstrating "the unity between priyahi's, {national ist/ leaders, ulama's and the people." Cf. Fandji FPoestaka, XXII, 22 (November 15, 19), p.720. For the prepared address of the then Masjumi vice-president, Mukhti, at the rally, see Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, II, 21 (November 1, 1940), pp.10-Il. It is an interesting indication of the relationship between Moslem leaders and priyahi's in the light of developments earlier in the year. (503) On November 2, Mr. Samsuddin, former Parindra-leader and head of the "Triple-A" movement under the occupation, was appointed mayor of Sukabumi. Cf. Kan Po, #55, (November 25, 19h), pe26. Later in the month, a highranking civil servant became mayor of Blitar (ibid., # 56 /Becenber 10, 19L47, pel), and on December 23, a priyahi was appointed to that position at Madiun. JIbid., (50,) For a brief reference, see Elsbree, op.cit., pp.90-91. The announcement can be found in Pandji Poestaka, XXII, === [PDF page 269] === 251 Not unexpectedly the new regional positions largely fell to high-ranking priyahi's; but, interestingly enough, one well-known orthodox kyahi joined the ranks of the Vice- Residents (505). On the other hand, the far more crucial additional advisory functions at the center -~ which in effect indicated the beneficiaries of the ultimate transfer of authority -~ were in the main entrusted to nationalist leaders (506). (505) (506) 22 (November 15, 194), ppe697-98. For the decrees establishing Vice-Residents and the Chamber of Advisers, see"Csamu Seirei" # 50 of November 12, 19h, and "Mak= loemat Gunseikan" # 67 and 69 of November 23, in Kan PO, #55 (November 25, 19h), pp.5-6. Of the island's seventeen Shi's, Djakarta and Rodjonezoro Residencies had been headed by Inconesian ShUchokan's since November, 1943. On December 12, 1944, R. F. Suroso was appointed to this position in Kedu Residency. Cf. also Note 293, abo e. Fourteen such appointments were made in the ttesidencies with Japanese chiefs between December and May. The names of the first group of eight appointees, including Hadji Ahmad Samusi (Bogor Vice-Resident), were published in Kan PG, # 56 (December 10, 19h), pp.15=-16. On April 29 =the emperor's birthday — the list was completed; see ibid., # 67 (May 25, 1945), p.20. On June 23, the Vice-Residents were called for their first Conference to Djakarta by the Gunseikan. Cf. Djawa Baroe, III, 13 Nine advisers were appointed on December 1. They included: Mr. Sartono (Internal Affairs); Ki Hadjar Dewantoro (Education); Dr. Buntaran Martoatmodjo (Health); Oto Iskandar Dinata (Security); Sukardjo Wirjoprancto (Propaganda); and Abikusno Tjokrosujoso (Labor). The remaining three functionaries were civil servants. Cf. Kan Po, # 56 (December 10, 19h), pp.15-1€. In June, T5i5, the Regent of Bandung, R. A. A. Wiranata Kusuma, replaced Mr. Sartono. Ibid., # 68 (June 10, 1915), p.25. On the first Sanyd's,appointed in late 1943, see Note 302, above. === [PDF page 270] === 252 Even go, the sum total of these adjustments was not too impressive; while the sphere of co-determination was conspicue ously increased, the springs of executive authority firmly remained in Japanese hands. Thus on balance, the first phase did not result in a decisive increment of power to the nationalist elite, although towards its close -- and prior to the rapid developments of the second phase — the Hokokai-leadership obtained control over important financial resources in the "War and Independence Fund," established on February 1, 1945 (507). By the end of February, 19145, the devolution of nominal control tc the nationalist leadership was, then, not of such importance that its undisputed control of the machinery of state was assured. ‘Yeished arainst the Masjumi, the Hékokai vas at best an equal, by no means a superior, when the first phase drew to its close (508). Compared to either, however, (507) As far as the writer could ascertain, information concerning this Fund only appeared in print five months after its founding. For its constitution and board of administrators, see Indonesia Merdeka, I, 6 (July 10, 1945), pp.10-11. The latter mirrored the composition of the Hokokai~executive but without its former Japanese preponderance; it was headed by Ir. Soekarno, and its thirty-seven members included one Japanese, many outstanding nationalists, Wachid Hasjim, H. A. Sanusi and Djunadi as Masjumi representatives, and one Chinese, one Arab and one Eurasian. (508) It appears likely that for quite some time many intellectuals kept aloof from the Hokokai. On November ll, 19h, the HOkokai executive issued a special invitation to them, in order "to explain in detail" the movement's activities. See the newsitem in Pandji Poestaka, XXII, 22 (November 15, 194), p.721. An Tonk lest appeal went out again on February kh. Jbid., XXIII, (February === [PDF page 271] === 253 the priyahi-elite suffered a heavy -—- and very likely intentionally calculated -- loss in prestige when the Japanese ordered their unprecedented humiliation in a series of training courses /latihan's/ for all the Regents of Java in late January (509). It is, of course, difficult to gauge the temper of Indonesian leaders during that first, frustrating phase of waiting; but it is likely that they ~~ and many vcthers, particwlarly among the younger generation -- wereno longer satisfied with the meek role of grateful recipients of minor favors so far assigned to them since Koiso's promise of “ultimate™ independence. Undiminished Japanese arrogance anda harshness and r@idly progressing economic deterioration doubtless contributed to spreading restiveness, which found explosive denonstration in the revolt of a Peta-detachment acainst Japanese officers at Blitar in mid-February (510), so far the most damaging challenge to (509) See the official announcement in Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, III, 3 (Fetruary 1, 19)5), pelO. The Regents, in e words of Slamet, “were practically drazged through the mud, so that of their traditional and respected glory, for many of them connected with their ancient, aristocratic origin, nothing was left." Japanese Machinations, Part I, ppel-S. Cf. also Gandasubrata, opecite, pelle (510) The lengthy official explanation of this revolt, in the form of a fatherly &dvice" of the C-in-C, was only released on May 19, in Kan Po, # 67 (May 27, 1945), pp.10ly. For post-war Indmesian accounts, see isa. Mohe Supardi's article, "Dibawah penindasan Djepang," loc. cit., and Pakpahan, op.cit., pp.»l08-10. Islamic agitation, though probable among the Moslem personnel of the Peta, does not appear to have played a role in this local rising. === [PDF page 272] === 25k the mile of the Rising Sun on Java. Had such a challenge occurred at an earlier date, it could doubtless have led to far-reaching consequences. At this late stage, however, it was neither used as an excuse for delaying the implementation of the previously promised measures, nor did it apparently delay the opening of the second phase, which rather dran..tically opened with a governmental announcement only two weeks after the outbreak of the Peta-rebellion (511). Yet even before this important landmark was reached, it was quite cbvious that Japanese control, far from beinz tightened on account of the Blitar events, was in effect at lone last startine to soften its grop on Indonesian public life. On February 21, the seventh session of the Central Advisory Council (51?) commenced at the capital. It proved to be (511) No leniency was, however, shown to the mutineers themselves. While their leader, Suprijadi, disappeared and was not betrayed by the population, sixty-eight soldiers were tried by a court-martial at Djakarta, which was attended by Iskandar Dinata, Abikusno, Dr. Supomo, Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, and two hizh-rankine Peta-éfficers, Kasman Singodimedjo and %as Sudiro, Sight of the accused were condemmed to death, two of them havinv their sentences later commuted by the C-in-C; twelve soldiers were set free. See Pakpahan, locecite As had happened in the two previous rebellions, the priyahi-officials were again held at least indirectly responsible for the rioting. The Regent of Ngandjuk, the mayor of Kediri city, and two atih's were immediately "allowed to resign." Cf. Kan Po, fr 61, (February 25, 1945), p.13. (512) The manbership of the Chilo Sangi-in had been increased by five appointees, including Abikusno, Mr. Sudjono and === [PDF page 273] === 255 its most important, and least restrained, meeting up to that time (513). The Council, in the first place, promulzated a thirty-three point "New Life"-Program, designed to alert all layers of the population for independence. In itself nothing else than a collection of sonorous and unobjectionable, if somewhat Spartan, moral precepts, the program was remarkable for its complete disregard of Japanese slogans and ideas. For a few short weeks, and until more important events superseded it, the "New Life - Movement" became the most widely publicized propaganda tool in the hands of Hokokai anu Masjumi alike (511). Gatot Manckupradja, on September 10, 19). See Djawa Baroe, II, 18 <Septemser 15, 1944), p.29. frior to the opening of the seventh session, fourteen further members were -—- as had been promised ~- added to the Council. Apart from some nationalists, like Muhamnad Yamin and R. Sudirman, they included an additional Chinese member, one Amboinese, two Arabs and one Eurasian. For a conplete listinz, see ibid., III, 6 (March 15, 1945), pel. (513) The session is fully reported in ibid., ppli-. (514) In the light of simultaneous happenings which we will presently discuss, it is not impossible that the Hodkokai and the Masjumi were competing for the lead in the "New Life" movement. The Islamic federation devoted an entire issue of its journal to the propagation of the new movement, in which the executive called on all branches to "take the lead" in the new agitation; for this purpose, it supplied them with detailed instructions, together with apposite Koran quotations in support of each of the thirty-three principles. Cf. -oeara Moeslimin Indoresia, III, 8 (April 15, 1945), pp.2, 3-5, and passim. The same issue carries i.a. an approving article by Hadji Agus Salim (ibid., pp.8-11). Ona typical Hokokai drive under the "New Life" banner, see Djawa Baroe, III, 1 === [PDF page 274] === 256 Of greater significance were the requests which the Council addressed to the Japanese authorities: Indonesian leaders, after calling on the government to extend military training to the people, specifically asked for the immediate release of consumer goods and for the rapid improvement in the working conditions of labor. The military authorities were also asked t) grant Indonesian associations permission for the establishment of secondary, private schools (515). Finally the Council -~ dominated by the mtionalist elite by virtue of numbers and leading positions -- addressed itself to one of the most serious political problems which had been created by three years of Japanese rule: In the interests of a speedy unification fo allorganized endeavors aimnine at Indonesian independence, so the last resolution read, the government should tmake every effort to unite the... Djawa HOkdkai and Mas jumi, who up to now have existed as separate organizations in spite of the fact that they serve identical purposes" (516). This was the first open and unmistakeable warning to Moslem (515) Ibid., ppel-5. Permission for the founding of such educational establishments was first granted to the Hokokai in "Makloemat Gunseikan" #25 of May 1, 1945, Kan Po, # 66 (May 10, 1945), ppell. Only three months later was it extended to Taman Siswa and Muhammadiyah in "Makloemat Gunseikan" # 3 of August 1, 1945, ibid., # 72 (August 10, 1945), p38. It is quite indicative of the second phase that the nationalist leadership obtained preferential treatment in this crucial question. (516) Djawa Baroe, loc.cit. === [PDF page 275] === 257 leaders that the exceptional role which Indonesian Islam had played under the aegis of Dai Nippon would be challenged by the nationalist leadership: The Islamic federation, the only independent and well-entrenched organization outside the HOdkskai, with a separate military unit under its direct command — apart from its many members and sympathizers in the officer corps of the regular Peta forces -- was threatened with the loss of its autonomy. the Masjumi executive — and the Japanese authorities —- mat this first suggestion with silence (517). When the nationalist onslaught on the Islamic federation's continued independence was carried one step further, Indonesian developments had entered the second phase since Premier Koiso had, for the first time, uttered the word "indevendence"” in September, 19h. This second phase opened with a covernmental declaration issued by the Commander-in-Chief on March 1, 195, the third anniversary of the Japanese landings on Java, in which definite steps towards the realization of Indonesian independence —- a sign eagerly awaited for six months ——- were announced (518). (517) A report on the resolution passed at the meetin appeared, as usual, in Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, II, 6 (March 15, 1945), ppe7-8, but no Masjumi comment on this appeal to unity ever graced the pages of this, or subsequent, issues of the federation's journal. The only Islamic approval of the proposed merger found by the writer is of much later date. It stemmed from Mas Isjman, a relatively unknown kyahi from Sukabumi, and appeared under the title "Tslam dan kemerdekaan Indonesia" in Djawa Baroe, II, 12 (June 15, 1945), ppe8-9. For a brief reference to these developments, cf. Zorab, op.cit., p.llh. (518) For the text, see ibid., IIT, 6 (March 15, 195), p.l. === [PDF page 276] === 258 With the institution of the Study Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence and the establishment of the 3tate Training Institute /Tenkoku Gakuin/7 for younz leaders, both promised in March and inaugurated on April 29, the independence movement proper started on its ever~accelerating path (519). The landmarks of its fascinating course need not be recapitulated here (520); We shall, instead, endeavor to follow the development of Indonesian Islam during these historic weeks. To see the position of its leaders during those crucial months in better perspective, we should perhaps reiterate that the achievement of Indonesian independence was an ideal shared by most of them with the "secular," Western-educated, nationalist elite. A similar basic agreement existed, of course, with the (519) The Study Committee was set up by 'Makloemat Gunseikan" # 23 of April 29, 194, in Kan Po, # 66 (May 10, 1945), pp.9~10. Its mempership can be found in Indonesia Merdeka. I, 3 (May 25, 1945), p.5. Cn the Tenkoku Gakuin, see "Makloemat Gunseikan" # 8 of March 13, 1945, in Kan Po, # 63 (March 25, 1945), pp.17-18, "Osamu Seirei" 7 18 and "Osamu Kanreitt #5, both dated April 3, 1945, in ibid., # 6 (April 10, 1945), pp.17-18 and 20-23 resp. On April 1, twelve prominent Indonesians were appointed as lecturers in the Institute; they included isa. Moh. Hatta, Dr. Supomo, R. H. Mohe Adnan and Dr. Prijono. For a complete list, see ibid., # 65 (April 25, 1945), p.15. Six further appointments — i.a., Dr. Djajadiningrat, Ki Hadjar Dewantoro, Muh. Yamin —~ followed one month later. Toid., 4 67 (May 25, 1915), p.20. (520) These are well described in Kahin, op.cit., pp.121 ff.; Elsbree, op.cit., pp.93 ff., also relates the relevant discussions between the Japanese authorities on Java with the Area Command at Singapore, and those with Southern Regions H.Q. at Saigon. See also Zorab, op.cite, pp. 1ly ff. === [PDF page 277] === 259 younger leaders, including the "Young Officers," whom the occupation —- as well as the resistance movement -- had brouzht into being. Of all Indonesian elite sroups, only the attitude of the priyahi's towards independence may be questionable, or at least difficult to assess. The actual problem which confronted priyahi's no less than the Islamic elite or the younger leaders after March, 1945 was, however, no longer that of loyalty to the idea of an independent Indonesia. Their problem was, rather, one of loyalty to their own, Indonesian rulers, because the impending transfer of real power shifted the center of political gravity from the military government into the hands of the nationalist leadership, Up to that time, each of these elite sroups —- including the