Recruitment and Factional Patterns of the Indonesian Political Elite: Guided Democracy and the New Order (PhD thesis, Columbia University, 1976)

=== [PDF page 1] === INFORMATION TO USERS This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted. The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction. 1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity. 2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and titus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame. 3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being photographed the photographer followed a definite method in "sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is continued again — beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete. 4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from "photographs" if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced. 5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received. Xerox University Microfilms 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 === [PDF page 2] === 76-29,042 GREGORY, Ann, 1937RECRUITMENT AND FACTIONAL PATTERNS OF THE INDONESIAN POLITICAL ELITE: GUIDED DEMOCRACY AND THE NEW ORDER. Columbia U n i v e r s i t y, Ph.D., 1976 P o l i t i c a l Science, general X e r o x University M i c r o f i l m s, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 (c) 1976 ANN GREGORY ALL RIGHTS RESERVED === [PDF page 3] === RECRUITMENT AND FACTIONAL PATTERNS OF THE INDONESIAN POLITICAL ELITEt GUIDED DEMOCRACY AND THE NEW ORDER Ann Gregory Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Political Science Columbia University 1976 === [PDF page 4] === ABSTRACT RECRUITMENT AND FACTIONAL PATTERNS OF THE INDONESIAN POLITICAL ELITE: GUIDED DEMOCRACY AND THE NEW ORDER Ann Gregory Attention was directed to four main areas: 1) background characteristics of the political elite; 2) influence of career patterns upon elite membership; 3) factional dynamics within the political elite; and 4) civilian-military interrelationships. Background characteristics. The major questions were: 1) To what extent did the elite represent the mass? 2) What combinations of ethnic, religious, social status, educational, generational, and geographical characteristics were common for the Indonesian political elite? and 3) What changes in elite background characteristics can be seen over time? The Indonesian elite was unrepresentative of the mass. There was a clear overepresentation of Central Javanese. Socially, the majority of the elite came from upper status families. The political elite had received Western-style education, whereas only a small percentage of the mass were literate at that time. i\o one background factor was necessary and sufficient in determining elite membership. The major interacting factors were: education and social status, religious, and ethnic origin. One had the greatest likelihood of achieving elite status if one were Central Javanese from an upper status and an abangan (nominally Muslim) background. Looking at the Indonesian elite from the time of === [PDF page 5] === the Revolution to the present the elite has gradually become even less representative of the population as a whole, especially in terms of ethnic and religious identification. Career Patterns. The Indonesian elite came from three institutions: the military, political parties, and the technocracy. The major question investigated wass What is the relevance of the time of ascent, the place of ascent, and the routes of ascent to the achievement of elite status'.'' Within the military it was found that the time of entry into the military was crucial in determining whether or not a person was able to rise to elite status. All military elite members participated in the Revolution. the time of entry was less important. For civilians Concerning the place and routes of ascent a majority of the military elite rose through command and staff positions, although a few rose through non-military positions and personal connections. The political party leaders had three base locations--the central party offices, the regional chapters, and mass movements. The technocrats had two base offices--a technical faculty and a government office. Membership in a prestigious clique was necessary for all members in ascending to elite status. Factional Dynamics. For.military factions divisional identification and ethnic background were, in general, congruent, and these were the most important factors in terms of the formation of military factions. However, the factional picture was more complicated, and other elements === [PDF page 6] === influenced alignment. Within the civilian elite, background factors were the major variables in determining the bases of factionalism, although ideological beliefs do play a role. Civilian-Military Relations. Soeharto's political strategies were successful in creating a state party, controlling the political parties, and restructuring the political system, but as the 1974 riots indicated, the regime's forceful attempts to build consensus through control were not an effective substitute for the development of policies which would be responsive to widespread public demand. In general, the Indonesian elite is not only unrepresentative of the society as a whole in terms of composition, but the trend is toward less representation rather than more; this has had the consequence of lessening the responsiveness of the elite toward demands within society. === [PDF page 7] === For Raden Ayu Kartini and all her modern sisters === [PDF page 8] === iii TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Chapter I. INTRODUCTION Indonesian Politics: An Historical Introduction Previous Studies of the Indonesian Elite.. Scope of the Study Background Characteristics of the Elite.. Influence of Career Patterns upon Elite Membership Factional Dynamics Methods Preview of Findings Background Characteristics of the Elite.. Patterns of Ascent to Elite Status.... Factional Dynamics II. THE BACKGROUND OF THE ELITE: ETHNIC, SOCIAL, EDUCATIONAL, GEOGRAPHICAL AND GENERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS Summary Java Non-Indonesian Groups Ethnic and Social Background of the Elite.. Ethnic Background Social Status and Occupation Religious Origins Education Introduction Educational Patterns of the Elite Birthplace of the Elite Generational Patterns III. CAREER PATTERNS OF THE MILITARY ELITE Summary Evolution of the Indonesian Military.... Four Military Elite Career Lines Introduction Military Career Groups 14 14 23 29 31 40 40 44 47 50 50 59 61 81 98 99 .99 115 141 149 149 150 178 191 199 220 220 227 247 247 253 === [PDF page 9] === CAREER PATTERNS OF THE CIVILIAN ELITE Summary Technocratic and Non-Party Segments Introduction Career Histories Background Characteristics and Career Patterns Guided Democracy Non-Party Segment.... Major Political Parties of the New Order. Sample Career Histories Background Characteristics and Career Patterns of the Guided Democracy and New Order Party Elites V. MILITARY FACTIONS Summary C l i e n t e l i s m and F a c t i o n a l i s m Clientelism Factionalism F a c t i o n a l i s m in the M i l i t a r y The Bases for F a c t i o n a l i s m H i s t o r i c a l Background of Factionalism... Factional Alignments in the New Order: 1966-1969 Factionalism in the Military from 1970-1974: A P o s t s c r i p t VI. CIVILIAN FACTIONS AND MILITARY-CIVILIAN RELATIONSHIPS Summary Civilian Factions Bases of Factionalism Divisions in the Technocrats Factionalism in the Major Parties: the FNT, the Masjumi/Parmusi, and the NU.. Military-Civilian Relations Introduction Military-Civilian Movements in the New Order: KOSGORO and Golkar The Military and Political Parties.... CONCLUSION 327 327 333 333 335 602 628 651 GLOSSARY LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 665 669 674 341 349 352 352 384 398 429 429 431 431 445 457 457 474 514 538 546 546 549 549 556 561 591 591 === [PDF page 10] === LIST OF TABLES 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. Agreement among the Positional, "Hat," and Reputational Approaches 37 Ethnic Representation in the New Order Political Elite and the General Population....... 100 Ethnic Representation in the New Order Elite Segments 105 Ethnic Composition of the New Order Armed Forces Leadership 107 Ethnic Representation in the Political Elites from the Revolution to the New Order 109 Social Status Recruitment of Javan Elite Members: A Comparison of Political Periods 118 Social Status Origin of Javans According to New Order Elite Segment 123 Social Status Origin of Non-Javans According to New Order Elite Segment 124 Fathers' Occupation of the New Order Political Elite Members 126 Relationship between Social Status and Father's Occupation among the New Order Javan Elite.. 127 Occupations of the Fathers of the New Order Political Elite and the "Native" Adult Population 129 Fathers' Occupation of Javans and Outer Islanders: New Order Political Elite 130 Fathers' Occupations: A Comparison of New Order Elite Segments 131 Fathers' Occupations: Guided Democracy and New Order Elites 133 Occupations of the New Order Elite's Grandfathers 135 Comparison of New Order Javan Elite Members' Status with Their Grandfathers' Occupations.. 136 Social Status and Religious Origins of Javan Members of the New Order Political Elite... 146 Relationship between Region of Birth and Religious Origin: New Order Javan Elite 147 Numbers of Indonesians and Europeans Receiving Western Primary Education 160 Graduates of the HBS According to Racial Origin. 162 === [PDF page 11] === Graduates of the AMS According to Racial Origin Indonesian Students Registered in Institutes of Higher Learning Graduates of Institutions of Higher Learning in Indonesia Relationship between Social Status Origin of New Order Javan Elite Members and PreUniversity Education Relationship between Father's Occupation and Pre-University Education of the New Order Political Elite. Religious Background and Pre-University Education of the New Order Political Elite.... New Order Elite Segment and Pre-University Education Highest Level of Education Reached by Members of the Indonesian Elites from the Revolution to the New Order Highest Degree Held by Members of the Political Elites from the Revolution to the hew Order. Social Status and University Education of Javan New Order Elite Members Higher Education and Elite Segment in the New Order Size of Birthplace for Guided Democracy and New Order E l i t e s: A Comparison with t h e j ^ n e r a l Population D i s t r i b u t i o n Population of B i r t h p l a c e: New Order E l i t e and Their Fathers Population of B i r t h p l a c e: New Order E l i t e and Their Mothers Population of Birthplace of Guided Democracy and New Order E l i t e s: Javans and Outer Islanders Population of B i r t h p l a c e of Guided Democracy and New Order E l i t e s: E l i t e Segments..... Javan and Outer Island Type of B i r t h p l a c e: Guided Democracy and New Order E l i t e s.... Type of Birthplace of the New Order Javan E l i t e: Social S t a t u s and Religious Background Age D i s t r i b u t i o n of Guided Democracy and New Order E l i t e Segments 164 171 172 180 131 182 184 186 188 189 190 192 193 193 194 195 196 197 214 === [PDF page 12] === Vll 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. Level of Education Reached by the New Order Army Elite: Comparison of Career Groups... 268 Mean Number of Years in Command and Staff Positions! The New Order Military Elite... 276 Mean Number of Years in Center and Field Positions: New Order Military Elite 279 Progression of the Careers of the Army Command Group: The New Order 282 Progression of the Careers of the Army Staff Group: The New Order 285 Progression of the Careers of the Army Karya/ Personal Group: The New Order... T.... 289 Progression of the Careers of the Other Services' Command Group: The New Order 291 Progression of the Careers of the Other Services' Staff Group: The New Order 294 Population of Place of First Assignment: New Order Army Groups 297 Military Training under the Japanese: New Order Command and Staff Groups 298 Type and Place of Army Military Education after 304 Type and Place of Military Training of the New Order Other Services Elite after 1945.... 306 Representation of the New Order Army Elite in SSKAD and SESKOAD Classes 311 Years in Military Teaching and Administration: New Order Military Elite Members 313 Length of Teaching and Administrative Assignments: New Order Army Elite 313 Military Assignments Abroad: New Order Elite.. 316 New Order Armed Forces Career Groups: Years in Karya Positions 322 Development of the Primary Careers of New Order Technocrats: 1942-1973 347 Progression of Careers of the Guided Democracy 353 Mean Ages of Political Party Leaders: The New Order 399 Ethnic Origin of Parliamentary Representatives and the New Order Party Elite 402 === [PDF page 13] === viii 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. Educational Level Reached by Parliamentary Representatives and New Order Party Elite.. Mean Years in Secondary Occupations? New Order Political Party Elite Paths to Party Leadership: New Order Progression of Party Career of the New Order Political Party Elite Progression of Governmental Positions Held by the New Order Political Party Elite Progression of Party Career of the Guided Democracy Party Elite Progression of Governmental Positions Held by the Guided Democracy Party Elite...... Ethnic Identification of Elite Members from Siliwangi and Diponegoro Divisions..... 405 411 413 415 417 423 424 463 === [PDF page 14] === ILLUSTRATIONS Chart Map Educational System of the Netherlands East Indies KOSGORO Organization 158 611 Major Ethnic Areas of Indonesia 60 === [PDF page 15] === ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am greatly indebted to many individuals who helped me with my research and writing. First of all I wish to thank James F. Guyot, Ann Ruth Willner, Dankwart A. Rustow, and W. Howard Wriggins, to whom I am indebted intellectual- I especially wish to thank James F. Guyot for his patience, tolerance, and help during the slow process of this dissertation. Ann Ruth Willner was of indispensable help in the field and back in the United States; many of my ideas in the dissertation were sparked by our conversations over the years. I am very grateful to my dear friend, Joan Sophie, without whose help and encouragement I doubt if I would have finished this dissertation; she not only read the various drafts of the dissertation, suffered while I wrote much of it, and gave many valuable suggestions, but she also lent me moral support which was indispensable to the completion of this work. I owe many thanks to my parents for patience and understanding while I have been working on my dissertation. I am grateful to Allan and Susan Samson for their support, friendship, and encouragement from the time we met in Jakarta. Acknowledgement is also due to the Southern Asian Insitute of Columbia University, whose support permitted me to carry on my research in Indonesia and in the United States. I am also grateful to George McT. Kahin and Benedict O'G. R. Anderson for their intellectual encouragement and for permission to use the facilities at Cornell === [PDF page 16] === University and the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project. I am thankful to the Lembaga Ilmu Fengatahuan Indonesia (the Indonesian Academy of Sciences) for permission to conduct research in Indonesia. I finally wish to express my thanks to the numerous people I interviewed for taking time out of their busy lives to help me with my research and to help me travel around their fascinating country. The list of friends and acquaintances in Indonesia, who were indispensable to my research, is too numerous to mention here, but I especially wish to thank Dra. Sjamsiah Achmad, Andrew7 Gunawan, Brigadier General Abdul Kadir, Commodore Foegoeh, Commissioner General Lrs, Hoegeng Iman Santoso, Professor Soelaeman Soemardi, and Colonel Sofyan for their invaluable help and assistance. My special thanks go to the family with whom I lived, Agus and Sudarni Sudono and "Ibu" (the mother of Sudarni Sudono). helpful in my research; They were most Ibu took on the role of a mother during my stay there, and I am grateful for her emotional support. === [PDF page 17] === CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Indonesian Politics: An Historical Introduction In elite theory and in studies of comparative elites, particular institutions have played a major role. Elite members derive much of their strength from the institutions of which they are a part. The major institutions mentioned in the literature are: the bureaucracy, the military, economic enterprises, political parties, the legislature, and recently, the technocracy, based on the universities, scientific institutes and the modern branches of the bureaucracy. In studies of Indonesian politics several identifiable institutions have been recognized as the bases of political power within the elite, i.e. the political parties, the bureaucracy, and the military, and elite segments stemming from these institutions have been active in all political periods, although the power of each segment varied with For examples see: Donald Fagg, "Authority and Social Structure: A Stud}7 of Javanese Bureaucracy" (Fh.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1958); Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962); George McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952); and Guy J. Pauker, "The Role of the Military in Indonesia," in The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, ed. John J. Johnson (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962). === [PDF page 18] === the political period. A new segment, the technocracy, has emerged in the present period, the New Order, which is based on two institutions, the university and the modern branches of the bureaucracy. Since independence (August 1945) Indonesia has undergone several distinct political periods. At the beginning of the first period, that of the Revolution (1945-1949) the major elite segments were the traditional civil servants, the Islamic leaders, and the secular nationalists. The first two segments represented pre-Dutch divisions in Javanese society (the major ethnic group), that between the Hindu-influenced upper status culture, exemplified by the courts of Central Java and their retainers, and that of the Islamic entrepreneurial culture, found mainly in the northern coastal cities of Java and in parts of the Outer Islands. The Dutch coopted the traditional upper strata and employed them in the civil service; the Dutch attempted to control and isolate the traditional Islamic leaders. the twentieth century the secular nationalist and modernist Islamic elites emerged, both influenced by the development and expansion of.vestern education in Indonesia, and both elites established political parties. The secular nationalists were mainly recruited from the lesser civil servant families, whereas the modernist Islamic leaders came either from the Islamic world of Java or from the Outer Islands. After the development of modernist Islamic organizations traditional Islam likewise organized in order to combat the === [PDF page 19] === growing influence of modernist Islam. Henceforth the Islamic elite was divided into two groups. During the Revolution two new segments emerged, the military and the communist parties. The military was influenced by secular nationalism, modernist Islam, and communisms but the leadership was mainly dominated by secular nationalists. The major segments jockeying for power during the Revolution were the secular nationalist, the Islamic, and the communist, with military leaders divided ideologically and coopted by all three segments. An attempt was made in the second period, Parliamentary Democracy (1950-1958), to establish a.vestern-style constitutional democracy; although less commitment was given to Vestern constitutional doctrine by Indonesian elite members compared to Indian leaders of the time, no other set of ideas about the proper forms and operation of government had widespread currency. It was during this period that political parties had more influence than they had wielded formerly or subsequently 5 however, the power of the army began to grow, which was a harbinger of what was to come. As was true during the Revolution the important unit of influence was a "political-cum-personal clique," a group of leaders with personal followings and personal ties to one another. Usually such a group straddled parties, the bureaucracy, and the military. For discussions of this phenomena during Parliamentary Democracy see Feith, Democracy in Indonesia; M.A. Jaspan, Social Stratification and Social Mobility in === [PDF page 20] === It often controlled a small party or a faction of a larger one; and it bade actively to obtain and keep positions of leverage within the bureaucracy. At the same time it articulated a wide range of interests on behalf of all those who chose to accept its leadership and protecting party members, civil servants, and others with personal ties of any sort to the members of the clique. Almost all the country's principal leaders were leaders of informal cliques of this kind.3 Pursuant with the goal of establishing a constitutional democracy elections were held in 1955, which served to bring new leaders and groups into prominence, but also resulted in lessening the fragile extent of consensus that had existed among the elite. By 1956 conflict in the political elite had come to immobilize government, growing to such importance in the civil service and the army that the effectiveness of these bodies as instruments of control was seriously impaired. The incapacitation of government was particularly dangerous to the regime because the split which dominated all others--between the nationalist-led coalition of forces and the modernist Islamic-led group-ran somewhat parallel to the division between Java and the Outer Islands. The split within the political elite was echoed by the military, and in 1956 regional military coups started, which resulted in the secession of most of Indonesia (Jogjakarta: Universitas Gadjah Mada, 1958); Leslie Palmier, "Aspects of Indonesia's Social Structure," 1-acific Affairs 28 (June 1955): 117-131; and W.F. Wertheim, "Changes in Indonesia's Social Stratification," Pacific Affairs 28 (March 1955): 41-52. Feith, Democracy in Indonesia, pp. 107-108. === [PDF page 21] === the populated and developed areas in the Outer Islands and the establishment of a short-lived republic. By 1960 the regional revolts were largely broken and all organizations and persons who were associated in one way or the other with the regionalist cause were discredited and banned from participating in politics. During the regionalist struggle preparation had gradually been made by 1 resident Sukarno and his supporters in the military and in civilian groups for the establishment of Guided Democracy, a system which would be more "in harmony with the spirit of the Indonesian people." Guided Democracy was the only period in which the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), the Indonesian Communist Party, had influence in government, but in return for participating in the highest organs of government the PKI lost its former independence. After the first few years of Guided Democracy Sukarno began to rely increasingly upon the PKI and radical nationalist groups for support due to the growing strength of the military. Guided Eemocracy was essentially a civilian-military partnership, with the military growing in power during this period. Factional composition and behavior during this period reflected the increase of military influence in politics. The major antagonists of Sukarno were Islamic groups and westernoriented intellectuals, who cooperated with some military Republic of Indonesia, Dewan i\asional, Dewan Nasional (Jakarta: Dewan Nasional, 1957), p. 25. === [PDF page 22] === l e a d e r s who were opposed to Sukarno's policies. r a d i c a l and economic By the end of Guided Democracy the PKI appeared t o be the favored successor to Sukarno, a development. which would have r e s u l t e d i n the u n i f i c a t i o n of a majority of the p o l i t i c a l e l i t e i n o p p o s i t i o n. Rumors abounded during the l a t t e r part of 1965 t h a t the army and the PKI would both attempt to s e i z e power before the other would have a chance to do so. At the end of September a group of r a d i c a l n a t i o n a l i s t j u n i o r o f f i c e r s from the army t o g e t h e r with the cooperation of the a i r force commander and some of h i s troops launched an a b o r t i v e coup, which was r a p i d l y crushed by s e n i o r o f f i c e r s from the army. The e x t e n t of c i v i l i a n FKI involvement i s s t i l l u n c l e a r, whether the t o p l e a d e r s of the IKI helped in the planning and launching of the coup. The counter-coup led by senior army o f f i c e r s sign a l l e d the beginning of a new period, t h a t of the i\ew Order, led by General Soeharto. The PKI was judged t o t a l - ly r e s p o n s i b l e for the attempted coup, and i t s members and sympathizers were k i l l e d and imprisoned. Anti-Sukarno and anti-FKI groups and p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s cooperated with m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s i n the establishment of a new government, which i n i t i a l l y was a broadly-based m i l i t a r y - c i v i l i a n p a r t nership. Gradually the m i l i t a r y consolidated i t s own house, and narrowed p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n which r e s u l t e d i n t h e gradual withdrawal of major n o n - m i l i t a r y support f o r the government. === [PDF page 23] === Previous Studies of the Indonesian Elite Writings on Indonesian politics have focused mainly on the elite, but few systematic studies of the composition and career dynamics of the elite have been made. Kiel Robert van studied the origins and formation of the nationalist elite during the last part of Dutch colonial rule. In his study van M e l stressed the importance of ivestern education in influencing the composition and political beliefs of the early nationalist leaders. Concerning elite composition, van M e l found that the nationalist elite was somewhat more broadly based than was the traditional elite, although the nationalist elite was recruited mainly from the ranks of the traditional elite. Harry Benda ' wrote on elite segments during the Japanese occupation, and examined the influence of the policies of the occupation upon the relative position of these groups at the start of the Revolution. At the start of the occupation there were three elite segments: the top-level civil servants, secular nationalists, and the Islamic leaders. Both the Islamic and secular nationalist elites gained at the expense of the civil servant elite, which had been the most powerful at The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite (The Hague and Bpndung,to*,van Hoeve, 1960*7^ The Crescent and the Rising Sun; Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945 (The Hague and === [PDF page 24] === the start of the occupation. The secular nationalists by the end of the occupation were dominant over the two other segments. Benda too observed that the nationalist elite was mainly recruited from the ranks of the upper-level civil servants; in fact at the start of the Revolution many high-level civil servants joined the ranks of the secular nationalists to make common cause against the Islamic elite. Benda observed that two new groups, the military and youth groups which were created during the Japanese occupation, became important in subsequent Indonesian politics. Herbert Feith, in his description and analysis of the period of Parliamentary Democracy, hypothesized that the elite was divided into two skill groups: the administrators and the solidarity makers. The administrators consisted mainly of those with advanced Western education who possessed skills; the administrators competed for power in the political arena on the basis of these skills. According to Feith, solidarity makers, although some possessed advanced Western-style education, competed for political power on the basis of their skills as "mediators," as "mass organizers" and as "manipulators of integrative symbols." Solidarity makers used their closeness to the people as a justification for their exercise of power. Feith used this model in his discussion of factionalism in political Feith, Democracy in Indonesia. Ibid., p. 113. === [PDF page 25] === parties and the military and in his analysis of cabinet politics during that period. The first systematic study of the origins of the elite was by Soelaeman Soemardi, in which he looked at the ethnic, educational, and occupational origins of cabinet ministers (1945-1955), members of the elected 1955 parliament, and top-level civil servants. Soemardi found that in comparison with the general population there was overrepresentation of Sumatrans and Central Javanese, and that the major ethnic group underrepresented were the East Javanese. The top-level civil servants were the highest educated (87% had had some higher education compared to 68% for cabinet ministers and 27% for members of parliament). According to Soemardi the civil service and the professions were the common non-political occupations of the elite members. This study extends this type of analysis through the Guided Democracy and New Order periods. Malcolm Willison wrote a master's thesis on cabinet ministers from 1945-1955 in which he analyzed social class backgrounds through looking at aristocratic and civil service titles of ministers using these titles. He also examined the education backgrounds of the ministers; his "Some Aspects of the Social Origin of Indonesian Political Decision Makers," Transactions of the Third World Congress of Sociology, vol. 3 (London: International Sociological Association, 1956), pp. 338-348. "Leaders of Revolution: The Social Origins of the Republican Cabinet Members in Indonesia: 1945-1955" (M.A. thesis, Cornell University, 1958). === [PDF page 26] === 10 findings were similar to those of Soemardi. In 1966 a comparative study of the Indonesian and Ghanaian political elites was published, but the only data on the Indonesian political elite were those Soemardi presented in the afore12 mentioned paper. Akio Yasunaka, influenced by Soelaeman Soemardi, compiled some basic data of cabinet ministers from 1945-1964, and also of members of national representative bodies who were from major political parties, but it was accompanied by almost no analysis. It is useful, however, as a source for some basic data for the first three periods of independent Indonesia for institutional elites. Ann Ruth Willner in her study of the Indonesian bureaucracy developed the theory of "neotraditionalism" in explaining elite behavior.13 She found that there has been a reinforcement of indigenous elements which has weakened institutional modernization begun during the Dutch colonial period. As an illustration Willner engages in a fascinating comparison of Guided Democracy and seventeenth century Mataram, the last Javanese kingdom before the onset of the colonial period. Willner hypothesizes that neotraditional 11 Thorn Kerstiens, The New Elite in Asia and Africa; A Comparative Study of Indonesia and Ghana (New York: Praeger, 1966). 12 "Basic Data on Indonesian Political Leaders," trans. Kenichi Goto, Indonesia 10 (October 1970): 107-142. "The Neotraditional Accommodation to Political Independence: The Case of Indonesia," in Cases in Comparative Politicsi Asia, ed. Lucian W. Pye (Boston: Little Brown, 1970). === [PDF page 27] === 11 accommodation may be a necessary initial phase of modernization. Donald Hindley, in his study of the end of Guided Democracy and the early New Order periods, dealt with the extent of the representativeness of the elite. In his discussion of aliran. major socio-cultural groups, he 15 further elaborated Geertz's analysis of Javanese society. According to Hindley, on the one hand society is divided religiously, i.e. santri (religious Muslims), abangan (nominal Muslims), and Christian, and then along traditional-modern lines into aliran. with each aliran represented by a political party. The traditional santri aliran. for example, is represented by the Nahdatul Ulama, the modernist santri aliran by the Masjumi (Parmusi). The traditional abangan aliran identified with the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI), Indonesian Nationalist Party, and the modernist abangan aliran with the PKI. The Christians, divided into Catholics and Protestants, are organized into two political parties. In the period of Guided Democracy all major aliran were represented by political parties, "Alirans and the Fall of the Old Order," Indonesia 9 75 See Clifford Geertz, The Social Context of EconoChanget An Indonesian Case Study (Cambridget M.I.T. Center for International Studies, 1956)t The Religion of Java (Glencoe, Ill.j Free Press, i960), and The Social History of an Indonesian Town (Cambridgei M.I.T. Press, 1965). For a critique of the concept of aliran see W.F. Wertheim, "From Aliran Towards Class Struggle in the Countryside of Java," paper presented at the International Conference on Asian History, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 5-10 August 1968. === [PDF page 28] === 12 whereas in the New Order, since the PKI has been outlawed, the modernist abangan aliran has no party to speak for it. In the New Order the two santri aliran are dissatisfied with the failure of the government to respond to their needs, even though they.are large aliran and were instrumental in the demise of Guided Democracy. Pauker wrote a controversial article In 1959 Guy J. on the decline of the first generation of leaders in Southeast Asia. In this article he compared the older and younger nationalist generations in terms of education and general governing ability and found the younger generation inadequate. Pauker considered the new nationalist leaders incapable of developing the country and protecting the country against internal and external aggression and called for the military elite to take over the reins of government and exercise a stabilizing role. The first systematic study of elite political culture was done by Donald K. Emmerson. Emmerson selected a stratified random sample of twenty high-level civil servants and twenty members of parliament and compared these forty men with a non-random sample of university students. In his study of the political culture Emmerson emphasized the abangan-santri split, and its manifestation in values "Southeast Asia as a Froblem Area in the Next Decade," World Politics 11 (April 1959): 325-345. "Exploring Elite Political Culture in Indonesia: Continuity and Change" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1972). === [PDF page 29] === 13 and attitudes. Emmerson was interested in particular features of the political culture, such as anomie, conflict, religious tolerance, and attitudes toward authority. He also looked at social background variables and the relationship of those to attitudes manifested by the elite. Concerning social background, Emmerson, like other scholars, emphasized the high status background of the elite. He noted the dominance of the Javanese, although unlike Soemardi's study and mine, he did not divide the Javanese into Central and East Javanese. looking at the two groups, the administrators and the legislators, he found that there were more santri among the legislators than among the administrators. Like Soemardi, Emmerson discovered that administrators had had a higher educational background than legislators. In background and attitudinal comparisons of the elite and student samples, Emmerson found that the students' origins were less Javanese and more urban and santri. In their attitudes they were less intense in feelings of ethnicity and more intense in religious feelings. Soemardi's study was the last systematic study of the origins of the political elite. There is need for an extension of this type of analysis to the recent periods. Do Soemardi's findings indicate short-term or long-term trends in elite composition? Are the present elite more or less representative of the population? The analysis of career patterns of the Indonesian elite has been little === [PDF page 30] === explored; career paths to elite status is an important field of analysis. Although factions have been discussed in works on Indonesian politics there has been little systematic exploration of the bases and dynamics of factionalism within the elite as a whole. Scope of the Study This work is a study of the political recruitment and factional patterns of the Indonesian political elite primarily from two periods, Guided Democracy and the New Order, concentrating upon the latter. Attention was directed to three main areas: 1) background characteristics of the political elite; 2) influence of career patterns upon elite membership; and 3) factional dynamics within the political elite and the extent to which background and career patterns influence factionalism. Background Characteristics of the Elite The major questions that were asked were three: 1) To what extent does the elite represent the mass of the population? 2) What combinations of ethnic, religious, social status, educational, generational, and geographical characteristics are common for the Indonesian political elite? and 3) What changes in elite background characteristics can be seen along a time continuum? The Indonesian political elite is not a cross-section of the Indonesian population, as no political elite is, === [PDF page 31] === 15 although some are more than others. Matthews' observation that p o l i t i c a l decision-makers "come from near the top of the s o c i e t y ' s system of social s t r a t i f i c a t i o n " 18 is true of the Indonesian p o l i t i c a l e l i t e. A central focus of e l i t e theory i s why the e l i t e i s different from the mass, how i t i s different, and how i t maintains i t s e l f with changes over time. Gaetano Mosca, the f i r s t modern t h e o r i s t in e l i t e theory, asserted that society i s divided into two c l a s s e s - 19 the rulers and the ruled. The ruling class is neither representative of nor accountable to the masses, although 20 it cannot risk too much discontent of the masses. I he ruling class possesses certain attributes which are values in their particular society, such as military prowess, wealth, and/or knowledge. Robert Michels in his pioneering study, Folitical Farties,21 maintained that not only are most elite members unrepresentative of the masses, using both achievement and ascriptive criteria, but in those cases where leaders have risen from lowly origins the 18 Donald R. Matthews, The Social Background of Folitical Eecision-Makers (New York: Random House, 1954), p. 56. 19 The R u l i n g C l a s s, e d. and r e v. A r t h u r L i v i n g s t o n, t r a n s. Hannah D. Kahh~{New York: McGraw-Hill, 1 9 3 9;, p. 50 20 Ibid., p. 51. 21 Folitical Farties:,.'< Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies r Modern Democracy, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (New York "ilsarst' s International Library Co., 1915). === [PDF page 32] === 16 tendency is for them to "lose all sense of solidarity 22 with the class from which they have sprung," According to Michels the long-range trend is that of lesser frequency of leaders rising from the bottom classes of society, because in modern times disparities between upper 23 and lower classes of society are increasing. Comparisons between elite and mass have been made in several case studies. A scudy of the administrative elite of the United States compared, among other variables, father's occupation and the extent of urban origin of the elite with the mass of the population and found the elite disproportionately representative of the professional and business occupations (54%) and disproportionately from urban areas, whereas a study of the Iranian elite showed even more urban bias in the recruitment of elite members and even the fathers of elite members tended to be born in large urban centers. 24 It has been found, however, that in comparing 22 Ibid., p. 82. 23 Roberto Michels, First Lectures in Political Socio1ogy, trans, with an intro. Alfred de Grazia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1949). See T.B. Bottomore, Elites and Society (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1966) for a discussion of theories concerning e l i t e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e n e s s. Also see William Kornhauser, The F o l i t i c s of Mass Society (Glencoe, 1 1 1.: Free P r e s s, 1959). \'. Lloyd Warner et al., The American Federal Executive; A Study of the Social and Personal Characteristics of the Civilian and Military Leaders of the United States Federal Government (New Haven and I\ew York: Yale University Press, 1963), p. 31 and Marvin Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran (Princeton, ISi.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 161. === [PDF page 33] === 17 military elites to civilian elites a higher proportion of 25 military e l i t e s are recruited from rural areas. Frey, in his study of the Turkish p o l i t i c a l e l i t e, also compared the e l i t e with the mass of the population. He found, for example, that whereas t h r e e - f i f t h s of the Turkish deputies in parliament from 1920-1957 had received university t r a i n ing, three-fifthsof the male population were not even literate. In Iran the contrast is g r e a t e r; 92% of the p o l i t i c a l e l i t e had university education compared to the lack of any formal education of 83% of the general populat i o n. 27 Concerning occupations, in Iran only six percent of the e l i t e ' s fathers pursued non-prestigious occupations, compared to a majority of the population. 28 Studies have shown, therefore, that the e l i t e i s not representative of the mass, but the extent to which i t i s not varies with the society and may be an important variable in the extent to which a government will be responsive to the needs of different groups within the society. 25 See Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 241 and Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 1960), p. 87. Frederick W. Frey, The Turkish Political Elite (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1965), p. 43. 27 Zonis, Elite of Iran, p. 168. 28 Ibid., p. 161. === [PDF page 34] === 18 The security of an elite rests in large part on the degree of its representativeness. An elite must be both symbolically and functionally representative. Various segments of the society must have formal opportunity for decision-making and also appear to share in the prestige of political elite status. On the one hand, if the elite becomes too oligarchical it jeopardizes the broad public participation and support it needs to further development goals. On the other hand, if in its desire to be representative it becomes too diffuse, some of its effectiveness may be lost.29 Social background variables are commonly investi30 gated in elite studies. It has been demonstrated in elite studies that recruitment to the elite mainly comes from high status and occupational groups, the more prestigious ethnic groups and religions, and that elite members have received at least an above average education. Through looking at social background variables, societies and their leaders can be compared, not only in the "eliteness" of the political elite but also in the attributes each society considers valuable, or, in other words, which attributes possess "social certification." 31 In Lester G. Seligman, "Elite Recruitment and Folitical Development," Journal of Politics 26 (August 1964): 621-622. 30 For examples, see F r e y, Turkish P o l i t i c a l E l i t e; Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, e d s., World Revolut i o n a r y E l i t e s: Studies in Coercive I d e o l o g i c a l Movements (Cambridge and London: M.I.T. P r e s s, 1966); and Dwaine Marvick, e d., P o l i t i c a l Decision-Makers: Recruitment and and Performance (Glencoe, 1 1 1.: Free P r e s s, 1961TT 31 For a brief discussion of "social certification" see Lester G. Seligman, "Opportunity, Risk, Selection, and Decision-Making: A Model of Political Recruitment," paper presented to the 66th meeting of the American Political Science Association, Los Angeles, 7-12 September 1970. === [PDF page 35] === 19 studies of nations undergoing modernization one can see the interplay of attributes traditionally considered valuable and those, such as modern education, introduced as a value by the modernization process. It has been found in studies of the political elites of nations undergoing modernization that the elite members... are products... of traditional backgrounds. They incorporate the old virtues of family background and respected status plus the newer ones of education, skill, and heroic achievements in behalf of national liberation. Those ruling are emancipated children of the traditional social structure. While rejecting the old, they cannot help but embody it.32 Scholars disagree about which variables are the most important in determining elite membership. Frey, in his study of Turkey, hypothesized that education was the most important variable. In the case of the Indonesian elite there is a subtle interplay among social status, ethnic origin, education, and religious identification. In the first part of this dissertation these major interacting factors influencing elite membership are investigated. For example, in comparison with their proportion of the population, ethnic groups vary in their participation in national politics, and hypotheses for this are explored. Status and occupation were examined not only for the fathers of the elite members, but also for the grandfathers in order to measure the extent of social mobility, and the significance of traditional and modern occupations in terms of recruitment 32 Seligman, "Elite Recruitment," p. 615. === [PDF page 36] === 20 patterns into the elite. Concerning religious identification, in Java there is an important dichotomy between those who are religious Muslims, the santri, and those who are nominally Muslim, but actually socialized more in the indigenous and Hindu religious traditions, the abangan. Access to modern education was very limited during the Dutch period, but membership in the elite for the most part seems limited to those possessing at least some modern education. In the section on education the relationship of elite membership and also elite values to education are examined, especially the influence of the traditional, Dutch, Indonesian private, and Japanese systems as a whole upon the composition and attitudes of the elite and the interrelationship of variables concerning elite segment membership, ethnic, social status and religious origin upon the nature of education received by elite members. The last background variables examined were generational and geographical patterns. The elite is divided into three generations, in accordance with the period influencing them the most, and these generations are examined with particular reference to the elite segments: the military, the political party and the technocratic segments. The population and type of birthplace were examined and compared with that of the parents. It is useful to compare the elite along a time continuum. In this way it can be determined: 1) whether or not changes within the elite are a reflection of changes === [PDF page 37] === 21 in society; 2) whether there is a lag between changes in society and changes in the elite; and 3) whether the elite has become more or less representative of the society as a whole. Several scholars have stressed the value of leadership studies which cover several political periods, rather 33 than one point in time. One theme in the literature is the decline of aristocracies. Ruling classes decline inevitably when they cease to find scope for the capacities through which they rose to power, when they can no longer render the social services which they once rendered, or when their talents and the services they render lose in importance in the social environment in which they live.-^ For example, from 1801-1906 the British aristocracy gradually lost their position of dominance in the cabinets to those from the middle class, who have been the majority in the cabinets of this century, except for a few Labour cabinets. 35 Even in the Labour Party the trend over time is for an increasing number of those of middle class origin to 33 See William B. Quandt, The Comparative Study of Political Elites, Sage Comparative Politics Series, No. 01-004 (Beverly Hills, Calif: Sage, 1970), p. 187 and Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Study of Elites: Who's Who, When and How," World Politics 18 (July 1966): 704. Mosca, Ruling Class, pp. 65-66. 35 Matthews, Political Decision-Makers, p. 43. Also see G e r r i t P. Judd IV, Members of Parliament 1734-1832 (New Haven: Yale University P r e s s, 1955). === [PDF page 38] === 22 be r e c r u i t e d for parliamentary membership. There was, though, a considerable lag between t h e time the middle c l a s s became dominant i n t h e e l e c t o r a t e and when i t dominated c a b i n e t s. 37 Mattai Dogan, i n h i s study of French d e p u t i e s from the l a t e n i n e t e e n t h century t o the p o s t World War IT e r a documents the d e c l i n e of the a r i s t o c r a t s in the French parliament, mirroring changes w i t h i n the s o c i e t y. 38 The findings were s i m i l a r for the Chinese p o l i tical elite. From the l a t e Ching dynasty t o the P e o p l e ' s Republic of China the steady d e c l i n e of the dominance of the t r a d i t i o n a l s c h o l a r - g e n t r y c l a s s in the p o l i t i c a l s y s tern was e v i d e n t. 39 Studies have a l s o noted the change in the t y p i c a l p o l i t i c a l e l i t e member from one r e c r u i t e d from the urban i n t e l l i g e n t s i a t o one r e c r u i t e d from a v i l l a g e or small town and more r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the population as a whole. This was shown by Frey i n h i s study of Turkey, where over time the p o l i t i c a l e l i t e included more p a r o c h i a l s, 36 W.L. Guttsman, "Changes in British Labour Leadership," in Marvick, Political Decision-Makers, p. 129. 37 Matthews, Political Decision-Makers, p. 43. 38 "Political Ascent in a Class Society: French Deputies 1870-1958," in Marvick, Political Decision-Makers, p. 74. For the declining Italian aristocracy see Harold D. Lasswell with Renzo Sereno, "The Fascists: The Changing Elite," in Lasswell and Lerner, Revolutionary Elites, p. 184. 39 Robert C. North with Ithiel de Sola Pool, "Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites," in Revolutionary Elites, eds. Lasswell and Lerner, pp..322, 378. === [PDF page 39] === 23 compared to the national-minded intellectuals of the 40 Kemalist period. In the Soviet Union the political elite members of the Stalinist period originated by and large from villages, from low social origins, and had little education, compared to the urban, middle class intellectuals who were the leaders in the Leninist period. Looking at education in Sri Lanka the educational level of parliamentary deputies declined from the first to the fourth parliaments.42 A major theme in the literature, therefore, is that in terms of elite composition some elites over time have become more representative of the society at large. Influence of Career Patterns upon Elite Membership Career patterns are important to investigate in any elite study for Patterns of political recruitment tell us a great deal about the mechanisms of integration within a political system and the institutionalization of access to power within the system.... Consequently, changes in political recruitment are not 40 Frey, Turkish Political Elite, pp. 387-388. •'"See George K. Schueller, "The Politburo" in Revolutionary Elites, eds. Lasswell and Lerner, pp. 97-178. Marshall R. Singer, The Emerging Elitet A Study of Political Leadership in Ceylon (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1964), p. 165. In the first parliament 63% received university education, compared with 38% in the fourth parliament. === [PDF page 40] === 24 infrequently associated with changes in the pattern of linkages within the society.^ The Indonesian elite in the periods under investigation were recruited from three major segments: the military, the political parties and movements, and the technocracy. From 1945 to the present time there have been changes in the representation of these three segments in the elite. In the early periods, the Revolution and Parliamentary Democracy, the political parties were dominant and consequently most elite members were party leaders. The position of the politician was still so strong among civilian members of the Guided Democracy political elite that the few non-party elite members had been politicians for years. the late 1950s Beginning in the military segment of the political elite began to increase in numbers and in strength. Within a few years after the inception of the New Order the technical intelligentsia, an elite segment first represented during this period, rose to a place of power just under the military elite. Two chapters of the dissertation are devoted to career patterns, but in the first chapter, which is concerned with ethnic, social, religious, educational, geographical, and generational background the three elite segments are compared. In the chapters on career patterns the major question is: What are the patterns of ascent to 43 Norman K. Nicholson, "Integrative Strategies of a National Elite: Career Patterns in the Indian Council of Ministers," Comparative Politics 7 (July 1975): 533-534. === [PDF page 41] === 25 elite status? In this the relevance of the time of ascent, the place of ascent, and the routes of ascent are investigated. Some case studies of career patterns of military and civilian elites have discussed the relevance of the time in which a person started his career. For example, in Pakistan senior positions in the military were held mainly by those who were commissioned in the 1950s; those a few years younger have been blocked from receiving promotions. South Korea senior officers differ very slightly in age from junior officers, but because they were trained first, the senior officers monopolize all the high positions.45 In the Soviet Union those who are members of the Central Committee and other high party committees are all from the older generation. The time a person started his career can also influence routes chosen to achieve elite status. For example in Eire the older political elite members had been active initially in national organizations, and after they reached elite status they represented a national 44 Talukder Maniruzzaman, "'Crises in Political Development* and the Collapse of the Ayub Regime in Pakistan," Journal of the Developing Areas 5 (January 1971): 223-224. Joungwon Alexander Kim, "Korean Kundaehwa: The Military as Modernizer," Journal of Comparative Administration 2 (November 1970): 355. 46 Vincent E. McHale and Joseph 1. K a s t r o, "The Central Committee of the CPSU: Analysis of Composition of Long-Term Trends," paper presented a t the 66th meeting of t h e American P o l i t i c a l Science A s s o c i a t i o n, Los Angeles, C a l i f., 8-12 September 1970, p. 10. === [PDF page 42] === 26 constituency rather than a local one; younger elite members followed a different route, starting from local level politics and after a certain number of predictable steps reached elite status, still retaining a great deal of localism. 47 From what institution or organization and from what place within that institution or organization do a high proportion of elite members rise? Various scholars of the military have observed that the best place within the military from which to rise to elite status is through command posts. This was noted, for example, for Nigeria and the United States.48 Case studies have been made of various national elites concerning the organizations and institutions from which elite members are recruited. In Iran, for example, elite members are recruited from the civil bureau49 cracy, the military, and the royal household. Mexico, the civil bureaucracy was again the most important institution, but the university was second, followed by the A.S. Cohan, "Career Fatterns in the Irish Political Elite," British Journal of Political Science 3, pt. 2 48 See Robin Luckham, The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt 1960-67 (Cambridge; University Press, 1971), p. 100 and Janowitz, Professional Soldier, p. 147. 49 Zonis, Elite of Iran, p. 187. In Greece bureaucrats are also the most important group; see Keith R. Legg, "Political Recruitment and Political Crisis: The Case of Greece," Comparative Political Science 1 (January 1969), P. 542. === [PDF page 43] === 27 political party and finally the military. Union the highest organs are dominated first apparatchki, second In the Soviet by the party by the state bureaucrats, and then a small percentage comes from the technical wings of the army. 51 In France, Turkey and the former West Indies law52 yers are the top group. Joseph A. Schlesinger did a study of the base offices from which governors and senators start to rise, and he found that the legislative and law enforcement offices were the base offices; the senators started mainly from law enforcement positions and the governors from legislative positions. 53 Another way of studying career patterns is by examining the different routes of ascent. of military and civilian routes. Studies have been made For example in Nigeria, Wilfried Gruber, "Career Patterns of Mexico's Political Elite," Western Political Quarterly 24 (September 1971: 476-480. McHale and Mastro, "Central Committee," p. 5; Frederic Fleron, "Representation of Career Types in Soviet Political Leadership," in Political Leadership in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, ed. R. Barry Farrell (Chicago: Aldine, 1970~J, p. 113; and Michael t. Gehlen, "The Educational Backgrounds and Career Orientations of the Members of the Central Committee of the CPSU," American Behavioral Scientist 9 (April 1966): 12-13. 52 Edward G. Lewis, "Social Backgrounds of French Ministers, 1944-1967," Western Political Quarterly 23 (September 1970): 566; Frey, Turkish Political Elite, p. 80; and Joel Gordon Verner, "The Recruitment of Cabinet Ministers in the Former British Caribbean: A Five-Country Study," Journal of the reveloping Areas 7 (July 1973): 646. 53 Ambition and P o l i t i c s: P o l i t i c a l Careers i n the United S t a t e s T c h i c a g o: Rand Mci\ally, 1966), p. 98. === [PDF page 44] === 28 although it is important to begin one's rise through command positions, those who make it to elite status have alternated between command and staff positions, although most of the 54 staff positions held are at a high level. In Brazil it is not only important to rise through command posts, but the most successful route is through command and sometimes staff posts in Rio de Janerio and Brasilia. In Peru, Argentina, and also Brazil academic achievement is important in order to qualify for promotion. For the United States Janovitz found that command positions were the most important, and when the aspirant was assigned to staff duties it would be most helpful for his rise if he involved himself in operations. Janowitz also found that some members of the military elite had had "specialized and innovating experiences which have increased their usefulness to the military." He also found that one-third of the four-star Luckham, Nigerian Military, p. 100. 55 Theodore wyckoff, "The Brazilian Military Oligarchy: Political Attitudes and Motivations," paper presented at the 67th meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 7-11 September 1971, pp. 3-4. Luigi R. Einaudi, "Revolution from Within? Military Rule in Peru since 1968," paper presented at the 67th meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 7-11 September 1971, p. 5; Robert A. Potash, The Army and Politics in Argentina 1928-1945: Yrigpyen to Peron (Stanfords Stanford University Press, 1969), p. 3; and Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 51. Professional Soldier, p. 147. 58 Ibid., p. 151. === [PDF page 45] === 29 generals during World War II and in the post-World War period had been military aides at one point in their careers. Studies of career routes of civilian elites have also been conducted. For example in the Soviet Union one route is through secretariat service, and the most successful aspirants have come to the top through the ranks of the party hierarchy. In Norway according to a study of the Labor Party elite the most common route is through the party, moving gradually from party membership to local party office, and only after extensive experience with a variety of local party offices does the aspirant become active nationally. In Turkey the bureaucratic members of the national elite chose one of two routes: through the local levels of the bureaucracy and through the national administration. Factional Dynamics Social background variables are commonly investigated in elite studies, but the relevance of social background in predicting attitudes and behavior has been hotly 59 Ibid., p. 160. McHale and Mastro, "Central Committee," p. 7. Penny Gill Martin, "Administrative and Partisan Experience in the Career Patterns of Norwegian Labor Party Leaders," paper presented at the 68th meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 5-9 September 1972, p. 6. 62 Frey, Turkish Political Elite, p. 117. === [PDF page 46] === 30 debated. Lewis J. Edinger and Donald D. Searing have noted that elite studies tend to focus either on social background or on behavior, "rather than upon intervening attitudes which might provide a link between backgrounds and behavior." In the last section of the dissertation the relationship between background and behavior is analyzed by the examination of factional dynamics. To what extent are background variables, such as ethnic, social status, religious origin; educational experience; and career patterns influential in determining factional alignments? In the chapter on military factionalism the major questions explored are: 1) To what extent are social background variables important in determining factional membership? 2) To what extent do career patterns and organizational characteristics of the Indonesian army influence factionalism? and 3) Around which issues have factions revolved from the Revolution to the present period? The chapter on civilian factions focuses on the major variables, mainly background variables, influencing factionalism and See Matthews, Political Decision-Makers; Rustow, "Study of Elites;" Lewis J. Edinger and Donald D. Searing, "Social Background in Elite Analysis: A Methodological Inquiry," American Political Science Review 60 (June 1967): 428-445; Donald D. Searing, "The Comparative Study of Elite Socialization," Comparative Political Studies 1 (January 1969): 471-500; Donald D. Searing, "Models and Images of Man and Society in Elite Theory," in Political Leadership, Glenn D. Paige, ed. (New York: Free Press, 1972), pp. 19-44; Seligman, "Elite Recruitment," pp. 612-626; and Seligman, "Opportunity, Risk." 64 "Social Background," p. 429. === [PDF page 47] === 31 the r e l a t i o n s h i p of ideology. F i n a l l y, analyses of m i l i t a r y - c i v i l i a n r e l a t i o n s h i p s a r e made, f i r s t of background v a r i a b l e s, and second t o see t h e influence t o examine the extent of legitimacy given t o t h e Soeharto regime. Methods For purposes of this research the political elite was defined as those individuals possessing formal or informal power to influence decision- and non-decision-making, relationship to national political and politico-economic policy. To ascertain the boundaries of the political elites of Guided Democracy and the early New Order periods a combination of the positional, "hat" and reputational approaches was used. The positional technique is the most direct way of determining membership of an elite. In this approach certain positions in a political system are judged to be the most influential, and the holders of those positions are deemed to be members of the political elite. This is the most common approach used in the study of national elites. The positional approach has been ft S For a d i s c u s s i o n of non-decision-making see Feter Bachrach and Morton S. B a r a t z, "Decisions and Non-Decisions: An Analytic Framework," American P o l i t i c a l Science Review 57 (September 1963): 632-642. fifi For examples of s t u d i e s u s i n g the p o s i t i o n a l approach see Frey, Turkish P o l i t i c a l E l i t e; L e s t e r G. Seligman, Leadership i n a New Nation: P o l i t i c a l Development in I s r a e l (New York: Atherton P r e s s, 1964)} and Singer, Emerging E l i t e. For a d i s c u s s i o n of the p o s i t i o n a l === [PDF page 48] === 32 criticized for its failure to include people who may be influential in decision-making, even though they hold no formal office or one that does not have elite status. The "hat" technique is a variation of the positional approach, and was suggested by Ann Ruth Willner. She observed that in the Indonesia of Guided Democracy, and in fact during the Mataram empire of the eighteenth century, the most important members of the political elite held several high 67 positions concurrently. This technique would be appropriate for other societies in which the same phenomena are observed. The reputational or panel approach identifies members of an elite through eliciting the opinions of knowledgeables in the society; those who have a certain percentage of votes or a certain rank are included in the elite. The reputational approach has been used mainly in ft R American community studies; the major national elite approach see Wendell Bell, Richard J. Hill, and Charles R. tvright, Public Leadership; A Critical Review with Special Reference to Adult Education (San Francisco: Chandler, 1961). 67 "Indonesia," pp. 250, 252. fi> R Floyd Hunter was the first to use this approach in his Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers (Chapel Hill: University of Worth Carolina Press, 1953). Also see Robert E. Agger and Vincent Ostrom, "The Political Structure of a Small Community," Public Opinion QuarterTy 20 (Spring 1956): 81-89; and George Belknap and Ralph Smuckler, "Political Power Relations in a Mid-'.vest City," Public Opinion Quarterly 20 (Spring 1956): 73-81. For an excellent discussion and evaluation of studies using the reputational approach see Bell, Hill, and Wright, Public Leadership. === [PDF page 49] === 33 study that utilized this approach was Zonis' study of the Iranian political elite. The reputationai approach in regard to community studies has been criticized due to its assumption that its panel of "experts" know the identity of the "real" leaders. Critics have also charged that followers of the reputationai approach do not take the time to study the political process of the community; Rustow warns in this regard that one must "already know enough about the real process to identify /the leaders/." 69 A few Elite of Iran. The controversy concerning the reputationai approach in community studies was especially spirited in the early 1960's. For arguments by its proponents see: \villiam V. D'Antonio, Howard J. Ehrlich, and Eugene C. Erickson, "Further Notes on the Study of Community Power," American Sociological Pveview 27 (December 1962): 848-854; William V. D'Antonio and Eugene C. Erickson, "The Reputationai Technique as a Heasure of Community Power: An Evaluation Based on Comparative and Longitudinal Studies," American Sociological Review 27 (June 1962): 362-376: and Howard J. Ehrlich, "The Reputationai Approach to the Study of Community Power," American Sociological Review 27 (December 1961): 926-927. For criticisms of the approach see: Baha Abu-Laban, "The Reputationai Approach in the Study of Community Power: A Critical Evaluation," Pacific Sociological Review 8 (Spring 1965): 35-42; Lawrence J.R. Herson, "In the Footsteps of Community Power," American Political Science Review 55 (December 1961): 817-830; Nelson Iv. Polsby, "Community lower: Some Reflections on the Recent Literature," American Sociological Review 27 (December 1962): 838-841; Nelson W. Polsby, "The Sociology of Community Power: A Reassessment," Social Forces 37 (March 1959): 232-236; Nelson W. Polsby, "Three Problems in the Analysis of Community Fower," American Sociological Review 24 (December 1959): 796-803; Raymond E. Wolfinger, "A Plea for a Decent Burial," American Sociological Review 27 (December 1962): 840-847; and Raymond E. Wolfinger, "Reputation and Reality in the Study of 'Community Power,1" American Sociological Review 25 (October 1960): 636-645. 71 "Study of Elites," p. 701. === [PDF page 50] === 34 studies have been conducted comparing the results obtained through the positional and reputational approaches; one study found little correspondence among individuals selected according to these two approaches, whereas another found a high degree of agreement.72 As Donald Searing states: "... there is no theoretical reason preventing the use of several techniques in the same research context." 73 Ihis was the approach used in this study in the determination of the composition of the Indonesian political elite. The "hat" and "positional approaches were utilized first in the determination of the Guided Democracy elite, and then for selecting those to be in the New Order elite the positional approach was first used. According to the "hat" technique all those who held two or more important positions were included in the political elite; then according to the positional approach all those who held one important position were also included. For the i\ew Order the holders of certain offices and positions were automati74 cally included in the political elite. Examples of positions are the following: l) cabinet ministers involved with political and economic policy; 2) heads of prestigious 72 See B e l l, H i l l, and Wright,. P o l i t i c a l Leadership. pp. 19-20. 773 " L e a d e r s h i p Theory," p. 4 1. For the Guided Democracy elite 42% were included in this way, for the elite of the i>Jew Order 67%. There were two cabinets during the period of my stay in Indonesia, the Ampera Cabinet (1966-1968) and the === [PDF page 51] === 35 state institutions and national legislative bodies; 3) some regional governors; 4) certain regional army 78 commanders; 5) the armed forces chief of staff and his deputies; 6) the national staff deputies of the armed forces; and 7) the army assistants. Therefore according to the positional and "hat" approaches many people were automatically included in the elite for these two periods before the reputational approach was used. Fifteen knowledgeable and experienced persons from the military, political party, and intellectual (included journalists) groups were Development Cabinet (from 1968 to the present). According to their positions those automatically included in the elite were those in charge of the following ministries: defense and security, foreign affairs, home affairs, justice, information, education and culture, religion, finance, trade, manpower, industry, and mines. Excluded were those in charge of the ministries of health, social affairs, maritime affairs, textiles, and transmigration. The importance of particular ministries can also be partially determined by the reputation of those who advance to head them, although this method was not used in the determination of the importance of particular ministries. These were the speaker and vice-speakers of parliament, the chairperson and vice-chairpersons of the People's Consultative Assembly, the chairperson and vice-chairperson of the Supreme Advisory Council, the head of the Indonesian State Bank, and the presidential economic and military advisory staff members. Most of the economic advisers headed ministries in the Development Cabinet. These were the four governors of Java. Later the governor of North Sulawesi was added because he actually had more power than the regional army commander of that area. He was added, though, through utilization of the reputational approach. 78 The following army regions were automatically included*. West Java, Jakarta, Central Java, East Java, North Sumatra, South Sumatra, North Sulawesi, and South Sulawesi. === [PDF page 52] === interviewed and an open-ended method was used to elicit 79 names. Those for whom there was a majority of agreement were included in the elite. As table 1 shows below there was a fairly high degree of agreement between those selected by the "hat" or positional approaches and those selected according to the reputational approach. Eighteen of those in the New Order who were included in the elite only because of their reputation rose to high positions; six of the group declined in reputation and did not rise to a governmental position of influence. Later as the research progressed, ten persons were added to the New Order elite; in most cases these were persons appointed to high positions during the period of the research. The total number of elite members for Guided Democracy was 64, for the i\ew Order 115. It is well to mention here that those included in the Guided Democracy elite reflected more the Guided Democracy elite of the last two years of that period, whereas those included in the New Order elite represented the early period of the New Order. Politics in the early parts of these two periods were fluid and included more actors in the elite level than later in the periods. That is the reason for the difference in the total number of elite members in these two periods. the present New Order elite members were determined the number would be smaller than in the early New Order period. 79 The opinion of a diplomat from the political section of the U.S. embassy was ascertained, and he included only ten people who ended up in the political elite. === [PDF page 53] === 37 TABLE 1 AGREEMENT AMONG THE POSITIONAL, "HAT," AND REPUTATIONAL APPROACHES (in percentages) Approach Guided Democracy 34 25 42 (64) Position Only Hat Only Reputation Only Position & Reputation Hat 6c Reputation Total New Order 30 32 37 (105) The data was collected mainly through personal interviews 80 Questionnaires were judged t o be i m p r a c t i c a l due t o t h e emphasis i n the Indonesian c u l t u r e upon i n t e r p e r s o n a l 81 relationships at all levels. were sought. Therefore personal interviews The length of each interview varied from one hour to twenty hours per person, averaging around four hours; most elite members were interviewed twice, although some were interviewed only once and others as many as five times. case the person concerned was imprisoned, dead, or otherwise inaccessible, interviews were sought with close associates, family members, and other kinsmen. From the New 80 for an excellent discussion of the use of interviews and interview techniques in research conducted abroad see Myron Weiner, "Political Interviewing," in Studying Politics Abroad, ed. Robert E. Ward (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964), pp. 103-133. 81 One American graduate student attempted to use questionnaires to gather personal information during the time of my research, but he found that method inadequate and unsuccessful, and resorted to personal interviews. === [PDF page 54] === 38 Order elite 105 were personally interviewed, but only fifteen of the sixty-four members from the Guided Democracy political elite. Many of the Guided Democracy elite members had died, were imprisoned, or, in the case of many of the military leaders, were posted abroad as ambassadors. However, there was widespread knowledge about many of these individuals in regard to basic background variables and also some published and unpublished sourcestherefore my comparisons of the Guided Democracy elite with that of the New Order were not greatly hampered by my lack of access to the members. It did affect the finer points of comparison, for example, in the category of grandfathers' occupations. In order to ascertain historical and present factional membership and behavior, a variety of sources of information was used: interviews with elite members, informants from the sub-elite, scholars, and occasionally newspapers and other published and unpublished sources. Accessibility was a problem mainly at the beginning. At first a letter of introduction was used and the various offices of elite members were visited; this tactic was not very fruitful. Then the "web" technique was used, a technique in which "researchers /rely_7 upon informal interpersonal contacts between themselves and prospective respondents and among the respondents interviewed and their 82 friends as means of gaining access." Through the 82. tv'illiam H. Hunt, Uilder w. Crane, and John C. Wahlke, "Interviewing Political Elites in Cross-Cultural === [PDF page 55] === 39 e x p a n s i o n o f p e r s o n a l c o n t a c t s and a l s o t h e c o n f i r m a t i o n of my r e p u t a t i o n a s a n o n - t h r e a t e n i n g person, i t became, on t h e whole, r e l a t i v e l y easy t o arrange i n t e r v i e w s. 8 3 Most of t h e e l i t e members were v e r y c a n d i d, e v e n t h o s e i n t h e milit a r y; s e v e r a l a c q u a i n t a n c e s s u g g e s t e d t h a t my b e i n g a woman a i d e d me i n e l i c i t i n g frank o p i n i o n s from e l i t e members and a l s o t h a t t h e y d i d n o t c o n s i d e r me a t h r e a t t o them, and on t h e c o n t r a r y, were a b l e t o r e l a x w i t h m e. 8 4 I a l s o found t h a t e l i t e members were more open i f t h e y were interviewed a t home, and i f p o s s i b l e t h e i n t e r v i e w s were c o n d u c t e d there. I n t h e I n d o n e s i a n c u l t u r e t h e h o u r s between 5:30 and 7:30 p.m. a r e used a s " c a l l i n g " h o u r s. I would often come armed w i t h a l e t t e r of i n t r o d u c t i o n from a f r i e n d of t h e e l i t e member o r, l a t e r i n t h e r e s e a r c h p e r i o d, come w i t h o u t a l e t t e r and e i t h e r conduct my f i r s t i n t e r v i e w on Comparative R e s e a r c h, " American J o u r n a l o f S o c i o l o g y 70 B i a s Y i n s l; h 6? "3 / 1 8 ° a S e Ue E m ei yl ys C J o n e s, "The C o S r t e s y IntLcZ » " International Social ^! ^ J ° " f i 15 (1963) i 7 5, c o n c e r n i n g t h e u s e f u l n e s s of a system o f p e r s o n a l i n t r o d u c t i o n s i n s e e k i n g i n t e r v i e w s. 83A i n t e r v i e w, r f? S r L?f I6 a rt h % df imany A c u i t y i n arranging personal ^IJZITLI Indonesians i n divulging artlcul ?r? r ^ i? i, f; 5 £ P a r l y i n the Javanese c u l t u r l Hilt rulZZ ? P e r s o n a l knowledge about someone e n a b l e s t h e p e r s o n t o w i e l d m y s t i c a l power over him. 84 One o f my i n t e r v i e w e e s was a famous, " t o u g h " g e n 1?l\JtilP?~rye f°?l e ma sa anny t h o u r s o n s e v e r a l occasions, Ind L v ^ l l™Zl » r e l a x e d, and r e f i n e d i n t h e J a v a n e s e manner, e x p r e s s e d i n h i s p h y s i c a l b e a r i n g a s fe?1 w w ^nt - ^ ^t 3 01 1 6 5eet0 hj l;mi r t Uae n- d a A g r a d u a l student, a fter ° consulting with the £ 3 f ™ \, qUbtQo u g h t dt hffere e s t u d e n t t o h i s home. The g e n e r a l ' s i? wa * f,rtrf l w i t h t h e male g r a d u a t e s t u d e n t; nAnPryssian-style. His b e h a v i o? was v e r y c u r t SL^^int^rview.^^ 1 ^ d i d n 0 t ° b t a i n ™ * information === [PDF page 56] === 40 the spot or arrange for another time, usually to be in his home. Concerning the reliability of data, my impression was that due to the nature of the bulk of the questions (mainly social background and career history) the answers given were fairly reliable. Occasionally with "heroic" details of military career history an elite member's version did not always agree with the versions of others. Many answers were also double-checked with other elite members and informants. The main approach used in the analysis of the data was the examination of the interrelationships among the variables, especially the variables of elite segment, ethnic group, social status, religious origin, education, and careers. The data were cross-tabulated and analyzed through the help of a computer. Statistical tests were performed in order to determine the strength of the relationship among variables. The Goodman and Kruskal Gamma was used for ordinal data, the Lambda for nominal data. Preview of Findings Background Characteristics of the Elite The first question asked was: To what extent does the elite represent the mass of the population? The Indonesian elite is not representative of the mass of the population in terms of sex, ethnic composition, social status, education, geographical patterns, and career patterns. There is only one woman in the political elite, and that was in the === [PDF page 57] === 41 Guided Democracy elite. There is a very definite overrepresentation of Central Javanese in the elite, and an underrepresentation of many ethnic groups. Socially, the majority of the elite are from upper status families, and this is reflected in the prestigious occupations their fathers and grandfathers had. For example, according to the 1930 census, only 3% of the population was employed in the professions and in government service, the most prestigious occupations, compared to 77% of the fathers of the New Order elite. At the time members of the political elite were students or had finished their formal education, only 5.5% of the population were literate in any language, and of those only 3% (.017% of the total population) could read and write Dutch, the language of modern education and the language necessary for career advancement. Elite members were more likely to be born in towns and urban centers, compared to the general population who resided in villages (83%). Whereas only 2% of the general population lived in cities of 100,000+, 25% of the New Order elite were born there. What combinations of ethnic, social status, religious, educational, and generational characteristics are common for members of the political elite? A major finding was that no one factor was necessary and sufficient in determining elite membership. The major interacting factors werei education; social status, religious, and ethnic origin? and elite segment membership. One had === [PDF page 58] === 42 the greatest likelihood of achieving elite status if one were Central Javanese from an upper status background and of abangan persuasion; with modern, secular education (the extent necessary depending upon which elite segment); and if one were either from the army or from the technocracy. Ethnic origins are important not only in influencing membership in the political elite, but to some extent may determine the particular segment to which one belongs within the elite. Javans, particularly Central Javanese, dominate the membership of the political elite and the latter are likely to be found in the center of power. Social status within many of the major ethnic groups is related to the kin and occupational proximity of the individual to the institutions wielding political legitimacy, and to a great extent occupation and status are closely related. Among the segments in the hew Order elite the technocracy and the military are recruited from those of the highest social origins. In general among the elite, the fathers and grandfathers had prestigious occupations, although there were some instances of mobility in the case of the elite members from Java. Religious origins in Java are closely related to social status, and this was shown in my research. Most Javans were recruited from those reared in the abangan tradition. There were differences, however, among the elite segments, the political parties having the highest representation of santri leaders. There is a close correlation between the variables of social status and education. === [PDF page 59] === This was shown by the types of elementary and middle school education received. There is also a close relationship between elite segment and higher education, the technocrats being the most highly educated and the military the least. The elite is divided into three elite generations, in accordance with the period influencing them the most. The oldest generation was molded mainly in the Dutch period, the middle generation during the Japanese occupation and Revolution, and the youngest generation in post-independent Indonesia. The variable of elite segment membership was the most important one in relationship to generation. The army in particular has difficulty in accommodating itself to younger generational pressures for representation. Can changes in elite background characteristics be seen along a time continuum? Looking at the Indonesian elite from the time of the Revolution to the present, the elite has gradually become less representative of the population as a whole, especially in terms of ethnic and religious identification. Within the area of ethnic origin three trends are evident over time: 1) the increase in the recruitment of Javans, particularly Central Javanese, as opposed to those from the Outer Islands 5 2) within the Outer Island category there has been a sharp decrease in the number of Sumatrans in the elite, but at the same time pattern of wider recruitment of representatives from other areas of the Outer Islands; and 3) the virtual elimination === [PDF page 60] === of those from the racial minority groups, especially the Arab and Eurasian communities, but this is also evident for the Chinese community, although at the present time influential members of the Chinese community are very important as a sub-elite working in cooperation with the military segment of the New Order elite. There has been a decreasing recruitment of santri into the political elite. The religious patterns of Guided Democracy and the New Order, though, are very similar, i.e. the dominance of abangan. Concerning social status background, there has been little change; recruitment of the elite mainly from upper status origins has ranged over time from 77% during the Revolution to 70% in the New Order. Looking at educational background, over time there has been a decrease in the percentages of elite members who have attended universities, from a high of 78% during the Revolution, to lows of 39% during Guided Democracy and 44% in the New Order. Patterns of Ascent to Elite Status What is the relevance of the time of ascent, the place of ascent, and the routes of ascent to the achievement of elite status? In Indonesia within the military, it was found that the time of entry to the military was crucial in determining whether or not a person was able to rise to elite status. The singular important characteristic of the military elite members was participation in === [PDF page 61] === 45 the Revolution. For civilians the time of entry is less important in determining success, but this factor is not absent. Most of the political party leaders are older men, who have been active both in the Revolution and prior to the Revolution. However, there is a growing number of younger leaders who are represented in the party elite; they were prominent in the politics of the changeover from Guided Democracy to the few Order. The time of training influenced both the military and civilian leaders in the place and route taken by them to achieve elite status. Concerning the place of ascent, it was found that a majority of the military elite of Guided Democracy rose through staff positions, but a majority of those of the New Order elite rose through command positions. Those from the command group were more likely to be appointed to high government office; they have also been more successful in preserving their elite status than those who rose from staff positions. The political party leaders had three base locations--the central party offices, the regional chapters, and mass movements affiliated with political parties. enced first The place where a leader started was influby the time, and second political party. by the particular The oldest political party leaders usually rose through regional chapters, the middle generation through the national organization, and the youngest through mass movements and youth groups. The technocrats had two base offices--a technical faculty and a government === [PDF page 62] === office concerned with economics and other technical subjects. For economists it was necessary for them to attend the economics faculty at the University of Indonesia, and then for most to go to the University of California at Berkeley for advanced training. Concerning routes of ascent for Indonesian military leaders it was important at an early stage of their career to serve under a commanding officer who possessed high prestige or who at least was a member of an influential clique. serve as a military aide. It was also common to Those who rose through command positions spent many years in field commands, and then their command positions were interspersed with divisional staff experience. The key to the rise to elite status for one who rose through command positions was the achievement of a prestigious divisional command. Those who rose through staff positions spent several years at a variety of low center positions, usually interspersed with a military training assignment, usually abroad. Elite status is usually achieved through assignment to a high staff position. For the technocrats the major route was the combination of academic and governmental careers, together with teaching at military staff and command schools. The political party leaders usually began their political career as head of a local branch of a youth movement or active in its national organization; for the younger leaders the youth movements were the means by which they were able to attain elite status, whereas for those of middle-age and === [PDF page 63] === 47 older the youth movements served as the first rung on the ladder followed by experience in the Revolution. The three major routes, as previously mentioned, were through the national party, from the regional level to the national level, and from the mass movements to the national level in the party. The major experience of the political party leaders from the hew Order has been in the legislature. Those from the periods from the Revolution to Guided Democracy were more often found in cabinet and other high governmental positions. Factional Dynamics It was discovered that for military factions divisional identification and ethnic background are, in general, congruent, and that these are the most important factors in terms of military factions. However, when divisional and ethnic lines are not congruent, army leaders often choose a faction composed of people from their ethnic background, not from their army division. The factional picture is more complicated than divisional and ethnic identification, and other elements, particularly religious and political beliefs, educational background, and aspects of career experience influence alignments, Uithin the civilian elite, background factors are the major variables in determining the bases of factionalism, although ideological beliefs do play a role in influencing factional alignments. However, often ideological beliefs themselves are closely related to background characteristics. Political parties === [PDF page 64] === 48 differ with respect to the extent to which particular background characteristics are more salient than others in determining factional membership, and whether or not ideology plays an influential role in factional membership. In the section on civilian-military relations it was demonstrated that Soeharto's political strategies were not successful in gaining legitimacy for the regime. They were successful in creating a state party, controlling the political parties, and restructuring the political system, all of which improve the extent of control which the government can wield in the civilian political structure. Through the mass riots of January 1974, the regime discovered that forceful attempts to build consensus through control were not a substitute for the development of policies which would, to some extent, be responsive to widespread public demand. The government so far has been unsuccessful in implementing these types of policies since these policies would be inimical to the interests of the elite. In general, the Indonesian elite is not only unrepresentative of the society as a whole in terms of composition, but the trend is toward less representation rather than more representation, contrary to many national elites studied; this trend has had the consequence of lessening the responsiveness of the elite towards demands within the society. The following chapter, chapter 2, is divided into two parts; the first part is an analysis of the ethnic, social, === [PDF page 65] === 49 and religious background of the elite and the second part is a study of the educational experience and geographical and generational patterns of the elite. Chapters 3 and 4 are concerned with the career patterns of the military and civilian segments respectively of the elite. In chapters 5 and 6 the factional patterns of the military and civilian segments of the elite are analyzed, concluding with an examination of civilian-military relations. The concluding chapter gives a synopsis of the conclusions reached in this study, and suggests areas for further research. === [PDF page 66] === 50 CHAPTER II THE BACKGROUND OF THE ELITEs ETHNIC, SOCIAL, EDUCATIONAL, GEOGRAPHICAL, AND GENERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS Summary The major theme of this chapter is that the Indonesian elite is recruited from narrow origins, and that this has been evident since independence. It is clear that the Javanese are increasingly dominant in the political elite. Social status recruitment patterns have remained stable since independence, and elite members continue to be recruited from those of high social origins. The first part of the chapter examines the ethnic, social, and religious origins of the Guided Democracy and New Order elites, the second part the educational, geographical, and generational patterns. The elite is also compared to the general population and to past elites. The ethnic groups represented in the elites are discussed and attention focuses on their traditional political and social systems, and the extent to which these groups were influenced by Dutch colonialism. The characteristics of the New Order elite can be summarized as follows: the Javanese, particularly the Central Javanese, dominate in all segments === [PDF page 67] === 51 of the elite. The Central Javanese comprise 44% of the New Order elite, whereas they approximate 28% of the population. Dominance of one ethnic group in the elite has been indicated in studies of other countries. In Kenya it was found that the Kikuyu, who comprise twenty percent of the population, monopolize the ranks of the national political elite, the civil service, and the state enterprises; their proportion of the army leadership is increasing. It is also common for an ethnic group to dominate leadership positions in the armed forces. In Burma and Malaysia the major ethnic group, the Burman and Malay respectively, dominate the armed forces. In the military elites of Czechoslovakia and Pakistan, leadership is concentrated in the Czech and Punjabi ethnic groups respectively, and the representation of these ethnic groups is greater than their proportion of Dennis Dresang, "Ethnic Representation and Development Representations A Comparative Study of Kenya and Zambia," paper presented at the 71st meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago 28 August-2 September 1974, pp. 4, 7-8. James F. Guyot, "Efficiency, Responsibility and Equality in Military Staffing! The Ethnic Dimension in Comparative Perspective," Armed Forces and Society 2 (Winter 1976): 291-304. Also see Cynthia H. Enloe, "Malaysia's Military in the Interplay of Economic and Ethnic Change," paper presented to the New England chapter of the Association for Asian Studies meeting, Hartford, 16 November 1975 and James F. Guyot, "Ethnic Segmentation in Military Organizations: Burma and Malaysia," in Political-Military Systems: Comparative Perspectives, ed. Catherine McArdle Kelleher, Sage Research Progress Series on War, Revolution, and Peacekeeping, vol. 4 (Beverly Hills and London: Sage, 1974), pp. 27-37. === [PDF page 68] === 52 the population would warrant. In Uganda one ethnic group, the Acholi, was the largest group in the armed forces, although they were one of the smaller ethnic groups according to population. Indonesia, therefore, resembles several other countries in that recruitment into elite ranks is disproportionately from one ethnic group. The remarkably obvious social characteristic is that the bulk of the Indonesian elite is recruited from high social origins, and the elite is not at all representative of the general population. Social status origins of Javans were examined in terms of region of origin, elite segment, and changes through time. Those from Central Java had the most prestigious social origins, and a high proportion of them claimed descent from royal families, especially from that of the Jogjakarta kraton (palace). Only among the East Javanese was there significant representation of those from the lower strata. The technocrats and military came from the highest social status origins (97% and 71% respectively). In the political party segment, however, more are from lower status origins than past political party elites. See Jaromir Cvrcek, "Social Changes in the Officer Corps of the Czechoslovak People's Army," in Military Profession and Military Regimes: Commitments and Conflicts, ed. Jacques van D o o m (The Hague and Parist Mouton, 1969), p. 108 and Khalid B. Sayeed, "The Role of the Military in Pakistan," in Armed Forces and Societyt Sociological Essays, ed. Jacques van D o o m (The Hague and Paris s Mouton, 1968), p. 276. Ali A. Mazrui, "Soldiers as Traditionalizers," World Politics 28 (January 1976)t 261. === [PDF page 69] === 53 What i s the relationship between social status and occupation? In t r a d i t i o n a l Java status and p o l i t i c a l power were often congruent. The Dutch recruited those of high s t a t u s origins for c i v i l service positions, and hence a person's occupation was related to his social s t a t u s. The fathers of e l i t e members were quite unrepresentative of the general population in terms of occupation. Comparisons of the fathers' occupation were made in terms of ethnic o r i g i n, e l i t e segment, and changes in the national e l i t e. A higher proportion of fathers of Javans were employed in the modern s e c t o r. The fathers of technocrats were concentrated in the modern sector, and the fathers of p o l i t i c a l party leaders in t r a d i t i o n a l non-elite occupations; the fathers of military leaders were usually employed in t r a d i tional e l i t e occupations and those of the modern sector. E l i t e s of other countries likewise tend to be recruited from those of high social o r i g i n. In a study of the Iranian p o l i t i c a l e l i t e i t was found that sixty-four percent of the e l i t e ' s fathers had held posts in the government or in the Imperial Court. The dominance of high s t a t u s occupations among fathers of e l i t e members was also the case in Sri Lanka and Greece, whereas in Ireland, Nigeria, Sweden, and Turkey there was a higher recruitment of those from Zonis, Elite of Iran, p. 155. Singer, Emerging Elite, p. 181 and Legg, "Case of Greece," p. 543. === [PDF page 70] === lower s t a t u s o r i g i n s. As i n Indonesia! t h e B r i t i s h and South Korean m i l i t a r y e l i t e s come from high s o c i a l o r i g i n s: i n Great B r i t a i n 46% of the m i l i t a r y elite from 1870-1959 were sons or s o n s - i n - l a w of members of t h e n a t i o n a l e l i t e and in South Korea, 54% of the m i l i t a r y e l i t e came from upper occupational groups and only 4% from lower occupational groups. In Czechoslovakia, on the contrary, seventy-four percent of those in the military elite came from worker and peasant classes. To what extent does the Indonesian elite structure allow for social mobility? In the New Order political parties provided an instrument for mobility within one generation. Political parties have declined in prestige, and hence the competition for party posts is less keen than in the past. The political party leaders of the New Order are from more humble origins than those from previous periods. In most cases of elite mobility it was inter-generational. In almost all instances of mobility, the family had J.A. Jackson, "The Irish Army and the Development of the Constabulary Concept," in Armed Forces and Society, ed. van Doom, p. 121; Luckham, Nigerian Military, p. 112; Olof Franden, "Notes on Mobility into and out the Swedish Officer Corps," in Military Profession, ed. van Doom, p. 108; and Frey, Turkish Political Elite, pp. 138, 143. C.B. Otley, "Militarism and the Social Affiliations of the British Army Elite," in Armed Forces and Society, ed. van Doom, pp. 98-99 and C.I. Eugene Kim, "The South Korean Military Coup of May 1961i Its Causes and the Social Characteristics of Its Leaders," Ibid., p. 312. 9Cvrcek, "Social Changes," in Military Profession. ed. van Doom, p. 97. === [PDF page 71] === 55 connections with upper status families, which enabled them to obtain Western education for their son. Marriage served both as a ratifier of mobility and as a means to gain mobility for one's children. Islam in Indonesia has had a differential impact on the society, ranging from the universal acceptance of Islam in Aceh and the hostility among many Javanese to the santri. Attention in this section was focused on Java, where the santri and abangan not only come from different social and cultural milieu, but have had contrasting exposures to the international world. Biographies of two elite members are used to illustrate these variations. The political elite is dominated by the abangan; this is influenced by the close relationship between social status and religious orientation. In Java., especially in Central Java, those of high status origins are usually reared in the abangan tradition. Only in the political party segment are the santri in the majority. In comparison with the elite of Guided Democracy, there have been changes in religious origins only in the political party segment. A primary requirement for entrance into the elite is some Western-style education, except for the older leaders of the Nahdatul Ulama party. In 1930, when most of the elite members were already literate in Dutch, only 6% of the Indonesian population was literate in any language, and only.017% could read and write Dutch. The likelihood of whether or not a child in colonial Indonesia could receive === [PDF page 72] === 56 a Western-style education was related to his social status. Hence in the elite those of upper status origin received the most prestigious pre-university education, and they were more likely to attend the university. In Iran, too, there was a close relationship between high status and university education. For the Indonesian elite the amount of education was also dependent upon elite segment, the technocrats receiving the most and the military leaders the least; this was also the case in Nigeria. The general trend in the Indonesian elite from 1945 to the present has been the decline of university educated leaders, ranging from 77% of the revolutionary elite to less than one-half of those in the New Order elite. This democratizing trend was also true in Sri Lanka and Great Britain. In Sri Lanka the elite of the 1960s was less well-educated than earlier elites, and in Britain, the percentage of those who attended the top ten public schools declined from 60% in 1939 to 42% in 1959. 12 Almost half of the Indonesian elite attending universities studied abroad. Over time the proportion of those who studied abroad remained constant, but the pattern changed. Whereas the past elites usually studied in Europe, most of the New Order elite Zonis, Elite of Iran, p. 167. Luckham, Nigerian Military, p. 96. 12 Singer, Emerging Elite, p. 77 and Otley, "British Army Elite," in Armed Forces and Society, ed. van Doom, p. 95. === [PDF page 73] === who studied abroad came to the United States. The New Order elite were more adult when they went abroad for study, usually attending a university in Indonesia and beginning their career first, whereas past elite members went abroad after high school. Another distinguishing mark of the Indonesian elite, in contrast with the general population, is their urban origin. Members of the political elite tended to be born in large towns and urban centers, which were also governmental centers, such as provincial, residency and regency capitals. An examination of the parents' birthplaces showed that their birthplaces were similar to those of their sons. Although the elite segments differed little, the military, as is true of other militaries, is recruited 13 from less urban origins than other elite members. The most relevant variables were those of ethnic, social status, and religious origins. Javans were more likely to be born in urban areas than those of Outer Island ethnic origin. This was also true of those of high social status and abangan background; in Java upper status groups traditionally lived in urban areas. Those born in centers of low population migrated by their late teens to urban areas, where there were educational and career opportunities. The elite is divided into three generations, in accordance with the period influencing them the most. 13 See Huntington, Changing Societies, p. 241 and Janowitz, Professional Soldier, p. 87. The === [PDF page 74] === 58 oldest generation, was molded mainly in the Dutch period, the middle generation during the Japanese occupation and the Revolution, and the youngest generation in postindependent Indonesia. The oldest generation was profoundly influenced by Western culture, and many felt more at home in that culture than in the indigenous culture. The second generation, influenced by the Japanese and by the period of the Revolution, is dominant in the military* and military leaders absorbed Japanese martial philosophy along with military training. They look back to a romanticized image of the Revolution when the army and the people were one and there was unity. The youngest generation grew up in independent Indonesia, and most members of this group have been active in protests against corruption and the lack of democratic rights. These three generations will be illustrated by three biographies. In new nations the elite generation that achieves independence attempts to hold onto power. In Indonesia this generation has preserved itself in the military, but its counterpart in the political parties was unsuccessful. Many political party leaders from the Guided Democracy period were ousted from their positions during the transition to the New Order, and many younger leaders came to the fore in the rough and tumble of party conferences. Army policy and promotion are controlled by the revolutionary generation, and it is difficult for those even a few years younger to advance. In age Indonesia is comparable to other military regimes; === [PDF page 75] === 59 in the United Arab Republic as in Indonesia the mean age of the elite at the start of the military regime was fortythree, and as each year passed, the mean age increased by one year.14 The mean age of elites in civilian regimes is older, usually in the 50s. The Indonesian elite, as is seen above, is recruited from narrow origins. In order to reach elite status it was preferable to be Javan, especially Central Javanese, of high social origin, possessing a Western-style education, and from an urban area. If an elite member is weak on one requirement, he usually is stronger in others. PART I Introduction Indonesia is a state possessing several hundred ethnic and sub-ethnic groups; however approximately twenty ethnic groups are theoretically large enough to participate in national politics, as is illustrated in map 1 on the following page. Representation of different ethnic groups in the elite is related to two major factors: 1) the complexity of the traditional culture and its role in R. Hrair Dekmejian, Egypt under Nasir (Albany: State University of New York, 1971), p. 179. See Julio A. Fernandez, The Political Elite in Argentina (New York: New York University Press, 1970), pp. 67, 72; Gehlen, "Career Orientations," p. 11; Verner, "Five Country Study," p. 641; and Zonis, Elite of Iran, pp. 233-235. === [PDF page 76] === MAP 1 MAJOR ETHNIC AREAS OF INDONESIA assar === [PDF page 77] === 61 traditional Southeast Asia; and 2) the nature and extent of the colonial influence. Some groups, such as the Javanese, had a complex traditional culture, played a major role in Southeast Asian history, and were deeply affected by the colonial impact. Others, such as the Minahassans, although their traditional culture was simple and their ethnic group relatively isolated until the advent of colonialism, were greatly affected by the Dutch colonial regime, and have played a greater role in national politics than the size of their ethnic group would warrant. Other groups, such as the Dayaks of Kalimantan and the Papuans of West Irian, relatively isolated traditionally and during the Dutch period, have not been represented in the national elite. The following discussion of the ethnic groups represented in the elite will not only serve to introduce the reader to these ethnic groups, but will also aid in explaining the disparity in the percentages of elite members from particular ethnic groups in comparison with their percentage in the population (see table 2, pp. 100-101). Java Javanese The Javanese, numerically and politically dominant, comprise approximately half the population of Indonesia. They have also usually been the dominant ethnic group in the archipelago; most of the past kingdoms were Javanese and at times their power was acknowledged by most states of === [PDF page 78] === the archipelago. In order to understand contemporary Indonesian politics and elite composition it is necessary to examine the Javanese in terms of the traditional system and the changes that occurred under Dutch rule. Traditional Java The traditional Javanese state was headed by a ruler, who personified "the unity of society."17 The kraton mirrored the cosmos, as in other Southeast Asian kingdoms influenced by Hinduism; the ruler was believed to possess supernatural power, and in turn, a large part of his power depended upon the continued possession of the state pusaka (relics endowed with magical power). Conceptually, the Javanese state was divided into several For works on Javanese history and Indonesian history in general see: Bernard H.M. Vlekke, Nusantara: A History of Indonesia, rev. ed. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1960); Muhammad Yamin, 6000 Tahun Sang MerahPutih (Jakarta: Pertjetakan Dharma, 1951); Ailsa Zainu'ddin, A Short History of Indonesia (New York and Washington, D.C.: Praeger, 1968); H.M. Yamin, Tatanegara Mad iapahit. 2 vols. (Jakarta: Prapantja, 1962); Slametmuljana, The Structure of the National Government of Mad iapahit (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1966); Boechari, "A Preliminary Note on the Study of the Old Javanese Civil Administration," Madjalah Ilmu-Ilmu Sastra Indonesia 1 (September 1963): 122-133; Soemarsaid Moertono, State and Statecraft in Old Java: A Study of the Later Mataram Period, 16th to 19th Century, Monograph Series (Ithaca, N.Y.J Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1968); B. Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies. 2 pts., 2nd ed. (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1966); and for the best general work on Southeast Asian history in English see D.G.E. Hall, A History of South-East Asia (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1955). Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture," in Culture and Politics in Indonesia, ed. Claire Holt (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), pp. 22-23. === [PDF page 79] === 63 18 concentric circles. The ruler and his family lived in the kraton. from which the princes and nobles would communicate to the privavi. the traditional civil and military administrators. The second circle, the capital (nagara). was the environs of the capital city, a political and administrative center, not an economic one. During the last independent Javanese kingdom, Mataram, the nobles and many of the privavi were forced by the sultan to live in the capital. One major theme of Javanese history is the threat of the nobles and high privavi to the stability of the kingdoms. Some of the tactics of the Mataram rulers, devised to counterbalance this polycentrism, 19 are similar to those used by the Tokugawa shogun. The third circle, the greater capital (nagara agung). was the extent over which the royal administration was able to exert direct rule. Nobles and princes appointed privavi to collect taxes twice a year. In the fourth circle, the neighboring regions (mancanagara). the local elite ruled with little interference from the ruler, but usually the ruler's suzerainty was 18 The following d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e Javanese realm follows t h a t of Selosoemardjan, Social Changes i n J o g j a k a r t a ( I t h a c a, N.Y.: Cornell U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s, 1962), pp. 23-27. 19 See D.H. Burger, Structural Changes in Javanese Societyi The Supra-Village Level. Translation Series (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia'Project, 1956), p. 8 for a discussion of the dangers posed by the nobles and high privavi and the devices used by the Mataram rulers to control them. === [PDF page 80] === 64 acknowledged. 20 The highest official of the Javanese state 21 was the patih followed by two to six wedana; these officials were responsible for the internal administration of the kraton. The ruler appointed bupati (governors) for the regions (fifty-one during Mataram), but only in the capital and the greater capital did the appointments reflect the choice of the royal administration. In the neighboring regions appointments were made in accordance with the local power structure. The bupati organized their regions in ways that mirrored that of the state s they too had patih. who headed the regional administration, and under the patih were wedana and other officials. The bupati, as did the ruler, possessed pusaka and was thought to possess spiritual power.22 The traditional stratification system was influenced by the political system discussed above; with the Javanese social status and political power were relatively congruent. The sultan, or susuhunan. was at the summit of 20 The pasisir (the northern coastal area of Java), was considered to be part of the neighboring regions, but at times when the realm was strong, the rulers interfered in the rule of the local elite, to such an extent that there was considerable circulation of elites. See Schrieke, Sociological Studies, 2:169 and Moertono, Later Mataram Period, p. 112. 21 Schrieke, Sociological Studies. 2:207. 22 See Heather Amanda Sutherland, "Pangreh Pradja: Java's Indigenous Administrative Corps and Its Role in the Last Decades of Dutch Colonial Rule" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1973), pp. 94-97 for a discussion of the role of the bupati in the regions. === [PDF page 81] === society. Below him were the nobles, "whose status 23 derived from the center of all power and authority." Light emanated from the ruler, and being the closest to the source of light, the nobles reflected the ruler's light. Status in the society, therefore, depended upon the degree of closeness to the ruler. Contrary to the patterns in Europe, in Java as in other Southeast Asian societies "blue blood thinned with every generation;" after so many generations, usually from five to seven, depending upon the rules of the particular kraton, the family no longer belonged to the nobility. Aristocratic status was maintained through service to the ruler and 25 through marriage. Below the nobles were the priyavi. Most privavi lay claim to noble and royal blood. Since nobility is limited to those recently descended from royalty, nobles do descend to priyayi status after some generations; it is also not uncommon for those entering privavi status from lower origins to claim a mythical noble or royal ancestor. It is difficult to make a firm separation of the privavi. either from the nobility or from the commoners on the basis of birth, since men entered the privavi23from both the upper and lower levels of society. Selosoemardjan, Jogjakarta, p. 21. Heather Sutherland, "The Priyayi," Indonesia 19 25 Originally the term was para iaii. younger brother (of the king). See Sutherland, "Fangreh Pradja," p. 45. === [PDF page 82] === Ideally speaking a prijaji was a well-born Javanese holding high government office who was well versed in the aristocratic culture of the courts, in literature, music, dance, the waiang kulit (puppet shadow play), in the subtleties of philosophy, ethics and mysticism, who had mastered the nuances of polite behavior, language and dress and, until well into the late nineteenth century, was at home in the arts of war, skilled in the handling of horse and weapons. And in addition to these acquired skills, a prijaji was meant to be a man of integrity and honor, with a strong image of the prijaji, in short was that of a man from the Hindu-Javanese courts, able to meet the spiritual and ceremonial demands of office.2° Like the nobles, the priyayi lived in cities and towns; they were never baronical landlords,27 as was the case of their counterparts in the feudalistic states of Europe and, at certain times, in China. Originally in order to be considered priyayi a person had to be an official, but gradually the priyayi also included the families and de28 scendants of officials. Below the priyayi. in a steep vertical descent, were the wong cilik (literally, "little people"), a category lumping merchants, peasants, and laborers together. It is said that the main distinguishing mark between the nobles and the priyayi on the one hand and the wong cilik on the other is that the latter work with their hands.29 A person's status is dependent upon his 26 Ibid., pp. 45-56. 27 Geertz, Religion of Java, p. 229. Moertono, Later Mataram Period, p. 95. 29 See Raymond Kennedy, F i e l d Isotes of I n d o n e s i a: South C e l e b e s. 1949-50 (ftew Haven: Human R e l a t i o n s Area F i l e s, 1953), p. 4. === [PDF page 83] === 67 closeness to the ruler, not whether or not he uses his hands in his work. The ksatria. the knight, used his hands to fight for the ruler. The peasant and merchant are far from the light emanated by the ruler, therefore 30 they are considered low. The Javanese merchant was never considered a privavi. The privavi say that a person who handles money is kasar (rough, uncultivated), whereas the privavi's activities are halus (refined, civilized). Privavi and their agents collected taxes from the merchants and peasants, but they were reflected in the ruler's light, unlike the merchants. Within the world of the Javanese peasant, the village, a peasant's social standing was connected particularly with his relationship to the 31 land. The "nuclear villager" families, from which most village officials were recruited, owned more than enough land for their use. "His /the nuclear villager's/ position often stemmed from an ancestor who was one of the founders It is true that in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries merchants rose to political power on the north coast of Java. But these merchants were not Javanese; they came from China, Arabia, India, and Malacca. In time these merchant-princes became Javanized, intermarried with the nobility and became indistinguishable from the Javanese nobility. The Javanese merchants did not have the power and status gradually accorded to European merchants in early post-feudal Europe. 31 See Robert R. Jay, Javanese Villagerst Social Relations in Rural Modiokuto (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 1969), chap. 9 concerning social rank in Javanese villages. === [PDF page 84] === 68 of the desa /village/..." Under the nuclear villagers were those who did not possess enough land to subsist on, therefore they were forced to rent some land from the nuclear villagers. The lowest group was composed of those who neither had a house nor land, but were 33 totally dependent upon the nuclear villagers. Concerning religious patterns in Java, Geertz associates religious practice with status in Java, i.e. the privavi and nobles are mainly influenced by Hinduism, the 34 merchants by Islam and the peasants by animism. traditional Java the first religion practiced was animism, which has survived, especially in the peasant world. Hinduism, first introduced in the court centers, was instrumental in aiding in the establishment of the administration, organization, the ideology of the Javanese state, including the justification of social hierarchy, and encouraged the cultivation of the arts. Certain Hindu elements did filter down to the villages, but to this day, Hinduism is most 32 W.F. Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transitions A Study of Social Change (Bandungt Sumur Bandung,' 1956), p. 115. 33 B. ter Haar, Adat Law in Indonesia (Jakarta: Bhratara, 1962), p. 79. See Geertz, Religion of Java. By and large this generalization is valid. But in some areas of Java, especially along the northern coast, Islam penetrated the upper status groups and there are many santri privavi. Also see Robert B. Cruikshank, "Abangan, Santri and Prijaji: A Critique," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 3 === [PDF page 85] === influential in the court centers and among privavi and nobles. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries Islam, 35 brought by foreign merchants, penetrated parts of Java. Islam influenced not only the merchant class, but the aristocrats of the north coast of Java, who, at that time, were engaged in a political and military struggle with Majapahit, the inland kingdom dominant in Java until its defeat by the northern coastal kingdom of Demak. The aristocrats of northern Java converted to Islam, partially in order to defeat Majapahit. For many centuries, the Javanese princes had been accustomed to conceive of religious practices as a means of increasing their inner strength or magic force. Understandably, they saw Islam in the same light. The growing influence of the new religion through Southeast Asia proved its powerful significance. Why should not the Javanese rulers accept Islam, too? Why not add this new source of magic force to the ones they already knew?36 Islam increased its hold upon the merchants, partially as a way of protesting the advent of Dutch rule in Java and was an ideological weapon used by protestors against the Dutch and the indigenous rulers coopted by the Dutch. 35 For a beautifully written analysis and description of the entrance of Islam into Java see Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 25-29. Vlekke, Nusantara. p. 86. === [PDF page 86] === Impact of the Dutch Under the Dutch the kingdoms were reduced to hollow shells, their power gradually lessening until only the arts were under their command, although in theory they exercised limited sovereignty in the areas of Jogjakarta and Surakarta in Central Java. The Dutch brought Banten and Ceribon in West Java under direct rule, and by the early part of the nineteenth century Mataram had been divided into four principalities--Surakarta, Jogjakarta, Mangkunegara, and Paku Alam--whose land and allegiances were intermingled with each other. Both direct and indirect rule were used by the Dutch, but by the twentieth century there was little distinction between the two. The courts in Central Java still remained, though, and the nobles and privavi were used by the Dutch as civil administrators. The court, if not the political focus of the privavi. remained the cultural focus, from where... the aristocrats turned civil servants, now the vehicles if hardly the springs of authority in Indonesia, drew their life style, their social values, and their religious ideals.3' One effect of Dutch rule upon the priyayi was the increase of their power vis-a-vis the peasants. This particularly occurred during the Cultivation period. The privavi 37 Geertz, Islam Observed, p. 41. 38 Leslie H. Palmier, "The Javanese Nobility under the Dutch," Comparative Studies in Society and History 2 (1959-60): 212. Officially the Cultivation system lasted from 1830-1850, but many aspects of it were in force until the Japanese occupation in 1942. Under the system the === [PDF page 87] === 71 were also changed into more of an hereditary class than in the traditional period. The Dutch believed that the privavi simply were an hereditary aristocracy, and in order to preserve the authority of the privavi the Dutch instituted a policy which provided for hereditary selection for bupati and they also used the hereditary principle in recruiting and promoting for the civil service.39 Whereas in reality in traditional Java social mobility into the upper stratum was not uncommon. Despite attempts of the Dutch to make the privavi into an hereditary class it was still possible for some from the wong, cilik to rise to middle positions and sometimes even to the position of wedana. often through the traditional adoption and apprenticeship system whereby a won?, cilik family would request a privavi with whom they had connections to adopt their son. Under the Dutch the privavi became bureaucrats, their local power was eroded and the central state was not peasants were forced to grow export crops; theoretically the peasant was to devote one-fifth of his land and time to the cultivation of the export crop. The actual amount probably varied from one-half to all. Humanitarian outcries plus, more importantly, the demands of private enterprise, in Holland to participate in the economy of the colony led to the abandonment of the Cultivation system, and the so-called Liberal period began, which encouraged Western private enterprise. For the Javanese peasant there was not much difference between the two periods; in many areas the European planter substituted for the Dutch controlleur and the Javanese bupati of the Cultivation period. Sutherland, "Priyayi," pp. 40 75-lb. Sutherland, "Pangreh Pradja," p. 110. === [PDF page 88] === 72 faced by the polycentric threats experienced by previous realms in Java. The highest native regional official under the Dutch was the bupati. who headed a regency; there were approximately fifty-two bupati in the Javanese ethnic area. In most divisions a patih was placed under the bupati. and was encouraged by the Dutch to assume most of the func41 tions of the bupati. The regency itself was divided into districts, headed by wedana (numbering approximately 400 for all of Java and Madura), and into sub-districts, headed by sten wedana (approximately 1200 in all of Java and 42 Madura. In the twentieth century the bureaucracy began to expand, especially in the specialist departments, such as agriculture and health, and a growing number of sons of the privavi. and also of wong. cilik. began to be employed in these new departments and in the communications and financial sectors. Another impact of Western education, other than the growth of new departments, was the emergence of the intelligentsia, itself originating from the privavi. By the end of the Dutch period the privavi were divided into three groups: 1) the lower rank officials; 2) the For a discussion of the administrative organization of Java see J.S. Furnivall, Netherlands India (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1939; reprint ed. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1967), pp. 191-192. 42 Heather Sutherland, "Notes on J a v a ' s Regent Famil i e s: Part I, " Indonesia 16 (October 1973): 114. === [PDF page 89] === 73 administrative officials; and 3) the intellectuals. According to R.M. Koentjaraningrat a large part of the first group was descended from wong cilik families. The second group formed the core of the privavi. going from the head of the local police (mantri polisi) to the bupati; most of this group were probably recruited from the traditional privavi. as were the intellectuals. Looking at the changes within the wong cilik under the Dutch, the status and power of the lurah (the village headman) increased. Many sons of lurah were able to receive Western education through the privavi contacts of their fathers. It was common for bupati to take daughters of lurah as secondary wives; this was a beneficial relationship for both the lurah and the bupati since it helped them create kin networks.46 The Javanese merchant was still not considered privavi. As in traditional Java the merchants are divided into strata in accordance with wealth. The poor traders are placed in the urban proletariat straturn,48 together with day laborers, factory hands and A Preliminary Description of the Javanese Kinship System. Yale University, Southeast Asian Studies, Cultural Report Series (New Haven: Yale University, 1957), p. 4. 44 Ibid., p. 8. 45 Ibid. 46 Sutherland, "Pangreh Pradja," p. 98. See Alice Dewey, Peasant Marketing in Java (Glencoe, 111.i Free Press, 1962). 48 Donald Fagg, "Town Life and Organization," Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass., 1956. === [PDF page 90] === 74 domestic servants. Persons originating from these groups found it almost impossible to improve their status. During the Dutch period the religious triangle 49 described and analyzed by Geertz was completed. .. j_ it was only in the nineteenth century that it /Islam7 definitely arrived to crystallize into an aggressive counter-tradition, one which indicted as ungodly not only Dutch rule but gentry Indicism and peasant syncretism as well.50 The opening of the Suez Canal encouraged large numbers of Indonesians to go on the hai (the pilgrimage to Mecca). Many returned fired with the ideal of a pure Islam and they established boarding schools; the content of their teaching became "not only un-Indic and un-Malaysian, but anti-Indie and anti-Malaysian." 52 Brief rebellions occurred during which santri killed both Dutch and priyayi. Religious orientations became more determined by status than in traditional Java, and antagonism between santri and abang,an increased in ferocity. The Javanese members of the elite grew up in a society stressing status difference, but one in which it was possible, although difficult, to rise from the upper levels of the lower strata. The merchant group, although 49 Religion of Java. Geertz, Islam Observed, p. 67. According to Geertz the numbers increased from 2,000 Indonesians in 1860 to 50,000 by 1926 (Ibid., p. 6 7 ). • 52 Ibid., p. 68. === [PDF page 91] === 75 still below the priyavi» had a vehicle for its demands by the end of the colonial period, political Islam. Sundanese The Sundanese, inhabiting the western part of Java, are the second largest group in the archipelago, numbering approximately 15% of the population. They are also regarded as rivals by the Javanese; this is particularly illustrated by army factionalism involving the army divisions of West and Central Java. The Sundanese have been intimately influenced by the Javanese and by the West. The Sundanese unlike the Javanese, do not have a court center. The Hindu kingdom of Pajayaran, influenced by previous Javanese kingdoms, was defeated by Mataram in the sixteenth century and Sunda has no group of court nobility. 53 In Sunda the menak were at the top of the social pyramid; they are considered equivalent to Javanese priyayi, although among the Javanese the privavi are under the nobility in the social pyramid. The menak stratum, like the privavi. was divided into upper, middle, and lower levels, and the upper menak level was composed of bupati families. At the time of Mataram there were only four bupati in Sunda and one of them, the bupati of Sumedang, 53 There are some, though, who possess titles indicating descent from a ruler of Pajayaran, but these are infrequent. === [PDF page 92] === was the representative of the Mataram ruler. Traditionally, status within the menak depended upon the closeness of a person's relationship to the bupati., but during the Dutch period position within the government structure became the main determining factor. 