The Politico-Military Role of the Indonesian Armed Forces, October 1965–1968 (MA dissertation, University of Chicago)

=== [PDF page 1] === Tl 6815 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO Date Edward J. Fox __ _____ February 15,___ ____ iq 68 September 7, 19^41 Author Birth Date The I’olitico-^litary Role of the Indonesian Armed Forces: October 1965-1968 Title of Dmertation International Relations Department or School Degree March, 1968 Convocation Permission is herewith granted to the University of Chicago to make copies of the above title, at its discretion, upon the request of individuals or institutions and at their expense. Extensive Quotation or Further Reproduction of This Material by Persons or Agencies Other than the University of Chicago May Not Be Made without the Express Permission of the Writer. Number of pages Note: === [PDF page 2] === THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO THE POLITICO-MILITARY ROLE OF THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES; OCTOBER 1965-1968 A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS EDWARD J. FOX CHICAGO, ILLINOIS MARCH, 1968 === [PDF page 3] === TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Chapter Objective Domestic Balance of Power until October 1965 Politico-Military Philosophy of Nasution 12 Military Security Operations Erosion of Sukarno's Power Mass Media—Television Civil and Governmental Spheres Within the Army and Armed Forces 60 Nationwide Slaughter of PKI Anti-Chinese Activities Pro- and Anti-Sukarno Forces COURSE OF THE AMPERA GOVERNMENT......................... 87 Demise of Sukarno and Nasution's Politico-Military Philosophy Civil-Military Relations: Implications CONCLUSION: DEMOCRACY OR "MILITARISM"................... 98 Indonesian "Democracy" and "Militarism" Summary CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF CONTROL-VIOLENCE RELATIONSHIP............... 109 GLOSSARY OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS.... 116 BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................................ 119 === [PDF page 4] === CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Objective The purpose of this study is to examine the course of events transpiring in Indonesia after the 1 October 1965 attempted coup d'etat to the beginning of 1968. Primary consideration is given to the program of control conducted by the Army and Armed Forces and to societal reper cussions following the consequent change in the socio-political balance of power. An attempt is made to see to what degree the Indonesian mili tary establishment, characterized historically by many deep centrifugal tendencies, has attained unity through its struggle, and whether this new unity is sufficient to effect a political system suited to the military elite's capabilities and goals. In investigating the program of control and how its effects were reflected throughout society (in terms of the nationwide pattern of violence) this work: (a) examines the extensiveness of the program of control, the degree of penetration of the social fabric it achieved, aid the nationwide response; (b) investigates the degree of cooperation and conflict within and among the branches of the Armed Forces vis-a-vis the opponents encountered in the military's efforts to exert control; and (c) formulates a prospect of the most likely course of government the Republic of Indonesia will pursue in the near future. === [PDF page 5] === Domestic Balance of Power until October 1965 The origins and development of the Indonesian National Army (TNI)1 have been characterized by many and deep divisions.* As one of the "emerging nations" and inheritor of a colonial experience, Indonesia has had to face a protracted struggle in order to find her real identity in the twentieth century of modernization. Her experience during the "physical revolution"^ and with "liberal democracy" as lived under the 1945 Constitution until the era of "Guided Democracy" initiated by President Sukarno in 1959 engendered a deep disillusionment and dislike by the military establishment for a system of political parties and parliamentary processes under which the military was subjected to civilian interference. The "tooth and nail" struggle with political parties and the continual military operations^ failed to bring the TNI to a degree of cohesiveness which would have enabled it to respond as an integrated whole to either domestic or foreign threats. In fact, the The History of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (Djakartal Department of Information, 1964). Hereafter cited as Republic of Indonesia. 2Bruce Grant, Indonesia (Baltimore: Penguin Books Inc., 1967), pp. 88-104. ^The "physical revolution" was that period of struggle with the Dutch from the end of World War II until independence in 1949 (the era of "liberal democracy"). Republic of Indonesia, p. 22. For a brief investigation of civilian government-military rela tionships see Samuel P. Huntington, "Civilian Control of the Military," in Political Behavior, ed. Heinz Eulaa, Samuel J. Eldersveld, and Morris Janowitz (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956), pp. 580-85» ^These were: against the Dutch; the 1948 Madiun PKI revolt; the Darul Islam rebellion; the PRRI (1958-1962) "civil war"; the West Irian campaign (resolved by the United Nations in 1962); and "Konfrontasi" with Malaysia (resolved in 1966). === [PDF page 6] === centrifugal tendencies were the cause of many social tensions, simul taneously being a reflection of the unsettled and conflicting state of the political parties and mass organizations, while growing more acute through closer links with the political cleavages. The nation's continual state of unrest facilitated the TNI's extension of its control into many spheres of activity normally rele gated to the civilian governmental apparatus,which in turn added a new dimension to the political instability. By executing programs under "state of war" conditions, the Army legitimized its activity in a wide range of managerial positions. In line with Sukarno's "Guided Democracy" the TNI was able to cast off the burden, to a great degree, of political party conflict^ while enjoying a comfortable position of prestige and opportunity.J But these experiments in civilian task management increased On the role of political parties under Guided Democracy see George McT. Kahin, ed., Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1964), pp. 194-212. ^For an essay in comparative analysis with many specific references to Indonesia see Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964). Hereafter cited as Development of New Nations. ^Due to the PRRI "civil war" Indonesia was under a state of martial law. Nasution used this opportunity to ban all political activity and, upon Sukarno's return from China, Sukarno initiated, with active Army sup port, the "Guided Democracy." For the TNI's role under guided Democracy see The Current Indonesian National Army's Role in the Republic of Indonesia (Djakarta: Army Information Service, 1901). ^Operating under "state of war" conditions and without civilian political party interference, the Army was put in the spotlight as the nation's defender against internal disruption. It was able to increase further its operational control of various sectors, in both administrative and managerial positions, normally relegated to civilians. Concerning the type of leader desired for Guided Democracy Dr. R. Abdulgani states: "... people who understand the objectives of the Revolution/over the experts... the Weberian non-professionals with 'com mon sense'..." Some Aspects Concerning Progress and Principles of the Indonesian Revolution (Series B & B. No. 1002; Djakarta: Department of Information, 1960), p. 288. === [PDF page 7] === intra-Army and inter-branch conflicts. The garrison or field unit com mander was not in the same position to reap the rewards as was the plan tation or factory military manager. Likewise, the Air Force (AURI), Navy (ALRI), and Police (AKHI) watched enviously the increasingly un equal distribution of economic and political power with all its implica tions. This situation was compounded by the ascendency of the Partai Kommunist Indonesia (PKI) which, via its organizational and leadership tactics, was able to move into the position of chief counter-weight to the Army’s influence." Sukarno was the prime and controlling factor in this troika of forces, casting his prestigious weight in the direc tion he desired in order to facilitate his wishes and programs while maintaining the increasingly precarious balance. A leftward trend was in evidence in the 1960's in this balancing process. Due to Sukarno's old age and illness, the question of succession was an all-pervading concern to both the TNI and PKI leadership. Martial law, in effect since 1957, was repealed in May 1965» weakening the Army's claim to legitimacy in its managerial operations in the civilian sphere. With the growing successes of the PKI, the Army, nationalist and religious groups began feeling the cincture of Communist invasion on their spheres of influence, both political and economic.Dire economic straits, the land reform problem, and PKI interference with traditional and religious beliefs, coupled with overpopulation and widespread dissatisfaction led 1Arnold C. Brackman, Indonesian Communism (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 270-500; and Herbert Feith, "President Sukarno, the Army, and the Communists: the Triangle Changes Shape," Asian Survey, IV, No. 8 (August, 1964), 969-80. ^Guy Pauker, "Indonesia in 1964: Toward a 'People's Democracy?'" Asian Survey. IV, No. 2 (February, 1965), 94. === [PDF page 8] === to an intensifying "crisis-conflict”^ situation. An incessant castiga tion of external enemies permeated the air with the language of violence. All that was needed was but a catalyst to bring the situation, so amor phous and tense with martial energy, to the reacting point. Rumors cir culated widely in 1965 of the impending outbreak threatening to disrupt the very social fabric of the nation: "Ibu Pertiwi sudah hamil ta!”^ The two chief contenders for this imminent takeover of the na tion's reins were naturally the PKI and TOI: the PKI with its doctrine of Marxist-Leninist Communism cultivated through its firm organizational technique; and the TNI with its doctrinal foundations based upon the «- periences of its military structure, and its penchant for utilizing its machinery of violence in problem solving. Among the military leaders, one stood out first and foremost in his declarations of his concept of what the civil-military relationship should be—General A. H. Nasution— Indonesia's number one soldier. A brief survey of his politico-military philosophy will elucidate the actual and aspired-for role which the TOI has played in the course of nation-building, and the vision it had of itself as one of the chief actors during this two-decade period. ^A "crisis-conflict" situation is a troubled state of affairs in which societal conflicts are of such intensity that a crisis may occur. Ewa Pauker stated that "Only a situation of violence will prove whether it is the PKI or the Army which has lost its élan, which of the two has really been domesticated by Sukarno." Ewa Pauker, "Has the Sukarno Regime Weakened the PKI?” Asian Survey. IV, No. 9 (September, 1964), 1066. ^"Mother Indonesia is in the last stage of pregnancy!” An oft quoted statement of Anwar Sanusi, Deputy of the Secretary General of the National Front. Pusat Angkataan (Information Centre) Bersandjata. Janu ary 16, 1967» p. 11. Hereafter cited as PAB. === [PDF page 9] === Politico-military Philosophy of Naaution General Naaution’s experiences were those first of a soldier. As time went on and there was increasing involvement of the military in political affairs, he matured in political acumen. His "physical revo lution” experiences left him with little esteem for parliamentary activity (such as the 1952 "October 17 Affair,and tactics of civilian politicians airing the military’s dirty laundry in public while they themselves achieved naught but negative results in problem solving).^ These implanted in his mind the conviction that the only plausible form of viable govern ment, while under the aegis of the charismatic Sukarno, would be one that had a high degree of military participation and would be in league with a highly-mobilized populace at the expense of the institution of party politics. The sum total of his various activities in a variety of com mand and staff positions; his speeches, operational procedures and mili tary orders, and most of all his writings, spelled out a highly articu late and comprehensive politico-military philosophy. Adhering in theory and practice to the state ideology "Pantjaetla, Naaution’s politico-military doctrine involved the concept of "territorial warfare," a defense in which the military and political functions merged— with the entire civilian population under Army leadership: ^For the military currents behind the "Affair" see Brackman, In donesian Communism, p. 179» On the TNI’s tactics of confrontation with civilian politicians, see Herbert Feith, The Wilopo Cabinet, 1952-1955: a Turning Point in Post-Revolution Indonesia (Modern Indonesian Project, Southeast Asian Program, Cornell University, 1961), pp. 105-41. 2Abdul H. Nasution, Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare (New Tork: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965)$ pp. 105-10. Warfare. Hereafter cited as Guerrilla ^The five principles of Pantjasila are: Nationalism, Humanity, Democracy, Social Justice, and Belief in God. A lengthy study of this state ideology is Dr. H. Roeslan Abdulgani, Pantjasila: The Prime Mover of the Indonesian Revolution (Djakarta: Prapantja, I964). === [PDF page 10] === The leadership in a chaotic region must be held by those who are in complete charge and in complete power. All instruments of power must reside in their hands and all instructions on military, political, social, and economic affairs are given by them; in short they have the overall command in accordance with the total character of true anti-guerilla warfare... the thing that counts most is their ability to lead such a total campaign. ^Italics mine.]^ It naturally followed that the role of leadership would fall to the Army, which, as a "functional group"^ during the era of "Guided Democracy" (referred to by Sukarno as the "Democracy a la Indonesia"), continued its role as first and foremost defender of the ideology and policies of the state and chief "protector of the Revolution." As such, the INI was a state apparatus (in the military field) and a functional group one inseparable single body. Although the Army was the largest functional group, it had not the experience and training necessary to enable it to act as chief formulator of state economic, monetary, or political policy. So Nasution formed a permanent committee of military managers "... the members of which theoretically are also all officers being assigned outside the defense organisation."^ The participation of the Army in the production process, Nasution felt, especially in land reform and industrialisation, would bring the Army closer to the people. In this system, the efficiency of an action was to have priority over its legality when this action was concerned with national defense ^Nasution, Guerrilla Warfare, p. 10). ^Members of society were classified according to function and distribution to the state. The four types of functional groups were con cerned with: (1) Material development and (2) Spiritual development, (3) the Armed Forces (ABRI) and (4) Religion. A. H. Nasution, Towards a People Army (Jakarta: c.v. Delgasi, 1964), p. 20. Hereafter cited as People's Army. 3Ibid., p. 22. === [PDF page 11] === "We shall never abide by the so-called international and security policy: law. We only abide by the law of our struggle."^ All of this would fully implement integration,^ as was the case in socialist countries, and the consequent efficient Armed Forces would operate very systematically in attaining domestic successes as well as battlefield kudos. was preferred. tary] In order to achieve this success a volunteer arqy Nasution refuted the belief that "The system of [volun can create a sort of special military caste which is isolated from the people and this can lead to military dictatorship." He sup plemented the voluntary TNI in his doctrine with an extensive compulsory military reserves system in order to make the Armed Forces a veritable "Peoples' Army" and the war on all fronts the monopoly of all groups. There was a great need of "mental retooling," the General believed, in order to make the Armed Forces realise that they were tools of the revo lution and "peoples' soldiers" who defend and back the peoples' ideals, without any compromise. Scientific substantiation and the legitimacy of this politico-military system of "Functional Democracy" was assumed 1Ibid.. p. 52. ^The contrary was more in evidence as explained by Feith: with its officers involved in a large number of administrative, political, and managerial tasks, the army gradually lost much of its reforming seal and sense of a separate political purpose." Feith, "President Sukarno, the Army, and the Communists," Asian Survey, p. 977. See also Ruth T. McVey (ed.), Indonesia (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files Inc. Press, 1963), p. 357;and A. H. Nasution, "How to be Good Managers," in To Safe guard the Banner of the Revolution (Jakarta: c.v. Delgasi, 1964), pp. 31-36. ^An error in translation occurs in the Biglish language text. Correction is: "Pembentukan Angkatan berdasarkan sistin LSukarelaJ... diktatur militer." The word "Wadjib" (compulsory) does not appear in this sentence. Dr. A. H. Nasution, Menudju Tentera Rakjat; hasil Karva dan pkiran (Djakarta: Jagasan Penerbit Minang, 1962), p. 187. ^Nasution, People's Army, p. 80. === [PDF page 12] === on the basis of this system's "identity" with modern democracy, a system in which there exists (according to Mannheim) a growing interdependence of all social and political forces. It followed that formal democracy be joined with functional democracy by mobilizing functional groups to participate in state executive power, there being no separation between executive and judicial functions. Here the "State still guarantees in dividual freedom, but every people must give first priority to our national interest."^ Abdul Haris Nasution, one of the small number of career military officers of his generation, had extensive staff and command experience throughout his career, which deepened his influence in various sectors of the military organization. As the successful commander of the crack West Java Siliwangi Division (1946-1948) and subsequent roles in the TUI's high command, he was able to build a strong foundation of faithful lieutenants and consequently effect the integration of his politico military doctrine into military operational policy. Through the reali zation of his doctrines concerning territorial warfare, military manage ment in the domestic civil arena, operational "illegality," and mass mobilization through compulsory military training, he was able to ac climate the nation to a high degree of military involvement in all as pects of domestic activity. Conversely, in the course of his career he was confronted by many dissident elements both within and without the TNI. There were those in the military distrusting his "Bonapartism." Along with those influenced by Saleh (who, during his tenure as Veterans' Minister made serious inroads in the Army by judicious use of patronage), they llbid., p. 102. === [PDF page 13] === 10 created a division in Java as well as elsewhere in the loyalties of the military to Nasution, a Sumatran. The reinstatement of Nasution in 1955 caused further animosity of the senior Army staff, which culminated in the 1958 P.R.R.I. rebellion. This was seen by Nasution as being as much a challenge to his leadership as to the incumbent government of Sukarno.1 With the 1962 "promotion" upstairs of Nasution and his replacement with General Yani, there occurred a weakening of the anti-Sukarno faction within the TNI, which in fact constituted an erosion of Nasution's leader ship2... an erosion advanced almost to the point of breaking this leadership. The waning of the power of both the TNI and Nasution was symp tomatic of the aforementioned turbulent state of Indonesian affairs. This state of tension was further heightened by the vociferous demands of PKI-affiliates and front organizations calling for both the arming of a "fifth force," along with a commissar system in Army ranks. Rumors of a "Council of Generals" filled the air already congested with public denunciations of "communist-phobia" and clamorings for the eradication of the "kabir" (officers-turned-managers and bureaucratic capitalists) The Chief of National Police was replaced during the summer of 1965 with a General Judodihardjo, who was expected to be more malleable in the hands ^Ibid.. p. 65. ^ani went about replacing anti-PKI regional commanders who openly opposed Jakarta in their regional anti-PKI activities. On Nasution's account of his waning responsibility and control of TNI leadership see his response to Sukarno's January 1967 "Nawaksara Supplement" challenge in Pusat Angkataan (Information Centre) Bersendjata ^This term was used by PKI instigators to stir up the impoverished people against those government and military officials who indulged in high living. === [PDF page 14] === of the PKI-influenced Sukarno. General Tani's replacement was scheduled for sometime after the 5 October Armed Forces Day celebrations, for which numerous military units from various outlying districts gathered in Jakarta in late September. === [PDF page 15] === CHAPTER II PROGRAM OF CONTROL Indonesian Armed Forces Day 1965 was observed without the planned excitement but with unplanned solemnity. The discovery at Lubang Buaja (Crocodile Hole), located at Halim Air Force Base, on 4 October, of the bodies of six generals of the TNI staff and Nasution’s aide, occasioned a grief-ridden state funeral without equal in Indonesian history.^ The movements of the night of JO September 1965—"Gestapu"^—and the early hours of 1 October 1965—"Gestok”—and the swift Army response shook the prevailing precarious balance of power. It was to be resolved eventually in the suppression of the PKI, the constitutionally executed demise of Sukarno, and a swing to the ABRI forces in the power structure. In order to achieve an effective and legitimate control every effort was utilised, covering the spectrum from parliamentary processes to the unrestricted use of the machinery of violence. The TNI had been struck a vicious blow and General Suharto knew that, if the TNI was to survive as a viable force, "... one should always anticipate the enemy rather than ^For a brief summary of the background and careers of those slain at Lubang Buaja see Buku Kenangan (7 TUDJÜH) Pahlawan Revolusi (Medan: Djalan Nusantara, April, 19^). ^"Gestapu," the abbreviation for "JO September 1965" was coined by Armed Forces Staff Information Director, Brigadier General H. Sugandhi. "Gestok," for "1 October 1965" was coined by Sukarno and referred to the TNI's actions to reassert control. A controversy emerged over Sukarno's efforts to condemn "Gestok" instead of "Gestapu." 12 === [PDF page 16] === 15 allow oneself to be anticipated by hie.' And Suharto was not willing to settle for a Cadmean victory. Military Security Operations The 0700 hours Radio Jakarta announcement of the "Revolutionary Council" found the loyalist troops in a quandry. General Nasution had been injured in a narrow escape from would-be assassins, but was in safe hands under heavy guard of troops of General Umar, Jakarta Territorial Commander. The politically unknown but militarily successful commander of the TNI Strategic Reserve Forces (KOSTRAD), General Suharto, arrived at his headquarters on Merdeka Square, across from the rebel-held Presi dential Palace, around 0700 hours in the midst of the confusion. News from Umar, who put himself under the command of Suharto, about the events at the homes of the six generals and the attempt on Nasution s life, along with a gradual summation of the prevailing situation, encouraged Suharto, who was the most senior Army officer on duty next to Nasution and cus tomarily replaced Tani as Chief of Staff in his absence, to announce his assumption of operational control of the Argy.