nationalist leaders themselves ~~ had been, as it were, sustained by separate grants of Japanese power, which had kept them in a changing state of equilibrium for over thirty months. Now three of these four sroups found themselves increasingly deprived of such direct and independent support. Instead, they were the longer the more forced to rely on their own strength, amd on whatever trust they could win from their future rulers, who were themselves entering the arena with the backing of the as yet all-powerful, if gradually abdicating, outside arbiter. Thus the great change which was rather rapidly taking place during the last phase of the occupation marked the transition from the artificial balance centered around Japanese power === [PDF page 278] === 260 to the free play of more or less self-generating social forcese This return to a measure of political dynamics and normalcy not only occurred in a climate quite unlike that prevailing in the last years of Yutch rule, it also witnessed a vrofoundly altered internal balance of power among; Indonesian sroupings. The perhaps least perplexing issue facins the nationalist leadership after March, 1915, was the position of the administrative elite; at no time in the past capable of generating a substantial measure of independent influence, this group ultimately had no choice but to transfer its allegiance to the new governing elite. The Islamic and the military leaders, on the other hand, possessed "countervailing power" of their own, largely as a result of Japanese policies in the past three years. Accepting the idea of independence with enthusiasm, they yet ~- each group along different paths -- posed serious protlems to the veteran leacers of Indonesian nationalism. These problems, as we know, have continued to heset Indonesian politics to this very day. Underneath the vastly accelerated waves of the mounting independence movement, the last phase of the occupation was, in effect, marked by two main, internal developments: On the one hand, the younger leadership forced its way into the councils of the older veneration, appealed for national unity and central leadership, and in the end unleashed the revolution in the face of their hesitation after Dai NipponS surrender (521). === [PDF page 279] === 261 On the other hand, nationalists and Moslems fought a stubborn battle concernin® the place of Islam in the new state — or rather, concerning the subordination cf the Islamic elite to the rule of their "secular" brethren. The latter, urbancentered, by far superior in numbers ana political expertise, challenged the Islamic leaders who enjoyed the crass-roots support of hundreds of thousands of villagers, and whom occupation policies had turned into a political force of unprecedented streneth. It is the latter dispute of which we saw the first outward sign in the previously discussed call for a merger, which the nationalist leadership had unsuccessfully launched in February. The closin:. pares of this essay will trace the available record of the final stages in this dispute under Japanese rule. At long last equipped with a printed forum of its own (522), (521) One of the most strikine incidents of the young generationts political initiative before the turbulent events of Aupust was a meetine of 200 representatives of the socalled Anzkatan Muda Indonesia on May 16-18 at Bandung. It passed a resolution calline for a centralized national leadership of all Indonesian movements on Java and in the other islands. For a full report, see Soeara lioeslimin Indonesia, III, 12 (June 15, 19453, ppel7-l0. Cf. also Abdullah's article, "Apa jang hendak diperdjoeangvkan Angkatan Baroe Indonesia," Djawa Baroe, ITI, 12 (June 15, 1945), ppeli-5. Cf. also Pakpahan, op.cit.e, pp.l2h-25. Sor an excellent anc detailed description of later events, in particular the role played by FPeta-members and undersround fighters, see Kahin, op.cit., pp.113-20 and 13h- 37, resp. (522) The first issue of the Hokokai-journal, the fortnightly Indonesia Merdeka, appeared on 4pril 25, the last of this short-lived series apdearing on July 25, The editorial === [PDF page 280] === 262 the nationalist leadership urmistakeably took the initiative after March 19)5. By the end of April, the HOkokai orvanized guerilla training of the island's population under the slogan "Freedom or Death!"" This training was entrusted to carefully selected teams of nationalists, who were despatched to all corners of Java: The Barisan Pelopor was coming into its own (523). Control of grass-roots defense was, of course, of prime importance, if the nationalist elite wanted to translate its unmatched predominance in all the new bodies organized at the center into actual political power reachinz dowm to the village level. The discrepancy between naticnalist strensth in urban centers, close to the springs of the governmental machstaff of the new joumnal was kept a secret. With the publication of Indonesia Merdeka, the Balai Pustaka's Pandji Poestaka ceased to appear after twenty-three years of continued existence, which had been only briefly interrupted durin? the first six weeks of the occupation. See also Note 221, above. (523) Exercises in guerilla warfare were held between May 3-13. The names of the regicnal HOkdkai supervisors can be found in Indonesia Merdeka, I, 1 (April 25, 1945), pp.6-7. For a report on the manoeuvres, see ibid., I, 3 (May 25, 1945), ppe6é-8. Most of these leaders already were Barisan Pelopor commanders. Former P.S.I.I. dissenter Kartosuwirjo, later to lead the Dar'ul Islam movement, was made training supervisor in Banten Residency. It wild be recalled that he had played a prominent part in the organization of the M.I.A.I's ill-fated Rait al-Mal in mid- 1943. After the dissolution of the first Islamic federation, Kartosuwirjo — and among others, Wondsamiseno -- ceased to be active in the Islamic movement. On his later activities, cf. C. A. 0. van Nieuwenhuijze, "The Darul- Islam Movement in West Java," Pacific Affairs, XXIII, (September, 1950), pp.1l6l-8h. See also Note 35h, above. === [PDF page 281] === 263 inery, and its relative weakness outside these vital areas constituted, in effect, one of the main causes for cisharmony >etween "secular" nationalists and the leaders of the Islamic movement. In terms of popular support, Masjumi must have by far out-distanced its rivals when the transfer of power was about to be made (52k). ‘et Islamic representation in the quasipolitical organs created by the Japanese -- though, as we saw, substantially larger than it had ever been under Dutch rile -~ lagged far behind this balance of support among the Indonesian peasantry. Whatever the occupation had done for Islam on Java, the net result of the past three years was, that the Japanese nad furthered -~ if not actually called into being -—- Moslem political strength on the island, without, paradoxically, zranting it the logical consumnation of this strength at the apex of political control (525). (524) That this may hold true of subsequent years may be surmised from the problems which have arisen in connection with the long-postponed general elections in independent Indonesia. These are excellently discussed by Feith, loc.cit. (525) The composition of the Preparatory Committee for the Study of Indonesian Independence continued this typical mal-dis-— tribution of votes. Its sixty-six members included seven Japanese, four Chinese, one Arab, and one Eurasian. Of its fifty-four Indonesian members, only six were Masjumirepresentatives: Sanusi, Abdul Halim, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, K. H. Masjkur, A. Kahar Muzakkir, and Wachid Hasjim. Hadji Agus Salim and Abikusno were present as individuals rather than as spokesmen for the organized tslamic movement. Although leading privahi's and other high-ranking civil servants were also inciuded, the nationalist elite predominated in numbers. Interestingly enough, no representative of the Angkatan ilida or Peta sat on this Committee. === [PDF page 282] === 26k, Now that the end of Japanese rule was in sight, the authorities did, as we shall see, virtually nothing to redress the balance on this — the political-level. The last Japanese measures in support of Indonesian Islam, instead, took place on the second plane, clearly aimed at meeting some long-standing Moslen demands on the socio-religious level. Lai Nippon, then, would not make Indonesia a iloslem State, but it would bequeath to its successors a more truly Islamic Java than had existed in March, 192. These striking measures followed each other in rapid succesion: As from May 1, 195, the Gunseikan decreed Friday a half—holiday in all zovernment offices (526). One month later, the authorities made even more important Islamic history, with the first printinz of the Noran on Indonesian soil at Djakarta (527). (526) "Makloemat Gunseiken'tt # 22 of *pril 29, 1945, in Kan Po, # 66 (Hay 10, 1945), p.9. For a typical Moslem comment, ef, Rapy, "Hak datang - hathal hilang," Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, III, 10 (May 15, 1945), pp.14-I5.” From January onwards, considerable zovernmental subsidies had been made available to Islamic schools all over Java. For details, see e.g. ibid., III, 2 (February 1, 1945), p16. Domei reported in mid-Jamuary that religious instruction in the higher grades of all government schools had been introduced in Banten Residency. See Asa Bafagih's comment in ibid.,p.9. (527) The printing of the Holy Book had been promised as early as September of the previous year. See Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, II, 18 (September 15, 19h), pe3- it actually commenced, in the presence of many Japanese and Moslems, on June 11. A full report, including interesting details concerning alleged pre-war plans of a similar venture, can be found in ibid., III, 12 (June 15, 1945), p.2. === [PDF page 283] === 265 Finally, an Islamic University, one of the sreatest hopes of Indonesian Moslems of the past decade -- oriefly but vainly aroused at an earlier stare of the occupation — opened its doors on July 8 (528). “hree weexs later, it was followed by an Islamic Institute in the capital, the last gesture of renerosity of the last infidel overlords to their Moslem subjects on the island (529). Had these important steps been taken only one year earlier, they would have called for analysis and a detailed assessment of the socio-religious gains of Indonesian Islam. In the rapid stream of events which marked the final phase of the occupation, they do not deserve more than the passinz mention we have accorded them here. it is, on the other hand, not impossible that this last-minute and almost desparate strengthening of Islam constituted a calculated Japanese move to add badly needed weight to Hoslem claims in the political arena. But political develo.ments had by then acquired a momentum of their own, (528) A list of the professors and other academic personnel eppointed to this Moslem University can be found in ibid., pp.l3-1h. The faculty included not only leading hioslems, but also many other Indonesian scholars. The opening ceremony is reported in ibid., III, 1h (July 15, 19h5), ppe6-7. See also Note 339, above. Abdul Kahar iiuzakkir became fir: t rector of the Islamic University, and has retained this position until this day. After the war, the University moved to Djokja. (529) The Institute was inaugurated on July 29. See Soeara Moeslipin Indonesia, IIT, 15 (August 1, 191.5), pp.d-9. === [PDF page 284] === which temporarily at Jeast relegated the socio-relizious realm to relative insignificance. Indonesian Islam, as one of its proponents significantly wrote on the eve of independence, had -- for good, we might add — entered the era of the political struggle (530). In the meantime, the military government had on May 15 itself clarified its own position vis-a-vis the place of Islam in the framework of an indevendent {ndonesia. On that day, Nisinura, head of the General Affairs Department /Sdmubu7, delivered to the members of the Preparatory Committee a lengthy, and subsequently published, statement concerning the course of external and internal developments (531). Commencing with the former, Nisimura acquainted his listeners with the surrender of jermany and Japan's determination tc ficht on alone. Having impressed on the Committee the need for careful deliberations concerninz the new state's constitution, the Somurucho finally addressed himself to the problem of Islam -- the very problem which his own colleazues had helped to accentuate in the span of the last thirty-odd months: "As far as the position of relizion in the new government is concerned /‘lisimura said/7, let me say that the attitude of the Military 4dministration with regard to this matter (530) A/mwar7 Tj/okroaminoto7, "Oemmat Islam mengindjak perdjoeangan politik," ibid., Ii, 16 (August 15, 1945), ppel->. (531)"Tentang keadaan perang doenia jang berpoetar dengan tjepat," Djawa Baroe, III, 10 (May 15, 1945), ppeli-5. The speech also appeared in Asia-Raya of the same date. === [PDF page 285] === 267 could be compared to a sheet of white paper. While we very clearly appreciate the bonds which exist between the Indonesian people and islam, the Dai Nippon authorities have not the slichtest blueprint or plan concerning the place which the Islamic religion should occupy in the government, or what the relationship should be between Islam ami other religions. As I already explained to you, gentlemen, the Indonesian people mist realize its own ideals in establishing its new state -~ Nippon will only lend its aid in these endeavors... I believe that the Indonesian people itself understands fully and thoroughly appreciates what, in this connection, best suits and accords with the situation on Java... and all over Indonesia at this time" (532). This, clearly, was the irrevocable end of Japanese control in one of the most crucial, and most hotly-debated, issues in the Indonesian balance of power. Henceforth, the Moslem leadwers could no longer successfully appeal for direct Japanese support in furthering their claims to a "greater share of responsibility in the establishment of the new government of Free Indonesia," which one outstanding Moslem -- too late — urged the Mas jumi-leadership to secure from the military authorities (533). (532) Ibid. (533) This appeal stemmed from Dr. Abu Hanifah, a physician and Moslem scholar without official position in the Islamic movement. No doubt written before Nisimura's speech, Hanifah's letter to the Masjumi-executive appeared in Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, III, 10 (May 10, 1945), pp. Y3-I]. The letter was also important for two other reasons: In the first place, it contained a plea for u ring all Islamic organizations, and thus put an end to their mere federation in Masjuni. Second, the author called on the federation's leaders to open their ranks to the many leading Moslem spokesmen who had not, for what— ever reasons, participated in she direction of Masjumi affairs during the occupation. The appearance of such frank statements in letters to the editors of the various journals after March, 1945 is a good indication of increasingly relaxed Japanese censorship. === [PDF page 286] === 268 In their public utterances, the Islamic leaders themselves drew the consequences of this situation. lMasjumi vicechairman Wachid Hasjim, the perhaps most influential representative of Indonesian Islam at the close of the Japanese era, announced his position with revard to the place of Islam in independent Indonesia: "Our past history /he argued7 has show that we have not yet achieved unity. In the interests of this unity -- which we most urgently require in our endeavor to establish our Indonesian State -—- the in our minds most important question is not, 'What ultimately shall be the place of Islam /in that state/?! The important ques-— tion should rather be, 'Ry what means shall we assure the place of four] religion in ¥ree Indonesia?! JI therefore once again repeat: What we need most of all at this time is the indissoludle unity of the nation't (53h). In spite of the many vocal appeals of Moslem writers in those feverish weeks, and notwithstandin: the most recent gains on the socio-relizious level, Free Indonesia would, then, not be proclaimed an Islamic State (535). That the problem itself (534) "Acama dalam Indonesia Merdeka," in Indonesia Merdeka, I, 2 (May 25, 1945), pe3. On the same page an anonymous commentator on this article blames the Dutch -- not, of course, the Japanese! -~- for Ccividine the nationalist fighters for independence from their Moslem colleagues. Wachid Hasjim was subsequently echoed by many Masjumi-spokesmen. See isa. A/nwar7 Tj/okroaminoto/, "Roemah Tangga Islam," Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, ITI, 11 (June 1, 1945), p.