55 The organization of the civil service under the Dutch was similar to that in the Javanese ethnic area, and as in the Javanese area the position of bupati was inherited (there were approximately thirteen bupati in the Sunda area). Below the menak stratum were the merchants, and in the latter part of Dutch rule, the landlords. The menak. as did the privavi and nobles, looked down with distaste upon commercial pursuits. However, evidently the cultural pressure was less than in the Javanese ethnic area, since at the present it is not uncommon for those from menak families to go into business. According to Soelaeman Soemardi, a wealthy businessman now would be considered the equal of someone During most of the colonial period the Sumedang bupati had higher prestige than the others. For a discussion of the bupati of Sumedang see Semiati Alisjahbana, "A Preliminary Study of Class Structure among the Sundanese in the Prijangan" (M.A. thesis, Cornell University, 1954), p. viii and Sutherland, "Regent Families: Part I," p. 129. Alisjahbana, "Sundanese," pp. 1-2. Interview with Soelaeman Soemardi, Springfield, Massachusetts, May 1971. My thanks go to him for his informative discussions of the Sundanese social structure. === [PDF page 93] === 77 from a middle menak family. The kivavi (Islamic reli58 gious notables^ traditionally the intervening stratum between the menak and the peasants, would not necessarily be lower than a middle and low menak. Below is the diagram drawn by Soelaeman Soemardi. Menak Businessmen Kiyayi High Middle High High Middle Low Middle Low Low The peasants form the bottom stratum. The Sundanese village, like the Javanese village, has a lurah. but fewer village officials than are found in the Javanese village. In the Javans themselves commonly divide the privavi and menak into upper, middle, and lower strata, placing for example a person whose mother was the daughter of a lurah and whose father was the son of a bupati into the middle stratum. This dissertation follows the practice in Java. Some of the literature divides the privavi and menak into two strata, upper and lower. See L.H. Palmier, Social Status and Power in Java. London School of Economics, Monographs on Social Anthropology, no. 20, corr. paperback ed. (London: Athlone Press, 1960; i\ew York: Humanities Press, 1969), pp. 81-83 and Sutherland, "Pangreh Pradja," n. 51, p..216. 58 The kivavi were largely recruited from merchants and peasants, but recent records indicate intermarriage between menak and kivavi families (see Sutherland, "Priyayi," p. 63. === [PDF page 94] === 78 Sundanese village, unlike its Javanese counterpart, there is "almost a clear-cut division between the all-privileged upper level and the all-deprived lower level."59 In the Javanese ethnic area a type of shared poverty is prevalent in the villages, and due to the. responsibility of the nuclear families toward the less fortunate it is more difficult for them to amass wealth than their counterparts in Sunda, although the Sundanese wealthy peasants do assume some responsibility for the poorer peasants. Sunda, there are more connections between the lurah and the bupati families, and apparently there is a higher incidence of intermarriage between the upper stratum and lurah families. Concerning religious patterns in Sunda, although the upper menak often tend to be abangan, Islam has influenced all strata of the population. In Sunda the antagonism between the menak and the kivavi is not evident, unlike the Javanese ethnic area. The major effects of Dutch rule were: 1) the preservation and extension of menak status; 2) Western cultural influence; and 3) the creation of a strong landlord group. The Dutch recruited the indigenous officials from the menak. and in terms of educational training favored this Alisjahbana, "Sundanese," p. 59. Clifford Geertz, Agricultural Involutiont The Process of Ecological Change in Indonesia. Association for Asian Studies Monographs and Papers, no. 11 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), p. 97. 61 Sutherland, "Priyayi," p. 63. === [PDF page 95] === 79 group in the admittance of pupils to schools. Therefore sons of menak families were able to obtain higher training so that Sundanese members of the professions originate mainly from the menak stratum. The Sundanese were more influenced by the Dutch than were the Javanese. There was no court center in Sunda, to which the upper stratum could look for cultural guidance. Not only was the capital of the colony located in West Java and most of the Western population in West Java, but almost all the higher educational institutions were there. The extent of Western influence in Sunda accentuated the cultural differences between the Sundanese and Javanese, differences which have been prominent in elite interrelationships. There was also more land alienation in Sunda than in other parts of Java. The Sundanese village suffered more than did the Javanese village from the Cultivation system, and the peasants were often forced to sell the small plots of land the government had given them in return for the land confiscated for estates. Thereby a new group of landlords arose. Sunda they form a more important group than in most other parts of Java, although in areas of East Java land was also alienated from the peasants, thereby creating a group of landlords. ft y Alisjahbana, "Sundanese," p. 54. In East Java the landlords are culturally more different from the peasants than their counterparts in Sunda. The typical East Javanese landlord is santri and the peasant is generally abangan and antagonistic to the === [PDF page 96] === 80 In short, the position of the merchant, landlord, and kivavi are higher in Sunda than in the Javanese ethnic area, reflecting the absence of a Hindu-based court center and the consequential greater acceptance of Islam in Sunda. The impact of the West created greater cultural distance between the two ethnic groups. It also adversely affected the position of many of the peasants, making it even more difficult for the son of the average Sundanese peasant to rise socially than for the average Javanese peasant's son. Other Areas of Java Banten, Ceribon, and Madura64 are other parts of Java from which some elite members have been recruited. These are areas which formerly possessed kingdoms, and whose social status systems are related to those of the Javanese and Sundanese. Both Banten and Ceribon have mixed Javanese- Sundanese populations. In Banten, because of the opposition of the nobles, the Dutch appointed commoners as bupati. However the new officials and nobles soon intermarried with each other, and the two groups fused. Banten, as in Ceribon and Madura, Islam was influential among the upper stratum. Ceribon, unlike Banten and world view of the landlord, whereas in Sunda the landlord and the peasant share similar religious outlooks. Madura has approximately 7% of the population, Ceribon approximately 3.5% and Banten.02%. 65 Sutherland, "Regent Families: Part I," pp. 120-121. === [PDF page 97] === 81 Madura, still possesses kraton. although the royal families had no political responsibilities under the Dutch, unlike the royal families of Jogjakarta and Surakarta. Most of the Dutch-appointed officials in Ceribon originated from kraton families, except at the end of Dutch rule. In Ceribon and Madura intermarriage between religious authorities and nobles and bupati was common. Madura influenced the northern part of East Java, both in pre-Dutch times and in the colonial period. Many Madurese settled in East J-ava-, and some of the immigrants are members of the local, regional, and national elites. Outer Islands Sumatra The major ethnic and regional groups in Sumatra are: the Minangkabau (approximately 3.4% of the Indonesian population), the South Sumatrans (2.3%), the Malays (2.1%), the Bataks (2.0%), and the Achnese (1.4%). In terms of percentages within the elite the order is as follows: As a result of internal schisms, encouraged by the Dutch, by the end of the eighteenth century there were three kraton. the Kasepuhan, Kanoman, and the Kacirebonan, the first being senior. The rivalry among the kraton. especially between the Kasepuhan and the Kanoman, is expressed in present-day local politics. Sutherland, "Regent Families: Part I," pp. 124-127. leather Sutherland, "Regent Families; Part II," Indonesia 17 (April 1974): 23. === [PDF page 98] === 82 Bataks (6.1%), Minangkabau (2.6%), South Sumatran and Acehnese (1.7%), and Malay (.9%). The first four groups will be discussed below.69 Sumatra, with the highest population of any of the Outer Islands, has the most representation in the national elite. It is also the most developed of the Outer Islands and had the most educational institutions of any of the Outer Islands during the colonial period. Since the Revolution the Batak and Minangkabau have been the most prominent ethnic groups represented in the national political elite. As will be discussed below, both groups were aided by the Dutch educational policy which encouraged the development of educational institutions in these areas. In their traditional cultures education likewise is deemed to be of great value. The Batak and Minangkabau members of the elite are found in civilian and military spheres, whereas most of the other Sumatran elite members are only in the military sphere. Minangkabau The Minangkabau, inhabiting West Sumatra, are an interesting and complex ethnic group. Their adat. 69 The main group of Malays, inhabiting East Sumatra, have been replaced, even in their home area by outside groups, especially by the Toba Batak and the Javanese. Many members of the Malay elite, supported by the Dutch as traditional rulers, were killed in the social revolution of 1946 that engulfed Aceh, and North and East Sumatra. Others were compromised by their participation in the Dutchsponsored federal state of East Sumatra. Since the Revolution the Malays in North Sumatra have not held political power. === [PDF page 99] === 83 (customary law) is matrilineal, but they are Islamic; their political and social organization is very complex and very decentralized, illustrated by the differences among Minangkabau villages. Minangkabau leaders were active in Indonesian politics from the inception of the nationalist movement. One of the Minangkabau customs is that of young men leaving the area to seek wealth through trade, and, during the Dutch period, to seek an education. It was the woman's family who proposed to the man, and a man had to prove himself worthy to receive a marriage proposal. Many young men never returned to West Sumatra and settled in other areas, especially Malaya and Java. The Minangkabau initially were the most important non-Java ethnic group, but in the late 1950s and the early 1960s their position declined. Many had participated in the regional rebellions of the late 1950s and, due to these rebellions and resistance to the institution of Guided Democracy the two major political parties (the Socialist and the Masjumi) largely led by Minangkabau were discredited and dissolved. The Minangkabau, however, remain an important group due to their large representation in the intellectual and economic realms. There were three distinct parts of Minangkabau land, stemming from the kingdom which originated in the fourteenth century: l) the darat, governed by the representatives of each lineage in the village community; 2) the outlying areas, the rantau, ruled by representatives === [PDF page 100] === of the royal family? and 3) the bab. the large seaports. The connections among these three parts were very tenuous, and most of the rantau and some of the bab were lost to the Dutch in the eighteenth century. main Kinangkabau land. The darat became the Government remained very decentralized, in the hands of each village community. There is a widespread myth that Minangkabau society is socially "democratic," whereas in the adat people are classified and given rights and duties in such a way that distinct social strata have resulted. According to Umar Junus in the village that he studied there were three classes of villagers: 1) the nandi, who are the first families and the great landowners; 2) the common people, who were able to buy land from the nandi and eventually able to become relatively self-sufficient, although the nandi still held political and economic power; and 3) locieh, who came to the village later than the second class and being unable to buy land from the nandi, worked the nandi's land and are dependent upon them. Other variations have been discovered in other villages, but in all villages, those from the first families had the highest prestige and economic and political power.71 However the Minangkabau social Harsja Bachtiar, "'Negeri' Taram: A Minangkabau Village," in Villages in Indonesia, ed. Koentiaraningrat (Ithaca, N.Y.i Cornell University Press, 1967), p. 378. "Some Remarks on Minangkabau Social Structure," Biidragen Tot en Taal-. Land- en Volkenkunde 120 (1964), pp. 295-309. === [PDF page 101] === 85 stratification system is less rigid and aristocratic than societies in Java and other ethnic groups in Sumatra. There are descendants of the kings, but they have prestige but no power. The focus of the stratification system lies in the village rather than in the city where the king lived.72 The Dutch began to rule the Minangkabau in the nineteenth century, and tried to impose the Javanese system of territorial rule by districts headed by officials into a society that traditionally was decentralized. The Dutch tried to use the penghulu (the lineage headman), but due to Dutch policies which they were forced to implement the The following account of the social and political system of the Minangkabau has been short and sketchy. For more information on the Minangkabau see: Taufik Abdullah, "Adat and Islam: An Examination of Conflict in Minangkabau," Indonesia 2 (October 1966): 1-24; Bachtiar, "'Negeri' Taram," pp. 348-385; Harsja Bachtiar, "Twelve Sumatran Villages: An Exercise in the Study of Political Institutions" (M.A. thesis, Cornell University, 1964); F.C. Cole, "Family, Clan, and Phratry in Central Sumatra," in Essays in Anthropology, ed. A.L. Kroeber and R.H. Lowie (Berkeley: University of California, 1936), pp. 19-27; Zahara Daulay, "Minangkabau: A Preliminary Study of the Culture and People" (M.A. thesis, Cornell University, 1960); P.E. de Josselin de Jong, Minangkabau and Negri Sembilan: Sociopolitical Structure in Indonesia (London: E. Ijdo, 1951); Anthony H. Johns, Rentiak Dilabueh: A Minangkabau Kaba. A Specimen of the Traditional Literature of Central Sumatra. Data Paper no. 32 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1950); Junus, "Minangkabau Social Structure," pp. 293-326; Edwin M. Loeb, Sumatra: Its History and People (Vienna: Verlag des Institutes fur Volkerkunde der Universitat Wien, 1935); J.V. Karetin, "Disappearance of Matriclan Survivals in Minangkabau Family and Marriage Relations," Biidragen Tot en Taal-. en Land- en Volkenkunde 117 (1961): 168-195; and W. harsden. The History of Sumatra (London: Payne, 1783). === [PDF page 102] === 86 the prestige of the penghulu fell and that of the Islamic leaders rose. West Sumatra became the early center of the Islamic reformist movement, which eventually led to the founding of the Masjumi party. There were certain economic changes, especially the development of smallholder rubber plantations, which enabled families to finance the education of their sons. There were opportunities for mobility through education.73 A large part of the aristocracy had been killed during the Padri War,74 and so the Dutch allowed non-aristocrats to receive schooling beyond the elementary level. Batak There are various groups of Batak, who all originate from the area of North Sumatra, south of the tip of Sumatra inhabited by the Acehnese. Certain of the Batak, especially the Toba» are among the most progressive and dynamic groups in the archipelago. The Batak, rather two of their sub-ethnic groups (the Toba and Kandailing) have For a brilliant discussion of the economic takeoff effected in West Sumatra through the smallholder rubber operations see Geertz, Agricultural Involution. The Padri War was sparked by the return of three Minangkabau from the hai in the early nineteenth century, who were fired by the Wahabist teachings, which called for the purification of Islam from alien influence. Before, the matrilineal adat and Islam had coexisted side by side. In some villages groups of reformers (called padri) attained political power and attempted to institute their reform campaign by force. The adat leaders and the nobles fought back. In the end, through Dutch intervention, the adat leaders won, but the nobles were almost all killed by the padri and the adat itself was "recodified," strengthening Islam. === [PDF page 103] === 87 replaced the Minangkabau as the most influential non-Java ethnic group. The Batak remained fairly isolated until the middle of the nineteenth century; their neighbors were afraid to venture into Batak territory because of their custom of headhunting. The Toba and Mandailing were the first Batak to have intimate contact with the outside world, accounting perhaps for the fact that all Batak members of the national elite are from these sub-ethnic groups. The Batak never developed a state; political power was dispersed among the village communities. The Batak are divided into patrilineal and exogamous rnarga (clans); the rnarga as a whole is not a corporate group since a rnarga is widely dispersed, but there is the feeling of belonging to one large family. In urban areas there are rnarga organizations, which serve as social groups, mutual aid societies, employment agencies and cooperative 76 societies. For both the Toba and Kandailing the founding rnarga of a village is called the rnarga raia (ruling rnarga). Tapi O.S. Ihromi, "Toba Batak Kinship System: A Preliminary Description"(M.A. thesis, Cornell University, 1963), p. 23. Ibid., pp. 19-20 and Clark E. Cunningham, The Postwar Migration of the Toba-Bataks to East Sumatra. Cultural Report Series (l\ew Havens Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1958), p. 20. Bataks who "make it" to high position are expected by their kinsmen and other Bataks (of their sub-ethnic group) to help them obtain employment. Those who refuse will lose support of their group. === [PDF page 104] === 88 and the marga raia in a village was led by an elder (raia huta) chosen by members of the marga raja* There was a village council, composed of representatives of all marga in the village. In the Toba area the raia huta was in a primus inter pares relationship with the other elders, whereas with the Mandailing the raia huta did have the deciding vote. The Mandailing ra ia huta was active in trade and had a monopoly of trade with the outside world, giving him more economic power than the Toba raia huta. The status structure of.the Toba and Mandailing was similar: 1) the members of the marga raia were the top group in a village; 2) the commoners were the second level; and 3) slaves, enslaved through debts 77 or captured in war, owned by members of the marga raia. 78 In the nineteenth century the Toba Batak were converted to Lutheranism by German missionaries. Education was always prized by the Toba Batak and when German missionaries introduced village education there were conversions It was difficult to repay debts, since interest was one hundred percent per year; if the debtor did not repay his debt in two or three years he became a slave, but in contrast to war captives his heirs were not enslaved (Loeb, Sumatra, p. 43). 78 For scholarly works on the Toba Batak see: Edward M. Bruner, "The Toba Batak Village," in Local. Ethnic and National Loyalties in Village Indonesia, ed. 0. William Skinner, Cultural Report Series (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asian Studies, 1959); Cunningham, Postwar Migration; Loeb, Sumatra; and J.C. Vergouwen, The Social Organization and Customary Law of the Toba-Batak of Northern Sumatra (The Hague: Martinus Ni.jhoff, 1964). === [PDF page 105] === en masse. The colonial government effected Dutch rule over the Batak in the latter part of the nineteenth century. The Dutch appointed the raia huta as the village official, and required that succession be by primogeniture. As a result of Dutch rule, the power of the raia huta increased. Social distance among social status groups became greater during the colonial period, largely due to the government regulation that only members of the marga raia could attend a government school. Social distance has increased even more in independent Indonesia since mainly only children of wealthy Batak., that is, usually members of the marga raia, can obtain an education. Of all the Batak the Toba Batak are the most influenced by the West, and are noted for their accomplishments in the educational field. The Mandailing, an Islamic people, who live on the border of Minangkabau land, have been influenced by the Minangkabau, including some of the matri80 lineal customs of the Minangkabau. Many, following the example of the Minangkabau, studied in pesantren in West Sumatra and then left Sumatra, influenced by the Minangkabau custom, to seek their fortune as merchants or obtain an education. This is perhaps why some Mandailing in the 79 Cunningham, Postwar Migration, p. 51. 80 It is common for Mandailing Batak to refer to themselves as Minangkabau and to be insulted if they are called Batak. === [PDF page 106] === 90 national elite are not from the marga raiat whereas among Toba members only those from the marga raia are represented. Aceh Aceh, a trading power from the sixteenth century and a center of Islamic learning, was not conquered by the Dutch until 1903. Aceh was headed by a sultan, but the sultan was not the representative of the cosmos, in contrast to the Javan ruler, but "the- regulator of... intercourse in the market and the protector of Islam..." Neither the sultan nor the uleebalang (the district chiefs) had much political power. The uleebalang successfully resisted the attempts of the sultan to control them, 83 and the lesser chieftains often broke away from the uleebalang and became uleebalang in their own right.84 The 81 Until 1699 when a legal recommendation was sent from Mecca there had been four women sultans. There is strong evidence that Acehnese society was matrilineal before Islam entered in the ninth century, and even after many centuries of Islamization there are still many basic aspects of matrilineality left. For a discussion of this see James Siegel, The Rope of God (Berkeley: University of California, 1969), pp. 51-55. 82 Ibid., p. 38. 83 For a model of the relationship between a sultan and the district chief see J.M. Gullick, Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malava. London School of Economics, Monographs on Social Anthropology, no. 17, 2nd ed. (London: Athlone Press, 1965), pp. 44-45. 84 As commercial rulers both the sultan and the uleebalang depended not upon land taxes but upon taxes collected from the flow of trade in the areas over which they had some control. And since commerce was the raison d'etre for a state, a person could become an uleebalang by carving out a state. To do this he would furnish money to pepper === [PDF page 107] === 91 districts were divided into mukim, each headed by an 85 imeum (an Islamic religious leader). The villages were headed by a village chief, the village religious leader, and the village elders. The social status system is composed of three strata: 1) the nobility, including the sultan's family and the uleebalanR; 2) commoners; and 3) slaves, most of whom were from the island of Nias. Between the nobility and the peasants were the ulama, men recruited from villages who had studied in pesantren, then returned to the villages to be religious leaders. The ties between the nobility and peasants were commercial, and the peasants felt closer to the ulama with whom they had an ideological bond, and the ulama, prior to the coming of the Dutch, gained so much power that the uleebalanR were forced to divide the districts into mukim. planters in a virgin area until the pepper ripened. The new uleebalanR, after the successful formation of the state, would receive a letter patent or edict of appointment from the sultan legitimizing his position (Ibid., pp. 17-22). 85 Loeb, Sumatra, p. 226. The commoners were divided into three groupst 1) the upper level consisting of relatives of the uleebalanR. the imeums. the members of the village governments, the Muslim religious teachers, the literate, old notable families, and the wealthy; 2) a middle level including the family members of village chiefs, religious knowledgeables, and others with some prestige; and 3) a lower level consisting of the rest of the peasants, including descendants of slaves === [PDF page 108] === 92 The Dutch made political positions hereditary in Aceh, and favored the sons of the nobility in terms of education, a policy which contributed to the domination of the noble element in Acehnese representation in the national political elite. South Sumatra South Sumatra is inhabited by many ethnic groups, the most important of which are those from Palembang and Lampung. Palembang looks back to the Buddhist kingdom of Srivijaya, the first great kingdom in the archipelago, which lasted from the seventh century to the twelfth cen87 tury, when it was conquered by the East Java kingdom of Majapahit. The son of the hajapahit ruler became ruler over Palembang. His descendants formed the ruling family 88 of Palembang, but the Srivijaya ruling family and nobles preserved their status and headed provinces.89 The Palembang ruler had mainly economic power, the control of international trade; he had little power over the nobles. 90 87 See O.W. Wolters, Early Indonesian Commerce a A Study of the Origins of Srividiaia (Ithaca,ft.Y.iCornell University Press, 1967), p. 197. 88 Walter M. Gibson, The Prison of Weltevreden and A Glance at the Indian Archipelago (New York: J.C. Riker, 1865). p. 171 and interview with Mr. Aspoor, Indonesian Consulate, New York, July 1972. 89 Marsden, Sumatra, p. 360. 90 Ibid., p. 360. === [PDF page 109] === Palembang,. therefore, has two aristocratic groups, those descending from Majapahit living mainly in the city of Palembang, preserving titles originating in the Javanese social system, and speaking Javanese. The aristocratic group tracing its descent from Srivijaya lives mainly outside Palembang. slaves. The other two groups are commoners and The stratification system is stricter than that of the Javanese, and marriages must be between equals, not only from the same general stratum, but from the exact same point within the stratum. 91 The only common cases of intermarriage were with wealthy Chinese and Arabs. 92 In Lampung the people are divided into the Orang Abung (mountain people) and the Qrang Pablan (plains people), of which the latter has a more sophisticated culture and is dominant. 93 The Qrang Pablan are divided into marga and then into villages,94 governed by chiefs. Some marga chiefs bought titles of nobility from the Banten ruler, who held suzerainty over Lampung for some time; the Dutch recognized these titles when Lampung was transferred to Dutch control in the eighteenth century. 91 Interview with Mr. Aspoor. 92 Jang Aisjah Muttalib, "Djambi from the Middle of the Nineteenth Century to the First Quarter of the Twentieth Century" (Department of History, Columbia University), pp. 27-30 and interview with Mr. Aspoor. 93 Loeb, Sumatra, p. 265. 94 Kampto Utomo, "Villages of Unplanned Resettlement in the Subdistrict Kaliredjo, Central Lampung," in Villages in Indonesia, ed. Koentjaraningrat, p. 289. === [PDF page 110] === The Dutch built few schools in South Sumatra, and in accordance with Dutch colonial policy in most areas, only those from upper status groups could attend Western-style schools. Those from South Sumatra who advanced to elite status came from these upper groups. East Indonesia Kalimantan The two major ethnic groups in Kalimantan are the Dayaks (approximately 1.1% of the Indonesian population), the original inhabitants, and the Banjarese (approximately 1.5%), a mixed ethnic group of Javanese and Malays who have lived in South Kalimantan for several hundred years and have long been associated with international and interisland trade. The Dayaks are a people who were isolated from the mainstream of Southeast Asian history and were little affected by Dutch colonial rule. The few representatives from Kalimantan in the national elite from the revolution on have come from Banjar. Banjar was a kingdom, similar to the other coastal kingdoms in the archipelago, in that its rulers were concerned with the regulation of trade and were the protectors of Islam. Merchants and kivavi are highly regarded there, and this is reflected by the prominence of merchants and kivavi in the national elite from Banjar. The Dutch did not develop Kalimantan, nor were there many educational institutions. Those who === [PDF page 111] === 95 received an education usually studied in pesantren, some travelling to East Java. Sulawesi The largest ethnic groups in Sulawesi are: the Buginese (approximately 2.6% of the Indonesian population), the Makassarese (1.1%), the Toraja (.9%), and the Minahassan (.5%). In general the elite members have been from the Bugis, Makassarese, and Minahassan ethnic groups. The Toraja, living in Central Sulawesi, were isolated for years and only recently have been affected by the outside world. The Minahassan have been represented in the elite more than the other groups. Traditionally in Minahassa, as in Batakland, the highest political organization was the village, and they were organized into tribes, headed by 95 chiefs. Their society was simple and isolated until the coming of the Portuguese in the sixteenth century and colonialization by the Dutch in the seventeenth century. In the traditional Minahassan society the chief and his family formed the highest strata, other free people the middle, and slaves the lowest. The Dutch initially favored the upper stratum, but slowly other strata advanced and were 96 able to rise. The Minahassan were converted to Christianity, and the Dutch coopted them into the colonial system, 95 ter Haar, Adat Law, p. 74. 96 Ibid., p. 62. === [PDF page 112] === 96 giving them privileges not shared by other Indonesians, ex97 cept for the Christianized^Ambonese from Maluku. Both the Minahassan and the Ambonese were highly educated under the Dutch system, and those who were loyal to the nationalist movement found themselves in high positions after independence. The Minahassan were active in the regional movements of the late 1950s and afterwards were less represented in the national elite than before. The Buginese and Makassarese both had kingdoms, founded in the seventeenth century, which lasted until they were conquered by the Dutch in the twentieth cen98 tury. The states were headed by sultans, and Islam was the official religion. Kennedy conducted research on 99 Bone, the Buginese kingdom. In brief, the state was organized hierarchically in a rather complex manner. the bottom of the hierarchy were the village heads. As in Java the sultan and the nobles were considered to have magical power, and their magical power depended upon their rank. The religious organization paralleled the political organization. The society was highly stratified, and unlike Java, marriage was always between people of the same class. The ruler and the nobility were the top stratum, 97 Indonesians still often refer to Kinahassa as the thirteenth province of Holland. 98 See Hendrik T. Chabot, "Bontorama: A Village of Goa, South Sulawesi," in Villages in Indonesia, ed. Koentjaraningrat, p. 190. 99 Kennedy, South Celebes, pp. 57-111. === [PDF page 113] === 97 and they lived in close proximity to each other. There were seven sub-categories within the nobility, and there was constant striving for the increase in status vis-a-vis one's relatives. The second stratum was composed of commoners, and the third of slaves, mainly Toraja. All of the Buginese and Makassarese elite members have come either from the royalty or the nobility. In South Sulawesi the Dutch controlled parts as early as the latter part of the seventeenth century, although the whole area was not controlled by the Dutch until the twentieth century. There were a few schools in the south, and as in other parts, the nobility were favored. Some children of the nobility were sent to Java and became involved in the nationalist movement, although most members of the elite from South Sulawesi are military leaders. Maluku Mention has already been made of the Ambonese (6.1% of the population), who, like the Minahassan, were converted to Christianity in the seventeenth century and were employed in the civil and military services at salaries higher than other Indonesians. Traditionally Ambonese society was organized into groups of villages (uli), headed by a ruler; the Dutch wanted to destroy the unity H. Th. Chabot, Versantschapp. Stand en Sex in Zuid-Celebes, tr. Richard Neuse (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1960), p. 104. === [PDF page 114] === 98 of the uli, and gave each village autonomy. The village during the colonial period was governed by a council, headed by the raia and composed of other traditional leaders. The sons of raja received opportunities under the Dutch to receive education past that of elementary school, and therefore it is usual for Ambonese elite members to be sons of raja. Non-Indonesian Groups The major non-Indonesian group is that of the Chinese; there are also Arabs and Indo-Europeans. In the past there were occasional representatives of the latter two groups, mainly as symbolic gestures. There is one Chinese member of the New Order elite, one of the most influential leaders of the Catholic party. Chinese are quite prominent in the New Order, both in their traditional role as wealthy businessmen in symbiotic relationships with Indonesian elite members and in their new role as political advisers. These Chinese are Peranakan Chinese, those who came to the archipelago many generations ago, as opposed to the Totok, who came recently.102 Frank L. Cooley, "Altar and Throne in Central Moluccan Society," Indonesia 2 (October 1966): 139. 102 For an interesting article on Indonesian Chinese see G. William Skinner, "The Chinese Minority," In Indonesia, ed. Ruth T. McVey (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1963), pp. 97-117. === [PDF page 115] === 99 Ethnic and Social Background of the Elite Ethnic Background Ethnicity pervades many facets of the background and interaction of Indonesian elite members, such as educational and career history, and intra- and inter-group rivalries, which will be discussed in subsequent chapters. In this section four aspects of ethnicity and the elite are considered: 1) the comparison of the ethnic distribution of the New Order elite with that of the general population; 2) the factors accounting for the over- and underrepresentation of ethnic groups in the elite; 3) the extent to which there are differences among the military, political party and technocratic segments in regard to ethnic representation; and 4) changes of ethnic representation in the elite from the Revolution to the present. The Javanese comprise roughly half of the population of Indonesia, whereas 64% of the elite are Javanese. The Central Javanese (28% of the population) make up 44% of the elite, horeover, most of those considered the most powerful in the Mew Order elite are Central Javanese. Within Java, the Madurese are the most underrepresented in the elite. The Outer Islands, except for Sumatra, are represented far less than their proportion of the population would warrant, and, in general, their representatives hold positions for symbolic reasons and have little if any power. Table 2 compares ethnic distribution of the i\ew Order elite with the general population. === [PDF page 116] === TABLE 2 ETHNIC REPRESENTATION IN THE NEW ORDER POLITICAL ELITE AND THE GENERAL POPULATION (in percentages) Ethnic Group Elite a Populat ion Java and Madura Javanese East Central Unknown Sundanesec Madurese Others 79.8 64.9 16.7 44.7 12.3 70.9 47.1^ 18.8 28.2 Sumatra Achnese Batak Toba Mandailing Simelungan Karo Others Malay Minangkabau Palembanger Lampunger Others 13.1 Kalimantan Banjarese Dayak Sulawesi Minahassan Gorontalonese Toraja Makassarese Buginese Others Maluku Ambonese Others 14.5 11.7 === [PDF page 117] === 101 TABLE 2--Continued Ethnic Group Elite Population Flores and Timor Bali and Lombok Irian Total d (114) (59,138,067) SOURCE: The ethnic percentages of the general population are taken from the the 1930 census, Netherlands East Indies, Dept. van ekonomische zaken, Volkstelling 1930. vol. 8, pp. 88-89. NOTE: The last time a census was taken ascertaining ethnic origin was in 1930. The question can be asked: To what extent are the percentages still valid since there may be differing birth and death rates according to different ethnic groups? It was impossible to compare birth and death rates of the different ethnic groups; there is so much movement from the Outer Islands to Java and from Java to the Outer Islands. It is unlikely that the percentage of the Javanese in the population at the present time would approximate their percentage of the elite. Java was affected more than the Outer Islands by casualties suffered during the Revolution and also by the massacres after the abortive coup in 1965. Eight members of the elite are of mixed ethnic background, and in order to simplify this and other tables their primary ethnic identification was determined through interviews. In the official census the Javanese are not divided into Central and East Javanese. Approximately 60% of the Javanese are Central Javanese; the percentages were computed and entered into the table. The elite population includes one Ceriboner, who has been included in the Sundanese ethnic group. Neither the one Chinese in the elite nor the Chinese population are included in this table. === [PDF page 118] === 102 The two major factors accounting for the over- and underrepresentation of certain ethnic groups have already been discussed, i.e.: 1) the nature and extent of the colonial impact; and 2) the sophistication of the traditional culture. Examples were given of groups that were the most influenced by the Dutch impact, such as the Sundanese, the Javanese, and the Christianized groups (the Minahassan, Ambonese, and the Toba Batak). Ethnic groups, such as the Javanese, Sundanese, Buginese and Palembanger, were used as examples of ethnic groups possessing rather sophisticated traditional cultures. The most important factor was the extent of Dutch influence, for groups such as the Ambonese, Minahassan, and Toba Batak, originally possessing relatively unsophisticated cultures, are overrepresented in the elite and the sub-elite and in general in the educated group. Areas of the Outer Islands, such as Bali, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi (other than Minahassa) 103 were colonized rather late and had few schools. Sometimes the Western impact and the values of the traditional culture coincided and encouraged educational development. This was mentioned in regard to the Minangkabau and the Mandailing and Toba Batak. With one exception, the only representative in the political elite from areas little affected by the Dutch impact are from the military. 103 In Kalimantan there was only one school offering post-elementary education; in Sulawesi (other than Minahassa) there were three; and in other parts of East Indonesia (except for Ambon), there were none. === [PDF page 119] === 103 Notably they come from areas like Aceh, South Sulawesi, and South Sumatra, areas where there had been a long history of armed resistance to the imposition of Dutch control. In Sumatra the Japanese organized paramilitary and military forces, and there was much resistance to the reimposition of Dutch rule. Due to the opportunities for military service and also due to the traditional respect for military prowess in these areas some were able to rise to elite and sub-elite status through the military. Political organization in these areas was underdeveloped and educational opportunities few, which probably accounts for the lack of representation of these areas in the civilian segments of the elite. In looking at the Sundanese it would be expected that they would be overrepresented in the elite. Their area was more intensely and directly influenced by the Dutch than that of the Javanese, and all the institutions of higher learning during the Dutch period were located in the Sundanese ethnic area, except for East Java. medical and dental schools in Surabaya, Two factors seem to play a role. One is that the Sundanese, as the second largest ethnic group and as the most powerful neighbor of the Javanese, are often In some areas, such as Bali, recruitment into the Japanese para-military forces was not based on social status, as it was in Java. The average Balinese officer in the para-military force was of low status and had little education. Therefore in the case of Bali the army did not serve as an avenue to national elite status. === [PDF page 120] === 104 perceived as threats by the Javanese elite. In traditional Javanese political thought adjacent territory is conceived to be enemy territory and strategy calls for the making of an alliance with the next territory. Sundanese often comment that in the isiew Order fewer Sundanese are appointed to high positions than previously. One Sundanese army leader remarked: Soeharto doesn't like Sundanese; he__takes Javanese to be commander even of Siliwangi /the army division located in West Java7.... Soeharto is closer to Sumatrans than to Sundanese.105 Other Sundanese also maintained that Soeharto's group, composed largely of Central Javanese, aligned itself with Sumatrans due to its fear of the threat of the Sundanese. A second reason mentioned by Sundanese elite members is that for the Sundanese, contrary to the Javanese, government service is not the only avenue to high status. ... there is a heavier Islamic influence in Sunda. In Central Java there is a feeling that to work with the hands is low status, and people enter professions partly for social status. In Sunda it is not considered low to go into business. 107 Anonymous interview, Jakarta, April 1969. -I A/r These are examples of what Anderson calls "leapfrogging," i.e. considering the territory adjacent as an enemy and making an alliance with the next territory (see his "Power," in Culture and Politics, ed. Claire '' Holt, pp. 28-33 and froertono, State and Statecraft, p. 71 Anonymous interview with an army leader, Bandung, November 1968. === [PDF page 121] === 105 What differences in ethnic representation are found among the elite segments? In analyzing the military, the political party, and the technocratic segments of the elite it was found that statistically there are no significant differences among the elite segments. In each segment Javanese, particularly Central Javanese, dominate, which is shown in table 3 below. TABLE 3 ETHNIC REPRESENTATION IN THE NEW ORDER ELITE SEGMENTS Ethnic Origin Military Political Party Technocratic Java and Madura Javanese East Central Unknown Sundanese & Ceribonese Madurese Bantenese Sumatra Kalimantan Sulawesi Maluku Flores Chinese Total 59 49 11 34 19 15 13 10 26 10 74 15 Only in the political party leadership do East Javanese almost approach the number of Central Javanese. The Nahdatul Ulama party has its strongest base and following in East Java. Even parties that have their strongest support outside Java tend to have a high proportion of === [PDF page 122] === 106 Javanese leaders. This is true of Parmusi, the modernist Islamic party; three of the four main leaders are Central Javanese and the fourth is Sundanese. The Christian parties are the only ones that have both their strongest followings and their major leaders from the Outer Islands. In the armed forces, leadership positions at the very highest levels are dominated by Javanese; Javanese also comprise most of those in the military sub-elite. In all four services Javanese are dominant in the central staff and also in the positions of regional commander. Within the army this is true for the Javanese whether they are from one of the Javanese divisions (Diponegoro and Brawijaya) or from the Siliwangi division, located in West Java. It is more likely for a Javanese member of the Siliwangi division to be appointed to a leadership position in the central staff or as regional commander than for a non-Javanese divisional member, especially a Sundanese. Table 4 on the following page illustrates Javanese dominance in the central staffs of the four armed forces and in the defense ministry, to which members from the four services are assigned. As is seen below Javanese are the most dominant in the navy and air force; the core of the navy and air force originated during the Revolution, and their headquarters were located during this period in Central Java. In the chapter on military career patterns the evolution of Javanese dominance will be further discussed. The trend of Javanese monopolization of the === [PDF page 123] === 107 TABLE 4 ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE NEW ORDER ARMED FORCES LEADERSHIP (in percentages) Ethnic Group Army Navy Air Force Police Defense Ministry Javanese Sundanese Outer Island Unknown Total 68.2 10.2 11.4 10.2 (88) 88.6 (44) 80.9 12.8 (47) 60.0 20.0 16.0 (50) 72.9 12.0 (133) NOTE: Table 4 represents the composition of the armed forces and defense ministry leadership as of June 1969. The differences in ethnic composition of the four armed forces were statistically significant (*)£J-=19.86, 8 df, p<.05). For purposes of computing the chi-square, the unknowns were omitted. leadership positions in the armed forces is likely to continue; for example most of the students in the array general staff and command college have been Javanese (in 1969 75.5% -i n o were Javanese) in the past years. To what extent have there been changes in ethnic representation within the political elite through time? Three trends are evident over time: 1) the increase in the recruitment of Javans and the decrease of Outer Islanders; 2) a wider recruitment of representatives from the Outer Islands; and 3) the virtual end of representation of Interview with a leader of the army general staff and command college, Bandung, March 1969. === [PDF page 124] === 108 109 those from racial minority groups. These trends are illustrated in table 5 on the following page. From the Revolution to Guided Democracy there was a gradual increase in the percentage of Javans in the political elite. However, beginning with Guided Democracy and continuing with the New Order, there has been a sharp increase in the proportion of Javans in the political elite; the position of East Javanese particularly has improved. Outer Islanders have decreased in the elite from a high of 31.6% during the Revolution to 20.0% in the New Order. During the Revolution and Parliamentary Democracy most of the representatives in the elite from the Outer Islands were Sumatrans. During these periods Sumatrans were very prominent in the government; this was largely due to the power and influence of the Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI), the Indonesian Socialist Party, and the modernist Islamic Masjumi party, both led largely by Minang' kabau from West Sumatra. During Parliamentary Democracy mobilization politics increased, and the influence of the PSI began to wither, due to its appeal directed mainly toward the intelligentsia; the Masjumi declined after the 1958 rebellion because of the involvement of many of its leaders in that rebellion, and it was forced by Sukarno to disband. Beginning in Parliamentary Democracy there is a slight increase in the representation of i 09 At the present time Chinese are influential advisers of several military l e a d e r s. === [PDF page 125] === 109 TABLE 5 ETHNIC REPRESENTATION IN THE POLITICAL ELITES FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE MEW ORDER (in percentages) Ethnic Area Rev. Pari. Dem. Transition Guided Dem. New Order Java £ Madura Javanese East Central Unknown Sundanese Madurese Bantenese 64 50 42 10 67 55 15 38 11 68 57 21 32 80 66 13 48 14 79 64 17 44 12 Outer Islands Sumatra Acehnese Batak Toba Mandailing Karo Malay Minangkabau Palembanger Lampunger 32 22 32 17 Kalimantan Sulawesi Minahassan Buginese Makassarese Others Maluku Ambonese Others 1 11 32 13 20 14 12 11 20 13 Flores £ Timor Bali <S Lombok Irianese === [PDF page 126] === 110 TABLE 5--Continued Ethnic Area Kon-Indigenous Chinese Others Total Fosi. Total Indiv. Rev. Pari. Dem. Transition Guided Dem. Wew Order (229) (109) (162) (94) (53) (28) (64) (115) NOTE* The elites of the first three periods were determined through the cabinet positional method. Also, if a person held two positions in a cabinet and if he served in more than one cabinet he was counted as many times as he held positions. Although a combination of the reputational and positional techniques would have been more accurate, the cabinets during these periods were quite powerful and most of the political decision-makers were cabinet members. Through the use of this method some persons were excluded, such as some army leaders. The army did have some political influence, such as influencing the life and composition of cabinets, but the civilian segments of the elite were more powerful than the military. The military began to increase its political influence during the Transition, at which time military leaders were included in the cabinets for the first time. Ethnic percentages of individuals (counting them once) were also computed for these three periods. There was little difference between those percentages and the ones above. heretofore unrepresented or underrepresented ethnic groups in the elite, such as those from Bali, Kalimantan, and Flores. Many groups are still underrepresented, such as the Balinese and those from Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Irian. The third trend, that of the declining representation of racial minorities, is evident from table 5. During the Revolution Indonesian leaders tried to obtain support from the racial minorities in their struggle for independence. During this period five cabinet positions were held by members of the Chinese, Arab, and Eurasian communities. The last cabinet position to be held by someone from a racial minority was === [PDF page 127] === Ill during Parliamentary Democracy; the Chinese representative in the New Order was a Catholic party leader. Javans, especially Javanese, have been dominant in Indonesian politics. Those from the Outer Islands who make it into the ranks of the elite have themselves become Javanized. Sometimes this began at birth, since onequarter of those from the Outer Island ethnic origins were born outside their ethnic areas, mainly in Java.110 Most Outer Islanders were educated in Java, usually from middle school one, pursued their careers in Java and went "home" very rarely, if at all (only five have close ties with their home areas). Many achieved their "success" in Jakarta, in national politics, not first in the region. In order to succeed in politics, whether civilian or military, a person from the Outer Islands not only must have close contacts in Java, but must become, at least to some extent, Javanized. Many not only became Javanized, but married Javan women. In order to illustrate the need for non-Javans to become Javanized the biography of an elite member who was born and lived in villages in South Sumatra his entire early life will be given. "Fak Abdullah" first lived in a city (Palembang, the regional capital) when he was nineteen years of age for a few months. Two years later, after he Two of the Outer Islanders have one Javan parent. For one in particular his Javan connections were most useful; his maternal grandfather, a Sundanese, was from the high menak stratum and was the bupati of Jakarta under the Dutch. === [PDF page 128] === 112 joined the new Indonesian army, he was posted in Palembang and stayed there from the age of twenty-one until he was forty-three years of age. After a year in India for training (army headquarters thought he favored the regional rebellion), Pak Abdullah was ordered to headquarters in Jakarta. This was the first time Pak Abdullah had lived in a different region from that of his birth. Pak Abdullah himself said in an interview that he had a very difficult time getting along with people from the many ethnic groups that comprise Indonesia, especially those from Java; this was confirmed by many other elite members. Under the pressure of this rather late change in his cultural milieu, Pak Abdullah exaggerated behavior that was expected in his culture, such as boasting, which is totally unacceptable to the Javanese. At the time of the interview I mentioned casually that I had heard that another army leader (a Javanese, who, like Pak Abdullah, did not leave his ethnic area until middle-age) and he were approaching an open split. Pak Abdullah, reacting in a way that Javans would consider unthinkably kasar, began literally to jump up and down and to rant and rave about this particular person. contrast with Pak Abdullah's behavior, when his new "enemy" was queried about the split, the Javanese smiled, nodded, and said softly: "The good wine doesn't need to have gold letters on the bottle." Elite members from the Outer Islands who have been interviewed have stressed the need for them to become at === [PDF page 129] === 113 least partially Javan in order to survive politically and personally in Java. Since most of those from the Outer Islands came to Java in their youth, it was easier for them to adapt than it was for Pak Abdullah. Even those who came to Java in their twenties or thirties had lived in a regional center in their youth, such as Medan, where many ethnic groups dwell, including a large number of Javanese. But Pak Abdullah, coming from a rather homogeneous region and having lived in a village until his early adulthood, did not have the opportunity in his youth to adapt to different cultures. By late 1968 and early 1969 Pak Abdullah's imminent fall from power was predicted and approximately a year later he was posted abroad as an ambassador. According to informants, this fall from grace, in large part, was due to Pak Abdullah's inability to become somewhat Javanized, Two major criteria are set for the appointment of non-Javans to elite positions. One is the desire to have the Outer Islands represented symbolically, and the other is that sometimes it is considered strategically wise to appoint an Outer Islander to a position which could be powerful if held by a Javan. An example of the first, the need for symbolic representation, would be the appointment of Outer Islanders to politically unimportant cabinet positions in the New Order.111 Occasionally an Outer Examples would be Dr. Tambunan (Toba Batak) and Dr. Siwabessy (Ambonese) former Ministers of Social Affairs and Health respectively. === [PDF page 130] === 114 Islander is appointed to a sensitive position because he is felt to be less of a threat because he has less backing than a Javan leader would have.112 Occasionally, though, an Outer Islander, who combines expertise with ethnic and political party representation, is appointed to a high position.113 In the New Order there is a persistent trend for the decreasing representation of the Outer Islands. In the early days of the New Order, before the regime had consolidated its power, Outer Islanders not only had many symbolic representatives, but also held positions of power. This is no longer the case. After the regime consolidated and stabilized itself it felt less need for symbolic representatives from the Outer Islands; those Outer Islanders who held powerful positions in the early days of the New Order were gradually retired or were transferred to less powerful pos it ions. 112 An example would be General Panggabean's appointment as chief of staff of the army. He is a Toba Batak and has little influence in the army, and hence was not perceived as a threat by Soeharto and his advisers. A Javanese general as chief of staff of the army would have been in a position where he could threaten Soeharto. 113 Examples would be Frans Seda, formerly Minister of Communications, and Adam Malik, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Seda is a trained economist, originates from Flores, and is from the Partai Katholik (Catholic Party). Adam Malik, a Mandailing Batak and an expert in foreign affairs, was considered to be the one "socialist" representative, until he resigned from the Murba party to join the government party, Golkar. === [PDF page 131] === 115 Social Status and Occupation Social Status Social status within many of the major ethnic groups, as was discussed in the introduction, is related to the kin and occupational proximity of the individual to the institutions wielding political legitimacy, that is, not to the amount of wealth a person possesses. Occupation and status are therefore closely related, although not exclusively; it can be mitigated by family background and kin connections. For example, the holding of a high bureaucratic office for a Javanese is thought to be the prerogative of those from priyayi origin. However, sometimes a non-priyayi would attain high bureaucratic rank, and through this and his family's adoption of priyavi culture it was possible for the family to rise to the status of priyayi. The social origins of the Indonesian elite are quite high; the recruitment of individuals possessing high status was influenced not only by the traditional systems, but also by Dutch policies, mentioned in the introduction to this chapter. In general, the Butch utilized the members of the traditional elites in administering the colonial government and the Dutch bestowed hereditary privileges where in many areas there had been none. The power of the traditional elite also increased under the Dutch. It has already been mentioned that modern education was limited mainly to those from the traditional elites. From which sectors of the traditional elites did the Indonesian === [PDF page 132] === 116 nationalist leaders arise? Most of them came from the lower echelons of the traditional elites. In Java, for example, the nobles and high priyavi held prestigious positions in the Dutch colonial government, and in most cases were not motivated to participate in the nationalist movement. Unlike the wong cilik the low priyavi could obtain a modern education, but they were usually unable to secure employment in the indigenous sectors of the bureaucracy, which were dominated by the nobles and high priyayi. Their inability to obtain government positions was one motivation influencing many young people to join the nationalist movement. During the Japanese occupation policies adopted by the occupational authorities accentuated the dominance of the priyayit especially the low priyayi. in the new national elite. For example, as will be discussed subsequently, the Japanese military in recruiting Indonesians for the auxiliary military force, PETA, deliberately gave officer rank to those from high status families. The nationalist leaders were also aided by the Japanese in the growth of the nationalist movement. The social status systems differ widely in accordance with the ethnic group, as was seen in the introduction to this chapter. The Javans' social status systems are very similar, however, and these ethnic groups are combined in the same tables. There are two important differences between the Javanese and the Sundanese: 1) except for Ceribon there are no kraton in West Java and there are no === [PDF page 133] === 117 nobles among the Sundanese; and 2) among the Sundanese those who follow business and religious occupations have a higher social status than their counterparts in the Javanese ethnic group. The elite members from the Outer Islands presented a problem for analysis, for although there are only twenty-four elite members originating from Outer Island ethnic groups, they come from a myriad of groups. Some groups possess a nobility whereas others do not, and the power and status of the nobility for those who possess one differs from ethnic group to ethnic group. All ethnic groups have traditional officials, but again their status is not always the same, as can be illustrated in the following questions: 1) Are traditional offices hereditary? 2) Is authority centralized or decentralized? and 3) Is status monopolized by those from the traditional officials' group? However, for simplicity's sake, the Outer Island ethnic groups were combined for analysis. Four categories were devised, which, in general, agree with status groups mentioned in the anthropological literature, i.e. nobility, traditional official, merchant, and peasant. The social status of the elite will be examined according to the following aspects: 1) the comparison between the elite and the general population and the extent to which there have been changes over time; 2) the comparison of ethnic and sub-ethnic groups in social status recruitment patterns? and 3) differences among the military, technocratic, and political party elite segments. === [PDF page 134] === 118 The Indonesian political elite is very unrepresentative of the general population in terms of social status origin. For example, no more than 10% of all Javans would come from priyayi origins, whereas 70% of the Javans in the New Order political elite are from priyayi and noble origins. To what extent have there been changes over time? Overall the general trend has been that of stability, i.e. the continued recruitment of the elite from upper status origins. In table 6 it is seen that the major change for the Javan elite was the decline in the recruitment of nobles to the ranks of the political elite after the Revolution. After this the system has been stable. TABLE 6 SOCIAL STATUS RECRUITMENT OF JAVAN ELITE MEMBERS: A COMPARISON OF POLITICAL PERIODS (in percentages) Status Rev. Pari. Demo. Transition Guided Demo. New Order Nobility Priyayi High Middle Low Unknown Wong Cilik Village Off. Relig. Off. Merchant/ Landlord Peasant Unknown Total 21 59 34 14 14 10 73 28 38 19 75 14 34 22 19 65 20 10 22 14 20 10 11 65 23 22 11 19 10 (51) 11 (91) (146) (108) (36) === [PDF page 135] === 119 Little increase is seen in the percentages of those recruited from wong cilik ranks. In comparing the elite segments of Guided Democracy and the New Order it was discovered that some changes had occurred in the social composition of political party leaders from Java. Whereas nine out of fifteen of the Guided Democracy political elite were recruited from upper status origins, ten out of nineteen of their counterparts in the New Order were recruited from those origins. The major reason most likely lies in the decline in the power and prestige of political parties. Since their status has fallen those originating from a lower social origin find less competition to their attempts to rise socially through leadership positions than in the past. During the period of Guided Democracy only Nahdatul Ulama leaders were from the wong cilik, as was to be expected of that party, whereas in the New Order political party elite segment other leaders besides those of the Nahdatul Ulama came from the wong cilik. The social origins of the elite members from the five political periods who originated from the Outer Islands also was examined and it was found that recruitment throughout these periods came from the traditional upper status groups. Why has there be so little change in the social origins of the elite? One major reason lies in the restriction of education during the Dutch period, when the elite members were young. The difficulty for lower status groups to obtain education, especially higher === [PDF page 136] === 120 education has continued after independence. served by Leslie Palmier This was obin his research in the 1950s. In the 1960s it became even more difficult for those with little means to send their children to school, even to elementary school, because of the increase in school fees and the necessity to give bribes to teachers. Are there differences among ethnic and sub-ethnic groups in social status recruitment patterns? The Javan members of the iNew Order elite were compared and the major findings were: 1) the noble element is found mainly among the Central Javanese; and 2) wong cilik origins are more common among those not from Central Java. Among Central Javanese kraton ties are prevalent and important in determining status. Many of the Central Javanese elite members are related to one or more of the kraton families,115 especially to that of the Jogjakarta kraton ruled by Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, himself a member of the elite. Of fifty-one Central Javanese, fifteen are from or deli (\ scended from the royal family of the Jogjakarta kraton, 114 "Occupational Distribution of Parents of Pupils in Certain Indonesian Educational Institutions," Indonesie (The Hague and Bandung) 10 (August and October 1957)» 320-376. Many of these Central Javanese are not considered nobles. As explained earlier, after a certain number of generations descendants of a ruler are no longer considered noble. Ten are military leaders; another military, considered Acehnese,' is related to the Jogjakarta royal family through his mother. === [PDF page 137] === 121 six from the Surakarta kraton, and four from the frangkunegara kraton. Two other Central Javanese trace their descent from fcataram before it was subdivided, and maintain that their ancestors were expelled from the kraton because of their opposition to the Dutch-sponsored rulers. Therefore more than one-half of the Central Javanese claim 118 membership in or descent from kraton. The emphasis upon noble descent is especially strong among military leaders, illustrating not. only the high social status recruitment of military leaders, but also their use of kraton descent as a factor supporting their legitimacy as leaders. Military leaders usually have little non-military education, and perhaps this accounts for their tendency to stress their "illustrious" origins and perhaps embellish them. high proportion of technocrats of Central Javanese origin also have kraton connections, but they do not emphasize them to the extent that the military leaders do. I\ine military leaders, for example, either trace their ancestry to Prince Diponegoro or claim that their noble ancestors fought together with Prince Diponegoro. 119 Central Javanese are not only dominant in the elite, but they have Others, such as Soeharto, are married to women who trace their descent from a ruling family. The number may actually be higher since not all elite members could be personally interviewed; some also were hesitant, due to their ideology or association with a particular movement, to admit their aristocratic origins. 119 After the Java War only the horse and kris /sword/ of an ancestor returned home, and many relatives say that his descendant, an army leader, is his reincarnation. === [PDF page 138] === 122 the highest social origins and are most intimately connected with the surviving kraton of Central Java and the aristocratic culture of these kraton. Could there be a relationship between the prominence of court centers in Central Java and the overrepresentation of Central Javanese 120 in the national elite? The court centers provided a source of status and employment, and later their members were able to use their status and connections to obtain Western-style education for their children. Prestige was also given to those from kraton origins. Among the Central Javanese there is less recruitment of those from the wonp; cilik. Forty-one of the fifty-one Central Javanese are from high status origins compared to fourteen of the twenty-one East Javanese and Madurese, and eight of the fourteen Sundanese. Are there differences among the elite segments in terms of social status recruitment? The segment recruiting Javanese from the highest status origins is the technocratic, followed by the military. Table 7 below shows that a high proportion of the military also comes from upper status origins. Contrary to Morris Janowitz's generalization concerning military elites of the new nations,121 Javanese officers stress not only their aristocratic origins, but use certain elements of priyayi culture, such as 120 My thanks go to James F. Guyot for this suggestion. 121 "Armed Forces and Society: A World Perspective," in Armed Forces and Society, ed. van Doom, p. 27. === [PDF page 139] === 123 TABLE 7 SOCIAL STATUS ORIGIN OF JAVANS ACCORDING TO NEW ORDER ELITE SEGMENT Soc. Status Military Political Party Technocracy Nobility Privavi High Middle Low Unknown Wong Cilik Village Off. Relig. Off. Merchant/Landlord Peasant Unknown Total 40 12 15 11 59 19 13 the code of the ksatria. in their statements on military ideology. This is illustrated not only in conversations with members of the elite, but in the official doctrine of the Indonesian military and even in names given to military enterprises. These /the military officersl.7 opinions are of great importance when members of the armed forces organization operate in contexts other than those of the strictly military ones. 1 2 2 The more the military has assumed power in the non-military spheres, the greater the emphasis upon the concept of the ksatria. rather than the concept of the army as being the Marion J. Levy, Jr., Modernization and the Struc ture of Societies; A Setting for International Affairs (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 595. === [PDF page 140] === 124 "tool of the people," which was used in earlier periods when the military were restricted in the sphere of activity. As will be discussed later, the social origins of the new officer corps are likewise high, especially due to the fact that the majority of new cadets in the military academy are sons of generals and colonels. Therefore the trend of high social status recruitment for the military will continue in the future. The non-Javans were compared in terms of social origin of the elite segments, and the non-Javan military members are likewise recruited from high social origins, as is shown in table 8. TABLE 8 SOCIAL STATUS OF NON-JAVANS ACCORDING TO NEW ORDER ELITE SEGMENT Social Status Nobility3 Traditional Off. Merchant Feasant Total Military Political Party Technocracy 15 NOTE: Lambda=.5510. Only certain groups, those possessing supra-local rulers, are counted as having a.nobility, even though in the literature members of the marg.a ra.ia in a Batak village, for example, are called "nobles" in some of the 1iterature. === [PDF page 141] === 125 Occupation Status, in general, is related to both descent and occupation. For example, a descendant of a kraton family in Java would be given the status of a privayi. even if his occupation were one usually reserved to those of wong cilik status. But this individual would be given lower status than a privayi who had a traditional privayi occupation. In the last section it was observed that the status background of the political elite is quite high; the occupational backgrounds of the fathers and grandfathers of the political elite are likewise prestigious. Many of the fathers were employed in the upper branches of the civil service or as officials to indigenous rulers of indirectly-ruled areas. A second major sector where the fathers were employed was the modern sector, encompassing the professions, the educational system, and the communications and financial world. Few were employed in the traditional non-elite sphere (in religious, landlord and merchant, village official and peasant occupations). Table 9 below shows in detail the fathers' occupations of the members of the New Order political elite. In this section three major areas will be explored » 1) the relationship between status and occupation; 2) occupational differences between the elite and the mass of the population, among the elite segments, and between the political elites of Guided Democracy and the === [PDF page 142] === 126 TABLE 9 FATHERS' OCCUPATION OF THE NEW ORDER POLITICAL ELITE MEMBERS Position iNumber Sultan Palace Official Outer Island Trad. Off. Pangreh Praia Bupati Patih Wedana Sten Wedana Judge Other Professional Physician Lawyer Engineer Other Educational Inspector Headmaster Teacher Political Movement Politician Journalist Communicat ions/F inane ial Railroad Administration Financial Administration Railroad Skilled Worker Other Private Clerk Landlord/Merchant Landlord Wealthy Merchant Small Trader Kivavi/Ulama Village Official Lurah Other Peasant Landed Peasant Partial Tenant/Peasant Landless Peasant Laborer/Servant Unknown 22 Total 12 16 115 === [PDF page 143] === 127 New Order; and 3) the extent of mobility found in the political elite and the ways in which mobility has been achieved. Table 10 shows the close relationship between occupation and social status among the Javans. TABLE 10 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIAL STATUS AND FATHER'S OCCUFATION AMONG THE NEW ORDER JAVAN ELITE Father's Occup. Nobility Privavi Traditional Elite Falace Official PanRreh Pra ia Kodern Sector Professional Educational Political Communications/ Financial Private Clerk Trad. Non-Elite Landlord/Merchant Religious Official Village Official Peasant Laborer/Servant Unknown Total 25 21 25 Wong Cilik 11 59 17 NOTE: Lambda=.8709. Those for whom their social status is unknown (ten) are not included in the table. Until late in the colonial period the pangreh praia (indigenous civil service corps) came from the nobility and the privavi. Educational policies of the Dutch favored the high-born and the professions and the civil service were therefore mainly staffed by those from the upper echelons === [PDF page 144] === 128 of society. Table 10 above shows that the occupations from private clerk below are usually filled by those from wong cilik background, but some priyayi are found in the landlord sub-category, and one in the village official occupation. In the past members of royal families occasionally were exiled from the kraton, as was mentioned previously. Many of those exiled from the Jogjakarta kraton after the Java War settled in villages and they and their descendants were chosen to be lurah. This was the case of one village official of priyayi origin; because of his aristocratic connections he was able to marry the daughter of a sten wedana. and through her the children were able to go to Western-style schools.123 In the case of landlords, through marriage to daughters of priyayi their children were given priyayi status. The use of marriage to effect mobility will be discussed subsequently. Comparisons were made between the fathers of the New Order elite and the adult "native" population in 1930. The fathers are very unrepresentative of the population at that time. For example, whereas 80.4% of the population in 1930 was engaged in agriculture, industry and mining, only four out of the 115 elite members were in those occupations. This is seen in table 11. 123 It is common for those from villages who have attained higher status to "arrange" their geneology so as to show that they do have illustrious ancestors. However, in this particular case the information appears valid. See Sutherland, "Priyayi," p. 75. === [PDF page 145] === 129 TABLE 11 OCCUPATIONS OF THE FATHERS OF THE NEW ORDER POLITICAL ELITE AND THE "NATIVE" ADULT POPULATION (in percentages) Occupation Government Service Professions Transportation Industry and Mining Commerce Religion Agriculture Household Service Others Unknown Total FopulafLon Elite 11.0 69.4 46.1 17.4 (20,279,642) 13.9 (115) SOURCE: The figures for the occupations of the Indonesian adult population were computed from the 1930 census (Netherlands East Indies, Volkstelling 1930, 8: 122-125). Ethnic groups can be compared as to types of occupations usually followed by the fathers of elite members. Three major differences can be seen between Javans and Outer Islanders: 1) a higher proportion of Javans are from traditional prestigious occupations, i.e. palace officialdom and the pangreh pra ia; 2) a higher proportion of Javans were employed in the modern sector; and 3) all fathers who are peasants are from the Outer Islands. seen in table 12 below. This can be === [PDF page 146] === 130 TABLE 12 FATHERS' OCCUPATIONS OF JAVANS AND OUTER ISLANDERS: NEW ORDER POLITICAL ELITE Father's Occupation Traditional Elite Modern S e c t o r Trad. Non-Elite Unknown Total Java Out e r 30 31 16 14 91 Island 10 23 The Javanese traditionally have had an aristocratic class, responsible for governing the various Javanese states. In general, the ethnic groups of the Outer Islands were not organized into states comparable to the Javanese states, and hence did not develop a large corps of administrators responsible for government on the supra-local level. Concerning the dominance of the Javans in the modern sector, by the early part of the twentieth century large parts of the Outer Islands were either not yet "pacified" or were in the early stages of colonial government, whereas Dutch rule in Java had gradually expanded until by the eighteenth century Java was controlled by the Dutch. In general, development in Indonesia was concentrated on Java, and as stressed earlier, most educational institutions were in Java. Hence, the modern sector is monopolized by Javans. It was found that all fathers who were peasants were from societies where even the upper status groups farmed their own land. One difference was observed between Javanese === [PDF page 147] === 131 and Sundanese: the Javanese religious party leaders are from merchant origins, whereas the Sundanese ones are from the menak. In West Java the menak have been influenced by Islam, and hence leadership in religious parties is not left to those from merchant origin, whereas the Javanese merchants have a political vehicle relatively free for their use. Elite segments were compared in terms of father's occupations and the most striking observance was the prominence of the technocrats' fathers in the modern sector. Ihis is seen in table 13. TABLE 13 FATHERS * OCCUPATIONS: A COMPARISON OF NEW ORDER ELITE SEGMENTS F a t h e r s ' Occup. Military Political Party Trad. E l i t e Palace Off. Fangxeh P r a i a Outer I s l a n d Modern Sector Prof. Educa. P o l. Move. Comm./Fin. P r i v. Clerk Trad. Non-Elite Landld./Mer. R e l i g. Off. V i l l a g e Off. Feasant Laborer/Serv. Unknown Total 29 20 23 Technocracy 10 11 11 74 26 15 === [PDF page 148] === 132 Some of the technocrats were influenced by their fathers in the choice of an occupation. For example, several of the economists' fathers held positions related to economics. Usually the technocrats were the third generation in their families to have occupations in the modern sector. The military elite's fathers are found primarily in the traditional elite occupations and in the modern sector. Most of the fathers in traditional elite occupations are either Javanese or from ethnic groups in the Cuter Islands with cultures emphasizing militaryprowess, such as the Buginese and Acehnese. Many of the Javanese elite members, whose fathers were from the pangreh praia or employed in the kraton were influenced as children by stories of the ksatria of traditional Java. Many were attracted to PETA, which became the backbone of the new Indonesian army. Light of the fathers of the military elite were employed by the state railways, usually in high administrative posts. As will be discussed in the following chapter on career patterns of the military, several military elite members first entered service through para-military units formed at the beginning of the Revolution by employees of the railways. Many of these same elite members had fathers who had been employed in the state railways under the Dutch. The political party leaders are fairly evenly distributed among the three sectors, and it is the only segment whereby approximately one out of three comes from traditional non-elite === [PDF page 149] === occupations. In general, these individuals are from Islamic political parties. Are there differences between the Guided Democracy and New Order elites in terms of their fathers* occupations? As is seen in table 14 below, a higher proportion of the New Order political elite have fathers who were employed in the modern sector, even accounting for the larger percentage of "unknowns" for the Guided Democracy elite. TABLE 14 FATHERS' OCCUPATIONS: GUIDED DEMOCRACY AND NEW ORDER ELITES (in percentages) Occupation Guided Democracy New Order 25 17 19 39 (64) 34 33 19 14 (115) Traditional Elite Modern Sector Trad. Non-Elite Unknown Total The Guided Democracy political elite is the older of the two elites and at the time their fathers were adults the modern sector was very small. Within the traditional nonelite sector 11% of the Guided Democracy elite had fathers who were landlords and merchants, compared to only 5.2.i of the New Order elite. === [PDF page 150] === 134 Social Mobility It has been demonstrated that most elite members -come from the upper status groups of the archipelago. But there has been some inter-generational mobility into these groups; in fact, inter-generational mobility is more common than mobility within one generation. This is similar to the conclusions drawn from a study of the American business elite, i.e. "the arrival of most of the men in their present high and powerful positions represents the culmination of several generations of social move124 ment." In order to investigate the extent of intergenerational mobility comparisons were made between the father's occupation and the elite member's grandfathers' occupations and between the father's status (in the case of Javans) and the elite member's grandfathers' occupations. Table 15 below illustrates the types of occupations followed by the grandfathers, and table 16 below compares the father's social status (if he was Javan) with the occupations followed by the elite member's paternal andmaternal grandfathers. Twenty-three of the fathers of elite members came from low occupational origins (according to the elite member's paternal grandfather's occupation), but were able to marry above their social status. This is unusual for Java (all but two are from Java), where usually a man will marry a woman either from a similar 124 V.7. Lloyd Warner and James Abegglen, Big Business Leaders in America (New York: Atheneum, 1963), p. 19. === [PDF page 151] === 135 TABLE 15 OCCUPATIONS OF THE NEW ORDER ELITE'S GRANDFATHERS Occupation Sultan Palace Official Outer Island Trad. Off. Fangreh Praia Bupati Fatih Wedana Sten Wedana Judge Other Professional Educational Comm./Fin. Private Clerk Landlord/Merchant Landlord Wealthy Merchant Small Trader Religious Kiyayi/Ulama Dukuna Christian Minister Village Official Lurah Other Peasant Laborer Unknown Total Paternal Grandfather 22 Maternal Grandfather 10 29 10 11 10 34 115 10 32 115 A dukun is a traditional Javan healer and religious figure; a dukun can be from various strata in the social status system. This dukun was from the high priyayi. === [PDF page 152] === 136 TABLE 16 COMPARISON OF NEW ORDER JAVAN ELITE MEMBERS' STATUS WITH THEIR GRANDFATHERS' OCCUPATIONS Grandfathers' Occupation Elite Member's Status Wong Cilik Privavi Nobility 8, Pat. Mat. Palace Off. Pangreh Pra ia Professional Educational 22 28 Comm./Fin. Private Clerk Landlord/Mer. Religious Off. Village Off. Peasant Laborer Unknown Total Pat. Mat. 12 64 12 64 17 17 NOTE: Gamma=.7l55. For purposes of computing the Gamma, the paternal and maternal grandfathers' occupations were combined for each of the two social status groupings, and the occupations were divided into three sectors: traditional elite, modern, and traditional non-elite. In this table elite members are not included if their social status is unknown (ten members). status or one from a lower status. Fifty-one fathers married within their same status and nine above (thirty125 two are unknown). Those cases where the female status was higher were usually instances of social mobility. In An example of marriage where the wife's status would be higher was the marriage between a man of wong cilik origin to a woman of privavi origin. A marriage between a man of low privavi origin and a woman of high priyayi origin was not counted. === [PDF page 153] === 137 general, the marriage of a man to a woman of high social origins was a ratification of a man's rise in the occupational ladder, and this marriage furthermore helped in the advancement of a man's career. Whereas he himself may not be considered nobility or priyayi. his children, due to the bilateral kinship system of Java, would have a social status higher than that of their father. How was the father able to rise on the occupational ladder? The usual path was a combination of educational opportunities and kin connections. If a child were from wong cilik origins how could he obtain a Western-style education? most of the twenty-three cases the father's family had priyayi connections, either through marriage or blood ties. This was particularly true of landlord and lurah families. The family would request a priyayi relative in a town or city to sponsor a bright son, and if the relative agreed the son would go to live with the priyayi family and receive his education, room, and board from this family, repaying them by performing servant and quasi-servant duties. After the son received his education he usually would obtain a position in the civil service, host (fifteen) received positions in the modern sector, usually in government service, but sometimes they worked in private See Koentjaraningrat, Javanese Kinship System and R.M. Koentjaraningrat, "The Javanese of South Central Java," in Social Structure of Southeast Asia, ed. George Peter Murdock (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1960), pp. 80-115. === [PDF page 154] === 138 industry. In the Outer Islands there were fewer opportunities for social mobility due to the lack of educational facilities and the lesser developed modern sector. Only six of the fathers became part of the traditional pangreh praia corps, and all six had married women from very high social status, i.e. the daughters of bupati. wedana, and high kraton officials. Most of the fathers married daughters from priyayi families (fifteen out of the twenty-three). In this instance mobile elite members' fathers and"mobile elite members themselves are quite different from mobile Americans who became business leaders; these business leaders tended to marry within their same original social status.127 What happened to the eight fathers who did not marry above themselves? They did not start at a good point on the occupational ladder which could help them to advance; they held positions lower than those who had married up. Therefore, the usual pattern was for the father, through priyayi connections, to obtain an education, receive a position usually in the modern sector that had chances for advancement, and for his success to be ratified through marriage to a woman from a higher status origin. His children, therefore, would rise to privavi status. There were only a few examples of fathers without privavi ties who were able to rise. One was an ambitious man, the son of an ulama who 127 Warner and Abegglen, Business Leaders, pp. 110-116. === [PDF page 155] === 139 obtained employment in the agricultural research office in Bandung, even though he only had an elementary school education. He later rose to a position on the agricultural faculty after independence. He did not marry above his origins; his wife likewise was the daughter of an ulama. Another elite member's father was the son of a peasant in the area of Surakarta. A Dutchman, who had no son, took a fancy to him and unofficially adopted 129 him and educated him. After the Lutchman was transferred, he gave the boy to the Mangkunegara kraton. rose to be a bupati in the kraton, and married the daughter of a wedana. He was never accepted by the nobles, but his son was considered privayi. The second pattern of generational mobility is the opportunity some of the mothers of elite members had to marry above their social status, thereby ensuring that their children would rise. Often these mothers were second wives; their fathers were quite willing to have their daughters taken as second wives since the marriage would give the fathers "official" connections which could prove useful and also would give their grandchildren an He was Sundanese, and in West Java, as mentioned previously, ulama have higher prestige than in the Javanese ethnic area. 129 There were cases whereby a son resulting from an overnight stay by a Butch or Indonesian official in a village was aided in obtaining education and prestigious employment by the responsible official. See Sutherland, "Fangreh Fradja," p. 99. It is not known if this was the case in this particular situation. === [PDF page 156] === 140 opportunity to obtain prestigious positions and a higher status in society. In most cases the mothers came from landlord, lurah, and merchant families. One example is an army leader's mother, the daughter of a lurah. who became the second wife to a judge, the son of a bupati. Her son, the army leader, received a good Western education and was one of the first cadets in the Dutch military academy in Bandung. What have been the marriage patterns of the twentythree leaders whose fathers were born into a low status? Have the}' as a rule married up so as to solidify their new status? Nine of these men did marry up and five married so as to ratify their new social stance. For five of the leaders whose fathers' occupations did not rise much beyond the grandfather their marriages were to women front the same social status (four are unknown). There were instances of individual mobility, that is, within one generation. Ten of the political elite, seven of whom are military, rose from lowly origins to elite status. Like the fathers discussed above they were able to obtain some Western-style education, mainly through the aid of priyayi connections. In the autobiography of Soeharto, it described him leaving the village where he was born to go live with relatives in Surakarta who were government officials in order that he === [PDF page 157] === 141 130 could obtain an education. Those who rose within one generation tended to marry women from high social status. Soeharto, for example, married the daughter of a wedana, descended from the Mangkunegara kraton. In conclusion, for inter-generational and generational mobility the most important factors were the interrelations among education, upper status connections, and marriage to women of high social status. For those who rose from santri wong cilik origins to priyayi status it was common to shed their religious background as well. Religious orientation is another indicator of status, especially among the Javanese. Religious Origins Mention has already been made of the differential impact of Islam upon Indonesian society. Islam penetrated to certain parts of the Outer Islands, such as Aceh, West and South Sumatra, South Sulawesi, and the coastal areas of Kalimantan. Within Java Islam historically influenced those from the northern coast, and to a lesser extent those from the non-coastal areas of West and East Java. In Central Java it was the merchant class that felt the pull of Islam. In both Central and East Java historically there have been conflicts between those who are santri and those who are not. Most of the Javanese members of 130 O.G. Roeder, The Smiling Generals President Soeharto of Indonesia (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1969), p. 83. === [PDF page 158] === 142 the elite were not reared in the santri tradition, but in the privavi variant of Agama Jawa (Javanese religion), which is a syncretic blend of Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and animism. Many Javanese elite members, including Soeharto himself, are active members of kebatinan 131 groups. It will be seen in the chapters on elite interrelationships that the religious orientations of elite members influence membership of and behavior in cliques and factions. The santri and abangan members of the elite come from different cultural and social traditions, not only from different backgrounds. The world of the santri differs from that of the privavi who are abangan. Certain images and thoughts come to mind that illustrate the santri world--the sounds of the market, the world of the pesantren.132 the symbolic solidarity of the Ummat Islam (the community of Islam), emphasis upon absolutes, the Islamic belief in the equality of persons, the longing of the santri to go to Mecca for the haj, and the hatred of the santri during the Dutch period for the Dutch infidel. 131 Kebatinan movements are mystical movements rooted in Agair.a Jawa. For an interesting discussion of recent trends see Allan A. Samson, "Kebatinan and Islam in Indonesia: Genesis of a Conflict," paper presented at the 25th meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Chicago, 30 March-1 April, 1973. 132 The pesantren is an Islamic school, organized as a teacher-pupil discipleship with no fixed courses, content, or length of study. === [PDF page 159] === 143 The images and values of the privavi world, as epitomized in Central Java are quite different--the soft, soothing music of the gamelan orchestra, the world of the kraton. emphasis upon status and etiquette, urbanity, relativistic values as expressed in the wayang, and mysticism emphasizing the striving of man to merge with the cosmos. addition, the privavi have been influenced more by Western culture than have the santri. The privavi had long, intimate contact with the Dutch, both through their employment in the civil service and through Western education. Some of the Western values have been integrated syncretically by the privavi into their world view. Two elite members will be used to illustrate the differences between the worlds of the santri and the abangan priyavi. These two leaders were chosen to illustrate continuity and change within these two worlds, therefore they are in some ways atypical. One, the santri leader, lived in the Middle East for a number of years, and comes from a northern coast priyavi family. The abangan leader is atypical in his intense influence by Western thought and culture. The santri leader, "Pak Hassan," with whom several long interviews were conducted, talked mostly about the experiences of his youth, especially his life in the pesantren and his long, adventurous trip to the Middle East. Contrary to most Kahdatul Ulama leaders, Pak Hassan had some western-style education, but due to his === [PDF page 160] === 144 disinterest and involvement in Islamic youth politics he twice failed the middle school. Pak Hassan mentioned his years in the Dutch schools only briefly, but elaborated on his life in the various pesantren he attended in Ceribon, Surakarta, and Jakarta. Pak Hassan's life changed radically when his mother was financially unable to support him. He had to leave the pesantren. but was able to obtain a position as an officer on a Dutch ship after a year's training. Pak Hassan had so much hatred for the Dutch that he promptly ended up fighting with the Dutch officers and was fired. After that Pak Hassan began his trip to the Middle East, initially to Mecca for the ha j. He lived in the Middle East for fifteen years; he studied law there and was active in the Indonesian nationalist movement in the Middle East. Pak Hassan was influenced by the many years he spent in the Middle East and feels at home in the Arab culture. The abangan leader, "Pak Suryo," has always been a member of two worlds, the Javanese priyayi and aban&an world and the Western world. His father was studying in Holland when Pak Suryo was young, and he started his elementary schooling there. After the family returned from Holland, he continued to study in the most elite Dutch schools, schools where each class had only a few Indonesians. Pak Suryo, in contrast with Pak Hassan, was not hostile toward the Dutch, and he could never cultivate hatred for them. Because his father refused to teach === [PDF page 161] === 145 him the Islamic religion he knew little of Islam, but he did hear about other religions from his father, especially theosophy, Christianity, Judaism, and the mystical teachings of Agama Jawa. Pak Suryo's father preached to him the Western value of equality, but the father was still "feudalistic" in his attitude toward the susuhunan (the ruler) of the Surakarta kraton where the father served as a bupati and also as the personal physician of the susuhunan, besides his employment as a physician by the colonial government. One day when the susuhunan passed by their house Tak Suryo was shocked to see his father doing the sembah (prostrating oneself) before the susuhunan. Unlike his father Pak Suryo has integrated the Western value of equality into his daily life; for example, he speaks Dutch with the Sultan of Jogjakarta, a personal friend, not the stratified language of Javanese. Pak Suryo, though, is influenced by mysticism and spoke vividly about his mystical experiences. The political elite is dominated by those who were reared in the abangan tradition. Of those from Java only twenty-eight of the ninety-one were brought up to be santri. To a great extent the religious origins of Javan elite members were determined by a combination of social status and regional origins. The differences between Central Java, on the one hand, and East and West Java, on the other, concerning religious patterns have already been discussed. The findings === [PDF page 162] === of this study illustrate the close correlation between religious origin and social status background of the Central Javanese. In general, those from Central Java who are from privavi families were not brought up in the santri tradition. Friyavi from Central Java have a long history of antagonism to the santri community. The close relationship between Javan social status and religious origin is shown in table 17. TABLE 17 SOCIAL STATUS AND RELIGIOUS ORIGINS OF JAVAN MEMBERS OF THE NEW ORDER POLITICAL ELITE Social Status Nobility Privavi Wong Cilik Total Santri Abangan 42 53 16 11 27 NOTE: Gamma=.7229. In this table and in the following one the unknowns (nine) and the Christians (two) are not included. All but three of those from privayi origins who were reared 133 in the santri tradition are from East or West Java. In these three cases the elite member was either influenced by his father who became "converted" to the santri tradition or by his mother who, in one case, was strongly santri and influenced her child. For example one elite member's father, of noble origin, became "converted" to the santri tradition through his wife, the daughter of a merchant. He became a local Muhammadijah leader, and the elite member used to come with him to the meetings. === [PDF page 163] === 147 Several of the santri wong cilik are N'ahdatul Ulama leaders. The leaders of N'ahdatul Ulama traditionally come from wong cilik origins, so, depending upon the elite segment and sub-segment, wong cilik origins can not only be disadvantageous but can also be an asset. As mentioned above, most of those in the elite from a santri background come from East and West Java; this is illustrated in table 18. TABLE 18 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REGION OF BIRTH AND RELIGIOUS ORIGIN: NEW ORDER JAVAN ELITE Region of Java East Java £. Madura Central Java Sunda £. Ceribon Total Santri Abangan 11 27 10 42 56 NOTE: Gamma=.7295. The highest proportion of santri in terms of elite segments come from the political party segment (twelve out of nineteen). Only fourteen of the sixty military leaders are from a santri background. One santri army leader remarked angrily that is is very hard for santri officers to win promotions, and those who are successful are more able and outshine the abangan officers in their midst. Several of santri origin who became abangan said that partially due to the hostile environment for santri in the military they gradually changed their beliefs and lifestyle so that === [PDF page 164] === 148 they could fit in with abangan officers. Military leaders originating from areas of the Outer Islands that are strongly Islamic often follow the example of their Javan counterparts and gradually become less Islamic in their orientations. In comparing the political elites of Guided Democracy and the New Order it was found that their religious origins are similar. In both periods Javans from an abangan background dominate. The proportion of santri vs abangan in the elite segments differed, though. There was a higher proportion of santri military officers and a lower proportion of santri political party leaders than in the New Order elite. During Guided Democracy a higher proportion of Sundanese army leaders were elite members, therefore raising the number of those reared in the santri tradition. Also during Guided Democracy parties of the left were strong, lessening the santri element in the political party segment. In this section it was seen that ethnic, social status, and religious characteristics are important determinants influencing the composition of the Indonesian political elite. Throughout these periods an aspirant to elite membership has more of a chance in reaching that goal if he is Central Javanese, privavi. and abangan. But these characteristics alone will not suffice if the aspirant has not had a Western-style education, with the exception of Nahdatul Ulama leaders. In the next part === [PDF page 165] === 149 of this chapter education, the next signpost along the road to elite membership, will be examined. PART II Education Introduction The early nationalist elite of Indonesia, like most, if not all nationalist elites of former colonial countries, were educated in a Western-style system and thereby were introduced to a new culture and values, and learned modern skills. This caused a wider cultural gap between elite and mass than had traditionally been present. The Dutch educational system in Indonesia socialized the pupils to be part of the Dutch culture. Dutch history, geography, and cultural values were instilled in the pupils; they would come out of school knowing everything about Holland, but little about Indonesia. Heroes in Indonesian history were often denigrated in the schools, especially if they led struggles against the Dutch. The Indonesians who experienced both Dutch education and their own traditional education were able to integrate to varying extents the contrasting values to which they were exposed. The cultural gap between the elite and the mass has narrowed somewhat over the years due to the neo-traditionalization and Indonesianization of the educational, political, and administrative systems. In the following section the formative influences of the traditional, Dutch, and Japanese educational systems will be analyzed in terms of the composition and attitudes of === [PDF page 166] === 150 the elite. Dutch policies which favored the education of those of high status were important in determining the composition of the elite in favor of those of high status. Systems of Education Traditional Educational Systems The members of the Indonesian elite have not only been exposed to a Western or Western-style education, but also to the various indigenous systems. Because of the importance of the Javanese and Sundanese in the political elite the discussion will be restricted to the traditional educational systems found in Java. Initially the traditional Javan system was a blend of Hindu and indigenous elements, and formal education was given mainly to the children of the nobles and priyayi. Those who received education attended classes either in the kraton, where the children and relatives of the rulers were educated, or in the homes of guru (teachers), which evolved into institutions called pesantren. In the kraton the children learned to read and write; studied history, philosophy, and etiquette; and, in essence, the values and mores of the aristocratic culture. In the case of the pesantren the students For brief discussions of the traditional educational systems see the following: Muhammad Shamsul Huq, Education and Development Strategy in South and Southeast Asia (Honolulu: East-West Center, 1965), pp. 8-17; M. Hutasoit, Compulsory Education in Indonesia (Faris: UNESCO, 1954), pp. 17-18; Selosoemardjan, Jogjakarta, pp. 341-345; Justus M. van der Kroef, "Educational Development and Social Change in Indonesia," Harvard Educational Review 24 (Fall 1954): 242. === [PDF page 167] === 151 would live in the house of the guru, where they studied religion and philosophy.135 During the Hindu period the pesantren were located near temples (candi); tuition was free and the pesantren were maintained by the community. The wayang was very important in the education and socializ at ion of the children of Java.137 Through the wayang the child learned the values of his society, which included the proper relationship between the upper and lower strata, etiquette, and the role which he should play in the •J o o society. In the early part of the Dutch period in Java the kraton and pesantren styles of education evolved in 135 See Selosoemardjan, Jog,Jakarta, p. 341. 1 36 Huq, Education, p. 11. 137 Narrowly speaking the wavang are shadow puppets, found in certain parts of South and Southeast Asia. In Java and Bali the stories are also performed by wooden puppets and by human beings. In Java the most common wavang stories are mixtures of Javanese myths and the Hindu epics, the Ramayana and the Mahabharata. In the Javanese ethnic area shadow puppets and human performers are most commonly used, whereas in West Java wooden puppets (wayang golek) are the common medium. For a comprehensive but short discussion of the wavang see Claire Holt, Art in Indonesia; Continuities and Change (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1967), pp. 123-150. Also see Benedict O'G. Anderson, Mythology and the Tolerance of the Javanese. Monograph Series (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1965); James R. Brandon, On Thrones of Gold; Three Javanese Shadow Plays (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 196777 Hardjowirogo, Sediarah Waiang Purwa (Jakarta? Balai Pustaka, 1965); and H. Ulbright, Wayang Purwat Shadows of the Past (Kuala Lumpur and Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1970). 138 This statement is more true of the Javanese child than the Sundanese child due to the heavier penetration of Islamic and Western cultures in West Java. === [PDF page 168] === 152 different ways and diverged from each other, whereas in the pre-colonial period the pesantren was a vehicle by which the values of the aristocratic culture flowed downward to the village. The penetration of Dutch rule influenced, among other aspects of Javan society, the nature of kraton education; there was not only an involution of the economy, 139 as Clifford Geertz demonstrated, but an involution of the culture as well. The realm of culture was the only area in which the rulers and aristocrats were able to use their initiative and energy. The Dutch saw the utility of encouraging aristocratic culture and kraton-style education as ways of channeling the energies of the nobility and privavi into pursuits which would not be threatening to the Dutch. For example, in the early nineteenth century a governor-general (Herman Daendals) ordered the sultans of Ceribori to provide for three schools to teach girls to dance in the hope of diverting the attention of the restless inhabitants of that region towards their ancient customs and popular amusements and to detract their attention from the agitation by political troublemakers.140 The kraton-style educational system remained basically concerned with cultural pursuits and told and retold the stories of past glories; the curriculum was expanded but mainly in an involuted fashion, i.e. "increasing tenacity 139 Agricultural Involution. I.J. Brugmans, Geschiedenis van het Onderwijs in Nederlandsch-Indie, p. 65, quoted in Vlekke, Nusantara. p. 277. === [PDF page 169] === of basic pattern; internal elaboration and ornateness; technical hairsplitting, and undying virtuosity." There was little influence by the Dutch culture on the Islamic culture which had its greatest growth in Indonesia during the Dutch period. The reaction of the Javanese nobles and priyayi to the Western impact, which was initially the defense and elaboration of their own culture, contrasted with the santri, under whose hands the pesantren developed into an Islamic educational insti142 tution. Until the development of Western-style education in Java the products of the pesantren were more outward-looking than those from the kraton schools. The teachers (kiyayi) usually had some contact with ideas outside the Javanese cultural sphere, since many had been to Mecca, whereas the kraton withdrew into itself. It was common for pupils to move from one pesantren to another in order to have a well-rounded education,143 whereas those from the kraton stayed in the same environs. The traditional educational systems continue to have influence, although in varying degrees. Many of the Geertz, Agricultural Involution, p. 82 (referring to the theory of Goldenweiser on cultural involution). As in the Hindu period the pupils lived in a building near the house of the teacher and the relationship between the teacher and his pupils was that of a guru and his disciples. Selosoemardjan, Jogjakarta, pp. 342-343. Many of the pesantren only taught the students to recite verses of the Koran by rote without understanding the meaning. === [PDF page 170] === 154 noble and privavi elite members from Central Java had some type of kraton-style education, ranging from private tutors to lessons in Javanese dance.144 The wayang influenced especially Javanese priyayi elite members. The wayang itself has several levels of meaning and interpretation, so some of the members were influenced mainly by the. wayang characters as types on which to mold their own character and also as signposts to identify a person's character, yet others went further and followed the mystical teachings found, in the wayang. An example of the way_ang/s influence was the statement by one of Soeharto's military advisers that he has tried to model his character on that of Arjuna, one of the heroes of the Mahabharata. He uses the wayang in other ways too: "When I have a mission I often go back 146 to the Bratayudha story and the Ramayana, and I am more influenced by wayang stories than by history." 147 The influence of mysticism upon some Javanese elite members has already been mentioned. Some of the elite are active in 144 Most of the dances are based upon stories of the wayang, and through the medium of the dance the children are imbued with the values found in the wayang. One wellknown school of dance was the Krida Beksa Wirama, whose head was Gusti Pangeran Aria Tedjasukmana, a brother of the late Sultan Hamengku Buwono VIII of Jogjakarta; see Holt, Art in Indonesia, p. 153. l45 Ibid., pp. 147-148. 146 The Bratayudha is the final battle between the two rival and related sides in the Mahabharata. the Pendawa and the Kurawa. 147 Interview with then Brigadier General Sudjono Humardhani, Jakarta, 15 March 1969. === [PDF page 171] === 155 148 the performance of wayang orang and dances, more are patrons of the traditional arts. and many Those who are santri usually have received both a Western-style education and an Islamic education, ranging from the traditional pesantren to the schools of modernist Islam. The effect of their education varies with the extent to which they have held fast to their religious beliefs. For those who had a rudiamentary Islamic education and may no longer even be santri this education has affected them little. However for those who are Islamic party leaders their education in Islam has colored their whole way of life and belief system. The traditional educational systems are therefore important in the socialization of the elite members, although this influence has been uneven. The Javanese members of the elite are the most affected by the traditional priyayi education. The Sundanese members, who share the kraton and wayang tradition with the Javanese, have been less molded by this tradition, due to the heavier Islamic penetration and the closer proximity of the Dutch. Within TTor example, in November 1968 the Ministry of Defense and Security sponsored a wayang orang (humans playing wayang characters) and the performers were members of a Javanese cultural organization in Bandung. The commander of West Java at that time (then Major General Dharsono) played Gareng, a clown; the director of the performance was a brigadier general in the army, and another army general was an actor. See Armed Forces Courier. 16 November 1968, p. 1 for a list of some of the well-known personages participating in the organization and performance of that particular wavang orang show. === [PDF page 172] === 156 the Javanese members there is a sharp divergence between those who are abangan and those who are santri. Dutch Educational System The system of Western-style education during the Dutch period was characterized by complexity, slow development, and by its relationship to and reinforcement of the existing status systems in Indonesia. It was only in the late 1840s that the colonial government began to implement the 1818 act providing for the education of "non-Christians."149 At that time the scope of government had begun to increase and there was need for more educated Indonesian officials as the duties of government grew. There, too, was fear of Islam as a potential political threat and C. Snouck-Hurgronije, the famous Dutch adviser on Islamic policy, suggested that the Dutch government first educate the Javanese aristocracy, and later others, and in that way, through the expansion of Western education, the influence of Islam would weaken and eventually 149 Amry Vandenbosch, The Dutch East Indies: Its Government, Problems and Politics (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1933), p. 198. There were a few schools in Jakarta, but they were restricted to Christians. See Huq, Education, pp. 11-12; Vandenbosch, East Indies. p. 198; Paul van der Veur, Education and Social Change in Colonial Indonesia, Southeast Asia Program, Papers in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series no. 12 (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1969), p. 1. Vandenbosch, East Indies, p. 119 and Furnivall, Netherlands India, p. 364. === [PDF page 173] === 157 151 disappear. There was also pressure exerted on the government by a group of Dutch intellectuals who were horrified by the exploitation of the cultivation system, and argued that Holland owed a "debt of honor to Indo152 nesia," and that one way to repay this debt would be to increase welfare services, including education. However, in spite of the pressure exerted upon the government only a few schools were opened up by the beginning of the twentieth century; in 1900 in Java only one out of five hundred children of school age attended primary school, 153 and most of these attended the "native" school which only gave three years of primary education. During the twentieth century a very complex educational system evolved, which is shown in chart 1 on the following page. This educational system will be discussed in terms of elementary, secondary, Indonesian private, and higher education. each level, except the private schools, there were various types of schools to which entrance was largely determined by racial and social status criteria. 151 For an interesting article on Dutch fears concerning Islam and the political advice of Snouck-Hurgronije to counteract the Islamic "threat" see Harry Benda, "Christian Snouck-Hurgronje and the Foundations of Dutch Islamic Policy in Indonesia," Journal of Modern History 30 152 See Zainu'ddin, Indonesia, p. 152. Clive Day, The Dutch in Java (ftew Yorkt Macmillan, 1904; reprint ed. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 391. === [PDF page 174] === CHART 1 EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM OF THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES ORIENTAL EDUCATION OCCIDENTAL EDUCATION CONTINUATION CONTINUATION CONTINUATION /CMOOL roit /fMooL*o& /CMOOL CONNFCIMC OurCM CUOODFAM DUTCM DUTCH /CMOOL INDOWI/'AN Hl"tNr*oy CMtNi/i AQABIAM 3 TIAO/ /CMOOL r VIAO/ G » O L / / c w FOO DOI-.f/T.C ffMM /CHOOL Bu/iNt// 7CMOOL TRAOC /CNOOL rQAmifcjC /CM ron 3 VIAD/ NATIONAL /CMOOL rrACMio/ 3V1AQ/ HOOMA1 /CMOOL t o o CONTINUATION / C M T(A<.MtQ/ AVIA0V SPQSAL. - HtCHfQ iLfNCNTAQV /CMOOLtlNOONr/IAN MULOI « v | A D / TOADS /CMOOL, 3 rlAl^ LOwlQ TfCMNiCAl /CMOOL AI y i A Q / COL/ rOAININC TOO ionr/Tt£ CllNCt^ i rlAP.' INTAOV /CMOOL (MULOl /CMOOL*OQ ACQiCuLTURAL AID/ 3 VIAQ/ NOOMAl / C M O O L ron / C M O O LL rot) JATiON / C " T£ A C M I U / I V£AQ NOQMAL /CM rOO GiQL/ 3VXAQ/ CMKMiCAL IN/.lTUTf I VIAQ/ DUTCM CMtNr/l A DUTCM fNDOxf 'IAN NOOMAl, /CMOOL 1.3 V«AO/ VtTfOiNAtav /tlOMDARV /CMOOL ACtt'C'JlTuOAl 3 VIAO/ /ELONnARY TICMNICAL i »fAQ/ /tCONOABf nroicAL/cM • rfAT)/ CMIA/) Poticr /CMOOL 3 VIAO/ TOAlNlNf. /CM r o O INDONE/IAN CO VI O N. MINT ornciAi/ ACADIMIrOQTME INTtONAL ADMiNif TQATION iNCiwtiqiNC LAW MEDICAL LlTIOAOV AGRICULTURE COLICCE 5 V O / SOURCE: Raden Loekman D j a j a d i n i n g r a t, From I l l i t e r a c y t o U n i v e r s i t v i Educational Development in the Netherlands I n d i e s. B u l l e t i n 3 (New York: Netherlands and Netherlands Indies Council of t h e I n s t i t u t e of P a c i f i c R e l a t i o n s, 1943), no page number. === [PDF page 175] === 159 Elementary Education At the beginning of the twentieth century there were three types of elementary schools, the Europeesche Lagere School (ELS), European Lower School; the First Class Native; and the Second Class Native. In order to pass the entrance examination for the civil service an ELS education was necessary. 154 At this time the restrictions on Indonesian entry into the ELS were so stringent that the 155 numbers of successful Indonesians were few* Educational opportunities began slowly to expand due to the growing demand for civil service employees, the expansion of private enterprise, and the result of nationalist pressure, first visible among the Indonesian Chinese. In 1908 the Hollansch-Chineesche School (HCS), the DutchChinese School, was created due to Chinese nationalist pressure, and the HCS served as the prototype for the 154 The language of the First Class Native School was the local language, whereas the entrance examination for the civil service was in Dutch. 155 By a decree in 1895 a child could not be older than seven years of age and had to speak Dutch in order to enter a European school, unless the Governor-General gave him a special exception. In a letter Raden Adjeng Kartini reacted to this decrees "How can a native child of six or seven years learn Dutch? He would have had to have a Dutch governess, and then before he is to learn the Netherlands language, the child must first know his own language, and necessarily, know how to read and write. It is only regents /bupati7 who do not have to ask permission for their families to go to the European schools; most of the native officials are afraid of receiving a 'No' in answer to their request and therefore do nothing (Letters of a Javanese Princess /New York: Norton, 1964/, p^ 56). === [PDF page 176] === 160 Hollansch-Inlandsche School (HIS), Dutch-Native School, which succeeded the First Class Native School and JWQS created to help stem the tide of Indonesians entering the ELS. Unlike the First Class Native Schools the HIS had the same curriculum as the ELS and Dutch became the language of instruction in 1911. There were still some Indonesians attending the ELS, but their numbers were small, usually one or two per class. The Indonesian pupils in the ELS usually came from upper priyayi and noble strata. Even to attend the HIS a child had to be priyayi. unless he were fortunate enough to have a European or priyayi sponsor, which was rare. Table 19 below indicates the small number of Indonesians receiving a Western-style education, i.e. ELS and HIS. TABLE 19 NUMBERS OF INDONESIANS AND EUROPEANS RECEIVING WESTERN PRIMARY EDUCATION School Year Europeansa 1914/1915 1919/1920 1924/1925 1929/1930 1934/1935 1938/1939 4,282 4,779 5.672 7,012 6,192 6,206 Indonesians 6,306 8,644 12,592 14,709 13,931 14,078 SOURCE: This table was adapted from Simon Lambertus van der Wal, Some Information of Education in Indonesia up to 1942. with a Bibliography, 2nd ed. (The Hague: Netherlands Universities Foundation for International Cooperation, 1961), p. 8. According to the 1930 census there were 242,372 Europeans in Indonesia. === [PDF page 177] === 161 The numbers of Indonesians attending the ELS and HIS remained small, however, between 1912 and 1939 there was more than a two-fold increase. Host of the Indonesian children receiving primary education attended the Yolksschool (People's School), which gradually replaced the Second Class Schools. By 1942 the Volksschool had graduated 2.2 million children, but the school only lasted three years. It was a deadend road for those desiring upward mobility. In 1921 the Schakelschool. Link School, was created, which prepared the graduate of a Volksschool for secondary education. But by 1930 there were only sixty Schakelschool in the whole archipelago 1 58 with an enrollment of 4000. Secondary Education Secondary education was usually divided into two wayss 1) academic and vocational, and 2) two levels, middle (three years) and high school (three years). The latter division was not always applicable, since three of the schools, the Hoogere Burger School (HBS), Citizens High School, the Gymnasium, and the Lyceum, went straight -I CfL Marnixius Hutasoit, "Problems and Potentials of Indonesian Education," 28th Sir John Adams Lecture, University of California, Los Angeles, 22 March 1961, p. 4. The villagers saw little value in the Volksschool; the length of instruction was short, and there was little in the curriculum that had either any relevance to village life (the texts were usually translated Dutch books) or could serve as vehicles for social mobility. 1 58 Justus Maria van der Kroef, "Dutch Colonial Policy in Indonesia, 1900-1941" (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1953), p. 221. === [PDF page 178] === 162 from the beginning of middle school to the end of high 159 In terms of the education of the political school. elite the HBS was the most important of these three. 160 Only graduates of the ELS, except in unusual circumstances, could attend the HBS. 161 According to Bernhard Dahm only one percent of the Indonesian graduates of the ELS went on to the HBS; in the case of the political elite, however, most of those who attended the ELS did go on to the HBS. Table 20 compares the number of Indonesian HBS graduates with the number from the other racial groups. TABLE 20 GRADUATES OF THE HBS ACCORDING TO RACIAL ORIGIN School Year Europeans Indonesians 1910/1911 1920/1921 1924/1925 1929/1930 1934/1935 1938/1939 1939/1940 49 141 161 252 374 457 507 11 32 157 204 204 220 88 83 73 55 53 59 59 14 34 29 26 26 Other Asians 17 32 53 124 116 132 10 14 11 18 15 15 SOURCE; I.J. Brugmans and Soenario, "Enkale Gegevens van Socialan Aard," p. 62 in van der Wal, Education in Indonesia, p. 9. 159 The Gymnasium gave a classical education, the Lyceum a modern one. One elite member attended the Lyceum and none the Gymnasium. 161The three government HBS were located in Java. 162'History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century (New York: Praeger, 1971), p. 18. === [PDF page 179] === 163 From 1910-1940 there was an even greater increase of Indonesians attending the HBS than was true of the ELS, but HBS graduates remained a very small proportion of high school graduates in Indonesia. Most elite members attended the three-year Meer Uitgebreid Lager Qnderwiis (MULO), Extended Primary Education, founded in 1914. HIS graduates who continued their education usually attended the MULO. In the beginning Europeans dominated the MULO schools as they did the HBS, but gradually the Indonesian enrollment increased and the Dutch enrollment decreased. In 1919 the first Algemeene Middelbare School (AMS), the General Secondary School, opened its doors in Jogjakarta; others were built, but they were all located in Java. The creation of the AMS gave the opportunity for more Indonesians to be admitted for higher education; previously only graduates of the HBS were admitted. Table 21 below illustrates the importance of the AMS in increasing the numbers of Western-educated Indonesians. Most of the elite members attended the academic secondary schools, but some went to vocational schools. Two of these, School tot Opleiding van Inlandsche Artsen (STOVIA), School for the Training of Native Doctors, and Nederlandsche-Indische Artsenschool (NIAS), Netherland Indies Doctor's School, are included in the discussion of higher education since graduates of these institutions are considered to be almost equivalent to university === [PDF page 180] === 164 TABLE 21 GRADUATES OF THE AMS ACCORDING TO RACIAL ORIGIN School Year 1920/1921 1924/1925 1929/1930 1934/1935 1938/1939 1939/1940 Europeans 361 75 549 54 607 38 619 32 740 34 754 32 Indonesians 17 83 354 34 762 47 995 51 1,012 47 1,160 49 Other Asians 39 111 11 235 15 338 17 487 19 442 19 SOURCE: van der Wal, Education in Indonesia, p. 63. graduates. The other vocational schools where elite members studied were: Opleidingschool voor Inlandsche Ambtenaren (OSVIA), Training School for Native Officials; Kweekschool (KS), Teachers School? and the technical and commercial schools. The OSVIA was for the sons of the traditional elite, whereas the KS, M A S, and STOVIA recruited students from low privavi families and even from the lower strata. At the time the first medical and teachers schools were established the status of their graduates was not high; the status gradually improved, but the teachers and medical schools continued to recruit low privavi and others below them, thus continuing the tradition of these schools as vehicles for upward mobility. The most. An example of the low status of physicians was the issuance of a third-class rail ticket to a doctor travelling on business, whereas an Indonesian civil servant would receive a second-class ticket (Dahm, History of Indonesia, pp. 24-25). === [PDF page 181] === 165 numerous vocational schools were technical and commercial schools, but few elite members attended these compared to the academic schools.164 Private Indonesian Educational Systems During the last decades of Dutch rule various private schools, organized by Indonesians, sprang up, some connected with political and/or cultural movements, others not. There were two major factors which accounted for the relative success of these schools! l) in different ways they attempted not only to syncretize indigenous and Western values, but to create a new culture which would respond in a progressive fashion to the Western intellectual challenge; and 2) a large number of Indonesians wanted their children to have a Western-style education, a desire which the Dutch attempted to thwart. These private schools can be divided into four types: 1) those based in a particular ethnic area and representing the culture of that area, such as the Budi Utomo schools found in the Javanese ethnic areas, and the Pasundan schools, found in the Sundanese ethnic area; 2) sec ular political party-sponsored schools, such as the Pereuruan Rakvat (PNI) and the Sekolah Rakyat (PKI); 3) the religious schools of the modernist movement, chiefly the 164 For information on the extent of commercial and technical education see Raden Loekman Djajadiningrat, From Illiteracy to University; Educational Development in the Netherlands Indies, bulletin 3 (New York* Netherlands and Netherlands Indies Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942) and van der Wal, Education in Indonesia. === [PDF page 182] === 166 early Sarekat Islam schools, The Muhammadiyah schools and various schools in West Sumatra, such as Sumatra Thawalib; and 4) schools which emphasized the development 1 f\fs of a national culture, mainly the Taman Siswa schools. Since the Muhammadiyah and Taman Siswa were the most important schools and the ones which a few elite members attended, the discussion will be focused on these two schools. The Muhammadiyah, a modernist Islamic organization i/ro founded in 1912, was chiefly concerned with Islamic religious education; it was opposed to the narrow rotestyle teaching found in the pondok (traditional Islamic Soon most of the Sarekat Islam schools were dominated by the left wing of the Sarekat Islam, socialist and communist in ideology. An example of this was the Semarang Sarekat Islam school headed by the leftist leader, Tan Malakka. See Ruth T. McVey, "Taman Siswa and the Indonesian National Awakening," Indonesia 4 (October 1967). 143, n. 20. It was not uncommon for teachers to be affiliated with more than one type of school. For instance Ir. Sanusi Hardjadinata, former Minister of Internal Affairs in the two Djuanda cabinets (1957-1959) had taught both in Pasundan and Muhammadiyah schools, and Wilopo, former chairman of the Supreme Advisory Council, former prime minister, and PNI leader, taught in Taman Siswa, Muhammadiyah, and Perguruan Rakyat schools. For information on the Budi Utomo see: Akira Nagazumi, "The Origin and Earlier Years of the Budi Utomo: 1908-1918" (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1967) and van Niel, Indonesian Elite. See Ruth T. McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965) for information concerning the Sekolah Rakyat. 168 See Howard M. Federspiel, "The Muhammadijah 1 A Study of an Orthodox Islamic Movement in Indonesia," Indonesia 10 (October 1970)s 57-59 and van Niel, Indonesian Elite, pp. 166-167. === [PDF page 183] === 167 religious schools) and pesantren. and also realized the need to provide some Western-style education, but an education rooted in Islam.169 They operated both full-time schools, combining religious and Western-style education, and part-time schools, created to provide religious instruction to those enrolled in Dutch schools. In the colonial period the Muhammadiyah operated fifty-five schools, which included four thousand students! they were mainly in Java, but in 1925 the Muhammadiyah started some schools in the Outer Islands. The Taman Siswa schools have been associated with an abanRan view of education in opposition to the Muhammadiyah schools and other comparable educational institutionsj171 but Taman Siswa went beyond a simple abangan view, as witnessed by the close cooperation of Sarekat Islam with the Taman Siswa.172 The Taman Siswa was founded by 169 Many of the early Muhammadiyah leaders had been in Budi Utomo, and one leader started plans for a school originally under Budi Utomo auspices in Jogjakarta. The school came into being after Muhammadiyah was inaugurated and became a center of Muhammadiyah activity. See Deliar Noer, "The Rise and Development of the Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia during the Dutch Colonial Period: 1900-1942" (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1963). Federspiel, "MuhammadiJah," p. 58. 17l See McVey, "Taman Siswa," p. 131. 172 Several Sarekat Islam schools put themselves under the wing of the Taman Siswa as did some Budi Utomosponsored schools and Sekolah Rakvat (Ibid., p. 131). Sarekat Islam was split between abangan and santri views, which would account for the merging of some of the Sarekat Islam schools with Taman Siswa. === [PDF page 184] === 168 173 R.M. Suwardi Surianingrat, the grandson of Prince Paku 174 Alam III. He had studied in STOVIA, was a leader of the Indische Party, spent several years in exile in Holland (1913-1918), and there obtained a teacher's certificate. Suwardi was influenced by the educational theories of toaria Montessori and Rabindrath Tagore. But the origins of Taman Siswa can equally be traced to the meetings of the Javanese traditional group, the Pagujuban Selasa-Kliwan, which met under the auspices of a wellknown mystic; this group concluded that Indonesia needed a national educational system, and the members formed the first board of governors of the Taman Siswa.177 Suwardi realized the need for Indonesia to modernize, but modernization should be built on the foundations of the indigenous cultures (he envisaged the development of local cultures which would result in the foundation of a national culture): 173 Suwardi is better known as Ki Hadjar Dewantara. 174 For more background on the Taman Siswa see: Ibid.; Abdurrachman Surjomihardjo, "An Analysis of Suwardi Surjaningrat's Ideals and National Revolutionary Actions (1913-22), Madialah Ilmu-Ilmu Sastra Indonesia 3 (October 1964): 371-406 and van Kiel, Indonesian Elite. The Indische Party was founded in 1911 by Douwes Dekker, an Indo-European. The party advocated an independent Indonesia, which would encompass everyone who made Indonesia their home. Suwardi, Douwes Dekker, and a third leader (Dr. Tjipto Mangunkusumo) were exiled from Indonesia in 1913. van Niel, Indonesian Elite, p. 220. 