Fashioning Authoritarianism: Militarization of Society in Indonesia, 1930-1966

=== [PDF page 1] === NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY Fashioning Authoritarianism: Militarization of Society in Indonesia, 1930-1966 A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS for the degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Field of History Norman Joshua EVANSTON, ILLINOIS September 2023 === [PDF page 2] === © Copyright by Norman Joshua, 2023 All Rights Reserved === [PDF page 3] === ABSTRACT On March 11, 1966, Indonesian President Soekarno suddenly transferred executive power to the Army, which have played a role in the Indonesian state and society since the late 1950s. This act replaced Soekarno’s own government with a military dictatorship dubbed the New Order, which lasted for nearly 32 years. Why and how did the Indonesian military come to intervene in the state prior to the onset of military rule in 1965-1966? Furthermore, how did the experience of colonialism, war, and revolution contribute to this enduring influence of the military in the state? This dissertation argues that the Indonesian military gradually intervened in non-military affairs through actions that were ultimately justified through the historical development of legal emergency powers and counterinsurgency techniques during the 1950s-1960s, culminating in the establishment of a military regime in 1966. In explaining the origins of military authoritarianism, this dissertation contends that the process of militarization, which entails the normalization of violence in state and society is crucial in understanding the origins of authoritarianism. In Indonesia, militarization was most evident through two distinct but interrelated “logics” of governance, namely the logics of emergency and counterinsurgency. In tracing these two historical processes, this dissertation examines the history of Indonesian concepts of State of Emergency and counterinsurgency from the colonial period to the Guided Democracy (1959-1965). It was during Soekarno’s Guided Democracy that both logics converged, creating a state that was militarized, paving the way for the military takeover in 1965-1966. === [PDF page 4] === ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS In the process of crafting this dissertation, I am indebted to numerous individuals and institutions. I extend my sincere gratitude to my advisors, Haydon Leslie Cherry and Laura Hein, for their unwavering guidance, support, and constructive criticism throughout my graduate school years. Haydon has been an inspiring mentor, a distinguished scholar to look up to, a masterful writer, and a cherished friend who nurtured my understanding of Southeast Asian history. Laura played a nurturing role akin to a “mother” throughout my academic journey, for which I am immensely thankful. I would also like to express my appreciation to Douglas Kammen for his meticulous attention and insightful comments, which proved invaluable in refining this dissertation into a coherent and readable form. I am grateful for the financial support I received from several institutions throughout my doctoral studies. First, I extend my thanks to Jeffrey Winters and the Indonesia Scholarship and Research Support Foundation for their generous support during the majority of my eight-year graduate school journey. I would also like to acknowledge the Northwestern University Department of History for providing me with summer funding. In addition, the research and writing for this dissertation were made possible by funds and fellowships from the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, the Buffett Institute for Global Affairs at Northwestern University, the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, and the American-Indonesian Cultural and Educational Foundation (AICEF). Further research support was also provided by the Koninklijk Instituut voor === [PDF page 5] === Taal, Land, en Volkenkunde (KITLV) at Leiden University, the Netherlands Institute for Military History, and the Fakultas Ilmu Budaya at Universitas Indonesia. During my research endeavors in Indonesia, the Netherlands, and the United States, I have received invaluable assistance from many people. I would like to express my deep appreciation to Rahadian Rundjan for his exceptional research assistance. Furthermore, I extend my gratitude to Elizabeth Morrissey at EDGS, Yayah Siegers at KITLV, and Julie Hoather and Annerys Cano at the Department of History for their administrative assistance. This project has also greatly benefited from comments, insights, and support provided by various scholars. In the Netherlands, I am grateful to Henk Schulte Nordholt, Adriaan Bedner, Marieke Bloembergen, Esther Zwinkels, and Harry Poeze. In Indonesia I extend my thanks to Peter Carey, Purnawan Basundoro, Andi Achdian, Allan Akbar, Susanto Zuhdi, and Linda Sunarti. In the United States, I am indebted to Geoffrey Robinson and Donald Emmerson for their enlightening comments on this project. Throughout my graduate career, I have benefited from discussions and conversations, both in formal and informal settings, with friends and colleagues who have enriched my academic experience. I would like to thank Matthew Foreman and Conrad Hirano for their support and companionship. I would also like to thank my Arryman colleagues, especially Luthfi Adam and Eunike Gloria Setiadarma, and my friends in Indonesia and the UK, Allan Akbar and Teuku Reza Fadeli, for their unwavering support. I am also thankful for the companionship of my colleagues in the Department of History, although it is regrettable that I cannot mention each one individually. Finally, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my partner, Annisa Heningtyas, my mother, Wilma Sri Widyastuti, my father, Harry Hermawan Soelias, and my brother, Nathan === [PDF page 6] === Josafat Soelias. Without their unwavering support, patience, and love, I would not have been able to complete my studies. It is to them that I dedicate this dissertation. === [PDF page 7] === TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT........................................................................................................................................ 3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS..................................................................................................................... 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS........................................................................................................................ 7 LIST OF TABLES, ILLUSTRATIONS, FIGURES, AND GRAPHS............................................................. 13 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................................... 15 THE QUESTION...................................................................................................................................... 16 HISTORIOGRAPHY................................................................................................................................ 27 ON MILITARIZATION........................................................................................................................... 33 ON STATE OF EMERGENCY................................................................................................................ 39 ON COUNTERINSURGENCY................................................................................................................ 42 THE ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION................................................................................. 45 CHAPTER I: A GOVERNMENT OF EXPEDIENCY: THE COLONIAL AND REVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY IN INDONESIA, 1930-1945................................................................... 51 INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................................... 51 THE DUTCH ORIGINS OF THE CONCEPT OF A STATE OF EMERGENCY................................... 54 AGAINST SUBVERSION: THE EXORBITANTE RECHTEN AS EMERGENCY POWERS................. 60 PREPARING FOR A STATE OF WAR: COLONIAL EMERGENCY POWERS IN THE 1930S........ 66 MILITARY GOVERNMENT: WAR AND THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION....................................... 77 === [PDF page 8] === PREPARING FOR REVOLUTION: EMERGENCY POWERS IN THE INDONESIAN REPUBLIC..... 83 EMERGENCY POWERS AND THE INDONESIAN REVOLUTION.................................................... 91 REVOLUTIONARY EMERGENCIES: THE FIRST DUTCH INVASION, THE JULY THIRD AFFAIR OF 1946, AND THE MADIUN AFFAIR OF 1948............................................................................. 102 CONCLUSION....................................................................................................................................... 113 CHAPTER II: IMAGINING ENEMIES: THE LOGIC OF COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE NETHERLANDS INDIES AND INDONESIA, 1930S-1950S.......................................................................................... 117 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................... 117 COLONIAL WARFARE AND COUNTERINSURGENCY................................................................... 120 COUNTERINSURGENCY AND MILITARY DOCTRINE IN THE NETHERLANDS INDIES.......... 126 THE ACEH WAR AS A BREAKTHROUGH IN COLONIAL COUNTERINSURGENCY METHODS ................................................................................................................................................................ 132 THE ACEH MODEL AS COLONIAL COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY: THE CIVILMILITARY OFFICER AND THE VPTL............................................................................................. 139 COUNTERINSURGENCY AND TNI MILITARY DOCTRINE DURING THE REVOLUTIONARY AND POST-REVOLUTIONARY PERIODS IN INDONESIA.............................................................. 148 THE KNIL AND PETA SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT IN INDONESIAN MILITARY DOCTRINE.. 152 TNI AND THE STATE OF EMERGENCY.......................................................................................... 158 EARLY CONDUIT FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY TECHNIQUES: THE NEDERLANDS MILITAIRE MISSIE IN INDONESIË.......................................................................................................................... 166 CONCLUSION....................................................................................................................................... 173 === [PDF page 9] === CHAPTER III: THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF MILITARIZATION: POST-REVOLUTIONARY CRIME IN JAVA, 1950-1953.................................................................................................................................... 177 INTRODUCTION: THE CHALLENGES OF MERDEKA..................................................................... 177 A STATE OF CHAOS: A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF INSECURITY IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY JAVA...................................................................................................................................................... 182 RECONCEPTUALIZING UNREST: FROM PEMUDA TO GEROMBOLAN....................................... 191 COUNTING CRIMINALITY................................................................................................................. 202 WEST JAVA.......................................................................................................................................... 210 CENTRAL JAVA................................................................................................................................... 225 EAST JAVA........................................................................................................................................... 234 THE DARUL ISLAM: A NATIONAL GEROMBOLAN?................................................................... 241 CONCLUSION: A NATION OF “BOYS WITH RIFLES”.................................................................. 244 CHAPTER IV: COUNTERING GEROMBOLAN: STATE RESPONSES AGAINST INSECURITY IN THE 1950S1960S........................................................................................................................................... 252 INTRODUCTION: THE GEROMBOLAN REDUX............................................................................... 252 ARMY REFORMS IN THE 1950S: THE PROBLEMS OF DEMOBILIZATION AS COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY................................................................................................ 256 DISARMAMENT CAMPAIGNS........................................................................................................... 262 DEMOBILIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT SCHEMES: THE BRN AND CTN............................ 269 CONCEPTUALIZING A MILITARY ROLE IN DEVELOPMENT...................................................... 274 ARMY AND PRIVATE SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS..................................................................... 281 === [PDF page 10] === 10 DIRECT COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS: THE OPERASI MERDEKA, OPERASI SEGI TIGA, AND OPERASI TRITUNGGAL................................................................................................... 283 17 OCTOBER 1952 AFFAIR.............................................................................................................. 286 DECOLONIZING LAW: THE MAKING OF THE 1957 LAW ON THE STATE OF EMERGENCY292 EARLY INDONESIAN COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGIES: A SUCCESS STORY? PRRIPERMESTA AND DARUL ISLAM....................................................................................................... 300 COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE PRRI-PERMESTA................................ 303 THE SHAPING OF INDONESIAN COIN: THE COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY AGAINST THE DARUL ISLAM............................................................................................................................... 308 THE EMERGENCE OF THE DOCTRINE OF TERRITORIAL WARFARE........................................ 314 CONCLUSION....................................................................................................................................... 319 CHAPTER V: GOVERNMENT FROM EMERGENCY: THE ADVENT OF GUIDED DEMOCRACY, 19571960............................................................................................................................................. 324 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................... 324 CAUSES OF GUIDED DEMOCRACY: THE TOTAL CRISIS OF THE LATE 1950S.................... 328 THE REVOLT OF THE COUNCILS: PRRI AND PERMESTA......................................................... 341 SEARCH FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION: STATE OF EMERGENCY AND PRESIDENTIAL DECREE OF 5 JULY 1959.................................................................................................................. 344 A COUNTRY UNDER A STATE OF SIEGE........................................................................................ 353 A NEW CABINET OF TECHNOCRATS............................................................................................. 357 GUIDED DEMOCRACY, GUIDED LIFE............................................................................................ 362 === [PDF page 11] === 11 NASUTION’S SECOND ARMY REFORMS: THE TERRITORIAL SYSTEM.................................. 368 DISCIPLINING THE STATE UNDER A STATE OF SIEGE............................................................... 373 MARTIAL LAW AND THE ECONOMY............................................................................................. 377 MARTIAL LAW AND THE PRESS..................................................................................................... 379 DYNAMIZING THE PEOPLE: MASS MOBILIZATION UNDER MARTIAL LAW......................... 384 FROM PEPERPU TO PEPERTI............................................................................................................. 389 CONCLUSION....................................................................................................................................... 393 CHAPTER VI: SOEKARNO’S LAST REVOLUTION: SOCIETAL MOBILIZATION DURING GUIDED DEMOCRACY, 1960-1965............................................................................................................. 399 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................... 399 DYNAMIZING THE PEOPLE: THE DEWAN NASIONAL AND FRONT NASIONAL.................... 403 THE TRIKORA CAMPAIGN AGAINST WEST IRIAN AND THE RISE OF THE SUKARELAWAN.. 411 CIVIL DEFENSE: MILITARY TRAINING FOR THE PEOPLE......................................................... 413 SUKARELAWAN MISSIONS TO WEST IRIAN................................................................................. 424 END OF MARTIAL LAW AND KONFRONTASI AGAINST MALAYSIA......................................... 429 “THE MARTIAL APPROACH”: MOBILIZATION OF SOCIETY DURING GUIDED DEMOCRACY ................................................................................................................................................................ 436 THE ARMY VERSUS THE PKI........................................................................................................... 452 THE ISSUE OF A “FIFTH FORCE” AND THE TRAGEDY OF OCTOBER 1, 1965....................... 457 CONCLUSION....................................................................................................................................... 462 CONCLUSION................................................................................................................................ 469 === [PDF page 12] === 12 REFERENCES................................................................................................................................. 503 === [PDF page 13] === 13 LIST OF TABLES, ILLUSTRATIONS, FIGURES, AND GRAPHS TABLE 1. POPULATION OF JAVA'S MAJOR CITIES IN 1920, 1930, AND 1961................................. 180 TABLE 2. NATIONAL CRIME STATISTICS BY TYPE AND LOCATION (PROVINCES), Q1-Q3, 1951... 203 TABLE 3. NATIONAL VIOLENT CRIME STATISTICS, CATEGORIZED BY TYPE OF CRIME. 1951-1954. ..................................................................................................................................................... 209 TABLE 4. NATIONAL MAJOR CRIME STATISTICS, CATEGORIZED BY REGION. 1951-1954............ 209 TABLE 5. MAJOR CRIMES IN WEST JAVA, CATEGORIZED BY PERPETRATORS. 1951-1954............ 210 TABLE 6. MAJOR CRIME STATISTICS IN WEST JAVA, CATEGORIZED BY TYPES OF CRIME. 1951-1954. ..................................................................................................................................................... 211 TABLE 7. MAJOR CRIME STATISTICS IN GREATER JAKARTA AND JAKARTA REGENCY, CATEGORIZED BY TYPES OF CRIME. 1952-1954.................................................................................................. 214 TABLE 8. GENERAL CRIME STATISTICS IN GREATER JAKARTA, CATEGORIZED BY TYPES OF CRIME. 1952-1953.................................................................................................................................... 214 TABLE 9. MAJOR CRIMES IN CENTRAL JAVA, CATEGORIZED BY PERPETRATOR. 1950-1954........ 225 TABLE 10. MAJOR CRIMES IN CENTRAL JAVA, CATEGORIZED BY TYPE OF CRIME. 1950-1954.... 226 TABLE 11. MAJOR CRIMES IN SEMARANG AND ITS ENVIRONS AS REPORTED BY SUARA MERDEKA. 1950-1954.................................................................................................................................... 227 TABLE 12. MAJOR CRIMES IN EAST JAVA, CATEGORIZED BY TYPE OF CRIME. 1950-1954.......... 234 TABLE 13. CRIMES IN SURABAYA AS REPORTED BY SURABAYA POST, CATEGORIZED BY TYPE OF CRIME. 1956-1957....................................................................................................................... 236 === [PDF page 14] === 14 TABLE 14. MAJOR CRIMES CONDUCTED BY THE DARUL ISLAM IN WEST JAVA, CATEGORIZED BY TYPE OF CRIME. 1950-1954................................................................................................................... 242 FIGURE 1. REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA IN 1961................................................................................. 201 === [PDF page 15] === 15 INTRODUCTION On the early morning of October 1, 1965, Indonesia’s bustling capital of Jakarta was shaken by the murder of seven Army generals—including the Army’s Chief of Staff, General Ahmad Yani—in a an attempted coup movement that was ultimately masterminded by the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI).1 The incident happened during Soekarno’s Guided Democracy regime, which began in 1959 and was characterized by a broad mismanagement of the economy and autocratic control of the country’s society, explaining why the government was weakened even though it squashed the coup attempt. The coup attempt collapsed under the quick response of the Army, its supporters, and its eminence grise, Lieutenant General Soeharto. The incident was subsequently followed by a string of violent skirmishes and mass killings of the Communists and their sympathizers. On March 11 of the following year, under the threat of internal social disorder, Soekarno officially handed over power to Soeharto and the Army to restore order in a de facto transfer of authority. After 1966, Indonesia would be ruled under the iron heel of military authoritarianism, which lasted for nearly thirty-two years. The events of the movement of October 1, 1965 (or the September 30 Movement, Gerakan Tigapuluh September) remains debated in Indonesian historiography. The definition used here is adopted from the Army’s official interpretation on the October 1, 1965 incident, which was also advanced by John Roosa. Another line of interpretation, which was based on the statements of the ringleaders of the September 30 Movement, puts the incident as a purely internal Army affair. Argued by Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey in 1966, this interpretation sees the Movement as a pre-emptive strike to protect President Soekarno from an alleged Army coup that was in the making by a CIAbacked “Council of Generals.” For the interpretation used here, see John Roosa, Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto’s Coup d’état in Indonesia, New Perspectives in Southeast Asian Studies (Madison, Wis: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006). === [PDF page 16] === 16 The Question When a coup d’etat occurs, the first objective of the conspirators is to legitimize their actions.2 In other words, “to put on the garment of legitimacy is the first aim of every coup.”3 Coups, however, were more akin to movies, where the majority of its important work was done behind the scenes. As Edward Luttwak pointed out in 1968, the crucial element of every coup is “the dangerous and elaborate process by which the armed forces and the other means of coercion are neutralized, and the political forces temporarily forced into passivity.”4 Therefore, when studying a coup d’etat, the most intriguing aspect lies not in the actual event itself, but rather in these protracted and intricate historical processes. In 1988, political scientist Alfred Stepan wrote that “in virtually all polities of the world[,] the military are a permanent factor in any calculus of power.”5 This was certainly the case in Indonesia. However, just like any other process of political change, military dominance in politics did not happen all at once. In the case of Indonesia, Daniel Lev has pointed out that the Army’s entry into politics was enabled by the nationwide implementation of martial law in 1957, which would subsequently paved the way to military authoritarianism.6 During the early 1950s, however, Following Edward Luttwak, a coup d’etat here is defined as “the infiltration of a small but critical segment of the state apparatus, which is then used to displace the government from its control of the remainder.” Edward Luttwak, Coup d’Etat: A Practical Handbook, First American Ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), 12. I would like to thank Douglas Kammen for pointing out this quote. Barbara Tuchman, A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous 14th Century (New York: Ballantine Books, 1978), 399. Luttwak, Coup d’Etat: A Practical Handbook, 48. Alfred C. Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1988), 128. Daniel S Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959 (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2009), 77–94. === [PDF page 17] === 17 the military was too fragmented to establish a claim for political prominence, as Ruth McVey has noted.7 Indeed, it was only in 1965 that the military completely transformed the country under a military authoritarian regime, aptly named the New Order (Orde Baru). Why and how did the Indonesian military come to intervene in the state prior to the onset of military rule in 1965-1966? This dissertation argues that the Indonesian military gradually intervened in politics through actions that were ultimately justified through the historical development of legal emergency powers and counterinsurgency techniques during the 1950s1960s, culminating in the establishment of a military regime in 1966. I show not only that the Indonesian military intervened in non-military affairs much earlier than 1957 or 1965, but also how these earlier interventions helped condition the state and society for military rule much later. Indeed, as American observer Willard Hanna has noted, the history of the Indonesian military in the 1950s was: a history of ‘incidents’ [peristiwa]: the October 17, 1952 incident, when an Army clique attempted to dissolve Parliament and call for new elections; the June 27, 1955 incident, the boycotting of a new Chief of Staff; the November 1956 Incident, when Colonel Lubis attempted a coup; plus a whole succession of charters and oaths and pledges; plus, of course, the crowded series of insurrectionist incidents of 1956, 1957, and 1958.8 Ruth McVey, “The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army,” Indonesia 11 (April 1971); Ruth McVey, “The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army: Part II,” Indonesia 13 (April 1972). Willard A. Hanna, “Bung Karno’s Indonesia Part V: The Indecision of the Military,” Fieldstaff Reports, Southeast Asia Series (American Universities Field Staff, September 25, 1959), 12–13. === [PDF page 18] === 18 In understanding these series of “incidents,” the main argument of this dissertation is that the Indonesian military gradually intervened in non-military affairs through actions that were ultimately justified through a combination of two factors, namely the growing reach of legal emergency powers—or martial law—and an ever-expanding series of military counterinsurgency strategies, particularly during the Liberal (1950-1959) and Guided Democracy (1959-1965) periods, subsequently paving the way for the New Order in 1966. While the underpinnings of military intervention in non-military affairs were inspired by colonial and revolutionary legal and military concepts, these foundations were reshaped and put into practice during the military reforms and counterinsurgency operations of the 1950s. Thus, this dissertation engages with the question of how colonial and revolutionary legacies helped shape military intervention in non-military affairs. This dissertation also explores the interaction between the Indonesian military and civilians during the early stages of military intervention in non-military affairs. It is important to acknowledge that militaries are never a sole actor in the process of militarization, as civilians too play a significant role. Beginning during the demobilization programs and counterinsurgency operations of the 1950s, this civil-military relationship were much more pronounced during the transition to Guided Democracy in 1959. This transition, which was marked by the replacement of parliamentary democracy with a politics of mass mobilization under the specter of martial law, created a political atmosphere that was conducive for the Army to grow and exert its political influence in non-military domains, subsequently producing a militarized state and society. === [PDF page 19] === 19 The Indonesian military came to intervene in the state prior to the onset of military rule in 1965 through the operationalization of what I call the “twin logics of emergency and counterinsurgency” within the repertoires of state action. Both the logics of emergency and counterinsurgency, bound together by the function of maintaining security of the state through its mechanism of expedient crisis-solving, became the mechanism for militarization, especially in moments of political, economic, and social crises—whether it was real or imagined. Throughout the 1950s-1960s, political, economic and social crises, such as political deadlock, social unrest, armed crime, open insurgency, economic decline, separatism, and intermittent, yet sustained, conflict have shaped the Indonesian experience. This constant state of crisis provided the backdrop for military intervention in the state. This is the “emergency” part of the argument. The “logic of emergency” here refers to the state—and subsequently, the society’s— tendency to deploy emergency or exceptional powers in dealing with threats and challenges. Emergency power is certainly violent, as evident by its coercive approach and “exceptionalist” tendencies. The “logic of counterinsurgency” is the state’s tendency to create, disseminate, and engage with real and imagined enemies within and beyond its borders. Many of the most violent moments in Indonesian history have occurred during counterinsurgency operations (or asymmetric warfare). This is important, because it created a state and society that was conditioned towards the use of violence and the presence of armed groups and institutions. I will return to a more detailed discussion of these two concepts later in this chapter. === [PDF page 20] === 20 Albeit its long experience with revolution, many of the ideas and institutions of the state were inspired, influenced, or adapted from its colonial predecessor. In particular fields, such as law and security techniques, there were direct continuities from the repertoires of the colonial state, which expertise was focused upon internal security. In the state’s “toolkit,” there were martial law and counterinsurgency techniques. This historical fact created a state that was inherently designed for the maintenance of peace and order. After enduring a prolonged period of colonial rule, war, and revolution, Indonesia finally gained its independence in 1949. However, the path to independence was marked by extensive violence—particularly by armed groups, or laskars—as well as political and economic challenges that persisted throughout the post-revolutionary era. During the 1950s, Indonesia faced a severe threat in the form of violent armed groups, commonly known as the gerombolan, most notably the Darul Islam (House of Islam) rebellion. This time, known as an “age of gerombolan” (zaman gorombolan), was largely the consequence of the country’s slow reconstruction from postrevolutionary socio-political instability and economic decline.9 While the Army emerged from the revolution relatively intact, it was predominantly a militia force, while its leadership was seriously fractured by factionalism, thus compromising its institutional capabilities. 10 Consequently, these armed groups increasingly posed a grave threat against the nascent and fragile Republican state. “Gorombolan” is the Sundanese term for gerombolan, which translates to “gangs.” On how West Javans remembered the period, see Hendi Johari, “Zaman Gorombolan (DI/TII),” Historia, August 3, 2020, https://historia.id/politik/articles/zaman-gorombolan-di-tii-vqmpJ/page/1. 10 McVey, “The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army,” April 1971; McVey, “The PostRevolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army,” April 1972. === [PDF page 21] === 21 It was during this period that the Army embarked on military reforms, which encompassed the institutional reorganization and education of its personnel. Many revolutionary-era soldiers and freedom fighters who were deemed unfit for service had to be demobilized as part of these reforms. This demobilization process presented a dual challenge for the state and the Army. On the one hand, it presented a socio-political concern as there was a risk of these veterans being recruited by the armed groups. On the other hand, civilians and military leaders alike considered that military reform was crucial in order for the Army to function as a unified and effective fighting force to suppress the gerombolans and project state power. The issue of demobilization during this “age of gerombolan” served as the backdrop for the Army’s involvement in non-military affairs. As Chapter IV will demonstrate, the Army began to assume roles in policing and economic management throughout the 1950s, as it grappled with the country’s security crisis and its own internal demobilization. General A.H. Nasution, the Army’s foremost intellectual, remarked in November 1950 that “insecurity is the result of economic breakdown.” 11 As a result, and with the blessing of civilian leaders, the military launched counterinsurgency initiatives that included programs in economic development. The Army, in collaboration with the Police and other ministries, launched campaigns to regulate firearms and suppress armed crimes. Meanwhile, in order to prevent disillusioned former service members from joining the gerombolan, the Army experimented with channeling demobilized soldiers to reservist corps and labor units, thereby initiating their participation in state-sponsored 11 A.H. Nasution, “Kemakmuran Rakjat Harus Dibangun Kembali,” Pikiran Rakjat, November 29, 1950. === [PDF page 22] === 22 developmental and transmigration projects as early as 1951.12 It was during that same year that the Army began to aggressively suppress armed insurgencies such as the Darul Islam, thus enabling the opportunity for experimentation in military civic action programs.13 Consequently, even before the rise of Guided Democracy in 1959 or the New Order in 1965, the Indonesian military was already deeply involved in non-military affairs. The military reforms throughout the 1950s were not solely focused on a preparation for non-military activities. They also organized themselves for purely military operations. During the operations against the regional PRRI-Permesta rebellions in 1958, the military effectively displayed its potential in carrying out modern military operations, garnering national prestige and establishing itself as a major political force in the country. Meanwhile, these regional rebellions also became a catalyst for the collapse of Liberal Democracy, as the Army’s growing political influence posed a formidable challenge to the political parties operating within the country’s political milieu.14 Eventually, these events led to a civil-military alliance between Soekarno and the Army, particularly with the military intellectual General A.H. Nasution, as they shared a common goal of preserving national unity, thus laying the foundation for the emergence of the Guided Democracy regime. 12 T.B. Simatupang, “Pidato Kepala Staf Angkatan Perang Untuk 5 Oktober 1951,” Yudhagama 13 (October 1951): 477. 13 “Keputusan2 Staf ‘K’ Pusat Pada Konperensi Di Jogjakarta Tgl 4 April 1951” (Staf “K” Pusat Kementerian Pertahanan, April 4, 1951), RA.8A 1589, ANRI; Bradley R Simpson, Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations, 1960-1968. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 78. 14 Daniel S. Lev, “The Political Role of the Army in Indonesia,” Pacific Affairs 36, no. 4 (1963): 349. === [PDF page 23] === 23 The arrival of Soekarno’s Guided Democracy regime in 1959 was decisive to military intervention in non-military affairs, as the military became substantially entrenched in matters of state administration, economic policy, control of the press, and eventually, politics itself. It was during this centralized and illiberal regime—built upon a political alliance of “stable conflict” between President Soekarno and the Army—that the military completed its transformation into a major political actor that would subsequently dominate the political life of the state.15 During Guided Democracy, the state pursued its goals in the framework of the long, inconclusive “Indonesian Revolution.” Initially, these tasks were contained in the national goal of reestablishing “security, economic growth (sandang-pangan), and a continuing struggle against imperialism.”16 It did so through emergency powers. Yet, declaring emergency powers alone could never have been successful without also mobilizing social support within the Indonesian society. This mobilizing agenda subsequently included a mission to contain and subsequently annihilate its enemies, namely the “gerombolan” armed groups and the regional rebellions; colonialism (and neo-colonialism) in West Irian and Malaysia; and much later, “counter-revolutionaries” within the country itself.17 15 On the Soekarno-Army relationship as a “stable conflict” see Herbert Feith, “Dynamics of Guided Democracy,” in Indonesia, ed. Ruth McVey, Revised Edition (New Haven, CT: Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, 1967), 325. 16 This quote is from Soekarno’s Independence Day speech on August 17, 1959, titled Penemuan Kembali Revolusi Kita (The Rediscovery of Our Revolution). This speech would be known as the Manifesto Politik, one of the basic documents of Guided Democracy. For the full text of the speech see Panitia Pembina Djiwa Revolusi, Bahan-Bahan Pokok Indoktrinasi (Jakarta: Jajasan Prapantja, 1964), 49. 17 On Soekarno’s conceptualization and reconceptualization of “revolutionary enemies,” see Panitia Pembina Djiwa Revolusi, 31. === [PDF page 24] === 24 Under Guided Democracy, the state emphasized order and discipline through the production and operation of emergency powers. This approach also provided the Army with a prominent influence in the political sphere. The declaration of a nationwide state of emergency in 1957 paved the way for an increased military role in almost all elements of governance in order to break through perceived socioeconomic challenges, such as “social disorder, smuggling, corruption, or subversive actions.”18 Consequently, many institutions of Guided Democracy, including the government and the economy, increasingly became occupied by military personnel collaborating closely with civilians, as Chapters V and VI will show us. Martial law administration bodies, which handled many of the most important governmental decisions during Guided Democracy, were often led by a joint civilian-military leadership, and its day-to-day operations often relied heavily upon a cadre of military jurists. On the other hand, civilian figures also gradually adopted to a “martial approach” to everyday life, as they adapted military norms or aesthetic values—such as the wearing of military ranks and uniforms.19 Even politics were transmogrified into a militaristic forms, as the populace was increasingly rallied, trained, and mobilized around the notion of an unfinished “revolution.” It was during this period that the military, with Soekarno’s endorsement, introduced nationwide military training programs for students and civil servants known as sukarelawan (volunteers).20 Under the framework of the sukarelawan program, the military expanded its 18 This quote is from Soeharto’s, then an Army Colonel, “Order of the Day” speech as the panglima (Commander) of Tentara/Territorium IV Diponegoro and regional martial law administrator on March 25, 1957. For the full text of the speech, see “Aksi Subversif, Korupsi, Dan Birokrasi Menghalangi Kita,” Harian Rakjat, March 25, 1957. 19 On foreign correspondents’ comment on this pattern, see “A Warrior in Chaos,” The Economist, June 9, 1962. 20 “21 Djuta Sukarelawan Indonesia Digembleng,” Mimbar Indonesia, May 1964, 35. === [PDF page 25] === 25 collaboration with various social organizations, including veterans, women’s groups, youth associations, religious groups, and labor unions.21 These volunteers saw limited deployments against the Dutch in the campaigns against the Dutch in West Irian (1960-1962) and the British and Malaysians in Kalimantan (1963-1966). Although the groundwork for military intervention in civilian affairs had been established since the 1950s, it was during this “sukarelawan” moment of the 1960s that this process experienced a significant surge. The Army expanded its close links with many elements of the population, most notably students and civil servants, through military training programs. This further solidified the Army’s connections to various societal elements, thus deepening its engagement with civilian forces. The institutional reforms introduced during Guided Democracy played a pivotal role in shaping the political role of the Army. The military’s presence in politics was particularly noticeable through its inclusion as a functional group in state institutions such as the Front Nasional.22 Consequently, as the Army became more political, it increasingly engaged with a political rivalry with the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party). This competition unfolded against the backdrop of Soekarno’s mobilization efforts for campaigns in West Irian and Malaysia and the Communists’ increasingly aggressive land reform campaigns in Java and Sumatra, thus intensifying the political contestation between the two groups. Consequently, in one of history’s most understated ironies, the Communists and Soekarnoists also became the “enemy,” as the military gradually took over state power, thus leading to one of the world’s worst genocides of the 21 David Bourchier, Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia: The Ideology of the Family State (London: Routledge, 2016), 113. 22 On the role of the Front Nasional in Guided Democracy, see Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, 37. === [PDF page 26] === 26 20th century in 1965.23 In sum, the Indonesian military gradually intervened in non-military matters by leveraging the expansion of emergency powers and the implementation of counterinsurgency strategies, with Guided Democracy serving as a catalyst for an increased military engagement in the political realm. The mechanisms by which the military intervened into non-military affairs involved the strategic combination of the two key concepts of emergency powers and counterinsurgency. The concepts evolved over a long historical period, but from the 1950s onwards, they (re)conditioned the state for eventual military authoritarian rule. Unraveling this process of militarization is essential for understanding the nature and legacy of authoritarianism in Indonesia. Under Soekarno’s Guided Democracy, this process also gradually aligned with martial values that permeated the society at large, thus extending beyond the Army and the state itself. In many ways, this project is not only an account of a society reeling back from massive change precipitated by the revolution they created themselves—but it is also a story of the creation of an alternative political ideal, a conservative-disciplinarian one, that was evident in many post-revolutionary societies. It is essential to understand how these developments became intertwined with militaristic values and logics, leading to their compatibility with military interventions in non-military affairs. This understanding is crucial for grasping the nature and long-lasting impact of militarization in Indonesia. 23 On the 1965 genocide against the Communists, see, among others, Geoffrey Robinson, The Killing Season: A History of the Indonesian Massacres, 1965-66, Human Rights and Crimes against Humanity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018); Jess Melvin, The Army and the Indonesian Genocide: Mechanics of Mass Murder, Rethinking Southeast Asia 15 (London; New York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2018). === [PDF page 27] === 27 The military’s rise to power in 1966 is a watershed in Indonesian history, as it relied on oppressive military rule through political violence and a regime of fear. However, despite its extensive record of human rights abuses and brutal political repression, during its initial years, the New Order also garnered significant support from elites, bureaucrats, soldiers, educated youth, and intellectuals. The emergence of military domination in political affairs in 1965 was also far from novel, as the Indonesian military has projected its socio-political influence in one way or another since the early 1950s. Soekarno’s declaration of Guided Democracy in 1959 further solidified this process. In a sense, President Soeharto’s ascent to power in 1966 was Indonesia’s own “Eighteenth Brumaire,” a moment of great counter-revolution that had been enabled by a long process of militarization. The effects of this processes continues to be felt in the country today, as the legacy of the New Order regime remains a subject of controversy and ongoing debate. Historiography In December 1992, the Monash University Centre for Southeast Asian Studies held a conference on Indonesian democratization. In light of the growing decline of the New Order military regime, the conference discussed the last period of “liberal democracy” in Indonesia, which was the 1950s. In her paper, Ruth McVey calls the 1950s the “disappearing decade,” lamenting how many Indonesianists have avoided the period akin to a “scholarly Sargasso Sea.”24 24 Ruth McVey, “The Case of the Disappearing Decade,” in Democracy in Indonesia: 1950s and 1990s, ed. David Bourchier and J.D. Legge (Clayton, Victoria: Center of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1994), 3. === [PDF page 28] === 28 In light of few exceptions, new research on Indonesia during the 1950s is rare.25 The mainstay works for 1950s Indonesia are still, Herbert Feith’s Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (1962) and Daniel Lev’s The Transition to Guided Democracy (1966). In Decline, Feith asked why Indonesia’s experiment with liberal democracy, which has dominated the nation’s politics since 1950, ultimately failed, a question which my research also engages with. However, Feith’s answer is problematic. According to Feith, the Indonesian political elite was differentiated into two streams. First was the rational “administrators,” or “problem-solvers,” people who were inclined to improving administrative management of the state or pursuing economic development, such as Vice President Mohammad Hatta, economist Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, and others. Meanwhile, the second group was the mobilizing “solidarity-makers,” or people who were invested in popular mass mobilization and the manipulation of political symbolism as a way of governing, such as Soekarno. Liberal democracy failed in Indonesia when the former group, which Feith identified as the one predisposed to liberal democracy, ultimately lost to the latter group in the contestation for political power.26 Feith’s argument was criticized in various ways. Harry Benda argues that the democratic experiment was doomed from the start, as Indonesia inherited a political culture that was never geared towards liberal democracy and the country “will find its way back to its own moorings.”27 25 A refreshing exemption is Farabi Fakih’s excellent work on managerialism in Guided Democracy Indonesia.. See Farabi Fakih, Authoritarian Modernization in Indonesia’s Early Independence Period: The Foundation of the New Order State (1950-1965), Verhandelingen van Het Koninklijk Instituut Voor Taal-, Land- En Volkenkunde, volume 312 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2020). 26 Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 1st Equinox ed (Jakarta: Equinox Pub, 2007). 27 Harry J. Benda, “Democracy in Indonesia,” The Journal of Asian Studies 23, no. 3 (May 1964): 453. === [PDF page 29] === 29 In other words, the problem lies in the political tradition. Indonesian actors, such as former Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo, criticizes Feith’s arbitrary usage of synthetic social-science typology, which ignores the real demand for “solidarity-makers” in a post-revolutionary society.28 Meanwhile, Feith’s periodization of liberal democracy has been criticized, as Goh Cheng Teik notes that true electoral democracy in the 1950s were only found in March 1956 until 1957, after Indonesia experienced its first elections in 1955.29 More recently, in a special publication of Tempo in 2019, Indonesian jurist Nono Anwar Makarim argues that the idea of the “1950s as a golden age in our democracy, is a myth.”30 Scholarly explanations for the origins of military rule in Indonesia and the nature of statist and authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia have focused excessively on the political maneuverings of military and civilian elites. Scholars have argued that the Army’s primacy in governing development and modernization compared to its civilian counterparts provided them with the legitimacy needed to gain power.31 Indeed, military role as modernizers and managers of economic development is often considered the basis of legitimacy of the military regime in the 1960s and the 1970s.32 28 Tempo, Pergulatan Demokrasi Liberal 1950-1959, Seri Buku Tempo (Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia 29 Goh Cheng Teik, “Why Indonesia’s Attempt at Democracy in the Mid-1950s Failed,” Modern Asian Studies 6, no. 2 (1972): 225. 30 Tempo, Pergulatan Demokrasi Liberal 1950-1959, xviii, 151–56. 31 Harold A. Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, 1st Equinox ed (Jakarta: Equinox Pub, 2007); Ulf Sundhaussen, The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967 (Kuala Lumpur; New York: Oxford University Press, 1982). 32 Michael R. J. Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Soeharto: Order, Development, and Pressure for Change, Politics in Asia Series (London; New York: Routledge, 1994); Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority, Contemporary Issues in Asia and the Pacific (Stanford, Calif: Stanford === [PDF page 30] === 30 By contrast, others have posited that cultural and historical factors, or “political culture,” were decisive in shaping Indonesian military ideology and their likelihood of taking over the state.33 Traditionally, centralized states and authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia have been viewed as part of the political culture of the region’s elites.34 Another line of argument emphasizes the military’s willingness to capitalize on a single historical event—the failed coup d’etat of September 30, 1965—as the pretext to its own rule, thus enabling them to establish and then efficiently employ mass surveillance and violence to successfully implant a military-led regime.35 One problem with these approaches, however, is that they fail to comprehensively explain the structural legacies and institutional mechanisms through which the military obtained and sustained the justification for military participation in non-military affairs. They also assume that the violent nature of contentious politics in Indonesia was singlehandedly invented by the Army, University Press, 1995); Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia’s Search for Stability, 2nd ed (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 2000). 33 Rudolf Mrázek, The United States and the Indonesian Military 1945-1965. Volume 1., 2 vols., Dissertationes Orientales, No.39 (Prague: Oriental Institute in Academia, Publishing House of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, 1978); Rudolf Mrázek, The United States and the Indonesian Military 1945-1965. Volume 2., 2 vols., Dissertationes Orientales, No.39 (Prague: Oriental Institute in Academia, Publishing House of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, 1978); Salim Said, Genesis of Power: General Sudirman and the Indonesian Military in Politics, 1945 - 49 (Singapore: Inst. of Southeast Asian Studies [u.a.], 1991); Peter Britton, Profesionalisme Dan Ideologi Militer Indonesia: Perspektif Tradisi-Tradisi Jawa Dan Barat. [Professionalism and Indonesian Military Ideology: Perspectives on the Traditions of Java and the West] (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1996); Leonard C. Sebastian, Realpolitik Ideology: Indonesia’s Use of Military Force (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006). 34 Benedict R. O’G Anderson, “Old State, New Society: Indonesia’s New Order in Comparative Historical Perspective,” in Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 94–122; Tony Day, Fluid Iron: State Formation in Southeast Asia (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002); Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia. 35 Richard Tanter, “Intelligence Agencies and Third World Militarization: A Case Study of Indonesia, 1966-1989, with Special Reference to South Korea, 1961-1989” (Melbourne, Australia, Monash University, 1991); John Roosa, Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Soeharto’s Coup d’état in Indonesia, New Perspectives in Southeast Asian Studies (Madison, Wis: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006); Melvin, The Army and the Indonesian Genocide; Robinson, The Killing Season. === [PDF page 31] === 31 thus overestimating the ingenuity of Indonesia’s men-at-arms. During this period, the Indonesian military was fragmented in its leadership, underequipped, and inefficient.36 In fact, its most successful counterinsurgency campaign against the Darul Islam rebellion in the 1950s required extensive cooperation from civilians.37 While this project remain focused on the institutional histories of the state and military in Indonesia, it tries to depart from the singular focus on the political agency of military elites and the institutional autonomy of the military as a political actor. In other words, this work focuses not only on the fact that the military intervened in society, but also how they did it. While I agree that the Indonesian military has shaped its own ideology in order to intervene in the state, it is important to understand that these ideologies was neither created “ex nihilo nor adopted ready-made.”38 Thus, military elites and institutions often adopted concepts and ideals that were already available to them, such as martial law and counterinsurgency techniques. A more recent literature on the Indonesian state emphasizes the influence of Western corporatism and organicism in Indonesian political thought, American covert and public support during the Cold War, managerial technocracy, or elite coalitions in shaping the nation’s democracy.39 Strong colonial and national states, however, do not only rule through law, fear, and 36 McVey, “The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army,” April 1971; McVey, “The PostRevolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army,” April 1972. 37 David K. Kilcullen, “Globalisation and the Development of Indonesian Counterinsurgency Tactics,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 17, no. 1 (March 2006): 44–64; David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 38 Carol Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period, Nachdr., Studies of the East Asian Institute (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1985), 4. 39 Hariyono, Penerapan Status Bahaya di Indonesia: Sejak Pemerintah Kolonial Belanda hingga Pemerintah Orde Baru [The Practice of the State of Emergency in Indonesia: From the Colonial Period to the New Order] (Jakarta: === [PDF page 32] === 32 violence, but also through the administration of knowledge, race, and gender.40 Further, state developmentalism often fails in the face of “everyday” resistance by the people and the idea of state autonomy also collapses when we examine everyday life in Indonesia more closely.41 While elites may seize power and establish authoritarian regimes through a successful coup, they still must tap into established social values to consolidate their rule and secure their legitimacy. Existing theories of authoritarian rule in Indonesia assumes that the legitimacy of military rule emanated purely from the military itself as an institution. Just like in other states, I show that authoritarian regimes require legitimacy secured through traditional, charismatic, or legal means. As states and regimes are deeply enmeshed within society, political legitimacy is also perpetually coproduced in political practices through coordination, conflict, and argumentation between nonstate actors and state institutions.42 I examine Indonesian civil-military relations not only by looking directly into how the military engaged with civilians, but also include attention to how civilians engaged with the military as an institution. In many ways, both military and civilians often found themselves Pensil-324, 2008); Simpson, Economists with Guns; Dan Slater, Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Bourchier, Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia; Fakih, Authoritarian Modernization in Indonesia’s Early Independence Period. 40 Ann Laura Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Katharine E. McGregor, History in Uniform: Military Ideology and the Construction of Indonesia’s Past, Southeast Asia Publications Series ([Canberra]: Honolulu: Asian Studies Association of Australia; In association with University of Hawai’i Press, 2007). 41 James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance, Nachdr. (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 2000); Geert Arend van Klinken, Joshua Barker, and Cornell University, eds., State of Authority: The State in Society in Indonesia, Studies on Southeast Asia, no. 50 (Ithaca, N.Y: Southeast Asia Program Publications, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 2009). 42 Joel S. Migdal, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Benno Netelenbos, Political Legitimacy beyond Weber: An Analytical Framework (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). === [PDF page 33] === 33 agreeing with each other in the pursuit of strategic national objectives—such as security, economic stabilization, or the establishment of a particular domestic and international order. In sum, this dissertation provides a detailed account of the historical context that has shaped and enabled the institutionalization of social order, disciplined regimentation, and centralized authority, through the lens of militarization. Indeed, in order to make better sense how military institutions justified their intervention in non-military affairs, we should pay more attention to how militaries deploy socio-cultural strategies and coopted established political norms, discourses, and institutions rather than just focusing on their violent use of sheer force. On Militarization Throughout much of the 19th and 20th century, prolific academic debates on the problem of military virtues dominating civilian societal mores and mechanisms of governance has proliferated significantly. The concept that emerged from these debates—militarism—is understood by social scientists as a term that highlights the dominance of the martial class over the state and society.43 One of the most famous dictums on militarism was Harold D. Lasswell’s 1941 warning of the coming of a “Garrison State” that is controlled or dominated by a political-military elite, where “specialists on violence are more preoccupied with the skills and attitudes judged characteristic of nonviolence,” where there is “the merging of skills, starting from the traditional accouterments of the professional soldier, moving toward the manager and promoter of large-scale civilian 43 On the academic debates over the concept of militarism, see Volker R. Berghahn, Militarism: The History of an International Debate, 1861-1979 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 2–28. === [PDF page 34] === 34 enterprise.”44 In a classic definition by Alfred Vagts, militarism is a “vast array of customs, interests, prestige, actions, and thought associated with armies and wars and yet transcending true military purposes.”45 More recently, and referring to the Oxford English Dictionary, Andrew Bacevich defined militarism as “the prevalence of military sentiments or ideals among a people; the political condition characterized by the predominance of the military class in government or administration; the tendency to regard military efficiency as the paramount interest of the state.”46 In many ways, militarization is directly related to this earlier concept of militarism as its condictio sine qua non. Just like militarism, militarization has been defined in various ways, and it has been the subject of longstanding debates in the social and humanistic sciences. One apt definition on militarization speaks to the variegated and interlinked discursive processes that almost covers every element of human life: “militarization is about the transformation of civilians into soldiers, and through the creation of certain types of soldiers, the creation of certain types of men and women; the creation of new types, conceptions, and understandings of ‘citizens,’ and the acceptance of these new types of categories and ways of being. It is a process of social, political, and military reproduction, the reproduction of the state through military values and identities, and the naturalization of the creative and (re)productive violence of the state in and through the very 44 Harold Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” American Journal of Sociology 46, no. 4 (January 1941): 455,458. Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism: Civilian and Military, Rev.Ed. (London: Hollis and Carter, 1959), 13. 46 Andrew J. Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 227, ff.5. 45 === [PDF page 35] === 35 bodies of its citizens.”47 Another definition speaks of militarization as “the process by which war and national security became consuming anxieties and provided the memories, models, and metaphors that shaped broad areas of national life.”48 One long-running definition of militarization as a cultural process refers to it as the “contradictory and tense social process in which civil society organizes itself for the production of violence.” 49 In this project, militarization is understood as “the gradual encroachment of military ideas, values, and structures into the civilian domain.”50 This definition, first penned by historian Laura McEnaney on understanding 1950s America, is broad and useful enough to become an umbrella term for this elusive social process, especially in the context of 1950s and 1960s Indonesia. In tracing this process, I use Richard Tanter’s four dimensions of militarization, which is an expansion of the military’s institutional or technological capacity, the gradual predominance of military in politics, an increasing preference of coercive solutions to political problems, and a growing prevalence of military symbolism or “martial ethos” in society.51 According to Tanter, a given state or society can be considered militarized or heading towards militarization if they experience at least one of these four dimensions. 47 Andrew Bickford, “Militaries and Militarization, Anthropology Of,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Elsevier, 2015), 483, https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.12210-X. 48 Michael S. Sherry, In the Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930s (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1995), 49 Michael Geyer, “The Militarization of Europe, 1914-1945,” in The Militarization of the Western World, ed. John R. Gillis (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1989), 79. 50 Laura McEnaney, Civil Defense Begins at Home: Militarization Meets Everyday Life in the Fifties, Politics and Society in Twentieth-Century America (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2000), 6. 51 Richard Tanter, “Trends in Asia,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 10, no. 1 (Summer 1984): 163–64; Tanter, “Intelligence Agencies and Third World Militarization: A Case Study of Indonesia, 1966-1989, with Special Reference to South Korea, 1961-1989,” 22–24. === [PDF page 36] === 36 Militarization depends on a normalization of violence, which subsequently leads to changes in societal values, beliefs, norms, and institutions as argued by Catherine Lutz and Cynthia Enloe.52 Thus, the subtle patterns of militarization become materialized not only in political, but also in cultural, institutional, ideological, and economic transformations.53 And the outcome of these processes can be more militarization. One major example of this is the establishment of “coercive-intensive” institutions that paved the way for the establishment of a military authoritarian state in Burma / Myanmar as discussed by Mary Callahan.54 Militarization has also operated in cultural domains, such as the popularization of military values—such as regimentation, centralization, and mobilization, as Michael Sherry and Catherine Lutz have argued respectively for interbellum and contemporary United States.55 Militarization as a process also flourishes through a symbiotic and collaborative relationship between interested actors amidst international and domestic security concerns, as examples from post-war Japan, the Taiwanese island of Quemoy and Matsu, and the United States have shown us.56 52 Catherine Lutz, “Making War at Home in the United States: Militarization and the Current Crisis,” American Anthropologist 104, no. 3 (September 2002): 723–35. 53 Cynthia Enloe, Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Sidney G. Tarrow, War, States, and Contention: A Comparative Historical Study (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 2015). 54 Mary P. Callahan, Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma, 1. print. Cornell paperback (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 2005). 55 Sherry, In the Shadow of War; Catherine Lutz, “The Military Normal: Feeling at Home with Counterinsurgency in the United States,” in Militarization, by Roberto J. González, Hugh Gusterson, and Gustaaf Houtman (Duke University Press, 2019), https://doi.org/10.1215/9781478007135-034. 56 Michael Szonyi, Cold War Island: Quemoy on the Front Line (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Tomoyuki Sasaki, Japan’s Postwar Military and Civil Society: Contesting a Better Life, SOAS Studies in Modern and Contemporary Japan (London; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2015); Stuart Schrader, Badges without Borders: How Global Counterinsurgency Transformed American Policing, American Crossroads 56 (Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2019). === [PDF page 37] === 37 Nevertheless, as symbiotic a societal relationship may be under militarization, it will still be dominated by the idea or practice of violence, including fear of enemy invasion or disaster, sense of a national crisis, and a necessity for the preparation for war or other contingencies, whether real or imagined. In terms of its direct effects on society, militarization is a productive social process, particularly in creating what Andrew Bickford calls a “military imaginary,” or “the ways in which the necessity, implementation, and desired outcomes of military service and training are imagined and envisioned by the state, and the ways in which these tropes are linked to normative ideas of the ‘proper’ soldier and citizen, legitimate violence, morality, and military tradition.”57 Yet, militarization is a social process that was not only ubiquitous, but also is always particular. The historical experience and the character of society also shaped change. During the 1950s, Indonesian society, particularly in Java, was reeling out from a long experience of colonial warfare, military occupation, and revolution. In that context, it is apt to consider that a state institution that would offer to bring order out of chaos would gain many supporters in the “marketplace” of ideas. In other words, it seemed natural that, who else, than the Armed Forces and its political allies, that could become the “Party of Order” for post-revolutionary Indonesia? This helps explain when changes in societal beliefs, norms, institutions influenced cultural, institutional, ideological, and economic transformations, thus paving the way for the establishment of militarized authoritarian state. In relation to the historiography of global authoritarian regimes 57 Andrew Bickford, Fallen Elites: The Military Other in Post-Unification Germany (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2011), 4. === [PDF page 38] === 38 more broadly, this “Southeast Asian pattern” is not unique, but rather ubiquitous. Accounts on the rise of European fascism, for instance, has placed the origins of fascism within the crisis-ridden political culture of interbellum Europe.58 Similarly, scholarly accounts of fascism in prewar Japan and China have emphasized how fascist worldviews manifested themselves not only through political parties or organized mass rallies, but also in the actions of political groups within a national revolutionary movement and in the aesthetic representations and state rituals embedded within popular culture.59 Similarly, scholarship on military rule in the Caribbean and Latin America also emphasized the importance of military professionalism and the militarization of civilian culture in maintaining authoritarian regimes such as in the case of the military junta in post-1964 Brazil and the dictatorship of Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic.60 Just like any other ideologies, authoritarianism emerged and gained its popularity and legitimacy from the utopia it offered as a way out from the problems of mass politics, industrialization, and social order propagated by capitalist modernity.61 Authoritarianism does not simply emerge from abstract “cultural” predispositions or “historical” traditions alone. Parallel to Europe, Japan, China, Brazil, and the Dominican Republic, similar historical processes also prefigured the rise of military authoritarianism in Indonesia, and these processes manifested most 58 Michael Mann, Fascists (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Alan Tansman, ed., The Culture of Japanese Fascism, Asia-Pacific (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009); Kenneth J Ruoff, Imperial Japan at Its Zenith: The Wartime Celebration of the Empire’s 2,600th Anniversary, 2014; Maggie Clinton, Revolutionary Nativism: Fascism and Culture in China, 1925-1937 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017). 60 Alfred Stepan, “The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion,” in Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); Valentina Peguero, The Militarization of Culture in the Dominican Republic, from the Captains General to General Trujillo, Studies in War, Society, and the Military (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004). 61 Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century, 1st American ed (New York: A.A. Knopf: Distributed by Random House, 1999). 59 === [PDF page 39] === 39 visibly through the militarization of state and society during the Liberal and Guided Democracy periods. Consequently, this dissertation examines Indonesia in the ranks of global fascisms and authoritarianisms, as it seeks to understand the historical origins of Indonesian military authoritarianism on its own terms. On State of Emergency In this dissertation, the process of militarization is deeply enmeshed with the proliferation of emergency powers or states of emergency. Emergency powers is a political concept that is ubiquitous, yet very broadly defined. One working definition interprets “emergency powers” as “coercive powers, claimed or invoked by or on behalf of the state, the purpose of which is to address a serious threat (usually to persons, property or social order) which, in the view of those who invoke it, cannot be addressed by ‘ordinary’ law.”62 Another definition argues for a condition that involves “governmental action taken during an extraordinary national crisis that usually entails broad restrictions on human rights in order to resolve the crisis.”63 Often, the activation of emergency powers entail the implementation of a “state of emergency” or “state of exception,” which Italian theorist Giorgio Agamben refers as the “noman’s-land between public law and political fact, and between the juridical order and life.”64 Similar to emergency powers, the concept of “state of emergency” itself is opaquely defined across 62 Victor V. Ramraj, “The Emergency Powers Paradox,” in Emergency Powers in Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 2. 63 Claudio Grossman, “A Framework for the Examination of States of Emergency Under the American Convention of Human Rights,” American University International Law Review 1, no. 1 (1986): 36. 64 Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 1. === [PDF page 40] === 40 geographical and cultural borders. In German legal theory, the idea is called “Ausnahmezaustand” (“state of exception”) and “Notstand” (“state of necessity”). In French, “état de siège” (state of siege). In the English-speaking countries, this idea is often dubbed as martial law or just emergency powers.65 On the relationship between sovereignty and the state of emergency, German jurist Carl Schmitt famously argues that the “sovereign is he who decides on the exception.”66 If we take Jean Bodin’s definition of sovereignty—“the absolute and perpetual power of a commonwealth”67— the declaration of the state of emergency, exception, necessity, or siege is essential to the question of sovereignty: it is the ultimate exposition of sovereignty itself. Examples of the exercise of emergency powers include the declaration of the state of emergency in India under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (1975-1977), the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960), and the Philippines’ Martial Law period under President Ferdinand Marcos (19721981). Emergency powers that were deployed in wartime also have remained in force through peacetime. In this case, the United States is a prime example, where the New Deal coalition that started during the Great Depression lasted through much of the 1970s by the way of war emergencies enacted by the Roosevelt administrations during World War II.68 In the United States, many of these war emergencies remained in force until the promulgation of the National 65 Agamben, 4. Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1985), 5. 67 Jean Bodin and Julian H. Franklin, On Sovereignty: Four Chapters from the Six Books of the Commonwealth, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 1. 68 James T. Sparrow, Warfare State: World War II Americans and the Age of Big Government (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2013). 66 === [PDF page 41] === 41 Emergencies Act of 1976, long after the end of the “real” war in 1945.69 While these historical examples vary widely in scope and severity, they all contain a common trope: the exercise of powers that are often outside the “normal” legal bounds, which entails the close cooperation between civilian and military spheres of governance. This project will show how the concept of a state of emergency—with its products such as martial law—became crucial for militarization of the state and society in Indonesia. Albeit experiencing a long revolutionary war against its former colonial masters, Indonesia’s civil, criminal, and procedural laws remain direct descendants of the Dutch colonial legal system, as it will be discussed in Chapter I. During much of the the 1950s, the law on the state of emergency was the colonial 1939 Law on the State of War and Siege (Regeling Staat van Oorlog en Beleg). This colonial law was often used by the state and the Army to engage its enemies, such as during the gerombolan problem in the 1950s and in Army-led counterinsurgency campaigns such as shown in Chapter III and IV. This process provided the Army with legal ways to intervene in state and society. Emergency powers, however, was not a sole domain of the Army, as Chapter V will show us. In the immediate years leading to the advent of Guided Democracy, in 1957, Soekarno declared a national state of siege (staat van beleg) in order to justify his move towards establishing the new political format. Appealing to the need of establishing order and security in the regions, state of emergency became enmeshed with politics. 69 On an overview of emergency powers in the United States, see Congressional Research Service, “National Emergency Powers,” CRS Report (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, February 11, 2021). On the law, see Peter Rodino, “National Emergencies Act,” Pub. L. No. 94-412 Stat.1255, § 1601-1651, 50 U.S.C. (1976). === [PDF page 42] === 42 The Army’s position in Indonesian politics was created and sustained by martial law. The concept of a state of emergency provides the military with a “tool” to intervene in state and society. Naturally, the Army became the main beneficiaries of this declaration of a state of siege, thus paving the way for a massive expansion of military intervention in non-military affairs, leading the militarization of state and society in Indonesia. In fact, the concept of a state of emergency never truly left Indonesia, as the 1959 Law on the State of Emergency (Perpu No.23 Tahun 1959), a relic of Soekarno’s Guided Democracy, is still in place today. On Counterinsurgency Militarization as a social process does not only rely upon the juridical “troubleshooting” qualities of a state of emergency. Militarization also generates and is generated by the existence of a perennial “enemy,” whether it was imagined or real. Here, the second logic comes into being, namely counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency, which is “the complete range of measures that governments take to defeat insurgencies,” often include “political administrative, military, economic, psychological, and informational” measures that “are almost always used in combination.70 As a concept, counterinsurgency is a totalizing one: it was certainly far from the “small wars” that has been stated by its early theorists such as C.E. Callwell.71 70 Department of the Army and United States Marine Corps, Department of the Navy, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, US Army Field Manual and Marine Corps Warfighting Publication, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2014); Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 1. 