é; WPersboean jang boelat adalah salah satoe dasar pemhangoenan Negara Baroe," by A. R. Baswedan, ibid., pp6-7, and A. Rahry, "Memperbaiki nasib >onzsa," Indonesia lierdeka, I, 4 (dune 10, 1945), p16. (535) For some few examples of the limited number of such appeals which appeared in pringt, see in particuler ‘muhammad Isa Anshary's "Kekoeatan Negara", Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia,III, 1) (July 15, 1915), pp.7-8, anc two letters "Oejoed Indonesia Merdeka," ibid., p.S, and "Indonesia === [PDF page 287] === had, on the other hand, not been far from the mincs of thousands of Moslems and their spokesmen, is evisent in Ir. Soekarno's address to the Preparatory Committee, two weeks after the Japanese had declared their neutrality in the argument. That it, furthermore, had to be raised on that occasion and on the highest level at all, testifies to the enormous strenrcth which Indonesian Islam had attained in the most recent past. Turning to the Islamic leaders on the Preparatory Committee, Indonesia's future President outlined the first principle of the Pantjasila, the ideolesical hasis he proposed for Free Tndore sia: ‘je will establish an Indonesian national state. I ask Ki Ragus Hadikusumo and other Moslems to excuse my using the word 'nationalism.' I too am a Moslem. But I request you, gentlemen, co not misunderstand me when I say that the first principle for Indonesia is the principle of nationalism..." (536). Merdeka," in ibid., ITI, 12 (June 15, 1945), pp.15-16. These random selections betray a very vague notion of what an "Islamic State" should be, apart from advancing the desideratum that all members of the central and regional governments be Moslems. Chapter XI, art.29 of the Provisional Constitution of the Indonesian Republic merely declared that "the State shali be based upon the belief in the Goa of all Mankind,"and guaranteed freedom of religion to all citizens. Cf. The Voice of Free Indonesia (Ujakarta), I, 1 (nec.), pe26. The discussion on this problem has by no means ceased in independent Indonesia. For a more recent, reformist approach to that Problem, see the very interesting lecture by Mohammad Natsir, Some Observations Concernin= the Role of Islam in National and International Affairs (Ithaca, N.v.: Southeast Asia Program, Cdrnell University, Data Paper # 16, September, 1954), passim. (536) Lahirnja Pantjasila, op.cit., p.19. Emphases in original. === [PDF page 288] === 270 Chairman Soekarno returned to the same problem a few minutes later, when he started to discuss the third of his principles, that of representative government: "For Islam, this is the best condition for the promotion of relizion wee. The House of Xepresentatives, this is the place for us to tring forward the demands of Islam... If we really are an Islamic people, let us work hard so that most of the seats in the people's representative body we will create are occupied by Islamic delegates..- Then the laws made by this representative body will naturally be Islamic laws, too..." (537). The discussion concerning the secular or Islamic basis of the state was, however, of secondary importance compared to the real problem of the political balance, not among ideolorgies or principles so much as among leaders. Tslamic agreement on the principle of Indonesian independence almost certainly extended to the aclmnowledgement of the leadershin of Soekarno and Hatta, who had doubtless emerred as the rallying points of the nation's aspirations during the occupation years. Cn the other hand, from the very outset many of the leaders of the nascent Indonesian state appeared to have been bent on denying the Islamic leadership's claim to represent a majority of Indonesians; a claim which the developments of the last decade — and especially those of its last few years -— had rendered at least very probable. The third Pantjasila principle, a sadly ironic commentary on the politics of independ— ent Indonesia to this very day, was, in other words, exposed === [PDF page 289] === 271 to attacks in the very hour of its birth... “or the last time in its short and far from illustrious history, the members of the Central Advisory Council met in their eighth session at Djakarta on June 12 (53@). Py then, the war appeared to be approaching Java ever more closely (539), and the meeting -- unlike its predecessors -- mirrored the proximity of the anticipated struggle (540). The entirely changed atmosphere which marked this brief session off from the far more orderly and docile course of previous meetings is, however, only in part explained by these, however important, happeninyse What lent the proceedings a unicue character was the withdrawal of Japanese control: The relaxation of Nippon's iron grip allowed an approximation of free play to the long- (538) A fairly detailed report on its proceedings and resolutions appeared in Djawa Haroe, ITI, 13 (July 1, 1945), ppeli-9. (539) Morotai and Tarakan were at that time already in Allied hands, while bombine raids, particularly in Borneo and Celebes, kept increasing in frequency. (540) One of the resolutions passed at the meeting called for the preparation of all-out guerilla warfare. Dutch civilian administrations (N.I.C.A.}) had been installed in areas occupied by the Allies. The battle-cry against the N.1I.C.A., first uttered at this session, reverberated through the revolution after the Japanese surrender. On the other hand, it is not impossible that anti-Japanese feeling and the expectation to fight against Dai Nippon with the Allies may among many Indonesian anti-fascists have gone hand-in-hand with the desire to wage war on the Dutch. See on this point Kahin, opecit., pp.129 ff. === [PDF page 290] === 272 suppressed Indonesian social forces, now erupting into re~- volutionary activity: Asked to advise the Saiko Shikikan on the measures best suited to prepare Indonesia for the test of battle and the fruits of independence, the Central Advisory Council recorded the answer which the pressure of the most vehement of these social forces appeared to dictate: All existing organizations on Java ~- so their answer reac ~— were to be abolished and merged into a new unitary movement under one united leadership. In this new movement, furthermore, important positions were to be entrusted to the spokes— men of the younger generation and to officers of the Peta corps (5l1). It is rather difficult to understand and interpret the internal developments which hac led to the demands for decisive youth leadership, by a chamber in which neliher "Young officers" nor other youth~leaders were themselves directly represented. On tne one hand, it is not improbable that the mounting revolutionary fervor of the Angkatan Muda had exerted strong pressures on the not entirely unwillin, if not even intimidated, councillors. The call for the inclusion of youth and military leaders in the national leadership may, therefore, in part at least have been the zenuine expression of a wicelyshared, crowing Indonesian impatience, primarily caused by (541) Djawa Baroe, loc.cit. === [PDF page 291] === 273 Japanese dilatoriness in transferrine authority. The resclution may, in such an interpretation, have had the backin” cf the established, "older" leadership, constituting a cirect challenve to the Japanese authorities. Qn the other hand -- and this annvears to the writer more likely -~ the Angkatan:iuda's claim to a prominent place in the nation's councils may not only have heen intended as a challenge to continued Japanese authority, but, at the same time, as an equally emphatic challenge to the divided ranks of the "older" leaders, threatening nationalists and Moslems alike. The Youncil's "advice" to the Commander-in-Chief would, in that case, have been brought about by moves of which the established Indonesian leadership -- in particular Soekarno am Hatta -~ had no knowledge, and of which they had, therefore, not approved (52). Whatever the motivation and intent may have been, the Japanese response to the Council's request made it at any rate quite clear that the demands of the youth-leadership would not be accepted by the wielders of the ultimate authority. Whether this Japanese answer be viewed as a forceful veto on a united Indonesian demand or as the intervention of an as yet all-power- (542) See on this question -akpahan, op.ecit., p.i25: "As far as we know, the two leaders /Soekarno and Hatta/7 were at that time still very apprehensive of the intentions of the /Spokesmen of the7 young generation." Cf. also ibid., pp.136 and 138, resp. === [PDF page 292] === 27h ful arbiter in a fierce struzzle for supremacy, undertaken at the request of the older Indonesian leaders, it almost certainly stenmed the tide of militant cha lene for several weeks. When finally Indonesia's youth forced its wa; to the forefront of the revolution, the Empire of the Rising Sun had ceased to be master and arbiter in the archipelago (5h3). The Japanese reply to the recommendations of the Central Advisory Council was published on July 2, when the military government announced its approval for the immediate creation of an Indonesian united front, bearing the somewhat uninspir-— ing designation "New People's ovement" (544). While its belated formation to some extent accorded with the puw.licly and vociferously expressed desire for Indonesian unification -— and in particular with the nationalist aspirations to central leadership —- the youns seneration's claim to a cecisive and controllinz role in a united Indonesian front was bluntly ignored, if not explicitly rebuffed. The Sunseikan appointed four Indonesian representatives to head the provisional pvreparatory committee of the "New People's Movement,'' and to select its membership: Yoekarno and Hatta, representing the nationalist elite and the HOkOxai; Wachid (543) For a detailed account of these events, cf. Kahin, Op. cit., pp.135 ff. (544) See "Keterangan Gunseikan tentang mengadakan zerakan rakjat jang baroe," Kan Po, # 70 (July 10, 1945), Dele For a brief reference, see Zorab, opecit., pelll. === [PDF page 293] === Hasjim, vice-chairman of Masjumi; ani lastly, ans unexpectedly, an outstanding pvriyahi, 2. A. A. Wiranata Musuna, former “event of Bandun: (545). hortly after the esta>lishment of the new movement had been officially announced, the Japanese head of the General Affairs Department presented these leaders with a nine-point elucidation of the scope and aims of the new orzanigation (56). In this important message the SoOmubuchd not only warned them against "continned internal discord in the face of the approaching enemy," but specifically reserved ultimate control over youth organizations to sovernmental -- i.e., Japanese -- avencies. The leaders of these bodies should, indeed, he “represented on the preparatory ccmmittee," tocether with other leadine Indonesians, but the reins of authority would remain with the civilian, “old--cneration" representatives apnointed (545) The historical parallel with a similar representation of tnese three "old" elite's in the Madjelis Rakjat Indonesia of 1941 is worth mentionin=. “(Gee Note 180, above). On the other hani, the contrast entailed in this confrontation -~ spanning a bare four years -- is very striking. (546) This important elucidation was suysequently published uncer the title, "Sekitar Gerakan Rakjat Baroe. Ral-hal jane diharapkan oleh ‘unseikanbu," in Indonesia Merdeka, I, 6 (July 10, 1945), ip.6-7. The Japanese command at Djakarta made it clear that it intended t- transfer power — if and when this was to take place -- to the executive of this united movement, and therefore wished to intezrate it with sovernment arencies. (Points 6 and 7). The appointment of the Independence Preparatory Coma: ttee on orders from Saigon six weeks later to all intents and purposes altered this plan. === [PDF page 294] === 276 by the Gunseikan, in "closest cooperation with [cen tral and regional7 zovernmental bodies" and in particular witn Japanese Nexperts.'t (54:7). The new movement, it is important to note, aid not constitute a merger into one monolithic organization. In effect, it centered around the federation of HOkOkai ana Masjumi, both of which, however, as yet retained their independence (548). And, while ultimately a closer devree of unification of the nationalist and 4slamie organizations was anticipated, it is (547) The personnel of the provisional committee of the "New People's Movement" was almost immediately announced. (Ibid., pe7.). It had a total membership of eighty, viz. eitht Japanese (including Shimigu ani also, simificatly, one Stmmubu-official), four Chinese, one “urasian, one Arab, and sixty-four Indonesians, of whom four were women. Resides the leadin* firures in the nationalist movement and in the administration, six Masjumi members (ineludinz Yachid Hasjim), as well as two Peta-officers (Abdul-Kadir and Kasman Sinzodimedjo ) and several leaders of youth groups (e.27. Sukarni, Sudiro, Adam Malik, and others), were included. “or the first time, the younzer elements were thus given representation. Sut the preponderance of "older" members within the committee and the inclusion of Japanese members pointed to the desire to prevent youthful "exuberance." Mr, Subardjo, protézé of the Japanese naval commander Maeda, who was soon to play an important part in the revolution,was also included in the committee. On his role under the occupation sce Kahin, op.cit., pp. 315-19. (548) One June 20, the Secretariat of the Central Advisory Council had released a statement, according to which weekiy consultative meetings between the executives of the two organizations had taken place since the beginninz of April, 1945, thus shortly after the inauguration of the 'tNew Life Movement."" To judze by the text of the statement, this closer contact had, however, apparently not led to even preliminary discussions of a merger. Cf. Kan Po, # 69 === [PDF page 295] === 277 significant that the government explicitly provided that even if and when such a unification would take place at a iater date, an "independent supreme committee in charge of relizious affairs, standing outside the /new7 movement, and placed in sole charge offproblems directly related to the islamic religion" should be established (549). Thus, though unification spelled a balance decidedly unfavorable to the Islamic elite (550), it had -—- no doubt with considerable Japanese backing -~ sought to forestall a total merger, in which its claims to indevendent leadership threatened to be ultimately (SL9) Indonesia Merdeka, log.cit. In this connection it is important to note the wholesale promotions of the entire Indonesian staff of the Shumubu to hisher official grades, which took effect on Ausust 15, See Kan Fo, #73 (August 25, 1945), p.17. On the last day of the same month -- thus after the capitulation had been made publici -- Dr. Djajadiningrat was again appointed Adviser to that office. Toid., #74 (September 10, 1945), p.12. See also Note 53, above. (550) This became apparent as soon as the Working Committee of the new federation was amounced on July 27. Although said to be "centered around Hokokai and Masjumi," its fifteen members in fact counted six nationalists (Soekarno, Hatta, Sukardjo Wirjopranoto, Oto Iskandar Dinata, Supeno and Dr. Muwardi), but only two Moslems (Wachid Hasjim and Mohe Roem, the latter representing the Hizbu!