^ Suharto was supported by a force consisting of elements of the Army elite paracommando Special Forces (RPKAD), under the command of Colonel Sarwo Idhie, who were scheduled for debarcation on 1 October to the Kalimantan Malaysian battlefront upon the request of coup planner, General Supardjo; Jakarta Garrison troops; the 528th Battalion of the West Java Silwangi, well-trained and battle tested in the campaigns ^Indonesia (Ithaca, New York: April, 1966), p. 170. ^For an analysis of Indonesian decision-making see Ann R. Willner, The Neotraditional Accommodation to Political Independence; the Case of Indonesia (Princeton. N.J.: Center of International Studies, 1966), pp. 51-57. === [PDF page 17] === 14 against the Darul Islam rebel Mueakhar during early 1965; and one KOSTRAD Brigade with artillery and armor (one armored car company under the direct command of Suharto). Based on this force and the promised restriction to quarters of Navy and Police forcesSuharto acted with extreme skill in dispatching his troops to recapture control of Jakarta from Lt. Col. Untung, the adopted son of President Sukarno, who was a commander of the Tjakabirawa Palace Guard and head of the "Council." Having identified units collaborating with the Palace Guard as the East Java 530th Battalion Brawidjaja and the 454th Diponegoro of Central Java (a unit in which Un tung once commanded), Suharto cleverly used past commanders of the 530th (from the West Irian campaign) to win this battalion over to his side by late noon, using the screened unit as further reinforcements. IttOO hours much of the 454th had gone over to the loyalist forces. early evening of 1 October, Nasution having joined Suharto at KOSTRAD Headquarters, control of the capital and the radio station was re-estab lished as the rebellious remnants of the 454th retreated to Halim on the outskirts of Jakarta. Negligible resistance was encountered in the city in the form of confused but armed PKI-affiliated and Air Forcetrained youths. Sukarno's call from Halim earlier in the day ordering Umar and General Pranoto (who was named the Army Chief of Staff as ïani's re placement by Sukarno) to report was refused by Suharto, who wanted to "preserve whatever generals were left." Edhie's efforts to achieve a bloodless surrender of Halim necessitated a helicopter trip to Bogor (forty miles from Jakarta), where Sukarno had gone after receiving ^Suharto received these promises from the respective Deputy Commanders. The Naval and Police Commanders were at Halim on 1 October and were later dismissed by Suharto. === [PDF page 18] === 15 Suharto1s ultimatum to leave Halim under the pretense, as advanced by Halim Air Commadore Dewanto, that such a surrender required the Presi dent’s direct order. This meeting proved futile for immediate results but Sukarno's indifference to the violence against the generals gave Edhie more reason for his zealous anti-PKI campaign of mid-October. Expecting an air attack^ Suharto alerted Army anti-aircraft units and evacuated KOS TRAD headquarters the night of 1 October as RPKAD units, backed by tanks, stealthily infiltrated the Halim perimeter under cover of darkness in readiness for a dawn attack. Again bloodshed was averted as the rebel remnants of the 4$4th and its colleagues evacuated Halim by foot and air for the Central Java Communist stronghold and a possible reorganization of forces. In quick succession an efficiently operating force of loyal TNI had regrouped, consolidated, taken the offensive, and assumed complete military control of the capital. Four battalions of Siliwangi were then ordered to Jakarta to aid in the security operations. Quick loyalist control also proved to be the case in North Suma tra, an area of high disaffection with central control and likewise a great degree of PKI infiltration in the military and governmental frame works. Acting without orders from a confused Jakarta, the North Sumatra military commander, General Kemal Idris, conducted a rapid sweep of his headquarters area, incapacitating disloyal troops. Finally, with per mission from Suharto, Idris moved on the provincial capital of Medan and, brandishing his sidearm in hand, entered the headquarters of the wavering local military command and quickly gained their support for the loyal forces. ^This was a correct estimate as later Mahmilub trials indicated. Heavily armed combat aircraft were ordered by Halim officers but never arrived from their home bases. === [PDF page 19] === 16 Regaining control of Central Java proved to be a task which re quired a concerted military effort that culminated in the mass genocide which characterized much of Indonesia from late October well into early 1966. Coup sympathizers effected a critical mutiny in the ranks of the Diponegoro. Under the leadership of Colonel Suhirman, head of Central Java G-2 and recently returned from military schooling in the United States, and the Diponegoro Division Assistant Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Usman, who took control of Division headquarters in Semarang during the early morning of 1 October, the coup elements issued orders for the formation of revolutionary councils in support of Untung in Jakarta. Diponegoro Division Commander General Sumpeno, making the rounds of his command area, narrowly escaped capture but was able to regroup loyal forces and neutralise the rebellious troops by personally recapturing Semarang while the rebels in Jogjakarta, having already killed the city's garrison commander Colonel Katamso and his Deputy, succumbed to armored units by 5 October. The new Jogja commander, Colonel Widodo, with the help of loyal troops, managed to pacify or remove the dissident elements of the local rebellious "L-Battalion" as Sumpeno conducted an immediate purge of the four Diponegoro units in volved. The major cities were secured but the entire string of vil lages along the main route between Jogja and Semarang was in the hands of rebellious elements. There followed a brief respite... a period of uneasy calm, consolidation of forces, and the long wait to see who would make the next move. The counter-coup throughout Indonesia had been executed in a relatively bloodless fashion. Erosion of Sukarno's Power The crisis of the time and Sukarno's adamant attitude in op posing TNI actions against the PKI (the Army had accumulated enough === [PDF page 20] === 17 “evidence” to implicate the PKI as perpetrator and executor of the Gestapu), forced the military hierarchy into initiating an effort aimed at the “legal” usurpation of the legitimacy and power that was Sukarno’s.1 This was seen as a necessity vis-a-vis the Communist threat to the political power claims and role of the military. Sukarno had the legitimacy of being in office, whether effective or not. He had the legitimacy borne as a leader of the Revolution and wielded the symbols of legitimate au Likewise the TNI was born of and bore the spirit of the Revo thority. lution, being its primary defender. The Army, though, was not in con trol of the executive, hence the need to erode Sukarno’s power via the Army’s program of control.By mid-October 1965 the pre-coup balance of power remained unchanged as the PKI awaited Sukarno’s assistance and protection. When the military went into action Sukarno countered in his customary grandiloquent style—only to be parried and slashed by the TNI’s countermoves. The TNI’s “one step forward" tactic of mid-December, resulting in a revamped, military-controlled Supreme Operational Command (KOTI),^ was the first move to alter the balance of power. The anti-Sukarno troika leadership of Suharto, Malik, and the Sultan of Jogjakarta re placed the Peking-Jakarta axis builder, Sukarno’s successor aspirant Subandrio. In order to legitimise its destruction of the PKI and erosion ^or an account of the process of Sukarno’s loss of formal au thority following Gestapu to his legal demise (MPRS Decision, 12 March 1967) and the implications of this ouster for the political future of Indonesia see Justus M. van der Kroef, “Sukarno’s Fall," Orbis, XI, No. 2 (Summer, 1967), 491-531. ^For Guy Pauker's analysis of the situation and the course of action taken by the TNI leadership see the Armed Forces Mail, May 17, 1967, ^See Chronologic al List of Control-Violence, pp. 109-15» === [PDF page 21] === 18 of the President's power, the Army deemed it necessary to proceed through the maze of parliamentary processes cautiously, since these moves would encounter heavy political and military resistance from those given posi tions by Sukarno. Through control of all means of mass media, by ju dicious and timely scheduling of Mahmilub,^ by exerting the proper so cial pressures at the opportune moment, and by its continual denial of any effort to oust Sukarno, the Army, while claiming to act only in de fense of Pantjasila and national unity, was able to achieve, after a protracted struggle, the legal ouster of Sukarno. The tactics used amounted, for Sulzberger of the New York Times, to "... a subtle, impeccably courteous, patriotic double-cross, using the symbol of national unity, despite itself, for the sake of unity. During the immediate post-coup pause, after the Army had re stored military security, Sukarno moved to regain the initiative. Die public and military demands for the banning of the PKI were ignored by him as his activities caused further widespread tensions and disruptions in the socio-politico-military fabric. Disregarding Sukarno's orders, the military intensified their security operations in answer to his No vember proposal for a new-style Indonesian Communist Party without for eign influence. Promising a "political solution" to the Gestapu "inter ruption" he concentrated on turning the nation's mind back to "konfrontasi" with Malaysia. The late December reorganization of the "Crush Malaysia" campaign (KOGAM) by Sukarno was a step in the direction of weakening the TNI's domestic power and influence. With the assistance of his lieuten ant, Subandrio, a concerted effort was made to maintain the leftward ^The Special Military Tribunal, which was authorized by Sukarno in December 1965 to bring to trial those responsible for Gestapu. ^The New York Times, April 8, 1966, p. 30. === [PDF page 22] === 19 political movement of Nasakom. On 20 November some 200 senior regional military officers were summoned to a closed-door conference at Bogor to reassert their confidence in Nasakom, and Sukarno closed the "Year of Taking Risks" with an address to KAMI asserting that "I won't give up Nasakom until I enter my grave." The military entered the year 1966 rapidly losing ground, cling ing loosely to the revamped but increasingly weakened KOTI. By mid February Sukarno had regained the initiative enough to safely state in public in response to the TNI's anti-PKI campaign: "... independence of the Republic of Indonesia is a result of the sweat and blood of all groups, of Nas and A as well as Korn... there is no group contributing more to the independence of our country except the Communists, the PKI. Challenges of this nature were followed by a proposal for the establish ment of a Sukarno Front (BS), which suggestion was quickly propagated by Subandrio. This BS was still-born, surprisingly enough as a result of the countermove by the West Java Siliwangi Commander General Adjis, a close friend of Sukarno, and the follow-up support of Adjie by Suharto and KAMI. After a Sukarno move to bring Nasution, Suharto, and Xdhie before ^Nasakom was Sukarno's plan for dividing power among the nation's chief competitors for a slice of the political pie. These three were the Nationalists (TNI included), religious groups, and the "Kommunists." 2PAB, December 24, 1965, p. 12. ^PAB, February 14, 1966, p. 1. \djie said that his administration (Siliwangi control of West Java) already constituted a Sukarno Front and any other front merely en couraged factionalism. This was a direct affront to Sukarno. === [PDF page 23] === 20 Mahmilub,^" the seemingly final blow to the ABRI and popular anti-PKI forces came with the 21 February announcement of the revamped Cabinet of "100 Ministers." This Cabinet excluded Nasution and Rear Admiral Martadinata (Commander of ALRI) bitter enemies of Sukarno but included staunch Sukarnoista who met with bitter public disapproval. This move further infuriated the numerous activists already militantly protesting the economic chaos resulting from the December 1965 monetary reform and served to accentuate this crisis-conflict period of "plin-plan" and "durnoiam."^ The resulting near-anarchic state of affairs caused by Sukarnoista and the "Parliament of the Street"^ forced Sukarno to yield the initiative and the much sought-after legitimacy to the Army in the form of the "March 11 Order.In a deft political move, the Army ac knowledged Sukarno's retention of full power—being exercized only through the medium of Suharto—in order that all forthcoming decisions against the leftists would appear to be Sukarno's alone. This point was further General Sutjipto SH, Minister of Agriculture and Suharto's chief speech-writer revealed that "... durno c.s. once even asked President Sukarno to bring Generals Nasution, Suharto, and Sarwo Edhie to the Mahmilub." Sukarno evidently considered this a favorable move but was prevented from doing such by the TNI. PAB, August 26, 1966, p. 2. ^Plin-plan (opportunists); and Nasution's definition of "... 'durno' (Machiavellist)... thief who is at the same time a policeman, a prosecutor and a judge..." and is therefore free to act unpunished. Antara, May 29, 1966, p. 6. ^The term used to refer to KAMI and KAPPI demonstrations calling for the realization of the "Tribura" (People's Three Demands): food prices; (2) Ban the PKI; ()) A New Cabinet. (1) Lower She immediate events leading to the March 11 Order were: a series of secret meetings in Bandung and Jakarta in early March; (b) an ultimatum to Sukarno to rid himself of Subandrio; (c) the movement of loyal troops into Java from all over Indonesia to reinforce the TNI's position; (d) a movement of RPKAD [incognito] troops to the Presidential Palace and; (e) an envoy of three generals trusted by Sukarno (Machmud, Rachmat, and Jusuf) to Bogor to get the President's "voluntary" signature. === [PDF page 24] === 21 emphasized by Minister Saleh’s television appearance, in which he con firmed that "political decisions are the monopoly of the President." The change in the political and social balance of power was in full swing. Rie PKI was immediately banned by Suharto and, within a week, Subandrio and fourteen other PKI sympathizing Ministers were taken into protective custody in an armed military move against the Presidential Palace while Cabinet was in session.Nasution was returned to public office as Deputy Supreme Commander of KOGAM. In April the TNI initiated an intensive campaign to "return to the Constitution" aimed directly at the erosion of Sukarno's power. This effort was emphasized in the "May 5 Statement" of ABRI which was a "... pledge to law, order, and radio audience. delivered by Suharto to a nationwide After extensive alterations in the membership of the parliamentary bodies (108 of a total 680 MPRS membership were dismissed), the nation's highest forum, the People's Consultative Congress (MPRS), convened in late June. appointed chairman. Sukarno's archenemy Nasution was unanimously This assembly confirmed the March 11 Order of trans ferrai of powers to Suharto; banned Communism and Marxism-Leninism in Indonesia; stripped Sukarno of his title "President for Life"; and de manded that the President "... complete his account to the MPRS, par ticularly on the causes leading to the .. affairs of the September 50 Movement/PKI and its aftermath and the economic decline including its character."3 The Government set about the serious task of resolving the \hen Sukarno balked at the "interim" Cabinet of the Army, RPKAD troops marched on the Palace and took into "protective custody" Subandrio, Saleh, and thirteen other Ministers. ^For the text of Suharto's radio address—see Antara, May 6, 1966, ^Results of Fourth MPRS Session in 1966 (Djakarta: p. 106. Antara, 1966), === [PDF page 25] === 22 catastrophic domestic and international difficulties which plagued In donesia. Many of these efforts diametrically opposed the policies and practices which Sukarno had pursued over the years regarding Western financial aid, status in the United Nations, prestige projects, con frontation with Malaysia, etc. Sukarno's teachings were cast aside to the detriment of his prestige, just as the dissolution of the National Front in September 1966 and the disruption of approximately forty extra bodies which Sukarno had created to keep the balance of power, led to the further erosion of his power base. The Mahmilub became a most lethal weapon in the hands of the TNI. By Presidential decree of December 196$, Suharto was authorized to establish this tribunal to try "those guilty of involvement in Gestapu."^ He was further authorized to decide who would be the defendants and the Army was charged with bearing the expenses incurred. By strategic scheduling of defendants according to the gravity of incriminating evidence against Sukarno, which was expected to be derived from the trials, the Army was able to heavily tarnish the public image of the charismatic leader. The three major Mahmilubs of late 1966 (ex-Minister of Banking Dalam, Subandrio, and Dhani) left little doubt of the ques tion of Sukarno's involvement in Gestapu. The TNI leadership's judicious exposure to the public of Sukarno's speeches^ permitted the Army to enable him to contribute to his own demise. Inhere were substantial indications that these trials were mere formalities for disposing of prejudged defendants. ^Sukarno's speeches were taped and screened by the TNI prior to release. The military undoubtedly knew the nature of his pro-Communist 17 August 1966, Independence Day speech but felt its public delivery would further implicate Sukarno in Gestapu and weaken his public image. New York Times, April 4, 1966, p. 5. For the text of Sukarno's August 1? speech see Never Leave History! (Djakarta: Department of Information, August 17, 19&). === [PDF page 26] === 23 Replacing Sukarno's military appointees with some of his bitter enemies, such as Dharsono, Idris, and Sutjipto S.H., further depleted sources of support for the President. By permitting student demonstrations when KAMI-KAPPI strength was needed to carry the issue at stake, and by re stricting the same when it was to the military's advantage, a powerful momentum was built. Smear campaigns dealing with the immorality and extravagance of Sukarno were carried on "behind the Army's back" in spite of their control over society and mass media.After each strategic move for greater control, the military encouraged nationwide statements of support from political and mass organisations, often conducting a military show of force to impress the serious nature of the proposed or completed move. The 4 December statement of the Indonesian Lawyers' Association (PERSHAI), emphasising that "Justice demands that anybody regardless of his rank and his past services to the country be subjected to punishment if he is found guilty... " was followed by the em phatic Armed Forces Commanders Joint Statement of 21 December, which promised joint military retribution to anyone hindering the implementa tion of the July MPRS decisions. The year 1966 closed with Malik pushing for the end of "dualism" in government, and with a promise of good news concerning the President's account of his role prior to Gestapu and dur ing its epilogue. Although Sukarno considered the MPRS to be "bound hand and foot and castrated,he responded to their July 1966 "request" with his ^This effort was conducted through newspaper accounts of the President's flair for women (and teenage girls) and through the "media" of sidewalk and wall scribblings of obscene accusations. ZpAB. December 17, 1966, p. 8. ^Ibid.. January 11, 1967, pp. 15-19. === [PDF page 27] === 24 Nawaksara supplement of 10 January 1967. denying any responsibility for the nation's state of affairs, and calling upon Nasution to defend his role of responsibility as Minister of Defense and Security. KAMI vigor ously protested this "account" as the machinery for the legal crushing of Sukarno went into rapid movement in late January in order to close the case against him. Jakarta commander Machmud told a radio audience on the 24th that he was ready to arrest Sukarno if ordered; and the Army leader of the Indonesian Workers' Association, on behalf of the Armed Forces, told Sukarno to "... end the divided leadership of In donesia or risk civil war."^ As a result of the failure of the "per sonal approach," outright insults were overtly uttered. The extent of the denigration of Sukarno's position was amply demonstrated by Minister of Information Diah's speech to students of a teachers' training insti tute, in which he claimed "... the chief task of the * 66 Generation is to destroy and remove the 'Supreme Clown' as the last vestige of the Old Order.After first having been promised Siliwangi support, Nasu tion answered the Nawaksara challenge in a fashion that further accused Sukarno, and he actively led the MFRS in establishing fact-finding bodies whose purpose was to gather the evidence needed to convict Sukarno and remove him from power. On 11 February Parliament unanimously approved a resolution to dismiss Sukarno. A Special Plenary session of MPRS was planned, with the sole purpose of ousting Sukarno. Supardjo, ex-Brigadier General mastermind of Gestapu, was scheduled to appear before the Mahmilub on 2) February, in what Nasution promised to be a trial that would like wise convict Sukarno. Under the stress of foreboding pressures and after ^Far Eastern Economic Review. LV, No. 5 (February 2, 1967), 148. ^Djakarta Times, February 3, 1967, p. 1. === [PDF page 28] === 25 a week of showdown meetings,1 Sukarno transferred all executive powers to Suharto effective 20 February 1967. Despite public clamorings for Sukarno's trial, Suharto advised the Plenary MPRS to get rid of Sukarno, but without excessive humilia tion; which tactic put the burden of toppling Sukarno on constitutional Riis 7 March MPRS, functioning with 114 members absent, made means. Suharto Acting President; withdrew Sukarno's mandate of power and stripped him of his remaining titles; barred him from any political activity until general elections; and left the question of a Commission of Inquiry on Sukarno's role in Gestapu to the Acting President. Justus van der Kroef's "Sukarno did not fall; he was hollowed out by a skillful po comment: litical guerrilla war... "^ seems to be a very exact estimate of the reality of the situation. The constitutional legality of the process, though questionable along technical lines, was acceptable to the general public, which had been conditioned throughout the erosion by the nation's well-controlled and successfully implemented program of public information. Of significant Events leading to the transfer of executive powers: February 7— letter of Sukarno—"... determined to hold the State leadership and to decide the main outlines of the leaderships of government." Far Eastern Economic Review, LV, No. 11 (March 16, 1967), 484. —on the possibility of transfer of power; 8—ABRI leaders decided to reject letter which amounted to the continuance of "dualism" in government; 10—Suharto re ported rejection to Sukarno; 11—ABRI commanders met with Sukarno at Bogor... stressed adherence to the constitutional way. Sukarno re quested meeting on the 12 th; 12 and 15—Bogor—Sukarno sent a message that requested certain guarantees (ABRI replied they were only "... able to guarantee their goodwill."); requested meeting on the 19th... four Commanders held a joint consultative meeting to determine common attitudes and views; 19—Bogor—inconclusive; 20—surprise summons of Admiral Muljadi by Sukarno. Sukarno agreed to sign the transfer of powers which "took place on the idea of President Sukarno" at 1700 hours. Antara, February 22, 1967« p. 10. Justus M. van der Kroef, "Sukarno's Fall," Orbis, XI, No. 2 === [PDF page 29] === 26 import in this program of public information was the utilisation of television to effect a more intimate transfer of information. Mass Media—Television Since the free press and other mass media jeopardised the revo lution during "liberal democracy"^ it became necessary for all mass media during the era of "Guided Democracy" to fall under strict govern mental regulation, and to serve only for the cause of the state and success of the revolution. As the newest member of the family of mass media, television in Indonesia was born into a state which stipulated that "... the TVRI [Television of the Republic of Indonesia] has a duty in advancing the mental, spiritual, and physical development of the nation." A crash program resulted in the first domestically-produced broadcast on 17 August 1962, in preparation for the IV Asian Games. Prior to October 1905, development in the field of television was markedly slow, with only one channel (E-9—having a 100 km. radius broadcasting range in Jakarta) and various relay stations (K-5 Bandung and E-8 Jogjakarta) tied into a Jakarta net. Public interest in this medium of mass communication was definitely on the incline, as revealed by statistics on television set ownership increase per year. Comparing sets increase per year from 1964 to the third quarter of 1966 in the cities of Djakarta, Bandung, and Bogor, it was seen that there existed Ifor two views on the history and role of mass media (newspapers) in Indonesia see: "The Press in Indonesia," Am pera Review, No. 5 (March 17, 1965), 21-22; and Khouw Giok Po, "Press Freedom in Indonesia," The AfroAsian Journalist, No. 7 (November/December, 1964), pp. 11-1). 2"Television: Its Development in Indonesia," Pantjasila, III, No. 19 (February, 1966), 17. === [PDF page 30] === 27 a slightly more than 25 per cent increase in Jakarta and about a 300 per cent increase in Bandung. With Jakarta encompassing 85 per cent of the television sets throughout Indonesia "... the capital citizens are television-minded."^ In spite of growing interest, the overall organization and re sults were less than those desired. But there was a marked increase in the television set population, whether this increase was for pur poses of conspicuous consumption or real interest. Whatever the pri mary interests of this audience, in addition to entertainment, tele vision was an important medium for explaining government policy. occasion, public transistor sets were placed strategically throughout Jakarta to gain a larger audience. Private sets were often placed on the verandah of the home in order to afford neighbors an opportunity to view, thus enlarging the viewing audience. Through such efforts there was an established audience which viewed photos of the six slain Generals. These were shown repeatedly on TV, accompanied by accounts of the brutality of the entire Gestapu movement. Although the tale of the events of the early hours of 1 October and Lubang Buaja had already been widespread by word of mouth, radio, and newspaper, the positive propaganda effect of this visual communication cannot be doubted. An estimated audience of ten people per set2 would give an audience of well over 300,000 in October 1965. With a curfew then in effect, and less evening traffic flow, it ^"MasJarakat Ibukota Televisi Minded?" ["Are the Capital Citizens Television Minded?"] translated from Business News. XI [November 30, 1966], 6. ^New York Times. July 18, 1965, p. 5. === [PDF page 31] === 28 may have reached far beyond this figure. However, it is a moot prospect on how many of the audience were politically conscious or how many be came political actors and what influence the information garnered from television had on their allegiances. With the expansion of military control during the post-coup period,^ there was a conscious effort to increase nationwide TV facil ities and coverage. taan announced: light days after the "March 11 Order" Pusat Pemberi- "All Mass-Media Under Guidance and Supervision of Army Information Center." Soon thereafter General Suharto presented a live TV speech explaining to the people the meaning and legitimacy of the "March 11 Order" and the purpose of the forthcoming MPRS. the legitimacy of recent developments he said: Outlining "... a good Government... not only relies on power but on authority..." Nasution explained to the same TV audience (£-5» X-8, and Ï-9) in June the mean ing of the 5 May 1966 joint statement and the Army's intent to refrain from toppling Sukarno or establishing a military junta. With large TV audiences in Jogjakarta (E-8 was in operation by 1966) and Surabaya, the military's effective use of this medium could well have been a factor greatly influencing the response, as it was so intended, of these staunchly pro-Sukarno areas of Central Java while the national balance of power was being altered. "Other than private owner ship of TV sets, there are scores of sets, especially in Central Java, to which the public at large have access for viewing TV programs... ^Purges of HRI-TVBI unions are discussed in PAB, December 23, 1965, P. 11. 2PAB, June 18, 1966, p. 7. === [PDF page 32] === 29 at places that are accessible to the general public.’’