177 McVey. "Taman Siswa," p. 130 === [PDF page 185] === 169 ... slowly but surely we have become alienated from our own people and our own environment. This alienation would have been bearable had it not been that in our case the abandonment of our own culture did not at the same time bring access to another civilization.... we have lost our world, but we have not entered another.178 The Taman Siswa created a complete educational system, from kindergarten to teachers school, and by 1942 it had 207 schools in 199 branches.179 The experience of those elite members who attended Taman Siswa schools 180 appears to have been important in the development of their nationalist feelings. For example, a military leader who transferred from the HBS to Taman Siswa at the beginning of the Japanese occupation, said: ... I was much influenced by the Taman Siswa, especially its spirit. The teachers were close to the students and taught them to be proud of our own culture, but without hating other cultures or thinking that other cultures were inferior. In the Taman Siswa we learned about Indonesia, whereas in the HBS we learned about Holland.... We were taught not to hate the Dutch, only the Dutch system.... We learned humanism there, not narrow-minded national ism.181 ^i Hadjar Dewantara, "Some Aspects of national Education and the Taman Siswa Institute at Jogjakarta," trans, editors of Indonesia, Indonesia 4 (October 1967)«'. 151 179 The geographical distribution was as follows: Bali, 4 branches; East Java, 70 branches (71 schools); Central Java, 42 branches (45 schools); West Java, 28 branches (32 schools); Sumatra, 49 branches; Kalimantan, 2 branches; Ambon and Ternate, 1 branch each (Ibid., pp. 164-165). 180 Four are from the military, four from political parties, and one from the technocracy. Two other members taught in Taman Siswa schools, both PNI leaders. Interview with then Brigadier General Sajidiman, Jakarta, 10 Karen 1969. === [PDF page 186] === 170 Higher Education It wasn't until 1920 that the first institute of higher learning, the Technical Institute, was founded in Bandung. It was followed by the Faculty of Law (1924), 1 82 the Faculty of Medicine (1927), the Academy of Administration (1938), the Faculty of Literature (1940), and the Faculty of Agriculture (1940); all were located in Jakarta,, except for the agricultural faculty, which was in Bogor, West Java. The professionals from Europe viewed these modest efforts of the colonial government with great distaste, since they perceived the entrance of Indonesians into the professions as a threat to their position. Before the establishment of higher educational institutions few Indonesians were able to receive a university education, for few could afford to study abroad and it was difficult also to obtain governmental permission to go abroad for study. After institutions of higher learning were established in Indonesia the trend was an increase dents, from 25 in 1924 to 143 in 1938. of stu- Table 22 below illustrates the disparity between the numbers of Indonesian students registered in institutions of higher learning in Holland and Indonesia. The numbers of those who survived to graduate are even smaller, as is seen in 182 STOVIA was abolished in 1936 after it had been superceded by NIAS, operating since 1913 in Surabaya. A school for the training of dentists had been in existence since 1913 in Surabaya. === [PDF page 187] === 171 TABLE 22 INDONESIAN STUDENTS REGISTERED lis INSTITUTES OF HIGHER LEARNING (in two-year intervals) School Year Indonesia Netherlands 1924/1925 1926/1927 1928/1929 1930/1931 1932/1933 1934/1935 1936/1937 1938/1939 25 30 44 106 109 112 120 143 15 12 21 28 22 21 20 32 SOURCE: Figures were compiled from tables in van der Wal, Education in Indonesia, pp. 12-13. NOTE: From 1920-1940 a total of 344 Indonesians were registered in institutions of higher learning in Holland, and 1489 in Indonesia. table 23 below, which also compares the number of Indonesians with Europeans and other Asians. What were the effects of Dutch education? Following this analysis it would appear that the major effects were: l) psychological frustration; 2) purposeful limiting of social mobility; 3) accentuation of regional differences; and 4) a widened gap between the Western-educated and non-Western-educated. The most immediate effect was a psychological state of frustration. From the very beginning, especially if the child attended a European school, he encountered prejudice directed against him. The Hollanders laugh and make fun of our stupidity, but if we strive for enlightenment, then they assume a defiant attitude toward us. What have I not suffered as a child at school through the ill will === [PDF page 188] === 172 of the teachers and of many of my fellow pupils? .... it was hard for the teachers to give a native the highest mark, never mind how well it may have been deserved. *-&3 TABLE 23 GRADUATES OF INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING IN INDONESIA (in two-year intervals) School Year Indonesians 1924/1925 1926/1927 1928/1929 1930/1931 1932/1933 1934/1935 1936/1937 1938/1939 14 23 40 Other Asians 12 13 21 Europeansa 13 20 SOURCE: van der Wal, Education in Indonesia, p. 12. NOTE: From 1920-1942 a total of 230 Indonesians graduated from institutions of higher learning in Indonesia. Most of the "Europeans" were of mixed IndonesianDutch blood. Those with both parents originating from Europe usually attended universities in Europe. This type of prejudice usually followed the Indonesian pupil all through the educational system, unless he studied in Holland; after a student returned from there, however, again he would be treated with prejudice, and this would serve to radicalize him. Students who studied in Holland became the most revolutionary. In Holland there were not the differences there were in the colony. They were treated the same as any other person in Holland.... Then they came back to Indonesia and of 183K a r t i n i, Javanese P r i n c e s s, p. 57. === [PDF page 189] === 173 course experienced vividly the disparity here. And they became quite revolutionary.184 This psychological frustration which graduates of Westernstyle institutions experienced was exasperated by the inability to obtain employment. "The colonial educational system conferred high status upon Indonesians but 185 did not guarantee high position." Employment opportunities in the civil service did not keep pace with advances in education for Indonesians, and graduates found it difficult to find employment in the civil service. Those who were successful found themselves employed in positions lower than their qualifications would warrant? at the same time they could see their Dutch classmates occupying high positions. There was a close relationship between a person's race and the type of employment and rate of advancement he could expect. Most Indonesians who had received university training were unable to find employment commensurate with their qualifications, whether in the public or the private sphere. This situation gave added impetus to the nationalist movement and freed unemployed and underemployed intellectuals to work in the movement. A second effect of Dutch educational policies was the difficulty persons from a low status background encountered in rising through education. The social system 184 Interview with then Major General Achmad Tirtosudiro, Jakarta, 14 April 1969. 185 Joseph Fischer, "Indonesia," in Education and Political Development, ed. James S. Coleman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 103-104. === [PDF page 190] === 174 before Dutch colonization had elements of fluidity, allowing bright young men to rise as was discussed previously. The Dutch saw the privavi as an hereditary stratum, and they mainly used ascriptive criteria in the admission of students to Western-style schools and in the recruitment of civil servants. It wasn't until after World War I that the educational and civil service requirements were liberalized; this enabled wealthy non-priyayi parents to send their children to secondary schools. Individual mobility, though, was enhanced by a university education; high social status was given to intellectuals even if they were from low priyayi origins. The educational system mainly gave opportunities to those from low priyayi origins for social advancement; few from wong cilik origins were able to rise through education because of the ascriptive nature of the entrance requirements. A third effect was the accentuation of differences between Java and the Outer Islands and between West Java and the Javanese ethnic area. A youth from the Outer Islands had to come to Java for an education beyond middle school, consequently young and bright youth moved to Java and were cut off from their home areas. This not only resulted in the depletion of the best talent from these areas, but was instrumental in the slower development of the nationalist movement in the Outer Islands. Kahin, Revolution in Indonesia, p. 32. Within === [PDF page 191] === 175 Java, West Java diverged even more from other parts of Java due to the concentration of higher educational institutions in this area and the strong influence of Western culture. However, although the gap between Java and the Outer Islands and between West Java and the rest of Java was intensified, the concentration of educational institutions in West Java served to provide similar educational experiences for Indonesian elite members, resulting in a greater unification of the elite than would have been the case if the higher educational institutions would have been dispersed throughout the archipelago. A fourth effect was the cultural alienation of the intellectual elite from both the mass of the people and the traditionally educated. We intellectuals here are much closer to Europe or America than we are to the Boroboedoer or Mahabharata /symbols of traditional Javanese culture/ or to the primitive Islamic culture of Java and Sumatra. Which is our basis: the West or the rudiments of feudal culture that are still to be found in our Eastern society?187 The intellectuals, educated in modern Western schools, were inculcated with values alien to the Indonesian culture. Thus they were not only far from the mass of the people in terms of the extent of their knowledge but they were socialized to the values of the West. Western education affected the conflict between the santri and abangan. Some of the santri educational institutions tried to integrate 187 Soetan Sjahrir, Out of Exile (i\"ew York: Greenwood Press, 1949), p. 67. === [PDF page 192] === 176 Western scientific knowledge with Islamic learning; others, though, totally rejected the West and maintained the traditional educational system. Post-Dutch Educational Systems The Japanese occupation lasted only from 1942-1945, yet it had a far-reaching influence upon the educational 188 system which was to evolve in independent Indonesia. The socially and racially segregated school system of the Dutch was abolished; in its place the Japanese constructed an egalitarian six-year elementary, three-year junior high, and three-year senior high schools. Indonesian was substituted for Dutch as the language of instruction, and Japanese was the only foreign language taught. Asian history and culture were emphasized and Western history and culture de-emphasized. The number of schools and pupils increased, and there was a subsequent decrease in ill iteracy,189 a notable achievement in the midst of war. There -I o o For more information concerning the effects of the Japanese occupation on education see: R. Murray Thomas, "Educational Remnants of Military Occupation: The Japanese in Indonesia," Asian Survey 6 (November 1966): 630-642; Willard H. Elsbree, Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953); Kuhammad Abdul Aziz, Japan's Colonialism and Indonesia ('s-Gravenhage, Holland: Nijhoff, 1955); Doedi Soemawidjaja, "Education in Indonesia: The Role of Education in a Developing Country," lecture given at Wisconsin State College-Whitewater, 15 May 1963. 189 The number of primary schools increased in Java from 13,595 to 15,439 and pupil attendance from 1,870,270 to 2,523,310 (see Richard Adloff and Virginia Thompson, Cultural Institutions and Educational Policy /New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1948/, p. 69). === [PDF page 193] === 177 was also a certain amount of social leveling, both in terms of social status origin and in terms of rural vs. urban. Selosoemardjan observed in the region of Jogjakarta that unlike in the Dutch period rural and urban youth started out equal (in terms of the mastery of a foreign language) and that the uniform curriculum in the schools and the creation of youth-training centers aided in the development of some equality among the students.190 During the Japanese occupation there was a myriad of special courses, ranging from bureaucratic training, Japanese language schools, railway officials' training institutes to youth leadership 191 courses. In all Japanese schools para-military training was given, and many were influenced to enter the military. Military leaders, compared to civilian members of the elite, commonly took these courses--eighteen out of the nineteen elite members who attended these courses are from the military segment. The present educational system was influenced both by the Dutch and by the Japanese. There is only one type of elementary school, although after the first six years of schooling the system does divide into academic, educational, technical and vocational branches.192 Catholic schools have replaced the ELS and HBS in terms of prestige; 190 Jog,Jakarta, p. 356. 191 Aziz, Japan's Colonialism, p. 178. 192 See the following for more detailed information of the post-independence educational system: Joseph Fischer, === [PDF page 194] === 178 most elite and sub-elite members send their children to Catholic schools, and after high school many sons of elite members attend universities in the United States and Europe or the military academy in Indonesia. Educational Patterns of the Elite Pre-University Training, Whether or not a child in colonial Indonesia could attend a Western-style elementary school was of crucial importance in determining whether or not he would be able to rise to elite or sub-elite status. Very few persons were literate in any language (6.4%) and even fewer could write in Dutch (.017%).Lyj Successful completion of the ELS or the HIS was usually necessary in order to attend middle and high schools. The policy of the colonial government in favoring the admission of those of high status to Western-style schools has already been discussed, and, indeed, most of the members of the political elite are of high social origin. Differences, therefore, in preuniversity education among elite members can be explained by their social and religious backgrounds. "Indonesia;" Hutasoit, Compulsory Education; Mas Sardjito, The Development of the Universitas Gadiah Mada (Jogjakarta: University of Gadjah Mada Press, 1957); and Kenneth Lee Neff, "Educational Flanning in a National Development Context --Indonesia- -A Case Study" (Ph.D. dissertation, American University, 1965). Netherlands East Indies, VolkstellinR 1930; 8:111. === [PDF page 195] === 179 Only those Javans of high status origin attended the ELS and the HBSs Dutch policy was successful in preventing those elite members of wong. cilik origin from attending these schools. This is shown in 'table 24 below. Only elite members of wong cilik origin attended the Schakelschool or Volksschool. Wong cilik were able to enter the HIS, but under circumstances discussed previously, i.e. most were from the village official stratum and their families had kin relations with priyavi who unofficially and officially adopted them and enrolled them in the HIS. As a child went up the academic ladder to middle and high school it was increasingly harder to gain admission to the HBS, MULO, and AMS; the consequence was that many attended vocational schools. It especially was difficult for someone from the Schakelschool to attend MULO, let alone the HBS. One elite member was able to attend MULO after the Schakelschool through his kin connections with a prominent high privavi nationalist leader who unofficially adopted him. A higher proportion of upper status elite members were able to stay in the prestigious schools than were those of wong cilik origin, who, if they received a high school education, were more likely to attend vocational schools. What is the relationship between the father's occupation and the type of pre-university education an elite member received? As is seen in table 25 below only those with traditional elite and modern occupations were able === [PDF page 196] === 180 TABLE 24 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIAL STATUS ORIGIN OF NEW ORDER JAVAN ELITE MEMBERS AND PRE-UNIVERSITY EDUCATION Type of School Elementary School3 ELS HIS Schakelschool Volksschool Islamic Unknown Middle School HBS £ Lyceum MULO Vocational SMPC Islamic None Unknown High School HBS & Lvceum AMS Vocational SMAd Islamic None Unknown Total for each level Nobility & Privavi Wong Cilik 14 46 12 12 39 11 15 10 16 11 64 17 NOTE: Tables 24 and 27 do not include those whose social status is unknown (ten). Gamma=.6776 (The Volksschool and Schakelschool were combined). Six elite members attended private elementary schools. Vocational middle and high schools include MOSVIA, STOVIA and NIAS preparatory schools, and the commercial and technical schools. SMP, the Sekolah Menengah Pertama (commonly translated as Junior High School), is the middle school during the Japanese occupation and after independence. SMA, Sekolah Menengah Atas (Senior High School) has been the high school during the Japanese occupation and after independence. === [PDF page 197] === 181 TABLE 25 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FATHER'S OCCUPATION AND PRE-UNIVERSITY EDUCATION OF NEW ORDER ELITE MEMBERS Type of School Elementary3 ELS HIS Schakelschool Volksschool Islamic Unknown Middle HBS & Lyceum MULO Vocational SMP Islamic None Unknown High HBS & Lyceum AMS Vocational Islamic None Unknown Total for each Trad. Elite Modern 30 11 25 24 11 40 Trad. Non-Elite 23 10 18 11 ZJL 38 21 NOTE: Those whose father's occupation is unknown are not included (sixteen). Lambda=.4562 (Volksschool and Schakelschool were combined). to send their sons to the ELS and the HBS, a higher proportion of these fathers had sons who attended the prestigious schools, i.e. the ELS, HIS, HBS, and AMS. Those from traditional non-elite occupations had to use connections, unless, in the case of some merchants, they were wealthy enough to pay expensive fees. === [PDF page 198] === 182 In examining religious origins of Javans and preuniversity education the close relationship among social status, religious background, and pre-university education is evident. As was discussed previously Javans, especially those from Central Java, of high social status tend to be abangan in their religious orientation. Those of abangan background received the most prestigious education, as is seen in table 26 below. TABLE 26 RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND AND PRE-UNIVERSITY EDUCATION OF THE NEW ORDER POLITICAL ELITE Type of School Elementary School ELS HIS Schakelschool Volksschool Islamic Unknown Middle School HBS & Lyceum MULO Vocational SMF Islamic None Unknown High School HBS & Lyceum AMS Vocational SKA Islamic None Unknown Total for each Santri Abangan 20 12 38 14 35 11 12 14 58 28 NOTE: Christians (two) and unknowns (three) are not included. Gamma=.7389. === [PDF page 199] === 183 The santri who attended the ELS and the HBS were from areas where there were many santri priyavi. There is a higher proportion of abangan who had no high school education; these particular abangan are from the military, which is dominated by abangan. Also, as was discussed previously, the abangan religious orientation includes both priyavi and those who are wong cilik. The three elite segments differ in the type of preuniversity education their members received. This is mainly due to the different social origins of the elite segments. Of the three elite segments the technocrats received the most prestigious pre-university education. A high proportion of the military also went to the ELS and the HBS. The technocracy and military have recruited those of high social origins. The political party segment, recruiting those of lower social background than the other two segments, had the least prestigious pre-university education. Several political party leaders are Nahdatul Ulama leaders. was a rudimentary The usual path to iSU leadership elementary education combined with religious training and then Islamic study in various pesantren until the late teens or early twenties. The military elite, compared to other elite segments, had the highest educational attrition rate, as is seen in table 27 below. === [PDF page 200] === TABLE 21 NEW ORDER ELITE SEGMENT AND PRE-UNIVERSITY-EDUCATION Type of School Elementary Sch. ELS HIS Schakelschool Volksschool Islamic Unknown Middle School HBS & Lyceum MULO Vocational SMP Islamic None Unknown High School HBS £>. Lyceum AMS Vocational SMA Islamic None Unknown Total for each Military Pol. Party Technocracy 12 49 18 10 11 42 mm mm 11 10 14 13 23 74 26 15 For most of the military elite, the Japanese occupation occurred during their middle school years, and the majority joined PETA., then continued in the military after independence and did not continue their education, except for military courses. Comparisons were also made among the elite segments of Guided Democracy and the New Order. The Guided Democracy political party leaders received a more prestigious === [PDF page 201] === 185 pre-university education than did their counterparts in the New Order. For example, 13% of the Guided Democracy political party leaders attended the ELS and 15% the HBS, whereas only 4% of their counterparts in the New Order had attended the ELS and none the HBS. There was also an increase of Islamic-educated political party leaders in the New Order (19% compared to 5% in the Guided Democracy period). If the New Order political party elite members were compared with those of the Revolution and Parliamentary Democracy periods there would be even wider disparity. Political parties were the early vehicles of the nationalist movement, and the prestige of the political party leader was at its zenith in the days of the Revolution and the first years of Parliamentary Democracy. After the parties declined in prestige and power, candidates of lesser stature were drawn into the race for political party posts, and in general, the present political party leaders come from lower social origins than those of. early independent Indonesia, and consequently were not able to attend prestigious schools in their youth. This is also the pattern for university education, as will be seen below. University Education Less than one-half of the New Order political elite attended universities, even if those who only went a few months are included. Elite members from past periods, however, were highly educated and many had spent long === [PDF page 202] === 186 years studying abroad. As will be discussed later many of the older nationalist leaders were urbane and cosmopolitan intellectuals, often more at home in Europe than in Indonesia. As is seen in table 28 below, there has been a steady decline in the percentage of elite members who have received higher education. TABLE 28 HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION REACHED BY MEMBERS OF THE INDONESIAN ELITES FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE NEW ORDER (in percentages) Highest Level Reached Revol. Pari. Dem. Trans. Guided Dem. New Order University Law Engineering Medicine Math. Econ., Bus. Pol. S c, Pub. Ad. Sociology Indology Humanities Education Journalism Agricul. Religion Sub. Unk. No. Spec. High School HBS AMS Vocat. SMA Type Unk. 77 38 16 13 70 38 10 12 68 25 15 15 40 13 44 12 11 15 10 11 19 30 26 13 === [PDF page 203] === 187 TABLE 28--Continued Highest Level Reached Revol. Pari. Dem. Middle School HBS MULO Vocational Private SMP Elenu. School Islamic None Unknown Total Trans. Guided Dem. New Order 13 20 10 (229) (162) (53) 18 (64) (115) There was little change in the percentage of those who went of for higher education who studied abroad. 194 However, in the earlier periods the elite members went abroad at an early age and stayed many years, whereas their counterparts in the New Order first studied in Indonesia and embarked upon a career before going abroad for graduate training. Most of the elite members from the earlier political periods had studied in Europe, especially in Holland, whereas more of the New Order elite members had studied in the United States than in any other country.195 The specializations have also changed over time. There has been a steady decline in the proportion of those who studied law, 194 The percentages of those attending university who studied abroad are: Revolution, 45%; Parliamentary Democracy, 43%; Transition, 41%; Guided Democracy, 35%; and the New Order, 38%. 195 Eleven studied in the United States, seven in Europe, two in the Middle East, and one in Australia. === [PDF page 204] === 188 engineering, and medicine, the most common subjects studied in colonial Indonesia. Because of the development of the educational system there is a greater diversification of subjects studied on the part of the New Order political elite. In terms of the subject most frequently studied law is still in first place, but economics is a close second. In the New Order although the percentage of those receiving university education declined, the proportion of those attending universities who were awarded doctorates increased. This is shown in table 29 below. TABLE 29 HIGHEST DEGREE HELD BY MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL ELITES FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE NEW ORDER Degree Revol. Pari. Dem. Trans. Guided Dem. New Order Ph.D., M.D. S.H.,a M.A. I.R., B.A» Total 34 85 44 163 24 59 20 93 12 14 34 17 13 19 36 S.H. is the law degree. I.R. is the degree in engineering. There was a close relationship between social status and university education. Political elite members from upper status groups were more likely to attend universities. For example, more than half of the upper status Javan elite members went to universities, whereas out of seventeen from === [PDF page 205] === 189 wong cilik origin only four received higher education. All of the Outer Islanders who attended universities came from upper status origins. The relationship between social status and university education of the New Order elite is illustrated in table 30 below. TABLE 30 SOCIAL STATUS AND UNIVERSITY EDUCATION OF JAVAN NEWORDER ELITE MEMBERS University Education None One Year or Less Didn't Graduate B.A., I.R. S.H., M.A. Ph.D., M.D. Total Nobility & Privavi Wong Cilik 30 12 64 12 17 There was also a close correlation between elite segment membership and university training. University education was the most important in the case of the technocrats and least important for the military. shown in table 31 below. This is Military education was important, however, in advancing a military career, as will be discussed in the following chapter. The technocrats and political party leaders differed in terms of the subjects studied. Technical subjects were the most common in the technocratic segment, especially economics, whereas most university graduates in the political party === [PDF page 206] === 190 TABLE 31 HIGHER EDUCATION AND ELITE SEGMENT IN THE NEW ORDER Amount of Education None 1 Year or Less Didn't Grad-. B.A., I.R. Ph.D., M.D. Unknown Total Military Political Party Technocracy 56 12 74 26 15 segment were lawyers. Concerning the place of education, the technocrats studied abroad with greater frequency than the members of other elite segments. More technocrats studied in the United States than in Europe, whereas those political party leaders who studied abroad were more diversified in their place of study--five in Europe and the Middle East, and only one in the United States. Even four military leaders studied abroad in universities, all in the United States. For all elite segments in the New Order the common pattern was to finish undergraduate school in Indonesia, begin a career, and then go abroad for advanced education. This, however, was influenced by elite generation; the older members of the elite tended to spend their entire university career abroad. In this section the close relationship between the social origins of the elite and the type of education which they received has been emphasized. Those who originated === [PDF page 207] === 191 from high social status origins had the most prestigious type of pre-university education and were more likely to attend universities. Western-style schools, from elementary schools to universities, were located in urban locales; therefore, those from urban areas were more likely to attend Western-style schools than those from rural areas. The urban nature of the Indonesian political elite will be discussed in the following section. Birthplace of the Elite The Indonesian elite, like most national elites and unlike the mass of the population, came from urban areas and government centers. Javan elite members are more urban in origin than those from the Outer Islands, and Javans from high social status origins were more urban in origin than those from low status origin. In analyzing elite segments it was found that the military is the most rural segment. The elite differs from the mass in terms of population of birthplace and/or residence. Table 32 below illustrates the tendency for the elite to be born in urban centers. To what extent were the parents' birthplaces similar to their sons? sons? Were they born in smaller towns than their Was the prevalent inter-generational migratory pattern from the villages to the towns and cities? the answers to these questions are negative. Largely There were more parents born in villages, but the differences in the size of the birthplaces of parents and sons are not great. Most of the parents were born in cities and towns of similar size to those of their sons; the percentage of agreement === [PDF page 208] === 192 TABLE 32 SIZE OF BIRTHPLACE FOR GUIDED DEMOCRACY AND NEW ORDER ELITES: A COMPARISON WITH THE GENERAL POPULATION DISTRIBUTION (in percentages) Population of Elite Birthplace 100,000+ 50-99,999 20-49,999 Less 20,000 Villages Total % of Population then Resident 93 (60,727,233) Guided Dem. Elite 25 18 30 (64) New Order Elite 24 18 32 (115) SOURCE: The percentages for the general population are from the 1930 census (Netherlands Indies, Volkstelljng, 1930, 8:5). between the population of birthplace of fathers and sons was 48%, between mothers and sons, 53%. The differences included both parents born in smaller places and in larger places. In the latter case usually the fathers were civil servants and teachers and were therefore posted to smaller towns and villages. It is typical that out of such a predominantly rural population, the elite and their parents were largely urban. The elite is largely recruited from those of high social status origin, and in Indonesia, especially in Java, most of those from the upper strata traditionally were centered in towns and cities. Therefore the results so far in this section relate to other elite characteristics previously discussed. Tables 33 and 34 below compare the population of the birthplaces of the New Order elite with those of their father and mother. === [PDF page 209] === 193 TABLE 33 POPULATION OF BIRTHPLACEt NEW ORDER ELITE AND THEIR FATHERS Subject's Birthplace 100,000+ 10 100,000+ 50-99,999 20-49,999 -20,000 Village Total 16 F a t h e r ' s B i r t h o lLace 502099.999 49.999 -20.000 11 18 22 Vill. 23 NOTE: Gamma=.4777. Those for whom the father's birthplace is unknown (33) are not included. TABLE 34 POPULATION OF BIRTHPLACE: NEW ORDER ELITE AND THEIR MOTHERS Subject's Birthplace 100,000+ 100,000+ 50-99,999 20-49,999 -20,000 Village Total 11 17 Mother's Birthplace 2050-20,000 99.999 49,999 12 21 12 Vill. 18 NOTE: Gamma=.4276. Those for whom the mother's birthplace is unknown (41) are not included. Most of the urban centers were located in Java, therefore it is to be expected that Javan elite members tend to come more from urban centers than do Outer Island elite members. The few of those from Outer Island ethnic origin born in the largest urban centers (200,000+) were === [PDF page 210] === 194 born on Java. Most of those originating from villages are from the Outer Islands. This is shown in Table 35. TABLE 35 POPULATION OF BIRTHPLACE OF GUIDED DEMOCRACY AND NEW ORDER ELITES: JAVANS AND OUTER ISLANDERS (in percentages) Population Birthplace 100,000+ 20-99,999 Less 20,000 Villages Unknown Total Guic ted Dem. Outer Java Islands 29 31 22 62 33 10 (91) (23) New O r d e r Java 25 30 28 12 (51)" Outer Islands 13 52 26 33 (13) NOTE: For Guided Democracy Gamma=:.6980; for the New Order Gamma=.3803. The unknowns were not included in the computation. The tendency of the military to be the most rural segment within the New Order elite has already been mentioned. A little more than half of the military elite was born in small towns and villages. However, the Guided Democracy political party elite was slightly more rural than the Guided Democracy military elite. Of the three elite segments the technocrats had the most urban origins, as is seen in table. 36 below, which compares the Guided Democracy and New Order elite segments. Another striking feature of the Indonesian elite is the fact that, contrary to the general population, most elite members were born in a seat of government higher than the village, ranging from a district capital to the === [PDF page 211] === 195 TABLE 36 POPULATION OF BIRTHPLACE OF GUIDED DEMOCRACY AND NEW ORDER ELITES: ELITE SEGMENTS Population Birthplace 100,000+ 29-99,999 -20,000 Villages Unknown Total Guided Democracy MiliPol. Nontary Party party 36 20 national capital, Jakarta. New Military 14 19 24 12 74 Order Pol. Party 26 Tech. 15 This was true both for the 196 Guided Democracy and the New Order elites. Those ethnically from the Outer Islands, like the Javans, were born most often in government and administrative centers, although there is a higher proportion of Outer Islanders born Jakarta, Bandung, and Bogor are included in one category in the following tables, even though Jakarta was the capital of the Netherlands Indies; Bandung a provincial capital, and Bogor a residency capital. The main reasons for including these three cities in one category are: 1) these three cities had the highest concentration of those originating from Europe and were the most "modern" cities (they also had the highest concentration of higher educational institutions in the archipelago); and 2) Bandung and Bogor were the headquarters of certain government departments, and in this way were more similar to Jakarta than the other provincial and residency capitals. Jogjakarta and Surakarta were the capitals of four Javanese kingdoms, indirectly governed, where, although Dutch control was evident, the legal head was the susuhunan in Surakarta and the sultan in Jogjakarta. The provincial capitals included in the provincialregional category are Surabaya and Semarang. The regional capitals are the Gewesten (literally translated as region, but also translated as residency) and Gouvernement in the Outer Islands. There were plans for implementing the limited amount of decentralization that had already taken place in Java by converting certain of the Gewesten to Gouvernement. which functionally were similar to provinces, but Dy \yt\i this decentralization plan had not been carried === [PDF page 212] === 196 in villages. This is especially true of those from ethnic groups where traditionally government is decentralized, such as the Minangkabau and the Batak. However, most of the Outer Islanders were born in division and sub-division capitals, as is seen in table 37 below, which compares Javans and Outer Islanders in the Guided Democracy and New Order elites. TABLE 37 JAVAN AND OUTER ISLAND TYPE OF BIRTHPLACE: GUIDED DEMOCRACY AND NEW ORDER ELITES (in percentages) Type of Birthplace Jakarta, Bandung, Bogor Surakarta, Jogjakarta Prov., Reg. Cap. Res., Div. Cap. Reg., Sub-div. Cap. District Cap. Other Towns Villages Unknown Total Guide>d Dem. Outer Java Island 10 New Order Outer Java Island 18 15 35 10 (91) 15 30 12 (51) 13 30 15 38 31 (23) 13 26 (13) The Javans from noble and privavi status were concentrated in the higher administrative centers; abangan out. The Gewesten and Gouvernement capitals correspond to provincial capitals in independent Indonesia, although there are a few exceptions. In Java residencies were under provinces and in the Outer Islands the divisions or Afdeeling were under the Gewesten and Gouvernement. In Java regencies were under residencies, and in the Outer Islands sub-divisions or Onder-Afdeeling, the lowest administrative division above the municipalities and villages, were under the division. In === [PDF page 213] === 197 were also usually born in administrative centers. The abangan tended to be born in kraton capitals and in residency and regency capitals, whereas the santri were found more in the lower administrative centers, other towns, and villages, as is seen in table 38. TABLE 38 TYPE OF BIRTHPLACE CF THE NEW ORDER JAVAN ELITEs SOCIAL STATUS AND RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND Type of Birthplace Jakarta, Bandung, Bogor Surakarta, Jogjakarta Prov., Reg. Cap. Res., Div. Cap. Reg., Sub-Div. Cap. Dist. Cap. Other Towns Villages Unknown Total Social Status Wong Nobility & Priyayi Cilik Religion Santri Abangan 11 12 12 22 13 19 64 17 58 28 NOTE: For social status Gamma=.4125; for religion Gamma=.4405. The social status and religious "unknowns" were omitted from this table (ten for social status and three for religious background); the two Christians are also left out. Java the lowest administrative division was the district. The "other town" category comprises those non-governmental towns listed as such, and noted as being in the category of "under 20,000 inhabitants" in the Atlas van Tropisch Nederland (Batavia: Netherlands Indies Topographical Service, 1938). === [PDF page 214] === 198 The elite members who were born in villages and small towns left these locales by their teen years. Patterns of elite migration were analyzed and it was found that elite migration tended to be from centers of low population to those of high population and from lesser governmental/administrative centers to higher ones. It is apparent that in order to enter elite ranks it was advantageous to live in urban centers. Almost everyone born in a village, a nongovernmental town, a district or regency capital moved to one of the main cities by the time he was in his teens. The movement of those from residency capitals to larger cities was less, but nevertheless present. Even those from provincial capitals and the three Western-oriented cities were highly mobile. All those from villages, except one, had moved to a major administrative center, usually to provincial, kraton capitals, or to Jakarta, Bandung, or Bogor. The Outer Island members of the elite had the most qualitative movement. usually to study. Most came to Java in their youth, In Java the average Outer Islander elite member became involved either in politics or in the military and began his career in Java. To summarize, the type of birthplace was influenced greatly by ethnic background, and within the Javans, by social status and religious background. Another important variable in elite background is age, discussed in the final section of this chapter. === [PDF page 215] === 199 Generational Patterns Three Elite Generations There are three main generations within the elite. 197 These generations can be separated not only by age, but, more importantly, by the period which most influenced their development. The oldest generation, in their 50s and early 60s, grew up in the Dutch period, the iaman 198 Belanda. Many members of this generation, particularly the intellectuals and party politicians (especially from the PSI and to a lesser extent the P M ) were profoundly influenced by the Dutch and, in general, by Western culture. Sutan Sjahrir (the former PSI leader), upon his return to Indonesia went through an identity crisis, and felt closer to Western culture than to his native cul199 ture. He was an exception in regard to his extreme closeness to Western culture, but still in the formative years of the older members of the political elite the Dutch system and its culture were predominant and had an irrevocable effect upon them. The older leaders from the Parmusi were less influenced than those from the PSI and the FNI, but still one older leader reminisced that in 197 These generations would be more accurately described as cohorts, groups of people of the same age, but in the language of Indonesian political discourse they are known as generations. 198 The rakyat (masses), particularly those in Java, still refer to the Dutch period as the iaman normal (normal times). 199 See his autobiography, Out of Exile. === [PDF page 216] === 200 his last year of the AMS he wrote a book of Islamic devotions in Dutch. He said that his classmates and he felt more comfortable in Dutch than in Indonesian and they used Dutch to teach Islam. Of the older elite members, the NU leaders were the least influenced by the Dutch. education was usually completely Islamic. Their One of the older NU leaders was an exception, however. His father thought that he "should know both worlds" and sent him to a HIS; however, after he graduated from the HIS he attended a pesantren. Although the NU leaders were the least influenced by the Dutch there was still some impact. The relationship between most of the older leaders and the Dutch was ambivalent. Although there was great dislike on the part of most of them for the Dutch and a striving and desire for independence, the main political language was Dutch and the concepts which were used to express their political opinions and ideas were mainly Western. The world in which the upper class, Dutcheducated intellectuals and civil servants moved was a Dutch world, by and large. The world of the NU leader (the marketplace, the pondok. Islamic politics) was less so, but even in the perennial debates with their modernist Islamic rivals, there was no escape from listening to and arguing about Western concepts. The degree of ambivalence varied among the leaders. Apparently the closer the leaders were to the Dutch, especially if they worked under them, the more hatred they had for them. === [PDF page 217] === 201 old Parmusi leader once remarked that this closeness was the reason why the PNI leaders had so much hatred for the Dutch (they and/or their fathers were the civil servants). The modernist Islamic leader, Haji Agus Salim, stressed that you should keep physically separated as much as possible from the Dutch, so that you would not hate them. The experiences and attitudes of "Professor Sarwo," a leader from the oldest generation, will be discussed, especially in regard to influences of his generation upon him. Professor Sarwo, an intellectual and a former PSI leader, is highly respected for his knowledge and has been active in the government for years, with the exception of Guided Democracy when he was in exile due to his participation in the regional rebellion. He is Javanese of privavi origin and spoke of his ancestor from the Jogjakarta kraton who became one of the leading "generals" in the struggle of Prince Diponegoro. Professor Sarwo went to Holland to the university after attending the ELS and HBS in Indonesia. He enjoyed his years in Europe, having studied and lived in various countries in Europe during his student years. In describing his experiences and reactions to the Dutch, Professor Sarwo said that he never felt any discrimination from the Dutch and had no feelings against them. He was in Holland during the Nazi invasion, and spoke with pride of the efforts of Indonesian students to help the Dutch Jews and said that two of the students were sent to Dachau for their === [PDF page 218] === 202 activities. He expressed his amazement at the Nazi hatred of the Jews. Professor.Sarwo spoke of his varied religious background. His mother was santri and gave him an early santri education; his father was Buddhist and taught him about Buddhism; and he studied at a Protestant ELS as a child. He married a Minahassan, who is from a strongly Calvinist background. Professor Sarwo lived in various countries, both in Asia and in Europe, during his exile from Indonesia during Guided Democracy, and he enjoyed all of them, with the exception of Switzerland, which he found too xenophobic. Here is a man, very cosmopolitan, urbane, and sophisticated, at home almost anywhere in an urban culture. His personality is unusual for a Javanese, and has probably been molded by his years in the West and his long exposure to Western culture. He is extremely frank and direct, a marked contrast to the usual indirect and subtle approach of the Javanese. His directness also appears to carry over in his relationships with Indonesians. For example, he indicated that he is under constant pressure by military leaders to agree to policies which would favor the latter; but when they try to pressure him to sign a document, the contents of which he does not approve, he tells themt "You may kill me, but I shall never sign this." Unprepared for such a direct response, the military leaders back down. The second generation, the one from which most of the political elite of the New Order come, is one that was === [PDF page 219] === 203 influenced greatly by the Japanese occupation and by the five-year struggle for independence. The psychological shock of seeing the Dutch rapidly defeated and humiliatingly marched off to concentration camps by Asians was tremendous. A large segment of the elite served in PETA, the Japanese-trained auxiliary force. During their training they were isolated and not only taught military skills, but also indoctrinated with the Japanese martial philosophy, the spirit of Bushido. One of the leaders expressed his admiration for Bushido principles, and went on to say that he still tries to live in accordance with some of the Bushido principles. One remnant from the teachings of PETA is the emphasis upon toughness; the Japanese taught the Indonesians in their military training that leaders should be tough and hard. Some of the army leaders are well-known for emulating their Japanese teachers. One of these generals said of himselft "The Japanese taught me to be tough and I am tough." When asked whether as a regional commander he occasionally found that he had to compromise since he commanded both civilians and military persons, he replied excitedlyt "No, you must be tough, tough." The Japanese period not only had an influence upon the military, but upon other groups as well, although probably not in such a concentrated form. There were various youth movements at different times during the occupation in which most of the party leaders of this === [PDF page 220] === 204 generation were active. In general, there was a change in the way politics was conducted which influenced the postindependence political culture. As Anderson states, in short, the Japanese dramatized politics and romanticized affairs of state.201 The Japanese style seemed both radical and traditional to the Indonesians. The emphasis upon mass participation and upon nationalism and Asian solidarity were new, but the symbolism and some of the concepts preached by the Japanese were quite similar to Indonesian traditional beliefs. 202 The period following the Japanese occupation was the Revolution. Almost all the elite members participated in the Revolution, but it was the second generation that was the most profoundly influenced by it. The politics of the Revolution was influenced to a great extent by generational differences. Political power was monopolized by the older generation, but those of the second generation were very active in pressuring the older generation for periuangan For an interesting discussion of the intellectual and emotional climate of the Japanese occupation see B.R. O'G. Anderson, "Japan: The Light of Asia," Southeast Asia in World War II: Four Essays, ed. Josef Silverstein, Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies, Monograph Series, no. 7 (New Haven: Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies, 1966), pp. 13-50. 20l Ibid., p. 21. 202 For example, some of the Japanese beliefs were similar to old Javanese beliefs concerning power, such as the belief of the Japanese that spiritual power can overcome material deficiencies and that spiritual power is developed through self-strengthening and "subordination of the self" (Ibid., p. 22). === [PDF page 221] === 205 (struggle) against the Dutch, rather than continuing the amount of, and trust in, diplomatic activity stressed by 203 the older generation. Military leaders especially look back to the Revolution as a time when life was less complicated, a time when they had close relations with the rakvat. and when corruption was minimal. was the happiest time of my life. "The Revolution We didn't have anything. Our only aim was to throw out the Dutch. We were fairly 204 united." If one examines the Revolution dispassionately, disunity was more evident than unity, but the important thing is that "the feeling of unity was powerful 205 at that time... " even though there was much infighting within and among the various groups. This generation is dominated by the military and those from guerrilla groups, and therefore as an example of this generation an army leader was chosen. There are, of course, both party leaders and technocrats from this generation who fought in the Revolution, usually in student armies or in laskar (guerrilla groups usually affiliated 203 For a fascinating account of the early days of the Revolution see Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance. 1944-1946 (Ithaca, K.Y. and London: Cornell University Press, 1972). 204 Interview with General Hoegeng Iman Santoso, then commander of the national police, Jakarta, 9 October 1968. 205 Herbert F e i t h and Lance C a s t l e s, e d s., Indon e s i a n P o l i t i c a l Thinking 1945-1965 ( I t h a c a, ft.Y. and London: Cornell University P r e s s, 1970), p. 29. === [PDF page 222] === with political movements), but the typical member of this generation is a military leader. "General Gatot," as he will be called, is from the western part of Central Java, a well-known recruiting group for army leaders. He was born into a priyavi family, who like that of Professor Sarwo, count among their ancestors a bupati who served under Prince Diponegoro. General Gatot attended first the HIS, the MULO, and was in his third year of MULO when the Japanese occupation began. During his youth he had been attracted to an army career, but didn't want to join the KNIL, the Netherlands Indies army, since it was a colonial army. General Gatot saw advertisements for Heiho, a Japanese-instituted paramilitary force, and knew that the Japanese army was looked upon as a good Asian army and therefore immediately joined. He was shocked to find out that almost all the Indonesians in Heiho were ex-KI\IL prisoners, illiterates, and common criminals. He wanted to escape, but was frightened by rumors spread around the camp that the fence surrounding the camp was electrified. General Gatot was lucky to be one of the two members of Heiho in the cam<p to be chosen for the PETA„ He was sent to Magelang, where noncommissioned officers were trained, and from there to Bogor for training as a commissioned officer. He found his PETA experience positive, especially the teaching of leadership skills; he said "the Japanese made us real leaders and taught us to control and command in the field." He added === [PDF page 223] === 207 that he learned that the strategy of the Japanese officers in commanding their subordinates is to listen to them; only after listening to their subordinates will the commanders make decisions. In his career, according to General Gatot, he has followed this strategy. He went on to say that after he makes a decision"... I have to be tough until another problem is met. Only with this system can we get complete support from our subordinates." After the Japanese defeat General Gatot was asked by one of the late army commanders to join his regiment in Central Java. After his transfer he became involved in a controversy between the officers and the enlisted men. General Gatot, influenced by the egalitarian ideals preached during the Revolution, was angered by the differential treatment of the officers and men by members of the pa.mong. Praia in the area where the regiment was stationed. His fellow officers seemed less influenced by these egalitarian ideals and supported the pa.monp, praia. Through an incident which arose from this controversy and the demands of the men for more equal treatment, General Gatot at the close of the Revolution was demoted by one rank because of his backing of the men; but he was not hampered too much by this demotion. Through his ability and also through his relations with certain key members of the army, he was able to rise through command positions, supplemented by stints in staff and command colleges, both in Indonesia and abroad. === [PDF page 224] === 208 The youngest elite generation (and the smallest one), in contrast to the other two generations, spent most of their formative years in an independent Indonesia. Hence their crucial development took place in a nation ruled by their own people. Some did have experience during the Revolution, but even those who fought in the Revolution or had non-military duties in guerrilla groups were quite young, and after the Revolution they went on to junior high school or high school and later to the university. Therefore, those who were active in the politics of protest (and most were) were protesting actions and/or members of their own government; their target of protest during their youth and early adulthood was not a foreign occupier. This is an important distinction between this youngest generation and the other two generations. This generation grew up in a nation beset by political and economic difficulties, and most were active in groups protesting the extent of corruption and the lack of democratic rights. All the members of this generation, with the exception of the one military member, were active in the crucial period between the abortive coup of October 1, 1965 and the downfall of Soekarno in March 1966. Half of the members are well-known for their active and vocal opposition to certain characteristics and practices of the New Order. This latter group has strong support from the present student community, which in January 1974 began the first serious open rioting against the New Order. The leaders in the youngest elite === [PDF page 225] === 209 generation, and their beliefs are widely held by students, are incensed by the amount of corruption and especially by the staggering increase in its extent; it is commonly said that corruption during Guided Democracy was not as widespread and as flagrant as it is during the present period and that the extent of corruption is ever expanding. second belief shared by these leaders and most students is a strong belief in democratic values and in the rule of law. One example of a leader of this generation was the late H.E. Subchan from the NU party and, until the new people's consultative assembly, a vice-chairman of that legislative institution. His views were well-known and he was active before the press, at meetings and at university seminars. ... the major cause of failure of the country's development plans in the last ten years has been corruption.... Repelita /the seven-year development plan/ will be accomplished if there is an effective control mechanism established on a sound democratic political power structure.206 Other members of this elite generation cooperate with the military government, and in interviews held between 1967 and 1969 they stressed that the present government is much better than that of Guided Democracy; by 1975, however, some were saying the opposite. In the early years of the New Order the members of this group maintained that the political culture of Indonesia differs significantly from those of Western countries, and according to the values of the Indonesian political culture it is impossible to Harian Kami. 23 January 1969. === [PDF page 226] === 210 eradicate corruption and establish a liberal democracy. At that time a few ambitious members of this group stressed that the army has to have civilian leaders who will communicate between the government and the populace and each hoped to be chosen as the leader or one of the leaders. A lawyer and the former leader of an action group influential at that time will be taken as an example of this generation. "Bung Lubis," as he will be called, belongs to the group active in the struggle for democratic ideals and principles. Bung Lubis, whose parents come from Sumatra, was born in Jakarta, but spent the years of the Revolution in Jogjakarta, where the political center of the Revolution was located. During the Revolution Bung Lubis was in elementary and junior high school. He spent half of the interviews talking about his father, of whom he obviously was very proud, and whom he in certain ways, tried to emulate. A brief account of his father's background will be helpful. His father originated from a village in the Mandailing Batak area of North Sumatra and in his early youth desired to join the nationalist movement. Bung Lubis' grandfather was opposed and once forcibly brought him home. The second time the father was successful in running away from home. He joined one of the nationalist movements and was involved in the 1926 rebellion in Sumatra; he managed to escape arrest and fled to Jakarta. A Dutch businessman took a liking to him, adopted him, and put him through school. Bung Lubis* === [PDF page 227] === 211 father became a journalist and was immediately embroiled in nationalist politics; during the Japanese occupation he joined one of the underground groups. During the first months of the Revolution Bung Lubis' father headed one of the nationalist laskar; then he was called to Jogjakarta to work in the fledgling Ministry of Information. After independence the family moved back to Jakarta, and Bung Lubis* father continued his activity in journalism, including the editing of an English-language newspaper. The father was strongly anti-Communist and also was identified with the PSI; in the early part of Guided Democracy his newspaper was closed down upon the direct order of Soekarno. Bung Lubis shared his father's dislike of the PKI. high school he was chairperson of a local branch of a national student organization, and he spearheaded the opposition to the decision of the organization's leadership to affiliate itself with the Communist-dominated International Union of Students. When the discussion at the national conference concerning this issue was not in accordance with his liking, Bung Lubis pulled his branch out of the national organization and established an independent local group. Bung Lubis spent a few years studying law at the University of Indonesia, but was interested in the attempts of one of the generals to cut down on corruption in the government, and therefore joined the Attorney General's Office. A year later he was sent to one of the regions of Sumatra to serve on the committee screening === [PDF page 228] === 212 detainees to determine whether or not they were involved in the regional rebellion in 1958. Bung Lubis considered many of the detainees innocent of the charge and released them. His work was rather frustrating since the day after he would release a detainee the army would re-arrest that person. His assignment in Sumatra was cut short at the request of the army commander there, and Bung Lubis was sent to Australia to study law. He returned to Indonesia imbued with the British sense of justice, and found himself in a different Indonesia, an Indonesia at the beginning of the transition from Parliamentary Democracy to Guided Democracy. After two years back in Indonesia, he was de facto kicked out of the Attorney General's Office. He completed his law degree in the next few months and after two years of reading and keeping in close contact with dissatisfied intellectuals Bung Lubis decided to establish a student movement (some members of the Siliwangi Division, the army division of West Java, also joined) opposed to the PK1; this was toward the end of Guided Democracy. After the abortive coup Bung Lubis and his group were in the forefront of the opposition to Soekarno, and they strove to root all of the "Old Order" people and policies out of the government. At the time of the interviews Bung Lubis was very critical of many action group leaders who had been coopted into the government and were not continuing their === [PDF page 229] === fight against corruption and the struggle for the establishment of a more democratic order. 207 Bung Lubis has continued his struggle; in recent years he has been especially active in furthering human rights, including the rights of those accused of PKI membership, which is unusual in the Indonesian political scene. He was reported as saying that "...as human beings, they /the Communists7 have basic rights which we must respect for the sake of our own dignity as human 208 beings." He heads a legal aid society, which operated nationally until the government forbade it to organize chapters outside of Jakarta. In January 1974, following the student demonstrations, Bung Lubis was arrested and was detained until October 1975. Analysis of Age Characteristics Age distribution within the elite is most salient in terms of elite segments and in comparisons between Guided Democracy and the New Order. What differences are there between Guided Democracy and New Order segments? Table 39 shows that the civilian segments of Guided Democracy were older than those in the New Order, whereas the Guided Democracy military segment was younger than its counterpart in the New Order. 208 Also see Antara. 1 October 1969. Harian Kami, 27 October 1971. === [PDF page 230] === 214 TABLE 39 AGE DISTRIBUTION OF GUIDED DEMOCRACY AND NEW ORDER ELITE SEGMENTS Age Military G.D. N.O. Political Party Under 40 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60+ Total Mean 12 20 51 32 43 24 37 73 46 Non-Partya G.D. N.U. 26 48 49 15 46 NOTE: There were six unknowns: four Guided Democracy and one New Order military leaders, and one Guided Democracy non-party leader. The base year used for computing the ages of the Guided Democracy elite was 1963, and 1969 was the base year used for the computation of the New Order elite. The third segment of the Guided Democracy elite cannot, like its counterpart in the New Order, be identified as technocrats, whereas they, like their counterparts in the New Order, are non-party leaders. There were a substantial number from the army who were included in both Guided Democracy and New Order elites (fourteen out of thirty-five of the Guided Democracy military leaders were carried on into the New Order). Most of the military carry-over members were younger leaders of the army elite of the Guided Democracy period. 209 But of those fourteen only five remain in elite positions as of 1975. Their mean age in 1963 was forty-one years of age, compared to a mean age of forty-five for those not carried over from the Guided Democracy period to the New Order. === [PDF page 231] === 215 In the New Order the political party elite segment had the broadest age range, from under forty to over fiftyfive years of age. In the military segment the army has the narrowest age range. Those from the air force and navy are younger than their counterparts in the army, mainly because most air force and naval leaders were too young to be in PETA during the Japanese period and found more opportunities for rapid advancement in the air force and navy. The police had more representatives from the oldest generation, most of whom had served in the police at the end of the Dutch period. Why are the military and political party elite segments so different? The main reason is the greater difficulty of the military in accommodating generational pressures for representation in the elite. As a result of generational conflicts in the political parties, younger leaders have come to the fore, and through the rough and tumble accompanying party conferences some of these younger leaders have been elected to positions of responsibility. The older leaders, though, are not usually expelled from leadership? instead it is common for the older leader to remain general chairman, even though his power is not great within the party. This is partially due to the deference shown to the elder, the bapak (literally, "father")* but, more importantly due to the sharp bickering among strong contenders who find it more expedient to let the older leader remain in the most prestigious position in order to === [PDF page 232] === 216 prevent a rival from gaining this position or to avoid serious dissension within the party. The political parties, too, were more affected by the'turmoil following the demise of Guided Democracy than were the senior army leaders. Many of the older nationalist leaders were discredited by their policy of cooperation with Sukarno and the PKI; these leaders were ousted from leadership during the transition from Guided Democracy to the New Order, sometimes through the intervention of the military. the military there are no leaders as senior in age as in the political parties; few Indonesians, except for the Minahassan and Ambonese, were recruited or attracted to officer rank in the KNIL during the Dutch period. In the New Order there are none of the most senior army leaders in positions of responsibility. Soeharto has followed a policy of either retiring them or posting them abroad as ambassadors. He considers it politically expedient not to have military leaders senior to him in age and experience in important positions. There is only one military leader under forty years of age (an air force leader). The military, especially the army, has not appointed members of the younger generation to powerful positions. The military is dominated by the "1945 Generation," i.e. those who fought in the Revolution. There are a few leaders who were military cadets during the Revolution, and also a few who served in lowly positions at the beginning of the Revolution! but there === [PDF page 233] === 217 are none in the present leadership who did not fight in the Revolution. Over the past several years there has been strong pressure exerted on the "1945 Generation" by the younger military generation. Finally, in 1972 an army leader announced that beginning in 1977 positions of brigade commandants will be held by the new generation, and that by 1980 the new generation will rise to the regimental and command level and to the staff of the regional command. 210 Army headquarters subsequently announced that by 1982 some officers from the new generation will be hold211 ing top positions in army headquarters. Generational pressures have also been evidenced in the armies of South Korea, Pakistan, and Zaire. In South Korea there have been three groups: Japanese academy graduates, those trained for brief periods during the American occupation, and those trained after the Korean War in the military academy. The ages of the three groups are similar, and promotional opportunities have been blocked for the lower groups. 212 Pakistan differs from Indonesia in that the senior officers in the military were commissioned mainly in the 1930s and the junior officers between 1941 and 1946. As in the South Korean and Indonesian armies, promotion of the junior officers was quite slow, even slower than in the 210 Sinar Harapan, 6 i\ovember 1972. ibid. 212 Kim, "Korean Kundaehwa," p. 361. === [PDF page 234] === 218 Indonesian army.213 In Zaire there is tension between the older generation, composed of those who were sergeant majors at the beginning of independence with little miltary training, and the younger generation trained in 214 Europe. Similarly, in Indonesia, as in other new nations, there is tension within the army between the generation composed of those with little military training who participated in the "national struggle" for independence and the younger, more highly trained generation. In this chapter it has Deen demonstrated that the Indonesian political elite is recruited from narrow origins and that this has been a consistent trend since independence. Ethnically, Javanese are increasingly dominant in the elite, and socially, recruitment into the elite continues to be monopolized by those from high social status origin, although political parties recently have begun to be vehicles for social mobility. These ethnic and social characteristics of the elite were influenced by Dutch educational policies, whereby educational institutions were concentrated in Java and admission policies favored those from high social status origins. The elite is also dominated by those from urban areas, the traditional residence of upper status groups, particularly 213 Maniruzzaman, "Ayub Regime," p. 223. 214 Jean-Claude Williame, "Congo-Kinshasa: General Mobuto and Two Political Generations," in Soldier and State in Africa, ed. Claude E. Welch, Jr. (Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press, 1970), pp. 138-139. === [PDF page 235] === 219 those of Java. Educational institutions were also concentrated in urban areas. Elite composition is also influenced by generation; the political party segment has been more successful in allowing the representation of various generations in leadership ranks than has the military. Given that a candidate for elite status meets standards of adequacy in the above areas, what possible paths may be followed by the aspirant for elite status? The following two chapters analyze the major career paths to elite status: the military, the political party, and the technocracy. === [PDF page 236] === 220 CHAPTER III CAREER FATTERI\S OF THE MILITARY ELITE Summary In political science literature the military has been divided into three career lines: command, staff, and technical. Most of the Indonesian military leaders rose through traditional command and staff positions, not through technical positions. There were a few army leaders who rose through unorthodox ways, namely through nonmilitary positions (karya) and through close personal relationships with influential leaders. Contrary to the militaries of Nigeria, Brazil and the Lnited States, the proportion of Indonesian military leaders who rose through command and staff routes is similar. In the i\ew Order, though, those who came to elite status through command positions had a higher survival rate in the elite than those who reached elite status through staff positions. The most salient characteristic of all those who reached the highest ranks within the army was service See Janowitz, Professional Soldier. Luckham, Mgerian Military, p. 100; U'yckoff, "Brazilian Military Oligarchy," pp. 3-4; and Janowitz, Professional Soldier, p. 147. === [PDF page 237] === 221 during the Revolution. The Indonesian army of the Revolution has its antecedents in the K M L (the Dutch Indies army) and the FETA (the Japanese-sponsored army), and most of those of high rank served in PETA. Those who were officers during the Revolution and were successful at winning promotions were found to possess certain characteristics: 1) a military education and/or a good general education; 2) local backing; and 3) sponsorship by a military patron (bapak). In certain cases the possession of particular skills helped to make up for deficiencies in the above, h'hat distinguishes the military elite from others who rose to high rank? In the analysis of the i\ew Order military elite clique membership appears to be the most important determinant, and military reputation, second. In the present elite prior friendship or past professional relationship with Soeharto has been instrumental in the rise to elite status, and, more importantly, in a person's survival rate. Four elite biographies illustrated the four career groups, i.e. command, staff, karya, and personal. Then the career groups were compared in terms of two background characteristics—the extent of general education and premilitary occupations. Those from the staff and karya groups were more educated than those from the other two groups. The staff group also had a higher frequency of work experience before entering the military. Kost of them were employed in the railways, and many entered the army === [PDF page 238] === 222 through a railroad workers army that was formed at the onset of the Revolution. The career groups differ especially in the years spent in the center as distinguished from the field, and in the years spent in command as compared with staff positions. Before the command member could aspire to elite status he spent many years in various levels of field command, working his way up from company commander to regimental commander, with the command assignments being interspersed with divisional staff experience. For the command group the key to their rise to elite status was the achievement of a prestigious divisional command. In the i\ew Crder those who have been regional commanders have often been appointed to high staff positions. For those in the staff group elite status is achieved by assignment to a high center staff position. Before this appointment the candidate spends several years at a variety of regional staff positions and then low center positions, usually interspersed with a military training assignment, often abroad. The karya group usually spent some years in field command and regional staff positions, then were brought to the center, either to a low center or relatively high center position for a few years. Subsequently they were appointed to a karya position, such as manager of a state enterprise or chaiiperson of a military-sponsored political or labor group, and they rose to elite status through the karya position. The personal group === [PDF page 239] === 223 spent years in regional staff positions, then, in general, were assigned to low center positions. Their rise to elite status was not due to their successful climbing of the military career ladder, but due to their close friendship with military influentials. Certain crucial years were chosen to illustrate the progression of military careers over time: the groups differed in the types of positions held during these years. Particular factors, such as divisional identification, place of first assignment, military education and instruction, military service abroad, and karya positions were analyzed to determine the extent to which they served as aids in the career of the military elite, and whether they were of more help to certain career groups than to others. Most of the army elite members are recruited from two divisions, the Diponegoro of Central Java and the Siliwangi of West Java. The army elite members, in general, were first assigned to a city or a town; those who rose through staff positions tended to start their army career in a large city. Military education appeared to be most important for those who rose through staff positions. Eut, in general, academic achievement or non-achievement did not appear to influence future assignments. Indonesia differed greatly from Peru, Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil in the importance of military education as a criterion for promotion. these Latin American countries military education appeared === [PDF page 240] === 224 to be the most determining factor influencing promotion. In Mexico all candidates for promotion from the second lieutenant level to the lieutenant colonel level must pass a battery of tests which last up to two weeks, and those with the highest scores are promoted. In Peru ninety percent of the army officers trere graduates of the military academy, and, furthermore, eighty percent of the division generals on active duty from 1940-1965 graduated at the top of their class. Brazil has a very elaborate relationship between military education and promotion. I\ot only must all professional military men have attended the academy, but all those who aspire to military elite status must pass the difficult entrance examination for a three-year course at the General Staff School. As Stepan states, since Latin American armies have had no combat experience, military education has been given a determining role in mili7 tary promotions. Ihe Indonesian army, in contrast, has had much combat experience, not only in the Revolution, but also in crushing various rebellions that have arisen at different times in scattered parts of the archipelago, Franklin D. Margiotta, "Changing Fatterns of Political Influence: The Mexican Military and Politics," paper presented at the 69th meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, 4-8 September 1972, p. 22. Einaudi, "Military Rule in Peru," p. 5. Wyckoff, "Brazilian Military Oligarchy," p. 3. Stepan, Patterns in Brazil, pp. 50-51. lbid., p. 51. === [PDF page 241] === - 225 in the fighting following the attempted coup of 1 October 1965, and, most recently, against guerrillas in Kalimantan. Military education and instruction appear to be more important in the formation of friendships which may be helpful to a person's career. For example, a sizable proportion of the New Order military elite came from the 1959 and 1960 classes of the Staff and Command School. In Greece, seven of the twelve men who were instrumental in the planning and execution of the April 1967 coup were from the 1943 Military Academy class and four came from the 1940 class. Few military elite members received assignments abroad, except for purposes of study. Those who received other military assignments abroad usually were military attaches. Most of the army elite members, mainly from the staff group, received their assignments as bonuses, whereas those from the air force were usually sent into exile, i.'hen the elite members returned from abroad they usually were given better positions, but that had little to do with their assignment abroad. From the beginning of the army there has been a strong belief that the Indonesian army not only has the function of assuring the security of the country, but also °George Zaharopoulos, "Politics and the Army in Post-..ar Greece," in Greece under Military Rule, eds. Richard Clogg and George Yannopoulos (New York: Easic Books, 1972), p. 32. === [PDF page 242] === 226 that of safeguarding and improving the social and political life of the nation. This second function remained dormant until 1957, at which time the practice began of posting high military officers to governmental positions, and also of assigning some army officers to organize political and trade movements. Karya positions can have one out of three effects for a career: promotion, demotion, and pre-retirement. Approximately sixty percent of the elite members, however, did benefit from a karya position. As noted above, the practice of appointing military men to karya positions began in the pre-military government. In Mexico, a civilian-dominated government, military officers are commonly used to fill high executive and diplomatic positions. Many were also appointed as governors. In conclusion, the major paths to success in the Indonesian military are through the traditional command and staff lines. Service in the Revolution was characteristic of all elite members. In the i\ew Order particular clique membership is instrumental in advancing to and preserving one's elite status. 'Margiotta, "Mexican Military and Politics," pp. 24-25. === [PDF page 243] === 227 Evolution of the Indonesian Military Military elite members began their military career during one of three time periodsi the Dutch occupation (13), the Japanese occupation (35), and the Revolution (27). It is important to note that none of the military elite joined the services after the Revolution. The time of entry into the military and the vehicle through which entry occurred differ; to a certain extent this has influenced career patterns and, as will be seen in chapter 5, factional patterns. To trace the origins of the modern Indonesian military one must go back to the Dutch Indies colonial army, the Koninkliik Nederlands-Indische Leger (KI\IL), the Royal Netherlands Indies Army, which was originally formed in 1830 as an auxiliary force for Dutch "pacification" efforts. By 1940 the KNIL consisted of 1,345 officers and 37,583 troops. The KNIL, even as late as 1942, was dominated by Dutch, and especially Eurasian, officers. There were a miniscule number of Indonesian commissioned or even non-commissioned officers recruited by KNIL. Before 1940 the few Indonesians who did have officer training attended the Officers School of Meester Cornells (near Jakarta) or, fewer still, the Hogere Kri idsschool (HKS), Fauker, "Military in Indonesia," p. 188. Ibid., p. 188. === [PDF page 244] === 228 12 Higher War School, in Breda, Holland. The few members of the New Order military elite who received officer training during the Dutch occupation attended the Koninkliik Militaire Academie (KMA), the Royal Military Academy, and the Corps QpleidinR Reserve Officieren (CORO), Training Corps for Reserve Officers, both of which opened in 1940 13 in Bandung. After the fall of Holland to Germany in 1940, the Netherlands Indies government accelerated its recruiting program, not only attempting to attract more Indonesians to the army, but trying to recruit those from the major ethnic groups, such as the Javanese and Sundanese, instead of the traditional recruitment of those from Christian areas (notably Minahassa and Ambon). This was evident not only in the government's general program to enlarge the number of troops, but also in its recruitment of officers, often by a combination of enticement and coercion. For example, one army elite member said that soon after he enrolled in the technical institute (THS) in Bandung, he was given the choice of switching to the KMA or joining the army after graduation with no guarantee of holding 12 Nugroho Notosusanto, "A National Perspective in Armed Forces and Society into the 1980'ss Indonesia," paper presented at the meeting of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Chicago, 11-13 October 1973, p. 2. 13 In addition, in Bandung and Batavia all Indonesian youth attending Dutch schools, together with Europeans, were required to enter the civil defence corps established around 1940 (see Ruth McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army," Indonesia 11 /April 19717: 133-134, ft. 2). === [PDF page 245] === 229 officer rank. Therefore he chose the lesser of the two evils; until then he had not envisaged the possibility of entering a military career. Others, attracted to the military or because of limited possibilities in their first career, entered the KMA from the CORO. The first class of the KMA was composed of twenty-six Indonesians, some of whom are still on active duty. By now, though, most have voluntarily or involuntarily retired from the army. Later on, during the Revolution, KMA cadets were dominant in the establishment of the Siliwangi division. Former KMA cadets are proud of their military origins, and contrast themselves with PETA alumni, who had far less military training than those from the KMA. In the case of the other armed services, there was a police academy in Sukabumi, West Java. There were very few Indonesians enrolled in the academy; in 1941 there were only two Indonesians in the entire student body. None of the present naval elite began their military service in the Dutch navy and merchant marine, although several training schools had been set up by the Dutch in Makassar, Jakarta, and Surabaya, and a few Indonesians trained at the Royal Institute of the Navy in Den Helder, Interview with Brigadier General Abdul Kadir, Jakarta, 12 May 1969. Interview with Commissioner General Teuku A. Azis, Jakarta, 17 May 1969. Iwa Kusuma Sumantri, Sediarah Revolusi Indonesia Masa Revolusi Bersendiata. 2 vols, (n.p., n.d.) 2s 125. === [PDF page 246] === 230 Holland. During the Dutch period there was a fledgling air force, which was a part of KNIL. Very few Indonesians, though, were allowed to have pilot training. The few Indonesians who were trained were limited to serving in 18 the crew. The founder of the air force, though, Air Marshall Suryadharma, was a graduate of the HKS in Breda, and he enrolled in the new K M L school that taught flying and scouting two years after he returned to Indonesia, in 1936. Although the number of officers trained in the air part of the KNIL was small, they nevertheless dominated the air force until the late 1950s. Most members of the military elite began their military career during the second period, the Japanese occupation. The most important military organization begun by the Japanese authorities was the Tentara Sukarela Pembala Tanah Air (PETA), the Volunteer Army for the Defense of 19 the Fatherland. Except for some PETA units in Bali, PETA was limited to Java. By 1945 there were 66 battalions and 35,855 soldiers in PETA on Java.20 The founding of the PETA began with the establishment of a youth training Notosusanto, "Armed Forces," p. 2. 18 Interview with Vice Air Marshall Ali Budiardjo, Jakarta, 3 April 1969. 19 For more information on PETA and the military organizations in general founded during the Japanese occupation see G.S. Kanahele, "The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia: Prelude to Independence" (Ph.D, dissertation, Cornell University, 1967). * Pauker, "Military in Indonesia," p. 190. === [PDF page 247] === 231 center (Seinen Dooioo) near Jakarta in Tanggerang. This was set up in January 1943 by the Tokubetsu Han (Beppan), the counter-intelligence unit under the 16th Army,the division of the Japanese army that was responsible for the occupation of Java. Each class was to last for six months, and during this time the recruits were to be given rigorous physical, "spiritual" or mental, and military training. The first class lasted for six months, but the second class was cut short due to the establishment of FETA and its officer-training center in Bogor. These two classes of Seinen Dooioo, numbering fifty young men between the ages of sixteen and twenty, were the nucleus of the new PETA army. Those from the second class stayed in Bogor to finish their training, and some from the first class taught at Bogor and others were posted to their home areas to get more recruits. Non-commissioned officer training (Renseitai) was inttagelang;it was not uncommon for graduates of the Renseitai to enter commissioned officers training at Bogor. Some from the Heiho were also able to enter such training, but this was rarer than for those from the Renseitai. Commissioned officer training was for three ranks: daidan-cho (battalion commanders); chudan-cho (company 21 Heiho began in May 1943; members of the Heiho were expected to be used as auxiliary personnel for the Japanese army. Towards the end of the occupation some were trained to fight and took part in battles outside Indonesia. There were 24,873 in the Heiho (Ibid., p. 190). === [PDF page 248] === 232 22 commanders) and shodan-cho (platoon commanders). Only 23 the shodan-cho received adequate military training. The Japanese recruited older men to be battalion and company commanders,24 and they chose battalion commanders from those who held positions of respect in their area, such as teachers, civil servants or religious leaders. Battalions were located in the home area of the commanders, and members of battalions were from those areas. Teachers seemed to predominate among the company commanders, although civil servants were not uncommon. Of course, there were some shodan-cho who later on during the occupation were promoted to the rank of chudan-cho; therefore not all 25 of the chudan-cho were older men. The shodan-cho were young, mainly in their twenties, and most had either finished junior high school or had had their schooling interrupted by the occupation. The average shodan-cho had finished the third class of MULO. 26 It is important to note that PETA had no general staff; there were rudimentary plans for the construction of one but by the time of the surrender these plans had not 22 Pauker estimates that 70 were trained as daidan-' cho, 200 as chudan-cho. and 620 as shodan-cho (Ibid., pp. 190-191). 23 Kanahele, "Japanese Occupation," p. 123 24 The battalion commanders ranged in age from forty to the early fifties; company commanders were below forty 25 Ibid., p. 126. Interview with Colonel D. Soegondo, New York, 10 September 1973. === [PDF page 249] === 233 been put into operation. There was not even formal liaison among the various units scattered around Java.27 Peta's territorial organization... tended to be a static system of immobile battalions whose success depended in large measure on good, mutually trustworthy relations between soldiers and local civilians.28 This lack of integration of the territorial battalions under a general staff was ominous for the future organization of the Indonesian army. One of the major difficulties during the Revolution and even until recently was the relative weakness of the center in comparison with the regions. In Sumatra the Bo-ei GivuRun (Volunteer Army) was initiated by the 25th Army (division in command of Sumatra) in November 1943, one month after PETA was effectively started in Java. In Sumatra, as contrasted with Java, there was no centralized training site for the commissioned officers; instead there were three sites, one each in North, West and South Sumatra. In Sumatra platoons, rather than battalions as was the case in Java, were organized first, and commanded by Indonesians. Companies were organized later, and many of the companies were commanded by Japanese. According to Kanahele 29 only one battalion was formed and that was located in South Sumatra and headed by a Japanese. However, a military elite member 27 Kanahele, "Japanese Occupation," p. 126. 28 Ibid., p. 126. 29 Ibid., p. 129. === [PDF page 250] === 234 maintained that he commanded a Giyugun battalion in North 30 Sumatra in 1944. The ranks were also different from those in Java; they were the same as in the Japanese army, 31 such as second lieutenant, first lieutenant, etc. The Giyugun, contrasted to the PETA, was more integrated into the Japanese army, and Giyugun members were employed in regional headquarters.32 It is not known whether they were employed in the headquarters of the 25th Army. The rest of Indonesia was under Japanese naval control, and there were no attempts by the navy to form Indonesian military forces.33 This is very important in that the only men from East Indonesia and from Kalimantan who had any military experience during the Japanese occupation were those residing in Java. This is a major reason why there is so little representation in the officer corps of those from Kalimantan and the non-Christian areas of Sulawesi. The Japanese continued the Dutch policy of training a few naval and merchant marine officers; however, they 30 Interview with Major General Achmad Tahir, Jakarta, 31 March 1969. 31 Interview with Major General Alamsjah, Jakarta, 12 June 1969. 32 Major General Achmad Tahir, for example, was the most senior Indonesian officer in the North Sumatra headquarters (interview with Major General Achmad Tahir, Jakarta, 31 March 1969). 33 Bali was an exception; the navy allowed the 17th army to form PETA (Kanahele, "Japanese Occupation," pp. 130-131); there were 1,626 men in PETA in Bali (Pauker, "Military in Indonesia," p. 190). === [PDF page 251] === 235 did create new schools in Semarang and Pasuran, both in Java. 34 The small nucleus of the naval military elite was trained by the Japanese. Most were trained in the merchant marine school in Jakarta. Some taught in the school after their training and on training ships, and others served on board Japanese ships. The Japanese, too, trained police officers and gave those who had been trained under the Dutch higher positions than they had held before the Japanese occupation. Only with the air force was there no continuation of the very modest beginnings under the Dutch. There were other auxiliary groups formed, such as the Heihoj the Keibodan, auxiliary police corps; the Seinendan, the largest youth organization; the Barisan Pelopor, a youth organization created in 1944 that was under nationalist control; and the Hizbullah. the Muslim auxiliary military force. The Heiho and the Hizbullah, in terms of the future composition of the Indonesian army, were the most important auxiliary groups. Some of the Heiho veterans entered the army of independent Indonesia, and rivalry developed between former Heiho and former PETA. The Heiho veterans felt that they had more experience in battle than had the PETA veterans. The Hizbullah. founded in 1944 and trained by PETA, was composed of santri young men largely recruited directly from the Sumantri, Revolusi Bersendiata. p. 125. === [PDF page 252] === 236 pesantren. The Hizbullah continued throughout the Revolution, although certain members joined the regular armed forces early during the Revolution. The integration of Hizbullah units into the regular army was fraught with difficulty, and some joined the Darul Islam rebellion, an Islamic rebellion in West Java and parts of Central Java that lasted from the late 1940s until the early 1960s. Some of those formerly affiliated with the Hizbullah did reach a high rank within the army but their number was small. The revolutionary period ranks second in terms of the numbers of military elite members who began their military career during this period. It is not an overstatement to assert that the Revolution was the most important time period in the history of the military. Although the Hizbullah was trained by FETA personnel, its organization was independent from PETA; this had been the demand of the Islamic leadership (Hizbullah was closely supervised, though, by Japanese occupation authorities and bodies). By August 1945 there were 50,000 members of Hizbullah; they were armed mainly with knives and bamboo spears (see Kanahele, "Japanese Occupation," p. 316 and John R.W. Smail, Bandung in the Early Revolution; 1945-1946. Monograph Series (Ithaca, M.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1964), p. 14. For discussions of the military during the Revolution, see the following sources: Anderson, Occupation and Resistance; Kahin, Revolution in Indonesia; Suraantri, Revolusi Bersendiata; McVey, "Transformation," pp. 133-143 especially; Nugroho Notosusanto, Sed iarah dan HANKAM (Jakarta: HANKAM, 1968); Sedjarah Militer Kodam VI Siliwangi, Siliwangi: Pari Masa Kemasa (Jakarta: Fakta Mahjuma, 1968); Fauker, "Military in Indonesia," pp. 191-193; and Ann Gregory, "Dimensions of Factionalism in the Indonesian Military," paper presented at the 66th meeting of the American Political Science Association, Los Angeles, 8-12 September 1970, pp. 12-13. === [PDF page 253] === 237 Characteristics of the military during this period influenced subsequent military policy, military career patterns, and factional patterns and struggles. Military elite members themselves stress the necessity of understanding the period of the Revolution--the events, actors, interactions of the actors, and relationships between the government and the military--before it is possible to analyze the military or the politics as a whole of independent Indonesia. Special attention will be paid to the composition, characteristics, organization, and effects of the revolutionary military upon career patterns in the following discussion. The revolutionary army was largely led by members of three groups: 1) ex-KNIL officers; 2) ex-EETA and exGivuaun officers; and 3) student army and laskar (armed 37 organizations) leaders. In the first group the ex-cadets from the KMA were especially prominent and continued to have much influence in the military, mainly in the staff, after independence was achieved. These leaders, too, were the major founders of the Siliwangi division, the division of West Java. The KNIL group was also singular due to the non-Javanese nature of this group in comparison with the second and third groups, which were largely Javanese. The ex-KNIL group was largely Sundanese, with a sprinkling of Outer Islanders, such as the well-known General Nasution. 37 These two components of the third group are often referred to as striidorganisaties (struggle organizations). === [PDF page 254] === 238 The ex-KNIL group looked upon themselves as the most professional of the three groups; however, the other two groups thought that they had more legitimacy than the ex-KNIL, since the KNIL had been a colonial army. Initially, due to the close contact of the ex-KNIL group with the political elite (geographically, intellectually, and through kinship), the ex-KNIL group had more influence with the new government than the other two groups. Ex-PETA and ex-Giyugun officers were proud of the fact that they had served in the first modern Indonesianled and Indonesian nationalist army. This group was the most advantaged of the three groups in terms of actual field command experience and the numbers of subordinates it could attract to its units at the beginning of the Revolution. Ex-PETA officers dominated what were to become the Diponegoro and Brawijaya divisions, the army divisions of Central and East Java respectively. Sumatra the armed units were formed mainly by veterans of the GiyuRun and its counterpart in Malaya. The ex-PETA Many people of West Sumatra moved to Malaya after the Dutch effected control over the area. The Japanese formed the Malay Volunteer Corps in 1943; many of the soldiers or their parents were originally from Indonesia, especially from Sumatra. The Indonesians were segregated into separate battalions and were commanded by Indonesian officers. The Japanese, after the surrender, made an agreement with the chief of staff of a regiment of the corps, now Major General Karim Rasjid, to send the Indonesian volunteers back to Indonesia. Most of these volunteers were Sumatrans, and they were returned to that island. Many of them became instructors in the armed units that were formed after the Japanese surrender (interview with Major General Karim Rasjid, Jakarta, 11 February 1969). === [PDF page 255] === 239 group was able to increase its power in the military after independence and it became the dominate one. They were aided by their identification with nationalism, the large numbers of men behind them, and because of their superior field experience. The third group, student army and laskar leaders, was a very varied one. The largest student armies were the Tentara Pelaiar Republik Indonesia (TRIP), Student Army of the Republic of Indonesia, under Mas Isman; the Tentara Pelaiar (TP), Student Army, under Achmadi, and the Cursus Mahasiswa (CM), Student Corps, under Martono. TRIP units were mainly in East Java, and TP and CM units in the Surakarta and Jogjakarta areas respectively. There were many other student armies, but they were small and also did not remain as separate entities for long. In West Java the student leaders, together with the ex-KNIL cadets and also ex-PETA, formed the Siliwangi division in 1946. Therefore in West Java the student 39 armies lasted only for one year as separate entities. In Central and East Java, however, even though the student armies were officially integrated into the army (mostly 39 In West Java, in comparison with East and Central Java, there was a dearth of arras because of the relative success of the Japanese army in taking away the arms of the PETA troops in West Java. In East and Central Java this was not the case and arms were relatively plentiful, and the regular army could offer fewer inducements to the laskar and student armies for integration into the regular army (see Smail, Bandung). === [PDF page 256] === 240 in the 17th brigade), the individual student armies stayed together as detachments and were more or less independent of regular army control. After the Revolution some of the student army members wanted to stay in the army; others preferred to continue with their schooling. In the Indonesian political elite there are representatives of both groups: Professors Widjojo and Soemantri Brodjonegoro, for example, of the latter group, and Major Generals Sudharmono and Mas Isman of the former group. There were a variety of laskar; some were closely associated with a political party, whereas others were not, although most were at least associated with a certain political philosophy. The political ideologies espoused by the various laskar went from the left to the right of the political spectrum, from radical leftist laskar to laskar who wanted the establishment of an Islamic state. Some of the laskar, such as Hizbullah and Barisan Banteng, had their antecedents in para-military organizations that began during the Japanese occupation. Others, such as the Pesindo. began at the onset of the Revolution, although it did have historical antecedents in certain socialist organizations of the Dutch period. Another type of laskar was based on ethnic origin; the most important one was the Kebaktian Rakvat Indonesia Sulawesi (KRIS), Service of the Indonesian People of Sulawesi. KRIS apparently developed from the Choku-eitai* a semi-military organization founded by the Japanese admiral, Maeda, who was the naval liaison === [PDF page 257] === officer in Jakarta. Some members were from Minahassa, many of whom were formerly from KNIL.40 After the proclamation of independence a sizable group of Sulawesi students in Jakarta participated in the founding of the KRIS; Anderson states that in Jakarta KRIS developed into a "powerful, cohesive, and well-armed paramilitary organization." In Surabaya one of the present military elite members, Major General Henk Worang, formed Pemuda Republik Indonesia Sulawesi 42 (PRIS;, Indonesian Youth of Sulawesi, KRIS. which was part of In 1946 PRIS as well as other pemuda groups originating from East Indonesia, were integrated into the Sixth Division of the Indonesian I\avy. Two more consolidations followed resulting in the incorporation of the pemuda into the 16th Brigade of the new Brawijaya division. The interview data indicate that none of the military elite originated from the ideological laskar, although certain members had close relations with particular laskar, such as 43 Pesindo and Hizbullah. Two were in KRIS. There was Anderson, Occupation and Resistance, p. 261. Anderson also states that the main strength of the KRIS was in two cities, Jakarta and Surabaya. In Surabaj/a the KRIS was dominated by Minahassan, but in Jakarta it was fairly representative of the major ethnic groups of Sulawesi. 41 Ibid., p. 261, n. 55. Interview with Major General Henk Worang, Menado, Minahassa, North Sulawesi, 22 May 1969. Several of the military elite members were associated with the Angkatan Muda Kereta Api (Railroad Young Generation) at the beginning of the Revolution, which affiliated itself with Pesindo, but these particular members soon joined regular army units. === [PDF page 258] === 242 competition between the regular army and the pemuda (youth) groups (both the student armies and the laskar), not only for territory and arms, but also over legitimacy. To many the laskar seemed to be more of a "symbol of the people in 44 arms" than was the-army. The most salient characteristic of the army was its local character. As news of the Japanese surrender filtered throughout Indonesia, local units sprang up, especially in Java and Sumatra. Ranks depended upon the type of armed unit the individual built up, which, in turn, was influenced by his extent of military education, general education, traditional and charismatic appeal, and access to arms. These blended into the requirement that the commander be a bapak to his men. At the beginning of the Revolution the largest effective unit that could be created was a battalion. This continued to be the case, despite the elaborate structure of divisions, brigades, and regiments that were later created. The only units that tended to remain intact during the Revolution were battalions; the 45 composition of brigades and regiments changed frequently. The first military organization, the Badan Keamanan Rakyat (BKR), People's Security Body, had no central command. One reason for the creation of the BKR by the new government was to bring local armed units under at least local political control, under the local National 44 Anderson, Occupation and Resistance, p. 265. 45 Smail, Bandung, p. 79. === [PDF page 259] === 243 Committees. achieved. Even that was difficult and often was not The first attempt to create a national headquarters was in early October 1945, at which time the BKR was changed to the Tentara Keamanan Rakvat (TKR), People's Security Army. The K M L group initially had the most influence in the government, and a senior KNIL officer who had risen through the ranks to major, R. Urip Sumohardjo, was appointed chief of staff. One of the first acts of the new headquarters was the attempt to organize Java into three commands, with divisions under the commands, but this attempt was a failure, host of those headquarters appointed had no authority in the areas where they were supposed to command, and the troops refused to recognize them. One result of the failure of the K M L group to appoint their members as territorial commanders was that the KINIL group became largely relegated to the center. Army headquarters too learned that any future attempt to build a superstructure had to have the approval of the commanders of the local units, and these commanders in turn were checked by their troops. One month after the TKR was organized there was a meeting of the regimental commanders called by the chief of staff. in-chief. They refused to elect him as commander- Instead they elected Sudirman, an ex-daidan-cho. who graciously asked Urip Sumohardjo to stay on as chief of staff. There were various changes over the next few years of the Revolution, but, in general, during this time there were === [PDF page 260] === 244 three services in the Indonesian National Army, called Tentara Nasional Indonesia and subsequently changed to Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia (APRI), Armed Forces of Indonesia.46 These services were the army, navy, and air force;47 the three services were united under one commander-in-chief, General Sudirman, until his death in 1949. The state police were usually under the Ministry of Internal Affairs until the Guided Democracy period, when they became part of the armed services. Two army divisions have monopolized army elite recruitment: the Siliwangi, created in West Java mainly through the efforts of General Nasution, the division's first commander and his colleagues, in May 1946, and the Diponegoro division of Central Java, organized a few After the state police became a military service in Guided Democracy APRI was changed to ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia), the Armed Services of the Republic of Indonesia. Interestingly enough, in 1972, several years after the 1969 revision of the armed services, the revision which integrated the services more fully into ABRI, ABRI was changed to the Tentara Nasional Indonesia, the name it had at the end of the Revolution. 47 During the early part of the Revolution both the navy and the air force were under the army; they became separate services in 1946. The navy was active in breaking the Dutch blockade around the islands and brought supplies from neighboring countries into Indonesia. The navy was also prominent in guerrilla actions, especially in Central and East Java. The air force began a flying school in 1947 in Jogjakarta; there were twenty cadets and one plane J There was really no air force staff; according to an air force leader at the end of 1949 there were only pilots and Suryadharma, the air force commander (interview with Air Vice Marshall Sri Bima Ariotedjo, Jakarta, 13 May 1969). === [PDF page 261] === 245 months later. The core of the Siliwangi division were the ex-KNIL officers, then came the student leaders (especially leaders of student groups in Jakarta and. 48 Bandung), and some ex-PETA officers, mainly those who had received high school and/or some university education in Bandung during the latter part of the Dutch period. It was common to find educated men in the Siliwangi serving as platoon and squad leaders; this was not true of the Diponegoro, and later the Brawijaya (created 49 in 1948 in East Java) divisions. The Diponegoro and Brawijaya divisions were dominated by ex-PETA officers. Neither the student armies nor the laskar were more than nominally integrated into those divisions. The Indonesian army is mainly a territorial army. The men in the territorial units are recruited from their local area, and the units are a microcosm of their areas. During the Revolution these local units were dependent upon the population for food and shelter, and were also dependent upon the loyalty of the villagers and townspeople in the struggle against the Dutch. Thus from the beginning there was a close relationship between the local civilian 48 In fact the two largest and most important battalions were "student" battalions; in these battalions there was a high proportion of high school and junior high school students among their officers and non-commissioned officers (Smail, Bandung,, p. 79). 49 Ibid., p. 81. === [PDF page 262] === 246 leadership and the local army officers. During the second guerrilla war in Java (in 1948) the army leadership formalized this relationship between civilian and military authorities. The lurah became the top official of the village, the K.O.D.M. (Commander Military Sub-District) of the sub-district, and the K.D.M. (Commander Military District) of the kabupaten, the K.M.D. (Commander Military Area) of the residency, the Military Governor of the territory and the headquarters for the island.50 There were two distinct types of units which developed from the revolutionary experience: the territorial units, such as the regiments with their battalions, which ruled the local areas together with the pamong, praia (the name for the pangreh praia after 1946) and the mobile units, 52 sisting of brigades and battalions under them. con- The mobile battalions were rather undeveloped during the Revolution, but in the 1950s and especially in the 1960s mobile brigades became very prominent in the Indonesian army. Abdul Haris Nasution, Fundamentals of Guerilla Warfare and the Indonesian Defence System. Past and Present (n.p.: Information Service of the Indonesian Armed Forces, n.d.), p. 54. The division of the battalions into territorial and mobile battalions was influenced by Japanese army policy. FETA battalions were given territorial duty, whereas regular Japanese army units had mobile duty. The first mobile unit created was the Mobile Brigade of the police, organized by Sutan Sjahrir in 1947, who was prime minister then. The purpose was to create a loyal instrument of the central government, as opposed to the many rebellious troops in Central Java and the challenges to the Sjahrir government by the high command (including General Sudirman) itself. This had also been the major reason for the creation of the Siliwangi division in 1946. === [PDF page 263] === 247 Four Military Elite Career Lines Introduction The most salient characteristic of those who rose to high position in the military, whether or not they are military elite members, is that they reached officer rank and were further promoted during or immediately after the Revolution. How was officer rank achieved during the Revolution? In order to reach officer rank at that time it appears that it was necessary to possess military training and/or a good general education and local backing within one's area. Those who were from upper status origins had an advantage in the above; they were not only more likely to have received a good general education, but the Japanese recruited those from upper status origins for officer training in PETA. A person's age was also important in determining whether or not he achieved officer rank at the crucial time, i.e. during the Revolution, and whether or not advancement would be impeded by a large group of superior officers only a few years older than the person. At the start of one's career in the officer corps it was important to have as a superior a man who was willing to be your patron (bapak; literally, father), and who possessed prestige and/or belonged to a clique that was influential. 53 "My thanks go to Colonel D. Soegondo for his interesting inside observations concerning avenues of elite and sub-elite entrance (interview with Colonel Soegondo, New York, 7 September 1973). 53 === [PDF page 264] === 248 There were two groups of officers who had been trained militarily by the time of the Revolution: those from the officer ranks of K M L and those from PETA. Officers from KNIL claimed leadership in the new army because of their higher degree of professional military training in comparison to the PETA officers. PETA officers, however, had more experience in the field. It was easier for someone from PETA to mobilize numbers of young men to follow him, especially if he had been a shodan-cho. There were a small group of officers during the Revolution who had neither received Dutch nor Japanese military training. They were bright young men who possessed a good general education (a Dutch high school education usually), who served under army leaders of the Revolution; they were given superior military training after the Revolution. 54 The necessity of local backing within one's area was true both for those who rose through command positions and those who rose through staff positions. In 1945 even those who are characterized as staff officers started their army career as leaders of small armed groups, usually student groups. Those who made it to elite status had enough local backing to organize a battalion, and sometimes a company. 54 Two members of this group reached elite status. Both were in student armies, and then were adjutants to army leaders during the Revolution. One was sent to the HKS in Breda, Holland for four years, and the other first to the military academy and then to the Academy of Military Law. === [PDF page 265] === 249 The importance of a bapak for an officer in winning promotion has been stressed. In comparing elite members with non-members it is striking that the elite members at an early point in their career, i.e. usually during the Revolution, had as superiors those who were either members of the military elite or already marked for elite status. Many elite members had served as adjutants to these military leaders. The superior usually was a member of a clique that had some influence. Those who made it to elite status had close relations with their senior officers. In a culture where personal relations are valued extremely highly, personal relationships are considered of equal importance (if not more) with the criteria of military skill in the giving of promotions. Without the support of influential patrons it would be almost impossible for one to rise to elite status. If someone neither possessed a military education prior to the Revolution nor a good general education and also never headed any local armed group were there other ways for him to start on the ladder to success in the military? A few members of the elite were able to advance because they possessed some skills that made them indispensable to their superiors and to the functioning of their units or the center staff. Usually these men were experienced in business and were useful in procuring supplies. For example, two elite members had received a commercial education during the Dutch period, and had === [PDF page 266] === 250 spent several years managing commercial enterprises. They had knowledge of finance and procurement that few army men possessed. Due to their expertise they were very valuable and so were given officer rank and received promotions. For those who made it to elite status it appears that assignment to an urban area was helpful, for most were sent to urban areas for their first assignment rather than to rural areas. In Java, particularly, upper status groups are concentrated in urban areas, and assignment to an urban area could be helpful to a young officer in the establishment of contacts that may be useful to the furtherance of his career. In tracing the careers of successful army officers education, local backing, and connections continued to have importance after the Revolution. Almost all the members of the military elite attended the army staff and command college in Bandung and a large number went to other countries for further military education, especially to the United States. For those who served in command posts local backing is useful in achieving success as a local commander, although it can be hazardous to become too partisan of local interests, as was discovered by the military leaders of rebellious areas in Sumatra and Sulawesi in the late 1950s. The need to receive backing from influential army leaders remained imperative. Those members with special skills and knowledge continued to use their skills to advance their military career. Most of the military === [PDF page 267] === 251 elite rose to elite status through good command and staff positions, the traditional military ladder. At the same time, however, they had the indispensable help of membership in an influential clique, a baoak who helped them, a number of close colleagues, and anak buah (clients) who were strategically located and who would help them in the erratic world of military politics. The importance of the Java divisions has already been mentioned, particularly the Diponegoro and Siliwangi divisions. High and intermediate positions, both command and staff, are dominated by men originating from these two divisions. There is representation from the Brawijaya division, but it commonly is found more in intermediate and lower positions than in higher ones. The Java divisions have dominated the Outer Islands since the unsuccessful rebellions of the late 1950s, especially in the areas that rebelled against the central government. It is still difficult for men from the Outer Island divisions to reach elite status. There are also fewer Brawijaya members of the elite than the numbers within the division would warrant. 55For example, in North Sulawesi, the commander and the chief of staff in 1969 were from the Siliwangi division; assistants two and six from the Diponegoro division, and assistants one, five and seven from the Brawijaya division. Only assistants three and four were from the North Sulawesi division. There is an historical connection between the Brawijaya division and those of Sulawesi. During the Revolution, as was mentioned previously, many young men originating from Sulawesi and living in Java, joined KRIS, which was integrated during the Revolution into the Brawijaya division. === [PDF page 268] === What distinguishes the military elite members from others who rose to the rank of general? In the analysis of the New Order military elite clique and factional membership appear to be the most important determinant, and military reputation second. In the present elite prior friendship or past professional relationship with Soeharto has been instrumental in the rise to elite status, and, more importantly, in a person's survival rate. Many of the military elite members, for example, served under Soeharto when he was commander of the Mandala campaign, the campaign for the "return" of West Irian to Indonesia, and also when he was commander of Cadangan Umum Angkatan Darat (Caduad), Army General Reserve, which became Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat (KOSTRAD), Army Strategic Command. By comparing the positions held by elite members in 1973 with those held in 1969, it can be clearly shown that those who were helped by Soeharto in achieving elite status, whether through personal friendship or through his regard for their military and/or political qualities, combined with his personal liking for them, have remained and advanced in elite positions. Many of the others who did not have a close relationship to Soeharto, including those who have the reputation of being able military leaders, have been retired or transferred to "exile" positions in Indonesia or abroad. === [PDF page 269] === 253 Military Career Groups Paths to Elite Status There were four distinct ways to achieve elite status in the present army elite: command, staff, karva (non-military) positions and through personal ties only. In the other armed services elite status was reached through command and staff routes. The first group reached elite status through command positions, occasionally breaking command sequence with staff and training positions. Few have had experience in teaching and administrative positions in the military academy and in the staff and command college, and fewer still have been posted abroad as military attaches. Most of their assignments have been in command positions. After they achieved elite status some continued to hold command positions, some a mixture of command and center staff positions, and others only held center staff positions. Twenty-one New Order and Initially General A.H. Nasution was included in the command category, since he did achieve elite status through command positions; but after the Revolution he was exclusively in the center. First he was commander of the Indonesian army, then during most of Guided Democracy he was Minister of National Defense and Security and also head of the armed forces. General Nasution is very atypical of the usual military elite member; therefore it was decided not to include him in the tables and in the analyses of the military elite. One other army leader was not included; this was due to inadequate information concerning his career. This is Major General Soeharto, who, in 1969, was assistant five of the army. 57 One naval leader was not included in either group since not enough was known of his pre-elite career to decide to which group he belonged. This was the late Admiral Muljadi, who was ousted as commander of the navy in 1969. === [PDF page 270] === 254 eleven Guided Democracy elite members rose to elite status through command positions; seven of those from the other services elite also rose through command positions. The second group made it to elite status through staff positions. Compared to the command group, this group spent many years in regional and center staff positions. sizable number of the staff group have spent years engaged in teaching and administrative positions in the military schools. Members of this group were more likely to be sent abroad as military attaches. Twenty-two I\ew Order and sixteen Guided Democracy army elite members are in this category. Eleven of the New Order elite from the other services rose through staff positions. In the beginning of independent Indonesia command positions were more important than staff positions, but gradually power has shifted more to the center due to certain historical events, such as the regional rebellions of the late 1950s, which led to the declaration of martial law; governmental changes such as those of Guided Democracy, during which time the army entered into an active partnership with the civilian elite and partook in "plums" such as directing state enterprises, participating in governmental institutions and bodies; and finally, the rationalization policies effected after late 1969. In the J\ew Order there is more equality of opportunity between those mainly holding command positions and those mainly staff positions in the achievement of elite status. However, those who === [PDF page 271] === 255 rose through command positions have preserved their status to a greater extent than those who rose through staff positions. The latter have usually been more active in intra-army politics, whereas regional military commanders find it easier to shield themselves from political disagreements and changes at army headquarters. The relative equality in the army between command and staff are reflected in the mean age for the achievement of elite status, which was forty-three for both groups. The other services differ, though; the mean ages for achieving elite status were forty-five for command and forty-two for staff. In the other services the service headquarters haye more or less been the undisputed center of power so that those who rose primarily through staff positions achieve elite status faster than those who rose through command positions. Intra-service politics, however, were mercurial, and sometimes a prospective candidate for elite status would find himself exiled as an attache or sent to a powerless position within the country. Then, with a change in service commander, this candidate could find himself propelled rapidly from his exiled position to an elite position. Ascent in the army to elite status followed a more even course. The next two groups, the karva and personal, are combined in the following analyses due to the small number in each group. One group, the karya group (four in Guided Democracy and five in the New Order elites), is === [PDF page 272] === 256 composed of those who rose to elite status through nonmilitary positions. They were heads of mass movements, state enterprises, or rose through governmental positions. The personal group, only evident in the New Order, consists of five army elite members who rose to elite status through personal friendship with Soeharto or other influential elite members. They have neither the staff nor the command record to have advanced through the traditional military ladder nor could they achieve elite status through non-military positions. Before the analyses of the career groups, the background and career history of four army leaders, representing these career lines, will be presented. Then the career groups will be compared in terms of background characteristics; positions held during their careers; and differences among them in terms of divisional identification, place of first assignment, nature and extent of military education, military teaching and administrative assignments, military service abroad, and karva positions. Sample Career Histories General Umar Wirahadikusumah, the representative from the command group, was chosen because he is typical of the group in the advancement of his career. Although he was never close to Soeharto, his decision to disobey Sukarno's summons the night of the abortive coup and instead join Soeharto in the crushing of the abortive coup, was instrumental in his advance to one of the top === [PDF page 273] === 257 positions in the Indonesian military. Major General Soenggoro, from the staff group, is one of those who neither was in the KNIL nor in the PETA but through his ability was able to rise up the military hierarchy. His final boost was provided by Soeharto, whom he had taught and then under whom he had served. Lieutenant General Ibnu Soetowo, the head of Pertamina, the state oil enterprise, is the most successful example of someone who rose through karya positions, tak Ibnu's power was based upon the tremendous financial resources he could command through his directorship of Pertamina. The last biography, that of Major General Sudjono Humardhani, illustrates one of those who rose through close personal friendship with Soeharto. General Umar Wirahadikusumah--Command General Umar is a Sundanese of menak origin (his father was a wedana in the Bandung area). Pak Umar went to the ELS, then MULO and afterwards became assistant manager in the rubber plantation where his brother worked as manager. Two years later the Japanese invaded, and Pak Umar joined PETA. He is from the first class at Tanggerang in the Seinen Poo jo; he was given the rank of shodan-cho and sent to the PETA training school to teach. He was promoted later to chudan-cho and posted to the south part of the Priangan (West Java). Pak Umar knew General Nasution at that time. When the Revolution began he joined the BKR as a company commander with the rank of captain, but after a === [PDF page 274] === 258 few months he became vice chief of staff of a regiment. In 1947 he became an adjutant to i\asution, a very important position for an aspiring candidate for elite member58 ship. General Umar then went on the Long March battalion commander. as a After Pak Umar came back to West Java he was assigned as garrison commander in Ceribon, a rather important position at that level of his career. Fak Umar mentioned that when he was there he had excellent relations with the Kasepuhan kraton, the oldest and most prestigious kraton in west Java. From there he was posted to Bandung as head of operations for the Siliwangi division. It is common for those rising through command positions to have some experience in the divisional staff. From head of operations Pak Umar was promoted to major and sent to Ceribon as chief of staff of the regiment. The regimental leaders in the 1950s had influence in the government of the kabupaten, and Ceribon was a major post. 59 This was the period of the Islamic rebellion in West Java, the Barul Islam, and since Pak Umar was considered a good strategist he was sent to Tasikmalaya, a center of Darul Islam activity, as regimental commander. The Siliwangi division, according to an agreement between the Indonesian and Dutch governments, had to leave West Java for Republican-held territory in Central Java. This was called the "Long March," a very important experience in the history of the Siliwangi division. The Siliwangi troops were in Central Java for almost a year. 59 In 1969 during one of my conversations with the regimental commander in Ceribon he boasted that he was "king over seven million persons." === [PDF page 275] === 259 Therefore, by late 1954 Pak Umar could be considered to have approached the ranks of the military sub-elite. After his post as regimental commander in Tasikmalaya Pak Umar was sent to the Staff and Command School (SSKAD) where he took the upgrading course. After his year at SSKAD he was appointed inspector-general of the Siliwangi division. In 1956 Pak Umar was promoted to the position of regimental commander in Bandung. He had close relations with the commander of the division, now retired Lieutenant General Suprajogi, and supported him against Colonel ^ainal Lubis. Pak Umar participated in the crushing of the rebellion in Sumatra, and then in March 1959 was appointed garrison commander of Jakarta and promoted to the rank of colonel. By 1961, when the Jakarta garrison became a regional command and Pak Umar became a colonel, he became one of the national military leaders. promoted to brigadier general. A year later he was During the coup in 1965 Pak Umar, then major general, backed Soeharto and refused to obey Sukarno's summons to come to Halim Airbase, where the coup group had assembled. Two months after the attempted coup he succeeded Soeharto as commander of KOSTRAD. In 1967 Pak Umar was appointed chief of staff of the army under the army commander, Panggabean, and in late 1969 he became a four-star general. There was a reorganization of the army in 1969, and the chief of staff of each armed service became the head of the service. The Lubis Affair is discussed in chapter 5. === [PDF page 276] === 260 General Umar continued as chief of staff until April 1973, when he was succeeded by General Soerono, who is from the Diponegoro division and a personal friend of Soeharto. Pak Umar was then appointed as head of the Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan (BPK), Financial Auditing Board, a pre-retirement karva post for him. Before leaving Pak Umar it is important to note that he had influential superiors at crucial times during his career, such as hasution and Suprajogi. He also had friends from childhood, from the Revolution, and from his SSKAD class who are now members of the military elite. Major General Soenggoro--Staff Major General Soenggoro, from Purworejo, Central Java, is from sn old privavi family. He attended the HIS, MULO, and finally the AMS. After he graduated from the AMS he dreamed of studying medicine, but his family could not afford it. So he worked in several governmental offices, then during the Japanese occupation he attended the school for high railway officials in Bandung. Both his brother and he wanted to enlist in PETA, but his mother would only allow one son to join PETA. So Pak Soenggoro and his brother flipped a coin and his brother won. After the Japanese defeat, Soenggoro, who had already joined the fighting in vVest Java together with other railway officials, The above information was gathered from an interview with then Lieutenant General Umar Wirahadikusumah, Jakarta, 3 June 1969. === [PDF page 277] === 261 took a short course in Purwakarta given by some ex-PETA officers; he did well in it. He also launched an attack on some Japanese troops and captured sixty weapons. Because of this he was proclaimed as company commander and given the rank of captain. At that time he was in Banyumas, in the western part of Central Java, near his home town. A few months later Soenggoro's company was sent to Bandung to fight against the Dutch. The commander of the operation, the late Gatot Subroto, already a member of the military elite, inspected this company and talked with Soenggoro. He was impressed by the amount of theoretical military knowledge Soenggoro possessed (Soenggoro had digested both the KNIL and Japanese army manuals), and thought that Soenggoro was from the KKIL. Colonel Gatot Subroto, then division commander, asked Soenggoro to come to his staff. After Gatot Subroto was transferred, Soenggoro's next superior, Colonel Bambang Sugeng, was also a member of the military elite. After the rationalization of 1947 the division became a brigade, and Pak Soenggoro was in charge of operations for this brigade. Later he also became chief of staff of the brigade. In 1949 he was appointed head of operations for the Diponegoro division. By the time of the end of the Revolution Pak Soenggoro was well on his way up the military career ladder. He was head of operations until 1953; at that time he was still a captain, whereas his colleagues were all majors. This may be due to his === [PDF page 278] === 262 lack of formal military training. In 1953 that was remedied when he was sent to SSKAD and one year later he was appointed one of its first instructors. Most of the students were posted to their divisions, but Soenggoro, unlike most of the others, was interested in teaching and so he was happy to accept the position. By 1956, when Pak Soenggoro went to Fort Benning, Georgia for the advanced course for comparative study, he was chief instructor at SSKAD. In 1958 he went to Fort Leavenworth and from there to England and Yugoslavia. Soeharto attended SESKOAD in 1959 (the name of the Army Staff and Command School was changed from SSKAD to SESKOAD), and Soenggoro was Soeharto's instructor in logistics. In 1961 after Pak Soenggoro returned from a trip to the Soviet Union with Nasution to negotiate for arms, he was appointed G-4 (logistics) for KOSTRAD, which Soeharto commanded. Soenggoro was also under Soeharto in the handala campaign, again as head of logistics. After the end of the Mandala campaign Soenggoro became chief of staff of the East Indonesia KOANDA. In 1965, before the coup, he was sent to West Germany as military attache. In 1967 he returned to Indonesia and was placed The last year in which Dutch military instructors taught at SSKAD was 1953. 