- llah). One spokesman for each of the two youth corps, Seinendan and Keibodan, one Peta-officer (Abdul Kadir), and one woman (Mrs. Sunardjo Mangunpuspito), together with Dr. Subardjo, R. A. A. Wiranata Kusuma and Dr. Sal-h completed the membership. Cf. Soeara ifoeslimin Indonesia, III, 15 (August 1, 1945), p.2. See also Djawa Baroe, III, 15 (August 1, 1945), pe20, for the program announced by the united leadership, of which Ir. Soekarno had by then been elected chairman. In the first Republican cabinet, formed on August 31, only one Masjumi-leader, Wachid Hasjim, was included as Minister of Atate, without port— folio. See Kahin, op.cit., p.139. === [PDF page 296] === 278 submerged by its victorious competitors (551). With this prospect of an uneasy compromise between nationalist and Moslem leaders we have reached the last discernible and traceable stage in the development of Indonesian Islam under the Japanese occupation, We may surmise that this compromise was a Japanese, rather than an Indonesian, interim solution, which at any rate could not have been entirely satisfactory to many "secular" nationalists. As such, it was not doubt part of a detailed plan which the military government must have been in the process of preparing for the gradual and orderly transfer of power to Indonesian authorities following the formal srant of independence. (551) In the light of later developments, this interpretation appears to be well founded. Thus the absence of a portfolio of Relivzious Affairs in the first Republican cabinet -- constituted before the surrender of Japan was officially announced on Java —- is a significant indication of decreased Moslen bargaininz strength following in the wake of the transfer of power. Religious Affairs were originally entrusted to the Ministry of Education, but in November an unidentified member of the Central National Committee /Komite Nasional Pusat/ protested against this arrangement, urging the reestablishment of an independent Islamic agency. He based his plea on two factors: First, such an agency would facilitate diplomatic contacts with Islamic countries abroad; second — and more important in the context of this study -~ only a separate office could cater for the demands of the "majority of our fighters /who7 base their struggle on the teachings of Islan." Cf. Soeara Mosslimin Indonesia, III, 20 (December 6, 1945), p.7. The Republic's first Minister of Religious Affairs, Dr. Rasjidi, took office in the first Sjahrir cabinet, formed in November, 19h5. The new Ministry was inaugurated on January 3, 1916. For a comment, see The Voice cf Free Indonesia, I, h === [PDF page 297] === 279 That plan, however, had to all intents ani purposes been conceived in terms of months, if not years (552). Moreover -~ to judge by precedents elsewhere itt Southeast Asia -—- the plan had doubtless provided for a fair measure of Japanese co-determination in a nominally independent Indonesia, which mizht, in turn, have to some extent at least continued to affect the balance of power between the competing elite-groups in Java, in particular perhaps providing limited support for the Islamic elite. These cautious blueprints of the local Japanese authorities were turied in the whirlwind of developments which ac-— companied the defeat of the Empire of the Rising Sun. On August 7, the Japanese Southern Areas Supreme Command took the initiative out of the hands of the Djakarta authorities be decreeing the immediate establishment of a new Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence (553). “hen that Committee was finally convened (55),), Japan had already sicned the instruments of sur- (552) Cf. Elsbree, opecite, pi. (553) See "fengoemoeman Nanpo Gun," Kan Po, #72 (August 10, 1945), pell. The Saigon announcement was issued at noon; eight hours later, the Gunseikan broadcast its contents to the people of Java. Cf. the text of the message, "Dai Nippon menepati djandji," in ibid., pp.13-15. (554) This second Preparatory Committee consisted of twenty members, eight of whom represented the Outer Islands. The twelve representatives for Java were, besides Ir. Soekarno and Hatta (chairman and vice-chairman, resp.): Dr. Radjiman, Oto IskandagDinata, Sutardjo Kartohadikusumo, Suroso, Dr. Supomo, Major Abdul Kadir (Peta), Ki === [PDF page 298] === 280 render to the Allied “orces. Ten days after permission for the Preparatory Committee had been granted, the Indonesian Republic was born. Indonesian Islam, after centuries of infidel rule, and after the most eventful forty months in its modern history, suddenly faced a new era and new problems. Ragus Hadikusumo and \lachid Hasjim (Masjumi), and Surjohamidjojo and Purubojo. The latter two delegates were hich-ranking court officials representing the Central Javanese principalities. For a complete list of all dele sates, see Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia, III, 16 (August 15, 195), pel. === [PDF page 299] === RETRO oFEC The examination of Islanic uevelormments in Indonesia in the forevoins paves covered a reriod of come forty-odd years. Jn Part One, an endeavor was mace to trace in brief outline these developments from the emergence of a clear-cut “ioslem policy by the Dutch colonial administration, at the turn of the present century, to the end of Dutch rule in Indonesia in early 192. Part Two of this essay was devoted to a far more detailed analysis of the Islamic problem in the short, but eventful, years of Japanese rule cn Java. ‘ihile in historical perspective the gradual consolidation cf Indonesian Islam in the course of half~a-century forms, no doubt, one continnous process, the writer tends to believe that the Japanese occupation was of crucial importance to Indonesian Islan, decisively ccntributineg to its rvreativ enhanced position in the contemporary Tndonesian scene. To facilitate the task of analysins the very complex aspects of the Islamic problem, recourse has been had to a threefola division of that problem throughout both parts of this studye In the first place, lJslam has been dealt with as a grass-roots problem affecting the vact majority of Indonesians, particularly the Javanese tani. Not only is it statistically true that the overwhelming majority of the island's population === [PDF page 300] === 282 are Mosiems, but it is their identification with that relivion which had, over the centuries, created an attitude of sullen indifference to foreien, "unbelieving," non-Moslem rule, which at tines erunted into open hostility. On this level, Islam proved to be the perhaps most important anc insurmountable barrier to the imrard aeccertance cf continued alien role, and as such one of the major problems confroentins the island's foreien overlords. The ideological content of the lon: chain of asrarian uprisins and rebellzions which punctuated Dutch colonial history in the Indies, especially >efore the present century, records the depth ana continuous presence of -rassroots 1Jslam as a prime factor in the shaping of the mind of the Indonesian villager. It was this asvect of Indonesian Tslam which insrired the most serious revolt against Japanese rule, and it is the same force which today is responsible for some of the most perturbins threats to political stability in independent Indonesia. In spite of this all-pervadiny Isla:nie sentiment, Javanese society in particular has over the centuries fallen far short of beins a truly Moslem community. The conquest of Islam which took place between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries, that is to sav, nas at hest heen of a nartial nature. ‘+n convertins the majority of the Incionesian people and their aristocratic rulers, Islam has had te compromise to a larze — and, to true believers, to an alarming -- extent === [PDF page 301] === 283 with pre-Islamic customs and usa:‘es. In severai important areas of social, and even of religious, life, the Inconesian Adat, or customary law, has been able to hold its own, even thouch some of its dictates run counter to itoslem principles. The centuries! old controversy between dat and islam is, we may add, continuine with undiminished streneth in invepencent Indonesia (555). It is this sccioerelicious controversy -- or, more correctly, the trowins Islamic endeavors to tin the balance in favor of a more truly -oslen community -~ which constituted the second aspect of the islamic problem analyzed in this paper. While the grass-roots chenomenon had always contained, be it in perhaps embryonic form, a political potential, the rise of a distinct Islamic political force, with a conscious leader ship of its own, constituted a separate and novel stage in the history of modern Indonesia. On this political level, Islan, as part of the nascent Indonesian nationalist movement, formed the third, and last, focal point of the discussion in the precediny pares. Needless to say, this arbitrary division between three strands of what essertiall, has been a sinele historical movement could not be strictly maintained throuchout this stuck. (555) Cf. i.a. Professor sazairints, Hulu: baru di indonesia, and rercvolakan penjesuaian ‘adat t kepada hukun huicum Ts lam (Djakarta: Rulan Rintanr, 1951-52), === [PDF page 302] === particularly at times of rap*a develo neat vou ln Unwneslan Islam, such es durins the early ‘twenties anc, again, uuriag tre Japanese occuvation — especialls, verhans, the course of the one year, L244 -—— the three lovels of tie vroblen could nob be claarly scansrated «ven for wurtes-s tka of analytical inuuirv. whey OO $m $1 moor rN. atte eB oe Manta Lay yy ba enzomein thane of Dart One contists 72 e Orie? ecntfreontabie Moot, rowan aka POM ye A Tet ta eta alee al aout PaCGLtes ol LLC wo ARIAS colic ‘ r ‘ a o 44 cot 1 an Ly aa ae sees b in the Invies with Vicslen reactions to taesce “eagures, as well newt bh tutewal | tani lave Lanman=¢ Cue a ination: 11 Fae a6 “LON normal «~s4aM1LC ueveLOrmmencuse Cuan. ition commenced : n>. ct ep tee ete bbb Maine the Late lovo's, when “uten *olior vis-a-vis thelr coslen suejects was for the first tine systematically formulitec, it concluded with a survoy of the situation oa the eve o° the Japanese occupation in early 19h?. there is sad irony ia the fact that the architect of Holhesiec scslei poliev, the liberal scholar-statesman land's Christiaan Gnouck furgronje, formul:zted his influential reconmendations on the islamic problem on the very ove of an Islamic renaissance with far-reachins repercussions cn both the sociorolitious and the political levels of Incvnesian Islan (O86). Sons yyw am; a ve nee e Snow eth Ty he, Le. 2a ‘ any O. owes ' 203i ter “ridlia 2s hid enews we OS TED Re. T 7 ~, ~ Fe eee DS: * ae nwuneslair isla, therefore, ceasen te (2: valiu var caortly after Pres 1. 4.. 4 Ve - ae Se el (Cf6) Snowe! aj t teg in MPOu, ani renained in. + + fan 2 4 3 y9% ‘ollan”. antl his ceath in lp?s. === [PDF page 303] === they had been published. Py followins tne advice of Snoick Hureronje when the conditions for tneir successful anslicaticn provressively ceased to exist, his successors in bne office of hdviserof Native Affairs -- anil, more immortant still, tneir uperiors in the colonial auninistrabtion anc in vovermnent -- were csuilty of a serious misreadinc of ranidly chaning conditions. What makes this almost sra,tic failure even less understandable is the fact that Snouck's islamic policies wore allowed to survive almost unaltered throwch several im ortant changes in overall Dutch colenial policy from 1700 onwards. Or, to re~state this observation somewhat differently, while in the context of Snouck's thinking, Islamic policy was, to a large extent, coterminous with colonial polia as such, in Jutech eyes the Moslem problem lost this primacy in later years, receding to a very minor aspect of over-all noliey. On the one hana, this demotion Zaile. to take inte account the very substantial role which *ndonesian Islam came to play; on the other, the fairly rizid avnlication of ranidly oulmoced princr cinles to the inccrrectblr minimized oroblem was larcely instrunental in “5 coowonfie the rift between Dutch rulers anc tslamic leaders. The above-nentioned sslanic renaissance, touched off hy the stirrings of “oslem reformism end mojiernism in the Mi:ulle ast —— in themselves a reaction to contact with the West — === [PDF page 304] === 256 almost overnizht changed what was uc to that time a rather stationary Islamic scene in the Incies, on which, in tum, Je on his view, Imisfy Snouck's whole enalysis had been we. nesian Tslam had almost solely been a crass-roots shenomenan of admittedly important dimensions, vet wituout rossessint tne inherent or polential streatth of a viable s::lal creel, capable of leading its unedacate] villave-relievers beyoni tne narray confines of its restrictive dommas. “ene volent tolaration on of. this relicion, covnled with strict vicilanee ava'’nse its quasipolitical, pan-islamic overtones, thus appeared to Snouck the twin postulates of Holland's Moslem policy in the archinelavoe Looking beyona the villa:rc level, he coulJi only see one potential native leading vroup in Indoresia, namely the hereditary aristocracy —- the priyahi-elite -- whose adherence to Islan, so he rightly perceived, was for the most part but slender. His hope to win the allestiance of this zroup by a cdeternined policy of assimilstion must be viewed as the lovical complement to his Islamic nolicy, anc 13 the only framework within which he, himself’, would have mrected the latter to succeed. By crawins these traditional leadsrs into the fold of ~utech civilization, they would -- su Snouek believed ~~ become the stronwmst barrier against the ssiritual authority of the uneducated:nd unsophisticated propounders of the Tslamic relivion in the villaves, islam, in other words, would thus -- to borrow a trenchant ohrase =~ wither away. === [PDF page 305] === 237 The correctness of this hyoothesis was pernaps ofen to doubt even at the time when it was formulated. Yut watever its intrinsic merits nay have been, it was acbually never put Ten pos to the test of exertence. In the first nlace, the prisra’. vere not allowed to fulfill the exmechations whieh Snoueck nad elaned in vhem. Tig assimilationist philoso hy.as, without adequate trial by the colonial authorities, abandoned after Tn the seeonl lace -- anu this was the really crucial problem -- the new century witnessed the rise of Tndonesian leadership zroups who sought to challente the traditional ad monopolistic prestige of the native aristecracy. Snouck's thesis suffered its major setback with the rise, in partic lar, of a new Tslamic elite in Indonesia. Pron modest berinnings at the turn of the centurv, their untirin: efforts, particui= arly in the missioner; and educational fielis, had led to a deeveninz of the Islamic religion amon millions of its heiievers at the time Duteci. rule ended. As was already su:vested, the impetus came in the main from the Moslen réformists, whe -- orvanizeld since 1712 — succeeded in adantin= many features of wastern civilization -- not least amon: which were several methods successfully copied from Christian missionaries -- th the’r aim of revitalizing and modernizing, if not revolutionizing, Indonesian Islan. The great and positive achievements of Indonesian modern- === [PDF page 306] === ism were, for some time, counterbalanced by the anta-onism which they understandably encush }red amone the thousands of orthccdom leaders of ~rass-roots Islan, particularisy on wre 7” a OS LBM GCE Javas Tor mamy years, that is, the Inionesian ne was dominated ty the deen schism between reformists and orthouox, the latter havin: established an organization of their own in the early 1720's. In this schism, the orthouox party initially received some hackin: from colonial acksinistrators whom Snouck Hurgronje had, understandably, not heen able to prepare for the advent an: spread of Islamic ma: ernism, But it was of »reater, and even more lastiny, importance that this rift was never allowed to become totally unbridgeable. Not being fundamentally divided by ucctrinal disputes, and heeaming, moreover, increasinsly united azainst botn Huropean rulers ani "secular" nationalists, reformists and orthodox found much common vround in the lasb decade or so of Thtech rule. Judvted ov its position on the eve of the Japanese occupation, Indonesian Islam as a whole had acquired a truly phenomenally strengthened influence within Indonesian society. These developments, then, in the span of a few years only, lifted the Islamic problem out of the context in which Dutcn Moslem policy -- based on Snouck Eurgronje's dicta — was grounded. From being a mere crass-roots phenomenon, Indonesian Islam became, if not set a united, an increasingly organized social force with a conscious and energetic leauership. === [PDF page 307] === This leadership played a predominant part in the first phase in the modern history of Indenesian nationalism, which lasted from 1918 to 1927. That phase remained unique in the blendine of widespread vrass-roots unrest with the nev politicorelizious elite of Tndonesian Tslam. For the Tirst, anda only, time under Dutch rule, these two levels of the Islamic problen temporarily merzed; and, althouch it was Communist, ratier vnan Islanic, leadership which directly inspired ani instivated the only larce-seale revolutionary arvrarian upsurge unuer colonial