71 Charles E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice, Third Edition (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996). === [PDF page 43] === 43 Counterinsurgency theory was created out of the spatial, demographical and historical contexts that was particular to a region and society. In colonial and independent Indonesia,, counterinsurgency strategies, tactics, and techniques were first built upon the traditions of colonial warfare, which will be discussed in Chapter II. Indeed, the militaristic and violent approach to governance has been a feature of the Netherlands Indies colonial state.72 Colonial warfare is, in many of its elements, counterinsurgency. Thus, ironically, when Indonesian military theorists such as A.H. Nasution came up with their own treatises of guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare after the Revolution, much of their inspiration came from theories of colonial war. In fact, as it will be examined in Chapter II, there was a short but underexamined period where the development of Indonesian military doctrine, strategy, and tactics directly adopted its Dutch predecessors. Certainly, historical continuities never exist without change, and the colonial theories were adapted into versions that were most suitable for use by the Indonesians. However, it is important to note that in a field of knowledge that is as old as military science, colonial legacies persist, albeit redeployed in differing contexts and causes. States that were continuously involved in counterinsurgency campaigns often become militarized. This was the case observed in Southeast Asia, as Mary Callahan has shown in Myanmar, in which the prevalence of counterinsurgency operations have led to military prominence in the political life of the state.73 In neighboring Thailand, as Daniel Fineman has observed, US-sponsored counterinsurgency operations against Communist guerrillas also 72 Henk Schulte Nordholt, “A Genealogy of Violence,” in Roots of Violence in Indonesia, ed. Freek Columbijn and J.Thomas Lindblad (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002), 37–38. 73 Callahan, Making Enemies. === [PDF page 44] === 44 provided the opportunity for military intervention in politics.74 Similar patterns have also emerged in Brazil and the rest of the Southern Cone, as Alfred Stepan has shown us.75 We can see the close linkage between counterinsurgency and emergency. Both concepts are continuously expansive and totalizing in terms of strategies, visions and goals—think about them as broad spectrum antibiotics meant to fight a variety of bacterial infections—while they are also specific—more like invasive surgery—in terms of its tactics and techniques. The specificity of the strategies, tactics, and techniques employed by both concepts are inherently a modern one: at least in the context of Europe and its colonies, counterinsurgency strategy first emerged in the modern form during the Napoleonic Wars, which then trickled down to the European colonial states and its successors. Just like the “logic of emergency,” the “logic of counterinsurgency” is also a “tool of empire” that pave the way for post-colonial militarization. Counterinsurgency operations often share similar long-term goals with state of emergency, namely for the “stabilization” of a particular region or people. However, the means taken differs from time and place. Thus, the “logic of counterinsurgency” and the “logic of emergency” cooperate, co-exist, and compete with each other according to historical context. While this tool is relatively passive—it is dependent on how civil and military stakeholders decide to treat and use it—its subsequent long-term effect is the militarization of the state, however small or large the scale. And then, it was through the process 74 Daniel Fineman, A Special Relationship: The United States and Military Government in Thailand, 1947-1958 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997). 75 Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics. === [PDF page 45] === 45 of militarization that the state and society became conditioned to illiberal forms of governance as shown by Soekarno’s Guided Democracy (1959-1965). The Organization of the Dissertation This dissertation is composed of six chapters, which are split into two main parts. In Part I, which consists of Chapter I, II, and III, I examine the legal, conceptual and institutional bases of militarization, which circulates around the historical development of the two main concepts of state of emergency (martial law) and counterinsurgency during the colonial period (1930-1939), the Japanese period (1942-1945), and the revolutionary period (1945-1949). Equally importantly, this part also discusses the social basis of militarization by looking at the social history of insecurity during early Liberal Democracy (1950-1955) in Chapter III. In sum, Part I provides the “socialideological basis,” so to speak, for the historical developments that will be examined in Part II. In Chapter I, A Government of Expediency: The Colonial and Revolutionary Origins of Emergency Powers in the Netherlands Indies and Indonesia, 1930-1945, I argue that the colonial law of the Netherlands Indies, which was governed by a “logic of emergency,” was the model for, ironically, postcolonial legal doctrines. This chapter focuses on legal and political history of the colonial 1939 Law on the State of War and Siege and the republican 1946 Law on the State of Emergency. It first examines the colonial emergency powers held by the Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies in the form of the exorbitante rechten and the 1939 Law on the State of War and Siege. The chapter then moves to the operationalization of these laws during the late colonial era, particularly during the first half of the twentieth century and in the years leading to World War === [PDF page 46] === 46 II. The chapter then briefly discusses the Japanese occupation of Indonesia, which was in essence a constant military occupation built upon the operation of martial law. After the Proklamasi in 1945, the chapter examines the constitutional and legal sources of emergency law in the independent Republic of Indonesia, from the 1945 Constitution to the 1946 Law on the State of Emergency—the new Republic’s first statute governing martial law. The chapter then walks through the operationalization of these new legal products, especially during the two political crises that happened during the Indonesian Revolution, the July 3 Incident and the Madiun 1948 Affair. In this chapter, I use previously unexamined records of academic and practical records of civilian and military juridical sciences. These records are found in a variety of shapes, from official law drafts, records of parliamentary debate, military scientific journals, and biographies of notable Indonesian jurists and military officers. In Chapter II, Imagining Enemies: Counterinsurgency Logic in the Netherlands Indies and Indonesia, the 1930s-1950s, I argue that both the colonial and postcolonial states of Netherlands Indies and the Republic of Indonesia continuously employed a “logic of counterinsurgency” in countering real and imagined enemies. Indeed, even after independence, the colonial doctrines of counterinsurgency strategy and tactics continued to play a major role in the development of Indonesia’s military doctrine. In tracing this, I discuss the historical continuities within the evolution of the military sciences in Indonesia, particularly in the development of counterinsurgency tactics and strategy through newly available military sources, most notably from the colonial-era Indische Militair Tijdschrift (Indies Military Journal). From the Java War until the Aceh Wars, colonial military doctrine was shaped around counterinsurgency strategy. In independent Indonesia, these counterinsurgency doctrines were continuously developed within the === [PDF page 47] === 47 Indonesian Army Command and Staff College. Indeed, colonial and revolutionary experiences in warfare became the prime examples for the TNI in developing their own military and political doctrines during periods of Liberal (1949-1959) and Guided (1959-1966) democracies. In Chapter III, The Social Origins of Militarization: Post-Revolutionary Crime in Java, 1950-1953, I argue that early postcolonial Indonesia was a nation-state handicapped by insecurity due to the prevalence of violent, armed crimes. The prevalence of violent crime, the main contributor to insecurity, may be spatially categorized into urban and rural variants. Generally, the spread of armed crime was caused by the three common problems of post-revolutionary societies, namely the proliferation of small arms, the prevalence of competing armed groups, and the limited institutional capacity of the young Indonesian state to contain or accommodate these challenges. In illustrating the socioeconomic backdrop for militarization, I have assembled an archive of violent crimes in urban and rural Java from 1950-1955. Focusing on the problem of violent crimes and gerombolan (armed groups) roaming across Java, this qualitative database is the first of its kind in Indonesian historiography. In compiling this database, I primarily use freshly declassified reports from the Criminal Investigative Service (Dinas Reserse Kriminil) and the State Security Surveillance Service (Dinas Pengawasan Keselamatan Negara) of the Indonesian National Police stored in the National Archives. This database was then supported with newspaper reports, judicial court documents, public complaint letters, and personal correspondence from the public related to the problem of insecurity across Java. Part II of the dissertation delves into the expansion of military intervention during the transitional period from Liberal Democracy to Guided Democracy and beyond. It comprises === [PDF page 48] === 48 Chapters IV, V, and VI, which explores different phases of this transition. Chapter IV focus on the transitional militarization spanning from 1950 to 1961. In Chapters V and VI, the dissertation focuses on the tumultuous years of Guided Democracy, which was characterized by mass mobilization and military control over society. In Part II, many of the institutions, concepts, and logics discussed in Part I were put into practice, as these elements gradually become integrated with the drastic political changes brought about by the transition to and the implementation of Soekarno’s Guided Democracy. This integration solidifies the shift towards military dominance in non-military affairs and the overall militarization of the state and society in Indonesia. In Chapter IV, Countering the Gerombolan: State Responses towards Insecurity, 1950s1960s, I argue that the state and society responded to insecurity through complementary direct and indirect actions shaped by the logics of emergency and counterinsurgency. This included the “noninvasive,” regulatory measures taken in urban and rural areas, such as the anti-firearms and counter-gerombolan policing campaigns, mobilization of civilians in the form of private security organizations and territorial forces, and Army control of property. Direct action is represented by joint military and police counterinsurgency operations that often also involved civilians and were a major institutional pathway to military intervention in non-military affairs. Many of the methods used in the state’s indirect and direct actions—whether it was anti-firearms campaigns, popular mobilization, counter-gerombolan policing, or direct counterinsurgency operations—were adopted from the colonial state, reinterpreted for new uses in the post-revolutionary era by the nascent Indonesian state. === [PDF page 49] === 49 In Chapter V, Government from Emergency: The Advent of Guided Democracy, 19571960, I return to the focus on law and politics to argue that the long disorder of the 1950s led to a permanent state of emergency and counterinsurgency, as the Indonesian state became more centralized and illiberal. The product of this long pattern of centralization was the establishment of the Guided Democracy regime (1957-1966), signified by the absolute authority of the executive branch—Soekarno—and the increasing role of the Armed Forces through martial law. In this chapter, I look at the rise of Soekarno’s Guided Democracy regime which was predicated upon the institutionalization of a national state of emergency in 1957, the formation of extra-constitutional state bodies such as the National Council (Dewan Nasional) and increasing military participation in the nation’s economic and social life. Indeed, in this chapter I see that Soekarno’s Guided Democracy emerged as the end-product of a long political experiment to break through the limits of Liberal Democracy that had dominated Indonesian social and political life during much of the 1950s. In Chapter VI, titled Soekarno’s Last Revolution: Societal Mobilization during Guided Democracy, 1960-1965, I argue that the Guided Democracy regime (1959-1965) inaugurated not only a new wave of sociopolitical control, but also a pattern of social mobilization that was unprecedented in Indonesia’s post-revolutionary history. This pattern of mobilization, in collaboration with the wave of social control discussed in the previous chapter, was encased in the veneer of “revolution.” Here, I examine Soekarno’s Guided Democracy regime as a government that tried to incorporate almost every aspect of life within the purview of the political will and goals of the “Great Leader of the Revolution” and to continue the efforts on the “unfinished === [PDF page 50] === 50 revolution.” As with any other revolutions, the idea itself necessitated not only societal guidance, but also the mobilization of forces. Crucial developments included, first, the campaign against the Dutch enemy in West Irian. Second was the return of mobilized people as a social force through the sukarelawan (volunteers), a concept which took cues from revolutionary-era pemuda ideals. Third was the expansionary nature of Soekarno’s “unfinished revolution,” which did not stop after the transfer of West Irian, but continued to become the Konfrontasi against the British (and the Americans) in regards to the establishment of the Malaysian Federation. It was during these episodes in Indonesian history, that the country experienced accelerating military intervention in non-military affairs. A direct indicator of this is the growing number of various rules, institutions, and discourses that were militarized in nature. In addition, imminent and perceived threats, both foreign and domestic, were essential in perpetuating military intervention in state and society. In highlighting this point, I look at the threat of the “internal and external enemies” such as the gerombolans and the PRRI-Permesta rebels the Dutch in the West Papua dispute (1950-1962), the British and Malaysians in the Confrontation against Malaysia (1963-1966), and the PKI during the party’s political maneuverings such as the Aksi Sepihak and the party’s proposal of a “Fifth Force” consisting of armed, mobilized youth and peasants. === [PDF page 51] === 51 CHAPTER I: A GOVERNMENT OF EXPEDIENCY: THE COLONIAL AND REVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY IN INDONESIA, 1930-1945 Introduction On May 11, 1940, the Dutch colonial police in the Netherlands Indies detained 642 Germans and 32 Dutchmen from the Residencies of Bantam, Cheribon, Buitenzorg, Priangan, and Batavia. Those outside of Batavia were gathered in Buitenzorg and put into heavily-guarded and closed train carriages attached to the express train bound for Batavia. Following their arrival in Batavia, the Dutch colonial army interned the group in concentration camps.76 These arrests were part of the massive internment of approximately 2,800 Germans and other supporters of the National Socialist Movement (Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging, NSB) in the Netherlands East Indies.77 The NSB were long considered as “dangerous to the state” (staatsgevaarlijke) by colonial politicians in Batavia, as they were ideologically close to their Nazi brethren in Berlin.78 The NSB members were subsequently interned after the Dutch declaration of a state of war (staat van oorlog) prior to the German invasion of the Netherlands. Eight years later, at the height of the Indonesian National Revolution (1945-1949), core members of the Central Indonesian National Committee (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat)—the de facto Republican parliament in Jogjakarta—gathered on September 20, 1948. The Committee 76 “De Interneering [The Internment],” De Residentiebode, May 14, 1940. Esther Zwinkels, “Containing ‘Potentially Subversive’ Subjects: The Internment of Supporters of the National Socialist Movement in the Netherlands Indies, 1940-46,” in Incarceration and Regime Change: European Prisons during and after the Second World War, ed. Christian G De Vito, Ralf Futselaaar, and Helen Grevers (New York; Oxford: Berghahn, 2017), 81. 78 “Tegen de Haren in [against the Grain],” Soerabaijasch Handelsblad, April 24, 1940. 77 === [PDF page 52] === 52 members met with Mohammad Hatta, who was Prime Minister, to debate the transfer of unlimited powers to the President in responding to an alleged Communist uprising in the East Javanese town of Madiun, later known as the Madiun Affair. According to David Charles Anderson, the Affair was “the most serious internal political and social crisis” experienced by the nascent Republic during the Revolution.79 The KNIP agreed Hatta’s proposal, and President Soekarno immediately declared a national state of danger (keadaan bahaya), thus providing the Army with unlimited authority in day-to-day governance in particular areas.80 On the following day, Army divisions from West and East Java immediately converged on Madiun, and the uprising was quelled ten days later. According to one estimate, at least 35,000 Communists and their sympathizers were arrested in Madiun, while approximately 8,000 of them died in the fighting against the Army.81 Both incidents, which took place during two distinct periods of Indonesian history, shared a similar trait: the use of emergency powers during times of crisis, which subsequently conditioned the state and society towards a centralized and militarized control. This chapter explores the colonial and revolutionary origins of the state of emergency in Indonesia. I argue that both the colonial and revolutionary states of the Netherlands Indies and the Republic of Indonesia were shaped by a “logic of emergency,” which entails the common usage of emergency powers in responding to threats and challenges against state power and social order. During political and social crises in both the colonial and republican regimes, “the state remains, 79 David Charles Anderson, “The Military Aspects of the Madiun Affair,” Indonesia, no. 21 (April 1976): 1. Ali Sastroamidjojo, Tonggak-Tonggak Di Perjalananku [Milestones in My Journey] (Jakarta: PT. Kinta, 1974), 234–35. 81 M. C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200, 4th ed (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2008), 266. 80 === [PDF page 53] === 53 whereas law recedes.”82 The persistence of the logic of emergency after the triggering factor was eliminated highlights how the influence of colonial law, particularly pertaining to laws on the state of emergency, have shaped postcolonial legal doctrines. Thus, the logic of emergency in Indonesia is apparent in how both the colonial and postcolonial regimes have tended to use novel legal measures and administrative institutions that are extra-constitutional in their principles. Particularly, this logic was reflected in both states’ conceptualization and usage of emergency legislations in responding to various threats. From the colonial state’s constant fear of German Nazis and Indonesian nationalists to the Republican state’s response to the Communists threat during the Revolution, emergency laws were constantly deployed and reinterpreted in both states’ search for peace and order. I conceptualize this pattern of governance as a “logic of emergency,” where the state’s use of extra-constitutional emergency measures extends to imminent challenges of all sorts, for a long time. This chapter is laid out as follows: First, I will look into the development of emergency powers in the Netherlands Indies. Second, I will look at the constitutional and legal sources of emergency law in the Netherlands Indies. I look at two examples of emergency law in the Netherlands Indies, which includes the emergency powers held by the Governor-General in the form of the exorbitante rechten and the colonial law on the state of war and siege. Third, I will look at the operationalization of emergency law in the Netherlands Indies during the first half of the twentieth century leading to World War II. Fourth, I will examine the Japanese occupation in Indonesia. Fifth, I will look at the constitutional and legal sources of emergency law in the 82 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, University of Chicago Press ed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 12. === [PDF page 54] === 54 independent Republic of Indonesia, from the 1945 Constitution to the 1946 law on the state of emergency. The chapter will conclude with a brief exposition on the operationalization of emergency law during the Indonesian National Revolution and concluding remarks. The Dutch Origins of The Concept of a State of Emergency The concept of a state of emergency is a relatively modern invention, with its first roots established during the French Revolution. In July 8, 1791, the French Constituent Assembly decreed for the differentiation between an état de paix (state of peace), état de guerre (state of war), and état de siège (state of siege). In the first state, military and civil authorities operate within their own spheres. Meanwhile, the second necessitates close cooperation between both authorities. In the last and most severe state, all functions for maintaining order and internal security is passed along to the military authority. Originally meant for military installations and ports, this law was later expanded to include the suspension of civilian rule over cities under the Law of 19 Fructidor Year 5 (September 4, 1797), and the suspension of the Constitution itself under the Article 92 of the Constitution of 22 Frimaire Year 8 (December 13, 1799).83 Throughout the long twentieth century, the French legal tradition of the Napoleonic code influenced many legal systems throughout continental Europe, which also included the Netherlands and its colony, the Netherlands Indies.84 After Indonesia declared its independence 83 Constitution de l’an VIII (Constitution of the Year VIII) was adopted on 24 December 1799 during the French Revolutions. See Agamben, State of Exception, 5. 84 The Dutch adopted Napoleonic-style civil codes from the French in 1838. See Bourchier, Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia, 24. === [PDF page 55] === 55 from the Dutch in 1945, the newborn republic inherited Dutch laws and legal traditions into its own juridical system. Tracing Indonesian concepts of the state of emergency requires us to examine its Dutch predecessors. In a Dutch Supreme Court ruling in 1953, Dutch jurist A.G. Eggens declared that “emergencies calls for their own kind of law.”85 In Dutch legal theory, emergency constitutional law (staatsnoodrecht) refers to the set of constitutional laws, regulations, and ordinances that are available for the government’s perusal during exceptional situations. The concept of a staatsnoodrecht regulates the granting of legal and extra-legal powers in order to balance the constitutional and democratic gaps in law, which may arise in the government’s exercise of emergency powers.86 In the Netherlands Indies, the legal hierarchy was made in the form of laws (wet) which were written by the Netherlands Indies government (regeering) together with the States-General (Staten-Generaal) in The Hague; ordinances (ordonnantie) established by the Governor-General and the People’s Council (Volksraad) in the NEI; regulations (regelingen) which were part of the General Administrative Regulations (Algemeene Maatregel van Bestuur) promulgated by the Dutch Crown and the Minister the Colonies; and Governmental Orders (Regeeringsverordening) written by the Governor General in Batavia.87 The Indies judiciary was 85 “Plaatselijk noodrecht? [Local emergency law?],” Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 51 (1953): 72, https://www.navigator.nl/document/id0c0449b3c2290b7349286718efa05553/ecli-nl-hr-1952-134-nj-195351plaatselijk-noodrecht. 86 W.M Prins, “Noodstaatsrecht [Emergency Constitutional Law],” Rechtsgeleerd Magazijn Themis, 1956, 77–78. 87 Soetandyo Wignjosoebroto, Dari Hukum Kolonial Ke Hukum Nasional: Dinamika Sosial-Politik Dalam Perkembangan Hukum Di Indonesia [From Colonial Law to National Law: Socio-Political Dynamics in Legal Development in Indonesia] (Jakarta: Rajawali Press, 1995). === [PDF page 56] === 56 also characterized by legal pluralism, in which “Indonesians, Europeans, Chinese, and other ‘foreign orientals’ (vreemde oosterlingen) [was] subject mainly to the law for Europeans, the law for Indonesians, or a combination of the two plus special provisions.”88 This pluralism also extended to the state courts, judges, and prosecutors in the Indies. Within this legal order, the staatsnoodrecht was formed as a part of the General Administrative Regulations, which means that the Netherlands Indies adopted slightly modified versions of the regulations passed in metropolitan Netherlands. The General Administrative Regulations stood above the legal pluralism applied in the Netherlands Indies, and considering its emergency purpose, this fact applied to the staadsnoodrecht as well. According to Dutch jurist M.I. Prins, who was one of the first legal scholars to examine emergency law theory in the Netherlands, the staatsnoodrecht is based on the idea related to state confiscation of property for the benefit of public interest or safety. This idea of the state’s authority to confiscate property is based on the natural law doctrine of dominium eminens, which presupposes the supreme property of the monarch, which in turn allowed the monarch to infringe on the rights of subjects in order to maintain peace and order.89 This idea is more popularly known in the Latin adage salus populi (or rei publicae) suprema lex.90 Later, this doctrine was superseded 88 Daniel S Lev, “The Politics of Judicial Development in Indonesia,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 7, no. 2 (1965): 174; On a magisterial account on the plural society in action, see J.S Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948). 89 M.I. Prins, “Staatsnoodrecht [Constitutional Emergency Law]” (Amsterdam, Universiteit van Amsterdam, 1911), 6–11. 90 Lit: The safety of the people (or of the commonwealth) is the ultimate law. C.W Van der Pot, Handboek van Het Nederlandse Staatsrecht [Handbook for Dutch Constitutional Law], ed. A.M Donner, Achtste Druk (Zwolle: Tjeenk Willink, 1968), 485. === [PDF page 57] === 57 by the doctrine of jus eminens, in which the fundamental rights of state subjects became more prominent, and the monarchical right to private property was changed into an indirect one.91 Together with the criticism against natural law doctrines throughout the 19th century, there was the debate over the legal contradiction of how an extra-legal act is considered unlawful yet necessary in preserving the state.92 This legal contradiction of necessity is what Victor V. Ramraj calls the “emergency powers paradox.”93 During the 19th century, there was an immediate need to solve the legal paradox, and by the turn of the century, there was a consensus among Dutch jurists that the legal basis for governmental action in times of necessity did not need to be limited to objective (written) law.94 In 1913, however, Leiden jurist Hugo Krabbe (1857-1936) argued that in times of emergencies, states might get by without the constitution because abnormal circumstances would justify abnormal laws on the basis of a general legal consciousness, and this approach was legally justifiable.95 This argument paved the way for a constitutional debate 91 Prins, “Staatsnoodrecht [Constitutional Emergency Law],” 21. Prins, 40. 93 Albeit based on modern, independent states, Ramraj’s definition of “emergency powers paradox” refers to “states that are struggling to establish legality in the face of a violent political crisis, emergency powers may be seen by the government as necessary to establish the conditions of relative stability in which a legal infrastructure and culture of accountability can take hold; yet the invocation of these powers throws into question the governments’ commitment to legality and constitutional government in the first place.” Ramraj, “The Emergency Powers Paradox,” 22. 94 E.T Brainich, “Staatsnoodrecht [Constitutional Emergency Law]” (Leiden, Leiden University, 1993), 76; Van der Pot, Handboek van Het Nederlandse Staatsrecht [Handbook for Dutch Constitutional Law], 485. 95 Hugo Krabbe, Ongezonde Lectuur [Unhealthy Reading] (Groningen: Wolters, 1913); Hugo Krabbe, De Moderne Staatsidee [The Idea of a Modern State] (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1915); Schmitt, Political Theology, 2005, 20– 22. Krabbe famously influenced Carl Schmitt and his conception of sovereignty in Political Theology. 92 === [PDF page 58] === 58 between Dutch jurists at the time, a debate that continued until after the end of the Second World War.96 In Dutch legal theory, emergency constitutional law is divided into two forms, namely subjective emergency law (subjectieve staatsnoodrecht) and objective emergency law (objectieve staatsnoodrecht). This differentiation between subjective and objective emergency laws was first posited by Dutch jurist W.F. Prins.97 Objective emergency law refers to emergency law that is regulated by statute. This includes legislation which allows for certain powers to be exercised in exceptional circumstances;98 regulations and decrees that are in effect on the basis of statutory emergency regulations; and regulations and decrees that came to effect on the basis of subjective (unwritten) emergency law.99 Two examples of objective emergency law in the Netherlands East Indies and Indonesia include the 1939 Regulation for State of War and Siege (Regeling op den Staat van Oorlog en Beleg 1939) during the colonial period, the 1946 Law for the State of Emergency of 1946 (Undang-Undang Keadaan Bahaya Tahun 1946) during the early Republican period, and the 1957 Law on the State of Emergency (Undang-undang Keadaan Bahaya Tahun 1957) during the Guided Democracy period. 96 C.W. Van der Pot argues that the declaration of the state of emergency ultimately leads to a “dictatorship of the Minister of the Interior in a jacket.” (De dictatuur van de minister van Binnenlandse Zaken hult zich in colbert). While it is certainly less conspicuous than a military dictatorship, Van der Pot wonders whether “it will disappear just as quickly once it gets going?” See Van der Pot, Handboek van Het Nederlandse Staatsrecht [Handbook for Dutch Constitutional Law], 494; Roelof Kranenburg, “Staatsnoodrecht [Constitutional Emergency Law],” Tijdschrift Voor Overheidsadministratie 54 (1946): 89–91. 97 W.F. Prins, “Buitengewone Regelingsbevoegdheden in Het Indische Staatsrecht [Extraordinary Regulatory Powers in Indies Constitutional Law],” Indische Tijdschrift van Het Recht, 1941, 353–91. 98 Prins, “Staatsnoodrecht [Constitutional Emergency Law],” 47. 99 Brainich, “Staatsnoodrecht [Constitutional Emergency Law],” 72. === [PDF page 59] === 59 Meanwhile, subjective emergency law refers to the right to power held by the state, particularly the subjective right of the government to violate objective law in during emergencies.100 Subjective emergency law is mainly differentiated from objective emergency law by the singular nature of its source of law, which is the constitution. Examples of subjective emergency law include the Governor-General’s authority to arbitrarily indict political prisoners through the exorbitante rechten articles during colonial times, or the Presidential authority in declaring a state of emergency and publishing emergency decrees ensured by Indonesian Republican, Federal, and Provisional Constitutions of 1945, 1949, and 1950. Ultimately, both in the Netherlands Indies and independent Indonesia, the deployment of subjective and objective emergency laws is legally based upon the respective states’ basic laws. Thus in practice, according to Asshiddiqie, there is no substantial difference between the implementation of subjective or objective emergency law, as both concepts actually relied upon each other in practice.101 Indeed, the idea of subjective and objective emergency laws are deeply interrelated, and the role of the head of state (the Governor-General in colonial times and President in postcolonial times) is central for its deployment. During colonial times, the invoking of the 1939 Law on the State of War and Siege—an objective emergency law—was predicated upon the Governor-General’s declaration of a state of war or state of siege, which in turn was based upon his constitutional authority in declaring a state 100 P.W.C Akkermans and A.K Koekkoek, eds., De Grondwet. Een Artikelsgewijs Commentaar [The Constitution, an Annotated Commentary] (Zwolle: W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, 1992), 921. 101 Jimly Asshiddiqie, Hukum Tata Negara Darurat [Emergency Constitutional Law] (Jakarta: RajaGrafindo Persada, 2007), 24–25. === [PDF page 60] === 60 of war and siege. In Republican times, and particularly during the Indonesian Revolution of 19451949, the 1946 Law on the State of Emergency—an objective emergency law—was activated after the President declared the country in a state of danger. While these interrelated acts represent the logic of objective and subjective emergency law, it is clear that in reality, both subjective and objective emergency laws depended upon each other. Against Subversion: The Exorbitante Rechten as Emergency Powers In order to explain the colonial origins of emergency powers, it is imperative to trace the juridical patterns of colonial governance in the Indies because it was central to colonial rule. While it is true that the Dutch played a significant role in the politics of indigenous states in the Indonesian archipelago since the early 18th century, it was only in 1830 that they managed to consolidate colonial power over Java, the principal island in the Indonesian archipelago. After Mataram was defeated during the Java War (1825-1830), the Dutch gained political control over the whole island of Java, paving the way for the establishment of an actual colonial state.102 One of the first acts of this colonial state was to promulgate its first basic law, namely the Governmental Regulations of 1854 (Regeeringsreglement 1854), on September 2, 1854.103 The Governmental Regulations provide that absolute sovereignty in the Netherlands Indies government was held by the GovernorGeneral, who was appointed by the Dutch crown. The Governor-General then, through its General 102 M. C Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1200, Third Edition (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 155. 103 The full name of the act is Reglement op het Beleid der Regeering van Nederlandsch-Indie (Regeeringsreglement). Indische Staatsblad, 1855, No. 2. === [PDF page 61] === 61 Secretariat (Algemeene Secretarie) and with the advice of the Council of the Indies (Raad van Indië), was authorized to promulgate laws on a day-to-day basis. While the establishment of the Netherlands East Indies state in 1854 may indicate the arrival of the modern state in Indonesia, it remained imperial in nature. In the Netherlands Indies, this imperial sovereignty was reflected in three stages.104 First was the authority of the Dutch Crown and legislators in the metropole to issue laws that were superior in hierarchy to those published in the Indies. This included royal decrees, which took precedence over colonial legislation in times of dispute between the Governor-General and the Council of the Indies. Second was the sole authority of the Dutch monarch to appoint the Governor-General, which was also completely subordinate to the Crown. Third, there was the absolute fiscal control of the metropole over colonial finances.105 Emergency powers in the Indies, however, were purely the prerogative of the Governor-General, as the direct representative of the Dutch Crown in the colony. Under Dutch colonial rule, emergency powers in NEI were centralized in the GovernorGeneral as the de facto representative of the Dutch Crown and the head of the colonial state. These powers were governed by the provisions in the Governmental Regulations of 1854, which was later superseded by the Indies Constitution of 1925 (Indische Staatsregeling 1925).106 Emergency powers in the Netherlands Indies consisted of two major powers, namely the executive authority 104 According to Rafael, Imperial sovereignty was “split between an absolute prerogative to decide and take exception, and the necessity to divide and partition itself among its various representatives and representations, rehearsing and exhibiting its capacities in spectacles whose meanings and dissemination it could not always control.” Vicente L. Rafael, Motherless Tongues: The Insurgency of Language amid Wars of Translation (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016), 23. 105 J.H.A. Logemann, Het Staatsrecht van Indonesië (s’Gravenhage: W. Van Hoeve, 1954), 20–21. 106 The full name of the act is Wet op de Staatsinrichting van Nederlandsch-Indië. Indische Staatsblad, 1925, No 415. === [PDF page 62] === 62 to declare a state of war or siege107 and the authority to arbitrarily detain, displace, and exile a person considered a threat to public peace and order (rust en orde).108 The latter was known as the “exorbitant laws” (exorbitante rechten) by scholars and journalists at the time.109 Both of these instruments illustrate the Governor-General’s central role in the deployment of emergency powers in the Netherlands East Indies. The first example of emergency powers held by the Governor-General is the exorbitante rechten. The exorbitante rechten were a set of provisions in the colonial constitution that allowed the Governor-General to implement special measures against those considered to be a threat to public peace and order. And these laws were exercised. According to one account, the colonial government arrested at least 1,145 men between 1855 and 1920, 4,500 men after the Communist uprisings of 1926-1927, and a number of Indonesian nationalists in the 1930s.110 On paper, the legal mechanisms provided for in the exorbitante rechten were similar to those in criminal law. First, the colonial attorney general (procureurs-generaal) could decide to pursue a case at the request of the Governor-General. Then, the colonial investigative service (Algemeene Recherche Dienst) would investigate the case. Afterward, the case was brought to trial in civilian courts. While it is true that these special measures were still conducted through “normal” 107 Articles 43-44 of the RR 1854, superseded by Article 33 IS 1925. I.A. Nederburgh, Wet Op de Staatsinrichting van Nederlandsch-Indië Vergeleken Met Het N-Indisch Regeeringsreglement [Law on the Constitution of the Dutch East Indies Compared with the N-Indisch Government Regulations] (s’Gravenhage: Gebr. Belinfante, 1925), 14. 108 Articles 45-48 of Regeeringsreglement 1854, superseded by Articles 35-38 of the Indische Staatsregeling 1925. Nederburgh, 15–16. 109 For instance, see “De Exorbitante Rechten van Den Gouverneur Generaal [The Exorbitant Rights of the Governor General],” Indonesia Merdeka, 1931, 12. 110 Theodore Friend, The Blue-Eyed Enemy: Japan against the West in Java and Luzon, 1942-1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 34. === [PDF page 63] === 63 avenues, when the investigation started from a request of the Governor-General based upon the exorbitante rechten, the outcome of the prosecution was already certain. The accused would then be charged and punished with one of the three measures in the exorbitante rechten. The constitutional basis of the exorbitante rechten ensured that the mustering of those articles would override any ruling based on the European or indigenous criminal codes active in the Netherlands Indies at that time. These measures included expulsion (externering),111 internment (internering),112 and exile (verbanning).113 Initially adopted to address cases in which foreigners were involved in borderrelated crimes, the act of expulsion involved restricting entry to or residency in NEI. The act also includes Dutch citizens—those from the metropolitan Netherlands—and later was expanded to include “indigenous” Indonesians.114 Meanwhile, in the act of exile, the punishment was banning a political prisoner from taking residency in certain parts of the Indies. If charged with this measure, the political prisoner faced immediate exile from his home, although he may still reside in other parts of the colony. 115 Lastly, the act of internment generally meant detainment. The form 111 Externering is “expulsion, the deprivation of the right to live in a certain area (within state boundaries); as an act carried out in the past due to border offenses, against foreigners and against political offenders (delinquenten).” See N.E Algra and H.R.W. Gokkel, Kamus Istilah Hukum Fockema Andreae Belanda-Indonesia [Fockema Andreae Dutch-Indonesian Dictionary of Legal Terms], trans. Saleh Adiwinata, A Teloeki, and Boerhanuddin St. Batoeah, Indonesian Edition (Jakarta: Binacipta, 1983), 131. 112 Internering is the “deprivation of liberty based on the interest of the public, on public and private safety, and so on.” Algra and Gokkel, 222. 113 Verbanning is “banishment, deprivation of the right of a convicted person to stay in the under court rule.” Algra and Gokkel, 608–9. 114 F.C Hekmeijer and K.H. Corporaal, Wet van 2 September 1854, Nederlands Staatsblad No.129, Indische Staatsblad 1855 No.2: Reglement Op Het Beleid Der Regeering van Nederlandsch-Indie (Regeeringsreglement). 115 Hekmeijer and Corporaal, 23–25. === [PDF page 64] === 64 of internment could vary, as the law only required for a political prisoner to remain in a specific part of the Indies. In other words, the act of internment could range from a simple municipal travel ban to house arrest or detention in a state prison. 116 From these measures, it is clear that internment is the most severe of the three. In comparison with the Governor-General’s authority in declaring a state of war or siege, the exorbitante rechten was rather more infamous in colonial history. The exorbitante rechten was often used to repress Indonesian nationalists during the “age in motion” (zaman bergerak)117 of the 1910s-1920s. The famous Indonesian nationalist Tan Malaka illustrated the specter of the exorbitante rechten as an unexploded, buried bomb: There is another danger that the Leader cannot see, which is like a bomb hidden somewhere which can explode at any time. This is what we know as 'exorbitante rechten', or the privilege held by the Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies to banish the leader of a movement who he deems dangerous to public order. As long as this privilege is in the hands of the Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies, then anyone who was considered dangerous to the Dutch, if he wanted to, could be arrested and exiled without being given the opportunity to defend himself in an open and public trial.118 116 Hekmeijer and Corporaal, 23–25. The ‘Age in Motion’ refers to the period of rising nationalist movements in Netherlands Indies during late 1920s. See Shiraishi. 118 “Ada lagi bahaja jang tiada kelihatan oleh Pemimpin, jang laksana bom terpendam, entah di mana, tetapi bisa meletus sewaktu2. Inilah jang kita kenal dengan nama ‘exorbitante rechten’, atau hak istimewa jang dipegang oleh Gubernur Djenderal Hindia Belanda untuk membuang seseorang pemimpin pergerakan jang dianggapnja berbahaja 117 === [PDF page 65] === 65 An ardent nationalist, Tan criticized the exorbitante rechten by portraying it as a dagger that was readily wielded by the Governor-General against any enemies of the current government, including one of their own citizens: “Exorbitante rechten”, the privileges of the Governor General of the Dutch East Indies were like a dagger held in the dark, always ready to be stabbed at someone who was "considered" as an enemy to oneself. From a legal point of view, these privileges are arbitrary and despotic. From the point of view of moral decency, these laws are not chivalrous, but rather cowardly!119 One prominent example of the deployment of this emergency power was the arrest of the journalist and long-time political activist of the Sarekat Islam (SI), Haji Misbach. On October 20, 1923, Misbach and four other high-ranking SI members were detained by the Algemeene Recherche Dienst (ARD).120 Misbach were arrested under charges of arson and bombing in the Kasunanan palace complex in Surakarta during the Sekaten celebrations of 14-23 October 1923.121 The investigation, spearheaded by the colonial attorney-general and the investigative service, was unable to draw a direct link between Misbach and the Surakarta bombings and other incidents. Eventually, however, the colonial authorities gathered enough evidence to charge Misbach with a buat ketentraman umum. Sepandjang hak-istimewa di tangan Gubernur Djenderal Hindia Belanda ini, maka siapa sadja jang dianggap berbahaja buat djadjahan Belanda, bila sadja dikehendaki, boleh ditangkap dan dibuang dengan tiada diberi kesempatan untuk mempertahankan dirinja pada satu pengadilan jang sjah umum terbuka.” Tan Malaka, Dari Pendjara Ke Pendjara I (Djakarta: Widjaja, 1952), 67. 119 “tetapi ‘exorbitante rechten’, hak-hak istimewa Gubernur Jenderal Hindia Belanda adalah laksana satu golok jang dipegang di dalam gelap buat ditusukkan sewaktu2 kepada seseorang jang ‘dianggap’ musuh bagi diri sendiri. Dipandang dari sudut hukum, maka hak-istimewa itu adalah aturan sewenang2, despotis, dan dipandang dari sudut kesusilaan, moral, adalah sikap jang tak ksatria, bahkan pengetjut!” Malaka, 84. 120 Takashi Shiraishi, Zaman Bergerak: Radikalisme Rakyat Di Jawa, 1912-1926 (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 1997), 382. 121 Shiraishi, 381. === [PDF page 66] === 66 role in instigating a nationwide rebellion, and he was exiled to Boven Digul in Dutch West New Guinea.122 Similar to Misbach, many prominent Indonesian nationalists such as Mohammad Hatta and Sutan Sjahrir also experienced the same fate under the exorbitante rechten: both were banished, one to Banda (Moluccas) and another to Boven Digoel (Dutch New Guinea).123 The case of Misbach illustrates a subjective emergency law in action. In deploying the exorbitante rechten, the Governor-General’s arbitrary prerogative in branding a person as an enemy of the state was predicated upon the exorbitante rechten articles in the Governmental Regulations. Its implementation, however, was still done through “normal” procedures: a consultation between the Governor-General with the Council of the Indies, an arrest by the Indies attorney general, a trial upon a civil court, and an implementation of the judge’s verdict by civilian apparatuses. The Governor-General could indict a person as an enemy of the state, but those sent to detain, adjudicate, and intern the political prisoner were civilian, rather than military authorities. Thus, through the exorbitante rechten provisions, there was a tradition of strong centralized executive in the Indies. In this case, subjective emergency laws intervened through constitutional articles, which tipped the scale against Misbach. This fact explains why the exorbitante rechten was massively unpopular, especially with Indonesian nationalists: it denied people the rights to a fair trial. Preparing for a State of War: Colonial Emergency Powers in the 1930s 122 Shiraishi, 383–88. Mavis Rose, Indonesia Free: A Political Biography of Mohammad Hatta (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); Rudolf Mrázek, Sjahrir: Politics and Exile in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994). 123 === [PDF page 67] === 67 In the late 1930s, a new development in international politics served as the background for the expansion of emergency law in the Indies. This was the rise of Japan, which since 1913 had been seen by the Netherlands Indies government as “the most probable enemy” for the colony.124 With the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War six years later, the political situation of the Pacific became more tense, as the Indies government realized that the archipelago, with its rich natural resources, might be the next target. In facing the looming threat of the Japanese in the Pacific, the government of the Netherlands Indies initiated a series of policies designed to prepare the colony for war. First was legal reforms in the laws regulating the state of emergency. In addition to the exorbitante rechten, emergency power in the Netherlands Indies was the constitutional authority for the Governor-General to declare a state of war and siege (staat van oorlog en beleg).125 Hence, according to the Governmental Regulations of 1854, the Governor-General was allowed to declare a state of war or siege only in the event of a war or revolt. After the constitutional reforms of the 1920s, this provision was modified by Article 33 of Indies Constitution of 1925. In the new constitution, the executive authority was expanded. While the wording is more precise on the 124 The “threat” of Japan was first defined by the State Commission for the Defense of the Netherlands Indies (Staatscommissie voor de verdediging van Nederlandsch-Indië) in 1913. H.T. Bussemaker, Paradise in Peril: Western Colonial Power and Japanese Expansion in Southeast Asia, 1905-1941. (Amsterdam: Bureau Grafische Producties Universiteit van Amstedam, 2001), 338. 125 This power was regulated by Article 43 of Regeeringsreglement 1854, which was modified by Article 33 of Indies Constitution of 1925. Article 43 of the Regeeringsreglement 1854 states that: “In the event of war or revolt, the Governor-General shall take such measures as he deems necessary in the interests of the Kingdom and of the Netherlands Indies, including such measures as otherwise required by the King's authority. In particular, he then has the power to declare the Netherlands Indies, in whole or in part, in a state of war or siege, to suspend laws and provisions of these regulations and to temporarily abolish authorities.” See Hekmeijer and Corporaal, Wet van 2 September 1854, Nederlands Staatsblad No.129, Indische Staatsblad 1855 No.2: Reglement Op Het Beleid Der Regeering van Nederlandsch-Indie (Regeeringsreglement)., 22–23. === [PDF page 68] === 68 declaration of a state of war or siege as a constitutional “category” of state of war and siege, the law underlined the purpose of the act, namely to maintain external or internal security, thus expanding its potential use.126 According to the Encyclopædie van Nederlands-Indie, the declaration of a state of war or siege by the Governor-General indicated “an abnormal legal situation, whereby the military authority acquires very extensive powers in comparison to civil authority, while furthermore the exercise of the various rights of residents (especially the so-called fundamental rights [grondrechten]) is temporarily restricted or even canceled.”127 In metropolitan Netherlands, the declaration of a state of war or siege was a prerogative of the Crown. In the Netherlands Indies, the state of war or siege was declared by the Governor-General, the direct representative of the Dutch Crown. The declaration of a state of war or siege directly necessitates a particular guideline for its conduct. This regulation came into being with the passing of the Regulations on the State of War and Siege series of laws promulgated by the colonial state. Since the end of the Aceh War in 1904, the Dutch colonial government has been using a modified version of the metropolitan law 126 According to Article 33 of Indische Staatsregeling 1925, (1). In order to maintain external or internal security, any part of the Netherlands East Indies may be declared in a state of war or a state of siege by or on behalf of the GovernorGeneral. With due observance of the provisions of art. 91 the manner in which and the cases in which this may be done, and the consequences regulated. (2). Provisions of general ordinances may be designated by such regulation which, as a result of the declaration in a state of war or siege, become wholly or partially ineffective. Nederburgh, Wet Op de Staatsinrichting van Nederlandsch-Indië Vergeleken Met Het N-Indisch Regeeringsreglement [Law on the Constitution of the Dutch East Indies Compared with the N-Indisch Government Regulations], 14. 127 Nederburgh, Wet Op de Staatsinrichting van Nederlandsch-Indië Vergeleken Met Het N-Indisch Regeeringsreglement, 14. === [PDF page 69] === 69 Regulations on the State of War and Siege of 1899.128 Nevertheless, the rising possibility of an open war in the Indies necessitated a new version of the law. On November 4, 1930, the Indies government established the Commission for the Preparation of the Regulation on the State of War and Siege (Commissie van Voorbereiding van en Verordening op den Staat van Oorlog en Beleg) to draft a new emergency law for the Indies.129 Having done its task, the commission was disbanded on July 1, 1931.130 However, the promulgation of the new draft law took some time within parliament. It was only on the eve of World War II, and when the war in China was already raging, the Indies received its first tailor-made emergency law, the Regulations for the State of War and Siege of 1939 (Regeling op den Staat van Oorlog en Beleg 1939).131 As a form of objective emergency law, the Regulations for the State of War and Siege of 1939 contained provisions to administer the transfer of supreme authority from the chief executive (Governor-General) to the military under a state of war or siege. The law allowed the GovernorGeneral to declare a state of war or siege in any part of the colony in the advent of war, the threat of war, a violation of territory, or internal commotions such as rebellions and riots where the standard governmental measures were deemed inadequate, or natural disasters.132 Thus, the 1939 128 At the end of the long Aceh War (1873-1904), Governor-General Johannes Benedictus van Heutsz (1851-1924) signed a decree (besluit) which adopted and modified the Dutch metropolitan law Regulations on the State of War and Siege of 1899 for use in the Netherlands IndiesThe full name of the law adapted from the metropole was Reglement van de gevolgen der verklaring in staat van oorlog of in staat van beleg van het gebied van Nederlandsch-Indiē of een gedeelte daarvan. The law was adopted through Besluit van Gouverneur-Generaal van Nederlandsch-Indië van 21 September 1904. Indische Staatsblad, 1904, No.372. 129 “Staat van Oorlog [State of War],” Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, November 4, 1930. 130 “Staat van Oorlog En Beleg [State of War and Siege],” Algemeen Handelsblad Voor Nederlandsch-Indië, July 1, 1931. 131 Staatsblad van Nederlandsche-Indie 1939, 1939, No 582. 132 Staatsblad van Nederlandsche-Indie 1939, No. 582, Art.1. === [PDF page 70] === 70 law differentiates three states of exceptionality. First is the “state of peace” (staat van vrede), which implies normal governmental operations; the “state of war” (staat van oorlog) which means a heightened state of exception; and the “state of siege” (staat van beleg) which is defined as “the most deviating legal situation.”133 The 1939 Regulations on the State of War and Siege gave the Governor-General broad powers to declare war or siege and appoint a military authority (militair gezag), normally the Commander in Chief of the KNIL, to deploy exceptional capabilities to protect public order and security. 134 Civil agencies such as the police and air-raid protection services were required to collaborate with the military or act under military direction in certain instances. 135 The regulations also empowered regional military authorities to declare a state of war or siege if connection with Batavia was cut off or there was a domestic uprising. 136 The military authority was given extensive powers, including regulatory, requisitional, and coercive powers. The military authority's regulatory powers permitted it to issue a very broad set of regulations and ordinances essential to maintain peace and security, albeit in conjunction with the civil authority. 137 The military authority was given the right to regulate the manufacture, transit, and ownership of firearms, ammunition, and explosives, 138 133 to censor written media, H.J Zijlstra, Inleiding Tot de Staatsinrichting van Nederland En Koloniën [Introduction to the Constitution of the Netherlands and Its Colonies], ed. J. Mullemeister, Vierde Druk (Rotterdam: Nijgh & Van Ditmar, 1938), 180. 134 Staatsblad van Nederlandsche-Indie 1939, No.582, Art 4. 135 Staatsblad van Nederlandsche-Indie 1939, No. 582, Article 9. 136 Staatsblad van Nederlandsche-Indie 1939, 582, Article 2, Paragraph 1. 137 Staatsblad van Nederlandsche-Indie 1939, No.582, Article 6; Zijlstra, Inleiding Tot de Staatsinrichting van Nederland En Koloniën [Introduction to the Constitution of the Netherlands and Its Colonies], 180–81. 138 Staatsblad van Nederlandsche-Indie 1939, No.582, Article 10. === [PDF page 71] === 71 correspondence, and public communications, 139 close public and commercial places such as theaters, cinemas, factories, and shops,140 and regulate land transportation, aviation, shipping, fishing, and the export of import of goods in general.141 In terms of requisitional powers, the military authority was given the authority to seize goods, buildings, and ships, as well as demolish them, in the name of military policy. 142 The military authorities was also given the authority to requisition manpower, either to directly supplement the armed forces or to aid the military with their skills in civil services or requisitioned private property. 143 144 The military authority's repressive actions were particularly invasive, including the power to issue oral or written orders to anyone, 145 prohibit anyone from leaving or entering an area declared to be in a state of war, 146 enter and search any building, 147 and detain anyone for up to ten days in the case of internal commotion. 148 During a State of War, however, the military authorities was obligated to get the Governor General's assent before implementing steps other than those specified in the statute. 149 Nonetheless, in a State of Siege, the military authority had actual limitless powers, with no requirement for prior approval or contact with 139 Staatsblad van Nederlandsche-Indie 1939, No 582, Articles 11 and 12. Staatsblad van Nederlandsche-Indie 1939, No.582, Article 16. 141 Staatsblad van Nederlandsche-Indie 1939, No.582, Articles 17 and 18. 142 Staatsblad van Nederlandsche-Indie 1939, No.582, Article 13. 143 Staatsblad van Nederlandsche-Indie 1939, No.582, Article 27. 144 Staatsblad van Nederlandsche-Indie 1939, No.582, Articles 13, 23, 26. 145 Staatsblad van Nederlandsche-Indie 1939, No 582, Article 7. 146 Staatsblad van Nederlandsche-Indie 1939, No.582, Article 21. 147 Staatsblad van Nederlandsche-Indie 1939, No.582, Article 24. 148 Staatsblad van Nederlandsche-Indie 1939, No.582, Article 19. 149 Staatsblad van Nederlandsche-Indie 1939, No.582, Article 33. 140 === [PDF page 72] === 72 civilian authorities. 150 In other words, during a State of Siege, the military authority could deviate from or take measures not explicitly stated in the statute if deemed necessary due to the emergency, and the right of appeal and cassation in civil courts was temporarily suspended, with criminal cases handled by military courts. 151 During its creation, the Regulation for the State of War and Siege of 1939 were not without its critics. The declaration of a state of war or siege did not require a war or insurrection within the country that is declaring it. For instance, at the height of World War I in 1914, the Dutch government declared a state of war, although the Netherlands was not a combatant country in that conflict. According to Zijlstra, the declaration could lead to unnecessary derogations from fundamental rights, although there was no actual change in the day-to-day operation of the government. This action, which Theodor Reinach calls a fictive State of Siege (état de Siège fictif), underlines the arbitrary nature of this law.152 While most critics empathized with the need of a “proper” emergency law in the Indies to prepare for unexpected circumstances, the Regulation for the State of War and Siege of 1939 was viewed as filled with gaps in its oversight of government regulation. For instance, the restrictions on the right of association and assembly were not sufficiently regulated; the legislation did not regulate governmental supervision of the meetings of 150 Staatsblad van Nederlandsche-Indie 1939, No.582, Article 37. Zijlstra, Inleiding Tot de Staatsinrichting van Nederland En Koloniën [Introduction to the Constitution of the Netherlands and Its Colonies], 181. 152 Zijlstra, 180; on état de siège fictif, see Theodor Reinach, De l’état de Siège. Étude Historique et Juridique (Paris: Pichon, 1885). 151 === [PDF page 73] === 73 political, private, and adat communities; nor it does regulate the power of local governments in managing emergencies.153 The second colonial policy in preparing the colony for war was to prepare for mobilization. On April 20, 1936, the Indies government established a State Mobilization Council (Staatsmobilisatieraad), which was led by the Commander-in-Chief of the KNIL, and included the commander of the Navy, the directors of the Departments of Justice, Finance, Interior, Economic Affairs and Transport and Water Management, and the Attorney General of the Supreme Court of the Indies.154 According to the Indies news agency Aneta, the State Mobilization Council was tasked with preparing the Indies for general mobilization in times of war. This included, among other things, arranging the mobilization of conscripts for the armed forces and shifting the economy into a war footing.155 The State Mobilization Council made arrangements with the private sector for wartime production, created strategic stockpiles of food and other essential goods, built civilian air-raid protection facilities, and drafted Dutch citizens into the armed forces.156 Additionally, and building upon the exorbitante rechten provisions discussed earlier, on January 13, 1937, the Indies government and the People’s Council passed a draft law 153 “De In- En Uitwendige Veiligheid [Internal and External Security],” Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, January 9, 1935. “Staatsmobilisatieraad in Indië Ingesteld. [State Mobilization Council Established in the Indies],” Haarlems Dagblad, April 21, 1936. 155 H.C. Zentgraaf, “Ons Aller Taak in Oorlogs-Tijd. [Our Duty in Wartime],” De Locomotief, August 11, 1936; Bussemaker, Paradise in Peril: Western Colonial Power and Japanese Expansion in Southeast Asia, 1905-1941., 397; L. De Jong, The Collapse of a Colonial Society: The Dutch in Indonesia during the Second World War (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002), 33. 156 Bussemaker, Paradise in Peril: Western Colonial Power and Japanese Expansion in Southeast Asia, 1905-1941., 397. 154 === [PDF page 74] === 74 expanding the authority of the government to regulate residency and travel within the colony.157 The law states that under urgent circumstances (dringende omstandigheden), the GovernorGeneral is authorized to place a person under special supervision (bijzonder toezicht) of the police. Those under special supervision were only able to leave their residence with a special passport.158 While there has been an expansion of emergency powers in the Netherlands Indies since the late 1930s, which was evident in the establishment of a council for mobilization and a regulation providing for close surveillance of the Indies population, emergency laws were active only when invoked. This moment arrived when Netherlands fell to German hands in May 1940. In May 1940, the De Geer government in The Hague declared a State of Siege in response to the Wehrmacht invasion of the Netherlands. This declaration of a State of Siege was immediately followed by a similar declaration by the Dutch Governor-General in Batavia, A.W.L Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer. Tjarda then ordered the seizure of all German ships in the Netherlands Indies, the arrest and internment of all German men from the age of seventeen, and the detention of the leaders of the National Socialist Movement (NSB) in the Indies.159 Immediately following the declaration, many NSB members, Ethnic Germans, German nationals, and naturalized German nationals residing in the Netherlands Indies were targeted for mass detention.160 These Germans were considered to be “potentially subversive” (potentieel 157 “Toezicht Op Reizen [Monitoring of Travel],” Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, January 13, 1937. “Om de Uitwendige Veiligheid. Maatregelen Door Tijden van Internationale Spanningen [For External Security. Measures during Times of International Tensions],” De Locomotief, January 14, 1937. 159 Zwinkels, “Containing ‘Potentially Subversive’ Subjects: The Internment of Supporters of the National Socialist Movement in the Netherlands Indies, 1940-46,” 86. 160 Austrians and Hungarians, which were allied with Nazi Germany at that time, were also considered as Germans. See Zwinkels 158 === [PDF page 75] === 75 staatsgevaarlijke) or “traitorous” (landverraderlijke) to the Indies state, and so they were detained. Dutch NSB members, whom the Indies government viewed as supportive of Nazi ideology, were deemed disloyal and highly probable to become a threat against the state. At the beginning of 1941, at least 2,400 Germans and 1,500 NSB members were detained in various camps across Java and Sumatra.161 Starting from June 1940, the State Mobilization Council mobilized approximately 30,000 men into the ranks of the KNIL, a number that was far from sufficient to withstand the Japanese invasion early the next year.162 Local and municipal governments established City Guards (Stadswachten) and Air Raid Protection Services (Luchtbeschermingdienst) in the various towns of the Netherlands Indies to counter the actions of enemy aircraft and infiltrators. In the plantations spread across Java and Sumatra, agricultural companies established Territorial Guards (Landwachten) for maintaining internal security. Civilian drivers were also organized under the Volunteer Automobile Corps (Vrijwillig Automobielkorps, Vaubek) and the Women’s Auto Corps (Vrouwelijk Auto Korps, VAK), while the Orange Youth Corps (Oranje Jeugdgroepen) was created to mobilize youths of 16 years and older to serve as Police or Red Cross assistants and airraid wardens.163 All of these organizations were formed through the Regulations for the State of War and Siege of 1939 provisions, and they were militarized and incorporated into the KNIL. 161 Zwinkels, “Containing ‘Potentially Subversive’ Subjects: The Internment of Supporters of the National Socialist Movement in the Netherlands Indies, 1940-46,” 86–87. 162 Bussemaker, Paradise in Peril: Western Colonial Power and Japanese Expansion in Southeast Asia, 1905-1941., 411–12. 163 Bussemaker, 412–13. === [PDF page 76] === 76 All of these war preparation initiatives conducted by the Netherlands Indies government, however, were not enough to contain the Japanese onslaught in 1942. The Dutch were far from ready to repel a foreign invasion. This was mainly because the KNIL had been established primarily to maintain internal security, while maritime defense—which was much more crucial in the context repelling the Japanese invasion of the archipelagic colony—was left to the hands of the British fleet. More importantly, however, the Dutch failed to win the support of the indigenous population in order to effectively conduct their mobilization initiatives A clear example here is the story recounted by K.H. Saifuddin Zuhri, one of the leaders of the Islamic mass organization Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and its youth arm, the Gerakan Pemuda Ansor (GP Ansor) at an NU meeting in Purbalingga on March 1942: Then Haji Masruri, who had been quiet up until then, asked, ‘Stadswacht, what does it do?’ I replied, ‘Stadswacht, that means ‘city guard’, Its job is to protect the city and not let it fall into the hands of the Japanese. In my view, the Dutch would only give such a job to people they trust, and clearly they don’t trust us. They actually suspect us of being pro-Japan, but they don’t have any proof.’ ‘Are we proJapan, then?’ asked Suhaimi. I thought he was fishing to find out my thoughts. ‘I’ll tell you,’ I answered as I glanced left and right, ‘but this is very secret. When I was in Surabaya at the meeting of the upper leadership to talk about such things, I asked what our position was regarding Japan. K.H.A. Wahid Hasyim, in front of K.H. Mahfuzh Shiddiq, said that we would help the Japanese by freeing ourselves from Dutch colonialism. Putting obstacles in the way of Japan and === [PDF page 77] === 77 helping the Dutch was out of the question. Counterproductive. But our attitude toward the Japanese later, after they have taken power, that’s something else again. That would have to be determined in due course. For now we focus our struggle to be free of the Dutch.164 On January 10, 1942, Imperial Japanese Army and Navy forces invaded the Netherlands Indies. The Allied and colonial defenses immediately collapsed under the brunt of the Japanese invasion. Two months later on March 8, 1942, Governor-General A.W.L. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer and the KNIL Commander General Hein ter Poorten surrendered to Commander of the Japanese 16th Army, General Imamura, in Kalijati, West Java.165 The signing of the surrender at signified the end of the Dutch colonial state in Indonesia, never to be resurrected again. Military Government: War and the Japanese Occupation The Japanese invasion of the Netherlands Indies heralded a new era in the conceptualization and practice of emergency powers in the islands. This is mostly because the Japanese occupational authorities were a military government, a first for the citizens of the Netherlands Indies.166 The colonial state that has stood since 1854 was devastated and decisively 164 Peter Post et al., eds., The Encyclopedia of Indonesia in the Pacific War, Handbuch Der Orientalistik. Section 3, Southeast Asia, v. 19 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2010), 20–21; Translated by William H. Frederick from K.H. Saifuddin Zuhri, Guruku Orang-Orang Dari Pesantren (Bandung: Al Maarif, 1974), 151–53, 155–56. 165 For an excellent primary account of the surrender, see Willem G. J. Remmelink, ed., The Invasion of the Dutch East Indies, Compiled by The War History Office of the National Defense College of Japan, War History Series, v. 3 (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2015), 529–35. 166 Although it is true that the Netherlands Indies have a history of deploying military officers and civil-military administrators in governing the Outer Islands, it was only during the Japanese Occupation that the Netherlands Indies was completely ruled by an occupational military government. H.W. van den Doel, “Military Rule in the Netherlands === [PDF page 78] === 78 destroyed in just three and a half years in what M.C. Ricklefs argued was “one of the most crucial episodes of Indonesian history.”167 Soon after the Dutch surrendered to the Japanese in Kalijati, the Japanese military administration immediately dismantled the colonial state. The Japanese military divided Indonesia into three differing regions, namely Sumatra under the 25th Army together with British Malaya, Java and Madura under the 16th Army, and Kalimantan and Eastern Indonesia under the Navy. These three areas were administered separately by the Army and Navy, to the extent that a former Japanese administrator argued that the Army and Navy-controlled areas “were dealt as independent countries.” Meanwhile, “administrative separation, efforts to encourage local self-sufficiency, juridical jealousies and political suspicions between the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy officials, and the damage to the transportation system caused by the ongoing war made contact with and movement between different areas of Indonesia much more difficult from early 1942 onwards.”168 In August 1942, the Japanese inaugurated a military administration for Java (Department of the Java Military Administration, Jawa Gunseikanbu), headed by a Military Governor (Gunseikan), which was always held by the Chief of Staff of the 16th Army. Of the Jawa Gunseikanbu, the General Affairs Department (Sōmubu) was “the most important and influential of the new military government’s eight departments,” and “of the Sōmubu’s three sections— Indies,” in The Late Colonial State in Indonesia: Political and Economic Foundations of the Netherlands Indies, 18801942, ed. R. B. Cribb, Verhandelingen van Het Koninklijk Instituut Voor Taal-, Land- En Volkenkunde 163 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1994). 167 Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1200, 247. 168 Ken’ichi Goto, “Indonesia during the Japanese Occupation,” in The Encyclopedia of Indonesia in the Pacific War, ed. Peter Post et al., Handbuch Der Orientalistik. Section 3, Southeast Asia, v. 19 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2010), 35. === [PDF page 79] === 79 General Affairs, Personnel, and Planning—it was the Planning Section (Kikakuka) in particular that represented the ‘pivotal organ in the execution of the military administration,’ with jurisdiction over the full range of local economic, social, and political policymaking.”169 This represents not only a shift from a civilian-led administration to a military-led one, but also a change from the traditions of indirect rule to a much more direct one. Additionally, centralized control was also amplified in the regions. Under the Jawa Gunseikanbu, the regional “state governors” (shūchōkan)—who were responsible for the former residencies of Java—held much more powers compared to the Dutch residents that were usually more of a “supervisory and coordinating figure,” while the Japanese shūchōkan “had the right to make the rules in a variety of areas, including education, health, religion, industry, and the maintenance of order.”170 One of the first acts of the Gunseikan was to declare that prior governmental institutions and all laws and regulations remain in effect, except when they were deemed to be against Japanese military regulations.171 In October the following year, the Japanese replaced the People’s Council with a Central Advisory Council (Chūō Sangi’in) as a pseudolegislative body manned by prominent Indonesian figures such as Soekarno, Margono Djojohadikoesoemo, and Mohammad Yamin, among others.172 The colonial administration and bureaucracy, which used a dual system of native rulers and Dutch supervisors, was revamped, as 169 Ethan Mark, Japan’s Occupation of Java in the Second World War a Transnational History (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018), 225. 170 Mark, 227. 171 Gunseikanbu, “Osamu Seirei No.1,” 1942, Article 3. 172 Mark, Japan’s Occupation of Java in the Second World War a Transnational History, 259; Arniati Prasedyawati Herkusumo, Chūō Sangi-in: Dewan Pertimbangan Pusat Pada Masa Pendudukan Jepang [Chūō Sangi-in: Central Advisory Council during the Japanese Occupation] (Jakarta: Rosda Jayaputra, 1984). === [PDF page 80] === 80 the Japanese installed an integrated singular “hierarchy of autocrats,” which was responsible to the Japanese Military Administrator in Jakarta.173 Furthermore, the Japanese also installed prominent Indonesians into bureaucratic posts previously held by Europeans and implemented an extensive propaganda campaign to win the hearts and minds of Indonesians. The campaign included promoting the use of the Indonesian language, changing city and street names into Indonesian, and promoting Indonesian artists and literary figures to lead propaganda campaigns.174 More importantly, the Japanese consolidated the plural courts system in the Netherlands Indies, thereby abolishing legal pluralism and laying the groundwork for the later Indonesian judicial system.175 The first agenda for the occupying Japanese military government in Java was to re-establish order. As early as March 8, 1942, the military government issued a decree on “Social Safety” (Keamanan Masjarakat), which forbid any “gathering, associating, propagandizing for the enemy, and the publishing of printed or illustrated matter;” instated a general curfew from 8.00p.m. to 6.00a.m; called “all officials of the old Government and all the people immediately [to] begin carrying out their duties as before,” and forbid any acts of looting and robberies under the maximum punishment of death.”176 It was a condition of war, and martial law—whether declared or not—applied. 173 The expression “hierarchy of autocrats” (autokrasi hïërarchis) or “autocratic hierarchy” (hïërarchi jang autokratis) was written by A.G. Pringgodigdo. Shigeru Satō, War, Nationalism and Peasants: Java under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945 (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), 26–27. 174 Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1200, 250. 175 Han Bing Siong, “The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia and the Administration of Justice Today; Myths and Realities,” Bijdragen Tot de Taal-, Land-En Volkenkunde 154, no. No.3 (1998): 417. 176 Mark, Japan’s Occupation of Java in the Second World War a Transnational History, 101–2. === [PDF page 81] === 81 It did not take long, however, until the Japanese implemented more intensive measures to mobilize the Indonesian society and economy into a state of total war. The first act was to create mass organizations across the country. The first mass organization sponsored by the Japanese, called the Triple A Movement (Gerakan Tiga A), was established to mobilize Indonesian youth in support of the Japanese war effort. This initiative failed due to the lack of popularity and involvement of Indonesian elites, and it was replaced by the Concentration of People’s Energy (Pusat Tenaga Rakyat, Putera) in March 1943, which was led by prominent Indonesians such as Soekarno, Hatta, Ki Hadjar Dewantara, and Kyai Haji Mas Mansur. Putera was later replaced by the Java Patriotic Service Association (Jawa Hōkōkai) in 1944, which was organized from the district level down into the villages and neighborhood associations. The Triple A Movement, the Center for People’s Power, the Java Patriotic Service Association were modeled upon the National Spiritual Mobilization Movement (Kokumin Seishin Sōdōin Undō) and the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei Yokusankai) in Japan.177 The Japanese used these organizations to surveil the population, coordinate propaganda efforts, manage the distribution and collection of essential goods, and mobilize the population for rallies, parades, and conduct various public rituals in order to bolster population support for the war effort.178 The second initiative of the Japanese was to mobilize the society, which was a part of “logic of counterinsurgency.” In 1943, the Japanese established the Youth Corps (Seinendan) for males 177 Mark, 260; Aiko Kurasawa, “Films as Propaganda Media on Java Under the Japanese, 1942-1945,” in Japanese Cultural Policies in Southeast Asia during World War 2 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 40; Satō, War, Nationalism and Peasants: Java under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945, 20. 