63 KOANDA, Komando Antara Daerah, Inter-Regional Command, were located only in the Outer Islands, and connected the regional 'commands within an island or a group of islands with one another. The KOANDA will be further discussed later in this chapter. === [PDF page 279] === 263 in charge of logistics in the army with the rank of major general. In 1971 he was implicated in a scandal that involved at least several staff members of the military elite; they were charged with selling arms illegally to Biafra, and Pak Soenggoro no longer has a position. In concluding it can be mentioned that Pak Soenggoro, like Pak Umar, was aided by his superiors and other contacts. In fact, in Soenggoro's case it may have been more crucial since at the beginning of the Revolution Soenggoro had neither KNIL nor PETA military training. Pak Soenggoro was also greatly helped by his knowledge of military science. 64 Lieutenant General Dr. Ibnu Soetowo--Karva Ibnu Soetowo is the most successful example of a leader who rose to elite status through karva positions. Ibnu Soetowo, fifty-five years old in 1969, comes from a town near Semarang, Central Java, where his father was a wedana. After attending the ELS and MULO, Pak Ibnu finished NIAS. He joined the government health service and was sent to South Sumatra, where he spent much of his adult life. In South Sumatra he was a physician in a transmigration area. His managerial qualities, for which he is well-known, manifested themselves early in his career. In his interview Pak Ibnu stressed that when he arrived, conditions were very bad; malaria was rampant, The above information is from an interview with Major General Soenggoro, Jakarta, 17 May 1969. === [PDF page 280] === 264 and there was not enough food for the transmigrants. Not only did he get food to feed the sick people, but he organized a force of one hundred men to oversee the transmigrants to make sure they took the preventive malaria medicine. Within a year, through his efforts, the death rate in his community fell from 250 to 20. He stayed in this position until the beginning of the Revolution. Pak Ibnu was highly respected in the area and was active in other ways, such as teaching the people about Indonesia and the effects of colonialism, and also about practical subjects such as buying and selling. After the Revolution began he was one of the founders of the BPR in South Sumatra; with his usual energy Pak Ibnu was able to procure many weapons. He was also chairman of NAPINDO, the armed youth movement of the PI\I; the movement formed itself into a battalion and he was its commander. Pak Ibnu began the Revolution as a major, then became a lieutenant colonel. In mid-1948 during the rationalization, Pak Ibnu was demoted one rank; this was standard policy throughout Sumatra. In 1950 and 1951 he was chief of staff of the Sriwijaya division of South Sumatra, and at the same time in charge of the army health service of the division. Top army staff officers were impressed with him and wanted to send Pak Ibnu to Breda, but Pak Ibnu said that he just wanted to be a physician and requested that he be relieved of his position as chief of staff. He continued as head of the health service until 1956, when the Sriwijaya === [PDF page 281] === 265 divisional commander was appointed chief of staff of the army and Pak Ibnu succeeded him as commander. General Nasution appointed Pak Ibnu as head of logistics (G-4) of the army and promoted him to colonel. Shortly afterwards Pak Ibnu was appointed second deputy of the army in charge of logistics and operations. Pak Ibnu reached elite status through his position as head of the Permina (now Pertamina) oil company. In 1957 the government "gave" an old Shell oil field to the army to manage. After trying several officers who did not seem to be good managers, General Nasution, a friend of Pak Ibnu, asked Pak Ibnu if he would try to make the oil field profitable. So in 1957 General Ibnu founded Permina; in 1960 he took over Permina as a fulltime job and from that time on he was karvawan (performing non-military duties). Pak Ibnu has been highly respected as a very successful, although allegedly corrupt, manager of the Pertamina. After the attempted coup in 1965 through his position as head of Permina he was able to finance the operations against the PKI and dissident army members and units. He has remained throughout the New Order as one of the top elite members, even though in 1975 Pertamina was in serious financial trouble. 65 Pak Ibnu was the only territorial commander who supported Bambang Utojo as chief of staff of the army; Bambang Utojo*s tenure as army chief of staff was short. The above information is from an interview with Lieutenant General Ibnu Soetowo (then major general), Jakarta, 5 June 1969. === [PDF page 282] === 266 Lieutenant General Sudjono Humardhani--Personal Pak Sudjono is Soeharto's closest friend, who is not only in the same kebaktian organization as Soeharto, but is one rung higher than Soeharto. Soeharto and Sudjono have been close friends since 1956. Sudjono Humardhani was born in Surakarta in 1919, the son of a tailor who made clothes for priyayi and nobles of the kraton; the family was priyayi and Sudjono's father had the rank of raden. After the HIS Pak Sudjono attended a commercial school for three years and then took over his father's business until the Japanese occupation, at which time he closed the business due to lack of cloth. During the Japanese period Sudjono was second in command of the Surakarta unit of the Keibodan, the civil defence organization. Pak Sudjono joined the army during the Revolution, and served in the regiment in the Surakarta area. Since Pak Sudjono had experience as a businessman he was placed in charge of supplies. At the beginning of the Revolution his rank was a second lieutenant, and in 1949 a first lieutenant. From 1950 until 1959 he worked in the financial office of the Diponegoro division and he rose to the rank of major. At that time Soeharto was the Diponegoro commander (in the late 1950s), and Sudjono was assistant seven (G-7) of the division, in charge of finance. In fact, The following information is based on interviews with then Brigadier General Sudjono Humardhani, Jakarta, 12, 15 March and 13, 19 April 1969. === [PDF page 283] === 267 he arranged and conducted an illegal barter operation. The scandal caused a premature end to Soeharto's assignment as divisional commander, and Soeharto was sent to SESKOAL. Pak Sudjono was transferred to army headquarters in 1960 and appointed deputy controller. In 1963 he went to Fort Harrison, Indiana for a year; this was his only military education. From the very beginning of the l\ew Order Pak Sudjono has been the most important personal assistant of Soeharto; he has specialized in economic matters, particularly in arranging investments and agreements with foreign countries, especially with Japan. Sudjono has increased rapidly in rank since the commencement of the I\ew Order; he was not a full colonel until August 1965 and now he is a lieutenant general. With Sudjono it is most evident that his close personal friendship and dukun relationship with Soeharto were the instruments that enabled him to gain elite status and to preserve his membership in the elite. Background Characteristics The career groups differ, as far as background characteristics, in the extent of general education and premilitary occupations. The major difference in the extent of general education was between the army command and the other groups; this is shown below in table 40. Only one of the army command group had any university education, whereas almost half of the army staff and most of the karya sub-group did. Of the nine from the army staff group, five entered === [PDF page 284] === 268 TABLE 40 LEVEL OF EDUCATION REACHED BY THE J\EW ORDER ARMY ELITE: COMPARISON OF CAREER GROUPS Level of Education Command Staff University High School Junior High Elementary Unknown Total 13 21 22 10 Karva/Pers onal universities after they began their army career. Those in staff positions were better situated geographically to enroll in universities than those in command positions since the former were often posted in cities like Jakarta and Bandung. Those from the staff group were also more influenced by the modern urban culture, which stresses Westernstyle education. Many of those who rose through staff positions remarked that they felt inferior to civilians with whom they had contact during their work and social life because of their lack of university education, and therefore often tried to remedy this feeling of inadequacy by enrolling in universities and studying part-time. Those who rose through karya positions usually had some university experience? however, those who rose through personal contacts received limited educated, usually only a junior high school education. Of those who only completed high school, those from the staff had the most elite education; === [PDF page 285] === 269 four out of six attended the HBS and AMS. Only two out of the thirteen from the command group attended elite high schools. Most of the military did not have pre-military occupations. In terms of the relationship of the pre-military occupation to their military career the most important premilitary occupation was that of employment by the railways department during the Japanese occupation as an inspector. In the railways department and also in the national headquarters of the Post, Telegraph and Telephone Service the Japanese organized advanced technical training schools, and numbers of young men came to Bandung to study. There also were para-military groups in the railways and in the Post, Telegraph and Telephone Service; both Seinandan and Barisan Pelopor (Pioneer Corps) were represented, and they were formed within the schools and offices. Most important was not the drill and propaganda in case of Seinandan and Pelopor units and training schools (professional training) but the esprit de corps created within the pemuda group by these separate entities and the opportunity for a pemuda leadership to develop independent of the age-graded hierarchy of the offices.69 At the beginning of the Revolution, the Pemuda Kereta Api (PKA), the Railways Army, was formed. Its main force was In the army command group, seventeen had none; in the staff group fourteen and in the karva/personal group six had no prior occupational experience. In the other services, however, four out of seven members in the command group had had prior occupational experience, whereas in the staff group only one had prior occupational experience. 69 Smail, Bandung, p. 55. === [PDF page 286] === 270 in Bandung, since Bandung was the headquarters of the: railways. The PKA was strongest at the beginning of the Revolution, at which time practically no student groups had been formed in the Bandung area, and the PKA was especially active in attempts to capture arms from the Japanese and the Gurkhas. Many of the PKA members joined student groups after they began in the Bandung area, and those who were left in the PKA were easily integrated into the Siliwangi division when it was formed in early 1946. Six of the military elite members worked for the railways and studied at the training schools during the Japanese period; five of the six are from the army staff group. Comparison of Career Group Positions Introduction The structure of the Indonesian army and how it relates to the lower governmental structure will be briefly discussed in order to understand the differences in the positions held by the various career groups. At different times during the late 1950s and the early 1960s the armed forces, particularly the army, was restructured. Usually this restructuring was devised for two major reasonst 1) to increase the power of the center over the field units; and 2) to provide institutionalized forms of control by For the above information on the PKA my thanks go to Major General Achmad Tirtosudiro (interview with him, Jakarta, 9 April 1969) and to Major General Wahju Hagono (interview, Jakarta, 27 April 1969). === [PDF page 287] === 271 the divisions, regiments, battalions and companies over comparable civilian units; this was not new, as shown by General Nasution's policy during the second guerrilla war in the late revolutionary period. One of the perennial themes in Indonesian politics, civilian and military, is the conflict between the center and the periphery. From the time of independence until the late 1960s the army staff tried various ways to secure control over the regional military commanders,who in many cases were the de facto warlords of their areas. The counter issue of autonomy for the regional areas has been nationally debated from the late 1940s.71 On the whole, it proved easier for the Indonesian army to effect control over civilian bodies than to increase the power of the center over the field units. By 1961, in general, military authorities from the regional level on down had parallel structures with civilian authorities. At first the military and the pamong prala shared their power in these areas as far down as the village level, but gradually the military began to gain the upper hand and soon the principal decision-makers in these areas were the chief military officers, not their civilian counterparts. For example, in the regions the effective See J.D. Legge, Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia: A Study in Local Administration 1950-1960 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961). === [PDF page 288] === 272 decision-maker became the divisional commander, and he ruled the region together with his staff. There was still a governor and his staff, but the ultimate decisions were usually made by the military authorities, not by the civilian authorities. In line with the parallel structures the divisional structure was called KODAM (Komando Daerah Militer), Military Regional Command. The country was divided into twenty-seven KODAM, the most important were those of Java (four) followed by certain strategic KODAM in the Outer Islands, such as North Sumatra and South Sulawesi. Within each KODAM the next lower unit was the KOREM (Komando Resort Mil iter). Military Resort Command. The Siliwangi division will be used as an example of regional military organization. The Siliwangi KODAM is divided into four KOREM, headed by regimental commanders and their staffs. Under the KOREM are the KODIM (Komando Mil iter Distrik), District Military Command; in West Java there are eighteen KODIM, headed by territorial companies; in West Java there are 330 KORAMIL. The KOREM correspond to the kabupaten. headed by bupati; the KODIM to kewedanaan, headed by a wedana; the KORAMIL to a kecamatan, headed by camat (comparable to the sten wedana of the Dutch period). There are non-commissioned officers assigned to villages to advise the lurah; in West Java the number is 3473. 72 72 Sejarah Mil iter Kodam VI Siliwangi, Masa Kemasa. p. 175. === [PDF page 289] === This convergence between civil and military networks is similar to China. 73 In order to increase the power of the center over the field units, the center authorized the creation of mobile brigades, to which field battalions and companies were attached. Day-to-day command was exercised by KODAM headquarters, but in the event they were called for duty outside the KODAM borders a centrally-established command had operational authority. 74 These field battalions were better equipped and trained, and naturally the men tended to feel a closer relationship to the center than was the case of those in the territorial battalions. Another tactic used by the center was the creation of elite forces, which will be included under the term "national command," in the following tables. The first elite force under central control was the RPKAD (Resimen Para-Komando Angkatan Darat), Army Para-commando Regiment, originally an elite unit of the Siliwangi division, which proved to be a useful instrument for center control, although residual loyalties to a certain extent remained to the Siliwangi. Other elite units nominally under central control were formed, but it wasn't until the formation of the Caduad (Cadangan Umum 73 See Harvey W. Iselsen, "Military Bureaucracy in the Cultural Revolution," Asian Survey 14 (April 1974), p. 374. 74 See Ruth McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army: Part II," Indonesia 13 (April 1 9 7 2 ) J 175.. === [PDF page 290] === 274 Angkatan Darat), Army General Reserve, by central headquarters in late 1960 that the center had an elite force that was only under the central government. The name was changed in 1963 to Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat (KOSTRAD), Army Strategic Reserve Command. The KOSTRAD was used in the West Irian campaign (Mandala) and later in the Malaysia confrontation. Soeharto was the KOSTRAD commander at the time of the abortive coup; he had been the first Caduad and KOSTRAD commanders, and headed the campaign in West Irian and was vice-commander of the confrontation against Malaysia. Many of the present military elite members served under him in these campaigns, including those from the other services. The final structure to be discussed is that of the KOANDA (Komando Antara-Daerah), Inter-Regional Command, set up in the late 1950s. Three were organized, one each in Sumatra, Kalimantan, and East Indonesia, to link the commanders within each island, in the case of Sumatra and Kalimantan, and, in the case of East Indonesia, to ease communication among the commanders of many islands and island groups. Except during the campaigns in West Irian and against Malaysia, the KOANDA were no more than For a history of Caduad and KOSTRAD see Sedjarah Mil iter KOSTRAD, Sediarah Singkat KOSTRAD (Jakarta: KOSTRAD, 1969). In the Mandala campaigns leaders from the other services, particularly the navy and the air force, participated. For example, for the West Irian campaign, air force and naval leaders were appointed as deputies. === [PDF page 291] === 275 liaison offices between Jakarta and the regional commanders. During the campaigns the center strengthened the KOANDA, as instruments of the center, and the KOANDA commanders 77 were "placed in charge of their respective areas." general, however, the KOANDA commanders had little power and their main chance to gain power was to exploit any existing rivalries among the regional commanders of the island or group of islands. As of 1969 none of the KOANDA commanders had power, and it was known as a place of exile. The 1970 reorganization of the army attempted to change this; this will be discussed in chapter 5. Comparison of Positions There were major differences among the career groups in terms of* 1) years spent in command and staff positions; and 2) the amount of time spent in the center as compared to regional and field areas. Table 41 below shows that the Indonesian military elite can be clearly divided into groups in terms of paths to elite success. Before a member of the command group could aspire to elite status he spent many years in various levels of field command, working his way up from company commander to regimental commander; command assignments, however, would be inter78 sperses with some divisional staff experience. For the 77 McVey, "Indonesian Army," p. 179. 78 Analysis of variance showed significant differences among the career groups in years spent in positions of field command (F=11.723, 2 & 51 df, p<.0l). === [PDF page 292] === 276 TABLE 41 MEAN NUMBER OF YEARS IN COMMAND AND STAFF POSITIONSt THE NEW ORDER MILITARY ELITE Type of Position Command Service Comm. Nat' 1 Reft. Field Staff High Cen. Nat' 1 Comm. Low Center Reg. Field Other a SPRI Karva Instruc. Ser. Abroad Unknown Total Command Army Staff 15.0 13.2 10.9 10.5 10.1 (21) (22) (11) Other Services Command 1 Staff Karva/ Personal (10) NOTE: The time period used to calculate the mean years was from late August 1945 to October 1969, which is from independence until the announcement of the reorganization of the armed forces. The types of positions underlined are usually elite positions. SPRI refers to the military assistants of President Soeharto. command group, the key to their rise to elite status was the achievement of a divisional command; then after a few years, if the first divisional command position was not an important division, they were transferred to one which was an === [PDF page 293] === 277 79 important one. A few advanced further to national command positions, such as KOSTRAD.or KOANDA command positions. The latter were not powerful, but their replacement, the KOWILHAN, after the 1969 reorganization of the military, are positions of power. For very few their rise culminated in the position of service chief. In the Isiew Order it was common for ex-regional commanders, who continued to be favored by Soeharto, to be appointed to high staff positions. After the 1969 reorganization those in very high staff positions, such as deputy, can have more power than a regional commander. For those in the staff career group elite status is achieved usually through assignment to a high center staff position. Before appointment to a high center position the candidate spends several years at a variety of low center positions, usually interspersed with a military training assignment, often abroad. Occasionally in the past the center would attempt to appoint a staff person as regional commander; usually the person would not last longer than a year because of opposition to him from within the division. In the New Order this tactic has met with better success due to the dominant strength of the center. But, generally the zenith of a staff member's career is a 79 An analysis of variance was conducted for the position of regional military commander in which the three army groups were compared, and the results were significant (F=23.67, 2 & 51 df, p<.0l). === [PDF page 294] === 278 position in the high staff. An analysis of variance for the army career groups in regard to the frequency of high center staff positions was conducted and the results were significant (F=9.67, 2 & 51 df, p<.0l). The karya/personal group is the most diverse group. The karva sub-group came to elite status through karya positions; before the average karva member was appointed to a prestigious position in the civilian sector he had a short stint in a high center staff position, usually as an assistant. Those in the personal sub-group spent most of their years in regional staff and low center positions, and without a close relationship to a powerful figure would not have been able to advance to elite status. The other armed services differ from the army, particularly those of the navy and air force. In both these services power lies in the center; therefore it is easier to rise to elite status through staff than through command positions. The police differ, however, in that command positions have more importance than in the navy and air force. The career groups were also compared according to the number of years spent in the center as distinguished from the field. Table 42 below shows that those who have risen through staff positions spent more years in the center than did those from the other group. The 80 An analysis of variance was conducted and the results were highly significant (F=12.29, 2 & 50 df, p<..00l). === [PDF page 295] === 279 TABLE 42 MEAN NUMBER OF YEARS IN CENTER AND FIELD POSITIONS: NEW ORDER MILITARY ELITE Place of Position Center Service Comm. High Cen. Low Cen. Nat' 1 Comm. Field Region Field Unknown Total Command Army Staff Karva/ Personal Other Services Command Staff 15.8 11.0 12.8 (21) (22) (10) (11) karya/personal group had more experience in the region and the field than did those from the staff, but their positions were either field positions or regional staff positions, not the prestigious position of regional commander. The personal sub-group had the most representation in the national command staff; this occurred exclusively in KOSTRAD and this is due to Soeharto's power to appoint persons to his KOSTRAD staff when he was commander. The command career groups of Guided Democracy and the New Order are quite similar in the length of time spent in center and field positions, but there are differences in the staff groups. The Guided Democracy staff group had more experience in high center posts; the New Order staff === [PDF page 296] === 280 leader spent more years in reaching high staff positions than did the average Guided Democracy elite staff member. Progression of Careers The progression of each career group in three or four year intervals from 1945 to 1973 will be charted. Certain years have been chosen in order to compare positions held by individuals in the career groups. Two years, 1945 and 1949, have been used for the Revolution; as indicated previously the position and rank a person held at the end of the Revolution was an important determinant for his chances to achieve elite status. Two key years during the period of Parliamentary Democracy were 1952 and 1956, the years of important military "affairs," the 17 October and the Lubis affairs respectively. There was a short transition period between Parliamentary Democracy and the Guided Democracy periods; the year, 1959, the end of the transition period, has been chosen. For Guided Democracy two years are used, 1962 and 1965. In 1962 Sukarno still had close relations with the army leaders, due to his desire to balance the growing strength of the PKI, but by 1965 he had shifted his support more to the PKI and "progressive" military leaders due to the strength of the military. For the New Order period three years were chosen: the beginning of 1967, when Soeharto was not yet acting president and conditions of near civil war still prevailed; the middle of 1969, before the === [PDF page 297] === 281 October 1969 rationalization of the armed forces was announced, and at which time political conditions had stabilized} and 1973, the strongest year to date of the Soeharto government, a time when no significant challenges, within or without the government, were made. Table 43 below indicates that for the army command group the mode in 1945 is that of company commander followed by battalion commander. By the end of the Revolution the mode had risen to that of battalion commander, followed by brigade commander. By 1956 (except for those in training) the mode had risen to regimental commander, which already signified membership in the army sub-elite. From 1962 until 1973, except for 1967, the largest number 81 were divisional commanders. By 1973 most had risen above divisional commander to very high center positions, to service chief, or to the cabinet; a few, however, have been exiled as ambassadors. In comparing the Guided Democracy command elite with that of the New Order, those of Guided Democracy had higher positions and ranks at the start of the Revolution; the median was battalion commander compared to company commander for the New Order. At the end of the Revolution most of the Guided Democracy command elite group members were brigade and regimental commanders, compared to In 1967 there were as many division commanders in the command group as those in the center staff. Soeharto had appointed several divisional commanders to positions at headquarters during the changeover in power. === [PDF page 298] === TABLE 43 PROGRESSION OF THE CAREERS OF THE ARMY COMMAND GROUP; THE NEW ORDER Position 1945 15 Command Service Comm., Min. Def. & .. KOPKAMTIB Coram. National Division Brigade Regiment Garrison Battalion Company Platoon Staff Nat'l Comm. High Center Low Center Division Brigade Regiment Garrison Battalion Company Student Army Instructional Training Military Attache 1949 1952 1956 1959 1962 1965 1967 1969 1973 19 11 10 15 10 11 === [PDF page 299] === TABLE 43--Continued Position 1945 1949 1952 1956 1959 Karva Cabinet Admin., Leg. State Enter. Governor Pol., Labor Movement Diplomatic 1962 1965 1967 1969 1973 SPRI Arrested Retired Deceased Unknown KOPKAMTIB (Komando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban). Command for the Restoration of Security and Order, was created in 1966 for the purpose of combating the threat of the PKI, and to investigate involvement of members of the populace in the PKI. Gradually its duties and powers expanded, and it was given the power to counter all threats to stability. It has issued numerous regulations in many fields, including that of the permissible length of hair for young men. By 1970 the power of the KOFKAMTIB had grown to such an extent that the KOPKAMTIB commander is considered equal to a service chief. === [PDF page 300] === 284 battalion and company commanders for the New Order elite command group. By 1956 almost half of the Guided Democracy command elite were either divisional commanders or divisional chiefs of staff $ most of the New Order Command members were still assigned at the regimental and battalion levels. The Guided Democracy command group in 1962 was comparable to the New Order command group in 1967i the members held either high command or high center staff positions. In 1965, the last year of Guided Democracy, the positions held by members of the command group were similar to those they held in 1962. The members of the Guided Democracy command group who became New Order elite members have fared better than their counterparts in the staff group. Not only were more from the Guided Democracy command group carried over into the New Order elite, but more have preserved their elite status. In 1969 six of the eleven Guided Democracy command members carried over into the New Order were in karva positions, and the others had high command and staff positions. 82 been dropped from elite status. By 1973 only three had The progression of the New Order army staff group is quite different, as seen in table 44 below. In 1945 the largest number were members of student armies, most of whom had staff duties, and most of the others were on divisional staffs. The latter was the mode in 1949; in 1952 82 One was deceased, one r e t i r e d and the l a s t was under a r r e s t. === [PDF page 301] === TABLE 44 PROGRESSION OF THE CAREERS OF THE ARMY STAFF GROUP: THE NEW ORDER Position 1945 1949 1952 1956 1959 1962 1965 1967 1969 1973 Command Service Comm., Min. Def. & ..KOPKAMTIB Comm. National Division Brigade Regiment Garrison Battalion Company Platoon Staff Nat'l Comm. High Center Low Center Division Brigade Regiment Garrison Battalion Company Student Army Instructional Training Military Attache" 13 10 10 13 12 10 10 === [PDF page 302] === TABLE 4 4 - - C o n t i n u e d Position 1945 1949 Karya Cabinet Admin., Leg. State Enter. Governor Fol., Labor Movement Diplomatic 1956 1959 1962 1965 1967 1969 1973 10 SPRI Arrested Retired, Deceased Unknown 1952 00 === [PDF page 303] === 287 the highest number were in low center and divisional staff positions. From 1956 until 1965 the mode was that of the high center position, except for the equal number of those in training in 1956. In 1965 karva positions were slightly higher than high center positions. By 1969 the mode had risen to high center positions. The staff group was less successful than the command group in preserving their elite status. By 1973 six of the staff group had been retired, as opposed to only one from the command group. The positions held by Guided Democracy elite staff members were higher at the beginning of the Revolution than those held by their counterparts of the New Order. By 1952 almost one-third of the Guided Democracy staff elite had reached pre-elite positions in the army staff, and by 1959 most had reached elite status. In that year two types of positions predominated: high center staff (over one-third) and high karva positions (over one-fourth). The number of staff elite who held karva positions increased during Guided Democracy until more than half of the Guided Democracy staff group held karva positions in 1965. In 1969 many still held positions; ten held karya position, although only one was important, and one held a low center 83 position. But by 1973 not one of the Guided Democracy 83 Three were deceased, two r e t i r e d, and one a r r e s t e d. === [PDF page 304] === 288 staff members held a position; four were deceased, but the others had been officially or unofficially retired. The New Order karya/personal group is fairly evenly divided from 1945 through 1956 between those who held command positions and those who held staff positions, as is seen in table 4 5 below. During these years they held mostly low command and staff positions. From 1959 through 1967 the group was divided between those who held karya positions and those who were in center staff positions. By 1973 the largest group remained in karya positions. The command members of the other services elite differs from the army command group, as has been mentioned previously. Since power, especially in the air force and navy, lies in the center, those who have been able to rise through command positions have had to go from command positions to staff positions. This is quite evident in table 46 below. Two of the three who rose to service commander from command positions are from the police. By 1973 most of the command group had been retired with two exceptions: one was sent as 84 As a whole SPRI members held staff positions un>til 1968, although they did serve unofficially as advisors to President Soeharto. One SPRI member in 1969 was included in the high center category since he was head of a semi-intelligence body, called Operasi Chusus (Special Operations). Operasi Chusus was not under the service commander; it was fairly autonomous. 85 One member previously had been a SPRI member, but his slow and final decline from power was finalized by an ambassadorial post. === [PDF page 305] === TABLE 4 5 PROGRESSION OF THE CAREERS OF THE ARMY KARYA/PERSOML GROUP: THE I\EW ORDER Position 1945 1949 1952 1956 Command Service Comm., Min. Def. & KOPKAMTIB Comm. Nat ional Division Brigade Regiment Garrison Battalion Company Platoon Staff Nat'l Comm. High Center Low Center Division Brigade Regiment Garrison Battalion Company Student Army Instructional Training 1959 1962 1965 1967 1969 1973 00 === [PDF page 306] === TABLE 45--Continued Position 1945 1949 1952 1956 1959 1962 1965 1967 1969 1973 Military Attache' Karya Cabinet Admin., Leg. State Enter. Governor Pol., Labor Movement Diplomatic SFRI Arrested Retired Deceased Unknown === [PDF page 307] === TABLE 46 PROGRESSION OF THE CAREERS OF THE OTHER SERVICES' COMMAND GROUPt THE NEW ORDER Position Command Service Comm. National Regional District Local Staff National Comm. High Center Low Center Regional District Local Student Army Instructional Training Military Attache Karya Cabinet Admin. Leg. State Enter. Governor Pol., Labor Movement Diplomatic 1945 1949 1952 1956 1959 1962 1965 1967 I 1969 1973 === [PDF page 308] === TABLE 4 6 - - C o n t i n u e d Position Arrested Retired Deceased Unknown 1945 1949 1952 1956 1959 1962 1965 1967 1969 1973 === [PDF page 309] === 293 ambassador to North Korea and the second is now naval commander. The latter won his position not through a struggle within headquarters but through the intervention of high army leaders. Table 47 below shows that the other services staff group likewise differs from the army staff group. All those from the air force and navy who rose to service commander, including all in the past, rose through staff positions. Instructional positions seem fairly common in the career pattern of staff members. From 1945 through 1965 a majority of this staff group was employed both in staff and instructional positions. Those in karya positions, beginning in 1962, increased through 1973, except for 1967. The high year of the staff group was 1969; shortly before the reorganization of the armed forces in 1969 plans had already been laid for the wholesale purge of the navy especially, and also a purge of the air force. Many were jailed, especially in the navy, and others were retired. Some are still in prison. Three of the staff members, though, were elevated from fairly powerless positions in the Ministry of Defense, which, before the reorganization of 1969, had little influence, to higher positions with greater power, although not at the center of power? an air force leader and a navy leader are KOWILHAN commanders, not for Java, though, but for Kalimantan and East Indonesia. === [PDF page 310] === TABLE 47 PROGRESSION OF THE CAREERS OF THE OTHER SERVICES' STAFF GROUP: THE NEW ORDER Position 1945 1949 1952 Command Service Comm. National Regional District Local Staff National Comm. High Center Low Center Regional District Local Student Army Instructional Training Military Attache' Karva Cabinet Admin., Leg. State Enter. Governor Pol., Labor Movement Diplomatic 1956 1959 1962 1965 1967 1969 1973 === [PDF page 311] === TABLE 47--Continued Position Arrested Retired Deceased Unknown 1945 1949 1952 1956 1959 1962 1965 1967 1969 1973 === [PDF page 312] === 296 Aids to Success? In this section the career groups are compared as to benefits given to career advancement by factors such as divisional identification and place of first assignment. Also, can military training assignments be useful or are they merely ratifications of promotion decisions already made? Are assignments such as instructional, karva. and military service abroad useful in advancing an army career? Are they more useful to one group than to others? Divisional Identification The Diponegoro and Siliwangi divisions were dominant for all army groups, and there was little difference between them in terms of command and staff career paths. Thirty-five are from these two divisions. The other Java division, the Brawijaya, has only four representatives in the army elite. Seven come from Outer Island divisions, and one, the former head of TRIP, who has no divisional identification. 87 The Outer Island divisions represented are: Bukit Barisan (two), Sriwijaya (three), Merdeka (one), and Hasanuddin (one). The Bukit Barison division, with its headquarters in Medan, is the division of North Sumatra; the Sriwijaya division, with its headquarters in Palembang, is the division of South Sumatra; the Merdeka division, located in North Sulawesi, has its headquarters in Menado; and the Hasanuddin division is located in South Sulawesi with its headquarters in Makassar. 87 After the end of the Revolution Major General. Mas Isman was assigned to a succession of staff duties and military service abroad, including ambassadorial, and never had a divisional identification. === [PDF page 313] === 297 Place of First Assignment Almost two-thirds of the army staff began their career in one of the larger cities, especially Bandung. Compared to the army staff group, only one-third of those from the command career group had their first assignment in metropolitan areas. This is shown below in table 48. TABLE 48 POPULATION OF PLACE OF FIRST ASSIGNMENT: NEW ORDER ARMY GROUPS Population 100,000+ 20-99,999 Less 20,000 Villages Outside Indonesia Unknown Total Command 1 Staff 21 14 22 Karva/Personal 10 Those who were assigned first to cities like Bandung were more likely to have contact with individuals, such as Nasution, who were important in building the central staff, and therefore they were more likely to be tapped for a central or Siliwangi divisional staff position. Many of those who rose through staff positions were also from urban areas, Bandung especially, and therefore were more likely to have attended higher educational institutions; thereby they were favored for staff positions on the basis of their educat ional background s. === [PDF page 314] === 298 Nature and Extent of Military Training Only four army elite members received military training during the Dutch period--two were KMA cadets (both from the staff group), and the other two (from the command group) received CORO and non-commissioned officers training. Almost one-fourth of the Guided Democracy staff group received military training under the Dutch, including two who studied at the HKS in Holland. The army command and staff groups differ in regard to military training during the Japanese occupation. Table 49 clearly shows that most of the command group members of the New Order received military training during the Japanese occupation, whereas few of those who rose through staff positions were trained by the Japanese. TABLE 49 MILITARY TRAINING UNDER THE JAPANESE: NEW ORDER COMMAND AND STAFF GROUPS Military Training Command Staff Military Training 16 No Military Training Total 21 22 Even a smaller proportion of the karva/personal group had Japanese military training (two) than did those from the staff career group. === [PDF page 315] === 299 Almost all elite members received some form of training after independence, not only in Indonesia, but also abroad. Most had more than one military training assignment, especially those in the command and staff groups. The following discussion will describe the types of military training the elite received after independence, including the representation of elite members in these training institutions. Then the importance of the training will be ascertained, including a comparison of the assignment prior to military training and the assignment received after military training. The first military training schools were established at the very beginning of the Revolution by ex-PETA officers in two towns in West Java, Tanggerang and Krawang. the officers trained were young students. Most of In both places over two hundred officers were trained, but approximately thirty-four of the students were killed in a clash with the Japanese. The schools lasted only a short time. Late in 1945 the Akademi Militer Nasional (AMN), the National military Academy, in Jogjakarta, and the Sekolah Tentara. in Malang, were organized? the latter school merged with 90 the AMN in 1948. Three staff members, one command member, The information on the two schools is from Major General Kemal Idris (interview, Jakarta 11 September 1968). 89 Only one elite member was trained in one of these two schools, the one in Krawang. 90 McVey, "Indonesian Army," p. 163. === [PDF page 316] === 300 and one karya member studied at the AMN. The staff members have had several assignments in administration and instruction at the military academy and at the staff and command school. In addition, those who studied at the AMi\, with the exception of the command member, are younger than most of the other members of the army elite.91 It has been difficult for AMN graduates to enter the ranks of the elite, because of the slight difference in average age, and the few who have entered the elite are either extremely skilled in a particular field, such as military law or intelligence, or are exceptionally able officers. The AMN was forced to close in 1950, and it did not reopen until 1957 (in Magelang, Central Java). 92 The next military training school set up was the Chandradimuka Academy in Bandung, founded not only to provide military training, but more importantly to serve as an ideological training center. The Chandradimuka Academy was abolished by army headquarters in 1953. 93 91 They are only a few years younger than the average military elite member, but in an army where the senior offi' cers are only a few years older than the junior officers, the latter find it difficult to advance. 92 After the capital moved to Jakarta, the academy could not attract enough applicants. 93 The head of the school, Colonel Bambang Supeno, was involved in factional disputes with the dominant group at headquarters, and this was a reason why headquarters abolished the academy (McVey, "Indonesian Army," p. 164). Two elite members studied at this academy. === [PDF page 317] === 301 Shortly after the Chandradimuka Academy was founded the Sekolah Staf Komando Anakatan Darat (SSKAD), the Army Command and Staff School, was established in May 1951 in N 94 Cilitung (near Bandung). It was founded for the purpose of giving guerrilla officers knowledge of military science, and it was especially designed for field grade officers, although officers lower than major attended courses there. For the first two years the instructors were Dutch from the Dutch Military Mission. The degree offered by the SSKAD until 1958 was the battalion degree. Beginning in 1957 plans began to be laid for a command and staff college, largely based upon the model of Fort Leavenworth, with certain changes in the planning stage to fit the revolutionary' tradition of the Indonesian military, in that the military believes itself to have a dual militarypolitical function. degree was added. In 1958 the command and staff college During the years of transition from SSKAD to SESKOAD, SSKAD instructors travelled to the United States, Great Britain, Yugoslavia, and the Arab countries to study the systems in those staff and command colleges. In 1959 the name was changed to SESKOAD{ the curriculum was revamped, and additional instructors, who were abler and more educated than many of the past 94 There were other schools which were established around this time and shortly afterwards, such as the infantry cadre schools (SKI), which were established in every military region; but the military elite did not attend any of these other training schools. === [PDF page 318] === 302 instructors of the SSKAD, were assigned to SESKOAD. 95 SESKOAD's most famous course, Course C, was added to the curriculum for the staff and command college. This course is concerned with social-political matters, and many civilian intellectuals were hired by SESKOAD to teach in Course C; usually they were professors and lecturers from the economics, sociology, and political science departments of the University of Indonesia in Jakarta. Before Course C was added, the curriculum of SESKOAD had been "purely one of Fort Leavenworth." 96 The staff and command curriculum has varied in the proportion devoted to political and military studies. For a short time after the abortive coup in 1965 the emphasis was 75% political and 25% military; after the political situation in Indonesia stabilized the proportion went back to the usual 50% political and 50% military. In 1969 a new course was added at SESKOAD, popularly called a "generals crash course;" the purpose of the course was to serve as a five-month intensive course for generals who had never attended SESKOAD. 97 More than half of the army elite also went abroad for training; this is true for all career groups. Like the 95 In the early days of the SSKAD it was difficult to attract able instructors because most officers wanted to stay in the field. 96 Interview with then Major General Tjakradipura, at that time commander of SESKOAD, Bandung, 24 March 1969. 97 According to newspaper sources (for example, I\usantara, 26 March 1969), the 1969 group was to include General Nasution, but, according to informants, he refused to attend the course! === [PDF page 319] === 303 98 officer corps as a whole, most of those who studied overseas went to the United States. Most of the elite studied in the United States between 1952 and mid-1958 during which time only 250 Indonesian officers received training in the United States; however, between 1958-1965 approximately 3,750 99 officers were trained in the United States. Fort Leavenworth was the most prestigious training assignment, and eight elite members studied there; Fort Benning was second in frequency with six of the elite members trained there. Other American training sites frequented by hew Order elite members weres Fort Harrison, Fort Sill, Fort Gordon, Fort Bliss, and the National War College. After the United States the most common countries for Indonesian officers to study in were: The Philippines, Pakistan, India, and Yugoslavia; but in the case of the army elite the most common countries after the United States were: Holland (5), Pakistan (3), West Germany (2), and Australia, India, the Soviet Union and Great Britain (1 each). All those who studied in Holland attended the HKS, and four were there for three years, whereas most of the others spent a year or less studying abroad. Table 50 below compares the career groups in the type and place of military education after sovereignty was achieved. 98 McVey, "Indonesian Army," p. 169. "ibid., p. 169 === [PDF page 320] === 304 TABLE 50 TYPE AND PLACE OF ARMY MILITARY EDUCATION AFTER INDEPENDENCES THE NEW ORDER Type and Place of Military Education Type in Indonesia Military Academy Chandradimuka Acad. SSKAD SESKOAD Academy of Mil. Law None3 Place Only in Indonesia Indonesia &. Abroad Only Abroad Karva/ Personal Command Staff 15 12 12 10 12 10 Two are physicians and never had any military training; two received their training at the KMA before the Japanese occupation There was less emphasis in the Guided Democracy military leadership on the necessity for post-independence training, especially education abroad, as part of one's elite credentials. In the New Order command group approximately one-half were trained abroad, whereas only onefourth of their counterpart in the Guided Democracy elite were trained abroad. Thirteen out of twenty-two of the New Order staff elite were trained abroad, compared to only six out of sixteen staff elite of Guided Democracy. Six of the Guided Democracy staff elite had training in Indonesia after independence compared to nineteen of the New Order staff leaders. Military education was not stressed as a requirement for or ratification of elite === [PDF page 321] === 305 status until the latter part of the 1950s and early 1960s, and by then the army elite of Guided Democracy had already reached elite status. Post-independence training for the other military elite members was also important. There are some differences between the other services and the army in the nature of elite participation in the training programs. One differ ence is that the elite of the other services attended more training schools and for longer total periods than did the army elite members. This is true especially of the air force and naval leaders; their services involve more utilization of technology than do either the army or the police. Another difference was that few members of the other services attended the equivalents of SESKOAD, SLSKOAL for the navy, SESKAU for the air force, and SESPOL for the police. Whereas most members of the army elite attended SSKAD and/or SESKOAD, only three of the other services elite attended their service's staff and command college. The air force and navy especially relied upon upgrading and technical courses and also upon academy training to educate their officers. It has already been mentioned that many naval and air force officers were in training during part of the Revolution; most of the naval officers who had not attended the naval academy underwent naval and marine training early in the Revolution. During the Revolution two of the air force elite members were attending the air force academy in Jogjakarta. === [PDF page 322] === 306 Most of the other services elite members also studied overseas. Asfor the army, the United States was the most common single overseas country (7) for a training assignment, but there was more representation of Western Europe (9) and the socialist countries (4) than was true of the army elite. Two also studied in Pakistan and the United Arab Republic. Table 51 below compares the type and place of military training after independence for the New Order elite members from the other services. TABLE 51 TYPE AND PLACE OF MILITARY TRAINING OF THE NEW ORDER OTHER SERVICES ELITE AFTER 1945 Military Education Type in Indonesia Service Academy Staff cS Command College Upgrading & Technical Training Place of Training Only in Indonesia Indonesia and Abroad Only Abroad None after Independence3 Command Staff This person graduated from the Dutch police academy. What was the importance of advanced military training to the military elite? their career? Was it instrumental in furthering This is very difficult to ascertain, because at the time the military elite members were advancing in their careers the steps of promotion had not been === [PDF page 323] === 307 institutionalized and geared to the rungs of the military training programs as is true to a certain extent of the younger army members. It is difficult to determine whether advanced military training caused career advancement, or whether the advanced training was a requirement that had to be passed before an assignment that had already been decided upon could be given. More detailed knowledge of internal army practice concerning promotions would be necessary for this determination. It was found that at least in indirect ways military training can be helpful to a person's career. If the officer was a field officer, an assignment at SSKAD or SESKOAD provided him with an opportunity to become acquainted with fellow officers from all over the country, and also, as headquarters gained more power, this gave the officer an opportunity to influence persons in headquarters. Usually the assignment after military training was determined by the center, but often this entailed a tug of war between the center and the region, which wanted able officers returned to it. Education is Attempts have been made to link promotion to succesive types of duty, interspersed with training. Theoretically it was decided in 1958 that the normal AMlvi graduate in infantry,' between assignments linked to training programs, would receive training at the Basic Infantry Development School (Sarbangif), the first and second Intermediate Officers' Course and the Advanced Course (all located at the Infantry Instruction Center in Ciamis, west Java), and finally to SESKOAD as a middle-rank or senior officer, depending upon the program to which he was assigned. Even for the officers of the younger generation this is not always adhered to (McVey, "Indonesian Army," p. 170, ft. 46). === [PDF page 324] === 308 highly valued in Indonesia, and attendance at SSKAD or SESKOAD, or especially abroad, gives the officer added prestige. Sometimes, however, a military training assignment can signal the decline of a military career; if headquarters has found someone very troublesome, this person is sometimes sent to SESKOAD. It is common, too, for those who have reached a high position and who are scheduled for a higher one to be sent to SESKOAD or another military school, in the case of the other military members, if they have never attended one, since the general rule for admission to elite status is that one must at least go through the motions of having some type of advanced military training. For example, two elite members, who were scheduled for important positions, had to be coached and tutored before they could graduate; both needed two terms instead of one for SESKOAD. Examples of difficulties elite members faced after military training were those first elite members who went abroad for training and who were not assigned positions upon their return home; this was especially true of those who spent several years in the 1950s in Breda, Holland at the HKS. When they came home there were often "positions" but no desks. This was in the period when headquarters was quite weak, and the advanced staff and command school was in its embryonic stages. Later, depending upon where he was sent, a foreign military assignment could be useful in raising person's status, but, except in the cases of SSKAD and === [PDF page 325] === 309 SESKOAD instructors, there is little relationship between advancement and foreign military training. Usually it was a "plum" that was given to an individual because of his position and relationship to those instrumental in deciding who will receive these assignments. Sometimes foreign military training is used as a type of "exile;" for example, an elite member remarked that he was sent to Pakistan for training because headquarters at that time suspected that he was in favor of the regional rebellions of the 1950s. Comparisons were made between the assignment prior to military training and the assignment afterwards. Most of the command elite and half of the staff elite came from field positions at the time of their first training assignment. Two-thirds of those from the command group were promoted and given a more prestigious command. Others were posted to low center and instructional positions. Most of the staff members who came from field positions were posted to low center and instructional positions, although a few were immediately promoted to high center positions. There was a tendency for members of the command and staff groups to rise in position after their first training assignment, but it is not known to what extent performance at the school was a determining factor in their rise in position. But in some cases it is known that the first training assignment was instrumental in determining whether a person would make his way up the command or the staff ladder. Comparisons were also made of those who had a === [PDF page 326] === 310 second instructional assignment. The positions of those from the command group were already fairly high (divisional and regimental commands), and afterwards they were given higher positions (divisional commands and high center positions). In the case of the staff elite, little promotion was evident after their second training assignment. Military training is usually a necessary step for promotion, but it is not known to what extent the decision has been made to promote a person before he commenced the military training assignment. Probably the most important function SESKOAD (and formerly the SSKAD) served was that of bringing officers together, and thereby forming and consolidating friendships among some of them. Ties of SSKAD and SESKOAD classes have remained quite close, and many army generals remarked that their SSKAD class and/or SESKOAD class have yearly reunions. In analyzing the SSKAD and SESKOAD classes from 1951-1965 it was found that army elite members were clustered in six SSKAD and SESKOAD classes; this is shown in table 52 below. For those from the other services, especially from the navy and air force, military training programs are more directly related to promotion than is the case in the army, especially in the early stages of one's career. However, advanced military training assignments can be given for the same reasons as in the army, as a de jure step for promotion and also as a type of exile. The === [PDF page 327] === 311 TABLE 52 REPRESENTATION OF THE NEW ORDER ARMY ELITE IN SSKAD AND SESKOAD CLASSES Year Students Instructors 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 NOTE: From 1951 to 1965 the classes ranged from fifteen to thir]ty students, fewer in the early years and more in later years. There were no Indonesian instructors in the SSKAD until 1953. In most of the years the elite members are represented the number of them in any one class is at least three j the two members attending the SSKAD at a time when they were the only member in the class to reach elite status both also attended SESKOAD in 1960, which is one of the largest classes in terms of representation in the New Order elite. === [PDF page 328] === 312 Military Teaching and Administrative Assignments Teaching assignments were a helpful avenue to elite status for some, and a necessary avenue for others. This, as will be seen, is only true of the New Order elite. SESKOAD, with the strong backing of the army commander of the early 1960s, the late General Jani, beame an intellectual center where members of the army sub-elite and civilian intellectuals who taught there could communicate together and strike up ties. Many of these civilian intellectuals are members of the technocratic segment of the elite. Even in the early 1950s, the SSKAD, although its influence was less than that of its successor, was the closest institution to a military college, and the instructors were able to wield some influence on staff policy, depending upon factional alignments at the particular time. Due to the fact that most only taught a few years, they were given new assignments after their military teaching assignment was completed, often to the headquarters staff but sometimes to the field. Table 53 shows the numbers of years of military teaching military elite members experienced. As table 53 shows, the staff groups had the most teaching experience. For all groups in the army elite, their assignments were usually in teaching, not in administration. Table 54 below contrasts the number of people and of years involved in teaching as compared with administration. === [PDF page 329] === 313 TABLE 53 YEARS IN MILITARY TEACHING AND ADMINISTRATION: NEW ORDER MILITARY ELITE MEMBERS Years Command Total Army Staff 15 Karya/Per. 12 22 21 Other Services Command Staff 10 11 TABLE 54 LENGTH OF TEACHING AND ADMINISTRATIVE ASSIGNMENTS: NEW ORDER ARMY ELITE Institution SSKAD Teaching Admin. SESKOAD Teaching Admin. Mil. Acad. Teaching Admin. Other Teaching Admin. Command Years Persons Staff Years Persons Karva/Personal Years Persons 11 18 The elite from the other services were more active in administration than the army elite, especially those from the staff group of the other services. In general, teaching and administration play a larger part in the careers of those from the navy and air force than from the army. Most of the elite members from the air force and navy had some === [PDF page 330] === 314 experience in teaching and administration. This is probably due to the more technical nature of these services. However, teaching does not have the importance for one's career as it does for the army staff group. The navy and air force are smaller groups, and politics within these services are more kraton-style. The intrigues within these services are in the headquarters, and they are centered around the service commander with his supporters and dissident members of the headquarters staff, who try to gain the support of army leaders in their struggle against the service commander. Therefore teaching for the elite member from the navy, air force and police never served as the career breakthrough which it did for several army elite members. The most important military training institution in which to teach for the present army elite was SESKOAD. The reason why SESKOAD was so important was that it gave chances for contact and friendship between the instructors and the students, and it gave the instructors opportunities to influence the students, who already had reached at least sub-elite, if not elite status, within the military. the Indonesian culture, personal contact is very important in any career, and within the army a teaching assignment offers a person exposure which can be especially crucial to anj'one who has not had much success in rising either through command or traditional staff positions. Six of Soeharto's instructors hold high and influential positions === [PDF page 331] === 315 in the New Order. Several of these individuals mentioned that they were first close to Soeharto during that year. One of these individuals, described in the sample career section (Najor General Soenggoro), was Soeharto's logistics instructor. After Soeharto was appointed KOSTRAD commander, he asked Soenggoro to become his head of logistics; for the Mandala campaign under Soeharto Soenggoro held the same position. After the Mandala campaign Soenggoro became Soeharto's chief of staff when Soeharto was appointed KOANDA commander for East Indonesia. The army elite of Guided Democracy and the New Order differed in the number of years spent on instructional assignments. The New Order command group had a mean of.81 years, whereas none of the Guided Democracy command group had any instructional experience. The mean for the New Order staff was 2.2 years, compared to a mean of 1.2 for the Guided Democracy staff group. The elites of the two periods also differed in the type of instructional position assigned; those from the Guided Democracy military elite were more likely to be found in administrative positions rather than in teaching positions, which were more often asigned to the New Order military elite. For example, the army elite of the New Order taught three years for every year spent in administration, compared to two years in administration for every year in teaching for the Guided Democracy elite. For the New Order elite, teaching assignments were used by many to aid them in gaining access to === [PDF page 332] === 316 elite membership? this was not the case for the Guided Democracy elite since they had achieved elite status by the time military teaching was a useful avenue to elite membership. Military Service Abroad Few military elite members have received military assignments abroad, except as study assignments. Those few went abroad as military attache's, except for one member who went to the Congo as part of the United Nations force. Table 55 below indicates the numbers of those who went abroad and the length of time of their assignments. TABLE 55 MILITARY ASSIGNMENTS ABROAD: NEW ORDER ELITE Years Armv Staff Karva/Per. 17 15 10 1.05 1.36 Command Mean .43 Other Services Command Staff NOTE: An analysis of variance was performed and the differences among the groups were shown to be statistically significant (F=2.542, 4 & 67 df, p<.05). Why were those persons given military assignments abroad? There seem to be two distinct groups, divided mainly into those from the army and those from the air force. === [PDF page 333] === 317 In the case of the latter all four were sent into exile. Their last assignments had been in air force headquarters, and all ran afoul of the air force commander, three with Suryadharma and one with Dhani. For those from the army elite, most received the assignment as a type of "plum." All but two army officers went from good staff jobs to their positions abroad, and when they returned they were promoted and assigned to even better positions. Usually, therefore, for the army leaders, it was a bonus or favor extracted from someone at headquarters who had influence over assignments abroad. One army leader said that he wanted to live for a few years in Italy; therefore as a favor he was assigned as the first and last military attache to that country! Another said that one leader during the early days of Guided Democracy wanted him to go abroad so that he could save some money to support his eight children. Two army leaders, however, were in slightly similar circumstances to the air force leaders. One was an army leader who had held high positions in headquarters. He became involved in a bitter disagreement with Nasution. He was sent to Western Europe for several years, which, he remarked, he enjoyed after his many years of disappointment in fighting for his concepts and ideas One air force leader remarked that although he was furious at the time he was assigned as an air attache to countries in the Middle East, he grew to enjoy the assignment and especially was appreciative of the money he was able to save during the assignment. === [PDF page 334] === 318 in army headquarters. A second leader, involved in the Lubis affair, was first exiled to a "no desk" position in headquarters, then assigned to the Congo and returned to a "no desk" position! What effect does an assignment abroad as military or air attache have upon the member's progress toward elite status? Little effect has been ascertained. When they returned from abroad, they were usually given better positions, but that had little to do with their assignments abraod. For the air force leaders it was an exile position, and they were called back when a new commander came to power; for most of the army leaders it was an enjoyable 102 break, and a position that was lucrative. Karva Positions From the beginning of the army at the core of the military ideology was the belief that the Indonesian army not only has the function of assuring the security and maintaining the independence of the country, but also the function of responsibility for safeguarding and improving the social and political life of the nation. After the Revolution until 1957, the emphasis upon the second function of the armed forces remained fairly dormanti 102 Except for one person, those from the command group went from the field back to the field, either as regional military commander or as regional chief of staff, both very high positions. === [PDF page 335] === 319 political parties wsre strong and the political party leaders preferred to stress what the army regarded as its first function.103 The "dual function" has been used to legitimize two different types of practices. One, which will be emphasized here, was the practice, beginning in 1957, of posting high military officers to governmental positions--diplomatic, ministerial, and administrative. Officers were also assigned to organize political and trade movements, although some army officers started political movements on their own using the "dual function" as their justification. We are not merely a state's apparatus, but are also a social-political force. As a state's apparatus or instruments of the State, we place ourselves at the disposal of the Chief Executive and we are subject to no one else; as a social political force we are one of the groups who must participate collectively with the other groups, in order to conclude the Revolution. As a body containing the greatest percentage of dynamic young leadership, we have to contribute to fill the shortages in other sectors of the Government. And by so doing we can not become a class apart, but automatically have to integrate ourselves with the People, thereby fulfilling the need for concentration of all forces for the attainment of goals of the Indonesian Revolution. It is these two functions that cause the Armed Forces to sit in the Institutions of the State in both the legislative and executive fields, from the highest to the lowest; in this framework we have assigned many of our members in non-military fields: as 103 In the regions, though, especially in the Outer Islands, the regional army leaders did have much influence over regional politics, in cooperation with pangreh praia. === [PDF page 336] === 320 Chairman and members of the Provisional People's Congress, -minister, -ambassadors, -secretary generals, -governors, -managers of state enterprises... 104 The second way in which Operasi Karya has manifested itself is in the civic mission, which involves lower officers and soldiers in projects mainly in the rural areas, such as building dams, roads, etc.105 The civic action mission began in 1962, and is often used as a way to retire soldiers. Initially, when the internal power of army headquarters was less, army leaders minimized the possible use of Operasi Karya as a way to demobilize soldiers and noncommissioned officers; it was emphasized, instead, that it was a way for the military to perform a bakti (service) for society. 104 Major General Hartono Wirjodiprodjo, "A Brief Outline of the Indonesian Armed Forces Civic Mission," n.p., n.d. The frequent army assertions that they can help by providing qualified personnel for the government is often belied by civilians, from private conversations to articles in newspapers. Few army officers have the skills and experience to serve in the government bureaucracy, and the usual bureaucratic chain of command is upset. Also there is no shortage of personnel in the bureaucracy; a constant problem has been the over-abundance of government personnel. A year and a half after the attempted coup in 1965 an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs remarked that the wholesale dismissal of officials from his ministry was a blessing in disguise since there were too many officials employed by the ministry. This is true for other ministries as well. There have been many comments that the practices of the soldiers involved in these civic mission projects have been more those of supervisors over the local population, who do the actual work. For information on the inception, theory, and practices of the civic mission in its early years see Tunggal Siagian, "The Operasi Karya: The Involvement of the Indonesian Army in Rural Development" (M.A. thesis, Cornell University, September 1966). 106 Ibid., 61. === [PDF page 337] === 321 In this section only the first aspect of Operasi Karya will be dealt with, since the concern is with elite military careers. The germ of this part of Operasi Karya began after the proclamation of martial law when JNasution met with senior officials in March 1957 to discuss ways of aiding civil-military coordination. ' It was agreed that each ministry would assign a senior official to army headquarters as a permanent liaison officer, and they were to contact the army leadership every day. In 1959 the army announced that army liaison officers would be assigned to seven ministries; in 1961 this indirect army participation changed into direct army participation in governmental institutions by the appointment of military officers to 108 high political positions. Even as early as 1957 army officers were involved in the management of former Dutch enterprises which had been taken over by the army. Ihe number of armed forces officers transferred to karya positions steadily grew, going from high-level government positions, to middle-level, and finally in the hew Order, into lower-level positions and stretching out throughout the whole country even into the villages.109 107 Michael M. Ehrmann, "The Indonesian Military in the Politics of Guided Democracy: 1957-1965" (M.A. thesis, Cornell University, 1968), p. 109. 108 Ibid., p. 111. 109 For example, concerning the regions, 19 out of 26 governors are military, 26 out of 53 mayors, 122 out of 228 bupati (Sinar Harapan, 1 February 1971). Increasing numbers of military men hold positions of wedana, camat and lurah. === [PDF page 338] === 322 What differences are there among the different military groups in the number of years members were assigned to karya positions and in the types of positions that they filled? Table 56 shows that the karya/personal group had the highest mean followed by the two staff groups. TABLE 56 NEW ORDER ARMED FORCES CAREER GROUPSs YEARS IN KARYA POSITIONS Years 10-12 Mean Command 15 Army. Staff Karya/Per. Other Services Command Staff The types of karya positions held by the groups also, differed. In the command group the members were most likely to be appointed to ministerial positions; four were ministers, one a governor, and the sixth an ambassador. The staff is more varied, and several also held more than one karya position. Of the fifteen staff members who have held karya positions, eight have held administrative positions, six ministerial, two were leaders of political movements, and one each, an ambassador and a governor. The karya subgroup held positions the longest; the karya/personal group as a whole held administrative and diplomatic positions, and one each headed state enterprises and political movements, === [PDF page 339] === 323 and served as a legislative leader and a governor. The staff of the other services held karya positions more frequently- -three were ministers and two were ambassadors. Only two from the other services command group had karya positions, but they held multiple posts --ministerial, administrative and legislative. What are the effects of karya positions upon an elite member's career? There are three major effects: 1) promotion; 2) demotion; and 3) pre-retirement, which can be, of course, intermingled with demotion; there is no automatic retirement age for all high military officers. With some the lines were somewhat blurred, or what initially was a demotion actually had a beneficial effect, due to unrelated circumstances. From what can be ascertained, approximately sixty percent of the military elite benefitted from a karya position in their careers. It would be interesting to compare the military elite with the sub-elite in this regard. Usually an appointment to a ministerial post, especially if it is a prestigious ministry such as internal affairs, is considered a promotion. Those from the army command group,tfiowere ministers, were appointed to these positions after finishing assignments as divisional commanders in strategic regions. Host of the army ministers headed ministries of importance for many years. Some of the military elite appointed to administrative positions in effect received promotions; they either headed important === [PDF page 340] === 324 and powerful agencies or these positions served as stepping stones to high positions, either ministerial or within the high army structure. Appointments to certain state enterprise positions could be very beneficial, as it was for Lieutenant General Ibnu Soetowo. These posts could also be important for those who headed political movements and trade unions, since these types of organizations could provide these army officers with independent sources of power and wealth; several in this category have been able to postpone their exit from the elite for many years. The diplomatic posts, with one exception, were demotions. An ambassadorship for an armed forces leader is well-known as a type of exile; the leader is stripped of his previous prestigious and powerful position, then sent far away so that he has few opportunities to exert his former influence. For example, in the middle"of 1969 when the army leadership was able to effect changes in the naval and air force commanders, the former naval commander was sent to the Soviet Union and the former air force commander to Great Britain. Another example is Major General Mas Isman, the former TRIP leader. Sukarno sent him out of the country for quite a few years as ambassador because of Sukarno's opposition to the political movement, KOSGORO, Mas Isman had organized around the nucleus of TRIP veterans. Unimportant administrative posts can also be demotions, leading for some to retirement. For example, one divisional commander was transferred from an important division to === [PDF page 341] === 325 a powerless and unimportant position in a ministry 5 a few years later he was retired. For most naval and air force leaders karya positions in the past were resting places in which to wait until a new commander took over in headquarters; momentarily it was a demotion, but fortunately a person to whom they were close became commander, then these leaders were propelled to high positions in headquarters. For some, their first karya position was a preretirement position, but for others a karya pre-retirement post is their second or third karya position. Karya positions can be a very useful way to retire senior generals who are no longer favored; some time after the New Order began, ambassadorships began to be filled with senior generals who had been active in the Guided Democracy period, and then later with generals from the present period whom the government wanted to retire from the active scene.. Also certain state institutions, those with little or no power, are used as pre-retirement resting places. 110 For others a leader favorable to them never became commander. For example, Lieutenant General Ali Sadikin, from the marines, never improved his relationship with naval headquarters; after a low-prestige ministerial post he was not appointed to naval headquarters but was appointed as Governor of Jakarta. This assignment, in effect, became a promotion; he is a very popular and efficient governor, and has probably reached the zenith of his career. === [PDF page 342] === 326 To summarize, although the Indonesian military elite is characterized by diverse origins, i.e. Dutch, Japanese, and Indonesian military experience, all of the members served in the military during the Revolution. There were four ways by which to advance to elite status in the Indonesian armyt through the traditional command and staff routes and through two non-traditional routes, karva positions and close personal friendships with members of the upper stratum of the army elite. Those from the other armed services travelled either the command or the staff route. Two divisions, the Diponegoro and the Siliwangi, dominated recruitment into the army elite. Attendance at the military staff and command schools was found to be helpful mainly in indirect ways, through widening networks of interpersonal relations. Instructional and karva positions often aided elite members in advancing to elite status. In the following chapter the career patterns of the civilian segments of the elite are analyzed. Participation in the Revolution was less important for civilian as compared with military elite members, but personal ties were equally crucial for all elite members in reaching elite status. === [PDF page 343] === 327 CHAPTER IV CAREER PATTERNS OF THE CIVILIAN ELITE Summary By 1973 the New Order political system could be characterized as a military-technocratic partnership, whereas in the Guided Democracy period it was a military-political party partnership. This chapter is an analysis of the career patterns of the New Order civilian elite segments, comparing them with those of Guided Democracy. The technocrats, mostly former academicians, are divided into two sub-segments, economists and a varied group of intellectuals. For both sub-segments the most common career pattern was the pursuance of dual careers in academia and government. For both sub-segments personal relationships were helpful in their rise to elite status. For example, all of the economists were former anak buah of Professor Soemitro. The technocrats, like the other elite segments, participated in the Revolution. Most of the economists were involved in military service during the Revolution, whereas most of the other intellectuals took part in a civilian capacity. Whereas the non-economists declined in status between 1969 and 1973, the economists increased in power and reputation; the Soeharto government bases its legitimacy on the effecting of economic development. === [PDF page 344] === 328 The non-party segment in the Guided Democracy period was very different from the technocratic segment of the New Order. The non-party elite, although they were not members of political parties, were politicians, and they first became involved in government and politics during the Revolution. They are less educated, too; some received only a high school education, and none, unlike the technocrats, received a doctorate. In the introduction it was stated that the major political parties represent the aliran (main streams) of Indonesian society, and that the parties therefore follow the lines of major social and ethnic cleavage. For example, the Masjumi party was thought of as a party representing the Outer Islands, although twenty-five percent of the vote came from Java in the 1955 elections. The three other major parties, the PNI, the NU, and the PKI, were Java-based parties, representing, in general, the privavi. the conservative santri community, and the abangan masses respectively. The political parties, therefore, reflected "distinguishable world-views... /and7 took on the character of grand movements." Under each one were a myriad of subsidiary women's, youth, student, labor, and cultural auxiliaries. The role of the parties changed over the years of independence. During Parliamentary Democracy political parties were at their Daniel S. Lev, "Political Parties in Indonesia," Journal of Southeast Asian History. 8 (March 1 9 6 7 ) J 57. === [PDF page 345] === 3 29 zenith. But. by Guided Democracy parties declined, with politics focused more on the center. But still there were local chapters throughout the archipelago, extending down to the villages. The FKI was the only party which benefitted from Guided Democracy, but it was destroyed after the abortive 1965 coup. In the early days of the New Order there was a resurgence of political party activity, especially those factions opposing Sukarno and the PKI. But gradually during the New Order the influence of political parties has declined, their leaders have been chosen by the army and/or coopted by it; and after the election of 1971 the parties declined even more. Through governmental interference the military-sponsored Golongan Karya (Golkar), Karya Movement, won the elections by a landslide, and soon after the elections the political parties were no longer allowed to organize in the villages. The primary occupation of the political party leaders, in contrast to the technocrats, was politics. Whereas the technocrats reached elite status through combined careers in academia and government, the political party leaders rose through political party activity. The three base offices for party politicians were center, regional, and movement party offices. For example, most of the younger party leaders rose through the youth sectors of their parties. More, leaders rose through center than either of the two other paths. Political party leaders usually had secondary careers, and the political parties differed === [PDF page 346] === 330 in regard to types of secondary careers chosen by the leaders. For example, NU political party leaders usually had secondary careers in business, and PNI leaders in the civil service. As is true for both the military and technocratic segments participation in the Revolution was characteristic of this segment. Most political party leaders were in military groups during the Revolution; their proportion was higher than for the technocrats. Certain background factors played a role in the success of party leaders. An example is Javan ethnic origin. Even in the Parmusi party, a party identified as an Outer Island party, most of the Parmusi party elite, as for the Masjumi before it, were Javan. Most of those elected to parliament from the Masjumi were from the Outer Islands. PNI leaders were exclusively Javan, although there were a substantial number of non-Javans elected to parliament from the PNI. Except for the NU leaders, who mainly only had a pesantren education, most of the other political party leaders had at least some higher education, whereas this was not true for the party representatives in parliament. Unlike the non-party and technocratic elites of Guided Democracy and the New Order, there was continuity between the party elites of these two periods. Many of the differences stemmed from the fact that the Guided Democracy party elite was the older of the two. For example, most of the New Order party leaders were active in youth movements, whereas this is not true of most of === [PDF page 347] === 331 those of the Guided Democracy political party elite. This is due to the fact that many of the latter grew up at a time when few youth movements existed. During the Revolution they often held responsible positions in the new government, compared to the activity of the New Order party elite, which usually was at a lower level. The educational background, however, is higher for the party elite from the New Order; most attended universities, whereas most of those from the Guided Democracy period did not. For purposes of comparison with other national elites, the technocrats and political party leaders were combined. In terms of the frequency of non-political occupations found in the elite, twenty-nine percent of the Indonesian civilian elite had been civil servants. This is similar to Tanzania (27%), whereas in Turkey and Sri Lanka, only 14% and 8% respectively were formerly from the civil service. The next most popular secondary occupation for the Indonesian New Order elite was education (27%), For Tanzania see Raymond F. Hopkins, Political Roles in a New Statei Tanzania's First Decade (New Haven and Londoni Yale University Press, 1971), p. 75. This study included members of the National Assembly and government administrators, excluding the military. An interesting finding was that twenty percent were recruited directly from student status into the political elite. For Turkey see Frey, Turkish Political Elite, p. 80i this included all the deputies in the Turkish parliament from 1920-1957. For Sri Lanka see Singer, Emerging'Elite^. p. 170; the above figure is for the 1960 legislature. For Argentina see Fernandez, Elite in Argentina, p. 77; the data is for the national executive, gubernatorial, and legislative sectors in the political elite for 1963. === [PDF page 348] === 33 2 whereas for the elites of Tanzania, Turkey, and Argentina the percentages are much less. The third occupation in frequency was business (20%), and, again, in comparison with the three countries above the percentage is the highest. In some countries, such as Argentina, practicing lawyers are the largest group, whereas in Indonesia there were very few. The Indonesian political elite, both in the nonparty, technocratic, and party segments, has been largely recruited from the center; only a few members have been recruited into the elite from regional positions. Those in the center category who did serve in the pre-revolutionary period as heads of regional branches were usually sent to the regions as representatives of headquarters. In the Soviet Union and Norway the political elite are largely recruited from regional party' and governmental leaders. In the Soviet Union, for example, 48% of the members of the 1961 Central Committee of the Communist Party was recruited from the regional party and government apparatus, and only 15% from the central party and government appara3 tus; there has been substantially no change in the tendency toward regional recruitment from 1952 to 1970. In ISorway the labor party elite is recruited from those who joined the party at an early age, served a long apprenticeship in a variety of local party offices, and who also were union Fleron, "Career Types," p. 113. McHale and Mastro, "Central Committee," p. 12. === [PDF page 349] === 333 members. This certainly was not true of the Indonesian political elite. The Norwegian Labor Party elite continued to serve as an effective national linkage system between the center and the local areas due to their maintenance of close local ties with a variety of groups, even after many years in the center, whereas this was not the case with the Indonesian elite members from the Outer Islands who have lived in Java for years and rarely maintained ties with their home areas. Technocratic and Non-Party Segments Introduction The majority of the technocrats of the New Order political elite are "technical" intellectuals: six economists, two engineers, and one agriculturalist. Four of the fifteen are what Edward Shils refers to as typical for the developing countries! one lawyer, two journalists, and one upper level civil servant, One of the two remaining members of the segment is a sociologist, and the other is the Sultan of Jogjakarta, who is not only a traditional leader but a modern intellectual. Martin, "Norwegian Labor Party Leaders," p. 5. Ibid., p. 9. The Intellectuals and the Powers and Other Essays (Chicago and Londont University of Chicago Press, 1972;, p. 390. === [PDF page 350] === 334 The technocratic elite led primarily academic lives, before and after the completion of their degree, but they were more intensely involved in government than Western academicians. They v^re more highly politicized, too, in terms of former political party membership and their intense concern with politics. They have been influenced by their involvement, military and non-military, in the Revolution. All were known as pro-Western during the period of Guided Democracy, and had little official influence at that time, although there was close contact between many of them and the military elite and sub-elite. After the attempted coup in 1965 many of the intellectuals, especially the social scientists, became involved in the political and economic civilian advisory teams that worked closely with Soeharto. The members of the economic advisory team have continued to work closely with the military, and are therefore from the group of intellectuals who believe that cooptation is the most effective strategy for intellectuals to influence policy-making in the predominantly military government. Their positions and prerogatives have continued to rise until finally in the end of 1973 criticism by students and intellectuals outside the government was directed as vigorously against this group of intellectuals, particularly the economists, as against the military. Until 1973 criticism of economic practices of the government by newspapers was most commonly directed against the military advisory team (SPRI), or against other military figures who headed state enterprises and government agencies. About a month before the riots of January 1974', which === [PDF page 351] === 335 The division among the intellectuals centered around the issue of cooptation versus non-cooptation of them by the regime j this will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 6. Below, career histories of two individuals fairly representative of the two sub-segments of the technocratic elite are given, followed by analyses of background characteristics and career patterns of the Guided Democracy nonparty and the New Order technocratic elites. Career Histories The first example is Professor Ali Wardhana, a pri9 vavi Javanese, like all the economists but one from the Outer Islands. It was common for the fathers of the economists to have been employed in the modern sector; this was the case not only for Professor Wardhana's father, but also for his grandfather, who was one of the first Indonesian physicians. His father studied accounting in Holland; the shock of returning home to racist treatment, after the rather egalitarian experience in Holland caused the father to develop intense nationalist feelings. organized a nationalist-oriented school (Merdeka /Freedom7 were a protest against Japanese influence, government favoritism of the Chinese, and, in general, the policies and practices of the Soeharto government, some newspapers began printing articles and letters to the editor that were very critical of the technocrats, especially the economists. See the following newspaper articles! Nusantara 30 November 1973i Tempo. 1 December 1973j and "The People Against the Technocrats," Topik, 6 December 1973. Professor Wardhana traced his descent directly from Prince Diponegoro. === [PDF page 352] === 336 School) upon his return, and Professor Wardhana received his early education there. Professor Wardhana's aunt, the wife of the PNI leader and former prime minister, Ali Sastroamidjojo SH, brought Professor Wardhana from Madiun to Jakarta so he could get a "good education," an ELS education. Professor Wardhana remarked that he constantly fought with Dutch students. After the Japanese invasion he went to the Taman Siswa school for a short time in Jogjakarta until the Japanese closed it down, and then went to Surakarta and^ stayed there until the Revolution. The Japanese period was important in Professor Wardhana' s political socialization; his father was active in Sutan Sjahrir's underground, and their louse became a meeting place for political leaders in the underground. During the Revolution he stayed in Surakarta with his father and attended the SMA. He was a member of Ikatan Pelalar Indonesia (IPI), League of Indonesian Students, but did not join any student army, which is unusual for the economists. After Professor Wardhana completed high school his father stopped supporting him because of the father's belief that a child should be independent after high school. After studying engineering at Gajah Mada University for a year, Professor Wardhana went to Jakarta and worked for Dutch trading companies for three years, and then in 1953 entered the faculty of economics at the University of Indonesia, headed by Professor Soeraitro. This was a very important decision, since it was through his specialty and his === [PDF page 353] === 33 7 association with Professor Soemitro and with Professor Widjojo, who was Soemitro's anak mas, and now the undisputed leader of the economics, that Professor Wardhana entered the elite. After he received his first degree in 1958, Professor Wardhana was sent to the University of California at Berkeley by Professor Soemitro where he received his H.A. and Ph.D. Professor Wardhana said that it was not until he studied at Berkeley that he realized that "through more understanding of economic problems /is7 the way to develop a country." According to Professor Wardhana "economics comes first" in development. He also stressed, however, two other prerequisites for development: 1) leadership committed to development; and 2) political stability, both cornerstones of the Soeharto regime. In 1962 Professor Wardhana returned to Indonesia and taught at the faculty of economics, where he was under Professor Widjojo who had succeeded Professor Soemitro as dean of the faculty of economics. Like other economists in the elite, Professor Wardhana taught at SESKOAD and at 11 other military schools, such as SESKOAL and LEMHANAS. In this usage, anak mas means the favorite anak buah of a bapak; mas is Indonesian for "gold." Professor Soemitro went into, exile as a result of his involvement with the regional rebellion of 1958. 12 LEMHANAS (Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional), the National Defense Institute, was founded in the early part of 1965 and is located in Jakarta. Its purpose is that of a "think tank," where national defense policy can be studied and recommendations made. === [PDF page 354] === 338 Professor Wardhana mentioned that during Guided Democracy it was more enjoyable to teach at SESKOAD than at the university, since at SESKOAD he had more freedom in his teaching; at the university, for example, market economics could not be taught. Professor Wardhana, unlike the other economists, was little involved in governmental agencies before the New 13 Order. The other economists were first involved in the planning agency under Ir. Djuanda, who was prime minister during the period of transition between Parliamentary Democracy and Guided Democracy. Most were also involved, although in a frustrating way, in bodies created by Sukarno during Guided Democracy.14 After the attempted coup in 1965, Professor Wardhana, along with other economists from the University of Indonesia joined the economic advisory team, and in June 1968 he joined the cabinet in 13 Professor Wardhana did serve as an advisor to the Bank Negara Indonesia (BNI), the Indonesian State Bank, beginning in 1964; however, he was less involved in government than was customary for the elite economist. Professor Widjojo spent part of the summer of 1965 at Cornell University, and at the time expressed frustration and anger over the development plan drawn up by the government; he said that it had been devised and written by noneconomists, then Sukarno instructed the economists to implement the plan. The advisory team is usually referred to as ESPRI, although non-admirers call the team the "Berkeley Mafia," a name first given it in a Ramparts article; see David Ransom, "The Berkeley Mafia and the Indonesian Massacre," Ramparts 9 (November 1970)t 27-29, 40-49. === [PDF page 355] === an important post, Minister of Finance, which he still holds. 16 The second example is Professor Seno Adji, who, unlike most of the other older generation lawyers in the elite, had experience in teaching law and also in working for the government. His father, born in a village, was unofficially adopted by a Dutchman, who gave the boy to the Mangkunegara kraton when he was transferred from Surakarta. At the time Seno Adji was born his father was 3. sten wedana in the kraton. Pak Seno attended the HIS, MULO, and then the AMS in Surakarta before enrolling in the law faculty in Jakarta in 1938. He was a member of 18 Indonesia Muda (Young Indonesia) and a student organization called Unitas Studiosorum Indonesiensis (USI), Indonesian Student Union, more conservative than the other prominent student organization of the time, Perhimpunan Pelaiar-Pelaiar Indonesia (PPPI), Association of Indonesian Students. Most of his friends from the USI joined the PSI, although some joined Masjumi. The Japanese invaded Indonesia at the end of his fourth year of law school, and he The above information on Professor Ali Wardhana is mainly from an interview with him in Jakarta, 4 June 1969. 17 Before his adoption he was taught Dutch by the sister of Raden Ayu Kartini. 18 Indonesia Muda was founded in 1930 out of the inspiration of the 1928 Youth Congress in Jakarta, which adopted the famous slogan "Indonesia, satu bangsa, satu tanah-air" (Indonesia, one people, one native land). === [PDF page 356] === 340 was assigned to Banyumas for a year as clerk of the court; after the year in Banyumas he was transferred to Jakarta and was employed by the justice department until the end of the Japanese occupation. After independence he continued to work in the ministry; when the government moved to Jogjakarta from Jakarta Pak Seno also moved. By the end of the Revolution he was chief of the naturalization section in Jogjakarta and at the same time received his law degree from Gajah Mada University in Jogjakarta. During much of the Revolution he lived in the same house with Burhanuddin Karahap, also a law student, who became a Masjumi leader and- a prime minister. After graduation from Gajah Mada University Pak Seno was appointed district attorney for the whole of Central Java, an important position in a major province. In 1953 Pak Seno had the good luck of discovering the identity of bank robbers who held up the BNI branch in Surabaya, and the attorney general, whom Pak Seno knew personally, was pleased and transferred him to his office in Jakarta. After two years in Jakarta Pak Seno was promoted to chief of the Bureau of Investigation in the Attorney General's office. In this function he worked with high officers from the armed services and the police, and also with high officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This was important in helping him gain his next promotion, which was deputy attorney general. In late 1959 Pak Seno was the chief departmental candidate for attorney general, but === [PDF page 357] === 341 Sukarno would not accept him because of Pak Seno's opposition to a government judicial decision which had not been based on an investigation. Seno Adji left the government at that time and joined the law faculty at the University of Indonesia. He became active in the IPKI party, which, as will be discussed subsequently, was mainly backed by Siliwangi officers and their civilian allies; he was elected to the executive council of the party in 1961. Soeharto liked Pak Seno and personally wanted him to join the cabinet in February 1966, but Pak Seno was vetoed by Sukarno. After authority was formally transferred from Sukarno to Soeharto the next month, Pak Seno was appointed Minister of Justice, a position he held until March 1974. Shortly after his appointment as cabinet minister he was also appointed Dean of the Faculty of Law and Social Sciences at the University of Indonesia; he held that position concurrently with the cabinet position until 1968.19 Background Characteristics and Career Patterns Academic Background Six of the technocrats are economists. Professor Soemitro, although not the leader of the group, was the first dean of the economics faculty and to a great extent has shaped the character of the group, and some of his 19 The above information is based on an interview with Seno Adji, Jakarta, 18 April 1969. === [PDF page 358] === 342 background will be briefly mentioned. He received his Ph.D. in economics in Holland shortly before the German invasion. Most of those who had had university training prior to independence studied subjects such as law, engineering, and medicine. At the beginning of independence there was a dearth of natural and social scientists, and Professor Soemitro received positions of importance. Along with Professor Soemitro*s involvement in the PSI and in several cabinets, Professor Soemitro joined the University of Indonesia as dean and professor in the new economics faculty. All of the other economists in the elite attended the faculty of economics with the exception of Drs. Sadli, who received his degree from Gajah Mada University, but became Soemitro's assistant at the University of Indonesia after his graduation from Gajah Mada. Drs. Sadli's case is rare, since the group of University of Indonesia trained economists is a very tight group and difficult for outsiders to join. All but one economist who attended the University of Indonesia went to Berkeley for the Ph.D.; the one exception is Radius Prawiro, who had studied in Rotterdam before enrolling at the University of Indonesia. In general, therefore, Professor Soemitro's anak buah who are now part of the elite had a common academic background. The other members of the technocratic elite have varied academic disciplines. All, except the pamonp; pra-ja member and a journalist, have university degrees, and most === [PDF page 359] === 343 studied in Indonesia and then four studied abroad, two in the United States at Harvard University and the other two in Holland. The others received their training in Indonesia. Youth Movement and Political Party Identification Most of the technocrats were involved in various youth movements, from the scouts in the early youth to more political youth movements in the middle and high school years. Only one technocrat was active during the Japanese occupation, in contrast to the members of the military segment. He was in Angkatan Baru (Young Generation), which was founded by youth leaders and served as a politi20 cal liaison body with the nationalist leadership. Several economists joined and led student organizations during the Revolution. One was active in the independence period in university student politics; he chaired the student council of the University of Indonesia. It is understandable that since Professor Soemitro 21 was a FSI leader, his anak buah would be active members or at least sympathizers. Even after the PSI was outlawed its ideology remained influential, not only among many intellectuals but also in certain army circles, particularly within the Siliwangi division. Only three non-economists were in political parties, one each in the PSI, the IPKI, and the Nationale Indische party. 20 See Anderson, Occupation and Resistance, pp. 55-57. 71 In 1955 he was in charge of the FSI election campaign. === [PDF page 360] === 344 Experience during the Revolution All of the technocrats participated in the Revolution, eight in military groups and seven through civilian functions. Five of the eight were in student armies, two of whom served in army headquarters. Except for one who guarded Indo-Europeans, the others served in laskar. The Sultan of Jogjakarta organized the Laskar Rakvat (People's Laskar) mainly as a deterrent against the radical laskar operating in the Jogjakarta area. The backing of the sultan for the Revolution and his closeness to army leaders were important factors in the success of the Republic against the Dutch; during the Revolution he was given the titular rank of major general, which was raised to titular full general in 1960. The military experiences of these technocrats during the Revolution were important because of the friends and contacts they made during this time, besides establishing some nationalist credentials. For example, one who served as adjutant to General Nasution in headquarters was sent by the army to Holland, where he received a Ph.D. in mining engineering. Another had been in CORO at the end of the Dutch period, and several of his friends from CORO are senior army leaders; in 1964 he was awarded the rank of titular major general. The activities of those who participated as civilians varied. For example, Professor Soemitro was Sjahrir's assistant and was not only in charge of the first monetary reform, but became the president of the first national bank. === [PDF page 361] === 345 Others served either in government departments or in the first legislative body, the Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat (KNIP), Central Indonesian Isational Committee. Frimary and Secondary Career Characteristics All of the economists, but one,22 have had twin careers in academia and in government during much of their career history. The economists were helped by Professor Soemitro and were chosen by him to study abroad and then to join the economics faculty. After the Revolution Professor Soemitro enrolled in the PSI and then was minister in three cabinets* in a sense he served as a role model for the economists. After Soemitro was exiled his students continued Soemitro's example by involving themselves both in government and in teaching. Professors Widjojo and Sadli, for example, worked in the National Planning Office in the late 1950s. During the Guided Democracy period the economists, except for Professor Soemitro and Radius Prawiro, who was only employed by the government, were active in teaching at military schools, as mentioned previously. Many of the non-economists held dual careers before reaching elite status. experience. Only three members had no teaching One had the experience of teaching in military This is Drs. Radius Prawiro who joined the BNIj he is an anak mas of the Sultan of Jogjakarta and has been helped in his career by the sultan. === [PDF page 362] === 346 schools. The pre-elite experience of the technocrats was instrumental in their rise to elite status; it not only gave them civilian and military contacts, but they gained valuable experience which guided them in their next venture in government, the New Order. Career History. 1942-1973 Table 57 below on career histories shows that several technocrats, especially the economists, were propelled into elite status soon after their final degree was earned. They rose to elite status more quickly than did the military elite members, who had to spend years in lower field and staff positions before they could reach sub-elite status. This is due in part to the disparity in size between the army officer corps and those receiving training in the natural, applied, and social sciences. From the time of the Revolution the officer corps has been sizable and therefore there has always been keen competition among the officers in the striving for promotion and status. During the Dutch period few were able to study subjects other than education, law, medicine, Indology, civil engineering, architecture and agriculture; it was not until the 1950s that academic departments for subjects such as economics were organized. In addition, during the period of Guided Democracy the regime did not consider economic development an important priority for the government, and therefore the economists did not gain elite status. The === [PDF page 363] === TABLE 57 DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRIMARY CAREERS OF NEW ORDER TECHNOCRATS: 1942-1973 Position Government Vice-Pres. Cabinet Head, Inst. Advisor Sr. Civil Servant Jr. Civil Servant State Enter. Governor Ambassador Sultan Academic Admin. Teaching Student Other Prof. Journalism Teacher Business Pre-Univ. Student 1942 (Dut) 1945 (Jap) 1945 (Rev) 1949 1952 1956 1959 1965 1962 1967 1969 1973 13 13 13 10 === [PDF page 364] === TABLE 57--Continued Position Jail/Exile No Position Military 1945 1949 1952 1956 1945 1942 1959 1962 1965 1967 1969 1973 ^his was the cabinet of the rebel government established during the regional rebellion of the late 1950s. === [PDF page 365] === 349 Soeharto government, however, bases its legitimacy on economic development, and therefore the economists, particularly those who were anak buah of Soemitro and later of Professor Widjojo, have much influence and hold high positions in the government. Most of the technocrats have either risen in status or preserved their high status; the Sultan of Jogjakarta is now vice-president of Indonesia and ten of the others are ministers in the cabinet. Guided Democracy Non-Party Segment There is no continuity between the Guided Democracy non-party elite segment and the technocrats of the New Order. The very nature of the two segments differs. The technocratic segment contains a high number of professionals for whom politics is a secondary career begun after success was achieved in their primary occupation, whereas for most of the Guided Democracy non-party elite politics was their primary career, and more than half were involved in government and politics by the time of the Revolution. The two segments also differ in other respects, including academic background, youth movement involvement, nature of revolutionary experience, and career history. Five of the eight members of the non-party segment chose politics as their primary career. Three had been active in politics for more than twenty years; the other two were younger and had spent from ten to thirteen years in politics. The segment included such well-known persons === [PDF page 366] === 350 as Sukarno and Djuandaj it also included famous pemuda (youth) from the Revolution, such as Achmadi who was the leader of the Tentara Felaiar (Student Army). The older members, such as Yamin SH,23 were prominent in nationalist politics from the onset of Indonesian nationalism. Therefore most of the non-party elite achieved elite status through their activities as nationalist and revolutionary leaders, unlike the technocratic segment of the New Order, who, except for Professor Soemitro, reached elite status in the New Order and first achieved recognition in their academic disciplines. Only two members of the non-party segment are comparable to the technocratic segment members-their primary occupations were in academia and the civil service. The last member of the non-party elite was the only woman elite member; this was Ibu Hartini, one of Sukarno's wives and the only legal wife at the time of his death in 1970. In 1955 she became his legal second wife, and by Guided Democracy was a powerful figure? for example in order to meet Sukarno it was usually helpful and sometimes necessary to use her as an intermediary,25 and 23 Muhammad Yamin SH was chairperson both of Jong Sumatranen Bond and Indonesia Muda. He was a leader of two pre-war parties and a member of the Volksraad from 1938-1942. 24 J.D. Legge, Sukarnoi A Political Biography (New York and Washington, D.C.i Praeger, 1972), p. 407. 25 See Ibid., pp. 334-335. Vious rumors were prominent in 1968 concerning Ibu Hartini*s influence of Sukarno. One example was the allegation that Hartini was the "coordinator of dukun whom Sukarno would consult, and included, according to the allegation, were pro-PKI dukun who would === [PDF page 367] === 351 most found it imperative to maintain good relationships with her. In terms of secondary occupations, four were civil servants and two had been privately employed professionals, a category absent for members of the New Order technocratic elite. Four of the Guided Democracy non-party elite were members of youth movements, but they were intensely involved in them and active for longer periods of time than their counterparts in the New Order. The non-party elite were active in the early youth movements, such as Jong Java. Jong Sumatranen Bond, and Indonesia Muda. The level of education received by the Guided Democracy non-party segment was lower than the technocrats of the New Order; six attended universities, but none received the doctorate. Technical subjects were also more prominent in the New Order elite. All but one of the Guided Democracy segment who attended universities only studied in Indonesia, whereas most technocrats studied abroad. The extent and nature of their revolutionary involvement differed greatly; only one of the Guided Democracy non-party members had military experience during the Revolution, and most of the others held high posts in advise him in accordance with PKI instructions; it was also alleged that through her "womanly" power Hartini was able to convince men opposed to Sukarno to change their orientation (see Nusantara, 3 and 4 October 1968). The Jong Sumatranen Bond, organized in 1917 by Sumatran students in Java, had its strongest chapters in West Java. === [PDF page 368] === 352 the new government, such as cabinet minister and delegate to Dutch and Indonesian negotiations. Finally, their career histories are quite different. In table 58 below it can be seen that many members of the Guided Democracy segment were intensely involved in politics and held high government positions from the inception of independence. Political Party Segments Major Political Parties of the i\ew Order The political party members of the elite come from nine parties and movements: Partai INasional Indonesia ( P M ), Indonesian National Party (6); the Nahdatul Ulama (Ml), Council of Muslim Scholars (6); Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Parmusi), the Indonesian Muslim Party (4); Partai Katholik. Catholic Party (3); Golongan Independent, the Independent Group (3); Partai Kristen Indonesia (Parkindo), the Indonesian Christian Party (1)? Partai Murba, Proletarian Party (1); Partai Sarikat Islam Indonesia (FSII), Indonesian Islamic Union Party (1); and Kesatuan Aksi Sar-jana Indonesia (KASI), Action Front of Indonesian Academicians (1). First a brief description of the histories, ideologies, leadership and appeal of the parties will be given, illustrated by three career histories of leaders of the largest political parties--Hardi SH of the PNI, the late H.M. Subchan Z.E. of the NU, and Agus Sudono, formerly === [PDF page 369] === TABLE 58 PROGRESSION OF CAREERS OF THE GUIDED DEMOCRACY NON-PARTY SEGMENT Position 1945 1949 1942 1945 Government President Cabinet, SecGen. Head, Gov't Agency Legislative Body Sr. Civil Servant Jr. Civil Servant Ambassador, Delegate Academia Academician Student Pre-Univ. Student Military UnderRround Jail. Exile 1952 1956 1959 [ 1962 1965 1967 === [PDF page 370] === TABLE 5 8 - - C o n t i n u e d Position No Position Deceased Unknown 1942 (Dut) 1945 (Jap) 1949 1945 (Rev) 1952 1956 1959 1962 1965 1967 === [PDF page 371] === 355 of the Parmusi. The political parties differ in their ideologies and types of leaders and supporters attracted to them. These differences will be illustrated by the comparison of certain background variables, namely age, ethnic identification, religious and social class background, and education. Subsequently career patterns will be analyzed, especially in regard to second occupations, youth movement involvement, nature of revolutionary experience, evolution of party posts held by the elite, and types of government posts to which they were assigned or elected. The two nationalist parties represented in the elite are the PNI and Murba.27 The PNI, established in early 1946, traces its origins to the pre-war P M founded by Sukarno in the late 1920s. 28 From 1945 until the present the PNI has passed alternately through radical and conservative 27 At the beginning of the New Order, Adam Malik, the foreign minister, identified himself as a Murba member, but in early 1967 he announced his plans to leave the party (Antara. morning ed., 27 March 1967) and at the end of 1967 advertised his intention to join the new Golongan Independent (Indonesian Observor. 22 December 1967) after it was organized. He never joined it, however, due largely to the disorganization of the group and its failure to agree upon a common platform or even upon the goals of the group. On 14 January 1971 Malik announced that he would join Golkar and campaign for parliament in the 1971 elections (Antara. morning ed., 14 January 1971). For Malik's explanation as to the reasons for his departure from the Murba party see Nusantara. 20 February 1971. T o r information on the background of the PNI during the colonial period see Bernhard Dahm, Sukarno and the Struggle for Independence (Ithaca and Londoni Cornell University Press, 1969) and Legge, Sukarno. For more information on the revolutionary and post-revolutionary PNI see the === [PDF page 372] === 356 stages in its ideology and leadership recruitment; these stages were stimulated and influenced by the characteristics 29 and ongoing changes in the political system as a whole. For example, for the period from 1946 until the end of the general election in 1955 party leadership was effectively held by radical nationalists. During the Revolution the leaders generally opposed negotiations between the Indonesian and Dutch governments and were critical of the truce agreements resulting from the negotiations. During the revolutionary and early Parliamentary Democracy periods conservative groups left the party twice and formed their own parties. There were two main groups of leaders in the PNI in the years of Parliamentary Democracy, one which controlled the party, the radical nationalist group, and the second, the cabinet group, who served on Masjumi-dominated following sourcess Anderson, Occupation and Resistance; Feith, Democracy in Indonesia; Herbert Feith, "Dynamics of Guided Democracy," in Indonesia, ed. Ruth T. McVey (New Havens Human Relations Area Files, 1963)j Feith and Castles, Political Thinking; Kahin, Revolution in Indonesia; Angus Mclntryre, "Divisions and Power in the Indonesian National Party, 1965-1966," Indonesia 13 (April 1972)J 183-210; and J. Eliseo Rocamore, "The Partai Nasional Indonesia 1963-1965," Indonesia 10 (October 1970)* 143-181. The best source on the PNI is Rocamora's article. 29 Much of the discussion below is based on Rocamora, "Partai Nasional Indonesia." 30 In 1948 large numbers of Javanese senior civil servants together with leaders from Kalimantan and Sulawesi formed the Persatuan Indonesia Rava (PIR), Greater Indonesia Union; in 1950 most of the leaders from a: pre-war party, Parindra, who were still in the PNI, left the PNI and formed the Partai Rakvat Nasional. (PRN), National People's Party (Ibid., p. 145 === [PDF page 373] === 357 or influenced cabinets. The first group was older and had been active in the nationalist movement longer than the second groupj most lacked university education, although there were a few who had studied in Holland, were active in the radical nationalist student movement, Per*" himpunan Indonesia, and returned to Indonesia imbued with radical nationalist thinking. Most of those in the cabinet group were younger and lacked nationalist credentials; they had a certain esprit de corps, having studied together at the law faculty in Jakarta shortly before the commencement of the Japanese occupation. Their thinking was similar to their Masjumi and PSI counterparts in the early cabinets, especially in regard to their shared belief in the need for the utilization of technical and administrative skills in government. The cabinet group gained power within the Pi\I by the end of the national elections in 1955, during which the PNI tied with the Masjumi for the highest number of seats in parliament (fifty-seven). Although the PNI leadership in the earlier period had been radical, its constituency was not, and as a result of the election, power was transferred to the conservative wing of the PNI. Conservative control, however, only lasted until 1960. The stage had already been set for a different political system, that of Guided Democracy, in which mass organizations had a leading role and emphasis was laid on mass participation? by late Guided Democracy many PNI leaders because of their loyalty to Sukarno drew closer to the PKI. === [PDF page 374] === 358 The PNI mass organizations also grew in strength and were decisive in the resurgence of radical leadership} the consertives held posts in the executive committee until August 1965, at which time seven top leaders were suspended. At the first PNI party congress since the attempted coup, in 1966, through army interference none of the radical candidates were elected, and from that time on the top party leadership has been controlled by the conservative wing, although it took many years for the changes to be implemented in certain provinces and localties. In the beginning, the new conservative party executive committee only had support in ivest Java. The next executive committee, elected in 1970, again through army interference, was headed by the late Hadisubeno; he used some of the ideological arguments of the former radical wing of the PNI to gather mass support in view of the coming elections. He carefully praised Sukarno and Sukarno's philosophy, Marhaenism, and also stated that political Islam was an enemy of the 31 Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. He also rehabilitated 32 many of the older leaders still revered by the masses. 31 See t h e following newspaper a r t i c l e s and e d i t o r i a l s on Hadisubeno's speeches and t a c t i c s: Kompas. 13 J u l y 1970} Harian Kami e d i t o r i a l, "The S i t u a t i o n I s Changing Very R a p i d l y, " 27 October 1970? Harian Kami. 28 November 1970 and 16 January 1971} Harian Kami e d i t o r i a l, "Marhaenism I n s t i t u t e Will Hold Meeting," 3 March 1971} and Eki Sjachruddin, "Hadisubeno: A New Face on I n d o n e s i a ' s P o l i t i c a l S t a g e, " Harian Kami. 19 March 1971. ""See Mingguan Chas. 84 ( t h i r d week of November 1974)} A n t a r a. afternoon e d., 14 November 1970} and Indonesia Rava. 19 November 1970, === [PDF page 375] === 359 Only after Hadisubeno promised to cooperate with the government was he able to gain the support both of radical and conservative groups in the PNI. Hadisubeno died, however, shortly before the elections and subsequently the government 33 issued a proclamation against the teachings of Sukarno. But not even Hadisubeno's bold campaigning could save the PNI in the 1971 elections, when the party went from first place in the 1955 elections together with the Masjumi to fourth place winning only twenty seats. Golkar, besides using heavy pressure in their campaign, could appeal to the PNI's conservative constituency, the pamonfl Praia and, in general, those of Javanese ethnic origin and of abangan persuasion. After the election the PNI incorporated one of Hadisubeno*s changes, the rehabilitation of the radical leaders, by including them and other senior leaders in the advisory council of the party, thereby giving them a forum from which to speak;34 this decision, however, prompted sharp criticism by "New Order" elements within the party, and some mass movements, for example, the student movement affiliated with the PNI, left the party. The PNI has remained weak, partially due to the absence of any strong leader to unite the factions, but also due to the erosion of a large segment of their constitutency by Golkar. 33 Donald Hindley, "Indonesia 1970t The Workings of Pantjasila Democracy," Asian Survey 11 (February 1971)i 117. Kompas. 12 January 1972. === [PDF page 376] === 360 The Murba party, organized as a merger of three small parties by Tan Malakka in 1948, is a nationalist communist 35 party. Its leaders were young, able supporters of Tan Malakka, with little education on the whole, but with impeccable nationalist credentials and with mass organizations, pemuda groups and laskar behind them. Their stand on opposing negotiations with the Dutch earned them popularity with the masses. From the establishment of the Murba until the demise of the PKI these two parties were bitter rivals, especially in youth, labor, and veterans organizations. The Murba campaign for the 1955 elections was unsuccessful; it won only two seats in the parliament, compared to thirty-nine for the PKI. However, Murba leaders and the party became influential during Guided Democracy. At the beginning of Guided Democracy Sukarno cultivated the Angkatan '45 (1945 Generation), a new group develed during the campaign to raise revolutionary consciousness; Sukarno sought to create a new group of political leaders Tan Malakka was charged with being the main planner of the July 3rd affair, an attempt to overthrow the government and was executed in 1949. This will be further discussed in chapter 6. The constitution of the party called for nationalization and collectivization of important economic enterprises, nationalization of banking and exports and imports, and democratic centralism in the party's internal decisionmaking (Kahin, Revolution in Indonesia, p. 315). Through the combination of nationalism and communism the party was able to attract a large group of sympathizers. After the re-establishment of the PKI, though, the PKI was quickly able to advance over the Murba, largely through its superior organization and its ability to Indonesianize its ideology in order to attract large numbers of members and sympathizers. === [PDF page 377] === 361 who would support his plan for Guided Democracy. This group included several prominent Murba leaders, such as Chairul Saleh and Adam Malik, By 1964 certain Murba leaders, notably the two prominent ones above, were worried by the growing strength of the PKI, and together with some other political leaders, journalists, and military elite members, proposed the dissolution of all political parties in order to weaken the PKI; when that was unsuccessful they established the Badan Proklamasi Sukarno (BPS), a body that was to indoctrinate "Sukarnoism;" and finally when the BPS was banned Murba leaders circulated rumors that the PKI was planning a coup. Due to its anti-PKI activities, Sukarno banned the Murba party in early 1965, and Chairul Saleh and Adam Malik were demoted. In early 1966 the party was rehabilitated again, but in the JNew Order it never regained the little influence it enjoyed even in the period of Parliamentary Democracy; its ideology was in conflict with the emphasis on rust en orde (peace and order) and development through foreign investment and aid in the New Order. In addition, the two most influential leaders, Chairul Saleh and Adam Malik, were no longer involved in the party; the former was imprisoned and died during his imprisonment, and the latter left Murba in early 1967 and has since joined Golkar, as was previously mentioned. The Murba party did contest the 1971 elections, but won no seat in parliament. Conversations with Andrew Gunawan, Jakarta, early 1968. === [PDF page 378] === 362 There are three Islamic parties represented among the political elite: NU, Parmusi, and PSII. Islam in Indonesia is divided into two main streams, traditional or orthodox Islam represented politically by the MJ, and the modernist stream, represented politically by Parmusi, which is the descendant of the Masjumi party. Religiously, PSII is also reformist; the inability of the PSII to remain fused with the Masjumi was due partly to some political differences, but perhaps more importantly to the memory of the PSII as the first popular mass organization in colonial Indonesia and the demand of the PSII leaders, therefore, for high positions. The PSII remained small, and the Masjumi and its successor, the Parmusi, have been the major representatives of reformist Islam. The NU was formed in 1926 by East Javanese kivavi and ulama, especially those associated with the Jombang pesantren, to counter the threat posed to orthodoxy by Islamic reformism which was making rapid headway, especially through the aegis of the Muhammadiyah, an Islamic social movement. Modern and revisionist currents in Islam threatened traditional Indonesian Islam, especially the Javanese variant, because of the opposition of these new movements to adaptations in the Islamic religion due to local customs. Traditional Islam in Java was strongly influenced both by HinduBuddhism and by animism. Also, reformism was an attempt to reconcile modernization and Islam, and this the traditional === [PDF page 379] === 363 Muslims opposed. Soon after the MJ was organized it spread throughout Java, although its strongest areas remained East Java and South Kalimantan; it had little support in urban areas. The early leaders of the MJ were kiyayi, but it was discovered soon after its inception that in order to compete effectively with the Muhammadiyah the NU had to copy the former's methods. This led to the development during the colonial period of a group of younger and partly Western-educated leaders. After independence the younger group gained political power within the MJ, although the kiyayi continued to participate and deference was shown to them by all groups. In 1937 due to the threat of certain draft ordinances promulgated by the colonial government. 