^ The late 1966 live televised Mahmilubs of Subandrio, and Dhani (and Supardjo’s in early 1967) were definitely planned as part of the program aimed at discredit ing Sukarno and legitimising the TNI's program. (Crash programs were conducted in certain areas to establish TV links prior to these trials.) Full TV coverage also was given to December P1RS HAI demands to oust the President constitutionally. Television addresses by prominent military or civilian personages closely followed military power moves, in addition to making a concerted effort to explain the economic program being at tempted. The role of the mass media in the New Order was outlined by Suharto as media which ... within the last five (5) months have succeeded in bringing society to the enjoyment of freedoms, however not yet to freedoms coupled with responsibility.... In the phases to come the govern ment with the social forces shall take further steps in order to improve the mass media in our country. In early 1967 the government’s use of the medium of television for political purposes was intensified along with the intensification of the anti-Sukarno campaign, and continued as part of the military ’s program of ’’consolidation and crystallization. ” The 6 April trial of the ex-Mayor of Solo was relayed to various areas by 1-8 in a continu ous effort of the TNI to gain the allegiance still tacked to Sukarno in this critical area of Central Java. In the framework of extending television service,^ a nationwide ^Much of the information in this section on television is through the courtesy of the Kedutaan Besar Indonesia (Embassy of Indonesia), Edu cational and Cultural Division, Washington, D.C. Private correspondence, November 22, 1967. ^Chairman of the Ampera Cabinet Presidium [Suharto], Government Report to the People (Djakarta: Department of Information, 19^7), p. 20. ^By November 1967 a total of five stations were in operation (1-4 Semarang and 1-7 Nagrak began broadcasting in the fall of 1967). === [PDF page 33] === 30 program is presently being conducted with varying degrees of success. Negotiations (Fall, 1967) with last Germany are probing the possibility of establishing a TV Training Center at a cost of three and one-half million German Marks. Efforts are being made to tie in Medan (North Sumatra) with Jakarta in order to gain the audience presently held by Likewise, efforts to gain the eye of the East and South Su Thai TV. matran TV audience of Singapore television broadcasting will eventually Financing, technical incompetence, and a host of other dif be made. ficulties are being encountered, but past successes prove they can be overcome. * nationwide TV network can prove to stimulate great suc cesses in the implementation of the present government's program, which needs the support of a mobilized and well-informed populace and has an "... important task to carry out in connection with the holding of the forthcoming [late 1969?] general elections. Domestic Civil and Governmental Spheres Paralleling the erosion of Sukarno's power and the consequent changes in the balance of power was a nationwide purge of the entire civil and governmental organisational framework (both domestic and foreign), which contributed greatly to the ascendency of the military into a position of greater authority. This purge entailed efforts aimed at the complete eradication of PKI influence as well as actions against the ethnic Chinese minority. Due to vested interests and inimical sen timents towards the Army's all pervading role in society, it was neces sary, as was the case with Sukarno, to execute this program with cantion and timeliness in order to preclude undesirable repercussions. ^Djakarta Times, September 15, 1967, p. 2. === [PDF page 34] === 31 Soon after the abortive coup the TNI initiated a nationwide pro paganda campaign accusing the PKI of having planned the affair with the aid of Peking. Acting under the powers of the "state of war" imposed on Jakarta 2 October and a bit later, nationwide, the military temporar ily suspended the activities of PKI and its affiliates and ordered the dismissal of members of both from government offices and state-run en terprises on all levels. Nasution's plan for this purge entailed: First step is to eradicate them to the roots, by utterly destroying their organizations, take the actors before the Military Court Kxtraordinary. Secondly all state apparatuses, as tools of the Revolution, should be purged of Gestapu elements and individuals, both in the State Institutes and in the Military Units.1 Since the PKI was a legal organization, its members were known. Conse quently, its leaders and officials were relatively easy to round up in the nightly post-Gestapu security sweeps of Jakarta and other major metropolitan areas. Military intelligence proved to be very effective in leading to the destruction of communist cells, which was done simply by arresting the leaders, the only ones able to link the cells together for collective retaliation. Once administrative control was more firmly established in Jakarta, the anti-Communist crackdown soon spread to the rest of Java and the archipelago. stages, military and civilian. The overall purge occurred in two Since the regional commander exercised de facto control through the Pantjatunggals,^ which the military con trolled within the scope of their emergency powers, the civilian anti- PK1 activities were greatly affected by the military program. Following ^PAB, December 7, 1965, p. 1. ^These were regional administrative bodies consisting of members of five (Pantja) services: Armed Forces, Police, Judicial Authority, Civil Service, and National Front. === [PDF page 35] === 32 the nation-wide self-dissolution of their organizations (GERWANI, BTI, Peeuda Rakjat et al.).^ the M... PKI-Gestapu members who dissociated themselves from their organizations actively supported the Indonesian Armed Forces in hunting down their erstwhile leaders, [and] this prac tice has now become a 'conditio sine qua non' for a political party to disband itself. The Gotong Royong House of Representatives was quickly purged in October, and by November reports of thousands of civil servants' suspensions were recorded. The purge of the nation's entire administra tive structure resulted in the placement of military personnel in every layer of government down to and including village administration. The simple criterion for guilt was association with the PKI (whereas in the ABRI it was support of Gestapu) and consequently many effective adminis trators were replaced by inexperienced and inefficient, however loyal, military managers and administrators. By November, fifty-seven members of Parliament had been banned as every ministry underwent extensive purges themselves and were responsible for purging all subordinate branches. Special teams were set up to conduct purges within the National Defense and Security Ministry, ABRI, Veterans and Veterans' Legion, and Civil With the December reorganization of KOTI, the Central Intel Defense. ligence Bureau (BPI) was merged into the National Intelligence Command in an effort by Suharto to control the guidance and coordination of civilian and military intelligence. But, in spite of this seemingly 1April 1965 estimates credited these PKI-oriented front organi zations with the following membership: Gerwani (women)—1.75 million; BTI (peasants)—8.5 million; Pemuda Rakjat (students—2 million and; SOBSI (labor)—3.5 million. R. Ramakrishanan, "Sino-Indonesian Relation," Foreign Affairs Reports, XIV, No. 4 (April, 1965), 59. Djakarta Daily Mail. December 17, 1965, p. II. === [PDF page 36] === 35 comprehensive purge, top leaders and PKI sympathizers in high level government positions were left unscathed. The successful efforts of the TNI-KAMI marriage in the early months of 1966 in meeting and overcoming the Sukarno-Subandrio threat gave birth to the “March 11 Order" signalling an intensification of the purge. Since the true "durnoists" had shown their hands prior to the "Order," it was less difficult for the military and screening teams to locate the sources of discord within the various governmental agen cies. An almost immediate purge of BPI was initiated with serious in tensity. On 18 March BPI’s director Subandrio was taken into protective custody, and a few days later the order went out to all BPI officials and members to report to the authorities within five days or be subject to prosecution. All state agencies were purged of BPI agents, and by the end of the month all BPI buildings were put under the jurisdiction of the Djakarta Pepelrada.^ In late August the BPI was dissolved by General Suharto and replaced by the Komando Intelidjen Negara (KIN) and placed under his chairmanship. The Department of Foreign Affairs, likewise under Subandrio18 In a report dated 19 April control, underwent a very extensive purge. treating the first stages of the purge, it was revealed that some senior officials, including the chief of the Directory of Psychological Warfare, had been suspended by order of the new Foreign Minister Malik for con nections with the BPI. The Foreign Department Youth Movement (GPD) was banned and dissolved as "servants" of ex-Minister Subandrio. In the framework of the second stage of putting the ministry in order, it was ^The Pepelrads were the highest regional governmental bodies. === [PDF page 37] === announced on 20 May that twenty-eight officials had been recalled from abroad. In June the Indonesian ambassadors to Hanoi and Havana were dismissed in the course of the investigations of screening teams sent abroad. Beginning in August of 1966 the fifth of these teams (consist ing of one military and three civilian members) conducted screening of Indonesian foreign diplomatic staffs in Thailand, the United States, Vest Germany, and Cairo. A Foreign Department statement in February 1967 reported that to date five ambassadors and 214 Indonesians abroad had lost their passports as a result of the investigations and first completed purge. In an "upgrading" course for the Department of Foreign Affairs, Chairman of the MPRS, A. H. Nasution, stressed the necessity to "... step up vigilance against the efforts to deviate us from the constitutional way... lawless way... [which is] harmful to us be cause it will blur the struggle of the New Order and will shake the fu ture of our republic... "^ Similar "upgrading" courses were initiated in various foreign embassies, and students studying abroad were screened to some degree. In the course of events, many military men assumed positions throughout the Foreign Ministry, thereby increasing the num ber of ambassadorships held in pre-Gestapu days. In an immediate effort to cleanse the Ministry of Justice and its far-reaching courts system, over one hundred regional prosecutors were ordered to Jakarta in December 1965 to undergo retooling and up grading. Among these, the Medan High Prosecutor was reported to have been behaving mysteriously in confinement and then to have "disappeared completely." An intensive program to cleanse and revamp the total Justice ^PAB. January 51, 1967, p. 4. === [PDF page 38] === 35 Department was conducted under the guidance of the new Attorney General, General Sugi Ar to. By May 1966 over one thousand officials in the Ministry, including eleven Senior Prosecutors and numerous prosecutors who had refused transfer to temporary provincial duties, were discharged. Beginning in December, intelligence courses for prosecutors were con ducted and a "National Vigilance Course" on Communism was introduced to familiarize the officials with and enable them to eradicate Communism. In June of 1967 Arto announced that about five hundred officials in the prosecution department had been dismissed as part of the nation’s anti graft campaign. In July the Chairman of the Djakarta Special State Court was among those judges relieved for irregularities in the issuance of citizenship certificates. In many instances the Army presented KOTI or the Cabinet Presidium with a fait accompli concerning certain aspects of this program of purge and control. It was the West Java regional commander who proclaimed the first total ban on the PKI in late November. Under the power of the 11 March mandate the government ordered all PKI affiliates to report to their local military commander by 31 March, and ordered that they be refused membership in all parties and mass organizations. The TNI asked for the formal resignation of about forty ministers (of whom fifteen were suspended and taken into custody on 18 March) of the "Cabinet of 100," which it dissolved. The newly appointed ministers were announced in Sukarno’s name in an attempt to establish the legitimacy of the new government. By publicly admitting to the legitimacy of the 1945 Con stitution and the many extraordinary powers which it gave to Sukarno, the military was laying part of the foundation for more extensive civil powers. Suharto, at an installation ceremony of twenty-five Army officers === [PDF page 39] === 36 becoming ministers, stated that there "... is no other choice but to be part of the new order and take responsibility for its development. By putting the burden of nation saving on the shoulders of the ABRI, Suharto made a commitment, the realization of which the military saw as being its own judge and jury. In the context of its program of politicoeconomic domestic and international problem-solving, the military brought back into prominence a small group of veteran politicians, trained economists and technicians in an effort to help rebuild the almost to tally disrupted administrative and financial systems. While this pro gram of nation-building and saving was going on, the widespread purge and reorganization of the total societal structure continued with the necessary intensity. In the context of Suharto's oft-printed and broadcast statement that for Indonesia in its present state, "social control is necessary to build up the new order," administrators in various government slots were reassigned to Jakarta and teachers and instructors were purged, numbering in the thousands. In the early days of October 1965 the military had quickly taken control of vital civilian agencies (Postal Union, oil companies, aviation, electricity and gas, water, telecom munications, etc.) and placed its men as "temporary supervisors" in the administrative structure of almost every occupational and organizational field. In the purges of state-run cooperatives the discovery of great financial deficits were turned to the TNI's advantage. KOTI ordered IpAB, September 19, 1966, p. 9» ^By blaming unbalanced books on PKI members' and affiliates' channeling of these funds for PKI activities, the TNI was able to invest its own "temporary" managers as well as (possibly) further divert reven ues for personal use, casting the blame for the loss of these resources on the "communist" ex-managers. === [PDF page 40] === 57 all business houses to form vigilante teams to guard against counter revolutionaries and economic guerrillas. The status of two of the na tion's most powerful and popular organizations, the Veterans' Legion of the Republic of Indonesia and the National Front, was radically altered. Under the direction of General Sarbini the Veterans' Legion was under close observation throughout the entire period following Gestapu. PKI infiltration of the Legion was so extensive that it was public knowledge that the Vets were serving as military training grounds for PKI members. After the coup, repeated purges (by December 1965. five members of the Central Executive Body and twenty-three Staff members were dismissed along with over 1,600 other Gestapu elements) still failed to purify the leadership and membership sufficiently. It was discovered that the screening team for Vets in Central Java was only registering pro-Communists in spite of the March 1966 order which dropped any PKI member from veterans' rolls (entailing loss of veteran's status and cer tain privileges). This politically and economically1 powerful organi zation was finally put under the post of a Minister of Veterans Affairs within the Ministry of Defense and Security. The National Front, a creation of Sukarno initiated to spread his policies and facilitate his balancing of national political forces, was one of the organizations most severely attacked by the public. Ear marked by Sukarno to promote his BS in early 1966, large segments of the 1During the Spring 1966 conference of Veterans' organizations multi-purpose companies were established to serve, if needed, as welltrained elements in production and to give suggestions and guidance to veteran-owned businesses such as their enamel product factory, fishing enterprises, and a silk company, the biggest in Southeast Asia, scheduled to begin operations in June 1967• === [PDF page 41] === 38 organization incriminated themselves by their continual violation of the New Order (by refusing to abide by recently-issued mandates) and support of Old Order tactics. By gaining the reputation as a refuge for ex-PKI members and refusing to purge its leadership the Front promoted its own demise. After a June 1966 transfer of leadership to R. Abdulgani and further attempts to purge the organization failed to produce any posi tive results, the Front was frozen in various regions and finally of ficially dissolved on 27 September 1966 on the grounds that it no longer performed any necessary function. The dissolution of the National Front was preceded by the es tablishment of a variety of organizations (civil defense, youth groups, religious organizations, etc.) which were to eventually replace it. part of the effort to warm the lower levels of the political stream1 the ABRI made a concerted effort to mobilize all segments of society down to the lowest levels. Strict orders went out to labor and trade unions pro hibiting takeovers and strikes by any groups in vital state and private companies. gional SOBSI, the PKI labor union, was disbanded and replaced. and district commanders were made responsible for insuring the organization of new front movements established to support the New Order. As early as 30 November 1965, ABRI moved to establish the people’s civil defense organizations (Hansip and Hanra; widescale purges of these or ganizations yielded numbers in the tens of thousands, e.g., North Sumatra reported 20,000 suspended by the end of November 1965) under one compact 1The_New York Times recorded the statement of an Indonesian scholar who felt that "You should remember that politics in Indonesia is like a river in the sun. The top three inches of water are warm, but below them are several feet of cool water that flows on unconcerned... people are that cool part." New York Times. October 27, 1965, p. 12. === [PDF page 42] === 39 command, the "Garuda Pantjasila" or Pantjasila Front. Various front organizations were established during the immediate post-coup days for the purpose of eradicating Gestapu and PKI;^ and at a later date ones which professed to desire a holy war against remnants of the Old Order. In North Sumatra » Security Coordination Command (KKK) was es tablished in an effort to make "bad elements" help the Armed Forces eradicate the Gestapu and prevent sabotage which had already begun in November 1965. Chatiks lthose who gave sermons in mosques) were dis charged and hundreds of dalangs (directors of Wayang-the traditional all-night shadow plays which are an integral part of Indonesian culture) were subjected to upgrading courses in order to "deepen their knowledge in connection with the development of Pantjasila culture." An extensive program of indoctrination of tourism officials, under the direction of Abdulgani, was intended to give foreigners the "proper" view of Indonesian developments and to raise the nation's prestige. Central-Regional Govern ments Working Conferences were established to create a harmonious coopera tion and working atmosphere between both. Eventually all state enter prises, state, and private banks were put under the control of Pepelrada, without changing the management, in an effort to prevent economic dis turbances caused by the "Gestapu/PKI, political/economic guerrillas." The rehabilitation of the political party, Murba, in November 1966 af fected the political balance of power to the favor of the TNI, and close control of the activities of political parties and mass organizations facilitated the military's purge and control program. The ^epelrad's ^The Combined Action Body for Crushing the September 30 Movement was formed on 2 October 1965, of over forty mass organizations (excluding PNI and Partindo) and was very active in aiding in the retooling and purge of government agencies along with "shipping out" fighters, many of whom died in Central Java or Sumatra. === [PDF page 43] === 40 order for the re-registration of all organizations and the requirement to turn in working schedules (concerning activities in the economic, political, social and cultural fields) was part of the intensive effort to isolate ex-PKl and sympathizers and to channel all activities in the desired direction. Civilians and political parties took much into their own hands in the course of assisting the Army's purge and rectification. Hiey conducted purges within their own ranks in many cases at the sacrifice of personal sentiments. Buildings and assets of banned organizations were taken over by them and turned over to local military authorities. Antara reported1 in mid-1967 that 1,302 of the 8,466 village heads in Central Java had been implicated in Gestapu, many forced out of office or exterminated by the villagers themselves. Of the vacancies created, 65 per cent were provisionally filled with military "caretakers" as was the vogue throughout the archipelago. The military found the civil populace so enthusiastic, in fact, that it became necessary early in the purge to impose regulations on their activities. One of those seg ments which was most active, even credited by many authorities as having carried the TNI through the dark days of early 1966, was the Indonesian students. ^By mid-September 1966 over 70,000 communists had been captured in Central Java. Among these were 80 per cent of the district and 40 per cent of the regional PKI committee members. Antara, September 22, 1966 (afternoon edition), p. 7. ^A characteristic explanation of why the military assumed adminis trative positions was: "... with the capacity and responsibility to the safety of the State and the Revolution based on the state of emergency laws... in accordance with the tasks of the Ampera Cabinet, particularly the task of achieving political stabilization which is closely related to security." Djakarta Times, January 30, 1967, p. 28. === [PDF page 44] === 41 Various student organizations were frozen (operational activities halted by local military authorities) in the early days of October 1965 in order to control their activities along with those of all mass or ganizations. As the direction of the purge was clarified, various uni versity student organizations joined together to form the Action Front of Indonesian University Students (KAMI) in late October. Branches of this organization were established in major university towns, as the KAMI consisted of elements which had been Army-trained^ and were led by military men. Constituting such a formidable force, as the "Parlia ment of the Street" proved, KAMI, in league with its little brother, the Indonesian High School Students and Youth Action Front (KAPPI), formed after an angry Sukarno banned KAMI in February 1966, was of necessity a force to be reckoned with by the TNI. Both having the same immediate aspirations, the TNI and KAMI-KAPPI became compatible bedfellows as the students brought Jakarta to a state of near anarchy prior to the "March 11 Order." The clandestine "Radio Ampera" student broadcasts were made possible with equipment furnished by the military. Students were moved to and from demonstration areas in military vehicles as members of the armed services stood by in tacit approval if not outright support. During the period following the mandate to Suharto it became necessary to impose restrictions upon this "Generation of * 66" which, with its new-found legitimacy through violence, was determined to pur sue a rapid solution to the problems at hand. The Army saw that such a rapid unconstitutional solution would cause prematurely too many dis locations in society and the power structure. In an effort to regulate ^For an account relating that since 1962 many of the 18,750 Jakarta university students had received military training, many of whom aided the TNI in the anti-PKI mop up operations see PAB, May 25, 1967, p. 5. === [PDF page 45] === KAMI-KAPPI activities, purges were conducted in their ranks and numer ous university students and lecturers were either dispelled or subjected to upgrading courses. The TNI worked laboriously to maintain a favorable student-military relationship through the good offices of KOSTRAD Com mander Idris and the students' favorite, Sarwo Idhie of the HPKAD. Speak ing on the unity between the ABRI and People (KAMI) at a KAMI upgrading course, Idris stated: 11... the Armed forces have really become like fish in water among the people.. This unity was promoted through a governmental order to teach the New Order in the schools. Primary school children were required to become members of the scouting program, Pramulka. Military officers were put into staff positions at various universities. On 31 March 1966 the Universités Bung Karno (pro-Sukarno) was put under the control of Jakarta Pepelrada, and KAMI was admitted into the governmental framework (by February 1967 Parliament listed thirteen KAMI representatives). Student protests were met with increasing restraint by the military, causing a severe straining of their relationship. After the armed violence of October 1966 and the enforced ban on demonstrations brought the students into line, they were again used by the military in its moves for the consolidation of power. In the early days of 1966, "in order to safeguard the revolution," rifles and machine guns were issued to 3,000 paramilitary students in Jakarta. occurred even earlier in Bandung. Issuing of weapons This widespread arming and training of university students became a part of the program for national defense and security within the framework of the student Compulsory Military* IpAB. September 11, 1967, p. 1. === [PDF page 46] === Training (WALAWA)^ established by Suharto in the fall of 1967. Though initially opposed by the students, this institution described by Suharto as "... not a symptom of 'militarism ... but has a function in the overall democratic people's defense system,"^ was made operational through various pilot projects in some of the major cities of Indonesia. Much credit for the acceptance of this policy and the numerous others advanced to the public throughout the two-year period following the attempted coup must go to the successful program