178 Benedict R. O’G Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946, 1st Equinox ed (Jakarta: Equinox Pub, 2006), 28–29. === [PDF page 82] === 82 between age of 14 until 25. Meanwhile, for those aged 25 until 35, the Japanese created the Vigilance Corps (Keibodan) as a civil defense organization responsible for auxiliary policing, fire, and air-raid organization. At the end of the war, the Seinendan and Keibodan have recruited approximately over 500,000 and 1,200,000 members respectively.179 These semi-military organizations were supplemented by the militia Heiho, which trained auxiliary soldiers to be attached to Imperial Japanese Army units across Java, and the Fatherland Defense Force (Pembela Tanah Air, PETA), a regional militia that is designed to defend Java against Allied invasion.180 The third act of the Japanese military administration was to mobilize the society and economy for the war effort. There were three major initiatives in conducting this economic mobilization. First was the institutionalization of a national neighborhood association system (tonarigumi), the enforcement of compulsory rice contributions to the military government, and the recruitment of forced labor (romusha).181 Both of these campaigns were notoriously detrimental to the Javanese economy and society, as enforced rice deliveries contributed to a famine in Java across 1943-1944, and most of the 500,000 people who were sent to work for the romusha, did not return home after the war.182 As discussed above, the Japanese military administration in Java illustrates the operationalization of emergency powers in its most extreme. The establishment of a Military Government (Gunsei) inaugurated the arrival of a real emergency—while the 16th Army 179 Joyce Lebra, Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), 97. 180 Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1200, 253. Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, 12–13. 182 Anderson, 13. 181 === [PDF page 83] === 83 commander, General Hitoshi Imamura replaced the Dutch Governor-General as the paramount holder of emergency powers. Meanwhile, almost every policy conducted by the Japanese during the Occupation were designed to support the Japanese war effort, and there was virtually no assurance of legal rights outside of the militarized system implemented by the Japanese. The right to habeas corpus was nowhere to be seen, while the rights to freedom, privacy, and property was nonexistent. In other words, the Japanese military occupation of Indonesia was a state of exception that lasted for three and a half years. Preparing for Revolution: Emergency Powers in the Indonesian Republic On August 6, 1945, two B-29 Superfortress bombers of the United States Army Air Forces flew over the industrial city of Hiroshima in southern Honshu. One of those Superfortress bombers dropped an experimental atomic bomb over Hiroshima, while the other took photos. The bombing resulted in in the loss of approximately 20,000 soldiers and 70,000-126,000 civilians killed. Three days later, another USAAF bomber group dropped a similar atomic bomb over the city of Nagasaki, killing 80,000 civilians. The Japanese soon surrendered unconditionally to the Allies after these bombings. Since 1944, when the war was already going against them, the Japanese prepared for an exit strategy from Indonesia. Sensing that the war was coming to an end, on September 7, 1944, Prime Minister Koiso Kuniaki advised the Japanese Diet to grant Java and Sumatra independence === [PDF page 84] === 84 in the near future.”183 The Japanese occupational forces and Indonesian nationalist leaders in Java had formed an Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence (Badan Penyelidik Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, BPUPKI) in May 1945. Attended by major Indonesian political figures such as Soekarno, Hatta, K.H. Mas Mansur, Ki Hajar Dewantara, Agus Salim, Abikoesno Tjokrosoejoso, Wahid Hasyim, Mohammad Yamin, Soepomo, and others, the 62-member Committee was tasked in preparing for Indonesian independence.184 This preparatory task ranged from deciding the basic ideas and form of government, designing an administrative system, and drafting a new Constitution for the new Indonesian state.185 The BPUPKI was influential in the drafting of Indonesia’s first constitution, the Constitution of 1945 (Undang-Undang Dasar 1945). On July 10, 1945, the BPUPKI begun their second meeting which lasted for eight days, to discuss drafting a constitution and policy issues such as citizenship, territory, religion, finance, and defense. The drafting of the constitution was done by a subcommittee in BPUPKI that was led by the legal scholar R. Soepomo, with Ahmad Soebarjo, A.A. Maramis, Singgih, K.R.M.T. Wongsonegoro, H. Agus Salim, and Soekiman Wirjosandjojo as members.186 183 Harry J. Benda, James Irikura, and Koishi Kishi, eds., Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia: Selected Documents (New Haven, CT: Southeast Asian Studies, Yale University, 1965), 259. 184 Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1200, 258. 185 Bourchier, Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia, 63; Benda, Irikura, and Kishi, Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia: Selected Documents, 267; Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, 9. 186 Bourchier, Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia, 74. === [PDF page 85] === 85 The members of the subcommittee for drafting the constitution were mostly Indonesian jurists, products of the Dutch legal education in Indonesia. R. Soepomo, for instance, is a renowned Indonesian jurist that was educated in Leiden, together with Soebarjo, Maramis, and Wongsonegoro. Meanwhile, the two other members, Salim and Soekiman, represented the Muslim groups. This composition ensured that the upcoming draft was “predisposed to a strong, centralized, non-Islamic state favorable to the Japanese and to [Soekarno.]”187 Soepomo was influenced by European organicist thought. Born on January 22, 1903 in Sukohardjo to a Javanese priyayi (aristocratic) family, Soepomo was educated at the Batavia Law School (Rechtshogeschool Batavia) and the Law School in Leiden. An expert in adat [customary] law, Soepomo was trained by Cornelis Van Vollenhoven himself. After graduating from Leiden, Soepomo was entrusted by the Indies government to lead the Yogyakarta State Court, while also holding a Professorship in Adat Law in the Rechtshogeschool Batavia. During the Japanese occupation, Soepomo was appointed the Chief of the Department of Justice (Shijobu-cho) and member of the Supreme Court (Saiko Hōin).188 In Leiden, the school of law taught by Van Vollenhoven and his protégés imprinted a lasting scholarly tradition to the young Indonesian jurists. One of the most important ideas here is 187 Bourchier, 74. MPB Manus et al., Tokoh-Tokoh Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia [Figures from the Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence] (Proyek Inventarisasi dan Dokumentasi Sejarah Nasional, Direktorat Sejarah dan Nilai Tradisional, Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1993), 97–99. 188 === [PDF page 86] === 86 “the romantic idea that every nation’s institutions reflect (or at least should reflect) its Volksgeist189 and that Indonesia’s Volksgeist was embodied in its own elaborate systems of indigenous law.”190 In the BPUPKI debates, Soepomo is renowned for introducing the concept of the Indonesian staatsidee191 and European integralism theory (teori integralistik) in Indonesian conception of the state. For instance, Soepomo delivered a speech in the BPUPKI on how the organicist-integralist political tradition that is most befitting for Indonesians: all groups, all parts and all members are bound tightly to one another to form an organic unity in society. The crucial feature of a state based on this way of thinking is the all-embracing character of national life. The state does not favour the strongest or the largest group, and does not place too much store on the interests of [the] individual, but rather looks after the well-being of all aspects of the life of the nation as an indivisible whole.192 189 The Volksgeist (lit. People’s spirit) is a Hegelian concept, referring to the “slow, unconscious distillation of the historical and living traditions of particular people.” As a concept, the volksgeist was adopted by German romanticists (such as Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich Schelling, and Adam Müller) and jurists of the Historical School, such as Friedrich Karl von Savigny. The concept is introduced to the Dutch legal tradition through the Leiden school by Professor Jacques Oppenheim, a senior of Cornelis van Vollenhoven. See Bourchier, Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia, 12–15. 190 Bourchier, 27. 191 The Staatsidee (lit. State idea) is the central concept behind all aspects of state organization and law, including the constitution. Marsillam Simanjuntak argues that the Staatsidee is “the basis of the development and growth of the content and direction of state law.” See Bourchier, 2; Marsillam Simanjuntak, Pandangan Negara Integralistik: Sumber, Unsur, Dan Riwayatnya Dalam Persiapan UUD 1945 [An Integralistic View on the State: Sources, Elements, and History in the Preparation of the 1945 Constitution] (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 1994), 2–4. 192 A.B. Kusuma, ed., Lahirnya Undang-Undang Dasar 1945: Memuat Salinan Dokumen Otentik Badan Oentoek Menyelidiki Oesaha-2 Persiapan Kemerdekaan [The Birth of the 1945 Constitution: Copies of the Authentic Documents of the Agency for the Investigation for Indonesian Independence] (Jakarta: Badan Penerbit Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia, 2004), 124–25; Bourchier, Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia, 67. === [PDF page 87] === 87 Bourchier summarized Soepomo’s idea as promoting an integralist state “in which the leader’s authority was unlimited by constitutional checks and balances.”193 On July 16, the BPUPKI accepted the draft constitution that was submitted by the committee.194 The BPUPKI was replaced by the Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence (Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, PPKI), which was headed by Soekarno and Hatta.195 Ten days later, Soekarno and Hatta read the Proclamation of Independence, auguring the birth of the Republic of Indonesia, with Soekarno and Hatta as President and Vice President. One day after, the PPKI promulgated the UUD 1945 as Indonesia’s first constitution. On September 4, 1945, Soekarno formed the country’s first cabinet, which was dubbed the Buchō cabinet because most of the members collaborated with the Japanese authorities during the occupation.196 The UUD 1945 is one of the shortest constitutions in the world. It is significantly more compact than the colonial constitutions in the Indies (RR 1854 contains 131 articles, the IS 1925 contains 187 articles, while the UUD 1945 only contains 36 articles). In addition, the UUD 1945 was also adopted very swiftly, with only six days of deliberations in the BPUPKI. The relative swiftness by which the UUD 1945 was accepted as a draft constitution was indicative of two things. First, the UUD was originally meant to be a temporary constitution for the new Republic. 193 Bourchier, Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia, 68. Bourchier, 80. 195 It is notable that, in comparison with the BPUPKI, the PPKI includes more representatives from outside of Java and those who did not work with the Japanese Military Government. Kan Po, vol. No.72, 1945, 12. 196 Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, 110–12. 194 === [PDF page 88] === 88 This is evident in Soekarno’s own words in front of the PPKI congress on August 18, 1945. Soekarno was trying to get the PPKI members to ratify the UUD 1945 draft, and he argues that: ... gentlemen, of course all of you are aware that that the constitution (we) are creating now is a provisional constitution. If I may use the word, it is an ‘emergency constitution’ (undang-undang dasar kilat). Later, when we are in a more peaceful state, we will reconvene the People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR) which can make a more comprehensive and perfect constitution.197 Second, it is clear that many of the articles contained in the UUD 1945 did not explicitly state an operating mechanism Many fundamental concepts that are normally defined in a constitution is relegated to be “regulated by statute” (diatur oleh undang-undang).198 This was also true for the provisions of emergency powers, which were bestowed upon the President as the chief executive of the Republic. It was not long until the Constitution was indirectly amended. Under pressure from skirmishes between Allied and Indonesian forces in addition to Dutch propaganda, the PPKI was concerned that an Indonesian government that centralizes power to a President with a history of cooperation with the Japanese would be detrimental to Indonesian diplomatic efforts.199 Furthermore, the image of a Buchō cabinet representing Indonesian interests in negotiating with 197 Muhammad Yamin, Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 [Preparatory Manuscript of the 1945 Constitution], 2nd ed., vol. 1 (Djakarta: Prapantja, 1962), 410. 198 Bourchier, Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia, 74. 199 Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, 170,172. === [PDF page 89] === 89 the Allies did not elicit a proper sense of representation for the younger Indonesian leaders. As a result, Vice President Hatta later announced the famous Proclamation X (Maklumat X) of 16 October 1945, giving way for the creation of political parties and designating the PPKI as the interim legislature of the new state under the name of Central Indonesia National Committee (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat, KNIP); with Sjahrir and Amir Sjarifuddin as chief and vice chief of the Working Committee (Badan Pekerja KNIP, BP-KNIP). This interim act of establishing a parliament was intensely debated in Indonesian political circles.200 Later on November 11, Soekarno appointed Sjahrir and Amir as Prime Minister and Vice Prime Minister respectively.201 This Proclamation indirectly amended the constitution, as the UUD 1945 did not mention prime ministers or cabinets, while ministers were appointed to assist the work of the President.202 Through this act of November 11, 1945, the center of executive power shifted from the President to the Prime Minister.203 Commenting on this fact, Simon Butt and Tim Lindsey argued that “the value of a constitution is questionable if its provisions can be so easily circumvented.”204 However, constitutional law experts such as the brothers A.G. and A.K. Pringgodigdo claimed that this was part of the “political convention,” of the time, which was then legitimized by the 200 Deliar Noer, KNIP: Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat - Parlemen Indonesia 1945-1950 [KNIP: Central Indonesian National Committee: Indonesia’s Parliament 1945-1950] (Jakarta: Yayasan Risalah, 2005), 17–18. 201 George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, Studies on Southeast Asia, no. 35 (Ithaca, N.Y: Southeast Asia Program Publications, Cornell University, 2003), 151–52. 202 Republic of Indonesia, “Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 (UUD 1945)” (1945), Article 17. 203 Ismail Suny, Pergeseran Kekuasaan Eksekutif: Suatu Penyelidikan Dalam Hukum Tatanegara [Shifts in Executive Power: An Inquiry in Constitutional Law] (Jakarta: Aksara Baru, 1986), 31. 204 Simon Butt and Timothy Lindsey, Indonesian Law, First edition (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2018), 5. === [PDF page 90] === 90 Transitional Provisions in the UUD 1945.205 Nevertheless, it is clear that the UUD 1945 remained a work in progress. It also highlights the political push-and-pull actions between those who supported centralization of power through a Presidential system and the separation of power through the promotion of a Parliamentary system in Indonesian politics. Nonetheless, similar to the Netherlands Indies, emergency powers in Indonesia were constitutionally bestowed upon the Republican head of state. In the UUD 1945, the clause for emergency powers were enshrined in Article 12, which provides that the President has the authority to declare a “state of emergency” (keadaan bahaya).”206 It is notable here that the constitutional wording of state of emergency is semantically transformed. The wording of a state of emergency in the Dutch form is “state of war” (staat van oorlog) or “state of siege.” (staat van beleg). Meanwhile, in the Indonesian constitution, the wording is “keadaan bahaya,” which translates from Indonesian into a “state of danger,” which in Dutch would be “staat van gevaar.” The semantic change contained in the emergency provisions of the Indonesian Constitution of 1945 hints towards an expansion of meaning. The declaration of a “state of danger” may include existential threats against the state that are far more expansive than war or the danger of war itself. In Indonesian, “keadaan bahaya” is indeed closer in meaning to the modern Western definitions of a state of emergency compared to the Dutch term staat van oorlog or staat van beleg. This also 205 Republic of Indonesia, Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 (UUD 1945), Aturan Peralihan Pasal IV; A.G Pringgodigdo, Perubahan Kabinet Presidensiil Menjadi Kabinet Parlementer [The Change from Presidential into Parliamentary Cabinet] (Yogyakarta: Gajah Mada, n.d.), 34, 67–69; A.K. Pringgodigdo, Kedudukan Presiden, Menurut Tiga Undang-Undang Dasar Dalam Teori Dan Praktek [Presidential Standing According to Three Constitutions in Theory and Practice] (Jakarta: Pembangunan, 1956), 18. 206 The full wording is “Presiden menyatakan keadaan bahaya. Syarat-syarat dan akibatnya keadaan bahaya ditetapkan dengan undang-undang.” Republic of Indonesia, Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 (UUD 1945), Article 12. === [PDF page 91] === 91 explains why the keadaan bahaya was subsequently treated as a state of emergency that was rather broader than what was stipulated in the colonial emergency statutes.207 Similar to the colonial example, the declaration of a state of emergency in independent Indonesia provides that its promulgation is administered by implementing regulations (Peraturan Pelaksana). On the eve of Indonesian independence in 1945, these legal frameworks did not yet exist, except for the colonial ones (the 1939 law). It was only in 1946, at the height of the Indonesian National Revolution (1945-1949), that the Republican government decided to draft and promulgate its own law on states of emergency. Emergency Powers and The Indonesian Revolution After Indonesia declared its independence on August 17, 1945, the nascent Republican government immediately faced major existential threats. As a nation that emerged from colonialism and military occupation, the Republic was forced to gear itself up for war at the starting line. The declaration of independence immediately brought many youths (pemuda) to join armed struggle groups (badan perjuangan) and militias (laskar). These organized, armed youths were the first to conduct the takeover of power, as Republican youths in Jakarta took over railway stations, the tram system, and radio stations as early as September 3, 1945.208 207 To this understanding, the Indonesian term “keadaan bahaya” will be translated into “state of emergency” in the following paragraphs. 208 Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200, 251. === [PDF page 92] === 92 On September 29, 1945, British and Dutch forces landed in Jakarta to dismantle the Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia and release Allied prisoners of war.209 Later, British and Dutch forces also landed at Medan and Padang on October 10, at Semarang on October 20, and Surabaya and Palembang on October 25.210 These landings were immediately followed by minor frictions and skirmishes between Indonesian youth groups and Allied forces, culminating in the bloody Battle of Surabaya on November 10, 1945.211 The Indonesian Revolution had begun. The Indonesian Revolution happened for a combination of reasons. First, there was the factor of the long Dutch colonialism over the Indonesian islands. As George McTurnan Kahin argued a while ago, the revolution emerged as a result of the forces of modernity that was brought upon the Indonesians under the experience of colonialism throughout the twentieth century. Colonialism in Indonesia arrived together with a new capitalistic social relations, religious and linguistic homogeneity, education (however limited that may be), and new technologies such as a vernacular press, radio, communications, and transportation.212 As a result, in the 1910s-1930s emerged a nationalist class of educated youth that would play important roles in instigating the Revolution. This “1920s-1930s” generation includes people 209 Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, 131. Anthony Reid, Revolusi Nasional Indonesia [Indonesian National Revolution] (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1996), 79. 211 Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, 151–66. 212 This process happened gradually, as the Netherlands Indies was ruled by the United Dutch East Indian Company (Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, VOC) from 1610 until 1800, when the VOC collapsed. Afterwards, the Indies were governed directly by the Netherlands as a colonial state proper. Under the colonial state, it was the first time that the whole archipelago was united under two languages (Dutch for administration and Bazaar Malay for vernacular), standardized education, new communications technologies, and, most importantly, linkage to global capitalist economic chain. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 38–40. 210 === [PDF page 93] === 93 like Soekarno, Hatta, and Sjahrir. Meanwhile, Benedict Anderson argues that in addition to the bourgeois nationalists, there was also the youth (pemuda), conceptualized as a primal spirit of youth within Indonesian society that was activated through the Japanese occupation, was another important factor behind the Revolution as it provided the momentum.213 Crucially, the Indonesian Revolution involved tensions between these “older” generation of nationalists and the “new” generation, the pemuda. However, in 1945, there was a clear common goal for both groups, namely the establishment of a sovereign republic of Indonesia. The contrast between the “old” and “young” generations is most evident in the constitution of the Army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) officer corps.214 The spontaneous and fragmented nature of its inception resulted in an Army that was led by Dutch-educated and Japanese-educated officers. The former officers of the Dutch colonial army, men such as Urip Sumoharjo, A.H Nasution, T.B. Simatupang, Didi Kartasasmita, A.E. Kawilarang, A.J. Mokoginta, and others were more predisposed to establishing a modern Army on the basis of a Western-style military organization. Dubbed the “KNIL / Bandung Group” due to their common experience in the Dutch military academy in Bandung, the group was characterized as having “far better access to and sympathy with the Djakarta intelligentsia than either the older KNIL officers [or] the bulk of the 213 It should be noted here that Benedict Anderson was talking about Java, so most of the conceptions of the pemuda was extensively based on Javanese cultural traditions. Additionally, Anderson would go so far to claim that “the emergence of the pemuda as a political force was certainly the most striking aspect of the early revolution.” It is interesting to note that Anderson here viewed the pemuda in a Hegelian manner: as a timeless spirit that is embedded deep within the Javanese society, just waiting to be tapped. Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, 1–6, 407. 214 The Indonesian Army is first formed as the People’s Security Army (Tentara Keamanan Rakyat, TKR). The TKR was then changed into the Indonesian Republican Army (Tentara Republik Indonesia, TRI) and eventually into the TNI. === [PDF page 94] === 94 PETA.”215 On the other side of the spectrum, there was the Japanese-educated, former Defenders of the Homeland officers. This group includes Sudirman, Djatikusumo, Kemal Idris, and Bambang Sugeng, among others. These Japanese-educated men aimed to establish a military that emphasized fighting spirit (semangat, seishin).216 In addition to the military units commanded by these men, there was also the plethora of militias (laskars) that came into being when after the Proklamasi. These laskars were often close to a patron, usually a popular political figure in the Government. One example of such a militia, the Indonesian Socialist Youth (Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia, Pesindo) was close to Amir Sjarifuddin.217 Pesindo’s connection to Amir subsequently allowed Pesindo members to play a role in Defense Ministry initiatives, such as the People’s TNI Corps (Korps TNI-Masyarakat) and the Military Education Corps (Pepolit). Here, the Dutch-educated group corresponded closely with the political orientations of the “old” nationalists, and the Japanese-educated and the laskars represents the political ambitions of the “young” pemuda group. If one is to make comparisons, the Indonesian national revolution is more similar to the French Revolution rather than the Russian where there was a “profound breaking with the ancient régime without the guiding hand of a disciplined party intent on power.”218 The competition between these “old” and “young” nationalists was a trend that underlines major power struggles 215 Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, 234–35. Mrázek, The United States and the Indonesian Military 1945-1965. Volume 1., 23–24; Nugroho Notosusanto, The PETA Army during the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia (Tokyo: Waseda University Press, 1979). 217 On Pesindo, see Norman Joshua Soelias, Pesindo, Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia, 1945-1950 [Pesindo, Indonesian Socialist Youth, 1945-1950], Cetakan pertama (Serpong, Tangerang Selatan: Marjin Kiri, 2016). 218 Anthony Reid, To Nation by Revolution: Indonesia in the 20th Century (Singapore: NUS Press, 2011), viii. 216 === [PDF page 95] === 95 within the Revolution. The first contention between the old guard and the pemuda generation was on constitutional law and governance. The famous Proclamation X signed by Hatta, which established the parliamentary system in Indonesian politics, was a result of the political maneuvering of pemudas and leaders close to them, such as Sjahrir and Amir. Benedict Anderson went as far as to call the Proclamation as a “silent coup.” 219 Anderson notes that “one of the many paradoxes of the early revolution [was] that the factors and forces behind Sjahrir’s and Amir’s rise to power in November 1945 created within a few weeks a powerful opposition to their continued rule.”220 First, on November 10, 1945 Sjahrir quickly lost support of his pemuda allies after publishing the political pamphlet Our Struggle (Perdjuangan Kita), which criticized almost the whole spectrum of Indonesian politics at the time.221 Second, the composition of Sjahrir’s first Cabinet was filled with people that were close to him, rather than representing the pemuda. Third, Sjahrir’s mandate was challenged by the arrival of another pemuda leader, the communist Tan Malaka, who managed to cobble up supporters throughout Java in the form of the front organization Unity for Resistance (Persatuan Perdjuangan, PP) on January 16, 1946.222 Through the PP, Tan Malaka tried to argue for a seven-point Minimum Program for the Indonesian government to follow: 219 Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, 170–74. Anderson, 269. 221 This includes the military, which was antagonized by Sjahrir’s call for purging “fascism and militarism” from the Army. Anderson, 190–95; Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 184. 222 Led by Tan Malaka, the Persatuan Perdjuangan represents a majority of pemuda leaders from various organizations, such as Ibnu Parna (Pesindo), Wali al-Fatah (Masjumi), Ir. Sakirman (Dewan Perdjuangan), Abdulmadjid (Partai Sosialis), General Sudirman (TKR), Atmadji (TKR Naval Branch), Soedjono (KNI Daerah Surakarta), Usman (PRI) and Mrs. Mangoenkoesoemo (Perwani). Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, 292–93. 220 === [PDF page 96] === 96 The state should be based on the acknowledgement of 100 per cent sovereignty and all foreign troops should leave the shores and waters of Indonesia; [the formation of] a people’s government; [the formation of] a people’s army; The disarming of all Japanese troops; management of all European internees; The confiscation and control of plantations; and the confiscation and control of industrial installations.223 The demands posited by the PP was in contrast to Sjahrir’s approach towards negotiating with the Allies. These facts laid the groundwork for Indonesia’s first constitutional crisis later in March 1946. The Sjahrir cabinet recognized the possibility of a constitutional crisis, and it is likely that this fact motivated him and Amir Sjarifuddin to draft a new emergency law. In 1946, there was a significant concern that the current parliamentary system would collapse in the face of a political lockdown or an actual emergency—such as an invasion.224 It is also possible that the experience of violent “social revolutions,” such as the Tiga Daerah Affair in Brebes, Tegal, and Pemalang throughout October-December 1945 or the regicides in the Sumatran sultanates, also provide the background for this necessity for a legal framework to deal with threats against the state.225 Thus, there was a necessity to organize a new framework on the law on the state of emergency. This 223 Anderson, 290. Hariyono, Penerapan Status Bahaya di Indonesia: Sejak Pemerintah Kolonial Belanda hingga Pemerintah Orde Baru [The Practice of the State of Emergency in Indonesia: From the Colonial Period to the New Order], 37. 225 On the Tiga Daerah Affair and the “social revolutions” in Sumatra, see Anton E. Lucas, Peristiwa tiga daerah: revolusi dalam revolusi, Cet. 1 (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 1989); Anthony Reid, The Blood of the People: Revolution and the End of Traditional Rule in Northern Sumatra (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford Univ. Pr, 1979). 224 === [PDF page 97] === 97 initiative came from Defense Minister Amir Sjarifuddin and his deputy, Ali Sastromidjojo.226 Amir was concerned with governmental effectiveness during the revolution, and Ali submitted the idea to write a mechanism to centralize governmental power under the President through new legislation regarding a state of emergency.227 However, Ali was concerned that the Central Indonesian National Committee would just shoot down any proposed legislation that tried to centralize power in a single person. Hence, the discussions on the UUKB 1946 was done on the basis of compromise between the principles of “supreme authority to the President” (kekuasaan penuh pada Presiden) and the “sharing of power with the DPR” (kekuasaan Bersama dengan Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat).228 On March 30, 1946, Amir and Ali initiated a meeting with leaders of political parties and youth organizations throughout Java and Madura. Conducted in Surakarta, the meeting attended by two representatives from each party and social organizations discussed the draft of a new emergency law for Indonesia. The meeting resulted in a draft law on the state of emergency, which was promulgated by the Central Indonesian National Committee as the Law No 6 of 1946 on the State of Emergency (Undang-Undang No.6 Tahun 1946 tentang Keadaan Bahaya, UUKB 1946) on June 6, 1946.229 226 Ali Sastroamidjojo will come up again later as the Prime Minister that enabled Soekarno’s self-coup in 1959, leading to Guided Democracy. 227 Sastroamidjojo, Tonggak-Tonggak Di Perjalananku [Milestones in My Journey], 201–201. 228 Sastroamidjojo, 202. 229 Kedaulatan Rakjat, March 25, 1946; Hariyono, Penerapan Status Bahaya di Indonesia: Sejak Pemerintah Kolonial Belanda hingga Pemerintah Orde Baru [The Practice of the State of Emergency in Indonesia: From the Colonial Period to the New Order], 37–38; Osman Raliby, Documenta Historica: Sedjarah Dokumenter Dari Pertumbuhan Dan Perdjuangan Negara Republik Indonesia [Documenta Historica: A Documentary History of the Growth and Struggle of the Republic of Indonesia], vol. I (Djakarta: Penerbit Bulan-Bintang, 1953), 315. === [PDF page 98] === 98 The 1946 Law on the State of Emergency was independent Indonesia’s first emergency law. While the law shares many similarities with the Regulations of State of War and Siege of 1939, there were several significant differences. Both laws provide the frameworks for transferring authority from the government to the chief executive—Governor-General during the NEI, and now the President in Republican times—which would assign a particular military or civilian authority to act as administrators in times of invasion, threat of invasion, rebellion or riots, or natural disasters.230 In contrast to its colonial sibling, however, the 1946 emergency law only recognized a single state of emergency (keadaan bahaya), while it also provided frameworks for a national or partial/regional states of emergency.231 In comparison to the colonial law, which delegated executive authority directly to a military authority (militair gezag), the Republican law provided that authority should be transferred to a new National Defense Council (Dewan Pertahanan Negara, DPN), which consists of civil and military leaders.232 Amir Sjarifuddin calls the Defense Council as a “real effort to consolidate and combine all the forces within society.”233 The newspaper Berita Indonesia reported that “Through the DPN, the consolidation of power between the government, the army, and the people in emergency situations means that it holds the highest authority in taking important 230 Republic of Indonesia, Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia No.6 Tahun 1946 Tentang Keadaan Bahaya (UUKB 1946), 1946, Article 2. 231 Republic of Indonesia, Article 1. 232 The Dewan Pertahanan Negara consists of the Prime Minister (as Chairman), Minister of Defense (as ViceChairman), the Minister of the Interior, Minister of Finance, Minister of Welfare, Minister of Communications, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, and three members of social organizations selected by the President himself. Republic of Indonesia, Article 3. 233 “Djawa Dan Madoera Dalam Keadaan Bahaja: Dewan Pertahanan Negara Dibentoek [Java and Madura in a State of Danger: National Defense Council Is Formed],” Berita Indonesia, June 8, 1946. === [PDF page 99] === 99 decisions promptly.”234 In other words, the State Defense Councils were to serve as an extraconstitutional institution that performed the executive function to govern, legislative function to pass laws, and the judicial function to adjudicate. The State Defense Council was first located in the same building with the Central National Indonesian Committee, in Malioboro, Yogyakarta. Ali Sastroamidjojo noted that, the National Defense Council was beset by various collaborative problems from the start. For example, Council assemblies were rarely attended by the members from the executive branch or the Army leadership. Meanwhile, most of the Council tasks were conducted solely by the Minister of Defense and its secretary.235 Subsequently, a large part of the Council’s tasks was only to supervise its regional counterparts. Furthermore, at this point, there was growing tensions between the civilian government (under Sjahrir) and the military, as the civilians were concerned that the Army will overstep their legal boundaries and the Army were worried that civilians were trying to impinge upon military affairs. If a nation-wide state of emergency is declared under the Republican 1946 law, every Regency also had the right to assemble a Regional Defense Council (Dewan Pertahanan Daerah, DPD), which would be responsible to the DPN. The Regional Defense Council was to made up of the Resident and two members from the regional legislatures (Komite Nasional Indonesia Daerah, KNI Daerah); the highest-ranking military commander in the region, and three representatives of 234 “Koalisi Kabinet Dan Dewan Pertahanan Negara [Cabinet Coalition and the National Defense Council],” Berita Indonesia, June 10, 1946. 235 Sastroamidjojo, Tonggak-Tonggak Di Perjalananku [Milestones in My Journey], 203. === [PDF page 100] === 100 social organizations from the regions.236 The 1946 law also ensured that the power for regional authorities to declare a state of emergency on behalf of the President, provided that communications between the regional government and the center was severed.237 According to Defense Minister Amir Sjarifuddin in a speech on June 7, 1946, during a state of emergency, “practically every power of the State is given to the National Defense Council, and the Council leads the people of our state in this state of emergency.”238 Similar to its colonial predecessor, the 1946 law also provided regulatory, requisitional, and repressive powers. One exception, however, differentiated the Republican and the colonial law. During a state of emergency, the right to legislation remained in the hands of the executive and legislative branches of government—the President and the Central Indonesian National Committee. The Defense Council, however, was also given this right to legislation if there was an imminent attack on Republican territory, although this right to legislation does not apply for threats of attack, internal commotions, or national disasters.239 This fact was a major departure from the colonial emergency law, which did not differentiate the reasoning for the declaration of a state of emergency to the emergency authorities’ power of legislation. Hence, in the new Republican law, the authority to produce legislation—which was completely passed over to the military authority 236 Republic of Indonesia, Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia No.6 Tahun 1946 Tentang Keadaan Bahaya (UUKB 1946), Article 4. 237 Republic of Indonesia, Articles 5 and 6. 238 Kementerian Penerangan, Soesoenan Pemerintah Dalam Keadaan Bahaja [Government in the State of Danger] (Djakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, 1946), 2. 239 Republic of Indonesia, Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia No.6 Tahun 1946 Tentang Keadaan Bahaya (UUKB 1946), Article 7, Paragraphs 1 and 2. === [PDF page 101] === 101 in any emergency conditions under the provisions of the colonial emergency law—was only relinquished to the emergency authority in times of war. From the elucidation above, it is clear that compared to its colonial predecessor, the Republican emergency law was written more “democratically,” at least in spirit. The Republican emergency law provided more oversight of military domination in emergency management through the formation of the Defense Councils. Parliamentary oversight over the Defense Councils was also evident, as Parliament was required to ratify Defense Council regulations through a statute.240 While it is true that emergency powers remained concentrated in the hands of the President, these powers were immediately redistributed through these Defense Councils. This pattern of centralization and redistribution of emergency powers implies a sense of governmental oversight on the wielding of these powers. Meanwhile, the inclusion of representatives from social organizations in the National Defense Council also created a sense of civilian participation to emergency management. Certainly these developments in emergency law legislation stand in stark contrast with its colonial predecessor. In addition, in the Republican emergency law we can see a strand of awareness of basic human or property rights, at least on paper. The Republican emergency law of 1946 explicitly provided avenues for citizens to voice their grievances if unjust treatment or material loss was involved. Furthermore, the Republican emergency law provided temporal limits to articles that 240 See Republic of Indonesia, “Undang-Undang No. 2 Tahun 1947 Tentang Dewan Pertahanan Negara, Peraturan, Pengesyahan Peraturan Dewan Pertahanan Negara No.6, 10, 12, 13, 15, 18, 19, 23, 24, 25 Dan 26” (1947). === [PDF page 102] === 102 impinged upon personal and property rights, which clearly served as a protection against executive dictatorship. At that time, the recognition of these basic rights was a breakthrough in itself. Revolutionary Emergencies: The First Dutch Invasion, The July Third Affair of 1946, and the Madiun Affair of 1948 During the revolution, the 1946 emergency law was activated during three significant events in Indonesian political history. First was during the July Third Affair in 1946, when Prime Minister Sjahrir was kidnapped by members of the political opposition, and second was during the Madiun 1948 Affair, when the PKI tried to initiated a takeover of power. Second was during the first Dutch invasion, from July 21 until August 5, 1947. Third was in September 18 until December 19, 1948, during the Madiun Affair. In this section, I will focus on the three major incidents during the Revolution which saw effective use of the emergency law. On March 12, 1946, the KNIP assembled in Surakarta, Central Java. It was during this meeting that the First Sjahrir Cabinet fell and was replaced by the Second Sjahrir Cabinet. The Persatuan Perdjuangan (PP) leaders felt that the Second Sjahrir Cabinet did not sufficiently represent their aspirations and the PP’s Minimum Program. Meanwhile, Tan Malaka claimed that the Five-Point Program promoted by the new cabinet were “vague to the point of evasiveness.” The PP then protested the appointment by forbidding their members from participating in the new === [PDF page 103] === 103 cabinet.241 This political impasse developed into a full-fledged political crisis involving Sjahrir’s government and the PP. On March 27, the Sjahrir government began secret negotiations with the Dutch LieutenantGovernor General Hubertus J. van Mook. At this point, the Dutch forces had reoccupied almost all of the eastern archipelago, and Sjahrir asked for Dutch recognition of Republican sovereignty in Java, Madura, and parts of Sumatra in exchange for leaving the options open for Republican participation in a Dutch-Indonesian Union.242 Recognizing that this negotiation would anger the Persatuan Perdjuangan, Sjahrir then moved to arrest their leaders. The first moves were done during the Persatuan Perdjuangan congress in Madiun. Between March 17 and March 26, 1946, pro-Sjahrir Pesindo units and Military Police (Polisi Tentara) arrested PP leaders Tan Malaka, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, Mohammad Yamin, Sukarni, Chaerul Saleh and Gatot Tarunamiharja. The arrests were made in order to preserve the security and well-being of the state.243 However, these arrests were not conducted legally: the use of Pesindo units and Military Police loyal to Amir are evidence of this. These so-called March razzias paved the way for a bigger political crisis in the following months. The Sjahrir government was trying to centralize governmental power in its relations with the Armed Forces. Earlier in January 1946, the Defense Ministry under Amir has tried to establish its influence in the Tentara Keamanan Rakjat (TKR) by creating an Educational Staff (Staf 241 Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, 316–17. Anderson, 322–23. 243 Anderson, 326–27. 242 === [PDF page 104] === 104 Pendidikan).244 This staff later developed into the Army Political Education Staff (Staf Pendidikan Politik Tentara, Pepolit), which was dominated by Partai Sosialis, Pesindo and Masjumi members. The Pepolit was often resented by Army officers, especially those who are not sympathetic to the two parties.245 It is also important to note here that much of the military supported the PP, mostly due to the influence of Sudirman. Both the unpopular policy of the Defense Ministry and Sudirman’s support of the PP widened the divide between Sjahrir’s cabinet and the military. The political crisis of July 3, 1946 began in Surakarta. On June 27, Sjahrir arrived in Surakarta after a trip to East Java. At night, the Prime Minister and his entourage were kidnapped by Army forces under Major General Sudarsono, the commander of the Third Division that was sympathetic to the PP. Sjahrir was then brought to the hill village of Paras at the slopes of Mount Merbabu, located 35 kilometers east of Surakarta.246 This kidnapping signified the start of the socalled July Third Affair, the first coup d’etat effort in the history of the Republic. On the following day, Soekarno and the cabinet immediately declared a state of emergency for the whole of Indonesia, and transferred all executive powers to the President through a special decree (Maklumat).247 Soekarno officialy announced his decision to take over all governmental powers in a radio speech on June 30, 1946, stating that the kidnapping of Sjahrir was “an act that 244 Anderson, 250–51. Anderson, 370–71. 246 Anderson, 385. 247 Maklumat Presiden No.1, 1946; Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 189; Butt and Lindsey, Indonesian Law, 52. The Maklumat Presiden No.1, 1946 points to the 1946 law as its reference. In Indonesia, the Maklumat (edict) is a legal instrument that is rarely issued by the executive branch. Other forms of these ad hoc Presidential legal instruments are Dekrit (decree), Penetapan (stipulations), and Instruksi (instructions). According to Tim Lindsey and Simon Butt, “the relative authority of these types of presidential instruments [in the Indonesian legal system]—if they have and legal force at all—remains unclear.” 245 === [PDF page 105] === 105 gravely endangers the State.” (satu tindakan jang begitu membahajakan Negara).248 This was the first time that Soekarno, as President, had declare a state of emergency.249 In response to the political crisis in Surakarta, and to “create an atmosphere of national crisis that would rally public support to the government,” President Soekarno and the cabinet activated the 1946 law by declaring a state of emergency for Surakarta on July 6, 1946 while extending it to the whole of Java and Madura the following day.250 On July 2, pro-government Pesindo units and the elite Siliwangi Division converged upon the PP stronghold in Surakarta, threatening to occupy the city unless Sjahrir was released.251 On July 8, the Republican government activated the National Defense Council, made up of Sjahrir as head (which was at replaced by Soekarno as President), Defense Minister Amir Sjarifuddin; Minister of the Interior Sudarsono, Minister of Finance Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Minister of Communication Abdul Karim, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces General Sudirman, Sumarsono (Pesindo), K.H. Masjkur (Sabililah) and Sardjono (PKI).252 Meanwhile, future prime minister Ali Sastroamidjojo played an important role as secretary.253 Major General Sudarsono 248 Raliby, Documenta Historica: Sedjarah Dokumenter Dari Pertumbuhan Dan Perdjuangan Negara Republik Indonesia [Documenta Historica: A Documentary History of the Growth and Struggle of the Republic of Indonesia], I:325. 249 Interestingly, this act was only validated through a state regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah) that was signed after the crisis was over, on July 8, 1946. Republic of Indonesia, “Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang 1946 No.4” (1946). 250 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 187–88; Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, 380; Republic of Indonesia, “Undang-Undang No 16 Tahun 1946” (n.d.). 251 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 190–91. 252 Hariyono, Penerapan Status Bahaya di Indonesia: Sejak Pemerintah Kolonial Belanda hingga Pemerintah Orde Baru [The Practice of the State of Emergency in Indonesia: From the Colonial Period to the New Order], 97. 253 The role of Ali Sastroamidjojo as Defense Minister Amir Sjarifuddin’s deputy during the First and Second Sjahrir Cabinets and Secretary of the National Defense Council is interesting here, as it was during his rule as Prime Minister in 1959 that Soekarno declared his famous Dekrit Presiden 1959 during a state of emergency, which was widely recognized as the starting point of the Guided Democracy. === [PDF page 106] === 106 and other PP leaders tried to propose a new cabinet to Soekarno, but they were arrested in Jogjakarta on July 3. The July Third Affair ended as quickly as it began. The Affair was significant because it marked the very first time independent Indonesia was declared in a state of emergency, the President took full executive powers, and the National Defense Council was activated. This deployment can also be considered as a successful one, as the crisis was immediately abated, with Sjahrir and his group released from detention, its kidnappers arrested, while Sjahrir’s political opposition lost political momentum. The July Third Affair played an important role in Indonesian history as a precedent for the progressive centralization of power through emergency law, as the state of emergency was never formally repealed by the government after the Affair. With the destruction of its political opposition within the Republic, Sjahrir was free to conduct diplomatic negotiations with the Dutch. The negotiations resulted in the signing of the first Dutch-Indonesian treaty in Linggadjati, near Cirebon. Signed on November 15, 1946, the Linggadjati Agreement recognized the Republic as the de facto authority in Java, Madura, and Sumatra, while both sides agreed on the creation of a federal United States of Indonesia (Republik Indonesia Serikat) in the future.254 Nevertheless, the signing of the treaty led to the fall of Sjahrir, who was replaced by Amir Sjarifuddin as Prime Minister, who took power in June 1947.255 It is notable here that at this point the Socialist Party had experienced a schism, which the party is split into the Sjahrir-supporting Partai Sosialis and the Amir-supporting Partai Sosialis Indonesia. Tragically, as significant as Linggadjati was for 254 255 Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1200, 275. Ricklefs, 276. === [PDF page 107] === 107 Dutch-Indonesian relations, the Dutch subsequently broke the treaty by invading Republican territory. On July 1947, Dutch military forces invaded Republican territories in the guise of a “police action.” Codenamed Operation Product (Operatie Product), the Dutch military operation managed to occupy significant parts of West Java, Madura, and East Java. Meanwhile, Dutch forces also seized the plantation belt around Medan (North Sumatra) and the oil and coal fields around Palembang (South Sumatra) and Padang (West Sumatra).256 The attack was only halted after the United Nations called for an immediate ceasefire at the end of the month. During the Dutch attack, a state of emergency was again declared for the whole of the Republic, albeit some of the Defense Council regulations implemented at the aftermath of the July 3 Affair was still in effect as the prior emergency was never repealed.257 In sum, from July 10 until August 1947, the National Defense Council promulgated extensive rulings on various issues related to the provisions included in the 1946 emergency law. These rulings include the regulations for the management of refugees, the occupation of civilian property by military forces, the regulation of militias, 258 censorship of printed and electronic media, 259 regulations pertaining to the economy (such as preventing hoarding of strategic goods and gold bullion, etc.), 260 militarization of state institutions (such as 256 Ricklefs, 276–77. Hariyono, Penerapan Status Bahaya di Indonesia: Sejak Pemerintah Kolonial Belanda hingga Pemerintah Orde Baru [The Practice of the State of Emergency in Indonesia: From the Colonial Period to the New Order], 100. 258 Peraturan Dewan Pertahanan Negara No.2, 1946; Peraturan Dewan Pertahanan Negara No.3, 1946. 259 Peraturan Dewan Pertahanan Negara No.7, 1946; Peraturan Dewan Pertahanan Negara No.8, 1946; Peraturan Dewan Pertahanan Negara No.9, 1946; Peraturan Dewan Pertahanan Negara No.11, 1946; Peraturan Dewan Pertahanan Negara No.16, 1946. 260 Peraturan Dewan Pertahanan Negara No.24, 1946; Peraturan Dewan Pertahanan Negara No.10, 1946; Peraturan Dewan Pertahanan Negara No.15, 1946; Peraturan Dewan Pertahanan Negara No.23, 1946; Peraturan 257 === [PDF page 108] === 108 the postal and telegraph services and the National Police), 261 and the mobilization of the general populace. 262Additionally, the National Defense Council also managed the registration of firearms and the formation of Military Regions (Daerah Militer).263 In 1948, the Republic was faced with another political crisis that required the government to take over emergency powers. After the signing of the Renville Agreement on January 1948, the Sjarifuddin Cabinet fell, as the agreement necessitates the concession of significant parts of Java to the Dutch.264 Soekarno then assigned Hatta to form an emergency “Presidential cabinet” responsible to himself, with Sjahrir’s people from the Partai Sosialis rather than Amir’s Partai Sosialis Indonesia.265 In a political maneuver, Amir then allied himself with other leftist parties under the banner of the People’s Democratic Front (Front Demokrasi Rakyat, FDR), which included leftist organizations such as the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI), the Indonesian Labor Party (Partai Buruh Indonesia), Pesindo, the Indonesian Farmers’ Front (Barisan Tani Indonesia) and Central Organization for Indonesian Labor (Sentral Dewan Pertahanan Negara No.21, 1946; Peraturan Dewan Pertahanan Negara No.12, 1946; Peraturan Dewan Pertahanan Negara No.18, 1946. 261 Peraturan Dewan Pertahanan Negara No.4, 1946; Peraturan Dewan Pertahanan Negara No.5, 1946; Peraturan Dewan Pertahanan Negara No.6, 1946; Penetapan Dewan Pertahanan Negara No.65, 1946; “Instruksi Dewan Pertahanan Negara No.13” (1947); Peraturan Dewan Pertahanan Negara No.19, 1946. 262 Penetapan Dewan Pertahanan Negara No.65; “Penetapan Dewan Pertahanan Negara No.66” (1946); “Penetapan Dewan Pertahanan Negara No.67” (1946); Peraturan Dewan Pertahanan Negara No.13, 1946. 263 Peraturan Dewan Pertahanan Negara No.14, 1946; “Peraturan Dewan Pertahanan Negara No.30” (1947); “Peraturan Dewan Pertahanan Negara No.32” (1947). 264 The Renville Agreement contains provisions on a military truce behind the so-called Van Mook Line, virtually shrinking Republican territory into Central Java. This agreement is very unpopular for both the nationalists and the pemuda. As Amir Sjarifuddin himself signed the agreement, he and his PSI supporters lost support in the KNIP. On the Renville Agreement of 17 January 1948, see K.M.L Tobing, Perjuangan Politik Bangsa Indonesia: Renville (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1986). 265 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 232. === [PDF page 109] === 109 Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia).266 A direct spiritual descendant of the Persatuan Perdjuangan, the People’s Democratic Front also adopted Tan Malaka’s seven-point Minimum Program, yet the new organization differed from its radicalized nature in conducting opposition. In contrast to the Persatuan Perdjuangan, which had based its opposition against the central government through shows of force and negotiation with the Central Indonesian National Committee, the Front was more inclined to conduct labor strikes and civil disobedience campaigns.267 One example of this is the massive labor strike in the cotton and sugar factories in Delanggu on June-July 1948.268 In addition, on August 10, 1948, the communist veteran Musso arrived in Surakarta. He promptly aligned himself with Front leaders such as Amir, Maruto Darusman, Djokosoejono, and Setiadjit.269 In addition to opposition against the official government policy towards the Dutch, the People’s Democratic Front was also concerned about Hatta’s military policy. During this period, Hatta was bent upon rationalizing the TNI by reducing the number of its troops. This policy, dubbed Reorganization and Rationalization (Reorganisasi-Rasionalisasi), was designed to cut the number of armed troops, initially from 350.000 regulars and 470.000 militias into 160.000 regulars and militias while further reductions were also planned for 57.000 personnel.270 The Front saw the rationalization program as a provocation, as many of their members were part of the militias being 266 Harry A. Poeze, Tan Malaka, Gerakan Kiri Dan Revolusi Indonesia Jilid III: Maret 1947-Agustus 1948 (Jakarta: Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia, 2010), 47. 267 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 260. 268 Suyatno, “Revolusi Indonesia Dan Pergolakan Sosial Di Delanggu,” in Revolusi Nasional Di Tingkat Lokal (Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1989), 5–7. 269 Anderson, “The Military Aspects of the Madiun Affair,” 3,15. 270 Ulf Sundhaussen, Politik militer Indonesia 1945-1967: menuju dwi fungsi ABRI [Indonesian Military Politics 1945-1967: Towards the Dual Function of the ABRI] (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1986), 68–69. === [PDF page 110] === 110 downsized. As a result, the relationship between the Front and the Hatta government increasingly soured, paving the way for the Madiun Affair of 1948. Despite its name, much of the Madiun Affair played out in Surakarta and its environs. In 1948, Surakarta was occupied by a mélange of political and youth organizations (laskars), almost all of them armed. There were the Barisan Banteng, the Hizbullah, and the Pesindo. Meanwhile, the local army units of the Division IV/Panembahan Senopati was renowned as politically inclined, while there was also the Division I/Siliwangi that moved there under the Renville accords.271 The Residency of Surakarta was a tinderbox, ready to be ignited. The 1948 debacle started when fighting between the Siliwangi and Panembahan Senopati forces broke out in Surakarta on August 24, 1948 after the Senopati division commander refused to be demobilized. This was followed by a series of fights and kidnappings between the Madiunbased FDR and TNI forces in early September.272 Meanwhile, various skirmishes broke out between TNI and FDR forces in and around Madiun, such as the fighting between TNI territorial forces against pro-FDR units in Nganjuk and offensives against Pesindo forces in Blitar on September 13.273 Together with Surakarta, Madiun would subsequently became the epicenter of the political crisis that was brewing at this time, as the city hosted the FDR and Pesindo 271 Poeze, Tan Malaka, Gerakan Kiri Dan Revolusi Indonesia Jilid III: Maret 1947-Agustus 1948, 106. Harry A Poeze, Madiun, 1948: PKI Bergerak (Jakarta: KITLV-Jakarta: Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia, 2011), 127. 273 Poeze, 134; Anderson, “The Military Aspects of the Madiun Affair,” 23. 272 === [PDF page 111] === 111 headquarters. Nevertheless, it is safe to say that during that time, the almost the whole area of Central Java and the western part of East Java was marred by instability. In response to this growing crisis, Soekarno again took full executive control over the government through emergency law on September 20.274 In Jogjakarta, civil liberties were immediately reduced: demonstrations, meetings, pamphlets, and signs were banned. Meanwhile, the printed press and radio were censored.275 Earlier on September 16, Hatta and the National Defense Council had declared the Surakarta, Semarang, Madiun, Pati, Kedu, and Banyumas Residencies together with the Jogjakarta Special Region and East Java to be Military Regions (Daerah Militer), thus enabling the TNI to operate without constraint in the region. Tasked with bringing peace and order to the area, the commander of the Army Military Police Corps, Colonel Gatot Subroto, was assigned as the Military Governor of the Surakarta-Semarang-Madiun-Pati Military Region.276 It is clear that the Republican government treated the Madiun Affair differently than the July Third Affair, as Surakarta was never declared as a military region back in 1946. Empowered by the 1946 law on the state of emergency, Gatot announced that all armed forces in the area were to be disarmed and demobilized.277 The FDR, however, viewed this as a provocation by the Republic and refused to follow Gatot’s orders. The FDR responded with a confrontative 274 Republic of Indonesia, “Undang-Undang No 30 Tahun 1948 Tentang Peraturan Tentang Pemberian Kekuasaan Penuh Kepada Presiden Dalam Keadaan Bahaya” (1948). This time, the President invokes the state of emergency through a law, which also mentions the 1946 law on the state of emergency as its reference. However, the 1946 law and the National Defense Council were still active at this time. 275 Poeze, Madiun, 1948, 227. 276 Poeze, 133. 277 This includes Army units and laskars. Poeze, 134. === [PDF page 112] === 112 statement, broadcasted in the Madiun-based Radio Gelora Pemuda on the evening of September 18, 1948: We are worried that our government is becoming fascistic and militaristic, particularly the Vice President, Prime Minister, and the Defense Minister. They are traitors that have sent millions of our compatriots to the evil Japanese as romushas. Unity is important, but it shall not create slavery. We were asking whether there was a negotiation between Jogjakarta and the Netherlands on the eradication of the Sayap Kiri. We now know that the Dutch are cooperating with the Republican government to colonize the people. The fascist collaborator Hatta is now trying to use the Republic to colonize the workers and the farmers. Madiun has aimed to obliterate all enemies of the revolution, the Military Police and the Army has been disarmed by the people. The workers and farmers have created a new government. We will continue to use our weapons until the whole of Indonesia is independent. The time for revolution has come.278 In Jogjakarta, Soekarno responded by declaring that the Surakarta-Madiun debacle was an attempted coup by Musso and the FDR, where he famously warns: 278 Soe Hok Gie, Orang-Orang Di Persimpangan Kiri Jalan (Yogyakarta: Yayasan Bentang Pustaka, 2005), 240–41. === [PDF page 113] === 113 Follow Musso and his PKI, which will bring the collapse of the dream of a free Indonesia—or follow Soekarno-Hatta, which with God’s grace will lead the Indonesian Republic to a free Indonesia, not colonized by any country at all.279 Soekarno’s declaration solidified support for the Republican government in Jogjakarta, which immediately launched a counter-attack against the Madiun rebels. On September 27, 1948, TNI forces based in East Java under Colonel Sungkono were sent into Madiun to quell and disarm the rebellion by force.280 By the end of the month, most of the Pesindo and FDR forces were already arrested and detained by the TNI, while TNI units sympathetic to the Front were disbanded. The state of emergency subsequently ended after three months. Conclusion The concept of emergency powers as it was realized and the ways it was used in Indonesia is a direct product of Dutch colonialism, Japanese occupation, and revolutionary turmoil. This chapter has argued that the logic of emergency was integral to the outlook of the colonial, military, and revolutionary governments of the Netherlands Indies and Republic of Indonesia. This logic of emergency was not static: it reflected in the long process of making, unmaking, and remaking of emergency laws. From the colonial Regulation on the State of War and Siege of 1939 until the republican Law on the State of Emergency of 1946, the concept of emergency was shaped by political and social developments experienced by Indonesians. 279 280 Poeze, Madiun, 1948, 180–81. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 290–91. === [PDF page 114] === 114 Under Dutch colonial rule, emergency law was first embedded in the legal system through the constitutional emergency authority of the Governor-General. This emergency authority is reflected in the exorbitante rechten provisions, which was embedded within the colonial constitutions. The exorbitante rechten allows the colonial government to arbitrarily oppress Indonesian nationalists in the interest of protecting the state by maintaining peace and order. In the face of global war, however, the Dutch colonial government realized that they cannot continuously rule through decree. The colonial government then passed the Regulation on the State of War and Siege of 1939 as the Netherlands Indies’ first emergency law, which was adopted from the Dutch metropolitan law of 1899. The new emergency law saw its use during the years leading to the Second World War, particularly in the containment of undesirables and mobilizing the population for total war. The emergency law, however, failed to prevent the collapse of the colonial state, as the Japanese invasion of 1942 spelled out the end of the colonial state. Arguably, the Japanese occupation paved the way for the creation of the Indonesian state and its emergency laws. Established during the Japanese occupation, the BPUPKI played a major role in the shaping of the 1945 Constitution. It was during this time that emergency powers in was first established in Indonesia through its enshrinement in the constitution. Similar to the colonial constitution, emergency powers in Indonesia were held by the President as the chief executive of the Republic. The role of Leiden-educated jurists such as Soepomo was essential in the drafting of the 1945 Constitution, which explains the commonality in how both the Indonesian and Netherlands Indies’ constitution deals with emergency powers. === [PDF page 115] === 115 It was during the Indonesian National Revolution that emergency powers in Indonesia were first deployed and reshaped. Immediately after the Proklamasi, Indonesia shifted its government from a Presidential system to a quasi-parliamentary system. Together with the shift in executive authority from the President to the Prime Minister, the Republic also initiated a constitutional reform in terms of emergency powers. The first act was a move to establish a new objective emergency law, which found its shape in the passing of the 1946 Law on the State of Danger. While the authority to declare a state of emergency remains with the President, the administration of emergency powers was thoroughly reformed by the establishment of the National and Regional Defense Councils, in contrast to the militair gezag of colonial times. To a certain extent, these councils democratized the administration of emergency powers in the Republican state, as the provisions for their establishment seem to provide an extra “rule” to the game, in contrast to the blank check ensured by the colonial law. However, as state institutions, these councils remain illiberal, as they are still extra-constitutional in nature. In both the July Third and Madiun Affairs, we may see the emergence of a pattern of the deployment of emergency powers in Republican politics. In both incidents—which were caused by internal rebellion—the role of the President is central in deploying emergency powers. As we can see, this mode of centralization of government in the hands of the executive during emergencies echoes the colonial pattern. However, as the new Republican state’s legitimacy was based upon democratic rule, there had to be a new institution bridging the role of the chief executive and operators of martial law, leading to the formation of National Defense Councils. During Madiun, the National Defense Councils functioned effectively in establishing military regions and appointing military governors. However, during the July Third incident, the Defense === [PDF page 116] === 116 Council system experienced problems in running day-to-day affairs when Prime Minister Sjahrir was missing, thus necessitating Soekarno to take over power directly. This problem was also repeated during the second Dutch invasion in 1948, when Soekarno and most of the cabinet was captured by the Dutch. This problem with the effort of “democratizing” emergency law became an impediment in itself, as it prevented the holder of emergency powers from governing effectively during times when the central government was decapitated, a point that was often repeated by the Army officers, such as Nasution. This pattern of the subjective emergency law preceding the deployment of objective emergency law remains significant in the Indonesian Republic, just as it has been in the Netherlands Indies. Indeed, Indonesia is not alone in this case. The enshrinement and use of emergency powers is common across Southeast Asia, whether during colonial or postcolonial times.281 What makes this fact significant is that the idea of the emergence of the revolutionary, Republican state assumes that the new state was completely different than its colonial predecessor. Nevertheless, as this chapter has shown, the emergency logic remains, and this logic will haunt Indonesian politics for years to come. 281 Kevin Y.L. Tan, “From Myanmar to Manila: A Brief Study of Emergency Powers in Southeast Asia,” in Emergency Powers in Asia: Exploring the Limits of Legality, ed. Victor V. Ramraj and Arun K. Thiruvengadam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 150. === [PDF page 117] === 117 CHAPTER II: IMAGINING ENEMIES: THE LOGIC OF COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE NETHERLANDS INDIES AND INDONESIA, 1930S-1950S Introduction In his 1963 Armed Forces Day speech, Armed Forces Chief of Staff (Kepala Staf Angkatan Bersenjata, KSAB) General Abdul Haris Nasution declared that the Indonesian Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) will follow a “Middle Way” (Jalan Tengah) as its political doctrine. The Jalan Tengah doctrine, according to Nasution, means that the “armed forces will not try to dominate political processes, yet it will not exist as a ‘dead tool’ in the hands of the civilian government.”282 After the rise of the militarized New Order regime in 1965-1966, this concept developed into the “Dual Function” (Dwifungsi ABRI) doctrine, which was part of the Indonesian Army’s official doctrine Tri Ubaya Çakti (Three Sacred Vows) initially formulated at the First Army Seminar in 1965.283 The concept of the dwifungsi implies that the Armed Forces have a “dual function” as a military and socio-political force.284 Eventually, the dwifungsi became one of the ideological foundations of the New Order regime (1966-1998).285 282 Angel Rabasa and John B. Haseman, The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 10. 283 Jun Honna, Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia, Routledge Research on Southeast Asia (London; New York: Routledge, 2003), 233, f.5. 284 David Jenkins, “The Evolution of Indonesian Army Doctrinal Thinking: The Concept of Dwifungsi,” Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science 11, no. 2 (1983): 24–25; David Jenkins, Soeharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics, 1975-1983, 1st Equinox ed (Jakarta: Equinox Pub, 2010), 258. 285 Sebastian, Realpolitik Ideology, 42–43. === [PDF page 118] === 118 The problem of civil-military relations has been a major topic in Indonesian historiography. The question of how the military came to power under Soeharto’s 32-year rule opened the floodgates for a series of studies on civil-military relations. First, for instance, there was the classic argument that the reason behind the Armed Forces’ rise to power was their own view that the military was an agent of progress and development, while the Army itself was already politicized since its inception in 1945.286 Other scholars have argued that the Armed Forces’ role in politics was a result of a long history of civilian meddling in Army affairs and a response to the incompetence of civilian governance.287 These “institutional” approaches, as I will call them, were heavily influenced by the development of civil-military relations as a subset of political science, most famously developed by Samuel Huntington in the 1960s.288 The “institutional” approaches mentioned above were complemented by “culturalist” approaches, which viewed that the political actions of the Armed Forces cannot be explained by political goals, but were also a function of ideology. Scholars have noted, for instance, that Indonesian military ideology was a product of the enmeshment between Western military professionalism and the perceptions, attitude, and obligations of Javanese traditional culture, which was represented in a so-called jago-satria ideal.289 The emergence of this jago-satria ideal 286 Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, 22; Said, Genesis of Power, 2. Sundhaussen, Politik militer Indonesia 1945-1967, ix–x. 288 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957). 289 The Jago or Satria are familiar figures of Javanese traditional and contemporary culture that represents ideal concepts of soldiership. The Jago, literally “Fighting Cock,” is “a dynamic youngster to whom struggle is passion and obsession, who is fighting on every possible and impossible occasion causing a strange mixture of unrest, benevolence, fear and pride among the Javanese community.” Indonesian historian Onghokham calls them the “ambivalent champion of the people.” The Satria, derived from the Hindu warrior Kshatriya caste, is simultaneously the “enfant terrible of the elite, and, at the same time, its main defender, an indispensable attribute of the ruler’s or nation’s 287 === [PDF page 119] === 119 become embedded within the Indonesian military ideology through history-making, as throughout the New Order, the Indonesian military have promoted themselves as “a self-sacrificing people’s army, as the guardians of the spirit of independence and the protectors of the Pancasila.”290 Even if there is a strong tradition of the study of military politics in Indonesia, significant gaps remain. For instance, how did colonial military tactics and strategy affect the development of Indonesian military ideology? More specifically, in what ways might colonial military doctrines have foreshadowed or shaped Nasution’s conception of dwifungsi and its subsequent interpretations? How did the long experience of colonial wars under Dutch rule shaped Indonesians’ perceptions on war itself? These questions remain valid today, as civil-military relations are constantly renegotiated, especially in a dynamic society such as post-revolutionary Indonesia. This chapter argues that colonial warfare and counterinsurgency doctrines deployed by the Dutch played a significant role in shaping post-independence Indonesian military ideology. First, I will look at the development of colonial military doctrine in the Netherlands Indies, particularly in its relation to counterinsurgency. From the Java War until the Aceh War, colonial military doctrine was shaped around a “logic of counterinsurgency,” which requires them to treat warfare in Indonesia differently from its European counterparts. Second, I will delve into the development of Indonesian military ideology and doctrine during the Indonesian National greatness and independence.” Britton, Profesionalisme Dan Ideologi Militer Indonesia: Perspektif Tradisi-Tradisi Jawa Dan Barat. [Professionalism and Indonesian Military Ideology: Perspectives on the Traditions of Java and the West], 226; Mrázek, The United States and the Indonesian Military 1945-1965. Volume 1., 14; Onghokham, “The Jago in Colonial Java, Ambivalent Champion of the People,” in History and Peasant Consciousness in South East Asia, ed. Andrew Turton and Shigeharu Tanabe, Senri Ethnological Studies (Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology, 1984). 290 McGregor, History in Uniform, 216. === [PDF page 120] === 120 Revolution (1945-1949). Third, I will examine how both colonial and revolutionary experiences in warfare became examples for the TNI during the period of Liberal (1949-1959) and Guided Democracies (1959-1966). Colonial Warfare and Counterinsurgency Counterinsurgency and militarization are concepts that are interrelated, yet distinct. An insurgency itself is an organized attempt to challenge state control of a region from a position of relative weakness, thus employing subversion and violence outside of existing state institutions.”291 Counterinsurgency refers to a variety of strategies used by governments to suppress insurgencies, including political, administrative, military, economic, psychological, and informational approaches.”292 In other words, counterinsurgency is a comprehensive endeavor to suppress and control insurgencies and addressing its core causes.293 Counterinsurgency is a technique frequently often used by political elites and military commanders in the field, but it is never a replacement for strategy. Counterinsurgency efforts are never prescriptive, as field commanders often need to constantly adapt to new circumstances to achieve their goals. The purpose of counterinsurgency was to design environmentally-specific methods to crush a specific insurgency and increase the resilience of a threatened society and its 291 Department of the Army and United States Marine Corps, Department of the Navy, Insurgencies and Countering 292 Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 1. 293 Department of the Army and United States Marine Corps, Department of the Navy, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, 1–2. === [PDF page 121] === 121 government. 294 To this note, the “logic” of counterinsurgency, as I conceptualize it, is related to the “logic” of emergency in that it views security risks as part of a “new” kind of war: thus blurring the distinction between a friend and enemy, or civilian and military. 295 Continuous engagement in counterinsurgency operations frequently results in militarization of society. Indeed, counterinsurgency and emergency mutually reinforce each other, resulting in the establishment of illiberal or authoritarian states, as one scholar have observed in Myanmar. 296 Both notions are comprehensive in terms of plans, visions and goals, but specialized in terms of tactics and approaches and the long-term consequence of this project leads to militarization of the state and society. Indonesianists Harry Benda and Ruth McVey once argued that the colonial Netherlands Indies state, at least during the early twentieth century, was a “beamtenstaat,” an administrative state par excellence.297 In the beamtenstaat, the state is controlled by a small group of elites, which consists of administrators and the defense and security services. In the Netherlands Indies, like all states, the maintenance of rust en orde (peace and order) was its raison d’etat, and in this case, the two most important parts of the state supporting this cause were the hard-working bureaucratic elites and the security apparatus. 