rule in 192/-27, the Islamic undercurrent of the rebellions was unmistakahle. The collapse of these revolts brought widespread grassroots commoticns to an end for many years to come. At the same tine, they spelled the virtual cessation of Moslem political action for about a decade, Repelled by their shortlived, but disastrous, association with Sommunist agitation, most Islamic leaders tended to shun the political arena after 27. A small but vocal ~roup amon= them continued, it is true, to seek a vrominent }:lace in the nationalist movement after 1927, but their virulent and stubborn radicalisn in the course of the next decade tended to alienate them from mtion-~ alists and Moslems alike. If the first phase of Tndenesian nationalism had borme the ceep imprint of Islam on its volitical level, the second phase, which followed the disturbances of the mid-1320's, saw === [PDF page 308] === 290 the beginnines of a rather clear and lasting divisicn between Moslem leaders and a "secular," Dutch-educated anc Vlesternoriented political elite which cane to dominate tne nationalist movement. While the dividin: line between these two stranus of tre Indonesian nationalist movement may often have been blurred, "oslems" and "nationalists" vere diviited by antaconisms and muSual suspicions: The nationalists at times not unjustifiably accused Islamic leaders of insufficient patriotic fervor, if not occasionally even of a measure of collaboration with the colonial government. On their side, many orthodox Noslens continued to reject nationalism in favor of Islamic "internationalism," and they, no less than modernist spokesmen, feared a "Godless" nationalism almost as much as they detested their infidel rulers. In spite of these, often very serious, obstacles in the way of Indonesian unity in the face of a Dutch policy equally detrimental to the aspirations of either v~roup, there can be little doubt that both nationalist and “oslem leaders came to share a deeply rooted ani increasingly outspoken anti-colonial attitude, which tended % obliterate their own disputes in the last decade of colonial rule. Yantinz, however, that in ultimate aims iioslems and "secular" nationalists were in fundamental arreement, their influence on different strata of the Indonesian pvopukb tion === [PDF page 309] === was by no means similar: The numerically far s.aller urba’ elite dominated the political scene at the center, caturing undisputed leaders“ip in the strugcle against foreign rule. At tne same time, it was the Islamic leaders with their mass following in smaller towns and villeses, ana in rarticular with their educational and social activities, who reached millions of Indonesiansto wiom the lanzuage and symbols of Vestern-rooted nationalism vere as yet ineomprehensible. In this way, it may be su-cested that in tne eclonial era it was Islam rather than nationalism proper, which helped to educate the Indonesian citizen of Ln future, in spite of the fact that, on the politieal level vrover, ‘slam did not play a sicnificant part in the decade followin- the events of 1927. While many Noslen leaders -- in pasticular anon: the moiernists — remained in touch with the nationalist movement in subsequent years, the lslanic movement shifted its major attention to the second, socio-relisious, level, and to increasingly concerted efforts to preserve and, where possible to expand, the influence of Islam within Indonesian society. In part, no doubt, this changed emphasis was the consequence of the disastrous experiences in the political upheavals of the 1920's. Moreover, the widespreac zrass-roots comnmotion started to ebb away after the miu-1920's, to cease almost completety when economic distress sripped tne Indonesian agrarian community in the wake of the depression of === [PDF page 310] === 1929. To a far greater extent, however, soslen avitation cn the socio-economic level was almost certainly a resi«nse to the effects on tslam flowinr from the reorientation of sutch colonial policy. This reorjentation was, in turn, very likely dict the rebellions, whose extent and violence nai taken the administration ‘ty surprise. fhatever the immediate cause, nowever, the authorities in the course of the newt fev crears vracually ahanioned thelr rrevious ondeavors ~- semecdied tn the so-called Bthical rolicy, officielly inau-urated in 1/90 -- of westerni2zinst Indonesian society by acans of rapid reforms under direct European sunesvision at the villa-e level. The new course tended to strengthen the ave-old authority of the native aristocracy, with the aim of obstructing the influence cf the nascent modern an! raaical Inaonesian politico-relizious — as well as of the Communist -- leadership on the tani, which nad resulted in the recent agitation and avrarian revolts. The peasant no doubt to some extent welcomed the relaxa— tion of the burdensconie reforms imposed on nin by ardent ad inpatient Dutch administrators in the cowrse of the past twentyfive years. But as far cs Indonesian Islam was conccrned, it was — in spite of continued officinl adierence to Gnouck's dectrine of neutrality -~- susjecteu to an irritating amount of control and supervision, which the colonial administration larvely entrusted te uhe priyahieel te. cncreasint Moslem === [PDF page 311] === hostility tewards tne Jutch authcrities, no less thar towaras the Indonesian executors of their policy, left its marks on the entire later colonial era, Simultaneously, and of treater immediate relevance to our ciseussion, a concerted effort was made tu enlarce the crovinee cof the customary law, This was a lo-ical enough concomitant of the w-eandonment of the Bhvical roliey, whicn haa a 4 Sot ee Tab te re we oT mye BMV Sa ED A SOCLOMFULL vas OVOLUedoT GO: the Tniies alon: aa +. Sen ees wey pk on wap ow es Vee dee et oO reese: western Lines o° Geveloocsentbe ere nev redder hac for mai f sro taps ney | Sawer og To Lage py ttt say ” years beer stronvly advicaled uy an Influential croup o Duteh Adatescholars in the Netherlands anl in the eoloemy ite self. The concludine years of Imtch rule in Tndonesia witnssed the vradual unfolding of their predominance in the sphere of colonial jolie. The new course was “ound tu have rave consequences for "Secular" nationalists anc soslems alike; but the second aspect of that course -- the strentthenin: of the Adat-daw -- ai rected islam far more directly. This became eviuent when, from the early 1930's onwards, the svhere cf Islamic jurisdiction was procressively curtatled hy the colonial vovernment. Iliore far reachin: encroachments were only prevented by the subsequent orzanigaticnal strencth of the Tslamic movement. tt. is, indeel, stranve teat the importence of the Islanite movement went, hy ana larse, unnoticed by nationalists and [Unreadable] colonial rulers elike. the former, pre-orensied with the === [PDF page 312] === tne political battle, (ay <= of tended to underestimate the far less consiicuous, yet at isast equally important, task verformed especially by Islamic reformisn; they were largely indi’ferent to, anu at tines even applauding, the inroads made on the vrovince of Islamic law by the colonial -overnment. The sutehn aubnorities, on tie other hani, were fatally ill-equicped tor the tach of reformulatin: an Islanic roliey which hed eecome cutcvated with .. “ a“, ao hr “ny "TAT 2 wae Bm eM a tae OL, the emerccnee of the new Vsoslo. feresS e. tle te chatin: of She. ™ ~ 3 sem 4 mapa t > r. twentiot) cenvuin. The reneated, vat unavoluabic, Vviulnvlon x ~ «nwt aa ~ 3 at: rue bie, male of Snouck's princirie of neutrality eis nol vrevent the nacers a Moe oe Vane Pyaar awe fase eine penkinad « Miaxrerna +t of “ubch Moslem noliey from nrefessiny conbimea atieronce to 1s mt, mal To] tae yy Vantin yf os nis tenets. Theyremained olind to a full realizrvion of the new situation confrontin™ then. In retrosrect, the most sbtrikin: sspect of those years may, then, weil have een that the Islamic problem as such was accorded a relatively insisnificant place in Butch colonial thinkin:. ith the separation.£ the Islamic movement from political action, former Dutch suspicions towards the modernists gradually subsidec, and save way to a:consure of tolerance "1d even to sporatic, minute, anc even then very reluctant, sovernients] aid te Moslem educational andi welfare work. 9 “ut these inconspicuous anu half nNearced measures tic nel in themsolves constitute a now Islaric nolicy: No auc in effect, ever formulated, === [PDF page 313] === 295 Alarmed at the sudden rise of the nationaiist movement, the authorities to all intents and purpeses concertrated their major attention on controlling its growth. The new reliance on the priyahi-clite, as well as on the Auat—law, were almost certainly dictated by these predominant considerations. The offense inflicted — en passant, as it were — on Indonesian Tslam by this re-crientation of colonial »volicy was only realized ty the authorities when the Islamic movement reacted to it with unexpected ani unprecedented indi snation and vizor. Cyoposition to the detrimental effects of the Netherlancs Indies! new Adat-policy, combined with the desire to consclidate the Islamic movement vis-a-vis the "secular" nationalists were the twin factors which forged an increasiny measure of unity among orthodox and reformists during the 1930's, It was the latter factor which kd to renewed Islamic participation in the political contest in the last years of Dutch rule. But the most impressive achievement of this trend — the federation of all Indnesian Islamic csroups — was the direct result of the colonial covernnent's attempt to invade the only remaining major province of Moslem juriddiction in late 19376 Tt was then, anc then only, that the authorities realized the strencth of Indonesian Islam: the last five years of Yitch rule saw some Delated and incidental proofs of that === [PDF page 314] === official recognition; but they were too hesitating to unus the estrangement which the lack of a coherent and basically revised Moslem policy had allowed to develor and widen in the course of some fifteen years. It should, however, be added that, irrespective of this failure, the possibility of formulating a new, dynamic woslem policy may have been at best problematical. In the final analysis, the Tslamic renaissance brought with it a -rowine umwillineness to he ruled by a Christian power, be it «ver so benevolent ana nonsinterferia: in hoslem afrairse Dutben Adat-rolicies therefore merely worsened a situation which was fundamentally anchored in the colonial relationship as such. Moslems, in the last years of Dutch rule, not only force fully reacted to the vovernment's repeated violations of official neutrality; they protested, with Like vehemence, acainst the very principle of neutrality itself, which con= demed Islam to the fate of mere toleration by Christian overlords, who, by the very neture of thines, could not assign a dynamic social task to the Islamic movement. I+ was, therefore, in a measure unavoidable that ultimately the neeative coals of Islam and "secular" nationalism should have become almost identical, so that, in the third stage of Inionesian nationalism, hc ln movementscould form a rather impressive, if short-lived, united frorit after the outbreak of the Second Vorlj War. === [PDF page 315] === Yet, from early 1940 omards at least, the rift which diviced most Xoslem leaders and their infidel rulers may even then have been deerer than the one dividin tne letter and the Vlestern-educatedc Indonesian political intelli-ventsia. Whether -otivated by sincere conviction or by political expediency, the majority of the Indonesian nationalist elite had, ever since the hezinnine cf the war, made the cause of democracy its own; many of its left-winse members, in fact, had championed this cause lon before Jjerman juldiers croased the frontiers of the “etherlands. “y sontrast, nu sine ilar tiss bound the Islamic leadership to the democracies of the Viest. The overwhelmin~ majority of the entire Moslem world very crobably stood aloof frem the struvtle avainnst the Avis, and, if anythin’, its sympathies may nave tended to lie with the orponents of the Allies. The leaders cf the Islamic movement, therefore, did not share in the short-lived hopes which Holland's entry into the war had aroused amon many of the "secular" nationalists, who, by cpenly sidins with democracy, expected, in return, some political concessions from the colcnial ‘overnment or its exiled suneriors in London. These aspirations were deomed by the authorities! stubborn refusal to utilize as allies the victims of yesterday's suspicion and banishment a last-minute, hesitant su--estion fcr a repprochement came too late to influence the attitude of most Indonesian leaders: === [PDF page 316] === jolland had by then alienatec botn tne islamic ana the nationalist elite's. it is, in fact, not unlikely that on tne issue of a de: Tree of collaboration with the fovernment the radical wing of the Islamic movement effected a ureak in the newlyeachievea Inacnesian united front on the eve of the Japanese invasion of the Indiese Of however limited importance this ideolocical disarreement and the final rupture +etween uicslems and nationalists may heve veon in itself’, tndonesia’s new overef NN lords were apparently well aware of its existence, as well as of the strenctth of the Tslamic movement. it was, therefore, hardly cue to chance that for many months they appeared to place greater trust in the leaders of Indonesian Islam ur = Le then in the Nestern-educated spokesmen of a Indonesian nationalism. ile When Nippon made itself mister of the Indonesian isles, it inherited -- in particular on Java — an islamic movement which, from inconspicuous beginnings, had grown to impressive strenzth in the course «0° forty-cdd years. 4lthouvh at tne villaze level its potential hac not been tested since the 19°0's, the bonds between the tani ani his leavers nad not been Invaired tr tne lon> era of apparent. acrarian neace. On the socio-retiviois plane, on the other === [PDF page 317] === 277 hand, an enersetic leadership nad at lony last in calling a halt to further vutch encroachments, while, finally, a bevinnins nad also been made with concerted action on the third, political, level in the last vears o° European control, if these three aspects of Indonesian Islam, the new rulers were primarily -- and, indeed, almost exclusively -- concerned with vthe first: 2 Say, sul leniy shifted fro: the suctoerelivicous to th. crasseroc's level, ‘ub while the Japanese, on the on. hand, shared vineiz noe ~~ y eye emt n> 4, at as i ~ ‘« eas ron dies yay ey orpececesseors! annrchens lon of eT “PAGS aPUGuS VOMMOUVLUON, pLum and therefore continued ani even tithtened most of tly ly-resented controls on Islanie activities, on the obher ter nand, they cought Lo mobilize this latent anu allenurvasive social force for Dai Nisnon's own purousese The sudden chanve confronting Indonesian Islan thus centered sround the crucial fact that, fron having been controlled and ne catively tolerated on che frinzes of Indonesian life by Vnristian rulers, it was now more stringently contr.lled, yet positively encouraed ta take its place in the center of that life by Asian "idolators." The history of Islam under the occumation is, then, fominated “sr the bin factors of, » unceasin: Japanese endeavors vo raily its sbokesnmen -= and in narticular the 1.. tn 2 ome sy laae: wee tai so Hela 2: tiousanis of more or less unsowhnislicated Moslem villase leai~ === [PDF page 318] === 300 ers ~- to the cause of vapan; and, second, ry the many successive concessions which the islamic leadership succeeded in ottainine from the military adainistrabion in return for whatever sucport it had to sive. Thus, althouth Javanese ws ~“~Vv Yoslen nolicies were oritinatly to all intents an. vurposes ‘ Ms,: wae: a «= ~ onl, Some fap. - mainly irected toraris the sinvtle objective of ree Yslanie siuppe at the vrasseroots level, in the course of time they came to extend to far-reaunin’s aijustments on ths [90eto-relipions planes and, more important still, Indonesian Islan made sicnificant «sins on the pelitical level, fron which it had been explicitly excluded tyr the Japanese at the outsate Like the majority of Intion:sian leaacrs, the zreaver part of the Islamic elite participated in "collaboration" curing the vapanese era, if for no other reason than that, what ever individual motivation may have dictated{ virtually no alternative to such a course of action axisted in the face of brute and ruthless military prover. 