of control exercised in the fields of mass-media and communications. It was through control of both these areas that the military was able to localize its information audience and channel their mental activities. One of the first objectives of Suharto on 1 October was to re take Radio Jakarta in order to reassert control over the capital's in formational network. The necessity of controlling the sources of public information in a time of crisis was self-evident, just as were the ef forts to check the movement of civilians within an area and between areas. The military took immediate control of all mass media, transportation,^ and communications. Military roadblocks were established at strategic traffic-flow points. Civilian aircraft and airfields were put under TNI control, as was the railway system. The PKI-dominated Postel and Telegraph Union was suspended, with activities under its direction being assumed by emergency military groups. Strict policies were established ^The full text of the briefing on WALAWA (history, patterns, aims, purpose, and curriculum) is contained in the Armed Forces Courier, Septem ber 2), 1967, pp. V, VIII. ^Djakarta Times, August 3, 1967, p. 1. An example of this continued control was the Governor of Jakarta, tough KKO Commander, Ali Sadikin's mid-1967 "request" that government offices and private entrepreneurs contribute busses for public trans portation when not in actual use by their owners. === [PDF page 47] === 44 concerning the issuance of identification cards, and unnecessary civil ian transportation and travel was forbidden in order to check the flow of PKI leaders and members and to prevent their regrouping. As part of the military's Civic Action program, highway repair was undertaken with much vigor in an effort to facilitate rapid troop deployment to troubled areas. For a period following 18 March 1966 the Immigration Department forbad Indonesian nationals, except those on official state duty, to leave the country. All telecommunications were put under strict Army control in order to regulate internal and external news control. Telephone service in Jakarta was severed immediately in order to pre clude intramural liaisons of PKI elements attempting to regroup. The curfew clamped on various areas and cities permitted the nightly se curity sweeps to achieve great successes. Without exception the civilian's every move and action was subject to military restraints just as his mind was continually exposed to information which was under strict military control. Those newspapers which had supported the Gestapu were immediately banned, and eventually almost one-third of the nation's newspapers we» banned as being pro-Communist and intensive purges were conducted among the personnel of others. In North Sumatra the Pepelrad prohibited the publication of ANY information other than that quoted, in full, from military and political reports or broadcasts. An immediate purge was conducted in Antara, the only national news agency, which was highly in filtrated by the PKI and its Hansip dissolved to be replaced at a later date by New Order supporters. A nationwide purge of the Indonesian Journalists Association (PWI) was reinforced by "upgrading courses" (in January of 1966 about 500 reporters went to Jakarta for the first === [PDF page 48] === 45 three-month course) for journalists in all fields. Through effective control of the press, the Army was able to conduct its anti-PKI cam paign, promote the erosion of Sukarno ’ s power, and violently attack any group opposing its policies or attempting to "hinder the implementation of the New Order." The intensive information campaign of the military made it difficult to separate the Army’s political grain from its propa gandistic chaff. Die far reaches to which this segment of the program of control aspired is indicated by the Basic Education and Culture Minis try’s "... instruction made in connection with the recent revival of comic strips which exert a significant influence upon the further growth of the mentality of children."1 In order to "improve management" the government stopped subsidizing newsprint and a new press regulation re quired that each party was permitted one newspaper, which became an organ of that party, with all responsibilities this entailed for that political party. This served as a double check and guarantee of caution in criti cizing governmental policies. As part of the struggle to gain the loyalties of those in Central and last Java the government subsidized the distribution of various Jakarta newspapers in these areas since the lack of newsprint and expenses involved, in addition to severe cen trally controlled censorship, produced a scarcity of news in these areas. The military, by inhibiting the circulation of local mass media in these areas, was able to spread its "preferred" information in an effort to control the growth in allegiance to the New Order. Not only were the newspapers instrumental in encouraging alignment with the post-Gestapu administration, but they were also among the chief forces cultivating discord aimed at the Chinese segment of society. For it was through the news media that the TNI in late October 1965 dropped any euphemisms used 1 Antara, May 30, 1966, p. 7. === [PDF page 49] === 46 in referring to its deadly opponent and openly campaigned against the PKI in the radio and press, implicating Peking for its role, thus tying in the domestic Chinese, The Overseas Chinese Association (BAPERKI) was banned on 9 De cember 1965» its assets frozen and put under Pepelrada, and its leaders investigated. As the intensity of the anti-PKI program increased so did the intensity of diplomatic conflicts between Peking and Djakarta. With the failure of Sukarno to regroup his forces in March, and consequent anti-Chinese activities, Peking stepped up her press campaign against Indonesia. This was used as an excuse to intensify measures of control over the Communist Chinese nationals in Indonesia. Anti-Chinese demands had been on the increase since October of 1965, coming especially from Islamic parties and leaders, KAMI and KAPPI. There were some strong anti-Chinese groups in the coalition which had forced the 11 March 1966 mandate, so consequently there followed extensive activities aimed at firmer control over the Chinese community. In late March Hsinhua was closed for reason of its "frequent at tacks on the Indonesian Government and Army," and the Chinese consulates in Surabaya, Makassar, and Bandjarmasin were ordered closed. In April all overseas Chinese schools were banned, being nationalized in early May. In North Sumatra the directors of these schools were ordered to leave the country. Orders were issued in Jakarta on 30 June for all Chinese nationals who were executive members of any Chinese organization, federation or school to register at the Attorney General's Office; and the transfer of assets and property—including that of religious and social bodies and banks owned or dominated by Chinese—was strictly forbidden. Various social organizations were banned on the grounds === [PDF page 50] === 47 of "harboring fugitive PKI" and Baperki1s former small rival, the In stitute for the Fostering of National Unity (LPKB) was encouraged by the Army. Public pressure demanded the repatriation of all Chinese aliens, and the military commander of Atjeh, in northern Sumatra, carted off hundreds of Chinese in an effort to fulfill his order demanding that all alien Chinese leave. Pressure was put on Chinese to change their names to Indonesian ones, Chinese signs were forbidden in front of shops, and Chinese language newspapers were banned and replaced with ones edited by the military.With the intensification of indoctrination they were printed sporadically, but during periods of a change in policy they were ordered to stop publication. At the August 1966 Bandung Conference it was decided, among other policies, to eliminate Chinese economic predominance. of Chinese shops were ordered. Occasional boycotts In late December a Committee for Investi gating Activities of Aliens was installed in North Sumatra to conduct investigations primarily in the economic and social fields. The use of the Chinese language in public was prohibited, especially in matters deal ing with finance, economics, and communications. The extremely derogatory word "Tjina" was made official and spoken on the radio. Various provinces or cities were "closed" to aliens seeking new residence there in order to prevent an influx (and consequent intensification of the local Chinese problem) of the Chinese from areas of great restrictions and persecutions. The focus of the program of Chinese control fell on East Java in late 1966. Here the commander, General Sumitro, prohibited alien and stateless Chinese ^On 5 October the Medan Press Summary announced that PAB was to initiate a Chinese language edition of PAB in order to "... enable the Chinese community to actively follow the Indonesian revolution." === [PDF page 51] === 48 to engage in rural wholesale and intermediary trade, putting a poll tax on both categories, and forbidding Chinese to change their place of residence. In April of 1967 the Chinese were ordered to hand over their shop keys to local authorities. Those seeking repatriation ran into many difficulties in procuring passports. By June, over 625 Chinese schools had been taken over and re-opened, with first priority to In donesian students, and any remaining vacancies open to Chinese. were forbidden to build their own schools. They Jakarta Commander Machmud's 20 April "Operation Security," a search for firearms and documents in the hands of all Chinese, brought repercussions from Peking in the form of a declaration announcing certain high Indonesian diplomats personae non gratae... leading eventually to the October break in diplomatic relations between Peking and Indonesia. The widespread organizational purges and reorganization would seem to indicate that the military controlled the predominant segment of the mobilized society and consequently was able to make the New Order of a form molded to its liking. This, however, was not the case, as can be realized through a closer comparative analysis of the program of control as effected in Medan (North Sumatra) and Surabaya (last Java).^ Briefly, the state of affairs in each area was as follows: (a) North Sumatra was the PKI stronghold on that island; General Idris took im- ^This analysis is based upon the news reported in the (a) Medan Press Summary (August 1964-August 1967) of various Medan Indonesian Language newspapers, prepared by the American Consul in Medan, (b) Deli Times (10 October 1965-9 November 1965) of Medan which changed its name to the Frontier (10 November 1965-13 January 1966) and (c) Surabaya Press Summary (October l965-July 1967). === [PDF page 52] === mediate and effective control of his command area and the TNI aided ex tensively in the purge; it was (is) an area with a high rate of smuggling and large concentrations of Chinese businessmen; (b) last Java with the Naval and Marine (KKO) headquarters at Surabaya was Sukarno's birthplace and an area of great loyalty to him; bloody purges here were conducted by Moslem Ansor youths. Examining the dates of implementation of various measures of control, it is seen that there was very little exact cor respondence between the two areas. In general North Sumatra responded more quickly to orders emitted from central authorities (quite a change from the Permesta rebellion 1958-19621) and enforced more measures on its own initiative. Surabaya implemented the same measures at a later date, not at all, or in its peculiar way.^ Much can be garnered about the situation and effectiveness of control measures from an examination of the information relating to various military personnel relieved from and assigned to these areas. The underlying causes of this imbalanced control were the familiar centrifugal forces of Indonesia—violation of military authority as a symptom of internal divisions in the TNI and ABRI, clashes of military personalities, conflicts arising over infringement on areas of vested interests, political and personal alignments, etc. The overall program of control had many weaknesses and hence produced results with varying degrees of effectiveness. The presence of PKI sympathizers on screening teams and purging bodies^ caused further confusion to the already chaotic ^Tor example, General Edhie, North Sumatran Commander banned PNI activities whereas East Java Commander Jasin gave the PNI five months to clean itself. ^Oei Tjoe Tat, a known PKI sympathizer and Baperki leader was a member of the Central Screening Committee. He was among the fifteen minis ters arrested in mid-March 1966. Various screening teams and purging bodies had to be purged themselves on a large scale. === [PDF page 53] === 50 state of affaire and proved to be counterproductive in relation to the results of the purge. Widespread disruption occurred in the country’s economic, governmental, educational, and legal structure as a result of the anti-Chinese restrictions and violence, the replacement of competmt officials with incompetents, purges of the educational system, and the near-cataclysmic breakdown of the courts system. The effectiveness of military men in their new positions reflected upon the reputation of the central government. Though the efforts to expand control were so ex tensive, there continues to be insubordination to the enforcement of various control activities (such as the refusal of many to take down Sukarno’s picture in late 1967). In view of the questionable effective ness of the program of control it is advisable to examine the efforts made within the military framework to achieve more centralized control and better unity. An understanding of the balance of power within the ABRI may contribute to a better understanding of the results, to date, of the program of control and the present situation in Indonesia. Within the Army and Armed Forces The extensive and critical involvement on such a widespread scale of the TNI in national, social, economic, and political affairs during the half-decade prior to Gestapu was gravely affected by the de gree of control exerted within the Army and Armed Forces. Oils control was even more a pressing necessity after October 1965 since the military was venturing on a sweeping program of reform and control with fewer restrictions upon it than before. Gestapu forces had committed a "fundamental violation"^ and thus could legitimately be countered by "^"Whereas "routine violations" such as smuggling, bribery, etc., were acceptable a "fundamental violation," one which threatened the very life of the State, was intolerable and punishable by the unrestricted use of the means of violence. Nasution, People’s Army, p. 15. === [PDF page 54] === 51 the machinery of violence. The main efforts of control within ABRI con sisted of (a) purging the military forces involved in or sympathetic to Ges tapu; (b) clearing the air of the "slander" of the "Generals' Council" and (c) an intense effort to achieve greater unity within and between the four branches of ABRI. The anti-PKI campaign had an intended by-product of greater military unity by persuading those involved that they had been duped, and consequently they wanted revenge, thus joining against a com mon enemy. At hand was the problem of whether the Army could prevent fissures in its own body from being exploited by dissident elements and Sukarno in a manner which would check the efforts of the anti-PKI and anti-Sukarno program. Suharto's immediate military control action was to prevent the continued support of disloyal units to Gestapu. In Jakarta, the Diponegoro 530th and Brawidjaja 454th were purged and retained in the capital in or der to assist in security operations. Some units of the 550th were sent to Sulawesi in order to combat remnants of Muzakkar, and others, in March of 1966, to Surabaya for security duties. The disloyal Central Java units, after an immediate purge in which a number of disloyal of ficers were neutralized, were rapidly deployed to the "Konfrontasi" front in Sumatra and Kalimantan, and loyal units from other parts of Java and even Sumatra assumed their command responsibilities. In the mop-up operations following his security sweep, RPKAD commander Kdhie "advised" the Central Java Diponegoro commander to dissolve political parties and purge the Division (the 406th Bn was sent to Jakarta until ^This was supposedly a group of high-ranking staff officers who met in May 1965 and plotted to take over the reins of government. For a treatment of this subject see John Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval (New fork: David McKay Company, Inc., 1967), Index: "Council of Generals," p. 300. === [PDF page 55] === 52 late September 1966 and another unit was reassigned outside Java) to keep dissident elements from sympathizing and integrating. By 30 October it was reported that only ten officers and enlisted men were still miss ing from the disloyal units of Surakarta and Jogjakarta; RPKAD and KKO units were moved, and in some cases permanently assigned, to trouble spots in Central Java. The Presidential Palace Tjakabirawa Guard was dissolved and its duties assumed by two battalions of TNI military police reinforced in mid-April 1966 by the 551st paratroop battalion which had returned from hunting communists in East Java. As a result of the 19 August Bandung Affair, Regional Commander Dharsono purged the Bandung garrison, relieving its Commander and Chief of Staff. A silent and un publicized purge was conducted throughout the ranks, concentrating on the officer corps. At the regional level, purges were conducted by the regional commander and his subordinates under the supervision of screen ing teams established by TNI Staff expressedly for this purpose. Many military men were tried and convicted by the Mahmilub, ex-Colonel Untung being executed in September 1967. With the discovery of the Generals' bodies at Halim Air Base on 4 October, Suharto furiously ordered the Air Force to purge itself. Air Force Commander Dhani's 1 October radio statement of AURI support for the coup and its deep involvement almost precipitated an open, armed clash with TNI which was narrowly averted due to Sukarno's appeal and the sound-minded, although angry, decision of TNI leaders to avoid fur ther disruption. Dhani was relieved and, after the March Order, Sukarno's appointee replacement also fell by the wayside. By April of 1966 over 300 AURI members were reported dismissed and arrested. Although a modus vivend was established in which no overt hostilities were in evidence, === [PDF page 56] === 53 the TNI found it advisable during the tense period of early 1967 to freeze all airbases with armed troops in order to preclude any AUR1 movement of forces in support of Sukarno. In July of 196? ADRI an nounced its purge was nearing completion. In a similar manner the Navy and Police were purged; however, it was a rather delayed action in the Police Department, considering the period of time which elapsed from the beginning of the house clean ing until the time high-ranking officials were implicated in Gestapu. Beginning with any degree of seriousness only in April 1966, the Police established a "Clearance Team” on the Police-BPI question, and by May over 200 police were purged in last Java alone. The purges of top-ranking officers of this 140,000 man force^ of police and civilian members did not occur until the second quarter of 1967 when it was reported that 384 police and forty-nine civilians were expelled and put under pro tective custody. The arrest of six high officers was reported in mid August and on 4 September the Djakarta Times announced the arrest, for roles in Gestapu, of three Senior Police officers, among whom was Police Brigadier General Sarwono, Chief of the VII Regional (Jakarta) Police Command. Various changes of command and assignments have occurred but the head of National Police, General Judodihardjo, a Sukarno appointee, has not to date (November 1967) experienced a change of command. He and KKO Commander Hartono are the only two of five top commanders who have not been affected by command reshuffles. In order to maintain Aruy morale and protect its legitimacy of operation, it was found necessary to disprove the so-called "Council of ^For the composition and function of the Indonesian National Police see U.S. Army Area Handbook for Indonesia (Washington, D.C.: the Army, 1964), pp. 490-94. Department of === [PDF page 57] === Generals.” The first step in disproving this "slander" was to check statements, under oath, of high government officials, high and middle officers of ABM, and civilian workers. In February of 1966, Nasution reported that fifty people under oath had been unable to bear testimony or produce any, other than hearsay, evidence. Mahmilub proceedings fur ther exonerated the TNI of its involvement in such a counter-revolutionary scheme. By maintaining tight security and secrecy in this investigation the Army was able to channel favorable information to the public as part of its legitimacy-seeking crusade. With the danger of disaffection more prevalent (than prior to the TNI's anti-Sukarno proceedings) in Army ranks due to divided loyalties and strong pro-Sukarno sentiments, this clearance of reputation became an integral part of the effort to soothe the internal stresses plaguing the TNI. (Some of these stresses were: integration of a diversity of religious, ethnic, social, and political differences; local recruitment engendering institutional loyalty to the Division, which reinforced primary loyalties to the region and ethnic group; and the generational gap between the "Generation of '45" and the In an attempt to better control, and in the loig range to alleviate these problems, Suharto found it necessary to cau tiously, but firmly, reshuffle the TNI leadership and command structure. Some of the regional commanders had been in their positions a half decade or more and had acquired many vested interests,while others it was feared that he was making Sumatra his personal economic domain. Adjie (West Java Siliwangi Com mander): his all-too-close friendship with Sukarno jeopardized the Army's anti-Sukarno program. "I'm anti-Sukarnoism but don't touch him or fight the Siliwangi." Tarzie Vittachi, The Fall of Sukarno (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 164. By early 1967, twenty-nine of thirty-four generals in top central Army, regional, and inter-regional commands had been changed. === [PDF page 58] === 55 owed their position to Sukarno's continued good favor. An extensive series of promotions gained the support of many middle rank officers for the program of the new TNI Command, while the reassignment of others weakened regional territorial resistance to central authority. Some of the most powerful commanders were given ambassadorships (Mokoginata and Adjie) while others were assigned to the Staff and Command School (SESKDAD) at Bandung and, upon completion of their three-month course, were assigned to positions in the TNI command at Jakarta. All seven regional commands changed hands, and as many subordinate commands as were possible (with out causing rebellion) were revamped. Deliberately denying the true purpose of this command reshuffle in public, the ABRI faithfully reported in the news that these transfers of leadership were "in the context of tour of duty, and tour of area" whether it was a commander who was being reassigned after five years or six months. The personality clashes of leaders (which was hushed in public) came into evidence, for example, when Suharto told the MPRS leadership (Nasution), which was pushing for a quicker and more complete anti-Sukarno legal ouster that due to the difficulties and the time they must "... give the Ampera Cabinet time to perform its task. The immediate results of these shifts were a strengthening of control over regional military authority; the placement of officers who were more adaptable to specific regional problems (in South Sumatra a commander who was exceedingly tough on students was replaced, and General Jasin was sent to East Java in the context of the need for an easier stand regarding the Chinese issue); a breaking of those mutual ties of responsibility for favors granted between a commander and his subordinates; 1PAB, August 15, 1966, p. 59. === [PDF page 59] === 56 and a collection of trusted anti-PKl, anti-Sukarno leaders (Idris-KOSTRAD, Panggabean—Arey Commander) to strengthen Central Command, 'those dis trusted officers who were assigned to Jakarta were put into positions as advisors and assistants where their primary duty was to be under sur veillance and away from their particular pocket of support. Conversely, tough commanders were assigned to commands where a network of vested in terests and corruption prevailed. Edhie was assigned to North Sumatra in July of 1967 to enforce government policy against the many "Canton Colonels" and "Kesawan Majors" (Canton and Kesawan are Medan's Wall Streets) who protected the Chinese businessmen in return for money. Efforts have been made in the direction of expanding Army doctrine to encompass ser vicemen doing duties outside the TNI, within the necessary program of controlling these military managers and administrators, since the politico social context in which they are now operating has radically changed. Prior to Gestapu the mismanagement and corruption of military managers and administrators were permitted as "routine violations" but with military ascendency to the seat of power and its responsibility for the success of the political and economic programs of the government corruption must be dealt with especially since these manager's activities are a direct reflection on the legitimacy of leadership role of the TNI. "Nasution used to be able to argue that corrupt colonels would have to be taken out of their managerial positions in estates and government firms because the alternative was a drift to PKI power. of its force now."^ That argument has lost most This effort centering on the change and control of leadership was a part of the larger picture of the sought-after unity ^Herbert Feith, "Killings in Indonesia," Nation (Sydney), CLXXXVIII, No. 9 (February 19, 1966), 11. === [PDF page 60] === 57 within and between the branches. Nasution explained the compactness of ABRI as being basically in the three fields of revolutionary doctrine, military doctrine and defense concept. ... as for the Military Doctrine... the nation already owns a Doctrine Council and the National Defense Institute... [the coming] Armed Forces Academy—(AKABRI) [inaugurated 5 October 1966 and of ficially opened 30 January 196?]