38 Modernist Islam in Indonesia was influenced both by W'ahhabism, a puritanical, fundamentalist movement originating in Saudi Arabia in the nineteenth century, and Islamic reformism, examples of which would be the writings of Jamal al-Din Afghani and Mohammad Abdul. As mentioned previously, by the end of the nineteenth century more Indonesians were able to travel to Mecca for the hai and also some studied at universities, such as Al-Azhar University in Cairo that were centers of reformism. Indonesians returned home from the Middle East, and to a lesser extent from India, influenced both by Wahhabism and reformism. The future rightwing groups in Masjumi were predominantly influenced by Wahhabism and the moderate and "left-wing" groups by reformism. For more information on Islam in Indonesia in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries see» Benda, Indonesian Islam; Clifford Geertz, "The Javanese Kijaji: The Changing Role of a Cultural Broker," Comparative Studies in Sociology and History 2 (January 1960): 228-249; Geertz, Religion of Java; and Clifford Geertz, "Religious Belief and Economic Behavior in a Central Javanese Town: Some Preliminary Considerations," Economic Development and Cultural Change 4 (1955-1956)i 134-158. 38 One draft ordinance would have virtually outlawed polygamy. === [PDF page 380] === 364 NU and Muhammadiyah jointly sponsored a federation, Madilisul Islamil a'laa Indonesia (MIAI), Greater Islamic Council of Indonesia. The MIAI continued to exist until 1943, at which time it was dissolved after Japanese occupation authorities agreed to recognize the NU. In 1944 the modernist organizations and the NU agreed to establish the Madilis Siuro Muslimin Indonesia (Masjumi), Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims; it was not a unified political party, but a federation of organizations. Two other groups, besides the NU, left the Masjumi (FSII and another small Islamic organization Perti) and established their own political parties; NU finally left in 1952. Religious differences between modern and traditional Indonesian Islam were factors, but more important was the modernist domination of the party.39 Due to NU's monopoly of political Islam in rural areas in Java its leaders thought that NU should have more voice within Masjumi. NU's association in Masjumi for some years aided it in gaining domination over the religious ministry, and these bureaucrats formed the next leadership group which developed within the NU. The three leadership groups previously mentioned, the kivavi, the traditional politicians, and the bureaucrats, are similar in their recruitment patterns; their educational 39 Feith, Democracy in Indonesia, pp. 233-237. Allan Arnold Samson, "Islam and Politics in Indonesia" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1972), p. 4. === [PDF page 381] === 365 experiences have been predominantly those of traditional Islamic schools and pesantren. although the politicians usually have some Western-style education. The NU, in contrast with the Masjumi, have been accommodationists in their attitude toward government. The NU party agreed with the inception of Guided Democracy and aligned itself with Sukarno, although there were a few exceptions, such as Imron Rosjadi, who was imprisoned, and Mohammad Dachlan, who refused to serve in parliament during Guided Democracy. As a whole, though, the NU party cooperated with Sukarno and adapted to Guided Democracy the same way it has adjusted to Soeharto and the military government, a regime which is suspicious of, and often hostile to, political Islam. The fourth leadership group, the urban politicians, developed at the beginning of the New Order and was led by the late H.M. Subchan, the only national NU leader who had a degree from a secular university; the nucleus of this group comes from youth groups. As will be seen below Subchan was active in the last days of Guided Democracy in giving youth group members para-military training in preparation for conflict with the PKI, and from the beginning of the New Order, he plunged into anti-Sukarno and proNew Order politics. Due to the close association of many NU leaders with Sukarno and the Guided Democracy system as well as to his ability and impeccable New Order credentials, Subchan was able to rise quickly in the party hierarchy. === [PDF page 382] === 366 The Nil's appeal has continued to be centered in East Java and South Kalimantan. Throughout the periods after independence the NU has maintained its hold over the rural masses, especially in the above areas; in the 1955 elections NU was third, and won forty-five seats in parliament. In the 1971 elections it was the only party that was able to resist the pressure of Golkar in its home areas although Golkar won a bare majority of the votes in East Java, mainly through pressure tactics, the NU party won more seats 41 than any of the other political parties. The Parmusi is the successor of the Masjumi, which was dissolved in i960. The Masjumi was composed not only of individual members, but of corporate members, the largest of which was Muhammadiyah, representing the reformist wing of Islam. The second strongest movement was the Persatuan Islam (Islamic Union), which represented the right wing, fundamentalist, dogmatic and influenced by the Wahhabist movement. Supporters of the Darul Islam also included many representatives from the fundamentalist stream of Masjumi, but this group had little representation in the national leadership. Most of the major leaders were not affiliated with the corporate organizations, but had been anak buah of Haji Agus Salim, and had been leaders of the Jong Islamieten For more information on the NU after independence see Feith, Democracy in Indonesia; Mochtar Nairn, "The Nahdatul Ulama Party (1952-1955)" (M.A. thesis, McGill University, i960); Kahin, Revolution in Indonesia; and Samson, "Islam and Politics." === [PDF page 383] === 367 Bond (JIB) and the Partai Islam Indonesia, which was formed in the 1930s by some JIB leaders. These leaders were usually university educated, contrasting greatly with their counterparts in the NU. Masjumi, although regarded as the party of the Outer Islands, received national support. In the Outer Islands it received both urban and rural support, whereas in Java its support was largely urban. Although it was regarded as an Outer Islands party, the majority of the members of the executive boards from 1949-1959 were Javanese. Ethnic identity, however, had less importance in internal Masjumi politics than in other multi-ethnic parties? this appears to be largely due to its emphasis upon Islam 43 transcending ethnic differences. H.A. Salim, as was mentioned previously, stressed that there should be no ethnic and social class differences, and, in addition, no hatred of other religions and nationalities. The political philosophy of many Masjumi leaders, especially those from the "left" reformist wing illustrates Samson, "Islam and Politics," p. 25. Samson attributes this to the greater opportunity for Javanese in colonial Indonesia to receive secular education; the experiences of the Javanese in JIB and the Partai Islam Indonesia also aided them in gaining organizational and administrative expertise. The Masjumi leaders, who originated from the Outer Islands did have educational and political experiences in Java. For example, Mohammad Natsir came to Bandung from West Sumatra to study; he joined the JIB, and subsequently became involved in modernist Islamic politics. 43 Ibid., p. 26. === [PDF page 384] === 36 8 the attempt of reformism to unify the Islamic religion with modern Western concepts. These leaders called for a religious socialism, in which there would be both collectivism and individualism. 44 The rank and file members, however, were not socialists; therefore, Masjumi leaders rarely mentioned socialism in the party program. Also in the 1950s the party leaders were primarily concerned with antiCommunism, regional autonomy, and the necessity for economic development, for which foreign aid and investment should be solicited. After the New Order began, former Masjumi supporters, both individuals and former constituent organizations of the Masjumi, called for the re-establishment of the Masjumi. took two years, however, before some agreement could be reached between the government and these individuals and groups so that a political party could be formed which would represent the constituency of the former Masjumi. As will be discussed in chapter 6, the Masjumi name was not allowed, and the first executive board contained only two former Masjumi leaders, both second-echelon. None of the wellknown former Masjumi leaders, such as Mohammad Roem, Mohammad Natsir and Prawoto Mangkusasmito, were allowed by During my two months' stay in the house of the eldest daughter of Haji Agus Salim, the more political members of the family asked many questions about Israel in general and the kibbutz in particular. Many of the Masjumi leaders are very interested in Israel's attempts to implement certain aspects of socialism, the relationship of socialism to Judaism, and the role of religion in Israel. === [PDF page 385] === 369 Soeharto to be on the executive committee. The party leaders thought that at the first party congress, which was held in November 1968, they would have the freedom to elect party officials? Mohammad Roem was chosen as chairman, and nine of the twenty-five members in the executive board were former Masjumi leaders. Soeharto refused to accept the new board; since its inception there have been four executive boards, only one chosen by a party congress, which was not recognized by the government. The present one was appointed by Soeharto in November 1970 and is supported by a minority within the party. The general chairman is Mintaredja SH from the Muhammadiyah; he was appointed minister by Soeharto in 1968 without the endorsement either of the Parmusi or the Muhammadiyah. When Mintaredja was interviewed he said that he did not want to join Parmusi, and went on to say that political parties were "crazy" and that they "make the people bad."45 Within Parmusi there are three groups of leaders* the reformists, the most popular group; the fundamentalists; and a new group, the accommodationists, usually younger leaders not previously associated with the Masjumi.46 Some of the leaders of this group came from the Muhammadiyah, and also from Gasbiindo, the labor federation, and smaller groups. As will be discussed in chapter 6 the accommodationists are Interview with H.M. Mintaredja SH, Jakarta, 8 April 1969. See Samson, "Islam and Politics." === [PDF page 386] === 370 willing to work closely with the military and some have close advisory relations with important members of the military elite. In terms of its popular support, Parmusi has declined greatly from the support which Masjumi enjoyed; this is mainly due to the very limited participation of Masjumi leaders in Parmusi. Compared to the 1955 elections when Masjumi tied with the P M for the highest number of seats in parliament (fifty-seven), in the 1971 elections Parmusi only won twenty-four seats in parliament. The PSII craces its origins to the Sarikat Islam, founded in 1912, the first mass movement in Indonesia. Its leadership was mainly dominated by Western-educated intellectuals and semi-intellectuals. There was also a group of religious leaders who became more powerful after Sarikat Islam allied itself with radical nationalism, and leftist and Marxist groups entered the Sarikat Islam.48 In 1921 the struggle between the reformists and the left (Marxist and Communist groups), which was called the Red Sarikat Islam, reached great intensity, and the leadership For more information on the Masjumi see the following sources: Feith, Democracy in Indonesiat Kahin, Revolution in Indonesia; Samson, "Islam and Politics;" and Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in IndO'-nesia (Singapore and New York: Oxford University Press, 1973). For more information on the Parmusi see Samson, "Islam and Politics" and K.E. Ward, The Foundation of the Partai Nuslimin Indonesia. Monograph Series (Ithaca, N.Y.i Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1970). This was aided by the conferral of legal status by the colonial government on the branches of Sarikat Islam, === [PDF page 387] === 371 was pushed away from modernist Islam. After the intense struggle for control of local branches, the Sarikat Islam ended as a mass movement,49 and many Muslim nationalists left the Sarikat Islam and entered the Muhammadiyah. The Sarikat Islam changed its name to the PSII in 1929, and increasingly emphasized religion; the kiyayi became more important in the party, which resulted in a split between reformist and conservative leaders. The reformist leaders left the PSII because of their fear that the reformist principles would be sacrificed in order to gain a mass following through the kiyayi. In 1937 the PSII followed the other Islamic groups into the MIAI, and finally into the Masjumi until it split from the hasjumi in 1947. The leaders of the new PSII were nationalists, centered around the sons of Umar Said Tjokroaminoto, the famous leader of the Sarikat Islam. During the Revolution and afterwards PSII leaders participated in several cabinets, although in minor capacities. The PSII remained small; for example, in the 1955 elections it received only eight seats in parliament. In 1971, though, it increased its number of seats to ten, largely due to problems of Parmusi with the government. Several prominent former Masjumi leaders joined the PSII, and evidently many former Masjumi not upon the center, which made it difficult for the center to control the branches. 49 Kahin, Revolution in Indonesia, p. 72. === [PDF page 388] === 372 supporters gave their votes to the PSII. At the PSII congress in 1972 a new group was elected, ending the domination of the party by the older generation, including the sons and kinsmen of Umar Said Tjokroaminoto. The army leaders, however, were opposed to the new general chairman, due mainly to his reluctance to agree that the PSII fuse 51 with other Islamic parties, and a coup against the PSII leadership was promoted by army leaders, with the apparent acquiescence of the former PSII general chairman, H. Anwar 52 Tjokroaminoto. The two Christian parties are the Parkindo, a Protestant party, and the Partai Katholik. a Catholic party. The Parkindo, established in late 1945, has been led by former 53 activists of the Christian Student Movement headed by Dr. Leimena from its inception, who led the Parkindo as general chairman through half of its existence. The Christian Student Movement developed in the 1930s and was not only composed of Indonesians (mainly Toba Batak, Hindley, "Indonesia 1971: Pantjasila Democracy and the Second Parliamentary Elections," Asian Survey 12 (January 1972): 63. For more information on Sarikat Islam and the PSII see Benda, Indonesian Islam and Kahin, Revolution in Indonesia. See Abadi, 1 January 1973. 52 See iNusantara, 23 December 1972; Abadi, 26 December 1972; Pedoman, 26 December 1972; and Jusuf Wibisono, "The Government and the PSII," Abadi, 8 January 1973. 53 The Christian Student Movement only existed in Java, and there only in four cities (Jakarta, Bandung, Surabaya, and Jogjakarta). Interview with Melauchthon Siregar, Jakarta, 15 October 1968. === [PDF page 389] === 373 Minahassan, and Ambonese), but also Dutch and Chinese; there was a study club, however, attached to the Christian Student Movement that was only for Indonesians. One result of the Christian Student Movement, recalled Dr. Leimena, was an increase in ethnic tolerance exhibited by its members. The student movement helped to defuse the keen rivalry which existed between the East Indonesians and the Toba Batak. The Christian Student Movement was dormant during the Japanese occupation, due to the opposition of Japanese authorities to Christian movements. After the Revolution the Parkindo was established by former Indonesian activists in the student movement; the leadership has always been fairly evenly divided between East Indonesians and Toba Batak. During the Revolution the North Sumatra branch, headed by M. Siregar, general chairman of the party after the inception of the New Order, formed an army, commanded by Siregar; the Parkindo army was later integrated into the national army. After independence several Parkindo leaders participated in cabinets, usually as symbolic representatives of their areas and party. The most prestigious Parkindo leader, Dr. Leimena, was active during Guided Demo55 cracy; most of the other leaders were opposed to the 54 Interview with Dr. Johannes Leimena, Jakarta, 23 September 1968. The general consensus of Parkindo leaders and leaders outside of Parkindo is that Dr. Leimena supported Guided Democracy because it was the government; he is often referred to as someone possessing a "civil servant" mentality. Dr. Leimena himself maintained, however, that "Guided === [PDF page 390] === 374 Guided Democracy system, although there was no party revolt against Leimena's leadership. The political policies of the Parkindo have always been toward the maintenance of their sectional interests, freedom of religion for Christians, and freedom to propagate the Christian religion, with respect shown to the dominant religion of Islam. The Parkindo in the 1971 elections preserved their standing in parliament (seven seats). They remained larger than the Partai Katholik. due to the greater number of Protestants in Indonesia (six seats in 1955 for the Partai Katholik and only three seats in 1971), although the Partai Katholik at the present time is more influential in the government through the relationship of some of the members and leaders with the military. The Partai Katholik likewise began in 1945, although it was a reconstitution of a Catholic party that was organized in the early 1920s. Kasimo, leader of the Partai Katholik for years, represented the colonial party in the Volksraad for eleven years, from 1931 until the Japanese invasion. Many of the middle-generation leaders were recruited from students at a teachers school in Central Java. The ethnic division in the Partai Katholik differs from Democracy is in principle good, but badly executed! too much guidance and too little democracy" (interview with Dr. Leimena* Jakarta, 4 May 1968). 56 A single Catholic party for Indonesia was not established until December 1949, at which time seven Catholic organizations, six of them regional, reconstituted themselves into one party (see Kompas, 30 November 1971). === [PDF page 391] === 375 that of the Parkindo; most Catholics are from Nusatenggara and also from Java (including many Chinese), compared to the dominance of Toba Batak, Minahassan, and Ambonese in the Parkindo. The hierarchy of the Catholic church also has influenced the party more than the loosely structured Protestant churches influence the Parkindo. There are groups, however, in the Partai Katholik that are resistant to clerical control, such as the youth movements and the Kompas (the Catholic newspaper) group. The Partai Katholik leaders also were less associated with Sukarno and Guided Democracy than the Parkindo leaders. In fact, an anti-Communist youth leader, Harry Tjan SH, was the coordinator of informal gatherings of Partai Katholik leaders who discussed tactics that could be used against the FKI. He began training students for eventualities in the struggle between the PKI and the other parties.57 He is representative of the new group of young intellectuals in the Partai Katholik. who were active in the Catholic youth movements and student movements, and are more interested in politics, in general, than the older leaders, who are more concerned with protecting the interests of their religion and in maintaining the freedom for its propagation. Some of these young people have become quite active as advisors to Major General Ali Moertopoj others, however, were active in organizations protesting the slowness of the Interview with Harry Tjan, Jakarta, 2 April 1969. === [PDF page 392] === 376 government in implementing the New Order and are now active in protest movements against corruption and the erosion of civil liberties. In general, in the New Order the party became more active politically. The party has been in the forefront in urging the consolidation of parties and in suggesting that religious parties be dissolved, probably because of the harm this would do the Islamic parties since the number of santri is large and there is no hierarchy in the Islamic religion which could fight for Islamic interests. In addition, the new chairperson, Drs. Ben Hang Reng Say criticized the abuses of authority and the restrictions on 59 democratic liberties practiced by the Soeharto government, which showed the influence of elements of the young generation in the party who have been critical of the regime. The two movements, KASI and Golongan Independent, were formed after the attempted coup in 1965, although there were prior organizations or groups during Guided Democracy from which these two organizations sprang. KASI was one of the action groups (kesatuan aksi). or AKSI, which developed out of various student groups, including those associated with political parties and those with no relationship to political parties. The action groups expanded their strength 58 For information and comments seei Antara, morning ed., 12 December 1968; Abadi, 13 December 1971j and Suluh Marhaen editorial, "A Little About 'The Reformation of the Political Structure,'" 16 December 1968. 59 See Kompas. 17 December 1972. === [PDF page 393] === 377 through the incorporation of various student groups, and t h i s enabled them to be highly effective in t h e i r mass actions. In 1966, especially, the various action groups were instrumental in the erosion of Sukarno's power and in providing legitimacy for the army to act against Sukarno and the pro-Sukarno forces. The action fronts were able to permit masses of people, especially the young, of whom the most bold were high school students, to p a r t i c i p a t e in huge mass demonstrations, and also to storm pro-Sukarno ministries. This source of strength of the action groups was also at the root of t h e i r weakness. Because the AKSi forces were so large and so diverse, i t was d i f f i c u l t for them to coordinate any long-range protests or even to agree upon goals after the overthrow of Sukarno and the crushing of the PKI had been effected. The government also wanted to neutralize such v o l a t i l e groups and one strategy was to coopt the leaders. Early in the i\ew Order many of the leaders of the action groups were appointed to seats in the parliament and the people's consultative assembly (MPRS), and t h i s and the r e s u l t i n g change in t h e i r role from youth or student leaders to representatives, served to alienate many of them from t h e i r constituencies. By 1969 the AKSI representatives in parliament and the MPRS were perceived by most of the students s t i l l active in protests as having sold out to the government. In December 1969 a number of these students presented Lebaran and Christmas " g i f t s, " to t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s. These g i f t s consisted of mirrors, cosmetics, needles and thread. The l e t t e r s accompanying the g i f t s among other things s t a t e d: may these cosmetics "make the honorable === [PDF page 394] === 378 Also some leaders were employed by military leaders, especially by Major General Ali Moertopo in Operasi Chusus. That these tactics were quite successful was illustrated by the fact chat many joined Golkar before the 1971 elections and ran for parliament. Many of the action groups, as mentioned above, developed from pre-existing groups; some of these groups were quite veil organized, such as the group of young Catholics Harry Tjan advised, who were given political training, or the group of Adnan Bujung Nasution, formerly head of KASI, which tried to help farmers in the villages so that support could be weaned away from the PKI. The above groups were fairly cohesive, although in some cases, such as i\asution's group, the organization split into two factions. Others, such as the student councils which became active in AKSI groups, such as KAMI, Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia (Action Group of Indonesian University Students) were amorphous organizations, with constantly changing memberships. After the abortive coup the Front Pantjasila was 61 formed, first as a coalition of anti-Sukarno leaders in political parties, such as H. Mohammad Dachlan and Subchan members more attractive to the rulers and fellow members in the DPRGR /pariiament7" (Pedoman, 15 December 1969). It was first called Komando Aksi Perganguan Gestapu (Action Command to Crush Gestapu). Gestapu is the acronym for the Gerakan Tigapuluh September (September 30th Movement), which was the name given to the coup by its leaders. === [PDF page 395] === 379 (NU), I.J. Kasimo and Harry Tjan (Partai Katholik). Agus Sudono (Gasbiindo), Dr. Tambunan (Parkindo), and Brigadier General Soehardiman (SOKSI, the army-dominated labor federation). Adnan Bujung iMasution was also in the Front Pantjasila together with leaders of the first two action groups formed, KAMI and KAPPI, Kesatuan Aksi Peladiar Pemuda Indonesia (Action Front of Indonesian High School Youth). The initiative began to pass from the Front Pantjasila to the action groups, due mostly to the large demonstrations they organized and for their bravery and nerve. Other action groups were formed, the more important of the later ones being KASI (with 5,000 members), which was composed mainly of professionals, especially academicians and lawyers. There were also AKSI groups that were not composed of students or the educated. The AKSI groups were most active in Jakarta, Bandung, and Bogor, but there were local chapters of the largest ones, such as KAMI and KAPPI throughout the country in cities like Palembang (South Sumatra), Banjarmasin (South Kalimantan), Menado and Makassar (Sulawesi), Jogjakarta and Semarang (Central Java). The action groups at the onset of the INew Order had power not only because of their numbers and the lack of Interview with H. Mohammad Dachlan, Jakarta, 5 April 1969. Examples were: KAPBI (Kesatuan Aksi Perserikatan Buruh Indonesia). Action Front of Indonesian Workers Association, 5000 membersj KATI (Kesatuan Aksi Tani Indonesia). Action Front of Indonesian Peasants); and KAPBI (Kesjaiyan Aksi Perserikatan Betia Indonesia). Action Front of Indonesian Pedicab Drivers. === [PDF page 396] === 380 governmental power, due to t h e presence of two contending governments, but a l s o because of t h e backing of v a r i o u s segments of t h e army, notably the Siliwangi d i v i s i o n and KOSTRAD, commanded then by Kemal I d r i s ( S i l i w a n g i ), and the RPKAD, commanded then by Sarwo Edhie, himself from t h e Diponegoro d i v i s i o n, but a l l i e d with elements of the S i l i w a n g i. The r e l a t i o n s between the Siliwangi d i v i s i o n and the KASI were e s p e c i a l l y c l o s e. During t h e f i r s t y e a r, t o o, t h e a c t i o n groups more o r l e s s had the support of Soeharto and h i s advisory groups, both m i l i t a r y and c i v i l i a n. By the second half of 1967 the a l l i a n c e between Soeharto and the s t u d e n t s was breaking; t h e s t u d e n t s began t o t u r n t h e i r a t t e n t i o n t o economic condit i o n s and t o c o r r u p t i o n, and the f i r s t l a r g e - s c a l e demons t r a t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e Soeharto government took place i n e a r l y 1968. That year a l s o saw the dismemberment of many of the a c t i o n groups, t h e most n o t a b l e of which was KAMI, which a t i t s height had a membership of 250,000 s t u d e n t s. The KAMI l e a d e r, Ma'rie Muhammad, in an interview gave h i s a n a l y s i s of t h e reasons for what was the imminent breakup of KAMI: 1) No concrete or physical common enemy. This s i t u a t i o n led t o t h e s p l i t t i n g of t i e s which had bound a c t i o n s t o g e t h e r; 2) The obvious ambition of f u r t h e r i n g p r i v a t e and group i n t e r e s t s; 3) The lack of p o l i t i c a l backing from the army... 4) The exhaustion of t h e s t u d e n t s, l o s s of proper l e a d e r s h i p, and t h e i r eagerness t o r e t u r n t o t h e i r s t u d i e s...64 Pedoraan, 30 December 1968. Ma'rie Muhammad, besides === [PDF page 397] === 381 There were also contrasting perceptions over the goals of the New Order; this was also noted in the case of the technocrats. Those, in general, who saw economic development as the most important and overriding goal of the New Order usually were coopted by the government; those who believed that the New Order should not only develop economically, but build a just society, guaranteeing civil liberties, including the freedom of political parties to organize themselves free from government interference, and the promotion of social equality, continued their activism, although for the most part no longer in the moribund action groups. New groups were formed, such as Angle at an Muda (Young Generation) and KAK (Komando Anti-Korupsi), fLfi Anti-Corruption Command. chairing the central board of KAMI, was chairperson of HMI, the modernist Islamic student organization, and was one of the AKSI representatives in parliament and the people's consultative assembly. Only KAPPI remained active; KAMI, though, still edited its lively and critical newspaper, Harian Kami, and its journal Mahasiswa Indonesia, but both were banned after the riots of January 1974, along with many other newspapers. For more information on the AKSI groups see the following sources: R.K. Paget, "The '66 Generation' in_Indonesian Politics" (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell Univer*sity, 1969); Stuart Graham, "Students & the New Order," pp. 111-120; Frank de Jong, "Soeharto and the Students," Asia Magazine (21 January 1968): 14; J.M. van der Kroef, Indonesia After Sukarno (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1971); Wiratmo Soekito, "Sukarnoism vs. Sukarnoism," Harian Kami, 26 February 1969; S.M. Ali, "Strains of Revolt," Far Eastern Economic Review 12 (30 March 1971): 7-8. The newspapers that carried the most frequent articles on AKSI groups weret Harian Kami. Indonesia Raya, Mimbar Deraokrasi, Mahasiswa Indonesia, and Pedoman. === [PDF page 398] === 382 The Golongan Independent was officially formed in February 1968, but its origins go back to the first half of the 1950s, to a magazine (Gadiah Mada) edited by Gajah Mada students. This magazine, with a circulation of 30,000, was popular with personnel of government agencies, including those at the district level; partially this was due to the anti-political party tone of its articles and its call for the use of logic in solving national problems. This latter idea was kept alive through the years, and it was the only common element in the thinking of the leaders of the Golongan Independent. Toward the end of Guided Democracy several future leaders of the Golongan Independent participated in a discussion group, which included Sulistio SH and Dr. Umar Kayam.69 During the coup these two future leaders stayed in the house of Mashuri SH, also an old friend from Gajah Mada, who was a friend and neighbor of Soeharto, and these three men assisted Soeharto and Soeharto's most trusted officers. At first the group attempted to pressure Three of the technocrats wrote articles for the magazine, Professors Soemitro, w'idjojo and Sadli; two of the Golongan Independent leaders, Sulistio SH and Dr. Umar Kayam also wrote articles. 68 Interview with Sulistio SH, Jakarta, 18 October 1968, 69 The discussion group had meetings with members of the military elite, including General Jani, the late army head before he was killed in the coup attempt and members of the Dewan Jenderal (Generals' Council), (interview with Sulistio SH, 2 December 1968). === [PDF page 399] === 383 Soeharto into agreeing to try Sukarno and set up a revolutionary council, but Soeharto was "too cautious." Even before the official inception of the Golongan Independent the group was divided into two factions, one headed by Dr. Umar Kayam, then Director-General of Radio and Television in the Ministry of Information, and the other by Mashuri SH, the present Minister of Information. At the beginning Dr. Kayam had the most support, probably due to the backing of Major General Kemal Idris and Major General Dharsono; but by the beginning of 1968, at the time of the formation of the group, most members had aligned themselves with Mashuri, who had the support of Soeharto. Dr. Kayam wanted to create a political organization, gathering support from many intellectuals, including former PSI members and leaders, and he also thought that it was important for the group to go to the villages to gather support. Mashuri and his faction believed that the Golonean Independent should first be represented in parliament and the regional legislatures, and in that way develop a political party that could contest the coming elections. In the end, neither faction succeeded. Umar Kayam attempted to establish his movement in towns and villages, and high school students were working with farmers Interview with Sulistio SH, Jakarta, 18 October 1968. Herbert Feith, "Soeharto's Search for a Political Format," Indonesia 6 (October 1968): 93. === [PDF page 400] === 384 in two villages in West Java,72 but shortly his program was forbidden by the government. Mashuri's faction was unsuccesful, first, in becoming a legal political party, and second, in convincing the military that it should be the official government party. Many became involved with Operasi Chusus in their attempts to convince the government that the faction should be the official government party, and this led to accusations of opportunism against this faction. Also, there was no unity in either of the factions; a MJ leader remarked in 1968 that there were thirteen members of the Golongan Independent in Parliament, and that the 73 party had thirteen different stands. Also the probabilities for its success were not improved by the antagonism of most parties toward the group; the Golongan Independent was opposed to religiously and ideologically based parties, and this caused strong reaction from the major parties, especially from the NU, against the Golongan Independent. Sample Career Histories The first example is Hardi SH, a Pi\I leader and a Javanese. He was chosen because, at the time of my research, he was the strongest PNI leader in terms of nation-wide party support. His father, a low privavi and a clerk of 72 Indonesian Observor, 10 January 1969. 73 Interview with H. Imron Rosjadi, Jakarta, 9 September 1968. See "What Is the 'Independent Group*?" Puta Mas iarakat, 5 February 1968. === [PDF page 401] === 385 the court, was opposed to Hardi's involvement in youth activities and wanted his son to be a pangreh praia. Hardi therefore had to join the Indonesia Muda secretively. After MULO and HBS Pak Hardi was accepted by the law faculty in Jakarta, and was in a group of law students which became active in the conservative wing of the PNI. In Jakarta during his four years of law school, Hardi lived in the house of Mohammad Roem, taught by Haji Agus Salim. and in addition, followed courses The Japanese occupation began during his fourth year at law school, and he was involved very little with the occupation, in contrast to most other PNI leaders; he did work for a year and a half, but that was as an assistant to a Japanese professor studying adat (the customary law). At the time of the Revolution Pak Hardi was in Jakarta and he joined Angkatan Muda, helping in the takeover of government offices. He returned to his home in Pati, where his family had joined the Revolution; in Pati Fak Hardi was a member of the local defense council. Roem, who became the internal affairs minister, gave Hardi an important start in politics by calling him to Jogjakarta to join the ministry. It was then that Hardi joined the new PNI, and served as a PNI representative in the Jogjakarta regional legislature, and was elected to the party's executive committee 75 PNI leaders usually come from Javanese prlvavi. panereh Praia origins. Mohammad Roem is an older, highly respected Masjumi leader. Ibu Roem is related to Pak Hardi by marriage. === [PDF page 402] === 386 in 1950. During the Revolution he became a "cadre" of Sarmidi Mangunsarkono, who, until his death in 1957, was one of the national leaders. Like several other political party leaders, Pak Hardi finished his law degree by the end of the Revolution from the new Gajah Mada University. After the Revolution he received leave from the ministry to study at Oxford University, and after one and a half years there, he returned to Indonesia, and requested permission from the three successive internal affairs ministers to leave government service so that he could devote full time to the party. Finally, after Mohammad Roem became internal affairs minister again, his request was accepted. In 1953 Pak Hardi was elected to the party council, and in 1955, to parliament, where he was chairperson of the PNI fraction; he rose rapidly and from 1957 to 1959 he served as the deputy prime minister in the Djuanda cabinets. Hardi, who was in the conservative wing of the party, was elected secretary-general of the party in 1960 together with one other conservative, thereby preventing the radical PNI groups from gaining full control of the party. Hardi was especially disliked by the PNI radical leaders because of his opposition to Guided Democracy. Pak Hardi mentioned that at the beginning he thought that Guided Democracy would be a democratic system based on the Pancasila, but when Sukarno announced that cabinet ministers should not be official political party members, Hardi realized that the system would not be democratic. In the 1963 party congress === [PDF page 403] === 387 the radical groups were unable to dislodge Hardi and he was elected the first vice chairperson, but in August 1965 he was one of the?NT leaders dismissed by the executive committee, with the backing and encouragement of Sukarno. After the coup the conservative wing, with the help of the army, began to gain control of the party, and at the 1966 party congress Hardi was again elected first vice chairperson. After Osa Maliki's death in 1969, the general chairperson of the PNI, Pak Hardi was the most popular PNI leader and the favored candidate for general chairperson at the next party congress in 1970, but through the machinations of Operasi Chusus, he was defeated by Hadisubeno, who was favored by army leaders because, first, they perceived Hardi as less friendly toward the military than Hadisubeno, and, second, Hadisubeno was personally close to Soeharto and Major General Soerono, then Diponegoro commander. Hardi was subsequently retired to the party advisory council. shown above, Pak Hardi was helped in his party career by personal connections, including those formed by kinship and school ties, and by his attachment to an early national leader of the PNI who helped him in his rise in the party. 77 The second career history is that of H. Mohammad Subchan Z.E., who was a most unusual MJ leader, called "the The above information on Hardi SH is mainly based upon two long interviews conducted with Pak Hardi in his home in Jakarta on 30 November 1968 and 12 February 1969; some of the information was also derived from a conversation with J. Eliseo Rocamora. === [PDF page 404] === 388 waterskiing, flying and dancing ulema" 78 and in another vein Allan Samson commented that Subchan had "developed a social science vocabulary that would make a sociologist 79 return to graduate school." Subchan, who was representative of a new group of younger, secular-educated leaders and members, will be contrasted with Mohammad Iljas, representative of the older, traditional NU leadership. Mohammad Iljas comes from an old kiyayi family in East Java, related to those from Jombang; Subchan's father was in i\U, but he was a kretek (tobacco, mixed with clove) cigarette manufacturer, not a kiyayi. The usual i\U leader either had no Western-style education, or very little; Iljas, for example, did attend the HIS, but afterwards had a completely Islamic education, attending pesantren in Jombang for seven years, and completing his studies with three years in Mecca. Although Subchan did study in a pondok, most of his education was in Western-style schools, culminating with an economics degree from Gajah Mada University. Iljas began his NU activities while in Jombang at the pesantren; Subchan, in contrast, came to the I\U after his study at Gajah Mada via the Pesindo, the socialist youth organization and laskar. During the Revolution Subchan was a member of a student organization influenced by the Murba leader, Tan Malakka, and he was also in Fesindo; it was only after the Parian Kami, 15 February 1972. 79 Samson, "Islam and Politics," pp. 209-210, ft. 34. === [PDF page 405] === 389 PKI rebellion in 1948 that he was awakened to the "dangers" of socialism. He still believed, however, that the government had the responsibility of redistributing wealth to 80 prevent the rich from becoming too wealthy. Pak Iljas was a regional leader of NU in the Pekalongan area from 1937 until his appointment as religious minister in 1955; he had had only four years of experience in the religious bureaucracy, as vice head of the religious department in Pekalongan. It was only in 1955 that Pak Iljas became a full-time politician; prior to that his political activities were secondary and his major occupation was that of a batik merchant. Pak Iljas remained active in I\U politics until his death in 1970; he had also been the vice chairperson of the Central Advisory Council, a governmental advisory council on which senior members of the elite sit. Pak Iljas lived mainly in the world of Islam, and continued to have close relations with the kivavi in Jombang. During the two interviews he spoke much about the Islamic religion and history and expressed the feeling of powerlessness the Muslims have at present, not only in their relations with the Soeharto government, but in the difficulty of protecting the religion against 81 Christian onslaughts. 80 My thanks to Franklintoeinsteinfor information concerning Subchan's experiences during the Revolution and his thoughts on socialism. 81 The above information on K. Mohammad Iljas is from interviews conducted in Jakarta, 30 October 1968 and 25 November 1968. === [PDF page 406] === 390 Whereas Pak Iljas came up the party hierarchy in a more traditional way, through heading regional chapters, experience in the Ministry of Religion, and through the maintenance of close ties with the Jombang group, including kinship ties, Subchan rose through modern business and economic activities and through the support of youth movements within the party. Before his entrance into the party hierarchy as deputy chairperson of the economics department of NU in 1956, he founded and chaired modern business and economic associations, for example, the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the All Indonesia Economic Council. By 1962 Subchan rose to the position of fourth vice chairperson of the MJ. Subchan was also sent by the government as delegate to various economic conferences, and in this role he was as controversial as he was in his role as an MJ leader. Subchan was a strong anti-Communist during the period of Guided Democracy and gave para-military instruction to youth affiliated with NO* youth organizations. Subchan cooperated with Harry Tjan of Partai Katholik; it is unusual for an INIU leader to cooperate so closely with a leader from a Christian party. 82 For example, in 1960 Subchan was sent as chief delegate to an Asian-African Trade Conference, and he disobeyed orders from the foreign minister to support the application of the Soviet Union as a member of the conference. Through the use of clever strategy he influenced the delegates of other countries to vote against the admittance of the Soviet Union to the conference. After he returned to Indonesia he was jailed by Sukarno for six months, and finally only released through the intervention of General Nasution (interview with Subchan, Puncak, West Java, 27 October 1968). === [PDF page 407] === 391 Subchan obtained most of his following as a result of his strong anti-Sukarno and anti-PKI stand after the attempted coup. He was the most active NU leader in early New Order politics, and he also had close relations with some army leaders at the onset of the New Order; hence he was appointed to be deputy chairperson of the people's consultative assembly (MPRS), a position which he held from 1966 to 1970. Subchan continued to have strong backing within the NU, and this support increased, as evidenced by his election in 1967 and again in 1971 as first vice chairperson of the party. However, the older leadership groups in NU were strongly opposed to him, not only because of his political ideas, his relations with non-Islamic figures, such as Harry Tjan, his "modern, Western" thinking and the threat to the older politicians due to his popularity, but also because certain aspects of his behavior were embarrassing to the older leaders. For example, a photograph taken of him dancing in a nightclub led to his expulsion from the executive council in 1967, shortly before the congress, by the general chairperson of the advisory board, one of the two 84 founders of the NU. 83 Even before the New Order, Subchan lectured regularly at SESKOAD? this was helpful in providing Subchan with opportunities to make contacts with army leaders. 84 Subchan was also criticized for remaining unmarried; a person is not considered an adult in the Indonesian culture until he or she marries. There was continual pressure on Subchan from other NU leaders to remedy his unmarried state. === [PDF page 408] === 392 Whereas Pak Iljas was mainly concerned with the threats to Islam and the powerlessness of the santri, Subchan spoke of the need for Indonesia to establish a society based on respect for individual liberties and a government devoted to the building of democracy. Subchan grew more and more critical of the lack of democracy and abuses of the New Order government; due to his outspoken statements he became increasingly unpopular with the military leaders. He was also considered less predictable than the average NU leader, who 85 accommodated himself to the government in power. Early in 1970 Subchan disseminated a secret report of a parliamentary committee's decisions concerning a governmental regulation on political party membership and activities in the coming elections. Subchan did this because he believed that the above regulation was illegal; this action led to the government's decision to break Subchan's power. After the 1971 elections his appointment as deputy chairperson of the MPRS was terminated, and in 1972, after his election again as first vice chairperson of the NU, the government encouraged the traditional leaders of NU to Samson, "Islam and Politics," pp. 182, 194. Toward the end of my research in Indonesia, in the beginning of 1969, there were rumors spreading alleging that General Nasution and Subchan were planning a coup against the government; to my knowledge this allegation had no basis in fact, but the existence of the rumor indicated the lack of trust in Subchan, and also in General Nasution. QfL See Harian Kami's editorial, "H.M. Soebchan Z.E. •L'Homme Terrible,'" 26 February 1970 and the Operasi editorial, "Concerning Soebchan's Opinion," 27 February 1970. === [PDF page 409] === 393 87 expel Subchan from the party's executive committee. With the backing of the government the chairperson and deputy chairperson of the NU Advisory Council and the general chair person of the party were able to expel him from the executive committee, a task they were unable to do in the party congresses.88 The last career history is that of Agus Sudono, a Central Javanese from priyayi and merchant stock, who is an example of an accommodationist Parmusi leader. He was chosen, not only because he is an example of a young, accommodationist leader, but also because of his success at reaching party leadership at a young age and not through the sponsorship of a Masjumi leader. He has been helped by his three-pronged career, that of a national labor leader, an international labor leader, and a political party leader. His close relationship with the military aided in his successful move of leaving the party, after which he became head of a government-sponsored labor confederation. Agus Sudono*s father, although a privavi. was influenced in his religious orientation by his wife, who was the daughter of a santri merchant; his father joined 87 See Kompas, 19 February 1972j Harian Kami. 15 February 1972; Merdeka editorial, "A Leader and His Parr ty," 17 February 1972; and Berita Buana, 22 February 1972; for a justification of the action of the NU leaders see the Golkar newspaper, Suara Karya, 22 February 1972. ^"he above information on Subchan is mainly derived from conversations with him on several occasions, including a day-long conversation on 27 October 1968, and also through discussions with Allan A. Samson in 1968-1969 in === [PDF page 410] === 394 Muhammadiyah artd soon became the branch leader. Agus Sudono was introduced to the Muhammadiyah at the early age of four, when his father would bring him to meetings and Pak Agus would give short speeches. The first organization that Agus Sudono joined was the Muhammadiyah boy scouts, the Bandu Hizbulwathan. He was only ten when the Japanese troops occupied Indonesia, but he said that during the occupation he observed the Japanese treatment of the workers and thought that when he grew up he would become a labor leader. At the beginning of the Revolution Agus Sudono joined one of the student armies, the Mobilisasi Pelaiar (Student Mobilization), and he was the youngest member of the group. At that time he also joined the Pemuda Islam Indonesia (FII), Indonesian Muslim Youth, and after the Revolution, while continuing his studies, he remained active in PII and served as district chairperson. In 1956, during Agus Sudono*s first year of law school at the University of Indonesia, he was elected general secretary of the national PII. At the same time that he was studying law he was embroiled in political activities, and also, because of financial difficulties he began teaching at a Muhammadiyah school. During his first year at law school his interest in becoming a labor leader was given further impetus because, at that time, according to Agus Sudono, the cabinet was Masjumi-led and the pro-PKI Indonesia. Information on Subchan since 1969 until his death in an automobile accident in Mecca in January 1973 is mainly derived from newspaper articles. === [PDF page 411] === 395 labor federation went out on strike and refused to unload rice, thereby raising the price of rice{ then the PKI blamed the Masjumi for the increase in the price of rice. Pak Agus decided then that labor unions can be put to the use of the PKI, which was dangerous for the country, and therefore he decided to enter a union and become a leader to help prevent the above from occurring. Soon after this he joined the teachers union of the Gasbiindo, then called SPII; the following year at the national congress he was elected deputy general secretary. At the next congress in 1960 he was elected secretary of Gasbiindo, and in early 1965, after a bitter fight with the general chairperson, Jusuf Wibisono, won the general chairpersonship, a position which he has kept since then. Under his leadership the Gasbiindo became the largest labor union in New Order Indonesia, with 3,078,119 members in 1968. 89 Through his position as general chairperson of Gasbiindo, and also through his close relations with the military leaders, he was able to rise in international labor movements, namely the International Labor Organization (ILO), the International Federation of Petroleum and Chemical Workers, and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. He is an officer of the latter two and a member of the ILO governing body. 89 Mertiu Suar, 30 May 1968. === [PDF page 412] === 396 After the attempted coup in 1965, Agus Sudono, in addition to his activities in the Front Pantjasila, had a crucial part in the negotiations with the government over the establishment of the Parmusi. He was in the special committee of seven that was in charge of negotiations, and he was the only one who remained in Jakarta for two days at the beginning of the party congress in Surabaya to continue last minute negotiations with the government over the future leadership of Parmusi. In general, he has not been successful in establishing himself as a political party leader in his own right 5 he has served on two party committees, the first one, which was devised after long negotiations with Soeharto, and the present one, from which he has resigned, which was appointed by Soeharto. His difficulties with the other national party leaders and also the local ones are due to two main reasons* 1) he is not a former Masjumi leader, nor was he a member of Masjumi;90 and 2) the leaders were suspicious that in his conversations with Soeharto during the negotiations he was striving to arrange a personal "deal." Conversations with various leaders involved indicate that these suspicions were not true; but they still show the level of distrust of the reformists for the accommodationists, especially for one who has rapport with military leaders. He was also unable to 90 Agus Sudono was the only candidate for executive office at the party congress who had not been a Masjumi party member. === [PDF page 413] === 398 Serikat Indonesia (Perbusi), United Workers Front of Indonesia, composed of all the labor unions in Indonesia. 91 Background Characteristics and Career Patterns of the Guided Democracy and i\ew Order Party Elites Background Characteristics What does it take to reach political party elite status? Certain background characteristics are helpful. The party leaders, except for the newer movements and the Partai fCatholik, are older men, usually in their fifties; they are men who were active not only in the Revolution, but often in political organizations existing prior to the Revolution. Party leaders tend to be recruited from those of high social status, if not within the general society, at least within the community that supports the political party. Except for the Christian parties, Murba, and the AKSI groups,92 party leaders commonly come from Java. The leaders are also highly educated. ethnic The influences of age, and social status background, and education upon the recruitment of political party leaders will be discussed below. Political party leaders will not only be 91Most of the information concerning Agus Sudono is from an interview with him in Jakarta, 13 May 1969, and also from frequent conversations with him during the period of my residence in his house. 92 A high proportion of AKSI leaders, especially the most active ones, were from Outer Island and Chinese ethnic origin. The Murba party also had a high proportion of those of Outer Island ethnic origin. The ethnic bases of the Christian parties have already been discussed. === [PDF page 414] === 399 compared as to their party identification, but they will be contrasted with those elected to parliament from their parties. Age Table 59 shows that those from older political parties, with the exception of the Partai Katholik, range in mean age from f o r t y - e i g h t t o f i f t y - s i x, of t h e new p a r t i e s a r e much y o u n g e r. 93 whereas t h e l e a d e r s TABLE 59 MEAN AGES OF POLITICAL PARTY LEADERS* THE NEW ORDER (number of individuals in parentheses) Political Party Pre-New Order Origin PSII PNI Parmusi Parkindo Partai Katholik Post-New Order Origin AKSI Golongan Independent Age 56 (1) 50 (6) 48 (4) 51 (6) 56 (1) 40 (3) 39 (1) 41 (3) In the older parties it is difficult for the younger generation to gain admittance to the ranks of the leadership, although, in general, a higher proportion are admitted than is the case for the military. The only party that has 93 Even for the political parties which have only one e l i t e member, the ages are f a i r l y representative of the leadership of those parties. === [PDF page 415] === 400 been in continous existence since the Revolution and has a relatively young age for their leaders is the Partai Katholik. Over the years the Partai Katholik developed from a party composed of leaders who usually had only a high school education (commonly teacher-training) to one led by university-educated leaders. Educational achievement has been emphasized in the party, which probably is a factor in the relative youth of the leadership since older leaders had relatively little education. Ethni c Origin Most of the political party elite members, as is the case with those from the military and technocratic segments, are ethnically Javan, but there are some differences among the parties, and also between the top leaders and those elected to the parliament in the 1955 election. The Pi\I and tsU parties always have been heavily Javan, especially Javanese, and this is shown by the ethnic origins of the political party elite members. But not only are the PMI and M' dominated by Javanese, but the political party elite members from the PSII, the Golongan Independent and even the Farmusi are Javanese. The latter party and its antecedent, the Masjumi, traditionally had much Outer Island support, as mentioned previously. Unlike the Masjumi, which had both Javan and Outer Island leaders, the Parmusi leadership is Javan. The composition of the Parmusi leadership was decided in negotiations between the government and === [PDF page 416] === 401 representatives of the constituent groups; the government was partial to leaders from Java, especially those who had not been Masjumi leaders. But, as mentioned previously, even in the Masjumi party the majority of the leadership came from Java, whereas most of the supporters were from the Outer Islands. Table 60 below, in comparing the ethnic origin of parliamentary representatives elected in 1955 with New Order party leaders, illustrates the tendency for party leaders to be Javan, even though some parties have strong 94 support in the Outer Islands. It is noticeable that even though one-fourth of the PNI representatives were from the Outer Islands, there is no Outer Island member in the elite. In general, this has been continuously true of the top FNI leadership; in the executive council there have been various attempts to have a semblance of geographical, and hence ethnic representation, but almost all of the top leaders have been Javan, and usually Javanese. Social Status There are differences in social status among the political party elite members. Those from the PJNI have the highest social origin; all of the leaders, except one, were recruited from the priyayi and noble strata. The Golongan Except for the Masjumi members who were dismissed from parliament after the party was banned, representation from political parties in parliament remained fairly constant until 1966; from 1966 to 1969 the major changes in personnel of the parties concerned took place in the PNI, due to the purge of left-wing members. Others in the PNI were also withdrawn by the new executive committee elected at the 1970 party congress. === [PDF page 417] === TABLE 60 ETHNIC ORIGIN OF PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATIVES AND THE NEW ORDER PARTY ELITE Ethnic Origin MPs Java Javanese Sundanese 75 64 11 Outer Islands Sumatra Sulawesi Kalimantan Bali & Nusatenggara Maluku 25 12 Chinese Total PNI Elite Parmusi MPs Elite MPs Elite 39 23 16 82 67 16 38 38 18 50 13 38 61 37 12 Katholik Elite MPs (57) (57) (45) NOTE: These four parties were chosen because they have the most members in the New Order political elite. === [PDF page 418] === 403 Independent leaders also come from high status origins. The party which has the lowest status origins is the NU; only one leader was recruited from the privavi. a man from one of the north coast kraton. where Islam traditionally has played an important role. One of the clientele groups of the PNI has been the pa mong Praia, hence it is expected that many leaders would be recruited from the privavi; however, even those in the past who represented the more radical wing of the PNI were recruited also from those of privavi origin. The NU leaders, in terms of social origin, are representative of the upper level of their group, wellknown kivavi and wealthy businessmen. The social origin of the Parmusi leadership lies between that of the PNI and the NU; two of the Parmusi leaders come from privavi origins, and two from wong cilik origins. the privavi. The PSII leader is from The leaders of the other parties are not Javan, but within their ethnic group most are from high status origin. Education The political party elite can be compared in terms of the highest level of education reached, comparing the members not only to each other, but also to the parliamentary representatives elected in 1955* There is little difference in education among the political party elite members. In general, most of the party elite members have had at least some university experience, except for the NU party leaders. Of those attending universities, the === [PDF page 419] === 404 largest number studied law (eleven out of nineteen)} law was a common area of study especially for the PINI, Parmusi, and Golongan Independent leaders. The three leaders holding the doctorate are also from these three parties. Table 61 below shows that the education of the party elite was noticeably higher than the parliamentary representatives. ence. The amount of education was not the only differ- For example, whereas a high proportion of Masjumi representatives only had an Islamic education, all of the larmusi leaders have received a Western-style education (this was also true for the major Masjumi leaders). Indonesia education is a status symbol, and a degree therefore is important. One party leader, who did not have his degree, remarked that this had hampered him in rising; therefore he enrolled' in one of the private universities and began working on a degree. In comparison to the technocrats, a smaller proportion of the universityeducated party elite members studied abroad--only six out of the nineteen who received university training studied abroad. The NU leaders, in general, studied at pesantren in Jombang; the kiyayi, who are influential in MU, are generally from Jombang, and their former pupils often become top NU politicians. detail in chapter 6. This will be discussed in greater === [PDF page 420] === TABLE 61 EDUCATIONAL LEVEL REACHED BY PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATIVES AND NEW ORDER PARTY ELITE PN".r Katholik MPs Elite Parmus i MPs Elite MPs Elite 19 13 18 16 63 25 18 18 Religious 40 56 Unknown 11 Educational Level Reached MPs Elite University 19 High School 40 Junior High Total (57) 13 38 (57) (45) === [PDF page 421] === 406 Pre-Political Party Experience and Career Patterns Party leaders started their involvement in politics when they were still young, often first through youth movements? the youngest party leaders were helped in their rise to elite status by their leadership of youth movements. All but one party leader participated in the Revolution, most through armed struggle, although a few joined government ministries. Three of the oldest party leaders were already members of the national elite and served in cabinets and in other governmental institutions during the Revolution? most, however, were either in laskar and student armies or active on the regional and local level in politics. For most party leaders their primary occupation was that of a politician? many had politics as a primary occupation after the 1955 elections, in which they were elected to parliament. All had secondary occupations, differing in length of time spent in these occupations? the most common secondary occupations were business, teaching, civil service, law, and journalism. Depending upon the party and also upon the age, most leaders achieved party leadership either through national or through regional activities; a few achieved leadership status through mass movements, usually youth movements. Political party leaders from all parties have had experience in governmental institutions, especially the legislative institutions, although a smaller percentage have had experience as cabinet ministers. the past, political party leaders were appointed to === [PDF page 422] === 407 government positions, such as cabinet positions, due to their status within the party, and the party would nominate candidates for these and other high positions. However, even at the high point of political party influence in Indonesia there were exceptions, and party members not nominated by their parties who were would be appointed to high positions, and the effect was that their party career would be enhanced by this position. At the present time it is common for party politicians to be appointed to high-level positions without the nomination of their parties, and also in some cases to be placed in a high party position by the government itself. Youth Movements Political party leaders, in comparison with military and technocratic elite members, have participated the most in youth movements. They belonged to several youth organizations and held leadership posts, usually the post of chairperson. The party leaders differ in the types of youth movements in which they participated. Those from religious parties, especially the NU, almost exclusively participated in religious youth movements, such as the Bandu Hizbulwathan, Femuda Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Youth), and the Jong Islamieten Bond. Those from Islamic reformist parties were active in other than religious groups, such as the nationalist scouts, === [PDF page 423] === 408 Indonesia Muda and Jong Java.95 The Partai Katholik leaders, like those of NU, were almost exclusively involved in religious youth movements. PNI leaders were involved in secular nationalist movements, such as Indonesia Muda; Javan youth movements, such as Jong Java; or Java-centered movements, such as Taman. Siswa. Youth movements have been important in proving a means by which younger party leaders have won leadership status in their political parties. In the present elite three young politicians began their political careers in youth movements, and through these youth movements achieved elite status. Another young leader was aided in his party career through his leadership position in the party youth movement, although he ultimately rose through the labor movement. His youth movement involvement, however, did aid him in achieving a leadership position quickly in the labor federation. Two others gained elite status in the party in their adult years through their sponsorship and patronage of youth movements. Revolutionary Experience The political party elite members, with one exception, participated in the Revolution, usually in one of the 95 Jong Java was the youth movement of the first quasinationalist movement in Indonesia, Budi Utomo, founded in 1908, and the first Indonesian organization formed on Western lines. It stood for the advancement of the Javan peoples, through the rejuvenation of Javan culture, and later began to stress political goals. In 1915 the Budi Utomo set up the first Indonesian youth organization, the === [PDF page 424] === 409 military groups. Eighteen of the party elite had military experience during the Revolution, seven in student armies (the Golongan Independent and AKSI leaders), four in laskar allied with political parties, three in the regular army, two as civilian advisors, and one in the navy and police. The party leaders differed according to their party affiliation, in the extent and type of military experience. For example, four of the five PNI leaders had military experience during the Revolution, whereas only three of the six i\U leaders fought in the Revolution;?NI leaders usually served in the regular army, either in a military capacity or as civilian advisors, whereas most of the Islamic party leaders, who fought in the Revolution, were in laskar. The party leaders can also be compared with their party representatives in parliament. A smaller proportion of representatives fought in the Revolution. For example, only 25% of the PNI representatives had military experience during the Revolution, 24% of the NU representatives, and 19% of the Masjumi representatives. The other political party elite members were also active in the Revolution, usually as members of the government; three were cabinet ministers or vice ministers, two Tri Koro Dharmo (Three Noble Goals), which was changed to Jong Java, in order to attract more young people to its goal of stimulating a "Great Java cultural concept" among young students (van Niel, Indonesian Elite, p. 169). Also see Nagazumi, "Budi Utomo." The youngest political party leader did not participate in the Revolution due to his very young age then. === [PDF page 425] === 410 civil servants, and two KNIP representatives. Six of the above were active in party politics? a smaller proportion of those participating militarily in the Revolution were active at that time in their parties (nine out of eighteen). Primary and Secondary Occupations All but six of the political party elite members spent most of their adult years engaged as politicians (mean of 17.9 years). Differences between the parties in terms of years spent in politics is closely related to the differences in age among the party leaderships. Some of the politicians have been active in politics since the 1920s and 1930s, in movements such as Sarikat Islam, Red Sarikat Islam, and Partindo, the radical nationalist party formed after the breakup of the first P M. Six came to politics later in their adult life; three had been civil servants for an average of ten years and three had been in business, also for an average of ten years. 97 The leaders tics who spent most of their lives in polialso were active in secondary occupations, notably the civil service, business, teaching, journalism, and law. In terms of the number of people, more were civil servants and teachers, but the most intensive involvement was in business; this is shown in table 62 below. 97 The following parties were represented in this group: Golongan Independent (all three), Parmusi (one), PNI (one~7, and Partai Katholik (one). === [PDF page 426] === 411 TABLE 62 MEAN YEARS IN SECONDARY OCCUPATIONSi NEW ORDER POLITICAL PARTY ELITE (number of persons in parentheses) Secondary Occupation Mean Years Business Civil Service Teaching Journalism Law (10) (11) There are political party differences in the length of time spent in secondary careers and also in the type of secondary career chosen. Three of the businessmen were NU leaders, and these leaders spent the longest amount of time in business (eleven years). In terms of civil service experience the parties differ in the nature of their leaders* experiences. For example, the four PNT leaders were in the information and internal affairs ministries, both PKI ministries in the past. Three of the four Islamic party leaders were posted in the religious ministry, a ministry controlled until recently by the NU. The Farkindo leader, a Toba Batak, was employed by the education ministry, a ministry where a large number of Toba Batak are employed. The parties differ too in the types of schools where their leaders taught and in the length of experience. Four PNI leaders had experience in teaching, but for three of them it was a way to earn money while studying at universities. Three of the four taught in Taman Siswa schols, so it can be said that their teaching experience was === [PDF page 427] === 412 an expression of their party activity. The three i\U leaders taught in pesantren, and the Christian leaders and the NU leaders had the longest teaching experience (around six years). Only one elite member taught in a Dutch school, and he soon changed to a private school because of the government's opposition to his nationalist activity. Few practiced law, although law was a common field of study for elite members. Only two practiced during the colonial period, for then it was difficult for lawyers to support themselves through the practice of law unless they were employed by the colonial government; because of their nationalist sentiment many leaders preferred, for example, teaching in Taman Siswa schools rather than work for the colonial government as lawyers. Political Party and Government Experience There were three main paths to party elite status for the Xew Order political party elite members: through the center party (twelve individuals), through the regional chapters (eight), and through mass organizations (six). There are two main influences upon the path that is chosen by the aspiring elite member: the age of the aspirant and the political party he has joined. of the party elite have The younger members mostly risen through the mass organizations, usually the youth movements of the parties. It is more likely for one who is from the middle generation to rise through the center than through the region. terms of the influence of the political party, those from === [PDF page 428] === 413 the PNI have tended to rise through center party positions, and NU leaders through regional chapter positions, especially those in East Java, where the spiritual arm party is centered. of the This is shown below in table 63. TABLE 63 FATHS TO PARTY LEADERSHIP: NEW ORDER Political Party PNI Murba Parmus i FSII Parkindo Fartai Katholik Golongan Independent AKSI Total Center Region Mass Movements 12 During Guided Democracy, except for certain strong regional chapters in the PNI and NU, the regional chapters had less influence in party affairs, and therefore most of those who rose to high party status in the late 1950s and 1960s rose either through the center or through mass organizations, especially youth movements. Order a method In the New which is becoming common for party advancement is through the government. This is especially true of parties who are dependent upon governmental approval in order to exist, such as the PNI and the Parmusi; there was a possibility in the beginning of the New Order that the PNI would be banned, and, in fact, in many quarters there === [PDF page 429] === 414 were strong demands for it to be banned. The government has been especially instrumental in the PNI and Parmusi in determining the recruitment of the top leadership. Most of those who rose to elite status through regional positions were leaders of important chapters in their party? for example, the Parkindo leader was the head of the North Sumatra chapter of Parkindo for many years, a key chapter for the Parkindo party since many Parkindo voters reside in this area. The NU leaders, who rose to national stature through regional politics were leaders of the East Java NU, the key area for the NU, except for one from South Kalimantan, the second most important area for the NU. Most of these leaders became active in the national party by 1956; they were elected to parliament, and after the elections transferred most of their attention to the national party. This is shown in table 64 below, which charts, by years, center, regional, and mass movement activity of the political party elite. Several trends are noticeable in table 64. First, there was a substantial decrease in party activity during Guided Democracy by those who are New Order elite members. By 1962 the Masjumi party was banned (accounting for three persons), and one of the NU leaders was jailed for political reasons. Although new persons had become active in the parties by the eve of the coup attempt in 1965, five of the PNI elite members had been expelled from their leadership positions. Second, the lowest number of people === [PDF page 430] === 415 TABLE 64 PROGRESSION OF PARTY CAREER OF THE NEW ORDER POLITICAL PARTY ELITE Year Dutch 1942 Jap. 1945 Revol. 1945 1949 Pari. D. 1952 1956 Trans. 1959 Gu. Dem. 1962 1965 New Or. 1967 1969 1973 Center Region Mass Movement Total No. 12 12 10 17 17 21 17 20 13 12 16 14 22 24 13 22 24 13 active in parties was reached in 1973. Three are deceased, but the others are no longer active politically in their parties; for example, the two ex-Masjumi leaders of Parmusi, a PNI leader and a FSII leader have been ousted from their parties due to governmental intervention. Neither the Golongan Independent nor most of the AKSI groups were in existence in 1973. Third, throughout the years there has been a general movement from the regional level to that of the center. In 1942, the dominant activity was in the regional and local areas, but the last year in which there was a high proportion still based in the regional chapters was in 1952. By 1956, the largest number of === [PDF page 431] === 416 party leaders were active in the center. Fourth, in the Revolution and from 1952 to 1965 there were a number of leaders mainly involved in mass movements. Except for the Revolution, however, the proportion involved was small; but, despite the small number, the mass movements, especially the youth movements, were important in helping the younger leaders rise to power. Some leaders, after winning a seat on the national party executive, remained active sponsors of youth movements in order to help preserve and maintain their power in their parties. The party elite, in terms of their governmental experience, have been active mainly in the legislative arm, usually as leaders of their party fractions in parliament and as parliamentary and MPRS leaders (mostly in the I\ew Order). This is shown below in table 65, which compares cabinet, high official (including secretary- and directorgenerals of ministries, ambassadorial positions, and those in charge of governmental agencies), and legislative positions of the party elite for some key years. Of the twenty-five cabinet positions held by party elite members, fifteen have been held by members of the three largest parties, NU, Parmusi, and the PINI. The mean number of years NU leaders held cabinet positions were 2.0, Parmusi, 1.5, and PNI 1.0. The largest number of cabinet positions were held by the party elite during 1969} by 1973 only four of the party elite were represented. During Parliamentary Democracy most of those who held cabinet === [PDF page 432] === 417 TA3LE 65 PROGRESSION OF GOVERNMENTAL POSITIONS HELD BY THE NEW ORDER POLITICAL PARTY ELITE Year Revol. 1945 1949 Pari. D» 1952 1956 Trans. 1959 Gu. Dem. 1962 1965 New Or. 1967 1969 1973 [ Cabinet High Official Legislative Total 11 14 14 14 20 23 14 positions usually received them by nomination of their party; but even then, influence outside the party could partly determine who would be acceptable for cabinet positions. As was mentioned previously, for example, the PNI leaders who served in the Masjumi cabinets were not from the radical wing, which controlled the PNI in the early part of this period, but from the conservative wing, since they were acceptable to the Masjumi leaders, who controlled their party and the Masjumi-led cabinets. During the New Order most of the cabinet ministers from the political parties are those deemed acceptable by the government and are not the nominees of their parties. The table also indicates that these party leaders did not hold many positions in the "high official" category, except during the === [PDF page 433] === 418 Revolution. In general, most of the experience of these leaders has been in the legislative bodies. Guided Democracy Political Party Elite The political party elites of Guided Democracy and the:<ew Order differ in the political parties represented and in background characteristics and career patterns. The political party elite of Guided Democracy came from a wide variety of parties: the PKI (4); nationalist and radical nationalist parties, PNI (5), Murba (2), Partindo (1);98 religious parties and movements, NU (2), PSII (2), Muhammadiyah (1), Parkindo (1) and Partai Katho99 lik (l); and a military-dominated party, IPKI (1). Masjumi In 1958 a group of left-wing leaders broke away from the PNI and formed the Partindo. The leader of Partindo, Asmara Hadi, criticized the PNI for not acting in accordance with its ideology of Marhaenism by not moving against the landlords, big businessmen, and corrupt politicians within its own ranks. He also called for the revision of Marhaenism so that it could be directly linked to Marxist class analysis (Rocamora,"Partai Nasional Indonesia," p. 149). During Guided Democracy its leaders were allied with the PKI on many issues, and after the coup many of its leaders were either killed or jailed. In the early New Order period the remaining leaders of the party appealed to the government several times to allow the party to be reconstituted and to take part in the elections, but their appeals were denied. 99 The IPKI (League for the Upholding of Indonesian Independence) was founded in 1954 by Nasution and his faction; this was at the time when Nasution had no official position. IPKI is mainly composed of Siliwangi officers and coopted civilians, often related through kinship to the Siliwangi leaders of the party. IPKI contested the 1955 elections and it essentially had an anti-party platform, calling for a shift in orientation from that of ideology to program; the IPKI leaders were surprised when the party only ranked ninth in the elections, receiving four seats in parliament. IPKI remained a small party, with steadily === [PDF page 434] === 419 was outlawed in the Guided Democracy period, but the Islamic reform movement was represented by the PSII and Muhammadiyah. The Communist and radical nationalist parties are no longer represented in the elite, whereas during Guided Democracy they were among the strongest parties; by the end of Guided Democracy the radical nationalists in the PNI controlled the party, and its leaders allied themselves to a greater or lesser extent with the PKI and the radical nationalist parties. The political party elite of Guided Democracy had far greater influence than in the i\ew Order; in Guided Democracy there was more or less an equal relationship between the military and political party elites, which is not evidenced in the New Order. The Guided Democracy party elite ranged in age from forty-two (PKI) to sixty-four (Muhammadiyah). In general, except for the NU (forty-seven), the mean ages of the religious party leaders were older and the ages for the nationalist parties were younger. During the Aew Order there has been a transfer of power from the older leaders of the Partai Katholik to the younger ones. To a lesser extent this was also true of the Parkindo and Parmusi. diminishing bases of support. Soon after Nasution was reappointed chief of staff of the army in 1955 he withdrew his backing from the party. IPKI contested the 1971 elections, but was unable to win any seats in parliament. In 1973, after some of its leaders received positions in the new Indonesian Democratic Party (the federation of nationalist parties) the general chairperson dissolved the party (see Burhan D. Magenda, "After the Medal Is Pinned, the Party Is Dissolved," Harian Kami. 4 June 1973). === [PDF page 435] === 420 Concerning the level of education, the New Order party elite is better educated; only eight of the twenty Guided Democracy party elite members attended a university in contrast to most members of the New Order party elite. Host of the New Order elite received their university education after independence, at a time when there was more opportunity for university training. Since they are older, most members of the Guided Democracy party elite who had higher education received their degrees prior to the advent of the Japanese occupation. There was less involvement in youth movements among the Guided Democracy party elite members. Many youth movements began after the development of political parties in the 1920s, and the members of the Guided Democracy party elite were older, and therefore, less involved in youth movements. The elites were similar in the types of movements in which they participated, i.e., those from religious parties joined mostly religious youth movements, and those from nationalist parties, Javan and secular nationalist youth movements. More Guided Democracy party elite members participated in radical youth movements than did New Order elite members, due to the number of PKI and radical nationalist leaders in the Guided Democracy political elite. Since the Guided Democracy party elite was an older group than their counterpart in the New Order, they had devoted more years to politics. Six of the twenty had even === [PDF page 436] === 421 been active in colonial politics in the 1920s and 1930s. For example, Ali Sastroamidjojo SH, prime minister of two cabinets in the 1950s, was one of the original founders of the first PNI. Another example is I.J. Kasimo of the Partai Katholik, who was elected secretary of the party in 1925, chairperson in 1929, and served four years in the Volksraad. The types of secondary occupations of the Guided Democracy party elite were similar, but the frequency and length of time spent in these occupations differed. Law and teaching had the highest mean years, although the greatest number of people had civil service experience. one person was in business. Only Two PKI leaders had been laborers, whereas in the New Order no elite member, military or civilian, had ever worked as a laborer. The nature of the participation of the Guided Democracy party elite in the Revolution differed greatly from that of the New Order party elite. Only seven of the twenty had military experience, and most of those seven were in radical laskar. The Guided Democracy party elite was more actively involved in party politics during the Revolution (only three were not involved), and they participated at a higher level in the parties than was the case of those active at that time in the New Order party elite. In comparing the political party experience, it was seen that a higher proportion of the Guided Democracy elite gained party elite status through center party === [PDF page 437] === 422 positions, largely because many were among the original founders of the parties. There also were a few who rose to party elite status during Guided Democracy because of favoritism shown them by Sukarno. Most of those who rose to party elite status through the holding of regional offices (five compared to thirteen who rose through center positions) were from the religious parties. Only two rose through mass organizations, one labor and one youth; they were both PKI leaders. This path became prominent only for younger leaders, who did not emerge until early in the New Order. By 1945 most of the Guided Democracy party elite were active in the center party, as shown below in table 66. By 1952, compared to 1967 for the ftew Order party, all but one Guided Democracy party elite member were in center positions. More New Order party elite members were active in mass movements, and for longer periods of time. In the New Order, few of the Guided Democracy party elite remained active in their party, although by 1973 six of the seven were in their parties' advisory councils, which are reserved for the "party elders." These councils, however, have no power. A larger proportion of Guided Democracy leaders have held cabinet positions and also high appointive official Although the chairperson and vice chairperson of the MPRS, the speaker and vice speakers of the parliament, and the chairperson of the Supreme Advisory Council (DPA) held cabinet seats during Guided Democracy, they were not included in the next table as cabinet members, since their counterparts in the New Order did not have cabinet seats. The === [PDF page 438] === 423 TABLE 66 PROGRESSION OF PARTY CAREER OF THE GUIDED DEMOCRACY PARTY ELITE Year Dutch 1942 Japanese 1945 Revolution 1945 1949 Pari. Dem. 1952 1956 Transition 1959 Guid. Dem. 1962 1965 New Order 1967 1973 Center Region Mass Movement Total No. 11 13 16 13 16 14 17 18 18 20 18 20 18 positions than those in the New Order. Although the Guided Democracy party elite members were prominent in the legislative institutions, only in 1945, 1962 and after Guided Democracy did legislative positions predominate. This is clearly shown in table 67 below. There is more distribution among the parties of cabinet positions in Guided Democracy than in the New Order. For example, nine of the cabinet positions were held by PNI leaders, but the rest were distributed among all of the political parties, except for the Partindo member. In general, the Guided Democracy cabinets during Guided Democracy became very large (one hundred members), and also.included heads of various bodies and state institutions. Many of the political party elite held important portfolios, however. === [PDF page 439] === 424 TABLE 67 PROGRESSION OF GOVERNMENTAL POSITIONS HELD BY THE GUIDED DEMOCRACY PARTY ELITE Year Re v o l. 1945 1949 P a r i. D. 1952 1956 Trans. 1959 Gu. Dem. 1962 1965 New Ord. 1967 1969 1973 Cabinet High Official Legislative Total 12 13 13 17 10 11 20 20 party elite had more experience in cabinet positions; the PNI leaders, for example, served a mean of seven years in cabinet positions, compared to one year for the New Order PNI elite members. NU leaders served for a mean of four years in cabinet positions, compared to two years for the NU New Order party elite. It should also be noted that those in the legislative bodies in Guided Democracy, who were members of the elite, were members of state committees and special governmental bodies dealing with economics, defense, foreign policy, and politics in general; their responsibilities as legislative members were far greater than their counterparts in the New Order. === [PDF page 440] === 425 Importance of Personal Factors Before the end of the analyses of party elite career patterns it should be emphasized that personal factors had a very important role in helping the party elite members achieve their positions. As with the military elite members, clique and faction membership was necessary in order to advance. It was crucial for the aspirants to belong to a clique that was influential in the determination of leadership positions. The aspirant also had to develop his own group, strategically placed, which would help him in his struggle for national positions in the party. These groups were often based on regional chapters and also on mass organizations. Other personal contacts, such as school friends and friends from youth movements, were also helpful in the rise of elite members. For example, one PNI clique was composed of law students from the last years of the Cutch-administered law faculty in Jakarta; these individuals remained close to each other in the intervening years and helped one another advance in their political careers. Another example was the Jong Islamieten Bond; the members of this youth movement became the leaders of the reformist wing of the Masjumi party and their ties to each other were instrumental in their career advancement. Kinship also has proved vital in some cases; the extent to which it is an important determinant depends upon the political party. The two political parties in which === [PDF page 441] === 426 kinship has been most influential were the PSII and the i\U. Two sons of the leading founder of the PSII, Haji Umar Said Tjokroaminoto, remained the key party leaders until 1973. In the NU, kinship has been very cruciali not only the students of the NU founders held positions of influence within the party, but also the children, grandchildren, and sons-in-law of the founders. Within most parties, marriages were often used to advance a person's career. Pleasing personality characteristics are instrumental in helping aspirants to advance. The Indonesian political parties possess party constitutions, elaborate organizational charts, and the leaders are chosen in party congresses, but party politics are more easily understood through looking at their cliques, which are an extension and development of politics from the traditional bapakanak buah ties and from the kraton political style. The personalities and characters of the leaders also are a blend between the traits associated with traditional leaders 102 and those necessary for leaders of political parties. The extent and nature of the blend are influenced by the particular political party identifications of the leaders. l01 Samson, "Islam and Politics," pp. 159-160. 102 For a fascinating discussion of leadership qualities in traditional and modern Indonesia see Ann Ruth Willner, Charismatic Political Leadership! A Theory. Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Center of International Studies Research Monograph no. 32 (Princetom Princeton University, 1968) and Willner, "Indonesia," pp. 242-306. === [PDF page 442] === 427 As will be discussed in the following chapter, affective ties between bapak and anak buah have always been important in the Indonesian culture, and these ties are more crucial than any material relationship between the bapak and anak buah. In order to succeed in a political career a politician must have a personality that will appeal to his colleagues, to prospective anak buah. and to his constituents. In this chapter background characteristics and career patterns of the civilian elite segments of the Guided Democracy and New Order periods were analyzed. A new segment, the technocrats, emerged in the New Order. The technocrats, before attaining elite status, pursued joint careers in academia and government. Many of the technocrats served in the military during the Revolution, and some have been helped by personal contacts formed with military leaders, some of whom they have known since the Revolution. The non-- party segment of the Guided Democracy elite is very different from its counterpart in the New Order in background characteristics and career patterns. similarity. But there is one Sukarno, in his first attempts to build a new system, tried to dissolve political parties. He was unsuccessful, but the non-party elite members did rise in status during Guided Democracy because they were not associated with political parties. In the New Order the government bases its legitimacy on its ability to effect economic === [PDF page 443] === 428 development, and this has been instrumental in the rapid rise of the economists in particular. The political party leaders in the New Order only come from religious and nationalist parties, in contrast to the Guided Democracy period, when a wider spectrum of Indonesian political thinking was represented. Certain background factors were found useful in making it to the top--Javan ethnic and respected social status origins, and, except for NU leaders, Western-style education. contrast to the party leaders, the parliamentary representatives were more Outer Island in origin and less educated. Whereas many rose to elite status through regional and mass movement positions in the New Order party elite, those from the Guided Democracy party elite rose pimarily through center positions. The younger party leaders, especially, have advanced through leading mass movements. A higher proportion of Guided Democracy party leaders held prestigious governmental positions. This reflects the higher status of political party leaders in Guided Democracy than in the New Order. Personal factors were instrumental for all civilian elite members, especially membership in the "right" cliques and factions. In the following two chapters the dynamics of clique and factional behavior will be analyzed, and it will be seen that background factors do influence factional composition and behavior. === [PDF page 444] === 429 CHAPTER V MILITARY FACTIONS Summary The main area of focus in chapters 5 and 6 is elite behavior in relation to military and civilian factions, and the interrelationships between the military and the civilian leaders and groups. in the Indonesian context, In looking at factionalism it is necessary to understand the cultural factors which influence its nature and manifestation. Factionalism in Indonesia draws upon the traditional models of patron-client organization and behavior present in the society. In comparison with other countries where patron-client models are found, in Indonesia, traditionally, there were a greater variety of patron-client models, and the prototype of the patron-client tie was not only that of the landlord and tenant. There also was less coercion in the traditional patron-client relationship than is true of other countries where this phenomena has been stud ied. To what extent are background characteristics, such as ethnic, social status, religious origin} educational Studies of Indonesian politics have commonly referred to military and party factions in their analyses (for examples see Feith, Democracy in Indonesia: Kahin, Revolution in Indonesia, and McVey, "Transformation"). === [PDF page 445] === 430 experience; and career patterns influential in determining factional alignments? In the Indonesian army the territorial divisions are organized along regional lines, containing within them, in general, the major ethnic groups of their particular regions. Therefore, except for the Siliwangi division, divisional identification and ethnic background are congruent. Throughout most of Indonesia's military history factions have been divided mainly along divisional lines, but where divisional and ethnic lines are not congruent, array leaders often choose a faction composed of people from their ethnic background, not from their division. The factional picture is more complicated than divisional and ethnic identification, and other elements, particularly religious and political beliefs, educational background, and aspects of career experience influence alignments. Descriptions of the major factional divisions from the time of the Revolution, culminating with a discussion of factionalism within the I\ew Order military will illustrate the influence of the bases of factionalism and the issues around which it has revolved. The Indonesian army evolved from a heterogeneous organization containing diverse segments from the Outer Islands, lower status groups, and politically left and santri groups into an army dominated by Javanese, mainly abangan and priyayi. Examples of factional politics and interactions will serve as markings showing the evolution of the Indonesian army into a more === [PDF page 446] === 431 homogeneous organization. The military factions have never acted alone in their struggles with rival factions; they have always aligned themselves with civilian factions sharing similar background characteristics and value sets. In the New Order the military leadership, in control of the state and of the military, was finally able to pursue policies which have resulted in the greatest degree of cohesion and control by the military leadership over its constituent elements. What were the most successful strategies pursued in this regard? It will be shown that Soeharto's success lay in his use of a varied and judicious mixture of approaches, including purging and transferring opponents, decreasing the strength of civilian factions aligned to rival military factions, and most important, changing the organizational structure of the military. The process of consolidation of power in the present government and in the military has changed the bases of factionalism, and created a rather closed system of factionalism with a very narrow range of participants. Military factional politics have come to resemble clique politics within a palace guard rather than the broadly based, rather open factional system of the past. Clientelism and Factionalism Clientelism The relationship between members of a military, political party, or technocratic faction and their leader, the bapak (father), is closely related to the traditional === [PDF page 447] === 432 behavior expected of patrons (bapak) and clients (anakbuah). Therefore it is useful to examine briefly the nature and characteristics of patron-client bonds in Indonesia, both the traditional models of patronage and the relations of patrons and clients in modern-day Indonesia, especially on the national level. The basic elements of the patron-client relationship found in Indonesia, as in many other countries, are: 1) the unequal status between patron and client; 2) greater or lesser reciprocity between patron and client, depending upon the resource base and instruments of coercion; 3) a very personal, affective relationship, modelled on the family; and 4) a diffuse relationship in which the patron is expected to be respon2 sible to his clients in varying ways. Societies with For theoretical discussions of clientelism see: L.M. Hanks, "Entourage and Circle in Burma," Bennington Review 2 (Winter 1968)i 32-46; Robert R. Kaufman, "The Patron-Client Concept and Macro-Politics: Prospects and Problems," paper presented at the 69th meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 4-9 September 1972; Rene Lemarchand and Keith Legg, "Political Clientelism and Development: A Preliminary Analysis," Comparative Politics 4 (January 1972): 149-178; John Duncan Powell, "Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics," American Political Science Review'64 (June 1970): 411-426; Fred W. Riggs, Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1966); Richard Sandbrook, "Patrons, Clients and Factions: New Dimensions of Conflict Analysis in Africa," Canadian Journal of Political Science 5 (March 1972)t 104-119; Peter T. Schneider, "Friends of Friends: Coalition Formation and Colonialism in Western Sicily" (no place, no date); James C. Scott, "The Erosion of Patron-Client Bonds and Social Change in Rural Southeast Asia," Journal of Asian Studies 32 (November 1972): 5-38; James C. Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," American Political Science Review (March 1972)t 91-113; Alex Weingrod, "Patrons, Patronage and Political Parties," Comparative Studies in Society and History 10 === [PDF page 448] === 433 patron-client relationships can be compared according to the places they occupy along the continuums of the four elements mentioned above. Much of the difficulty scholars have encountered in constructing a general theory of clientelism is related to the varying forms found in the societies where the phenomenon exists. Clientelism cannot be meaningfully considered ••• apart from the setting in which it exists. The forms which it takes depend to a large extent on the structure of the society and on the political system in which it operates.3 In traditional Indonesia, particularly in Java, there were three main models for patron-client relations, first between the king and subject (mirrored on the relationship between God and man), the second between teacher and student, and the third between the villager with land and the one with little or no land. The oldest model was that between king and subject (suwita), which was a network of patron-client relations stretching from the capital city (July 1968)» 377-400; and Alan Zuckerman, "On the Institutionalization of Political Clientelesi Party Factions and Cabinet Coalitions in Italy," paper presented at the 70th meeting of the American Political Science Association, i\ew Orleans, 4-8 September 1973. Kaufman states in his definition that the patronclient relationship is anchored only loosely in community norms. This is not true for Indonesia where the relationship has been recognized as an expected and valued mode of behavior. For a case study in which the emotional need of being both a patron and a client is discussed, see Karl Jackson, "Participation in Rebellion: The Dar'ul Islam in West Java," paper presented at the 23rd meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Washington, D.C. 29-31 March 1971. Lemarchand and Legg, "Clientelism," p. 156. === [PDF page 449] === 434 to the villages. Nobles, bureaucrats, craftsmen, and peasants were included within the system, which has been defined as an "asymmetrical exchange of services with the client providing products or labor in return for physical protection, chances for advancement and enhanced status." In the bureaucracy every official had his patron and his clients, and all were involved in reciprocal relationships. ... the hierarchy of the state, and the bureaucracy in particular, was integrated not by formal institutional or organizational means, but by the myriad dyadic linkages of the client system. Since the traditional state had no functionally specialized political and economic organizations separate from these particularized pyramids of patrons and retainers, political relationships were always preponderantly particularistic, ascriptive and diffuse in character.5 This system did give some opportunity for social mobility, and it was at least possible for the peasant to be recruited into the local elite. According to Javanese political thought the relationship between a king and his subjects should be close and personal, with feelings of mutual love and respect. The family was perceived as the model in Sartono Kartodirdjo, "Agrarian Radicalism in Java* Its Setting and Development," in Culture and Politics in Indonesia, ed. Claire Holt (Ithaca, N.Y.t Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 83. Ibid., p. 84. Scott in his "Patron-Client Politics," p. 101, notes that, in general, in pre-colonial Southeast Asia, although inequalities were clearly present, there was a high incidence of "elite circulation." Although this was less true for Java than other parts of Southeast Asia, it was more common in pre-colonial Java than after the Dutch impact. === [PDF page 450] === 435 regulating the behavior of the king and his officials toward the subjects "as a parent cares for his children." Furthermore, it was believed that fate ordained one's station in life, and that one should accept his fate and act in accordance with his station. The relationship of master and servant was theoretically modelled on that of king and subject, with feelings of mutual love and respect between the two and behavior appropriate to their stations. It is interesting that the major Javanese addition to the Mahabha rata is the character of Semar, servant of the Pendawa, but at the same time he is Ismaya, the most powerful Javanese god who could "if he so desired, rule the world." Traditionally the closest emotional patron-client tie is between the guru and his pupil, and this relationship commonly could last one's entire life. The model for this relationship was also based upon the family. In fact, the favored pupils would often marry the daughters of the guru. The guru-pupil relationship is important in present-day Indonesia, not only in Islamic circles, but also in kebatinan groups. In a description of the interpersonal relations within kebatinan groups• M.A. Mulder contrasts the emphasis upon equality, fellowship, and brotherhood among the members with the reverential position held by Moertono, Later Mataram Period, p. 26. Brandon, Javanese Shadow Plays, p. 75. === [PDF page 451] === 436 the guru. Mulder comments that "often the loyalty to the guru becomes more important than the loyalty to parents or The last model is that between the well-off villager and the poorer families in the village. Traditionally there was little difference among the villagers in terms of economic and political standing. Several factors hampered the village elite and also the supra-village officials from developing onerous patron-client ties with the villagersJ 1) strength of kin and village structures, which enabled patronage functions to be performed through these institutionsj 2) the availability of unoccupied land, which provided the opportunity for the villagers to leave and found new settlements if the government became too oppressive} and 3) lack of power of the central state. Through the Dutch impact, however, land became scarce and more concentrated in ownership. Other changes also affected social relationships within the village: the population increase, development of commercial agriculture, and the expansion of political power of the 12 village officials. These effects accentuated greatly "Aliran Kebatinan as an Expression of the Javanese Worldview," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 1 10. Ibid., p. 112. Scott, "Rural Southeast Asia," p. 7. 12 Ibid., pp. 7-8. === [PDF page 452] === 437 differences within the villages.13 Great variation is seen today within this model of patron-client relationship, depending upon the extent of Dutch and modern Indonesian impact on the village. One study was conducted by Robert R. Jay in a village in the eastern part of Central Java, an area where there was less economic impact of the modern economic sector than in parts of West Java. Jay, in his study, describes some of the responsibilities of a patron toward his client, and emphasizes the obligations of the landholder to give "material aid in emergencies, also advice and gifts, in return for labor services and social gestures acknowledging his quasi-parental role and superior rank." Although there was a shortage of land, the position of the sharecropper vis-a-vis the landholder was not particularly onerous, and it was not uncommon for one dependent family to have patron-client ties with more than one landholder. Moreover the landholder seemed ... to receive no distinctive treatment other than what flows normally from his exchange relationships. Moreover, the villagers* strong bias for conceiving relations between the well-to-do and the poor in terms of relations between senior and junior family members has probably impeded the growth of self-consciously exclusive classes. -* 13 See Margo L. Lyon, Bases of Conflict in Rural Java, Center for South and Southeast Asia Studies, University of California, Research Monograph no. 3 (Berkeley: University of California, 1971), p. 13. Jay, Javanese Villagers, p. 230. 15 Ibid., p. 267. === [PDF page 453] === 438 Lemarchand and Legg also note that social and political equilibrium is a by-product of the patron-client system. Scott observes that it provides an alternative mode of association to class and primordial groups. In a study of West Java, where the western economic impact was stronger, it was found that the relationship between the landlord and the tenant was far more onerous and less ameliorated by the kin model of social relations found 18 in the more traditional villages of Central Java. Other figures in the village which are patron-like figures are rural officials, especially the lurah. and are treated as senior members of the large village family. In a recent study of relationships in a Javanese village Richard Franke found that often patron-client relationships are far less harmonious than mutual direct interactions evidence. For example, in exploitative situations the clients would complain bitterly about their patrons when the latter were not present. 19 16 "Clientelism," p. 172. "Patron-Client Politics," p. 91. 18 See Rd. A. Adiwilage, Land Tenure in the Village of Tiipagalo (Bandung Regency) (Bandungs Kantor Perantjang Tata Bumi, Djawa Barat, 1954), which is discussed in Lyon, Rural Java, pt. 1, sect. 2. Huizer also mentions that the patron-client relationship between landholder and tenant has often changed from a "benevolent paternalistic" relationship toward one which is more "exploitative" (see Gerrit Huizer, "Peasant Mobilization and Land Reform in Indonesia," Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs 8 19 See "The Javanese Kangen Family." === [PDF page 454] === 439 Indonesia differs from many of the countries where patronage has been studied in the relative lack of coercion found in the bapak-anak buah relationship, except in some areas, and in the extent of affective relationships, modelled after that of the family. The role of the godparent in Italy, Greece, and Mexico 20 as a benevolent patron has been analyzed, but, in general, studies have stressed that the prototype of the patron-client relational ship is that between landlord and tenant. In Indonesia the more common prototypes are relations between priyayi, between guru and pupil, and between richer and poorer families in villages. In relationships among members of the upper strata there is no coercion evident! there is more in villages, but less than in other countries studied. In a study of authority patterns in the local bureaucracy of eastern Central Java, Donald Fagg observed that although the camat (same as a' sten wedana) is looked'. See Weingrod, "Patrons, Patronage;" J.K. Campbell, Honour. Family and Patronage; A Study of Institutions and Moral Values in a Greek Mountain Community (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964); and George M. Foster, "The Dyadic Contract in Tzintzuntzan, II: Patron-Client Relationship," American Anthropologist 65 (1963)t 1280-1294. 21 See Luigi Graziano, "Patron-Client Relationships in Southern Italy," paper presented at the 69th meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C. 5-9 September 1972; Carl H. Lande and James A. Curry, "Local Level Factionalism in the Philippines," paper presented at the 71st meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago 29 August-2 September 1974; Scott, "Patron-Client Politics;" and Zuckerman, "Coalitions in Italy." === [PDF page 455] === 440 22 up to as an authority figure, he rarely gives a command. ...the general impression is one of powerful linguistic and gestural conventions of suasive indirection, of gently persuasive pressures quite notably devoid of any blatant suggestion of arbitrarily imposed control.... there is control, but the emphasis is not revealed in an imperative fashion.23 The subtle ways the bapak uses to "request" his wishes to his anak buah also enables the latter in a likewise subtle and delicate way to refuse their bapak's request. It is not done by use of the negative, but through almost imperceptible movements and language. One of the great difficulties of a bapak, other than a landlord or lurah, is whether or not his anak buah will do his bidding, even though it is in the form of authoritative decrees from the government. The difficulties of the bapak in this vein are compounded if his anak buah and he originate from similar social status origins, such as is common in military and bureaucratic cliques. One of the perennial problems in Indonesia, as in Burma, has been the implementation of decisions. Hanks comments that in Burma the king would give his minister commands, and if the ministers approved of these commands they would pass them on to their clients; but only those who perceived that they would gain from the implementation of these commands would heed their patrons. 24 22 "Javanese Bureaucracy," p. 364. 23 Ibid., pp. 364-365. 24,, Circle in Burma," p. 34. === [PDF page 456] === 441 The p a t r o n - c l i e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p i n Indonesia i s marked by a very c l o s e personal r e l a t i o n s h i p, ' m o d e l l e d on k i n r e l a 25 tions, and kinship terms are used. The instrumental tie is definitely present, but less than is evident in the previously mentioned studies of Mexico, South Italy and Greece. The bapak is expected to treat his anak buah with affection, respect, and to help them in providing for their families; in return the anak buah are loyal to their bapak and will provide him with support, including political support for those active in government, the military, or political parties. In fact, in general the bapak has more responsibilities than the anak buah, except in the case of the landlord and lurah, and it is easier for the anak buah to refuse the request of a bapak than for the bapak to refuse the request of his anak buah. For those in politics, it is important to have a number of anak buah. scattered in various strategic locations. The relations between a bapak and his anak buah have both moral and transactional elements; in the case of an influential bapak who possesses both a core and periphery, moral attachments are more important to the core and transactional attachments to the periphery. 25 F.G. Bailey states that in Orissa, India patrons and clients are addressed in kinship terms (Stratagems and Spoils: A Social Antrhopology of Politics /Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970/, p. 38). 26 Ibid., pp. 43-45. === [PDF page 457] === 442 e anak buah, unless his bapak is his landlord or lurah. will usually counterbalance his bapak's "request" with the needs of his family and with the continued ability of his bapak to aid him. If the bapak is losing status due to political defeats or loss of office, for example, it is quite likely that most of his anak buah will also fade away, except those who are closest to him.27 This tendency for the anak buah to leave with the demise of their bapak is lessened by common strong ideological beliefs. In Scott's discussion of the resource base of patronage, he states that office-based property is the 28 least secure resource base. If this office-based property base is enlarged to include status associated with office-holding, it provides a major reason for the instability of patron-client ties. Status and wealth in Indonesia are closely related to political power, and if a person declines politically, his status, wealth, and ability to provide for his clients also decrease. Therefore, there is an increased propensity for his clients to transfer their loyalties to another patron. As Eric R"# Wolf states, in systems where the most important function of the patron is to provide connections with the institutions of the society, his hold on his clients is weak, and instead of having solid patron-client blocks, there are 27 Selosoemardjan, Jogjakarta, p. 139. 28 "Patron-Client Politics," p. 98. === [PDF page 458] === 443 "diffuse and cross-cutting ties between multiple patrons and multiple clients, with clients often moving from one orbit of influence to another." 29 In national cliques another factor contributing to the falling away of clients, once a person's position declines, is the similarity of social class origins. Lemarchand and Legg also discovered that a loss of status of the patron to the extent that his new status approximates that of his clients presaged the end of the patron-client relationship. 30 The view presented here differs sharply from the one taken by Karl Jackson in his study of the bapak-anak buah relationship in the villages of West Java. Jackson came to the conclusion that villagers would go to the help of their bapak, even if he lived far from the village and had no resource base there. However, there were serious methodological problems in the study. A short story was presented to the villagers, and they were asked to indicate which of the four possible "alternatives for action" would be the "best" for the person in the story to do.31 There are two major difficulties with this method: 1) the story 29 ."Kinship, F r i e n d s h i p, and P a t r o n - C l i e n t R e l a t i o n s i n Complex S o c i e t i e s " i n The S o c i a l Anthropology of Complex S o c i e t i e s, ed. Michael Banton (New York and Washington, D.C.t P r a e g e r, 1966), p. 18. Also see Zuckerman, " C o a l i t i o n s i n I t a l y, " pp. 2-3 for t h e p o s i t i o n of the p a t r o n as a mediator between h i s c l i e n t and government. 30 " C l i e n t e l i s m, " p. 152. ^ " D a r ' u l I s l a m, " p. 44. === [PDF page 459] === 444 itself is highly unrealistic, and therefore it is impossible to tell how it was actually interpreted by the villagers; and 2) not only was social desirability not controlled, but a response in terms of social desirability was made even more likely by asking the villagers which is the "best" alternative, instead of the most likely one. Furthermore, in the Sundanese culture honesty is not held as an important value, and in fact, is often thought to be opposite of the goal of social harmony, and therefore the Sundanese, even more than Americans, would answer according to social 32 desirability. I t should be briefly mentioned that patron-client 33 pyramids are common in Indonesia; for example, i t was through the u t i l i z a t i o n of the patron-client pyramids t h a t v i l l a g e r s became p o l i t i c a l party members or sympathizers. The PKI was most successful on a large scale in the Jackson also c a l l s the bapak-anak buah r e l a t i o n ship " t r a d i t i o n a l authority" and not a patron-client r e l a t i o n s h i p. He s t a t e s that in Indonesia the bapak usually does not have material control over the resources t h a t are important to a c l i e n t. The bapak-anak buah pattern, in my opinion, i s a type of patron-client r e l a t i o n s h i p. Because of societal differences, the resource base of patronage i s lower on the continuum in Indonesia than in most other s o c i e t i e s commonly studied. However, the bapak-anak buah phenomenon s t i l l f i t s within the patron-client model. For a discussion of patron-client pyramids see Fowell, "Peasant Society," pp. 411-426; Schneider, "Friends of Friends," p. 17; Sandbrook, "Analysis in Africa," p. 110; and Steffen W. Schmidt, "The Transformation of Clientelism in Rural Colombia," paper presented at the 71st meeting of the American P o l i t i c a l Science Associat i o n, Chicago 28 August-2 September 1974), p. 2. === [PDF page 460] === 445 use of patron-client pyramids to gain members of the party and of its mass organizations. FKI identification by these villagers was in the main symbolic; they usually knew nothing about the ideology and did not give the party support at the time of its demise. The iNU party also used and continues to use this technique in gathering adherents but its membership was also gained through the relationship between a guru and his pupils, reinforced by santri village life when the pupils returned to their villages after attending pesantren. Factionalism Factionalism in Indonesian national politics, as in India, has its roots in the traditional political and social order. Factions exist at all levels of political, military, and institutional life, with alliances between factions and cliques in the different institutions and parties as the common pattern. My definition for a faction in the context of Indonesian national political life iss a more or less organized, continuous group within a party, the bureaucracy, or the military bound together by similar background experiences, a common set of values and goals, and expectations of personal and material gain. The 34 For a description of the traditional roots of factionalism in India, see Paul R. Brass, Factional Politics in an Indian Statet The Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh (Berkeley and Los Angelest University of California Press, 1965), pp. 233-234 and Myron Weiner, Party Building in a New Nationt The Indian National Congress (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 87. === [PDF page 461] === 446 behavioral patterns of Indonesian factions are influenced by the traditional patron-client models. A faction will form an alliance with another faction similar in background, values, and goals in another party or institution in order to increase its strength in a conflict with its rival faction within its own party or institution. Definitions of factions in anthropological and political science literature differ widely, mainly because the various definitions define the type of factionalism common 35 to the particular society under investigation. The differences in definitions of factionalism among scholars center around several areas of contention: 1) Is the basis for the formation of a faction ideological or purely instrumental? 2) To what extent is the leader the kingpin around which the faction revolves? and 3) To what extent must there be continuity before a group can be called a faction? Other than definitional arguments, scholars have disagreed as to beneficial characteristics of factions, i.e. to what extent can they be beneficial to the individual, the political party or other institution, and to the political system as a whole. 35 See J.A.A. Stockwin, "A Comparison of Political Factionalism in Japan and India," Australian Journal of Politics and History 16 (December 1970): 362. Frank P. Belloni and Dennis C. Beller, "The Study of Political Party Factions," International Review of History and Political Science 10 (May 1973)i 71. === [PDF page 462] === 447 Richard Rose and Joseph Nyomarkay, in their respective studies of Great Britain and Nazi Germany, emphasized that the raison d'etre of a faction is to advance a par37 ticular goal or ideology. Others, such as F.G. Bailey, Norman K. Nicholson, and Richard Sandbrook stress the instrumental nature of factional ties, and do not. see fac38 tions acting in terms of ideological or policy ends. For example, Nicholson defines factions as... amorphous segments... operating within a cultural context which places a high value on diffuse and unrestrained political power and led by an elite whose orientations are self-centered and instrumental. 39 Closer to the Indonesian faction would be Raphael Zariski's statement that the goals of a party faction... may include any, several, or all of the following: patronage... the fulfillment of local, regional, or group interests, influence on party strategy, influence on party and governmental policy, and the promotion of a discrete set of values to which members of the faction subscribe.40 Indonesian factions can be compared to each other as to the extent of commitment to ideological goals. The reformist 37 Richard Rose, "Parties, Factions and Tendencies in Britain," Political Studies 12 (February 1964)t 37 and Joseph Nyomarkay, Charisma and Factionalism in the Nazi Party (Minneapolis! University of Minnesota Press, 1967), p. 35. 38 Bailey, Strategems and Spoils, p. 52; Norman K. Nicholson, "The Factional Model and the Study of Politics," Comparative Political Studies 5 (October 1972): 292; and Sandbrook, "Analysis in Africa," p. 115. 39 Nicholson, "Factional Model," p. 292. "Party Factions and Comparative Politics: Some Preliminary Observations," Midwest Journal of Political Science 4 (February 1960)t 33. === [PDF page 463] === 448 faction of the Parmusi would rank high in its commitment to ideological goals, while its rivals, the accoramodationists would rank low; the main interests of the accommodationists is patronage. Indonesian factions, although instrumental to greater or lesser extent depending upon the particular faction, appear to be less instrumental than those described in the Philippines, Sarawak and Sabah. In the Philippines for example, the goals of factions are particularistic, and they seem to be only based on familyand self-interest; in Sabah and Sarawak there appears to be emphasis mainly upon instrumental goals, with a very high incidence of party switching by leaders and followers. In Taiwan, too, instrumental factors always are 42 more important than ideological ones. In Indonesia, background characteristics are strongly related to ideological beliefs and adherence to a particular value system, and therefore rival ideological factions usually differ also in terms of background variables, such as ethnic and social origin and educational experience. This appears to be similar to characteristics of Israeli factions, where ethnic background, time of immigration, and organizational 41 See Carl H. Lande, Leaders. Factions and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics, Yale University Southeast Asia Studies Monograph Series no. 6 (New Haveni Yale University, 1965)j Lande and Curry, "Local Level Factionalism!" and R.S. Milne, "Patrons, Clients and Ethnicityi The Case of Sarawak and Sabah in Malaysia," Asian Survey 13 (October 1973)t 891-907. See Bernard Gallin, "Political Factionalism and Its Impact on Chinese Village School Organization in Taiwan," === [PDF page 464] === 449 identification influence the ideological faction a person 43 joins. Investigation of factions of the Japan Socialist Party indicated the strong influence of pre-party organizational membership.44 Marion Levy emphasized the importance of school ties in the formation of cliques and factions, and gave the examples of Japan, primarily, but also the 45 United States. In PNI factions, especially, the place and time of schooling influenced factional formation. Most scholars stress the importance of the leaderfollower relationship in tying a faction together, although there are widespread differences in the extent of the leader's influence shown in various studies. Sandbrook and Bailey, for example, maintained that the leader recruited the followers, and both stressed the transactional nature of the relationship, although both also stated that the core of a faction may be bound by moral ties. Rose, however, while recognizing the influence of leadership, in Local-Level Politicst Social and Cultural Perspectives, ed. Marc J. Swartz (Chicago: Aldine, 1968), p. 397. Scott D. Johnston, "A Comparative Study of IntraParty Factionalism in Israel and Japan," Western Political Quarterly 20 (June 1967), p. 292. 44 George 0. Totten and Tamio Kawakami, "The Functions of Factionalism in Japanese Politics*" Pacific Affairs 2 Structure of Societies, pp. 631-632. Sandbrook, "Analysis in Africa," p. 11 and Bailey, Strategems and Spoils, p. 52. === [PDF page 465] === 450 maintained that ideology binds the faction together, not the leaders.47 In Indonesian factions the relationship between the leader and his followers is very important. As is the ovabun-kobun (father-like, child-like) relationship between a Japanese factional leader and his followers,48 the relationship between an Indonesian factional leader and his followers is a personal and affective relationship; but because of the complex nature of Indonesian society, a person is attracted to a faction not only because of the personality of its leader or the chance that the leader could improve a follower's status and material life, but also because the leader and follower share a common set of values. Given the choice of joining several factions, which conform to a person's set of values, the potential faction member would probably choose the faction in which he has shared certain experiences with factional members, and which was also headed by a leader who attracted him and could help him. As in Thailand, membership in a faction in Indonesia is heavily influenced by personal ties to the leader and the other factional members.49 Kinship connections, including marriage ties, also influenced Rose, "Tendencies in Britain," p. 39. 48 See Chie Nakane, Japanese Society (London: Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1970), p. 42 and Haruhiro Fukui, "Factionalism in a Dominant Party System: The Case of Japan," paper presented at the 71st meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 29 August-2 September 1974, p. 2. ^Riggs, Thailand, p. 213. === [PDF page 466] === 451 factional composition and the cementing of factional ties, although in Indonesian factions kinship ties are less prevalent than in the Philippines. As in Japan, the core of an Indonesian faction is usually loyal to its leader, but if the leader does not assume... diffuse and far-reaching responsibilities for their /followers? protection and welfare and /does not7 take full account of their wishes whenever these are strongly felt.... it is thought proper that his followers should switch loyalties quickly.