1t is also not unlikely that Dai Nispents Lichtnint initial successses contributed as much to an attitude of willins cooperation in the besinnint, as fear of terror and reprisals NMelved tc cement it in later ye-rSe itil September, li at least, the Moslem leaders annear to have possessed greater dvarvainine strensth vis-a-vis tne new rulers thandid the other Indonesian elite--rouns. In === [PDF page 319] === 301 the first place, the iictates of their relivion -= however often they may have been compromisec, if not hetrayed, hy some individuals -= provided Islamic snokesmen with a noral line of ultimate ce"ense avainst Jaranese PNACPUITHIGNESs oO similar refuve, 1b woull appear, was a% the casposal of elbher the urban inteliiventsia or the native aristocracy, albhous the latber may have senuctht sriritual shelter in che strenct of its traditional prestive. cacont, the croa Moslem leaders on larve sectors of the villave por ulation that of other claimmts — a vrize worth payinc for in terms of an amount of autonomy tons withheld from the desterneducated, urban aationalist leaders. To judge y the available evidence, several outstanding Moslems, alone amon the three main Indonesian elite-~roups under the occupation, openly, and in a measure successfully, resisted Japanese Jlemands e This defiance centered in the main arcund the worship »° She Japanese emveror which Ninson demanded of all its new subjects in the ~outhern Yerion; supciliary areas of controversy lay in the use of the Arabic serinpt anid lancuaze, and, lastly, in the field of relivicus education. As the detailed account in this study shows, Indonesian 4slam was partly victorious in the first two of these fields; in the third, and very crucial, fiel« of education, its vartial suc- === [PDF page 320] === ss was, by contrast, ‘ourht at -.rnans too hicn a rrice in arms of Jananese intrision into “oslen educational estabct listments. The story of Indonesian islaz durin: che Ja anese cvetination of Java falls into four sucecssive anu fairiy iistinaet periods. To some extent, these periods coincide with snifts the fir in Japanese veneral policies on Java. Thus —— from the tezinninys of She occupation in Maren, 1742, bs he end cf that year -- constituted an era of crjientation am experimentation not restricted to the Islamic orohlem. The second -= which occupies the first ten months of the following year -—- was essentially a period of consolidatiun of Japanese power during which the sroundwork for new measures, again not, restricted to Islan, was laid. those measures mar’: the third stare, which lasted from Novemuer, 191.3 till Autust, 19:3; these were the most event— ful months for the 4slanis «lite, wav 2b that time came to enjoy zreater favor than did the leaders.f the nationalist movement. The fourth neriod, finaily, bean with the promise of Indonesian indenendence in early Sevtenher, 19h, and concluded with the Japanese surrender in August of the following year. In that period the balance tended to be redressed in favor of the nationalist leaders. During the first nine months of the first period, from the bezinnings of the occupation until September, 191.2, the === [PDF page 321] === 303 military authorities endeavored to create a new, united Islamic orvanization. This effort failed, and in ~ertemser the prenas occuration federation }.7.A.1. was accorded official recomition a3 the representative o7 all existin: Voslet -rouns. 7n compromise solution clearly indicated the difficulty of simi: merging — as the Japanese had hoped to merze -- orthouox and reformists, whose organizations represented hundreds o2 thousands of followers. It is, by contrast, interestiny to note that a complete merger of the many but relatively weak, naticonalist parties was, apparently without difficulty, effected shortly after the resuscitation of the M.I.A.I. The failure of this hastily attempted unification of the Islamic group was, in part at least, almost certainly connected with the rivalry anong the radical, politico-religious leaders on the one hand, and the spokesmen of the "nuratt Isa lamic movenent -- orthodox and reformists -- proper, on the other. In fact, while the pre-war V.I.A.7. had teen larvely sponsored by the latter, it was the rarical wing that predominated in the federation s new executive. The followins thirteen months comprised the second period, one of transition and re-orientation. The policies of the military administration in the precedins period had doubtless been intended to be of a merely temporary character. in the measure that Japanese rule was consolidated, and in the measure also that the course of the war dictated a change in === [PDF page 322] === overall policies in Java and elsewhere, a new pattern of Indonesian mublic life was gradually emerginz. From the Japanese point of view, the Islamic problem, in particular, had to all intents and purposes not heen satisfactorily solved in the first period. vinile the rcovernment had temporarily acquiesced in the restoration of the old Islamic federation, it left little doubt about its dissatisfaction with the Islamic status quo ante bellum. To begin with, it soon became anparent that no substantive powers of comcetermination, let alone of control, were to be vranted to the federation'd leaders. The administration's 2elizious Affairs Cffice —- entirely staffed with dapanese execrtives —~ imored the federation in assunin= jirect control of the thousands of Moslem villave teaciiers on Java. The direction of Tslanic affairs on the to the new rulers most important, grass-roots, level was thus from the outset, and in spite of several unsuccessful efforts of the central Moslem leadership, removed from its purview. The leaders of the Islamic federation, thus deprived of a crucial sphere of direct influence, then turned their attention to action on the socio-relizgious plane, by endeavoring to create a farflung net-work of Moslem welfare establishments throughout the island. Tnis ambitious and unprecedented scheme, independently inaucurated and pronvarated by the if.].A.I. executive, was frustrated by the military authorities. JIhe Japanese may, === [PDF page 323] === not unjustifiably verhans, have considerec such an esta>lishment under direct Moslem control a potential threat to the success of their own plans revardin’ the Koslenms on Java, gas This is the more probable since the federation nad envisaze to wake their welfare-offices serve as local organizational centers of Moslem villave teachers, whom the Relizious Affairs Office claimed as its own charrcese This abrupt prohibition, tnough by no means an isolated indication of Japanese d‘stfavor, was the most tellins forebodins of impendins: organizational chanves in the Islamic neffeet, probable that ever since their refee vorld. it is, luctarnit recoznition of the “1.4.7. in late 1942, the Japanese had laid plans for a successor-crvanization more suitable to their policies. No deubt these plans were creatiy facilitated ‘y the deepseated antagonism which divided the radical, politico-reliszious minority amon= Moslem leaders anJ the svokesmen of the leading orthodox and reformist “rounds. In spite of the fact that Islamic political parties had been banned in the earliest stazes of the occupation, tne more radical sioslem politicians had ~— perhaps because of tieir record of staunch non-cooperation under vutch rule -- been able to secure a predominant nosition in the i.7.A.1. executive. then the direction of Nipponts voslem nolicies passed to new Japanese personnel in the cours? of 19.3, these polite === [PDF page 324] === ical leaders found themselves increasinvly Gevrived of dauanese tackin~; their ®clipse was accompanied ty the vise of orthodox and reformist leacers who, apart from their essential non-political orientation, represented the vreat majority of organized Inronesian Moslens. The dissolution of 2.1.4.2. in late Octoher, 1943, imnediately followed ty the foundins of Masjumi, this forsed the lovzical consummetion of the uevelooments or the last thirteen months. hven before that crucial vate, however, tie -]jven repeated in-ications of their rreference Cor the "non= molitical" members of the islamic elite; mst consricuvus amen: them, perhans, were tne a uointments of scveral Moslems to the qiasi-nolitical aivisery orvans created ta the nilitary authorities in late 17.3, ani exclusively resic! ted to the —— + ts te oa LIK rok + i” saa 7 “ Pasperm: ily “. reoresentatives of this litter -roum. 20 was from uhese.osltary auninistrabicon lems, moreover, that sunporb fo nid been inersasinely cubained. Lore important tian ‘slamic representation in gu lic boales was the fact that nany iccslens -- indludgius some fairly prominent men — volunteered as officers in the Indonesian army Which the Japanese created in late 19:3. lu fact, it nas Sienificant that this army's banner displayed, not the sym>ols of indonesian naticnalism -- wnien remained banner until Serbemer, 19ly —— but the Islanie Crescent, superinposed on Dai Nivponts t1sin- Sun. === [PDF page 325] === The third period -—- from Sovember, 10ul te car ember of the folluwins) year -—— witnessed the most cisnificart develcpments in the history of” Inicnesian Islam unuer the cocer cupation cf Java. In the first place, in those renting the hoslem leadership uncoubtedly came te occupy a positicn of unas paralleled importance vis-a-vie other eliteegzroupc. Tne foundcins of the Masjuni preseced by only a few weeks the Jissciution of tne nationalist orvanization, which the military authori ltes hai seneticned in Teeemror, 1L2. du “is cteg:, they created & new mass movement under Jirect dananese contre) ip carte Dol), Indonesian nationalisn, «ve J he severely, rostrict: vereivn crivinall:y allowed sore ce rlayy, Jarirs that paris: suffered a sericus eclisse: eationalict leaders, thoush nominally riseed in iromirent positions on the executive cof this new, multi-racial ane lithic organization, rlayed a sutvordinate role in its manacement, while, at the regional anc. local levels, the aduwinistrative elite plaved an cverd whelminzly decisive role. [Unreadable] the foundin: of Masjumi formed a stark contrast to these developments. While the new mass movement swallowed up all previcus qiasi-indenendent ovranizations on Java, the new islanic federation, outwarcly oven Crecd Prom direct Japanese a 7 -t Dong bk SE ht, fee e 7) -agy ye TM fee Bas: control, remained ousside chis enforced merver, Pie as jum wOg. ar Cover Prom the ver outset teamed owt t tl Saw eneaytan ES nud’ GOV EF 3 LPOn, une erm ALGGe VOS VEG Vili iar VPaIauer ¥.. Liew? “~ wer. a. + 3 + es a 7 wpe ’. om mowers than had «ver ‘ean cvrantelt to its vredecesco¥. MAS === [PDF page 326] === was particularly apnarent in the fact that the Yauanese encourazed village leaders to join the new federation, wnich vas also partly entrusted.iti. the administration a? the pericdic trainins courses for these leaders, nithertc exclusively supervised by the Cirfice of Relisicus Paradoxicall. enoush, the prestive «f the Jeacers cf Masjumi and the autonomy allowed tu them, anpear to have cansideratiy Increased in spite of, if ast 75 a result of, serious villace ee ellicns, led be foneties] Jorlom waciers in Vest Java in Tebruary, 19hh. Surprisinviv, yet wisely, the Javanese reacved to this crass-roots revolt \+ the first important cccurren phenomencn cn Java since the 192u's -— not hy wholesale reprisals avainst. Indonesian Islem. Sn the contrarr, success crants of increasins co-determination in matters tslamic to the Masjumi leadership were announced in the weeks immediately following these upheayels. Whatever the caises for these inportent concessions may have been, by the end of this period, these orthodox and reformist Moslem leaders had become eovernment officials, directin: -- be it under continued, thovrh perhaps lessened, Japanese overall control -- the conduct of Moslem alfairs at the center and in the revicns. The Islanic movement, in other vords, oad become an intesral nart of the iitary administration o7 Java, At the same tine, it had milib succeeded in substantially recuecin: the traditional influence === [PDF page 327] === and regulatory sunervision f the priyatieelite in the orevince of Islam at the local level. This tc the Moslems conspicuously favorable balance of power tetveen Indenesian croups underwent a chanre curin: tre fourth period of occunation history, which lasted from early September, 19Ll until the Japanese surrender in wid-Awust, 1945. Atter rremier Yoisa's on =celayed promise of indonesian independence "in the near future," civen in Takyo on Senteriier 7, WL, the local Japanese comman., radualiy as first, “ut cy i sey a » TA vse:: * -5 ey tye Sha LS at an over-aceeleratin« rate, aijuctea its Sad fter ‘larch, 1 nolicies tc an ultimate -- if even ‘hen ~erheys larvely nominal —- transfer cf authority to =m Indonesian -overnment. hide reorientation immediately broucht the natvicnalist leaders, after an interval of almost a year, back into prominence, and the equilitriun amon: Inuonesian elite's, hitherto skillfully manipulated by the Jaranese, slowly started to sive way to increasing predominance of th= "secular," nationalist leauershife In spite of these developments, however, indonesian Islam in this final phase continued to clay a very important, thoush diminishins, role in Japanese eyes. Tt is true that, once the use of the outvard symbols of Indonesian naticnalism -- in partioular flax and anthems -- were officially sanctioned, its ra idly advancine tide conlo ne lon-er be stemred: TS was thus ok a, inevitarle that the nationalist ssokesmen shoul’ ultimately === [PDF page 328] === 310 exchange their positions of nominal leadershi: for these cf ever more substantial contro! in some important areas of tne administration at least. But for at least six months after the vaguely=eworded promise of Indonesian independence had Leen made, tre authorities in Djakarta:noved only very cauticusly in the cireection of unhesitatiny support of the nationalist leaders; until wvarch, Lois, ther tc a certain extent even continucd to favor the Moslem elite. Thus Vasjumi was civen control «ver an Tslamic auxiliary fishtin~ corps o* its am in Tecember, WL. Ty contrast, the nationalist leadersiiin was ab that tinue only permitted to establish and control a non-military ycutn corps, while it almost until the ena of the occupation seens tc nave teen deied access to the Indonesian army proper anu to the paramilitary youth organizations, which remained under direct Japanese command and supervision. The streneth of the Islamic movement, thei, remained virtually unimpaired durins the first, transitional phase of the concludins veriod of Jaqanese rule on Java. in the measure that power tended o gvravitate towards the nationalist leadership, however, this favored positicn of Indonesian Islam came under sts: Thus, from Fehbe oven attack from the "seculer" naticnal ruary, 1945 omwards, demands for the abolition of Vasjumi, as the only independent orranization cutside the Japanese-sronsored official mass movement, and its amalsamation with that body — === [PDF page 329] === 311 which, in turn, had come under predominmt naticnalist leadershin since September, 19), —- were repeatedly and publicly voiced. Only when, in the second phase cf these historic developy ments, the zrantin:; of Indonesian inderendence ceased to he a matter of vague promises, and when the transfer of @ became imminent, dic the *“slamiec position deteriorate. ‘ltimate political control, it became clear, woul: inevitably cass to the nationalist leaders: Ia stulte of the mary impertant benefits which had arerued to indonesian tslam from Tai “linrents policies, and in spite even of the fact that it had, larsely as a consegence of these solicies =~ and notwithstandins officially declared Japanese intentions to the contrarv —— become a political factor par excellence, the Islamic elite had never been given an even remotely adequate representation at the center of the island's political life. It remained, indeed, one of the mas t paradoxical =~ and to Moslem leaders mo-t verturbing — legacies of the rule of the Rising Sun in Indonesia that the Moslems on Java had been forsed intc a unique and well-organized political force with a compact mass followe int, while they had been denied the locical consummation of their predominance at the unex of political nower. the rapid and almost kaleidoscopic Jevelorments of the last six months of