... [and the proposed] Armed Forces Technical Academy... all doctrines already existing within each of the Four Armed Services have to be amalgamated... jointly dis cussed and formulated into a doctrine which really will ensure a more perfect compactness...1 AKABRI consisted of a combined-branch staff and student body; combinedforces sports competition (RPKAD usually beat KKO here too) and parades, roll calls, and shows of force were held regularly. News media continued an impressive harangue on the unity within the ABRI and between the Armed Forces and people. Nasution's plans included the establishment of a Revolutionary Spiritual Guidance Committee, under the leadership of Abdulgani, in order that members of ABRI could gain a deeper under standing of Indonesian Socialism. ABRI members were encouraged to read the newspapers with dedication in order to have a deeper knowledge of the revolution and a more firm basis upon which to respond to the present situation. These aspirations for unity and the leadership changes were in line with the tireless struggle to "consolidate and crystallise," which goal was reflected in the top echelon reorganisation. In late June 1967 the National Strategic Command (KOSTRANAS) was established for the pur pose of evaluating the kind, method, time, place, and strength of ex ternal and internal threats, and developing the strength to counter the threat. As a main command of the Ministry of Defense and Security, it ^PAB, January 7, 1966, p. 12. === [PDF page 61] === was directly responsible to the Ministry Presidium, Suharto. The Sep tember reorganization which removed the four ABRI commanders from Ministerial positions and put them under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Defense (Suharto) was intended, among other reasons, to promote the desired integration and unity of the military. Just as was the case with domestic control, this policy varied from region to region in spite of efforts to establish uniform procedures. The first Defense and Security Seminar, opened on 12 November 1966 and in session for one week, aimed to "... systematize the accumulated experience of 21 years of struggle... into written doctrines to guide the present and coming generations in carrying out further the struggle. The persistent disunity was overtly in evidence throughout the entire post-coup period. KKO Commander Hartono * s October 1966 statement that "as long as Sukarno is President any order given will be followed," and North Sumatran Commander Dharsno's promise "to shoot anyone taking down Sukarno’s picture" were in direct violation of the spirit of the Army command at that time. Integration is far from complete as the old ten sions, along with new ones, strain this unity. Many of the new regional and provincial commanders have had to work like "new lieutenants" within the structural and operational framework as established by their subor dinates. Suharto was unable to get the unswerving allegiance of top commanders in the series of closed meetings in early March 1966, and he must still treat all too many commanders with great caution lest hos tilities be renewed. Purges of the lower ranks have consequently been avoided as deep centrifugal tendencies still exist. IpAB, November 15, 1966, p. 41. Instead, a serious === [PDF page 62] === 59 effort has been made to improve the conditions of the lower ranks and their families in order to remove the fundamental causes of their at traction to Communist preaching. === [PDF page 63] === CHAPTER III PATTERN OF VIOLENCE Studies of organizations and the power structures of organiza tions provide much analytical information on how the changeover of the power-controlling elite, and even minuscule innovations introduced within the operational framework, can have radical effects on the overall func tioning of that organization. In the case of post-October 1965 Indonesia the accelerated rate of change in the socio-political balance of power created widespread dislocations and vacuums in the societal framework. These aberrations of normalcy resulted in nationwide unrest which boiled over into mass slaughters, selective terror and killings, racial violence, and, on occasion, near anarchy. The following section studies this pattern of violence (which, in the context of this work, covers a variety of activités ranging from killing to group protests which the disrupted state of the nation al lowed to have the potential of more serious violence) in the framework of three phases; (a) the anti-PKI and Gestapu violence; (b) anti-Chinese activities, and (c) that violence rising from the struggle between the pro- and anti-Sukarno forces. These three phases overlapped in time and identity in the actual situation. The anti-Chinese activities began under the pretense of opposing alien Chinese allegiance to and support of the PKI and on account of Peking’s alleged instigation of Gestapu. The pro- and anti-Sukarno violence was identified as participants, by 60 === [PDF page 64] === 61 accusation, association or acclamation, were categorized to be pro- or anti-PKI and Gestapu. All three phases occurred simultaneously with varying degrees of intensity and have not yet completely halted their expression. For the sake of analysis, a separation of the three is made in order to indicate and isolate the changes in the balance of power which caused violence, and the violence which encouraged further altera tions in that power balance. Nationwide Slaughter of PKI The immediate reassertion of loyalist TNI authority, as explained earlier was, for the most part, bloodless, in characteristic Indonesian manner. Die bloodletting that followed with intensity from mid-October until the early months of 1966 horrified even Indonesians. When military security was re-established (in the sense of KOTI's knowing the degree of support to be expected from the regional commanders), an order was sent out encouraging an all-out effort aimed at the eradication of PKI. With the outlawing and consequent dissolution of its organizations, widespread destruction of PKI facilities occurred. PKI headquarters in more than thirty cities were ransacked and/or destroyed by mobs. Nasution’s reported funeral oration for the slain Generals; the occurrence involving Martadinata^ at the funeral of five-year-old Irma Nasution who had been critically wounded by a bren-gun burst intended for her father in the early hours of 1 October; and the discovery in Central Java of the mutilated bodies of the Jogjakarta Commander and his deputy, coupled with the fact that Sukarno was seemingly undisturbed by the ^Naval Commander Martadinata reportedly bitterly spat out the word Sikat [SWOP!] to Moslem student leaders attending the funeral. Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval, p. 1)2. === [PDF page 65] === 62 deaths of the generals and failed to condemn the PKI, were the signals touching off the bloody violence which transpired. The mass media conducted an intensive information campaign "revealing" PKI lists of leaders to be killed, mass graves intended for victims, and PKI atroci ties, in order to enlist the support of the masses and rationalize the killings in an effort to maintain legitimacy. The slaughter was con ducted with detachment reminiscent of the Darul Islam hatchet men who answered, when questioned about their butchery of pregnant women: "They were Communists... Communists don't count.This sentiment was ex pressed with varying degrees of intensity, in different directions due to varying underlying motivation, and in accordance with differing re gional authoritative guidance in different parts of the Republic. North Sumatra was the primary area on this island of PKI pene tration. Their activities dealing with the land reform program and en couragement of squatting built up hostilities. When the purge came to this area and Atjeh in mid-October, the TNI became heavily involved in directing the anti-PKI activities. In Atjeh, it was reported, more were killed than the small number of PKI members in that area, with much of the violence aimed at Darul Islam Rebellion (1955-1961) opponents. With membership lists of BTI in hand, the executioners "neutralized" as many included therein as possible although many had joined innocently, be lieving they were joining the religious front Barisan Tani Islam. Making the purge somewhat of a religious war against the atheistic Communists, the xenophobic Moslems of North Sumatra aimed principally at the Javanese 1James Mossman, Rebels in Paradise; Indonesia's Civil War (London: J. Cape, 1961), p. 46. === [PDF page 66] === 63 imported to work the plantations.1 One report related the account that 20 per cent of the plantation workers in the Medan area had been anni hilated. "Many were Communists, all were suspected of being Communists, and the fact that they were Javanese strangers was reason enough to kjl1 them."2 in North Sumatra thousands turned themselves in to the military authorities, many thousand more were arrested. Many were summarily exe cuted by the military, and still others turned over to violent deaths at the hands of angry Moslem mobs. The effective disruption of the Communist cell structure by the rapid military action in Jakarta precluded the necessity of overt vio— Thousands were arrested and detained in the nightly security lence.^ sweeps throughout the capital. Truckloads of victims were carried from the city under cover of darkness and killed in outlying areas under military supervision. There was extensive destruction of PKI and af filiates property in Jakarta and the homes of Ai dit, Lukman, and Njoto were burned. Such anti-PKI action was carried on under the permissive gaze of the TNI. By early 1966 the entire Politburo was destroyed, with the exception of Sudisman, and a large percentage of the PKI15 national As part of the government's program aimed at relieving overpopu lation pressures on Java, many Javanese were resettled on Sumatra. Their presence was seen as jeopardizing the local labor situation. 2New York Times, May 8, 1966, VI, 90. ^Since the PKI was a legal organization its structural framework and membership was known by TNI Q-2. With the arrest and isolation of leaders the entire cell structure remained unlinked. With no PKI re sistance, the TNI agents were able to methodically eradicate Communists with a minimum of violence exposed to the public eye. Sudisman was finally brought before the Mahmilub during autumn of 1967. === [PDF page 67] === 64 leadership either killed or in detention. The rest of West Java ex perienced a minimum of bloodshed coming from the anti-PKI purge, in part due to the tight control and security maintained by the Siliwangi. Sniper fire greeted the RPKAD's arrival in Semarang, Central Jav in mid-October and the following day the local PKI headquarters was burned to the ground by mob action. This was the general outline of the pattern of violence which evolved in Central Java. Military moves to re-establish security were met with token resistance (or the military moved in defense of PKI inspired attacks on non-Communists)and in the wake of the TNI’s security, violent purges of the PKI occurred with military encouragement and overt support. clearing out pockets of resistance. Idhie set about personally Together with his intensive propaganda campaign and the force of arms, he was able to restore security at the expense of numerous rebel casualties. His determination and fury (caused in part by Sukarno’s blasf remark on 1 October at Bogor: this [slaughter of 6 generals] is in the course of the revolution... ”) were very much in evidence when the entrance of his armored column to a pro-Gestapu village was blocked by a group of Communist women Gerwani, displaying bared posteriors in defiance of his authority. Idhie had them machine-gunned down in situ. and also those villagers who ran out to protest his initial action. Needless to say, such resistance to ^The coup leaders and certain elements implicated in Gestapu had gone to the Central Java PKI stronghold to await Sukarno•s settlement of the "political matter" at hand. When the Army took the offensive the PKI sympathizers attempted to organize a counter-offensive. Their propaganda spread reports of red-bereted (RPKAD headgear) "Necolims" who were invading from Malaysia. Idhie countered by air dropping leaf lets over rebel-controlled areas, explaining the reality of the situation and necessity of surrender. This was followed by armed movement when opposed. === [PDF page 68] === 65 military authority was not commonplace as news of the HPKAD's ruthless efficiency spread. Ihe day scheduled for the State funeral of the murdered Jogjakarta officers, 22 October, became "R" day for the Communists who made a final attempt to regain the initiative in Central Java. Sdhie’s troops were rapidly pulled out of the funeral ceremony and rushed to the defense of the loyalists in the regions of Bojolali, Klaten and Surakarta (Solo) where a major last effort to wipe out anti-Communists was in process. Over 100 nationalist, religious, and government leaders were assassinated in KLaten, with an estimated 250 falling to the violent murders of the PKI in Bojolali. The "Revolutionary Council of Surakarta" feel on the 23rd, signalling the end of large-scale clashes, and Solo was transferred to RPKAD units. "On the night of October 25 the Kentong (traditional Javanese signal drum) sounded, signalling the start of a rampage of ar son, kidnapping, and killing... PNI and NU who had suffered at the expense of the PKI’s land reform policies received "quick-kill"train ing (2-5 days) from the RPKAD, were armed, and joined in the "clean-up" operations. Sporadic killings developed into systematic viciousness. The pattern generally was one of TNI or "army-cum-civilian" groups entering a town or village, seizing those on PKI membership lists or ac cused by "loyalists" and summarily executing them; turning them over to their own villages for execution; or giving them to the OJT executioners. In some cases the annihilation of accused PKI-villages was relegated to other villages by the Army, which retained a considerable degree of con trol over the slaughter. "... with the Army in sway there was a modicum 1Arthur J. Dommen, "The Attempted Coup in Indonesia" China Quarterly No. 25 (January - March 1966), pp. 148-50. ^Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval, pp. 155-61. === [PDF page 69] === 66 of crude justice... thousands were sent to Nusakaaban, a Devil's island, in the Indian Ocean South of Java... thousands shot and buried in unmarked graves.Prisons and makeshift stockades were overflowing. Occasionally internees were released to the mercy of murder squads. Of tentimes, when TNI units withdrew from securing an area, the PKI leaders were slain so suddenly that resistance and reorganization were all but impossible as party members were leaderless and in a quandary. The violence reached its peak of intensity in the Banjumas area where as many as six truckloads of captives per night were carried off to the canefields and decapitated. On 4 November, KKO units arrived in order to "assist" in the security operations. By January 1966 certain units of the HPKAD were able to return to Jakarta, since security was con sidered restored, although killings continued well into March. As the killings spread eastward they became more horrible and less controllable. With the arrival of HPKAD and other strongly anti PKI units in East Java in November,scattered fighting broke out with badly armed Communists. With amazing rapidity the execution of the purge was assumed by Ansor youths—the Nil's youth wing—students in Muslim schools and universities who had been trained by the TNI and used throughout 1965 to prevent the PKl-inspired peasants from taking over land. Their savagery spread with little military supervision but en couraged by a considerable degree of Army protection. Nightly patrols initially slaughtered known PKI members and affiliates in their own "Terror in Review," Far Eastern Economic Review, LII, No. 6 The insecure situation in East Java was amply demonstrated by the 20 October incident in which the police chief of Madura was stabbed eleven times and his hand cut off while standing on the speaker's plat form at an anti-Communist rally... him murderers escaped! === [PDF page 70] === 67 villages, then moved on to the next to aid their comrades there in the gruesome task. Many personal, political, or religious inspired grudges were settled in a wave of indiscriminate savagery. Groups moving from one area to another slaughtered on the basis of simple accusation, whether their source was responsible or not. join in the onslaught. Madurese sailed in to As was the case in Atjeh and even more so on Bali, the violence was injected with the fire of a "zihad" (holy war)^ with the Ansor regarding the slaughter as a sacred mission. Decapita tions were the most common form of murder since it was believed that only by this manner of death would the victim's spirit be prevented from returning. Blood was licked from dripping cane knives in order to re ceive the victim's strength, and eyes were gouged out to prevent the victim from identifying his slayer when he returned reincarnated. The Kldiri district experienced the most vicious slaughter in East Java. Here the military commander, a brother of one of the slain generals (Sutojo), personally conducted a slaughter which left thousands dead. Various rivers in this area were plagued with log-jams of bodies, while the jails remained relatively uncrowded (as was the case throughout most of East Java), and the people temporarily stopped eating fish. The two-month period of slaughter, beginning around mid-November on Bali, was conducted with such ferocious slaughter that TNI units had to be called in order to retard the indiscriminate slaughter. The Prince's dead dancing girls and the school principle's head paraded before a special assembly indicate the comprehensiveness of the Balinese program. Begin ning with arrests of village Communist leaders and house razings, mo- ■^Seymour Topping, "Slaughter of Reds Gives Indonesia a Grim Legacy," New fork Times, August 24, 1966, pp. 1, 16. === [PDF page 71] === 68 mentum built up into the unrestricted terror of the PNI Tamin youth The PKI had created a more complicated network of intrigue on gangs. this island than on the others by challenging the banjar (village units) system, breaking the adat isti adat (century old customs), and attempt ing to undermine the largely PNI-oriented land owners along with the island's religious values.Due to the paucity of TNI regulars sta tioned on Bali, there was a minimal amount of regulation of the slaughter by authorities and a near-maximum of participation by non-victins. timates rated Ball as having the highest percentage of participants and deaths per total population. Groups of one hundred were machine-gunned in a small town's botannical garden. The Tamin's pattern of slaughter consisted of nightly sweeps wherein they entered a village and killed at will. lages The typical fate of a majority of the several thousand vilterrorized the entire island. The worst slaughter occurred in pro-PKI governor Sutedja's home county in the western part of Bali, claiming many of his relatives and destroying much of their possessions. The killings in this area were participated in by Moslem Banjuwanji youths who had crossed over from East Java after having been unable to satiate themselves with the PKI blood spilled in revenge for the Communists' murder of over three score Ansor in the Banjuwanji area in early October. villages were decimated. Throughout Bali entire Entire families were killed by entire families participating in the "witch hunts." Successful Javanese merchants, Com munist or not, were slain indiscriminately. Detainees were demanded ^Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval, p. 173. ^New York Times, August 24, 1966, p. 16. === [PDF page 72] === 69 back from authorities in order to be killed... and were returned. When the RPKAD arrived, decapitation made way for shootings and tens of thousands had been diamankan ("made secure”) with many more scheduled to go. The PNI assumed virtually all the provincial governmental posi tions of import til the wake of the purge and military control (prior to Gestapu they were on equal footing with the PKI). Well into February 1966 public beheadings were still held in the capital of Flores Island, with nightly truckloads of more than twenty victims heading out of town. In Kupang, the capital of Indonesian Timor, the public was permitted to witness the beheadings —but witnesses were required to take part. Throughout the island mass arrests and killings occurred even during April. Reliable estimates of the nationwide death toll were in the hundreds of thousands and many more hundreds of thou sands experienced loss of families, homes and livelihood. The overall pattern of violence contained, in every case, some element of the TNI, in a greater or lesser degree, and its assisting agents. The pattern varied from region to region and within each region. It was primarily the underlying personal motives for the public "reasons to be violent" which determined the variety of patterns that was a reflee tion of the deep cultural, religious, and racial division prevalent in Indonesia. The North Sumatran and Balinese slaughter of Javanese and the Jakarta cabbies’ violence amply demonstrate this. %e chronic short age of land and overpopulation, the Malthusian factor,particularly of Central and last Java was seen as a predominant causal factor of the ^Guy Pauker credits the motivation for the killings to be "... the extreme social tensions of Malthusian origin created by the communist challenge to the accepted way to deal with overpopulation." Armed Forces Mail, May 15, 1967, p. 5» === [PDF page 73] === 70 violence in those areas. Added to this was the PKI's intrusion into the vested interests of nationalist and religious groups. The years 1964 and 1965 were replete with clashes and other sets of violence be tween these groups and the Communists. Die population-land ratio and especially the PKI challenge to the traditional beliefs and practices were overriding factors effecting the Bali purge. The PKI, due to widespread regional successes and strategic suc cesses in the capital, overstepped the Indonesian sense of tolerance in many of its actions. Reports of desecrations of mosques, violation of the Koran (the East Java "Kanigoro Affair" of January 1965)» dramatic presentations such as "The Death of Allah," taking over land belonging to mosques, and an extensive variety of similar affronts built up deepseated infuriation. With the desecration of the six revolutionary heroes at Lubang Buaja and the TNI's information campaign blaming the PKI and revealing its "deception of the masses," these hostilities erupted. PKI structure was severely disrupted. The The land reform program suffered a severe setback in the course of violence as evidenced by the necessity of laws forbidding transfer or reclamation of land. lem has only been prolonged. This critical prob The Army instigated and legitimized violence, engendering a habit of violence throughout Indonesia which must be broken in order for parliamentary government to survive. The hatreds engen dered over the numerous deaths increase the length of the list of cen trifugal forces plaguing the country. Hundreds of thousands of ex-PKI members remain, still plagued by the same problem. The post-Gestapu pattern of violence was definitely related to the downward tread of economic indicators. It was this problem of primary concern—economic survival— which was part of the underlying causes encouraging anti-Chinese violence. === [PDF page 74] === 71 Anti-Chinese Hostilities Just as is the case throughout Southeast Asia, so too Indonesia has a long history of anti-Chinese sentiments and activities. Indonesian Chinese control, whether alien or citizen, of a majority of the wealth producing sector of the economy was a prime cause of this resentment, in addition to the Chinese' persistent effort to avoid assimilation. 1 The Chinese economic community benefitted tremendously as a result of the 1957 nationalization of Dutch holdings (approximately one billion dollars in value) and the ensuing military mismanagement of these properties, which caused dislocations favorable to Chinese economic penetration. Chinese business operations were made relatively impervious to legal jurisdiction through a variety of quasi-legal or illegal tech niques... "routine violations." An extensive educational system was geared more toward Peking doctrine and ideology than toward assimilation and "Indonesation" of the students. There was more than a grain of jus tification in the Chinese’ sentiment that "It is not easy to integrate into the style of a society whose social and working standards are in ferior to yours."1 The truth of the matter is: In what society does the son of the Middle Kingdom voluntarily integrate? The Indonesians recognized a feeling of cultural superiority which they resented vehe mently. Due to the increasingly friendly relations between Peking and Jakarta, the Chinese national had never felt so secure in Indonesia as he did in September 1965 in expectation of the realization of a Djakarta- Peking axis. When the floodgate of resentment burst in October, begin- 1Donald Kirk, "Indonesia's Chinese Are People Without a Country," New York Times Magazine, October 23, 1966, VI, 52 ff. 2Ibid., p. 154. === [PDF page 75] === 72 ning with the Army arrests of Chinese aliens, it poured forth an almost continuous stream of destruction and misery for its Chinese victims. The refusal of the Chinese embassy in Jakarta to fly its flag at half-mast in mourning for the murdered generals and the noticeable absence of any Chinese Communist embassy representatives at the funeral fertilized the seed of anger among the Indonesians. It blossomed forth into violent mob action against Chinese personal and governmental property, diplomatic personnel and the individual Chinese. The anti-PKI informa tion campaign expanded to embrace the Chinese who were credited with sup porting the PKI and Gestapu. The TNI's denunciation of Peking for its alleged role in the coup fed the anti-Chinese violence which in turn en couraged further Peking protests. Although many Chinese were swept up in the slaughter of the PKI, the pattern of violence derived from amti- Chinese activities was not at all the same. The periods of high inten sity of anti-Chinese violence were late 1965» April and the fall of 1966, By early 1966 the estimated total of and April and the fall of 1967. deaths was in the low thousands whereas that of the PKI slaughter was in the hundreds of thousands. Killings of Chinese were rarely in triple figures per incident, although property damage and loss was extremely high, often times being restricted to this alone. The executors of this purge were primarily student mobs and frequently anti-alien Chinese who were Indonesian Chinese citizens. Regional Army commanders were often the worst harassera of the Chinese, frequently encouraging anti-Chinese incidents. This violence varied regionally, following closely in in tensity the pre-Gestapu anti-Chinese pattern. Directionally reversing the intensity of violence which charac terized the PKI slaughter, the plight of the Chinese was most acute in === [PDF page 76] === 75 Atjeh and other parts of North Sumatra. families Many Chinese merchants and their were slaughtered along with the PKI. One report revealed that the West coast of the province was left totally devoid of Chinese by the end of 1965. With the renewed violence following the "March 11 Order" came ransackings, beatings and torturing of teachers and leaders, forced marches, a variety of insults... and deaths. In September of 1966 alien Chinese were driven from the province by order of the regional commander, and suffered gross indignities in the concentration camps set up for them in Medan, North Sumatra. Following a scattered pattern of small scale killings and destruction of Chinese property, the "De cember 10 Incident" in Medan claimed an estimated two hundred Chinese lives and untold destruction in a twelve-hour mob rampage throughout the Chinese quarter. This affair arose from a mob demonstration at the Chinese consulate, in which shooting occurred, turning the mobs loose on the Chinese. Repeated attacks on the Medan consulate brought "serious" protests from Peking which further enraged the mobs. These protests charged the rioters, predominantly Moslems, with burning, pillaging and raping of hundreds. In April, mobs took over Chinese-run schools and all facilities of Chinese organizations, entailing destruction and blood shed. The Medan "Kampung Marantih" incident in October, in which Atjeh internees attacked an Army officer taking pictures, was left unresolved. As a result, angered students raided the Chinese quarter in late Novem ber in what became known as the "Djalan Listrik" incident, causing many casualties and much destruction which rendered Medan a "dead city" for ten days. Violence recurred periodically during 1967 and legal prose cution of Chinese businessmen has come more to the fore with the assign ment of General Edhie as II Bukit Barisan Commander. === [PDF page 77] === 74 in West Java. "When the Army gave the green light for the crack down on the Communists, it also touched off a witch-hunt against the Chinese."