-^2 The core of an Indonesian faction does appear to be more loyal to its bapak in times of political adversity, particularly in the case of an ideological faction, than in Greece where, apparently, both the core and the periphery 53 vanish. Most of the literature speaks of factions possessing only one leader, such as in India, where there can only be one leader of a faction. 54 In Indonesia, however, it is not uncommon for a faction to have two or three leaders, but a member will feel more loyalty toward one leader than toward the others. Among factional leaders in Indonesia there seems to be less jealousy than is the case for their counterparts in India,55 and through the Lande and Curry, "Local Level Factionalism," p. 7. Johnston, "Israel and Japan," pp. 291-292. 52 Feith, Democracy in Indonesia, p. 127. 53 Keith R. Legg, Politics in Modern Greece (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1969), p. 137. 54 55 B r a s s, lit t a r Pradesh, p. 55. I b i d., p. 55. === [PDF page 467] === 452 values of cooperation stressed in the culture it appears easier for a faction to exist with two or three leaders than is the case of most other countries. In addition, many of the faction leaders and members had prior experiences together, often as members of a study club or as students in the same faculty; their relationships with each other have been on a more or less equal basis. Decisionmaking in the Indonesian faction is conducted through a method of consensus, in contrast with Italian factions where the followers do not participate in decision-making. Reasons explaining the use of consensus in the making of decisions within the Indonesian faction are primarily two: 1) the traditional system of decision-making (mus iawarah-mufakat). which entails consensus arising out of joint discussion; and 2) Indonesian factions are usually made up of clientage networks, which means that the leader of a faction does not necessarily have the unqualified support of all factional members, and that each factional member has his own core of supporters behind him. The non-coercive nature of the traditional patron-client relationship in Indonesia has already been discussed, and is related to the traditional system of authority in the society, described by Ann Ruth Willner as "non-authoritarian paternalism." Zuckerman, "Coalitions in Italy," 57 "Indonesia," p. 271. === [PDF page 468] === 453 Scholars have also hypothesized about the permanence/ impermanence of factions, both in terms of whether or not factionalism per se is a stage in the political development of a society and whether or not a faction has to have a certain minimum life span before it can be classified as a faction. Samuel Huntington considers factionalism to be 58 the first stage of political development, and that political "takeoff" cannot occur until the factions polarize into two groupings.59 Whether or not a political system remains factionalized, in my opinion, depends more upon the political culture of that system than upon the level of political development. Japan, for example, is highly factionalized and is a developed country economically and politically. The factions themselves are highly institutionalized; the Liberal Democratic Party factions, for example, have their own offices, publications, and fairly sophisticated organizations of their own. nesia Once Indois politically developed, its factional patterns will probably change, but in the direction of greater institutionalization, as in Japan, rather than the ending of factions and their polarization into two parties. Concerning the necessary life span of a group before it can 58 Changing Societies, p. 412. 59 Ibid., p. 415. Stockwin, "Japan and India," p. 363 and Michael Leiserson, "Factions and Coalitions in One-Party Japan« An Interpretation Based on the Theory of Games," American Political Science Review 62 (September 1968)i 771. === [PDF page 469] === 454 be considered a faction, some scholars, such as V.O. Key, do not have criteria for the length of existence of a group in order for it to be considered a faction} but others, such as Nyomarkay, Rose and Zariski, insist that in order to be defined as a faction a group has to have been in existence for a certain minimum period. Indonesian factions do show a certain continuity through time, in their representation of sets of values and also to some extent in factional membership. A few of the political party factions can trace their origins to the 1920s and a few military factions to the Revolution, although the names of the factions may have changed, since the names are usually those of their current leaders. Lande and Curry mention that many factional rivalries in the Philippines go back to the 1890s during the first struggle for independence, and some factions in the Japan Socialist Party, according to other scholars, go back to the 1920s. To what extent are factions in Indonesia beneficial? Belloni and Beller have suggested three points of reference to be considered in examining the extent to which a faction is beneficial* 1) in relation to the Southern Politics in State and Nation (New Yorkt Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), p. 10. Nyomarkay, Nazi Party, p. 35; Rose, "Tendencies in Britain," p. 37i and Zariski, "Party Factions," p. 34. "Local Level Factionalism," p. 3. Stockwin, "Japan and India," p. 363 and Totten and Kawakami, "Japanese Politics," p. 116. === [PDF page 470] === 455 individual; 2) in relation to the party or institution; and 3) in relation to the political system as a whole. For the Indonesian, factional membership can be quite satisfying, by providing emotional and often material security, and also by increasing the opportunities for political and social participation in the political system. Similarly, factionalism in Japan, India and Thailand provides benefits for the leaders and followers. In the case of Indonesia, factionalism has had beneficial and harmful effects. It has been beneficial, in that it provided for a wide articulation of interests, and the existence of factions with different ideological beliefs within parties enabled those parties to survive in the ideological shifts of the political system. Thus the existence of a left-wing faction helped the PJNI to retain its influence during the latter part of Guided Democracy, and its rival, the right-wing faction, was allowed to reconstitute the party after the abortive coup in 1965. Other scholars have noted the relationship between the maintenance of internal party democracy and factionalism. Factionalism has been harmful for political parties in Indonesia in that the lack, of party loyalty weakened parties in their dealings with other parties; this helped pave the way for a 65,1 Political Party Factions," p. 71. See Nakane, Japanese Society; Brass, Uttar Pradeshi and Riggs, Thailand. 67 p. 72. See Belloni and Beller, "Political Party Factions," === [PDF page 471] === 456 government dominated by the military. During Parliamentary Democracy party cabinets often fell because of the active opposition of a rival faction within the same party; the rival faction sought alliances with factions of rival political parties and the military in order to win its struggle against its rival faction. To what extent has factionalism been beneficial to a political system? The major variable seems to be whether or not the political system is a competitve or fairly noncompetitive one. Scholars hypothesizing the benefits of factionalism in terms of the political system as a whole have mainly investigated one-party systems( and discovered that factionalism contributed to increasing participation within the system and insuring that various alternatives would be aired. In the case of Indonesia, those who value a political system dominated by the political parties probably would see factionalism within political parties as harmful and military factionalism as beneficial. Factionalism in the political parties weakened them in struggles not only with each other, but, more importantly, with the military. Military factionalism in the early years of Indonesia's independence hampered the military from exerting as much political influence as segments of it desired, and in the beginning of the New Order prevented it from instituting a tightly controlled military regime. 68 Ibid., pp. 72-73. === [PDF page 472] === 457 In an earlier work on military factionalism my conclusion was that ... it is actually somewhat beneficial for the society as a whole if the military remains factionalized. In that case the main groups in society will feel that they have their "representatives" within the ruling group. Also, as long as the military remains factionalized it will be necessary for the ruling military group to coopt some civilians and civilian groups, and therefore the military will be somewhat responsive to the demands of the civilians.^9 In chapter 6 it will be shown that the weakening of factionalism within the military in the early 1970s aided in enabling the government to institute tighter controls on the society than heretofore experienced, and had a deleterious effect on the maintenance of close militarycivilian ties. Factionalism in the Military The Bases for Factionalism Introduction Factions within the army have been based upon one, or more commonly, upon a combination of the following factors: 1) divisional orientation; 2) ethnic, social status, and educational background; 3) time and type of military training; 4) personal and familial loyalties; and 5) religious and/or political ideology. The number of factors that individuals share in common usually "Factionalism in the Indonesian Army: The New Order," Journal of Comparative Administration 2 (November 1970): 352. === [PDF page 473] === 458 determines whether or not they belong to the core or the periphery of a faction. Given that an individual meets the basic requirements for several factions, he often bases his choice upon which one will be most useful to him in advancing his career, although strong personal loyalties can transcend ambition. The above factors influencing composition of factions will be illustrated in the following two sections concerning the history of military factions and the factional alignment of the present period. First, the factors will be separated and discussed briefly. Divisional Identification The Indonesian army is basically a territorial army; the territorial divisions of the army are a microcosm of the region in which they are located. The exception to this general rule is the Siliwangi division of West Java into which members of ethnic groups not native to the area are also recruited. In examining the historical evolution of factions in the Indonesian army, it will be seen that the most important variable in faction formation has been that of divisional identification, and that the boundaries between the major factions have been more or less coterminous with divisional lines, although there has been some overlap. The influence of divisional identification in faction formation is increased by the nature of regionalism and === [PDF page 474] === 459 ethnicity in modern Indonesia. Regionalism and ethnicity have been important limiting barriers to the ability of the central government to effect policies? gradually, the central government has increased its control over the regions, but even after the reorganization of the armed forces in 1970 the regional military elite still have some power to limit the government's effectiveness in the regions. From the middle 1950s, after the imposition of martial law, regional military authorities have served as the de facto governments of their areas, with the cooperation of the regional bureaucratic elites. Largely due to the congruence, by and large, of divisional identification on the one hand and regional and ethnic origin on the other, divisional loyalties are strong, and remain with a person long after he is transferred from the divisional area. For example, the members of the divisional staffs in the Outer Islands, when asked for their divisional identification, always state their original, and for them, their primary, divisional membership, such as the Siliwangi or Diponegoro, not the divisions where they are presently posted. The divisions have organized associations, sometimes called Keluarga Besar (Great Family) or Baden Pembina Corps (Body of the Officer Corps), composed of active, non-active, and retired officers from those divisions. The groups are used to maintain group identity, to serve as bodies ratifying divisional policies, and as instruments in communicating the wishes of the divisions === [PDF page 475] === 460 to the government or to a national leader. An example of the latter would be when the Brawijaya division used its Keluaraa Besar in its attempt to convince Sukarno to resign as president. Of the Java divisions, the Siliwangi Baden Pembina Corps has been the most active, not only in politics, but also in economic enterprise. The Bukit Barisan division of North Sumatra and the Sriwijaya division of South Sumatra have formed their own Baden Pembina Corps: these two divisions also include in their Baden Pembina Corps those from the Java divisions who have served in the two divisions. This gives the opportunity for crossdivisional alliances to be formed. The main divisional actors on the national political scene have been the Siliwangi and the Diponegoro divisions, but the Brawijaya (East Java) division has at times played an important pivotal role. Leaders of other divisions have tended to align themselves with one of the main factions. Each division has its own factional breakdown, but the discussion will be limited to the major national factions. Since divisional identification has been the major determinant concerning factional alignment, the rest of the discussion concerning the bases of factionalism will focus upon the differences among the members of the national political elite from the Diponegoro and Siliwangi divisions, === [PDF page 476] === 461 with occasional references to the elite members originating from the Brawijaya division. Ei-hnic Origins Leaders of the Diponegoro and Brawijaya divisions are recruited from the ethnic group(s) of the areas where the divisions are based. The Diponegoro division is quite homogeneous, containing only members of the Javanese ethnic group, whereas the Brawijaya division contains both Javanese from East Java and Madurese from Madura or East Java. Internal cliques and factions within the three Java divisions have sometimes been formed along intra-regional lines, or in the case of the Brawijaya, along ethnic lines; for example, in West Java there used to be definite and Cirebon Banten- groups, and a Kedu group in the Diponegoro division, while within the Brawijaya division factions have sometimes been formed along Javanese and Madurese lines. 72 Twenty-two members of the national political elite in the New Order are from the Diponegoro division, twentyone from the Siliwangi division, and four from the Brawijaya division. In the Guided Democracy political elite there were ten members from the Diponegoro division, twelve from the Siliwangi, and three from the Brawijaya division. During the Revolution there were brigades and battalions composed of East Indonesians within the Brawijaya division. After the Revolution, however, these East Indonesians were transferred to their respective ethnic areas in East Indonesia where they established divisions. Their primary divisional identification is for the division from their own ethnic area. I am indebted to Benedict R. O'G. Anderson for his observations of the importance of intra-regional loyalties in influencing the formation of factions within the Java divisions. === [PDF page 477] === 462 The divisions in the Outer Islands, as in the case of the Diponegoro and Brawijaya divisions, are recruited, in general, from the ethnic groups of the particular regions. It is true that many of the top regional staff members and most of the regional commanders in the Outer Islands since the early 1960s are not from those areas; in these cases they are members of the Java divisions who have been transferred to the Outer Island divisions, usually for the purpose of the maintenance of central control, especially over those areas that participated in the regional rebellions 73 of the late 1950s. But their primary identification is not to the Outer Island divisions where they are temporarily transferred but to the particular division of which they are members and to which they evidence loyalty. Within the Outer Island divisions, ethnic identity influences factional cornposition and behavior, especially in those areas that encompass a number of rival ethnic groups, such as North Sumatra.74 The Sriwijaya division is unusual in that one of its leaders is Javanese, although it can be argued that the division is not an exception since large communities of Javanese have migrated to South Sumatra. This particular man spent years in South Sumatra, married into the local elite, and, in general, has become more "South Sumatran" in many ways than "Javanese." John Smail conducted an interesting study dealing with the effect of ethnic loyalties upon the Bukit Barisan division during the regional movement against the central government in 1956. The central government was able to use the ethnic rivalries in their successful attempt to defeat the regional movement ("The Military Politics of North Sumatra: December 1956-October 1957," Indonesia 6 /October 19687* 128-187). === [PDF page 478] === 463 One of the outstanding differences between the two major divisions, the Diponegoro and the Siliwangi, is the extent of ethnic diversity, with the former ethnically homogeneous and the latter ethnically heterogeneous. The members of the elite from the Diponegoro are all Javanese, whereas in the Siliwangi there is representation among the elite members of Javanese, Sundanese, and those from the Outer Islands. This is shown in table 6 8. TABLE 68 ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION OF ELITE MEMBERS FROM SILIWANGI AND DIPONEGORO DIVISIONS Guided Democracy Sili. Dipo. Ethnic Group Javanese Sundanese Outer Islands Total 12 10 10 New Order Sili. Dipo. 21 22 22 NOTE: For Guided Democracy Lambda=.33; for the New Order Lambda=.38. In some individual instances ethnic identification was a stronger determinant in predicting factional allegiances and the propensity to switch factions than divisional membership. In analyzing the factional alignment historically and for the New Order, it was observed that, for example, most of those Siliwangi leaders who joined a faction dominated by members of the Diponegoro division were Javanese. === [PDF page 479] === 464 Social Status Social status, in its relationship to political and religious ideologies, was of most influence in the formation of factions earlier in the history of the army. The challengers to the dominant groups in the army in Java have often been santri and radical elements; the santri contenders were largely from non-privavi status groups, especially from merchant and kivavi families, and it has been hypothesized that a large number of the radical military leaders came from lower status groups. These challenges have often resulted in rebellions, such as the Kadiun revolt, the Darul Islam, and the attempted coup in 1965. The top army leadership, however, has been dominated by those from upper status groups. The background of the Javan elite members from the Diponegoro and Siliwangi divisions is upper status} this was true both of the Guided Democracy and i\ew Order elites. However, there are: closer relationships between the Diponegoro elite members and the kraton than is true of the Siliwangi elite, even those of Javanese ethnic origin. Some members from the Diponegoro division are connected through kinship, through either parent's family or often through both parents* families, to one or more of the kraton in Central Java. Kraton connections are more important in the case of the Diponegoro division, for those Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, personal letter. === [PDF page 480] === 465 members usually lived in close proximity to the kraton. had frequent interactions with their kinspeople and with the nobility to whom they were related, and were influenced by the traditional Javanese culture and values. The Javanese members of the Siliwangi division, many of whom born in West Java, were divorced from the kraton culture, and it had less influence upon their way of thinking. Educational Background The Siliwangi and Diponegoro members shared a Western-style education, but in comparing the two divisions it was found that the Siliwangi leaders received a more elite education. Siliwangi leaders were more prone, for example, to attend the ELS and the HBS. More of the Siliwangi leaders attended universities and colleges than did the Diponegoro elite members; the level of education reached was also higher for those from the Siliwangi division.77 The few Diponegoro leaders who had some university education attended classes only sporadically in the post78 independence period when they were on active duty. The strength of the relationship between divisional membership and attendance at elite and non-elite elementary, middle, and high schools may be rendered, using the Goodman and Kruskal Gamma: for elementary school Gamma=.86, for middle school,.80, and for high school,.50. 77 The strength of the relationship between divisional membership aid extent of education was computed (Gamma=.40). 78 They usually attended universities with low educational standards, and not the national universities. === [PDF page 481] === 466 Educational differences tended to acerbate divisional rivalries, especially in regard to conflicts over promotion and military training. Those who had a high level of education would emphasize the importance of such education in determining promotion.79 Education had an impact upon a military leader's political philosophy, and, for example, many Siliwangi leaders were attracted to the PSI, the "intellectuals'" party par excellence. Time of Military Training The diverse military experience of members of the army has had an influence upon factional alignment. The major cleavages seemed to be between those who were in the Dutch military, especially if they had attended the KMA, and those who were trained by the Japanese. This is reflected in the divisional leadership composition. Those who had studied at the KMA tended to join the Siliwangi division; it is true that there were many PETA recruits in the officer ranks of the Siliwangi, but they were largely influenced by the "elders" of the division, that is, by those from the KMA. The Diponegoro, and also the Brawijaya, divisions, in contrast, have been dominated by those who 80 served first during the Japanese period. 79 See McVey» "Indonesian Army," pp. 154-156 for a discussion of the conflicts over promotions. 80 Twelve of the New Order Diponegoro elite members were in PETA, compared to five of the Siliwangi leaders; all four of the Brawijaya leaders were in PETA. === [PDF page 482] === 467 A third type of military experience which influenced factional alignments was service in student armies and laskar. It was difficult to integrate the laskar into the divisions; often intermittent civil strife was the dominant pattern of interaction during the Revolution. Factions within divisions, especially of the Diponegoro and Brawijaya divisions, have been based upon past laskar identifications. Past membership in a student army does not appear relevant for Siliwangi intra-divisional factions, but for the Diponegoro division, and to a lesser extent, the Brawijaya division, past student army membership influences factional alignment within the divisions. the 1950s some of the student armies formed their own organizations, usually for self-help, but, in one case, the TRIP, under Major General Mas Isman, formed an organization called Koperasi Simpan Pindiam Gotong, Roiong; ( K O S G O K O ), Mutual Cooperation Saving and Lending Cooperative, which expanded into an influential mass organization. The KOSGORO will be discussed in chapter 6. Post-revolutionary military training schools have also served as building blocks for factions, such as the SSKAD association formed in 1952, the military academy group, and the infantry training group. most influential in the 1950s. These groups were Later, SESKOAD attendance sometimes influenced membership in factions, especially among those who had studied during the same year. === [PDF page 483] === 468 Personal and Familial Loyalties It is not uncommon for those belonging to the same faction to be connected with each other through kinship and other personal ties, such as school ties or common revolutionary experiences. For example, most of the members of Soeharto's faction had either gone to school with each other, were related to each other, or knew each other from the days of the Revolution. Of course this does not mean that friendship and therefore alignments are determined by school or kinship ties. Personal interaction can influence both feelings of friendship and feelings of enmity. These feelings, whether negative or positive, are often accentuated by the frequent interaction of the Indonesian elite, due to its smallness. Since education was limited during the Dutch period it was common for members of the elite, especially if they lived in the same geographical area, to share school experiences. This is especially the case if they have attended schools in one of the major cities, such as Bandung, Jakarta, Surakarta, Jogjakarta, and Surabaya. One elite member could name twenty-four elite members from the Guided Democracy and New Order periods, who, at various times, were his classmates; they included military leaders, political party leaders (from the PKI to Islamic party leaders), etc. It is not uncommon for members of a family to belong to different political parties, even ranging from a radical leftist party to a conservative === [PDF page 484] === 469 Islamic party. Personal and kinship ties are also important in distinguishing the core of a faction from the periphery. Religious and/or Political Ideology Ideological and religious differences also influence factional alignments. The extent of Islamic identification, especially for the Javanese, can influence factional alignments. As was discussed, Islam had a varied influence among the Javanese, and often, the extent to which a person is Islamic is influenced by his social background. The military elite is largely recruited from those of privavi origin, and the privavi philosophy and religion were influenced by Hinduism and Buddhism, and, to a lesser extent, by animistic elements and Islam. The members of the military elite who are santri (a small proportion) usually have close relations with members of the civilian elite from Islamic political parties and groups, and some of these military leaders were active in the establishment of Islamic groups and have remained in these groups as "advisers." With issues concerning Islam, it is common for the santri military leaders to align themselves with the various civilian groups. Those from an abanaan background, the majority, are usually rather suspicious and distrustful of the santri, especially those active in Islamic organizations. Several santri generals remarked that they often found their religious orientation to be a === [PDF page 485] === 470 handicap in their military careers. During the i\ew Order most of the noted santri generals were either retired or given positions with no power. Those who are abangan, and who are politically oriented, have been influenced by the various secular parties, ranging from the former PSI, various factions of the PNI, to radical leftist parties, such as the PKI. Those of priyayi background usually felt more at home with the PSI and PNI, and those from lower status background with the PKI, or if they were santri. with an Islamic party. The Diponegoro division historically was influenced by the PNI and the PKI, the Siliwangi division by the PSI, the Masjumi, and IPKI. The Brawijaya was similar to the Diponegoro, with the exception that santri officers have been better represented. One reason for the higher proportion of santri officers in the Brawijaya division, compared with the Diponegoro and Siliwangi divisions, was the lack of Islamic insurgency in East Java compared to 81 Central and West Java, "therefore the Brawijaya santri officers were not forced to choose between loyalty to their faith and loyalty to the army. It was characteristic for military factions to align themselves with civilian factions possessing similar outlooks, especially during times of debates concerning policy, either in the military or in the civilian sphere. 81 McVey, "Transformation," p. 139, n. 12. === [PDF page 486] === 471 There is another dimension which should be mentioned, that is, the extent to which particular factions may be more "modern"- or more "tradition"-oriented. In Indo82 nesia "modernization" has become the new ideology. There is no common ideology in the New Order, other than the nebulous "modernization," which most factions, both military and civilian, could agree upon, so the cencept of modernization has come to fill a void and to give the sys81 tem some symbolic semblance of harmony and order. there any difference between the divisions in the extent to which the members are more influenced by the traditional cultures or the "emerging" modern culture? One can see at least surface differences between the Siliwangi and Diponegoro leaders. The average Siliwangi leader early in his life was exposed to different cultures, both Western and cultures of many ethnic groups.84 He went to school, sometimes to a college or university, in an area (West Java) where there was a mixture of nationalities and ethnic groupsj and therefore of cultures. The recruitment pattern of the division has been "Indonesian" as distinct from the exclusively Javanese recruitment pattern of the Diponegoro and the Javanese and Madurese pattern of the Brawijaya. Htfillner, "Indonesia," p. 288; see also pp. 289-306. 83 Ibid., p. 290. 84 Most Siliwangi leaders in their youth lived in ethnic areas other than their area of origin. === [PDF page 487] === 472 Most Siliwangi leaders interviewed appeared eager for change and experimentation? their feelings seemed to be» "Let's try a new system? it may not work, but it does not hurt to try, and after all, it may work." Those from the Diponegoro division grew up in Central Java; they lived mostly in homogeneous communities where even the "aliens" (mostly Chinese) had become rather Javanese and many Chinese were known for their'interest in the Javanese culture and patronage of Javanese arts. Central Java there were few Westerners or those from other ethnic groups. These leaders usually did not leave the area until they were already mature, and therefore, less prone to be influenced by different ways. The Diponegoro leaders, as contrasted with those from the Siliwangi division, seemed less anxious to change the political and social structure. They also felt that it was "dangerous" to attempt change and that, if change were attempted quickly, the harmony and order of the system would be disturbed. In this regard two military leaders, with whom long discussions were held can be contrasted. One, the Siliwangi general, enjoyed talking about his theories of moderni zation, and how traditional attitudes and ways of behavior can be changed. He had wide knowledge and understanding of Western social science literature. He was very impatient at the slowness of change, and at what he considered to be "irrational" ways of thinking and behaving. The second, a Diponegoro general, talked at great length === [PDF page 488] === 473 about mysticism, the wavang. the heroes of Javanese myth and history. Before he would make a decision he would go back to the stories of the wavang and then spent some time in meditation. He occasionally went to the top of a holy mountain, stayed there some days and meditated. In his discussions his identification with the traditional Javanese values, as opposed to what are considered more "modern" values, could be sensed. Bases of Factionalism in the Other Military Services In comparing the bases of factionalism in the navy, air force and police with those of the army, several differences can be seen. It is in the center that factionalism plays an important role in the intra-politics of the navy, air force and police. Looking at the history of the air force and navy it is seen that their factions have been formed around a nucleus of officers who had similar training experiences and age identification. Democracy During Guided ideological splits developed within these two services, especially between those who favored a partnership with the PKI and those who were opposed to cooperation with the PKI. It should be mentioned that many who were considered pro-PKI in the navy and air force at that time were choosing the PKI for tactical, anti-army considerations, as a way of strengthening their service vis-a-vis the army. The main arena of factional politics in the navy, police and air force are the central headquarters, and the === [PDF page 489] === 474 competition is mainly over position, material and influence within the service. It is common for their leaders to seek support outside their service, during the early years from political party leaders and their factions, and from Guided Democracy to the present from army leaders. Factions revolve more around the commander of the services than is true of the army factions; for example, almost all factions in the three services were formed around commanders and their opponents within these services. A brief historical description of the factions from the air force, navy, and police will be given after the discussion of the evolution of army factions. Historical Background of Factionalism Introduction In the following discussion it will be seen that the issues around which factions have formed are issues both internal and external to the military. Internally, the army leadership has been plagued by the problem of promotions of its officers, since most officers have been from the same general age group and entered the army at the same period. A related issue has been that of "professionalization," i.e. "rationalization" of the army by retiring those with little military training. Attempts by the government and/or the army leadership to "rationalize" the army historically led to factional disputes; those in favor of "rationalization" most often were those with advanced === [PDF page 490] === 475 military training, a high level of general education, and usually came from the Siliwangi division, where the officers were more educated..and better trained. Other internal issues, sometimes related to the above, concerned military training, the problem of finance, and centralization. Factional alignments have also been influenced by political parties and movements, especially during the Revolution and Guided Democracy, but also to a lesser degree during other periods, except in crises such as the 17 October 1952 affair, discussed below. Throughout the political periods, military leaders and other officers commonly maintained close ties with political party factions; often military and civilian factions would support each other on particular issues, irrespective of whether the issues were external or internal to the army. The various factional disputes described below share certain elements in common! 1) the major actors are Diponegoro and Siliwangi leaders, and each faction recruited more of its members from one division than from the other; 2) all disputes involve, to a greater or lesser extent, the issue of centralization vs. decentralization; and 3) all military factions are aligned with civilian factions. The major effect of these factional disputes was that the officer corps gradually became more homogeneous; many lower strata, santri. radical, and Outer Island officers were retired from the military. The links between the parties and army gradually changed, from the Revolution === [PDF page 491] === 476 when the army factions revolved around the political party factions to the late Guided Democracy and New Order periods when political party factions were influenced.by the army. Revolution To understand f a c t i o n a l r i v a l r i e s one must go back t o the time of the Revolution, from 1945 through 1949. discussed in c h a p t e r 3, a l l over Java and Sumatra l o c a l armies spontaneously sprang up, formed by v a r i o u s groups such ast ex-KMA cadets and ex-KNIL o f f i c e r s? former FETA, Givugun. and Heiho o f f i c e r s, ex-members of t h e Senindan; a c t i v i s t s i n various p o l i t i c a l and r e l i g i o u s groups; and students. In o r d e r t o f i g h t e f f e c t i v e l y a g a i n s t the Dutch t h e many, and often a n t a g o n i s t i c groups had t o be u n i f i e d or a t l e a s t coordinated so t h a t t h e i r energy would be spent more i n f i g h t i n g t h e Dutch than each o t h e r. The v a r i o u s s t e p s taken by t h e army l e a d e r s h i p have been d i s cussed, measures t o organize the c e n t r a l s t a f f, and attempts t o c r e a t e d i v i s i o n s and t h e r e b y c o n s o l i d a t e the v a r i o u s groups i n one t e r r i t o r y in one m i l i t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n, such as t h e d i v i s i o n. Of t h e p r e s e n t d i v i s i o n s t h e f i r s t two d i v i s i o n s formed were the Diponegoro and Siliwangi d i v i s i o n s; the Brawijaya d i v i s i o n was formed toward the end of the Revolution. The nucleus of t h e S i l i w a n g i l e a d e r s h i p was e x - cadets from t h e KMA, and under them were members of t h e West Java s t u d e n t armies, most of whom had a l r e a d y had === [PDF page 492] === 477 contact with the ex-cadets during the Japanese occupation and the early part of the Revolution. There were ex-PETA officers in the Siliwangi, but a large proportion of these had been students in Bandung during the last year or two before the Japanese occupation, and maintained their connections with the student world. It was more difficult to form the Diponegoro division than it was the Siliwangi division. There are several factors which help to explain the relative ease of the Siliwangi division in forming and consolidating itself in comparison with the Diponegoro division: 1) most of the founders of the Siliwangi division had been students together in Bandung and knew each other well; 2) the armed groups that formed the Diponegoro were hampered in coming together, since they had local backing and were recruited from those native to the area; on the other hand, the Siliwangi were from various ethnic areas and would have found it difficult to gain support from the local population in potential conflicts with rival groups, therefore they had more need to band together for survival; 3) the shortage of arms in West Java, compared to Central Java; and 4) the experience of the Siliwangi division in Central Java during part of the Revolution, and the nature of their return to West Java. Concerning the latter, according to the Renville 85 The religious guerrilla groups, recruited from the local population, were a persistent problem in West Java from the end of 1948 until 1961, but that did not greatly affect" unity within the Siliwangi division. === [PDF page 493] === 478 Agreement the Siliwangi troops had to withdraw from West Java, which was held by the Dutch, in early 1948 and move to parts of Java under Republican control, which was most of Central Java and part of East Java. from West Java for almost a year. They stayed away The experiences the Siliwangi troops had in Central and East Java, ethnic areas alien to most of them, the considerable conflict between the Siliwangi and Diponegoro, laskar, and later Brawijaya units, served as a unifying influence upon the division. This was capped by the Long March, a long and difficult journey by foot back to west Java by the Siliwangi troops soon after they were instrumental in the crushing of the Madiun rebellion, to be discussed below. The Dutch attacked the. Republic in December 1948, and following that the Siliwangi troops started marching back to West Java, fighting bitterly not only against the Dutch, but against the Darul Islam, the Islamic guerrilla troops favoring the establishment of an Islamic state. The events of the Long March further knitted the Siliwangi division together in an esprit de corps never matched by any other 86 division. During the Revolution the two major factional conflicts, both of which also represented conflicts between rival groups of military and civilian factions, resulted from the founding of the Persatuan Periuangan in For a spirited account of the Long March see Siiwangi Division, Sedjarah Mil iter Kodam VI Siliwangi, Masa Kemasa. ch. 4. === [PDF page 494] === 479 December 1945? the conflicts culminated in the July 3rd Affair (1946), and the Kadiun Affair (September 1948). 0/ In order to understand the participation of part of the army in the July 3rd Affair, it is necessary to mention the bitter rivalry between General Sudirman, the army commander, and Amir Sjarifuddin SH, the defense minister and leader of the Savap Kiri (left wing) of the Partai Sosialis (PS), Socialist Party. According to Sjarifuddin the pemuda were the prototype of a revolutionary army, and he criticized the K M L and PET A as "creations empty of political conviction." In order to operationalize his concept of a revolutionary army, Sjarifuddin stressed the importance of the laskar as a "democratic alternative to 89 the army," and gave strong support to the Pesindo, including financial and military; he also created an educational staff in the defense ministry to give political indoctrination to the troops, using the Soviet army as his model, then filled the defense ministry with sympathetic officers from the army and the laskar. These tactics were threats to Sudirman's powers in addition, Sudirman considered the 87 For a detailed account and analysis of the July 3rd Affair see Anderson, Occupation and Resistance, ch. 16j for an anlysis of' the Madiun Affair see Kahin, Revolution in Indonesia, chapter 9; and Sumatri, Revolusi Bersendiata. chapter 5. 88 Anderson, Occupation and Resistance, p. 248. 89 Ibid., p. 250. === [PDF page 495] === 480 army more representative of the masses than were the urban politicians of the PS. The impetus for the founding of the Persatuan Perjuangan (PP) was provided by Tan Malakka; the PP attacked the Sjahrir government on its policy of negotiations with the Dutch and on the lack of social change promoted by the government. From the beginning, Sudirman was active in the PP; in fact, he was a member of the sub-committee formed to organize the PP. After the strategy of the government to wean groups away from the PP began to be successful, often through cabinet appointments, the government arrested the particular top PP leaders who lacked support of large groups and parties. The govern ment used Pesindo troops and the military police in the arrest of the leaders. The relations between Sjarifuddin and Sudirman plunged to a new low. Rumors were rife concerning the plans of Sjarifuddin to purge the army. In order to increase the number of army units loyal to the government, the cabinet created the Siliwangi division in May 1946 and authority over the Siliwangi was not given to General Sudirman. At the same time opposition civilian politicians were calling for the formation of a coalition cabinet due to their opposition to the cabinet's policy of negotiations with the Dutch. Sudarsono, a close associate of Sudirman and commander of the Third Division, which later became the nucleus for the Diponegoro division arrested the prime minister, Sjahrir; under pressure === [PDF page 496] === 481 Sjahrir was released, but General Sudirman refused orders to arrest Sudarsono. Subsequently Sudarsono, with the backing of Sudirman, evidently decided to pressure for the formation of a new cabinet, which would include the arrested PP leaders. Sudarsono was able to release the prisoners, then took them to Soeharto's (now president) regimental headquarters, and from there to Sukarno's residence, which was surrounded by Pesindo troops and police; the ploy failed and Sudarsono was arrested. Negotiations were then conducted among Sukarno, Sudirman, and the political party leaders, and it was agreed that no reprisals would be taken against the army high command, and also none taken against the political party leaders who were not directly involved. 90 The blame was placed on Tan Malakka, who was arrested and subsequently executed. The next crucial affair involving both military and civilian factions was that of Madiun in 1948. At that time Hatta was prime minister; his rise to power was influenced by the open split between Sjarifuddin and Sjahrir, which was instrumental in the fall of Sjarifuddin*s cabinet. Sjahrir's group left the PS and formed the PSI; the Sayap Kiri reorganized and formed together with other groups, such as the Pesindo, the Front Demokrasi Rakyat (FDR), the Feople's Democratic Front, and took over the Tan Malakka program, although the bitter enmity between Sjarifuddin's 90 Ibid., pp. 402-403. === [PDF page 497] === 482 group and that of Tan Malakka remained and they did not join together. At this time began what has perhaps been the most persistent conflict in the army, that between the Siliwangi and Diponegoro divisions. The first major manifestation of the conflict was the debate over the "rationalization" plan decided by Hatta in 1948. At that time the army, including the laskar. was 450,000 strong; according to Hatta's plan, the army would reduce its size, first to 160,000, then finally to 57,000. Demobilization began, and the demobilization was largely and selectively carried out against army troops partial to the FDR; consequently the FDR, relying for much of its strength upon its military allies, began to decline in power. The Fourth Division was one slated for demobilization, but its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Suadi, resisted demobilization. By then, the FDR had aligned with the PKI, and its leaders were on a speaking tour trying to gather support for a move against the government. During this time there had been constant armed conflict between the Fourth Division, on the one hand, and the Siliwangi and Barisan Banteng (a pro-Tan Malakka laskar) troops on the other; many of the officers from the Fourth Division had been kidnapped and killed, including the commander, Lieutenant Colonel Sutarto. Then some miles away in Madiun pro-PKI units revolted and took over the government buildings; the PKI leaders were caught unawares. The revolt was crushed === [PDF page 498] === 483 mainly by troops from the Siliwangi division.91 After the unsuccessful revolt at Madiun many of the laskar were disbanded and others were incorporated into the army; many members of the former laskar were demobilized after the Revolution, and few of the army leaders originate from a laskar. Another effect of Madiun was the wholesale arrest and d e m o b i l i z a t i o n of l e f t - w i n g s o l d i e r s and o f f i c e r s. 92 Parliamentary Democracy The post-revolutionary army not only differed from that of the Revolution in terms of the shearing off of the radical element, but also in the number of santri-oriented officers. Mention has already been made of the abangan bias of the officer corps. During the Revolution, after the Renville Agreement was signed, the Hizbullah refused to retreat to Republican-held territory from its positions in West Java; in 1949 a Hizbullah leader, S.M. Kartosuwirjo, proclaimed the Darul Islam Indonesia, the Islamic State of According to several army leaders from the Siliwangi and Diponegoro divisions, approximately one-third of the Diponegoro troops at that time sympathized with the Madiun revolt. 92 Major General Suadi maintained that before Madiun there was a military "affair" in the planning stages, one led by General Sudirman. His story could not be verified, and doubt has been cast upon it by a scholar of that period, but his account will be given here. According to Suadi, who at that time was the new commander of the Fourth Division, he received a note written by Sudirman via Soeharto to meet in Jombang, East Java in order to decide whether the army high command and troops supporting it should "separate from the central government" due to their opposition to the policy of "rationalization." The meeting lasted from September 15 to September 16, and the decision was made to === [PDF page 499] === 484 Indonesia, setting off a chain of religious revolts lasting thirteen years. At the beginning of the revolt some units and also some individual soldiers deserted to the Darul Islam; other santri officers and men left the army after the Revolution, often due to their distaste for fighting against their co-santri colleagues. Many santri youth were not attracted to a military career due to the continuing presence of Islamic revolts.93 Those who stayed in the army often found that their santri identification posed a barrier to promotions and good assignments. The officer corps at the beginning of Parliamentary Democracy, therefore, was far more homogeneous than its revolutionary counterpart. This was accentuated after the regional rebellion in the late 1950s, at which time many non-Javan military leaders who had participated in the rebellion were retired from the army. After the onset of Parliamentary Democracy factional strife continued unabated; it was acerbated by the death of General Sudirman. The other army leaders were of fairly separate from the government as a protest in order to convince the government to change its policies; Sudirman was to move on September 28 to East Java. The Madiun revolt, which began on September 18, if Suadi*s account is true, helped prevent Sudirman's planned action. According to Suadi, there were demands by the central government that he be executed, but he was protected by Sudirman and was his personal bodyguard throughout the guerrilla war. My thanks go to George Larson, who gave me the notes from the interview he conducted with Major General Suadi in Jakarta on 13 May 1969. 93 See McVey, "Transformation," p. 139. === [PDF page 500] === 485 equal stature and were around the same age j hence there was no universally acknowledged leader of the army. The factional struggles which will be discussed subsequently were interplays of similar themes. As in the national society as a whole, ethnic, religious, and social status rivalries plagued the officer corps, although, due to the gradual homogenization of the corps, these were less incense. Far more important in influencing factional strife were the fierce competition for promotion and prestigious positions, the issue of rationalization, and the related issue of centralization versus regionalism. Alliances were common between national military and civilian factions, which will be shown in the description of certain crises within the military. The interplay of these issues is seen in the first factional crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, the 17 October 1952 Affair.94 There were two major factions, the Nasution faction and the PETA faction!, Theftasutionfaction was dominant and it controlled the central headquarters of the army and armed forces, and in the brief period since the transfer of sovereignty had effected mass transfers of officers they considered "unreliable" and often retired these officers a short time after they were transferred. The Nasution faction wanted to professionalize and rationalize the army, making it into a "small, highly 94 For analyses and descriptions of the 17 October Affair see Feith, Democracy in Indonesia, pp. 246-273 and McVey, "Transformation," pp. 143-155. === [PDF page 501] === 486 equipped and mobile 'cadre army,*" 95 and in 1952 plans were made to retire 80,000 of the army's 200,000 men. 96 These plans also envisaged the growing centralization of decisionmaking in the army, which ultimately would result in the complete subordination of the powerful divisional commanders to the central army staff. The leader of the faction, Colonel iXasution, then army chief of staff, spent some months during 1952 devising plans for a military coup; he planned to utilize the Siliwangi division and favored decreasing parliament's power and instrumenting a type of partnership between Sukarno and himself. INasution was hampered by the disapproval of other important leaders in the faction, although he did have the backing of the younger Siliwangi officers. The members of this faction usually shared one or more of the following characteristics: Siliwangi divisional membership, Dutch military education, central staff assignment, and sympathy with the PSI, while most of the top leaders of the faction shared all of the 97 above characteristics. Those from the Diponegoro division in the Nasution faction had been in the KNILj many 95 McVey, "Transformation," p. 145. 96 Feith, Democracy in Indonesia, p. 249. 97 The leadership of the Nasution faction was composed of nine Siliwangi, three Diponegoro, two Brawijaya, one Bukit Barisan and one military police leaders. Five of the Siliwangi members came from the KMA, three from FETA, and one from a student army. Two of the three Diponegoro members had come from the KNIL, and the other attended the KMA. === [PDF page 502] === 487 of the Siliwangi members of the faction had been in PETA, but for them divisional membership was of primary importance. There was only one PETA-educated leader not from the Siliwangi division; he was a physician from the Brawijaya division assigned to the central staff and personally close to members of the Nasution faction. Ethnically this faction was almost evenly divided between Javanese and non-Javanese. The PETA faction 98 opposed the professionalization and rationalization plans of the Nasution faction. Their strength lay in the regions, and the implementation of the rationalization and professionalization policy of the Nasution faction would have severely eroded the strength of the PETA group. For similar reasons they fought against the centralizing strategies of the army central command. The leaders of the faction were from the Diponegoro division, although there was representation in the faction of Brawijaya leaders. There were also two Siliwangi leaders in this faction; their identification with the PETA faction appeared to be due to their personal rivalry with Nasution. Their most vocal spokesman, Colonel Bambang Sumpeno, a Diponegoro leader and head of the Chandradimuka Academy, campaigned in favor of a mass army, closely tied 98 The faction was given the name "PETA," which referred to the most striking difference between the two factions i the Nasution faction was dominated by those who had attended the KMA or who were officers in the Ki\IL, and the PETA faction was almost exclusively composed of those from PETA. === [PDF page 503] === 488 to civilians and concerned with local defense; he went through the various regions collecting signatures of regional military leaders stating their opposition to the plans of the army high command, and also talked to President Sukarno, a kinsman of his, concerning the rationalization plans. Colonel Bambang Sumpeno was suspended from the army, but his suspension resulted in an investigation of the army central command and the defense ministry by parliament, spearheaded by Zainal Baharuddin, a friend and kinsman of Colonel Zulkifli Lubis, head of armed forces intelligence and a bitter enemy of Colonel Nasution. Both factions were aligned with civilian factions and individual leaders. The closest allies of the Nasution faction were the PSI leaders and pro-PSI leaders, such as the Sultan of Jogjakarta, Hamengku Buwono IX, who had served several times as defense minister. The connections between the Nasution faction and the PSI leaders were partially cemented by kinship and marriage ties. The Nasution group was also backed by the Partai Katholik, the Parkindo, and the Wilopo faction of the PNI (Wilopo was prime minister at that time). The PETA group had wider support in the political party sector} they were backed by the following parties and factionsi the Sidik and Manai Sophian factions of the PNI (more to the left of the Wilopo faction), the PSII, the Zainal Arifin faction of the NU, the Isa Anshary faction of the Masjumi (a conservative faction), === [PDF page 504] === 489 the Murba party, the Progressive Faction (a leftist group), the PKI and others. The conflict came to a head on 17 October 1952 after the parliament had begun discussing the possibility of dismissing Nasution and other top members of his faction. Nasution and members of his faction tried to pressure Sukarno, through talks and through surrounding the parliament with troops and tanks, to dissolve parliament. Sukarno refused, and soon internal coups occurred in divisions where the regional military commanders had supported the Nasution faction. Nasution and the other top leaders were retired from their positions in the army central staff. The Nasution faction had too many forces aligned against it: 1) the masses of soldiers feared demobilization, and they levelled pressure on their superiors to resist the threat of demobilization; 2) the divisional leaders opposed the attempts of the army central command to centralize decision-making in the army; 3) in the regions the Nasution faction only had the support of the Siliwangi and Bukit Barisan divisions; 4) the Nasution faction and their civilian allies were divided as to the desirability of a coup; 5) there were large numbers of politicians lined up against the faction, who were either anti-PSI and/or who favored the continued subjection of the military to civilian control; and 6) Sukarno refused to support the coup plans of Nasution and in the end backed the PETA group. === [PDF page 505] === 490 After Nasution' s defeat power in the army was dispersed down to the divisional and even to the regimental level. For three years the arena of factional politics was the Ikatan Perwira Republik Indonesia (IPRI), the Republic of Indonesia Officers League, an organization containing all who were or had been army officers. 99 During this time there was much dissatisfaction within the army concerning their position and status vis-a-vis the civilian elite and the present cabinet. Army officers and their men were unhappy with the policies of the first Ali cabinet, in general, and with Iwa Kusumasumantri SH, the defense minister, in particular, especially in the policy of awarding promotions and positions to the cabinet's supporters within the army. The budget allocation for the army was quite low, so low that it was difficult for regional military leaders to finance operations against rebels. The status of army officers was declining in comparison with their civilian colleagues in the national and regional governments. The plan of the defense minister to give arms to irregular organizations outside the army, such as the village guard units, which were strongly influenced by the PKI, especially aroused the ire and opposition of the army. Relations between the 99 See McVey, "Transformation," pp. 155-157 for a discussion of IPRI's role. My thanks to Colonel D. Soegondo for sharing his knowledge of the IPRI with me. See Feith, Democracy in Indonesia, pp. 403-406. === [PDF page 506] === 491 cabinet and the army, especially those from the Siliwangi division, further deteriorated due to a governmental regulation issued in 1954, which prohibited army members from campaigning in the 1955 elections. Before the issuance of this regulation army officers who supported IPKI, especially those from the Siliwangi division, expected the party to emerge as a sizable party due to its estimated voter support; the government's ban on campaigning was at least partially responsible for IPKI's poor showing. The growing alienation between the cabinet and the large majority of army officers was responsible for the growing shift of opinion among the officers from that of the anti-17 October line to that of the pro-17 October line. At the end of 1954 officers from the two factions met together in order to pave the way for reconcilation. A conference was held in Jogjakarta in early 1955 and by then, opinion had definitely shifted to the 17 October side; the anti-17 October group acquiesced to the shift and this meeting produced the Jogja Charter, which in essence, was an attempt to end serious army factional disputes and to increase pressure on the government. After the conference, the army chief of staff, Colonel Bambang Sugeng, resigned; the cabinet ignored the recommendation of the working committee of the Jogja conference that the new chief of staff be appointed in accordance to seniority, and instead, lOl Ibid., p. 107 and interview with Brigadier General Sukendro, Jakarta, 7 May 1969. === [PDF page 507] === 492 appointed Colonel Bambang Utojo, a pro-PNI officer-. Colonel Lubis, deputy chief of staff, not only led a boycott of the transfer ceremonies, an action called the 27 June 1955 Affair, but refused to turn over his authority to Colonel Bambang Utojo. The cabinet suspended Lubis, but a meeting of divisional commanders and the central army staff supported Lubis; he also had the support of IPRI. The army was able also to obtain support from the opposition parties and a sizable segment of the political public. The army leaders stood fast and refused all compromises offered them by the cabinet, causing the first Ali cabinet to fall. At this time there was some discussion within the army as to whether or not the army should sponsor a coup d'etat. but the general consensus was that the new unity within the army was too fragile to risk another coup attempt. After the fall of the first Ali cabinet, Bambang Utojo retired and the suspension of Lubis was rescinded. Negotiations were begun for a new army chief of staff; at first Colonels Simbolon (pro-17 October), Gatot Subroto (pro-17 October) and Lubis (anti- 17 October) were the candidates. Later Nasution was entered as a candidate; the cabinet, led by the Masjumi leader Burhanuddin Harahap, agreed upon Nasution. The cabinet erroneously thought that Nasution would be closer to the cabinet than to the president, since he had been aligned with leaders from the PSI and Masjumi parties in the past. Nasution, though, had shifted his choice of civilian allies, === [PDF page 508] === 493 from those of the FSI and Masjumi to Sukarno and leaders from the PNI. By 1955 the Masjumi and the fsi had become the spokespeople for decentralization, and this also was a time of growing regional unrest. i\asution, on the other hand, always had stood for a centralized army and a strongly unified state. After Nasution's appointment as chief of staff a factional shift again occurred within the army, influenced by Nasution's military and political policies and goals. Nasution, together with a few Siliwangi officers, mainly Javanese, and other officers, again mostly Javanese from other divisions, formed a faction which included a large number of those who had been anti-17 October. The number of active leaders in the iNasution faction was quite small, approximately seven, in comparison with the opposing faction, the Lubis faction, which comprised at least eighteen active participants. The Lubis faction was largely composed of non-Javanese Siliwangi leaders and also army leaders from the Outer Island divisions.103 Many of those in the Lubis faction had taken part in the 17 October Affair on the side of Nasution. Lubis' civilian allies were the FSI and the Masjumi. 102 See McVey, "Transformation," p. 158 for an interesting analysis of the reasons behind INasution's shift in civilian allies. 103 Examples a r e C o l o n e l s Simbolon from J\orth Sumatra and Warouw from E a s t I n d o n e s i a. === [PDF page 509] === 494 Nasution, in order to increase the power of the general staff and also to diminish the power of the Lubis faction, launched a policy of transferring key supporters of certain divisional commanders he wished to transfer. Finally Nasution*s opponents were sufficiently alarmed that by August 1956 they agreed to meet with Colonel Lubis to plan a coup d'etat.104 Lubis relied mainly upon the Siliwangi division, but his plans were hampered by the transfer of the Siliwangi divisional command from a pro-Lubis supporter, Colonel Kawilarang, to a pro-Nasution Siliwangi officer, Suprajogi. Nasution, through key transfers and through playing on the fears of the officers that they would be caught on the losing side of a factional struggle, gradually narrowed the active and committed support for Lubis. The failure of the Lubis faction in the staggered confrontation with Nasution and his supporters was also due to the absence of coordination on the part of those proLubis army officers participating in the coup attempt. Nasution*s victory over Lubis enabled him to mold the Siliwangi division into a force which he could rely upon, and also through the defeat of the Lubis faction For a fascinating account of the ploys and counterploys launched by Nasution and Lubis in the three months that elapsed between the planning of the coup and its immediate fizzle see Ibid., pp. 159-172. Many pro-Lubis officers, especially those who had taken an active part in the Lubis Affair, were arrested, retired, or given "positions" for which there were na desks. === [PDF page 510] === 495 Nasution was able to create a general staff that was, on the whole, loyal to him. Transition The arena of army factionalism moved from the center, which was now firmly controlled by Nasution, to the Outer Islands, where members of the Lubis faction still held powerful positions, and they were able to continue their struggle against the centralizing efforts of Nasution and the second Ali cabinet. They were supported in this defiance by the regional elites and general population of their areas and also by their allies in the center, the Psl and Masjumi parties. Several factors influenced the regional movements in 1956 and the subsequent declaration of the rebel government (PRRI) in 1958, which will be briefly discussed. Long-range political and economic problems lay at the root of the regionalist complaints. There had been great pressure for decentralization on the part of those in the regions since 1950; public pressure had grown particularly vocal after the pa,pn nner.pra ia had refused to implement the decentralization laws that had been passed. The following discussion of the regional movements and the FRRI is partially abstracted from my manuscript, "A Study of the Regional Movements in Sumatra and the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia in Sumatra." For other analyses of the PRRI see Graham R. Alliband, "Upheaval in Sumatra: from Dewan Banteng to the PRRI Rebellion" (M.A. thesis, Cornell University, 1970)i Herbert Feith and Daniel S. Lev, "The End of the Indonesian Rebellion," Pacific Affairs 36 (Spring 1963)i 32-46; and Smail, "North Sumatra," pp. 128-187. === [PDF page 511] === 496 The center-regional problem was acerbated by the preponderance of Javanese in the ranks of the pa mong Praia, even in the Outer Islands. When the PSI and Masjumi were in control of the government, tension was less, probably because of the fact that those parties had their strongest backing in the Outer Islands and their leaders could serve as political brokers between the center and the Outer Islands. The regionalists, like all Indonesians, were bitterly disappointed by the failure of the 1955 elections to solve Indonesia's political problems. The elections were expected to be a panacea for Indonesia's political ills, but the regionalists also charged that the Outer Islands did not have adquate representation in the parliament, and that, in addition, Indonesia should have a bicameral parliament. Another political factor influencing the regional movements was the resignation of Vice-President Hatta, a Minangkabau from West Sumatra; the regionalists interpreted his resignation as a signal that the situation in Jakarta was so bad that Hatta was unable to have any influence over the turn of events. Another reason for the regional movements occurring at that time was the hope that the movements could force the fall of the second 108 Ali cabinet. Since the 1955 elections the radical For a thorough analysis of the 1955 elections, see Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955. Monograph Series (Ithaca, N.Y.J Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1957) 1 08 See Legge, Regional Autonomy, p. 9. === [PDF page 512] === 497 nationalists and the PKI had had more influence, especially due to their popular backing, which had been evidenced by election results; the regionalists were inextricably opposed to this radical shift in Indonesian national politics. Dissatisfaction with the government was probably a more important factor in the emergence of the regional movements than the issue of regional autonomy.109 Also, there were long-standing economic complaints. The major one was that government spending was not fairly divided between Java and the Outer Islands; some even demanded a greater share for the Outer Islands than their proportion of the population would warrant because most of Indonesia's foreign exchange earnings came from the Outer Islands. The regionalists in 1956 and 1957 had the political initiative; at first large-scale smuggling of primary products was organized by the regional military leaders, and later there were a series of bloodless coups in which armyled councils took power out of the hands of the civilian governors, who were Javanese, in North, South and West Sumatra in December 1956 and in East Indonesia (in Sulawesi, Maluku and Nusatenggara) in March 1957. All of these regional coups were successful except the one in ftorth Sumatra, where the population is ethnically mixed and the central government was able to gain control through the 109 Ibid., p. 234. === [PDF page 513] === 498 manipulation of ethnic rivalries. In late 1957 the initiative began to pass to the central government; this was partially due to unrelated occurrences. One was the defeat of a pro-Indonesia resolution on West Irian in the United Nations General Assembly, and the other was the attempted assassination of President Sukarno by Muslim extremists. After these two events, labor groups seized Dutch enterprisesj martial law had already been declared and Nasution used these powers to effect an army takeover of the Dutch firms. Masjumi leaders were harrassed by crowds blaming them for the attempted assassination of Sukarno and several prominent politicians fled to Sumatra. Early in 1958 the regional leaders in Sumatra decided to issue an ultimatum to the central government demanding that the cabinet, which was still the second Ali cabinet, should resign and that a new "business" cabinet be formed, either by Hatta or the Sultan of Jogjakarta. The cabinet refused the ultimatum and the regional leaders responded by declaring the FRRI, and formed a cabinet composed of military and civilian leaders. Support for the FRRI came only from Tapanuli (a part of North Sumatra), North Sulawesi and, of course, its center in West Sumatra. The rebellion was quickly stamped out by troops sent from Java 110 For a fascinating account of the regional movement in North Sumatra and the strategies and countermoves employed by the central government to defeat the attempt of Colonel Simbolon to separate North Sumatra from the central government, see Smail, "North Sumatrat" pp. 128-187. === [PDF page 514] === 499 by Nasution. Two main reasons can be listed for the failure of the PRRI. One, the regionalist faction was not united in its actions and purposes; the leadership was divided between military and civilian, Muslim and Christian, and by personal differences. Second, the regionalists did not want to separate from the central government; they only wanted to "correct" the drift of the central government, and this "corrective" movement could not inspire the officers and men to fight; only in A\orth Sulawesi, a predominantly Christian area and heavily influenced by Dutch culture, was there hard fighting between the rebel and government troops. The defeat of the regionalists changed the composition of the army leadership, and hence its factional makeup. Fewer of the army elite members were to come from Outer Island origins; the regional military leaders, who were all from the Outer Islands, were retired from the army. The army leadership, therefore, became more homogeneous. Another effect of the unsuccessful rebellion was the increase in the power of the general staff. This was partially caused by the change in regional commanders, many of whom had commanded their areas for years, and had local roots and strong backing in their areas. Regional commanders were not only changed in the rebel areas, but in all the provinces; in addition, the number of regional commanders was increased from seven to seventeen, which was also instrumental in lessening the relative power of === [PDF page 515] === 500 the regional commanders vis-a-vis the center. The new regional commanders, as contrasted with those in the past, frequently were not natives of those areas, particular those sent to the Outer Islands. Also, the policy of frequent tours of duty, even though it was sometimes difficult to implement, did prevent the growth of independent power, to the extent that it was present in the past. Nevertheless, Nasution was not able to exert great control, either over his headquarters staff or over the regional commanders. Guided Democracy Factional dissension during Guided Democracy was influenced by three issues: 1) the role of the army; 2) the relationship of the army to Sukarno; and 3) the policy For example of the former, in 1959 Brigadier General Sukendro, who was deputy chief of staff for special affairs, did not agree with President Sukarno's decision to dissolve the parliament (Nasution agreed with Sukarno). Sukendro wrote a paper attacking Sukarno's decision and sent this to all the regional commands. President Sukarno was very angry and decided to exile Sukendro. Army headquarters decided to oppose the presidential decision to exile Sukendro (at the time of the decision Nasution was out of Jakarta). But after Nasution returned to Jakarta, he made evident his approval of Sukarno's decision to exile Sukendro and was able to effect the presidential decision. Through the help of the Jani faction, the opposition faction, which steadily gained power after 1960, Sukendro was able to come back to Indonesia after a few years in exile (interview with Brigadier General Sukendro, Jakarta, 7 May 1969). === [PDF page 516] === 501 112 toward the PKI. As was the case during previous periods divisions within the army were influenced by the division between center and region. However, during Guided Democracy, the only region which participated in the struggle between the center and the region was Central Java, the home of the Diponegoro division. This was noticeable particularly toward the end of Guided Democracy, when a collision course between Sukarno, who by then was aligned with the PKI and other radical groups, and the central army leaders seemed inevitable. There was much discussion within the army concerning the proper role of the army in the Indonesian state. discussed in chapter 3, during Guided Democracy the army gradually assumed more and more of a combined role, with 113 political/economic/military functions. Guided Democracy, in essence, was a civilian-military partnership, with the military not only politically influential, but with officers appointed to positions in the civil service, state enterprises, and political and state bodies. The expansion of the army's function was not accepted by all members of the officer corps, especially those in field positions; this feeling of opposition to the expanded military role was 11 2 See Daniel S. Lev, "The Political Role of the Army in Indonesia," Pacific Affairs 36 (Winter 1963-1964)i 357 and The Transition to Guided Democracy; Indonesian Politics. 1957-1958, Monograph Series (Ithaca, N.Y.» Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1966); p. 71. 113 For a descriptive discussion of the role expansion of the army at this time see Ehrmann, "Indonesian Military." === [PDF page 517] === 502 manifested particularly by field officers of the Diponegoro division. The romanticism of the Revolution still had meaning for many of the Diponegoro officers, and they were angered at the extent of corruption that was evident in the karya segment of the army. Like Soeharto in the New Order, Nasution, chief of staff until 1962, was unable to dispose of those officers most flagrantly involved in corrupt practices, since to remove these officers would endanger his tenure as army chief of staff. The second issue, the relationship of the army to Sukarno, was another issue splitting field officers of the two Javanese divisions from the army leaders in Jakarta. The loyalty of the army in Central and East Java toward Sukarno was particularly intense, and many resented the policies of the army leaders, which developed into those of opposition to Sukarno's external and internal policies. For example, the army did not implement Sukarno's policy of confrontation against Malaysia, beyond a token attempt, and army leaders were opposed to Sukarno's policy of radicalizing politics, and relying upon the PKI as the linchpin of the "revolutionary vanguard," the third issue mentioned above. There were four factions and groups within the army during Guided Democracy, the two major factions (the Nasution and Jani factions) and two small groups active mainly toward the end of Guided Democracy (the Sukarno group, which properly speaking was not a faction, but a === [PDF page 518] === 503 conglomeration of army leaders intensely loyal to Sukarno, and the small and clandestine group influenced by the FKI). The Nasution faction was the stronger of the two main factions at the onset of Guided Democracy, but after he was promoted to the prestigeful post of armed forces commander, but one that had less power than army chief of staff, his faction began to decline. Nasution's faction was mainly composed of Siliwangi leaders, with a minority from the Bukit Barisan and Brawijaya divisions and individual representatives from other divisions. Many of the supporters and close associates of Nasution were appointed by him to karya positions, positions in which they remained until after Soeharto rose to power. Membership in Nasution's faction was quite fluid and the faction decreased in size as Guided Democracy wore on. At its zenith one-third of Nasution*s faction had been aligned with him previously; these leaders were either aligned with him in 1952 or in 1956. The decrease in size of the Nasution faction was particularly noticeable after he was shifted to the position of armed forces commander. The loss in membership was also due to personal factors and to Nasution's policy of not challenging many of Sukarno's policies.114 Nasution, 114 Numerous army leaders, who knew Nasution well and had worked with him, remarked that because of certain characteristics of Nasution's personality, it was quite difficult to work under him. It was common for those, who, at one time, had been close to him and a part of his faction to end their relationship with Nasution and leave the faction because of personal antagonisms between Nasution and themselves. === [PDF page 519] === 504 for example, lost some active members of his group when he refused to back them in their demands that the PKI either be outlawed or severe restrictions placed on its operation. In the early part of Guided Democracy many of the regional commanders, supported by Brigadier General Sukendro, then head of army intelligence, either banned or severely harrassed the PKI in their areas. Their moves in the regions were supported by the formation of the Ljga Demokrasi (Democratic League) at the center, in which Sukendro was involved, and at that time he was backed by >>asution. Some members of i\asution*s faction were pressing him to launch a coup, but JXasution refused, doubtless because the disunity of the army, coupled with the great popularity of Sukarno, would render defeat certain. Sukarno outlawed the Liga Demokrasi, and then called a national conference of regional commanders and high civilian officials, and demanded that the regional military commanders end their harrassment of the PKI. i\asution, caught in the middle, did not back the regional leaders. These regional commanders withdrew into their own areas, and did not participate as much as previously in national army politics. The second faction, which gradually became stronger than that headed by Nasution, was led by General Jani, 115 116 Lev, "Role of the Army." Ibid., p. 357. === [PDF page 520] === 505 who rose from deputy chief of staff for operations to army chief of staff in June 1962. Jani's faction was mostly composed of Diponegoro leaders, although there were a few Brawijaya and some Siliwangi leaders previously closely associated with Nasution. In contrast with the Nasution faction, only one member of the Jani faction had partici117 pated in the earlier factional groupings. This lack of experience in previous national factional alignments is probably due to the slight difference in ages of the core members of the Nasution and Jani factions. The core of the Nasution faction had been prominent at an earlier period, were a few years older, and had a higher rank during the Revolution than was the case of the core members of the Jani faction. After Jani's succession to the post of chief of staff, he strengthened his position through the transfer of key regional commanders, previously closely aligned with Nasution and vehemently anti-PKI and general staff leaders loyal to Nasution, and replaced them with men loyal to himself. After the transfers only two regional military commanders remained, who had been close to Nasution. Members of the Jani faction were closer to Sukarno than those of the Nasution faction. After Jani's appointment as chief of staff, Sukarno gained more influence politi cally, and another effect of the appointment of Jani was a decline in the political effectiveness of the army, which 117 He had been in the Nasution faction in 1952, then shifted to the Lubis faction in the 1956 factional alignment. === [PDF page 521] === 506 decreased even further after the ending of martial law 118 in 1963. The closer relationship between Sukarno and the Jani faction, as compared to the Nasution faction, was related to the ethnic and religious background of those from the Jani faction. All the members of this faction, with two exceptions, were Javanese; almost all of them came from abangan backgrounds. In the Nasution faction there were more Javanese than was true of his faction in 1952 (approximately half), but most of the Javanese in his faction were from santri origins; this characteristic was particularly true for those who remained in his faction after the ascendancy of Jani. In general, no matter the ethnic background, those who remained in Nasution*s faction tended to be santri in background and in practice. Both the Nasution and Jani factions were anti-PKI, although the Nasution faction was the more antagonistic of the two toward the PKI. By the end of 1965, the anti-PKI hardliners were centered around Nasution, and they advocated a political offensive against the PKI. Jani's faction thought that Sukarno would be able to domesticate the PKI. In April 1965 Jani and Nasution agreed to hold an army seminar, in which the relationship between the army and the PKI was discussed. In the conference Sukarno was successful in obtaining public agreement of the officers to his Herbert Feith, "President Soekarno, the Array and the Communists: The Triangle Changes Shape," Asian Survey 4 === [PDF page 522] === 507 policies, and the conference pledged loyalty to Sukarno and his concept of the alliance of the nationalist, religious and communist forces. The Sukarno group, at first very small, grew in size toward the end of Guided Democracy. It was not a united group, as were the factions of Nasution and Jani, which met together often, but a collection of individuals who were close to Sukarno. Many of these individuals had originally been in the Nasution faction, but transferred over to what became loosely known as the "Sukarno group." There was no dominant division within this group; the leaders of this group were fairly evenly divided among the Java divisions. There was rather strong backing for this group by the field officers of the Diponegoro division. There was also representation from former student army leaders in Central and East Java; both Mas Isman (TRIP) and Achmadi (TP) were members of this group. There was competition between these two student army leaders, and also among other leaders of the faction. The competition between Isman and Achmadi was quite keen, and Sukarno finally showed preference to Achmadi and sent Isman to the United Arab Republic as ambassador. The ethnic representation of this group is heavily Javanese, the most Javanese of all. The Sukarno group of generals became strong by the 119 My thanks go to Ulf Sundhaussen for the information on the army conference. === [PDF page 523] === 508 end of Guided Democracy, due probably to the growing dominance of Sukarno in the political system. The last group, the PKI group, was very small, influenced by PKI beliefs, and it was organized clandestinely. Some had been influenced by the PKI from the time of the Revolution; others were attracted to its ideas after the onset of Guided Democracy. It was this group that was involved in the abortive coup of 30 September 1965. Two of the major leaders were from the Siliwangi division, both Javanese, however, but the other leaders and their support came mainly from the Diponegoro division. The only region in which local revolutionary councils were established was in Central Java, and this was the only region where there was any violence on the part of the PKI or proPKI army groups. The official Indonesian interpretation of the attempted coup is that it was "masterminded" by the PKI leader, Aidit.120 Other interpretations range from explaining the coup as an "internal military affair" with minimal participation by PKI mass organizations under the orders of the military, to those close to the official 121 interpretation of the Indonesian government. It is 120 See Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Saleh, The Coup Attempt of the "September 30 Movement" in Indonesia (Jakarta: Pembimbing Masa, 196877 121 For accounts and analyses of the 30 September movement, see the following: Benedict R. Anderson and Ruth T. McVey, A Preliminary Analaysis of the October 1, 1965 Coup in Indonesia, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Interim Report Series (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1971)j Arnold C. Brackman, The === [PDF page 524] === 509 known, however, that the military participants in the coup were largely army field officers and units from the Liponegoro division and there was also heavy air force involvement. Bitter rivalry had existed between the army and air force for many years, including personal rivalry between the air force founder and Nasution. The air force during Guided Democracy had accepted both of Sukarno's demands (rejected by the army) concerning the establishment of political advisory councils in the armed services and the formation of a fifth force, which would be the arming of civilians. All the known and accused participants, the PKI, rival army officers, Sukarno, and the air force, would Communist Collapse in Indonesia (New York: W.'w. i\orton, 1969); Arthur Dommen, "The Attempted Coup in Indonesia," China Quarterly 25 (January-March 1966): 103-110; Victor M. Fie, "The 20 September Movement in Indonesia: 1965 Gamble that Failed," paper presented to the International Conference on Asian History, Kuala Lumpur, 5-10 August 1968; Donald Hindley, "Political Power and the October 1965 Coup in Indonesia," Journal of Asian Studies 26 (February 1967): 237-249; John Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval (New York: David McKay, 1967),- Daniel S. Lev, "Indonesia 1965: The Year of the Coup," Asian Survey 6 (February 1965): 103-110; Leslie Palmier, "The 30 September Movement in Indonesia," Modern Asian Studies 5 (January 1971)* 1-20; Guy J. Pauker, "The GESTAPU Affair of 1965: Reflections on the Politics of Instability in Indonesia," Southeast Asia 1 (WinterSpring 1971): 43-45; Uri Ra'anan, "Indonesia 1965," in The Politics of the Coup d'Etat: Five Case Studies, eds. William G. Andrews and Uri Ra'anan (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1969), pp. 43-64; Stephen Sloan, A Study in Political Violence: The Indonesian Experience (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1971); John 0. Sutter, "The Two Faces of Konfrontasi: 'Crush Malaysia' and the Gestapu," Asian Survey 6 (October 1966): 523-546; Justus M. van der Kroef, "Interpretations of the 1965 Indonesian Coup: A Review of the Literature," Pacific Affairs 43 (Winter 1970-1971): 557-577; Donald E. Weatherbee, "Interpretations of Gestapu, the 1965 Indonesian Coup," World Affairs 132 (March 1970): 305-317. === [PDF page 525] === 510 have benefitted from the removal of the general army staff. There were numerous rumors in Jakarta at the time concerning planned coups and uprisings by the anti-PKI army leaders and the PKI; in the general atmosphere, compounded by Sukarno's illness, it is understandable how one of the two claimants "to the throne," and the one supposedly favored by Sukarno, would rise up to claim its inheritance before a preemptive strike by the other. The abortive coup failed very quickly, however, and the result was the crushing of the PKI and other radical organizations, the weeding out of the army of those who were known and suspected "leftists," and the establishment of a military regime. Historical Background--Other Armed Services Within the air force there were three main factions prior to the onset of the Mew Order. The first faction in origin was that of Suryadarma, its founders its members came from the senior officers of the air force. Most had been youth volunteers in the Dutch military on the eve of the Japanese invasion; many were trained during the war in Australia by Dutch pilots. The second faction was that of Sujono, originally a follower of Suryadarma. Most of the members of Sujono*s faction had their first military experience during the Revolution; some of the members of this faction were able to evade the Dutch forces and go to India where they were taught flying. In 1955 there was a split between === [PDF page 526] === 511 Sujono and Suryadarma, and Suryadharma was successful in the factional struggle. Most of the members of these two factions, by the present time, are working outside of the air forcej most are in karva functions and others have retired from the military. Suryadharma was a radical nationalist, and had close relations with Sukarno until the Aru incident, at which time he refused to give air support to a naval operation in West Irian and was replaced by Omar Dhani as commander. Suryadharma's wife was active in pro-PKI organizations, such as Himpunan Sard iana Indonesia (HSI), Association of Indonesian Scholars, and Gerakan Wanita Indonesia (Gerwani), Women's Movement of Indonesia. The next two factions, those of Omar Dhani and Rusmin Nurjadin, are composed of younger men. Omar Dhani's group was American-trained and that of Rusmin I\urjadin, largely Indonesian-trained. The Omar Dhani group controlled policy in the air force from 1962 until the 30 September movement. The Dhani group was very close to Sukarno, and also to the PKI, although their closeness seemed to be more because of rivalry with the army than because of ideological beliefs. The rival group was Rusmin Nurjadin*s faction, which came to power after the unsuccessful coup attempt. The naval factions were also partially based upon time of training. The first factions, those headed by Pardi, the first naval commander, and Subiakto, the next naval commander, were trained outside Indonesia. The first group's leaders were those who had had training in the Dutch === [PDF page 527] === 512 academy. Subiakto was first in the Pardi group, then he formed his own group. Another faction emerged in the officer corps in 1956, organized by Eddy Martadinata, who had been an adjutant of Admiral Pardi. Most members of his faction consisted of young officers trained in The Hague after 1949. Martadinata was aligned with iNasution, and opposed the policies of Sukarno. During Guided Democracy a movement opposed to Martadinata arose within the navy, called the Gerakan Perwira Profiresif Revolusioner (GPPR), Progressive Revolutionary Officers' Movement, which was centered at the naval base of Surabaya and composed of younger officers. The GPPR was opposed to the naval leadership for technical and service reasons, 122 according to Ruth McVey. These younger officers had superior technical education, and they were usually placed in positions which demanded high technical skills, but were far from the center, where power lay in the navy. The GPPR also wanted a purge in the navy and a reorganization which would retire the old leaders and bring the younger officers into elite posts. In order for the affair to be settled in a way that would not harm Martadinata's position, he was forced to make a compromise with Sukarno, and in June 1965 came out in favor of the fifth force. In the police the factions centered around the police commanders and their contenders, as was common in the navy 122 "A Preliminary Excursion Through the Small World of Lt. Col. Untung," p. 67. === [PDF page 528] === 513 and air force. The first police commander, Soekanto, a Javanese bureaucrat, was opposed to the influence of political parties in the police force; he was also not in favor of Sukarno's policies during Guided Democracy, and through Sukarno and the tactics of a group led bySukarno Djojonegoro, Soekanto was replaced by Sukarno Djojonegoro as police commander in late 1959. Soon after his appointment a rival, Sutjipto Eanukusumo, began leading a movement against him; many of the police officers who had supported Sukarno Djojonegoro in his campaign for police commander became dissatisfied because Sukarno Djojonegoro, in the words of a police leader, "had promised his boys many things... " but "when he was made police chief he was not able to fulfill all of these deals." Through dissatisfaction in the police and the intercession of Sukarno and Subandrio (the foreign minister), Sukarno Djojonegoro was replaced by Sutjipto. Dissidents against Sutjipto arose immediately, and one of the leaders was a cousin of Sukarno Djojonegoro; Sutjipto was replaced by Sutjipto Judodihardjo, who was commander until 1968. general, cliques and factions in the police did not seem to be influenced by ethnic or training differences. Lven ideological factors were less important than in the other services. Cliques and factions were formed around the desire to compete for promotion and to improve one's position in the service. === [PDF page 529] === 514 Factional Alignments in the New Order: 1966-1969 Factionalism in the Army At the beginning of the New Order there was close cooperation between the main factions in the army, the Soeharto faction, mainly based upon the Diponegoro division, and the Panglima se-Jawa (Java commanders) faction, largely recruited from members of the Siliwangi division, led first by Major General Suwarto until his death early in the New Order, and then by Major General Dharsono, Siliwangi commander during much of this early New Order period. The years from 1965 to 1967 may be described as a 123 period of sub-civil warfare; at that time the groups, who were opposed to Sukarno and the PKI were fairly united, and the emerging regime had broadly based support and cooperation among those groups. The Soeharto and Panelima se-Jawa factions were supported by various student and intellectual groups, Islamic political parties and groups, the Christian parties, and factions of some of the other parties, such as the right-wing faction of the PNI. There was great resistance to the takeover of the Guided Democracy regime by the above combination. This opposition came from groups in the military, including the army and the other 123 For an innovative typology of the conditions of military takeover see Ann Ruth Willner, "Perspectives on Military Elites as Rulers and Wielders of Power," Journal of Comparative Administration 2 (November 1970): 264-265. For an interesting analysis of factions in Indonesia, especially in the early New Order period, see Hindley, "Alirans," pp. 23-66. === [PDF page 530] === 515 armed forces, and civilian groups, for example, the leftwing of the PNI, the PKI, the small radical nationalist parties, like the Partindo, and student and intellectual groups aligned with the more radical parties. The two other factions active in the early years were the Nasution faction, which cooperated with the Soeharto and the Panglima se-Jawa factions, and the Sukarno faction, composed of those who were close to Sukarno and who were loyal to him. A few of the members of the Nasution faction switched over to the Soeharto faction in the early part of the New Order. Most members of the Nasution faction were appointed to civilian positions and prevented from wielding power. In late 1967 and early 1968, Soeharto was able to coopt almost half of the members of Sukarno's faction, a strategy which angered the New Order "radicals," who were in the Panglima se-Jawa faction or in groups aligned to the faction. The members of the Sukarno faction who were not coopted by Soeharto were arrested, retired, or given unimportant positions. A small faction, the Palembang faction, based upon the Sriwijaya division of South Sumatra, developed in the early New Order period. This faction aligned itself with the Soeharto faction. In late 1967 the alliance between the Soeharto and the Panglima se-Jawa factions began to break down, and from 1968 until the end of 1969 military factions could be divided into two groupsi those supporting the Soeharto regime and its policies (the Soeharto and Palembang === [PDF page 531] === 516 factions) and those nominally or bitterly opposed to the policies of the Soeharto regime (the PanRlima se-Jawa and Nasution factions). The members of the core of Soeharto's faction were Central Javanese from the Diponegoro division. The members of this core have served under him or with him at one point or more during his career, beginning with PLTA during the Japanese occupation. Almost every member of this group was abangan, and antagonistic to, or at least failed to sympathize with the santri. Most came from a high social background, the exception to this being Soeharto himself, who is the son of a village official. Soeharto does, however, have ties to the Mangkunegara kraton through his wife. The core members of Soeharto's faction identified strongly with the Javanese culture, and most of their lives were spent in Central Java. Mostly they have been sympathetic to the PiM, and often have kinship and school connections with PNI leaders from Central Java; they were antagonistic to the Islamic political parties, especially One rather persistent rumor during my stay in Indonesia was that Soeharto is the illegitimate son of a wedana from Jogjakarta; most likely this has no basis in fact, but in traditional Java an illegitimate son of a wedana would be considered more "legitimate" politically as a ruler than a son of a village official. Some of Soeharto's critics remarked that it was quite likely the rumor was started by aides of Soeharto as a tactic to improve Soeharto*s political legitimacy. In 1974 a colleague just back from Jakarta mentioned that the rumor had accelerated and had Soeharto as the illegitimate son of the father of the present Sultan of Jogjakarta. === [PDF page 532] === 517 125 to the Parmusi. They have close contacts (personal and kin) with members of the upper bureaucracy, which is strongly FNI and Javanese-based. Many members of Soeharto*s faction, and their wives, were identified with kraton. Most members of the core have familial relations with members of the regional political elite of Central Java and the national elite members from Central Java. The close personal relationships between Soeharto and his core were important in explaining the reason why these particular people have risen so high and so fast. His closest friends, Lieutenant Generals Sudjono Humardhani and Ali Moertopo, before the onset of the New Order were not even considered members of the military sub-elite, but after the attempted coup they soared to political and economic power through their friendship with Soeharto, The members of both the core and the periphery of Soeharto's faction were with him during at least one of the four major experiences of his career: the Revolution, commanding the Diponegoro division, student days at SESKOAD, and commanding Caduad and KOSTRAB. The eight members of the core were with him for a-mean of 2.1 of these four experiences; the twelve members of the periphery were with him for a mean of 1.3 of these four experiences. 125 As Sukarno before him, Soeharto is less antagonistic to the NU party, which is largely a Javanese party. As discussed previously the NU is influenced by the Javanese culture, in which there is a synthesis of animistic, Hindu, and Islamic elements. === [PDF page 533] === 518 The members of the periphery of Soeharto*s faction differed in several respects from those of the core. The first noticeable difference in the two sub-groups was the representation of non-Diponegoro elements in the periphery: five were Eiponegoro, four Siliwangi, two Bukit Barison, and one from the Brawijaya division. Those from the Siliwangi were considered by other Siliwangi leaders as being "disloyal" to their division and as "ambitious" and "plinplan" (changing with the wind). Concerning previous factional identification, the former members of the Sukarno faction who were coopted by Soeharto were found in the periphery. The Palembang faction, aligned with Soeharto, was based on the Sriwijaya division of South Sumatra, as mentioned above. It was either composed of people originally from South Sumatra, or those, though not born in South Sumatra, who served for some years in the Sriwijaya division. Two of the leaders of the Palembang group were from this latter category: one, Lieutenant General Ibnu Soetowo, a Central Javanese, spent many years in South Sumatra, as discussed in chapter 3, and has closer ties to that area than to his home area in Java; the other, Major General H. Worang, from Korth Sulawesi, spent some years serving in South Sumatra, and developed close friends and economic allies from that division. The political party sympathies of this group were more heterogeneous, ranging from the PiM === [PDF page 534] === 519 t o t h e MJ. There was much c r i t i c i s m of S o e h a r t o for m a i n t a i n i n g h i s a l l i a n c e w i t h t h e Palembang g r o u p, since t h i s g r o u p, i n t h e e a r l i e r p e r i o d of t h e i\ew O r d e r, was t h e most o f t e n accused of p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n l a r g e - s c a l e corruption. Some members of t h i s group were i n p o s i t i o n s of s t r a t e g i c economic i m p o r t a n c e a t t h e time of the a t t e m p t e d coup, and t h e y were v e r y g e n e r o u s i n f i n a n c i n g Soeharto's counter-coup operations. of t h e r e a s o n s why S o e h a r t o s t i l l T h i s i s perhaps one p r o t e c t s them. t h i s g r o u p has much economic i n f l u e n c e, Also, and i t has been t h e c e n t e r of economic e n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p and e x p e r t i s e t h e army. The f a c t i o n s t h a t were unhappy w i t h t h e d i r e c t i o n t a k e n by t h e New Order were t h e Panglima s e - J a w a f a c t i o n 1?7 and t h e N a s u t i o n f a c t i o n. The Panglima se-Jawa was based upon t h e S i l i w a n g i d i v i s i o n. faction I t was backed not only by t h o s e p r e s e n t l y a s s i g n e d t o t h e d i v i s i o n, but had t h e s u p p o r t of t h e BPC S i l i w a n g i, t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n e n compassing a l l a c t i v e and n o n - a c t i v e members of t h e wangi. Sili- As i s t r u e of t h e l e a d e r s h i p of t h e S i l i w a n g i, the members of t h e Panglima s e - J a w a f a c t i o n came from v a r i o u s ethnic groups. There were a few n o n - S i l i w a n g i l e a d e r s •I -J£L Lieutenant General Ibnu Soetowo was number seven in the FNI list of candidates for South Sumatra in the 1955 elections (see Suluh Indonesia, 28 July 1955). 127 This faction (trans. Java commanders) received its name from the meetings which the regional and special military commanders of Java had during the early period of the New Order. Strong New Order statements were released after these meeting. === [PDF page 535] === 520 the group, but all but one, Major General Sarwo Edhie, quickly disassociated themselves from the faction after the onset of the dispute between the Soeharto and Pan&lima se-Jawa factions. Major General Sarwo Edhie, a Diponegoro man, is from the RPKAD, a group of the army with strong ties to the Siliwangi division. The Panglima se-Jawa faction was backed heavily by most of the officers of the Siliwangi division during this period. In fact, it was the younger officers and their civilian associates who often spurred their leaders to react in a more radical way than perhaps the leaders would otherwise have chosen. Many of the 3ESK0AD teaching staff were also associated with this faction. Members of the KOSTRAD staff were also involved in the attempted programs and maneuvers of this faction, especially the close associates of Major General Kemal Idris, commander of the KOSTRAD in the early years of the iNew Order. The major civilian allies of the PanRlima se-Jawa faction were the AKSI groups, the Umar Kayam faction of the Golongan Independent, some PSI leaders, and certain factions of other parties, particularly those factions not based in the Javanese ethnic area. Some members of the armed services other than the army, particularly certain.leaders of the state police (including the former commander of the police, Commissioner General Hoegeng Iman Santoso) were associated with or sympathized with this faction. The members of the Panglima se-Jawa faction, as those of the Soeharto faction, did not have a === [PDF page 536] === 521 strong identification with Islam, although there were more santri represented in this faction than in the Soeharto faction. Those of Javanese descent are of a definite abangan bent. However, the members of this faction tended not to be antagonistic toward the modernist variety of Islam, represented by the Parmusi. The Nasution faction was rather small in this period; many of the members, who still held good positions, left the faction very early in the New Order. Those members still in Nasution*s faction, who were assigned to military positions, were transferred by Soeharto into non-military positions. By 1969 only about five members of his faction were left; the rapid disintegration of his faction was probably also due to the narrowness of its appeal, to intergenerational cleavages, and to certain personality differences, which were mentioned previously, and not only to the fact that Soeharto transferred Nasution to a powerless position early in the New Order, that of MPRS, the people*s consultative assembly, chairperson. Those still in his faction were santri, and most were active in the Pendidikan 1 28 TingRi Da'wah Islam, an Islamic educational foundation. These individuals have close relations with certain Islamic groups, particularly with the Mohammadiyah, some factions of the NU party, and certain Islamic youth groups. During Nasution himself organized the Pendidikan Tineai Da'wah Islam "some years ago, and I offered assistance only from behind the scenes in order to maintain relations with Bung Karno /Sukamo7 at that time" (Pedoman. 18 April 1969). === [PDF page 537] === 522 the first years of the New Order, Nasution was very active in appearing before youth movements and Islamic groups, and in his speeches spoke out strongly concerning the necessity for regional autonomy, measures that were needed to reduce corruption, the danger of not allowing Muslims to have influence in the state, and the need to return to an "independent" foreign policy, i.e. a genuine non-aligned foreign policy. Factional rivalry during this early period occurred mainly between the Soeharto and Panglima se-Jawa factions. The Panglima se-Jawa faction accepted Soeharto as the New Order leader; the disagreements were over the type of political structure and political groups that should emerge in the New Order. The Panglima se-Jawa faction and its civilian allies called for a complete break with the old political patterns; they criticized the emphasis upon ideology and regionalism in the formation and interaction of political parties. At the beginning of the New Order their position was quite strong; for example, the decisions taken at the Second Army Seminar held in Bandung in August 1966 incorporated their major ideas for restructuring, including an electoral district system, simplification of the party system, and the refusal of participation in the elections to former members of the PKI, but not to the former Masjumi, PSI and Murba members.129 Many of the proposals of the 129 For an interesting article discussing the army seminar; the various changes in the parliamentary bills on === [PDF page 538] === 523 army seminar were incorporated in the bills relating to general elections, political groups, and the representative institutions introduced in parliament some months later. There were overwhelming protests from the major political parties concerning the provisions of these bills, and the government decided in late 1966 to abandon the principles of the army seminar. Compromises were reached between the government and the parties by the middle of 1967, which recognized the parties' demands for proportional representation, multi-member province-wide constituencies, and no residency requirement. The position taken by the Panglima se-Jawa faction concerning political parties caused them to lose support of important groups of former allies, namely some action groups and intellectuals associated with political parties, the santri groups in particular. This was an important reason for the decline in power of the Panglima se-Jawa faction vis-a-vis the Soeharto faction. Undaunted by his defeat, Dharsono and the Siliwangi division, with the cooperation of a few civilian groups, such as elements of the Golongan Independent and AKSI groups, and elements of the PSI and the Catholic party, pressured for the adoption of a two-party system in Indonesia, and a district system in the coming elections, and the political banning of Orla (Orde Lama, the Old Order, elections, political groups, and representative instituions; and the political thinking of and backing for the two dominant factions, see Harold Crouch, "The Army, the Parties, and Election," Indonesia 11 (April 1971): 131-176. === [PDF page 539] === 524 p e r t a i n i n g t o Guided Democracy) persons and o r g a n i z a t i o n s. Members of t h i s c o a l i t i o n of m i l i t a r y - c i v i l i a n forces, u s u a l l y c a l l e d the New Order r a d i c a l s, were convinced t h a t a two-party system, in which the two p a r t i e s would be divorced from t h e old p a r t i e s and would be committed t o programmatic modernization, was e s s e n t i a l for development and would ensure the establishment of political stabilization.130 The New Order radicals believed that one major reason for the violent conflicts that appeared in the Indonesian society were the "old-style" political parties, which were based upon ideological and religious divisions of the society, which were also influenced by regional differences. Unless the old type of party system were ended, they believed that there was no hope for the realization of economic development and political stabilization. To express their demands concerning the adoption of a two-party system and a district system they relied mainly upon covert pressure upon Soeharto and members of his faction, but they used overt pressure against certain organizations, especially the FNI, to express their demand to ban politically Orla elements. A ban on FNI activities was first imposed in East Java in August 1967 by the divisional commanders this action by Jasin was immediately 130 For an excellent discussion and analysis of the thinking of the New Order radicals, see R. William Liddle, "Modernizing Indonesian Politics" in Political Participation in Modern Indonesia, ed. R. William liddle, Yale University Southeast Asia Studies Program (New Haven* Yale Southeast Asia Studies, 1973), pp. 177-206. === [PDF page 540] === 525 followed by the banning of the FI\I in Sumatra and in most 131 parts of Sulawesi by the regional commanders. Shortly before the 1968 MPRS session Dharsono and his faction accelerated the campaign and held a conference, Mus iawarah Rakvat Jawa Barat (Conference of the People of West Java in January 1968. The conference, attended by leaders of parties, mass organizations, and regional legislatures, prepared resolutions, which echoed the demands of Dharsono and his faction.132 From January 1968 the campaign to have these demands discussed in the forthcoming MPRS session was accelerated, and they hoped that the government would accept these demands. Dharsono publicly presented 133 the resolutions of the conference to Soeharto, and began giving many speeches and interviews on these proposals. On the eve of the MPRS session another conference of the Musiawarah Rakvat Jawa Barat was held, and it again urged the government to discuss the proposals of the conference 131 For announcements of the banning see the issues of Antara, August-September 1967. In January 1968 the government announced that the banning of the PNI should end immediately; the order only began to be effected after the MPRS session, and for some months regional and local PNI chapters found it difficult in many areas to operate. 132 For a discussion of the resolutions of the conference see Hindley, "Alirans," p. 63. 133 See Antara, afternoon ed., 26 January 1968. For the contents of the resolution, which was in the form of a petition, see The Straits Times (Singapore), 23 January 1968. === [PDF page 541] === 526 in the MPRS session. But Soeharto and his faction, together with influential factions in the major political parties, opposed the adoption of this system, and Soeharto, in his role as commander of the armed forces, forbade Dharsono to discuss his proposals in the MPRS session. Shortly after the 1968 MFRS session, the Siliwangi leadership changed its proposal from a two-party system to a "two-group" system, which they decided to implement 135 in West Java. According to the two-group plan, the existing parties and groups in the regional and district legislatures in.Vest Java would be divided into two groups, first called the "A" and "B" groups, then the Pembangunan (Development) and Pernbaruan (Renewal) groups. The divisional leaders assigned the parties and groups to one of the two above groups on a basis that would not promote ideological cleavage, mixing karya, religious, and nationalist parties and groups in both groups. As an example, the Islamic and Christian parties were not assigned to opposite groups; they would be mixed in both groups, so that there would be an Islamic and Christian party in the Pembangunan group, and an Islamic and Christian party in See Antara, afternoon ed., 7 March 1968. 135 Most of my knowledge of the "two-group" system was derived from interviews with military and civilian leaders in 1968-169. Also seei Suluh Marhaen, 1 February 1968; Sutan Mangkuto Ameh in Duta Masiarakat. 27 February 1968; Abadi, 11 February 1969; Indonesia Raya 20 February 1969; Angkatan Bersendiata. 28 February 1969; ftusantara t 1 March 1969; Kompas, 2 April 1969; and Mimbar Demokrasi (Bandung), last week of April 1969. === [PDF page 542] === 527 i 36 the Pembaruan group. The divisional leaders desired to promote "non-ideological" factions, but there were no incentives for the members of the Pembangunan group to work in common; their natural allies would be in the Pembaruan group. It was an illogical type of campur (mixture), which could not possibly have worked. Most of the national leaders of the political parties were vehemently opposed to the implementation of the two-group concept in West Java or anywhere; Soeharto and his faction were also opposed to it, mainly because of the attitude of the political parties. Dharsono and his faction defied Soeharto and began arranging for the "two-group" concept to be applied in West Java in September 1968, and by the middle of March it was implemented in almost all the legislatures in West Java on the district (kabupaten) and municipal (kotapraia) level, in spite of the vocal protests from most national political 137 party leaders. To a great extent, chough, adherence to the "two-group" concept was through pressure and "persua138 sion" in West Java. One of the Siliwangi leaders, the fifth assistant of the division, had bluntly stated that "whoever opposes the two-party system i s the enemy of t h e Interviews with Colonel Abbas, first assistant (intelligence) of the Siliwangi division on several occasions from summer 1968 until early 1969, Bandung and with Major General Dharsono, Bandung, 22 March 1969. 137 Antara, afternoon ed., 15 September 1968, and Antara, morning ed., 21 March 1969. 138 See the article in Mimbar Demokrasi (Bandung), first week of April 1969. === [PDF page 543] === 528 139 Siliwangi." The Warta Harlan reported on 15 March 1969 that quite a few political party leaders in various areas of West Java had been arrested when they refused to sign an oath supporting the "two-group" system. In April 1969 the government came out publicly with a statement that political restructuring should not be forced.140 In late May 1969, after the government had announced that Dharsono would be assigned to Thailand as ambassador, the central government effectively ended the plan by announcing in a decree that no region alone could implement political restructuring, and that it was "taking over" the two-group system. The government was not only opposed to the "twogroup" plan, but Soeharto was furious at the Siliwangi division for coming out with its own development plan for West Java. The government development plan was scheduled to begin imminently, but the word that the plan had been rejected by the Siliwangi divisional leaders worried the government. A conference had been scheduled for Harch 1969 of the Musiarawah Jawa Barat, but it was cancelled by the government; the conference had planned not only to discuss the "two-group" system, but also development for West Java. During the struggle between the Soeharto and the Panglima se-Jawa factions over the issue of political l39 Sinar Harapan, 15 March 1969. 140 See the Angkatan Bersendiata editorial, "The Two Group Problem," 3 April 1969. === [PDF page 544] === 529 restructuring, Nasution spoke up in favor of at least some degree of restructuring. He stated that under the present political structure it was not only impossible for democracy to grow, but that it provided a "ground for the growth of dictatorship." He proposed a compromise on the issue of the type of electoral system Indonesia should have by suggesting that it be a combination of the district and proportional representation systems. He tried to appeal to the political parties by suggesting that in parliament the armed forces be limited to a number of seats equal to the number won by the majority party or group. According to reports, Soeharto would not accept any of Nasution's ideas, and was very angry at his advocacy of a mixed electoral system. By the middle of 1969 the strength of the Panglima se-Jawa faction was fast declining, the Nasution faction could only serve as a small irritant, and the Soeharto faction was clearly the master of both the army and the country. Three major reasons for the victory of the Soeharto faction are: 1) the members of the Soeharto faction had slowly ensconced themselves in the government, and the faction began to effect an alliance with the bureaucracy; 2) the Soeharto faction was mainly Javanese, as contrasted to the Panglima se-Jawa faction, thereby giving it more legitimacy in the eyes of the Javanese; and 3) the Soeharto faction was willing to compromise -with the political parties, and it alienated fewer groups than did the Panelima === [PDF page 545] === 530 se-Jawa faction, which tended to be more rigid and "ideological" than was the Soeharto faction. Factionalism in the Other Armed Services The air force and navy especially gradually lost whatever autonomy they had had in the past. The commanders of the air force and navy were ousted from their positions in 1969 by Soeharto, and then exiled as ambassadors to Great Britain and the Soviet Union respectively. be discussed further subsequently. This will In the i\ew Order the important way to advance and keep a good position in the navy and the air force is to have a close relationship with Soeharto and close associates of Soeharto. The nature of factions and cliques in the navy and air force changed due to the complete loss of autonomy within these services. The state police retained some autonomy, and the power struggle to oust an unpopular commander was evidenced both within the policy, and finally in the negotiations between the challenging group and the army leadership. During much of the tsew Order, Commissioner General Hoegeng Iman Santoso was commander, a man highly respected in the country because of his reputation as being completely incorruptible, a rather miraculous feat considering the low salary given even to a general. Hoegeng wanted to make the state police into a non-corruptible, efficient, and modern service, which earned him respect in many quarters, inside and outside the police, but resulted in much grumbling within the police department, especially === [PDF page 546] === 531 when he required his subordinates to come to work on time, and not to leave the office before the end of the work day. His growing estrangement from some powerful members of the Soeharto faction was also a factor causing the weakening of his base of support. By 1971 Soeharto was able to end Hoegeng's appointment as police commander. This example does show that there was a greater degree of autonomy within the police, even though the central government was finally able to control the leadership of the police. Soeharto's Attempts to Build Cohesion: 1966-1970 There were five major methods which Soeharto used in building cohesion within the military, which contributed to the stabilization of the political system. These methods, too, had the effect of controlling factionalism. The methods which Soeharto used were: l) purging those considered leftists and those unwilling to transfer their loyalties from Sukarno to Soeharto; 2) transferring those who were leaders of antagonistic factions to distant regions or outside the country or to unimportant positions in the central military staff or the civil service; 3) using institutions within the military through which criticism and advice could be channeled; 4) favoring factions of political groups which were favorable to the Soeharto faction; and 5) changing the organizational structure of the military. This was approximately the sequence of strategies that emerged over time. === [PDF page 547] === 532 One can distinguish two periods of purging. The first period immediately followed the attempted coup. Those considered to be the coup leaders and followers, both civilian and military, were jailed or killed. officers Those who were considered leftist but who were not believed to be directly implicated in the coup attempt were transferred to unimportant positions. The second purge period began during the guerrilla uprising of the PKI and its allies in Blitar, East Java, around the middle of 1968. There were many people arrested then, both civilian and military. During the height of this period it was rare for there to be a day when no arrests were announced. The arrests affected all divisions, within Java and the Outer Islands.141 One officer in the Ministry of Security and Defense (HAi\KAM), in great shock, said: So many of my friends, whom I have known for years, have been arrested, and I never suspected they may be pro-PKI. We /meaning his colleagues within the militarx7 look around us and we don't know whom to trust. For example, in August 1968 one major general, four colonels, two lieutenant colonels, and seven majors from the Siliwangi division were arrested (Antara, morning edition, 23 August 1968); on the same day the official armed forces newspaper,- Angkatan Bersendiata. carried a report that the regional army commander of Central Java had ordered the arrest of two hundred members of the military. The newspaper also carried an announcement by an officer of the Brawijaya division that 850 persons, including members of the armed forces, had been arrested in South Blitar, and that there were approximately 400 members of the Brawijaya division who were assisting the underground PKI movement. === [PDF page 548] === 533 Several generals remarked privately that there seemed to be a "contest" among some regional commanders as to who could arrest the most people. In the non-military newspapers, there were frequent editorials urging careful investigation before people were arrested, and that "anti-communist" phobia should not be used as an excuse to get rid of oppo142 nents. The PKI scare, however, provided a great temptation to military leaders, especially those in the regions, to get rid of all who were considered opponents or even those who were only disliked by someone. The second policy, that of transferring members of opposing factions, was initially used by Soeharto in 1966 to decrease the strength of the Nasution faction. vVith the members of Panglima se-Jawa faction this policy only began after the Soeharto faction had consolidated itself, that is, after the 1968 MPRS session.14 The MPRS session ended as a victory for Soeharto, in that he was elected president with no conditions, and the emergency powers, which Sukarno had been forced to grant him in March 1966, were extended.144 It was after the MPRS session that Soeharto began, slowly, An example would be the fampas editorial of 8 January 1968. For a good discussion and analysis of the pre- and early-post consolidation period, see Feith, "Political Format," pp. 88-105. The Nasution faction agreed to support Soeharto for the presidency, but it did not want his emergency powers extended. On this issue the Panglima se-Jawa faction tried to prevent conflict between the Soeharto and Nasution factions. === [PDF page 549] === 534 in a Javanese fashion, to break the power of the Panglima se-Jawa faction by applying the policy of transfer. He very gradually transferred members of the Panglima se-Jawa faction, first the less important members, then the more important ones, until at the end the leaders of the faction were too far away from each other to be of help in a time of crisis. Realizing that the Pangl ima se.-Jawa faction was a potential coup group, whether or not the members of the faction had discussed the possibility, Soeharto pursued the tactic of exiling his opponents, either to the periphery of the country, or to foreign countries as ambassadors, or to Jakarta in unimportant staff or civil service positions. In the third policy Soeharto and his faction utilized advisory committees within the military, to which those who were politically astute and experienced in political matters, but who were associated with one of the opposing factions, were appointed. One example of an advisory committee of this nature would be the advisory group under General Panggabean, called the SPRI Panggabean, to which a large number of generals who fit this characterization were appointed. These people were useful because of their knowledge and experience, and to some extent their opposition to the regime could be neutralized by coopting them in this way, or at least by giving them an advisory role in the regime. These appointments could serve to prevent them from expressing their opposition in an active way. === [PDF page 550] === 535 The fourth policy was that of lessening the opposing factions' strength by diminishing the influence of the political party factions the opposition. which supported or were close to An example of this was the Jn\I election for party chairpersonship, which took place in Semarang, Central Java in April 1970. There were two candidates for party chairpersonship, one of whom was Hardi, who was the strongest national PNI figure. He had strength not only in Java but also in the Outer Islands. Hardi's army contacts were largely with officers from the Siliwangi division, and he also had close contact with the lirKI party. The other candidate, Hadisubeno, whose strength lay mostly in Central Java, had close contacts, including familial and personal ties, with army leaders from the Diponegoro division. Hadisubeno, an old friend of Soeharto, was Soeharto's choice for PNI general chairperson, and largely through the aid of one of Soeharto's advisers (Lieutenant General Ali Moertopo) and with the cooperation and help of the Diponegoro division, with its headquarters in Semarang, Hadisubeno was elected general chairperson. The fifth type of policy evident in this period was that of changing the organizational structure of the military. Soeharto was not only bothered by factions within 14 See Rosihan Anwar in Pedoman. 27 April 1970; Zaenal Arifin SH in Sinar Harapan, 20 April 1970; Kara Karma in Operasi. 27 April 1970; Kentjana in Harian " Kami. 30 April 1970; Merdeka, 6 April 1970; Harian Kami. 8 April 1970; Kpmpas, 7 April 1970; and Indonesia Rava, 27 May 1970. === [PDF page 551] === 536 his own service, but also with inter-service rivalry. The other services, much smaller and with less power than the army, have always attempted to prevent the "encroachments" of the army. In the leadership of some of the services, notably in the navy and marines, pro-Sukarno or leftist factions were still very strong, and this was of serious concern to Soeharto.146 In order to further cohesion of the army and also to lessen independent action by the other services, Soeharto reorganized the whole structure of the armed forces.147 According to the reorganization of 1969 there are no longer commanders of the services; instead there are chiefs of staff, who have no operational authority. The defense minister, who is ex-officio commander During the tenure of Admiral Muljadi as naval commander, a nephew of Sukarno, Commodore Poegoeh, was both secretary to the naval commander and editor of the newspaper, El Bahar, which continually carried sharp criticism of the Soeharto regime from a radical nationalist viewpoint. In early 1969 an adviser of Ali Moertopo checked the names of naval leaders whom he considered leftist and proSukarno, including the names of the naval commander and two of the three deputies. He said that in a few months these persons would be ousted from their positions, and "we" (Soeharto's faction) would change the whole leadership of the navy. Some months later his prediction was borne out. After the appointment of a new naval commander, a man who had served under Soeharto, a wholesale purge of naval leaders was conducted, and by the beginning of 1970 many naval leaders, including Commodore Poegoeh, had been arrested. Concerning the purge in the navy see Kerdeka. 