the Jananese occupation clearly revealed the consequences of this disadvantaceous position. Confronted === [PDF page 330] === by the impending partial transfer of power to an indonesian government, the military authcrities -radually relaxed their control, anc, with it, the carefully constructed systen of “checks and balances," by which whey had for three years meine tained an artificial equilibrium amonz the various indonesian elite-rroups. After Varen, 1245, Japanese surnort clearly swun~ to the nationalist leacership, while it was sradually -- aid in June also officially — witnarawn from Veslem leaders, who in vain cleimed a "reater siare in sovernment2]. resson= Measures providine for the ultimate mercter of fee Mas jumi with the nationalist-comin.ted Indonesian mass-orzanization, first demanded in “eoruary, were simultaneously announced by the Japanese administration. It was fortunate for the Islamic movement that this threat to its autonomy came too late to prevent the Nasjumi from entering the era of indonesim independence as a distinct, and imnensely vcowerful, oreanizations Tit. Reviewing its cevelopment up to the time of the Japanese surrender in 4erust, 1945, we cannot doubt that Indonesian Tslam ned come te oceuny a position of unrreecdented strenvth,. Tn the snert svan of forty months 1% naa risen from the fringes of Indonesian rolitical life to its verv center, a transiticn virtually unaffected by the decline in Japanese backins curins === [PDF page 331] === ois the last few months of alien rule. It is true, of course, that Java was neither a Voclem state, nor, inJeed, a more truly Islemic community on the eve yo} Tet of Indonesian independence than it had heen when Inter rule had collapsed in March, 1942. The funcamental socioerelivious balance between Islam ami customary lew in particular, with which dutch Islanic nclicy and the -slamic movement had heen nainiy preoccupied in eclonisl times, had harely undercone siv;nifiemt chanves in the Jaranese era, On the other hand, however, vai Nioo on. (i coneenoret ine on the crass-roots anseect of Inconesjan islam, had reveluticnized its very base for many vears to come. vwillincly or un~ willin-ly, the villaze leaders of YJavals “oslems had been forced out of their other-worldly seclusion, to become ceerly involved in the affatrs of their country. This politization of thousands of local kcuders, in turn, previded the oreaniazational base for a dynamic Islamic movement, lea hy an intellisent, and increasinvly powerful, central end reviomdi leacershir, which during the occupation hac obtained official recornition, encourasement, and a fairly continuous “easure of autonony. More important still, vnese leaders had become vovernment officials in crarvze of Islamic affairs: sor env decades supervised by alien experts — whether untch or Jaranese —, Tndonesian fioslems tz the enc oo? Japanese rile vere in virtual cone istration and oxecetion of ~ vernmental policies === [PDF page 332] === affectin: thelr problems. [th was a position «ff strencth from which -—- as post-oceupation event. were bo oreve <= they coula no lonrer be displaced for any length uf time. Finally, on the politicel level, ‘slan had likewise acyaneed far beyond its stature in early VW9n2. vhnen waiten rule over Indonesia collapsed, the isaders of the Islamic movement had only hegunto orpanize politically, in part as a reaction +o Dutch volicies, andin wart to abtain a mure Cavorable vole itieal *.clance ‘vith the "secular" neticralist partiese The Japanese hac, as we sax, cog licitir sowtnt to uivorce islam from parties, and later “v execlucinof the movement from leadin- nositions in Yet the altinate oleeet of Uhneir ova islamic --olicies ~ and, beyond them, of the Japanese effcrts to “diviue anu ruly — was, that th military authorities hac themselves created bhat ood -etweern tne centre. and local l-adersnin, torether with an organizational fray ework, which constituted -- anJ have to a great extent continued to cunstitute — the basis of Mos [Unreadable] lem political stren-th on Java. lhe official transformation of the siasjumi into a political narty, which cccurred three months after the Japanese surrender, was, thercfore, no mre than the acknowledrement of a fait accompli (557). + anes Sumi into a nolitical varty (S07) The decisicn to transform tas: at Jorja, on November 7-8, wag taken at a Moslem Tonere ON Cue === [PDF page 333] === It is, indeed, no undue exazveraticon to sa [Unreadable] of this neverful political narty telonvzs amen: the tosh imertant results of Japanese rule in Tniconesia. It Vipconts concerted effort to build up Voslem strength, anu to valance it arsainst that of other Indcnesian sroups, which lec t. a Geen er and more lasting division among Nuslems ont non-re wbisnalists than had cxisted «uring the precedins for ueracese vil chanses a3 well as the armed turmcil which followed soon after Indonesian independence fai been proclaine: Ste h sara th Meee Dy wis ars ae Y Yen Loult Lo ascecs the Valance Ob tayyrer setween 1VUG inn loa at a Y os ri control hai ecllarsged, Ysatn ° -. Toye oe - 4 svvoptbs boon Lastrimetbar ohesnen aon Payot. _ i* na Ra BED. DOT. wee Do " Ter tam f 7 te seg a + ~~ se Pe aD of the $GL8BP LO eeehiersrois) LN clipe Dur nulent CAM LY Wied rid y ives careful investi ctaticn. Yo ofoilowias the end of the war, ne political scene raniily srew ever nore complake In the irst place, the pre-war facticnalism anens. the “"secnolar" nationalist leaders remasserbed itself aml Jivided their rankse In ‘the second slace, their predominance was soun chal- WLS, At the sane clas, @ aew executive vas cucsen, in whieh Phe rads political leauers -- oxcluded Prem the the: Jan anese in ate 12,3 —— were ~lven sume 4eTaiied 2 rt, see Soeara Loeslimin indonesia, TIT, 20 (December > 1915), rele ee ae ee ee cal, ney === [PDF page 334] === lenved by the non-colls orators an. un.uertround Sitters v2 the oceupation rears. hastl, the emerzvence in: ¢arli consolijvation of leftewin:s forces intreduced.et another factor inte Indonesian polities, whieh vas to exert a crofoun. inyy + t fluence on future developments. hese far-reaching chances the internal confisuration of political forces were, furthermore, accompanied by a protrected and exhaustins struscie ase ainst an external enany, a strucvle "hich has doubtless k ft tts indelible marks on Tnioncsian nolitical Lifa. fithin a few monbhs after the cucrender a? danan, an inricate cuit ination of factors nad, theszfore, decisively chanced the tolitieal situation, rele ~ating much of Inusnesia's iTisanvece. the “isins Som which have continued to affect Indeneslan polities to this very daz. Two of these -- the amed challence to civilian aw thority of part of the military leadership and that of rebellious Moslem fanaticism — have at times come close to threatenins the orderly vrocess of goverment in the youn Republic. The third lesacy is the c‘asjumi. Thoagh it cannot entirely disclaim responsibility for the continued existence that militant fanaticism which it had been Larsely instrumental in rearin: ring the sccunation years, it may yet 2in~ anc important, if not pos prove to be an essentie === [PDF page 335] === unique, One thou *h thie asoried movement RV anese te leaders than naonesia. ami force in the nascent democratic process of Free question Shoul:, in eencluision, ve raise it, even “writer knows onivy too olifnat; 3 more cusily answerel. rantin=, that is, that the Islacics in Intonesia ores mich cof Los present streasun to one interresmim, Lowa ean thaw crestly enhanced ya Lorypete.) ay Qo uireess af Japanese vcsleo pol- Or, tc rephrase this cnestion nac the Islanmade on Jave laiter had of them? Sur tion may matter of deen ana ities on Java (SCS) fren the vory besianings of onward, but also — and this is of even greater that the anil cons analysis of Tslanic develorment have shown that the Islamic problem was not continunis Javanese caine to the island with istent Moslem policy. ppon possessed little - (558) The mrobl2m also receivel a vreat cela of attontion in Sumatra, ALthoush aucquate information on the other Inu = nestan islanus, whieh stouc under naval cownand, Is no’, as vet available, thers are scattered invications testifyin: to Yapanese awareness of the problem ia those sreas. An ovsanized Islamic movement, vowever, Sopears to have “een estric bad ho ti Tava ° wi ie only a importance the cautious, scientific dirias the ooscupaconeern to the military authorthe occunation fairly well-inforne.. === [PDF page 336] === expertise which had sone into the moldin~ of Dutch colonial and Islamie nolicy, her military administrators were, nonebneless, apmarently well-equisvned for tne task of viirnin.: tne support of Indonesian soslens. mo 2°73 eed ine, pema ) yy Facilitated tev the smal! miutier we bet ee tb This tasl: vas couwtless ; - or i oe cde nee Lee. of canarle ancl enersetic eupanese Voslems who were in charve of Islamic affairs; wiether cone Tide Collevers a7 the tu vhet or not —- ao question az vet in ulsmisce amen = Inasnes lan velievers -- they caine i, or forced, entranee Into the “slanic work on Java. Japanese controi was this far more intimate, efCective, and perturbing than the -listant Dutch supervision had ever heen. The new overlords were, in aidition, as undeviatin= in the pursuit of their principal aim as they proved to he flexible in the choice of means for attaininy ite In contrast to Nolland's larvely passive atbitude towards Islam, that is to say, the active Islamic police of the Javanese was readily adavted to swiftly chan-int circumstances. In the place of cauticus revulation, Japan chose closely controlled enccurazement, coumled with a villinsness to compromise on come crucial [Unreadable] issues. 40 is, then, J3fSicul’ te demr the Japmese a fair Gesree of savacity enc cven courage in the handliz: of the Tslamic problem on Java. This conclusion may vain in plausibility if it is Dorne in mind that the vreat ani far-reaching === [PDF page 337] === chanzes which that rolicy wrought in indonesian islan were effected under military occupetion, and in the short span of barely forty months (559). fo. t oF the leaders 22% Indonesian islam on Java were ill-prepared te cope with this sudden chance cf waler ani attitude. Like most nationslists, they cowstless welecned the an of Dute. rule and entertained the bone of farina’ 3Uher aaiov Asians than undor Diuelstin os. Initially, at least, Oy almost certainivy shared the falrizy cenerel acmirstion Por tye conspicucns an. impressive Japanese Successes. THe Ss sy A OO A DE se wm eee pe Meyer It is far more difficult, anl far more hazarccus, to ashad “ecome pas sess Islamic reacticns to Japanese rul firmly established. Cn the one hand, Inonesian “Moslems were -- avain not unlike their "seculer" brethren, though perhaps to a less inhibiting Gegree -- divided sy internal facticnalism, which for quite some tiie weakened their bargainins power vis-a-vis the Japanese. On the other lund, however, some of their leaders at least must at a fairly carly date nave realized the potentially stron: position in which they were placed by the Japanese preoccupation with Inconcesi Islan. Lookint at the external achievenaiis, we «re “ound to cone elude that these Mecslen leaders vho "ecllaverstec" with the cee. rr neaac a Far at ~: 14 (552) Tor a ciiilar assessment cl? Japancou Islamic poliey ib part of “waatra by a Dutch scholar, of. 4. J. Piekaar, Ntjeh en Je corloy met Japan, 7.27) anc 226, resn. === [PDF page 338] === 320 nilitary authorities ~— and they aprear to have forned the vreat majority of Islamic spokesmen on Java \~ nad siillfuliy used the unigue opportunities presented “y the cccupition era for the advancement of their cause, if nov oF their vergun fortunes. Thev nad, as vie sav, nov only secured a comparatively ree measure of autonomy for the Islamic movement, Lub they had also tained a vastly improved position vis-a-vis the administrative elite as well as the non-relicious nationalist leadershipe But if we attenpt to search beyond these achievements, in an endeavor to ask at what price they were onotained, we enter the realm of uncertainty and pure speculation. We do know that some of the to Moslems outrazeous demands of the Jacanese ~- the observance of emperor worsnip, for exanple — were met with courareous, and ultimately successful, opposition, ve also know that Islanic steadfastness was victorious in some other less conspicuous arcas, ardove even know what some minor Moslem leaders vlaced themselves at the head of local prisin7s avainst tne Japanese aibhorities. On the other hand, however, we cannot ascertain wuether the conspicuous record of the Islamic leadership's support for Dai Nippon was entirely »orn of fear, temporianz and impotence, or whether it was, in rart at least, cue to the fact vhat the Japanese had succeeded - to use a term borrowed from the Indonesian -—- in "stealinz the hearts" of some of Java's === [PDF page 339] === leadins Moslems (560). Whatever the gains which *slam made under the occunaticon, it would be difficult to dem that, in a larvec measure, were made possible by the fact tnat the military aministratica willed and aithorized them. Islamic sains were thus not necessarily Japanese losses, but the very reverse} and this may be true in spite of the fact that in certain, and ty no means insiznifieant, instances tie Japanese had nai to male important . a ~ 7. er wees: years aaa cries for:osiem su port. An anvarent and concessions as the somewhat perplexine unity c° sins seems “a have existed between infidel rulers and many..osler leaders. Jaen teavine and mitually honest It was, we cannot mow. it is, however, not twoossible to suvc-st that, parbieularly curin: one Roter phases oo the ceeuvavion, tie incrcasin~ strenvth enjoyed ‘sy islamic leaders had vradiuall: leu toa Jed ef - ¥ sive-and-take with the Japanese authorities viiien, as tine went on, involved ever fewer compromises for tneir relivcion. sven then, however, the at least external identification of these jeaders ith the cause of Japan, culminatinzs in the proclamation of a Holy iar against the Jest, can only be interpreted as a victory of no mean vroverbionsfor the Japanese adninistration. There can be little const that Une fanaticism soved jin (C60) In this connection the inverestine - judement o? an oute standin; sumatran reformist ceserves scrutiny. Cf. Havka ajahku, wPels?-92. See @lso Pak,ahants 1261 hari dibawah ss, - TAB AN ~ sonar v.atanari Terbit, ©.ilv-ro. — ee oe === [PDF page 340] === the service of Dai Nippon has borne a harvest, which has continued to nlasue InJonesia the attainment of her independence. In the?inal aaslysis, then, it is Gardensome ani the peonle vt *, 1 a) ay far CAO Lhd Inu nesia, the mdblions of Inconestan..oslems, whe have tre cole risit of demanding an answer to tine question sosited ia the preeeciine ATES « a Nestern ssorver ust content bimself vith navine cbatea di ag oun ‘neceanai le dowst esnfronbint Vin ab the end eP vis mest, anton the tasis. 2 th dele anu Srna omen ve amr facts at his Cismoral., ve ean. mop ao: uo. yD hae Leedin: Meglens who imew carboor the Mor are now deads most of those still alive -- MNeclle*loraters'" as well as others =~ ave so far abstained from chedidin: Lisit on the invard foto of Tndenesian lslan unier the rule o® the Risin™ Sune Tt wouk! be vresumptuous for the writer to place too hasty en interpretation on the makers of en-‘rossed .4 to te future to kesome the iistorians or veceeruora 0 recent rast. ion} - Cael s v-- The Tha -- om bahly ah on ara 1. on ye Saaks of the rresent a; causes for this concerted sildet Introduction te this stugy, the still far tow wi tne dbomdiate Lneir country's === [PDF page 341] === BIBLIOGRAPHY % (A) OFFICIAL PUTLICATIONS (a) Dutch Administration: Incisch Verslag, 1930-1. Rapport van de commissie voor het onderzoek, ingesteld bij Gouvernementsbesiuit van 26 Januari 1927, Now 1x he Bantam Report), 1908. — Rapport van de conmissie var. onderzoek, ingesteld bij Souvernementsbesiuit van 13 Februari 1927, No. la (Tie Sumatra West Coast Report), Volel, 1928. Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indi#, met Bijbladen, Tien jaar Japansch gewroet in Nederlandsch-Indié, 192. Verslag van de commissie tot bestudeerin’ van staatsrechtelijke Lervormingen, ingesteld bij Youvernements- L Noe besluit van 1 September 1910 1x/KAB (The Visman aoe er Report), 2 vols. All these documents were published by the Landsdrukkrrij, Batavia. (b) Japanese Administraticn: Boekoe pengoempoelan oendang~oendang, disoesoen sengan pergoebahan dan tambahan sampai penzhabisan boelan 0, tahoen Syoowa 19 (2604) (Djakarta: Gunseikanbu, 260] I7). A collection of laws and decrees of the Mil- %* Primary sources published during the Japanese occupation of Indonesia bear brief explanatory comments. All other materials are listed without such comments. === [PDF page 342] === 30h, itary Administration up to July, 19hh. Indonesia nu en straks (Typescript, Djakarta, November 27, 12 ppe). Dutch translation of a secret Japanese survey of Indonesian political affairs. Origin and author unknown. Kan Po ~ Berita Pemerintah (Djakarta: Gunseikanbu, Rahagian Kikakuka, 2602-05 /1902-5/). The fortnightly official gazette, containine, besides all central and regional laws, orders and decrees, the speeches and official announcements of Japmese administration spokesmen. ‘he series was started on August 8, 192 and continued unti] September 10, 1945. Laws promulgated before Aupust, 192 were published ina special issue, dated March 9, 19)3. Lapoeran tentang kerihcetan di Indramajoe Ken, Tjirebon ue (typescript, nede)e Lfolice report on the Indramayu rebellions of June, 19kk. Moeslimin di Soematera Baroe (\edan: Badan Penjiaran Bunka-ka, 2603 /19437). Official report on the Sumatran Moslem Conference of June 20, 193. Orang Indonesia jang terkemoeka di Djawa (Ujakarta: Sunseikanbu, AGILITY. An official Who's Who of prominent Indonesians, compiled under the direction of Mohammad Hatta. (B) NEWSPAPERS Algemeen Indisch Dagblad (andung), 1937=-h2. Asia-Raya (Djakarta), 2602 G19u27 ~- 2605 /19457. Commenced publication on April 29, 192, and conbimied until September 8, 1945. The central Indonesian-language daily on Java, under joint Japanese-Indonesian editorship. Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad (Ratavia), 1937-h2. Berita Oemoem (Ljakarta), March-April, 19l\2. Daily organ of Parindra, the larvest Indonesian political party prior to the occupation. Merced with Asia-Rava after April 28, 192. Nood-editie van de Semarangsche dazbladen (Semarang), sarch, 1942. fi-lineual emergency issues during thé first four weeks of the occupation. === [PDF page 343] === Any Pemandan (Jjakarta), March-May, 1912. A privatelyowned Indonesian newspaper. Appeared under chanved title, Pembangoen in June, 192 until December 31, 1943. Sinar Barce (Semarang), June, 2602 /1927 - Jecember, 2603 2, e only newspaper for Semarang during the occupa- Zion, it was published from June 1, 19):2 until September 10, 195. Tjaja Timoer (jakarta), March-May, 192. Another privatelyowned daily, ordered to cease publication on July 8, 19h2. Commemorative booklets published by: Asia-Raya, September 2602 /19427 and April 2503 [19137 Sinar Baroe, March and July 2603 /19437 Nerceka (Djakarta), Tebruary, 1915. — C. PRBRIG_LICALS Ynder Dutch Administration: Critiek en Opbouw (Ratavia), 1936-2. De Fakkel (Ratavia), 190-42. De Indische Gids (Amsterdam), 1&76-19)0. Koloniaal Tijdschrift (The Hague), 1911-1941. Koloniale Studién (Patavia), 1916-1941. Nationale Commentaren (Zatavia), 1937-192, Under Japanese Administration: Djawa Raroe (Djakarta), 2603-05 /1943-l57. Illustrated fortnightly published by the "Djawa Shimbun Sha" under Japanese editorship, in Indonesian and Japanese until April, 1945, thereafter in Indonesian only. The first 138ue appeared on Jamary 1, 1943, the last on Auzust 1, 195. Indonesia Merdeka (~jakarta), 200h /19iS7. A fortnizhtly published by the "Djawa HokOkai" from April-July, 1945, it took the place of Pandji Foestaka and served as the only short-lived organ of the nationalist leadershis during the occupation. === [PDF page 344] === 32 Pandji Foestaa (Djatarta), /cols. I¥={x47]7, 2600-05 /TW9u2- 5/. The only macazine ccntimied Cron the Tuten era, this apneared as an illustrated weekly brouchh out ls the covernment's ctublishins house "alai foestazal" until 192, when it decane a bi-weelly piv>lieation. board consisted of Indonesians with a Yapanese: chief. It ceased mblication with the issue of LS, to be by Tnoonesia lerdel:as rorgeueny wt i ~ ss ° 7 Ln Ay ls le ‘: y Fradjoerit (Djakarta), 260L-05 /Voub-LS7. An illustreted magazine, published jointly by head-office of the Fiscnters! Aid ‘rganization /Tacan Fembantoe Pradjoerit"? and the military covernmentts:ropazanda Department /Sendenbu7. Its editorial staff consisted almost entirely of Indcnesians. Pradjoerit first appeared as a bi-weekly cn serterher 15, ole lol; its last issue is dated July 36, 1945. Soeare M.T.A.T: /Soeara adjilis Isian a'tlaa Inionesia/ (jakerta), 2003 /ioh3/. Si-weekly pu-lished vy the first Indonesian Tslamic federation from January till ‘iovember, 1943. The tasazine's title was chanzed to Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia in December, 1943, and it appeared from then onwards «as the orvarn of wasjuwni. Fubiication was continued irremilerly after the Jamnese surrender, the last aval’- able issue bearine the date cf December 4, LolS. FostOceucation: wee [Unreadable] \ syed Mimbar 4Avana (uiaberta,, Lecce. Report on Indonesia (indonesian information Office, New York} Lysol. The Voice of Free Indonesia (Vjakarta), 1945-8. 9. ROOK AND ARTICES Abdul Karim Amrutliah, "tod en de Keizer,' een “atwa van Dr. Abdul Karim Hamrullah," edited and translatea by J. L. Swellencrehel. Inconesi@ (Amsterdam), VI (1952=03),po.77-3?. Only the most important articles published durin: the oceupa= tisn have been selected for inclusion in tnis list. === [PDF page 345] === Say ‘Abdul Razzq, “iodern Trends in Islam," The Islamic Review (Noking, Sneland), 39, 9 (Se tember, 1951), pp.19=23. Abduleani, Roeslan, Penzetahuan Umum: Propasanda Jjepang (/Djakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, ned./ Series: Fendidikan Pegawai Staf Kempen, mimeo.) Adi Negoro, "Zur Kulturpolitik Indonesiens," by Djamal Udin (pseud. for Adi Nesoro), Zeitschrift fitr Geopolitikx (Perlin), V (1928), pp.258-6h and 317-25, Ahmadsarido, "Islam in Indonesia," The Islamic Review, 39, Alisjahbana, St. Takdir, "Didikan barat dan cidikan pesantren. Memudju ke masjarakat jang dynamisch," in Achdiat K, Mihardja (ed.), Polenik kebudajaan (Njakarte: Ralai Arx, A. von, L'€volution politique en Indonésie de 1900- 192 (*riboureg: Artizianelli-Monza, 1909). Penda, Harry J., "The Communist ZXebellions of 1926-27 in Indonesia," Pacific Historical Review (Los Anzeles). To be published during 1955. Benda, Harry J., "The Dawn of the Rising ~un: The Beginnines of the Japanese Cecupation of Java," Indonesié (Amsterdam). To be published during 1955. Nederlandsch-Indi# (Haarlem: Tjeenk Willink & Zoon, end ede, 1935)~ Blumberger, J. Th. Petrus, De commnistische beweging in Plumberger, J. The Petrus, De nationalistische beweging in Nederlandsch-Indié (Haarlem: Tjeenk “illink & Zoon, 1931). Bone, Robert C., "The “uture of Indonesian Political Parvies" Far Eastern Survey (New York), XXI], 2 (February, 1954 3 Dpel7—2 3, Bouman, H.,Enisge beschouwinzen over de ontwixkeling van het Indonesisch Nationalisme op Sumatra's Westkust (Groninzen/Batavia: J. 6. Wolters, 1949). Bousquet, 3.%H., "Introduction & l'étude de 1'Islam indnésien," Revue des Etudes Islaniques (Paris), 1938, II-III, pp 0135-2 59 e === [PDF page 346] === 328 Rousquet, 7. H., La politique musulmane et coloniale des Pays-Bas (Paris: Paul Hartman 719307). Cholil, Kjai H. ‘oenawar, "remandancan Sepintas Laloe: tentang pernvedaan sikap mendiang remerintah 7elanda dan Pemerintah Ralatentara Dai Niopon sekaranz, terhadap Islam dan kaoem woeslimin di Indonesia," Sinar 8aroe, Commemorative issue of July, 1943, non-paginated. Damsté, 4. Je, 'e Mohammedaansche Wet in Indié," Koloniaal Tijdschrift (The Hague), XXVITI (1938), pp.138-l2. Dimyati, Muhammad, Sedjarah Perdjuanzan Indonesia (Vjakarta: Widjaya, 1951). Drijvers, J., ceschouwin= over de Indonesische problemen na een jaar Japansche bezetting (Tussum: F. %. Kroonder, THUS). Eisenberger, Je, "De godsdienstige rechtspraak in de Zuider- en Oosterafdeelinz van Borneo," Kolonia& Tijdschrift, XXVII (1938), pp.526-63. Elsbree, Willard H., Japan's Role in Scutheast Asian Nationalist Movements, 190-5 (Gambridze, Wass.: Harvard Emerson, “upert, Malaysia, A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule (Jew York: Wacmillan, I937).° Encyclopsedie van “ederlandsch Oost Indié, ed. by S. de Graait. 2. 3. Stibbe, 6 vols.(The Hazue: i. Nijhoff and Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1916-1938). Feith, Herbert, "Toward Hlections in Indonesia," Pacific Affairs (New lork), XXVII, 3 (September, 1954), pp.230-5h. Furnivall, J. S., Yolonial Folicy and Practicet A Vomarative Study of Burma and Netherlands India (Cambridge: ih Unive rsity Tress, 1945). Furnivall, J. S., Netherlands Indias A Study in Plu-al Economy (Hew York: Macmillan, 19Lh). Gandasubrata, R. A. A. S. ii., An Account of the Japanese Occupation of Banjumas Residency, Java, March 1942 to Kueust I5G5, transl. by Leslie EK. Palmier (Ithaca, New York: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, Data === [PDF page 347] === modern Trends in Islam ‘chicaso: iniver- Ginb, i. As Rey ohammedanism: An Historical survey (London: Oxford “iniversity Fress, I953). [Unreadable] Gobee, Be, "De Islam," in Gedenkboek voor ‘iederLandscn- Indié ter eelezenheid van het repeerings jubileum van Howe de] Koningin, 1090-1923 (Fatavia: 3. hoirf « Cie, oy one. os pe ly: aqobee, Ee, "Folitieke en relivieus-:olitieke teweginien," in Daar wérd wat groots verricht, ed. by Ww. 1. van teisdingen and H. Joo senberk Chmaterdan: Elsevier, 19h), pelh6-59, 4 og “ys. o Gohée, Me, Review article of “Vocusguet. Le colonijale..., in Uoloniaal Tijiscrrift Mees a Je Fuillaume, Alfred, Tslan ( arvonisw.: 139oh). ~ [Unreadable] Maar, OD. ter, 2auat haw in Inoonesia, ed. am! transl. tyr '. ye) a SS TR aah B.A. Hoebel and A. A. Senitiler (New Zor’: Institute of racific Rela} VLOTS, 198) e Naar, ©. ter, ““alvervese vie nleuwe 1. Jatrechtspraak," Koloniale Studién (atevia}, Ki TII €1939), 2, vrr.l3-li. vaar, “. ter,"#en keerrunt in de Adatrecntspolitiek: Toekomsthescheuwinven," ibid., XII (1926), 1, pr.2k5-"3. Hamka (pseud. for ‘aagi Abdul Malik Karim Amru'llan) Ajahku, Riw.jat hidup Dr. Ard. arim Amruilah dan perd— juangan kaum aA;rama (Ujakarta: Widjaya, 1950). Hamka, Penuntun naik hadji (Djakarta: Gapura /19°17). Harahap, Parada, Nippon ji masa perang! (Djakarta: Djawa Shimbun Sha, 250k 7T9hL7). Hartmann, tichard, "Tslam und Nationalismus," Abhanclunzen der Deutschen Akadenie auer wissenschatten zu “verti 19L5/ Le]. Le _ oe ~ * 7 a LO. Philosophisch-.isterische jiasse, = C19q8). Vasjim, 1. A. Nachid, "Gekitar -embentukan Yemerterian [Unreadable] Aeama 2.7.5.," limber “sama (Djakarta), 7, 1 (June, 12°C), === [PDF page 348] === Joy Hatta, Mohammad, Verspreide Geschriften (Djakarta: 6. Fr. J. v/d Peet, 1952). ne Hagairin, Hukum baru di Indonesia (~jakarta: Pulan Rintang /19517). Hazairin, Pergoelakan penjesuaian '‘adat kepada Hukum Islan (Djakarta: Bulan Bint ig TSSST). Kadt, J. de, De Indonesische trazedie: het treurspel der gemiste kansen (Amsterdam: 3. A. van Oorschot, 1949). Kahin, George icT., "Indonesian Politics and ‘ational isn," in William L. Holland (ed.), Asian Nationalism and the Kahin, George McT., (ationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University rress/I. P. Rey 1952). Kartodirdjo, Cerip, "De rechtspraak op Java en Madoera tijdens de Japansche bezettins, 1942-5," Indisch Tijdschrift van het Recht (Batavia), 1917, 1, pp.8-21. Kat Anzelino, A. 2. A. de, Staatkundig beleid en bestuurs- OER An Nederlandsch-Indié, 3 vols. (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1930). Kattenburg, Paul il., A Central Javanese Villaze in 1950 (Ithaca, N.v., Southeast Asia Procram, Cornell University, Data Paper: #2, 1951). Kernkampy W. J. Aw, "De invloed van den islam,"" in ©. V7. ormser (ed.): Wat Indi@ ontvinz en schonk (Amsterdan: Kernkamp, W. J. A., "Rezering en Islam," in Daar wérd wat groots verricht, ed. by W. H.wHelsdinzen *% H. Hoozenberk,.pel91-207. (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 19l1). “Koch, p, li. G., Om de vrijheid (Djakarta: Jajasan Pembangunan, 1950). Kramers, J. H., "L'Islam et la démocratie," in Orientalia Neerlandica, published for the Netherlands Criental Society (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1948), pp.223-39. Kroef, Justus Me van der, "Conflicts of Religious Policy in Indonesia," Far Eastern Survey, XXII, 10 (September, [Unreadable] === [PDF page 349] === Kroef, Justus M. van der, "Society and Culture in Indonesian Nationalism," The Americm ape of Sociclo (Chicago, Ill.) LVIII, 1 (uly, 1952), pp.Ti-che zl Landon, Kenneth Perry, Southeast Asia, Crossroad of Religions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1919). Lubis, Mochtar, "Party Confusion ih Indonesia," Far Eastern Survey, XXI, 15 (October 29, 1952), ppel5 c5-55. veulen, De van der, "The Mecca Pilgrimace and Its Importance to the Netherlands East Indies," The Asiatic Review Meyer, D. He, Japan wint den oorlor: Documenten cver Java (vaastricht: Latter-Wisr pels /T9L6/). Mulder, J. Hey "Van Nederlandsch- Indie tot Indconesié," in Wordend Indonesi#, ed. by G,. 1. Tichelman «% }:. van Meurs (Haarlem: De Snaarnestad, 1918), pp.13-6hl. Nieuwenhuijze, C. A. O. van, "The Darul-Islam Movement in West-Jave," Pacific Affairs, XXTII, 2 (June, 1950), Dp e 164-8), e Nieuwenhuijze, C. A. 0. van, Mens en vrijheid in Indonesié Nieuwenhuijze, C. A. C. van, What the Japanese did to Islam on Java (unpublished typescript, no date given; 5 Ppe)> Overdijkink, 3 W., Het Indonesische Frobleem: De Feiten (The Hague: Nijhoff, lou Pai’ pahan, P., 1261 hari dibawah sinar Matahari terbit (Djakarta?, publisher unknown 719087) » 7Patavia, Regeerings Yoorlichtinzsdienst, oie ) Piekaar, A. J., Atjeh en de oorloz met Japan’(The Hague Randung: W. van Noeve, 1900). Pijper, + *., "De Ahmadiyah in Indonesia" in Binzkisan Rudi: jen bundel opstellen aan Dr. Fhillipfus Samuel Samuel van Ronkel, published under the auspices of the “Batavia's Gennabcchap (Leiden: A. ¥%. Sijthoff, 1950), pp.2u7-5h. Pijper, G. F., Fragmenta “slamica (leider: E. J. Brill, 193h). === [PDF page 350] === Pijper, G. F., "De strijd om de monogamie," Koloniale Studitn, XXI (1937), pp.476-90. TO Plas, Charles 0. van der, "Mededeelinven over de strgningen in de Moslimsche zemeenschap in Nederlandsch—-Indié en de Nederlandsche Islampolitiek," Indisch Senootscha (The Hague), Vergaderinz wan 16 Februari 193], op.c53-72. Plas, Charles 0. van der, Nationalism in the Netherlands indies (8th Conference of the I. P. %., i. Tremblant, Quebec, 1912). Pluvier, J. M., Overzicht van de ontwikkelin: der nationalistische bewegin’ in Indonesi® in de yaren 1930 tot 192 ee ee East Indies “urine and Immediately after the Japanese Occupation (Tnpublished doctoral dissedation, Georgetown University, Washinston, 1.C., 1 8). Popve, Janus, Political Developments in the Netherlands Prawiranegara’ Sjafruddin, Islam dalam pergolakan dunia (Bandung: Al Matarif /19507). Prillwitz, P. M., "The Estate..griculture during the Japanese “ccupation," The Economic Review of Indonesia (Ratavia), Ty 1 (Jamary, 194%), ppelo-L7. Pringgodigdo, A. K., Sedjarah pergerakan rakjat Indonesia Prins, Jan, "Adatlaw and liuslim Religious Law in Modern Indonesia," Welt des Islams (Leiden), N.S. Vol.I (1951), Dp «283-300. Frins, Jan, Adat en Islamietische Plichtenleer in Indonesi8 (The Hazgue/Sandunz: ¥. van Hoeve, 1900). Schrieke, B. (ed.), The Jffect of Western Influence on Native Civilizationsin the Malay Archivelazo (Ratavia: ma tay arcnipe i270 G. “Wolff & Cow, 1929). Shadily, Hassan, Islam in J,donesia focussed in its Character as a Relizious and National Force (ithaca, N.Y.: Unpublished MS, 1953). Shorter Encyclopaedi: of Islam. Edited on behalf of the Royal Netherlands Academy by 1%. A. R. tibb and J. 4H. Kramers (Leiden: =. J. Brill, 1953). === [PDF page 351] === 333 Sjahrir Soetan, Perdjoeangan kita (Djakarta: Pertjetakan Repoeblik Indonesia FITS. Sjanrir, Soetan, Out of Exile, transl. by Charles Wolf, Jr. (New York: The John Day Zo., 1949). 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Poerbohadidjojo, "Soal Islam di Indonesia seteloem dan sesoedah § Maart 2502," Asia-Raya, commemorative issue of September, 19]2,. Wondoamiseno, W., "Sikap hi.J.A.I. terhedap percebahan djaman baroe," Pandji Poestaka (Djakarta), XX, ¢3 (October 17, 19,2), pp. 3-76. === [PDF page 353] === Zorab, A. A., De Japanse bezetting van Indonesié en haar volkenrechtelijke zijde (leiden: iniversitaire Pers, 15h).