294 Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 2. On the friend-enemy distinction, see Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab, Expanded ed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). 296 Callahan, Making Enemies. 297 Harry J. Benda, “The Pattern of Administrative Reforms in the Closing Years of Dutch Rule in Indonesia,” The Journal of Asian Studies 25, no. 4 (August 1966): 589–605; Ruth McVey, “The Beamtenstaat in Indonesia,” in Interpreting Indonesian Politics: Thirteen Contributions to the Debate, ed. Audrey Kahin and Benedict R. O’G Anderson (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1982). 295 === [PDF page 122] === 122 The functions of bureaucracy and defense often intersected in the late-colonial state, and within the colonial order, the armed forces played a major role in maintaining security when bureaucracratic management encountered difficulties. Elsbeth Locher-Scholten argues that the “modern” reasoning behind Dutch colonial expansion during the early 20th century—whether it was proposed by soldiers, scholars, or civil servants—was the “maintenance of Dutch authority” itself: in the Netherlands Indies, imperial expansion was fueled by the “desire for systematic maintenance and extension of administrative power.”298 This is particularly evident since the beginning of the 20th century and the rise of the so-called Ethical Policy (Ethische Politiek), in which in theory The Hague ceased to view the Indies as a profit-making region (wingewest) and shifted its attention to a “civilizing” and “developmental” role.299 Consequently, the martial tradition in the Indies was born with a particularly colonial mission: the maintenance of colonial peace and security (rust en orde). However, as Henk Schulte Nordholt has shown, the arrival of the modern state in the Indies created “a state of violence,” and it was this “state of violence that the Indonesians have inherited from the Dutch.”300 Colonial and metropolitan armies are inherently different in their characteristics. Colonial armies, an indispensable part of the “imperial systems of power,” are also inherently different than 298 Elsbeth Locher-Scholten, “Dutch Expansion in the Indonesian Archipelago around 1900 and the Imperialism Debate,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 25, no. 1 (March 1994): 109. 299 Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200, 193. 300 Henk Schulte Nordholt, “A Genealogy of Violence,” in Roots of Violence in Indonesia (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002), 37–38. === [PDF page 123] === 123 their metropolitan counterparts.301 In a definition that Benedict Anderson once called “tropical Gothic,” colonial militaries were often mercenaries recruited from the periphery, purposely designed as a constabulary force, often technologically inferior to its mainland counterparts, and was symbolized as a beacon of colonial power.302 More often than not, colonial wars were counterinsurgencies. Recent studies have shown that modern counterinsurgency strategies were adopted from the methods of colonial warfare.303 In 1840, in French Algeria, Maréchal Thomas Bugeaud (1784-1849) utilized the infamous razzia tactic in dealing with Berber insurgents. The razzia, which refers to the raiding tactics used by the French in Algeria, played a major role in a change in European warfare doctrine: military theorists realized that victory against native insurgents was extremely difficult without controlling or destroying the enemy’s logistical centers such as villages, food supplies, or cattle.304 French counterinsurgency strategy was further developed by Maréchal Joseph Gallieni (1849-1916) in 301 Hack and Rettig refers to “imperial systems of power” as a matrix of political, military, economic, and diplomatic systems that were developed to maintain domination. Karl Hack and Tobias Rettig, eds., Colonial Armies in Southeast Asia (New York: Routledge, 2006), 7. 302 In Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson confirmed this “tropical Gothic” of colonial militaries, which reflects “capitalism in feudal-aristocratic drag.” Colonial armies were “recruited (below the officer level) from local religious or ethnic minorities on a mercenary basis; ideologically conceived as an internal police force; dressed to kill in bed- or ballroom; armed with swords and obsolete industrial weapons; in peace on display, in war on horseback. If the Prussian General Staff, Europe’s military teacher, stressed the anonymous solidarity of a professionalized corps, ballistics, railroads, engineering, strategic planning, and the like, the colonial army stressed glory, epaulettes, personal heroism, polo, and an archaizing courtliness among its officers. See Benedict R. O’G Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Rev. ed (London; New York: Verso, 2006), 151. 303 Thomas Rid, “The Nineteenth Century Origins of Counterinsurgency Doctrine,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 33, no. 5 (October 2010): 727–58; Ian F.W. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750 (London: Routledge, 2001), 25. 304 Douglas Porch, “Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare,” in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 380. === [PDF page 124] === 124 Indochina (1892-1896) and Madagascar (1896-1897). According to Douglas Porch, the Gallieni method—famous as the “oil stain” or méthode de la tache d’huile—consisted of abandoning concepts of large-scale operations or ‘front lines’… Posts were established around which patrols would circulate, progressively extending the area of control until they touched upon that of an adjacent post. At the same time, the post would become a market that attracted the natives, often by purchasing their goods at prices above the market level. The arrival of the indigenous population allowed the French to make contacts and gather intelligence but, above all, to demonstrate that prosperity would follow cooperation with the French. The natives, grateful for the economic reconstruction of their land via the roads, markets, wells, and other public works projects sponsored by the French, recognized the advantages of colonialism and rallied to the occupying power.305 This strategy of “progessive occupation” was further developed by Maréchal Hubert Lyautey (1854-1934), who was renowned as the Resident-General of French Morocco in 19121925. A protégé of Gallieni, Lyautey once said that “the administration of a colony should be modeled upon the army division.”306 The “Gallieni method” was then popularized in a very popular essay in the Revue des deux mondes, which helped launched Lyautey in the global pantheon of colonial administrators. Lyautey famously argued that the officers in the colonial armies are different from its metropolitan counterparts: “The social role that metropolitan officers seemed 305 306 53. Porch, 388. Hubert Lyautey, Lettres Du Tonkin et de Madagaskar (1894-1899) (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1920), 629– === [PDF page 125] === 125 reluctant to take up had, in fact, been adopted by officers in the colonies: ‘the colonial officer defines himself, above all, by his social role.’ A colonial soldier was more than a warrior. He was an administrator, farmer, architect, and engineer—in short, he took up any skill required to develop the region in his charge.”307 The Gallieni-Lyautey method may be divided into three main elements: First, it emphasized the primacy of political action over military action, suggesting that conflicts could be resolved through dialogue rather than force of arms. Secondly, it called for the replacement of military columns with a ‘creeping occupation’, using the analogy of an oil stain spreading out inexorably over a wider area. Thirdly, it stressed the importance of economic-organizational development in ensuring the lasting stability of newly-acquired imperial possessions. Encompassing these three elements was a guiding principle: that in order to facilitate swiftness of action and to prevent the spread of colonial unrest, civil and military powers should be unified in the hands of the soldier, who would act as the ‘first administrator’ of the colony.308 The Gallieni-Lyautey method became influential in the development of European colonial warfare strategies and administration techniques, even though its effectiveness was now questionable.309 Certainly, there were other examples of colonial powers that have developed 307 Porch, “Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare,” 390; Hubert Lyautey, “Du Role Colonial de l’Armée,” Revue Des Deux Mondes 157, no. January 15, 1900 (1900). 308 Michael P.M. Finch, A Progressive Occupation? The Gallieni-Lyautey Method and Colonial Pacification in Tonkin and Madagascar, 1885-1900 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 2–3. 309 Porch, “Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare,” 394. === [PDF page 126] === 126 counterinsurgency practices, such as the Russian Empire in the Caucasus (1817-1864) or the German Empire in Southwest Africa (1904-1907) and German East Africa (1905-1907). However, it was the French that pioneered and “codified” these practices while also launching it into into popular circulation in military science. Meanwhile, Royal Netherlands Army in the metropole were very much influenced by the French military as its model, and this fact also spilled over to the colonial military tradition.310 Further, in more contemporary times, the Gallieni-Lyautey method found its way into modern counterinsurgency strategy through classic works on counterinsurgency warfare, such as Colonel Roger Trinquier’s Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency (1961) and Lieutenant Colonel David Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (1964) which is still cited by counterinsurgency theorists to this day.311 Counterinsurgency and Military Doctrine in the Netherlands Indies In the Netherlands Indies, the KNIL was at the center of colonial power. Similar to its equivalents in other European colonies, KNIL often found itself fighting against “internal” 310 An example of how the French became the Dutch military model is reflected on how, since 1887, the French Army had military attachés in The Hague to closely monitor Dutch defence policies and attended Dutch military exercises. Meanwhile, French Army exercises also “excited great interest from the side of the Dutch.” Klinkert continues to mention that, at least form early 1880s, “of all visits of Dutch officers to exercises abroad, those to France were the most frequent,” and both countries often conducted officer exchanges. Additionally, from 1795-1806, the Netherlands was one of the “sister-republics” of France (Batavian Republic) and later ruled by a French king (Louis Bonaparte) during the Napoleonic Wars. Further, see W. Klinkert, Defending Neutrality: The Netherlands Prepares for War, 1900-1925, History of Warfare (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2013), 37. 311 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, PSI Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006); Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, trans. Daniel Lee (London and Dunmow: Pall Mall Press, 1964). === [PDF page 127] === 127 enemies. From the second half of 19th until the first half of the 20th century, the Netherlands Indies fought no less than 32 colonial wars in a state of “armed peace.”312 These wars include the Padri War (1803-1838), the Java War (1825-1830), Dutch Military Interventions in Bali (1849), the Kongsi Wars in West Kalimantan (1850-1854), and the Aceh War (1873-1904), among others. At its inception in 1814, the KNIL adapted European methods, as its forces were organized into columns that consisted of a large number of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, with a long logistical supply train in its rear. This kind of organization was ill-suited to jungle and mountain warfare in the Indies, especially against indigenous rebels, who often relied on a variety of tactics—hit and run, evasion, etc.—that today we would term “guerilla” warfare.313 Additionally, in 1814, the colonial troops posted in the Indies did not have a specific colonial doctrine yet, and they had to learn from their experiences from Napoleonic Europe and the experiences of the colonial civil service.314 Subsequently, the KNIL, together with its officer corps, had to conceptualize its own counterinsurgency strategy and tactics from its experiences in these colonial wars. One of the largest wars ever fought by the KNIL was the Java War, which one author has called “last stand of Java’s ‘old order’.” The Java War was the twilight of the Kingdom of 312 H.L. Wesseling, “Koloniale Oorlogen En Gewapende Vrede, 1871-1914,” Tijdschrift Voor Geschiedenis 91 (1978): 478–89. 313 J.A. de Moor, “Warmakers in the Archipelago: Dutch Expeditions in Nineteenth Century Indonesia,” in Imperialism and War: Essays on Colonial Wars in Asia and Africa, ed. J.A. de Moor and H.L. Wesseling (Leiden: Brill, 1989), 67. 314 Petra M.H. Groen, “Colonial Warfare and Military Ethics in the Netherlands East Indies, 1816-1941,” Journal of Genocide Research 14, no. 3–4 (2012): 279. === [PDF page 128] === 128 Mataram’s power and heralded the arrival of the Dutch as the paramount ruler over the island.315 The Java War represented a major upheaval in Javanese society as roughly 200,000 Javanese lost their lives, while almost 15,000 Dutch soldiers—7,000 of them Europeans—were killed in action.316 The Java War was a war of counterinsurgency between the KNIL and the forces under Prince Diponegoro. Diponegoro himself represented a faction of the Mataram royal court that revolted in the face of Dutch influences over palatial politics. At the outset, the KNIL forces deployed against Diponegoro wielded strategies and tactics adapted from European general warfare, with large-scale columns requiring long logistical trains. This created difficulties for the KNIL, as these formations were ill-suited for counterguerrilla warfare in the Javanese valleys and mountains. In 1826, future Governor-General of the Indies J.C. Baud stated that the military knowledge acquired in European academies was utterly useless against Indonesian adversaries as the enemy avoided pitched battles, prepared ambushes, burned villages, destroyed roads and mustered various methods of combat that were unknown to European troops.317 This situation changed when the KNIL Commander General Hendrik M. de Kock (17791845) adopted a new strategy that consisted of four points: 315 P. B. R. Carey, The Power of Prophecy: Prince Dipanagara and the End of an Old Order in Java, 1785-1855, Verhandelingen van Het Koninklijk Instituut Voor Taal-, Land- En Volkenkunde 249 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007), 654. 316 de Moor, “Warmakers in the Archipelago: Dutch Expeditions in Nineteenth Century Indonesia,” 52. 317 J.A. De Moor, “Colonial Warfare: Theory and Practice. The Dutch Experience in Indonesia,” Journal of the JapanNetherlands Institute 2 (1990): 98–99. === [PDF page 129] === 129 First, he decided to develop a closer relationship with the sultanate so that the remaining princes and senior officials did not go over to Dipanagara. Second, he resolved to deepen political military ties with Surakarta so that both Sunan Pakubuwana VI and Mangkunegara II remained loyal. Third, he made a commitment to take back those areas of Mataram still under Dipanagara’s control and restore an effective system of administration and security so that the economy could be revived. Fourth, he determined to contain the prince’s forces within a narrow strip of mountainous land between the Praga and Bagawanta rivers in the districts of Kulon Praga, southern Kedhu and eastern Bagelèn so that they could be isolated and worn down. This would create what in today’s military parlance would be called a ‘killing area’. Finally, he resolved to capture Dipanagara and the other leaders of the rebellion, if necessary by putting a price on their heads.318 Here, the French model of colonial warfare emerges again: according to Petra Groen, De Kock and his subordinates were inspired by the French operations in the War of the Vendée (17931796), the Napoleonic occupation of Calabria (1806-1811), and the French campaigns in Egypt (1798-1801) and Spain (1808-1814).319 In order to execute the strategy, de Kock deployed a strategy called Benteng Stelsel in 1827. First pioneered by Colonel T.D. Cochius (1787-1876), a veteran of the Padri War (1803-1837) in Sumatra, the Benteng Stelsel called for the KNIL to adopt temporary defensive measures in the 318 319 Carey, The Power of Prophecy, 646. Groen, “Colonial Warfare and Military Ethics in the Netherlands East Indies, 1816-1941,” 281. === [PDF page 130] === 130 form of fortifications (benteng). These fortifications were to be placed in strategic areas, such as hilltops. The benteng, constructed using local materials, was a “rectangular barrack-like structure sufficient to house at least a platoon (25-30) of soldiers,” surrounded by a 1.7 meter high stockade made from palm trees, with one or two gun emplacements at the corners. By March 1830, no less than 258 benteng were established across Central and East Java, from Banyumas to Ponorogo. The construction of these benteng, together with 11 KNIL mobile columns that were deployed to pin down Diponegoro’s forces, was central to the eventual success of the Dutch operations in the Java War.320 Similarly, at the end of the Padri Wars in West Sumatra, Lieutenant-Colonel Andreas V. Michiels (1797-1849) also reorganized the KNIL formations into small, mobile units and established strategic fortifications in order to break the stalemate in the war.321 The strategic use of the fortifications and the introduction of mobile flying columns during the Padri and Java War exhibits the high importance of territorial control and the mobility of forces in counterinsurgency operations. Another important element of Dutch counterinsurgency doctrine was the consolidation of civil and military authority under the hands of the military officer. Throughout much of the 19th and early 20th century, the use of KNIL officers as civil-military authority (civiel-militaire gezaghebber) was due to the shortage of personnel in the Indies Civil Service (Binnenlands Bestuur, BB) and difficulties in quelling insurgencies around the Netherlands Indies.322 It was after the Padri and Java Wars, KNIL officers were often assigned to civilian positions, such as in 320 Carey, The Power of Prophecy, 647. de Moor, “Warmakers in the Archipelago: Dutch Expeditions in Nineteenth Century Indonesia,” 54. 322 Doel, “Military Rule in the Netherlands Indies,” 75. 321 === [PDF page 131] === 131 administrative posts. The practice of seconding military personnel to civilian positions was particularly common in areas that were considered rebellious or politically unstable.323 West Sumatra, Palembang (South Sumatra), Lampung, Kalimantan, and Aceh were all under military governance at some point during the second half of the 19th century.324 During the Padri Wars, KNIL Lieutenant-Colonel A.F. Raaff was promoted to the post of civil-military authority, which enabled him to not only organize military operations and maneuvers, but also to enter into legal agreements with the local Minangkabau elites and village heads or coordinate civilian and military resources effectively.325 In the Kongsi Wars against Chinese insurgents in Montrado, West Kalimantan (1850-1854), Dutch counterinsurgency efforts succeeded after Batavia appointed Major A.J. Andresen as the civil-military governor of the area.326 According to Major W.E. Kroesen, who replaced Andresen as governor, the Dutch implemented a three-pronged counterinsurgency strategy in Montrado, namely maintaining the unity of civilian and military authority under military command; utilizing armed steam-powered gunboats for troop transport, fire support, blockades, and the landing of forces; and conducting patrols in small, self-sufficient units consisting of 30-75 soldiers in order to maintain speed and mobility.327 In practice, the military regime of Andresen and Kroesen led to what Dutch historian De Moor calls “’armed foraging,’ in which armed companies ransack[ed] villages to get rice and livestock. Villages were burned down, inhabitants were shot, if not by the Dutch, then later on by 323 Doel, 59. Doel, 60. 325 Doel, 59. 326 de Moor, “Warmakers in the Archipelago: Dutch Expeditions in Nineteenth Century Indonesia,” 59. 327 de Moor, 60. 324 === [PDF page 132] === 132 the Chinese, who wished to punish the population for its ‘collaboration’ with the Dutch.”328 The Dutch also recruited Dayak mercenaries for operations against the Chinese kongsi forces.When the Kongsi wars ended in 1854, “Borneo became the scene of many brutalities.”329 During this period, it appears that the KNIL utilized razzia-like methods in order to contain the insurgency in West Kalimantan. The Aceh War as a Breakthrough in Colonial Counterinsurgency Methods The practice of using territorial and mobile forces while implementing military control over civilian authority is further consolidated during KNIL’s next conflict, the long Aceh War (18731904). The Aceh War was a protracted colonial bloodletting—the war lasted for roughly thirtyone years and cost the lives of 75,000 Acehnese, 12,500 colonial soldiers, and 25,000 coolies in service of the Army.330 The Aceh War was also known as a turning point for Dutch colonial policy in general.331 After Aceh, the “lessons and techniques of the Dutch counterinsurgency in Aceh were incorporated directly into the colonial regime, with targeted violence against local populations becoming a regular element of civilian rule.”332 328 de Moor, 59. de Moor, 59. 330 Groen, “Colonial Warfare and Military Ethics in the Netherlands East Indies, 1816-1941,” 284; Schulte Nordholt, “A Genealogy of Violence,” 36–37. 331 Paul van’t Veer’s De Atjeh-Oorlog was translated as Perang Aceh: Kisah Kegagalan Snouck Hurgronje. Paul van ’t Veer, De Atjeh-Oorlog, Uitgeverij de Arbeiderspers (Amsterdam, 1979); Paul van ’t Veer, Perang Aceh: Kisah Kegagalan Snouck Hurgronje (Jakarta: Grafitipers, 1985). 332 Andrew Goss, “Mobile Warriors and Cosmopolitan Intellectuals: The Legacy of the Dutch Counterinsurgency in Colonial Aceh,” in Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Irregular Warfare from 1800 to the Present, Proceedings of the XXXVI International Congress of Military History, Amsterdam, 2010., ed. Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, Jan Hoffenaar, and Alan Lemmers (Netherlands Institute for Military History, n.d.), 625. 329 === [PDF page 133] === 133 In March 1884, the Governor of Aceh, P.F. Laging Tobias, assigned two KNIL officers, a major and a captain, as officier-civiel gezaghebber (civil-military authority holder) in the onderafdelingen (sub-district) level. In addition to their military tasks, the officier-civiel gezaghebber was also authorized to establish relations with local customary law (adat) chiefs or village heads and to arrest, detain, and adjudicate persons in their assigned territory.333 The Dutch then also created a “concentrated line” (geconcentreerde linie) of defenses, consisting of sixteen fortified posts, connected by trams and telephone lines—in an area of fifty square kilometers around Kutaraja (now Banda Aceh).334 The military administered area, according to van den Doel, was a “disaster from the start,” as Acehnese forces regularly infiltrated and raided the tramways and telephone lines. Thus, the situation necessitated a new counterinsurgency strategy, which came with the arrival of the Leideneducated Indologist Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1857-1936) and Major J.B. van Heutsz (18511924), who was assigned as military governor of Aceh in 1898. In 1892, Snouck Hurgronje, wrote an influential report on how to deal with the Acehnese rebellion, in which he argued that to defeat the insurgency it was imperative for the Dutch to strike hard against the Acehnese ulama rather than dealing with the local aristocracy (uleebalang).335 333 Doel, “Military Rule in the Netherlands Indies,” 61. Doel, 62. 335 Snouck Hurgronje’s famous 1892 report, Atjeh-verslag, is published in the Ambtelijke Adviezen van C. Snouck Hurgronje that was translated to Indonesian as Nasihat-Nasihat C. Snouck Hurgronje Semasa Kepegawaiannya Kepada Pemerintah Hindia Belanda. An extended version of the report was published as the two-book monograph De Atjèhers, in 1893. C. Snouck Hurgronje, De Atjèhers, 2 vols. (Batavia, 1893); E. Gobée and C Adriaanse, NasihatNasihat C.Snouck Hurgronje Semasa Kepegawaiannya Kepada Pemerintah Hindia Belanda, vol. I, Seri Khusus Indonesia Netherlands Cooperation in Islamic Studies (INIS) (Jakarta: Indonesia Netherlands Cooperation in Islamic Studies (INIS), 1990), 106; E Gobée and C Adriaanse, eds., Ambtelijke Adviezen van C. Snouck Hurgronje, vol. 1 334 === [PDF page 134] === 134 In 1890, the KNIL established a new, mobile force, the Corps of Foot Constabularies (Korps Maréchausée te Voet). Equipped as a light infantry unit that is designed to be capable of long range raiding against the enemy, the Maréchausée designed with counterguerrilla operations in mind. The unit mostly consisted of indigenous (Javanese, Ambonese, and Manadonese) soldiers led by European officers. They were trained to operate in small units of 20 to 250 men, armed with light M95 bolt-action carbines and swords (klewang).336 Drawing on the general operational strategy prepared by Snouck Hurgronje, Van Heutsz relied on the Maréchausée to conduct raids deep into Acehnese territory. During Van Heutsz’s tenure as military governor it became more common to task KNIL officers with civilian administrative positions. With the blessing of Snouck Hurgronje, Van Heutsz appointed Maréchausée officers as administrators in order to oversee the pacification of Aceh. Hence, in the perspective of the development of counterinsurgency methods, the warriors of the mobile force became a part of the territorial force, and this is one of the major breakthroughs achieved during the Aceh War. Officers appointed to such duties included Major G.C.E van Daalen (1863-1930), who was later assigned to the post of the Governor of Aceh after Van Heutsz was promoted as Governor General of the Netherlands Indies in 1904, and Klaas van der Maaten (18611944), who was renowned as a prolific writer of war history and a biographer of Snouck 336 In concept, the Korps Maréchausée te Voet was based upon the Royal Netherlands Maréchausée (Koninklijke Marechausee), which was a gendarmerie (military force with law enforcement duties). In practice, however, the Korps Maréchausée te Voet was essentially a light infantry force. Groen, “Colonial Warfare and Military Ethics in the Netherlands East Indies, 1816-1941,” 287. === [PDF page 135] === 135 Hurgronje.337 Van der Maaten is also known for his two-volume monograph De Indische Oorlogen (The Indies Wars, published in 1896), to which I will return later.338 The assignment of military officers to civilian administrative posts enabled the KNIL officers to become accustomed to conducting non-military tasks. This is illustrated by the experiences of Maréchausée Captain P.W.F. Kaniess, a former civiel-militaire gezaghebber in the residency of Gayo Lues of Aceh, who was assigned to the job in 1912-1925.339 Kaniess observed that in Aceh “civil and military rule, which in this case is the consolidation of army command and civilian administration, is an absolute necessity” for maintaining peace and security.340 The merging of civil and military powers enabled the military officer to establish close relations with the local population, to stay up to date on the latest intelligence, and to be able to continuously train and mobilize forces promptly to respond to any challenges to peace and security.341 Kaniess argued that “the maintenance of peace and security (rust en orde) cannot rely only to the karabijn (carbine) and the klewang (sword),” but was also contingent upon the study of the “adat law, ethnology, languages, and local customs.”342 337 Doel, “Military Rule in the Netherlands Indies,” 64. Klaas Van der Maaten, De Indische Oorlogen. Een Boek Ten Dienste van Den Jongen Officer En Het Militair Onderwijs., vol. I (Haarlem: De Erven Loosjes, 1896); Klaas Van der Maaten, De Indische Oorlogen. Een Boek Ten Dienste van Den Jongen Officer En Het Militair Onderwijs., vol. II (Haarlem: De Erven Loosjes, 1896). 339 Born in East Prussia in 1871, Paul Walter Franz Kaniess (1871-1936) was a Maréchausée officer that served in Sulawesi from 1906-1908 and Aceh from 1909-1912. Nicknamed “Father of the Gayos” in his obituary, Kaniess was famous for his pacification of the Gayo region during his tenure as civil-military administrator. See “In Memoriam Captain Paul Walter Franz Kaniess,” Indische Militair Tijdschrift 67 (June 1, 1936). 340 P.W.F. Kaniess, “Over En Uit Den Werkkring van Den Civiel En Militair Bestuurder,” Indische Militair Tijdschrift 57, no. 1926 (1926): 337. 341 Kaniess, 338. 342 Kaniess, 339. 338 === [PDF page 136] === 136 In addition to making war, these civil-military officers also performed administrative functions, such as rooting out rebels from the kampong; building local infrastructure systems such as roads, sanitation, and clean water; erecting local schools; collecting taxes; and conducting judicial functions in the region. Often, these “civilian tasks” contained civilian and military benefits. When Kaniess was appointed as civiel-militaire gezaghebber, he immediately established a working relationship with local adat chiefs. This was done early in order to enable the local elites and police force to continue enforcing the local laws, while the KNIL soldiers posted in the area were assigned only for oversight, mediation, and arbitration functions in the event of a dispute.343 Thus, the KNIL units were not burdened by local administrative tasks. Meanwhile, civil and military considerations were in play in in the provision of basic infrastructure. According to Kaniess, the task was useful for rebuilding the local economy and connecting isolated regions with Dutch governmental centers, thus enabling closer state control over the region and its populace. At the same time, the construction of roads was also a good use of the geographical knowledge available in the hand of the military units.344 Similarly, there was a civil and defense objective behind the construction of schools. While the provision of schooling is certainly beneficial for the spread of Western education for the local population, the education was also equally important to defense as it was in the interest of the Dutch to see that the local elites were literate. Certainly, in order to function as indigenous administrators alongside with the Dutch resident, the local elites needed to be at least literate. 343 344 Kaniess, 685. Kaniess, 777. === [PDF page 137] === 137 Between 1915 and 1918, for example, Kaniess built five Sekolah Rakyat (People’s Schools) that were funded by the local government.345 In order to get the manpower to build these schools, Kaniess mobilized the local population through corvée labor (heerendiensten) and the use of local taxes.346 Another example of a civil-militaire gezaghebber was Captain M.J.J.B.H. Campioni, who was assigned to onderafdeling Tapa Toean in 1901 and onderafdeling Meulaboh, both in Aceh, in 1903.347 In his posthumously published notes on military operations in an area that was not fully pacified, Campioni noted several important points, namely the methods for searching native houses, for organizing raiding parties, procedures to court-martial apprehended rampoks (robbers), and a guideline for interaction with civilians, such as native chiefs. According to Campioni, it was important to be polite yet strict and firm in dealing with the native village heads. If a local military commander gave an order but it was not carried out by the local village head, a short reprimand would follow the first transgression, a fine of f.10 to f.25 for the second time, and arbitrary detention for the third time, with the civiel-militaire gezaghebber to be notified.348 While local military commanders were to refrain from intervening in civilian affairs, they were allowed to arrest, prosecute, or fine villagers, such as imposing fines against carrying 345 Kaniess, 859. P.W.F. Kaniess, “Over En Uit Den Werkkring van Den Civiel En Militair Bestuurder,” Indische Militair Tijdschrift 58, no. 1927 (1927): 190. 347 Captain Marie Joseph Jan Baptiste Hubert Campioni (1868-1904) was a Maréchausée officer serving in Aceh from 1895 until his death in 1904. “In Memoriam Captain Marie Joseph Jan Baptiste Hubert Campioni,” Indische Militair Tijdschrift 35 (January 1, 1904). 348 M.J.J.B.H. Campioni, “Wenken En Voorschriften Gegeven Door Een Troepencommandant, Tevens Civiel Gezaghebber in Een Nog Niet Geheel Gepacificeerdgebied, Wijlen Kapitein M.J.J.B.H. Campioni,” Indische Militair Tijdschrift 35 (July 1, 1904): 1055. 346 === [PDF page 138] === 138 weapons and missing kampong passes; or dealing with crimes and misdemeanors.349 One interesting prescription by Campioni is that the officers should not trust local spies and guides, which is also discussed in the KNIL’s tactical manual Voorschrift voor de Uitoefening van de Politiek-Politioneele Taak van het Leger (Regulations for the Exercise of Politico-Politional Task of the Army, VPTL). decades later.350 For the Acehnese, the deployment of Maréchausée officers as civiel-militaire gezaghebber did not came without a price. The military officers often used excessive and violent methods that were unpalatable to the Acehnese. One famous case involved Major G.C.E. van Daalen, who served as an officier-civiel gezaghebber in the Pidië region of Aceh. Snouck Hurgronje noted that Van Daalen often used the rattan—a synonym for corporal beatings—in order to gain respect for the Dutch authorities and gather intelligence. Villages were often “condemned to ten or twenty years of forced labour if Van Daalen suspected guerrillas to be living there.”351 During the Aceh War, Dutch colonial counterinsurgency methods experienced a major development. In the fighting against the Acehnese, territorial control-and-patrol methods that were commonly used by the KNIL proved to be insufficient to protect areas already under their control. More importantly, in the context of Aceh, the KNIL did not have sufficient capability to harass the Acehnese in their own bases, which called for a new kind of military force. 349 Campioni, 1054. Campioni, 1056. 351 Doel, “Military Rule in the Netherlands Indies,” 72–73. 350 === [PDF page 139] === 139 In response to these shortcomings, the KNIL “re-invented” their battle formations by establishing the Maréchausée as a flexible mobile force that was designed for long-term battles and raids deep within enemy territory. The arrival of the Maréchausée, together with Snouck Hurgronje’s advice, paved the way for eventual Dutch victory. Meanwhile, the Maréchausée officers such as Van Heutsz rose to prominence in the Indies military and civilian administration, as they subsequently were promoted to policymaking and administrative positions. At this point, at least in practice, counterinsurgency methods of “territorial” and “mobile” forces had become integrated in the Indies state, epitomized by the Maréchausée units and the civil-military governors and administrators in Aceh. The Aceh Model as Colonial Counterinsurgency Strategy: The Civil-Military Officer and the VPTL By the turn of the century, Dutch interests on colonial warfare peaked, as various studies were written and published. None, however, enjoyed a larger audience than Van der Maaten.352 Van der Maaten’s De Indische Oorlogen (1896) was written as a study of the “small wars” that dominated colonial warfare in the Indies throughout much of the 19th century.353 According to De Moor, Van der Maaten’s work is at par with the more famous work on the topic by the Anglo-Irish 352 De Moor, “Colonial Warfare: Theory and Practice. The Dutch Experience in Indonesia,” 110. Van der Maaten’s De Indische Oorlogen was translated to Indonesian in 1978 under the name Watak Berperang Bangsa Indonesia Berbagai-Bagai Daerah by the Center for Acehnese Documentation and Information. I will refer to the translated version unless differently noted. Van der Maaten, De Indische Oorlogen. Een Boek Ten Dienste van Den Jongen Officer En Het Militair Onderwijs., 1896; Van der Maaten, De Indische Oorlogen. Een Boek Ten Dienste van Den Jongen Officer En Het Militair Onderwijs., 1896; Klaas Van der Maaten, Watak Berperang Bangsa Indonesia Berbagai-Bagai Daerah (Suatu Perbandingan), trans. Aboe Bakar (Banda Aceh: Pusat Dokumentasi dan Informasi Aceh, 1978). 353 === [PDF page 140] === 140 officer Charles E. Callwell, Small wars: Their principles and practice (1906).354 Referring to colonial war experiences in the Java War and the Aceh War, Van der Maaten proposed that counterinsurgency efforts in “small wars” should be aimed against the ringleaders of the opposition, as usually after a protracted war, the people themselves were already tired of fighting.355 Here lies the difference between a “large war” and a “small war”: the primary military effort should be shifted from destroying the enemy army to decapitating the enemy leadership and separating the enemy from the people. The bulk of the military, Van der Maaten argued, effort should not be concentrated in a large army destined to annihilate the enemy, but rather to be split into two forces, one for territorial and population control and the other for pursuing the rebel leaders. In other words, Van der Maaten’s argument points to a recurring theme in counterinsurgency strategy, namely to separate the guerrilla from the people. After its publication, Van der Maaten’s Indische Oorlogen was widely read in Dutch academic and military circles, thus providing a basis for a new understanding of colonial warfare in the Indies. At the end of the Aceh War Van Heutsz was dubbed “The Conqueror of Aceh.” He returned to the Netherlands as a war hero, and then in 1904 he was appointed Governor General of the Netherlands Indies. The appointment of a former KNIL officer as the chief executive of the colonial state inaugurated a new era of civil-military relations in the colony. It was during Van Heutsz’s tenure as Governor-General, that the position of civiel-militaire gezaghebber became 354 De Moor, “Colonial Warfare: Theory and Practice. The Dutch Experience in Indonesia,” 100; Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice. 355 Van der Maaten, Watak Berperang Bangsa Indonesia Berbagai-Bagai Daerah (Suatu Perbandingan), 7–8. === [PDF page 141] === 141 institutionalized. During the early days of Van Heutsz’s governor-generalship, he sent major military expeditions to several areas of the Outer Territories (buitengewesten) with the goal of imposing colonial “order,” which means pacifying the local sultanates and tribal leaders. In these expeditions, Van Heutsz exported the counterinsurgency methods and approaches utilized in Aceh. The first expedition, in 1906, was sent to the Southern and Eastern Districts of Kalimantan (Zuider-en Oosterafdeeling van Borneo) in order to quell a local rebellion there. Van Heutsz assigned Maréchausée Captain H.Christoffel as the civiel-militaire gezaghebber and Major H.N.A. Swart as the resident of the territory.356 Both officers were tasked with conducting policing and pacification operations. In 1906, he reassigned Christoffel and Swart to Southern Sulawesi (Residentie Celebes en Onderhoorigheden) for the same task, while similar policies were also implemented in Sumba, Sumbawa, and Timor.357 Van Heutsz’s policy of utilizing military officers as administrators was heavily criticized by the employees of the Binnenlands Bestuur, yet the policy continued along much of the second half of the 19th century until the 20th century. In 1912, at least 17.8 percent of the administrators outside of Java and Madura were military officers, although this number continued to decline, falling to 7.6 percent in 1920 and 6.6 percent in 1930.358 Yet the pattern of using military officers as civil-military administrators, which was firmly established after Aceh, has become part of everyday governance in the Indies. The policy of placing military officers as colonial “first administrators” required the KNIL to conceptualize its non-military role in the management and production of military science. The 356 Doel, “Military Rule in the Netherlands Indies,” 65–66. Doel, 67. 358 Doel, 68–71. 357 === [PDF page 142] === 142 policy of using military officers as civil administrators was not without its critics. In 1912, KNIL officer C.G. Ze noted the many deficiencies of transferring jobs from the KNIL to the Binnenlands Bestuur: the salaries as an administrator were higher, yet it also came with the task of living in sparsely populated areas where necessities were scarce and expensive. Meanwhile, colonial civil servants were also tasked with the management of many services, such as education, trade, finance, etc. If they were to focus on all these tasks, Army officers would eventually lose their suitability for military service, according to Ze.359 This discussion on using military officers in governance arrived concurrently with new sociopolitical and economic development in the Indies. Throughout the 1920s, there was a wave of police reform in the Netherlands Indies, which subsequently involved a discussion on the role of the military in maintaining domestic security.360 During the reforms, there was an idea, supported among others by General F.J. Kroesen—who was then the commander of the colonial army—to expand the role of the KNIL in dealing with domestic emergencies, such as rebellions and uprisings. This idea emerged due to the Army’s concerns with the ineffective performance of the Field Police (veldpolitie), which was designed to replace the Armed Police (gewapende politie).361 This idea were opposed by members of the Council of the Indies (Raad van Indië). Nevertheless, several KNIL officers, such as Major General K.F.E. Gerth van Wijk, sounded 359 C.G. Ze, “De Positie van Den Officier-Civielgezaghebber Fd. Controleur,” Indische Militair Tijdschrift, January 1, 1912, 74. 360 Marieke Bloembergen, Polisi Zaman Hindia Belanda: Dari Kepedulian Dan Ketakutan, Indonesian Ed. (Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas dan KITLV-Jakarta, 2011), 297–307. 361 The concern emerged as the Field Police (veldpolitie) failed to effectively respond to several crises such as the millenarian “uprising” incident in Tangerang on February 24, 1924. The Tangerang incident resulted in the death of 32 “rebels” and two Field Police officers. Bloembergen, 289–95, 297. === [PDF page 143] === 143 support for the idea, as such move would help lower the colonial state’s expenses.362 In responding to these discussions, on November 7, 1923, the colonial government in Batavia promulgated a regulation that administers the relationship between civil and military authorities, particularly at times when the military support was needed.363 The regulation, which became the first legal framework for civil-military cooperation in the Indies, concluded that military units were to be under the command of the civil governor or resident of the affected area.364 Furthermore, in 1925, the Indies government implemented Army-police reforms by separating the Outer Regions (buitengewesten) into three areas that corresponds directly to the jurisdiction of civil police or the military in the role of maintaining peace and order.365 Many of these areas were defined as such according to its social conditions and their strategic value to the colonial government. However, police reforms in the Indies took a militarized turn after the outbreak of the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia) rebellions of 1926-1927 in Java and 362 This opinion was aired in a series of essays in the daily Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad. Van Wijk argues for the replacement of all Armed Police (veldpolitie) with the KNIL, as both institutions have the same task: fighting against “domestic enemies” or “Inlandsche vijand.” See Bloembergen, 299. 363 The full title of the regulation is the “Regulation of the Relationship and Cooperation between Civil and Military Authority” (Regeling van de verhouding en de samenwerking tusschen burgerlijke en militaire gezaghebbenden). J Drewes, “De Nieuwe ‘Regeling van de Verhouding En de Samenwerking Tusschen Burgerlijke En Militaire Gezaghebber’ Vastgesteld Bij Gouv.Besluit van 20 Juni 1927 No.1 (Staatsblad 1927 No.345), A.O. 1927 No.11.,” Indische Militair Tijdschrift 58, no. 1927 (1927); Bloembergen, Polisi Zaman Hindia Belanda: Dari Kepedulian Dan Ketakutan, 306. 364 Bloembergen, Polisi Zaman Hindia Belanda: Dari Kepedulian Dan Ketakutan, 306. 365 The three categories include: (1). Regions that necessitates mostly general policing tasks under the Armed Police (gewapende politie). These include the East and West Coasts of Sumatra(Oost en Westkust van Sumatera), Tapanuli, Bengkulu (Benkoelen), districts in Lampung, Aceh, Riau, Bangka, and Billiton; (2). Regions that necessitates politikpolitional tasks under the KNIL, including Djambi, Palembang, Borneo, Celebes, Bali, Lombok, and Timor; (3). Regions of mixed general policing and politiek-politioneele tasks, where the Armed Police (gewapende politie) was to be gradually replaced by the Field Police (veldpolitie). These areas include Manado, Moluccas (Molukken), New Guinea (Nieuw-Guinea), and the Kei, Aru, and Tanimbar islands. Bloembergen, 301–2. === [PDF page 144] === 144 Sumatra.366 In 1928, KNIL Commander General H.L Ia Lau, again sounded a call for the further use of the colonial Army in responding to mass unrest, such as rebellions, uprisings or strikes. This time, the commander obtained support from Governor-General Dirk de Graeff, the Indies Council, and the governors of West Java, Central Java, East Java, Djogjakarta, and Soerakarta.367 Meanwhile, the regulations that ensures civilian authority over KNIL units that were seconded to the regional governors and residents were amended in 1927. The new amendment provides for the possibility of full military control over military and civilian police forces in events of riots or uprisings, while two years later, the colonial government confirming that both the military and the police carries the task of politiek-politioneele in the Indies.368 The trend of Army-police reforms in the 1920s also happen to pave the way for the institutionalization of KNIL counterinsurgency methods and doctrine. This institutionalization was done through the publication of a new tactical manual for both officers and soldiers alike. In 1928, the KNIL published the first edition of its famous manual, the Voorschrift voor de uitoefening van de Politiek-Politioneele Taak van het Leger (Manual for the Politico-Policing Task of the Army, VPTL). The manual was designed to be required reading for any military cadet in the Koninklijk Militaire Academie in Breda and the rank-and-file soldiers of the KNIL. A summary of centuries of Dutch colonial warfare in Indonesia, the VPTL is a synthesis the counterinsurgency tactics that were used by the KNIL up to the Aceh War. These tactics includes light infantry operational 366 On the Communist rebellions of 1926-1927, see Harry J. Benda, “The Communist Rebellions of 1926-1927 in Indonesia,” Pacific Historical Review 24, no. 2 (1955): 139–52; Ruth Thomas McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism, 1st Equinox ed (Jakarta: Equinox Pub, 2006), 323–46. 367 Bloembergen, Polisi Zaman Hindia Belanda: Dari Kepedulian Dan Ketakutan, 305. 368 Bloembergen, 306. === [PDF page 145] === 145 methods in conducting raids into enemy territory, navigation in tropical environments, intelligence-gathering methods, the use of locals as guides and interpreters, management of field bivouacs, logistical methods, and the procedure for conducting patrols.369 Prior to the publication of the VPTL, cadet officers at the Royal Military Academy (Koninklijke Militaire Academie, KMA) and the Higher War College (Hoogere Krijgsschool, HKS) had to cope with literature—often titled as “hints” (wenken) or “guidelines” (leidraad) to Indies warfare—that was not part of obligatory teaching.370 It was only after the publication of the VPTL that the KNIL was equipped with tactical guidelines for counterinsurgency that were integrated with a general framework of performing politico-policing tasks.371 Interestingly, the VPTL overwhelmingly cited experiences from the Outer Islands, particularly from the Aceh Wars.372 Here again, the extraordinary influence of the veterans of Aceh are evident, as the timing in publication of the VPTL coincided with when veterans of that pacification war were leaving the service.373 In the context of these internal security reforms, Army officers in administration posts have become common during the first half of the 20th century, and the policy has its proponents, even in theoretical context such as military science. In 1937, KNIL Infantry Captain H.A. Reemer wrote 369 Voorschrift Voor de Uitoefening van de Politiek-Politioneele Taak van Het Leger [Regulations for the Exercise of the Political-Police Task of the Army] (Batavia: Reproductiebedrijf, 1937). 370 See, among others, R.M. van Mourik, Wenken Voor Patrouilles Bij Het Optreden Tegen Een Inlandsche Vijand (Weltevrede, 1926); W.F. Eisma, Leidraad Voor Het Kader Bij Het Patrouilleeren Tegen Verzetslieden (Nijmegen, 1928). 371 G. Teitler, “Voorlopers van Het VPTL, 1928-1829: Een Terugblik,” Militaire Spectator 170, no. 5 (2001): 268. 372 De Moor, “Colonial Warfare: Theory and Practice. The Dutch Experience in Indonesia,” 104. 373 Teitler, “Voorlopers van Het VPTL, 1928-1829: Een Terugblik,” 268. === [PDF page 146] === 146 an article titled “Dubbelfunctie van Civiel- en Militair- Bestuurder (The Dual Function of the Civil and Military Administrator)” in the Indische Militaire Tijdschrift, the Indies’ premier journal for military science. The article explores the various problems of civil administration faced by new officer-recruits of the KNIL that were freshly minted by the Royal Military Academy at Breda. These problems include the management of political relations with local adat leaders, demography, law, education, religion, health, finance and taxation, corvée labor, legal disputes, economy, and local administration.374 Reemer’s article was an introduction to colonial administration, especially in areas under indirect rule, which was the case in most of the Outer Islands, for new KNIL officers. He claims that “administration (bestuur) means giving the leadership to local leaders…” so as to “maintain societal harmony between the people, the adat chiefs, and the European administrator in the area.”375 Peppered with examples drawn from firsthand experience as well as colonial archives, the article suggests that the practice of the civilmilitary officer was commonplace at this point, and prospective KNIL officers should prepare for the job if the need arises. Although Reemer is not the first person to share their views and experiences as a civil-military officer, it is interesting that he was the first to coin the term dubbelfunctie (Dual Function) in the Dutch-Indonesian corpus of military science.376 Reemer’s article officially inaugurated the arrival of the dual function concept in the Dutch colonial army’s 374 A. Reemer, “Dubbelfunctie van Civiel-En Militair- Bestuurder. [Dual Function of Civil and Military Administrator],” Indische Militair Tijdschrift 68 (1937). 375 Reemer, 12–13. 376 On other IMT articles discussing civil-military cooperation in the colonial context of the Indies, inter alia: Drewes, “De Nieuwe ‘Regeling van de Verhouding En de Samenwerking Tusschen Burgerlijke En Militaire Gezaghebber’ Vastgesteld Bij Gouv.Besluit van 20 Juni 1927 No.1 (Staatsblad 1927 No.345), A.O. 1927 No.11.”; A.M. Sierevelt, “Een Voorbeld Tot Waarschuwing,” Indische Militair Tijdschrift 56, no. 1925 (1925); L. Wijerman, “Leger En Politie,” Indische Militair Tijdschrift 63, no. Maart 1932 (1932): 159–66; A.M. Sierevelt, “Leger En Politie,” Indische Militair Tijdschrift 63, no. Mei 1932 (1932): 385–94. I === [PDF page 147] === 147 counterinsurgency doctrine. It is not so far to say that the Reemer’s concept of dubbelfunctie subsequently influenced Nasution’s dwifungsi concept more than thirty years later. During the early 1930s, KNIL forces was often found permanently stationed for policing purposes. On January 32, 1932, an Army-Police Commission (Leger-Politie Commissie) coordinated with the Colonial Department of the Interior, the Police, and the KNIL on the permanent posting of Maréchausée units as field police (veldpolitie) in Java. Mainly positioned to respond to security issues in the Javanese countryside, at least six Maréchausée companies with a total strength of 200 men was initially posted in Serang, Majalengka, and Cilacap (all in West Java), and Surabaya, Malang, and Bondowoso (in East Java).377 In 1934, the 1st Maréchausée company in Cilacap was repositioned to Meester Cornelis (a neighborhood in the southeastern part of Batavia), with detachments in Cikarang and Bekasi, the 2nd Maréchausée company at Serang posted detachments at Rangkasbitung and Karawang, while the 3rd Maréchausée company with headquarters in Majalengka had detachments at Indramayu, Majalengka, and Cibarusah. The Maréchausée detachments were posted in Bekasi, Karawang, and Cibarusah as the area was notorious for its robbery (rampok) activity..378 This policy was criticized, mostly by military observers such as Maréchausée Captain W.L.A. Hojel, who noted that the usage of Maréchausée units in policing tasks was detrimental to the military skills of the units, such as marching, 377 W.L.A. Hojel, “De Marechausees Als Veldpolitie Op Java (I),” Indische Militair Tijdschrift 67 (January 1, 1936): 1118. 378 W.L.A. Hojel, “De Marechausees Als Veldpolitie Op Java (II),” Indische Militair Tijdschrift 68 (January 1, 1937): === [PDF page 148] === 148 marksmanship, field training, and general military practice.379 Nevertheless, the policy remained until the Japanese invasion in 1942. After the introduction of the VPTL, counterinsurgency techniques were completely institutionalized as the backbone of the KNIL doctrine. The two main principles, namely territorial and population control (“territorial” forces) and flexible mobile units (“mobile” forces) were integrated in the KNIL defense policy. On the one hand, through the creation of the civil-military dubbelfunctie, the KNIL were able to maintain close control of society through “winning the hearts and minds” of the populace. On the other hand, the KNIL further developed the light infantry tactics that were first used by the Maréchausée in Aceh—together with other examples of colonial warfare across the archipelago—into a general warfare doctrine for the colonial army. Counterinsurgency and TNI Military Doctrine during the Revolutionary and Post-Revolutionary Periods in Indonesia In 1953, General Abdul Haris Nasution published a book titled Pokok-Pokok Gerilya (Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare), which launched his career as a military theorist on the practice of small wars. Offering a synthesis of his own experiences during the Indonesian National Revolution (1945-1949) and global counterinsurgency thought, the Fundamentals became influential in the shaping of TNI doctrine. Indeed, Nasution’s conception of a “Perang Rakyat Semesta” (Total People’s War) in the 1950s remains relevant in Indonesia today, as it is still an 379 Hojel, 10. === [PDF page 149] === 149 integral part of official TNI doctrine.380 Fundamentals contain advices on how to wage a modern war against a more powerful adversary through the conduct of guerilla warfare in facing a more technologically-advanced foe. On the other hand, a less-widely acknowledged point of the Fundamentals was its critique and advice on “anti-guerilla” operations. According to Nasution, the concept of Total People’s War is a product of the development of global warfare. After World War II, modern warfare was not only predicated upon wars of attrition on the battlefield, but it was also a total war, where the Armed Forces and the people both participates in the military, political, psychological, and socio-economic aspects of war.381 Hence, the intellectual reasoning of Nasution’s proposition of a total war in contrast to a limited war for Indonesians was based on the global development of warfare itself. The principle of Total People’s War lies at the center of Nasution’s conceptualization of war. On the operational level, however, Nasution proposed a two-pronged strategy which is familiar to students of colonial warfare: the use of locally recruited guerrillas and militias as territorial forces and professional regular army units as mobile forces. This is important, as 380 On November 11, 2019, Indonesian Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto mentioned to the Parliament that Indonesian defense policy will still use the concept of Pertahanan Rakyat Semesta” (Total People’s Defense), a concept that is based on the National Revolution. It is clear that Prabowo refers to Nasution’s conception in this case. “Konsep Pertahanan Rakyat Semesta Yang Diperjuangkan Prabowo,” CNN Indonesia, accessed February 23, 2021, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20191112075443-20-447516/konsep-pertahanan-rakyat-semesta-yangdiperjuangkan-prabowo; “Prabowo: Jika Terpaksa, Kita Lakukan Perang Semesta Rakyat,” CNN Indonesia, November 11, 2019, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20191111160849-20-447375/prabowo-jika-terpaksakita-lakukan-perang-semesta-rakyat; Kristian Erdianto, “Konsep Pertahanan Rakyat Semesta Lima Tahun Ke Depan Ala Prabowo...,” Kompas.Com, November 12, 2019, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2019/11/12/08111711/konsep-pertahanan-rakyat-semesta-lima-tahun-ke-depanala-prabowo?page=all. 381 Abdul Haris Nasution, Pokok-Pokok Gerilya Dan Pertahanan Republik Indonesia di Masa yang Lalu dan yang akan Datang [Fundamentals of Guerilla Warfare and the Defense of the Republic of Indonesia in the Past and in the === [PDF page 150] === 150 Nasution claims that “strategic guerrilla warfare is defensive in principle. Victory in war can only be gained through an offensive by a disciplined, regular armed force.”382 Hence, we can see the repetition of the theme found in colonial warfare doctrines: the importance of territorial and mobile forces in war. In practice, however, the historical legitimacy of Nasution’s Total People’s War theory was questionable. According to Robert Cribb, Nasution’s theory is rather different in writing as it was in practice, as “Nasution’s remarks about the organic relationship between the guerrilla and society were thus not made just for the sake of developing guerrilla strategies but also to claim for the army a direct relationship for the people, independent of the republican state, and so to establish a platform and justification for army involvement in politics.”383 In a similar vein, David Jenkins also mentioned that during the period of Liberal Democracy (1949-1959) and the Revolution, the TNI as such “possessed no shared ideology, programme, or defined political goals.”384 Perhaps Cribb and Jenkins are correct that Nasution’s conception of a Total People’s War did not accurately reflect the general’s experiences during the Revolutionary war. Just like any ideologies, military ideology, however, “was neither created ex nihilo nor adopted ready-made.”385 Historical fact suggests that at the outset of the Revolution, the Indonesians adopted guerrilla fighting not by choice, but rather out of expedience. Nasution argues that “we wage guerrilla 382 Nasution, 90. Robert Cribb, “Military Strategy in the Indonesian Revolution: Nasution’s Concept of ‘Total People’s War’ in Theory and Practice,” War & Society 19, no. 2 (October 2001): 145. 384 Jenkins, “The Evolution of Indonesian Army Doctrinal Thinking: The Concept of Dwifungsi,” 15,18. 385 Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths, 4. 383 === [PDF page 151] === 151 warfare not because we followed a guerrilla ‘ideology,’ but we were forced to do so because we could not muster a comparably modern and organized force” against the enemy.386 Meanwhile, TNI organized territorial forces—the Village Security Units (Organisasi Keamanan Desa, OKD) and mobile forces—the Siliwangi Division and the Mobile Command (Komando Angkatan Perang Mobil) in 1948.387 In terms of efficacy, the guerrilla strategy conducted by the TNI during the Revolution was rather effective, at least according to the Dutch soldiers posted in Java during Operation Product (Operatie Product) in 1947 and Operation Crow (Operatie Kraai) in 1948. For instance, Dutch infantryman M.A.P de Lange of the 5-6 Regiment Infanterie spoke of the Indonesians as “normal people that were forced to act like animals in order to fight against us, because only through guerrilla methods and tactics they were provided with the opportunity to achieve their goals.”388 Another anecdote from Captain E.A.C Weber of the 3-2 Regiment Infanterie spoke of the TNI forces: The enemy proved themselves to be a good pupil… what can easily be considered as ‘tactics’ are actually military operations in small groups to exhaust Dutch forces. This tactic can be considered as successful… The enemy understood our situation 386 Nasution, Pokok-Pokok Gerilya Dan Pertahanan Republik Indonesia di Masa yang Lalu dan yang akan Datang [Fundamentals of Guerilla Warfare and the Defense of the Republic of Indonesia in the Past and in the Future], 10. 387 Saleh As’ad Djamhari, Ichtisar Sedjarah Perdjuangan ABRI (1945-Sekarang) [An Overview of the History of the Struggle of the ABRI (1945-Now)] (Jakarta: Pusat Sejarah ABRI, Departemen Pertahanan-Keamanan [Centre for the History of the Armed Forces,Department of Defence and Security], 1971), 37–41. 388 Gert Oostindie, Serdadu Belanda Di Indonesia, 1945-1950: Kesaksian Perang Pada Sisi Sejarah Yang Salah [Dutch Soldiers in Indonesia, 1945-1950: A Testimony of War at the Wrong Side of History] (Jakarta: Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia, 2016), 93. === [PDF page 152] === 152 due to the effectiveness of their intelligence and the incapability of our security […] …the enemy has excellent tactics and exemplary discipline.”389 Just like other ideologies, military doctrine is a product of how military elites have interpreted and imagined the political and social world they live and is a product of historical processes as well. Thus, ideology is continuously in the making. For this reason, it is important to illustrate the ideological milieu in which the TNI was developed. The KNIL and PETA Schools of Thought in Indonesian Military Doctrine At its conception in 1945, the TNI officer corps was made up of two major lines of thought/education, namely the Dutch-trained, former KNIL officers and the Japanese-trained, former PETA officers. These two broad schools of thought emerged in the crucible of the Indonesian National Revolution, when armed youth groups and local militias (laskars) emerged during the de facto power vacuum after the Japanese surrender and the Declaration of Independence (Proklamasi) on August 17, 1945. The former KNIL group, represented by Nasution, T.B. Simatupang, Didi Kartasasmita, A.E. Kawilarang, A.J. Mokoginta, and others, was more concerned with establishing a centralized, hierarchical structure in the military, as they had been taught and was practiced in Western militaries. The KNIL group, dubbed by Benedict Anderson as the “Bandung group”, were mostly graduates of the Royal Military Academy (Koninklijk Militaire Academie) in Bandung. The former 389 Oostindie, 93. === [PDF page 153] === 153 KNIL officers were characterized by “far better access to and sympathy with the Djakarta intelligentsia than either the older KNIL officers (such as Urip Sumoharjo) [or] the bulk of the PETA.”390 Generally, former KNIL officers shared a similar worldview, which involved the formation of a professional, centralized, and hierarchical armed forces that were subject to state control. Former PETA officers, among whom were Sudirman and Zulkifli Lubis, “had no preJapanese military training [and] were imbued with a revolutionary spirit and trained primarily for guerrilla warfare,” in contrast to the former KNIL officers that were “better trained for staff work and had a generally more professional, less populist, view of the military role.”391 This fact was a product of design rather than accident, as the Japanese policy in organizing PETA was rather limited: PETA was never organized beyond the battalion (daidan) level, while the highest operational unit was the company (shodan). Furthermore, PETA battallions and companies were designed to operate individually without a general staff, and they were territorial and defensive in nature.392 Through their harsh and unforgiving training regimes, the PETA officers inherit what that was called as “the Japanese approach to war,” which emphasized semangat (seishin, fighting spirit) as the decisive factor in winning battles.393 390 Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, 234–35. PETA officer cadets were trained in “specialized guerrilla techniques such as infiltration, liaison, communications, and disguise,” while “training was focused on surprise attack techniques.” According to former PETA officers Bambang Sugeng, Djatikusumo, and Hidayat, “Guerrilla training was one significant legacy of Japanese training acknowledged by PETA officers.” Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1200, 258; Lebra, JapaneseTrained Armies in Southeast Asia, 110–11. 392 Mrázek, The United States and the Indonesian Military 1945-1965. Volume 1., 27. 393 Mrázek further claims that the PETA trainees “regard[ed] the Bushido emphasis on spirit and virtue as ‘closely attuned to Indonesian ideas about the nature of power and its accumulation through a process of ascetism and selfdiscipline.” See Mrázek, 23–24; Notosusanto, The PETA Army during the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia. 391 === [PDF page 154] === 154 Thus, from the outset the TNI officer corps was split into two very different intellectual pedigrees that reflects the dichotomy between the “old” nationalists and the more radical pemuda. If we take Herbert Feith’s typology of Indonesian politicians of the immediate postwar era, the former KNIL group would fall into the “administrator” type, and the former PETA group would be in the “solidarity-maker” camp, although more often than not, these synthetic categories are never mutually exclusive.394 As a former KNIL officers, Nasution and his group had closer contact with colonial military doctrines compared to his former PETA counterparts. When they were educated in the KMA Bandung, the former KNIL officers were exposed the colonial officers’ education curriculum, in which counterinsurgency doctrine was a major part. The direct influence of colonial warfare doctrine in Nasution’s Fundamentals can be clearly seen in the chapters that discuss counterinsurgency, or anti-gerilya, operations. Nasution states that “the main goal of counter-guerilla operations is to separate the people from the guerrillas… afterwards, to destroy the guerrilla forces.”395 Nasution even coined the long-popular adage of counterinsurgency: “in its essence, the army should win the people’s hearts. This is the anti-guerrilla strategy.”396 In addition to its popularly-quoted Total People’s War strategy, Nasution were also staunchly critical on what he calls as the symptoms of “guerrilla-ism”: “Guerrilla-ism” is the largest and most dangerous problem for the guerrilla himself. “Guerrilla-ism” does not support orderly planning and leadership, thwarts orderly 394 Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 113–22; McVey, “The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army,” April 1971, 134. 395 Nasution, Pokok-Pokok Gerilya Dan Pertahanan Republik Indonesia di Masa yang Lalu dan yang akan Datang [Fundamentals of Guerilla Warfare and the Defense of the Republic of Indonesia in the Past and in the Future], 68. 396 Nasution, 72. === [PDF page 155] === 155 operations against the enemy, results in waste and chaos itself, which in turn weakens us in the face of the enemy…. “Guerrilla-ism” also disrupts the trelationship with the people[,] and most importantly “guerrilla-ism” [and] the absence of discipline will create enmity and guerrilla battles between ourselves.397 Nasution’s attention to the problems of discipline and order/control in guerrilla forces is understandable in light of the intense political competition and conflicts between various groups during TNI’s early years. Meanwhile, a similar view is also reflected by Nasution’s colleague General T.B. Simatupang, who was concerned if revolutionary warfare may lead to warlordism, as it was the case in post-Napoleonic Spain and post-Revolutionary China.398 In his Soal-Soal Politik Militer di Indonesia, Simatupang argued that political instability is undergirded by the stability of the state and the armed forces: We have experienced that political instability on top of instability in the armed forces leads the state to a downward spiral… it should be noted that there will be no stability in a country if its armed forces are not stable, not free from deceit, and not free from ‘Warlordism.’ An unstable armed force is the source of instability for every country. Thus, in lieu of the efforts towards political stability, there should 397 Nasution, 35. During the revolution, Simatupang was the Armed Forces Chief of Staff who replaced General Sudirman. Simatupang, together with Nasution (and Sayidiman Surjohadiprodjo, although much later) were some of the most prolific writers of military science in Indonesia. T. B Simatupang, Percakapan Dengan Dr. T.B. Simatupang [Conversations with Dr. T.B. Simatupang], ed. H.M. Victor Matondang (PT BPK Gunung Mulia, 1989), 34–35. 398 === [PDF page 156] === 156 be a continuous effort towards an armed force that is more stable, more efficient, free from deceit and free from the tendency towards “Warlordism.”399 In Fundamentals, Nasution emphasized the importance of distinguishing between territorial forces and mobile forces in war. The emphasis on territorial forces is also reflected by Simatupang, who gives an important role for military territorial organizations. During the Revolution, Nasution and Simatupang established a territorial system, dubbed the Wehrkreise400 (Military District) system, which were the direct predecessors of the TNI Regional Military Commands (Komando Daerah Militer, Kodam).401 The Wehrkreise system involved the establishment of a working military government, which conducted not only defensive functions (such as recruiting and training local territorial forces), but also civilian administrative ones, such as policing and law enforcement; economic functions; and social functions such as education and sanitation.402 According to Nasution, the establishment of these territorial organizations were critical to conducting Total People’s War, as control of population is key. Meanwhile, Nasution also argued for the importance of a mobile vanguard force consisting of a highly disciplined, regular army in order to win the war. On the operational level during the Revolution, this force 399 T.B Simatupang, Soal-Soal Politik Militer Di Indonesia [Problems of Military Politics in Indonesia] (Jakarta: Penerbit Gaya Raya, 1956), 57–58. 400 The Wehrkreise system is first established by Prussia as part of the Prussian Military Reforms of the 1860s. As a KNIL engineering officer, Simatupang was fluent in German, and he often used many untranslated German terms in his writings, which implies that he is well-versed in German military history. Roger Chickering, “War, Society, and Culture, 1850-1914,” in The Cambridge History of War Volume IV: War and the Modern World, ed. Roger Chickering, Dennis Showalter, and Hans Van de Ven (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 121. 401 T. B Simatupang, Report from Banaran: Experiences during the People’s War, trans. Benedict R. O’G Anderson (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2010), 71. 402 Nasution, Pokok-Pokok Gerilya Dan Pertahanan Republik Indonesia di Masa yang Lalu dan yang akan Datang [Fundamentals of Guerilla Warfare and the Defense of the Republic of Indonesia in the Past and in the Future], 317. === [PDF page 157] === 157 was represented by the better-trained and better-equipped Siliwangi Division, which was Nasution’s own home division. While it is clear that colonial counter-insurgency policy have shaped TNI’s theory of counterinsurgency, it also influenced the idea of the role of military officers in society. This is evident in the development of civil-military officers in the TNI. Even long before Nasution announced his conception of a “Middle Way” on October 5, 1959, TNI officers were already studying the possibility of placing military officers in civilian roles, especially in the Central Education Bureau of the Ministry of Defense (Biro Pendidikan Pusat Kementerian Pertahanan, abbreviated BPP Kemhan) and the higher officer schools such as the Army Command and Staff School (Sekolah Staf dan Komando AD, Seskoad). It should be noted here too that the proponents of expanded military role in society was never purely dominated by military men. In the periodical Yudhagama published by the BPP Kemhan, for instance, the educator Ki Hadjar Dewantara wrote that in Javanese ideology, the military is an inseparable part of the society, and the existence of an army with an ideology (tentara jang berideologie) is a historical inevitability.403 Writing in Yudhagama in 1951, Sajidiman Surjohadiprodjo conceptualized an operational method for TNI counterinsurgency operations. According to Sajidiman, the mitigation of a guerrilla war “cannot be done only with military action,” but “there should be good coordination between political and military actions,” especially at the battalion level.404 One way to do this was to assign a Military Liaison Officer (Perwira Penghubung Masjarakat) tasked with maintaining 403 404 K.H. Dewantara, “Ketentaraan Dan Kebudajaan,” Yudhagama 8 (Mei 1951): 316–17. Sajidiman Soerjohadiprodjo, “Penjelesaian Suatu Perang Gerilja,” Yudhagama 9 (June 1951): 325, 324–27. === [PDF page 158] === 158 correspondence with the local “Pamong Pradja (administrators) and state department heads, important figures in the battalion’s area of operations, and everyone that may provide information for the developments in local situations.”405 The role of this Perwira Penghubung Masjarakat was then developed into the Territorial Officers and Territorial Non-Commissioned Officers (Perwira dan Bintara Territorial) that were attached to TNI infantry battalions.406 At its inception, Sajidiman’s idea was criticized, particularly by one S. Effendi from the Sumatra Military District, because there was no legal basis yet for the institution of the Perwira Penghubung Masjarakat within the organization of the TNI.407 From Sayidiman’s writing on the Civil-Military Officer, it is clear that the TNI’s concept of the Civil-Military Officer drew heavily on the civiel-militaire bestuurder concept characteristic of Dutch colonial counterinsurgency and pacification operations. The Civil-Military Officer in TNI doctrine plays a similar role to its earlier counterpart, namely as the basis for the formation of territorial forces in military campaigns. TNI and the State of Emergency The TNI became involved in legal matters when state of emergency laws were invoked by the government in regions that experienced armed uprisings, such as in West Java during the Darul Islam rebellion. Throughout the 1950s, the colonial 1939 Law on the State of War and Siege were 405 Soerjohadiprodjo, 327. Sajidiman Soerjohadiprodjo, “Batalion Infanteri Sebagai Inti Pertahanan Indonesia,” Yudhagama 16 (January 1952): 597–98. 407 S. Effendi, “Bahagian Manakah Jang Mesti Melaksanakan Tugas Ini?,” Yudhagama 12 (September 1951): 444. 406 === [PDF page 159] === 159 often used as the legal basis for military support for local governments in strategic areas during periods of rebellion or excessive violent crimes. As discussed in the previous chapter, a “logic of emergency” governed the policies of the nascent Indonesian Republic, and even more so after independence was achieved. Why did the Indonesian state and the Army use the colonial 1939 law, rather than the Revolutionary-era 1946 law? The reasoning behind this lies in the nature of the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch in 1949. From August 23, 1949 to November 2, 1949, representatives from the Republic of Indonesia, the Dutch-led Federal Consultative Assembly (Bijeenkomst Federal Overleg) and the Kingdom of the Netherlands met at The Hague for the Round Table Conference (Ronde Tafel Conferentie, RTC). The conference resulted in the Netherlands recognizing Indonesian sovereignty on December 27, 1949, thus establishing a federal Republic of the United States of Indonesia (Republik Indonesia Serikat, RIS), which was led by Soekarno as President and Hatta as Prime Minister. The federal state consisted of six “states” (negara): the Republic of Indonesia in parts of Java and Sumatra, the State of East Indonesia (Negara Indonesia Timur, NIT), the State of Pasundan (Negara Pasundan) in West Java, the State of East Java (Negara Jawa Timur), the State of Madura (Negara Madura), the State of South Sumatra (Negara Sumatera Selatan) and the State of East Sumatra. The RIS also included a number of “territories” (daerah): the Special Territory of West Kalimantan, the Territory of Bandjar, the territories of Dajak Besar, Bangka, Billiton, and Riau, and the two “federations” in East Kalimantan and Southeast Kalimantan.408 On the international side, the RTC agreements introduced the formation 408 Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 59. === [PDF page 160] === 160 of a Dutch-Indonesian Union, which was a loose commonwealth under the Dutch Queen Juliana (1909-2004).409 In August 1950, however, the federal state collapsed, and the RIS was replaced by a new unitary Republic of Indonesia.410 Independence were also followed by changes in constitutional and legal arrangements. During the brief RIS period, Indonesia adopted the Federal Constitution (Konstitusi RIS 1949), but this was replaced by the Provisional Constitution of 1950 (Undang Undang Dasar Sementara 1950, UUDS 1950) when the unitary state was restored.411 Just like the 1945 Constitution, the 1950 Provisional Constitution also provides for Presidential authority to declare a state of emergency.412 Furthermore, the Transitional Provisions (Ketentuan-ketentuan Peralihan) in both the Federal and Provisional Constitutions stipulates that laws and regulations that existed before the promulgation of the constitutions were to remain in effect as long as they are not revoked, added or amended.413 Thus, in theory, both the UUKB 1946 and SOB 1939 remained in effect in Indonesia. In 1954, Basarudin Nasution414 wrote that under 409 Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1200, 269. Ricklefs, 270. 