16 January 1970. For details of the reorganization see Warta Harlan, 12 November 1969. For reactions of the Indonesian press see the following editorials: Harian Kami 7 October 1969; Pedoman, 12 November 1960; Indonesia Rava. 13 November 1969; and Abadi, 13 November 1969. === [PDF page 552] === 537 of the armed forces (at that time Soeharto), has the authority to direct the activities of each branch of the armed services down to the company level. Instead of the country being divided into many separate commanders, there were six commands according to this reorganization, in which officers from the army, air force, and navy served in the same organizational structure. The defense ministry is now responsible for personnel, instead of the individual service staffs. At the time of the reorganization members of the Soeharto faction stated privately that two years would elapse before the change could be effected. At the time of the reorganization, it was not known whether or not the reorganization would be successful in promoting cohesion and establishing control over the various armed services and in limiting factionalism within the army. In order for cohesion to come about there would have to be more than organizational change and controls effected. The other armed forces have been very resentful of the escalating power of the army. Within the army, other divisions resented the monopoly of positions and power in the hands of the Diponegoro division. There were still ethnic and religious tensions within the military, particularly within the army9 which paralleled the cleavages within the society as a whole, although the army is far more homogeneous than in the past. Many junior officers expressed unhappiness at the extent to which senior officers participated in corruption. This resentment === [PDF page 553] === 538 could have been caused either by jealousy, or probably less frequently, by idealistic beliefs. At that time political differences within the officer corps still remained and those differences would hamper cohesion from being effected. Factionalism in the Military from 1970-1974: A Postscript Factionalism in the army underwent important changes as a result of the reorganization of the military and the consolidation of the Soeharto regime. It was found that in the early New Order the two main factional actors were the Soeharto and the Panglima se-Jawa factions, representing differences in regional and ethnic origin, political attitudes and beliefs, and divisional identification. Factions were still strongly influenced in the early Isew Order period by divisional identification; although divisional differences can be seen in the later factional lineup, they are less prominent as a base for factionalism. After the consolidation of the regime the Soeharto faction faced no serious military threat to its dominance of political and military life. Members of the Soeharto faction became increasingly entrenched in three groups and institutions» the military, the civil service, and the team of personal military advisors (ASPRI) to Soeharto. The Soeharto faction split into three factions, based upon these different bases of support and military factional politics in the later period was mainly dominated by rivalries between the first and last factions, centered around the === [PDF page 554] === 53S& persons of General Soemitro, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and KOPKAMTIB (Command for the Restoration of Security and Order) commander, and Lieutenant General Ali Moertopo, member of the team of military advisors (ASFRI) and head of Operas! Chusus. these two factions Competition between was reflected in Golkar which will be discussed in chapter 6, and in various areas of public controversy, culminating in the events that led up to the demonstrations and mass violence in January 1974 during the visit of the Japanese prime minister, Tanaka, and resulted in the demise of Soemitro and his faction. The area of factionalism, in this later period of the iNew Order, was narrower, centered largely around military leaders who were clustered together in the faction of Soeharto during the early New Order period; and the new factional area did not include the regional military commanders in any active capacity. In many ways factional politics resembled the traditional kraton-stvle politics, in which cliques surrounding the traditional Javanese ruler competed with each other. The two factions can be compared as to their composition and military and civilian bases of support. Of the two factions, Soemitro had the stronger military support, consisting of most of the leaders in the Ministry of Defense and Security, the army staff (SUAD), the regional commands, and also in BAKIN (the intelligence agency headed by Lieutenant General Soetopo Joewono until his replacement === [PDF page 555] === 540 by Yoga Sugama after the January riots). The Soemitro faction was the more diverse in terms of divisional origin. There were representatives in the Soemitro faction from all the Java divisions, including some Siliwangi leaders who had been opposed to the Panglima se-Jawa faction. Soemitro himself is from the Brawijaya division. The ASPRI faction was composed of very few military leaders, who were all from the Diponegoro division, but they were very powerful because of their close personal friendship with Soeharto. Soemitro*s closest civilian allies were the technocrats; these two groups were joined by their common opposition to the ASPRI, and especially to Ali Moertopo. Soemitro*s faction, composed of professional military men who were not close to Soeharto before the abortive coup in 1965, disliked the ASPRI faction for two reasons: 1) the power of the ASPRI faction depended upon their personal relationships with the president and was not founded on institutional supports; and 2) the ASPRI aligned itself with Chinese businessmen and with certain intellectual groups, both of which Soemitro and his faction distrusted. The technocrats, who had based their entire economic policy on close relations with Western countries and international agencies and on their economic expertise acquired at American universities, were bitterly opposed to the power of the ASPRI in the making and application of economic policy and its reliance upon close economic relations with Japan and Japanese firms. The ASPRI faction received suppport from === [PDF page 556] === 541 some former AKSI leaders (particularly those from Catholic organizations), some members of the former Golongan Independent, and some accommodationist leaders of the Parmusi, such as Agus Sudono and Mintaredja. The third faction, which emerged from the Soeharto faction, led by Amir Machmud, internal affairs minister, had little power, except as a swing faction; although the ministry was under him, Amir Machmud enjoyed little support from the pamong Praia* did not even have the support of most of the governors, as they were divided among all three factions. The conflict between the Soemitro and ASPRI factions came to a head with the demonstrations in January 1974. During the first half of 1973 there was growing unrest within most levels of the population, particularly among 148 the students and the younger generation. There was increasing criticism of the government, particularly of the technocrats and the ASPRI. Criticism revolved around See Allan A. Samson, "Indonesia* A Climate of Concern," Asian Survey 14 (February 1974)» 157-165 for an analysis and discussion of the reasons for the unrest. For articles discussing the situation prior to the January 1974 demonstrations sees O.G. Roeder, "A Campus Call for Harmony," Far Eastern Economic Review 82 (10 December 1973), pp. 16-18; Rosihan Anwar, "The Students and the Technocrats," Far Eastern Economic Review 82 (10 December 1973)$ 19; Asia Research Bulletin 3 (31 December 1973)$ 2294-2295; Peter Simms, "Indonesia's Social Inequalities Led to Mob Violence during Tanaka's Visit," Asia Research Bulletin 3 (31 January 1974): 2351-2356; Kompas editorial, "General Soemitro's Reaffirmation," 5 January 1974; and Tempo, 8 December 1973. === [PDF page 557] === 542 several major issuest 1) the extent of Japanese economic influence; 2) government preference for Chinese-Indonesian entrepreneurs over indigeneous entrepreneurs; 3) worsening economic conditions for the masses and the growing contrast between the livelihood of military and business elites and the masses of Indonesians; and 4) the growing harshness and dominance of military rule. Many civilian groups complained that there was little communication between the government and the people, and little heed was paid to civilian demands. At the opening of parliament in August 1973, after the serious anti-Chinese riots in Bandung, Soeharto called for the institution of a two-way system of communication between the government and the people. After Soeharto's speech and increasingly toward the end of the year, General Soemitro went to campuses and to civilian groups talking about a new "social leadership pattern" to be instituted in April 1974, which was the time of the conclusion of the first development plan. Soemitro said that "... leaders from top down to the bottom must be able to communicate with the people and the people need not fear to express their views."149 It was not clear to Indonesian audiences what the new "social leadership pattern" would mean. Some rumors spread that Soemitro would be president in April, whereas other rumors stated that the ASPRI faction would be defeated by April. 149 Tempo, 8 December 1973. Soemitro's speeches to === [PDF page 558] === 543 students and other civilian groups did earn him much popularity with these groups. The ASPRI faction was opposed to Soemitro's actions and fearful of the support given to Soemitro by the technocrats and increasingly by students and other civilian groups. The demonstrations and the serious violence in January 1974 gave Ali Moertopo the opportunity to accuse Soemitro of planning a coup against Soeharto. The ASPRI leaders also maintained that the students were used by the technocrats and by ex-Masjumi and ex-PSI elements in their attempt to take Indonesian down the road of "free fight and laissez faire pattern of development in the Western and American fashion."151 After the riots Soemitro was dropped first from his position as KOPK.AMTIB commander, then as Deputy Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces; his closest military associates were also removed from their positions. In response to widespread criticism of ASPRI Soeharto "abolished" it, but according to reports the individual leaders still retain their power, and Ali 152 Moertopo*s Operasi Chusus is still in operation. See Imam Wilujo, "Courage to Create a Democratic Atmosphere," Sinar Harapan, 24 November 1973 and Tempo, 8 December 1973. See Marzuki Arifin, "What Road Must Be Taken," Expres, 18 January 1974; this paper was considered the spokesperson for Ali Moertopo and his views. 152 My thanks go to Indonesian friends and acquaintances, who in confidence, discussed military factions of the late New Order with me. For articles referring to military factionalism in this period see: Richard Chauvel, === [PDF page 559] === 544 this juncture it is not known what shape the emerging factions will take, but as long as Soeharto*s personal military advisers maintain their power, the new opposing faction will most likely be centered in military institutions. To summarize, military factional composition has been influenced by background characteristics, particularly those of divisional, ethnic, and religious identifications. Factions historically have centered around the Diponegoro and Siliwangi divisions, whose officers differ in ethnic, religious, and educational background and in the extent of Western cultural influence. These factors were influential, not only in the composition of factions, but also in factional behavior, and the stands taken by the factions on issues. Army factions have always been aligned with civilian factions, which usually share some background characteristics with their military allies. The naval, air force, and police officers are from more homogeneous background than those from the army, probably accounting for the fact that ethnic and social background characteristics are not bases for factionalism. Differences in training (for the navy and air force) and competition for the office of commander (in the three services) are major bases for factionalism. "The Calm before the Storm--A Review of Folitical Trends/ Developments in Indonesia July 1972-June 1973," Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs 7 (July-December 1973)i 43-57i Allan A. Samson, "Indonesia 1972i The Solidification of Military Control," Asian Survey 13 (February 1973)i 127-139i and Samson, "Climate of Concern." === [PDF page 560] === 545 In chapter 6 a similar type of analysis is conducted for the civilian segments of the elite, followed by an analysis of military-civilian relationships during Guided Democracy and the i\ew Order, including the search of the military for a political organization linking the military and civilian spheres together. === [PDF page 561] === 546 CHAPTER VI CIVILIAN FACTIONS AND MILITARYCIVILIAN RELATIONSHIPS Summary This chapter discusses four questions: 1) What are the main variables influencing factional alignments within civilian parties and groups? 2) What attempts has the Indonesian army made to develop political organizations that could rival civilian movements? 3) What is the nature of the evolving relationships between civilian and military groups over time; and 4) What strategies did the Soeharto regime develop to control and limit the activities of the political parties? In contrast with the military, in which factionalism is influenced by both background variables and organizational characteristics of the Indonesian army, within the civilian elite background factors are the main variables in determining the bases of factionalism, although ideological beliefs do play a role in influencing factional alignments. However, often ideological beliefs themselves are closely related to background characteristics. For the civilian elite, it was found that the most important background factors influencing factional composition and alignment werei ethnic origin, age and generation, educational === [PDF page 562] === 547 e x p e r i e n c e, p r e - p a r t y p o l i t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e, and p e r s o n a l and k i n r e l a t i o n s. The p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s can be compared w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e e x t e n t t o which p a r t i c u l a r background c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s a r e more s a l i e n t t h a n o t h e r s i n d e t e r m i n ing f a c t i o n a l membership, and w h e t h e r o r not p l a y s an i n f l u e n t i a l r o l e in f a c t i o n a l ideology membership. E e s c r i p t i o n s of t h e major f a c t i o n a l d i v i s i o n s t h e time of t h e c o n c e p t i o n of t h e major p o l i t i c a l after from parties i n d e p e n d e n c e, and c u l m i n a t i n g with a d i s c u s s i o n and a n a l y s i s of f a c t i o n a l i s m i n t h e New O r d e r w i l l illustrate Che i n f l u e n c e of t h e b a s e s of f a c t i o n a l i s m and t h e issues around which f a c t i o n s e v o l v e d. also The d i s c u s s i o n w i l l show t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between background characteristics and c r o s s - p a r t y and c r o s s - o r g a n i z a t i o n a l alignments. Factionalism within p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s r e s u l t e d in the weakening of t h e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s i n terms of c o m p e t i t i o n and c r o s s - o r g a n i z a t i o n a l, party, inter-party army-political competition. The second p a r t o f t h e c h a p t e r a n a l y s e s militaryc i v i l i a n r e l a t i o n s h i p s, c o n c e n t r a t i n g upon two a s p e c t s: a t t e m p t of t h e m i l i t a r y t o c r e a t e r i v a l p o l i t i c a l the movements and t h e s t r a t e g i e s and p o l i c i e s t h e S o e h a r t o government used i n o r d e r t o c o n t r o l t h e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s. During t h e f i r s t y e a r s a f t e r i n d e p e n d e n c e, c i v i l i a n groups were s t r o n g enough i n comparison w i t h t h e emerging m i l i t a r y t o e n c e i n t r a - a r m y r e l a t i o n s and p o l i c y. influ- Gradually the posit i o n between t h e two began t o r e v e r s e, c u l m i n a t i n g === [PDF page 563] === 548 overwhelming control by the military over civilian groups and policy. As a reaction to the army's initial weakness vis-a-vis civilian political parties and movements, after the unsuccessful 17 October Affair, army leaders attempted to create rival political movements. Thus began a persistent pattern that led to the creation of Golkar as the official government party by the Soeharto regime, which successfully contested the 1971 election. Golkar and KOSGORO, a military-civilian organization founded by Mas Isman from TRIP, are analyzed and compared in terms of army sponsorship, ideology, and support. The policies and strategies the Soeharto regime used to control the political parties and their leadership are discussed. These strategies ranged from rather crude attempts to engineer the election of favored party leaders (to the party leadership council) to the simplification of the political party structure, first unsuccessfully begun by the leader of the Panelima se-Jawa faction, then later slowly implemented by Soeharto and his advisers. Despite the technical success of Soeharto's political strategies, they were not successful in helping the regime gain legitimacy. This failure was shown most dramatically by the 1974 riots and the subsequent arrest, questioning, and/or exile of prominent intellectuals and student leaders who had been former supporters of the regime. === [PDF page 564] === 549 Civilian Factions Bases of Factionalism Introduction Factionalism In the political parties and divisions within the' technocracy were influenced both by background and ideological factors, but background differences appeared to be primary in determining factional alignments. Relevant background characteristics included ethnic and social status origin, age and generation, education, pre-party political experience, and personal/kin relationships. Factional alignments were characterized by different ideological beliefs, but it appeared that these beliefs were derived largely from different socialization patterns, which were themselves a function of the particular background characteristics which distinguish each faction. In addition, parties can be compared in the extent to which ideological differences determined factional alignments. Ethnic and Social Status Origin In the formation of party factions ethnic origin sometimes played a role. In the PNI during Guided Democracy, the Hard! faction recruited many members from nonJavanese ethnic groups, in contrast with the Ali-Surachman faction, mainly composed of Javanese. The ethnic origins of these two factions within the PNI influenced their ideological stances, and, in particular, the allies which each chose. In the New Order, the PNI was divided Into two === [PDF page 565] === 550 factional alliances* based upon whether or not the PNI should "accommodate" itself to the military government! the "accommodationist" faction was dominated by Javanese, compared to the large representation of non-Javanese in the non-accommodationist faction. The influence of ethnic origin was also seen in the Masjumi partyi the Sukiman faction, largely Javanese, had close relations with the PNI and the NU, largely Javanese parties, whereas the Natsir faction's closest allies were the PSI and the Siliwangi division, both dominated by non-Javanese. The members of the Natsir faction had been imbued with the ideology of Islamic reformism, which had its Indonesian center in West Sumatra. In Indonesian politics it is most common to see Outer Islanders resocialize themselves to conform to the Javanese culture, but in the Natsir faction for those who were Javanese, the reverse process often occurred. Social status origin was of less importance than ethnic origin in determining factional lines» this was due to the importance of social status in political party recruitment. Politically conscious Javanese of merchant origin, and therefore usually santri. tended to join the Nahdatul Ulama or, in some cases, the Masjumi or Parmusi. In the early PNI one could see social status differentiations along factional lines. The right wing of the revolutionary PNI, which formed the PIR, was composed of those of noble background, compared to the privavi origin of those in the other PNI factions. === [PDF page 566] === 551 Age and Generation Age and generation were factors that influenced factional alignments in the three major parties and also the divisions within the technocrats. The two technocratic members, who, with a few followers split off from the rest, were the oldest technocrats, and they refused to accept the leadership of someone junior to them. In the P M age differences among factions were quite noticeable; from the revolutionary period each faction could be contrasted with its rival(s) in terms of average age of the members. Similar patterns were seen in the Masjumi, Parmusi, and NU parties. In Indonesia the various generational groups have received different socialization patterns, which influence factional membership. However, even though there were cases where leaders who differed in age had similar ideological or policy values and attitudes, they were not aligned if the younger or youngest was the leader of that "ideological or policy" faction. The older leaders would refuse to "follow" the younger leader because those rather senior in age would feel "shame" if they were to follow a younger leader. In Indonesia a leader is still perceived as a bapak, and it seems inappropriate for any anak buah to be older, except by a few years, than the bapak. Education The e x t e n t t o which l e a d e r s have received u n i v e r s i t y education and t h e time and place of t h i s education i n f l u enced f a c t i o n a l membership and alignments. For example, === [PDF page 567] === 552 one faction in the PNI, the Batavia or Wilopo faction, was almost exclusively composed of those who attended the law faculty in Jakarta (called Batavia during the Dutch period) during the same years. Most members of the rival faction during the Revolution had also studied law, but most had studied law in Leiden, not in Jakarta. Concerning the extent of education, the Hardi faction during Guided Democracy was better educated than its rival, the Ali-Surachman faction. A similar pattern in the contrast of time and place of university education could be seen in the Masjumi party. Most of the members of the Natsir faction studied in Jakarta, whereas a large proportion of the members of the Sukiman faction studied in Holland. In the NU party the educational differences centered around pesantren education exclusively compared to modern university training. In the New Order those who had only received pesantren education were concentrated in the Jombang faction, whereas those who had received university training dominated the Subchan faction. The divisions among the technocratic leaders were influenced by place of university education. The rivals of Widjojo had different educational experiences from those of Widjojo and most of the technocrats. Pre-Party Political Experience The factions can also be distinguished by the extent and nature of political experience prior to the Revolution, and for the technocrats, after the Revolution. In the PNI === [PDF page 568] === 553 factions could be compared as to the extent of political experience in the decade before the Japanese occupation. the Masjumi party organizations and individuals were members, and factional alignments were influenced by organizational identification. In the Parmusi this was also clearly noticeable j the leaders of the reformist faction had been prominent in the Masjumi, contrasted with the absence of former Masjumi members in the accommodationist faction. The two technocratic leaders who broke away from Widjojo both had been active leaders of the PSI and more involved in politics than Widjojo and his followers. Personal and Kin Relationships In a country where personal and kin relationships intimately pervade every aspect of life, including the use of kinship terms in addressing superiors, inferiors, colleagues, and everyone one meets, it is necessary to stress their role in factional membership and alignment. Political party and technocratic leaders knew the core leaders of their faction before either the party, technocratic group, or faction was formed. Some of the factional members were related through kinship, and others formed close personal relationships with others who became members of the same factions through common experiences in youth movements, educational institutions and pesantren. and also through the experience of having the same bapak. who was a national leader. The party which has the closest === [PDF page 569] === 554 network of Interpersonal and kin relations affecting the party as a whole and also factional alignments within it is the NU partyt the klvavi families who founded the NU formed marriage alliances with each other and with their students. There is still a strong tendency for the children of the NU leaders to marry each other. Those related to the founders of the NU, either through kinship or through a guru-student relationship, were concentrated in one New Order faction, the Jombang faction. In the Masjumi and the Parmusl the core of the reformist faction was composed of those who were the anak buah of Haji Agus Salim. In all parties there was much evidence of intramarriage, and sometimes these marriages were used to form alliances between leaders. One leader told me that his father, a political party leader during the Dutch occupation, and another leader with a daughter, arranged his marriage, which ratified the political alliance of the two leaders. Ideology The combination of background factors and ideological currents influential in Indonesia and outside the country contributed to the development of factions within the poli^ tical parties, and later to rival groups within the technocrats. In the PNI, the ideological divisions were influenced by the extent to which the members desired social and economic change, and whether or not they emphasized exclusively the need for national independence and the === [PDF page 570] === 555 increase of national sovereignty. The factions desiring radical economic and social change in the PNI usually aligned themselves with other radical parties, such as the PKI, Murba, and Fartindo. Those who did not favor radical change emphasized the need to develop a strong and unified Indonesia, and their factions would align themselves with more conservative parties, such as PSI, elements of Masjumi, and the NU. The Masjumi and Parmusi parties were divided between those who held a strong ideological commitment to Islamic reformism and those who were called "pragmatists," that is, they would cooperate with the existing political structure, even at the expense of their Islamic identification. The NU factions differed in this way from the other two parties. The faction in power was composed of those closer to traditional Javanese Islam, an Islam that has cooperated with the non-Islamic governments in control. has no clear coherent ideology, in contrast to the reformist faction of the Masjumi and Parmusi. The opposing faction, composed of younger members, who have been exposed to the "modern" culture through university training, have a reasonably coherent set of political beliefs, rooted in the Western democratic socialist tradition. In Guided Democracy, and even more in the Ifew Order, there has been a strong tendency for the factions of the parties to be divided into those which are accommodationist and those which are non-accommodationist in their relations with the government. In the New Order the party === [PDF page 571] === 556 factions possessing the most coherent ideologies or sets of political beliefs tend accommodatlonlst. to be those which are also non- In this, one can see the influence, for example, of ethnic background. Except for the technocrats* the non-accommodationist factions have a higher representation of non-Javanese than the accoramodationist factions. During Guided Democracy, however, there was no relationship between coherence of ideology or possession of an ideology and a non-accommodationist stance, due to the importance of socialist and nationalist concepts within the official ideology of the government. The interplay between background and ideology will be illustrated further in the description and analyses of factionalism in the three major parties of the New Order, the PNI, the Parmusi, and the NU, and also in the technocrats. In order to show the continuity of factional division from the past, some historical background will be given. Divisions in the Technocrats The technocrats, compared to the political party and military leaders, had few cleavages within their group. This was partially because of the small number of persons in the total group (fifty persons approximately), but perhaps more important was the overriding acceptance of Professor Widjojo Nitisastro by almost every member of the group as the bapak, and also their belief that they were instruments for development, and therefore must be loyal === [PDF page 572] === 557 to the Soeharto government and serve It without any independent political ambitions. After Professor Soemltro went Into exile at the beginning of Guided Democracy• Professor Wldjojo, Soemltro's most senior student* became the bapak of the economists, who later began to be called the technocrats. Their unity as a group was first forged by their opposition to the policies of Sukarno, especially his disregard for economic development, which, in the view of the economists, should take precedence over political and social development. Sukarno made attempts to split the group, but he was unsuccessful. During Guided Democracy the technocrats were drawn into an alliance with certain elements of the army, particularly those from SESKOAD, and they received protection and financial help from SESKOAD. Soeharto and his faction chose the technocrats as their major civilian allies, and have relied upon them to maintain the legitimacy of the government by guiding the economic development of the country. The type of policies that should be followed and the extent to which the technocrats should attempt to control the military have influenced small divisions within the technocrats, although generational and personal factors have played as large a role in these divisions as have policy disagreements. The first split in the technocrats was between Professors Wldjojo and Sarbini. Sarbini was different from most members of the technocrats, both in terms of === [PDF page 573] === 558 background factors and in the types of policies he favored. He was older than Widjojo, and did not accept Widjojo as the leader of the technocratsi he was also one of the few who had not attended the University of California at Berkeley after he completed his study at the University of Indonesia. Sarbini*s personality is less "Javanese" than that of Widjojoi he is rather frank and blunt in his opinions. Unlike most of the technocrats, Sarbini was a very active member of the PSI during Parliamentary Democracy! his concern for politics was shown by his attitude toward economics and economic development, in that he did not divorce economics from politics. Professor Sarbini did not agree with what he perceived to be the over-reliance of Widjojo upon foreign aid and investment. By September 1968 he was openly critical of Widjojo*s policies! Widjojo would not accept his criticism, not only because he disagreed with Sarbini*s analyses, but more because Widjojo required total loyalty from a member of his group. Loyalty was considered to be of greater importance than competence. Professor Sarbini also began criticizing the lack of attention paid to the indigenous business community and the non-participatory nature of development planning in Indonesia. Gradually, Professor Sarbini became active as one of the main intellectual opponents of the policies of the Soeharto government. In addition to his statements in 1968, See Pedpman, 16 December 1968. === [PDF page 574] === 559 he criticized the massive corruption in the government, the growing autocracy of the regime, and the economic partnership between the government and the Chinese businessmen. Sarbini had support from the younger faculty members In the economics faculty of the University of Indonesia, and also from other faculties. Many of his anak buah were involved in the January 1974 demonstrations, including the main leader of the demonstrations, his son-in-law, Hariman Siregar, who was student council president. Professor Sarbini and many of his anak buah were arrested after the demonstrations. The second split, less open and more muted than that between Sarbini and Widjojo, occurred between Professor Soemitro and Professor Widjojo. The personal reasons for the split were not only the issue of older versus younger generation, but also that of teacher and student. Professor Soemitro, the founder of the economics faculty, was Widjojo*s teacher, and Professor Soemitro would not accept that his former position as bapak had been preempted by Widjojo. In the competition that began soon after Soemitro's return to Indonesia, Soeharto clearly backed Widjojo. Soeharto saw Widjojo and his anak buah as men without political ambition, but Soemitro, who had been a very active politician for years, Soeharto did not trust. Soemitro, unlike Widjojo and Widjojo*s followers, refused to give his unqualified loyalty to Soeharto. Soemitro also differed from Widjojo in terms of desired economic === [PDF page 575] === 560 policies and political controls. From the time Soemitro returned to Indonesia and was offered the position of trade minister, he has remained adamant about the necessity for the institution of controls upon Soeharto and the military. For example, his main condition for accepting a position in the government was that armed forces members be removed from positions from which they could obstruct economic policies. He was finally persuaded by Widjojo and his group to compromise with Soeharto and accept a cabinet post, but he still pursued policies of revoking the armed forces* privilege to import goods and of cancelling import licenses of prominent Chinese businessmen, who were "part3 ners" of military leaders. Soemitro, like Sarbini, began to emphasize the necessity for giving help and even preference to indigenous businessmen. Professor Soemitro, also like Sarbini, differed in other ways from Widjojo and his group, besides that of age. All of Soemitro*s higher education was in Europe in the 1930s, and unlike his students, he did not attend Berkeley, and therefore was not influenced by its economic ideology and approach. Soemitro was less influenced by the Javanese culture than Widjojo; he was open and frank, and did not hesitate to challenge See Nusantara. 19 June 1968. See?Soemitro*s.Courage,M Mertlu Suar editorial* August 30, 1968. See Derek Davies, "Shadow and Substance," Far Eastern Economic Review 76 (17 June 1972)i 23-24, === [PDF page 576] === 561 directly attempts of the military leaders to influence him. His frequent opposition to military policies and policies of other technocrats led to his demotion from trade minister to that of Minister of State for Research Activities in the Second Development Cabinet, formed in March 1973. Factionalism in the Major Partiesi The PNI, the Mas jumi/Parmus i, and the NU PNI The PNI was divided ideologically from the time of the Revolution. These ideological divisions were influenced by ethnic, educational, and social status background, and by the nature of past party identification. The PNI, organized in early 1946, was an amalgamation of various political groups. The nucleus of the PNI was the Serikat Rakvat Indonesia (Serindo), organized shortly after the start of the Revolution, and led mainly by those who had been members of the pre-war PNI and the parties that followed it in the colonial period.(Partindo, Gerindo, and Parindra). In early 1946 the Serindo joined with a number of small nationalist parties in various parts of Indonesia, particularly within Java, to form the PNI. In the early part of the Revolution three main factions could be distinguished, the right, the center, and the small faction from the Batavia Law Faculty, who were fairly conservative. I am grateful to Gustav Papanek of Boston University for sharing with me his impressions of the technocrats* === [PDF page 577] === 562 There was a small left faction, but it was not important at this time. The right faction was recruited from the upper civil service, not only within Java, but also from the Outer Islands, Many of the members of this faction broke away from the PNI to form the PIR in 1948. The social origin of the right faction was quite highi for example, most of the Javanese leaders were from the nobility. The educational level was also advanced? most of them had received university education, especially in law. The right faction was the oldest, in terms of age of its members, of the factions. The greater ethnic diversity of the right faction was shown by the leadership list of the PIR after it was formedi five of the ten national leaders were from the Outer Islands. Except for a few, most of those from the right faction had not engaged in prior nationalist activity. The difficulty this conservative faction had in exercising influence over the public stances of the party, which was dominated by radical nationalists who had been active in the pre-war PNI and Partindo, prompted them to split from the PNI, and form their own party. Because of their influence as traditional leaders, many felt that the PIR would be potentially a powerful partyi this was not borne out. The center and the Batavia factions (the latter emerged from the center faction) were very similar in educations ethnic, and social status origin. Both factions were almost exclusively composed of Javanese, and both were recruited from the privavl. although the members were not as === [PDF page 578] === 563 aristocratic as those from the right. Most had received a university education, usually in law. The major differences between the two factions in terms of background concerned the educational institution attended and time of attendance. The Batavia faction all attended the law faculty in Jakarta shortly before the Japanese occupation. They, too, had been active in pre-war nationalist organizations, but not to the extent of those in the center faction. They were also a few years younger than those in the center faction. Most of those in the center faction had studied law, but many of them had studied in Leiden, Holland, not in Jakarta. Factional divisions during Parliamentary Democracy were unstable, with alliances changing over time. In the beginning of Parliamentary Democracy there were three main factions, the Sidik, the Sartono-Suwirjo, and the Wilopo factions. During the Revolution Sidik and Sartono had been part of the center faction, and Suwirjo and Wilopo had been part of the Batavia faction. Sidik's faction differed from the other two factions in several respects. Most of t h e '. members of the Sidik faction had little education* They had been leaders of mass organizations and guerrilla groups in the post-Dutch periods. The Sidik faction was strongly nationalist, Influenced by socialism, and was very critical of the political and economic stabilization policies undertaken by the early cabinets, which were dominated by the PSI and Masjuml parties. The Sartono-Suwirjo faction, although === [PDF page 579] === 564 Its members had similar educational background to the Wilopo group, were older and had been active In pre-war nationalist movements. They were also antagonistic to the PSI, because of Sjahrir*s stand against those who had collaborated with the Japanese government. In contrast, Wilopo*s faction had close relations with the PSI. The Wilopo faction also was close to Vice-President Hatta, whereas the Sartono-Suwirjo faction had good relations with President Sukarno. In the early years of Parliamentary Democracy, because of these differences, the Sartono-Suwirjo faction often sought alliances with the Sidik faction. The Wilopo faction, for example, criticized Suwirjo when he was foreign minister in the Sukiman cabinet for agreeing to the acceptance of United States aid under the Mutual Security Act, and helped bring the government down. The Sartono-Surwirjo and Sidik factions bitterly opposed the Wilopo faction, when Wilopo was prime minister, for returning the North Sumatran oil wells to the Royal Dutch Shell,^ and they were also critical of the pro-17 October stance of the Wilopo faction. The cooperation between the Sidik and Sartono-Suwirjo factions became even more prominent after the victory of the Sidik faction at the 1952 party elections. These two factions merged and began to be called the Sidik-Sartono faction or just the Sidik faction. The Wilopo faction began rapidly to decline in feith, Democracy in Indonesia, p. 297. ^bid., pp. 297-298. === [PDF page 580] === 565 power, and the Sidik-Sartono faction at that time cann- paigned openly for the fall of Wtlopo cabinet. The national elections were the most important factor in determining the relative power position of the PNI factions in the years before Guided Democracy. Although the branches of the PNI tended to be conservative, party decisions had been made by> a small group of men in the center. However, after the elections the leaders of the local branches were elected to Parliament and became active in the discussions of party policy. Also, the PNI had become, through its attempts to amass funds and expand the membership of the party, a party that attracted, not radical nationalists, but those anxious for economic and political advancement. Sidik had died, and his successor, Sarmidi Mangunsarkoro, did not have Sidik*s charismatic appeal. In the 1956 party congress Suwirjo won the party chairpersonship by a narrow margin. By then Suwirjo had his own faction again, and it was more conservative than the one led by Sarmidi. There were widespread criticisms of Suwirjo*s rather vacillating leadership, and two years later a leftist faction left the PNI and formed its own party, Partai Indonesia, Indonesian Party (Partlndo). Some of Suwirjo*s former allies, such as Sartono, criticized Suwirjo*s compromises with Sukarno and the army, and leaders of the mas8 organizations wanted an end to party support of "reactionary" elements, the landlords, capitalists, bureaucrats, and pro-federalists (those who wanted === [PDF page 581] === 566 Indonesia to be a federal rather than a unitary state). The old Sidik faction joined with the new- ormas (mass organizations) faction and defeated Suwirjo in his bid in 1960 for reelection as party chairperson. The Sidik and ormas factions were aided by array prohibitions against political party activity in the regions, which hampered the local PNI leaders, the mainstay of the Suwirjo faction. The army anti-corruption campaigns from 1957 to 1963, which hurt the members of the Suwirjo faction, army partial financing of the ormas. and the ban on political party membership of senior civil servants all helped to weaken the Suwirjo faction. Two conservative leaders, Suwirjo and Hardi, were elected to party offices, however; and PNI politics during Guided Democracy was woven around these two factions, the radical one, led by Ali Sastroaraidjojo SH, originally from the Sidik faction, and Surachman, from the ormas faction; and the conservative one led by Hardi, made up of members of the old SartonoSuwirjo faction. Ethnically, both factions were dominated by Javanese, although there was much more ethnic diversity in the Hardi faction, influenced by the fact that the Hardi faction had more control over regional and local PNI politics and the Ali-Surachman faction over the central headquarters. The Hardi faction was more highly educated, as a whole, than the Ali-Surachman faction, and its social status background was higher. The Ali-Surachman faction had a larger number of younger leaders, especially those from === [PDF page 582] === 567 the mass organizations, than did the Hardi faction. The two factions differed the most on ideological issues, which were influenced by ethnic and regional origins. The ormas leaders in the Ali-Surachman faction, in particular, were critical of the non-radical stance of the Hardi faction, especially of the Hardi faction's support of capitalist elements, landlords, bureaucrats, and, in general, its "feudal" attitude. The ormas leaders also opposed the cooperation of the Hardi faction with the NU, and with elements from the array, including IPKI, in the prevention of the implementation of land reform. In the center there grew to be increasing cooperation between the PNI and the PKI, whereas in the regions the local PNI joined with the army and the NU in the pursuance of anti-PKI policies. The AliSurachman faction called for a revision of the ideology from one of a nationalistic content with some reference to socialism to one in essence that would accept Marxism in the analysis of the country's condition and development. The two factions were Influenced ideologically by the ethnic and regional background of the factions1 members and supporters. The Ali-Surachman faction, heavily dominated by Javanese, felt that the danger of the Muslim parties was greater than the danger posed by the PKI. They chose to support Sukarno largely because he had guaranteed for many years "a secular, that is, non-Islamic, Indonesian state." McIntyre, "Indonesian National Party," p. 195. === [PDF page 583] === 568 The Hardi faction, with a lot of support in the regions, had a large non-Javanese component, and traditionally the non-Javanese do not have the antipathy of the Javanese for political Islam, unless they are Christian, of course. The members of the Hardi faction felt that the PKI was more dangerous to them than political Islam, and they did not support Sukarno because of his alliance with the PKI. In August 1965, due to Sukarno's urging, the ormas leaders began to campaign for the expulsion of the main conservative leaders, those strongest in Central and West Java, from PNI membership. They were successful in that, as was mentioned in chapter 4. Shortly after the attempted coup, a PNI statement, the majority of the authors being ormas leaders, was issued supporting the 30 September movement. The older leaders of the party were outside Jakarta, but the involvement of the ormas leaders in the statement was responsible for the immediate shifting of power within the party from the radical to the conservative wing. The conservative faction formed itself into a rival central leadership council. Ibid., p. 196. Mclntyre has an interesting table on Pi 194 giving the number and percentage of those suspended from the PNI and its mass organizations in 1965, in accordance with their ethnic and regional origin--29% were Javanese and 40% are non-Javanese (31% are from Jakarta but their ethnic origin is not given). The information on PNI factions was partially derived from interviews with PNI leaders in 1968 and 1969, and also from the following sourcesi Anderson, Occupation and Resistancei Feith, Democracy in Indonesiai Mclntyre, === [PDF page 584] === 569 The shifting of power from the radical to the conservative faction was not because of internal changes within the party, but because the conservative faction had the backing of Soeharto, the army high command, and the Siliwangi division. Soeharto insisted that a party congress take place in March 1966 in Bandung, and due to array interference a new party leadership was elected consisting only of those from the conservative faction. The conservative faction put up Osa Maliki as its candidate, not Hardi, since Hardi, having been labelled as a "false Marhaenist" and very outspoken in his opinions, would be unable to gather the support of the masses and the regional chapters. In the first years of the New Order, although there were differences within the new leadership, no splits or factions emerged. Attention was paid to the building up of the PNI chapters, after most had been disbanded by military authorities, and they were also concerned with attempting to weaken the strength of the radicals' popular support. There were some issues on which the leaders differed, such as the extent to which a leader believed in an accommodationist or non-accommodationist policy toward the government, his emphasis upon economic development as opposed to emphasizing to the same extent political and social "Indonesian National Partyt" Rocamora, "Partai Nasional Indonesia i" Kahin, Revolution in Indonesia! Antara. morning ed., 11 January 1966i Pelopor Baru. 7 April 1966j and conversations with J. Eliseo Rocamore, Jakarta, in 1968 and 1969. === [PDF page 585] === 570 development, and the extent t o which the leader believed in a non-aligned foreign p o l i c y. Osa Maliki, Usep Ranawidjaja SH, and Hardi SH, for example, tended t o be c r i t i cal of the army's use of i t s "dual function," the army's policy toward p o l i t i c a l parties and mass organizations, and the e x c l u s i v e emphasis of the government upon economic development. They feared that Indonesia's sovereignty and nationalism would be undermined by over-reliance upon Western aid and investment. The most important issue uniting these leaders appeared t o be t h e i r c r i t i c i s m of the army's domination of the p o l i t i c a l scene and i t s attempt t o remold p o l i t i c a l parties and mass organizations* For example, Usep Ranawidjaja indicated vehemently h i s opposit i o n t o the government's plan to reduce the number of p o l i t i c a l parties and mass organizations since i t would undermine the strength of the p a r t i e s and mass organizations. He compared the army plan t o the policy of Mussolini's government i n I t a l y. The accommodationist leaders, Mohammad Isnaeni, Dr. Sunawar Sukowati, and Hadisubeno stressed the advantage of "pragmatic" thinking over "ideol o g i c a l " thinking, backed i n interviews and public speeches t h e i r agreement with the dominance of the army in p o l i t i c s, stressed the need for economic development, and were far Interview with Usep Ranawidjojo SH, Jakarta, 10 October 1968. In 1972 Usep was sent as ambassador t o North Vietnam. === [PDF page 586] === 571 l e s s concerned about p o s s i b l e e f f e c t s of f o r e i g n investment and a i d. I t was not u n t i l a f t e r Osa Maliki died ( i n 1969) t h a t t h e p a r t y ' s l e a d e r s h i p s p l i t along accommodationist versus non-accommodationist l i n e s. Osa M a l i k i ' s death coincided with i n c r e a s i n g l y coercive p o l i c i e s of the m i l i t a r y dominated government. The s p l i t between accommodationists and non-accommodationists was a c c e l e r a t e d by the s t r u g g l e for succession. The two c o n t e s t a n t s for p a r t y general chairperson were Hardi, who had the backing of both cons e r v a t i v e and r a d i c a l non-accommodationists and Hadisubeno Sosrowerdojo, who was backed by the accommodationists. Hardi had the support, a t the onset of the s t r u g g l e, of most of t h e r e g i o n a l c h a p t e r s, t h e mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s, and, i n g e n e r a l, support from the broad mass of PJNI members. Hadisubeno, however, was supported by Soeharto, a personal f r i e n d, the army l e a d e r s h i p and most r e g i o n a l commanders, and the m i l i t a r y a d v i s e r s of Soeharto (ASPRI), notably Ali Moertopo and h i s Operasi Chusus. Through covert and overt t a c t i c s of t h e army, Hadisubeno was e l e c t e d general c h a i r p e r s o n of t h e p a r t y. After Hadisubeno*s e l e c t i o n as general c h a i r p e r s o n he changed h i s accommodationist stance r a d i c a l l y, e v i d e n t l y f o r the purpose of t h e general e l e c t i o n campaignj he wanted Most of t h e information on the a t t i t u d e s and opinions of the PNI l e a d e r s was e l i c i t e d i n personal interviews with those l e a d e r s i n 1968 and 1969. === [PDF page 587] === 572 to unite the "Marhaen Family" again, and in his speeches tried to appeal to the masses by emphasizing the positive roles of Sukarno, restoring Marhaenism as the party'e active philosophy, including the older and popular political leaders in a party advisory council, and warning in very descriptive and vehement speeches about the dangers of political Islam. Hadisubeno died shortly before the 1971 elections, and after the elections a struggle for succession broke out; this struggle was not resolved until the government-sponsored merging of the nationalist and Christian parties in 1973, and first Mohammad Isnaeni, then Dr. Sunawar Sukowiti became general chairperson of the Partai Demo" krasi Indonesia (PDI), the Indonesian Democratic Party. The accommodationists favored the creation of the PDI, since it was the expressed policy of the government. The non-accommodationists bitterly opposed it, both the radical and conservative members. According to the nonaccommodationists, the unity of the party should be restored by making it into a party that would have the backing of the masses, and they declared that it was impossible to unify the party if it became a "tool of the govern13 ment."" The accommodationists, lacking mass support, 13 Burhan Magenda, "No End of 'Fake Marhaenists,*" Harian Kami. 8 May 1972. An indication of the weak position of the accommodationist party executive was a sizable demonstration composed of members of mass organization? this demonstration occurred at a time when a demonstration was rare and fairly dangerous to have. It took place in front of === [PDF page 588] === 573 favored an alliance with the government, without whose support the accommodationists would not have been able to retain their positions within the party. The Maslumi and the Parmusl Masjumi*s factions were influenced by ideology and by the corporatist character of the party, in that both organizations and individuals could join the party. For example, during the Revolution the party's factions largely grew out of the strongest organizations within the Masjumi, such as the NU, the PSII, and the Natsir faction, recruited mainly from the Jong Islamieten Bond and the Muhammadiyah. During the Revolution the main factions in the national leadership were those of Natsir (often called the religious socialists or the reformers), Sukiman (called also the accommodationist faction), and the NU and PSII factions, which later formed political parties.1 The NU and PSII have been discussed in chapter 4, so the discussion here will be limited to the Natsir and Sukiman factions. The two factions differed in ideology, age, and previous political experience. The Sukiman faction drew its main support from Javanese, and ideologically it fell Isnaeni's house at the time of the PNI central executive board meeting. The demonstration was broken up by police. There was a fundamentalist faction of the/Masjumi, as in the Parmusi, which was influenced by Wahhabism, and had close relations with some members of the Natsir faction. This faction's power has always been rather limited, and will not be discussed here. === [PDF page 589] === 574 between the Natsir faction and the NU. For example, both the NU and the Sukiman factions from the beginning of the Revolution wanted to create a state in which Islam would play an important role, and in discussions on the constitution both the Sukiman faction and the NU fought unsuccessfully for a mandatory provision that the president and vice-president would always be Muslims; during the discussion the representative of the religious socialists, Haji Agus Salim, opposed them. The leaders of the Sukiman faction were somewhat older than those of the Natsir faction. The core of Natsir*s faction consisted of the anak buah of Haji Agus Salirat these people were influenced by Haji Agus Salim's teachings and leadership, and they remained close allies all their political life. They were all active in the Jong Islamieten Bond, and in Islamic study clubs. Some were in the Partai Islam Indonesia, and fewer in the Muhammadiyah and the Persis. Many of the core members studied at the law faculty in Jakarta at the same time, in the 1930s and early 1940s. It was mentioned that the Natsir and* Wilopo factions were aligned with each other in the early 1950s and served in the same cabinets. The contacts between members of these two factions go> back at least to their days at the law faculty. The Sukiman factional leaders had somewhat more varied political experiences than the members of the Natsir faction. Many were not only from the Jnng Islamieten Bond, but were also active in PSII, the Partai Islam Indonesia, or Muhammadiyah. === [PDF page 590] === 575 and several had been members of the Volksraad. Their educational experiences differed too from those of the Natsir factiont many of those from the Sukiman faction studied in Holland, whereas the Natsir factional leaders only studied in Indonesia. The Natsir faction, although not dominant at the beginning of the Revolution, gradually increased its strength until most members of the party council were either members of the faction or influenced by the ideology and policy statements of the faction. In the 1948 congress, the power of the conservative NU faction was further diminished when their religious leaders were only given advisory functions instead of legislative functions. The NU left the Masjumi party in 1952, ostensibly over the insistence of the Natsir faction that someone from the Muhammadiyah be appointed religious minister instead of a; Nahdatul Ulama leader. The withdrawal of the NU weakened the position of the Sukiman faction, since the NU and the Sukiman faction had often been aligned with each other. Natsir*s strong position was illustrated by his ability to remain chairperson of the party from 1949 until 1959i his tenure ended after he joined the rebel government. Throughout the 1950s the Sukiman and Natsir factions clashedi most of these differences concerned the nature of the desired political system and with which political parties or factions of political parties the Masjurat should seek alliances. The Natsir faction was critical of === [PDF page 591] === 576 Sukarno*8 attempts in the late 1950s to change the system of Parliamentary Democracy to Guided Democracy. The Natsir faction, partially because of their strong base in the Outer Islands, favored more regional autonomy. Their allies were the PSI, the leaders of the Siliwangi division, and the fundamentalist wing of the Islamic reform movement, namely Persis. The Suleiman faction, like the accommodationists of today, maintained that in order for Islam to prosper the Masjumi should cooperate closely with secular nationalist groups. Sukiman had close relations with the conservative factions of the PNI and also with Sukarno. Natsir, in particular, had a history of antagonistic relations with Sukarno. The Masjumi party in the 1950s was seriously hampered in its effectiveness by its intense factionalism. Neither the Natsir nor the Sukiman factions would even support a cabinet headed by the rival faction. For example, in 1950 Natsir formed his cabinet in cooperation with the PNI. The army was opposed to the PNI candidate for defense minister, and due to Natsir's close relations, with the army leadership (from the Siliwangi division), he decided to force the PNI to compromise by threatening to form a cabinet in cooperation with several small parties. The Sukiman faction and the NU were vehemently opposed to Natsir's decision, and since the Masjumi was divided, the PNI refused to compromise. Natsir did form a cabinet, but it did not have the support or participation === [PDF page 592] === 577 of the ENI and of the Suklman faction. After the fall of the Natslr cabinet* Suklman became the new prime minister, and at the time of Its formation the Masjuml executive council, controlled by the Natslr faction, announced that Suklman did not represent the Masjumi party. No member of the Natslr faction was asked to serve by Suklmani the Natslr faction was instrumental In the downfall of the cabinet, which occurred less than a year after its inception. The enmity between the two factions continued until the party was banned in 1960. Before the banning of the party, the two major leaders of the Suklman faction (Sukiman and Wibisono) resigned from the party. This was precipitated by Suklman's defeat in the leadership struggle following Natsir's joining the rebellion, in which Prawoto of the Natsir faction defeated Sukiman for party chairperson. The basic factional division within Masjumi was prevalent also within the Parmusi party. Again, the two main factions were the reformists and the accommodationists. The reformists had the backing of most of the rank and file and the regional and local chapters, but through military policy, the reformists were prevented from officially leading the party. Among the reformist leaders were those who had been active in earlier periods, such as Mohammad Roem, Prawoto, and Natsir, but also those a bit younger than the prominent leaders, such as Omar Tusin, Lukman Harun, and Djarnawi Hadikusuma. The reformist leaders differed from === [PDF page 593] === 578 the accommodationists in terms of age, organizational background and primary political loyalty, and ideology. The accommodationists were much younger than the reformist leaders; Mintaredja, one of the older accommodationists is thirteen years younger than Mohammad Roera, and Agus Sudono, one of the younger leaders, is twenty-four years younger than Mohammad Roem. The reformist leaders were either anak buah of Haji Agus Salim, or anak buah of one of the older reformist leaders. All the reformist leaders originated from the Masjumi, whereas few of the accommodationists were in the Masjumi party. The accomraodationist leaders came from Islamic organizations, and their primary loyalty was directed to those organizations, not to the old Masjumi or the new Parrausii several of these organizations were well-known for their accommodationist stance, such as Gasbiindo headed by Agus Sudono, whereas others, such as Muhammadiyah had both accommodationist and reformist wings. The reformists differed from the accommodationists in their religious and political ideology. The accommodationists viewed themselves as brokers between their organizations and the government, and they strongly believed that they should cooperate closely with the government in power. They were not concerned with Islam as an ideology, and did not consider an Islamic state an important goal. The criticisms of the accommodationists toward the reformist leaders were tactical, not ideological. These leaders === [PDF page 594] === 579 criticized the "unrealistic" stance of the reformists! they said that the time was past when the Masjurai was influential, but the reformist leaders would not recognize this. Reformist Islam, according to the accommodationists, should have a voice and organization with which to represent the Islamic organizations and individuals who fell within the Masjumi orbit. Since the government in power is suspicious of Masjumi, the Parmusi should be accommodating to the government» and through cooperating with the government and not antagonizing important civilian groups, the organizations within Parmusi and their leaders would receive instrumental rewards from the government. Mintaredja, the Soeharto-appointed Parmusi general chairperson, has always been careful in his speeches to adhere to the government's positions, even going so far as to state during the election campaign in 1971 that a vote for Golkar was a vote for Parmusi. To the reformists, religious and political ideology was the raison d'etre for the past existence of the Masjumi and the present existence of the Parmusi. They charged that the accommodationists were pure opportunists, with no principles or moral scruples, and that they were not representative of the Ummat Islam, and did not represent its goals* The reformists believed that Islam did* provide guidance for life in the modern age, and that it served 15 Samson, "Islam and Politics," p. 90. === [PDF page 595] === 580 as an instructor of moral values. They believed strongly that Islam could be used as a primer to show goals of socio-economic development, such as the Islamic emphasis upon social justice, free education, and equality of persons, and that, furthermore, within Islam, one could find the spirit of democratic socialism, a system which the reformists felt was the most equitable system for the modern age. The reformists were opposed to the sacrificing of Islamic goals for any temporary instrumental ends. They would rather not have the party prosper than to prostitute the party to immoral uses. In answer to the accommodationists, who said that "politics is the art of the possible," the reformers said that "politics is the unceasing struggle with a host of hostile forces that obstruct the goals of the Umraat Islam." Nahdatul Ulama From 1952, after the break of the NU with the Masjural and until Guided Democracy, intra-party politics were not characterized by competing factions, divided by goals, Ibid., p. 109. The information on Masjumi and Parmusi factions was mainly derived from interviews with political party leaders. I also relied upon Samson, "Islam and Politics," and the following sources were usedi Rosihan Anwar, "Islam and Politics in Indonesia," paper presented at the 27th International Congress of Orientalists, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 13-19 August 1967i B.J. Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia (The Haguei Martinus Nijhoff, 1971)i Nairn, "Nahdatul-UlamaiM Feith, Democracy in Indonesiat Kahin, Revolution in Indonesia! and K.E. Ward, The Foundation of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia. Cornell University, Modern Indonesia Project, Interim Report Series (Ithaca, N.Y.i Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1970). === [PDF page 596] === 581 strategies, or ideologies* as was common in the Masjumi party. Only in Guided Democracy did the NU divide into factions. In the early 1950s the NU was fairly homogeneous and its energy was focused on the election campaign, after the split with Masjumi. The NU has been characterized as a dynasty, a religious welfare organization, and as a family firm. Its founders were three kivavi. who were heads of pesantren in East Java, Kiyayi HasJim Asjai'ry, Kiyayi Wahab Chasbullah, and Kiyayi Haji Bisri. Friendship and kinship alliances were formed among these three kivavi families, and these alliances have "shaped NU's religious and political pos18 ture. Except for the new group of urban politicians, influential positions within the party have been monopolized by the family and students of the three founding kivavi. In the early period, politics within the party was conducted by cliques of personal rivals, rivalries based 19 upon family origin combined with personal animosities. A hypothesis that place of pesantren education and ethnic o r i g i n were other bases for intra-party p o l i t i c s was not substantiated by the research. The leadership and major base of support for the NU was from East Java. 17 The few Sarason, "Islam and P o l i t i c s, " pp. 155, 160, 199. Ibid., p. 159. 19 I am indebted to Mohammad Slddik for some of my information on NU intra-party politics, especially for the Parliamentary Democracy and Guided Democracy periods. === [PDF page 597] === 582 non-Javanese leaders* such as Idham Challd from Banjarmasin, have spent years in East Java* and have their main support from that area. There are two main locations of pesantren. in Jorabang and in Gontor. The Gontor pesantren is not affiliated with the NUi it is a reformist pesantren. and although it has some NU alumni* its strongest backing comes 20 from reformist Islam. Pesantren in other areas' are small* and look to the large ones for guidance* and only in the New Order did any kivavl from non-Jombang pesantren become active in an NU faction opposed to the faction backed by the Jorabang pesantren. NU politics became loosely factionalized in Guided Democracy. This change occurred after Sukarno demanded that the party support his policy of including the PKI in the government, and, in general* to support the institution of Guided Democracy and the policies of Guided Democracy. The party split as to the extent of cooperation with Sukarno that should be followed. The majority followed Idham Challd, who favored an accommodationist policy. This traditionally had been the policy of Islamic notables in Java, and NU "is the inheritor of the Javanese Islamic tradition, in which court-recognized ulama acquiesced in Dutch and Javanese aristocratic power so long as positions in the 20 The leaders of Gontor have as studiously avoided involvement in politics as those of Jombang have participated in politics. See Lance Castles* "Notes on the Islamic School at Gontor," Indonesia 1 (April 1966)t 30-45 for information on the curriculum and ideological position of the Gontor pesantren. === [PDF page 598] === 583 21 state-appointed bureaucracy were maintained for them." The religious ministry has been dominated by the NU, and the majority within NU have exchanged positions within the religious bureaucracy, together with a few appointed governmental positions, for support of the secular power. This traditional tendency to support the secular authority in power has been reinforced by the lack of Westerneducated leaders within NU. The Masjumi leaders were Western-educated and were not dependent upon government positions to support themselves, in contrast with most of the NU leaders. There was a minority of NU leaders, who, during Guided Democracy, formed a loosely connected faction in opposition to the majority position of support for Sukarno's policies. The opposition faction was led by Sjaichu, Mohammad Dachlan, and Subchan. The two factions differed somewhat in background characteristics, mainly in age and type of education. The average Idham Chalid factional member was older, and the faction was composed of men who had received the traditional pesantren education. Several members of the opposing faction had received Western-style education and were independent financially from the government. Before the 1963 conference the opposition faction was able to gain the support of the SJuriah, the NU advisory board composed of prestigious ulama, which appeared to ensure the election of Dachlan. 21 Samson, "llslam and P o l i t i c s, " p. 149. There was === [PDF page 599] === 584 strong feeling on the part of the religious leadership and lesser leaders of the NU of opposition to many of Sukarno's policies, especially that of land reform. Dachlan's faction was confident of its ability to win the election because of the support of the majority of kivavi and ulama. who have the position of legitimizer within the party. The Siuriah. for example, must approve all decisions of the party's executive board, which is composed of bureaucrats and politicians. But, during the conference, Sukarno made a special trip to the conference site, and openly indicated that he preferred Idham Chalid for the general chairpersonship. The majority accepted Sukarno's preference, and voted for Idham Chalid, illustrating the common saying that the secular authority is the main determiner in choosing the top leader of NU. Factional divisions in the New Order were also influenced by the traditional NU strategy of accommodating itself to the secular power, but the dynamics of factionalism in the New Order NU indicate ideological and policy differences for the first time in its history. My analysis of factions within the NU during the New Order differs from 22 that presented by Samson in two respectst 1) the definition of faction and number of factional divisions within NUi and 2) the extent of ideological and policy differences between Subchan's faction and that of the majority, 22 Ibid., pp. 157-158, 167-169. === [PDF page 600] === 585 usually called the Jorabang, faction. Samson states that there are four factions in NUi klvavi. old-style politicos, 23 religious bureaucrats, and urban politicians/students. 24 He also called these "factions" "leadership groups." ray opinion, the definition of these groups as "factions" is not accurate! the existing factions in NU were not divided by leadership, with the possible exception of Subchan's faction. All cliques and factions within NU have had to have some support of kivavi and ulama. since they act as legitimizers. Also the average clique within NU would not be composed of members of only one "leadership group." According to my analysis there are two factions in the NU in the New Order, the Jombang faction, which is an alliance of cliques under leaders like Idham Chalid, organized 25 against Subchan and his faction. Subchan had risen quickly in power and stature as the prime example of a NU New Order leader. Because of the accommodating stance of the dominant wing of the NU, most NU leaders did not participate in anti-PKI and anti-Sukarno politics after the attempted coup in October 1965. Those who did, such as Sjaichu and Dachlan, were the more traditional NU leaders who had difficulting in communicating with the New Order forces of students, array leaders, and other political party 23 24 Ibid., p. 157 Ibid., p. 156. 25 My conclusions were reached through Interviews with party leaders and conversations with Indonesian intellectuals === [PDF page 601] === 586 leaders. Subchan, a modern, highly education, and verbal leader, had close relations from the beginning with youth and student movements, certain army leaders (particularly from the Siliwangi division), and young political party leaders active in the campaign aginst Sukarno and the PKI, such as Harry Tjan of the Partal Katholik. Due to his increased influence Inside and outside the NU, Subchan was able to become independent of Sjaichu, and also to be more open about his political and moral beliefs, which differed in important ways from those of the traditional NU religious and political leaders. The bases of support of the two factions were quite different. Within the party Subchan had the regional support of the West Java chapters, and strong backing from youth and student groups. He also was supported by certain kivavi and ulama. particularly in the Jogjakarta area, where he had attended Gajah Mada University. The Jombang faction received regional support from Central and East Java and South Kalimantan, and, in general, from the "traditional" forces of NU, a large percentage of religious notables? older politicians, including those who were well-educated! and many associated with the religious ministry. The Jombang faction also had more kin and close personal 26 Several older Western-educated, urban politicians, although in many political, religious, and moral issues in agreement with Subchan*3 faction, supported the Jombang faction because they would find it difficult to "follow" someone so much younger than they. === [PDF page 602] === 587 relations with the founding fathers of NU than the members of the Subchan faction. Its bases of support were more localized in rural areas, in comparison with the Subchan faction, which received its strongest backing from merchants and students in urban areas. Its main strength outside the party was from President Soeharto and the central army leadership, which was instrumental for the Jombang faction's continued dominance of party positions and policy. In the 1967 and 1971 party congresses Soeharto and his military advisors openly showed their preference for Idham 27 Chalid, as Sukarno had done in the 1963 party congress. Without their support it is likely that Subchan would have been elected as general chairperson, although it is true that he was a controversial figure. Like the Sukarno government, the Soeharto government used economic and political rewards in order to win acquiescence from the traditional NU politicians. There were clear ideological and policy differences between Subchan and the Jombang leaders. These could be delineated into two major areasi 1) religious and moral issues and 2) the desired political system. The Jombang leaders were more concerned with the role of Islam in the state, both as a political and as a moral force, than were Subchan and his faction. Many Jombang leaders spoke of the 27 For discussions of the 1971 party congress, see Samson, "Islam and Politics*" p. 192i Tempo. 4 December 1971; Abadl. 16 December 197t Nusantara, 28 December 1971» and Harlan Kami. 22 December 1971. === [PDF page 603] === 588 low position of Islam in political life, the little influence of the santri in the government, and the need for the government to accede to their demand that Muslims in Indonesia should be obliged to obey Islamic law. They pointed to the danger of secularism in modern Indonesia, which they charged was . •. fanned by political "acrobats" who are oriented to the Western way of life under the cover of Islamic modernization. The unstable political and economic situation is exploited by the rationalism-worshipping group while passing over the role of religion in the development of the nation.28 Much of the energy of the traditional politician was also spent in decrying the loss of morals by Indonesians, especially the youth, and the sponsorship and permission by the government for such "immoral" activities as gambling. Western-style dancing and drinking. One of the leaders expressed his moral outrage over the style of dress and actions of the youth in a Jakarta youth carnivalt... "strapless and mini-skirts put on by our teenagers which expose half of their bodies, the youths milling about with colored faces remind us of the primitive era in human history." Islam had taught the people how to behave in a proper manner. The actions of the youths in the carnival were a manifestation of "modern paganism."29 The Jombang leaders looked askance at Subchan's open liberal behavior, such as the consumption of alcohol and dancing in nightclubs. Subchan did not care about this 'editorial, "On Minister Dachlan's 'Dangers,*" Harlan Kami. 29 February 1968. 29 Antara interview with Haji Achmad Sjaichu, June 27, 1968. === [PDF page 604] === 589 type of moral issuei he was concerned with political morality. For example, Subchan was influenced greatly by Western cowboy stories, especially by the code of honor found expressed in these stories, such as the emphasis upon straightforwardness of heroes and the tradition of fighting 30 for the underdog. To him the worst political action would be to stab an opponent in the back; the act of drinking is not immoral, but to behave in an underhanded way is. In general, Subchan and his faction were not concerned with religious issuesi they were nationalists, and Subchan, especially, emphasized the need to develop a sound democratic political system for Indonesia. Subchan was viewed by most Indonesians as serious and sincere in his continuous campaign for the development of a democratic system, which would be characterized by the rule of law, economic democracy, and basic human rights. This led him increasingly to a non-accomraodationist stance vis-a-vis the government. As early as February 1968, for example, Subchan warned of the danger of the emergence of 31 autocracy in Indonesia, and subsequently said that as early as 1967 the process of democratization of institutions had stopped. 37 He strongly believed that a system 30 My thanks to Franklin C. Weinstein for his notes of the interview he conducted with Subchan, Jakarta, 30 July 1969. 31 Sinar Haraoan. 3 February 1968. 32 Pedoman. 24 June 1969. === [PDF page 605] === 590 of checks and balances should be established in Indonesia and that in this way "one institution is continually con33 trolled by another." Subchan, influenced by his experiences in the socialist youth movement* Pesindo, felt the necessity for some type of economic equality, and believed that the government should be responsible for implementing 34 economic equality, Subchan's continued frankness concerning his political beliefs, including his growing criticism of the military-led government, led to military pressure levied on the Sluriah in early 1972 to expel Subchan after his reelection in late 1971 as the first 35 chairperson of the party. Subchan was killed in an automobile accident in January 1973, and there has been no one to replace him as factional head. The possible successors to Subchan have been intimidated by the government, and they also lacked both Subchan's independent financial resources and probably the strong commitment to the political principles which Subchan held. The politicians of the Jombang faction did not appear to have well-thought-out conceptions of the political system. The usual response elicited through interviews and the analyses received from reading newspaper reports of 33 Ibid. 34 Interview with Subchan by Franklin C. Weinstein, Jakarta, 30 July 1969. 35 See Harlan Kami. 15 February 1972; editorial, "Leader and His Party," Merdeka. 17 February 1972? and Wahid, "Subchan and Nahdatul Ulama," Kompas. 25 Februarray 1972. === [PDF page 606] === 591 interviews and speeches was that they were basically satisfied with the political system at that time (1967-1969), and only thought that more attention should be paid to Islamic principles and to Islamic participation. They were far more Islamic-centered than was the Subchan faction! and did not conceptualize abstractly about the political system. This was. also partially caused by their lack of non-Islamic education, and hence, training in the 36 social sciences and modern philosophy. Military-Civilian Relations Introduction In the first two political periods of Indonesia, the Revolution and Parliamentary Democracy, more power lay in the civilian sphere than in that of the military. Political parties during these periods had great impact upon the militaryi one of the bases for factionalism within the One example of an interview which shows the lack of understanding of modern political philosophy and organizations was one with Haji Achmad Sjaichu. During the interview he was talking about a bill in parliament, which he had proposed, that would outlaw all Communist writings. I asked him if this included Marxist, non-Communist writings. He looked shocked and said that it was not possible for a Marxist writing to be non-Communist. I then explained the existence of parties in various countries that considered themselves Marxist, but anti-Communist, and that these parties covered the Marxist spectrum from Marxist to MarxistLeninist, and to Marxist-Leninist-Trotskyite, etc. His response was that all those parties were Communist parties, and that it was a Communist tactic to have various parties under its wing, even though they professed different philosophies and philosophical interpretations. Information on NU factions was derived from personal interviews conducted with political party leaders and informants and from the following sourcesi Boland, Struggle of === [PDF page 607] === 592 military was that of conflicting religious/political ideologies, which were articulated by the major political parties. Political parties or factions aligned themselves with military factions in their struggles against rival political parties and factions, which, in turn, received help from their particular military allies. This has been illustrated in the recounting of the famous political "affairs" of these two periods--Persatuan Perluangan; the Madiun, the 17 October, and Lubis affairs, and the regional rebellions of the late 1950s. During the New Order civilian factions still are aligned with military factions, but now the civilian factions are in the position of clients, and not in the position of senior or equal partner. During Guided Democracy and certainly during the New Order military leaders created political parties and movements which, at the present period through the great power of the military government, have more influence than the civilian political movements. In the early periods cabinets and civilian groups were able to interfere with military organization and the internal politics of the militaryi these attempts led to a difficult struggle within the military to unify itself, at least for the duration, in order to preserve what they Islamj Feith, Democracy in Indonesiai Nairn, "NahdatulUlaraa Party?" Noer, Modernist Muslim Movement: and Samson, "Islam and Politics." === [PDF page 608] === 593 perceived to be the legitimate autonomy of the military. During the New Order the power positions were reversedi the military have controlled the selection of party leaders by indirect and direct maneuverings within the parties or by an outright refusal to recognize an elected leadership. During Parliamentary Democracy there were premature attempts by the military to organize political movements that could successfully compete with civilian movements. The first attempt was the creation of IPKI by Nasution and his military and civilian followers. The military faction involved in the creation of IPKI was concerned with the widespread sentiment among many politicians to "send the TNI /array.7 back to the barracksi" but that appeared to be primary. there were other reasons, The political parties were able to regulate IPKI campaigning in various ways, and the party did not even have the entire backing of the military. The party received very few votes in the 1955 elections. Other small movements, such as the KOSGORO, were already in existence by the end of Parliamentary Democracy, but it was not until Guided Democracy and the New Order that military-sponsored movements were able to exercise any influence. Before proceeding to the discussion of militarycivilian relations in the New Order, concentrating upon military-created political movements and military 37 Interview with Brigadier General Sukendro, Jakarta, 7 May 1969. === [PDF page 609] === 594 regulationH of political parties, it is important to examine briefly military-civilian relations during Guided Democracy, for that period, in essence a joint civilianmilitary government, in hindsight served as a stage of transition from the civilian-dominated governments of Parliamentary Democracy to the military-dominated government of the New Order. In 1957 martial law was proclaimed, and this paved the way for the entrance of the military into economic and political institutions and movements. The military not only were able to participate in economic and political institutions, but through their martial law powers were able to exert some control over political parties/movements and labor unions. For example, there were restrictions on political party and labor union activity, including the prohibition of political meetings, demonstrations and strikes} many members of parliament and regional assemblies 38 were also arrested. A few months after the institution of martial law the first attempt was made by the array leadership to create a political movement, which hopefully would incorporate and control civilian movements. This was the Badan Keria Saraa Pemuda-Millter (BKS-PM), Youth-Military Cooperation Body. In the next two years, similar movements were organized, in which the army tried to create BKS's from women's, peasants', religious leaders', and workers' organizations. 38 Lev, Transition to Guided Democracy, p. 63. === [PDF page 610] === 595 The purpose was to separate these o r g a n i z a t i o n s from t h e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s, and thereby s t r e n g t h e n the p o l i t i c a l power of the m i l i t a r y v i s - a - v i s t h e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s. These f i r s t attempts were u n s u c c e s s f u l. After a s h o r t experience with the m i l i t a r y i n t h e s e groups, the p o l i t i cal p a r t i e s refused to cooperate with t h e army, and the array was unable t o e x e r c i s e c o n t r o l over t h e s e groups, with the exception of t h e v e t e r a n s. 39 Some of the smaller unions were more w i l l i n g t o work w i t h i n t h e s e bodies than t h e l a r g e r unions f o r two reasons* because of t h e i r need t o seek a powerful a l l y and because a l l unions were represented e q u a l l y i n the BKS, not according t o t h e i r membership. The concept of "karyawan" (work, performing a funct i o n ) gained prominence a t t h i s time. I t was adopted by the m i l i t a r y i n i t s s t r u g g l e s with SOBSI, the PKI-dominated l a b o r union, and was g r a d u a l l y e l a b o r a t e d and became one of the major d o c t r i n e s of the New Order government. t h e i r competition with SOBSI the army l e a d e r s a s s e r t e d t h a t the employer and t h e employee did not have c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s since they were both performing work which was for t h e good of t h e n a t i o n; t h e n a t i o n p r o f i t e d from the output of a s t a t e e n t e r p r i s e, t h e r e f o r e both the manager and t h e f a c t o r y worker i n t h i s e n t e r p r i s e have s i m i l a r 39 The veterans organizations also had been formed according to political party affiliation or sympathy of the veterans. In 1957 and 1958, however, the army leadership was successful in unifying.the various veterans groups into one organization, which was supervised by the army staff. === [PDF page 611] === 596 interests. The karvawan concept was used l a t e r a g a i n s t non-Communist t r a d e unions a f t e r t h e development of Golkar as the " s t a t e p a r t y. " 40 Gradually in the late 1950s the system of Guided Democracy began to evolve, and the army leadership was very active in its institution and development. One of the goals of both Sukarno and the army was to create one national political front, which would dispense with parties and other movements. These parties and political movements were blamed for the divisiveness and disharmony of the body politic. It was envisoned that all political parties would be included in this national front, and that decisions would be made in a spirit of harmony by the traditional methods of compromise and consensus. But the army leadership and Sukarno differed in their ideas of the ideal composition and leadership of the national front. Sukarno favored the creation of a national front which would be guided by radical organizations, whereas the army leadership was vehemently opposed to participation by the PKI, especially in the government. Therefore almost a year after the first BKS's were created, the army leadership organized the Front Nasional Pembebasan Irian Barat (FNPIB), the National Front for the Liberation of West Irian, as a counter to Sukarno's plan for the creation of a leftist For an interesting discussion of the karvawan concept see Ken Ward, The Indonesian Election of 1971i An East Javanese Case Study (Clayton, Victoria. Australia! Nonash University, 1974). === [PDF page 612] === 597 dominated national front. The FNPIB was based upon the BKS's, and the army leadership attempted to organize the FNPIB as a national organization with regional and local branches that would be able to compete with the parties 41 for popular support. The parties, in general» were opposed to the FNPIB, especially the PKI, and the political parties were supported in their opposition by Sukarnoi this opposition plus the inept leadership of the FNPIB prevented the array from developing a strong organization. Although Nasution had issued a directive stating that the FNPIB was the only legitimate mass organization, through the combined opposition of the political parties and Sukarno, the FNPIB was dissolved in January 1961. The Front Naslonal (FN), National Front, was then created. The army leadership was opposed to its creation, especially because of their fear that the PKI would be prominent in it. Their strategy was twofoldi create a successor organization to the FNPIB, which would compete at parallel levels with the FN, but at the same time participate in the FN and prevent the PKI from controlling it. The new body that was created was called the Badan Pembina Potensi Karva (BPPK), Body to Build the National Potentiali it had the unspoken support of the less radical factions of the PNI and the Murba and also of religious groups, who feared the domination of the PKI and its mass organizations 41 Ibid., p. 67. === [PDF page 613] === 598 in the FN. Since the political parties were included in the FN, they were unable to support the BFPK openly, but 42 they did assign middle-level cadres to the BPPK. The army leadership wanted the BPPK to be able to compete with the PKI and its mass organizations, and they included the old BKS's in the new BPPK. During the existence of the BPPK there was much conflict between the FN and the BPPK; finally in November 1962, through pressure by leftist organizations and Sukarno, the BPPK was formally dissolved and it was incorporated into the FN. Some of the leadership of the BPPK was also brought into the FN; army headquarters was able to continue its affiliations with the mass movements which were influenced by the army through the fifth assistant of the army (the assistant in charge of territory), who maintained communications with their counterparts in the regions, the fifth assistants of the 43 divisions. Froa its inception the FN was beset by constant turmoil and competition, and was far from the idealistic image under which it was established, that it would embody the traditional Indonesian spirit of harmony and cooperation. The competition was among the nationalist, leftist, and religious parties and groups, and also the army. Slowly the more conservative groups, including the 42 My thanks to Andrew Gunawan for this information. 43 During this time Suprapto Sokowati, later lieutenant general and head of Sekber Golkar, was the fifth assistant of the army. === [PDF page 614] === 599 army, were able to gain power in the FN, especially in the regional units, and although the PKI always had representatives it was prevented from participating actively in the administration of the FN. In 1961, with the formation of the regional executive boards, the army was very prominent} for example, ten out of seventeen chairpersons~of the regional boards were from the army, and nine out of seven44 teen vice-chairpersons were also array members. In the field of labor, the army had been concerned about the strength of the PKI labor federation, the Sentral Organisasi Buruh Sosialls Indonesia (SOBSI), the Indonesian Socialist Workers Central Organizationi the desire to control SOBSI had been one of the main reasons for the creation of the labor BKS's. In 1960, Ahem Erningpradja, the labor minister and the head of a PNI labor union, came out with his long-desired plan to unite all of the labor organizations into onei he formed the Organisasi Persatuan Peburuhan Indonesia (OPPI), United Indonesian Labor Organizations, which was backed by Sukarno and also by the array leadership. SOBSI from the beginning was opposed to OPPI, and the other labor federations vacillated for some months, some union officials speaking out in favor of OPPI while 44 For the list of members of regional boards and committees of the regional FN, see Republic of Indonesia, Departemen Penerangan, Almanak Lembaga2 Negara dan Keparti an (Jakartai Departemen Penerangan, 1962). Everett D. Hawkins, "Labor in Transition," in Indonesia, ed. McVey, p. 268. === [PDF page 615] === 600 the central executive members of unions chastised greatly those members who spoke out in favor of the OPPI. Various OPPI branches were formed in the regions. and at least in some regions OPPI was not only backed by the regional army leadership but by regional branches of non-Communist 46 unions. In general, however* OPPI was ineffectual* and in 1962 the army leadership formed a new labor organization, Sentral Organisasi Karvawan Sostalis Indonesia (SOKSI), Indonesian Socialist Functional Workers Central Organization, which grew out of the association formed for workers 47 in state enterprises, which was controlled by the army. In the early months of 1963 many efforts were made to expand SOKSI membership, and to pressure other labor unions and federations to merge with SOKSI. In 1964 Colonel Suhardiman, its head, claimed that SOKSI had 7.5 million 48 members. There was continual conflict between SOKSI and SOBSI, and finally in late 1964 the PNI labor federation 49 joined PKI in strongly criticizing SOKSI. The main battles between SOKSI and SOBSI occurred in the industrial 46 Ibid., p. 268. This was the Persatuan Karvawan Perindustrian Negara (PERKAPEN), Union of Employees of State Industries. See Jacques Leclerc, "An Ideological Problem of Indonesian Trade Unionism in the Sixties« 'Karyawan* versus,Buruh,,w Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs 6 (JanuaryJune 1972)i 83. 48 Ehrmann, "Indonesian Military," p. 208. 49 Ibid., p. 209. === [PDF page 616] === 601 councils, which were first organized in the state enterprises, but were planned for all industries. In the election campaigns between SOBSI and SOKSI for seats on the councils, SOBSI won more seats, but SOKSI was able to maintain itself as a severe threat to SOBSI, because of army backing. Almost a year before the attempted coup the Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karva (Sekber Golkar), Secretariat of Functional Groups, was created under army sponsorship, and comprised functional groups within the FN. One can see a straight evolutionary line from the BKS, the FNPIB, the BPPK, and SOKSI to the Sekber Golkarj the goals and tactics of all these military-sponsored organizations were the samei to fight against SOBSI. There seem to have been few changes in these organizations except for the names. Until the remaking of the Sekber Golkar into the official state political organization before the 1971 elections, not only unaffiliated groups joined Sekber Golkar, but also those affiliated with political parties. During Guided Democracy it was common for mass organizations formerly affiliated with banned parties to seek protection by joining Sekber Golkar. Although the Sekber Golkar claimed that by September 1965 it was 30 strong that its very strength I am grateful to David Reeve of the University of Sydney for sharing his observations of SOBSI-SOKSI competition in the composition of the industrial councils. === [PDF page 617] === 602 51 prompted the PKI to sponsor the abortive coup, it was a disparate organization formed of many organizations of varying ideological hues, including those sponsored by army leaders, such as KOSGORO and SOKSI. In its relations with civilian groups the military in the New Order has been able to draw upon its experience during Guided Democracy, and with that experience and the power the army leadership was gradually able to assume, has pursued strategies and policies that resulted in the control by the military over civilian groups and they have prevented any civilian group from emerging as a serious challenge to the army's position and power. In the New Order the army has pursued two strategies toward political movements* first, to develop military-sponsored movements and coopt as many civilian leaders and groups to join these organizations as possible, and second, to control the leadership selection within the political parties. This will be explicated in the following sections. Military-Civilian Movements in the New Orderi KOSGORO and Golkar The KOSGORO and Golkar are two rather different, though in some respects, similar organizations founded by military leaders. Both of them originated before the New Order, but both achieved their greatest strength during the New Order, the Golkar because of the decision of the 51 Sekretariat Bersama Golonaan Karva dalam Pembangunan (no place, no date). === [PDF page 618] === 603 military regime to institute it as the "state party" in contesting the 1971 elections and KOSGORO through the vacuum created in the villages by the unwilling exit of the PKI. KOSGORO was started in 1957 by veterans of TRIP 52 under the impetus of Mas Isman, but it did not become a large organization until after the attempted coup at which time it was able to take advantage of the demise of the PKI and increase its sponsorship of cooperative endeavors in a larger number of villages. Golkar and KOSGORO differ in terms of ideology and support. The core of the KOSGORO is TRIP, led by Major General Mas Isman, considered by many to be a charismatic leader "like Sukarno," who was aided also by his reputation of providing for his anak buah. The KOSGORO also had more genuine support from a number of civilians, and increased its backing through a combination of ideological and instrumental techniques; whereas the Golkar, a creation of the military as a tactic to decrease the power and support of SOBSI, had characteristics of an "artificial" entity, alive only through administrative fiat and having no strong core of civilian support. The ideology of the KOSGORO is a syncretic blend of nationalism, traditionalism, and a touch of radicalism, the latter in its seemingly genuine concern for the ^TRIP was the East Java student army during the Revolution. In 1957 the name of KOSGORO was Kooerasi Simpan Pin1am Gotong Rqvong (Mutual Cooperation Saving and Lending Cooperative); it was changed to Kesatuan Organisasi Serbaguna Gotong Rovong. the United Multi-Purpose Mutual Cooperation Organization in March 1966. === [PDF page 619] === 604 peasantry! Golkar really does not have an ideology, and, in fact, it is opposed to "ideology." Nor does Golkar have a core of leaders and followers possessing similar experiences, such as the core of KOSGORO. Both the Golkar and KOSGORO are influenced by the privavi mentality, in that their thoughts of the rakvat (masses) have a rather paternalistic character. For example, both KOSGORO and Golkar felt that the rakvat should be led in the "right" pathi the Golkar used direct and indirect orders, and the KOSGORO went down to the villages and used traditional ways to show the villagers the advantages of "modern" ways. Several military-civilian organizations have been formed in recent years, but the Golkar and the KOSGORO are, in my opinion, the two most interesting organizations to examine, Golkar because it was the vehicle chosen by the military government to serve as the "state party," and KOSGORO because it was not an artificial creation of the army for the purpose of influencing civilian organizations, like so many of the other military-civilian organizations. KOSGORO is also the largest military-civilian movement not sponsored 53 by army headquarters. Mas Isman and the TRIP veterans involved in the founding of KOSGORO were unhappy at the lack of progress made in Indonesia since the end of the Revolution. During 53 It is quite likely, however, that Mas Isman had the encouragement of Nasution in 1957 when the organization was foundedi at that time the two military leaders were rather close. === [PDF page 620] === 605 the Revolution they had been dependent upon the peasants for their subsistence and security; they were much influenced by this experience and were concerned about the lack of interest of the government in the lot of the peasants. They felt strongly that in order to "build up the nation," the peasants have to be raised from their lowly status, and 54 modernization must occur in the villages. The founders became increasingly concerned with the development of PKI strength in the villages, and, according to interviews, by 1962 felt that the "PKI really was not for the people?" the founders, largely recruited from those of prlvavi origin, felt that they knew what was in the interest of the rakvat. of the wone cillk. Another stated motivation was their fear that the younger generation was no longer "national-minded" and that an organization was needed that would socialize the younger generation to be strong nationalists, in which they would put nation before self. The ideology of the KOSGORO is indicative of their attempt to blend Marhaenism and the radical nationalism of the Guided Democracy period with that of the new "nonpolitical" ideology of development and modernization found in the New Order. This will be seen in the following 54 The information concerning the motivations for the founding of the KOSGORO was gleaned from an interview conducted with then Brigadier General Mas Isman at the KOSGORO headquarters (his house), Jakarta, 10 September 1968, from conversations with other national and regional KOSGORO leaders, and other knowledgeable3. === [PDF page 621] === 606 description of what KOSGORO perceives to be their ideology. Their three main principles arei 1) devoted service (pengabdian)i 2) concern for the people (kerakvatan): and 3) solidarity (solldarltas). ples is the following. Their conception of these princiThe first principle (pengabdian) stresses the necessity for the revolution to continue to serve as the guiding spirit for the nation, its leaders, and the former fighters. The KOSGORO must place national interests above its own, and therefore KOSGORO and the nation, in fact, have identical interests. At the present time it is important and necessary to "remove backwardness" from the people, and, in that, KOSGORO must serve as a constructive force for development and must educate the rakvat for development. Democracy concept In this first principle the Guided of the need for the continuance of the revolution and its spirit of self-sacrifice merged with the New Order ™ideologyw of development. In the principle of kerakvatan the peasants are seen as constituting the backbone of the nation, not only in regard to numbers but as a group which strengthens and maintains the traditional values of Indonesian culture. The laborers axe named as the second most important group. Hence, much attention must be paid to these groups, especially to the peasants. Other groups are mentioned too as The information concerning KOSGORO*s ideology came mainly from the above interview with Mas Is man and from his Pedoman Perdloangan (no place, 1968). === [PDF page 622] === 607 smaller but, nevertheless, vital groups, such as the students, youth, intelligentsia and the women. According to the KOSGORO ideology it is through the concern with the major groups within society and not in individuals that the KOSGORO arrives at its belief in democracyj the KOSGORO... in all its works will develop styles which will attract the rak1at. draw together the wishes of the raklat and then return the results of these thoughts and wishes to the raklat to inspire his activities.56 In this principle the ideology of modern socialism is wedded to traditional Javanese thinking of the relationship between the privavi and wonfg cllik. The peasants and laborers are named as the most important groups, but the privavi determine how and in which way the "wishes" of the rakvat are to be interpreted and acted upon. In the emphasis upon groups and not upon individuals, this KOSGORO principle is in accordance with Sukarno's conception of society consisting of functional groups, not of individuals. Through solidaritas, cadres will be developed to work in the villages, and through these cadres the villages will be transformed. The villages will serve the cadresj and only through the union of the cadres with the peasants, in a political, economic, and, even more important, cultural sense, will the "sickness in Indonesia's political body" be healed. Society in the traditional Javanese view Mas Isman, Pedoman Perdioangan. p. 13. === [PDF page 623] === 608 is seen as a uniont although there are different groups* all should be merged in harmony, and the society should be a mirror of the cosmos. According to the ideology of Guided Democracy, traditional Indonesian values resided in the villages, and society should return to the practices of the villages in regard to the relationship among groups and the decision-making process. In this last principle, the New Order stress upon development is seen in the call for the "transformation" of the villages. Sukarno and Subandrio, the foreign minister, were very unhappy with the activities of Mas Isman and the KOSGORO. Sukarno opposed the growing competition between KOSGORO and the PKI in the villages; Subandrio*s antagonism stemmed primarily from the mutual dislike between Mas Isman and himself. Mas Isman was posted abroad to Thailand and Burma as ambassador from 1959 to 1964 in order to prevent him from spending much time with the KOSGORO. In 1964, due to his conflict with Sukarno and Subandrio, he was sent to the United Arab Republic as ambassador and found it difficult to devote as much time to the KOSGORO, although he often made trips to Indonesia and was known as the 57 In 1968 Mas Isman was appointed sixth assistant of the army, and again the reason was to prevent him from working full-time with the KOSGORO, which, by then, was in a period of rapid expansion. According to informants this strategy did not work, since Isman spent little time on the job and was notorious for circumventing regulations. === [PDF page 624] === 609 58 "absent ambassador." His career abroad ended in January 1967 when he was recalled to Jakarta. In its first ten years the KOSGORO slowly developed into an organization possessing strength especially in East Java, and to a limited extent in Central Javai its leadership core continued to be composed of TRIP veterans and the majority of its members came from the peasantry. In both East and Central Java the KOSGORO had influence not only in the villages but also at the top level of the regional administration, and in both provinces, especially in the New Order, the military commanders and governors had to respect its influence. Before 1967 KOSGORO had been very active in East Javanese villages, providing services that had formerly been provided by the government, but were in a state of deterioration, such as irrigation, village security, village roads, and schools. This assistance of the KOSGORO was provided through the traditional system of gotone rovong (mutual cooperation). After Mas Isman returned to Indonesia the KOSGORO expanded and increased its membership and activities. April 1969 it had three hundred branches. By Septemr ber 1968 the largest number of members were still peasants. Subandrio wanted to send Mas Isman to Mexico, but Sukarno said that Cairo was far enough from Jakarta (inter* view with Mas Isman, Jakarta, 10 September 1968). 59 It was widely believed that Mas Isman received funding from the C.I.A. during Guided Democracy and later. Antara* morning edition, 3 April 1969. === [PDF page 625] === 610 with laborers second, then students, and finally the veterans of TRIPj in terms of power, however, the rank order was reversed. In 1968 ten of the fourteen members of the central board were TRIP veterans, but at the lower levels membership was less concentrated among the TRIP veterans. Certain organizational changes were also made. In 1966 the KOSGORO divided into two sectors, political and cooperative. The cooperative sector, derived from the original KOSGORO, was in charge of various cooperative projects, including those involved with farming and fishing, market and cooperative banks, and educational projects. The political sector's responsibility was the development of separate functional organizations for peasants, laborers, youth, scientists, students, high school pupils, and women's organizations! the successful ones were those composed of farmers, laborers and youth. Chart 2 below shows the elaborate organization which KOSGORO aspired to become. A newspaper, Warta Harlan, was established, and it developed into one of the major newspapers and had a broad readership"" It was through these functional groups that Mas Isman hoped to develop KOSGORO into a strong political organization, and one that would be able to contest the coming elections. Along with his attempts to develop functional groups within KOSGORO, Mas Isman tried to broaden the appeal of the organization so that it would be able to encompass the main sectors of society, including two groups increasingly === [PDF page 626] === 611 CHART 2 KOSGORO ORGANIZATION CENTRAL COLLECTIVE BOARD CENTRAL LEADINQ COUNCIL GENERAL CHAIRMAN CIHfKAL COLLICTlVI •OAND T u i m r i r IiHttiuW far R d. i o i t ami tptrltuai Guutaata i M P i - m i i t Couanl at j I aUniban n r E i n x a l ' M ', * f lha - KOS(,ORO" IDAKOKAKI a I m u utf far M i M Ctotlaflca l l l i t m l l l i KOSGORO Natlaaal feme* tnMi u l * f»f r t t w k i a m r M I m u u l * far CdMit-on and Sdtftrv fXICUTIVC CHAIItMAN KCIITA1Y CtKCKAL A l l i i r i IbUUMi I t t t i t u l * ft* Socil A t t a i n and H u l l * latti u i i r»* Cullura *<hl A f t taitiiuta far Fni^utr Staking Frvjefl [aduiirlal Mid D*»«lapiient P n t f r t BuMtf ABd P r o a Tr»d« LatnpuBf Prol*cl Mont) ^umaira Pn>i«l 211 KO»CORO NATIONAL C«op<riU*« Bank COOFfRATIVI UNIT Aifrrullura and rarminc Prnjf<4t Fliharf Pro]rct> rn>j*cu/J«*t Vtaiurai PROVINCIAL LCADINO COUNCIL j Admory tt«rd. Trraiurtr tnfomati »n L*CJ1 A ffaln 11 •(OSGOIO PROVINCIAL Coopt'iLiva Sink C O O « « A T I V E UNIT Joint Vfn'ufca DISTRICT LEADING COUNCIL OISTIKT CHAIRMAN IX*! rift BAKOtLAK AdvtMr7 Board ItutltVlM Twtinr Informitloa U f J l Attain K4FCUTIV1 CHAIRMAN SECRETARY Branch** KO'.ZORO 1 Cw««nli«a Rank VIILAOI V1LLA6I LCADINO COUNCIL DISTRICT wOOPERATIVK UNIT CHAIRMAN Koccnao Vit L A C S COOPrRATiVt SOURCEi This o r g a n i z a t i o n chart was g i v e n t o me by the KOSGORO n a t i o n a l headquarters i n Jakarta. Joint Veaturea === [PDF page 627] === 612 alienated by the military regime, the santri and the students. We have to admit that the Islamic groups had their share in eradicating the PKI, and therefore we have to ask them to join us. The government is too much afraid of Islamic groups; if you don't get the support of the Islamic groups, you will lose forty percent of the people.61 Mas Isman's pragmatic strategy, designed to appeal to various groups led him to take certain negative stands on questions of the day. such as birth control, only because of the feeling of major segments of societyi his reason, for example, for his opposition to birth control was his desire not to offend those who were santri. He was also opposed to the government policy "of throwing out the students" after the army no longer needed their helpi he said that "we" have to appeal to the students and "lead them in a construe* tive way." 62 The strength of the KOSGORO at the same time was its weakness! it was strong because of the core of dedicated members, namely the TRIP veterans, but because of the ethnic nature of this small core KOSGORO found it difficult to expand out of the Javanese ethnic area. Its strongest geographical area of support was East Java, and the only other Interview with then Brigadier General Mas Is man, Jakarta, 10 September 1968. 62 Ibid. === [PDF page 628] === 613 areas of strength were Central Java and Lampung, in South 63 Sumatra, where many Javanese lived. Also, much of its ideology reflects privavi Javanese culture which does not cut across ethnic boundaries as well as the philosophies of parties such as Parrausi and even the PNI. The Marhaenism of the KOSGORO influenced many former sympathizers or members of the All-Surachman faction of the PNI to join KOSGORO. Several top leaders of the PNI peasants organization, for example, joined KOSGORO. This was especially true In East Java? in fact, it was reported that the East Java branches of KOSGORO were dissolved by army authorities in October 1969 because of the great influx of left-wing 64 PNI members. Economically the KOSGORO increased its activities in the New Order, and in that field still had freedom of action after early 1972, when the government prohibited political organizations from having chapters or being active in villages. The two most interesting economic projects are the market banks and the corn-growing program in Lampung, which was aided by the Mitsui Company of Japan. The market banks were established with the purpose of helping the small traders by.lending them small sums and also 63 The KOSGORO organized a branch in North Sumatra, again an area heavily settled by Javanese. The leadership, however, was not exclusively Javanese! the executive and leadership councils, formed in 1969, appeared to be fairly evenly divided between Javanese and Toba Batak (Warta Harlan. 10 April 1969). 64 Pedoman. 7 October 1969. === [PDF page 629] === 614 by enabling them to learn business techniques that would result in the expansion of their businesses. In keeping with KOSGORO*s belief that you reach the rakvat through traditional ways, the tellers were instructed to dress in a simple way, so as not to make their customers feel malu (ashamed, embarrassed). If I were dressed with a tie, or with shining shoes, the people would not want to enteri Look at our officei it has the appearance of a "waning" /small coffee shop along the side of a road/65 Emphasis was placed on the necessity for the bank employees to establish "family" (close and personal) relationships with the customers, and thereby try to change the customers' uneconomic "traditional" practices through using traditional, paternalistic techniques. These banks appeared to be quite popular, but apparently by 1971 they were unable to absorb the losses that had occurred and they were forced to close down. Plans for the corn-growing project in Lampung began in 1966, but it was not until the agreement with the Mitsui Interview with a market bank coordinator by a Warta Harlan reporter (Warta Harlan..9 October 1968). Three other types of projects were begun by market banks during 1968 and 1969i educational support and projects involving fishermen and handicraft industries. There is a strong belief within the KOSGORO leadership that widespread education Is an important goal, and the Krawang KOSGORO market bank, in conjunction with an organization for students* welfare, instituted a joint project to encourage both savings and matriculation in elementary, middle and high schools (s e e Wart a Harlan. 25 July 1968, 5 November 1968, 23 April 1969 for descriptions of these projects). Conversation with David Reeve, December 1974. === [PDF page 630] === 615 Company of Japan was finalized that there was much progress. After this agreement with Mitsui in 1968 the project was to encompass ten thousand hectares of cultivated and uncultivated land, where corn would be grown by modern, scientific techniques, through the use of improved seed, fertilizer, insecticides, and machines. It was hoped that besides a local market for corn, much of the corn harvested could be exported. Although only 900 hectares were finally planted and the goal was reduced to 4100 hectares, the project was successful in that it had the support of many Javanese transmigrants of the area, which resulted in the strengthening of the Lampung chapter of KOSGORO. KOSGORO was frustrated in its hopes of campaigning in the 1971 elections, except as a neglected part of Golkari its functional organizations also have suffered a period of decline due to Golkar pressure. It can no longer be active politically in the villages, but it is able to maintain itself as an economic and cooperative organization, and has continued its interest in the furtherance of education and culture. The organization in the past few years has begun to stress the importance of the indigenous, i.e. non-Chinese, entrepreneurs, and has tried to attract them into the 68 DJakarta Times, 27 May 1968. Warta Harlan. 4 January 1969 and Antafa. morning edition, 13 March 1970. === [PDF page 631] === 616 KOSGORO, again demonstrating the mixture of ideology and pragmatism in the KOSGORO. Before beginning an examination of Golkar and the attempts of the Soeharto government to create a "state party" from Golkar, it is useful to look at the theoretical argument that a military regime needs to develop a political apparatus in the form of a mass movement or political party in order to help it attain legitimacy and provide for the articulation and aggregation of interests. Morris Janowitz said that if the military is to succeed in providing national leadership and engendering mass support for its progress, it must "develop a political apparatus outside of the military establishment but under its direct domination." Samuel Huntington also stressed the need for military regimes to develop political institutions, including parties, but dwelled at length upon the difficulty for the military to develop those institutions, mainly because of the attitudes of the military toward political con« 72 flict and the process of development. Theirs is a "non-political model of nation building" which fails to recognize the conflicts of interests and values inherent in any society, but particularly prevalent in one undergoing rapid See the report of the third KOSGORO conference, Angkatan Bersendiata. 2 June 1972. ^•The Military in the Political Development of New Nationst An Essav in Comparative Analysis (Chicago and Londoni University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 29. 72 Changin* Societies, pp. 237-263. === [PDF page 632] === 617 social change, and which consequently makes no provision for mediating conflict and reconciling interests.73 interests. Feit emphasized the need for ideologies to be created by the military regimes in order for the institutionalization of the regimes to be effective and in order to give the regimes legitimacy and tie the ruled to the rulers. As a qualification to the need for a mass movement or party to be organized by a military regime, Ann Ruth Willner stated that the dimensions of mobilizing mass support and of building political organizations can be separated, and that a charismatic leader can have mass support without a political organization; Willner revised the Janowitz thesis by holding that "sustained mass support of a military regime will depend upon its success in developing a political apparatus outside the army." It has also been observed that military regimes often align themselves with the 76 bureaucracy, influenced by shared characteristics of the civil bureaucracy and the military, such as the obsession 73 Ibid., pp. 245-246. 74 Edward Feit, The Armed Bureaucrats (Bostoni Houghton Mifflin, 1973), pp. 172-179 and "Pen, Sword and People: Military Regimes in the Formation of Political Institutions," paper presented at the 67th meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 7-11 Sep* teraber 1971, pp. 8-15. 75 " E l i t e s as R u l e r s, " p. 268. See Feit, Armed Bureaucrats and "Pen, Sword and People." === [PDF page 633] === 618 with order, rules, direction, and hierarchy. 77 It will be seen that the Indonesian military, like its counterparts in Pakistan, Thailand, and the Republic of Korea, felt the need for the establishment of a political movement, al78 though it took some years to be established. This movement, Golkar, was to have the major purpose of providing legitimacy to the regime through a successful showing in the 1971 electioni it was not designed for the articulation and aggregation of interests. The Soeharto regime, like the Ayub government in Pakistan and the Park government of the Republic of Korea, formed its alliance with the bureaucrats and the technocrats, not with the "masses of the 79 peasantry" as Huntington advocated. The legitimacy of the Soeharto government has decreased greatly since the 1971 election. One factor was the regime's "bulldozing" tactics used during the election campaign. During the election 77 See Feit, Armed Bureaucrats, pp. 9, 11-14. 78 Concerning attempts of t h e m i l i t a r y i n these t h r e e c o u n t r i e s t o c r e a t e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s, seei Henry Bienen and David Morell, " T r a n s i t i o n from M i l i t a r y Rule* T h a i l a n d ' s E x p e r i e n c e, " i n P o l i t i c a l - M i l i t a r y Systems, ed. K e l l e h e r i Rounaq Jahan, P a k i s t a n i F a i l u r e i n National I n t e g r a t i o n (New York* Columbia U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s, 1972)i C. I. Eugene Kim, " I n s t i t u t i o n - B u i l d i n g and Adaptationi The Case of the DRP i n South Korea," paper presented a t t h e 68th meeting of t h e American P o l i t i c a l Science A s s o c i a t i o n, Washington, D.C., 5-9 September 1972| and C. I. Eugene Kim, "The M i l i t a r y Regime of South Koreai The Past Performance and Future P r o s p e c t s, " paper presented a t t h e meeting of the I n t e r U n i v e r s i t y Seminar on Armed Forces and S o c i e t y, Chicago, 11-13 October 1973. 79 Changing S o c i e t i e s. p. 241. === [PDF page 634] === 619 campaign, even after the government had "arranged" the leadership of the major political parties, the government was still afraid that the Golkar would not have a respectable showing in the elections. Therefore it used the application of direct and indirect pressure down to the village level by the regional and local military authorities and civil servants in order for the regime to receive a majority of the votes. Another reason for the decline in legitimacy of the regime was its inability to create an ideology that would bind the people to the military government. The slogans of development and modernization seemed pale to many Indonesians in comparison with the nationalistic ideology of Guided Democracy. The slogans had worn thin, especially because ten years of the New Order have brought the benefits of development chiefly to those who are a part of the regime: the military, the bureaucrats, the technocrats, and those political party leaders who have been coopted by the regime. The following traces the development of the Sekber Golkar into the "government" party, its "success" at the polls, the subsequent attempts of Golkar to create an organization and the resulting conflicts among active militarycivilian groups in Golkar. At the beginning of the New Order the military government, which was a broad coalition of military and civilian forces, did not feel the need to create a political movement of its own. Gradually, the coalition became narrower === [PDF page 635] === 620 as the military government stabilized and expanded its power, and popular support of the government decreased. By 1968 Soeharto felt that a date had to be set for the elections, because, according to his analysis, elections were necessary to provide legitimacy both for his government and for the military's assumption of a socio-political role. Until the middle of 1969 Soeharto and his faction could not decide how the government should contest the elections. Should they unite with the PNI? The PNI was the party that most suited the abangan Javanese from Central 80 Java, who made up the core of the Soeharto faction. should they create a new party, a "Soeharto party?" The latter possibility was considered for some time especially by Ali Moertopo and his advisers, but the spectre of IPKI's failure in the 1955 elections always hung over themj other military leaders were opposed to this suggestion, mostly for the same reason. Their fears were realized by the Thai military in the 1969 elections, for which the Thai military 81 created a political party. Soeharto and his faction were 80 Masashi Nishihara stated that the Soeharto faction thought of making the Parmusi the government (Golkar and the Indonesian Elections of 1971. Cornell_University, Modern Indonesia Project, Monograph series /Ithaca, N.Y.i Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 19727, p. 4 ). According to my knowledge this was never seriously discussed. Most of those interviewed from the military government felt antagonistic toward santrl and dwelled at length on the dangers of political Islam, especially of the reformist variety represented in the Parmusi party. 81 Bienen and Morell, "From Military Rule," p. 20. === [PDF page 636] === 621 not sure whether or not they could exercise control over an existing party, such as the PNI, contrary to the belief of the Ayub government in Pakistan when it used the Muslim 82 League, which had been a well-known national party. the early months of 1969 the Soeharto faction increasingly discussed whether or not the Sekber Golkar could be revamped and used as the vehicle for the electionsi this was what they finally decided to do. In the early post-coup period the Sekber Golkar began to growi at that time the military began t o conceive i t as the desirable coordinator of all functional groups repre83 sented in the parliament. The Soeharto faction began to pressure functional groups into joining the Sekber Golkar. In 1967 the Sekber Golkar divided its 262 member organizations into three divisions? material, consisting of labor, peasant, civil servant groups and cooperative groupsi spiritual, consisting of women*s, student, intellectual, artistic, journalistic, and ulama groupsi and defense, con84 sisting of the armed forces, veterans, and civil defense. It was also decided that seven organizations within Sekber 85 Golkar would band together and run in the elections. 82 Jahan, Pakistan, p. 128. 83 Nishihara, Golkar, p. 20. 84 Karva dalam Pembangunan. p. 40. 85 There were three military-civilian organizations! SOKSI, the Muslawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong Roiong (MKGR), Family Mutual Help Association, founded by Brigadier General Soegandhiei and K0SG0R0. The four other organizations === [PDF page 637] === 622 Six of the seven were headed by generals. At the end of 1969 and the beginning of 1970, after the decision had been made to use Sekber Golkar, the government made structural attempts to strengthen itt 1) all functional group appointments to the regional and local assemblies had to be made by constituent Sekber Golkar boardst and 2) the regulation by the internal affairs minister (Lieutenant General Amir Machmud) requiring civil servants to be members of civil servant organizations and not of political parties. The older leaders of Golkar, namely those that represented the main mass organizations in the Sekber Golkar, like K0SG0R0, played a small role in the new Golkar and in the election campaign. The main actors in the new Golkar and in the campaign were intellectuals, civil servants, and military officers directly under the defense department. Three military officers represented these groups* Ali Moertopo, the intellectualsi Amir Machmud, the civil servants! and Soemitro, the military. The intellectuals articulated the Golkar ideas of modernization and development. The intellectuals in Golkar came mainly from three different groupsi 1) young Catholic leaders, many of whom were Chinese, who were afraid of the potential power of the Islamic political partiesi 2) elements from the Golongan werei the armed services, a workers federation, a civil servants organization, and a professional organization 86 Ward, Ejection of 1971. p. 26. === [PDF page 638] === 623 Independent, guided mainly by their desire to change the political structure, but also hostile of Islamic partiess and 3) the Bandung group, most of whom had been active either in KASI, or in the student newspaper in Bandung, Mahasiswa Indonesia. or in both, and had been influenced 87 by Dharsono's concept of a two-party system. The technocrats were not included, although some were actively campaigning, since they were not involved in the workings of the Golkar campaign headquarters as were the three groups mentioned above. These groups of intellectuals were influenced by a variety of political ideasi those of Sutan Sjahrir, the late PSI leader? those of the abangan Javanese with their antagonism against the santri? those of the anti-Communists in Indonesia, opposed to the extent of social and economic change which the PKI advocated? and those of American political scientists, including Janowitz and Pye, who emphasized the positive role of the military in the process of modernization, and also Daniel Bell, in "end of ideology." The intellectuals thought that they would influence not only the goals of Golkar, but its tactics, and that through their participation in Golkar they would be able to influence local areas and develop cadres in these localties who would support their "modern" ideas. A 87 For an interesting discussion of these three intellectual groups see Ibid., pp. 35-41. 88 See Ibid., p. 37. === [PDF page 639] === 624 young intellectual outside of Golkar castigated them for their "naivete." In no province is Sekber Golkar not dominated by ABRI /the armed services7.... They have the pretention that they can change Golkar from within by infiltrating it first and dominate it later on the basis of the strength of their idea and mission which is modernization.... What is wrong... is the inability of these modernists to learn from past experiences... • These experiences teach us that a bigger and stronger organization will devour smaller and weaker ones.89 The intellectuals were at a considerable disadvantage vis-a-vis the civil servants and the military, in that there was no hierarchy linking them to the regions and localities, and they were chiefly active in Jakarta and a few other main cities. The ordinary citizens had contact with local military officers and civil service officials, and their pitch to recalcitrant voters had nothing to do with Golkar leading Indonesia down the yellow brick road to modernization and development, but that: 1) Golkar was the government party and a vote against Golkar implied disloyalty; 2) a vote against Golkar meant that the chaos of 1965 and 1966 could return; 3) a vote against Golkar would mean that one would receive no government services or jobs; and 4) that Golkar had the backing of tradi90 tional authorities. There were plans to hold a conference of the "upholders of tradition" three months 89 Nono Anwar Makarim in Harlan Kami. 12 March 1970. 