^ An area traditionally anti-Chinese, West Java gave vent to its Gestapu-stimulated rage almost completely through the anti-Chinese phase of the pattern of violence. Towns outside Jakarta, once predomin antly Chinese, were deserted as a blood purge eliminated traders and shopowners. Intense harrassment, especially in smaller towns, included orders for "aliens" to place nationality signboards outside homes and shops; forbidding a change in place of residence; student-organized boy cotts of Chinese shops; instructions (in the town of Sukabumi) for all Indonesian Chinese to change their names to Indonesian within twenty-four hours; and things of such nature. This widespread violence followed in the wake of deployment in strength of Siliwange units throughout the outlying areas. Following a series of immediate post-coup arrests of Chinese nationals the lid blew off in Jakarta in mid-October with the battle and ensuing destruction of the Chinese Republics University. This twohour battle entailed hand-to-hand combat between Moslem and Chinese students, a twenty-minute volley of police machine-gun fire, and many casualties. Sporadic anti-Chinese demonstrations occurred, oftentimes developing into ransacking of shops in Grogol, Jakarta’s Chinatown, and beatings of Chinese individuals. Suspected Chinese leaders were, in many cases, harrassed to their deaths, such as the one who "jumped" to his death from an upper story Hotel Indonesia window. The worsening of relations with Peking reflected on anti-Chinese activities. The March 1966 student storming of and destruction in the Chinese consulate, and ^Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval, p. 200. === [PDF page 78] === 75 demands that the Chinese Communists stop their propaganda campaign, (a) against Indonesian leaders and government, and (b) in support of the Indonesian communists involved in Gestapu, brought increased virulent attacks from Peking. Hainhua, the official China press news agency, was raided by demonstrators who destroyed the interior of the building, set the roof afire, and burned staff cars, injuring well over a score of newsmen. Violence against the Qiinese Commercial Center and renewed attacks on the consulate resulted in injuries to many diplomats, in cluding the Consul and Commercial Counselor. In mid-April, amidst the renewed outburst of violence, the Chinese Communist embassy was stormed with much destruction and burning of government documents. 1 October 1966 was commemorated by KAMI with renewed attacks on Chinese government The April 1967 hostilities brought sharp establishments and in Grogol. protests from Peking against the wild anti-Chinese demonstrations, beat ings, and armed troops' search of Chinese nationals' homes for "secret documents" and concealed arms.^ The demonstrators turned away from the embassy to looting and an indiscriminate manhunt for anyone Chinese caught roaming the streets. The "Krawang Affair"^ increased anti-Chinese ten sions throughout West Java. The increasingly hostile relations caused by activities such as these and reciprocal violence of the "Red Guards" against the Indonesian diplomatic staff in China resulted in the October 1967 severence of diplomatic relations between Jakarta and Peking. ^The arrest and subsequent "self-inflicted" torture of a Chinese Communist "agent" (He beat his head severely on the jail walls and ended his agony by pouring boiling water over himself1) occasioned a huge pro test funeral by the Jakarta Chinese which in turn encouraged harsher anti-Chinese violence. ^This matter dealt with the incident in which an Indonesian girl house-servant was beaten to death by her Chinese employers. === [PDF page 79] === 76 Following the anti-PKI pattern of violence in Central Java— violence in the wake of HPKAD security—the Semarang offices of Baperki were raided along with over a hundred Chinese-owned shops the day after Edhie’s arrival. Scattered deaths occurred here, along with similar anti-Chinese activities in Jogjakarta and Surakarta which continued long after the "crush Gestapu" slaughter. The pattern in East Java followed similar lines, being affected to a greater degree by military instiga tion of anti-Chinese activities. excused by the demonstrators The April 1966 violence was in part as retaliation for the "illegal" Chinese demonstrations in Jakarta protesting the death of a Chinese national "agent" and the visiting Chinese Consul's advice to East Java Chinese to challenge the government's authority. In late June, Peking sent a strong note protesting the raids of armed troops and police on Chinese properties in which eleven were killed and many wounded. Defending their interests, the Indonesian Chinese of East Java organized large-scale anti-Chinese Communist rallies which culminated in their seizure of the Chinese consulate in the "Surabaya Affair." Chinese protests in April 1967 over economic restrictions and the order to turn the keys of their shops over to authorities encouraged renewed violence by the students, which spread to Jakarta and the outer islands. On Bali, people highly influenced by spiritualism turned violently on Chinese who had "cast evil spells on livestock." Chinese merchants were identified as the cause of high prices and consequently were eliminated by merciless gangs. The violence on Bali occasioned protest notes from Peking as the island sporadically joined in the nationwide racist ac tivities. Various reports and accounts, as well as Peking's charges, told of much anti-Chinese violence in various of the outer islands, es pecially on South Sulawesi where the Chinese consulate was repeatedly === [PDF page 80] === 77 attacked by mobs inflicting extensive property damage and injuries to the diplomatic staff. Numerous deaths were undoubtedly suffered, but press censorship resulted in a failure to reveal such information. One account from Ambon told the grisly tale of a Chinese merchant caught hoarding sugar under his floorboards. but they politely refused saying: He offered it to his young captors "No, we want you to have it." They force-fed him sugar until he died. The reradicalization and deradicalization^ (the high and low intensity of activity dealing with the treatment of Chinese) of anti Chinese activities which characterized the post-Gestapu period was symptomatic of the existing "crisis-conflict" situation. With Sukarno's move to regain the initiative prior to 11 March 1966, came a consequent deradicalization. The April intensification of anti-Chinese activities was followed by an ebb in May with Malik's denunciation of this radical solution to the problem. Moves to re-establish economic stability and the economic decision of the Bandung Conference in the fall led to a reradicalization of the campaign. The final putsch against Sukarno drew the energies for violence toward this direction, therefore entailing a deradicalization of the "Chinese problem" solution. The reradicaliza tion after this successful power move was checked by sounder minds in the government, who realized the dislocations in the economy to be suf fered by following such policies and the need for a more sensible deradicallzed solution. In April 1967 Grogol was cordoned off from the mobs by armed troops and the order went out from Suharto to military commanders instructing them to deradicalize their anti-Chinese programs. ^Tdeas on the use of reradicalization and deradicalization as an analytical framework were gotten from class lectures dealing with Com munist China given by Professor Tang Tsou at the University of Chicago in the spring of 1967. === [PDF page 81] === 78 They were further instructed, in some areas, to enforce the economic legislation against the Chinese, yet to protect these sources (without reimbursement) from which they once received bribes and protection money. Certain regional commanders were reassigned (last Java) in order to bet ter deal with the "Chinese problem" and (North Sumatra) to better enforce the deradicalized program. The question is raised whether this deradical ization of the anti-Chinese efforts indicates a more viable government than existed prior to Gestapu, and whether the increasingly non-violent (in terms of numbers of dead and injured and destruction) anti-Chinese activities indicate the successful implementation of the present Ampera government's program. But first the violence erupting from the compe tition between the pro- and anti-Sukarno forces will be investigated, since it was in the context of this pro- and anti-Sukarno violence that the post-Gestapu struggle for power was expressed and the contest from which emerged the present (1968) government. Pro- and Anti-Sukarno Forces As the first significant moves to change the balance of power and to erode Sukarno's position were being made the nationwide slaughter was on the wane.^ Although the mass killings went well into February 1966 the major part of the bloodbath was almost over by the time Subandrio was relieved and the decision to move against Sukarno had been made. The Nationalist (PNl) and Moslem Scholar (NU) supporters, recently battle experienced, following the period of the fragmentation and eradication ^For one view of the pro- and anti-Sukarno struggle which resulted from "Operasi Lembing Mas" (Operation Golder Spear—as the TNI's program of erosion of Sukarno's power came to be known) see Justus M. van der Kroef, "Sukarno's Fall," Orbis, XI, No. 2 (Summer, 1967), 501-31. === [PDF page 82] === 79 of the PKI had only each other standing in opposition to their respec tive political party’s aims.^ The alignment of their forces in the struggle, being carried on by the Army, to oust or perpetuate Sukarno, constituted a consignment of violent actors for the third phase of the pattern of violence. The resulting clashes between these dissident political groups, along with their allies, rocked Indonesia sporadically from the time of Gestapu throughout 1967. After the Army’s moves for security had achieved their immediate military objectives the TNI launched a program consisting of political power objectives, which ran into the stone wall of Sukarno’s power. The controversies which raged over Sukarno’s proposed "new-style" Indonesian Communist Party and the Subandrio promulgated Sukarno Front had immediate repercussions in the form of outbreaks of pro- and anti-Sukarno demon strations along with gang fights, terrorist activities and deaths of members of both groups. The leftist National Indonesian Students Front, created by Presidential fiat, caused further conflict between the KAMI (anti-Sukarno) and leftist pro-Sukarno groups affiliated with Bung Karno University and Partindo^ youth wing. Terrorist gangs, under the command of "dumos" Subandrio and the Minister of Special Presidential Security Affairs Colonel Sjafie (ex-leader of the Cobras gang), were ordered to ^For the purpose of simplication, the Moslem Scholars Party (NU) is identified as the anti-Sukarno force whereas the Nationalist Party of Indonesia (PNI) is the Sukarnoist force. These are the two most power ful political parties in Indonesia. The left wing of the PNI, led by Ali Sastroamidjojo and Surachman (”A-SU”—In Indonesian means ”dog”), was PKI-inftitrated and actively supported the PKI at Jakarta level. The NU consequently branded their chief political competitors as Com munists and carried on their anti-PNI campaign under the rallying cry: "Eradicate ASU/Gestapul" ^This group was one of the ten legal parties under "Guided Democracy." Its inclinations were said to be toward the left. === [PDF page 83] === move against the anti-Sukarno KAMI and NU youths, causing widespread disorder and a heightening of tensions. The chaotic situation of early 1966 was marked by simultaneous angry demonstrations, one rattling the American embassy with shouts of "Go Home Yankee!" while the other, only three miles away wanted to "Hang Subandrio!" The repugnance for the "Cabinet of 100," added to the "Three Demands" of the "Generation of ’66" encouraged an intensification of violence which culminated in the demon strations and activities in Jakarta which were an attempt to prevent the 25 February investiture of the new leftist ministers. The ensuing violence and deaths, including that of a University of Indonesia medical student named Hakim, turned KAMI into a violent political force. Their violent mentality, expressed over clandestine "Radio Ampere" within the statement: "Every drop of their blood will be avenged. The blood debt will be paid with blood.was materialized in a force which tore re lentlessly at the Old Order power. The Ministry of Education was re peatedly "visited" by student mobs numbering in the thousands who de manded the dismissal of Minister Sumardjo. Tensions mounted even higher as student demonstrators were machine-gunned by Tjakrabirawa Palace During a 28 February meeting of GSNI (high school student move guards. ment) attended by Sukarno, Subandrio, and Saleh, the President urged the students to "answer terror with counter-terror." Fighting broke out with leftist defenders of the Foreign Ministry where thousands of antiSukarnoists had gathered, smashing and defacing the Ministry and its premises. The explosion of the extremely intense "crisis-conflict" situation was planned by both sides to occur on 12 March... the ^New York Times, February 26, 1966, p. 3» === [PDF page 84] === 81 final showdown. Anarchy and slaughter was narrowly averted by Sukarno's "March 11 Order" to Suharto. The period of "consolidation and crystallization" which followed until the TNI power move in early 1967 was marked by sporadic acts of violence, periods of intense violence, and furious outbursts. In the Banjtunas area near Jogjakarta, credited as being the area of the worst violence, anti-PKI-style killings occurred. NU were ambushed in the canefields, beheaded and their bodies dumped into the irrigation canals. In the Jogja area, where the balance of power ratio was four to one in favor of the PNI, excessive violence was committed against NU members and leaders. The split in PNI ranks occasioned the NU's virulent at tack of the PNI "ASU's"^ which naturally occasioned violent revenge. KAMI headquarters was attacked in Jogja by PNI youths and, in late April, all universities were closed due to the intensity of the conflict. Students moved from one area to another and from their domestic provinces (especially East Java and Jakarta Raya) on "travel tours" and "study excursions" to reinforce their allies in Central Java. The New York Times reported on 7 July that several thousand RPKAD troops had been rushed to Central Java due to the stepped up violence occurring as a result of the MPRS decision to strip Sukarno of his title "President for Life."^ Minor clashes occurred throughout the islands as the mutual smear and terror campaign encouraged increased casualties. Protesting the denigra tion of the party's reputation, one North Sumatran PNI leader beckoned the authorities to "... arrest those calling out 'A-Su'—[orJ I'll order all Marhaenists (MF) [pro-PNI and staunch Sukarnoistsj to take ^Supra. p. 78, n. 1. ^New York Times. July 7, 1966, p. 7. === [PDF page 85] === 82 their own action by seizing such offenders and rub their mouths against the road.1’1 Large scale clashes in Jogjakarta hospitalized scores of youths as KAMI made little headway here or in East Java. Student delegates were sent to Jakarta to report on anti-NU activities of PNI and MF and enlist the support of central authorities in their defense. The 19 August "Bandung Affair," a violent clash between KAMI and PNI youths which occurred over repercussions to Sukarno's 17 August Independence Day speech, resulted in numerous casualties, both dead and wounded. As the screams to "Get Out Old Man!" intensified,both sides girded themselves for an all-out struggle. A-SU elements raided the September graduation ceremony of Brawidjaja University in East Java causing an outburst of violence. PNI groups swore to the destruction of any force attempting to oust Sukarno as the scattered acts of violence increased. In the eyes of the NU the eradication of the PNI became synonymous with the obliteration of the PK1. The ban on demonstrations, reimposed after the vicious 3 October event at the Presidential Palace in which scores of students were bayoneted and smashed with rifle butts, was observed rather religiously by KAMI. However, PNI-NU mutual attacks continued. In early February 1967 the pro-NU Mertju Sujar newspaper office was attacked by A-SU elements. Both PNI and NU leaders in various provinces were reported missing or viciously slain. Medan was terrorized by sten-gun armed APES (Supporters of Sukarno), and a mob of 800, shout ing "Long live Bung Karno," attacked and extensively damaged the offices of Pemuda Pantjasila (anti-Sukarnoists) in February. Personnel of Medan's pro-Sukarno Suluh Marhaen newspaper were attacked and its building "Medan Press Summary. July 26, 1966, p. 1. === [PDF page 86] === 83 Molotov-cocktailed on more than one occasion. The 20 February transfer of executive powers to Suharto was met with minimal civil disorder, oc curring primarily in remote villages, due to tight military control. Outbursts of violence occurred during the period of the March Special Session of the MPRS and have continued in various areas. Surakarta was plagued in mid-April with renewed terrorist activities with the heaviest toll among the Moslem community. The death in battle with TNI troops of the pro-Sukarno spiritualist leader Mbah Suro weakened the integra tion of his five thousand plus followers in Central and last Java, hence weakening leftist power. With the political demise of Sukarno the strug gle between the PNI and NU has reverted to its pre-Gestapu party squab blings, and violence continued throughout the fall of 1967 as the NU con tinued to press for the dissolution of its chief political rival. Military factionalism was expressed, both overtly and covertly, in the context of the pro- and anti-Sukarno conflict, contributing greatly to the resulting violence. The intra- and inter-branch loyal ties to Sukarno precluded an unrestrained campaign against him. Siliwangi Commander AdJie’s open support of Sukarno was not an isolated case of military forces, possessing the means for great violence, being held in the sway. KKO troops on the Kalimantan "Konfrontasi" front made a rapid withdrawal, leaving heavy equipment behind due to the "lack of transport," in order to "help in the security operations" in Central Java. An Army bulletin "requested" that certain military commanders discontinue acting without orders... no specific branch was named but indications suggest that it was intended primarily for the KKO. Numerous incidents occurred in which TNI personnel of all ranks were killed by "fake KKO" (as KKO Commander General Hartono explained) and === [PDF page 87] === 84 shot at by "uniformed men." The Marines were especially bitter with the TNI's permissive slaughter of "PKI" in Bast Java, the principle area of KKO recruitment and the homes of their families and relatives, many of whom were annihilated. The pro-Sukarno KKO was accused by the Central Java Moslem minority of being pro-Communist. The same charge was leveled against the Diponegoro Division.Members of both were fre quently charged with abetting anti-NU terrorism, last Java Commander Sumitro's purge, with the aid of RPKAD units, was reported to be es pecially effective against the KKO who were reportedly allied with the PNI left or Communists. Orders were proscribed by TNI Command forbidding all members of ABRI from taking part in any political or mass organization activities, from hiring themselves out as guards or the renting of their weapons. The Indonesian press related the account during a period of high proand anti-Sukarno violence in 1966 of a clash, at a football game between Bandung and Surabaya, in which an Army Major was shot to death "due to antagonisms between the KKu (who were displeased with the then present trend in Indonesia) and RPKAD." In April, Central Java KAMI, with the support of Jakarta KAMI publicly decried the "use of armed forces for the purpose of one party" and on 30 November KKO members were involved in an act of violence at Jakarta KAMI headquarters. An early February 1967 report had it that three youths were killed by uniformed men guarding A-SU for money and the New York Times reported on 1 March that ^Charges against the Diponegoro accused the Division of 40 per cent PKI infiltration. Die Division itself admitted to the figure of 6 per cent, conducting a purge only of the officer ranks since a purge of the enlisted ranks might cause a mutiny. === [PDF page 88] === 85 two pro-Sukarno KKO troops had been killed in a clash in Jogjakarta, where NU charged that six hundred Marines were backing the Sukarnoists terror campaign. The implications of this pro- and anti-Sukarno pattern of vio lence, regarding the viability of the present regime, suggests that the fortunes of the anti-Sukarnoists (pro-Ampera government) are on a very favorable upswing at the expense of the Old Order faction. In spite of the centrifugal tendencies challenging the TNI, both within its military family and society as a whole, the Army was able to achieve its aims through the proper mobilization of forces and the all-pervading threat of the use of the machinery of violence. The fact that a greatly outnumbered NU still exists within hostile territory and continually challenges PNI authority is an indication of greater military authority in that area than the continued violence would seem to indicate. Suc cessful use of power on the domestic front and its responsible use on the international scene (ending of "Konfrontasi," offer of troops for United Nations peace-keeping on the Arab-Israeli frontier) credited the TNI with a high degree of legitimacy and viability as a military insti tution. But it must prove itself in the role in which it sees itself as a functional element responsible for the future economic and political development and success of the nation. The final sections of this study look at the stated aims of the present government; the actions to date in view of these statements; the reality of the government’s program in view of the degree of effective ness of the program of control (as judged by the pattern of violence); and whether the maximum of control extended to date is sufficient to al leviate the "crisis-conflict" situation and phase into a minimal violence in pursuance of the successful implementation of a more representative === [PDF page 89] === 86 government. The question is investigated of how society perceives the process of problem solving vis-a-vis extensive military participation in civilian spheres and the reality of this perception in terms of the distance travelled by the present Ampera government until January 1968. === [PDF page 90] === CHAPTER IV COURSE OF THE AMPERA GOVERNMENT Total control entails mass support. Each of the power-sharing elements—the PKI, Sukarno, Parliamentary groupings, and the TNI—had control of only a portion of the prerequisites for total power and political viability. Only when one faction could accrue enough in gredients of the total formula could it guide the nation's destiny. Due to internal divisions and external domestic challenges the military was unable to gain superior strength in sufficient fields (symbol mani pulation, harbingers of land reform and what appeals to the masses, ideological terminology, ethical and moral validity, legitimacy, etc.) to effect total control, so its primary concern became self-integration. With the proper period of time and sequence of events, consolidation would occur and control of the nation's destiny fall into the INI's hands. This unity was weakened by the TNI's civilian managerial and administrative roles, through which they lost sight of a unifying com mon political purpose. The death of Sukarno did not occur, and the military's share of total control was waning. But the TNI had developed a habit of unified response to exploded "crisis-conflict" situations. Due to this innate clan vital, and in spite of itself, the Army reluc tantly cast aside the customary tactic of permitting the "crisis-conflict" situation to resolve itself (through the instrument of Sukarno's "political solution") and the New Order military surged to the fore to shoulder the seemingly-unbearable burden. 