411 These changes in the constitution and form of the state led several Indonesian figures and jurists to call these different phases “Republics” in the French manner: The First Republic (17 August 1945-27 December 1949), the Second Republic (27 December 1949-17 August 1950), the Third Republic (17 August 1950-5 July 1959), and the Fourth Republic (5 July 1959-now). Sudijono Djojoprajitno, Sartono, and Mohammad Hatta were some of these figures. See Harun Alrasid, “Tentang Masa Peralihan,” Jurnal Hukum Dan Pembangunan 27, no. 1 (1997): 1. 412 According to Article 129 of the Provisional Constitution of 1950: (1) Under the methods and cases determined by law, the Government may declare the territory of the Republic of Indonesia or parts of it in a state of emergency (keadaan bahaja), only and as long as the President deems it necessary for the interest of internal and external security. (2) The law regulates the effects of such declarations, and may also stipulate that the powers of civilian authority, which under Constitutional designation is related to to public order and policing, are entirely or partly transferred to other civilian authority or to the military authority, and civilian authority holders submit to military authority holders. Republic of Indonesia, “Undang-Undang Dasar Sementara Republik Indonesia 1950 (UUDS 1950)” (1950), Article 129. 413 Konstitusi Republik Indonesia Serikat (Konstitusi RIS 1949), 1949, Article 192; Republic of Indonesia, UndangUndang Dasar Sementara Republik Indonesia 1950 (UUDS 1950), Articles 142 and 143. 414 Mr. Basarudin Nasution was the head of the Army Justice Directorate. He was a student and assistant of Djokosoetono, a student of Supomo that helped establish the Army Law School (Akademi Hukum Militer, AHM) and 410 === [PDF page 161] === 161 the Provisional Constitution of 1950, the 1946 Law on the State of Emergency remained valid through the Transitional Provisions, while the 1939 Law on the State of War and Siege was also valid under Article 142 of the UUDS 1950, although in practice, the central government would subsequently use the 1939 Law on the State of War and Siege as the preferred law for state of emergency in the Indonesia.415 After the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch in 1949, multiple states of emergencies were active in Indonesia. Almost all of the Republican and Federal territories remained under a state of emergency. During the Revolution and based on the 1939 Law on the State of War and Siege, Dutch authorities activated a state of siege (staat van beleg) in areas outside of the Republican strongholds of Java, Sumatra, and Madura, which remained active during the transfer of sovereignty.416 Meanwhile, in the Republican territories of Java, the 1946 Law on the State of Emergency remained in force. Thus, in order to legitimize and solidify the whole country under a single legal regime, in 1950, the DPR RIS declared that both laws were applicable: the 1946 Law on the State of Emergency for Republican territories, and the 1939 Law on the State of War and Siege for the Federal territories. 417 Gradually, as a result of constitutional changes and the transfer the Police Academy (Akademi Kepolisian). Djokosoetono was credited with one of the inspiring figures behind Nasution’s “Middle Way” concept. On Basarudin Nasution and Djokosoetono, see Bourchier, Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia, 104–5. 415 Basarudin Nasution, S.O.B. Pedoman Pelaksanaan Peraturan Tentang Keadaan Perang Dan Keadaan Darurat Perang [Guidelines for the Implementation of the State of War and State of Siege] (Djakarta: Penerbit Fasco, 1957), 416 Staatsblad van Indonesië, 1949, No.134. 417 Sekretariat DPR-RIS, Pertanjaan Anggota Dan Djawaban Pemerintah, vol. Djilid II (Jakarta: Sekretariat DPRRIS, 1950), 35; Hariyono, Penerapan Status Bahaya di Indonesia: Sejak Pemerintah Kolonial Belanda hingga Pemerintah Orde Baru [The Practice of the State of Emergency in Indonesia: From the Colonial Period to the New Order], 123. === [PDF page 162] === 162 of sovereignty, the Hatta government then turned to the more widely-known emergency law available to them, which was the 1939 Law on the State of War and Siege. Meanwhile on March 16, 1950, the RIS government promulgated Governmental Regulation No 7 of 1950, which specified that the role of “military authority” (militair gezag) as stated by the 1939 Law on the State of War and Siege was to be conducted by the Minister of Defense, or those assigned by him.418 This was the first time the 1939 Law on the State of War and Siege was referred to in the postwar Indonesian legal system, and it became the basis for the use of the colonial emergency law. Notably, this was also the first time that the government clarified its position regarding supreme authority during a state of emergency. Instead of the President or the Army commander, authority was to be wielded by the Minister of Defense. One interesting fact is that the government did not receive any complaints from the Army regarding this shift of power. From this moment until 1957, all legislation concerning the declaration of a state of emergency referred to the colonial-era 1939 Law on the State of War and Siege. Meanwhile, practical military reasoning also played a role in the discontinuance of 1946 law as Indonesia’s premier law on states of emergency. According to Nasution, the National and Regional Defense Councils formed under the 1946 Law on the State of Emergency were rather ineffective, as many of the laws and regulations issued became moot in the face of war.419 During times of war and military occupation, civilian administration were simply non-existent, as many functions of government were taken over by the military. It is possible that this argument represents 418 “Peraturan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia No.7 Tahun 1950 Tentang Pelaksanaan ‘Regeling Op de Staat van Oorlog En van Beleg’” (1950). 419 A.H. Nasution, Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia, Cetakan Kedua, vol. 10 (Bandung: Penerbit Angkasa, 1991), 27. === [PDF page 163] === 163 the Army’s early impulse to gain power in the Indonesian political scene. However, the criticism against the performance of the 1946 Law on the State of Emergency also arrived from the civilian elites. For instance, according to Ali Sastroamidjojo, who was Secretary of the DPN during the revolution, Council meetings were rarely attended by representatives of the TNI or Prime Minister Sjahrir. In practice, almost all of the laws and regulations passed by the DPN were written by Amir Sjarifuddin, who was Minister of Defence at that time, and Ali Sastroamidjojo as secretary.420 Indeed, during the July 1946 and Madiun 1948 emergencies, the Republican government did not only invoke the 1946 Law on the State of Emergency, but also transferred unlimited powers to the President, which was based purely on decree.421 The argument that a successful counterinsurgency operation requires the centralization of power and close cooperation between military and civilian authorities represents a bilateral consensus between the Army and the Cabinet. There was the possibility that the Army’s opposition to the diffusion of power is caused by the military’s desire to maintain its influence on the affairs of defense and security against civilian encroachment. Two political incidents that have shaped the Army’s views happened during the Sukiman administration (April 1951-February 1952), when Justice Minister Muhammad Yamin unilaterally released a group of 950 political prisoners in Army jails. At this time, the prisons were filled with 17,000 so-called “SOB prisoners” (tahanan SOB), which were mostly arrested for involvement with rebel-bandit groups during the Hatta and Natsir cabinets. Some of the men released by Yamin was people who were politically close to him, including Chairul Saleh, and the Army leadership was not consulted on this. The Army thus responded immediately, re-arresting 420 421 Sastroamidjojo, Tonggak-Tonggak Di Perjalananku [Milestones in My Journey], 203. See Chapter 1, pp. x-y === [PDF page 164] === 164 most of these 950 men. As a result of this debacle, Yamin resigned from the cabinet on June 14, 1951, and the relationship between the Sukiman Cabinet and the Army soured, as the military interpreted this act as a civilian intervention in military affairs.422 In the second incident, the Sukiman administration initiated a series of mass arrests of PKI members on August 1951. Dubbed the “Razzia Sukiman,” this action was based on an alleged threat that the PKI was organizing a coup. During the Razzia, at least 15,000 people were arrested by the Sukiman government.423 The Sukiman government did not inform the Army leadership beforehand to support these arrests, yet subsequently declared that the arrests have been carried out under the authority provided by the 1939 Law on the State of War and Siege. Presented with this fait accompli, General Nasution consequently refused to support the Sukiman government, as he—or any other Army leaders—was not consulted during the planning of the arrests.424 Both incidents reflect how the politicians in Jakarta abused the emergency laws, resulting in uncoordinated policies and actions, which was certainly unpalatable for an institution that depends on judicial legitimacy and clear hierarchy such as the Army. The problem of potential uncoordinated policies and actions, not to mention its political weight, contributes to the fact that the TNI was not inclined to continue to use the 1946 Law on the State of Emergency as the basis for declaring a state of emergency, as the decentralized nature of the Revolutionary emergency law could lead to problematic situations. 422 Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 185. Feith, 189. 424 A.H Nasution, Tjatatan-Tjatatan Sekitar Politik Militer Indonesia [Notes on Indonesian Military Politics] (Jakarta: Pembimbing C.V., 1955), 171. 423 === [PDF page 165] === 165 Furthermore, the TNI was also wary of having to succumb to this new responsibility of policing. In October 1951, Army Chief of Staff Nasution proposed that in the future planning for the Army, it is necessary to focus the attention to the development of specialized Army units and the Military Police (Corps Polisi Militer, CPM) for “policing tasks in support of the National Police,” in order to prevent the TNI from becoming a “professional police-army (beroepspolitieleger) just like the KNIL in the past.”425 In an article published in 1952, Nasution emphasized that “the Army should provide military policing support only for certain regions and times designated by the central government. When the Army provides military support, it should be legally authorized under a state of emergency, and if policing support was necessary the CPM should conduct policing tasks.”426 Nasution underlined that “the current TNI, whether we like it or not, has become a professional army, a very large beroepspolitieleger, with all the negative consequences of a large professional army and police army.”427 This fact was perceived as a huge problem for the Army, where ideally a professional army should not conduct domestic policing tasks. Another article by Lieutenant Colonel M.M.R. Kartakusuma further elaborates the problem of the use of the Army in policing situations: Creating a safe and orderly situation for the restoration and the development of the country is a policing task, which is in essence not the primary task of the Armed Forces, but it is the primary task of the other governmental apparatuses such as the 425 A.H. Nasution, “Membangun Tentara Kita,” Yudhagama 13 (October 1951): 479. Nasution, 479. 427 A.H. Nasution, “Kembali Kepada Tentara Rakjat,” Yudhagama 17 (February 1952): 631. 426 === [PDF page 166] === 166 Pamong Pradja and the Police. The Army play a role only when the Pamong and the Police is not capable of conducting their tasks… The tasks and organization of our Armed Forces is not designed or made to be a police army, such are the people within it, such are the equipment, education, and training, so if an Armed Forces that was meant for defensive purposes is ordered to be a police army, the organization and the nature of the Armed Forces is being undermined (diperkosa sifatnja)… Perhaps, among state apparatuses, the Armed Forces is the only one which truly desires to abolish the SOB (also because the procedure of invoking it is perverted due to improper interpretations), so the true nature of the Armed Forces would not be undermined by this…428 It is true that at this point, the TNI was not trained to conduct policing tasks. Meanwhile, the deployment of TNI units in roles stipulated by the law on the state of emergency was also perceived as a challenge for the Armed Forces development and training efforts. Thus, from the articles above, we can see that the utilization of TNI forces in policing tasks were criticized even from within the officer corps. Early Conduit for Counterinsurgency Techniques: The Nederlands Militaire Missie in Indonesië 428 M.M.R. Kartakusuma, “Dari Tentara Emosi Dan Sentimen Ke Tentara Teknik Dan Rasio,” Yudhagama 18 (March 1952): 675. === [PDF page 167] === 167 The TNI also studied counterinsurgency techniques and politico-policing tasks as part of its development program. While it is true that over time TNI would receive much of its counterinsurgency education and training from the United States, at its outset – during the early 1950s – the Dutch played a major role.429 After the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch to the Republic of Indonesia in 1949, the TNI received a Dutch Military Mission (Nederlands Militaire Missie in Indonesië, NMM) as part of the Round Table Agreements of 1949. The NMM was tasked with training TNI officers for a period of four years, from 1950 until 1954. After its inception in 1950, “hundreds of Dutch military instructors became an influential factor in Indonesian military history[,]” where they were embedded in the TNI from the “Command and Staff School down to the battalion training centers.”430 The NMM were assigned with broad tasks, which could be roughly designated into four main groups: officer training, construction of a military academy, establishing military administration, and advising the TNI officer corps.431 The activity of the NMM was centered in Bandung, where they played a significant role in building the infantry, artillery, armored warfare, communications, administration, combat engineers, driving, military police, and the staff schools. Initially, 799 TNI officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) took three-month courses on tactics, terrain, pioneering, and 429 See Mrázek, The United States and the Indonesian Military 1945-1965, 2 vols. Dissertationes Orientales, No. 39 (Prague: Oriental Institute in Academia, Publishing House of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, 1978). 430 Mrázek, The United States and the Indonesian Military 1945-1965. Volume 1., 83. 431 P.C. Bastings, J.G.M. Partouns, and L.H.M. Vries, “De Nederlandse Militaire Missie in Indonesië 1950-1954. Organisatie, Taak En Functioneren van Een Randverschijnsel in de Nederlands-Indonesische Betrekkingen. [The Dutch Military Mission in Indonesia 1950-1954. Organization, Tasks, and Functions of an Peripheral Phenomenon in Dutch-Indonesian Relations]” (Doctoraalscriptie, Utrecht, Rijksuniversiteit te Utrecht, 1988), 75–76. === [PDF page 168] === 168 ballistics in the new Infantry School.432 Groups of ten to twelve Dutch officers were stationed in In the various territorial commands across the country, where they advised their Indonesian counterparts on military administration.433 On January 17, 1951, the TNI established its first officer training college, the Center for Officer Army Training (Pusat Pendidikan Perwira Angkatan Darat, P3AD).434 The P3AD would later become the Army Command and Staff School (Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat, SSKAD, now SESKOAD). The school was designed as an upper-level educational institution for select Army officers in order to prepare them for command and staff work. In addition to practical military knowledge, the P3AD also provided coursework on political economic, legal, and sociocultural topics. The founding of the P3AD was an important moment for the TNI as “most of the basic ideas of military strategy and policy were formulated there in the late 1950s and early 1960s, before the advent of other schools.”435 At its inception, the P3AD relied on a number of foreign teachers and imported literature, mostly drawn from the NMM.436 Even the building and grounds 432 Voorlopige Nederlandse Militaire Missie in Indonesie [Provisional Dutch Military Mission in Indonesia], Verslag van de Werkzaamheden van de Voorlopige Nederlandse Militaire Missie in Indonesie. Afgesloten 15 November 1950 [Reports on the Activities of the Provisional Dutch Military Mission in Indonesia. Concluded on November 15, 1950.], 1950, 9–10. 433 “Generaal Pareira: Missie Legt Accent Op Vorming Instructeurs. Uit Indonesisch Soldaat Kan Uitstekend Militair Groeien. [General Pareira: The Mission Emphasizes in Training Instructors. The Indonesians Can Establish an Excellent Military.],” Algemeen Indisch Dagblad: De Preangerbode, January 18, 1951. 434 There was a military academy, the Akademi Militer Yogya (AM Yogya), established in Jogjakarta during the Revolution. However, the AM Yogya was closed in 1950 due to Nasution’s reforms. It was only 1957, that the Army opened its National Military Academy (Akademi Militer Nasional, AMN) at Magelang, where it remains to this day. Hence, from 1950-1957, the P3AD was one of several schools that produced new officers for the Army. Moehkardi, Pendidikan Pembentukan Perwira TNI-AD 1950-1956 [TNI-AD Officers Education and Training 1950-1956] (Jakarta: PT Inaltu, 1981), 29. 435 Charles Donald McFetridge, “Seskoad: Training the Elite,” Indonesia 36 (October 1983): 88. 436 At the inauguration of the first SSKAD cohort in November 1951, there were 18 Dutch instructors, 12 of them from the NMM. Compare this to 6 Indonesian military and civilian instructors. Dinas Sejarah Angkatan Darat [Army === [PDF page 169] === 169 for the new school, located in Bandung, was formerly used by the School Reserve Officieren Infanterie (SROI) of the KNIL.437 The first commander for the new school was Colonel A.J. Mokoginta, a former KNIL colleague of Nasution, and the school’s curriculum was initially modeled upon Dutch examples from the Higher War College (Hogere Krijgsschool) at Breda.438 At last 80 percent of the school’s initial educational programs were based on the curriculum of the SROI, according to Major Setiadi Kartohadikusumo, who was the head of the Education Bureau of the P3AD in 1951.439 The school graduated its first batch of officers on April 1, 1952.440 During the period of the Dutch Military Mission in Indonesia, the TNI utilized Dutch training manuals for their Army schools. One such manuals was the KNIL’s Voorschrift voor de Uitoefening van de Politiek-Politioneele Taak van het Leger (Regulations for the Exercise of Politico-Politional Task of the Army, VPTL), which was translated into Indonesian by the TNI General Staff as the Guide for the Politico-Policing Task of the Army (Penuntun Pekerdjaan Politik Polisionil Tentara) in 1951.441 The manuals, however, were modified for TNI strategic doctrine. For instance, while both the Dutch and the Indonesian versions of the VPTL discuss methods of searching houses and kampongs for the enemy, the Dutch VPTL recommended a cruel, Historical Service], SESKOAD: Sejarah Perkembangan Dan Pengabdiannya. [SESKOAD: History of Its Development and Service] (Jakarta: Dinas Sejarah Angkatan Darat [Army Historical Service], 2016), 140. 437 Moehkardi, Pendidikan Pembentukan Perwira TNI-AD 1950-1956 [TNI-AD Officers Education and Training 1950-1956], 55. 438 Sundhaussen, The Road to Power, 64. 439 Moehkardi, Pendidikan Pembentukan Perwira TNI-AD 1950-1956 [TNI-AD Officers Education and Training 1950-1956], 88. 440 Moehkardi, 95. 441 Staf Umum Angkatan Darat Kementerian Pertahanan Republik Indonesia [Army General Staff Ministry of Defence Republic of Indonesia], Penuntun Pekerdjaan Politik Polisionil Tentara [Regulation for the Exercise of the Political-Police Tasks of the Army] No.6515., Tjetakan Pertama [First Edition] (Jakarta: Masa Baru, 1952). === [PDF page 170] === 170 “safety-first” approach: firing salvoes at kampongs and houses that were suspected to harbor enemy forces.442 This tactic was absent in the Indonesian version, in accordance to the TNI concept of a Total People’s War that emphasized civilian support for the conduct of military operations.443 Indeed, this reflects the differing approach to the importance of securing local population support: in contrast to the KNIL, the TNI viewed the people as central in a war of counterinsurgency or revolution. Just like any war plans, in practice this idea differs from paper. Admittedly, this effort in adopting ideas derived from colonial military theories ran into many problems during its time in Indonesia. This was due to several factors. First, the simple fact that members of the NMM were Dutch, a former enemy, and thus was deeply resented by many TNI officers and Parliament members. For instance, writer and legislator Mohammad Yamin once said that “due to its strategic position, the NMM has access to Indonesian defensive strategies that were supposed to be a state secret,” another legislator said that “the government should acknowledge that the NMM… have incited unwanted sentiments among the members of our armed forces.”444 Meanwhile, General Sumitro complained that the NMM was merely teaching “conventional” (read: colonial) tactics from the VPTL, and Ruslan Abdulgani lamented that the 442 Kennis van Het V.P.T.L: Een Kwestie van Leven of Dood! [Introduction to the VPTL: A Question of Life and 443 Staf Umum Angkatan Darat Kementerian Pertahanan Republik Indonesia [Army General Staff Ministry of Defence Republic of Indonesia], Penuntun Pekerdjaan Politik Polisionil Tentara [Regulation for the Exercise of the Political-Police Tasks of the Army] No.6515., 84–95. 444 Abdul Haris Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, vol. Jilid 3: Massa Pancaroba Pertama (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1983), 49, 37. === [PDF page 171] === 171 NMM was preaching to the choir, as they taught outdated VPTL tactics to a guerrilla army which already had much experience conducting guerrilla warfare and thus know how to counter it.445 In addition to the Army Command and Staff School, the TNI also established another specialized military school that would play an important role in the militarization of Indonesian society in the future. On August 20, 1952, the TNI established its first Military Law School (Sekolah Hukum Militer).446The school was christened by Minister of Defence Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, who said that the Army would at last be able produce its own military law officers (perwira kehakiman) to man the military judicial system.447 According to Basarudin Nasution, the School’s first Director, the graduates of the School were to replace the civilian jurists and lawyers, “who often understood the basics of law, but are not able to immediately serve as military prosecutors (auditeur-militer) and court members as they are not familiar with the military as an organization and its spirit (watak-nja).”448 This school for military lawyers became the Military Law Academy (Akademi Hukum Militer) on October 2, 1953.449 The Dutch-educated Indonesian jurists and the NMM played a major role in the establishment of the Military Law Academy. Within the “Committee for the Establishment of Military Law School” appointed by the Army Chief of Staff on June 5, 1952, there were at least 445 Lusy Wulansari, “Misi Militer Belanda Di Indonesia 1949-1952 [The Dutch Military Mission in Indonesia 19491952]” BA Thesis, Fakultas Sastra, Universitas Indonesia, 1994), 75–76. 446 Corps Perwira-Siswa Akademi Hukum Militer, Peringatan 1 Tahun Sekolah Hukum Militer (Djakarta: Akademi Hukum Militer, 1953), 7. 447 Corps Perwira-Siswa Akademi Hukum Militer, 5. 448 Corps Perwira-Siswa Akademi Hukum Militer, 9. 449 Korps Perwira Mahasiswa, Buku Kenang-Kenangan Perwira Mahasiswa Angkatan Ke-V Akademi Hukum Militer Dan Peringatan 17 Tahun Akademi Hukum Militer (Djakarta: Akademi Hukum Militer - Perguruan Tinggi Hukum === [PDF page 172] === 172 three NMM advisers, in addition to prominent figures such as Prof. Mr. Soediman Kartohadiprodjo (University of Indonesia Law School), Lt. Col. Soeprapto (Assistant to Army Chief of Staff), and Husein Tirtaadmidjaja (Supreme Court). The Committee played a role in the institutional setup and syllabus of the school.450 In contrast to the Army Command and Staff College, however, teaching in the Military Law Academy was almost entirely conducted by Indonesians, mostly jurists from the University of Indonesia Law School.451 The Military Law Academy played a major role in educating military law officers in military-related law, particularly the law on the state of emergency. Both the Army Command and Staff School and the Military Law Academy would become important “think-tanks” for Army officers in strategic and juridical issues, such as governance, political-economy, law, and the role of the Army in Indonesian society. Considering the role of Dutch Military Mission officers and Dutch-educated Indonesian jurists in the establishment of these schools, it is arguable that these schools became critical conduits for Dutch influence in the Indonesian Army. It was through these institutions too, that the Army continued to develop its military strategies and legal doctrines, particularly in relations to counterinsurgency and states of emergency. 450 The NMM officers were Major Mr. P. Westerdijk, Major Mr. J.van de Berkhof, and Captain Mr. J.H.M. Dambrink, all military law officers in the Dutch Army. Corps Perwira-Siswa Akademi Hukum Militer, Peringatan 1 Tahun Sekolah Hukum Militer, 15–16. 451 For instance, Prof.Mr.R. Djokosoetono taught Civics (Ilmu Negara), Politics (Ilmu Politik), and Constitutional Law (Hukum Tata Negara), while Soediman taught Introduction to Law. Prof.Mr.Dr. Hazairin taught Islamic and Adat Law, while Prof. Mr. R. Satochid Kartanagara taught Criminal Law, Military Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure Law, and Military Criminal Procedure Law. Basarudin Nasution taught classes on the law on the state of emergency (hukum keadaan bahaya). The only person of Dutch descent is Drs. H.J. Heeren, who taught Sociology. See Corps Perwira-Siswa Akademi Hukum Militer, 65–67. === [PDF page 173] === 173 Conclusion In 1981, historian of science and technology Daniel R. Headrick argued that technological innovations in medicine, communications, and weaponry were the “tools of empire” that enabled European empires to project their imperial powers across the globe.452 The same logic can be applied to the legal and military innovations discussed in this chapter. Yet, I argue that these “tools” were not exclusively “imperial” nor “colonial.” As this chapter has shown, the development of counterinsurgency strategy and emergency laws were tools of the colonial state and the newly independent Republic of Indonesia, as both allowed the expansion (and maintenance) of state control and influence in their territories in specific ways. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, the patterns of technological developments in medicine, communications, and weaponry observed in the European empires were also found in constitutional-legal and military sciences. The invention of emergency and counterinsurgency both depended upon and influenced each other, as both are the two sides of the same coin. Counterinsurgency strategy in Indonesia is first developed by the colonial security services. The KNIL had used counterinsurgency strategies since its earliest campaigns, as we have seen during the Java War, Padri War, and its subsequent campaigns. From the Java War until the Aceh Wars, the colonial army developed a logic of counterinsurgency that is also influenced by international developments in colonial warfare, most importantly from the French. This logic of counterinsurgency consisted of two important elements, namely the control of the population and 452 Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981). === [PDF page 174] === 174 the mobility of striking forces. It was during the Aceh Wars that the KNIL experimented and solidified the “counterinsurgency logic” into an applicable military tactic and strategy. The emphasis on population control were institutionalized by the use of military forces for governance purposes, such as the civil-military officer. Meanwhile, the importance of flexible, mobile military units found its modern form through the formation of the elite Korps Maréchausée te Voet. Through these methods, the Dutch succeeded in pacifying the archipelago, and the lessons of Aceh gradually became engraved to the minds of the Dutch military and political elites in the colony. After the victory in Aceh, the figure of the colonial military officer was permanently venerated in the pantheon of colonial power. A series of colonial security reforms in the late 1920s, which was ultimately based on fiscal reasoning, further confirmed the KNIL’s role in the maintenance of peace and order in the colony. In 1928, the KNIL published its tactical manual, the VPTL. Through the publishing of the VPTL—which was essentially a synthesis of the long Aceh experience—colonial counterinsurgency was officially codified and institutionalized as an official doctrine of the colonial army. The VPTL also highlighted that, in dealing with an insurgency, there was a necessity to consolidate both civilian and military control under the military, which has significant implications on the development of martial law. It was during this period, when the idea of the “dual-function” (Dutch: dubbelfunctie, Indonesian: dwifungsi) first emerged: an Army is not only created to defend the polity from foreign adversaries, but also to maintain order in the domestic sphere, even though the Army always thought that doing so was difficult in practice. === [PDF page 175] === 175 After the collapse of the Netherlands Indies state under the boots of invading Japanese forces in World War II and the outbreak of a long and bloody National Revolution, the new independent Republican state of Indonesia emerged. It was during the Revolution that Indonesian military elites, such as Nasution, experimented and reinterpreted colonial counterinsurgency strategies into a revolutionary one. A student of colonial warfare, Nasution soon shaped his own concepts of counterinsurgency strategy in his famous Pokok-Pokok Perang Gerilya. In the treatise, Nasution again emphasized the importance of population—or territorial—control, and the importance of mobile striking forces. There is a direct continuity between colonial counterinsurgency strategies of the KNIL and Nasution’s idea of counterinsurgency. During the 1950s, Nasution’s conception immediately became relevant, as the country experienced a series of security challenges in the form of Army mutinies and regional rebellions. The tried-and-tested counterinsurgency strategy was deployed, yet it has to conform with the realities of the new era: the Indonesian Republic is no longer a colonial state, yet it was a negara hukum (state of laws). Here, the crucial link between counterinsurgency and emergency became apparent. Thus, the implementation of military counterinsurgency strategies had to be complemented by juridical legitimacy through martial law. Therefore, new emergency laws were developed by the Indonesian state. However, the path-dependent nature of science becomes more evident here, as Indonesians first used the colonial-era emergency law 1939 Regulations on the State of War and Siege, while many parts from the colonial law found its way to the Republican emergency laws of 1946 Law on the State of Emergency (and later the 1957 Law on the State of Emergency). Consequently, we can see the two interlocking “logics” of counterinsurgency and emergency being developed by the Army in its technical and strategic education institutions. === [PDF page 176] === 176 Nevertheless, it is important to underline the role of the Dutch Military Mission in the establishment of the Army’s education system. Its two premier higher military schools, the Army Command and Staff Colleges and Military Law Academy, was initially established under the supervision of the Dutch Military Mission in 1951 and 1952. Initial TNI counterinsurgency doctrine was initially adopted from Dutch colonial practices, as exhibited by the adaptation of the colonial counterinsurgency manual VPTL into the corpus of Indonesian military sciences in the Army Command and Staff College. Meanwhile, the colonial approach to martial law and state of emergency was also adopted through the training in the Military Law Academy through figures such as Basarudin Nasution. The doctrines and practices promoted in the Army Command and Staff College and Military Law Academy was substantially important in fostering and enabling effective military methods in territorial control, which in turn is an essential part of colonial counterinsurgency strategy. Indonesian Army counterinsurgency and state of emergency doctrines, however, were only institutionalized much later, particularly after the initial successes of Army counterinsurgency campaigns in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Nevertheless, this chapter has shown that there was a clear and present continuity between colonial and post-colonial counterinsurgency practices that would subsequently affect Indonesian politics long after the Dutch left Indonesia. === [PDF page 177] === 177 CHAPTER III: THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF MILITARIZATION: POST-REVOLUTIONARY CRIME IN JAVA, 1950-1953 Introduction: The Challenges of Merdeka On December 28, 1949, after the transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands to Indonesia, President Soekarno arrived at Kemayoran Airport in Jakarta. That moment indicated Soekarno’s first time in Jakarta after four years of the Revolution. Soekarno then continued his journey to the Independence Palace (Istana Merdeka). As his motorcade passed through the streets of Jakarta, he was delayed by a crowd, approximately 100,000-strong. When Soekarno arrived in the Istana, he declared that: “we are now on peaceful terms with the Dutch. We must now begin to rebuild our nation, but without unity we cannot achieve the ideals for which we have fought so long.” Soekarno ended his short speech with the words: “do not stop fighting until all Indonesia, including Irian (New Guinea) are free.” The crowd responded by chanting “Merdeka! Merdeka!”.453 The arrival of President Soekarno, the undisputed leader of the Indonesian nation at that time, represented the end of the long Indonesian National Revolution. Revolutionary dynamics everywhere, however, continue to play out long after the end of the revolution, and transitions from revolutionary to a truly independent state have often been marred by blood, either from political, social, or economic contestations. Indonesia was no exception. After the transfer of 453 “Soekarno in Djakarta Stormachtig Begroet,” De Telegraaf, December 29, 1949. === [PDF page 178] === 178 sovereignty from the Dutch in 1949, Indonesia entered a period of continuous conflict both in the center and the far-flung regions. Born out of colonialism, war, and revolution, the Republic of Indonesia inherited a weak state. In general, physical infrastructure was heavily damaged, the bureaucracy was riddled with problems, and the national economy was dislocated. Competition between political parties often spilled over into state institutions, such as the civil service, the Army, and the judiciary. In short, the Indonesian nation emerged from the revolution intact, yet the same thing cannot be said about the state itself. What, then, should we make of the character of the Indonesian National Revolution and the post-revolutionary state that emerged after it? A direct consequence of the Revolution was the widespread social unrest that existed in virtually all parts of Indonesia, a problem which was exacerbated by a weak state governed by an incoherent class of urban political elites that inherited a dilapidated colonial-era civil institutions and a crumbling economic infrastructure.454 In this chapter, I argue that during the 1950s, the Republic of Indonesia was a nation-state handicapped by insecurity, and this greatly helps to explain the settings for the militarization of the state and society. Violent crime, the main contributor to insecurity, can be categorized into urban and rural variants. Generally, crime was caused by the three common problems of postrevolution, namely the proliferation of small arms, the prevalence of competing armed groups, and the limited institutional capacity of the young Indonesian state to deliver on promises to control 454 Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200, 289. === [PDF page 179] === 179 these armed groups. Violence appeared under many different banners: some groups created unrest in the name of religion, such as the House of Islam (Darul Islam); other groups rebelled against rationalization and demobilization, such as the Army of the Just King (Angkatan Perang Ratu Adil) in West Java, Andi Aziz and Kahar Muzakkar in South Sulawesi, the Ibnu Hajar group in South Kalimantan, and the PRRI-Permesta revolts in Sumatra and Sulawesi; and still others simply engaged in brigandage, such as the Bambu Runtjing, Tjitarum, and the widespread violent crime and gerombolan waves throughout Java. The prevalence of violent crime throughout the 1950s was both caused by and subsequently resulted in a handicapped nation-state, in which the central government were incapable of projecting its power and authority outside of major cities. Meanwhile in the capital too, the government also often faced challenges to its legitimacy due to the failure in protecting the people. In other words, Indonesia in the 1950s was a weak state that was handicapped by its own people rather than external threats. This chapter is laid out in two parts. In the first part, I discuss the sociological and institutional settings in which violent crime appeared in the 1950s. This includes a discussion of the concept pemuda (youth), which was popular during the Revolution, and how it was transformed into the new term gerombolan. In the second part, I examine the acts of violent crime across West, Central, and East Java. Urban and rural locales are discussed, including the main cities of Jakarta, Bandung, Semarang, and Surabaya, Meanwhile, major criminal groups such as the Merapi-Merbabu Complex and Darul Islam will also be discussed. The chapter concludes with === [PDF page 180] === 180 a discussion of how crime and criminality in Java set the stage for new and broader forms of societal militarization. During much of the 1950s, the demographic outlook of the country experienced two massive changes. Overall, the Indonesian population dramatically increased throughout the 1950s —77.2 million in 1950, 85.4 million in 1955, and 97 million in 1961.455 As a result of the devastation brought by the Japanese Occupation and the revolution, urbanization also intensified during this period, especially in the main cities of Java such as Jakarta, Bandung, Semarang, and Surabaya.456 (See Table 1) This was partly caused by the destruction of the rural areas and the disappearance of industries after war and revolution.457 Virtually, there was a demographic crisis in 1950s Indonesia, in which people flowed into the urban centers from the countryside, signified by dramatic increase in urban population. Table 1. Population of Java's Major Cities in 1920, 1930, and 1961 455 Cities Population in 1920 Population in 1930 Population in 1961 Djakarta 513,115 2,973,052 Surabaja 192,190 341,675 1,007,945 Bandung 94,800 166,815 972,566 Ricklefs, 290. Joseph Army Sadhyoko, Perbanditan Di Kota Semarang Pasca Revolusi 1950-1958 (Temanggung: Kendi, 2021); Purnawan Basundoro, “Antara Baju Loreng Dan Baju Rombeng: Kontrol Tentara Terhadap Rakyat Miskin Di Kota Surabaya Tahun 1950an,” Masyarakat, Kebudayaan Dan Politik 24, no. 4 (2011): 309–17; Graeme John Hugo, “Population Mobility in West Java, Indonesia” (PhD Thesis, Canberra, Australian National University, 1975). 457 Nathan Keyfitz, “The Ecology of Indonesian Cities,” American Journal of Sociology 66, no. 4 (January 1961): 350; Tan Goantiang, “Growth of Cities in Indonesia 1930-1961,” Tijdschrift Voor Economische En Sociale Geografie 56, no. 3 (1965): 104. 456 === [PDF page 181] === 181 Semarang 158,036 217,796 503,153 Surakarta 134,285 165,484 367,626 Jogjakarta 103,711 136,649 312,629 Malang 42,981 86,646 341,452 Adopted from Goantiang 1965. Meanwhile, economic reconstruction was slow. Foreign firms, such as the StandardVacuum Oil Company, the Caltex Oil Company, and the Koninklijk Paketvaart Maatschappij (KPM) remained in control of the Indonesian export economy. Inflation grew tremendously, and the governmental apparatus failed to address this, despite being heavily overburdened with civil servants.458 Throughout the 1950s, effective economic policy was hindered by the lack of political support, as cabinets were “in office for too short a period to be able to implement effective economic policies, even when there was a clear vision about what policies were needed.”459 In comparison with the late colonial period, Indonesian GDP per capita in the 1950s plummeted, inflation surged, and black markets and smuggling was rampant due to high tariffs and an artificially high exchange rate of the Rupiah.460 Economist Benjamin Higgins, who spent time in Indonesia as an observer during the late 1950s, claimed that “Indonesia must surely be accounted the number one economic failure among the major underdeveloped countries.”461 458 Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200, 291. Anne Booth, Economic Change in Modern Indonesia: Colonial and Post-Colonial Comparisons (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 40. 460 Booth, 42–44; Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200, 274. 461 Benjamin Higgins, Economics Development: Problems, Principles, and Policies (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1968), 678. 459 === [PDF page 182] === 182 One thing that the Indonesians inherited from the colonial state was a relatively strong legal apparatus. In practice, however, the institutional capacity of the central government was severely limited. Meanwhile, the Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI), the state’s main “troubleshooters in the field,” was far from a coherent force at least until the late 1950s.462 Hence, if one might be forced to characterize the Indonesian political and social world in the 1950s, a dualistic, Janus-like picture emerged. the 1950s was not only a moment of order where postrevolutionary state-building and experimentation of ideologies (democracy, Islam, ethnic regionalism) flourished. The decade was also a period of chaos, where political and economic instability, social unrest, military uprisings, and regional revolts reigned. In this chapter, I concentrate on the “chaotic” face of the 1950s by looking at the depth and breadth of social unrest in Java, which subsequently caused the state to come up with a solution that they already inherit from earlier times—the logic of emergency and counterinsurgency.463 A State of Chaos: A General Overview of Insecurity in Post-Revolutionary Java On November 20, 1950, S. Purwodihardjo, an official in the Ministry of the Interior, wrote a letter to Minister of Defense Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX requesting small arms for use by members of the civil service (Pamong Pradja) and its police force (Polisi Pamong Pradja). The small arms – including Colt revolvers, carbines, and swords – were to be distributed to the Provincial Governors (Gubernur), Residents (Residen), Regents (Bupati), Mayors (Wali Kota), 462 McVey, “The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army,” April 1971; McVey, “The PostRevolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army,” April 1972. 463 See Chapter I and II. === [PDF page 183] === 183 District Chiefs (Wedana), and Underdistrict Chiefs (Camat). In total, the Ministry of the Interior requested 3,440 Colt revolvers, 7,010 carbines, and 9,558 short swords (klewang).464Replying to the request, Hamengkubuwono IX agreed to lend the small arms, provided that the proper training in their use was provided to the civil service members under the supervision of local Army or Police units. Hamengkubuwono was concerned that without proper training and oversight, arms provided to the civil service would fall into the hands of the “wild forces” (pasukan liar) roaming Java.465 This exchange reveals just how dire the security situation was in Java during the early 1950s. Disorder and chaos prevailed within the Indonesian society in the early 1950s, and a similar observation was clearly evident to the political elites in Jakarta. Raden Mas Sewaka, a Sundanese ménak who served as Minister of Defense for the Sukiman Cabinet (April 1951-1952), lamented that: It can be said that the security situation throughout Indonesia at that time was not encouraging at all. Armed groups (gerombolan) existed in almost every area: the DI (Darul Islam) Kartosuwirjo in West Java, DI in Western Central Java and the MMC (Merapi Merbabu Complex) group in Eastern Central Java, Kahar Muzakar in Sulawesi, Ibnu Hadjar in South Kalimantan, RMS (Republik Maluku Selatan) in the Moluccas, and brigand groups in North, Central and 464 S. Purwodihardjo, “Pindjaman Revolver Bagi Mantri-Polisi d.l.l,” November 20, 1950, RA.8a 1371, ANRI. Hamengkubuwono IX, “Permintaan Pindjaman Revolver Bagi Mantri Polisi Dll.,” December 11, 1950, RA.8a 1371, ANRI. 465 === [PDF page 184] === 184 Southern Sumatra. Official or wildcat strikes have occurred in several vital companies in major cities, such as Jakarta, Bandung, Semarang, Medan, and Surabaya.466 The birds-eye view provided by Sewaka was also confirmed on the ground. In 1950, the Societal Surveillance Service (Pengawas Aliran Masjarakat, later the Dinas Pengawasan Keselamatan Negara or State Security Surveillance Service), the Police intelligence arm, reported that there were at least 206 incidents of armed assault against the Police, resulting in the death of 42 police officers and the loss of 1,202 small arms.467 Meanwhile, 27 foreigners were also killed during the year, including Yale professor Raymond Kennedy who was visiting Java at that time. This grim picture of social unrest was common, although these statistics are for West Java alone. However, according to Herbert Feith, in regards to the widespread insecurity across the Indonesian archipelago, the problems of West Java was “the most difficult of all.”468 The national attention towards resolving insecurity is also reflected in the cabinet programs throughout the period of Liberal Democracy. From the Third Hatta Cabinet (December 1949September 1950) until the Second Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet (March 1956-April 1957), the concern for resolving internal security (keamanan) were always at the fore of the Cabinets’ 466 Sewaka, Tjorat-Tjaret Dari Djaman Ke Djaman (Djakarta: Ichtiar, 1955), 306. Ménak is a Sundanese upper-level aristocrat, equal to the Javanese priyayi. 467 Kantor Pengawas Aliran Masjarakat Propinsi Djawa Barat, Djawatan Polisi Negara, “Ichtisar Kedjahatan Dalam Tahun 1950 Diseluruh Propinsi Djawa Barat” (Bandung, Maart 1951), RA 8a 1013, ANRI. 468 Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 54. === [PDF page 185] === 185 programs.469 The dire situation also invited critical responses from political parties and organizations, such as the Nationalist Party (Partai Nasionalis Indonesia), Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia), and the Railway Workers’ Union (Sarekat Buruh Kereta Api). The railway workers were deeply concerned with gerombolan attacks against trains and rail lines, and they asked that the central government paid more attention to ensuring their work safety. Nationalist Party politicians also complained to the central government, asking Soekarno to solve this problem of insecurity.470 Meanwhile, Communist Party members complained in their newspaper, the Harian Rakjat, on December 23, 1952: The terror gangs (gerombolan teror) are trying to further expand their territory to the border of the municipality of Greater Jakarta. This increasingly violent disturbance, threat and terror, not only complicates the livelihoods of the peasants in the villages around Jakarta, it is a direct and indirect threat to the security of the city as the seat of the central government. It is clear that the actions of these gangs is similar to the imperialists’ attempts to destroy the people's movement by means of intimidation.471 469 Feith, 50, 153, 186; Herbert Feith, The Wilopo Cabinet 1952-1953: A Turning Point in Post-Revolutionary Indonesia (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2009), 86–87; Kementerian Penerangan RI, Keterangan Pemerintah Atas Program Kabinet Ali Sastroamidjojo (Djakarta: Pertjetakan Negara, 1953), 4; Kementerian Penerangan RI, Keterangan Pemerintah Atas Program Kabinet Ali Sastroamidjojo (Kedua) Di Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat (Djakarta: Pertjetakan Negara, 1956), 4. 470 M. Fauzi, “‘Lain Di Front, Lain Pula Di Kota’: Jagoan Dan Bajingan Di Jakarta Tahun 1950-An,” in Kota Lama, Kota Baru: Sejarah Kota-Kota Di Indonesia Sebelum Dan Setelah Kemerdekaan, ed. Freek Columbijn et al. (Yogyakarta: Ombak, 2015), 591. 471 Harian Rakjat 23 December 1952. Cited in Fauzi, 591. === [PDF page 186] === 186 Complaints on insecurity was not only noted by the state security services, but also by commoners. In an earlier letter dated January 19, 1950, Salim Abdul Wahid, a resident in the city of Cirebon in West Java, wrote a letter to President Soekarno: … the situation in Indonesia has become unsafe, became chaotic, because there is the Darul Islam... …I think that if this [situation] continues, the people may all become Communists because their lives are threatened for nothing… …if independence is to continue, the people and their belongings must be protected… I hope the situation will be safe again as soon as possible... The sanctity of independence should be protected so that it will stand forever…472 In a letter dated January 21, 1950, Sasranalangsa, a commoner residing in Surabaya, wrote to President Soekarno regarding to the social and political conditions of the 1950s: The people are not satisfied with this new [political] condition, because they have not felt the conditions that should be favorable to them. The situation at this time is like a driver in a running car with a foot on the clutch pedal. The transmission has been put into gear, but the clutch is still depressed. The car continues to run, even though the gear has changed, but it will not run immediately. At some point it will certainly stop, because it runs out of power if the driver does not immediately release the clutch. If the car has stopped, the driver is forced to change gears, so that the car can start running again. In this parable, the car is the 472 Saliem Abdoel Wahied, “Merdeka: Kapada Padoeka Presieden Soekarno,” January 19, 1950, RA.12 114, ANRI. === [PDF page 187] === 187 government, and the clutch is the style of government. Thus, every change of government brings miserable consequences for the people being governed. The emphasis of the situation at this time is on the matter of security. In a safe situation, all efforts will run smoothly. In what way have you secured our territory? Is it through the TNI, Military Police, Mobiele Brigade, State Police, Regional Police, Barisan Pengawal, etc? Have we actually achieved the security we desire?... …security cannot be obtained by deploying such troops alone, but with assertiveness, each person struggling independently, in their own environment, in their own power, their own will. What are the current needs of the people? Since the past, the people just need food, clothes, and their own shelter. The people do not want a beautiful object or a project that is renowned around the world. The people do not want red (merah) or green (hijau). The people just want to eat, dress, and sleep in his own place.473 Sasranalangsa then continued to propose policies on the production and distribution of food, clothing, and shelter. According to him, ensuring food supply is the easiest: as long as security is achieved, the people will provide for themselves. On clothing and housing, Sasranalangsa added, the government should take a “laissez-faire” approach and allow local traders to flourish; meanwhile, the government should organize a statewide housing development campaign to establish new housing projects. 473 Sasranalangsa, “Surat Kepada PJM,” January 21, 1950, RA.12 340, ANRI. === [PDF page 188] === 188 Another letter is from the people of Cibarusah, Karawang Regency, West Java for President Soekarno that was sent through Colonel Sadikin, the Commander of the Siliwangi Division and Military Governor of West Java on June 18, 1950: The undersigned, on behalf of the people of Cibarusah, Bojongmangu and Pasirkoepang Villages. It is a very restless time because there are many robbers (garong) and thieves (rampog) and the official Army is nowhere to be found. Now, the people are asking that the authorities send in the TNI Siliwangi from Battalion 3001, Major Darsono’s people (anak) [then] maybe Cibarusah and the villages can become safe, lest the people run away because the people are experiencing losses of property and lives…474 The letter was then signed by twenty representatives of the two villages of Bojongmangu and Pasirkoepang. The letters written by Sastranalangsa, Wahid, and the people of Cibarusah cogently illustrates the Indonesian situation of the 1950s. In many areas of West Java, the period from 1949 until 1962 is dubbed the “zaman gerombolan” (“an age of brigands”).475 It is clear that the primary problem of the Indonesian society at that time was insecurity. For the Indonesian people, the 1950s was a decade of contradiction. Post-revolutionary independence arrived hand-in-hand with an outbreak of violent crimes. These observations were not only reflected by Indonesians, but also foreigners reporting in on Indonesia. Looking back 474 “Permohonan Diadakan TNI Divisi Siliwangi Di Tjibarusah.,” June 18, 1950, RA.12 123, ANRI. Gustaaf Reerink, “From Autonomous Village to ‘Informal Slum’: Kampong Development and State Control in Bandung (1930-1960),” in Cars, Conduits, and Kampongs: The Modernization of the Indonesian City, 1920-1960, ed. Freek Columbijn and Joost Coté (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 203. 475 === [PDF page 189] === 189 from the year 1959, the first year of Soekarno’s “Guided Democracy,” Willard A. Hanna, an American Universities Field Staff scholar posted in Java, reflects that the decade had been distinguished, to be sure, by noteworthy advances in education and health, in national self-consciousness, and in international influence; it had been distinguished also by internecine political feuding, by nationwide armed disorders, both large and small, by reckless economic manipulation, and by questionable international dealings. It had been distinguished most of all, so far as the vast majority of the people of Indonesia were concerned, by disappointed expectations of achieving exactly what revolution was supposed to bring—more or better food, clothing, shelter, and miscellaneous consumer goods.476 This acute observation by Hanna provides us with snapshot of post-revolutionary Indonesia that was riddled by both progress and devolution; optimism and disappointment; order and chaos. Similar to Hanna, LIFE magazine’s photo essay on 1950s Indonesia also illustrates Indonesian instability during the post-revolutionary periods: A generation of Indonesian patriots fought for merdeka (freedom). Now that they have won it, they are discovering that the bright days of fulfillment can be clouded by the aftermath of struggle and new problems of peace. In western Java triggerhappy young men with guns still stalk the countryside. Some were natives who, having fought as mercenaries for the Dutch, now roam unemployed, hated by their 476 Willard A. Hanna, Bung Karno’s Indonesia (New York: American Universities Field Staff, Inc, 1961), x. === [PDF page 190] === 190 countrymen. Some are guerrillas who fought the Dutch, then turned against President Soekarno. They include Moslem fanatics of Darul Islam (“World of Islam), who want to make Indonesia an Islamic utopia where by Allah’s grace all things are perfect. Several thousand of these dangerous men are led by a former Dutch officer who has an egocentric plan to purge “Japanese influence” from Indonesia by warring on the Soekarno government.477 In its essence, insecurity in 1950s Indonesia was primarily driven by the prevalence of non-state armed groups, or what I call “the gerombolan problem.” This social phenomena emerged in the context of “the failure of successive leadership groups to meet the high expectations generated by the successful struggle for independence.”478 This, in turn, created societal disillusionment, which was then then translated into popular unrest, which is often manifested in societal violence in the form of crimes, rebellions, and coups. This is not to say that societal violence were invented in the 1950s. Indeed, Henk Schulte Nordholt argues that the close relationship between violence and crime with state and power was first firmly established by the colonial regime of the Netherlands Indies, which was “a state of violence”.479 This process of entrenchment and reinforcing of crime, violence, and politics, however, were substantially magnified during the Japanese occupation and Revolutionary periods. Thus, the newly independent Indonesia in the 1950s did not only inherited the tools and traditions 477 “The New Nation of Indonesia,” LIFE, February 13, 1950, 94. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1200, 289. 479 Nordholt, “A Genealogy of Violence,” 37. 478 === [PDF page 191] === 191 of a strong and authoritarian state, but also a society that was already geared for the proliferation of crime and violence. Reconceptualizing Unrest: From Pemuda to Gerombolan In order to trace the sociopolitical origins of insecurity in 1950s Indonesia, it is imperative for us to return to the early days of the Revolution. A prominent feature of the Indonesian National Revolution is the role of the young generation (Angkatan Muda), or the pemuda (youth), which formed the bulk of the Republican fighting force. Pemuda itself is a social concept that is often used during the early days of the Indonesian National Revolution. Literally meaning “youth,” the concept has several historical and sociocultural roots and meanings. First, there is the Javanese roots famously posited by Benedict Anderson. According to Anderson, the concept of Pemuda was, in many ways, adopted from the traditional Javanese idea of male “youthness,” which has a distinct style and meaning.480 Youth, which refers to the liminal period after the coming-of-age and fatherhood, was conceived as “a time of withdrawal, concentration, and preparation” in search of meaning for the coming life.481 Thus, the youth attached themselves to prominent patrons such as the local djago or Kyai (Islamic teacher, leader of Islamic schools—pesantrèns) to be trained. These young men attached to the djago or Kyai played a Janus-like role within Javanese traditional society: 480 481 Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, 1–3. Anderson, 4. === [PDF page 192] === 192 In times of tranquility of order, utopia was the world within—whether the search for the absolute through study, asceticism, and prayer, or the quest for power through physical and magical exercises. In times of crisis, however, utopia often assumed an external aspect in response to the social disintegration and natural catastrophes which were traditionally regarded as the visible signs of dynastic decline and danger in the cosmological order. Under these conditions, the santri and their like flowed out into society in many guises: as the zealous supporters of new dynastic pretenders, as propagandists for religious brotherhoods, and even simply as magico-religious bandits.482 The ideal of the pemuda is significant during the Revolution, as “when society itself succumbed to chaos and disintegration, the counter-institutions of the pesantrèn and the djago band offered a model of a transcendent order.”483 Taufik Abdullah expands Anderson’s definition by separating the concept into “subjective” and “objective” constituent aspects. The “objective” aspects is based on real, measurable indicators—such as biological age, generational position in the family, or hierarchical position in an organization. Meanwhile, the “subjective” aspect refers to the meaning ascribed to the concept by society at large.484 One example would be the widespread idea that pemuda should be more “progressive” than the older generation, or they should bring positive changes to the world. This 482 Anderson, 9. Anderson, 10. 484 Taufik Abdullah, Pemuda Dan Perubahan Sosial (Jakarta: Pustaka LP3ES, 1974), 1. 483 === [PDF page 193] === 193 also leads us to a kind of “generation gap” factor that also defines a pemuda.485 Meanwhile, Abdullah also underlines the fact that many of the youth groups was led by a selected, privileged section of the pemuda—the pemuda “elite”—which often have obtained higher education and lived in the major cities such as Jakarta, Bandung, Surabaya, and Yogyakarta.486 After the Proklamasi of August 17, 1945, the pemudas organized themselves into armed groups. These armed groups—laskars—immediately grew into prominence among Indonesian society. Etymologically, the word means an “army, a group of soldiers, or troop” in Indonesian, and it was adopted from the Arab and Persian terms askar or lasykar.487 Historically, a laskar translates to “an armed unit, outside of the regular military, that is often politically-oriented.”488 Meanwhile, laskars often refers to the armed units of political “struggle organizations,” or badan perdjuangan, which emerged during the early days of the revolution. These laskars emerged in a variety of forms: from a politically-oriented, organized group with a basic setup of administration, to a mélange of armed bandits that showed only patrimonial, group or regional loyalties that participated in sustained or symbolic revolutionary actions against the Dutch. Major examples of these laskars are the Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia, Hizbullah, Barisan Banteng, Barisan Pemberontakan Republik Indonesia, and Laskar Rakjat Djakarta Raya. 485 Abdullah, 7. Abdullah, 4–5. 487 “Laskar,” in Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia (KBBI) Daring (Badan Pengembangan dan Pembinaan Bahasa, Kementerian Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan Indonesia, 2016), https://kbbi.kemdikbud.go.id/entri/laskar. 488 Robert B. Cribb, Gejolak Revolusi Di Jakarta 1945-1949 (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 1990), 61. 486 === [PDF page 194] === 194 In terms of leadership, these laskars were often led by a primus inter pares, often representing the stereotype of the Javanese djago.489 The emergence of autochthonous “strongmen”-type figures leading armed paramilitary groups are also evident across Southeast Asia. These figures often emerged into the political limelight after a successive period of colonialism, decolonization, and war.490 Colonial regimes often made use of these local power brokers, such as in the alliance between indigenous administrators and djagos in the Netherlands Indies or the relationship between village heads and panglima penyamun (bandit chiefs) in Malaya.491 Considering the ambivalent position of the jago in Javanese society, it is not uncommon to see former criminals or rebels sitting on top of the leadership ladder of these laskars.492 Consequently, as an institution, the laskars also inherited its leaders’ ambivalent status within society. An example of a politically-oriented and organized laskar were the Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist Youth, Pesindo), which has exhibited a closeness to Sjahrir and Amir Sjarifuddin’s Socialist Party. Originally an amalgam of various laskars and “struggle organizations” (badan perjuangan) that emerged during the early days of the Revolution, the Pesindo saw its origins in the Surabaya-based youth organization Youth of the Republic of Indonesia (Pemuda Republik Indonesia), which was established on September 23, 1945 under 489 On the Javanese figure of the jago, see Chapter 2, p.3, f.8. For a fine summary of the patterns of violence and its relationship to historical crises in Southeast Asia, see Karl Hack, “Decolonization and Violence in Southeast Asia,” in Beyond Empire and Nation: The Decolonization of African and Asian Societies, 1930s-1960s, ed. Els Bogaerts and Remco Raben (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2012). 491 Nordholt, “A Genealogy of Violence”; Cheah Boon Kheng, The Peasant Robbers of Kedah, 1900-1929: Historical and Folk Perceptions (Singapore: Oxord University Press, 1988). 492 See Robert Cribb, Para Jago Dan Kaum Revolusioner Jakarta 1945-1949 (Depok: Masup Jakarta, 2010). 490 === [PDF page 195] === 195 Soemarsono, Kusnadi, Krissubanu, and Ruslan Widjajasastra.493 Later in its life, the Pesindo is notable for its attention to organization-building and political programs. In addition to fighting in the front lines, the Pesindo also established schools—most notably the so-called “Marx House” in Madiun, Pesindo’s headquarters—and initiated cultural programs. Pesindo was well-armed and organized, primarily due to its closeness with Amir Sjarifuddin, who subsequently became Minister of Defense during the Revolution. Its closeness with Amir also paved the way for its own fall during the Madiun Incident of 1948.494 Meanwhile, at the other side of the spectrum, an example of a laskar that was less organized yet politically inclined was the Insurgent Corps of the Republic of Indonesia (Barisan Pemberontakan Republik Indonesia) under Soetomo (Bung Tomo), which was founded in Surabaya. According to one account, Bung Tomo’s Insurgent Corps “was less an organization as such than a jumble of spontaneously formed traditional-style bands owing loose loyalty to a radio transmitter and its chief.”495 Bung Tomo mobilized local Surabayan jago in order to fill the Corps’ ranks, and the organization was known to become unruly, not subject to any central authority other than Bung Tomo himself. Roughly similar to Bung Tomo’s Insurgent Corps, there was also the Jakarta People’s Militia (Laskar Rakyat Jakarta Raya), which mostly operated out of the West Javan region of Karawang. This laskar, renowned throughout the Revolution as the main Revolutionary force 493 Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, 129. Soelias, Pesindo, Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia, 1945-1950 [Pesindo, Indonesian Socialist Youth, 1945-1950]. 495 Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, 156. 494 === [PDF page 196] === 196 halting Dutch expansion out of occupied Jakarta, was formed out of a close coalition between Republican nationalists and local bandits.496 Major nationalist figures that played a role in the shaping of this laskar was Chairul Saleh, Armunanto, Johar Nur, Kusnandar, and Ahmad Astrawinata.497 Throughout the early days of the Revolution, the Jakarta People’s Militia controlled Karawang, until Republican army units from Central Java cleared the area and ended their hegemony in the region.498 The Jakarta-based People’s Militia contrasted itself with the Surabayan Insurgent Corps by nature of its federated form—it was a loose amalgamation of local bandits, and its influence remained throughout the Revolution. The Pesindo, Barisan Pemberontakan Republik Indonesia, and Laskar Rakyat Jakarta Raya are typical of the laskars during the Revolution. Indeed, the Revolution was populated and motivated by self-established armed groups such as these. Indeed, it appears that in relation to the question whether it was the pemuda or the older nationalist group that primarily steered the Revolution, it is irrefutable that these laskars dominated the conduct of the Revolution on the ground. It was these armed groups that formed the bulk of the Republican forces against the Allied and later Dutch presence. The Revolution opened new opportunities for criminals and jagos. In his study of revolutionary Jakarta, Robert Cribb claimed that the tradition of Revolutionary laskars was a product of the alliance and disalliance between the Jakartan criminal underworld and revolutionary 496 Cribb, Para Jago Dan Kaum Revolusioner Jakarta 1945-1949, 2. Cribb, 100. 498 Cribb, 175–85. 497 === [PDF page 197] === 197 nationalist leaders.499 This alliance was predicated upon the political analyses and programmatic action capabilities of the nationalist leaders and the mass organization of the criminals.500 The importance of laskars for the conduct of the Revolution is evident in how the Republican government have repeatedly sought control of these armed groups. The first act to organize the laskars was by initiating a first nation-wide conference of pemuda groups in Yogyakarta. The First Indonesian Youth Congress, initiated by the Yogya-based Gerakan Pemuda Republik Indonesia under the sponsorship of Minister of Information Amir Sjarifuddin, was conducted on November 9, 1945 at Balai Mataram.501 Representatives from at least thirty youth groups and laskars attended the Congress.502 The Congress, however, failed to achieve its aim in consolidating the groups into a single nationwide organization, and it only resulted in the amalgamation of seven youth organizations into the Pesindo. The rest of the laskars, especially the Barisan Banteng and Hizbullah, remained independent. The second effort to bring the laskars under state control was the promulgation of National Defense Council Regulation No.19 of 1946 on October 4, 1946. Published under martial law,the regulation explicitly governs and defines the organization of laskars and other armed groups.503 The regulation states that a laskar is a “people’s organization, which is military in nature, outside of the Army and which is approved by the Minister of Defense.” Approvals for new laskars were contingent upon the number of manpower and small arms in their possession. Laskars operating 499 Cribb, 31. Cribb, 57. 501 Hardjito, Risalah Gerakan Pemuda (Jakarta: Pustaka Antara, 1952), 33. 502 Hardjito, 36. 503 Peraturan Dewan Pertahanan Negara No.19. 500 === [PDF page 198] === 198 in a Residency should at least have a strength of 200 men, provided with a barracks, and organized as a coherent and disciplined military unit.504 Meanwhile, armed groups that did not fulfill these requirements were to be organized as a barisan tjadangan (barisan), or “reserve unit”.505 The difference between the laskars and barisans were their chain of command and finances: the laskars were to be paid through the state coffers, while the barisans were not; on the other hand, laskar leadership was to be appointed by the government, while the barisans were free to elect its own leaders.506 Following the regulation, the National Defense Council also established Central Laskar Council (Dewan Kelaskaran Pusat) on November 12, 1946, attended by nine of the major laskars in Java at that time.507 Through the promulgation of this Defense Council ruling, the Republican state regulated—at least on paper—the formation and organization of laskars and other armed groups. It was the first time that the Republic were to provide a legal framework to the concept of laskar. As with many other revolutions, however, what that is clear in theory does not translate well on the ground. Republican state capacity to implement and regulate the growth of new laskars throughout the Revolution was very limited, and “unregulated” armed groups continued to emerge across Java and the other islands. When the “armed phase” of the Revolution ended with the transfer of sovereignty in 1949, these laskars remained across Java, retained their weapons, and many of them returned to their former occupations, or they became rebels or criminals. These former laskars were often confused, 504 Peraturan Dewan Pertahanan Negara No.19, Article 1. “Barisan,” in Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia (KBBI) Daring (Badan Pengembangan dan Pembinaan Bahasa, Kementerian Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan Indonesia, 2016), https://kbbi.kemdikbud.go.id/entri/Barisan. 506 Peraturan Dewan Pertahanan Negara No.19, Article 2. 507 Cribb, Para Jago Dan Kaum Revolusioner Jakarta 1945-1949, 166. 505 === [PDF page 199] === 199 disoriented, and out of a job. Many of them only knew fighting, which hardly allows for useful skills in in the post-revolutionary world. In order to survive, many of them became criminals or brigands. As a consequence, the existence of these former laskars immediately became problematic for the state. After the transfer of sovereignty the term laskar subsequently fell out of use. This development is closely related to the Republic’s new interest on postwar reconstruction and maintenance of peace and order. In place of the laskar, a new term, gerombolan, was used far more often. Gerombolan is mainly used in referring to groups of brigands or common criminal groups that conducted criminal acts, such as brigandage, robberies, riots, and other crimes. This shows how these former laskars lost its revolutionary prestige—while its relationship with the expanding central state became increasingly strained. In Indonesian, gerombolan itself as a term literally means “a group of people,” yet it has a more negative connotation than kelompok (the Indonesian term for “group”). According to one Indonesian dictionary, gerombolan means a “group” or “band” of people, yet it was also used by the state in defining “a band of troublemakers, (rioters and so on).”508 In contemporary times, the word gerombolan is still used to refer to a group of people that are menacing, not unsimilar to the English term “gangs.” To a certain extent, the Republican definition of gerombolan inherits many of the qualities bequeathed by the colonial judicial system in understanding banditry. For instance, much of the robberies described in this chapter is defined by the term rampok, which has been 508 “Gerombolan,” in Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia (KBBI) Daring (Badan Pengembangan dan Pembinaan Bahasa, Kementerian Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan Indonesia, 2016), https://kbbi.kemdikbud.go.id/entri/Gerombolan. === [PDF page 200] === 200 widely used since colonial times in referring to robber-bandit groups.509 For instance, referring to the crime waves in the hinterlands of Batavia (Ommelanden), the colonial government often refer to brigandage as rampok, while the brigands themselves were called perampok (or in Dutch, rampokker) or garong.510 On the ground, the gerombolans do emanate a character distinct from their colonial counterparts, and their revolutionary provenance made it hard for them to be completely subject under the term “robber-bandits.”511 Consequently, the state emerged with a new term that encompass a wider audience, namely the gerombolan, which means a group of people that were unruly. In this context, gerombolan is a more “neutral” term, as it is less value-laden than rampok or garong. It is clear that in the post-revolutionary milieu, there is a transformation of meaning that is not only semantic but also pragmatic for the former freedom fighters and struggle organizations that fell out of favor with the Republican state. Furthermore, the word gerombolan represents the former laskars’ changed, and no longer liminal position in the postwar society. At least in the first half of the 1950s, the Indonesian state did not consider the gerombolan problem as enemy of the state, and they actually considered them as criminals that should be rehabilitated. In fact, the state took an ambiguous attitude towards the 509 The term rampok is used similarly to “dacoity” in British India and Burma. On bandits in colonial Java, see Margreet van Till, David McKay, and Beverley Jackson, Banditry in West Java, 1869-1942 (Singapore: NUS Press, 2011); Henk Schulte Nordholt and Margreet van Till, “Colonial Criminals in Java, 1870-1930,” in Figures of Criminality in Indonesia, The Philippines and Colonial Vietnam, ed. Vicente L. Rafael (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999). 510 R. B Cribb, Gangsters and Revolutionaries: The Jakarta People’s Militia and the Indonesian Revolution, 19451949 (Singapore: Equinox Pub. (Asia), 2009), 18. 511 This point was also put forward by Margreet van Till, especially considering the differing nature of violence conducted by colonial and revolutionary/post-revolutionary criminals. Till, McKay, and Jackson, Banditry in West Java, 1869-1942, 184–85. === [PDF page 201] === 201 gerombolan problem. The case of the Darul Islam is representative here. Consider the statement of Kasman Singodimedjo, chairman of Masyumi,in 1955: The government should not consider [the Darul Islam] an enemy, rather like a father his son. Regardless of how naughty the son, if taught a lesson he should not be beaten to death, rather given a lecture, or dealt with just one blow, drenched in affection. It is similar with a domestic rebellious movement.”512 Thus, in the 1950s, the gerombolans were considered as a social problem that had to be rectified through sustained violent and rehabilitative means. Figure 1. Republic of Indonesia in 1961. 512 Kasman Singodimedjo. “DI anaknja, Masjumi ajahnja.” Harian Ra’jat, 20 September 1955. Cited in Chiara Formichi, Islam and the Making of the Nation: Kartosuwiryo and Political Islam in Twentieth-Century Indonesia, Verhandelingen van Het Koninklijk Instituut Voor Taal-, Land- En Volkenkunde 282 (Leiden: KITLV, 2012), 145. === [PDF page 202] === 202 United States Central Intelligence Agency. Republic of Indonesia and Portuguese Timor. [Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1961] Map. https://www.loc.gov/item/93682097/ Counting Criminality Former freedom fighters notwithstanding, it is hard to exaggerate the high level of crimes in urban and rural areas of Java throughout the 1950s. In September 1951, the Criminal Investigation Service (Dinas Reserse Kriminil) published a report on security conditions across the nation. The report noted that between January and September 1951 there was an increasing levels of criminal activity across the country.513 One police historian wrote that in the 1950s, “increasing crime” were “creeping in and poisoning the body and life of the Indonesian nation and society.” 