90 R. William Liddle, "Evolution from Abovei National Leadership and Local Development in Indonesia," Journal of Asian Studies 32 (February 1973)i 298-299. === [PDF page 640] === 625 before the elections, but a financial scandal caused the 91 conference to be cancelled. The old Sekber Golkar group, rather inactive during the elections, were resentful of the intellectuals around Ali Moertopo. Although their mass organizations were not large, they had more following than did the intellectuals, and the old Sekber Golkar leaders, influenced largely by radical nationalism, ideologically opposed the PSI ideology, which so heavily influenced the intellectuals. Throughout the election campaign it was evident that Golkar was a very disparate organization, with its activists ranging from PSI to Parmusi to PNI sympathizers, and with conflicts also along organizational lines, i.e. the intellectuals of the Ali Moertopo group versus not only the old Golkar group,92 but increasingly the civil service and military groups. This manifested itself also through conflicts among the different groups concerning candidates on the Golkar ticket. Since the Golkar leaders were opposed not only to political parties but also to ideology, considering it "traditional" and harmful to economic development, they were unable to fathom the necessity for constructing an ideology or some type of belief system that would tie 93 the Golkar together. 91 See the Pedoman editorial, "Traditionalistsi Half Billion." 1 April 1971. See the Abadi editorial, "Golkar Is Horrible," 25 June 19711 93 Ward, Election of 1971. p. 89. === [PDF page 641] === 626 What has been the situation of Golkar after the.94 election? The conflicts among the Golkar leaders continued, especially between the intellectuals and the military group associated with the defense department (HAMCAM); this was also reflected in the rivalry between Ali Moertopo and Scemitro, head of HANKAM until he was discharged after the January 1974 riots. Although Soemitro lost in the power struggle between Ali Moertopo and himself, HANKAM still appears to be dominant over the civilian intellectuals. The other two groups, the old Sekber Golkar and the civil service, favor HAMCAM over the intellectuals; both the civil service and the old Sekber Golkar are dominated by military leaders. Organizationally Golkar has been dominated by military leaders; this is evident both on a national and a re95 gional basis. A national congress was held in 1973, which, according to reports, was a beautifully orchestrated congress, in which no discordant notes were made by the 96 delegates to proposals of the executive board. But so 94 For analyses concerning Golkar since the elections, see Samson, "Military Control," pp. 132-135i Samson, "Climate of Concern," pp. 159-161; and Ward, Election of 1971. 95 In the central board and national advisory council, for example, more than half of the members are military; of those who are involved the most heavily in Golkar, most are military. See Tempo. 15 September 1973. === [PDF page 642] === 627 far, Golkar has not become an integrated organization, with an identity separate from its disparate elements, and internal unity and organizational loyalty has not yet emerged. Like the experience of the military regime in Thailand after the 1969 elections, the creation of a state party did not guarantee that its representatives in parliament would 97 not disagree with the wishes of the government. Although the Indonesian military regime has not had the difficulties with parliament that the Thai government had, the representatives have been critical of certain governmental policies, such as those toward indigenous and non-indigenous entrepreneurs, the rice problem and the draft marriage bill. 98 Since 1972 the government has attempted to integrate the functional groups in order to strengthen Golkar and increase their control over the mass movements. For example, all the civil servant groups were united under Golkar. This policy was also followed for the peasant groups, then for labor, students, and other organizations. There was resistance, especially by the student groups, and integration of these groups was not completely achieved, but these policies not only further weakened the political parties, but were an attempt to depoliticize and control 97 the mass See Bienen and Morell, "From Military Rule," p. 20. 98 See ManasIswa Indonesia, third week of November 1972; Mimbar Demokrasi editorial, "What about Golkar Following the Parites* Fusion?" second half of January 1973t Burhan Magenda, "Getting Rid of Strayed 'Idealists,'" Harian Kami. 6 August 1973i and Pedoman. 22 December 1973. === [PDF page 643] === 628 movements. This was not an attempt to unite these groups ideologically or through a system of beliefs or ar. attempt to provide for the articulation and aggregation of various interests, but almost exclusively a concern with control. Another measure of control, a more important one and more damaging to political parties, was the decision to forbid the establishment or continuance of any political organization, including Golkar, in the villages. The rationalization was that political parties had upset the traditional harmony of the village, and that in order to develop Indonesia the villages should be depoliticized. Golkar was not affected by this measure, since the main Golkar stalwarts, the local military and civil administration, were still in the villages, and there was no core of Golkar support in the villages anyway, but the parties were severely damaged 99 by this regulation. The Military and Political Parties Introduction One main strategy of the Soeharto government in establishing a strong military regime is that of controlling political parties; through certain policies instituted toward these parties and influence over the composition of their leadership, Soeharto planned to prevent the political parties from developing the strength necessary to pose a "See "Why Floating Mass2m Suara Karva. 23 March 1972i Abadi editorial, "Floating Mass and Basic Rights," 4 April 1972i and Kompas. 15 September 1972. === [PDF page 644] === 629 threat to military rule. In the beginning, the Soeharto regime sought to end the leadership of pro-Sukarnoist figures in the nationalist parties and prevent strong, ideologically-motivated Islamic leaders from ascending to leadership in the Islamic parties. Then as the military regime grew stronger, through active interference with the parties, the government was able to insure the election or governmental appointment, in the case of the Parmusi, of weak, accommodationist leaders. Various attempts were made to change the political structure, with the aim of "simplification" and further weakening of party strength, culminating with the governmental decision in 1970 to force the political parties to federate into two groups. It was only after the elections, which further weakened the parties, that these restructuring attempts finally bore fruit. The government's strategies and policies concerning the control of political parties will first be discussed, then the process of "political restructuring." The attempts at controlling the Parmusi and PNI will be emphasized, with a brief analysis of governmental interference with the IPKI and PSII parties. Control of Political Parties The party most affected by governmental control has been the Parmusi, since it is, in essence, the inheritor of the Masjumi and that party has been banned since 1960. On the rationale that the Masjumi was the first victim of === [PDF page 645] === 630 Guided Democracy and the growing strength of the PKI, and that its supporters were among the vanguard of the New Order, former Masjumi members and supporters attempted soon after the attempted coup to arrange for the rehabilitation of the Masjumi. Their attempts were made through informal contacts with military leadersi this pattern was maintained to a great extent irt the negotiations for the establishment of the Parmusi and after the Malang congress in their attempts to convince the government to recognize the new leadership. In 1966 Masjumi supporters felt that imminently the Masjumi would be rehabilitated by the government, and they were very heartened by the statement issued at the army seminar in Bandung that August. The seminar was dominated by Siliwangi leaders, who were more sympathetic to reformist Islam than their colleagues from the Diponegoro division, and the seminar statement implied that the Masjumi must be included in the political mobilization of all New Order forces. The Masjumi supporters were shocked when, in December, the regional military commanders issued a statement saying that both Masjumi and the PKI had deviated from the 1945 Constitution, and were further dismayed when Soeharto announced in January 1967 that the Masjumi would not be allowed to be rehabilitated. Islamic youth organizations made a last ditch attempt to secure l00 Anwar, "Islam and Politics," p. 25. Ward, Pagtai Muslimin Indonesia, p. 25. === [PDF page 646] === 631 Masjumi's rehabilitation by the formation of the Komando Jihad (Holy War Command), but it was banned in Jakarta by 102 the regional commander in April 1967. After Soeharto's decision was announced, two groups were negotiating with the government in the setting up of a new Islamic party, one led by former Vice-President Hatta and backed by several youth organizations, and one composed of representatives from Islamic social and educational groups, many of which had been organizational members of Masjumi. In January 1967 Hatta renewed his offer of May 1966 to establish a new Islamic party, which would be called the Partal Demokrat 103 Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Democratic Party). This party, contrary to dominant elements within the MJ and the former Masjumi, would not call for the institution of an Islamic state. The second group received the support of the Masjumi leaders and backers, and it set up a committee of seven, which included six Masjumi leaders, to negotiate for the establishment of a new party with the government. Soeharto favored this group and refused Hatta permission to set up his party. Many months elapsed before the government would allow the Parrausi to be set up, during which time frequent negotiations were conducted between this committee 102 Ibid., p. 25. 103 See Antara. morning ed. 31 May 1966 and Antara. morning ed., 24 January 1967. For Hatta's reaction of Soeharto's refusal to allow his party to operate, see Antara. morning ed., 17 June 1967. === [PDF page 647] === 632 (and its successor, the committee of five) and military leaders and advisors of Soeharto. The stumbling blocks always revolved around the inclusion of former Masjumi figures in the leadership lists submitted to the military authorities. The first draft list was sent to Soeharto in September 1967, but since five of the six chairpersons were former Masjumi leaders it did not meet with Soeharto* s approval. Soeharto and his faction have been suspicious of Islamic groups, especially those of the modernist Islamic variety which have their strongest support outside the Javanese ethnic area. Most army leaders, in addition, think of the Masjumi as the party of rebellion, since elements of the party were active in the Darul Islam movement in West Java and other areas, and also several Masjumi leaders were prominent in the 1958 regional rebellion. The Masjumi leaders did have supporters in the army leadership, especially those from the Siliwangi and Brawijaya divisions, but these leaders, such as Nasution and Sudirman were no longer powerful, and could not serve as effective patrons. Negotiations were continued with the government, and in these negotiations the committee was aided by Agus Sudono, a Javanese and a priyayi, who was able to communicate better with members of Soeharto*s faction than were other leaders originating from the Outer Islands or from santri backgrounds. A revised list was drawn up at the end of October 1968, in which four of the eight chairpersons were Masjumi, but the list was not approved again. In February 1968, Soeharto met === [PDF page 648] === 633 with the committee and with representatives from the mass organizations, already represented in parliament, and told them that there could be no Masjumi leaders on the Parmusi board, only leaders from mass organizations! he evidently did tell them that when the Parrausi held their first congress 105 the party would be free to elect former Masjumi leaders. A new committee was formed, the committee of five, and it was decided by this committee that they should comply with the government's demand and a new list was submitted which contained no names of Masjumi leaders. This list was ap106 proved the same month, and Parmusi was finally launched. During the months before the party congress in November the Parmusi was handicapped in its efforts to mobilize mass support because their leaders were not well-known figures, unlike Masjumi leaders, such as Roem, Natsir, Prawoto Mangkusasmito, and Sjafruddin Prawiranegarai it was understood by many, though, that the situation would be remedied at the first congress. My knowledge of this is based on interviews and conversations with some of those involved in the negotiations. Also see Ward, Partai Muslimin Indonesia, p. 36 and Samson, "Islam and Politics," p. 59. It was also said that Soeharto had used the phrase "at your congress after the elections... " The elections had been scheduled for the summer of 1968, but they*were postponed. Soeharto stressed that he had meant that the Parmusi could not choose its leaders until after the general electionsi the Parmusi leaders maintained that Soeharto had given them the right to select their own leaders at their first party congress (interview with Mohammad Roem, Jakarta, 10 February 1969). l06 See Operas1. 21 February 1968. === [PDF page 649] === 634 Before the congress the Parrausi was quite united! it was understood by all that the Masjumi leaders would be elected; reports from virtually every province indicated that this was desired. Soeharto had met with the executive board in September, but had not told them that he had decided that no Masjumi leader would be permitted to serve on the board. Soeharto chose to communicate to the Parmusi executive board in a very indirect way that he did not want any former Masjumi leaders elected. A Muhammadiyah leader, Mintaredja, who was also a cabinet minister, received a letter from Soeharto requesting that his order refusing permission for Masjumi leaders to be elected be forwarded to the Parmusi board. Mintaredja showed the letter to some Muhammadiyah leaders, and it was decided not to forward it! they allegedly were afraid that the Parmusi leaders would think they were responsible for the order. On October 28, after most of the delegates to the party congress had already left for Malang, Parrausi leaders met with Soeharto and 108 were shocked to hear his decision. They were also told by Ali Moertopo which leaders were desired by the government and for what positions within the party. None of the people recommended were well-known outside the central organization. The Parmusi central board was afraid of a revolt at the conference, and requested Agus Sudono, who 'interview with Mintaredja, Jakarta, 8 April 1969. l08 Samson, "Islam and Politics," pp. 72-73. === [PDF page 650] === 635 had the closest relations with the military, to stay behind for a few more days to negotiate with Ali Moertopo. Agus Sudono was able to wring some concessions from Ali Moertopot two lesser known Masjurai figures were allowed to serve on the new central board. Feeling in the congress ran high, both against the government and against the Parmusi central board, especially against Agus Sudono. The congress defied Soeharto and elected Roem as general chairperson, but hoped that he would be accepted by the government since he was known as a moderate Islamic leader and had not been involved in the regional rebellion (he is Javanese). Two of the other four chairpersons and five members of the executive council were former Masjumi leaders. The Parmusi received a radiogram from one of Soeharto*s advisors at the end of the congress that the government would not recognize the new executive board. For the next year there were two party boards, one recognized by the party and the other, the first central 109 board, recognized by the government. The party made attempts for the next year to obtain clearance from the government. Major General Alamsjah offered his good 109 On this issue see the following articlest Abadi, 14 December 1968, 1 May 1969, and 7 November 1969i Berita Yudha, 15 November 1968j Qperasi Digest. 18 November 1968, 19 November 1968, 25 November 1968, and 2 January 1969i Angkatan Bersendiata. 23 November 1968i Harian Kami. 11 November 1968t Rosihan Anwar in Kompas. 14 November 1968i Taufik Ismail in Harlan Kami. 15 November 1968i and Wiratmo Soekito in Harian Kami. 13 November 1968. === [PDF page 651] === 636 offices, and suggested that several requests be complied with, such as the issuance of a statement by Natsir in favor of the government development plan. Roem agreed to these requests, and then meetings were held between some military advisers of Soeharto, such as Sudjono Humardhani and Alamsjah, and Roem, but in April 1969 Sudjono Humardhani announced at a Parmusi meeting of regional chairpersons that the government would not recognize the leaders elected at the congress. The Parmusi continued with two leadership councils, the Roem council elected at the congress, considered to be the legitimate one by most party members, and the Soeharto-appointed council, headed by Djarnawi. A Masjumi-dominated committee was established to nominate the Parmusi slate for the general elections; eighty percent of the candidates selected were Masjumi figures. The army was opposed to Masjumi dominance in the Parmusi, and, after the announcement of the candidates, a coup occurred, led by John Naro and Imron Kadir, well-known accommodationist leaders without popular backing, against 112 the Djarnawi board. This coup was evidently sponsored by Operasi Chusus, led by Ali Moertopo. Naro and Kadir were unsuccessful in convincing many of those appointed to See the f i r s t p a r t of Roera's l e c t u r e a t the c l o s ing s e s s i o n of t h e second conference of the J a k a r t a branch of t h e Parmusi on 9 November 1969, r e p o r t e d in Abadi. 13 November 1969. S a m s o n, "Islam and Politics," pp. 82-83. 11 7 Ibid., pp. 84-85 and Pedoman editorial, "Now It Is the Turn of the PMI," 20 October 1970. === [PDF page 652] === 637 113 lead the "new" Parmusi to serve. The next day, 21 October 1970, the Djarnawi board expelled Naro and Kadir from the party and gave the nominees twenty-four hours to resign their positions. Djarnawi's board had the support of the majority of Parmusi's individual and organizational members; Naro only had the support of some accommodationist leaders and a few of the smaller member organizations in the Parmusi, who resented the dominance of the Muhammadiyah and the Masjumi contingencies. Through government pressure Djarnawi finally agreed to allow Soeharto to settle the "dispute" within the party. Although the majority of Parmusi's supporters clearly favored Djarnawi, Soeharto appointed Mintaredja, an accommodationist leader who did not even have the support of his organization, the Muharamadi" yah, and on 21 November Soeharto announced the names of those on the new board. Several of those appointed to it subsequently announced their refusal to serve on it. The Djarnawi board decided not to recognize the presidential decision, and announced that all echelons of the party were non-active. The controversy extended for some weeks, with pressure applied to the government by Islamic 113 Antara, morning ed., 20 October 1970. 114 Nusantara. 21 October 1970. 115 Antara, 15 November 1970. Antara. afternoon ed., 21 November 1970. 11/ Kompas, 25 November 1970. 118 Abadi, 23 November 1970. === [PDF page 653] === and non-Islamic leaders and mass organizations to rescind the presidential decision. A compromise was finally reached between Mintaredja and Djarnawi, in which Mintaredja agreed to four demands by Djarnawi and his boardi 1) a party advisory council would be formed, to which the Djarnawi board would be appointedi 2) the Mintaredja board would not form rival executives in the regionsi 3) the names of the candidates for the election would not be tampered withi and 4) a party congress would 119 be held after the general elections. A week later Mintaredja, with army backing, broke the first part of the agreement, and refused to appoint an advisory coun120 cil. Then soon Mintaredja broke the second and third parts, and, to date, a party congress has not been held. The army was successful in eliminating Masjumi influence in the Parmusi, and through the army's policies a potentially influential party was reduced to a minor party, led by accommodationists who were dependent upon 121 the military for their positions. 119 Indonesia Rava. 23 December 1970. Indonesia Rava. 30 December 1970. 121 For a r t i c l e s concerning t h e Naro coup and S o e h a r t o ' s subsequent appointment of Mintaredja ( o t h e r t h a n those a l r e a d y c i t i e d ) s e e i Kompas. 19 October 1970, 3 November 1970, 24 November 1970 and 25 November 1970t Harian Kami e d i t o r i a l, 19 October 1970 and e d i t o r i a l of 20 October 1970 j A n t a r a. 20 October 1970, 21 Octob e r 1970, 24 October 1970, 27 October 1970, 19 Novemb e r 1970, 24 November 1970, 16 December 1970, 26 Decemb e r 19701 Indonesia Rava. 27 October 1970 % Warta H a r i a n. 24 November 1970» Anekatan B e r s e n i a t a. 25 November 1970, 120 === [PDF page 654] === 639 Two blatant examples of army interference in PNT politics can be illustrated by the extraordinary conference held in 1966 at the insistence of Soeharto and the regular party congress of 1970. Before the attempted coup in 1965 the Osa Maliki-Hardi faction had little military support in its controversy vis-a-vis the Ali-Surachman 122 faction; but after the PNI statement was issued supporting the 30 September movement, the fortunes of the Osa-Hardi faction rose and immediate support from army headquarters was forthcoming. The Osa-Hardi faction declared the central leadership council banned, formed a new council, and sought recognition from the army, which was forthcoming a few days later. However, since the New Order forces had not yet consolidated their position, it was difficult for the new army leadership to effect their choice of Osa and Hardi. The Ali board did enjoy support from other sections of the armed forces, including the police commander, 123 Sutjipto Judodihardjo, and some of the district military commands, such as those in Central Java. For the next few months the two factions jockeyed for power, with their day-by-day strength depending upon the relative positions 28 November 1970, 29 January 1971; Berita Yudha. 28 November 1970j Pedoman. 28 November 1970, and editorial of 6 January 1971. 122 As mentioned previously, the senior PNI leaders were «<=!.<= all out of Jakarta when the attempted coup occurred, and the young leaders, most of whom were in mass movements, issued the statement in support of the coup. * Mclntyre, "Indonesian National Party," p. 191. === [PDF page 655] === 640 of Sukarno and the "Old Order forces" versus the array headquarters and the New Order forces. The position of the Ali faction changed radically after the army leaders successfully pressured Sukarno into signing a decree on 11 March 1966 assigning power to Soeharto, and a few days after the decree was signed Soeharto ordered that a PNI extraordinary congress take place to "solve" the leadership problem in the party. The PNI leaders were forced to have the conference in Bandung and not in Jogjakarta, where local military officers were sympathetic to the Ali faction, and Soeharto empowered local military commanders... to deny delegates authority to attend the congress if they regarded them as being in any way associated with or sympathetic to the "Gestapu PKI" /the 30 September move ment7.124 In this way most of the delegates favoring the Ali board were prevented from attending the congress. This was the first interference by Soeharto in party politics on a national level. Mclntyre propounds an interesting hypothesis explaining Soeharto's major motivation in the determination that power in the PNI be turned over to the OsaHardi faction. Through a successful interference, Soeharto would gain control over the most important secular nationalist party, which, in turn, would reduce his dependency upon organizations, such as the AKSI ones, with large Islamic components, which he thought were tipping the 124 Ibid., p. 208. === [PDF page 656] === 641 balance of civilian organizations in favor of Islamic parties. In 1968 Soeharto was very helpful to the PNI in insisting that the PNI regional and local branches be allowed to function after they "purify" themselves from leftist elements. At this time many chapters of the PNI had been banned, especially in the Outer Islands, largely at the insistence of "radical" New Order regional commanders. Soeharto was determined that the PNI be reconstituted as a viable party to counterbalance political Islam. Of all the political parties, Soeharto felt the closest to the PNI, probably because of his abangan Central Javanese background. In the last chapter mention was made of the interference of the Soeharto government with the 1970 PNI congress, as an illustration of a technique for decreasing the power of a rival military faction through lessening the power of its civilian supports. Before the congress it was already evident that Soeharto had chosen Hadisubeno as the "favored" candidate for general chairperson, and Operasi Chusus, under Ali Moertopo, was active in convinc126 ing regional boards that Hadisubeno would be elected. District military commands had also summoned PNI leaders in their localities and "asked" them to elect Hadisubono, 125 Ibid., p. 208. See the Nusantara e d i t o r i a l, " P r e s i d e n t ' s Speech Important t o PNI Congress," 7 April 1970. === [PDF page 657] === 642 127 because President Soeharto "approves" Hadisubeno. The congress was held in Semarang, the headquarters of the Diponegoro division, and although there were some Siliwangi members trying to convince delegates to vote for Hardi and not succumb to the scare tactics of Operasi Chusus and the Diponegoro regional command, the delegates were "convinced" they should vote for Hadisubeno. During the conference, according to Harian Kami (20 April 1970)i Participants' cards were torn, delegates considered obstacles to outsiders were "arrested" or controlled, a trained pressure group was specially tasked to disturb sessions whenever a participant voiced a demand for democracy in congress, and even session chairmen were rudely overthrown from their seats. It was poetic justice that the Hardi forces suffered the same indignities as had their rivals, the Ali faction and its supporters, for it was only through military intervention that the Osa-Hardi faction had prevailed over the Ali faction. The small Islamic party, the PSII, also had similar experiences as the Parrausi and the PNI, although on a smaller scale. In July 1972 the PSII party congress changed its executive leadership from that headed by Anwar Tjokroaminoto, a son of the founder, to a new execu128 tive board led by a young leader, M.C. Ibrahim. During this time the government was pressuring the Islamic parties 127 Harian Kami. 14 April 1970i also see the Nusantara editorial, "Let Us Preserve President Soeharto's Reputation," 15 April 1970. 128 Abadi editorial, "The PSII in the News," 1 August 1972. === [PDF page 658] === 643 to complete their fusion into one organization. The new PSII executive was not in favor of the fusion, and the government became very impatient with the delay. Two months after the congress, Operasi Chusus arranged a "coup" within the PSII, and a young group took over the party headquarters and announced the establishment of an "emergency leadership" under Anwar Tjokroaminoto and other leaders who had been defeated in their bid for leadership in the party two months 129 before. For several months conflict existed between the two executive boards, and in January 1973, to show governmental preference for the "emergency leadership" openly Ali Moertopo stated He ^M.C. Ibrahim7 is indeed shallow as regards leadership. His actions to reconcile differences of view in the Development Unity Group are not harmonious and in the regions this can disturb the situation. Also he has reportedly dismissed all those who are in favor of a fusion.130 Ali Moertopo went on to say that he was "convinced that Anwar Tjokroaminoto would be able to settle the problem of the PSII." The PSII, as in the case of the PNI, the Parmusi, and indirectly the NU, was controlled by the government in a way that showed the government's 129 See Nusantara. 23 December I972j Abadi editorial, "PSII in Anxiety," 26 December 1970i Pedoman editorial, "•Seizure of Power' in PSII and What Is the Problem of Political Parties?" 26 December 1972. 130 Abadi editorial, "Ali Moertopo*s Evaluation," 1 January 1973. 131 Ibid. === [PDF page 659] === 644 determination to force political parties to agree with 132 its policies. "Simplification" of the Political Party Structure The first attempt to fuse the political parties was made by Major General Dharsono, discussed in the last chapter. Almost a year after the demise of Dharsono*s two group system Soeharto called upon the political parties to 133 form two groups, and the functional groups one group. Perhaps this was partially due to the desire on the part of some army officers, intellectuals, and a few political party leaders to effect some changes in the political structure. Soeharto*s suggestion was to merge the non-religious parties into the material group and the religious parties into the spiritual group. Controversy arose immediately over the inclusion of all religious parties in one group, 134 and over the group names, material and spiritual. Discussions were held between Soeharto and the party leaders and it was decided that the Christian parties would be 132 For a forceful negative reaction to the exercise of power by the military in the political parties, see "The Government and the PSII" by Jusuf Wibisono, Abadi, 8 January 1973. 133 Antara, afternoon ed., 13 February 1970. See Kompas, 9 February 1970? Sinar Harapan editorial, "The Suggestion for Groupings Needs to Be Explained," 10 February 1970i and Harian Kami editorial, "Concerning Grouping of Parties," 13 February 1970. === [PDF page 660] === 645 135 included in the material grouping, and that the name i 36 material be changed to national. The major political parties were very reluctant to form the two groupings. The president then summoned the two potential groupings to the palace, and finally the party leaders said they would "discuss the matter further * in depth*... but the president apparently already realized that this 'discussion in 137 depth' could be expected to continue till Doomsday." Therefore two liaison officers were appointed to push the parties into agreement. Finally, an agreement was made among the political parties to form two groups: the National 138 and Unity groups. Nono Anwar Makarim, a prominent AKSI leader presently in exile in the United States, wrote: The group of the PNI and associates was formed in as brief a time as it would take for Operation Lightning, and no wonder, since it was set up by people who are used to the pace and speed of Operasi Chusus. Some time later, in a pace more befitting the Javanese, the Muslim group was Although the two groups were formed both were fairly moribund until 1972. In October 1971 Soeharto began placing pressure again upon the political party leaders, and 1 35 Antara, afternoon ed., 28 February 1970. 1 36 Note that Soeharto's suggestion was influenced by the names "material" and "spiritual" included within the Golkar division of 1967. 137 Nono Anwar Makarim in Harian Kami, 19 March 1970. 138 ibid. 139 ibid. === [PDF page 661] === 646 announced that the parties in the parliament would be reduced to two groupings, and that these two groups and Golkar would contest the projected elections set for 1976. >The national group changed its name to the Democratic Development Group, and assigned a small committee to study the problems of fusion. The main controversy was the issue of equal representation of parties (the preference of the small parties) versus representation in accordance with strength (PNI*s preference). Throughout 1972 pressure was exerted on the nationalist group to agree to fusion and to effect consolidation. Quite often pressure was applied to the regional boards by array officers in the field, and in this way attempts were made to speed up the fusion process. Soeharto was insisting that the fusion of the two groups take place before the March 1973 session of the people's consultative assembly (MPR) but the PiNI was trying to delay the fusion, largely because the executive board was unpopular with most party members and they did not want "to risk a new source of disunity by agreeing to a 142 fusion." They were also faced with the coordinated efforts of the four minority parties to prevent the 140 See Suara Karva. 8 October 1971 and Berita Buana, 9 October 1971. For an interesting article on the evolution of problems besetting the Democratic Development Group, see Topik, 21 March 1974. Burhan Magenda, "Matching Cunning in the Regions?" Harian Kami. 1 October 1972. === [PDF page 662] === 647 domination of the PNI, and with the belief of many leaders and party cadres that the formation of the new group was mainly a tactic to destroy the PNI and to eliminate the ideology of Marhaenism. The fusion was finally agreed to in early 1973 before the MPR session, in accordance with the wishes of Soeharto, but the new party, called the Partai Pembangunan Demokrasi (PPD), the Development Democratic Party, continued to have problems of consolidation, partially due to the controversy over the PNI's demand to have a strong position in regional leadership to compensate it for its small representation in the 144 central executive board. Similar pressure was applied to the Islamic group by Soeharto after the palace meeting in October 1971. April 1972 the Islamic group reported to Soeharto that 145 confederation of the parties had been accomplished. By October 1972 the political activities of the individual parties were to have been unified, but fusion had not yet been accomplished. Finally, due to heavy pressure by Soeharto, the Partai Pembangunan Persatuan (PPP), the United Development Party was created two months before 143 See Topjic, 21 March 1974. 144 See Burhan D. Magenda, "A Late Starter," Harian Kami. 16 July 1973. See the Abadi editorial, "Confederation of Muslim Parties," 17 April 1972. === [PDF page 663] === 648 the MPR session, although there was a lot of criticism of this fusion by two major NU leaders (Imron Rosjadi and 147 Jusuf Hasjim) and other lower leaders. Some of the same problems have been occurring with the PPP as with the PPD in the regions, although the competition is not so much among the different constituent parties as among the different factions. The government, however, through the regional commanders, has attempted-to ensure that the regional boards are controlled by the Idham and Mintaredja factions. The military government led by Soeharto has been quite successful in creating a state party, controlling the political parties, and restructuring the political system, all of which improve the extent of control which the government can wield in the civilian political structure. However, the weakness of the government's policy of tight control over civilian groups and its attempts to exercise that type of control over the armed forces was illustrated by the mass riots of January 1974. These riots were primarily a protest by students and the urban poor against governmental policies, which they regarded as rewarding the benefits of economic development mainly to the See the Pedoman editorial, "The Physical Fusion of the Muslim Political Parties," 10 January 1973. Burhan Magenda, "Overdue Complaint?" Harian Kami. 12 February 1973. burhan Magenda, "A Late Starter," Harian Kami. 16 July 1973. === [PDF page 664] === 649 powerful, and "prostituting" Indonesia, to foreign interests. The regime discovered that forceful attempts to build consensus through control was not a substitute for the development of policies which would, to some extent, be responsive to widespread public demands. Therefore, governmental response to the riots was two-pronged: first, repression of the rebellious elements, especially intellectuals, and second, institution of policies which would begin to meet the needs expressed. The second response is unlikely to be successful due to the strength of institutions and elite members whose interests are counter to the implementation of policies which would, in the long run, decrease their power and resources. In summary, the first part of this chapter discussed the importance of background characteristics in the formation and behavior of political party factions. Political parties differed in accordance with which background characteristics were salient and to what extent ideology influenced factional formation. Factionalism within political parties contributed to the weakening of the parties vis-avis the military, therefore helping to pave the way for domination of the system by the military. The second part of the chapter concentrated on two aspects of militarycivilian relations, the evolving attempts of the military to create viable political movements and the control the government has exerted over political parties, further contributing to the decline of the political parties. === [PDF page 665] === 650 the years have passed the recruitment patterns into the the New Order political elite have narrowed, thereby major groups in Indonesian society are not represented or only given token representation. What effects will this have on the stability of the New Order government? In the conclusion some speculations will be raised about the relevance of representation to regime stability. === [PDF page 666] === 651 CONCLUSION This dissertation has focused upon four main areas: 1) the background characteristics of the political elite; 2) the influence of career patterns upon elite membership; 3) factional dynamics within the political elite; and 4) civilian-military relationships. Summary of Themes Background Characteristics of the Elite The first question posed was: To what extent is the elite representative of the mass of the population? As in all societies the Indonesian elite is distinguished from the mass by certain significant background factors, and, as is common of most other newly independent countriess the long term trend is for this disparity to increase. Recruit ment patterns of the Indonesian elite are biased in favor of those who are Javanese, particularly Central Javanese, from high social status, abangan, and urban origins, and who received a Western-style education dur period. >> the Dutch The potential elite members thereiore are a small group, and it is an almost insurmountable task for someone from the masses to advance to elite status. The second question concerning background characteristics wasi What combinations of ethnic, social status, === [PDF page 667] === 652 religious, educational, generational, and geographical characteristics are common for members of the political elite? No one factor was found necessary and sufficient in determining elite membership. The major interacting background factors were: Western-style education, and social status, religious, and ethnic origin. Dutch colonial policy accentuated the tendency for recruitment patterns into the elite to be so narrowly based. A common characteristic shared by almost all elite members is the possession of some Western-style education at a time when only.017% of the population was literate in Lutch. Dutch educational policies encouraged those of high status and Javan origin to attend Western-style schools. What changes in elite background characteristics can be seen over time? It was shown that from the Revolution to the present the elite has gradually become less representative of the population as a whole, especially in terms of ethnic and religious identification. Scholars have observed that at the beginning of independence the elites of multiethnic nations have been recruited not only from the majority ethnic group, if there is one, but also from the minority groups. Then gradually recruitment patterns tighten up, and not only are powerful positions dominated by the major ethnic group, but often there is a decrease in the number of symbolic positions given to ethnic minorities. This phenomenon has been observed in Burma, Malaysia, the Soviet Union, China, and many African countries. Indonesia is === [PDF page 668] === 653 similar to these countries in that recruitment into the elite is not only increasingly dominated by the major ethnic group, the Javanese, but that even in political parties drawing most of their support from non-Javanese groups the top leadership is largely recruited from Javanese. The dominance of the Javanese and the abangan was in full flower by the Guided Democracy period, and this dominance has continued and is accentuated in the I\ew Order, bocial status background of the elite has remained constant, in that consistently elite members have been recruited from those of high social status origins. Career Patterns Three questions were discussed in reference to career patterns: What is the relevance of the time of ascent, the place of ascent, and the routes of ascent to the achievement of elite status? The elites were divided into three segments: military, political party, and technocrat (non-party in Guided Democracy). The time of ascent was crucially important to military elite members. Participation and possession of officer rank in the Revolution was a characteristic shared by all military elite members. For civilians the time of entry was less important, although participation in the Revolution was common also for civilian elite members. In the political parties, as contrasted to the military, however, there is a growing number of younger leaders who were able to rise to party leadership in the early New Order period. === [PDF page 669] === 654 Concerning the place of ascent, the military elite members have risen through command, staff, and a few through karva positions. Some New Order army elite members, though, rose only because of a close personal relationship to Soeharto. Those who rose through command positions have been more successful in preserving their elite status than those who made it through staff positions. For political party leaders it was found that they had three base locations --the central party offices, the regional chapters, and mass movements. The place that was more apt to lead to elite membership depended upon the time of entry and the particular political party. For example, the younger leaders found mass movements instrumental in providing an entry into national party politics. The technocrats had two base offices--a technical faculty and a government office concerned with technical matters. In examining routes of ascent it was shown that for military leaders clique membership and influential patrons early in their career were of especial importance. Military leaders had fairly predictable careers, the positions held depending upon whether they rose through command or staff positions. Technocrats combined academic and governmental careers, but most also taught at the military staff and command schools during Guided Democracy which gave them access to potential military elite members. For political party leaders clique membership and sponsorship by a political party leader were most useful for their career === [PDF page 670] === 655 advancement. They usually began their political party careers through leadership of youth movements and used those positions to gain the attention of national political party leaders and hence to move into national party politics or sometimes first into regional party politics. All party elite members have had some type of experience in the governmental structure. Until the I\ew Order the political party leaders usually held cabinet and high governmental positions t whereas in the iNew Order they are largely relegated to powerless legislative bodies. Factional Dynamics A major focus in the study of factionalism was the extent to which background characteristics influenced factional alignments. In the study of military factions it was found that divisional and ethnic identity, usually congruent, was the most important base of factionalism. For political party leaders background factors were found to be the most important determinants of factional composition and alignment. Ethnic and religious origin, age and generation, and educational experience were the most relevant. The political parties differed in terms of which particular background characteristics were more salient than others in influencing factional membership. Ideological differences sometimes play an important role in factional formation, but, more often than not, ideological beliefs are strongly influenced by ethnic, social, and religious background. === [PDF page 671] === 656 A second focus was the gradual homogenization of the elite compared to the heterogeneous origins of elite members during the Revolution. within the military. This is particularly evident An historical discussion of military factionalism illustrated the evolution of the Indonesian army from a heterogeneous organization containing diverse segments from the Outer Islands, lower status groups, groups influenced by leftwing movements, and santri groups into an army increasingly dominated by Javanese who are mainly from abangan and priyayi origins. Repression by the military led to the demise of leftwing civilian political parties and party factions at the beginning of the i\ew Order. Hence the political parties" have become more homogeneous, although not to the extent of the homogenization of the army. Military-Civilian Relationships Two aspects of military-civilian relationships were analyzed: the attempts of the military to create political movements and the strategies and policies the Soeharto government used in order to control the political parties. Beginning with premature attempts during Parliamentary Democracy, the army has tried to organize political movements which would rival civilian movements and which would be able to gather under their wing the clientele of the political parties, especially those from the PKI. The army was unsuccessful in this until it became the dominant === [PDF page 672] === 657 institution in the political system. Their success in this endeavor was illustrated by their ability to coerce the voters in the 1971 elections to vote for the state party, Golkar. But, although the military was able to win the elections through their "persuasive" measures, their strategies to make Golkar into an integrated organization have been unsuccessful. The Soeharto regime devised various strategies to control political parties and their leaders. These strategies ranged from rather crude attempts to "arrange" the elections of favored party leaders to the "simplification" of the party system by forcing the political parties to amalgamate into two parties. The Soeharto government was successful in creating a state party, in controlling the political parties, and in forcing the political parties to merge into two parties. The government achieved an unprecedented amount of control over civilian groups; however this control did not build consensus and legitimacy for the regime and its policies, as was witnessed by the 1974 riots. The regime by 1974 had become even less representative of the major groups in Indonesian society than in the early part of the New Order. The following section will discuss the lessening representativeness of the regime. Representativeness of the Regime The Indonesian political elite has been recruited from increasingly narrow origins. In the New Order, === [PDF page 673] === 658 e s p e c i a l l y, the p o l i t i c a l e l i t e has become very unrepresent a t i v e of major groups in the s o c i e t y. As the iNew Order evolved, decision-making has been monopolized by Javanese mainly Central Javanese, of p r i y a y i and abangan background and from t h e m i l i t a r y and t e c h n o c r a t i c segments of s o c i e t y. Three major s o c i e t a l groupings are l i t t l e r e p r e s e n t e d by the c u r r e n t p o l i t i c a l e l i t e - - O u t e r I s l a n d e r s, the ummat Islam which cuts across e t h n i c l i n e s, and the abangan peasants and l a b o r e r s. Although t h e r e was a decrease in the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the Outer I s l a n d s during Guided Democracy, p a r t i a l l y as an aftermath of the r e g i o n a l r e b e l l i o n, t h e r e was more r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e ummat Islam and some r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the abangan peasants and l a b o r e r s during t h a t period through the Jr'K.I. What has been the s i t u a t i o n of these groupings in the I\ew Order? As the Soeharto government s t a b i l i z e d t h e r e has been a l e s s e n i n g of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of Outer I s l a n d e r s in the elite. Furthermore, few of those who had been a c t i v e in n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s in the past had been p a r t i c u l a r l y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e i r e t h n i c a r e a s. They had l i v e d in J a k a r t a for y e a r s, had become Javanized, and r a r e l y returned t o t h e i r "home" areas for v i s i t s. Economic c o n d i t i o n s have improved i n the Outer I s l a n d s s i n c e t h e onset of the New Order, and the a l i e n a t i o n between Java and t h e Outer I s l a n d s, t h a t has been evident for many y e a r s, has not i n creased. Regional u n i v e r s i t i e s have been developed and employment p o s s i b i l i t i e s in t h e Outer I s l a n d s f o r t h e i r === [PDF page 674] === 659 graduates have expanded, and there has been a slow decrese in the proportion of Javans employed in the civil service in the Outer Islands, although the major military figures there are still Javans. Major political changes have been sparked by dissatisfied groups in Java, the main island with the largest population, not by those in the Outer Islands. The santri expected their power to increase as a result of their contribution to the takeover of the oukarno government. Instead, the santri have seen their position in government decline. W.F. Wertheim compared the policies of the Soeharto government toward Islam to those followed by the colonial government. Both governments feared the power of Islam and compromised on less important issues, such as marriage regulations, but were both steadfast in their determination to minimize the political influence of Islam. The santri then a now complain about the reliance of the government upon foreign and Chinese capital, which adversely affects Indonesian entrepreneurs? they are also shocked by the permissiveness of both governments in moral matters. The position of the abangan poor peasants and laborers has become even worse during the New Order. Compared to the santri. who at least are represented by political "A House Divided," in Ten Years' Military Terror in Indonesia, ed. Malcolm Caldwell (Nottingham, Englandt Spokesman Books, 1975), pp. 88-90. === [PDF page 675] === 660 parties, the poor peasants and laborers have no representative. The economic development which has occurred in Indonesia over the past years has not beneficially affected the poorer peasants. In fact, there has been increasing exploitation, both on the part of the upper strata of peasants and of the government, particularly the military members. There is growing differentiation between the richer and poorer peasants. The technological improvements made in agriculture have benefitted the wealthier villagers, and they have often used their profits to buy more land, thereby alienating the poor peasants from the land they have owned or have rented, forcing the poor peasants to migrate to the cities where there are few employment possibilities. There is also evidence that the patron-client bonds in the villages have become onerous, and that there has been an increase in "debt-labour" bondage. In parts of the country that are near major urban centers or near areas of economic development peasants have had their land taken away from them by governmental authorities or by array officers who want to "invest" in land; minimal compensation, if any, has been given. Earnings from the traditional agricultural export sector have also decreased due to Richard W. Franke, "Hunger for P r o f i t - - T e n Years of Food Production," in Ibid., p. 168. See Tempo, 15 December 1973 and Abdul Qadir Djaelani, "Land, the People, and the Rulers," Tempo. 21 December 1973. === [PDF page 676] === 661 economic contraction, which affected the earning power of the peasants. Doubts about the legitimacy of the Soeharto government have not only been raised by the santri and the poor peasants, but, more importantly, since 1973 by sub-elite segments such as the students, leaders of groups formerly considered "accommodationist," and field grade officers, particularly from the volatile Diponegoro division. the i\ew Order elite has become less representative of society, it has been forced to resort to pressure and intimidation to effect its decisions. The Soeharto government has developed sophisticated instruments and policies of control, which so far have resulted in stability, but "it is the stability of a vacuum, a state undisturbed by the erratic movements of partisan bodies." The regime has decreased political participation by "contracting the politically active, narrowing the circle of those with access to power or the means of political organization," and by curtailing the use of political parties as institutions which can channel the demands of their constituents to the government. ^Ingrid Falmer, "The Economy, 1965-1975," in Terror in Indonesia, ed. Caldwell, p. 144. M.D. Feld, "Professionalism, Nationalism, and the Alienation of the Military," in Armed Forces and Society. ed. van Doom, p. 68. W. Howard Wriggins, The R u l e r ' s Imperatives: S t r a t e - === [PDF page 677] === 662 What are the consequences of lessening representation of major societal groupings by an e l i t e? The most dramatic consequence was in Pakistan, where an e l i t e c o a l i t i o n, dominated by the m i l i t a r y, consisting of those from smaller ethnic groups in the west attempted coercively to control the Bengali, the largest ethnic group, in the e a s t. The result was the creation of an independent s t a t e in the e a s t, Bangladesh. The most important variables in predicting regime change in Indonesia, as in most other countries, are the extent of sub-elite d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n and the extent to which violence has been successful in inducing regime change. Indonesia does not have a history of large-scale peasant revolts which have been successful or have come close to success. Moreover, the peasant rebellions which h i s t o r i c a l l y have occurred were movements of millenarian radicalism, which have been a threat to local e l i t e s, but have been small-scale and r e l a t i v e l y isolated, thereby f a i r l y simple to suppress. Although there is increasing evidence that important elements of the e l i t e and sub-elite are becoming c r i t i c a l of the Soeharto regime, there will be h e s i t a t i o n on t h e i r part to partake in a movement to overthrow the government. The Soeharto government has devised effective control mechanisms, and as long as i n t e r national support for the regime remains and economic conditions for the e l i t e and sub-elite continue to stay at a See Sartono Kartodirdjo, "Agrarian Radicalism in Java," in Culture and Politics, ed. Holt, pp. 71-125. === [PDF page 678] === 663 high level, in my opinion, the Soeharto government will be able to preserve itself. There is little likelihood of class solidarity emerging across aliran lines, which would enable poor abangan and santri to unite in one political movement to press for social and political change or to engage in a revolution. Although it appears that the regime is fairly stable, it is difficult to come to any but a tentative conclusion about this because of the lack of information on the general population. It is important to know about the mass of society and the linkages between the elite and the mass in order to hypothesize about future political developments. >iost of the political science research on Indonesia has been conducted in Jakarta and on some aspect of elite politics. Little is known about politics in general in the Outer Islands, and in Java little research has been done on regional elites and on the general population. Some of the topics which could be fruitfully explored on those levels are: political socialization, culture and attitudes; the nature of patron-client ties and linkages between elites and non-elites; and the relationship between the military and civilians. Although studies of Indonesian politics have focused on various aspects of the elite there are still large gaps in our knowledge. One question raised by my research is: Given that persons have the background and career prerequisites for elite membership, what are the factors, other === [PDF page 679] === 664 than clique and factional membership, which explain why particular persons attempt to advance to elite status, why they succeed, and why others fail? The weight of these various factors will depend upon the character of the game of politics in Indonesia. The rewards of success in Indonesian politics are high--material, social, and power gains. But the consequences of failure can also be great--exile, jail, or death. === [PDF page 680] === 665 GLOSSARY abangan: n o m i n a l ( l y ) Muslim a d a t: customary l a w, tradition agama Jawa: t r a d i t i o n a l J a v a n e s e r e l i g i o n, blend of animism and Hinduism syncretic a l i r a n: l i t. s t r e a m o r c u r r e n t } a world-view and t h e community t h a t a d h e r e s t o i t anak b u a h: c l i e n t, follower anak mas: f a v o r i t e c l i e n t, follower Angkatan Baru: New G e n e r a t i o n Angkatan Muda: Young G e n e r a t i o n Bandu H i z b u l w a t h a n: Muslim 3oy S c o u t s bapak: l i t. father? patron, leader B a r i s a n Bantengt Wild B u f f a l o Corps B a r i s a n P e l o p o r: Vanguard Corps b u p a t i i r e g e n t, head of a r e g e n c y (kabupaten) camat: s u b - d i s t r i c t h e a d, same a s s t e n wedana c h u d a n - c h o: company commander daidan-cho: battalion commander Darul Islam: Nation of Islam desa: village dukun: Javan healer and religious figure Giyugun: Volunteer Army Golongan Independent: Independent Group gotong royong: mutual cooperation guru: teacher, especially in spiritual wisdom haj: pilgrimage to Mecca social === [PDF page 681] === 666 hajii Muslim who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca halus: refined, civilized Heiho: Auxiliary Forces Hizbullah: Army of Allah imeum: Islamic religious leader Indonesia Mudas Young Indonesia Jong Javai Young Java Jong Sumatranen Bond: League of Young Sumatrans kabupaten: regency karyat lit. work} used by military to refer to non-military duty karyawani lit. labor; used by military to refer to nonmilitary assignment kasar: rough, uncultivated kecamatan: sub-district Keibodans Vigilance Corps, auxiliary police kewedanaani district kiyayii Islamic traditional religious notables kraton: royal palace ksatria: knight laskar: guerrilla group Liga Demokrasi: Democratic League lurahi village head mancanagarai neighboring regions of a Javanese state margai clan marga rajai ruling clan in Batak village menak: upper stratum in Sunda Mobilisasi Pelajar: Student Mobilization === [PDF page 682] === 667 mukim: sub-district in Aceh Musjawarah Rakyat Jawa Barat: Conference of the Peoples of West Java nagara: capital of a Javanese state nagara agungt greater capital of a Javanese state Nationale Indische Fartij: i\ational Indies Party Operasi Chusus: Special Operations Operasi %arya: civic mission pamong praja: lit. servants of the realm; name given to the upper level civil service corps after 1946 pangreh praja: lit. rulers of the realm; indigenous administrative corps during colonial rule Fartai Islam Indonesia: Indonesian Islamic Party Partai Katholik: Catholic Party Partai Murba: Proletarian Party pasisir: coastal area; used to refer to the northern coast of Java patih: vizier during the sultanate; high official next to the regent during Dutch period pemuda* youth Pemuda Muslim Indonesia: Indonesian Muslim Youth penghulu: l i n e a g e headman Fersatuan Islam: Union of Muslims pesantren: seminary for students of branches of Islamic knowledge pondok: traditional Islamic school priyayi: Javanese elite group consisting of gentry officials and intelligentsia pusaka: relics endowed with magical power === [PDF page 683] === 668 rakyatt people, masses raya: village headman in some areas raya hutas head of ruling clan in Batak village Renseitai: Non-Commissioned Officers Training School santri: religious and strict Muslim Sayap Kiri: left wing Schakelschool« Link School Seinendan: Youth Corps Seinen Eoojoo: Youth Training School for the Military Arts s h o d a n - c h o: p l a t o o n commander sten wedanat sub-district head susuhunan: ruler; used for the ruler of the Surakarta. kraton ulama: Islamic theologian uleebalang: district chief in Aceh ummat Islam: Community of Islam Volksraad: Feople's Council Volksschool: Feople's School wayang kulit: shadow puppet theater wedana: district head wong cilik: lit. little people; lowest strata of Javanese social system consisting of merchants, laborers, and peasants === [PDF page 684] === 669 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AKSI: k e s a t u a n a k s i. a c t i o n groups AMNi Akademi M l l i t e r N a s l o n a l. N a t i o n a l M i l i t a r y Academy AMSJ Algemeene Middelbare S c h o o l. G e n e r a l Secondary School ASPRIt A s i s t e n P r i b a d i. P e r s o n a l A s s i s t a n t s ( t o t h e P r e s i d e n t "5 BKS: Badan K e r i a Sama. C o o p e r a t i o n Body BNI: Bank Negara I n d o n e s i a. I n d o n e s i a n S t a t e Bank BPPKi Badan Pembina P o t e n s i K a r v a, Body t o B u i l d t h e National Potential Caduad: Cadangan Umum Angkatan D a r a t. Army G e n e r a l Reserve CM: Cursus Kahasiswa. S t u d e n t Corps CORO: Corps O p l e i d i n g Reserve O f f i c i e r e n, f o r Reserve O f f i c e r s T r a i n i n g Corps DPR: Dewan P e r w a k i l a n R a k v a t. P e o p l e ' s R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Council* p a r l i a m e n t DPRS: Dewan P e r w a k i l a n Rakvat S e m e n t a r a. P r o v i s i o n a l People's Representative Council, parliament ELS: Europeesche Lagere S c h o o l. European Lower School FDR: F r o n t Demokrasi R a k v a t. P e o p l e ' s Democratic F r o n t FN: F r o n t N a s i o n a l. N a t i o n a l F r o n t FNPIB: F r o n t N a s i o n a l Pembebasan I r i a n B a r a t. F r o n t f o r t h e L i b e r a t i o n of West I r i a n National G e s t a p u: Gerakan T i g a p u l u h S e p t e m b e r. 30 September Movement G o l k a r: Golongan K a r v a. F u n c t i o n a l Groups HANKAM: Pertahanan-Keamanan. M i n i s t r y of S e c u r i t y and Defense HBSi Hoogere Burgere S c h o o l. C i t i z e n s High School HCS: H o l l a n s c h - C h i n e e s c h e S c h o o l. Dutch-Chinese School === [PDF page 685] === 670 HKS: Hoogere Kriidsschool. Higher War School IPI: Ikatan Pelaiar Indonesiai League of Indonesian Students IFKIs Ikatan Pembela Kemerdekaan Indonesia! League for the Upholding of Indonesian Independence IPRI: Ikatan Perwira Republik Indonesiai Republic of Indonesia Officers League IR: Insinjur, engineer JIB: Jong Islamieten Bond, Young Muslims Association KAMI» Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia. Action Group of Indonesian University Students KAPPI: Kesatuan Aksi Pelaiar Pemuda Indonesia. Action Front of Indonesian High School Youth Kesatuan Aksi Sariana Indonesia. Action Front of Indonesian Academicians KASIJ KMA: Koninklijk Militaire Academie. Royal Military Academy KNIL: Koninklijk Nederlands-Indische Leger. Royal Netherlands Indies Army KNIP: Komite Nasional Indonesia Fusat, Central Indonesian National Committee KOANDA: Komando Antara Daerah. Inter-Regional Command KODAM: Komando Daerah Militer, Military Regional Command KODIM: Komando Militer Distrik, District Military Command KOPKAMTIB: Komando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban. Command for the Restoration of Security and Crder KOREM: Komando Resort Militer. Military Resort Command K0SG0R0: Kesatuan Organisasi Serbaguna Gotong Rovong. United Multi-Purpose Mutual Cooperation Organization KOSTRAD: Komando Cadangan St-rategis Angkatan Darat. Army Strategic Command KOWILHAN: Komando Wilayah Pertahanan, Regional Defense Command KRIS: Kebaktian Rakyat Indonesia Sulawesi. Service of the Indonesian People of Sulawesi === [PDF page 686] === 671 KS: Kweekschool. Teachers School LEMHANAS: Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional. National Defense Institute Masjumi: Madilis Siuro Muslimin Indonesia* C o n s u l t a t i v e Council of Indonesian Muslims MIAlt Madilisul I s l a m i l a ' l a a Indonesia. Greater Islamic Council of Indonesia MPRs Maielis Permusiawaratan Rakvat* P e o p l e ' s Consultat i v e Assembly MPRS: Maielis Permusiawaratan Rakvat Sementara* P r o v i s i o n a l F e o p l e ' s Consultative Assembly MULOt Meer Uitgebreid Lager Onderwiis. Extended Primary Education NIAS: Nederlandsche-Indische Artsenschool, iNetherland I n d i e s Doctor's School NU» Nahdatul Ulama* Council of Muslim Scholars OPPIs Organisasi Persatuan Peburuhan Indonesia. United Indonesian Labor Organization Orla: Orde Lama. Old Order (Guided Democracy) ormas: organisasi masiarakat, mass organizations OSVIA: 0pieidingschool voor Inlandsche Ambtenaren. Training School for Native Officials Parkindo: Partai Kristen Indonesia. Indonesian Christian Party Parmusii Partai Muslimin Indonesia. Indonesian Muslim Party Partindo: Partai Indonesia. Indonesian Party PDIi Partai Demokrasi Indonesia. Indonesian Democratic Party Persist Persatuan Islam, United Islam PETAi Tentara Sukarela Pembala Tanah Air, Volunteer Army for the Defense of the Fatherland PIIi Pemuda Islam Indonesia. Indonesian Muslim Youth === [PDF page 687] === 672 PIR* Persatuan Indonesia Rava. Greater Indonesian Union FKAi Pemuda Kereta Api. Railways Youth Corps PKI: Partai Komunis Indonesia. Indonesian Communist Party FNIJ Partai Nasional Indonesia. Indonesian Nationalist Party PP: Persatuan Periuangan. Struggle Union PPDi Partai Pembangunan Demokrasi. Development Democratic Party PPP: Partai Pembangunan Persatuan. United Development Party PPPI: Perhimpunan Pelaiar-Pelaiar Indonesia. Association of Indonesian Students PRIS: Pemuda Republik Indonesia. Indonesian Youth of Sulawesi PRN: Partai Rakvat Nasional. National People's Party PRRI: Pemerintah Revolusi Republik Indonesia. Revolution-* ary Government of the Republic of Indonesia PSI: Partai Sosialis Indonesia. Indonesian Socialist Party PSII: Partai Sarikat Islam Indonesia. Indonesian Islamic Union Party RPKAD: Resimen Para-Komando Angkatan Darat. Army ParaCommando Regiment Sekber Golkar: Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karva. Secretariat of Functional Groups SESKOAD: Sekolah Staf Komando Angkatan Darat. Army Staff and Command School SMA: Sekolah Menengah Atas. Senior High School SMP: Sekolah Menengah Pertama. Junior High School SOBSIi Sentral Organisasi Buruh Sosialis Indonesia. Indonesian Socialist Workers Central Organization SOKSIt Sentral Organisasi Karyawan Sosialis Indonesia. Indonesian Socialist Functional Workers Central Organization === [PDF page 688] === 673 SPRIi staf pribadi. personal staff SSKAD: Sekolah Staf Komando Angkatan Darat. Array Staff and Command School STOVIAi School tot Qpleiding van Inlandsche Artsen. School for the Training of Native Doctors TKR: Tentara Keamanan Rakvat. People's Security Array TP: Tentara Pelaiar. Student Army TRIPJ Tentara Pelalar Republik Indonesia. Student Army of the Republic of Indonesia USI: Unitas Studiosorum Indoniensis. Indonesian Students Union === [PDF page 689] === 674 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Books Abdullah, Taufik. Schools and Politics; The Kaum Muda Movement in West Sumatra (1927-1933). Ithaca, N.Y.i Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Monograph Series, Cornell University, 1971. Adloff, Richard, and Thompson, Virginia. Cultural Institutions and Educational Policy. New York: Institute of of Pacific Relations, 1948. Anderson, Benedict R. 0*G. Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance. 1944-1946. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1972. . Mythology and the Tolerance of the Javanese. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Froject Monograph Series, Cornell University, 1965. Anderson, Benedict R. and McVey, Ruth T. A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1. 1965 Coup in Indonesia. Ithaca, N.Y.J Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Interim Report Series, Cornell University, 1971. Atlas van Tropisch Nederland. Batavia: Topografischen Dienst in Nederlandsch-Indie, 1938. Aziz, Muhammed Abdul. Japan's Colonialism and Indonesia. 's-Gravenhage: M. Nijhoff, 1955. Bailey, F.G. Politics and Social Change: Orissa in 1959. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963. . Stratagems and Spoils: A Social Antrhopology of Politics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970. Beck, Carl, and Malloy, James M. Political Elites: A Mode of Analysis. Pittsburgh: Archive on Political Elites in Eastern Europe, University of Pittsburgh, n.d. Bell, Wendell; Hill, Richard J.; and Wright, Charles R. Public Leadership: A Critical Review with Special Reference to Adult Education. San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1961. Benda, Harry J. The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945. The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1958. === [PDF page 690] === 675 Bottomore, T.B. Elites and Society. land: Penguin, 1966. Harmondsworth, Eng- Boland, B.J. The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971. Brackman, Arnold C. The Communist Collapse in Indonesia. New York: W.W. Norton, 1969. Brandon, James R. On Thrones of Gold: Three Javanese Shadow Plavs. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970. Brass, Paul R. Factional Politics in an Indian State: The Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965. Burger, D.H. Structural Changes in Javanese Society: The Supra-Village Sphere. Translated by Leslie H. Palmier. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Translation Series, Cornell University, 1956. Campbell, J.K. Honour. Family and Patronage: A'Studv of Institutions and Moral Values in a Greek Mountain Community. Oxford: Clarendon Fress, 1964. Chabot, H. Th. Versantschapp. Stand en Sexe in ZuidCelebes. Groningen and Djakarta: J.B. Wolters, 1950. Translated by Richard Neuse. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, Makassar, Source 1, 1960. Cooley, Frank L. Ambonese Adat: A General Description. New Haven: Yale Southeast Asian Studies Cultural Report Series, Yale University, 1962. Cunningham, Clark E. The Postwar Migration of the TobaBataks to East Sumatra. New Haven: Yale Southeast Asia Studies Cultural Report Series, Yale University, 1958. Dahm, Bernhard. History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century. New York and London: Fraeger, 1971. . Sukarno and the Struggle for Independence. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1969. Day, Clive, The Dutch in Java. New York: Macmillan, 19041 reprint ed., Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1966. de Jong, P.E. de Josselin. Minangkabau and Negri Sembilan: Socio-Political Structure in Indonesia. Leiden: E. Ijdo, 1951. === [PDF page 691] === 676 de Kat Angelino, Arnold Dick Adrian. Colonial Policy. vols. The Haguei Martinus Nijhoff, 1931 Dekmejian, R. Hrair. Egypt Under Nasir: A Study in Political Dynamics. Albany* State University of New York Press, 1971. Dewey, Alice. Peasant Marketing in Java. Free Press, 1962. Glencoe, Ill.t Djajadiningrat, Raden Loekman. From Illiteracy to University: Educational Development in the Netherlands Indies. New York* Netherlands and Netherlands Indies Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations Bulletin 3, 1942. du Bois, Cora. Social Forces in Southeast Asia. Harvard University Press, 1959. Cambridge* Edinger, Lewis J., ed. Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies* Studies in Comparative Analysis. New York* John Wiley, 1967. Eisenstadt, S.N. From Generation to Generation* Age Groups and Social Structure. Glencoe, 111.* Free Press, 1956. Elsbree, Willard H. Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements. 1940-1945. Cambridge* Harvard University Press, 1953. Fallers, Lloyd A. Bantu Bureaucracy. Chicago and London* University of Chicago Press, 1956; Phoenix-Books, 1965. Federspiel, Howard M. Persatuan Islam* Islamic Reform in Twentieth Century Indonesia. Ithaca, N.Y.* Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Monograph Series, Cornell University, 1970. Feit, Edward. The Armed Bureaucrats. Mifflin, 1973. Boston* Houghton Feith, Herbert. The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia. Ithaca, N.Y.* Cornell University Press, 1962. Feith, Herbert, and Castles, Lance. Indonesian Political Thinking* 1945-1965. Ithaca, N.Y. and London* Cornell University Press, 1970. Fernandez, Julio A. The Political Elite in Argentina. York* New York University Press, 1970. New === [PDF page 692] === 677 Freeman, Lenton C. Elementary Applied Statistics* For Students in Behavior Science. New Yorki John Wiley & Sons, 1965. Finch, Susan, and Lev, Daniel S. compilers. Republic of Indonesia Cabinets. 1945-1965. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Interim Reports Series, Cornell University, 1965. Frey, Frederick. W. The Turkish Political Elite. M,I.T. Press, 1965. Cambridge: Furnivall, J.S. Netherlands India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939? reprint ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967. Geertz, Clifford. Agricultural Involution: The Processes of Ecological Change in Indonesia. Association for Asian Studies Monograph 11, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963. . Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968. • The Religion of Java. Press, 1960. Glencoe, 111.: Free . The Social Context of Economic Change: An Indonesian Case Study. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Center for International Studies, 1956. . The Social History of an Indonesian Town. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1965. Gibson, Walter M. The Prison of Weltevreden and a Glance at the East Indian Archipelago. New York: J.D. Riker, 1856. Gullick, J.M. Indigenous Political Systems of Wesrern Malaya. London School of Economics Monogra'phs on Social Anthropology no. 17. 2nd ed. London: Athlone Press, 1965. Hall, D.G.E. A History of South East Asia. St. Martin's Press, 1955. Hardjowirogo. Sediarah Waiang Purwa. Pustaka, 1965. New York: Djakarta: Balai Holt, Claire. Art in Indonesia: Continuities and Changes. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1967. === [PDF page 693] === 678 Hopkins, Raymond F. Political Roles in a New State* Tanzania's First Decade. New Haven: Yale University Fress, 1971. Hughes, John. Indonesian Upheaval. McKay, 1967. New York: David Hunter, Floyd. Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Fress, 1953. Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968. Huq, Muhammad Shamsul. Education and Development Strategy in South and Southeast Asia. Honolulu: East-West Center, 1965. Hurewitz, J.D. Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension. New York: Praeger, 1969. Hutasoit, M. Compulsory Education in Indonesia. UNESCO, 1954. Paris: Indonesia, Angkatan Darat, Sedjarah Militer KOSTRAD.: Sedjarah Singkat KOSTRAD. Jakarta: KOSTRAD, 1969. Indonesia, Angkatan Darat, Sedjarah Militer Kodam VI Siliwangi. Siliwangi: Pari Masa KeMasa. Jakarta: Fakta Mahjuma, n.d. Indonesia, Departemen Penerangan. Almanak Lembaga-Lembaga Negara dan KePartian. Jakarta: Departemen Penerangan, 1962. Indonesia, Dewan Nasional. Nasional, 1957. Dewan Nasional. Jakarta: Dewan Indonesia, Ministry of Education, Instruction, and Culture. Development of Education in Indonesia. Jakarta: Ministry of Education, Instruction, and Culture, 1955. Isman, Mas. Pedoman Perdioangan. bitan dan Pers, 1968. Jakarta: Lembaga Pener- Jahan, Rounaq. Pakistan: Failure in National Integration. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972. Janowitz, Morris. The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964. === [PDF page 694] === 679 . The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait. New York: Free Press, 1960. Jaspan, M.A. Social Stratification and Social Mobility in Indonesia. Jogjakarta: Gajah Kada University, 1958. Jay, Robert R. Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java. New Haven: Yale Southeast Asia Studies Cultural Report Series, Yale University, 1963. . Javanese Villagers: Social Relations in Rural Modlokuto. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1969. Johns, Anthony H. Rentiak Dilabueh: A Hinangkabau Kaba. A Specimen of the Traditional Literature of Central Sumatra. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Data Paper, Cornell University, 1958. Jones, Howard Palfrey. Indonesia: The Possible Dream. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971. Judd, Gerrit P. IV. Members of Parliament 1734-1832. Haven: Yale University Press, 1955. New Kahin, George McTurnan. Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1952. Kartini, Raden Adjeng. Letters of a Javanese Princess. New York: W.W. Norton, 1964. Kennedy, Raymond, The Ageless Indies. Press, 1968. New York: Greenwood Kennedy, Raymond. Field Notes on Indonesia: South Celebes: 1949-1950. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1953. Kerstiens, Thorn. The New Elite in Asia and Africa: A Comparative Study of Indonesia and Ghana. New York: Praeger, 1966. Key, V.O., Jr. Southern Politics in State and Nation. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949. Koentjaraningrat, R.M. A Preliminary Description of the Javanese Kinship System. New Haven: Yale Southeast Asian Studies Cultural Report Series, Yale University, 1957. Kohout, Frank J. Statistics for Social Scientists: A Coordinated Learning System. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974. === [PDF page 695] === 680 Kornhauser, William. The Politics of Mass Society. coe, 111.i Free Press, 1959. Glen- Kwee Tek Hoay. The Origins of the Modern Chinese Movement in Indonesia. Translated and edited by Lea E. Williams. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Translation Series, Cornell University, 1969. Lande, Carl H. Leaders. Factions, and Parties* The Structure of Philippine Politics. New Haven: Yale Southeast Asia Studies Monograph Series, Yale Univer.sity, 1965. Lasswell, Harold D., and Lerner, Daniel, eds. World Revolutionary Elites; Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1966. Lasswell, Harold D.I Lerner, Danielj and Rothwell, C. Easton. The Comparative Study of Elites: An Introduction and Bibliography. Stanford: Hoover Institute Stuies Series B, 1952. Legg, Keith R. Politics in Modern Greece. Stanford University Press, 1969. Stanford: Legge, J.D. Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia: A Study in Local Administration 1950-1960. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1961. Sukarno: A Political Biography. New York: Praeger, 1972. Lev, Daniel S. The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics. 1957-1958. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Program Monograph Series, Cornell University, 1966. Levy, Marion J., Jr. Modernization and the Structure of Societies*' A Setting for International Affairs. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966. Liddle, R. William. Ethnicity. Party, and National Integration: An Indonesian Case Study. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967. Loeb, Edwin M. Sumatra: Its History and People. Vienna: Verlag des Institutes fur Volkerkunde der Universitat Wien, 1935. Luckham, Robin. The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt 1960-67. Cambridge: University Press, 1971. === [PDF page 696] === 681 Lyon, Margo L. Bases of Conflict in Rural Java* Berkeley: Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies Research Monograph Series, University of California, 1971. McVey, Ruth T. The Rise of Indonesian Communism. N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1965. Marsden, W. The History of Sumatra. Ithaca, Londoni Payne, 1783. Marvick, Bwaine, ed. Political Decision-Makers: Recruitand Performance. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1961. Matthews, Donald R. The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers. New York: Random House, 1954. Michels, Roberto. First Lectures in Political Sociology. Translated with an introduction by Alfred de Grazia. Minneapolis! University of Minnesota Press, 1949. . Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy. Translated by Eden and Cedar Paul..New York: Hearst's International Library, 1915. Moebirman. Waiang Purwai The Shadow Plav of Indonesia. The Hague: Van Deventer-Maasstichting, 1960. Moertono, Soemarsaid. State and Statecraft in Old Java: A Study of the Later Mataram Period. 16th to 19th Century. Ithaca, N.Y.i Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Monograph Series, Cornell University, 1968. Mosca, Gaetano. The Ruling Class. Edited and revised by Arthur Livingston; translated by Hannah D. Kahn. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939. Nakane, Chie. Japanese Society. Nicolson, 1970. Londoni Weidenfeld & Nasution, Abdul Haris. Fundamentals of Guerilla Warfare and the Indonesian Defence System. Past and Present. Jakarta: Information Service of the Indonesian Armed Forces, n.d. Netherlands Indies, Departement van Economische Zaken, Volkstelling 1930. 8 vols. Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1936. Nishihara, Masashi. Golkar and the Indonesian Elections of 1971. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Monograph Series, Cornell University, 1972. === [PDF page 697] === 682 Noer, Deliar. The Modernist Islamic Movement in Indonesia. 1900-1942. Singapore and New York: Oxford University Fressi 1973. Notosusanto, Nugroho. HANKAM, 1968. Sediarah dan Hankam. Jakarta: Nyomarkay, Joseph. Charisma and Factionalism in the Nazi Party. Minneapolis* University of Minnesota, 1967. Palmier, Leslie H. Social Status and Power in Java. London School of Economics Monographs on Social Anthropology. London: Athlone Press, 1960; first paperback corr. ed., 1969. . Indonesia and the Dutch. sity Press, 1962. Parry, Geraint. Political Elites. London: Oxford UniverNew York: Praeger, 1969. Perlmutter, Amos. Military and Politics in Israel: NationBuilding; and Role Expansion. New York: Praeger, 1969. Potash, Robert A. The Army and Politics in Argentina. 1928-1945: Yrigoyen to Peron. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969, Quandt, William B. The Comparative Study of Political Elites. Sage Comparative Politics Series..3everly Hills: Sage Publications, 1970. Reid, Anthony. The Contest for North Sumatra: Atieh, The Netherlands, and Britain 1858-1898. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1969. Riggs, Fred W. Thailand: The Mndernization of a Bureaucratic Polity. Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1966. Roeder, O.G. The Smiling General. Agung, 1969. Jakarta: Gunung Sardjito, Mas. The Development of the Universitas Gadiah Mada. Jogjakarta: University of Gadjah Mada Press, 1957. Schlesinger, Joseph A. Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966. Schrieke, B. Indonesian Sociological Studies. 2 vols. The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1966. 2nd ed. === [PDF page 698] === 683 i ed. The Effect of Western Influence on Native Civilizations in the Malay Archipelago. Batavia: G. Kolff, 1929. Seligman, Lester G. Leadership in a New Nation* Political Development in Israel. New York: Atherton Press, 1964. Selosoemardjan. Social Changes in Jogjakarta. Cornell University Press, 1962. Ithaca, N.Y.: Shils, Edward. The Intellectuals and the Powers and Other Essays. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974. Siegel, James. The Rope of God. California, 1969. Berkeley: University of Singer, Marshall R. The Emerging Elite: A Study of Political Leadership in Cevlon. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1964. Sjahrir, Sutan. Cut of Exile. Press, 1949. New York: Greenwood Slametmuljana. The Structure of the National Government of Madiapahit. Djakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1966. Sloan, Stephen. A Study in Political Violence: The Indonesian Experience. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1971. Smail, John R.W. Bandung in the Early Revolution: 19451946. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Monograph Series, Cornell University, 1964. Somers, Mary F. Peranakan Chinese Politics in Indonesia. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Interim Report Series, Cornell University, 1964. Stepan, Alfred. The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971. Sumantri, Iwa Kusuma. Sediarah Revolusi Indonesia Masa Revolusi 3ersendiata. 2 vols, n.p., n.d. Taulu, H.M. Sediarah Minahasa. Manado: Rame, 1955. ter Haar, B. 1962. Adat Law in Indonesia. Jakarta: Bhratara, Ulbright, H. Wavang Purwa: Shadows of the Past. Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1970, Kuala Vandenbosch, Amry. The Dutch East Indies: Its Government. Problems, and Politics. Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 1933. === [PDF page 699] === 684 van der Kroef, J.M. Indonesia After Sukarno. Vancourver: University of British Columbia Press, 1971. van der Veur, Paul. Education and Social Change in Colonial Indonesia. Athens, Ohio: Center for International Studies, Southeast Asia Program, Ohio University, 1969. van der Wal, Simon Lambertus. Some Information on Education in Indonesia U P to 1942. with a Bibliography. 2nd ed. The Hague: Netherlands Universities Foundation for International Cooperation, 1961 van Leur, J.C. Indonesian Trade and Society. and Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1955. The Hague van Niel, Robert. The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite. The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1960. Vergouwen, J.C. The Social Organization and Customary Law of the Toba-Batak of Northern Sumatra. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964. Vincent, Joan. African Elite: The Big Ken of a Small Town. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1971. Vlekke, Bernard Hubertus Maria. Nusantara: A History of Indonesia. The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1959. Ward. K.E. The Foundation of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Interim Reports Series, Cornell University, 1970. . The Indonesian Election of 1971: An East Javanese Case Study. Clayton, Victoria, Australia: Monash University, 1974. Warner, W. Lloyd, and Abegglan, James. Big Business Leaders in America. New York: Atheneum, 1963. Warner, W. Lloyd» van Riper, Paul P.; Martin, Norman H.j and Collins, Orvis F. The American Federal Executive: A Study of the Social and Personal Characteristics of the Civilian and Military Leaders of the United States Federal Government. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1963. Weiner, Myron. Party Building in a New Nation: The Indian National Congress. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1967. Wertheim, W.F. Indonesian Society in Transition. Bandung, Indonesia: Sumur Bandung, 1956. 2nd ed. === [PDF page 700] === 685 Willmott, Donald E. The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia* 1900-1958. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Monograph Series, Cornell University, 1961. Willner, Ann Ruth. Charismatic Political Leadership: A Theory. Princeton: Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Center of International Studies Research Monograph Series, Princeton University, 1968. Wirjodiprodjo, Major General Hartono. of the Indonesian Armed Forces, A Brief Outline n.p., n.d. WoIters, 0.W. Early Indonesian Commerce: A Study of the Origins of Sriwidiaia. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1967. Wriggins, W. Howard. The Ruler's Imperatives: Strategies for Political Survival in Asia and Africa. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1969. Yamin, Muhammad. 6000 Tahun Sang Merah-Putih. Dharma, 1951 . Tatanegara Madiapahit. pantja, 1962. 2 vols. Jakarta: Jakarta: Pra- Zainu'ddin, Ailsa. A Short History of Indonesia. and Washington: Praeger, 1968. Zonis, Marvin. The Political Elite of Iran. Princeton University Press, 1971. New York Princeton: Articles Abdullah, Taufik. "Adat and Islam: An Examination of Conflict in Minangkabau." Indonesia 2 (October 1966): 1-24. . "Modernization in the Minangkabau World: West Sumatra in the Early Decades of the Twentieth Century." In Culture and Politics in Indonesia, pp. 179-245. Edited by Claire Holt. Ithaca, N.Y.i Cornell University Press, 1972. Abrahamsson, Bengt. "The Ideology of an Elite: Conservatism and National Insecurity: Some Notes on the Swedish Military," pp. 71-83.,,. In Armed Forces and Society: Sociological Essays. Edited by Jacques van Doom. The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1968. === [PDF page 701] === 686 Abu-Laban, Gaha. "The Reputational Approach in the Study of Community Power: A Critical Evaluation." Pacific Sociological Review 8 (Spring 1965): 35-42. Agger, Robert E., and Ostrom, Vincent. "The Political Structure of a Small Community." Public Opinion Quarterly 20 (Spring 1956): 81-89. Anderson, Benedict R. 0*G.. "The Idea of Fower in Javanese Culture," pp. 1-70. In Culture and Politics in Indonesia. Edited by Claire Holt. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univeristy Press, 1972. . "Japan: The Light of Asia," pp. 13-50. In Southeast Asia in World War II. Edited by Josef Silverstein. Mew Haven: Yale Southeast Asia Studies Monograph Series, Yale University, 1966. Bachrach, Peter, and Baratz, Morton S. "Decisions and NonDecisions: An Analytic Framework." American Political Science Review 57 (September 19637: 632-642. Bachtiar, Harsia. "'Negeri' Taram: A Kinangkabau Village," pp. 348-385... In Villages in Indonesia. Edited by Koentjaraningrat. Ithaca, N.Y.« Cornell University Press, 1967. Badgley, John H. "Two Styles of Military Rule: Thailand and Burma." Government and Opposition 4 (Winter 1969): 100-117. Baker, Ross K. "The Ethiopian Army and Political Stability: Prospects and Potentials." Middle East Studies 6 (October 1970): 331-339. Barnett, Correlli. "The Education of Military Elites," pp. 193-214. In Governing Elites: Studies in Training and Selection. Edited by Rupert Wilkinson. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. Belknap, George, and Smuckler, Ralph. "Political Fower Relations in a Mid-West City." Public Opinion Quarterly 20 (Spring 1956)t 73-81. Belloni, Frank P., and Seller, Dennis C. "The Study of Political Party Factions." International Review of History and Political Science 10 (May 1973): 50-74. Benda, Harry. "Christian Snouck-Hurgonje and the Foundations of Dutch Islamic Policy in Indonesia." Journal of Modern History 30 (December 1948)t 338-347. === [PDF page 702] === 687 . " P o l i t i c a l E l i t e s in Colonial Southeast Asiai An H i s t o r i c a l A n a l y s i s. " Comparative Studies in Society and H i s t o r y 7 (April I965)t 233-251. Biderman, Albert E. "The R e t i r e d M i l i t a r y, " pp0 123-163. In Handbook, of M i l i t a r y I n s t i t u t i o n s. Edited by Roger iv. L i t t l e. Beverly H i l l s t Sage P u b l i c a t i o n s, 1971. Bienen, Henry. "One-Party Systems in A f r i c a, " pp. 99-127. In A u t h o r i t a r i a n P o l i t i c s in Modern Society» The Dynamics of E s t a b l i s h e d One-Party Systems. New York and London: Basic Books, 1970. Bienen, Henry, and Morell, David. " T r a n s i t i o n from M i l i t a r y Rule: T h a i l a n d ' s E x p e r i e n c e, " pp. 3-26. P o l i t i c a l - M i l i t a r y Systems; Comparative P e r s p e c t i v e s. Edited by Catherine McArdle K e l l e h e r. Beverly H i l l s: Sage P u b l i c a t i o n s, 1974. Bleeker, P. "Minahassa." Journal of the Indian Archipelago and East Asia (Singapore), new series 3 (1859): 56-64. Roechari. "A Preliminary Note on the Study of the OldJavanese Civil Administration." Madialah Ilmu-Ilmu Sastra Indonesia 1 (September 1963): 122-133. Bruner, Edward M. "The Toba Batak Village," pp. 52-64. Local. Ethnic and National Loyalties in Village Indonesia. Edited by G. William Skinner. New Haven: Yale Southeast Asia Studies Cultural Report Series, Yale University, 1959. Castles, Lance. "The Ethnic Profile of Djakarta." nesia 3 (April 1967): 153-204. . "Notes on the Islamic School at Gontor." nesia 1 (April 1966)» 30-45. IndoIndo- Chabot, Hendrik. T. "Bontorama: A Village of Goa, South Sulawesi," pp. 189-209. In Villages in Indonesia. Edited by Koentjaraningrat. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1967. Chauvel, Richard. "The Calm Before the Storm--A Review of Political Trends/Development in Indonesia July 1972June 1973." Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs 8 Cohan, A.S. "Career Patterns in the Irish Political Elite." British Journal of Political Science 3 (April 1973: 213-228. === [PDF page 703] === 688 Cole, F.C. "Family, Clan and Phratry in Central Sumatra," pp. 19-27. In Essays in Anthropology." Edited by A.L. Kroeber and R.H. Lowie. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1936. Cooley, Frank L. "Altar and Throne in Central Moluccan Society." Indonesia 2 (October 1966): 135-156. . "Village Government in the Central Moluccas." Indonesia 7 (April 1969): 139-164. Creutzberg, K.F. "Education in the Netherlands East Indies." Asiatic Review 4 (1934): 118-121. Crouch, Harold. "The Army, the Parties and Election." Indonesia 11 (April 1971): 131-176. Crowley, James B. "Japanese Army Factionalism in the Early 1930's." Journal of Asian Studies 21 Cruikshank, Robert B. "Abangan, Santri and Prijajii A Critique." Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 3 (March 1972): Cvrcek, Jaromir. "Social Changes in the Officer Corps of the Czechoslovak People's Army," pp. 94-106. In Military Profession and Military Regimes: Commitments and Conflicts. Edited byJacques van D o o m. The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1969. D'Antonio, William V.; Ehrlich, Howard J.; and Erickson, Eugene C. "Further Notes on the Study of Community Power," American Sociological Review 26 (Lecember 1962): 848-854. D'Antonio, William V., and Erickson, Eugene C. "The Reputational Technique As a Measure of Community Power: An Evaluation Based on Comparative and Longitudinal Studies." American Sociological Review 27 "The Development of National Education in Indonesia." Indonesian Review 1 (December 1951): 393-399. Dewantara, Ki Hadjar. "Some Aspects of National Education and the Taman Siswa Institute at Jogjakarta." Translated by the editors of Indonesia. Indonesia 4 Dogan, Mattel. "Political Ascent in a Class Society: French Deputies 1870-1958," pp. 57-90. In Political Decision-Makers i Recruitment and Performance. Edited by Dwaine Marvick. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1961. === [PDF page 704] === 689 Dommen, Arthur. "The Attempted Coup in Indonesia." Quarterly 25 (January-March 1966)J 103-110. China Dowse, Robert E, "The Military and Political Development," pp. 213-246. In Politics and Change in Developing Countries; Studies in the Theory and Practice of Development. Edited by Colin Leys. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969. Edinger, Lewis J. "The Comparative Analysis of Political Leadership." Comparative Politics 7 (January 1975)» 253-270. Edinger, Lewis J., and Searing, Donald D. "Social Background in Elite Analysis: A Methodological Inquiry." American Political Science Review 60 (June 1967): 428-445. Ehrlich, Howard J. "The Reputational Approach to the Study of Community Power." American Sociological Review 26 Eleazu, Uma 0. "The Role of the Army in African Politics: A Reconsideration of Existing Theories and Practices." Journal of Developing Areas 7 (January 1973): 265-285. Federspiel, Howard M. "The Muhammadijahi A Study of an Orthodox Islamic Movement in Indonesia." Indonesia 10 Feith, Herbert. "Dynamics of Guided Democracy," pp. 309-409. In Indonesia. Edited by Ruth T. McVey. 1'^ew Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1963. . "Fresident Soekarno, the Army and the Communists: The Triangle Changes Shape." Asian Survey 4. "Soeharto's Search for a Political Format." Indonesia 6 (October 1968): 88-105. Feith, Herbert, and Lev, Daniel S. "The End of the Indonesian Rebellion." Pacific Affairs 36 (Spring 1963): 32-46. Feld, M.D. "Professionalism, Nationalism and the Alienation of the Military," pp. 55-70. In Armed Forces and Society: Sociological Essavs. Edited by Jacques van Doom. The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1968. Fischer, Joseph. "Indonesia," pp. 92-122. In Education and Political Development. Edited by James S. Coleman. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. === [PDF page 705] === 690 Finkelstein, L.S. "Education in Indonesia." Survey 20 (1951): 149-153. Far Eastern Fleron, Frederic. "Representation of Career Types in Soviet Political Leadership," pp. 108-139. In Political Leadership in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Edited by R. Barry Farrell. Chicago: Aldine, 1970. Foster, George M. "The Dyadic Contract in Tzintzuntzan, IIi Patron-Client Relationship." American Anthropologist 65 (1963): 1280-1294. Franden, Olof. "Notes on Mobility into and out the Swedish Officer Corps," pp. 107-126. In Military Profession and Military Regimes: Commitments and Conflicts. Edited by Jacques van Doom. The Hague and Parist Mouton, 1969. Friedrich, Paul. "The Legitimacy of a Cacique," pp. 243-269. In Local-Level Politics t Social and Cultural Perspectives. Edited by Marc J. Swartz. Chicago: Aldine, 1968. Gallin, Bernard. "Political Factionalism and Its Impact on Chinese Village School Organization in Taiwan," pp. 377-400. In Local-Level Folitics: Social and Cultural Perspectives. Edited by hare J. Swartz. Chicago: Aldine, 1968. Geertz, Clifford. "The Javanese Kijaji: The Changing Role of a Cultural Broker." Comparative Studies in Socioand History 2 (January i960): 228-249. . "The Javanese Village," pp. 34-41. In Local. Ethnic and National Loyalties in Village Indonesia. Edited by G. William Skinner. New Haven: Yale Southeast Asia Studies Cultural Report Series, Yale University, 1959. . "Religious Belief and Economic Behavior in a Central Javanese Town: Some Preliminary Considerations." Economic Development and Cultural Change 4 (1955-19567T134-158. Geertz, Hildred. "The Balinese Village," pp. 24-33. In Local, Ethnic, and iNational Loyalties in Village Indonesia. Edited by G. William Skinner. New Haven: Yale Southeast Asia Studies Cultural Report Series, Yale University, 1959. . "Indonesian Cultures and Communities," pp. 24-96. In Indonesia. Edited by Ruth T. McVey. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1963. === [PDF page 706] === 691 Gehlen, Michael F. "The Educational Backgrounds and Career Orientations of the Members of the Central Committee of the CPSU." American Behavioral Scientist 9 Graczyk, Jozef. "Social Promotion in the Folish People's Army," pp. 82-98. In Military Profession and MiliRegimes: Commitments and Conflicts. Edited by Jacques van Doom. The Hague and Paris: Mouton» 1969. Gregory, Ann. "Factionalism in the Indonesian Army: The New Order." Journal of Comparative Administration 2 Gruber, Wilfried. "Career Patterns of Mexico's Political Elite." Ives tern Political Quarterly 24 (September 1971): 467-482. Guttsman, W.L. "Changes in British Labour Leadership," pp. 29-56. In Political Decision-Makers. Edited by Dwaine Marvick. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1961. Guyot, James F. "Efficiency, Responsibility and Equality in Military Staffing: The Ethnic Dimension in Comparative Perspective." Armed Forces and Society 2 Winter 1976): 291-304. . "Ethnic Segmentation in Military Organizations* Burma and Malaysia." pp. 27-37. In Political-Militarv Systems; Comparative Perspectives. Edited by Catherine McArdle Kelleher. Beverly Hills* Sage Publications, 1974. Hanks, L.M. "Entourage and Circle in Burma." Bennington Review 2 (Winter 1968)* 32-46. Hansen, Gary. "Indonesia 1974: A Momentous Year." Asian Survey 15 (February 1975): 148-156. . "Indonesia 1975: National Resilience and Continuity of the New Order Struggle." Asian Survey 16 Hawkins, Everett D. "Labor in Transition," pp. 248-271. In Indonesia. Edited by Ruth T. McVey. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1963. Herson, Lawrence. "In the Footsteps of Community Power." American Political Science Review 55 (December 1961): 817-830. HindTey, Donald. "Alirans and the Fall of the Old Order." Indonesia 9 (April 1970): 23-66. === [PDF page 707] === 692 . "Indonesia 1970: The Workings of Pantjasila Democracy." Asian Survey 11 (February 1971): 111-120. . "Indonesia 1971: Pantjasila Democracy and the Second Parliamentary Elections." Asian Survey 12. "Political Power and the October 1965 Coup in Indonesia." Journal of Asian Studies 26 (February 1967): 237-249. Huizer, Gerrit. "Peasant Mobilisation and Land Reform in Indonesia." Review of Indonesian and Kalayan Affairs 8 (January-June 1974): 81-138. Hunt, William H.; Crane, Wilder W.{ and Wahlke, John C. "Interviewing Political Elites in Cross-Cultural Comparative Research." American Journal of Sociology 70 (July 1964): 59-68. Jackson, J.A. "The Irish Army and the Development of the Constabulary Concept," pp. 109-126. In Armed Forces and Society: Sociological Essays. Edited by Jacques van Doom. The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1968. Janowitz, Morris. "Armed Forces and Society: A World Perspective," pp. 15-38. In Armed Forces and Society: Sociological Essays. Edited by Jacques van Doom. The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1968. . "Social Stratification and the Comparative Analysis of Elites." Explorations in Entrepreneurial History (Winter Supplement 1956): 6-11. Joffee, Ellis, "The Conflict between Old and i\ew in the Chinese Army," pp. 101-129. In Garrisons and Government: Politics and the Military in Isew States. Edited by Wilson C, McWilliams. San Francisco: Chandler, 1967. Johnston, Scott D. "A Comparative Study of Intra-Party Factionalism in Israel and Japan." Western Political Science Quarterly 20 (June 1967): 288-307, Jones, Emily L. "The Courtesy Bias in South-East Asian Surveys." International Social Science Journal 15 (1963): 70-76. Jordan, Amos A., Jr. "Officer Education," pp. 211-245. In Handbook of Military Institutions. Edited by Roger W. Little. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1971. === [PDF page 708] === 693 Junus, Umar. "Some Remarks on Minangkabau Social Structure." Biidragen Tot en Taal-. Land- en Volkenkunde 120 (1964): 293-326. Kartodirdjo, Sartono. "Agrarian Radicalism in Java: Its Setting and Development," pp. 71-125. In Culture and Politics in Indonesia. Edited by Claire Holt. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972. Kira, C.I. Eugene. "The South Korean Military Coup of May 1961: Its Causes aid the Social Characteristics of Its Leaders," pp. 297-316. In Armed Forces and Society: Sociological Essays. Edited by Jacques van Doom, The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1968. Kim, Joungwon Alexander. "Korean Kundaehwa: The Military as Modernizer." Journal of Comparative Administration 2 (November 1970): 355-371. Koentjaraningrat, R.M. "The Javanese of South Central Java," pp. 88-115. In Social Structure in Southeast Asia. Edited by George Peter Murdock. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1960. Kraus, Jon. "Arms and Politics in Ghanaf" pp. 154-221. Soldier and State in Africa. Edited by Claude E. welch, Jr. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970. Leclerc, Jacques. "An Ideological Problem of Indonesian Trade Unionism in the Sixties: 'Karyawan' Versus Buruh.'" Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs 6 Legg, Keith R. "Political Recruitment and Political Crisis: The Case of Greece." Comparative Political Science 1 (January 1969): 527-555. Leiserson, Michael. "Factions and Coalitions in One-Party Japan: An Interpretation Based on the Theory of Games." American Political Science Review 3 (September 1968): 770-787 Lemarchand, Rene, and Legg, Keith. "Political Clientelism and Development: A Preliminary Analysis." Comparative Politics 4 (January 1972): 149-178. Lev, Daniel S. "Indonesia 1965: The Year of the Coup." Asian Survey 6 (February 1965): 103-110. . "Political Parties in Indonesia." Journal of Southeast Asia History 8 (March 1967): 52-67. === [PDF page 709] === 694 . "The Political Role of the Army in Indonesia." Pacific Affairs 36 (Winter 1963-1964): 349-364. Lewis, Edward G. "The Social Backgrounds of French Ministers, 1944-1967." Western Political Quarterly 23 Liddle, R. William. "Evolution from Above: National Leadership and Local Development in Indonesia." Journal of Asian Studies 32 (February 1973): 287-309. . "Suku-Simalungan: An Ethnic Group in Search of Representation." Indonesia 3 (April 1967): 1-30. Logan, J.R. "Traces of the Origin of the Malay Kingdom of Borneo Proper, with Notices of Its Condition When First Discovered by Europeans and at Later Periods." Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia (Singapore) 2 (1848): 513-527. Machado, K.G. "Changing Aspects of Factionalism in Philippine Local Politics." Asian Survey 11 (December 1971): 1182-1199. Mclntryre, Angus. "Divisions and Fower in the Indonesian National Party, 1965-1966." Indonesia 13 (April 1972): 183-210. McVey, Ruth. "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army." Indonesia 11 (April 1971): 131-176. . "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army: Part II." Indonesia 13. "Taman Siswa and the Indonesian National Awakening." Indonesia 4 (October 1967): 128-149. Maniruzzaman, Talukder. "'Crises in Political Development' and the Collapse of the Ayub Regime in Pakistan," Journal of the Developing Areas 5 (January 1971): 223-234. Maretin, J.V. "Disappearance of Matriclan Survivals in Minangkabau Family and Marriage Relations." Bi idragen Tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 117 (1961): 168-195. Mayer, Adrian C. "The Significance of Quasi-Groups in the Study of Complex Societies," pp. 97-122. In The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies. Edited by Michael Banton. New York: Praeger, iy66. === [PDF page 710] === 695 Mazrui, Ali A. "Soldiers as Traditionalizers." Politics 28 (January 1976): 246-272. World Milne, R.S. "Patrons, Clients and Ethnicity: The Case of Sarawak and Sabah in Malaysia." Asian Survey 13 Moerdowo, Raden. "Higher Education in Indonesia." Eastern World 2 (June 1957): 23-25. Morris-Jones, W.H. "Political Recruitment and Political Development," pp. 113-134. In Politics and Change in in Teveloping Countries: Studies in the Theory and Practice of Development. Edited by Colin Leys. Cambridge: Cambridge University Fress, 1969. Mulder, J.A. M e l s, "Aliran Kebatinan as an Expression of the Javanese Worldview." Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 1 (September 1970): 105-114. Nelsen, Harvey W. "Military 3ureaucracy in the Cultura Revolution." Asian Survey 14 (April 1974): 372-395. Nicholas, Ralph W. "Segmentary Factional Political Systems," pp. 49-59, In Political Antrhopology. Edited by Marc J. Swartz, Victor W. Turner and Arthur Tuden. Chicago: Aldine, 1966. Nicholson. Norman K. "The Factional Model and the Study of Politics." Comparative Political Studies 5 (October 1972):.291-314. . "Integrative Strategies of a national Elite: Career Patterns in the Indian Council of Ministers." Comparative Politics 7 (July 1975): 533-558. North, Robert C. with Pool, Ithiel de Sola. "Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites," pp. 319-455. In World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements. Edited by Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1965. Notosusanto, Nugroho. "Indonesia: Armed Forces and Society into the 1980's," pp. 39-54. In Political-Military Systems: Comparative Perspectives. Edited by Catherine McArdle Kelleher. Eeverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1974. Otley, C.B. "Militarism and the Social Affiliations of the British Army Elite," pp. 84-108. In Armed Forces and Societyi Sociological Essays. Edited by Jacques van Doom. The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1968. === [PDF page 711] === 696 Palmer, Andrea Wilcox- "The Sundanese Village," pp. 42-51. In Local. Ethnic and National Loyalties in Village Indonesia. Edited by G. William Skinner, New Haven: Yale Southeast Asia Studies Cultural Report Series, Yale University, 1959. Palmer, Ingrid. "The Economy, 1965-1975," pp. 139-158. In Ten Years' Military Terror in Indonesia. Edited by Malcolm Caldwell. Nottingham, England: Spokesman Books, 1975, Falmier, Leslie. "Aspects of Indonesia's Social Structure." Pacific Affairs 28 (June 1955): 117-131. . "The Javanese Nobility under the Lutch." Comparative Studies in Society and History 2 (January i960): 197-227. . "Occupational Distribution of Parents of Pupils in Certain Indonesian Educational Institutions." Indonesie 10 (August and October 1975): 320-376,. "The 30 September Movement in Indonesia." Asian Studies 5 (January 1971): 1-20. Modern Pauker, Guy J. "The GESTAPU Affair of 1965: Reflections on the Politics of Instability in Indonesia." Southeast Asia 1 (Winter-Spring 1971): 43-45. . "The Role of the Military in Indonesia," pp. 185-230. In The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries. Edited by John J. Johnson. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962. . Southeast Asia as a Problem Area in the ^ext Cecade." World Politics 11 (April 1959): 325-345. Polsby, Nelson W. "Community Power: Some Reflections on the Recent Literature." American Sociological Review 27 (December 1962): 838-841. . "The Sociology of Community Fower: A Reassessment." Social Forces 37 (March 1959): 232-236. . "Three Problems in the Analysis of Community Power." American Sociological Review 24 (December 1959): 796-803. Powells John Duncan. "Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics. American Political Science Review 64 === [PDF page 712] === 697 Price, Robert M. "A Theoretical Approach to Military Rule in New States: Reference-Group Theory and the Ghanaian Case." World Politics 23 (April 1971): 399-430. Ra'anan, L'ri. "Indonesia 1965," pp. 43-64. In The Politics of the Coup d'Etat: Five Case Studies. Edited by William G. Andrews and Uri Ra'anan. New York: Van Xostrand Reinhold, 1969. Rejai, Mostafa. "Toward the Comparative Study of Political Decision-Makers." Comparative Politics 2 Rocamora, J. Eliseo. "The Partai Nasional Indonesia 1963-1965." Indonesia 10 (October 1970): 143-181. Rose, Richard. "Parties, Factions and Tendencies in Britain." Political Studies 12 (February 1964): 33-46. Rosenthal, Donald B. "Factions and Alliances in Indian City Politics." Midwest Journal of Political Science 10 (August 1966): 320-349. Rossi, Peter H. "Power and Community Structure." Midwest Journal of Political Science 4 (No vember i960): 390-401. Rustow, Dankwart A. "The Study of Elites: Who's Who, When and How." World Politics 18 (July 1966): 690-717. Samson, Allan A. "Indonesia 1972: The Solidification of Military Control." Asian Survey 13 (February 1973): 127-139. . "Indonesia 1973: A Climate of Concern." Survey 14 (February 1974): 157-165. Asian Sandbrook, Richard. "Fatrons, Clients, and Factions: New Dimensions of Conflict Analysis in Africa." Canadian Journal of Political Science 5 (March 1972): 104-119. Sartono Kartodirdjo. "Agrarian Radicalism in Java," pp. 71-125. In Culture and Politics in Indonesia. Edited by Claire Holt. Ithaca, N.Y.J Cornell University Press, 1972. Sayeed, Khalid B. "The Role of the Military in Pakistan," pp. 274-297. In Armed Forces and Society: Sociological Essays. Edited by Jacques van Doom. The Hague and Paris: Kouton, 1968. === [PDF page 713] === 698 Schueller, George K. "The Politburo," pp. 97-178. In '••/orld Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideo logical Movements. Edited by Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1965. Scott, James C. "The Erosion of Patron-Client Bonds and Social Change in Rural Southeast Asia." Journal of Asian Studies 32 (November 1972): 5-38. . "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia." American Political Science Review 66 Searing, Donald D. "The Comparative Study of Elite Socialization." Comparative Political Studies 1 (January 1969): 471-500. . "Models and Images of Man and society in Leadership Theory," pp. 19-44. In Political Leadership. Edited by Glenn D. Paige. New York: Free Press, 1972. Seligman, Lester G. "Elite Recruitment and Political Development." Journal of Politics 26 (August 1964): 621-626. Singarimbun, Masri. "Kutagamber: A Village of the Karo," pp. 115-128. In Villages in Indonesia. Edited by Koentjaraningrat. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Fress, 1967. Skinner, G. William. "The Chinese Minority," pp. 97-117. In Indonesia. Edited by Ruth T. McVey. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1963. Smail, John R.'.v. "The Military Politics of North Sumatra: December 1956-October 1957." Indonesia 6 (October 1968): 128-187. Soemardi, Soelaeman. "Some Aspects of the Social Origins of Indonesian Folitical Decision Makers," pp. 338-348. In Transactions of the Third World Congress of Sociology. London: International Sociological Association, 1956. "Some Notes on the Northern or Dutch Half of Celebes," Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia (Series l7 II (1848): 673-686. Spiro, Melford E. "Factionalism and Politics in Village Burma," pp. 401-421. In Local-Level Politics: Social and Cultural Perspecties. Edited by Marc J. Swartz. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1968. === [PDF page 714] === 699 Stern, Alan J.? Tarrow, Sidney; and Wil/liams, Mary Frase. "Factions and Opinion Groups in European Mass Parties: Some Evidence from a Study of Italian Socialist Activists." Comparative Politics 3 (July 1971): 529-559. Stockwin, J.A.A. "A Comparison of Political Factionalism in Japan and India." Australian Journal of Politics and History 16 (December 1970): 361-374. Surjomihardjo, Abdurrachman. "An Analysis of Suwardi Surjaningrat' s Ideals and i\ational-Revolutionary Actions (1913-1922)." Kadlalah Ilmu-Ilmu Sastra Indonesia 2 (October 1964): 371-406. Sutherland, Heather. *\\otes of Java's Regent Families: Fart I." Indonesia 16 (October 1973): 113-147. "Notes on Java's Regent Families: Part II." Indonesia 17 (April 1974): 1-42. "The Priyayi." Indonesia 19 (April 1975): 57-77. Sutter, John 0. "The Two Faces of Konfrontasi: 'Crush Malaysia' and the Gestapu." Asian Survey 6 (October 1966): 523-546. Thomas, R. Murray. "Educational Remnants of Military Occution: The Japanese in Indonesia." Asian Survey 6 Totten, George C, and Kawakami, Tamio. "The Functions of Factionalism in Japanese Politics." Pacific Affairs 38 Utomo, Kampto. "Villages of Unplanned Resettlement in the Subdistrict Kaliredjo, Central Lampung," pp. 281-298. In Villages in Indonesia. Edited by Koentjaraningrat. Ithaca, K.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1967. van der:<roef, J.K. "The Arabs in Indonesia." Journal 7 (1953): 300-323. Middle East . "The Changing Class Structure in Indonesia." American Sociological Review 21 (1956): 138-149. . "Educational Development and Social Change in Indonesia." Harvard Educational Review 24 (Fall 1954): 239-255. . "Interpretatations of the 1965 Indonesian Coup: A Review of the Literature." Pacific Affairs 43 === [PDF page 715] === 700 . "Social Dysfunctions of Indonesian Education." Comparative Education Review 2 (October 1958): 15-21. van der Veur, Paul to*. "Cultural Aspects of the Eurasian Community in Indonesian Colonial Society." Indonesia 6 (October 1968): 38-53. van Doom, Jacques. "Armed Forces and Society: Patterns and xrends," pp. 39-51. In Armed Forces and Society: Sociological Essays. Edited by Jacques van Doom. The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1968. . "Political Change and the Control of the Military: Some General Remarks," pp. 11-31. In Military Profession and Military Regimes: Commitments and Conflicts. Edited by Jacques van Doom. The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1969, Verner, Joel Gordon. "The Recruitment of Cabinet Ministers in the Former British Caribbean: A Five-Country Study." Journal of Developing Areas 7 (July 1973): 635-652. Weaver, Jerry L. "The Political Elite of a MilitaryDominated Regime: The Guatemalan Example." Journal of Developing Areas 3 (April 1969): 373-388. toeiner, Myron. "Political Interviewing," pp. 103-133. In Studying Politics Abroad. Edited by Robert L. Ward. Boston: Little, Brown, 1964. '\eingrod, Alex. "Patrons, Patronage, and Political Parties." Comparative Studies in Society and History 10 's'ertheim, V.'.F. "Changes in Indonesia's Social Stratification." Pacific Affairs 28 (March 1955): 41-52. . "Indonesia Before and After the L'ntung Coup." P a c i f i c Affairs 39 (Spring-Summer 1966): 115-127. . "Islam in Indonesia--A House Divided," pp. 75-94. In Ten Years' M i l i t a r y T e r r o r i n I n d o n e s i a. Edited by Malcolm Caldwell..Nottingham, England: Spokesman Books, 1975. Williame, Jean-Claude. "Congo-Kinshasa: General Mobutu and Two P o l i t i c a l G e n e r a t i o n s, " pp. 124-151. In S o l d i e r and S t a t e in A f r i c a. Edited by Claude E. Welch, J r. Evanston, 1 1 1.: Northwestern U n i v e r s i t y F r e s s, 1970. === [PDF page 716] === 701 W i l l n e r, Ann Ruth. "The N e o t r a d i t i o n a l Accommodation t o P o l i t i c a l Independencet The Case of I n d o n e s i a, " pp. 242-306, In Cases i n Comparative P o l i t i c s! Asia. Edited by Lucian W. Pye. Boston* L i t t l e Brown, 1970. . " P e r s p e c t i v e s on M i l i t a r y E l i t e s as Rulers and as Wielders of Power." Journal of Comparative Admini s t r a t i o n 2 (November 1970): 261-276. Winder, R. Bayly. "Syrian Deputies and Cabinet M i n i s t e r s, 1919-1959: Part I. " Middle East Journal 16 (Autumn 1962): 407-429. "Syrian Leputies and Cabinet M i n i s t e r s, 1919-1959: fart II." Middle East Journal 17 (Winter and Spring 1963): 35-54. Wolf, Eric R. "Kinship, F r i e n d s h i p, and P a t r o n - C l i e n t R e l a t i o n s i n Complex S o c i e t i e s, " pp. 1-22. In The Social Anthropology of Complex S o c i e t i e s. Edited by Michael Banton..New York: Praeger, 1966. Wolfinger, Raymond E. "A I l e a for a Decent B u r i a l. " American Sociological Review 27 (December 1962): 341-847. . "Reputation and Reality in the Study of 'Community Power.*" American Sociological Review 25 Yasunaka, Akio. "Basic Data on Indonesian Folitical Leader." Translated by Kenichi Goto. Indonesia 10 Zaharopoulos, George. "Politics and the Army in Post-War Greece," pp. 17-35. In Greece under Military Rule. New York: Basic Books, 1972. Zariski, Raphael. "Party Factions and Comparative Politics: Some Preliminary Observations." Midwest Journal of Political Science 4 (February i960): 27-51. Zartman, I. William. "The Study of Elite Circulation* Who's on First and What's He toing There?" Comparative Politics 6 (April 1974): 564-488. === [PDF page 717] === 702 Indonesian Newspapers Abadi ( J a k a r t a ) Angkatan Bersenjata (Jakarta) Antara (News Bulletin) (Jakarta) Armed Forces Courier (Jakarta) Berita Buana Berita Yudha (Jakarta) Duta Mas iarakat (Jakarta) Harian Kami (Jakarta) Jakarta Times (Jakarta) Kompas (Jakarta) yerdeka (Jakarta) Mercu Suar (Jakarta) Mimbar Demokrasi (Bandung) ?<usantara (Jakarta) Operasi (Jakarta) Qperasi Digest (Jakarta) Sinar Harapan (Jakarta) Suara Karva (Jakarta) Suluh Karhaen ( J a k a r t a ) Tempo ( J a k a r t a ) Warta Harian ( J a k a r t a ) === [PDF page 718] === 703 Unpublished Material Alisjahbana, Semiati. "A Preliminary Study of Clan Structure among the Sundanese in the Prijanyan." M.A. thesis, Cornell University, 1954. Alliband, Graham R. "Upheaval in Sumatra: From Dewan Banteng to the PRRI Rebellion." M.A. thesis, Cornell University, 1970. Ames, Earry. "Rhetoric and Reality in a Militarized Regime: Brazil after 1964." Paper presented at the 68th meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 5-9 September 1972. Anwar, Rosihan. "Islam and Politics in Indonesia." Paper delivered at the 27th International Congress of Orientalists, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 13-19 August 1967. Eachtiar, Harsja. "Twelve Sumatran Villages: An Exercise in the Study of Political Institutions." M.A. thesis, Cornell University, 1964. Bey, Arifin. "A Dialogue in Search of Consensus: The Roots of the Indonesian Political Conduct, 1949-1959." Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University, 1962. Daulay, Zahara. "Minangkabau: A Preliminary Study of the Culture and People." M.A. thesis, Cornell University, 1960. Dekmejian. R.H. "Elite Recruitment, Markov Chains, and Path Analysis: Israel, Egypt, and Lebanon." Paper presented at the 70th meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 29 August-2 September 1974. Dominguez, Jorge I. "The Civic Soldier: The Military as a Governing Institution in Cuba." Paper presented at the meeting of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Chicago, 11-13 October 1973. Dresang, Dennis. "Ethnic Representation and Development Representation: A Comparative Study of <enya and Zambia." Paper presented at the 70th meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 29 August-2 September 1974. Ehrmann, Michael M. "The Indonesian Military in the Politics of Guided Democracy: 1957-1965." M.A. thesis, Cornell University, 1968. === [PDF page 719] === 704 Einaudi, Luigi R. "Revolution from Within? Military Rule in Peru since 1968." Faper presented at the 67th meeting of the American Folitical Science Association, Chicago, 7-11 September 1971. Eldersveld, Samuel J. "Political Elite Linkages in the Dutch Cosociational System." Paper presented at the 70th meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 29 August-2 September 1974. Emmerson, Donald K. "Exporing Elite Political Culture in Indonesia: Continuity and Change." Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1972. Enloe, Cynthia II. "Malaysia's Military in the Interplay of Economic and Ethnic Change." Paper presented at the meeting of the New England Chapter of the Association for Asian Studies, Hartford, 16 ^November 1975. Fagg, Donald. "Authority and Social Structure: A Study of Javanese Bureaucracy." Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1958. "Town Life and Organization." Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1956. Feit, Edward. "Pen, $wor\- and People: Military Regimes in the Formation of Political Institutions." Paper presented at the 67th meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 7-11 September 1971. Frey, Frederick w. "The Determination and Location of Elites: A Critical Analysis." Paper presented at the 66th meeting of the American Political Science Association, Los Angeles, 8-12 September 1970, Fukui, Haruhiro. "Factionalism in a Dominant Party System: The Case of Japan." Paper presented at the 70th meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 29 August-2 September 1974. Graziano, Luigi. "Patron-Client Relationships in Southern Italy." Paper presented at the 68th meeting of the American Folitical Science Association, Washington, D.C. 5-9 September 1972. Gregory, Ann. "Dimensions of Factionalism in the Indonesian Military." Paper presented at the 66th meeting of the American Political Science Association, Los Angeles, 8-12 September 1970. === [PDF page 720] === 705 Hutasoit, Marnixius. "Problems and Potentials of Indonesian Education." 28th Sir John Adams Lecture, University of California, Los Angeles, 22 March 1961. Ihromi, Tapi O.S. "Toba-Batak k i n s h i p Systemi A Preliminary Description." K.A. t h e s i s, Cornell U n i v e r s i t y, 1963. Jackson, Karl. " P a r t i c i p a t i o n in R e b e l l i o n: The L a r ' u l Islam in West J a v a. " Paper presented at the 23rd meeting of the A s s o c i a t i o n f o r Asian S t u d i e s, Washington, D.C., 29-31 March 1971. Kanahele, G.S. "The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia: P r e lude to Independence." Ph.D. d i s s e r t a t i o n, Cornell U n i v e r s i t y, 1967. Kaufman, Robert R. "The P a t r o n - C l i e n t Concept^and >acroF o l i t i c s: Prospects and Problems." i a p e r presented a t the 69th meeting of the American t o l i t i c a l Science A s s o c i a t i o n, Washington, D.C., 4-9 September 1972. \im, C. I. Eugene. " I n s t i t u t i o n - B u i l d i n g and Adaptation: The Case of the DRF in South Korea." Paper presented at the 68th meeting of the American P o l i t i c a l Science A s s o c i a t i o n, Washington, D.C. 5-9 September 1972. . "The M i l i t a r y Regime of South Korea: The Past Performances and Future P r o s p e c t s. " Paper presented a t the meeting of t h e I n t e r - U n i v e r s i t y Seminar on Armed Forces and S o c i e t y, Chicago, 11-13 October 1973. Lande, Carl H. "Ixetwcrks and Groups i n Southeast Asia: Some Observations on the Group Theory of P o l i t i c s. " Paper presented a t the Southeast Development Advisory Group P o l i t i c a l Development Seminar,.sew York, 20-21 March 1970. Lande, Carl II., and Curry, James A. "Local Level F a c t i o n a l ism in t h e P h i l i p p i n e s. " Paper presented at the 70th meeting of the American P o l i t i c a l Science A s s o c i a t i o n, Chicago, 29 August-2 September 1974. Legg, Keith R. "Regime Change and Public Policy i n a C l i e n t e l i s t l o l i t y: The Cases of Greece and I t a l y. " Paper presented a t the 68th meeting of t h e American P o l i t i c a l Science A s s o c i a t i o n, Washington, D.C, 5-9 September 1972. McCoy, Alfred W. "The P o l i t i c s of the Poppy in Indochina: A Comparative Study of P a t r o n - C l i e n t Relations under French and American A d m i n i s t r a t o r s. " F-aper presented a t the 25th meeting of the Association for Asian S t u d i e s, Chicago, March 1973. === [PDF page 721] === 706 McHale, Vincent E., and Mastro, Joseph P. "The Central Committee of the CPSU: Analysis of Composition and Long-Term Trends." Faper presented at the 66th meeting of the American Political Science Association, Los Angeles, 8-12 September 1970. McKinlay, R.D., and Cohan, A.S. "Military Coups, Military Regimes, and Social Change." Paper presented at the 70th meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 29 August-2 September 1974. Margiotta, Franklin D. "Changing Patterns of Political Influence: The Mexican Military and Politics." Paper presented at the 69th meeting of the American iolitical Science Association, New Orleans, 4-8 September 1973. Martin, Fenny Gill. "Administrative and Partisan Experience in the Career Fatterns of Norwegian Labor Party Leaders." Paper presented at the 68th meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 5-9 September 1972. Mitchell, Christopher. "Factionalism and Political Change in Bolivia." Paper presented at the 7Cth meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 29 August-2 September 1974. Muttalib, Jang Aisjah. "Djambi from the Middle of the Nineteenth to the First Quarter of the Twentieth Century." Department of History, Columbia University. Nagazumi, Akira. "The Origin and Earlier Years of the budi Utomo: 1908-1918." Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1967, Nairn, Mochtar. "The Nahdatul-Ulama Party (1952-1955): An Inquiry into the Origin of Its Electoral Success." M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1960. Nathan, Andrew J. "Factionalism in Chinese Politics: The Case of the Cultural Revolution." Paper presented at the 67th meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 7-11 September 1971. Neff, Kenneth Lee. "Educational Planning in a National Development Context--Indonesia--A Case Study." Fh.D. dissertation, American University, 1965. Paget, R.K. "The '66 Generation' in Indonesian Politics." Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1969. === [PDF page 722] === 707 Palmert David Scott. "Authoritarian Regimes and Reform: Military Government in Feru." Paper presented at the 70th meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 29 August-2 September 1974. Samson, Allan Arnold. "Islam and Politics in Indonesia." Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1972. . "Kebatinan and Islam in Indonesia: Genesis of a Conflict." Paper presented at the 25th meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Chicago, 30 March1 April 1973. Schmidt, Steffen W. "The Transformation of Clientelism in Rural Colombia." Paper presented at the 70th meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 29 August-2 September 1974. Schneider, Peter T. "Friends of Friends: Coalition Formation and Colonialism in Western Sicily." n.p., n.d. Seligman, Lester G. "Opportunity, Risk, Selection and Decision-Making: A Model of Political Recruitment." Paper presented at the 66th meeting of the American Political Science Association, Los Angeles, 8-12 September 1970. Siagian, Toenggoel P. "The Operasi Karya: The Involvement of the Indonesian Army in Rural Development." M.A. thesis, Cornell University, 1967. Simatupang, General T.B. "The Role of the Military in Stabilization of Southeast Asian Nations: With Special Focus on Indonesia." Paper presented at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Hamburg, West Germany, 29 January 1970. Soemawidjaja, Doedi. "Education in Indonesia: The Role of Education in a Developing Country." Lecture given at Wisconsin State College--Whitewater, 15 May 1963. Sutherland, Heather Amanda. "Pangreh Pradja: Java's Indigenous Administrative Corps and Its Role in the Last Decades of Dutch Colonial Rule." Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1973. van der Kroef, Justus Maria. Indonesia, 1900-1941." University, 1953. "Dutch Colonial Policy in Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia === [PDF page 723] === 708 Welch, Claude E., Jr. "Radical and Conservative Military Regimes: A Typology and Analysis of Post-Coup Governments in Tropical Africa." Paper presented at the 69th meeting of the American Political Science Association,.\ew Orleans, 4-8 September 1973. .vertheim, v,7.F. "From Aliran towards Class Struggle in the Countryside of Java." Paper presented at the International Conference on Asian History, University of >!alaya, Kuala Lumpur, 5-10 August 1968. "v'illison, >.alcolm, "Leaders of Revolution: The Social Origins of the Republican Cabinet Members in Indonesia, 1945-1955." M.A. thesis, Cornell University, 1958. Wyckoff, Theodore. "The Brazilian Military Oligarchy: Political Attitudes and Motivations." Paper presented at the 67th meeting of the American Political Science Assocation, Chicago, 7-11 September 1971. Zartman, I. William. "Notes on a Theory of Elite Circulation." Paper presented at the 68th meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 5-9 September 1972. Zuckerman, Alan. "Hierarchal Social Divisions as a Leterminant of Folitical Groups: Factions in the Italian Christian Democrat Party." Paper presented at the 67th meeting of the American Folitical Science Association, Chicago, 7-11 September 1971. . "On the Institutionalization of Political Clienteles: Party Factions and Cabinet Coalitions in Italy." Paper presented at the 69th meeting of the American Political Science Association, i\ew Orleans, 4-8 September 1973.