87 === [PDF page 91] === 88 The series of events occurring after October 1965 left Indonesia in a political power situation where the TNI’s two chief antagonists, the President and the Communist Party, were pushed far enough out of the picture that the TNI could conduct its program relatively unopposed. Many of the old centrifugal forces in society remained, and some new opposition was engendered, but the overall picture was one favorable for at least a tenuously peaceful evolution. The Army had effective enough control to mobilize the long-suffering society (or at least pre vent their mobilization against the military), but the big question was how the military planned to channel this nation, in a period of lesser "crisis-conflict" tensions, which had so recently been mobilized under state-of-war conditions. Demise of Sukarno and Nasution's Politico-Military Philosophy The procedures taken by the military to swing the balance of power in their favor and to erode Sukarno’s personal control were al most a step-by-step actualization of Nasution’s politico-military doc trines as presented in brief outline in Chapter I of this study. That pre-Gestapu philosophy constituted an aspiration for military rule at the expense of civilian political participation (in sum a military dic tatorship) as the only possible method of problem-solving in Indonesia. But the divergencies from that doctrine which occurred as a result of the radical changeover in the power structure could very well have changed the nature of the government deriving from the realization of the altered philosophy. By successfully meeting challenges to its au thority and overcoming periods of near-explosive "crisis-conflict" ten sions via legal means (supported by the threat of armed might) the TNI === [PDF page 92] === 89 passed its qualifying examination for the directorship of the embryonic institutionalization of governmental processes which were of a democratic nature. The demise of Sukarno likewise permitted opportunities for a more parliamentary political development which were nonexistent earlier. As Guy Pauker indicates, Nasution "... had reason to feel personally responsible to the nation for having played a major role in the 1959 abolition of parliamentary government and the return to the presidential system of the 19^5 Constitution, which had helped Sukarno to become a dictator."^ Evidence indicates that Nasution had lost much of his support prior to October 1965, and lost even more appeal by his condescension to Sukarno’s "Cabinet of 100,11 which excluded him from any significant governmental role. The suggestion has been made that Nasution's "unanimous election" as MPBS Chairman has left him politically impotent.2 It seems very likely that the machinery organized under Suharto—who personally told Nasution (as Chairman of MPRS) to slow down the anti-Sukarno momentum of extra-legal efforts and adhere re ligiously to the time-consuming parliamentary process—was the over riding force which put Indonesia back on the track of constitutional (Indonesian Constitution of 19^5) government. The new machine refused to be responsible for generations of "Latin American style military dictatorships.11 The ouster of Sukarno removed the sword of Damocles from over the SMI’s head. It gave the Army the legitimacy it would not have had if the doctrines of Nasution had been pursued completely and in an un1Armed Forces Mail, May 17, 1967, p. 5. ^Roger K. Paget, "The Military in Indonesian Politics: The Burden of Power" (unpublished research, Archives file, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, Center for Social Organization Studies === [PDF page 93] === 90 altered form before the Bung1 s legal demise (especially if the TNI had executed a coup after October 1965 and prior to March 196?)• The cen tral core of Nasution's philosophy was (is) in the process of further realization—extensive military participation in civil affairs, a nation wide military training program, and leadership in the hands of the military, etc.—minus certain essential elements fostering a military dictatorship. Consciously working to soothe the situation from one of "crisis-conflict" to one of a tranquil normalcy, the TNI is now in a position, since Sukarno's demise, to concentrate less on territorial warfare (or make this policy more conspicuously one of national po liticization) and more on making the underlying principles of its shib boleths the "lingua Indonesia" of the nation. Civil-Military Relations: Implications In spite of the existence and proven utilization of the people’s assembly, the extensive involvement of the military in all aspects of Indonesian life has caused serious consternation to the politically con scious segment of the civilian populace. The military mind was of the same accord as Sukarno’s June 1966 Nawaksara address to the MPRS: is not in keeping with the spirit and letter of the 1945 Constitution if the MPRS, should fall back into liberal democracy... [characterized by] lengthy debates on petty lines... [and the party’s] interest of its own over that of the nation.Likewise ABRI totally agreed with the Suara Rakjat editorial, which stated that the one solution to the problem at hand was via the instrument of one party, as Sukarno had said [the TNI still drawing from Sukarno’s established legitimacy]. 1PAB, June 20, 1966, p. 1. === [PDF page 94] === 91 This single party would serve as a vanguard, which Indonesia lacks in its history. The role of vanguard should be given to the ABRI, since experience showed that one of ten parties could not be selected to give the role to because of resulting menace to national unity... and since ABRI is most qualified being the most consistent defender of Pant jasila.^" Abdulgani saw the role of ABRI in general and the TNI in particular to be that of acting as an element of stabilization which "... even quite often constitutes a strength in pioneering the breaking through of the stagnations."2 Many governmental offices and administrative positions once held by civilians were placed in the hands of military men. Any domestic operation of even the smallest concern to the government was placed under ABRI supervision. Civilian politicians continually decried the fact that, due to their inability to reach agreements concerning cer tain offices and positions, the military—distrusting the effectiveness of those who could not even make an elementary decision—took the posi tion themselves, though it may have been placed in the hands of an in competent "green uniform." Likewise, the plethora of military men on the overseas staff of the Department of Foreign Affairs, and,the dis trust of these "agents verts" for career diplomats (military ambassa dorial positions consist of twenty-five of a total thirty-six ambassa dorships and seven of seven in Southeast Asia) occasioned the remark by a career foreign service officer: "... if Armed Forces people are still eager to become diplomats. I'm sure there is no lack of en- ^Surabaya Press Summary. March 24, 1966, p. 1. 2PAB. May 18, 1966, p. 1. === [PDF page 95] === 92 thusiasm on the part of the Foreign Service career men to be made générais."^ And later, the Djakarta Times, commenting on General Panggabean's announcement of a forthcoming change in TNI leadership, remarked: "I wonder if Pak Adam ["Pak"—a respectful term of address— "Brother" Adam Malik, Foreign Minister] still has ambassadorial posts vacant for them."^ February During the period prior to the political coup of 1967, civil-military relations were in a peculiar state since the ABRI was grasping everything within its power in order to mobilize forces (and neutralize opposition) for the final move. There existed no clear division between civil and military spheres. The horizontal and vertical unity of elements of the New Order, called for by Nasution and by the press campaign that continually extolled the virtues of so cialism, created an atmosphere in which identity of purpose clouded over the distinguishability of function. Experiences of countries with a situation similar to that of Indonesia were reviewed in the press: "The unity between Armed Forces members and the people laid down during the war years and during the Yugoslavian post-war reconstruction period, has become a condition sine qua non to the life of the Yugoslavian na tion and the mirror of its freedom.This unity, publicized with such intensity by the military, was received with divided response—from open agreement to critical skepticism—by society. Following the transferral of power, political and social forces moved to have the ambiguous relationship clarified. ^Djakarta Times, July 17, 1967, p. 3. Ibid.. December 21, 1967, p. I. ^PAB, December 21, 1965, p. 10. === [PDF page 96] === 95 The first and foremost concern of political actors was the ex tension of political privileges through the implementation of the March 1967 MPRS decision to hold general elections. In early April, the NU Deputy Chairman came out against Army participation in the elections unless they should represent an existing mass organization or functional group. The question of percentage of TNI representation in the elected government (the military demanded one-third of the seats of a total 460) caused the MPRS resolution on the issue to bog down and remain unsettled.Serious efforts to pass the general elections legis lation prior to the end of 1967 in order to hold elections by mid-1969 met with failure. A Djakarta Times editorial included among the weak nesses of the November 1967 bill that it amounted to a joint manipula tion of the two major parties (PNI and NU) to retain their seats "... in the interest of their parties rather than the nation... ”—fac tionalism that insures the continuance of the military elite's predomin ance in government. Nasution has emphasized to the public that the primary concern is not the date of elections but an assurance that there will be a victory for the New Order forces. The big debate over whether the birth of new political parties should be permitted was largely stifled by Suharto for a time. He was inclined to encourage civilian participation in the government's economic ^At a December HANKAM meeting it was reaffirmed that 11... tn order to prevent Pantjasila and the '45 Constitution from being deviated, the Armed Forces demanded one-third of the seats in executive and legis lative bodies." It was contended that with this percentage the TNI could block the victory of the Old Order if necessary. Armed Forces Courier. December 9, 1967, p. I. ^Djakarta Times, November 29, 1967, p. H. === [PDF page 97] === 94 development program, but discouraged political development. He felt that the legalization of certain earlier-banned parties would only fur ther confuse the chaotic situation characterized by the PNI-NU conflict in which the opponents had never been able to develop an institutional means to compose their fundamental differences of political and religious ideology. At a press conference on new parties the Acting President stated that the "... MPBS has decided to simplify the number of political parties. If new parties should grow like mushrooms in the rainy season, then this will be contrary to the MPBS decision.But continued public pressure and the NU campaign aimed at weakening the PNI power encouraged the government's approval of a new political party, the Partai Muslimin Indonesia (PMI), which was to be formed with a base of the Muhammadijah.2 The possible rapprochement between the NU and PNI as signalled in the 28 December 1967 Djakarta Times headlines, "N.U. Supports Soeharto's Policy on P.N.I.,"^ may preclude the final approval of this party although there were still public demands at the end of the year for its formation. The continued echoings throughout society of "creeping militarism," and demands of student and professional groups (KASI in July 1967) for a 1PAB, April 10, 1967, p. 8. ^This is an Islamic organization operating in social welfare and education, having six million members, parliamentary and congressional representatives, twelve thousand schools, thirty-four universities and two thousand branch offices throughout the country. Djakarta Times. September 20, 1967, p. III. ^Djakarta Times, December 28, 1967, p. I. Under heavy fire nation wide and desirous of survival, the PNI finally gave ground with its con cession that the "PNI Breaks off Belations with Soekarno." Djakarta Times. December 22, 1967, p. I. St late December conference of MuhammadiJah Youth adopted a reso lution demanding that the government legalize the PMI 1 11... to intensify the surveillance over the remnants of Gestapu-PKI; and to admit members of the 1966 Generation in government institutions without harming their function as the agents of social control." Djakarta Times, December 28, 1967, p. II. === [PDF page 98] === 95 clarification of the civil-military relationship and the reason why so many ABRI officers were flooding the civilian leadership structure, were met with military moves to dispel these fears and re-establish control of civilian activities by the non-military authority framework. late July, Suharto dissolved KOTI and the Pepeldas, transferring the authority of the latter to the provincial governors. The top regional executive bodies (Pantja Tunggals) were likewise dissolved and Muspidas (regional leadership congresses) formed. Antara announced on 29 August that, in order "To realise the restoration of power to the civilians, the regional leadership conference has been founded... with governors as top executive in the region [and] would be assisted by functionaries from the Armed Forces, which would form an advisory board [Muspida] This restoration was to be done in stages. Civilian experts were brought into high government offices in a wide variety of fields as advisors and administrators. One student of Indonesian affairs has referred to the "Machiavellian foresight" of the current TNI leadership which is sharing the "... planning and burdens of possible failure by not having a military government." The Dean of the Faculty of Psychology of the University of Indonesia was appointed to the Staff Directorate of Per sonnel, Research, and Development of the Defense and Security Staff Headquarters, and various university teams were charged with the re sponsibility of resolving governmental problems.An Armed Forces Co 1Antara, August 29, 1967, p. 5. ^Ann Ruth Villner, "The Communist Phoenix and the Indonesian Garuda," World Politics. XIX, No. 3 (April, 1967), 517, 519. $A Cabinet Presidium Decision No. 153 of 3 July 1967 stated that "... a University/State Institution's task-force will be inaugurated which will perform research-operations, surveys, and data-collec ting in the field of export, import, distribution, credits, finance, etc., as well as the data-processing, evaluating and investigation... [in order to] accelerate the implementation of the Ampera Cabinet's program.... (This task force) includes students as well as lecturers. Bulletin atonomi Keuangan (English Edition), No. 12, July 14, 1967, pp. 84, E& Hereafter cited as BEK. === [PDF page 99] === 96 ordination Body of Karya Operations was formed to promote civic mis sions and the crystallization and integration of the people and ABRI. The military took strong steps to prosecute its member-violators in an effort to gain civilian support for its program and to counter public charges of corruption. Presidential decision No. 228/1967, dated 2 De cember, called for the eradication of corruption and led to the establish ment of an anti-corruption team under the leadership of the Attorney General. Immediate purges occurred in the ranks of the military and top governmental officials accused of being supporters of Gestapu. By consciously striving to meet legitimate public demands, the ABRI leadership at present is legitimizing itself in the public eye as a responsible and credible revolutionary force. While permitting criticism of its policies and practices, the military elite still retains strong restriction over "liberal" expressions of dissatisfaction which are detri mental to the successful implementation of its program. The military still threatens to punish severely any forces encouraging a return to the Old Order. Its programs of social and economic development have gained the allegiance of enough of the elite and professionals to make inroads into the solution of the chronic problems pressing the nation. A concerted effort was made to insure that "General Suharto's Influence Reaches All Remote Spots''^ in an attempt to reach the masses and enlist their support for the new government. Mohammed Hatta's speech delivered in the Hague in mid-1967 admitted that Indonesia did not yet have true democracy but the road it was travelling was conducive to a system of ^Robert Keatley, "Indonesia's Burden: Army Corruption Slows Efforts to End Chaos Inherited from Sukarno," Wall Street Journal, May 2, 1967, pp. Iff. 2Armed Forces Courier, December 9, 1967, p. III. === [PDF page 100] === 97 government in which personal liberties and the individual's pursuit of happiness have become more attainable goals. In this sought-after democracy, the question of consensus of the governed must justifiably be examined in its proper Asiatic context. Mozingo's observations of the Asian scene warrant serious consideration in their applicability to Indonesia and the present course of the Ampera Government: In Asia the absence of quasi-democratic, pluralistic institutions has not been proven to be an insuperable obstacle to maintaining stable, political communities based on the tacit or expressed con sent of the governed. Indeed, some Asian societies are likely to find what they regard as the appropriate balance between the con flicting demands of progress, justice and order best achieved within a form of traditional-authoritarian political system, more in har mony with their historical development.1 ^David P. Mozingo, Containment in Asia Reconsidered, P-3^35 (Santa Monica, California: The RAND Corporation, July, 19^6), p. 26. === [PDF page 101] === CHAPTER V CONCLUSION: DEMOCRACY OR "MILITARISM" Many students of Indonesian affairs are wont to listen with skepticism to the Indonesian military elite's proclamation that the ABRI leadership will "... continue opposing all kinds of dictator ships, personal dictatorship, group dictatorship, or military dictator ship.The extensiveness of the program of control put the military within proximate reach of every development in society and in a posi tion to channel these developments along the path desired by the military. The violent repercussions accompanying the expansion of ABRI control were not a reflection of deep-seated public resentment to this extreme shift in the balance of power. Evidence substantiates the viewpoint that the majority of the social response was based upon dissatisfactions existing prior to TNI control which were indigenous to the Indonesian social and cultural fabric. The most extreme violence occurred imme diately after Gestapu when the TNI was shaking off the drowsiness ac cumulated during the period of its decrease in power in the latter days of "Guided Democracy." The military elite was the chief abettor in this violence as it busied itself in the task of shuffling unfamiliar papers from its seat behind the "bi-polar" executive desk acquired in March 1966. IpAB, March 15, 1967, p. 10. 98 === [PDF page 102] === 99 As the "crisis-conflict" situation subsided, due to the con certed effort on the part of the TNI, and the "dualist" bench was re placed by a single executive chair held by the military elite, a more deradicalized and rational approach to the problem of ridding itself of enemies and winning over middle-of-the-roaders came into sway. Along with fewer antagonists came more security in office and the luxury of being able to advance further against forces having interests contrary to the aspirations of the New Order. ABRI inroads to the solution of the nation’s problems reinforced popular allegiance to the course of the Ampera Cabinet, which further strengthened the military's grasp on society and legitimized its role as "defender of the Revolution." terior Minister Rachmat informed regional administrators that ... the extent of the role played by the Armed Forces will depend on the extent of danger that threatens the nation... and the Armed Forces should not be interpreted as the existence of militar ism or the symptoms of militarism because the Armed Forces does not exert military laws... [but does] wish to restore a sound basis for the life of Pantjasila democracy... 1 With the moral weight of constitutional propriety behind it and a revitalized politico-military philosophy which encouraged the pursuit of power primarily for the sake of spreading the benefits of democratic institutions, the military elite found itself in a position legitimized not solely by the control of power and the ability to regulate violence 1Armed Forces Courier, August 26, 1967, p. III. === [PDF page 103] === 100 but especially by its pursuit of democratic processes.The fact that the Old Order was buried under the banner of "democracy" cannot be denied, but the nature of this democracy warrants investigation. Indonesian "Democracy" and "Militarism" The Dutch colonial experience did much to discredit the con cept of "Western democracy" in the eyes of the Indonesian elites. This disillusionment was furthered by the immediate post-War II fiasco in volving the Allies and their confused manner of dealing with the South With independence in 19^9» Indonesia entered into east Asian countries. a chaotic period of "liberal democracy" during which a host of aspirants squabbled for the opportunity to change into costumes which were too large for any of them. Sukarno and the military elite concluded the tryouts with the imposition in 1959 of "Guided Democracy" and the en suing campaign to "kill off the parties." This "Guided Democracy" re tained some of the trappings of parliamentary democracy in an effort to keep at least the facade of a regime responsible for human expression, but Sukarno went too far in the direction in which he was leading the regime. The military found its position of shared leadership being usurped by the PKI. This was intolerable not only to those who were dedicated to the military as a profession but also to those who found within the military a carte blanche to personal enrichment. When the opportunity availed, the TNI leadership moved to re-establish and sur pass its prior position in the power structure. This was done with the ^For a brief study of legitimacy and popular support for au thorities and regime, see David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965), pp. 27Ô-310. It is Easton's resolve that "The inculcation of a sense of legitimacy is probably the single most effective device for regulating the flow of diffuse support in favor both of the authorities and of the regime." Ibid., p. 278. === [PDF page 104] === 101 vehicle of force and violence, legitimized within the parameters of the "democratic process.” This process evolved, bearing outward forms familiar to Western democracy but with innards quite dissimilar. The internal mechanism of this "Pantjasila Democracy" appeared to be close to a Maoist "democratic dictatorship." There were to be the privileges of democracy (Pantjasila) for all of those striving to achieve the suc cessful implementation of the Ampera Cabinet's program, and the priva tions characteristic of a dictatorial regime for enemies of the state. With such weak foundations of transplanted Western social and political ideas (Democracy) and vehement public disapproval of "Mili tarism," the Ampera Cabinet has ventured on what it sees as a middle course—"Pantjasila Democracy." Operating within the context of a re structured politico-military philosophy and equating military aspira tions with the nationalistic state ideology, the present "Ruler Type" praetorian state^ has opted for the building of civilian political structures in preference to a military dictatorship. The military has made many moves, in part due to public demand, toward building a democratic framework into which civilians can fit when the time comes. It must be noted that, in spite of the publicity given to "creeping militarism," there has been only a 5 per cent in crease in the number of top cabinet and subministerial positions placed into military hands since October 1965» In July of 1967, ABRI members held forty-six of 108 top posts in the Ampera Cabinet. There has been ^For an excellent study of this subject, see Amos Perlmutter, "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Towards a Theory of CivilMilitary Relations in Developing Polities" (unpublished manuscript, Institute of International Studies; University of California, 1967)« esp. pp. 24-31. Praetorianism is here defined as a "constitutional form of • government without consent*" (ibid.. p. 32) but certain indigenous In donesian factors alter this meaning (esp. "consent") when considering the "Correlates of Praetorianism." Ibid.« p. 4. A breakdown of the composition of the Ampera Cabinet: Eastern Economic Review, LVII, No. 27 (July 8, 1967), 26. Far === [PDF page 105] === 102 a far greater increase at lower administrative levels (Suara Hakjat reported on 30 November 1965 that at least 95 per cent of the twentyfive governors in Indonesia were military) although many of these were ad interim assignments. The July 1967 dissolution of KOTI (Cabinet and Presidium assumed its function) and PEPELDA (powers transferred to governors and district heads) and the September reorganization of ABRI (removing the commanders of the four branches from ministerial rank and placing them under the control of a Minister of Defense, Suharto) within the framework of the Defense and Security Organization (HANKAM^ were publicly proclaimed by the TNI leadership to be its response to counter the complaints of "militarism." The military elite willingly admitted to its extensive political involvement but continually em phasized that this high degree of participation was only for a transi tional period. A visiting group of American Political Science Associa tion scholars was told, in all sincerity, that the Indonesian military elite "... definitely would not like to be condemned by generations after us as Founders of Indonesian militarism. The Ampera government has given every indication that it has legitimate intentions in its leadership role. The traditional status quo politics (liberalism and unregulated parliamentary procedure) have given way to a "consolidation and crystallization" linked to types of organizational structures proposed by rapid growth theories. The govern ^A listing of MUSPIDA Chairmanships has civilians in only twelve of the forty-four positions throughout Indonesia. Java alone has no civilian MUSPIDA Chairmen. See BEK, No. 59« September 8, 1967, pp. 429, 432-34. ^A Chart of the Structure of the Command Organization of HANKAM: PAB, September 19$ 1967, pp. 14-15. ^Djakarta Times, September 6, 1967, p. 7. === [PDF page 106] === 103 ing elite’s admiration for and close relations with Yugoslavia and Pakistan indicate the state economic and political models (though seriously untried by Indonesia but by no means stochastic models in view of post-independence experience) Indonesia sees worthy of emulation; just as the violent purge which the TNI encouraged and/or conducted proved the military’s bitter distaste for a Communist-controlled state. The new political import of anti-Communist military leaders... [is] clearly due in large part to the total or partial breakdown of democratic institutions and processes, and it remains to be seen if the new... [regime is] able to strike successfully at the root causes of Communist growth.1 The serious efforts made to effect modernization, alter the socio-political context, and resolve the economic and political problems—problems which were permitted to become a part of the Indonesian’s daily life—and policies permitting the guarded re-entry of civilians into the power structure bode well for the present government. Social and political forces have been given the floor of the forum and their demands responded to in many cases. The post-Gestapu disorder delayed the progress pre viously made in solving certain serious problems, but under a more stable government the solution can be pursued in a fashion that promotes so cietal-governmental solidarity. In his August 1967 Independence Day speech Acting President Suharto urged the nation that it was ”... time ^A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. 