514 In its 1951 report, the Criminal Investigative Service differentiated criminal perpetrators into several important clusters of gerombolans. First, there were “politically-oriented groups seeking to take over power from the government.” These included Darul Islam, which was active in Djakarta, parts of West Java (Bogor, Priangan, and Tjirebon), some of Central Java (Pekalongan and Banjumas), and South 513 Dinas Reserse Kriminil, “Ichtisar Kedjahatan Dalam Triwulan Ke-III Tahun 1951” (Djakarta: Dinas Reserse Kriminil, Djawatan Kepolisian Indonesia Pusat, September 1951), 1,3, RA.8a 963, ANRI. 514 According to Memet Tanumidjaja, The police were “confronted with increasing crime in areas that were gradually expanding and covering all areas of political, economic, social and military life. Political parties and social organizations, even within government institutions, were clawing at each other, fighting over positions, and so on. In essence, mental disintegration were creeping in and poisoning the body and life of the Indonesian nation and people.” Memet Tanumidjaja, Sedjarah Perkembangan Angkatan Kepolisian (Jakarta: Pusat Sejarah ABRI, Departemen Pertahanan-Keamanan [Centre for the History of the Armed Forces,Department of Defence and Security], 1971), 96. === [PDF page 203] === 203 Kalimantan; the Bambu Runtjing (Bamboo Spear), which was active in Djakarta and West Java; Pemuda Proletar Revolusioner, Angkatan Comunis Muda, and Pemuda Republik Indonesia in East Sumatra; and the Kesatuan Rakjat jang Tertindas in South Kalimantan.515 Table 2. National Crime Statistics by Type and Location (Provinces), Q1-Q3, 1951. Type of Case Central Java West Java East Java 515 Q1 (Jan-Apr) Q2 (Apr-Jul) Q3 (Jul-Oct) Total, 1951 1951 1951 Q1-Q3 1951 Arson 145 422 244 811 Homicide 113 113 90 316 Kidnapping 12 13 19 44 Robbery 7538 3107 2888 13533 Total 7808 3655 3241 14704 Arson 848 914 667 2429 Homicide 793 395 401 1589 Kidnapping 63 106 74 243 Robbery 1544 2873 2312 6729 Total 3248 4288 3454 10990 Arson 110 172 812 1094 Homicide 281 166 124 571 Kidnapping 48 43 17 108 Robbery 3668 2093 1282 7043 Total 4107 2474 2235 8816 Dinas Reserse Kriminil, “Ichtisar Kedjahatan Dalam Triwulan Ke-III Tahun 1951,” 3. === [PDF page 204] === 204 Djakarta-Raya South Sulawesi Kalimantan North Sumatra Lesser Sundas Homicide 11 15 20 46 Kidnapping 13 10 24 Robbery 252 326 655 1233 Total 264 354 685 1303 Homicide 129 129 Kidnapping 29 29 Robbery 585 585 Total 743 743 Homicide 37 37 41 115 Kidnapping 13 16 Robbery 269 196 97 562 Total 309 233 151 693 Homicide 40 32 126 198 Kidnapping 21 Robbery 132 162 34 328 Total 180 203 164 547 Homicide 45 40 102 187 Kidnapping 10 Robbery 39 82 118 239 Total 86 126 224 436 Quarterly Total 16002 11333 10897 38232 Adopted from Dinas Reserse Kriminil. Ichtisar mengenai Kriminaliteit dalam Triwulan III Tahun === [PDF page 205] === 205 Second, the Criminal Investigation Service report noted the presence of “common robber” groups. The authors of the report further divided these into two types: first “common robber groups that were possibly influenced by Communist tendencies,” mainly in Semarang, Kedu, Surakarta (Central Java) and Surabaya (East Java; and other “common robber groups,” particularly in Banten, Solo, Madiun, Kediri, Malang, Surabaja, Besuki, and Bali. Third, the report identified “potentially foreign-influenced gerombolan” such as the Angkatan Perang Ratu Adil (APRA) in West Java.516 Fourth, there was the “gerombolan of former soldiers or freedom fighters”, the Barisan Sakit Hati in Priangan, Tjirebon, and Pekalongan (West Java). Fifth, there was the gerombolan of former Corps Tjadangan Nasional members in South Sulawesi.517 According to the police reports, These groups mainly targeted members of the army, police, village guards, civil servants, and common people with sympathy to the Republican state. They were also “heavily armed, very mobile, and often times more capable than the government apparatus.”518 The Criminal Investigative Service concluded that “the motives behind these crimes were not merely social and economic, but also political.”519 It is important to note that that these classifications were by no means static. During the Wilopo administration in 1953, the Prime Minister’s Office submitted a note on national criminality that diverged from the earlier understanding of the problem. This document provided 516 The Legion of Just King (Angkatan Perang Ratu Adil, APRA) was a militia force that was led by former KNIL Captain Raymond Westerling. On January 23, 1950, they tried to launch a failed coup d’etat in Bandung and Jakarta. 517 This refers to the Kahar Muzakkar group of rebels in South Sulawesi. 518 Dinas Reserse Kriminil, “Ichtisar Kedjahatan Dalam Triwulan Ke-III Tahun 1951,” 4. 519 Dinas Reserse Kriminil, 3. === [PDF page 206] === 206 a short history of internal threats against the Republican state since 1945, which contained a laundry list of major domestic threats to security: We recognize these as the most important domestic threats against state security: a. The rebellion by the F.D.R. or P.K. – Muso centered in Madiun [1948] b. The A.U.I (Angkatan Ummat Islam) in the southern part of the Kedu-Banjumas Residency. c. The A.P.R.A. (Angkatan Perang Ratu Adil) rebellion in West Java. d. The rebellion led by Captain Andi Aziz in Makassar. e. The rebellion led by R.M.S (Republik Maluku Selatan) in the Moluccas. f. The rebellion by Batallion 426 in Central Java. g. The rebellion by former CTN (Corps Tjadangan Nasional) units in South Celebes, or the Kahar Muzakkar rebellion. h. The rebellion in Hulu Sungai (Kalimantan) led by Ibnu Hadjar. i. The Darul Islam-Kartosuwirjo rebellion in West Java and the western part of Central Java. j. The explosion of violent crimes against estate lands and burning of tobacco warehouses across the Besuki Residency [East Java]. k. The Grajak movement in Merapi-Merbabu Complex. === [PDF page 207] === 207 l. Various movements in West Java other than Darul Islam-Kartosuwirjo, such as the Bambu Runtjing, Barisan Sakit Hati, Landak Merah, etc.”520 The document produced by the Prime Minister’s office identified five kinds of rebellions. First was the “political movement that was based upon the assumption of state making within the Republic of Indonesia.” This included the Darul Islam rebellion, which had managed to establish a secessionist state within Republican territory. The resulting insurgent state, the Negara Islam Indonesia, had managed to promulgate a basic constitution, establish an army, police, and civilian administration, and collect taxes (though often under the threat of violence). Thus, the Darul Islam was a political movement that was aimed at the establishment of an Islamic State within the territory of Indonesia. 521 The second category was “political movements that were not based upon the assumption of state-making within the Republic of Indonesia.” This category included the Bambu Runtjing and Merapi-Merbabu Complex, which more will be discussed later in this chapter. Generally, the movements included in this category did not pursue the establishment of a secessionist state.522 The third category was “movements emerging as a product of unrest against the problem of former armed combatants.” This category includes dissatisfied former Army or laskar soldiers who were demobilized and “rationalized.” Movements included in this category includes the Andi 520 Perdana Menteri Republik Indonesia, “Nota Perdana Menteri Tanggal 20 Februari 1953 Tentang Keamanan Dan Ketertiban Umum Di Seluruh Indonesia” (Djakarta: Kabinet Perdana Menteri, March 3, 1953), 1, RA.8A 1410, ANRI. 521 Perdana Menteri Republik Indonesia, 2. 522 Perdana Menteri Republik Indonesia, 6. === [PDF page 208] === 208 Aziz and Kahar Muzakkar incidents in South Sulawesi (Makassar) and the Ibnu Hajar movement in Kalimantan.523 The fourth category was “common criminal movements” found in various urban and rural areas in Indonesia and the fifth category of the “criminal movements at sea” which includes piracy, smuggling, and so forth, are reserved for the generally less politically threatening gerombolans.524 Here, we can see a pattern of how the Indonesian state operate through creating a distinction of “illegitimate” and “legitimate” force.525Major crimes conducted by these gerombolans were reported and compiled by the Criminal Investigative Service and the State Security Surveillance Service as “security disturbances” (gangguan keamanan) or “important reports” (laporan penting). Often, these crimes were recorded as violent crimes as such due to the involvement of small arms and other dangerous weapons. For instance, common thefts conducted by individuals or gerombolans were also recorded in this database, as long as it includes the use of weapons and firearms. The data compiled for 1951-1954 reveal that the most common crimes committed by these groups were acts of brigandage (1,035 incidents), armed robbery (285 incidents), homicide (47 incidents), assault (23 incidents), and arson. The vast majority of these crimes were committed in West Java (848 incidents), with far fewer incidents in Central Java (228), Sulawesi (161) and East Java (73). 523 Perdana Menteri Republik Indonesia, 8. Perdana Menteri Republik Indonesia, 10–11. 525 Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). 524 === [PDF page 209] === 209 Table 3. National Violent Crime Statistics, Categorized by Type of Crime. 1951-1954. Type of Crime Brigandage 1951 22 1952 809 1953 99 1954 105 Total 1035 Armed Robbery Homicide Assault Arson Kidnapping Prison Break Hijacking Desertion Smuggling Sexual Violence Strike Gambling Foreign Infiltration 247 39 18 19 17 26 289 47 23 22 19 Total 33 1180 140 114 1467 Compiled from Kumpulan Surat Kawat Gangguan Keamanan Dinas Pengawasan Keselamatan Negara, Bundel 19511954 (ANRI RA8C 443), Ichtisar & Tjatatan Laporan-Laporan Penting Dinas Reserse Kriminil, 1 Mei s/d Tanggal 15 Mei 1952, and Ichtisar & Tjatatan Laporan-Laporan Penting Dinas Reserse Kriminil, 16 Mei s/d 31 Mei 1952 (ANRI RA8C 451). Table 4. National Major Crime Statistics, Categorized by Region. 1951-1954. Provinces West Java Central Java Sulawesi East Java Kalimantan North Sumatra Jogjakarta Special Region South Sumatra Central Sumatra 1951 17 11 1952 632 195 160 51 56 50 16 16 1953 99 20 11 1954 100 11 Total 848 228 161 73 61 53 20 16 === [PDF page 210] === 210 Nusa Tenggara Total 33 110 140 114 1467 Compiled from Kumpulan Surat Kawat Gangguan Keamanan Dinas Pengawasan Keselamatan Negara, Bundel 1951-1954 (ANRI RA8C 443), Ichtisar & Tjatatan Laporan-Laporan Penting Dinas Reserse Kriminil, 1 Mei s/d Tanggal 15 Mei 1952, and Ichtisar & Tjatatan Laporan-Laporan Penting Dinas Reserse Kriminil, 16 Mei s/d 31 Mei 1952 (ANRI RA8C 451). From these statistics, we can draw several conclusions. First, throughout the early 1950s, there were significant levels of major crimes across Indonesia. Second, these crime waves were a symptom of post-revolutionary social unrest, which was not only caused by social and economic factors, but also political ones. Third, a significant amount of recorded major crimes in Java were from West Java (including Greater Djakarta), Central Java (including Jogjakarta Special Region, and East Java. the three regions that we will focus on in this chapter. West Java Throughout the 1950s, West Java was a deeply troubled region. As noted above, West Java as a province is overrun by crime waves consisting of gerombolans, whether these brigand groups operated under political pretenses or for pragmatic socioeconomic reasons. By its nature, West Java is differentiated with the other provinces by the fact that it housed the national capital, Jakarta, and Bandung, the provincial capital. Table 5. Major Crimes in West Java, Categorized by Perpetrators. 1951-1954. === [PDF page 211] === 211 Perpetrators Gerombolan Gerombolan Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia Bandits Gerombolan Bambu Runtjing Gerombolan Tjitarum Individuals Unknown TNI Gerombolan Ex-CTN Police Total 1951 10 1952 244 1953 30 1954 Total 293 134 46 80 263 103 24 22 16 554 10 122 32 28 16 770 17 99 100 Compiled from Kumpulan Surat Kawat Gangguan Keamanan Dinas Pengawasan Keselamatan Negara, Bundel 1951-1954 (ANRI RA8C 443), Ichtisar & Tjatatan Laporan-Laporan Penting Dinas Reserse Kriminil, 1 Mei s/d Tanggal 15 Mei 1952, and Ichtisar & Tjatatan Laporan-Laporan Penting Dinas Reserse Kriminil, 16 Mei s/d 31 Mei 1952 (ANRI RA8C 451). Table 6. Major Crime Statistics in West Java, Categorized by Types of Crime. 1951-1954. Type of Crime 1951 1952 1953 1954 Total Brigandage Armed Robbery Homicide Kidnapping 14 416 107 84 12 95 609 125 12 10 Hijacking Assault Arson Prison Break Desertion Gambling Total 17 554 99 100 770 === [PDF page 212] === 212 Compiled from Kumpulan Surat Kawat Gangguan Keamanan Dinas Pengawasan Keselamatan Negara, Bundel 1951-1954 (ANRI RA8C 443), Ichtisar & Tjatatan Laporan-Laporan Penting Dinas Reserse Kriminil, 1 Mei s/d Tanggal 15 Mei 1952, and Ichtisar & Tjatatan Laporan-Laporan Penting Dinas Reserse Kriminil, 16 Mei s/d 31 Mei 1952 (ANRI RA8C 451). Jakarta, the national capital, was founded as Batavia by the Dutch East India Company in 1618. Batavia expanded into the center of administration for the Netherlands East Indies, sharing its role with the suburban resort town of Buitenzorg (now Bogor) and Bandung. Batavia was a city with an urban sprawl that expanded aggressively throughout the centuries, incorporating the new administrative town of Weltevreden (now Menteng) in the early 19th century and its immediate suburb, Meester-Cornelis (now Jatinegara) in the first half of the 20th century.526 In 1905, Batavia became an autonomous city (gemeente or kotapradja). Naturally, expansion of territory was accompanied with an increase on population, which rose exponentially throughout the centuries. At the end of the 1930s, Tanjung Priok was dominated by migrants from Banten and Tangerang, while people from Bogor and Priangan stayed in Weltevreden. Central Javanese people were mostly concentrated in Weltevreden and MeesterCornelis.527 These inmigrants subsequently gave way to the rise of crime bosses to coordinate, regulate, and control these migrants. Consequently, crime figures has been a part of Jakarta’s social makeup since colonial times. The characteristic of crimes in Jakarta may be differentiated between the urban, built-up centers and its hinterlands. In the city, most crimes were usually theft, hijackings, and robberies. 526 527 Cribb, Para Jago Dan Kaum Revolusioner Jakarta 1945-1949, 13–14. Cribb, 18. === [PDF page 213] === 213 Often, foreigners such as Chinese-Indonesians and Dutch were targeted. Perpetrators often wielded pistols and revolvers, yet they rarely pose as Army or Police fatigues. Perhaps due to this character, police records did not consider them as gerombolan actions, but merely common criminal acts. For example on April 23, 1952, five major crime cases happened in the city center. At 07.00AM in the morning, a Dutchman working for the KPM, A.L. van der Bosch, was hijacked in Teluk Betung Street by two Indonesians wielding a Mauser pistol. His Chevrolet car was stolen by the robbers, with a loss of Rp.25.000. Later at 08.30AM, another hijacking ensued, carried out by three pistol-armed men, at Malaka Street, Kota. The three Chinese-Indonesian victims—Liong An Hie, Ang Oen Hi, and Oey Key Siong—lost Rp.84.302.5 in cash, cheques, and valuables, not including their Chevrolet sedan that was also stolen. At 15.30pm, a Chinese-Indonesian by the name of Tjia Liong Pong became victim of a robbery, losing Rp.510 in cash. The robbery was done at Petojo by six men, probably unarmed, in midday. Later at 20.00pm, another ChineseIndonesian, Tien Ko Sien, a native of Tanjung Priok, was robbed by three men armed with knives and a pistol. Tien lost Rp.300 in cash, a wristwatch, and a Rp.100 pen. At 22.30pm, yet another robbery ensued, this time by two unarmed Indonesians. The victim, Chinese-Indonesian Tjie Hoa Lim, was riding a betjak. Tjie lost Rp.235 in cash, Rp.35 worth in valuables, and three registration documents for his autolets.528 The perpetrators drove away in a Jeep.529 These five cases happened in a single day, which says much on the state of insecurity in Jakarta at that time. 528 Autolet is a local intracity transport common in 1950s Indonesia. Roughly similar to the Jeepney in the Philippines. Dinas Reserse Kriminil, “Ichtisar Dan Tjatatan Laporan2 Penting Dari Tanggal 1 Mei s/d 15 Mei 1952” (Djakarta: Dinas Reserse Kriminil, Djawatan Kepolisian Negara, May 21, 1952), 1, RA.8C 451, ANRI. 529 === [PDF page 214] === 214 Table 7. Major Crime Statistics in Greater Jakarta and Jakarta Regency, Categorized by Types of Crime. 1952-1954. Types of Crime 1952 1953 1954 Total Brigandage 39 46 Compiled from Armed Robbery 33 34 Homicide Hijacking Assault Arson Gambling Total 78 87 Kumpulan Surat Kawat Gangguan Keamanan Dinas Pengawasan Keselamatan Negara, Bundel 1951-1954 (ANRI RA8C 443), Ichtisar & Tjatatan Laporan-Laporan Penting Dinas Reserse Kriminil, 1 Mei s/d Tanggal 15 Mei 1952, and Ichtisar & Tjatatan Laporan-Laporan Penting Dinas Reserse Kriminil, 16 Mei s/d 31 Mei 1952 (ANRI RA8C 451). Table 8. General Crime Statistics in Greater Jakarta, Categorized by Types of Crime. 1952-1953. Type of Crime Theft Robbery and Armed Robbery Homicide Arson Kidnapping 1952 12021 1953 11121 Total 23142 1274 490 1764 114 46 28 160 28 18 13 Total 13422 11690 25112 Compiled from Indonesia Raya, 19 February 1954. Cited from Amurwani, 2011. During the period, former laskars often became criminal groups in Jakarta. One example is the story of Imam Sjafe’i, or “Bang” (Brother) Pi’i. During the Revolution against the Dutch, Imam led an Army unit near Cirebon, called the Special Forces (Pasukan Istimewa or PI), which was part of the Jakarta People’s Militia.530 After the Revolution ended, Imam led his men into 530 Cribb, Gejolak Revolusi Di Jakarta 1945-1949, 132. === [PDF page 215] === 215 Jakarta, settling in the then newly-rebuilt area of Senen (now Pasar Senen). Imam and his men subsequently became known as the local crime boss of Senen, albeit still maintaining his Army commission as a Captain. This group obtained firearms from the Dutch military complexes around Senen and Salemba, and they were active in crime acts such as racketeering, robbery, theft, and pickpocketing.531 The former laskars residing in urban Jakarta became important underworld figures, and substantially influenced the city’s social history. In Jakarta and its environs, certain areas were often submitted to gerombolan activity. These areas include the hinterlands and immediate outskirts of Jakarta, such as Bekasi, Tangerang, Depok, Pasar Minggu, and Pondok Gede. In these areas, gerombolans from Darul Islam, Bambu Runtjing, and common criminals often conducted theft, robberies, kidnapping, arson, and murder.532 In Gandaria, Pasar Rebo on August 16, 1952, there was a gerombolan attack on the local Pakajon rubber plantation. The gerombolan, 20-men strong, were uniformed and armed with Lee Enfield rifles and Sten submachineguns. Two plantation employees, one Dutch under the name of J.H. Leepaers and an Indonesian by the name of Mohamad Numan was shot dead. When the police arrived, the gerombolan has disappeared from the scene.533 The next day, the Ciledug Police Station was assaulted by 40-men gerombolan, armed with Lee Enfield rifles, Vickers machine guns, and Sten submachineguns. A firefight between the gerombolan and the police ensued for 531 Fauzi, “‘Lain Di Front, Lain Pula Di Kota’: Jagoan Dan Bajingan Di Jakarta Tahun 1950-An,” 582–83. Fauzi, 589. 533 Dinas Reserse Kriminil, “Ichtisar Dan Tjatatan Laporan2 Penting Dari Tanggal 15 Agustus s/d 31 Agustus 1952” (Djakarta: Dinas Reserse Kriminil, Djawatan Kepolisian Negara, September 8, 1952), 1, RA.8C 451, ANRI. 532 === [PDF page 216] === 216 quite some time until the gerombolans retreated.534 Skirmishes of these kind continued in the outskirts of Jakarta until 1954, which speaks a lot on the insecurity around the capital city. Meanwhile, the provincial capital of Bandung is the second largest urban center in West Java. It is located in the highlands, roughly 2400 feet above sea level, in the middle of an ancient volcanic caldera, surrounded by hills and mountains that was perfect for guerrilla activity. At the beginning of the Revolution, Bandung served primarily as an administrative and educational center, a role which continued until the present day: since its reoccupation by Republican forces, Bandung had been the provincial capital of West Java, and the city hosts the Governor’s office, the Siliwangi Division headquarters (now Kodam Siliwangi), and the provincial Police commissariat (Polda Jawa Barat).535 The Technische Hogeschool (now Institut Teknologi Bandung) is also located in the city, cementing its role as an educational center for the Republic. Meanwhile, the city itself is roughly split into two parts, namely the Northern side, where many of the Dutch, Eurasians, and other nationalities live; and the Southern side, where many of the Chinese and most of the Indonesians live in and around markets, suburban areas and kampongs.536 Gerombolan activities has been a feature of the Revolution in Bandung and its suburbs since its early days. One instance is the famous case of the djago movement led by Soma, which controlled northern Cimahi (a suburb of Bandung) from December-February 1946. Soma’s 534 Dinas Reserse Kriminil, 1. John R.W. Smail, Bandung in the Early Revolution 1945-1946 A Study in the Social History of the Indonesian Revolution, Monograph Series, Modern Indonesia Project (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1964), 3. 536 Smail, 4. 535 === [PDF page 217] === 217 gerombolan was later based in Padalarang, a town that in the strategic road linking Purwakarta and Bandung. In an interview with a former KNI leader in Cimahi, John Smail notes that He (a KNI leader in Tjimahi) said that its main slogan was that the time had come to divide out the wealth for the rich among the people. The men who were drawn into this movement, which he said was promoted by some jagos from the Krawang area, went about in armed groups practicing extortion on the wealthier inhabitants. They were particularly hostile to village headmen and heads of kampungs… I enquired about the pamong pradja and he said that they had all fled to Tjimahi for safety…537 Meanwhile in March 1946, during the height of the early Revolution, Bandung was evacuated by most of its inhabitants due to the arrival of British forces. According to John Smail, “South Bandung, except for the parts of it with a large Chinese population, became and remained for a year and a half a dead city with grass growing in its streets.”538 It was estimated that more than half a million people moved out of Bandung into the rural areas during the period. During the immediate postwar period, Bandung developed into an important center for schooling and education, yet its development could not keep up with the great influx of postwar migrants into the city, a feature that is also common in other major urban agglomerations discussed in this chapter such as Semarang and Surabaya.539 After the war ended, many outmigrants returned 537 Smail, 165. John R. W. Smail, Bandung in the Early Revolution 1945-1946: A Study in the Social History of the Indonesian Revolution, 1st Equinox ed (Jakarta: Equinox Pub, 2009), 151; Hugo, “Population Mobility in West Java, Indonesia,” 254. 539 Hugo, “Population Mobility in West Java, Indonesia,” 256,259. 538 === [PDF page 218] === 218 to Bandung, in search of jobs and better living opportunities. Throughout the 1950s, many of the population movements to Bandung and other cities were motivated by regional insecurity in West Java, particularly due to the Darul Islam rebellion and the prevalence of gerombolan activities in the Priangan Regency, particularly around Tasikmalaya and Garut.540 In post-revolutionary Bandung, gerombolan activities were often found in the immediate outskirts of the city. On May 3, 1952, a 200-men gerombolan, 100 of them heavily armed, attacked Sumedang. The brigands targeted the local police barracks in the city, and the local police and army units responded immediately. Ultimately, the gerombolans failed to reach the police barracks. During the urban skirmish, at least 30 houses were ransacked and burned down, with heavy cost to the locals.541 On July 22-23, 1952, a 200-men gerombolan, uniformed and heavily armed, robbed 32 houses in Cicalengka. The brigands first attacked Nagrog Village, robbing and burning down 32 houses in their wake. The gerombolan then rampaged around the area, hitting villages next to Nagrog. When the local Army units sent in reinforcements by truck, their trucks were shot at, and two soldiers were heavily injured. In the following day, another gerombolan, roughly 20-men strong, joined in, robbing two other villages in the vicinity. As a result of this episode, two soldiers were injured, two villagers were shot dead, and 45 houses were robbed and burned down, with a total loss of Rp. 15.125.95.542 Considering that both Sumedang 540 Hugo, 254–55; Reerink, “From Autonomous Village to ‘Informal Slum’: Kampong Development and State Control in Bandung (1930-1960),” 203; Geoffrey McNicoll, “Internal Migration in Indonesia: Descriptive Notes,” Indonesia 5 (April 1968): 44–45. 541 Dinas Reserse Kriminil, “Sumedang Kota Mendapat Serangan Dari Gerombolan Bersendjata” (Djakarta: Dinas Reserse Kriminil, Djawatan Kepolisian Indonesia Pusat, Mei 1952), RA.8C 443, ANRI. 542 Dinas Reserse Kriminil, “Kampung Njalindung Desa Nagrog Tjitjalengka Kedatangan Gerombolan Garong” (Djakarta: Dinas Reserse Kriminil, Djawatan Kepolisian Indonesia Pusat, August 21, 1952), RA.8C 443, ANRI. === [PDF page 219] === 219 and Cicalengka are in the immediate vicinity of Bandung, this shows a lot on the insecurity in and around the city. The roads outside of Bandung was notorious for being dangerous at night, as roaming gerombolans often stopped and hijacked travelers. Consider one incident in Cicalengka, which was midway between Bandung and Garut. On May 5, 1952 at approximately 5 pm, an autobus traveling from Bandung to Garut was suddenly stopped by an armed gerombolan of 15 men. Moments later, the same gerombolan also intercepted a private car driving from Garut, and a truck of TNI soldiers traveling from Bandung. The gerombolan robbed all three, and managed to run away with Rp.215 in cash, five sets of Army uniforms, a Steyr carbine, plus two TNI soldiers as prisoners.543 Outside the relative security of Jakarta and Bandung, West Java was an area teeming with gerombolans. According to one official account, there was a general increase of gerombolan activity in West Java from 1950-1952. These brigands roamed West Java, leaving not much but a path of destruction at its wake. Generally, the areas of Bogor, Cirebon, and Priangan Regencies were the most affected by these gerombolan activity.544 As a result, the provincial government estimated that from January-April 1952 the West Javanese suffered Rp.9.981.366.32 in losses, an increase from Rp.7.339.580.47 during September-December 1951.545 543 Dinas Reserse Kriminil, “Gangguan Thdp Kendaraan2 Bermotor Dibetulan Kp. Pemutjatan (Tjitjalengka) Jg Dilakukan Oleh Gerombolan Bersendjata Lengkap” (Djakarta: Dinas Reserse Kriminil, Djawatan Kepolisian Negara, May 9, 1952), RA.8C 443, ANRI. 544 Antara, 7 June 1952, Cited in Kementerian Penerangan Propinsi Djawa Barat, Propinsi Djawa Barat (Bandung: Kementerian Penerangan, 1953), 239. 545 McNicoll, “Internal Migration in Indonesia: Descriptive Notes,” 238. === [PDF page 220] === 220 There were three main gerombolan groups operating in West Java. First was the Darul Islam, second the Bambu Runtjing, and third was the Tjitarum.546 According to M. Fauzi, the Bambu Runtjing was a “guerrilla unit consisting of workers, farmers, pemuda, and soldiers that was populist in ideology, consistent with the Proclamation of 17 August 1945, and against negotiating with the Dutch.”547 Operating from the Bekasi, Karawang, Purwakarta, and Subang areas, The Bambu Runtjing was one of the many guerrilla groups that were disillusioned with the Republican diplomatic policy with the Dutch. According to one estimate, its troops numbered over 500 well-armed men.548 It is very likely that these gerombolans were the remnants of the Revolutionary-era laskar group Brigade Bambu Runtjing, which was part of the Jakarta People’s Militia.549 It was led by prominent jago such as Muhidin Nasution, Alip, and Mohammad Noor, in addition to pemuda leaders such as Chairul Saleh and Johar Nur.550The Bambu Runtjing often robbed villages, stores, and plantations across the West Javan countryside, targeting villagers and civil servants alike. This gerombolan is notorious for operating in and around Bogor Regency, which includes most of the hinterlands around Jakarta. The Bambu Runtjing were often heavily armed. On March 10, 1953, the Bambu Runtjing was involved in a fierce firefight with the police. As a result, the gerombolan lost four of their men. The police then confiscated three revolvers, a hand grenade, and ammunition. In another 546 On the Darul Islam, see Chapter II. Fauzi, “‘Lain Di Front, Lain Pula Di Kota’: Jagoan Dan Bajingan Di Jakarta Tahun 1950-An,” 590; Cribb, Para Jago Dan Kaum Revolusioner Jakarta 1945-1949, 217–32. 548 Cornelis Van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), 107. 549 On the Revolutionary-era Brigade Bambu Runtjing, see Cribb, Para Jago Dan Kaum Revolusioner Jakarta 19451949, 217–32. 550 Cribb, 262. 547 === [PDF page 221] === 221 firefight in Bekasi on February 4, 1953, the police confiscated a Mauser carbine, a Model 95 carbine, one hand grenade, and ammunition.551 These are all military-grade weapons, thus showing how well-armed and dangerous these gerombolans were. The Bambu Runtjing often targeted villages to be robbed and burned down. On May 3, 1952, a Bambu Runtjing group robbed Tjinangsi Village in Subang, West Java. The gerombolan attack costed the village more than Rp.6,400, six people dead, and six others injured.552 On 26 July, 1952, a Bambu Runjing gerombolan led by two local jagos, Arneng and Dumi, ransacked Lemah Abang, in Purwakarta. The group escaped with Rp.6636, burning down five houses with the estimated loss of Rp.27,500.553 In the same day, a 50-men Bambu Runtjing group under Ijan Gojang, a renowned jago, burned down eight houses in Tjikarang, with a loss of Rp.10,000. The next day, yet another Bambu Runtjing gerombolan under Daim burned through Lemah Abang, robbing and burning houses in their wake, with the loss of almost Rp.5000.554 The Bambu Runtjing also targeted foreigners and minorities in their criminal acts. For instance, there was the case of a Dutch pastor named Kohler in Tjipanas Village, Bogor. On midnight May 3, 1952, Kohler was suddenly assaulted by a 30-men Bambu Runtjing group, some dressed as soldiers and armed with guns. He was then robbed of valuables, with an estimated loss 551 Fauzi, “‘Lain Di Front, Lain Pula Di Kota’: Jagoan Dan Bajingan Di Jakarta Tahun 1950-An,” 590. Dinas Reserse Kriminil, “Ichtisar Singkat Tentang Laporan2 Penting Dari Tanggal 1 Djuni s/d 15 Djuni 1952” (Djakarta: Dinas Reserse Kriminil, Djawatan Kepolisian Indonesia Pusat, 1952), 2, RA.8C 451, ANRI. 553 Dinas Reserse Kriminil, “Ichtisar Dan Tjatatan Laporan2 Penting Dari Tanggal 1 Agustus s/d 15 Agustus 1952” (Djakarta: Dinas Reserse Kriminil, Djawatan Kepolisian Negara, Agustus 1952), 2, RA.8C 451, ANRI. 554 Dinas Reserse Kriminil, 2. 552 === [PDF page 222] === 222 of Rp.1700.555 In another incident on May 16, 1952, 10 men from the Bambu Runtjing robbed a store in Sukabumi owned by a Chinese-Indonesian named Tjek A Nie. The store lost Rp.6000 in cash and merchandise.556 The Bambu Runtjing also often fought with other gerombolans, such as the Darul Islam. One notable incident was on April 22, 1952, when a 60-men Bambu Runtjing group under Tadjudin clashed with a 30-men Darul Islam unit under Achmad Sungkawa in Tjikalong, west of Bandung. As a result of the fighting, the Bambu Runtjing robbed and burned seven houses in the nearby village.557 In another incident on July 17, 1952, a group of unknown Bambu Runtjing was attacked by a well-armed group of 50 Darul Islam unit in Tjirandjang, Tjianjur. The results of this skirmish was unknown.558 It is clear that these two gerombolans fought each other when they have the chance, probably due to competition for hegemony in the area, or merely fighting for limited resources. The Bambu Runtjing also targeted civil servants, police, and soldiers. On July 28, 1952, Dujing bin Mole, a local village chief in Djonggol Underdistrict (ketjamatan) in Bogor, was murdered by a 20-men Bambu Runtjing gerombolan under Sanapi. Two days later, the local lurah in Damyak, Djonggol, was robbed and murdered by the same group.559 This pattern of targeting 555 Dinas Reserse Kriminil, “Ichtisar Dan Tjatatan Laporan2 Penting Dari Tanggal 16 Mei s/d 31 Mei 1952” (Djakarta: Dinas Reserse Kriminil, Djawatan Kepolisian Negara, June 9, 1952), 2, RA.8C 451, ANRI. 556 Dinas Reserse Kriminil, 3. 557 Dinas Reserse Kriminil, “Ichtisar Dan Tjatatan Laporan2 Penting Dari Tanggal 1 Mei s/d 15 Mei 1952,” 3. 558 Dinas Reserse Kriminil, “Ichtisar Dan Tjatatan Laporan2 Penting Dari Tanggal 1 Agustus s/d 15 Agustus 1952,” 559 Dinas Reserse Kriminil, 3. === [PDF page 223] === 223 local civil servants remained for quite some time, as a 10-men Bambu Runtjing gerombolan,armed with Lee-Enfield rifles, Sten submachineguns, and a machete, robbed and murdered a lurah named Madroip in the same underdistrict on September 23, 1953.560 Similar with the Bambu Runtjing, another major gerombolan roaming West Java was the Tjitarum. This gerombolan emerged from a splinter group of the Revolutionary-era Bambu Runtjing, and it was led by a former teacher, Tjetje Subrata.561 The Tjitarum operated out of Djampang, an area South of Sukabumi, and they often robbed and burned villages around Sukabumi, Cianjur, and Bandung. Similar and closely related to the Bambu Runtjing, this gerombolan often clashed with the Darul Islam as they compete for territories and resources.562 The kinds of crimes conducted by the Tjitarum was roughly similar to Bambu Runtjing. In addition to acts of brigandage, the Tjitarum also targeted members of the civil service. For instance, on June 8, 1951, a 30-men group of the Tjitarum kidnapped and murdered the lurah of Djagamoekti Village, Djampang Kulon, Bogor Regency.563 On April 21, 1952, a heavily armed, 30-men group of the Tjitarum attacked a village in Tjimahpar, Djampang Kulon, Bogor Regency, resulting in the death of a village police (Polisi Desa) and several other villagers.564 Similar acts 560 Dinas Reserse Kriminil, “Laporan Kedjadian2 Jang Ketrima Dengan Perantaraan Radiogram Pada Tanggal 28-91953 Oleh Bagian Dinas Reserse Kriminil” (Djakarta: Dinas Reserse Kriminil, Djawatan Kepolisian Negara, September 29, 1953), 2, RA.8C 443, ANRI. 561 Kementerian Penerangan Propinsi Djawa Barat, Propinsi Djawa Barat, 242. 562 Kementerian Penerangan Propinsi Djawa Barat, 244. 563 Dinas Reserse Kriminil, “Penjembelihan Atas Dirinja Lurah Desa Djagamoekti” (Djakarta: Dinas Reserse Kriminil, Djawatan Kepolisian Indonesia Pusat, June 16, 1951), RA.8C 443, ANRI. 564 Dinas Reserse Kriminil, “Gerombolan ‘TJITARUM’ Bersendjata Lengkap Menjerang Penduduk Kp.Tjimega, Ds. Tjimahpar, Ketj. Djampangkulon (Bogor)” (Djakarta: Dinas Reserse Kriminil, Djawatan Kepolisian Negara, May 3, 1952), RA.8C 443, ANRI. === [PDF page 224] === 224 of brigandage by the Tjitarum were also recorded from May-August 1952, almost all of them in Bogor Regency. In summary, we can see that the urban and rural areas of West Java was infested by criminal activities. In the urban areas such as Jakarta, many of the crimes tend to be less “political” compared to the rural areas. Many criminal incidents, such as hijacking, theft, and robbery in Jakarta were mostly motivated by socioeconomic reasons. This was evident from their targeting of Chinese-Indonesian and Dutch living in Jakarta. These criminals were also often armed with firearms, which means that they posed a significant threat against local peace and order. One significant factor that differentiate Jakarta and other cities discussed in this chapter is the prevalence of ex-laskar crime groups in the city, which significantly influencd Jakarta’s societal fabric. In the immediate outskirts of the national capital, another pattern of crime emerged. Here, a variety of gerombolans were active. These crimes did not only include theft and robbery, but also brigandage, which is generally larger in scale and more intensive in scope compared to the common urban robbery. Two of the most significant of these gerombolans, the Bambu Runtjing and the Tjitarum, were in many ways remnants of the Revolution. These groups consisted of former laskars, and they often rampaged around the West Javan countryside. These gerombolans targeted not only foreigners such as Chinese-Indonesians and Dutch people, but also Republican civil servants, Army members, and Police. In addition to the Darul Islam group roaming West Java which we will return later in this chapter, the Bambu Runtjing and the Tjitarum posed a significant threat towards Republican state in the area. === [PDF page 225] === 225 Central Java On May 11, 1950, a Chinese-Indonesian named Liem Swan Liang was riding his bicycle down from Bojong Street to his house at Kampung Randusari, Semarang. Suddenly, a becak passed him, forcing him to stop. Two men, armed with revolvers, then pointed their guns at Liem, asking him to surrender his bicycle. The two men escaped with Liem’s beloved bicycle.565 One month later, on July 19, another Chinese-Indonesian by the name of Kwee Hoaij Po was robbed in front of Tawang Railway Station in Semarang. The robbers were armed with Sten submachineguns. Kwee immediately screamed for help. Luckily, a Mobile Brigade policeman heard Kwee, and tried to pursue the robbers with a police truck. The robbers managed to escape, as the policeman was unarmed at that time. As a result, Kwee lost f.1500 in cash and f.2422 worth of valuables.566 The vignettes described above is representative for the port city of Semarang, which is the provincial capital and most populous city in Central Java. Indeed, Central Java is the second region with the most gerombolan and criminal activity.567 Just like in West Java, the majority of crime acts in Central Java in general is brigandage, or gerombolan activity, which was mainly active in the rural regions of Central Java. Table 9. Major Crimes in Central Java, Categorized by Perpetrator. 1950-1954. Perpetrator Gerombolan 565 1951 1952 102 1953 13 Sadhyoko, Perbanditan Di Kota Semarang Pasca Revolusi 1950-1958, 88–89. Sadhyoko, 89–90. 567 See Chart 2. 566 1954 Total 124 === [PDF page 226] === 226 Bandits Gerombolan Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia Individuals Unknown Gerombolan Merapi-Merbabu Complex Prisoners TNI Gerombolan 426 Batallion TNI Police Gerombolan PKR Total 34 40 11 189 156 20 Compiled from Kumpulan Surat Kawat Gangguan Keamanan Dinas Pengawasan Keselamatan Negara, Bundel 1951-1954 (ANRI RA8C 443), Ichtisar & Tjatatan Laporan-Laporan Penting Dinas Reserse Kriminil, 1 Mei s/d Tanggal 15 Mei 1952, and Ichtisar & Tjatatan Laporan-Laporan Penting Dinas Reserse Kriminil, 16 Mei s/d 31 Mei 1952 (ANRI RA8C 451). Table 10. Major Crimes in Central Java, Categorized by Type of Crime. 1950-1954 Type of Crime Brigandage Robbery Homicide Arson Assault Hijacking Prison Break Sexual Violence Total 1951 1952 101 27 137 1953 13 22 1954 12 Total 124 35 173 Compiled from Kumpulan Surat Kawat Gangguan Keamanan Dinas Pengawasan Keselamatan Negara, Bundel 1951-1954 (ANRI RA8C 443), Ichtisar & Tjatatan Laporan-Laporan Penting Dinas Reserse Kriminil, 1 Mei s/d Tanggal 15 Mei 1952, and Ichtisar & Tjatatan Laporan-Laporan Penting Dinas Reserse Kriminil, 16 Mei s/d 31 Mei 1952 (ANRI RA8C 451). === [PDF page 227] === 227 The Central Javanese provincial capital of Semarang is established as an autonomous city (stadsgemeente) on March 1906 in the Netherlands East Indies. Since then, Semarang expanded as a center of administration and commerce in the northern coast (pasisir) of Java. Its population expanded significantly throughout the 20th century, from 141.853 in 1920, reaching 341.844 in 1952.568 Similar to Jakarta and Bandung, its demographic outlook was dominated by Indonesians and Europeans (including Dutch and Eurasians), while inmigrant population expanded greatly after the Revolution.Semarang is significant for the fact that it hosts the headquarters for important governmental functions for the Province of Central Java, such as the Diponegoro Division headquarters (now Kodam Diponegoro) and the Regional Police Command (Polda Jawa Tengah). These centers of state power notwithstanding, 1950s Semarang was heavily crime-ridden. Crimes in Semarang consisted of pembegalan (hijacking); maling (theft), and robbery (rampok). These criminals were usually motivated by economic and social causes.569 These criminal incidents was widely reported by the local newspaper Suara Merdeka, which often publish crime news for the consumption of the Semarang middle-class. Table 11. Major Crimes in Semarang and its Environs as reported by Suara Merdeka. 19501954. 568 Type of Crime 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 Total Hijacking 21 41 Robbery 38 53 Theft 17 Total 68 12 12 14 111 Djawatan Penerangan Propinsi Djawa-Tengah, Propinsi Djawa-Tengah (Semarang: Djawatan Penerangan Propinsi Djawa-Tengah, 1952), 70. 569 Sadhyoko, Perbanditan Di Kota Semarang Pasca Revolusi 1950-1958, 203. === [PDF page 228] === 228 Cited from Sadhyoko, 2021, pp.105-107, 117-119, 141-143 Semarang criminals often wore Army uniforms in order to disguise their activities. On April 28, 1950, a group of rampok in Army uniforms attacked a Chinese-Indonesian at his house on Pedamaran Street, Semarang. The robbers were armed with revolvers. As a result, they escaped with the victim’s money and wristwatch worth f.400.570 Two more robberies by Army-clad rampok happened on May 29, 1950. The first victim, identified only by his initials SBJ, lost f.400 worth of cash and other valuables. The second victim, under the initials LKG, lost f.500 and other valuables. In both cases, the robbers were heavily armed, with pistols and carbines.571 On August 8, 1950, a Semarang local living in Tegalsari, R.Eddy Danupamekas, was robbed by a group of rampok at his house. The robbers arrived in car, wore Army fatigues, and wielded Thompson submachineguns. Eddy and his family were then forced to relinquish clothing, valuables, and a bicycle to the rampoks, with an estimated loss of more than f.4500.572 Semarang criminals often targeted Chinese-Indonesians and figures of state authority, such as civil servants, soldiers, or police officers. On June 11, 1950, Slamet, a police detective (reserse) working in Semarang, was robbed by nine poks armed with Bren light machine guns at his house. The victim and his family was not harmed, but the rampoks escaped with a substantial amount of 570 “Perampok Di Pedamaran 39 A,” Suara Merdeka, April 29, 1950; Sadhyoko, Perbanditan Di Kota Semarang Pasca Revolusi 1950-1958, 122. 571 Both SBJ and LKG were most likely Chinese-Indonesians, considering their initials. “Perampokan-Perampokan,” Suara Merdeka, May 30, 1950; Sadhyoko, Perbanditan Di Kota Semarang Pasca Revolusi 1950-1958, 123–24. 572 “Rampok Di Tegalsari,” Suara Merdeka, August 5, 1950; Sadhyoko, Perbanditan Di Kota Semarang Pasca Revolusi 1950-1958, 130. === [PDF page 229] === 229 valuables.573 On September 6, 1950, a civil servant working for the city and his friend was returning home on a taxi. Their taxi was then suddenly halted by five men, clad in Army uniforms and armed with revolvers and Sten submachineguns. The begals shot one of the taxi’s tires, and they forcefully robbed their victims. Money and valuables worth f.1400 were lost.574 A similar case happened on October 9, 1950, when two armed men in Army uniforms robbed a woman and her child.575 On June 20, 1950, victims with the initials of D and A was robbed at their house by a group of armed rampoks. 8-men strong, the robbers were heavily armed, wielding Bren light machine guns, Sten submachineguns, revolvers, and driving a car. They entered the house systematically, with four men surrounding the house, two threatening the victims at gunpoint, and the other two tasked with searching the house. The victims lost f.3850 worth of money and valuables.576 On July 25, 1950, a group of armed robbers broken and entered a house on Bedagan Street. The victim, initialed SPA, and his friend managed to escape the house through the back door. They ran to the local Military Police office to ask for help. When the MPs arrived at the scene, a fierce gunfight ensued. The ringleader was summarily killed by a shot to the head, and the others managed to 573 “Rampok Di Karangbendo,” Suara Merdeka, June 12, 1950; Sadhyoko, Perbanditan Di Kota Semarang Pasca Revolusi 1950-1958, 124. 574 “Pembegalan Taksi,” Suara Merdeka, September 7, 1950; Sadhyoko, Perbanditan Di Kota Semarang Pasca Revolusi 1950-1958, 93. 575 “Pembegalan Di Jalan,” Suara Merdeka, October 10, 1950; Sadhyoko, Perbanditan Di Kota Semarang Pasca Revolusi 1950-1958, 96. 576 “Perampokan,” Suara Merdeka, June 21, 1950; Sadhyoko, Perbanditan Di Kota Semarang Pasca Revolusi 19501958, 125. === [PDF page 230] === 230 escape. Postmortem investigation indicated that this group had targeted at least four other houses.577 On October 15, 1950, a maling tried to rob a Chinese-Indonesian under the name of Tan Seng Liem. The thief targeted Tan’s bicycle, which was parked in front of a store in Bojong Street. Luckily for Tan, a soldier of the Military Police was around, and helped to apprehend the thief. The case was handled by local police.578 Often, these criminal acts also resulted in the death of victims, such as the case in March 1953. At midnight March 2, 1953, a maling illegally entered a house of a Semarang local by the initial of S. The victim tried to resist to protect his valuables, but he was overwhelmed and stabbed in the abdomen. The victim was brought to the local governmental hospital, where he died.579 Certainly, these reports of crimes are far from comprehensive. However, it should provide us with a picture of how Semarang urbanites had to deal with criminal activity in their city. In addition to the criminal activity in urban centers such as Semarang, there were also significant crime in rural areas. While rural Central Java also have its proper share of robberies, theft, and hijackings, the rural areas were differentiated by the widespread activity of brigandage by gerombolans. Some of these brigand groups operated through purely economic and social motives, but some of them were also considered as political by the police. 577 “Perampokan Di Kampung Bedagan,” Suara Merdeka, July 26, 1950; Sadhyoko, Perbanditan Di Kota Semarang Pasca Revolusi 1950-1958, 127–28. 578 “Pencuri Sepeda Yang Malang,” Suara Merdeka, October 16, 1950; Sadhyoko, Perbanditan Di Kota Semarang Pasca Revolusi 1950-1958, 113–14. 579 “Bertempur Dengan Maling,” Suara Merdeka, March 3, 1953; Sadhyoko, Perbanditan Di Kota Semarang Pasca Revolusi 1950-1958, 116. === [PDF page 231] === 231 In rural Central Java, the major gerombolan group was the Merapi-Merbabu Complex (MMC). The MMC operated out of the valleys of Mount Merapi and Merbabu in Central Java. According to a report from the Prime Minister Office in 1953, the MMC is categorized as a “political movement that was not based upon the assumption of a state within the Republic of Indonesia.”580 In contrast to the Darul Islam movements, The movement is characterized by the idea that they “did not proclaim a new state at its core, while they also did not form civilian territorial organizations (pamong pradja, police, etc.), yet they were also militant.”581 The MMC is acephalous in organization, as it was not led by a primus inter pares such as Kartosuwiryo in Darul Islam. There were several notable figures in the MMC, such as Soejoed, Multajat, Mardjenggot, Walujo Muchsin, and Suradi Bledeg. All of these figures were local jagos that became crime bosses in the region.582 The MMC gerombolans often hijacked and robbed cars, trucks, buses, and trains in the area; attacked police and TNI forces in order to obtain weapons; influenced the local pamong pradja to follow them, or incite local peasants to overthrow those who did not agreed with their political goals.583 For example, on May 27, 1952, Tarmoredjo, a villager living in Kragilan Village near Magelang, was robbed and murdered by a gerombolan of 5 armed men. He was shot three 580 This categorization is similar to the Gerombolan “Bambu Runtjing” in West Java. Perdana Menteri Republik Indonesia, “Nota Perdana Menteri Tanggal 20 Februari 1953 Tentang Keamanan Dan Ketertiban Umum Di Seluruh Indonesia,” 6. 581 On the Darul Islam, see Chapter II. Perdana Menteri Republik Indonesia, 6. 582 Djawatan Penerangan Propinsi Djawa-Tengah, Propinsi Djawa-Tengah, 212. 583 Perdana Menteri Republik Indonesia, “Nota Perdana Menteri Tanggal 20 Februari 1953 Tentang Keamanan Dan Ketertiban Umum Di Seluruh Indonesia,” 7. === [PDF page 232] === 232 times after refusing to give up his money and jewelry.584 Meanwhile on December 14-15, 1952, a 250-men strong MMC gerombolan raided two department stores in the city of Ambarawa, with estimated losses reaching Rp.20.262.42.585On January 17, 1954, two members of MMC gerombolans murdered Amatdimedjo, a peasant living in Dukuhpeleh Village, Limbangan, Kendal Residency. The two men clubbed Amatdimedjo until death, and his body was hung on a tree by the local road. The police stated that the motives were unknown, but it is possible that the murder was part of an armed robbery.586 Meanwhile, the MMC gerombolans were also active in Semarang. On January 27, 1954, a civil servant working for the Public Works Service for the Semarang municipal government was robbed and murdered by a group of rampok on Stadion street in downtown Semarang. The robbers escaped with Rp.5000 of the victim’s money. Investigation by the police indicates that the robber group was connected to the Merapi-Merbabu Complex gerombolan. The police then advised citizens of Semarang to stay vigilant against the infiltration of the MMC rebels.587 Local figures of authority, such as village chiefs and police officers, were targeted by the MMC gerombolan. An example of how the MMC have targeted local pamong pradja was the 584 Dinas Reserse Kriminil, “Ichtisar Singkat Tentang Laporan2 Penting Dari Tanggal 1 Djuni s/d 15 Djuni 1952,” 10–11. 585 “Laporan Kedjadian2 Jang Ketrima Dengan Perantaraan Radiogram Pada Tanggal 29-12-1952 Oleh Bagian Dinas Reserse Kriminil” (Djakarta: Dinas Reserse Kriminil, Djawatan Kepolisian Indonesia Pusat, December 30, 1952), 1, RA.8C 443, ANRI. 586 Dinas Pengawasan Keselamatan Negara, “Laporan Harian Kedjadian2 Jang Keterima Dengan Perantaraan Radiogram, Pada Tanggal 25 Djanuari 1954 Oleh Bagian DPKN-DKN” (Djakarta: Dinas Pengawasan Keselamatan Negara, Djawatan Kepolisian Negara, January 26, 1954), 5, RA.8C 443, ANRI. 587 “Rampok Menembak Mati Pegawai DPU Di Siang Hari,” Suara Merdeka, January 28, 1954; Sadhyoko, Perbanditan Di Kota Semarang Pasca Revolusi 1950-1958, 139. === [PDF page 233] === 233 incident in Pakis Underdistrict (kecamatan), Kedu Residency on November 23, 1952. During the incident, a company (80-250 men) of MMC gerombolan assaulted the house of the local assistant wedana (subdistrict officer), brutally murdering him, his wife and three of his children, along with a house guest and her child. Following the murders, a local Mobile Brigade police unit was engaged in a fierce gunfight against the gerombolan, and four policemen were killed in the fighting.588 Due to the robberies and homicides against wealthy peasants, merchants, and civil servicemen, the Merapi-Merbabu Complex is viewed as a symptom of a larger movement of extreme leftist (extreem-kiri) political groups. This view was made more acute by the fact that the Communist-oriented Barisan Tani Indonesia was especially active in the area.589 Crime in Central Java was, in many respects, follows a similar pattern with West Java. In the urban center of Semarang, the majority of the crimes were common urban crimes, such as hijacking (begal), theft (maling), and robbery (rampok). In many of these cases, the criminals were often armed with guns and other weapons, while they also often wore Army or Police uniforms. Similar to the criminals in Jakarta, favorite target for these criminals were foreigners, such as the Chinese-Indonesians and Dutch living in Semarang. A different picture emerged when we shift our view to the rural areas of Central Java. Here, there was a major gerombolan movement, dubbed the Merapi-Merbabu Complex, which operated out of the mountainous valleys of Mount Merapi and Merbabu. Similar to their counterparts in 588 Dinas Reserse Kriminil, “Laporan Kedjadian2 Jang Ketrima Dengan Perantaraan Radiogram Pada Tanggal 25-111952 Oleh Bagian Dinas Reserse Kriminil” (Djakarta: Dinas Reserse Kriminil, Djawatan Kepolisian Indonesia Pusat, December 16, 1952), 4, RA.8C 443, ANRI. 589 Perdana Menteri Republik Indonesia, “Nota Perdana Menteri Tanggal 20 Februari 1953 Tentang Keamanan Dan Ketertiban Umum Di Seluruh Indonesia,” 7. === [PDF page 234] === 234 West Java, the Bambu Runtjing and the Tjitarum, the Merapi-Merbabu Complex often participated in acts of brigandage against local villages, targeting Indonesians, Chinese-Indonesians, and Dutchmen alike. In addition to the relatively more wealthy Chinese-Indonesians and Dutch living in the rural areas, the gerombolans also often targeted civil servants, Army, and police members, thus posing a significant challenge to Republican authority in the region. East Java The third region considered in this chapter is East Java, especially in and around its capital and main city, Surabaya. According to the National Statistics on Major Crimes cited above, East Java is the third most crime-ridden province in the country, excluding Sulawesi. In a pattern roughly similar with West and Central Java, East Java was divided into two geographical regions, namely urban and rural parts. The capital and main urban center in East Java was Surabaya, which was a port city famous as a center of industry and shipping since colonial times. Surabaya was important as an administrative center, as it hosts the Governor’s office, the Brawijaya Division headquarters (now Kodam Brawijaya), and the provincial Police headquarters (Polda Jawa Timur). Table 12. Major Crimes in East Java, Categorized by Type of Crime. 1950-1954. === [PDF page 235] === 235 Type of Crime Robbery Brigandage Homicide Assault Arson Prison Break Smuggling Total 1951 11 1952 18 32 1953 11 Total 32 54 Cited from Kumpulan Surat Kawat Gangguan Keamanan Dinas Pengawasan Keselamatan Negara, Bundel 1951-1954 (ANRI RA8C 443), Ichtisar & Tjatatan Laporan-Laporan Penting Dinas Reserse Kriminil, 1 Mei s/d Tanggal 15 Mei 1952, and Ichtisar & Tjatatan Laporan-Laporan Penting Dinas Reserse Kriminil, 16 Mei s/d 31 Mei 1952 (ANRI RA8C 451). On January 2, 1951, Sukiran and Roesman, two officers of the local police Mobiele Brigade, was escorting a treasurer working for the Surabaya branch of the Borsumij (BorneoSumatra Maatschappij) general trade company. They were suddenly intercepted by a group of four armed rampok while on the way to the local Borsumij factory. Sukiran and Roesman resisted the robbers, and a gunfight ensued. As a result, Sukiran was shot dead, while Roesman was wounded, while the robbers managed to escape the scene, albeit without any money.590 On May 26, 1951, a group of 8 armed robbers entered Wonokromo Railway Station in downtown Surabaya. The station guards were stunned as the robbers were armed with revolvers, and they managed to escape with Rp.3333.50 from the safe located in the stationmasters’ office.591 590 Djawatan Kepolisian Indonesia Jakarta, “Kumpulan Surat Kawat Gangguan Keamanan Bundel 1951” (Djawatan Kepolisian Indonesia Jakarta, 1951), Radiogram 2/1/51 No.4/t, Radiogram 8/1/51 No.19/t, RA.8C 443, ANRI. 591 Djawatan Kepolisian Indonesia Jakarta, Radiogram No 29/RDG/28/5/1951. === [PDF page 236] === 236 The vignettes above illustrates the kind of crimes that were often found in 1950s Surabaya. Just like the other cities, violent armed maling and rampok incidents also colored the city’s social history. On May 9th, 1952, a Chinese-Indonesian by the name of Soe Kay Tjieng was robbed in his hotel room in Embongwungu, Surabaya. The perpetrators, wielding revolvers, ran away with Soe’s gold and jewelries worth Rp.72.672.50.592On May 21, 1952, Hadji Anwar, a local of Gresik, a town 19km west of Surabaya, was robbed in his house by four men armed with revolvers. Anwar was having a ceremony (selametan) in his house, and the arrival of the robbers surprised his guests. Anwar managed to escape and alerted the local village head. Later, the police assisted by local villagers apprehended the gerombolan, arresting three of them and confiscating three revolvers and a safe.593 On May 30, 1952, Njoo Tan Tung, a Chinese-Indonesian living in Benowo Village, Djabakota, Surabaya, was robbed by three men, armed with revolvers. Njoo lost Rp.11.502.50 worth of money and valuables.594 Another robbery happened on June 28, 1952, in Djabakota, when Ngatminah, a local of Ngawinan Village, was robbed by three men, two uniformed and armed with Sten submachineguns while the other was unarmed. Ngatminah lost two songkok worth Rp.112.595 Table 13. Crimes in Surabaya as reported by Surabaya Post, Categorized by Type of Crime. 1956-1957. Type of Crime Theft 592 1956 13239 1957 12666 Total 25905 Dinas Reserse Kriminil, “Ichtisar Dan Tjatatan Laporan2 Penting Dari Tanggal 16 Mei s/d 31 Mei 1952,” 8. Dinas Reserse Kriminil, “Ichtisar Dan Tjatatan Laporan2 Penting Dari Tanggal 1 Djuni s/d 15 Djuni 1952” (Djakarta: Dinas Reserse Kriminil, Djawatan Kepolisian Negara, n.d.), 12, RA.8C 451, ANRI. 594 Dinas Reserse Kriminil, 12. 595 Dinas Reserse Kriminil, “Ichtisar Dan Tjatatan Laporan2 Penting Dari Tanggal 1 Djuli s/d 15 Djuli 1952” (Djakarta: Dinas Reserse Kriminil, Djawatan Kepolisian Negara, July 21, 1952), 15, RA.8C 451, ANRI. 593 === [PDF page 237] === 237 Smuggling Fraud Robbery Extortion Arson Total 1398 1007 89 31 15766 1329 1102 67 40 15210 2727 2109 156 71 30976 Cited from Fallezi, 2007. In addition to ordinary crimes, Surabaya also faced with the problem of homeless people (gelandangan), illegal occupation of land, and squatting. According to Purnawan Basundoro, since 1945 until the late 1950s, land and property ownership in Surabaya is “extremely chaotic,” as abandoned houses and buildings were often occupied by homeless people.596 Surabaya was overrun by refugees and other internally displaced persons from the regions as a result of the Revolution. This situation was also observed in Semarang and Bandung during the same period.597 An example was the story of one Idris, a vagrant in the city of Surabaya in 1956. He was forced to live in shantytowns and hovels in Surabaya after a gerombolan attacked his village and burned his house.598 596 This pattern of migrant squatting was also widely evident in Jakarta and Bandung. Basundoro, “Antara Baju Loreng Dan Baju Rombeng: Kontrol Tentara Terhadap Rakyat Miskin Di Kota Surabaya Tahun 1950an,” 310; Reerink, “From Autonomous Village to ‘Informal Slum’: Kampong Development and State Control in Bandung (1930-1960),” 204. 597 Radjimo Sastro Wijono, Modernitas Dalam Kampung: Pengaruh Kompleks Perumahan Sompok Terhadap Permukiman Rakyat Di Semarang Abad Ke-20 (Jakarta: LIPI Press, 2013), 131–33; Reerink, “From Autonomous Village to ‘Informal Slum’: Kampong Development and State Control in Bandung (1930-1960),” 201–2. 598 Trompet Masjarakat. 12 January 1956. Cited in Basundoro, “Antara Baju Loreng Dan Baju Rombeng: Kontrol Tentara Terhadap Rakyat Miskin Di Kota Surabaya Tahun 1950an,” 313. === [PDF page 238] === 238 In fact, the problem of illegal occupation of land and squatting became acute in Surabaya, inviting the close attention from the Surabayan municipal government and the Army. Some of the first acts by the municipal government in order to prevent squatting was to require the owner of abandoned houses to report to the Surabaya Housing Office (Kantor Urusan Perumahan Surabaja) on July 29, 1952. Abandoned, unused houses were to be controlled by the Surabaya municipal government through that office, or “blockaded” by the government.599 Through this method, many Dutch-owned houses and buildings fell into the control of the municipal government. Meanwhile, the business of eviction was handled by the municipal government’s Bureau for the Prevention of Illegal Buildings (Biro Pentjegah Bangunan Liar), in cooperation with the Police.600 The local Brawijaya Division then promulgated its own ruling on property ownership on August 1952, stating that public or privately-owned houses and buildings that were already occupied by the Army should be transferred to the City Military Command (Komando Militer Kota Besar), which will assign a Housing Officer (Perwira Perumahan) to manage them. The legal owners of these houses were not allowed to requisition back their property if it was to be used for personal reasons. This policy was supported by the local city parliament on August 27, 1952.601 These examples suggest that the municipal government and the Army viewed illegal occupation and squatting as criminal problems to be eradicated. In addition to crimes on property, economic crimes such as smuggling also often took place in Surabaya. For example is a set of smuggling cases uncovered by the Surabaya Police from July- 599 Basundoro, 310. Basundoro, 311. 601 Basundoro, 310–11. 600 === [PDF page 239] === 239 August 1952 in Tanjung Perak, the main port of Surabaya. On July 8, 1952 the Surabaya police arrested the wife of a policeman under the name of Margo, for possessing 5 kg of illegal opium. The opium was smuggled in from Singapore onboard a Dutch KPM ship Van Riemsdijk, and the police wife was promised Rp.10000 as a reward for carrying it pass the port authorities.602 On August 1, 1952, a Surabayan local named Abdulhamid bin Kapir Muchamad was arrested for carrying 37 pieces of diamonds worth Rp.30.000 without a permit, in addition to Rp.5100 in counterfeit Rupiah bills. Abdulhamid, who smuggled the items onboard the KPM ship Baud, claimed that he obtained the counterfeit money from Singapore.603 On August 20, 1952, a worker from the Naval Academy (Institut Angkatan Laut) was arrested for smuggling in a pistol with three rounds of ammunition, and 45 pieces of gold coins and 51 packages of wristwatches.604 While certainly cases of smuggling and other economic crimes often happen in ports such as Tanjung Priok (Jakarta) and Tanjung Mas (Semarang), it seems that the National Police provided more attention towards the incidents in Tanjung Perak. In terms of rural East Java, it is significant that the gerombolans in this province were far less active, especially compared to West and Central Java. In comparison with the other Javanese provinces, East Java is relatively safer, with less gerombolan activity in the region except in its eastern parts, such as Banyuwangi and Jember.605 According to the data compiled by the Criminal Investigative Service and the State Security Surveillance Service, gerombolan activity in East Java 602 603 Dinas Reserse Kriminil, “Ichtisar Dan Tjatatan Laporan2 Penting Dari Tanggal 1 Djuli s/d 15 Djuli 1952,” 15. Dinas Reserse Kriminil, “Ichtisar Dan Tjatatan Laporan2 Penting Dari Tanggal 1 Agustus s/d 15 Agustus 1952,” 13. 604 Dinas Reserse Kriminil, “Ichtisar Dan Tjatatan Laporan2 Penting Dari Tanggal 16 Agustus s/d 31 Agustus 1952” (Djakarta: Dinas Reserse Kriminil, Djawatan Kepolisian Negara, September 8, 1952), 14, RA.8C 451, ANRI. 605 Dinas Reserse Kriminil, “Ichtisar Dan Tjatatan Laporan2 Penting Dari Tanggal 1 Djuni s/d 15 Djuni 1952,” 5. === [PDF page 240] === 240 is limited to localized acts of brigandage. There were no significant groups equal to the Darul Islam, Bambu Runcing, and Tjitarum in West Java, or the Merapi-Merbabu Complex in Central Java. This does not mean that East Java is spared from gerombolan activities, which mostly took place in the eastern part of the province, such as in Besuki and Malang Regencies. For example, on May 19, 1951, a TNI soldier and a villager in Pasuruan, Malang Regency was kidnapped by two gerombolans, one of them 10-men strong and the other 40-men strong. The gerombolans were armed with Bren machine guns and wore Army uniforms. The soldier, Saman, was found dead four days later.606 Gerombolan attack in Pasuruan happened again on early morning June 4, 1951, when a 10-men gerombolan, armed with rifles, randomly shot at the villages of Djemblung and Karangsono, costing the local villagers with 1 dead and 12 others heavily injured.607 In Besuki Regency, gerombolans often attacked and shot at the police and army units posted there, such as the incident on Rogodjampi Village in Banyuwangi, on September 14, 1953. At that time, a 5-man police patrol was involved with a firefight with a local gerombolan armed with Mauser rifles and pistols. Two police agents, R.Abdullah and Suparman, was shot dead during the skirmish. The gerombolan themselves escaped, leaving behind their Mauser rifles and a 9mm pistol.608 These 606 Dinas Reserse Kriminil, “Pembunuhan Atas Dirinja Saman Anggauta TNI Bat.515 Lawang Dan Pentjulikan Atas Dirinja Sehab Petinggi Kendang Dukuh (Pasuruan)” (Djakarta: Dinas Reserse Kriminil, Djawatan Kepolisian Indonesia Pusat, June 25, 1951), RA.8C 443, ANRI. 607 Dinas Reserse Kriminil, “Penembakan Terhadap Orang2 Jang Djaga Gerdu Dan Orang2 Desa Hingga Membawa Korban, 1 Orang Meninggal Dan 12 Orang Luka2.” (Djakarta: Dinas Reserse Kriminil, Djawatan Kepolisian Indonesia Pusat, June 25, 1951), RA.8C 443, ANRI. 608 Dinas Reserse Kriminil, “Laporan Kedjadian2 Jang Ketrima Dengan Perantaraan Radiogram Pada Tanggal 17-91953 Oleh Bagian Dinas Reserse Kriminil” (Djakarta: Dinas Reserse Kriminil, Djawatan Kepolisian Negara, September 19, 1953), RA.8C 443, ANRI. === [PDF page 241] === 241 kinds of skirmishes often took place in East Java, yet in terms of scale, the gerombolans were far less numerous compared to their counterparts in West and Central Java. In conclusion, crime in East Java is prevalent, yet not as violent as West and Central Java. Urban crime in East Java, especially in Surabaya, was rather limited in terms of scale and scope, while it was often dominated by economic crimes such as smuggling and the problems of squatting and illegal occupation of lands. Meanwhile, in rural East Java, gerombolan activities were less prevalent than West and Central Java. When there were gerombolans, they mostly operated in the eastern part of the province, most notably in Besuki and Malang Regencies. The Darul Islam: A National Gerombolan? The Darul Islam, led by its imam, Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo (1905-1962), is best viewed as an overarching banner—containing the idea of an Islamic state as an alternative for Indonesia—which encompassed various regional rebellions throughout the 1950s-1960s. In Aceh, the Darul Islam movement was shaped by religious pretext over regional opposition against the central government. In South Sulawesi, the Darul Islam movement was more of a demobilization problem. In West and Central Java, Darul Islam was mostly a result of competition over regional autonomy mixed with Islamic themes and millenarianism.609 However, the Darul Islam is 609 Van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam, 2–3. === [PDF page 242] === 242 substantially motivated by its Islamic ideology to establish and Islamic state, the Negara Islam Indonesia.610 Thus, the Darul Islam itself is a rebellion with multidimensional causes.611 The Darul Islam movement was mostly based in West Java around Kartosuwirjo. As Cornelis van Dijk has written a great detail on the Darul Islam, it is unnecessary to repeat it here.612 Perhaps it is sufficient to note that the Darul Islam movement existed from 1948 until 1962, when Kartosuwirjo was finally arrested by Siliwangi troops. The rebellion existed in West Java, Central Java, South Sulawesi, Aceh, and South Kalimantan, while its main force, Kartosuwiryo-led Tentara Islam Indonesia, operated mainly in West Java, particularly in and around Tasikmalaya, Ciamis and Garut in the Priangan Regency.613 Table 14. Major Crimes conducted by the Darul Islam in West Java, Categorized by Type of Crime. 1950-1954. Type of Crime 1951 1952 1953 1954 Total Brigandage Kidnapping Robbery Homicide Total 139 144 45 80 266 273 46 80 Compiled from Kumpulan Surat Kawat Gangguan Keamanan Dinas Pengawasan Keselamatan Negara, Bundel 19511954 (ANRI RA8C 443), Ichtisar & Tjatatan Laporan-Laporan Penting Dinas Reserse Kriminil, 1 Mei s/d Tanggal 15 Mei 1952, and Ichtisar & Tjatatan Laporan-Laporan Penting Dinas Reserse Kriminil, 16 Mei s/d 31 Mei 1952 (ANRI RA8C 451). 610 Formichi, Islam and the Making of the Nation. For a detailed yet somewhat dated overview, see Cornelis Van Dijk’s Rebellion under the Banner of Islam. A newer interpretation that puts emphasis on the role of political Islam is Islam and the Making of the Nation by Chiara Formichi. See Van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam; Formichi, Islam and the Making of the Nation. 612 Van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam. 613 McNicoll, “Internal Migration in Indonesia: Descriptive Notes,” 44. 611 === [PDF page 243] === 243 At its height, the Darul Islam operated like the other gerombolans discussed in this chapter, albeit better organized and armed. The group mostly consisted of former laskars, such as the Hizbullah and the Sabililah. In terms of their contribution to the insecurities of the 1950s, it is beneficial to note several notable cases of Darul Islam attacks in West Java during the period. On November 12, 1952, a 100-men Darul Islam gerombolan attacked Biru Village in Majalaya, near Bandung. 43 houses were robbed with the loss of Rp.16.592.50, and 5 villagers were shot dead.614 On November 20, 1952, a 200-man Darul Islam gerombolan attacked a TNI post in Garut. During the attack, 88 houses were robbed and burned down, 8 villagers and 3 Village Guerrilla Guards (Pager Desa) were shot dead, and 7 people were injured.615 Darul Islam forces often attacked Army and Police units, such as the attack on June 5, 1952, where a 400-man group of Tentara Islam Indonesia under Achmad Sungkawa and Smith Solihin fought with Battalion 311 and 325 of the Siliwangi Division in Cianjur, Bogor Regency. In the attack, the Siliwangi forces were routed. At least 16 TNI soldiers died, 7 injured, and 9 were missing, while three Bren and a Lewis machine gun was taken by the gerombolan.616 The Darul Islam forces in West Java targeted not only villages, but also Army, Police, and the civil service. In sum, the Darul Islam insurgency took heavy toll on the West Javan countryside. Between the last quarter of 1951 and the first quarter of 1952, there were 414 and 428 persons 614 Dinas Reserse Kriminil, “Laporan Kedjadian2 Jang Ketrima Dengan Perantaraan Radiogram Pada Tanggal 25-111952 Oleh Bagian Dinas Reserse Kriminil” (Djakarta: Dinas Reserse Kriminil, Djawatan Kepolisian Negara, November 26, 1952), 2, RA.8C 443, ANRI. 615 Dinas Reserse Kriminil, “Laporan Kedjadian2 Jang Ketrima Dengan Perantaraan Radiogram Pada Tanggal 22-111952 Oleh Bagian Dinas Reserse Kriminil” (Djakarta: Dinas Reserse Kriminil, Djawatan Kepolisian Negara, November 24, 1952), 1, RA.8C 443, ANRI. 616 Dinas Reserse Kriminil, “Ichtisar Dan Tjatatan Laporan2 Penting Dari Tanggal 1 Djuni s/d 15 Djuni 1952,” 2. === [PDF page 244] === 244 killed, 4.046 and 3.052 houses burnt, and 3.244 and 6.192 robberies conducted by the Darul Islam. The number of internally displaced persons due to the Darul Islam between October-December 1951—either willingly or evacuated by the Republican state—reached 52.672.617 From 19551962, the number of refugees 209.355 in 1962 and 303.764 in 1958, averaging on 250.000 people per year. 1.500 people were killed annually by the Darul Islam, while the yearly number of burned down houses were never less than 10.000 from 1958-1960.618 According to the newspaper Indonesian Observer, from 1951-1956 Darul Islam victims reached 13.257 murdered, 1.622 kidnapped, 4.832 wounded, and 266.952 houses plundered and burned down in West Java alone.619 It is clear that the Darul Islam insurgency was taking its toll on the Indonesian state and society, and it would not take long until the Republican state had to come up with a plan to eradicate these rebels. Conclusion: A Nation of “Boys with Rifles” After nearly four years of fighting, the sudden arrival of peace in 1949 hit the former revolutionaries like a shock. Consider this one note from a young student and former laskar in West Java (possibly part of the Jakarta People’s Militia) at the end of hostilities in 1949: 617 Van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam, 105. Van Dijk, 105. 619 Indonesian Observer, January 19, 1957. Cited in McNicoll, “Internal Migration in Indonesia: Descriptive Notes,” 44. 