164. For Minister of Foreign Affairs Adam Malik’s summary of efforts made since 1966 in the economic field and those proposed for the near future see Adam Malik, "Promise in Indonesia," Foreign Affairs, XLVI For an excellent study of the plausibility of and pertinent questions necessarily asked concerning the military as the national leader of economic development see Mohammad Sadli, The Influence of the Military on Economic Development: An Analysis Drawn Mainly from Indonesian Experience (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard Univer sity, March, 1964). === [PDF page 107] === 104 to place Pantjasila Democracy on a programmatic basis.... [This democracy consists of] the participation of all interested parties in the socio-political life through consultations for consensus.In this State Address he likewise reiterated the dual function of the Armed Forces as defense-security forces and as a socio-political po tential, denying the accusations of ABRI's establishment of a military dictatorship. The numerous centrifugal forces which remain tend to discourage the military elite from moving beyond the point of no re turn into a military dictatorship.The image of Sukarno has been tar nished to the point of no-political-return^ and his strongest support has jumped upon more promising bandwagons... the military accruing much of this. The present military elite could at best emulate Ataturk’s offleers and establish a lasting political structure, though the present Djakarta Times, August 18, 1967, P* 7. It is the opinion of this author that the ABRI leadership real izes that the existing divisive forces in the country (division within ABRI itself, very strong civilian contempt for a military dictatorship, and these disgruntled masses who have not been satisfied yet concerning their basic need and hence find the left a very favorable calling) would fragment Indonesia if the present military elite (or for that matter, one in the near future) attempted to establish a dictatorship. The most likely prospect is a coalition government "directed" by the military but permitting increasing civilian participation and working toward a gradual military withdrawal to its stated profession. For one scholar’s opinion of the Indonesian state of affairs see Guy J. Pauker, "Indonesia's Convalescence," P-5652 (Santa Monica, Cali fornia: The RAND Corporation, August, 1967). ^Incidents such as requiring "Dr. Sukarno" to stand trial (he failed to appear in court) in appeals court for his abuse of authority while still President (see the Armed Forces Courier, December 25, 1967, p. V), and the appearai ce in military pay envelopes in January 1968 of new paper currency without Sukarno's picture are indications of his position. The present course of the TNI elite closely parallels the pro ductive efforts of the Turkish officer corps (Perlmutter’s points one through three). Perlmutter, "Developing Polities," pp. 50-51. === [PDF page 108] === 105 status of the proposed PMI vis-a-vis the TNI is largely uncertain. Though the present "period of transition" may witness tighter military control and the legalized entrance of members of the military elite into the civil authority structure via general elections, the goal of the Ampera Cabinet remains one of extending the privileges of democracy— "Pantjasila (or "guarded") Democracy" —to the entire Indonesian nation. Only by encouraging the institutionalization of responsible political organizations which are able to act autonomously over a period of time and by the extension of political rights and privileges (perhaps of necessity under authoritarian direction) can a more integrated society be achieved and a domestic development attained which will be conducive to modernization. The extent of military participation in this political and economic development will determine, in large part, the future course and success of the present government. If modernization and politiciza tion are presently (1968) postponed at the expense of a "consolidation" of a military oligarchy, these processes will be further delayed at a later date "... if political change must wait for the breakdown of ... [this] military oligarchy,... [and the] outcome will not be conducive to an orderly and humane process of modernization.The intent of the military elite presently in positions of authority and the desires of the populace are aimed in the direction of avoiding such an eventuality. Summary The foregoing study: (1) briefly examines the political role of the Indonesian National Army (TNI) from its origins until October 1965 Ijanowitz, Development of New Nations, p. 106. === [PDF page 109] === 106 and the politico-military philosophy of Nasution as it evolved during this period; (2) surveys in depth the extensive program of control conducted by the TNI following the 1 October 1965 attempted coup d'etat and the nationwide violence occurring thereafter, continuing through the present and; ()) weighs these events in light of the political ac tivities and policies of the present Ampera government (operating under a revised politico-military philosophy) in order to gain a keener in sight into the present state of Indonesian politico-military affairs. The Army's extensive political role was on the decline in the 1960's primarily due to the PKI's activities and favoritism with Sukarno. With the given state of domestic affairs, the TNI could best survive in a praetorian state under Army leadership guided by Nasution's politico military philosophy (which amounted to a demand for a praetorian state). The question of Sukarno's successor and the inevitable showdown between the TNI and PKI culminated in the events of Gestapu. In an effort to change the political balance of power to the TNI's favor, the Army in itiated a grand effort to mobilize the masses and gain the consent of the governed. With this tacit consent, the move against Sukarno was made along "legal" lines in order to establish legitimacy as a respon sible social force while still controlling the means of violence. The situation demanded, in the minds of those considering future stability and viability, action in the direction of a political stability. They saw the necessity of establishing a governmental framework which, al though not initially based on pluralist competition, would lay the blue print for the attainment of this pluralism when a greater degree of political stability had been attained. === [PDF page 110] === 107 The administrative framework which has developed by early 1968 is one which a regime having totalitarian intent would only permit at the risk of its very survival. The problems of leadership succession and fostering pluralistic competition for consensus have been (and are being) dealt with in a non-totalitarian manner. Through the program of control the TNI has attempted to both mobilize the masses in an at tempt to gain their consensus (consent of the governed was given but will be retained only if the TNI succeeds in resolving the nation's difficulties) and to establish a political framework which will eventu ally remove the characteristics of praetorianship. The pattern of post-coup violence revealed: (1) a high degree of Army encouragement and participation affecting all three phases (anti-PKI, pro- and anti-Sukarno, and anti-Chinese) of violence; (2) the TNI's increasing capability (in large part due to its effective program of control) to regulate violence as the "crisis-conflict" state of the nation subsided; (3) the centrifugal forces within the nation and ARBI itself which affect the unity and success of the present government; and (4) the potentially explosive forces surviving in the wake of violence. The program of control and pattern of violence revealed the TNI as the most (only) potent and viable political force existing in Indonesia. The TNI's travelling of the legal course in promoting the demise of Sukarno left the politico-military philosophy of Nasution in a position of choice: force its praetorian (military dictatorial) aims upon the nation or adapt itself to the prevailing mentality of legalism. choosing the latter, a necessary change in certain fundamental tenets of the philosophy had to be brought about. By following the established === [PDF page 111] === 108 legal path, further internal TNI-ABRI and nationwide conflict was avoided and the political-military philosophy of Nasution has become a part of the legitimacy of the new Ampera government. In the presence of the military operating within the context of a political-military philosophy dedicated to non-praetorian political development, Indo nesian civilian political and social forces have been able to express themselves and encourage the military to implement the government’s program of nationwide economic and political development. In spite of the economic problems which still prevail and frequent civil disorder, present civil-military relations are of a nature conducive to the develop ment of a non-praetorian state. === [PDF page 112] === CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF CONTROL-VIOLENCE RELATIONSHIP The following is a brief chronological table of events trans piring in Indonesia from October 1965 to January 1968 which affected the political balance of power in the realization of the Army's program of control. Die violence occurred either as a result of this shift or was the causal factor necessitating a further control movement by the military leadership. Control Violence 1365 October Suharto takes over TNI; curfew; neutralize rebels Death of 6 Generals; death of Jogjakarta Commander 16 HPKAD to Central Java Widespread anti-PKI violence in wake of TNI control 18 PKI and affiliates activities banned Anti-Chinese activities nation wide 22 Cabinet Presidium orders all Ministries to suspend Commu nist affiliated organizations under their control PKI counter-offensive in Central Java and elsewhere 25 Bloody slaughter begins in Cen tral Java 25 Birth of KAMI 28 Martial law in Central Java November RPKAD to East Java Ansor slaughter in wake of TNI MPRS strips Communist MPs, in cluding Aidit, of parliamentary functions 11 Jakarta ends "state of war" 20 General Adjie—first total ban of PKI in West Java 24 Military oust civilians from KOTI; expand role to take over all functions of government 50 Establishment of Pantjasila Front 109 Bali killings—last until mid January; Tamin executioners === [PDF page 113] === 110 Control Violence December Baperki banned "December 10 Incident" Medan— slaughter of Chinese 10 14 Nasution, Abdulgani, and Sultan Buwono Deputy Commanders of KOTI—first significant shift in the balance of power; Subandrio ousted 1266 January 15 Sukarno offensive—proposes a Sukarno Front Student demonstrations —"Three Demands"; Jakarta in uproar en tire month 16 Sukarno reported 87,000 killed since 1 October 1965 31 Chinese deaths estimated in four figures February Mahmilub trial opens in Jakarta 13 KAPPI born 20 "Cabinet of 100"; Nasution re moved; Njono sentenced to death by Mahmilub 22 Sukarno forms KOGAM to replace KOTI; installation new Ministers 26 KAMI banned by Sukarno; Jakarta curfew anti-Sukarno forces Jakarta student clashes; also with military Students clash with troops—deaths; KAMI baptism of blood and becomes political force March Violent student demonstrations Education Ministry, Foreign Of fice, Chinese and American Embassies Untung trial—death sentence 11 March 11 Order transfer of power to Suharto 12 Suharto formal ban of PKI and affiliates Renewal of anti-Chinese activities 18 Subandrio and other Ministers into custody; interim Presidium and Ministers appointed; Ruling triumvirate Suharto, Malix, Sultan Continuation of pro- and anti Sukarno violence === [PDF page 114] === Ill Control Violence March Tjakabirawa dissolved--TNI as sumes duties; Department of Army changed to Ministry of Army; Chinese consulates ordered closed in var ious areas 29 April TNI campaign to "return to the •45 Constitution" 16 "Surabaya Incident"—anti Communist Indonesian Chinese attack Chinese consul 26 Revamp Supreme Advisory Council 28 Mt. Kelud (East Java) erupts (as it did when Sukarno was born)— an omen to superstitious Indo nesians May Armed Forces Statement of Solidar ity 19 Government ban of foreign schools and seizure of same Intense Jogjakarta clashes— pro- and anti-Sukarno forces IV Session MPRS—Nasution Chair man; ratify Suharto's powers Nationwide repercussions to MPRS, especially in Central Java; students continue pro testing Cabinet's composition June 20 July MPRS strips Sukarno title "Presi dent for Life"; ABRI Solidarity Statement Thousands of paracommandos to Central Java to quell riots; Jakarta tight security (30,000 troops) 25 Ampera Cabinet with Presidium of five with Suharto as chairman Central Java—violent eruptions entire month August 11 End "Konfrontasi" with Malaysia 17 Sukarno's Independence Day speech in defense of Nasakom Violent, widespread domestic repercussions === [PDF page 115] === 112 Control Violence August 19 25-50 Bandung Army Seminar: (a) Constitutional procedure in preference to the "personal ap proach" in ousting Sukarno de cided upon; (b) Decision to end Chinese economic domination; Trial ex-Finance Minister Dalam percussion to Sukarno's speech between pro- and anti-Sukarno forces; Jakarta "Parliament of the Street" resumes September Certain cities and areas "closed" to new alien residents 27 Renewal anti-Chinese activities with intensity National Front officially dis solved October Subandrio trial—testimony the first linking Sukarno to Gestapu Ban of demonstrations AKABRI inaugurated 22 MFRS note to Sukarno to explain his role in the government and Gestapu 25 Subandrio sentenced to death Student demonstrations—brutally quelled by TNI Increased violence between proand anti-Sukarno forces November 12 Suharto opens first National Defense and Security Seminar; Murba rehabilitated 26 Intense anti-Chinese violence in Medan December Dhani Mahmilub—further impli cates Sukarno 16 Indonesian Lawyers and Judges demand Sukarno's role in coup be investigated 21 Armed Forces Joint Statement— "firm steps" against anyone (aimed at Sukarno) opposing new administration and Constitution of '45 Pro- and anti-Sukarno violence continues === [PDF page 116] === 113 Control Violence December 24 Dhani death sentence—session urged Sukarno account for his role in Gestapu 31 East Java—severe economic and other restrictions on Chinese 1262 January 10 challenges MPRS right to ask for an account of his actions; ges tions Nasution’s role and respon- Negative popular repercussions sibility; machinery to oust Sukar- to Sukarno’s account no moves into full gear 21 MPRS announce March meeting to Pro- and anti-Sukarno clashes discuss Presidential tenure— prelude to trial Hundreds of thousands of stu 28 30 dents demonstrate—demand trial of Sukarno Sukarno under virtual house ar rest and Palace surrounded by TNI units February 10 MPRS Standing Committee (headed by Suharto) demands ouster of Sukarno—marks legal beginning of the end for Sukarno 14 Nasution’s three-hour account of his role in government —further condemns Sukarno; Indonesian Supreme Court demands Sukarno be tried for treason 20 Sukarno transfers all executive powers to Suharto Trial of coup mastermind Supardjo 24 Parliament unanimously proposes Suharto Acting-President until elections Terrorism, riots, and clashes throughout Indonesia === [PDF page 117] === 114 Control Violence March Opening of MPRS Special Plenary Small, isolated clashes of Session pro- and anti-Sukarno forces 13 Sukarno loses power, titles, and is barred from political activity Suharto made Acting President 15 Jakarta curfew lifted first time since October 1965 Chinese vehemently protest rural trade ban in East Java 28 April New wave regulations and restrietions aimed at Chinese Nationwide renewal of anti Chinese violence; youths re taliate for Chinese protesting "shop key" order May Major reshuffle of top TNI officers by Suharto June 21 KOSTRANAS (National Strategic Command) formed Continued pro- and anti-Sukarno violence July Sudisman trial "Jogjakarta Declaration"— by all TNI, vowing to pre vent another Sukarno era Students protesting prices and slow progress of government 18 Arrest of group "plotting" Sukarno's comeback KOTI and PEPEDDA dissolved Growing public concern for "creeping militarism" August Ali Sastroamidjojo, three time Premier, arrested 25 HA NKAM—reorganization of the military; the four ABRI Com manders are removed from Ministerial slots Increase in anti-Chinese hos tilities; Continued pro- and anti-Sukarno clashes September WALAWA initiated Student protests Suharto becomes Minister of Defense === [PDF page 118] === 115 Control Violence October 50 Students attack Chinese Com munist emabassy Severance of diplomatic re lations with the PRC Chinese communist guerrilla activities in North Sumatra and Kalimantan November 12 Siliwangi units "neutralize" Kalimantan guerrillas Security operations against Sumatran subversives Religious and "Gestapu/PKI" guerrilla violence; rising public furor over corruption and high prices Dayak tribesmen slaughter Chinese Students protest against draft of elections bill December Presidential decision—combat corruption Renew purges of military and government bodies 12 Suharto—1968 the year of limit for the Nation’s patience 18 Anti-corruption task force sworn under Attorney General Sugiarto 1968 Scattered terrorist acts; mili tary activities against subver sives and rebels === [PDF page 119] === GLOSSARY OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ABRI - Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (including the Army, Air Force, Navy and Police) AKABRI - Academy of Indonesian Armed Forces AKRI - Police Force ALRI - Navy AMPERA - Message of the People's Sufferings Ansor - Moslem students who were the chief East Java executioners ANTARA - National News Agency Institute APES - Supporters of Sukarno "A-SU" - Word used by enemies of the left wing of the pro-Communist PNI under the leadership of Ali Sastroamidjojo and Surachman. "DOG." AÜRI - Air Force BAPERKI - Organization of Citizens of Chinese Origins BPI - Central Intelligence Agency under Subandrio BS - Sukarno Front BTI - Indonesian Farmers Front Dalang - Director of Wayang shadow play DI - Darul Islam ("The Area of Islam")—Political-religious movement, since 1948 anti-Sukarno Durno - An evil character in the Wayang play who gives bad advice to his superiors and is an instigator who spreads slander DWIKORA - The People's Two-fold Command to Crush Malaysia GERWANI - Indonesian Women's Movement (PKI) GESTAPU - 30 September Movement which attempted the pro-Communist coup GESTOK - 1 October Movement to eradicate the coup elements Guided Democracy - "... democracy guided by wisdom and consultations/ representations, having as a nucleus consultations for agreement in a sphere of mutual assistance among all the revolutionary pro gressive forces. Bases on NASAKOM..." (MPRS edict No. VIII/ 1965, April 16, 1965) HANKAM - Defense and Security Coordinating Body of the Armed Forces HANRA - People's Defense paramilitary organizations 116 === [PDF page 120] === 117 HANSIP - Civil Defense Organization Kahar Muzakar - leader of the- PRII (United Islamic Republic of Indo nesia) rebellion who was shot in early 1965 KAMI - Action Front of Indonesian University Students KAPPI - Indonesian High School Students Youth Action Front KASI - Action Command of Academicians KIN - Intelligence Command under Suharto KKK - Security Coordination Command KOGAM - Crush Malaysia Command Konfrontasi - Military confrontation with Malaysia KOSTRAD - Army Strategic Reserves Command—active reserve troops who were constantly engaged in combat operations or intensive training in order to meet any national emergency KOSTRANAS - National Strategic Command (June, 1967) KOTI - Supreme Operations Command LPKB - Institute for the Fostering of National Unity (Chinese) MAHMILUB - Extraordinary Military Tribunal established to try those in volved in Gestapu Marhaen - Originally the name of a poor peasant, now is the term used for the "small man of Indonesia" Marhaenism - Political doctrine of the PNI MPRS - Provisional People's Consultative Congress—the supreme Indo nesian legislative body with members appointed by the President MUSPIDA - Regional leadership congresses NASAKOM - Basic concept of Sukarno—a coalition of Nationalists, Agama (religious groups) and Kommunists NAWAKSARA - "Nine points"—Sukarno's July 1966 speech to the MPRS with "Supplement" of January 1967 denying any role in Gestapu NEKOLIM - Neo-colonialists, colonialists, and imperialists NF - National Front—body formed by Sukarno in I960 to monopolize all "progressive and revolutionary" forces in society NU - Moslem Scholars Party Orde Baru - (New Order) A new state of conditions with realistic think ing, giving top priority to national interest, anti-personality cult and true implementation of the 19^5 Constitution (Nasution) Orde Lama (Old Order) - State of conditions before the Gestapu period characterized by deviation from the 194^ Constitution, vested interests, and suppression of the truth (Nasution) Pantjasila - Five pillars of the State and Nation === [PDF page 121] === 118 "Puntjasila Democracy" - the participation of all interested parties in the socio-political life through consultations for consensus Pantjasila Front - Body of all existing people's civil defense organiza tions Pantja Tunggal - Regional administration by the five services of the Civil Service, ABRI, Judicial Authority, aKRI, and the NF Partindo - One of the legal parties under Guided Democracy—leftist PEPELDA - Regional Implementation Authority PEPELRADA - Highest Regional Authority for the Implementation of Dwikora PERBEPSI - All-Indonesian Veteran's Association Pemuda Rakjat - PKI youth front organization PERSHAI - Association of Indonesian Lawyers "Plin-Plan" - attitude of an opportunist, hypocrite PRRI - Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (anti-Sukarno rebellion 1958-1962) PKI - Communist Party of Indonesia PMI - Muslim Party of Indonesia (proposed in late 1967 but not legally authorized as of January 1968) PNI - Nationalist Party of Indonesia PWI - Indonesian Journalist's Association SOBS I - PKI-dominated Indonesian Federation of Trade Unions SOKS I - Indonesian Socialist Workers Union RPKAD - Resiman Pasukan Komando Angkatan Darat—elite paracommandos Tamin - PNI youths who conducted the anti-PKI slaughter on Bali TNI - National Army of Indonesia WALAWA - Student Compulsory Military Training === [PDF page 122] === BIBLIOGRAPHY Books Abdulgani, Dr. H. 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"Indonesia’s New Order," New Statesman, LXXIII (March 31, 1967), 426-27. Malik, Adam. "Promise in Indonesia," Foreign Affairs, XLVI (January,3968), 296-301. "Masjarakat Ibukota Televisi Minded?" Business News, XI (30 Nopember 1966), 6. McLennan, B.N. "Politics and Change in Indonesia," International Journal of Comparative Sociology, VII (March, 1966), 138-52. === [PDF page 126] === 123 Medan Press Summary. 1964-68. Mellor, Bridget. "Political Killings in Indonesia," New Statesman (August, 1966), p. 189. "Musical Chairs in Jakarta," New York Times. Economist, CCXIV (February 20, 1965)1 768. 1965-68. O'Ballance, Edmund. "Indonesia," Military Review, XLIII, No. 12 (De cember, 1963), 30-37. "One Million Dead?—and How They Died," The Economist, CCXX (August 20, 1966), 727-28. Pauker, Ewa T. "Has the Sukarno Regime Weakened the PKI?" Asian Survey, IV, No. 9 (September, 1964), 1058-70. Pauker, Guy J. "Indonesia in 1964t Toward A People's Democracy?" 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Wertheim, W.F. "Indonesia Before and After the Untung Coup," Pacific Affairs, XXXIX (Spring/Sumaer, 1966), 115-27. "What the Guru Said; What Suharto Does," The Economist, CCXIX (April 16, 1966), 232ff. Willner, Ann R. "Communist Phoenix and the Indonesian Garuda," World Politics, XIX (April, 1967), 500-20. Other Chairman of the Ampera Cabinet Presidium. port to the People." Djakarta: Department of Information, 1967. McVey, Ruth T. "Indonesian Communism and China." Paper presented at the University of Chicago's Center for Policy Study conference on "China, the United States and Asia," February 5-9, 1967. Mozingo, David P. "China's Policy Toward Indonesia." Paper presented at the University of Chicago's Center for Policy Study conference on "China, the United States and Asia," February 5-9, 1967. . "Containment in Asia Reconsidered." P-3435• California: The RAND Corporation, July 1966. Santa Monica, === [PDF page 128] === 125 "Never Leave History!" [Speech of President Sukarno.] Department of Information, August 17, 1966. Djakarta: Paget, Roger K. "The Military in Indonesian Politics: The Burden of Power." Unpublished research. Archives file, University of Chicago, Department of Sociology, Center for Social Organiza tion Studies, [n.d.] [early 1967.] Pauker, Guy J. "Indonesia’s Convalescence." P-3652. Santa Monica, California: The RAND Corporation, August 1967. Perlmutter, Amos. "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Towards a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Polities." Unpublished manuscript. Institute of International Studies: University of California, 1967. Private correspondence with the Kedutaan Besar Indonesia (Bnbassy of Indonesia); Educational and Cultural Division, Washington, D.C.: November 22, 1967. Results of Fourth MPRS Session in 1966. Djakarta: Antara, 1966. Some aspects Concerning Progress and Principles of the Indonesian Revo lution. Series B&B, No. 1002. 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