618 === [PDF page 245] === 245 I regrouped with the main troops in Purwakarta. All was calm. Not even a single gun went off. When the night arrives, my heart is filled with tense silence. Has this Revolution really finished, as the work of warding off the enemy is no longer there. So was my thoughts at the time. I concluded that I must return to society to continue my studies at the Technical School, which I had left for 4 years. And I proposed this to my commander. Through a letter, I was honorably discharged from the TNI with the rank of corporal. ... I returned to Jakarta in a public car. I arrived at Jatinegara at 20.00. From there I took an oplet to Pasar Baru. I alighted at Bioscoop Globe. At 21.00, the movie was just finished. I crossed to the parking lot. Instantly, I felt ashamed, looking at the people exiting the theater. They showed off. Meanwhile I’m like a vagrant. Nobody paid any attention to me. Well, this is how the world wants it. Things are different in the front and in the city. This is the real struggle.620 The story of this anonymous laskar is representative for many of the former Indonesian freedom fighters in facing the new reality of peace. After 1949, the war has officially ended, and these people, who were dragged—or voluntarily surrendered themselves—into the fires of Revolution, had to face with the grim consequences: their martial services were no longer needed. The spirit of the 1945 Revolution—the perjuangan—was abruptly replaced by demobilization and reconstruction. It was in this context that many of the former laskars were 620 Fauzi, “‘Lain Di Front, Lain Pula Di Kota’: Jagoan Dan Bajingan Di Jakarta Tahun 1950-An,” 581. === [PDF page 246] === 246 radically decoupled from reality: their reality was the perjuangan, and it was clearly ending soon. Several of the laskars were disbanded, some of them were integrated into the TNI, and many were simply demobilized. After demobilization, the laskar members were to return to society and their previous occupations. However, in light of the chaotic postwar political and socioeconomic context, there were limited opportunities for these laskars. There were simply not enough housing, work, or even clothing to accommodate the return of these laskars. Consequently, at the end of the Revolution, many of these laskars became criminals and brigands. Just like during the war against the Dutch, they gathered around similar-minded colleagues, gathered arms, and tried to survive, often through extralegal means. The early 1950s saw the rise of the gerombolan problem, which plagued the Indonesian countryside for many years. The numbers of armed crime were, globally speaking, not very high. However, the sense of widespread insecurity triggered a widespread feeling of fear—which then augmented the sense of societal disillusion that was prevalent after the conclusion of Revolution in 1949. In other words, the nation was imbued with what, in Ted Gurr’s terms, a “relative deprivation” of security, which had been expected to come after the Revolution has ended.621 Thus, the feeling of widespread insecurity became the dominating issue in 1950s Indonesia. The first factor enabling a widespread feeling of insecurity was the small arms problem. This fact is reflected in the prevalence of armed crimes and gerombolan actions. During this period, criminals often wielded revolvers, Sten and Thompson submachineguns, or Bren light 621 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel, Center of International Studies Publications (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), 27. === [PDF page 247] === 247 machine guns. These weapons, which was often military-grade firearms, were widespread in Java after the Revolution. It is most likely that these firearms were remains from the Revolution or obtained from Dutch and TNI armories located across the country. Responding to the question whether Indonesia will be able to restore order after its return to Jogjakarta, a young Indonesian nationalist said to LIFE journalist Max Ways in 1949: It will be very difficult—more difficult now than before the police action. The Dutch are right when they say that the heart of the problem is the fact that Japanese arms have fallen into the hands of many elements who have no interest in order and little real interest in independence. Some of these are Communists—probably more will be Communists. Most cannot be described in political terms. They are boys with rifles.622 Indeed during the 1950s, firearms were not a monopoly of the state, but it was often held by common people. Guns were considered part of everyday life. Consider this story from Maun Sarifin, a local of Prumpung, East Jakarta in regard to firearms: It used to be free. People were offered to use. My friend offered me myself. My friend worked there, in a weapons factory or the military. My brother also gave me one, told me that the bullets were in the backpack if necessary. In the past, everyone had [guns]. My parents also have, because [the guns] were small. If we need bullets, we would just ask the Corporal living across the street. He usually gives us one box. 622 Max Ways, “Chaos in Asia,” LIFE, June 6, 1949, 117. === [PDF page 248] === 248 He often gives me [bullets] during Eid. Use this instead of firecrackers, he said. But be careful not to hit anyone with it. So everyone had [guns]. Moreover, the thieves also have guns.623 The story of Maun Sarifin illustrates the liberal attitude towards gun ownership in 1950s Indonesia. Subsequently, the mere existence of these weapons became problematic for the maintenance of peace and order. The second factor that supported insecurity was the persistence of armed groups. The prevalence of criminals or gerombolans disguised as soldiers or policemen illustrates what I call the demobilization problem. Many former laskars or TNI forces that were demobilized often were unsatisfied with their social conditions, and they often became criminals. This is not to say that all former laskars or demobilized TNI battalions immediately shifted their careers to the underworld. Many of the former freedom fighters managed to demobilize peacefully. Yet, it is true that some of them became criminals. The third factor is the limited institutional capacity of the state to promptly mitigate these crime waves. This is also related to the first two factors. When military-grade weapons were not a monopoly of the state, the existence of heavily armed gerombolans became serious challenge for the nascent Army and Police forces. The Republican Army and Police forces at this time were far from perfect in terms of organization, manpower, and equipment. Meanwhile, the fact that both the armed groups and the Army were former guerrillas and experienced in warfare against the 623 Interview with Maun Sarifin, 17 July 2004. Cited from Fauzi, “‘Lain Di Front, Lain Pula Di Kota’: Jagoan Dan Bajingan Di Jakarta Tahun 1950-An,” 593. === [PDF page 249] === 249 Dutch, certainly both sides are in an equal footing in terms of tactics and strategy, or at least initially. These three factors—the proliferation of small arms, prevalence of armed groups, and limited state capacity—contributed much towards the insecurity in 1950s Indonesia. These three problems were intensified because there was a proclivity for criminals to target figures of authority—such as soldiers, police officers, or civil servants. In addition to the fact that those working for the government were often more well-paid than commoners, it is also possible that this tendency spilled over from the Revolution, where officials and state symbols became target of daulat action. Daulat, which means “sovereignty” in Indonesian, have assumed a new meaning during the Revolution, as noted by Benedict Anderson: …the older word kedaulatan (sovereignty or authority), so often, in this time of revolution, married to rakjat (the people), gave birth to the new word mendaulat, which acquired rapid currency all over Java, and which meant the deposition, humiliation, kidnapping, or murder of hated officials or other representatives of authority, usually carried out by groups of armed pemuda.624 The prevalence of acts of violent crimes against state representatives in 1950s Indonesia means that these Daulat actions were also carried over from the Revolution. Meanwhile, the gerombolan problem also exacerbated other issues such as race. For instance, attacks often targeted minorities, such as Chinese-Indonesians and Dutch living in Java. While there is an economic reasoning behind this tendency—foreigners were often more well-off 624 On daulat and mendaulat, see Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, 334. === [PDF page 250] === 250 compared to common Indonesians during the period as a result of colonial racial and ethnic policies—it is also important to recognize a deeper, more “ideological” reasons behind this. Throughout Indonesian history, foreigners and minorities in Indonesia often became a legitimate target of violence. They represent the “other” in society, which makes them a convenient target for violent criminal acts. Many of the violent crimes across Java consisted of brigandage, robbery, homicide, assault, and arson. All of these categories of crime includes the use of small arms. Meanwhile, the majority of crime incidents were recorded from West Java, Central Java, Sulawesi, and East Java. Considering that Sulawesi is administered as a single province during this period, many of those recorded crimes were skewed towards South Sulawesi, which experienced two incidents—the demobilization-related Andi Aziz and Kahar Muzakkar uprisings—during the early 1950s. In this chapter, we have noted that different regions have different kinds of gerombolans. In certain areas of West Java, there were the Darul Islam with its aspiration of creating an Islamic state. Meanwhile, there were also the Bambu Runtjing and Tjitarum, which were motivated by a mixture of Revolutionary ideals, economic reasoning, and disillusionment with the Army’s demobilization policy. In Central Java, there was the Merapi-Merbabu Complex, which was an amorphous agglomeration of various gerombolans contending for resources. East Java is the contrasting case here, as it does not have a major gerombolan movement roaming the countryside, although there were one or two incidents of gerombolan in the rural areas. Meanwhile in the urban areas, we can see that Jakarta, Bandung, and Semarang share a similar experience with violent crimes within their municipal borders. Here again, East Java === [PDF page 251] === 251 becomes an exception as violent crimes in Surabaya seem to be rather under control. In Surabaya, the problem of gerombolan was replaced by the problem of illegal occupation of land. It is clear that every region have their own causes for the gerombolan, which in turn also shaped the various characters of the gerombolan. At least in the first half of the 1950s, the gerombolan problem was not considered as a national emergency. It was often viewed as the excesses of Revolution, a runoff from the long experience of colonialism and war. Certainly many aspects of its causes were continuities from these previous moments in Indonesian history. However, it is clear that the gerombolan was gradually taking a toll in Indonesian society. Insecurity became a significant problem, as order was a precondition to the reconstruction and development of the country. Consequently, the Republican state had to come up with a creative solution towards this postwar problem. === [PDF page 252] === 252 CHAPTER IV: COUNTERING GEROMBOLAN: STATE RESPONSES AGAINST INSECURITY IN THE 1950S1960S Introduction: The Gerombolan Redux In a scene depicted in the novel Twilight in Jakarta (1957) by Mochtar Lubis, a telling conversation took place in a municipal landfill in Jakarta sometime in the late 1950s. Saimun, a garbage truck driver, was lamenting his life to his friend, Itam: It is true that at times it feels like I’m going crazy, Mun, living like this. It feels like we are just being trampled upon. We cannot live in the village to work on the rice fields anymore. The gerombolan will kill us. If we escape to the city, we live miserably.625 Albeit fictive, this scene is telling in regards to the lived experience of the working classes in 1950s Indonesia. Their livelihoods were interrupted by the internecine violence that characterized much of the decade. Meanwhile, when people were uprooted from their villages, they moved to larger towns and cities in search of security. In the cities, however, jobs were not always easy to find as well, compounding their misery. As much as this image represents the social condition on the ground for the common Javanese during this “age of gerombolan,” it did not take very long for the government to devote its attention towards the problem of insecurity. During the October 5 Armed Forces Day 625 Mochtar Lubis, Senja Di Jakarta, Second Edition (Jakarta: Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia, 2019), 163. === [PDF page 253] === 253 celebrations in 1950, President Soekarno declared that, despite the relatively orderly manner of the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch, “peace and security has not established strong roots.”626 Soekarno recognized that the long aftermath of the Revolutionary war was indeed the cause for this situation. More importantly, however, is the President’s discussion of the gerombolan menace: Armed gerombolan, which may at first have been formed to confront the Dutch, have deviated from their original objectives and are now being used by those who were willing to seek political goals in a way that is against the law, or have become gangs and mobs whose purpose is none other than ‘pound’ (menggedor), steal, loot, and rob people - these gangs must be disarmed by military action if possible, or destroyed by military action if necessary… … armed gerombolan outside of the official Armed Forces could not and should not be allowed to exist; they should not be considered as patriots, because they act and behave in a manner detrimental to the state; as they act by using their weapons, they must be met with military action!627 626 “…kita mengetahui bahwa ketenteraman dan keamanan itu belum memperoleh kembali dasar-dasar yang kuat.” Cited from Soekarno’s 1950 Armed Forces Day (October 5) speech, “Angkatan Perang Bersiap!” broadcasted by the National Radio (Radio Republik Indonesia). Iman Toto K. Rahardjo and Suko Sudarso, eds., Bung Karno Masalah Pertahanan-Keamanan Himpunan Pilihan Amanat Kepada TNI/POLRI (Jakarta: Grasindo, 2010), 10. 627 “Misalnya gerombolan-gerombolan bersenjata, yang mungkin pada permulaan didirikan untuk menghadapi Belanda, tetapi yang telah menyimpang dari tujuannya yang semula dan sekarang diperalat oleh suatu golongan yang mau mencari cita-cita politik dengan jalan yang bertentangan dengan hukum negara, atau yang telah menjadi gerombolan-gerombolan yang tujuannya tak lain dari menggedor, menyamun, merampas, merampok, - gerombolangerombolan ini harus dilucuti dengan tindakan militer kalau mungkin dibinasakan dengan tindakan militer kalau perlu… …gerombolan-gerombolan bersenjata di luar angkatan perang tidak dapat dan tidak boleh dibiarkan adanya; mereka tidak dapat dianggap pecinta negara, sebab mereka bertindak dan berkelakuan merugikan negara; mereka bertindak dengan mempergunakan senjatanya, mereka harus dihadapi dengan tindakan militer!” Cited from Soekarno’s 1950 Armed Forces Day (October 5) speech, “Angkatan Perang Bersiap!” broadcasted by the National Radio (Radio Republik Indonesia). Rahardjo and Sudarso, 15–16. === [PDF page 254] === 254 On April 27, 1951, the newly reconsolidated Unitary Republic of Indonesia elected a new cabinet under Prime Minister Sukiman and Vice Prime Minister Suwirjo. While reestablishing peace and order had been on the table since the Hatta Cabinet of the RUSI, it was during the Sukiman Cabinet that the Indonesian state started to pay attention to issues of insecurity. In fact, security (keamanan) became the number one objective on the Cabinet’s list of programs.628 In this chapter, I argue that in the effort to address insecurity, the state—which includes its civilian, defense, and security apparatuses—initiated a series of direct and indirect policies that was shaped by the logics of emergency and counterinsurgency. By indirect, I point to the “noninvasive,” regulatory measures taken in urban and rural areas, such as the anti-firearms and counter-gerombolan campaign, mobilization of civilians in the form of private security organizations and territorial forces, and Army takeovers of property. Direct policies were undertaken by the military and police forces in the form of counterinsurgency operations. In Indonesia, many of the state’s methods—whether it was the operationalization of martial law, antifirearms campaigns, popular mobilization, counter-gerombolan policing, direct counterinsurgency operations—were inherited from the colonial state, albeit reinterpreted for new uses in the post-revolutionary era by the nascent Indonesian state. This chapter begins with the early Army reforms of the 1950s, which primarily deals with the problem of demobilization. The chapter then looks at the early efforts of post-revolutionary disarmament campaigns and Army-led demobilization schemes during the 1950s. It was the state’s 628 For instance, see the entry on “Susunan Kabinet Sukiman-Suwirjo” in Tatang Sastrawiria and Haksan Wirasutisna, Ensiklopedi Politik (Djakarta: Perpustakaan Perguruan Kementerian P.P. dan K., 1955), 375. === [PDF page 255] === 255 effort against insecurity, and the role of the Army within it, that created the pathway for military involvement in non-military affairs. This fact emerged not only in the Army’s central role in establishing a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy, but also due to its role in demobilization, which introduced the Army into playing a role in economic development—to create jobs for demobilized soldiers. Meanwhile, some solutions taken by the Army, such as transmigrating former soldiers and supporting the establishment of private security organizations, paved the way for close relationship between the Army and society. During the October 17, 1952 crisis, progress in Army reforms were halted as the civilian politicians took interest in curbing the military role in non-military affairs,which almost ended in an attempted coup against the civilian government. However, Soekarno’s mediating role in the October 17, 1952 Incident spared the Army of its consequences. The result, however, is the halting of the Army reforms of the 1950s, and thus the efforts to curb insecurity by military reforms alone. Nevertheless, the Army’s successful role in counterinsurgency operations against the PRRI/Permesta and Darul Islam rebellions were important to the development of TNI doctrine. It was during these campaigns that the TNI experimented with its counterinsurgency strategy, which in turn shaped the Army’s doctrine. In the PRRI/Permesta campaigns, the Army realized the importance of Nasution's “mobile forces” and the capability of mustering a modern combined arms campaign. Meanwhile, the campaigns against the Darul Islam helped to emphasize the importance of Nasution’s “territorial forces,” or trained and mobilized population, in conducting a counterinsurgency. The chapter closes with the institutionalization of the Army’s new doctrine, === [PDF page 256] === 256 the Doctrine of Territorial Warfare, which was foundational to understanding the military’s gradual intervention in non-military affairs. Army Reforms in the 1950s: The Problems of Demobilization as Counterinsurgency Strategy One of the primary factors in the success of counterinsurgency campaigns is the separation of the insurgents from the local population. Even if the insurgents are operating from deep within the jungles or the mountains, they still need to procure logistics just like any other armies., Insurgent armies rely on local people to provide them with food and supplies, as well as information. This fact means that the process of winning the “hearts and minds” of the people is at the core of counterinsurgency operations. At the same time that it was addressing insurgency, the TNI was also deeply invested in demobilizing its wartime Army, which in early 1952 consisted of at least 200,000 men. The size of the Army was to be reduced in number, through a gradual retirement of 80,000-100,000 of its 200,000 men, into a “core” force of 100 mobile and welltrained battalions supported by militias and Village Guerrilla Troops (Pager Desa).629 Obviously, this Nasution-sponsored initiative brought unrest to the officers and soldiers threatened with discharge, as they would have to lose the prestige of serving in the Army and face the difficulty of looking for alternative employment in post-war Indonesia.630 Thus, the Army was faced with a 629 Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 249; Barry Turner, A.H. Nasution and Indonesia’s Elites: “People’s Resistance” in the War of Independence and Postwar Politics (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2018), 131. 630 Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 249. === [PDF page 257] === 257 problem of demobilization that had two faces: the demobilization of troops, and minimizing the risk that these former soldiers would join the gerombolans. From these examples, we can immediately see two different but related factors that were behind the reasoning for Army participation in developmental programs. First, there was the factor of the demobilization problem of the TNI. As we have mentioned before, the Army officers emerged from two very differing stocks, the former KNIL and former PETA types. This schism within the officer corps intensified as successive waves of reorganization and rationalization (reorganisasi-rasionalisasi, re-ra) programs were introduced to reduce the number of soldiers in the Army. The first wave of Re-Ra programs was during the Hatta cabinet in 1948, when the cabinet tried to shrink the TNI from 350,000 regulars and 470,000 laskars into 160,000 men, 57.000 of them regulars.631 This first rationalization program was based upon budgetary constraints, as Hatta have stated earlier in his address to the KNIP on February 18, 1948.632 In fact, it was during this first Re-Ra that the idea to transfer demobilized soldiers to developmental activities, such as agriculture or training in new jobs, was conceived by the cabinet.633 Nevertheless, Hatta’s Re-Ra program subsequently resulted in unrest, as many demobilized soldiers and laskars joined the Front Demokrasi Rakjat (FDR), which then led to the violent outbreak of the Madiun affair in 1948. 631 See Chapter I of this dissertation. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 262; Yahya Muhaimin, Perkembangan Militer Dalam Politik Di Indonesia, 1945-1966 (Gadjah Mada University Press, 1982), 52. 632 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 262. 633 Kahin, 263. === [PDF page 258] === 258 After the transfer of sovereignty in December 1949, this schism played out again in the second reorganization efforts, this time led by Nasution. In 1950, the TNI inherited a large revolutionary army that still has too many personnel that was undertrained and unsuitable of operations. In a conversation with journalists from Aneta, Nasution wrote that ideally “we need an army that consists of at least 150,000 organized men” plus reserves. Meanwhile, “the current army which amounts to 200,000 regulars and 80,000 reserves” is an expensive inheritance from the Revolution.634 Nasution designed a general demobilization program which included four elements: reassigning veterans to developmental projects and other governmental institutions; maintaining decommissioned soldiers as a militia, designing a social program for receiving them back in the society, and forming a national veterans organization.635 Subsequently, on November 15, 1950, the Armed Forces and Police issued a joint instruction on the minimum requirements for Armed Forces and Police recruitment. Geared towards those who wanted to remain within the Armed Forces and the Police, the instruction stated that in addition to the physical and ideological requirements, candidates for service in the Army should be literate, while candidates for service in the Police they should be a graduate of elementary schooling (Sekolah Rakjat).636 This second Army reorganization program in the 1950s faced various problems. Ruth McVey has written that “the rough equality of the army leader’s ages and of their claims to preeminence was to form a continuing source of strife, for it meant that a large body of people—the 634 Nasution, Tjatatan-Tjatatan Sekitar Politik Militer Indonesia [Notes on Indonesian Military Politics], 316–17. Nasution, 204. 636 A.H. Nasution and R.S. Soekanto, “Instruksi Bersama No.1 KSAD Dan Kepala Djawatan Kepolisian Indonesia Tentang Sjarat-2 Penerimaan Anggauta APRI Dan Kepolisian.,” November 15, 1950, RA.8A 1427, ANRI. 635 === [PDF page 259] === 259 greater part of the revolutionary officer corps—could feel entitled to high position in the peacetime army, and certainly to preference over those who entered after the vital period of the revolution.”637 In addition, after the transfer of sovereignty, many former Republican guerrilla fighters “came down from the mountains in triumph, ready to take an active part in the politics of the urban centers,” together with “a group of Republican political prisoners emerging from Dutch jails either before December 27 (1949) or soon afterward.”638 Thus, when the Army introduced reforms after the transfer of sovereignty and former KNIL members entered the TNI, this created a series of demobilization crises within the Republic. First example of these demobilization crises was the Just King Armed Forces (Angkatan Perang Ratu Adil, APRA) or Westerling affair in West Java in 1950. The APRA consisted of formerly demobilized KNIL and Dutch Army soldiers under KNIL Captain Raymond P.P. Westerling, a former Dutch commando who was renowned for his role in wartime atrocities in South Sulawesi.639 Prior to the transfer of sovereignty in 1949, Westerling had requested that his forces be incorporated into the then RIS Armed Forces, a request that was rejected by the government at that time.640 On January 23, 1950, roughly 800 armed men attacked Bandung, then the capital of the Negara Pasundan. APRA units seized the Siliwangi Division headquarters in Bandung, and killed 79 members of the Division in addition to a number of civilians.641 The APRA forces 637 McVey, “The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army,” April 1971, 141. Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 61. 639 Feith, 62. 640 Disjarahdam VI / Siliwangi, Siliwangi Dari Masa Ke Masa, Edisi ke-2 (Bandung: Penerbit Angkasa, 1979), 240. 641 Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 62. 638 === [PDF page 260] === 260 participated in skirmishes against Siliwangi forces, and the rebellion petered out after Westerling escaped the country on February 22. Not long after the Westerling Affair, another instance of armed rebellion arose in South Sulawesi, which came to be known as the Andi Aziz Affair. In this case, former KNIL units under Captain Andi Abdul Aziz, requested the Federal government to quickly integrate his units into the Armed Forces. When the Army headquarters responded slowly and news arrived that a group of centrist TNI officers under Lieutenant Colonel A.J. Mokoginta had been sent to Makassar in April 1950, the Andi Aziz group revolted, forming a “Free Corps” (Pasukan Bebas) in the highlands of South Sulawesi. The Andi Aziz group managed to capture Makassar, where they imprisoned Mokoginta and other TNI officers.642 The rebellion only subsided after Aziz flew to Jakarta to negotiate with the Army headquarters and was swiftly arrested. As a result of this incident, South Sulawesi became a crisis area, with guerrillas taking the initiative to control towns and kampongs governed by local aristocrats.643 The third example is the more expansive rebellion that broke out in the Moluccas during the same year. On April 25, 1950, the former justice minister of Negara Indonesia Timur, Mr. Soumokil declared the establishment of an independent Republic of South Moluccas (Republik Maluku Selatan, RMS). In response, the APRIS imposed a naval blockade over the islands and landed 850 men on the island of Buru on July 13, 1950, followed by an amphibious landing on 642 643 Feith, 67. Feith, 69. === [PDF page 261] === 261 Ambon in September 26, 1950.644 Officially, the RMS movement collapsed after the occupation of Ambon and Buru, yet guerrilla fighting continued in the neighboring island of Seram throughout much of the early 1950s.645 These three examples—the APRA/Westerling, Andi Aziz, and RMS affairs—represent the premier instances of the immediate problems of demobilization faced by the TNI in its early years. Indeed, the problem of veterans and demobilization was not only an issue for the political elites in Djakarta, but it was also prominently featured in the popular culture of the period. One stark example here is the film by director and producer Usmar Ismail—who was widely known as the “Father of Indonesian Cinema,”—titled Lewat Djam Malam (After the Curfew), which was produced in 1954. The film tells the story of a former pejuang, Iskandar, who had just returned from the front in Bandung. Iskandar meets his former pejuang friends, Puja and Gunawan, only to find them “corrupted”: Puja had become a manager in a brothel, and Gunawan was a building contractor that was literally corrupt. Iskandar quickly became disillusioned with the current situation, and he then murdered Gunawan, his own friend. Iskandar himself was killed by an Army Military Police patrol shortly afterwards.646 Exploring the popular issues of the plight of former pejuang, the film, which was written by Asrul Sani, was widely popular during the time, winning Best Picture in the Indonesian Film Festival of 1955. Another product of popular culture that explores the themes of revolutionary trauma is the 1952 novel by Mochtar Lubis, Djalan Tak Ada Udjung (A Road With No End). The novel tells 644 Feith, 70. Feith, 71. 646 Lewat Djam Malam (PERFINI, 1955). 645 === [PDF page 262] === 262 the story of a schoolteacher, Guru Isa, who became traumatized during the Japanese occupation and the Revolution. As a result of his trauma, he was unable to have an erection. Guru Isa subsequently was close to Hazil, an idealist young pejuang, who was very enthusiastic about the Revolution and eager to fight against the Dutch. Isa and Hazil became close, and Hazil subsequently had an affair with Isa’s wife, Fatimah. Hazil was arrested by the Dutch, and during his arrest, he immediately uncovered the locations of other guerrilla forces to his captors. Meanwhile, Isa, who was enraged by Hazil’s affair with his wife, subsequently worked together with the local guerrillas against the Dutch, and was later arrested as well. In the darkness of their internment cells, both Isa and Hazil faced their worst fears, and showed their true colors. In contrast to Hazil, Isa prevailed under interrogation, never telling anything to his captors, and ultimately regains his manhood.647 While Ismail and Lubis were by no means the only Indonesian writers and filmmakers that produced works on the issues of post-revolutionary trauma, these examples reveal the “cultural mood” of the time—it was clear that the issue of former pejuang and gerombolans haunted Indonesian popular culture during the period. Disarmament Campaigns In a parliamentary hearing on October 11, 1950, Prime Minister M. Natsir announced that insecurity was a primary concern for the government, whether it was a product of common crimes or political ones. Natsir also said that the government did not want to follow a one size fits all policy: every policy needed to be adapted to particular settings.648 This approach to security policy 647 648 Mochtar Lubis, Jalan Tak Ada Ujung (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1952). Kementerian Penerangan, Ichtisar Parlemen, vol. 127 (Jakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, 1950), 475. === [PDF page 263] === 263 was ramped up during the Sukiman-Suwirjo Cabinet of 1951. As much of the security problems were related to the circulation of small arms and the existence of armed groups, the Indonesian government took steps towards disarming and demobilizing these armed groups. The problem of disarming and demobilizing the former laskars and other paramilitary organizations was challenging for the Republic. On November 14, 1950, Prime Minister Mohammad Natsir and Minister of Defense Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX initiated a nationwide program for requisitioning firearms through a Proclamation (Maklumat Pemerintah).649 Natsir and Hamengkubuwono called for “every institutions, struggle organizations (badan perjuangan), and individual that still own or store unregistered weapons to relinquish it to the government, starting November 28 until December 4, 1950.” At the same time, the government provided the opportunity for the former laskars to join the Army or the Police. When surrendering their weapons, the laskars were to be split into groups no more than five men, should clearly show their weapons, and carry a palm leaf (janur) as a sign they did not have hostile intentions, while individuals should carry their weapons in clear sight.650 Meanwhile, on the early morning of November 19, 1950, Army authorities in Jakarta put the city under quarantine. The quarantine order, announced at 05.00 AM in the morning, was effective for six hours from 06.00 AM until 12.00 PM. Citizens were not allowed to leave their houses, and no forms of transportation were allowed to exit or enter the city. A KLM flight, 649 It is interesting that the government did not rely upon the existing Law No. 8 of 1948 on firearms regulation, but promulgated a proclamation (maklumat) instead. “Undang Undang No 8 Tahun 1948 Tentang Mencabut Peraturan Dewan Pertahanan Negara No.14 Dan Menetapkan Peraturan Tentang Pendaftaran Dan Pemberian Idzin Pemakaian Senjata Api.” (1948). 650 Pemerintah Republik Indonesia, “Maklumat Pemerintah Republik Indonesia 14 Nopember 1950,” November 14, 1950, RA.8a 1370, ANRI. === [PDF page 264] === 264 destined for the Netherlands, was delayed until the following morning, while a Qantas airliner was not allowed to land in the city’s international airport. All of these actions were caused by a report about the movement of illegal arms from the city to the countryside, leading the local military authorities to carry out razzias on several houses for firearms. 651 In November 1950, quarantine order was issued in the West Java capital of Bandung. This time, the Army battled against gerombolans in the nearby military town of Cimahi, resulting in the arrest of 36 people and at least 25 Sten guns and pistols confiscated.652 On December 7, 1950, military police units from the Siliwangi and Diponegoro Divisions conducted firearm raids in West Java and Brebes (Central Java), which resulted in the arrest of almost all Masyumi, Muhammadiyah, and other Islamic parties leadership in Brebes, while 57 people were arrested in West Java.653 These firearms-related raids were also conducted outside of Java. In Central Sumatra, the local police, Army, and Military Police units initiated a firearms raid on November 14, 1951, which resulted in the confiscation of 719 small arms.654 Almost all of these raids were conducted in order to reduce the prevalence of firearms-related crimes. 651 “Djakarta Sehari ‘Dibeku’ Karena Penggeledahan Sendjata Setjara Besar2an.,” Pikiran Rakjat, November 20, 1950. 652 “12 Djam Daerah KMKB ‘Dikurung’ Karena Ada ‘Gerakan Lempar Batu Sembunyi Tangan,’” Pikiran Rakjat, February 12, 1950. 653 “Penangkapan Orang2 Di Djawa-Barat + Brebes” (Kabinet Perdana Menteri Republik Indonesia, n.d.), RA.8A 1247, ANRI. 654 Kantor Kepolisian Propinsi Sumatera Tengah Bahagian Reserse Kriminil, “Perlaksanaan Instruksi No.760/R.S. Incidenteel Operatie Pengumpulan Sendjata Api Gelap Di Kabupaten Samudra” (Kantor Kepolisian Propinsi Sumatera Tengah Bahagian Reserse Kriminil, December 13, 1951), RA.8C 645, ANRI. === [PDF page 265] === 265 This anti-firearms Governmental Proclamation of November 14, 1950, which was only valid for Java, was followed by similar proclamations in the Outer Islands, such as in Central Sumatra.655 Ultimately, the national campaign failed, as it only resulted in 4,000 small arms being turned over from across Java at the time of its conclusion.656 It is notable, however, that the voluntary surrendering of laskars still took place across Java after the program. One major example of former laskars voluntarily surrendering to the Republican authorities was in Surabaya, where 1,371 men surrendered their arms on February 1, 1951. These laskars carried with them 379 weapons and 1,576 explosives (grenades, mines, etc).657 But this was an exception rather than the norm. On September 4, 1951, the Sukiman administration promulgated a new interim emergency law (UU Darurat) on the regulation of firearms and explosive materials, which stated that any person illegally importing, possessing, using, or transporting firearms are threatened with life imprisonment, death penalty, or maximum imprisonment of 20 years.658 The disarmament efforts were often a joint venture between the Army, Police, and civil government. In the Central Javan capital of Semarang, both the municipal government and the local Army authorities implemented a number of policies regarding arms control and public order. In Semarang, the municipal government have opened a firearms registration office in early 1950. 655 Staf “K” Provinsi Sumatra Tengah, “Maklumat Staf ‘K’ Prov. Sumatera Tengah,” July 30, 1951, RA.8a 1377, ANRI. 656 Hariyono, Penerapan Status Bahaya di Indonesia: Sejak Pemerintah Kolonial Belanda hingga Pemerintah Orde Baru [The Practice of the State of Emergency in Indonesia: From the Colonial Period to the New Order], 129. 657 Staf “K” Propinsi Djawa-Timur, “Lapuran Pedjuang Dan Sendjata Api.,” July 30, 1951, RA.8a 1492, ANRI. 658 Republic of Indonesia, “Undang-Undang Darurat Republik Indonesia No.12 Tahun 1951 Tentang Mengubah ‘Ordonnantietijdelijke Bijzondere Strafbepalingen’ (Stbl.1948 No.17) Dan Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Dahulu No.8 Tahun 1948” (1951). === [PDF page 266] === 266 Firearms owners were advised to register their weapons in the office by May 1950. However, after the deadline passed, it appears that illegal, unregistered guns were more prevalent than registered ones.659 To further public awareness on the issue, the municipal government even conducted an exhibition on illegal firearms and documents in the 1955 Semarang Fair.660 Meanwhile, the Central Javan Diponegoro Division, which has its headquarters in Semarang, also implemented several counter-gerombolan policies under the authority of the 1939 Law on the State of War and Siege. On March 8, 1951, Diponegoro Division Commander Colonel Gatot Soebroto promulgated a ruling (Peraturan Panglima) banning any group that was organizationally “similar to, almost similar to, resembles, or rivals the Army.”661 This included the multiple groups that were often armed and wore Army-like uniforms. Later, Gatot also inaugurated rulings that restricted public collection of cash and materials and communications. In the former ruling, any collection of money and goods are only allowed with the written permit of the local regent or mayor, while according to the latter ruling, communications were restricted to those considered unharmful to public order.662 These rulings were designed to restrict the supply of money, materials, and information to the gerombolans. On July 9, 1951, the Diponegoro Division 659 Sadhyoko, Perbanditan Di Kota Semarang Pasca Revolusi 1950-1958, 167. “Pekan Raya Semarang: Ingin Saksikan Dokumen Dan Senjata Gelap?,” Suara Merdeka, September 16, 1955; Sadhyoko, Perbanditan Di Kota Semarang Pasca Revolusi 1950-1958, 172. 661 Tentara dan Territorium IV/Divisi Diponegoro, “Peraturan Panglima Tentara & Territorium IV/ Divisi Diponegoro No.3/T/B.3/D.III/51 Tentang Melarang Adanja Gerombolan/Perkumpulan Jang Organisatienja Sama, Hampir Sama, Menjerupai Atau Menjaingi Organisatie Angkatan Perang, Organisatie Pemerintah Lainnja Jang Bersendjata Atau Organisatie Jang Semi Militair.,” April 8, 1951, RA.8a 1503, ANRI. 662 Tentara dan Territorium IV/Divisi Diponegoro, “Peraturan Panglima Tentara & Territorium IV/ Divisi Diponegoro No.6/T/B.3/D.III/51 Tentang Pembatasan Penjiaran Dan Lain2 Dari Pemberitaan Di Djawa Tengah.,” March 8, 1951, RA.8a 2457, ANRI; Tentara dan Territorium IV/Divisi Diponegoro, “Peraturan Panglima Tentara & Territorium IV/ Divisi Diponegoro No.5/T/B.3/D.III/51 Tentang Pengumpulan Umum Mengenai Uang Atau Barang,” March 8, 1951, RA.8a 1380, ANRI. 660 === [PDF page 267] === 267 also announced that civilians outside of military service were not allowed to carry, use, or own military gear, such as uniforms, head coverings, or insignias of rank or units. Those who violated this rule were subject to imprisonment.663 The laskars, however, were often indifferent to these calls to surrender their arms. In Central Java, for instance, these proclamations were followed by negotiations between governmental representatives sent out by the Pekalongan Resident R.Soedjono and Amir Fattah, the leader of the Central Java DI/TII. During the negotiations, Amir Fattah agreed with the government’s call to surrender their arms. However, he regretted Jakarta’s rushed decision to round up arms, especially without any prior negotiations with DI’s leader Kartosoewirjo. As a result, opinion differed throughout Fattah’s company commanders: at least half of them agreed to surrender their arms and follow Fattah, and the other half disagreed.664 This case is a perfect example of how calls for disarmament often faced resistance from the former laskars. Nevertheless, firearms became a perceived menace to the Indonesian authorities during much of the 1950s. Indonesian local security forces often initiated raids against illegal firearms. In addition to the quarantine in Jakarta and Bandung, there were at least 15 major firearm raids conducted in Central Java from 1950-1957.665 During this campaign, military police units from the Diponegoro Division moved against illegal firearms, especially against demobilized Dutch military members in the city. In one case, Diponegoro Division military police arrested a former 663 “Soal Pakaian Seragam: Penjelasan Tentang Hal Tersebut,” Suara Merdeka, July 9, 1951; Sadhyoko, Perbanditan Di Kota Semarang Pasca Revolusi 1950-1958, 150. 664 Kantor Gubernur Djawa Tengah, “Laporan Singkat Tentang Sikap Amir Fattah Terhadap Ma’lumat Penjerahan Sendjata,” November 29, 1950, RA.8A 1372, ANRI. 665 Sadhyoko, Perbanditan Di Kota Semarang Pasca Revolusi 1950-1958, 168–69, 177. === [PDF page 268] === 268 Dutch officer, a Lt. Texier, who was working for a factory. Texier was carrying 49 pistols and six mortars in his company truck. The MPs suspected that Texier intended to sell these weapons on the black market. Lt. Texier was subsequently arrested and turned over to the Dutch military police in Bandung.666 In theory, civilian cases were handled by the police, and the Military Police dealt with the military ones. In practice, however, it was much more complicated than that. In January 1951, joint Army and Police forces initiated counter-gerombolan operations In Jogjakarta and its outskirts. This operation lasted for three months, until March 1951. In a letter for Vice Prime Minister Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, the Head of Jogjakarta Security Staff, Paku Alam VIII, wrote that the joint operations resulted in the arrest of 260 individuals and the confiscation of 20 revolvers, 4 rifles, 4 automatic pistols (pistol-mitralleur), 2 Sten submachineguns, 15 air guns, 1,913 rounds of ammunition, and 51 explosives (hand grenades and land mines). In a later report, the Jogjakarta Police reported that after these counter-gerombolan raids, the valleys around Merapi was relatively secure, as the gerombolan moved their operations to other areas.667 Thus, it was clear that while disarmament is necessary for the establishment of social order, the state faced significant resistance towards this effort. The experience in dealing with these firearms-related problems also conditioned the TNI to recognize that the problem of demobilization and disarmament was directly related to security, which falls under the purview of 666 “Batu Sebagai Ganti Senjata,” Suara Merdeka, July 26, 1950; Sadhyoko, Perbanditan Di Kota Semarang Pasca Revolusi 1950-1958, 169–70. 667 Staf “K” Daerah Istimewa Jogjakarta, “Gerakan Merdeka,” February 1, 1951, RA.8C 959, ANRI; Kantor Besar Kepolisian Daerah Istimewa Jogjakarta Bagian Reserse, “Daftar Adanja Gedoran Dan Begal Dalam Daerah Istimewa Jogjakarta” (Kepolisian Daerah Istimewa Jogjakarta Bagian Reserse, March 16, 1951), RA.8a 959, ANRI. === [PDF page 269] === 269 military affairs. Consequently, the Army had to come up with other means for disarming and demobilizing these popular forces. Demobilization and Development Schemes: The BRN and CTN In the context of the 1950s, the primary reason behind TNI involvement in development programs was the necessity to establish new institutions designed for accommodating former soldiers and laskars into post-war life. This was established as part of the solution to the problem of demobilization and disarmament. One way to conduct gradual demobilization was to transfer particular Army members designated for demobilization into national development schemes. Indeed, it was during the tumultuous decades of the 1950s that the TNI first tried to conceptualize the use of the military in non-military operations, or civic actions. On November 29, 1950, General Nasution wrote in the Bandung daily Pikiran Rakjat that “insecurity is the direct result of economic breakdown.”668 In response to this, various demobilization schemes, which begun during the Hatta Cabinet, was further expanded by the Natsir and Sukiman cabinets. On July 19, 1950, the Hatta Cabinet established the National Bureau for Demobilization (Biro Demobilisasi Nasional), which would become a part of the National Reconstruction Council (Dewan Rekonstruksi Nasional). 669 The Council, which was led directly by Deputy Prime Minister Suwirjo, was an interdepartmental agency responsible for demobilization and national reconstruction efforts throughout the country. In addition to the 668 669 Nasution, “Kemakmuran Rakjat Harus Dibangun Kembali.” “Peraturan Presiden No.15 Tahun 1950 Tentang Biro Demobilisasi Nasional” (1950). === [PDF page 270] === 270 officials from the Ministry of Defence, the Council was staffed by representatives from the Ministry of Social Affairs, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Public Works, and Ministry of the Interior.670 The Council oversaw two major initiatives for demobilization, namely the National Reserve Corps (Corps Tjadangan Nasional, CTN) and the Bureau for National Reconstruction (Biro Rekonstruksi Nasional, BRN), which was both established on December 1, 1950. 671 The CTN was originally designed as a part of the Army’s reserve force, which accommodated former soldiers that were designated for demobilization in the near future. These soldiers included those who were considered unfit for service or nearing retirement age. According to the initial guidelines from the National Reconstruction Council, these “unwanted” soldiers should be “accommodated in the CTN units and then tasked in governmental projects[,] so they will gradually adapt to civilian life.”672 Hence, the CTN “work battalions” were a de facto part of the Army, yet they were managed by the National Reconstruction Council. The CTN, led by Lt. Colonel Suwido, was initially projected to manage at least 56,500 reservists. In contrast to the CTN, the BRN was designed as an all-encompassing civilian demobilization agency. Initially led by the former West Javan governor, Raden Ukar Bratakusumah, the BRN was tasked with accommodating former pemudas, laskars, Village Guerrilla Troops (Pager Desa), and even former KNIL soldiers. On May 11, 1951, Bratakusumah 670 “Peraturan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia No.12 Tahun 1951 Tentang Tugas Dewan Dan Biro Rekonstruksi Nasional” (1951). 671 “Peraturan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia No.12 Tahun 1951 Tentang Tugas Dewan Dan Biro Rekonstruksi Nasional” (1951). 672 “Keputusan Dewan Rekonstruksi Nasional No.1/D.R.N./1951” (Kabinet Perdana Menteri Republik Indonesia, Mei 1951), sec. Garis-garis besar tjara memetjahkan soal-soal jang dibebankan kepada Dewan Rekonstruksi Nasional p.1, RA.8C 702, ANRI. === [PDF page 271] === 271 was replaced by the retired former KNIL and Siliwangi officer Didi Kartasasmita, who was also from West Java.673 According to Kartasasmita, he was selected by the government because he was “considered capable of approaching the former soldiers and members of struggle organizations,” while his brief stint in the export-import sector in Bandung after his retirement from the military definitely helps his credentials.674 The wide-range of categories assigned under the auspices of the CTN and BRN resulted in a relatively large pool of demobilized troops: initially, the BRN was estimated to absorb 207,000 former fighters.675 While both the CTN and BRN involved work training in preparing for demobilization, BRN members were able to obtain capital and technical aid to boost entrepreneurship.676 In addition to its headquarters in Jakarta, the BRN had offices in a number of provinces and residencies that necessitated its presence. Nevertheless, the long-term goals for both the CTN and BRN were the same: they were meant to arrange the gradual demobilization and reintegration of former soldiers, freedom fighters and laskars back into society, particularly for those who have not found any jobs, in order for them to live with a decent livelihood.677 The operations of the BRN and CTN were predicated upon two major programs, namely to create jobs and facilitate transmigration. The first element was designed to reeducate and train 673 Tatang Sumarsono and K.H. Ramadhan, Didi Kartasasmita: Pengabdian Bagi Kemerdekaan (Jakarta: Pustaka Jaya, 1993), 263. 674 Sumarsono and Ramadhan, 261, 264–65. 675 “Keputusan Dewan Rekonstruksi Nasional No.1/D.R.N./1951,” sec. Garis-garis besar tjara memetjahkan soal-soal jang dibebankan kepada Dewan Rekonstruksi Nasional. 676 “Keputusan Dewan Rekonstruksi Nasional No.1/D.R.N./1951,” sec. Garis-garis besar tjara memetjahkan soal-soal jang dibebankan kepada Dewan Rekonstruksi Nasional, pp. 3–4. 677 Republic of Indonesia, “Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia No.42 Tahun 1951” (1951). === [PDF page 272] === 272 the former soldiers, freedom fighters, and laskars in skills that might translate into new jobs, while the second element constituted the initial posting of these populations into new areas that might provide them with better opportunities to obtain work. The BRN and CTN made efforts to reeducate and assign former freedom fighters in state-owned enterprise, public works, and transmigration initiatives. The logic behind this was to not only prevent these former military-men from joining the gerombolan, but also to channel their energies into efforts in national development and reconstruction. According to the Territorial Reserve Corps (Corps Tjadangan Territorial), the operational unit of the Army’s CTN, “The Corps’ asrama was designed to consolidate and educate its members, according to their own talents and interests, to participate in the task of national development (pembangunan Negara) not through carrying arms and bullets, [yet] it also instills military discipline and general education in order for them to obtain a broader view in life… rather than viewing Army life as the only way for life’s obligations and continuously become a military laborer (buruh ketenteraan).”678 Thus, the BRN and CTN initiatives were particularly designed to reinitiate former revolutionaries back into civil society. At the core of the CTN endeavor is to train these demobilisanten in various blue-collar jobs. For example, the initial design of the CTN was to train their members in seven fields, including industries and handicraft, public works (roads, irrigation, and buildings), agriculture, trade and koperasi, fisheries and education, military support (Army drivers, mechanics, machinists, engineering workers), and “general courses” (such as journalism, stenography, basic 678 Directoraat Corps Tjadangan Nasional, “Rentjana Consolidatie Pertama Corps Tjadangan Territoriaal” (Djakarta: Markas Besar Angkatan Darat, February 21, 1951), 1, RA.8c 711, ANRI. === [PDF page 273] === 273 accounting, electrician, and so on).679 In order to do this, the CTN troops were sent out for studywork in various provincial / regional departments, trade schools, companies, and other military units in Jakarta, Bogor, Bandung, Semarang, Jogjakarta, Surabaya, Malang, and Makassar.680 The duration of study varied by profession. For instance, it took five months to train a Road Pioneering Company (Kompi Perintis Jalan Raya), which included training in roadmaking, asphalting, and rudimentary bridge-laying, while training a Housing Pioneering Company (Kompi Perintis Perumahan) took at least eight months, including five months of carpentry and three months of masonry. The training for Logistics Pioneering Companies (Kompi Perintis Logistik) were the fastest, only taking three months to train the reservists.681 A similar approach was also taken by the BRN. The education conducted by the Bureau was vocational and elementary, yet it was designed to enable the immediate absorption of manpower into new jobs. In East Java, The BRN trained the demobilized freedom fighters in courses in agricultural farming and plantation work (6 months), inland fishery (3-6 months), marine fishery (6 months), livestock farming (6 months), basic industries (6-12 months), and nursing (6 months).682 After training, the CTN and BRN recruits were transmigrated into underpopulated areas outside of Java, such as South Sumatra, South Sulawesi, and South Kalimantan. The two most significant areas for BRN transmigrants were Sumberjaya in Lampung (South Sumatra) and Purukcahu in Central Kalimantan.683 679 Directoraat Corps Tjadangan Nasional, 1. Directoraat Corps Tjadangan Nasional, 2. 681 Directoraat Corps Tjadangan Nasional, “Rentjana Consolidatie Pertama Corps Tjadangan Territoriaal.” 682 Kementerian Penerangan, Propinsi Djawa Timur (Kementerian Penerangan, 1953), 621. 683 Sumarsono and Ramadhan, Didi Kartasasmita: Pengabdian Bagi Kemerdekaan, 264. 680 === [PDF page 274] === 274 Conceptualizing a Military Role in Development In a 1951 Armed Forces Day edition of the Yudhagama, Colonel G.P.H. Djatikusumo wrote that “soldiers are not only on the front line for affairs of defense, but they are also on the front lines for the development of the country.”684 In his speech during the same Armed Forces Day of 5 October 1951, Armed Forces Chief of Staff Major General T.B. Simatupang proposed to Educate the former members of our Armed Forces, who are aspiring national forces that have lived through a dynamic experience of struggle (perdjoangan), [to] make them vanguards, pioneers in the efforts to reform our economy. We can make them the pioneers to open up new lands, to become sailors, to become fishermen, to become modern farmers, to become technical experts that are direly needed for the development of our country.685 In that same year, the Siliwangi Division experimented with what Nasution called “construction battalions” that participated in national development projects in West, Central, and East Java. In 1952, the TNI’s early conception of the developmental role for the armed forces was subsequently split into three phases. First, the TNI were to participate in national developmental programs in the regions, such as the dispatch of infantry and combat engineer units to the national road projects in West and Southeast Kalimantan. Second, the TNI demobilized units into reserves that subsequently transmigrated to other regions, which would later become the National Reserve 684 685 G.P.H. Djatikusumo, “5 Oktober Hari Angkatan Perang,” Yudhagama 13 (October 1951): 487. Simatupang, “Pidato Kepala Staf Angkatan Perang Untuk 5 Oktober 1951,” 477. === [PDF page 275] === 275 Corps (Corps Tjadangan Nasional, CTN). Third, there was to be a general demobilization of the Army, with the reductions of 15,000-25,000 personnel per year for three to five years.686 Transmigration of the CTN was to be one of the solutions for demobilization, while it was also viewed as a strategic policy. The CTN was first established during the Hatta Cabinet, together with its civilian counterpart the National Reconstruction Bureau (Biro Rekonstruksi Nasional, BRN). According to a statistical report in 1956, the CTN and the BRN relocated 12,037 and 14,548 men and their families respectively to Lampung, South Sumatra in 1953.687 According to Advisor to the Defense Ministry Colonel R.M.G. Sugondo in 1953, the decentralization of the population from centers in Java, Bali, and Lombok have the potential to increase national agrarian output, especially in terms of rice production. Sugondo viewed this untapped potential as especially important for boosting the national resilience in food supply. Meanwhile, the transmigration programs would also pave the way for the establishment of new bases of defense for the conduct of people’s war or guerrilla warfare if necessary.688 Sugondo’s view was in line with the Total People’s War paradigm proposed by Nasution. Thus, through these kinds of developmental and transmigration programs, the TNI intended to kill two birds with one stone: to reduce organizational problems within the Army and prevent mutinies, while also laying the foundations for future defense. 686 A.H. Nasution, “Tentara Menjumbangkan Tenaga Untuk Pembangunan,” Yudhagama 19 (April 1952): 724–26. Biro Pusat Statistik, Statistik 1956 (Djakarta: Biro Pusat Statistik, 1956), 16; Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 81. 688 R.M.G. Sugondo, “Emigrasi Dan Transmigrasi Dipandang Dari Sudut Militer Politis,” Yudhagama 24 (March 1953): 978. 687 === [PDF page 276] === 276 The deployment of the military for economic purposes was not purely an initiative from the Army itself: it was also supported by politicians, at least on paper. One example is Vice President Mohammad Hatta, whose speech outlining the Army’s future role for economic development was read in front of the Third Association for Military Officers (Ikatan Perwira Republik Indonesia, IPRI) Congress in Surabaya in 1954: From time immemorial, the armed forces have the duty to defend the safety of the people, as well as to defend the economy…. …In Indonesia the TNI emerged and developed together with the revolution. The TNI participated in the struggle for the revolution, and even became a pioneer in the struggle for our independence. Youth and soldiers are often referred to in a series of names as the pioneers of our national revolution. Indeed, our national revolution is far from over, because the goals we carried out with our independence were so that we could establish one just Indonesia and one prosperous Indonesia. Until this is achieved, it can be said that the revolution is not yet finished. But what is dangerous for us is because we are already free, so we are drunk with freedom. Forgetting that independence and sovereignty are only a part of our old dreams... But if we look at the history of the TNI in a purely sociological position, then the TNI is part of the development of the country. TNI now cannot be separated from the upheaval of our revolution. It is also not surprising that the TNI has often intervened in discussing matters === [PDF page 277] === 277 concerning the safety of our country, about our economy, and has participated in discussing the issue of corruption that is rampant among our society…689 Hatta recommended funneling demobilized and retired military men into national developmental programs: ...perhaps one can think about how older members of the Army, i.e. soldiers who, according to the current system, are no longer obliged to serve in the Army and are required to return to society, should they be deployed to factories... …if the army can contribute productive activities, build various kinds of companies, then the army can increase production and reduce the costs that the government has to give to the army. So that the money that must be given can be used in its entirety, for example to purchase military equipment… …In short, with the activities of the army in building, organizing and running development companies, apart from 689 “Dari masa dulukala angkatan perang atau panglima2 angkatan perang itu mempunjai tugas untuk membela keselamatan masjarakat, djuga membela perekonomian…. …Di Indonesia TNI muntjul dan berkembang bersamasama dengan revolusi. TNI ikut serta memperdjuangkan revolusi, malahan mendjadi pelopor dalam perdjuangan kemerdekaan kita. Pemuda dan tentara sering disebut orang dalam satu rangkaian nama sebagai pelopor revolusi nasional kita. Memang, revolusi nasional kita djauh daripada selesai, oleh karena tjita2 jang kita selenggarakan dengan kemerdekaan kita jalah supaja kita dapat menegakkan satu Indonesia jang adil dan satu Indonesia jang makmur belum tertjapai. Sebelum ini terdjapai, boleh dikatakan revolusi belum lagi selesai. Tapi jang djadi bahaja bagi kita jalah lantaran kita sudah merdeka, maka kita telah mabuk merdeka. Lupa, bahwa kemerdekaan dan kedaulatan hanja baru merupakan sebagian daripada tjita2 kita jang lama… Tapi kalau kita tindjau sedjarah TNI dalam kedudukan sosiologi, maka TNI adalah bagian daripada pembangunan negara. TNI sekarnag tidak bisa dipisahkan daripada pergolakan revolusi kita. Itu pulalah tidak mengherankan, bahwa TNI sering2 ikut tjampur membitjarakan soal-soal keselamatan negara kita, soal2 ekonomi kita, ikut serta membitjarakan soal korupsi jang meradjalela dikalangan masjarakat kita…” Mohammad Hatta, “Darma Bakti Angkatan Perang Dalam Pembangunan Ekonomi,” Duta Tamtama, January 1956, 6–7. === [PDF page 278] === 278 merely participating in military activities, the Army contributes directly to our development.690 Simultaneously with these centralized efforts, there were also initiatives from the various Army units to take care of their demobilized and retired members, most often in the form of foundations (Jajasan). On September 17, 1953, for instance, the Army Military Police Corps (CPM) established Jajasan Gadjah Mada, with the aim of developing the individual businesses of former CPM members, improving their standard of living, organizing vocational education for them, and to advocate for educational support for former CPM members.691 On the surface, the BRN and CTN initiatives represent one of the more advanced efforts conducted by the Indonesian state to demobilize its armed populace. Their schemes seems to be ideal, as the BRN and CTN initiatives allows the government to take care of their veterans through the channeling of their potential into constructive development programs. The status of BRN and CTN into a quasi-Army unit also helps to boost the self-esteem of the veterans, who were demobilized. Yet, the project also proved to be problematic because the stopgap nature of its implementation often faced challenges which varied from region to region. One overarching challenge was the feeling of injustice experienced by those who were demobilized. In Kediri 690 “…barangkali berhubung dengan itu bisa dipikirkan, bagaimana anggauta2 tentara jang umurnja sudah agak tua, jakni perajurit2 jang menurut tata keperadjuritan biasa tidak wadjib lagi duduk dalam tentara dan wadjib kembali didalam masjarakat, hendakanja bisa dikerahkan pada pabrik2… …apabila tentara bisa menjumbangkan aktivitet jang produktif, membangun berbagai2 rupa perusahaan, dengan itu tentara bisa menambah produksi dan mengurangkan pula biaja jang harus diberikan oleh pemerintah kepada tentara. Sehingga biaja jang harus diberikan itu bisa dipergunakan seluruhnja, msialnya untuk memperbaiki perlengkapan…. Pendek kata, dengan aktivitet tentara jang membangun, mengadakan dan menjelenggarakan perusahaan2 pembangunan, selain dari melatih setjara militer sadja, maka tentara memberi sumbangan kepada masjarakat kita didalam pembangunan.” Mohammad Hatta, “Darma Bakti Angkatan Perang Dalam Pembangunan Ekonomi (II),” Duta Tamtama, July 1957, 6,15. 691 “Pembentukan Jajasan ‘Gadjah Mada,’” Gadjah Mada, September 17, 1953. === [PDF page 279] === 279 Residency (East Java), for instance, the local PAM reported that, among the 4,000 demobilized CTN and BRN troops temporarily housed in depots: The feelings of these kids, they felt that they have done a great service to the country… as since the revolution they fought purely for the country and its people. Generally, a return to civil life is very hard, and it is considered as a setback to life (kemunduran hidup) as their pride and nationalism obtained during the revolution is offended (rasa kehormatan dan kebangsaan jang diperoleh selama dalam revolutie tersinggung).692 More practically, the BRN and CTN initiatives also suffered from budgetary issues. Initially designed to accommodate more than 56,000 demobilized soldiers, the CTN was only able to absorb less than half of that number due to the limited budget assigned by the state. Meanwhile, certain regions experienced problems in funneling the reservists into workplaces. In the Northern Sumatra and Aceh Military Region for instance, there was no problems finding work for the CTN as the provinces had ample demand for labor. However, in the Central Java and East Java Military Regions, many of the reservists had difficulty in finding work, and the stipend from the central government was their only lifeline. In contrast to the other BRN programs, the transmigration program was the most successful. However, the transmigrasi projects often caused unwanted 692 Kantor Kepolisian Karesidenan Kediri Bagian P.A.M., “Surat No.1038/L/C/P.A.M Perihal Demobilisasi.” (Kantor Kepolisian Karesidenan Kediri Bagian P.A.M., June 16, 1950), 1–2, RA.8C 702, ANRI. === [PDF page 280] === 280 social friction between the transmigrants and local residents, who often felt discriminated by the government’s focus on those from Java.693 The BRN and CTN program was dissolved in 1955, when its tasks were absorbed to the new Ministry of Former Freedom Fighters (Kementerian Urusan Bekas Pedjuang).694 Kartasasmita never continued to lead the program after the initiative was taken over by the Ministry.695 The Ministry of Former Freedom Fighters were short-lived, however, as it was subsequently absorbed into the Ministry of Veterans Affairs, which was first led by former Laskar Rakjat Djawa Barat activist Chairul Saleh, as Minister for Veterans Affairs and Chairman for the Legion of Veterans (Legiun Veteran Republik Indonesia), on April 9, 1957.696 Chairul himself was selected for the role due to his role in the efforts on demobilizing the former Laskar Rakjat Djawa Barat fighters after his return from exile in April 1956.697 As Minister and Chairman of the Legion of Veterans, Chairul played a major role in the drafting of the first law concerning veterans, Law No.15 on Veterans of the Republic of Indonesia, which was promulgated on August 10, 1965.698 Nevertheless, the demobilization efforts in West Java Military 693 Sumarsono and Ramadhan, Didi Kartasasmita: Pengabdian Bagi Kemerdekaan, 265. The short-lived Ministry of Former Freedom Fighters (Kementerian Urusan Bekas Pedjuang) was first established on August 12, 1955. It was d At its inception, it was led by Soetomo (Bung Tomo) of Surabaya and Barisan Pemberontakan Republik Indonesia fame. (See Chapter III). Departemen Penerangan, 20 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka, vol. 4 (Jakarta: Departemen Penerangan Republik Indonesia [Ministry of Information, Republic of Indonesia], 1965), 567. 695 Sumarsono and Ramadhan, Didi Kartasasmita: Pengabdian Bagi Kemerdekaan, 267. 696 Bambang Soeprapto et al., Chairul Saleh Tokoh Kontroversial (Jakarta: Mutiara Rachmat, 1993), 100. 697 Soeprapto et al., 92–97. 698 In writing the draft law, Chairul was assisted by the Army jurist Mr. Basarudin Nasution—who was a childhood friend of Chairul—and Prof. Djokosoetono, which were both from the Army’s Military Law Academy (Akademi Hukum Militer). See “Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia No.15 Tahun 1965 Tentang Veteran Republik Indonesia” (1965); Soeprapto et al., Chairul Saleh Tokoh Kontroversial, 102. 694 === [PDF page 281] === 281 Region (Siliwangi Division) found considerable success during its early years as the Division already experimented in establishing Reconstruction Battalions to absorb their surplus manpower.699 This experiment by the Siliwangi Division would be developed further into the Bhakti civic-action programs against the Darul Islam, which we will discuss later in this chapter. Army and Private Security Organizations Meanwhile, private security organizations (organisasi keamanan) were established across Jakarta and Semarang. In Jakarta, the initiative was led by local jagos to establish private security organizations to guard the city at night. According to H. Irwan Syafi’ie, a former head of the Revolutionary-era Bambu Runcing laskar: ...I was facing Imam Syafe’i, at that time an Army Captain. I explained, "Sir, if this continues, Jakarta is chaotic". "Why"? "Yes, they must be provided with jobs to live on." "What work, I’m only a Captain." I said, "At that time, the Chinese shops had PKK patches, the PKK was the Village Security Assistant (Pembantu Keamanan Kampung). Now we just make a security force, for those who returned home (ex-laskar returnees). The village guards will look for them every month like the PKK to the houses [and] to the shops. Every month we give them a fee, yes they will be the ones to maintain security. "Oh... yeah, that's right."700 699 “Keputusan2 Staf ‘K’ Pusat Pada Konperensi Di Jogjakarta Tgl 4 April 1951.” Interview with H. Irwan Syafi’ie, 25 November 2005. Amurwani Dwi L., “Lue Jual Gua Beli: Jago Dan Jagoan Kriminalitas Di Jakarta 1930-1960,” in Indonesia Across Orders: Arus Bawah Sejarah Bangsa, 1930-1960 (Jakarta: LIPI Press, 2011), 343. 700 === [PDF page 282] === 282 During the 1950s, many private security organizations emerged throughout Jakarta, mostly consisting of former laskar members. The first was Cobra, a portmanteau created from Corps Bambu Runcing. Cobra had representatives all over Jakarta, and Syafi’ie himself became part of Cobra, responsible for the Gambir area in Central Jakarta.701 Meanwhile, Sjafi’ie’s patron, Irwan Sjafi’ie, then an Army Captain, was a former laskar that was famous as the crime “Boss of Senen,”702 It was not long until the local authorities felt the need to regulate these private security organizations. On January 15, 1954, the Jakarta City Military Command (Komando Militer Kota Besar Djakarta Raya) announced the names of 29 officially recognized private security organizations. These organizations were provided with an official permit from the City Military Command, while private security organizations that did not have such permits were considered illegal organizations. By the end of 1954, it was estimated that members of these private security organizations in Jakarta reached 13,000 men.703 Similar initiatives were were taken by authorities in Semarang. First was the establishment of Night Security Guards (Penjagaan Keamanan Malam) in July 1950, led by a former TNI soldier named Salaman. Consisting of demobilized soldiers, the Guards offered security services to house or building owners in Semarang, charging f.10 per house or f.15-25 per store or warehouse every month. Based in Jalan Poncol No.10, the Guards were authorized by the Semarang branch of the Police’s State Security Service. Similar organizations also emerged in the city, such as Semarang 701 Amurwani Dwi L., 343. Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, 174. 703 Amurwani Dwi L., “Lue Jual Gua Beli: Jago Dan Jagoan Kriminalitas Di Jakarta 1930-1960,” 356–59. 702 === [PDF page 283] === 283 Night Guards (Penjagaan Malam Semarang) and Secure Night Guards (Penjagaan Malam Aman).704 Meanwhile, in accordance to the Army’s practice of using territorial forces to conduct Total People’s War, the Diponegoro Division established People’s Defence Organisations (Organisasi Pertahanan Rakjat, OPR). The OPR was first inaugurated on August 8, 1952 in South Semarang, and later expanded across the whole of the city in 1954.705 The OPR was essentially a neighborhood-based, squad-level militia unit that was created and led by the village chiefs or the lurah.706 These units were trained in basic military skills, national ideology, citizenship, and regional security by the Army and municipal authorities. This policy managed to gradually reduce the prevalence of crimes in Jakarta and Semarang, while also providing jobs for some of the former laskars.707 Direct Counterinsurgency Operations: The Operasi Merdeka, Operasi Segi Tiga, and Operasi Tritunggal Together with the demobilization schemes and policing operations against firearms, the Army still conducted initial counterinsurgency operations against gerombolans and rebels in Java. 704 Sadhyoko, Perbanditan Di Kota Semarang Pasca Revolusi 1950-1958, 155–56. Sadhyoko, 158,160. 706 Sadhyoko, 157. 707 Sadhyoko, 160–61; Amurwani Dwi L., “Lue Jual Gua Beli: Jago Dan Jagoan Kriminalitas Di Jakarta 1930-1960,” 360. 705 === [PDF page 284] === 284 The first initiative was taken by the Natsir government in 1950, which launched a series of general military operations called Operasi Merdeka against the gerombolans in Java.708 As part of the Operasi Merdeka in 1951, the Diponegoro Division launched a major counterinsurgency operation, “Operasi Merdeka Timur II (Merdeka East II)” with the goal of eradicating gerombolan activity, particularly the Merapi Merbabu Complex in Central Java. From February 16 until March 16, 1951, the Division initiated razzias in urban areas such as Semarang, Salatiga, Surakarta, and other Central Javan towns and military operations in order to disrupt the gerombolans’ supply lines. Afterwards, the Division sent nine of its battalions to Klaten, Bojolali, and southern Semarang regencies, which were known gerombolan bases, in order to occupy those regions and disrupt gerombolan activities.709 In doing this, the Division established the Komando Operasi Merapi Merbabu (MerapiMerbabu Operations Command) led by the Division’s Chief of Staff Lieutenant Colonel Suadi Suromihardjo. The Komando Operasi focused on eradicating gerombolan activity by the way of cooperation with local and civilian government in the area, including those from the Information and Social Ministries. This close cooperation between the Army, civil government, and the local population was dubbed a “Triangular Operation” (Operasi Segi Tiga).710 708 Pusat Sedjarah Militer Angkatan Darat, Sedjarah TNI Angkatan Darat 1945-1965 (Bandung: Pussemad, 1965), 122. 709 Panglima Tentara & Territorium Djawa Tengah / Divisi Diponegoro, “Laporan Mengenai Gerakan M.T. II.,” April 6, 1951, RA.8C 613, ANRI. 710 Julianto Ibrahim, Dinamika Sosial Dan Politik Masa Revolusi Indonesia (Bulaksumur, Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 2014), 158–59. === [PDF page 285] === 285 The Komando Operasi resulted in the capture of approximately 1,500 individuals.711 During the operation, Suradi Bledheg, the de facto leader of the MMC gerombolan, was shot dead in a skirmish in Klaten.712 With the death of Suradi, the Diponegoro Division was able to disrupt logistics for the MMC gerombolan and restrict their area of operations. However, the MMC gerombolan re-emerged in the middle of 1952, and this time the Police sent in Mobile Brigade units to restore peace and order. In January 1953, the Army, Police, and local Pamong Pradja cooperated in a counterinsurgency operation, dubbed Operasi Tritunggal, against the Merapi-Merbabu Complex bandits, resulting in the capture of prominent figures such as Mardjenggot, Waluyo Muksin, Sujud, and others.713 Meanwhile, the Semarang-based commander of Operasi Tritunggal, Captain T. Setyobudhy, declared that the operation was a success, having resulted in 57 rebel deaths, 140 rebels captured, and the recovery of 64 firearms.714 These counterinsurgency operations, however, ultimately failed to achieve its goal to restore peace and order in their targeted areas, as its implementation in the field vary from one area to another. Thus, the operations became protracted, with the TNI forces continuously on the defense while the initiative remains at the hands of the gerombolans, particularly the Darul Islam.715 711 Panglima Tentara & Territorium Djawa Tengah / Divisi Diponegoro, “Laporan Mengenai Gerakan M.T. II.” Djawatan Penerangan Propinsi Djawa-Tengah, Propinsi Djawa-Tengah, 212. 713 Djawatan Penerangan Propinsi Djawa-Tengah, 213; Dinas Sejarah Militer Komando Daerah Militer VII/Diponegoro, Sejarah Rumpun Diponegoro Dan Pengabdiannya (Semarang: CV Borobudur Megah, 1977), 565. 714 Sadhyoko, Perbanditan Di Kota Semarang Pasca Revolusi 1950-1958, 164. 715 Pusat Sedjarah Militer Angkatan Darat, Sedjarah TNI Angkatan Darat 1945-1965, 122–23; A.H. Nasution, Sedjarah Perdjuangan Nasional Dibidang Bersendjata (Djakarta: Mega Bookstore, 1965), 175. 712 === [PDF page 286] === 286 Overall, however, the initial demobilization, disarmament, and counterinsurgency campaigns were not successful. Many of the former laskars and demobilized soldiers fell into a life of crime that was often categorized as gerombolan by the state. The initial efforts to disarm the population were also incomplete. Additionally, the Army’s initial efforts of countering insurgency during this period was also far from effective. Consequently, the Army’s efforts gained attention in the parliament, which subsequently resulted in the October 17, 1952 Incident. 17 October 1952 Affair One of the most important events in the early history of civil-military relations in Indonesia was the October 17, 1952 Affair. This incident happened on the backdrop of the Army’s efforts in military reforms and demobilization, while social insecurity was also still the norm across Java. According to Herbert Feith, the October 17, 1952 Affair was a moment of “key importance in the history of parliamentary institutions in Indonesia and the attempt to confine political struggle to them.”716 As part of their plans for demobilization, the Army Headquarters and the Ministry of Defense decided to further reduce the size of the Army through a gradual retirement of 80,000 of their 200,000 personnel through pensions and discharges on the basis of health.717 This plan created unrest within the Army, especially with the former-PETA officers who tended to be close to the PNI and other parties in the Parliament. The two men representing this group was Colonel 716 717 Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 246. Feith, 249. === [PDF page 287] === 287 Bambang Supeno—who was also a distant relative of Soekarno—and the former intelligence officer Colonel Zulkifli Lubis, a rival of Nasution. In a move that bypasses Army hierarchy, Supeno first urged the President to replace Nasution as Army Chief of Staff. Supeno then gathered support from middle-ranking officers who were not sympathetic to Nasution’s plans for demobilization, and wrote a letter to the Defense Minister, Prime Minister, and the Defense Section of the Parliament stating a motion of no confidence against his superiors in the Army Headquarters, particularly Nasution.718 As a result, Nasution retaliated by suspending Supeno from all duties, as this was a blatant disregard to the military chain of command. Unfortunately for Nasution, this drama unfolded just a few days before the planned parliamentary debate on the demobilization bills proposed by the Ministry of Defense. Thus, the issue of demobilization became a political problem, and many members of the parliament, including non-party Zainul Baharuddin, Bebasa Daeng Lalo of the Partai Rakyat Nasional, Zainul Arifin of Nahdlatul Ulama, Manai Sophiaan of Partai Nasional Indonesia, and Isa Anshary of Masyumi heavily criticized Nasution’s Army reforms, particularly over the issue of demobilization.719 Another issue that became a hot topic was the matter of Army’s use of martial law. On March 26, 1952, Zainul Baharuddin criticized how the government had utilized the 1939 Law on the State of War and Siege for its own political purposes, while calling the Army, who had enjoyed wide authority under martial law, was no longer living among the people like “fish in the water.”.720 Meanwhile Zainul Arifin condemned the 1939 law as being a remnant of colonial rule, 718 Feith, 250. Feith, 252–55. 720 Sundhaussen, The Road to Power, 111–12. 719 === [PDF page 288] === 288 while Indonesia was now ruled through “militarized anarchy.”721 Muhammad Yamin and Iwa Kusumasumantri, both representatives of the Murba Party, called for the abolishment of the 1939 law, while Arudji Kartawinata (PSII) mentioned that the 1939 Law on the State of War and Siege was a threat to the people’s basic rights.722 In addition to the issues of demobilization and martial law, the issue of Army reforms were also debated in the parliament with the fiery tone of political debate common to the 1950s. For instance, the policy of using Dutch military advisors were heavily criticized by members of parliament, who cynically imposed the moniker “Nederlandsche Mata Mata (Indonesian: Dutch spies)” on the Dutch military mission.723 The politicians viewed that this proved the Army Headquarters’—and Nasution’s “Western orientation,” and thus not in accordance with the “revolutionary spirit.” More reasonably, the parliament also voiced concerns that the demobilized soldiers could then join the various gerombolans if they felt they were treated unfairly.724 As a direct consequence of this tension over Army reforms, a major rift emerged between the politicians in Parliament and Army headquarters. Nasution viewed the politicians’ criticism as an unnecessary political intervention in internal army affairs: Friction emerged between the Army and Parliament leaders, because the Parliament constantly attacks the Army Chief of Staff regarding the use of the 721 Literally: “anarki jang militeristis” see Sundhaussen, 112. Sundhaussen, 112. 723 “Nederlandsche Mata Mata is Indonesian for Dutch spies. Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 252–55. 724 Sundhaussen, Politik militer Indonesia 1945-1967, 116. 722 === [PDF page 289] === 289 NMM [,] even though the Mission itself was first established through the Round Table Conference—a political decision that was agreed upon by all parties.725 On September 24, 1952, the Affair emerged as a full-blown confrontation between the Nasution group of “military technocrats” and the politicians in the Parliament who was allied with the anti-Nasution group of former PETA military officers. On that date, Zainul Baharuddin, with the support of the more radical political parties in parliament, submitted a motion of no confidence against the Defense Minister, Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, called for military reforms and the establishment of a Parliamentary investigative committee towards the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces.726 The motion was then modified by Manai Sophiaan, which was accepted by the Parliament on October 16, 1952. The Army officers symphatetic to Nasution responded in force against what he saw as “civilian intervention in military affairs.” On October 17, a number of pro-Nasution Army troops, equipped with tanks and armed personnel carriers, led a group of 30,000 civilians in a demonstration in front of the Parliament, calling for its dissolution and an immediate national elections. Later, the demonstrators met with Soekarno at the Istana Negara. Soekarno refused to disband the parliament, arguing that dissolving parliament through non-electoral means would lead to dictatorship. 727 The crowd then dispersed, and the attempted putsch ended as soon as it began. Nevertheless, the October 17, 1952 Affair triggered a shake-up of Army leadership. Soekarno 725 Abdul Haris Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, vol. Jilid 2: Kenangan Masa Gerilya. (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1983), 248. 726 Sundhaussen, Politik militer Indonesia 1945-1967, 116–17. 727 Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 258–59; Sundhaussen, The Road to Power, 70–71. === [PDF page 290] === 290 replaced Colonel Nasution with Colonel Bambang Sugeng as Army Chief of Staff on December 1952, and the Dutch military mission was dismissed three months later.728 Without Nasution, the Army officer corps was politically split, at least until the signing of the Charter on the Integrity of the Indonesian Army (Piagam Keutuhan Angkatan Darat Republik Indonesia) in 1955 in Jogjakarta, when the centrist and regionalist army leaders agreed to for a reconciliation through adopting a “charter of unity.”729 The October 17, 1952 Affair influenced the development of Indonesian Army’s political doctrine significantly. First, it showed Colonel Nasution and other former KNIL officers that implementing Army reforms—such as professionalization, doctrinal changes, leadership transfers, and demobilization program—at that time was inherently political, and any efforts to try to “isolate” these processes within the sphere of military domain was likely to be in vain. Second, it informs us that the development of Army policy, whether related to “technical” problems such as military education, organizational reform, or the development of doctrine will inevitably be drawn into the vicissitudes of civil-military politics, especially in relation to the role (and blessing) of the Republic’s primus inter pares, President Soekarno. Consequently, the October 17, 1952 Affair marks the beginning of the Army’s political awareness, as it realized that in order to survive in the politiczed arena of Liberal Democracy, it had to consolidate itself as an institution. In other words, the incident galvanized the Army into a politically-aware institution. This fact is especially 728 Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 269, 289–90. Djamhari, Ichtisar Sedjarah Perdjuangan ABRI (1945-Sekarang) [An Overview of the History of the Struggle of the ABRI (1945-Now)], 86. 729 === [PDF page 291] === 291 important if the Army were to conduct its own agenda, such as on demobilization or centralization of command. Second, this was the first time that the Army, or groups allied to them, was aware of the importance of mobilizing popular forces in support of their political goals. The force itself was led by Lieutenant Colonel Kemal Idris, a PSI-leaning Siliwangi officer. 730 The demonstration was “substantially an Army-organized affair,” as it was planned by a group of young staff officers under Nasution, the Lieutenant Colonels Sutoko, Azis Saleh, and S. Parman.731 More importantly, however, was the role of the demonstrators. The 30,000-strong demonstrators was organized by Colonel Dr. Moestopo, head of the Army Dentistry Corps, and Colonel Kosasih, commander of the Jakarta garrison, with the support of the Siliwangi Division’s intelligence section.732 There was indication that Moestopo made use of the former laskars, veterans and demobilized soldiers under the employment of Sjafi’ie, who was then working with Moestopo as an Army captain.733 Last but not least, it was during the October 17, 1952 Affair that the Army realized the importance of having its own press outlet in order to support its political goals. The Indonesia Raya daily, led by Mochtar Lubis, published articles that supported Nasution’s position while also featured the demonstration on the front page of the daily’s October 17, 1952 edition.734 730 Sundhaussen, Politik militer Indonesia 1945-1967, 123. Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 262. 732 Sundhaussen, Politik militer Indonesia 1945-1967, 123. 733 This view was posited by the former laskar Achmadi Moestahal in his memoir, Dari Gontor ke Pulau Buru. On Moestahal’s view on the October 17, 1952 Affair, see Amurwani Dwi L., “Lue Jual Gua Beli: Jago Dan Jagoan Kriminalitas Di Jakarta 1930-1960,” 339; On Achmadi Moestahal and his memoir, see C. W. Watson, Of Self and Injustice: Autobiography and Repression in Modern Indonesia (Singapore: NUS Press, 2006), 51–63. 734 David T. Hill, Journalism and Politics in Indonesia: A Critical Biography of Mochtar Lubis (1922-2004) as Editor and Author (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2010), 42. 731 === [PDF page 292] === 292 The October 17, 1952 Affair is important to Indonesian military politics, as it represented the first time that civilian politicians have tried to intervene in what the Army viewed as military affairs, with the result of a growing rift between the Army and the party politicians in Jakarta. As we have discussed earlier, the issue of disarmament and demobilization is important in order to maintain peace and order. Thus, when the issue became politicized in the parliament, Army reformers such as Nasution viewed this as a civilian encroachment to Army affairs. However, as a result of the October 17, 1952 Affair, Nasution was removed from its position as Army Chief of Staff, thereby depriving the Army with its primary reformist. Then, it was during this moment as a “political leper,” Nasution formulated and developed his conception of the Middle Way doctrine, which would later shape Indonesian military doctrine after his reinstatement as Army Chief of Staff on October 27, 1955.735 Decolonizing Law: The Making of the 1957 Law on the State of Emergency The combination of political tension between the Army and the parliament and the prevalence of security operations throughout Indonesia, which required clear juridical legitimacy, triggered new developments in Indonesian martial law. While it is clear that the then-current law for the state of emergency, the colonial-era Law on the State of War and Siege of 1939, was effective. However, because it was a law inherited from the colonial era, it lacked “legitimacy” in the eyes of many politicians and the population at large. As discussed before, criticism of the 1939 Law on the State of War and Siege was reflected in the days leading to the constitutional crisis of 735 Nasution describes himself as a “political leper” during this period. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, 1983. === [PDF page 293] === 293 October 17, 1952. The 1939 Law on the State of War and Siege was one of the problems discussed by the parliament as “remnants of colonial rule,” and therefore lacking its legitimacy as a tool for the new Republic. Thus, there was a political necessity for the government to draft and issue a new emergency law. Between 1954 and 1957, the initiative towards a draft for a new emergency law was underway in the parliament. In 1954, President Soekarno issued a Presidential Proclamation (supported by Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo) establishing establishing a State Committee for the drafting of a new law on states of emergency. Members of the committee included Lieutenant Colonel Widya from the Ministry of Defense, Lieutenant Colonel A. Bustomi and Mr. Basarudin Nasution from Army Headquarters, Mr Sudradjat from the Ministry of Justice), Djanu Asmadi from the Ministry of the Interior, Mr. Sukartono from the Attorney General’s Office, and Assistant Chief Commissioner of the Police Agoes Basoeki from the National Police.736 On June 18, 1957, the DPR discussed the first draft of the state of emergency law (Rancangan Undang-Undang Keadaan Bahaya, RUU Keadaan Bahaya). During this session, Muhammad Yamin noted that civil rights should still be respected by the emergency law, while H.A.A Achsien from the NU approved the draft with further amendments. Soedjono, from the de facto opposition party Masjumi, completely opposed the draft on grounds that “there is no urgency at all to discuss the draft.” 737 Ironically, it was a PKI member of parliament, Situmeang, who fiercely supported the draft, though 736 737 Republic of Indonesia, “Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia No.77 Tahun 1954” (1954). “RUU Keadaan Bahaja Di DPR: Harus Indahkan Hak2 Azasi,” Pedoman, June 18, 1957. === [PDF page 294] === 294 he did propose the addition of a clause providing a mechanism for public grievances during the implementation of emergency powers. During the session the next day, A.M. Tambunan (from Parkindo) called for clear limits on the use of emergency powers, although he also noted that “sometimes laws that limit personal rights are necessary, so we must be willing to make sacrifices.”738 Arudji Kartawinata (PSII) criticized the draft law for being too similar to the colonial emergency law, and Soeprapto (Pembangunan) called for strict parliamentary controls over its implementation, as many of the stipulations/clauses were in fact harsher than the colonial one.739 Debate over the draft law, which was “among the fiercest in the Parliament’s history,” went on until December 1957.740 In the end, a new law called Undang-Undang No.74 Tahun 1957 tentang Keadaan Bahaya (Law on the State of Emergency of 1957), which superseded both the revolutionary Law on the State of Emergency of 1946 and the colonial Law on the State of War and Siege of 1939, was promulgated on October 30, 1957. When the Second Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet fell on March 14, 1957, General Nasution and other Army leaders pressured President Soekarno to declare a nationwide state of siege in order to counteract the regional Darul Islam rebellion in West and Central Java and the PRRI/Permesta rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi.741 Soekarno agreed, declaring a state of siege 738 “RUU Keadaan Bahaja Di DPR: Hukuman2 Lebih Berat Dari SOB, Banjak Persamaan Dengan SOB,” Pedoman, June 19, 1957. 739 “RUU Keadaan Bahaja Di DPR: Hukuman2 Lebih Berat Dari SOB, Banjak Persamaan Dengan SOB.” 740 Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, 86. 741 Lev, 15–16. === [PDF page 295] === 295 (keadaan darurat perang, staat van beleg) for the whole of Indonesia.742 According to Lev, the nationwide declaration of a state of siege immediately “catapulted military commanders everywhere in the country into positions of formidable [legal] authority, such as they had known only during the revolution.”743 The state of siege—which was declared under the 1939 emergency law, continued to be in place under the new 1957 Law on the State of Emergency as a state of war (keadaan perang). The 1957 Law on the State of Emergency allows for two types of emergency: a state of emergency (keadaan darurat) or a state of war (keadaan perang), which replaced the staat van oorlog and staat van beleg situations under the 1939 law.744 Similar to the 1939 Law on the State of War and Siege, the President may declare an area or the whole of Indonesia under one of these emergencies. However, the 1957 law only allows the President to wield this authority with the approval of the Council of Ministers (Dewan Menteri), or the Cabinet.745 Similar to the 1946 Law on the State of Emergency, the operationalization of emergency powers became diffused again in the new 1957 law. In areas under a state of emergency (keadaan darurat) executive powers were held by the Regional Emergency Authority (Penguasa Darurat 742 Republic Indonesia, “Keputusan Presiden No.40 Tahun 1957” (1957), https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Home/Details/92751/keppres-no-40-tahun-1957. 743 Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, 16. 744 Note that the wording of UUKB 1957 defines the first, “lighter” variant of emergencies as keadaan darurat (state of emergency), while the second, “harsher” variant of emergency is spelled as keadaan perang (state of war). In order to avoid confusion, I will use the original Indonesian term to refer to the first variant of emergency under the UUKB 1957. 745 Republic of Indonesia, “Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 74 Tahun 1957 Tentang Pencabutan ‘Regeling Op de Staat van Oorlog En Beleg’ Dan Penetapan ‘Keadaan Bahaya’” (1957), Article 1, https://www.bphn.go.id/data/documents/57uu074.pdf. === [PDF page 296] === 296 Daerah), a council consisting of the regional executives (Governors and Residents), serving as the chairperson, the local police chief, and representatives from the Regional Governmental Councils (Dewan Pemerintah Daerah, DPD).746 Curiously, however, the 1957 Law on the State of Emergency does not explicitly specify how emergency powers were to be administered at the highest level of government, if keadaan darurat was promulgated at the national level. If a state of war (keadaan perang) was invoked, emergency powers were to be held by the Armed Forces commanders in Jakarta through the Army, Navy, and Air Force chiefs of staff. The highest emergency authority was to be held by a Commander (Panglima Besar) as War Authority (Penguasa Perang), which the 1957 law specifies was to be the Armed Forces Chief of Staff.747 Similarly, in the provinces and regencies, local Army commanders were to serve as the head of the Regional War Authority (Penguasa Perang Daerah), while the other members of the government were subject to him.748 Similar to the colonial-era law, the 1957 Law on the State of Emergency specified regulatory, requisitional, and repressive powers. During keadaan bahaya, the regulatory powers given to the Penguasa Darurat includes the authority to promulgate regulations and ordinances considered necessary for the maintenance of peace and security, so long as they did not contradict laws that were already promulgated by the central government.749 The Penguasa Darurat may 746 Republic of Indonesia, Article 7, Paragraph 1. One interesting note here is that the TNI never had a Panglima Besar—roughly translates to Grand Commander— after Sudirman. For instance, Nasution’s title was Panglima Angkatan Bersenjata, or Armed Forces Chief of Staff. 748 Republic of Indonesia, Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 74 Tahun 1957 tentang Pencabutan “Regeling op de Staat van Oorlog en Beleg” dan Penetapan “Keadaan Bahaya,” Article 7, Paragraph 2. 749 Republic of Indonesia, Articles 12 and 15. 747 === [PDF page 297] === 297 censure any media and communication activities, including broadcasted and printed media and telephone and radio communications.750 The Penguasa Darurat may regulate production or transportation of firearms, ammunition, and explosives.751 In addition, the Penguasa Darurat may also regulate, limit, or prohibit the traffic of goods; land, air, and sea transportation or public and commercial spaces.752 The requisitional powers of the Penguasa Darurat included the ability to investigate, restrict, and confiscate any goods suspected to be used or will be used to disturb security and limit or prohibit the use of these items.753 Furthermore, the Penguasa Darurat had the authority to confiscate and control postal, telephone, telegram, and radio equipment,754 and was allowed to requisition any information deemed necessary for the maintenance of security from all members of the civil service.755 The Penguasa Darurat was given with a wide range of repressive powers. The Emergency Authority was allowed to regulate and restrict public gatherings.756 The Penguasa Darurat could investigate any person’s belongings and clothing in its area, while also able to deny a person’s right of residence, designate them one, or limit people’s activities outside of their homes (including implementing curfews).757 The Penguasa Darurat is also authorized to restrict the use of buildings, 750 Republic of Indonesia, Articles 19 and 20. Republic of Indonesia, Article 28, Paragraph 1. 752 Republic of Indonesia, Article 28, Paragraph 5,6,4. 753 Republic of Indonesia, Article 25. 754 Republic of Indonesia, Article 28, Paragraph 2. 755 Republic of Indonesia, Article 18. 756 Republic of Indonesia, Article 21, Paragraph 1. 757 Republic of Indonesia, Article 23 and 22. 751 === [PDF page 298] === 298 homes, or public spaces for a certain period of time.758 The Penguasa Darurat may enter and search any buildings, including homes.759 The Penguasa Darurat is also allowed to prohibit any person from leaving the area if they were considered essential personnel for public security or economic activities in the region.760 During a state of war (keadaan perang), the Penguasa Perang was allowed all of the emergency powers provided to the Penguasa Darurat in addition to new ones, thus significantly expanding its capabilities. In addition to the regulatory powers wielded by the Penguasa Darurat, the Penguasa Perang may restrict—in addition to censure—any media and broadcasting.761 The Penguasa Perang had the power to confiscate and/or destroy any telegraph, letters and other postal goods, including money orders.762 The Penguasa Perang might also require all civilian governmental bodies and its members to be subject to Penguasa Perang regulations.763 The Penguasa Perang was allowed to oversee any regulatory acts published in its area, and had full or limited authority to promulgate any regulations by the Cabinet, if the DPR is no longer convening in Jakarta.764 In terms of requisitional powers, the Penguasa Perang was also able to requisition any information considered necessary for security and defense from any persons, in contrast to only 758 Republic of Indonesia, Article 21 Paragraph 2. Republic of Indonesia, Article 24. 760 Republic of Indonesia, Article 28. 761 Republic of Indonesia, Article 33. 762 Republic of Indonesia, Article 34, Paragraph 1 and 2. 763 Republic of Indonesia, Article 41. 764 Republic of Indonesia, Article 43. 759 === [PDF page 299] === 299 members of the civil service.765 The Penguasa Perang is allowed to confiscate or destroy any goods and property for security and defense purposes.766 The Penguasa Perang is also empowered to order any person to help conduct these confiscations.767 The Penguasa Perang may requisition manpower by mobilizing the citizenry to work for the Armed Forces and help in public security or defensive roles, in which then Armed Forces regulations then apply to them.768 In addition to the repressive powers given to the emergency authority under a keadaan bahaya, the Penguasa Perang had the authority to prohibit any person to leave the area if they were considered as essential personnel for public security, defensive, or economic activities in the region.769 The Penguasa Perang could detain any person without trial for ten days, which may be extended to another ten days. A hearing should be done after the third day of arrest.770 In sum, the emergency powers under the 1957 Law on the State of Emergency were broadly similar to the ones provided by the 1939 Law on the State of War and Siege.771 There are four points that directly link emergency law with counterinsurgency strategy. First, the power to restrict communications and transportation was essential for the conduct of counterinsurgency. Second, the ability to regulate, restrict, and requisition the movements of people, property, and goods was also important for choking the insurgents’ supply lines. Third, and of greatest significance, the power to requisition local manpower, either from civil service or the general 765 Republic of Indonesia, Article 31. Republic of Indonesia, Articles 35 and 36. 767 Republic of Indonesia, Article 37. 768 Republic of Indonesia, Article 40. 769 Republic of Indonesia, Article 31. 770 Republic of Indonesia, Article 38. 771 See Chapter 1. 766 === [PDF page 300] === 300 population, was indispensable for counterinsurgency strategy. Fourth, the power to detain people on the spot is helpful for a counterinsurgency campaign—or any military operations, for that matter—as it diminishes the bureaucratic clot of normal judicial procedures in the name of necessity. Early Indonesian Counterinsurgency Strategies: A Success Story? PRRI-Permesta and Darul Islam Throughout the early 1950s, the TNI have experimented with establishing new “mobile forces” units in responding to the various security challenges across Indonesia.In the Diponegoro Division, Lieutenant Colonel Ahmad Yani created the Banteng Raiders (Buffalo Raiders), a light infantry battalion that was designed for counterinsurgency operations against the Darul Islam in Central Java. The unit was trained in raiding tactics, surprise attacks, and non-conventional warfare. During its initial operations, The Banteng Raiders were successfully deployed against the Darul Islam-oriented mutinous Battalion 426 of the Diponegoro Division in May 1952.772 Yani’s role in the creation of the Banteng Raiders helped him in his military career later on, as he was one of the first officers sent to the US Army Command and General Staff school in Fort Leavenworth in 1955. In West Java, the Siliwangi Division, which was mostly preoccupied with counterinsurgency operations against various gerombolan groups such as the Darul Islam, Bambu Runtjing, and Tjitarum, also established a new mobile strike force. In responding to these rebel 772 The Army’s Battalion 426 mutinied against its superiors in the Diponegoro Division on December 7th 1951. Consisted of formerly Hizbullah members, the battalion then declared their support for the Darul Islam. Van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam, 153–54. === [PDF page 301] === 301 groups, Siliwangi Division commander Colonel A.E. Kawilarang created the Kesko TT III (Kesatuan Komando Tentara dan Territorium III) on April 16, 1952. Inspired by the toughness of Dutch special forces (Korps Speciale Troepen) units that he faced during the RMS campaign, the Kesko TT III was trained in airborne and amphibious capabilities and commando tactics by a former KNIL special forces officer, Rokus Bernardus Visser (later Mochamad Idjon Djanbi),773 who was personally handpicked by Kawilarang.774 In 1953, Army headquarters took over the Kesko from the Siliwangi Division and turned it into the Army Commando Corps (Korps Komando Angkatan Darat), which later became the Army Para-Commando Regiment (Resimen ParaKomando Angkatan Darat, RPKAD) in July 1955.775 The establishment of the Banteng Raiders and the Army Para-Commandos marked the first time that the TNI officially organized mobile strike forces trained in commando tactics. In addition to the Army’s own role, the role of the Police in counter-gerombolan operations was also central. In September 1953, Lieutenant Colonel Mokoginta—who would later become part of the Committee for Army Doctrine in 1958—published an article on “Domestic Disorder and its Eradication,” (Kekatjauan dalam Negeri dan Pemberantasannja) in the Army Military 773 During World War II, Visser enlisted as a Sergeant in the Dutch army in exile in the United Kingdom. He was then trained as a radioman in the No.2 (Dutch) Troop in the No.10 (Inter-Allied) Commando. Being a commando, he went through the six-week intensive commando course at Achnacarry. After the war, he was sent to the Netherlands Indies in part of the Dutch campaigns against Indonesia, and was tasked with opening a paratrooper school in Bandung as a Captain. Visser decided not to return to the Netherlands after the transfer of sovereignty, married his Sundanese wife, became a Moslem, and adopted the name Mochamad Idjon Djanbi. He was retired in West Java when Kawilarang first heard of him. Kenneth J Conboy, Kopassus: Inside Indonesia’s Special Forces (Jakarta: Equinox Pub., 2003), 16–17. 774 According to Conboy, Kawilarang dispatched his aide, Lieutenant Aloysius Sugiyanto, to recruit Djanbi. Conboy, 18–19. 775 Conboy, 21–22. === [PDF page 302] === 302 Police Corps periodical Gadjah Mada. In the article, Mokoginta laid out general prescriptions for counterinsurgency operations, which includes separating combat areas from established Territorial Commands (Komando Tentara dan Territorium) into target-based operational commands (Komando Sasaran).776 In this new commands, there would be a guideline of a separation between Army and Police tasks: “armed gerombolans that are the responsibility of the Army are those with 150 men and above, while the responsibility of the Police are those with 30 men and below.”777 Thus, in responding to this need for a counterinsurgency element, the Police also established new, specialized mobile strike units. On March 11, 1952, the National Police established the Pioneer Force (Polisi Perintis) as part of their municipal and territorial units. The Pioneers were designed as a rapid reaction force against disturbances before the arrival of the Police Mobile Brigade (Mobrig, now BRIMOB) units, which was the heavy-hitters of the Police force.778 The Polisi Perintis units recruited police members that were relatively younger than the average member of the police, well-educated, unmarried, or even fresh graduates from the Police Academy with the rank of Agen Polisi II (equivalent to Second Lieutenant).779 In addition to the Polisi Perintis, the Criminal Investigative Service also created a new subsection within its ranks, dubbed the Mobile Investigators Section (Seksi Mobile Reserse), which was first inaugurated in 1954 to help with the eradicating the Merapi-Merbabu Complex 776 A.J. Mokoginta, “Kekatjauan Dalam Negeri Dan Pemberantasannya,” Gadjah Mada, September 17, 1953, 15. Mokoginta, 12–13. 778 Tanumidjaja, Sedjarah Perkembangan Angkatan Kepolisian, 77. 779 Tanumidjaja, 78. 777 === [PDF page 303] === 303 gerombolans in Central Java.780 However, the crème de la crème of the Police strike units were the Mobile Brigade. The Mobile Brigade was a paramilitary, police tactical corps that has units embedded in each of the regional police forces. Since its inception in 1947, the Mobile Brigade has participated in almost all military and counterinsurgency operations in Indonesia.781 Thus, Police Mobile Brigade units were also deployed against the Andi Azis incident in South Celebes, the Republic of South Moluccas crisis, and in counterinsurgency campaigns against the Darul Islam.782 Counterinsurgency Operations against The PRRI-Permesta The opportunity to test these new elite units arrived after the advent of the regional rebellions in 1958, the so-called Revolutionary Government of Indonesia (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia, PRRI) and “Charter of Universal Struggle (Perdjuangan Rakjat Semesta, Permesta) or PRRI/Permesta rebellions, in Sumatra and Sulawesi. The PRRI/Permesta movement was a regional rebellion, first initiated by regional Army commanders disillusioned by the military policy pursued by the Army headquarters and the economic policies of the central government in Jakarta.783 780 The Mobile Reserse remains now in the Criminal Investigative Service as a subunit assigned to counter violent crimes. Tanumidjaja, 93. 781 Tanumidjaja, 50–65. 782 Tanumidjaja, 96–113. 783 The standard account here is Kahin and Kahin’s Subversion as a Foreign Policy., A rather balanced treatment, with emphases on interviews of the Council leaders, is by Leirissa. See R.Z. Leirissa, PRRI-Permesta: Strategi Membangun Indonesia Tanpa Komunis (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 1991); Audrey R. Kahin and George McTurnan Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1997). === [PDF page 304] === 304 The PRRI/Permesta rebellion began when a group of former revolutionary Banteng Division officers gathered in West Sumatra in November 1956. The officers gathered to discuss problems of regional autonomy and development, in which Jakarta was considered as discriminatory to the regions. This meeting resulted in the formation of the Banteng Council (Dewan Banteng) under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Achmad Husein. In the following months, the Banteng Council was followed by the formation of similar councils in North and East Sumatra, the Elephant Council (Dewan Gadjah) under Colonel M. Simbolon; the Garuda Council (Dewan Garuda) in South Sumatra under Lieutenant Colonel Barlian, and the Permesta in Sulawesi under Lieutenant Colonel H.N. Ventje Sumual.784 It was in Sulawesi, however, that these “Councils of Colonels” first became an open resistance against the dominance of Jakarta over the regions. On March 2, 1957, Lieutenant Colonel Sumual led the Sulawesi military commanders and their local civilian counterparts to declare a “Charter for Universal Struggle” (Piagam Perdjuangan Semesta, Permesta), which calls Eastern Indonesia’s demands for expanded local autonomy, economic development, control over local revenue, and the restoration of Soekarno and Hatta in the national stage. 785 Legally, these officers justified their actions by appealing to the provisions on the State of Siege, which allowed regional Army commanders to declare a state of emergency.786 On February 15, 1958, the Councils 784 Djamhari, Ichtisar Sedjarah Perdjuangan ABRI (1945-Sekarang) [An Overview of the History of the Struggle of the ABRI (1945-Now)], 75–77. 785 Leirissa, PRRI-Permesta: Strategi Membangun Indonesia Tanpa Komunis, 96–101; Kahin and Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy, 65. 786 Here, we can see that the regionalist Army officers abused the SOB 1939 law, repeating the mistakes of the Sukiman government. === [PDF page 305] === 305 in Sumatra and Sulawesi declared joint a Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia, PRRI) with the aim of establishing an alternative form of government, thus posing as a direct threat against Jakarta’s grip over the regions.787 The TNI then responded to this challenge to Jakarta’s authority with a series of military operations. These operations were Operasi Tegas in Riau, Operasi Sapta Marga in North Sumatra, Operasi Sadar in South Sumatra, Operasi 17 Agustus in West and Central Sumatra, Operasi Merdeka in Sulawesi, and Operasi Mena I and Mena II in the Halmahera islands.788 During these operations, the TNI experimented with combined arms tactics as battles in the campaign necessitated a collaboration between land, air, and sea forces. The resulting pictures show an inherently modern war, as “all operations that were done to quell the ‘PRRI/Permesta’ are joint operations between the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Police.”789 For example, during Operasi Tegas in Riau, TNI forces under Lieutenant Colonel Kaharuddin Nasution, Air Force Lieutenant Colonel R.H.A. Wiriadinata, and Navy Major Indra Subagijo was sent to regain control of Riau.790 During the operation, the TNI air-dropped Air Force Quick Reaction Force (Pasukan Gerak Tjepat, PGT) and Army Para-Commando Brigade (Resimen Para-Komando Angkatan Darat, RPKAD) units over the American-owned Caltex oil 787 Redi Rachmat et al., Tantangan Dan Rongrongan Terhadap Keutuhan Dan Kesatuan Bangsa: Kasus PRRI (Proyek Inventarisasi dan Dokumentasi Sejarah Nasional, Direktorat Sejarah dan Nilai Tradisional,Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1992), 60–61. 788 Djamhari, Ichtisar Sedjarah Perdjuangan ABRI (1945-Sekarang) [An Overview of the History of the Struggle of the ABRI (1945-Now)], 78. 789 30 Tahun Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, 1976), 213. 790 Makmum Salim, Sedjarah Operasi2 Gabungan Terhadap PRRI-Permesta (Departemen Pertahanan-Keamanan Pusat Sedjarah ABRI, 1971), 20. === [PDF page 306] === 306 fields and refineries. The paratroopers were followed by joint naval landings by the Diponegoro Division’s 423rd “Banteng Raiders” Infantry Battalion, the Brawidjaja Division’s 528th Infantry Battalion, and a battalion of Police Mobile Brigade (Brimob) troops, eventually taking control of Pekanbaru on March 14, 1958.791 During Operasi Sapta Marga, elements of the Siliwangi Division’s 322nd Infantry Battalion, with assistance from RPKAD units, took Belawan, Medan, and Pangkalan Brandan on March 20, 1958.792 Meanwhile in Operasi Sadar, Army forces under Lieutenant Colonel dr. Ibnu Sutowo conducted intelligence operations and psychological warfare to try to persuade the rebel units to pledge their loyalties to the central command.793 The final offensive in Sumatra was Operasi 17 Agustus, which featured a joint air, sea, and land operations in an amphibious landing operation off the coast of Padang. Led by Colonel Ahmad Yani, the operation consisted of four infantry battalions from the Diponegoro (438th and 440th) and Brawidjaja Divisions (509th and 510th), one battalion of the Navy’s Marines (Korps Komando Angkatan Laut, KKo AL), four battalions of paratroopers from the Air Force’s Quick Reaction Force and the Army’s Para-Commando Brigade, with the Air Force and the Navy providing bombing and naval gunfire support.794 The operation, which begun on April 17, 1958, resulted in the immediate collapse of the rebel forces as Padang fell to TNI hands on the following day, and ten days later, the PRRI campaigns in Sumatra ended as the rebellion subsequently collapsed. 791 Salim, 20–26. Salim, 28. 793 Markas Besar Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, 30 Tahun Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, 215. 794 Salim, Sedjarah Operasi2 Gabungan Terhadap PRRI-Permesta, 35–37. 792 === [PDF page 307] === 307 In its campaigns against the Permesta rebels in Sulawesi, the TNI also deployed its forces in a combined air, sea, and land operations. In the joint Operasi Merdeka, five infantry battallions from the East Java-based Brawidjaja Division (501st, 502nd, 512nd, 513th, 516th, and the 517th Infantry Battalions), one infantry battalion from the Central Java-based Diponegoro Division (432nd Infantry Battalion), one infantry battalion from the Kalimantan-based Tanjungpura Division (601st Infantry Battalion), and two infantry battalions from the Sulawesi-based Hasanuddin Division (702nd and 715th Infantry Battalion), supported by three battalions of Police Mobile Brigade, Navy Marines and Army Para-Commando troops were deployed across Sulawesi in a series of operations beginning on April 9, 1958.795 Although mopping-up operations extended well into 1961, major military operations against the Permesta in Sulawesi virtually ended after TNI forces entered Manado on June 26, 1958.796 It was during the operations against the PRRI and Permesta that the TNI successfully experimented with combined operations. The campaign against PRRI/Permesta was mostly a campaign of conventional war, involving amphibious landings, air assaults, and mechanized maneuvers conducted jointly by the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Police units from across the country. During the PRRI and Permesta operations, the TNI successfully deployed its mobile forces, such as the Marines, Air Force Quick Reaction Forces (PGT), the Army Para-Commando Regiments (RPKAD), and the Police Mobile Brigade, supported by naval and air units. 795 796 Salim, 60–100. Kahin and Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy, 184. === [PDF page 308] === 308 However, there was another counterinsurgency challenge that have to be solved, namely the Darul Islam rebellion. Operations against the Darul Islam, which was essentially a protracted counterinsurgency, necessitated a wholly different strategy. Nevertheless, some lessons from the campaigns against the PRRI and Permesta were deployed in the operations against the Darul Islam, namely, the employment of mobile forces in striking against the enemy. The Shaping of Indonesian COIN: The Counterinsurgency Strategy against the Darul Islam While the TNI operations against the PRRI/Permesta rebellions achieved significant success within a year, the story was quite different in the case of the Darul Islam rebellions, which extended well into the 1960s. While the initial outbreak of Darul Islam occurred in West Java in 1949, with sister movements cropping up elsewhere in South Sulawesi in 1951, and Aceh in 1953, it was not until 1959 that the TNI counterinsurgency operations achieved real success. In 1959, together with its territorial forces, the Army deployed battalions of mobile strike forces, such as the Banteng Raiders battalion of the Diponegoro Division, the Kujang battalions of the Siliwangi Division, and the Army Para-Commando Regiment (RPKAD), to fight against the Darul Islam in West Java. It was during that year that the TNI (and most importantly, the Siliwangi Division) developed a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy against the Darul Islam. Designed by a team of officers from the Siliwangi Division and the recently-established RPKAD, the comprehensive plan was known as the Guidance for Restoring Peace and Security (Pokok Perencanaan Pemulihan Perdamaian Keamanan, P4K). The basic aim was to “defeat the === [PDF page 309] === 309 enemy’s ability to maneuver, until the enemy is restricted into certain discrete areas, which can then be cleared area by area.”797 The plan differentiated West Java into different “Operational Areas” (Daerah Operasi, DO): “’A’ areas were those controlled by the government, ‘B’ areas were contested areas, and ‘C’ areas were rebel strongholds, subsequently declared ‘destruction areas’ (daerah perhancuran).”798 The TNI was to conduct civic action and social-psychological activities in the “A” areas, and then clear “B” and “C” areas in containment and raiding operations. It was through the P4K that the TNI first utilized local mass mobilization tactics through the mass deployment of Village Security Organisations (Organisasi Keamanan Desa, OKD) in order to obtain manpower. The OKD provided the TNI with the necessary strength to provide “local guard forces, security patrols, and security for critical installations,” while also providing the government forces with reliable, locally-source intelligence, which was indispensable for the various local commanders operating in the field.799 Meanwhile, the local militias were also deployed in containment and raid techniques, which was called the “fence of legs” or “human fence” (Pagar Betis) tactic. The pagar betis concept implies the use of local militias and OKDs for cordoning the insurgent areas, thus freeing the local army units to be used as a mobile strike force. The usage of local militias and OKDs were crucial to the TNI’s success in mounting 797 Translation adopted from David K. Kilcullen. Dinas Sejarah TNI-AD, Penumpasan Pemberontakan DI/TII S.M. Kartosuwiryo Di Jawa Barat (Jakarta: Dinas Sejarah Angkatan Darat [Army Historical Service], 1985), 129. David K. Kilcullen, “Globalisation and the Development of Indonesian Counterinsurgency Tactics,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 17, no. 1 (March 2006): 49. 798 Kilcullen, “Globalisation and the Development of Indonesian Counterinsurgency Tactics,” 49. 799 Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 91. === [PDF page 310] === 310 counterinsurgency operations, providing them with the necessary ten-to-one ratio of forces in “classical” counterinsurgency theory.800 According to Kilcullen: Pagar betis, on the other hand, used militias to secure the villages, the Village Security Organization, with small army cadres, secured each village or town. A small surveillance element provided overwatch, and then—key to the concept—civilians from each village around the perimeter of a Darul Islam— controlled hill area were taken to a designated zone where they formed a cordon, linking up with neighboring villages. Each village had to provide a certain number of people, and the village chief could periodically substitute individuals, provided the total remained constant. Feeding the people in the cordon was the village’s problem, and the army provided a small post every few hundred meters to control the cordon and prevent insurgents from escaping or cordon members deserting.801 Together with the P4K strategy, the Pagar Betis tactic was an essential part of TNI counterinsurgency doctrine. In the context of a counterinsurgency operation against a rebellion, the tactic is effective in separating the rebels with the local villagers and their rice-fields, thus systematically isolating their forces from their own supply lines. Meanwhile, it was also difficult for the the Darul Islam commanders to open fire against the villagers, which they consider as noncombatants.802 800 Kilcullen, 92. Kilcullen, 92. 802 Van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam, 124–25. 801 === [PDF page 311] === 311 Meanwhile, in relation to the pacification strategy taken under the P4K plan, the Siliwangi Division also designed a civic-action operation as follow-up operations after the conclusion of an intensive counterinsurgency campaign. This operation, which was dubbed Operasi Bhakti, was designed by the Division to rehabilitate villages that were heavily damaged by the rebellion, which was considered a cause for instability, distrust, and further security disturbances.803 While the operation was concerned with all villages across the divisional jurisdiction in West Java, the approach was similar to that laid out in the P4K: the Bhakti operations differentiated villages into three kinds of “Developmental Operation Areas,” (“Daerah Operasi Pembangunan,” DOP). The first category, DOP A, included villages that only experienced minimal or zero insurgent activities and were ready for village development operations. The second category, DOP B, included villages that were directly or indirectly affected by insurgents, yet they are in close proximity with major roads and cities and ready for limited village development operations. Meanwhile, the third category, DOP C, was for villages that were isolated and heavily affected by gerombolan activity.804 The Bhakti operations focused on rehabilitating villages and repatriating refugees; reconstructing paddy fields and irrigation; repairing damaged roads, schools, and mosques; and rebuilding the village administration.805 Conducted by eleven specially-assigned battalions of the Siliwangi Division, the Operasi Bhakti was mostly deployed in areas that were heavily marred by 803 Toenggoel Paraloan Siagian, “The Operasi Karya: The Involvement of the Indonesian Army in Rural Development” (Master’s Thesis, Ithaca, Cornell University, 1966), 62. 804 S. Sokowati, T.N.I Dan Civic-Mission Suatu Aspek Pembinaan Wilayah [TNI and Civic Mission An Aspect of Territorial Management], Penerbitan Chusus 251 (Departemen Penerangan Republik Indonesia [Ministry of Information, Republic of Indonesia], 1963), 30–31. 805 Sokowati, 31. === [PDF page 312] === 312 Darul Islam activity.806 The Bhakti operations was considered successful, and it became the model for the TNI’s civic-action and community development program, the Operasi Karya, which would be inaugurated later on December 3, 1962.807 Key to the success of the P4K, pagar betis, and the Bhakti operations was the submission of civilian authority to military authority. Soekarno’s declaration of a nationwide state of siege on March 14, 1957, provided the regional Army commands with a free rein to experiment with new counterinsurgency strategies.808 Thus, under martial law, the TNI could kill two birds in one stone—it could muster more men for the forward operations, and it can solve the security problem in the villages.809 Meanwhile, under martial law, the economic- and social-oriented tasks conducted under the Bhakti operations was easily justified, as under martial law many of these tasks were subordinated to the military authorities anyway. The P4K and pagar betis tactic was successful, as it allowed the TNI to quell the insurgency in just two years, after an extended campaign that lasted for almost twelve years.810 Meanwhile, the Bhakti operations provided a platform for the Army to further isolate the Darul Islam rebels, while also preventing further security disturbances. In April 1962, the TNI launched a major offensive, the Operasi Brata Yudha, as a decisive operation against the Darul Islam rebels. In this operation, the Siliwangi Division was assisted by troops from the Diponegoro and Brawijaya 806 Sokowati, 34. Siagian, “The Operasi Karya: The Involvement of the Indonesian Army in Rural Development,” 62. 808 Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, 15–16. 809 Kilcullen, “Globalisation and the Development of Indonesian Counterinsurgency Tactics,” 50. 810 Kilcullen, 51. 807 === [PDF page 313] === 313 Divisions.811 At the core of the operation was a relatively new unit, the 328th Infantry Battalion “Para Kujang II,” one of two elite battalions under the Siliwangi Division trained in commando tactics and airborne capabilities.812 Meanwhile, the recruitment and training of Village Security Organizations were ramped up, particularly under the initiative of Lieutenant Colonel Ishak Djuarsa in Bogor.813 The Operation was successful: two months later, on June 4, an infantry company of the 328th Infantry Battalion under Lieutenant Suhanda captured Kartosuwirjo, and the insurgency subsequently collapsed in West Java.814 Meanwhile, after a series of military actions and negotiations, the Darul Islam movement in Aceh have agreed to “return to the fold of the Republic” in 1959,.815 David Kilcullen notes that the P4K was similar to the “system of ‘black’ and ‘white’ areas applied by General Sir Gerald Templer, the British commander in the contemporaneous Malayan Emergency,” but it was more probably based on Dutch methods that was practiced during the Revolution.816 Considering the role of the Dutch Military Mission in the early 1950s, it is possible that the training provided by the Dutch have played a role in shaping Indonesian officers’ approach to counterinsurgency. Meanwhile, there was no direct connection between the Indonesians and the British in contemporaneous Malaya. According to one research, the other, pacification-side of the counterinsurgency campaign, the Operasi Bhakti, was also influenced—and possibly, financed— 811 Van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam, 125. Disjarahdam VI / Siliwangi, Siliwangi Dari Masa Ke Masa, 320. 813 Disjarahdam VI / Siliwangi, 320. 814 David K. Kilcullen, “The Political Consequences of Military Operations in Indonesia, 1945-1999” (PhD Dissertation, Sydney, University of New South Wales, 2000), 71. 815 Van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam, 335. 816 Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 90. 812 === [PDF page 314] === 314 by American observers posted in Indonesia during that time.817 Nevertheless, the Indonesian counterinsurgency strategy immediately reflected the two basic dictums of Nasution’s strategy first lined out in Pokok Pokok Gerilya in 1953: the combination of “territorial” and “mobile” forces in facing an insurgent enemy. The Emergence of the Doctrine of Territorial Warfare If the 1950s-1960s were an “experimental period” for the development of TNI counterinsurgency doctrines, the 1960s-1970s were a period of institutionalization. The first stage for institutionalization of counterinsurgency doctrines was through the establishment of Army education institutions such as the SESKOAD. These new institutions then provided the Army with a “think-tank” for the development of a new doctrine. The momentum for institutionalization took place on December 1960. In 1958, the Army established a Committee for Army Doctrine (Panitia Doktrin Angkatan Darat), led by Lieutenant Colonel Soewarto and Colonel Mokoginta. The Committee was tasked with designing and forming an official doctrine for the Army.818 Later, the initial findings from this committee contributed to the doctrinal discussions within the Seskoad. From December 9-15, 1960, Seskoad conducted its First Seminar on Defense Problems (Seminar I Seskoad tentang Masalah-Masalah Pertahanan). This Seminar was designed to be a yearly seminar for students at Seskoad. Officers in the First Regular Course (Kursus Reguler I) include Brigadier General Soeharto, Brigadier General Sarbini, Lieutenant Colonel Amir 817 818 Siagian, “The Operasi Karya: The Involvement of the Indonesian Army in Rural Development,” Appendix B. Sundhaussen, The Road to Power, 138. === [PDF page 315] === 315 Machmud, Colonel S. Soekowati, and other figures from the Armed Forces. Two main papers were discussed in the seminar, namely “Territorial Warfare as the Conception of Indonesian Defense” (Perang Wilajah sebagai Konsepsi Pertahanan Indonesia) and “The Use of Military Force for Internal Security” (Penggunaan Kekuatan Militer dalam Penjelesaian Keamanan dalam Negeri).819 Both papers paved the way for the development of the concept of Territorial Warfare— a direct descendant of Nasution’s Total People’s War—and counterinsurgency warfare as the basis for TNI doctrine. In 1962, Seskoad produced a monograph on Territorial Warfare, which is now known as the Territorial Warfare Doctrine (Doktrin Perang Wilayah). Again, the ghost of Nasution’s PokokPokok Gerilya lingers. Territorial Warfare was defined by Seskoad as “a form of war that is universal (semesta), predicated upon the whole use of national forces in total, with priorities to military forces as its element of strength, in order to decide the end of the war through counter offensive in order to protect the nation’s sovereignty.”820 This definition, which will be reiterated often in the Army’s doctrinal and strategic documents, served a double role. First was an appeal to a sense of institutional legitimacy emanating from the Revolution—which would prevent criticism on the Army reforms as “un-revolutionary.” Second, and most importantly, was to provide the Army with a flexible interpretation of defense and security to incorporate aspects that 819 Soeharto et al., “Perang Wilajah Sebagai Konsepsi Pertahanan Indonesia,” Karya Wira Djati (Madjalah Resmi Sekolah Staf Dan Komando Angkatan Darat) 1 (1961); Sarbini et al., “Penggunaan Kekuatan Militer Dalam Penjelesaian Keamanan Dalam Negeri,” Karya Wira Djati (Madjalah Resmi Sekolah Staf Dan Komando Angkatan Darat) 1 (1961). 820 “Bentuk perang jang bersifat semesta, jang menggunakan seluruh kekuatan nasional setjara total, dengan mengutamakan kekuatan militer sebagai unsur kekuatannja agar dengan counter offensive dapat menentukan kesudahan perang untuk mempertahankan kedaulatan negara.” Sekolah Staf dan Komando Departemen Angkatan Darat, Doktrin Perang Wilajah, NS 1124-01 (Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat (SESKOAD), 1962), 3. === [PDF page 316] === 316 were traditionally considered as outside of the sphere of military affairs. This second fact is clear from the following main doctrine to be implemented by the TNI: The use and development of political, economic, socio-psychological, and military forces which are intertwined during peace and war in maintaining national security. The grand strategy should be able to deal with all possible circumstances even though it aims to achieve relatively stable objectives and retains flexibility in the tools and methods utilized in obtaining and maintaining the initiative.821 The Territorial Warfare doctrine differentiates war into three phases, namely the frontal phase of repelling enemy attacks; the binding, opposition, and consolidation phase; and the counteroffensive phase. In all phases, the strategy was to be driven by three elements, namely mobile strategic reserve units, regional territorial units (Kodam), and the territorial militia units / partisan (People’s Defence Organizations, Organisasi Pertahanan Rakyat). In all three phases, the “people” play a major role in conducting “active people’s defense,” which means participating in acts of sabotage, subterfuge, infiltration, communications, and defense in addition of conducting civil defense functions (such as fire brigade, rescue, air raid warning, and others).822 It should also be noted here that the United States played a role in the development of the Indonesian Army, the shaping of its counterinsurgency strategies, and subsequently, in legitimizing the Army’s doctrine in intervention in non-military affairs. Throughout the second 821 822 Sekolah Staf dan Komando Departemen Angkatan Darat, 7. Sekolah Staf dan Komando Departemen Angkatan Darat, Attachment. === [PDF page 317] === 317 half of the 1950s, Indonesian Army officers have been trained in the United States, most notably General Ahmad Yani, who graduated the Fort Leavenworth in 1956.823 This program was expanded to a Military Assistance Program (MAP) in 1958-1959, and a Civic Action Program (CAP) later in 1962.824 Meanwhile, returning Army officers, such as Yani, reformed the Army educational system, particularly in the Army Command and Staff College (Sekolah Staf dan Komando AD, SESKOAD) and the Military Academy (Akademi Militer), which was modeled upon the United States Military Academy at West Point.825 It was during the training programs in the US Army’s Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth that Yani and others had become exposed to courses on Airborne and Special Operations.826 However, the nature of the MAP and CAP programs in Indonesia differs to other countries, such as in South Vietnam. This was mainly caused by Nasution, who had emphasized the need for the program to be “a direct US Army-Indonesian Army effort,” rather than on a government-togovernment basis.827 It was only in 1961, that the United States State Department recommended “supplementing traditional military training for Indonesian officers with ‘specialized instruction 823 According to one account, by 1956, there were thirty-five Army officers trained in the US, in which four held key positions in the Army General Staff (Staf Umum Angkatan Darat). Bryan Evans III, “The Influence of the United States Army on the Development of the Indonesian Army (1954-1964),” Indonesia 47 (April 1989): 31. 824 Evans III, 32–34. 825 Evans notes that the then US Military Attaché to Indonesia, Colonel George Benson, “passed to the Indonesian Army all the available information on the US Academy’s courses, structure, curriculum, and organization, so the Magelang Academy became, on a smaller scale, almost a duplicate for West Point.” Benson’s interview, however, was not corroborated with materials on the Indonesian Military Academy itself. See Evans III, 39. 826 Evans III, 43. 827 Evans pointed out that this was due to Nasution’s distrust to American civilian government of their support for the PRRI-Permesta rebellion and the vocal opposition within the Kennedy Administration for TNI’s role in the civilian sector. However, another plausible reason was due to Nasution’s own experience with political intervention in military reforms, which resulted in the October 17, 1952 Affair. See Evans III, 35. === [PDF page 318] === 318 designed [to] improve their ability [to] discharge civil administrative responsibilities,’ including training in ‘legal [affairs], public safety, public health, welfare, finance, and education, economics, property control, supply, management, [and] public communications.’”828 This recommendation emerged after President Kennedy sent an economic mission in early 1961, under Donald Humphrey of Tufts University and Walter Salant of the Brookings Institution, to make recommendations for American aid to Indonesia.829 Perhaps it is true that the development of the Indonesian Army’s doctrine paralleled the emergence of military-led modernization theories in Western academies.830 However, as this chapter has noted, the Indonesian Army had experimented with civic action programs through its experiences in direct and indirect counterinsurgency operations against the gerombolans since the early 1950s, far earlier than the arrival of the Humphrey Mission in 1961 and the Civic Action Program in 1962. Thus, the American influence built upon prior institutional structures that were already in place. This does not deny the presence of American influence in the development of Indonesian military doctrine prior to 1965. However, their support should be interpreted as ideological and material at best, as summarized by Simpson: “What Indonesia’s doctrine of civic mission and territorial warfare demonstrates is how theories of military modernization promoted in the United States found willing 828 Simpson, Economists with Guns, 70. Simpson, 64. 830 See Simpson, chap. 3. 829 === [PDF page 319] === 319 audiences in many countries where armed forces establishments were already seeking to justify a greater role in the economy, state, and society.”831 To a certain extent, the ideas in the Territorial Warfare doctrine seem to reflect revolutionary war concepts developed by Mao in China and Giap in Vietnam. However, according to Guy Pauker, who interviewed Brigadier General Suwarto, the Deputy Commander of Seskoad in the 1960s, Indonesian officers only had “a casual acquaintance with the views of Mao Tse-Tung and were not familiar with those of Vo Nguyen Giap. Their main source of inspiration, he alleges, was their own experience during the 1945-1949 struggle for independence, and the application of common sense to that experience ten years later.”832 Indeed, if we take Pauker’s reporting on Suwarto’s view as being honest, inspirations for the Territorial Warfare doctrine was not rooted in Communist revolutionary warfare theories. It is more prudent to consider that Territorial Warfare was adapted from experiences gained during the revolution, which was also influenced by colonial counterinsurgency practices, with the legitimizing support of Western—most notably, American—military thinking later during the decade. Conclusion Throughout the late 1950s, Indonesia faced a condition of insecurity that was seemingly permanent in the regions. In engaging with this problem, the Army, as the country’s “troubleshooters in the field,” participated in various efforts to deal with this problem. At first, the 831 Simpson, 79. Guy J. Pauker, “The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management,” RAND Memorandum RM-3312-PR (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, November 1963), 7–8. 832 === [PDF page 320] === 320 measures taken was internal—Army reforms and education and demobilization. However, as the problem of insecurity primarily revolved around the widespread use of firearms and the prevalence of gerombolans, the Army gradually participated in policing measures and demobilization efforts that inevitably lies beyond the field of defense and security. When these policing and demobilization efforts failed due to, among others, political reasons, the Army then developed its own counterinsurgency strategy that gradually incorporated non-military matters into the sphere of military affairs. While it is true that there were many incidents of insecurity that carries a socio-economic (demobilization) and regionalist tinge, none of them were more significant than the Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (PRRI) / Perjuangan Rakyat Semesta (Permesta) rebellion and the Darul Islam / Tentara Islam Indonesia (State of Islam / Indonesian Islamic Army, DI/TII) insurgency. The PRRI/Permesta rebellion took place in Sumatra, North Sulawesi, and South Sulawesi from 1958 until 1961, while the DI/TII insurgency were mostly based in West Java, Central Java, Aceh, and South Sulawesi from 1949 until 1962. Both the PRRI/Permesta and DI/TII posed serious security challenges for the central government in Jakarta. Jakarta responded to these armed rebellions with military action. The military actions taken, however, were significantly different. The military response to DI/TII mostly involved counterinsurgency operations, with the Siliwangi Division as a vanguard. Meanwhile, The PRRI/Permesta campaign consisted of the PRRI/Permesta campaign became the proving ground for the Army’s “mobile forces” tactics, and the DI/TII campaigns were a training ground for the === [PDF page 321] === 321 “territorial forces” that was emphasized in Indonesian counterinsurgency strategies.833 During the PRRI/Permesta campaign, the the Army officer corps learned the value of strategy of “shock and awe,” through the deployment of combined arms in dealing with insurgencies. Meanwhile, during the DI/TII campaigns the Army officers recognized the importance of civic action programs to win a protracted counterinsurgency campaign. When President Soekarno declared a nationwide state of siege in March 1957, the Army unleashed its counterinsurgency strategies in full power. The successful counterinsurgency campaigns against the Darul Islam became the pilot project for the TNI’s counterinsurgency agenda. Territorial forces were shaped and deployed through the use of territorial army units and local forces under pagar betis. Meanwhile, forms of mobile “strike forces” were developed all over the country, epitomizing in the formation of the Army’s premier special forces unit, the RPKAD. Here we see a pattern emerging: After Darul Islam, the TNI institutionalized its counterinsurgency strategy into its military doctrine, just like the KNIL after they defeated the Acehnese. In the colonial era, military control on insurgent populations were institutionalized by official policy of placing KNIL officers as civil-military authority holders in military-controlled areas. During the Republican era, TNI officers controlled the people through the Military Liaison Officers and NCOs and legalized by the implementation of the state of emergency laws. Meanwhile, during Aceh, the KNIL formed its mobile forces by establishing the Maréchausée as mobile striking forces against the Acehnese. The Indonesian Army, on the other hand, established 833 See Chapter II. === [PDF page 322] === 322 airborne-trained special forces such as the Banteng Raiders and the RPKAD. This pattern of establishing special forces were also followed by the Air Force, with its Pasukan Gerak Tjepat (PGT), and the Navy, with its Korps Komando (KKo, now Indonesian Marine Corps). Nevertheless, the focus for the TNI was still the same: emphasizing the role of territorial forces to control territory and population and creating mobile “strike forces” as the heavy-hitters in military campaigns. The logic of counterinsurgency, which entails the deployment of territorial forces and mobile forces in war, were then institutionalized into TNI doctrine as the Doktrin Perang Wilayah in 1962. This indicates a significant shift, as what started as a particular strategy in winning certain kinds of wars became codified into how an army should operate in all circumstances. As Kilcullen notes, that the effectiveness of the P4K and pagar betis operations both as “population control measure and a manpower-saving cordon-and-search tactic” had significant impact in the Army’s tactical thinking: “So important was this lesson, that the Indonesian army has applied this method in almost every conflict since.”834 In addition, The P4K and pagar betis operations also provided the Army with the important lesson of thinking about counterinsurgency as an “activity primarily aimed at destroying the insurgents rather than defeating their strategy,” the importance of “decapitating” an insurgency by capturing its ringleaders, the necessity of using local militias, and the indispensable role of elite counterinsurgency units and special forces to capture the enemy leaders.835It was after the 834 835 Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 93. Kilcullen, 94. === [PDF page 323] === 323 campaigns against the PRRI/Permesta and the Darul Islam that the TNI became an army of counterinsurgency, which subsequently paved the way for the social-political role of the Army, leading to the militarization of Indonesian society during the Guided Democracy period. === [PDF page 324] === 324 CHAPTER V: GOVERNMENT FROM EMERGENCY: THE ADVENT OF GUIDED DEMOCRACY, 19571960 Introduction During a lively afternoon on November 30, 1957, President Soekarno and his entourage visited the Perguruan Cikini elementary school (formerly the People’s School, Sekolah Rakjat) in Cikini, close to the governmental district in Central Jakarta. It was the 15th Anniversary of the school’s foundation, and Soekarno had been invited by the principal, Sumadji Muhammad Sulaimani, to give a short speech. Indeed, two of the President’s children, Guntur Soekarnoputra and Megawati Soekarnoputri, were students at the school, which explains the affinity between the President and that school. Naturally, the arrival of the nation’s president invited a major crowd in front of the school. After the event, as Soekarno was preparing to leave, there was a series of explosions: five fragmentation grenades were thrown from the crowd. Seven people – including two members of the Presidential Guard, two women, and two children, and a man – were killed on the spot. Two others died in the hospital. At least one hundred people was injured during the tragedy. In addition, Soekarno’s car, a 1954 Chrysler Crown Imperial, was badly damaged. Soekarno himself was not harmed. The incident, which will be subsequently known as the Cikini Affair (Peristiwa Tjikini), is the first of many assassination attempts against Soekarno. The four perpetrators of the attack in Cikini, Jusuf Ismail, Sa’adon bin Mohamad, Tasrif bin Husen, and Tasim bin Abubakar, who were “apparently acting under the banner of Islam,” === [PDF page 325] === 325 were quickly arrested and tried several months after.836 As this was an assassination effort, the perpetrators were tried in a military court. The court, led by Army Judge Mr. Gunawan, sentenced three of them for execution, while the other one was imprisoned for twenty years.837 At first, Colonel Zulkifli Lubis, an Army regionalist and an archenemy of Nasution, was accused as being the mastermind. Lubis denied this, and other regionalist officers also received blame. This assassination attempt was a foundational moment in Indonesian political history. It was the first of several attempts to assassinate Soekarno. Daniel Lev noted that the Cikini Affair had wide ramifications: it accelerated the gradual transformation of the Indonesian political scene from the party-led Liberal Democracy period into Guided Democracy, which was dominated by President Soekarno with the support of the Army and the PKI.838 The Affair, however, also represents the “arrival” of the threat posed by insecurity in the political center: if the years prior was marked by major gerombolan activity outside of the national capital of Jakarta, in this case, the rampant insecurity succeeded to hit the heart of Indonesian politics and its leader. In this chapter, I will discuss the origins and dynamics of Soekarno’s Guided Democracy. On the one hand, there was a persistent threat of insecurity, whether it was from the bickering of the political parties in Jakarta, the gerombolan menace, or the regional rebellions. Insecurity became a pretext for the establishment of a new kind of state that was focused more on the 836 Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, 48. Panitia Penjusun Naskah Buku “20 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka,” 20 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka (Jakarta: Departemen Penerangan Republik Indonesia [Ministry of Information, Republic of Indonesia], 1966), 608; “Album Penerangan,” Mimbar Penerangan, April 1958, 279; R. Surjo Sediono, Peristiwa Tjikini (Djakarta: PT Soeroengan, 1958), 378–79. 838 Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, 48. 837 === [PDF page 326] === 326 establishment of a new kind of order that was predicated upon eradicating insecurity. On the other hand, Guided Democracy also emerged as a political solution to accommodate political powers that were not, at least officially, accommodated by the Liberal Democracy system. Initially, Soekarno’s Guided Democracy was a centralized and illiberal regime—albeit revolutionary in rhetoric—that was dominated by himself and the Army.839 This chapter argues that Guided Democracy emerged not merely as an effort to centralize power by Soekarno, the Army, and the PKI. The advent of Guided Democracy was predicated upon efforts to remedy a sense of national crisis among the ruling elites. These efforts were built upon the prior experiences of political instability and social insecurity. Guided Democracy was the product of a search for a new political order, which resulted in a political consensus between the major political actors mentioned above. It was during this search for a new political order that the Army gradually entrenched itself in government. The regime itself is the end-product of a long political experiment to break through the multidimensional limits of Liberal Democracy that have dominated Indonesian political and social life during much of the 1950s. Indeed, the liberal type of democracy in Indonesia, which was most identified by party politics and parliamentary debates, was then viewed as a barrier in the nation’s endeavor towards security and development. It is important here to consider how Soekarno’s Konsepsi in 1957 was a pivotal moment of political experimentalism in Indonesia. Soekarno had floated the idea of a single-party state in 839 Feith, “Dynamics of Guided Democracy,” 324–25. === [PDF page 327] === 327 1945 with his idea of a PNI-Staatspartij (PNI-State Party). However, the diffusion of power during the Revolution made the possibility for a single-party rule unlikely. Additionally, Indonesia had to portray to the Western world that the newly-founded Republic was not merely a rump fascist state that was ruled by pro-Japanese collaborators. The end of the Revolution in 1949 also further delayed this urge of a search for an Indonesian version of democracy, as political compromises had driven the country into a brief experiment with federalism and a new unitary state under parliamentary democracy. However, the idea of an integralist Indonesian body-politic and its supporters remained. It was during this process, that the Army consolidated itself as a political force and became increasingly entrenched in non-military affairs. In 1959, the situation became ripe for the return of Soekarno, together with the Army, to the forefront of the stage of Indonesian politics. Under the banner of reigniting the spirit of Revolution, Soekarno’s Guided Democracy sought to bypass the liberal order of the 1950s. In doing this, there were two main trends. First was extraconstitutional rule, or a blatant disregard for established rules and norms: both Soekarno and the Army innovated with creating new institutions and concepts that were extraconstitutional in nature. These new institutions were established through initiatives that override the current legal order under a state of emergency. As the Army is the primary “expert” in the field of martial law, the military’s influence over non-military affairs grew exponentially during this early period of Guided Democracy. Second was the synthesis of a national consensus through political symbolism, which was represented in the concept of an “unfinished revolution” as a goal for the nation-state. These facts also paved the way for the rise of the PKI into the political stage—and thus a growing competition with the Army—which will be discussed more fully in Chapter VI. === [PDF page 328] === 328 Ironically, however, neither solution was effective in curbing the exact thing they were designed to do. The life of revolutionary regimes are dependent upon the control, persuasion, and direction of the masses and their energies towards a certain political goal. Thus, it did not take long until both Soekarno and the Army sought their own political machinations. Indeed, Guided Democracy was more “orderly” than its predecessor, as certain problems of Liberal Democracy— such as general insecurity and political stability in the national level—was solved. However, the solution to many of the foundational problems of Liberal Democracy, such as economic development, remained unsolved. As a result, political chaos, economic decline, and insecurity remained a feature of Indonesian social life throughout the 1960s. In other words, Guided Democracy is a contradiction—an effort for “ordering” society that actually paved the way for the mobilization of society, which will ultimately contribute to its own downfall. Causes of Guided Democracy: The Total Crisis of the Late 1950s Throughout much of the 1950s, Indonesia was governed through a multiparty, parliamentary system that foreign scholars refer to as “Constitutional Democracy” and Indonesian histories call “Liberal Democracy”. This system of parliamentary democracy, which subsequently led to the rise and fall of seven cabinets throughout the span of less than ten years, was definitely “working” for the parties and political elites in Jakarta.840 Yet, the system was also “working 840 From 1950-1959, The Indonesian government was ruled by eight cabinets: Natsir (September 1950-April 1951), === [PDF page 329] === 329 limpingly,” and it had faced many challenges, such as widespread insecurity, difficulties in law enforcement, rising threat of social disintegration, and bureaucratic inefficacy.841 We have discussed the problems of insecurity and lawlessness in the previous chapters, and indeed it was one of the core sociopolitical problem that became a mainstay for almost every cabinet. During the Natsir Cabinet (September 1950-April 1951), the reorganization and rationalization of the army and civil service and the restoration of security in rebel and bandit areas were first and second on the program list.842 The Sukiman Cabinet (April 1951-April 1952) vowed to “carry out decisive actions as a state governed by law (negara hukum) to ensure order and security.”843 The Wilopo Cabinet (April 1952-August 1953) promised to “wisely carry out any measures to overcome security problems as a state governed by law (negara hukum), improve the organization of state apparatuses, and develop the people’s strength to ensure security and order.”844 The first Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet (August 1953-August 1955) program called for “revitalizing the policies on restoring security, to allow for decisive action and to generate the people’s spirit.”845 Similarly, the Burhanuddin Harahap Cabinet (August 1955-March 1956) also sought order by vying to “restore the moral authority of the government, specifically the trust of 1955), Burhanuddin Harahap (August 1955-March 1956), Ali Sastroamidjojo II (March 1956-April 1957), Djuanda I (April 1957-June 1958), and Djuanda II (June 1958-July 1959). This translates to roughly one cabinet every year, highlighting the severe instability in the political sphere. See R. B. Cribb and Audrey Kahin, Historical Dictionary of Indonesia, 2nd ed, Historical Dictionaries of Asia, Oceania, and the Middle East, no. 51 (Lanham, Md: Scarecrow Press, 2004), 477. 841 Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 324–25. 842 Feith, 153. 843 “Multum in Extenso,” Mimbar Penerangan, June 10, 1951, 58. 844 Kementerian Penerangan, Keterangan Dan Djawaban Pemerintah Atas Program Kabinet Wilopo (Jakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, 1952), 8. 845 Kementerian Penerangan, Kami Perkenalkan....! (Kementerian Penerangan, 1954), 14. === [PDF page 330] === 330 the army and of society.”846 Lastly, the second Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet (March 1956-April 1957), whose program focused more on foreign policy goals such as the Bandung Conference, also stated that its premier domestic agenda was the “restoration of internal security, which was disrupted by the illegal gangs (gerombolan) who revolted against the State by whatever name they call themselves.”847 Meanwhile, the rapid change of cabinets happened over the background of a general polarization of social forces, which emanated from the political center of Jakarta to the countryside. Almost all of the political parties attached had their own “under-organizations” (onderbouw), which represented almost all elements of social life, from “women’s, youth, veterans’, labor, peasant, religious, educational, cultural, and sporting organizations—with the whole complex forming an aliran or political stream.848 When political parties brought the contestation of national politics into the villages, these aliran patterns became much more emphasized and amplified, producing a civil society that was polarized under politics. Another important element of aliran politics was in the national press, where almost every major circulation newspapers have their own political orientations, such as the Harian Rakjat (PKI), Pedoman (PSI), Abadi (Masyumi), Suluh Indonesia (PNI), and the independent, (yet initially Army-backed) Indonesia Raya.849 846 Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 416. Kementerian Penerangan, Keterangan Pemerintah Tentang Program Kabinet Ali Sastroamidjojo (Kedua) (Jakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, 1956), 4. 848 The aliran or “political stream” concept is first coined by Clifford Geertz as a way to understand how competing social groups in rural Javanese society was structured around an ideological differentiation with each other. Geertz is influenced by J.S. Furnivall’s concept of a “plural society.” See Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 125; Clifford Geertz, The Social History of an Indonesian Town (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1965); Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India. 849 Hill, Journalism and Politics in Indonesia: A Critical Biography of Mochtar Lubis (1922-2004) as Editor and Author, 40. 847 === [PDF page 331] === 331 Hence, by the early 1950s, it was clear that the rising problem of internal sociopolitical disintegration and governmental bureaucratic inefficacy—together with the continuous political fighting between parties in Jakarta—was part of the emerging challenges that brought Indonesia’s experiment with parliamentary democracy towards its death knell. While rapid change of political configurations in Jakarta were a constant fact throughout the 1950s, it was only during Ali Sastroamidjojo’s second cabinet (March 1956-April 1957) that the initial causes of disintegration came to the fore. This was the first cabinet after Indonesia’s first national elections in 1955, and the cabinet roughly reflected the electoral results, though sans the PKI. Ali’s cabinet was a coalition of the PNI, Masyumi, and the NU, which commanded similar percentages in the parliament seats.850 The 1955 Elections was relatively successful as it was relatively free and it received a high turnout. However, the 1955 Elections produced disappointments and surprises to Jakarta’s elites. First, there were concerns on the fear of political reprisals, especially from major parties that held important positions in government. According to Moelyono, former leader of the PSI branch in Pekalongan: We felt very sad [during the 1955 election campaign] because we were faced with the [situation where] people were quite clearly living under the tyranny of the PNI via the village headmen. Because all the village headmen, all the camats [subdistrict heads] were PNI… The poor people were scared of the village headmen. Those 850 In 1955, the PNI received 57 seats, the Masyumi 57 seats, the NU 45 seats, and the PKI 39 seats. The remaining 59 seats were split between the PSII, Parkindo, Partai Katholik, PSI, Murba, and others. See Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200, 287. === [PDF page 332] === 332 with some education [who worked for the government] weren’t scared but were reluctant, because they knew they wouldn’t get a promotion if they joined the PSI. They wouldn’t lose their jobs, but they would never be promoted. But not only that. I didn’t get a promotion for several years either, but the government also tried to find fault in my work so that I could be dismissed from my job.851 Meanwhile, there were also concerns on the role of the military, particularly in areas where martial law was still in place. Military oversight, according to Anton Lucas, created a democracy that was constrained: “Indonesian democracy during Parliamentary Democracy was demokrasi minta idzin (asking permission democracy) or in Javanese ‘demokrasi nyrimpeti’.”852 According to one former revolutionary-era activist, Karyaputra: Parliamentary Democracy was in fact nyrimpeti democracy… on the practical political level you had to get permission for a public meeting from KMK, it was called the Municipal Military Command (Komando Militer Kota). Without their permission you couldn’t hold a meeting. Maybe nationally the cabinet did not restrict public meetings, but locally the KMK did.853 Last and most important “surprise” was related to the results. The PNI, Masyumi, NU, and PKI emerged at the top, with 57 seats shared between the PNI and Masyumi, while the NU and 851 Anton E. Lucas, “The Failure and Future of Democracy: Conversations with a Group of Former Revolutionary Activists,” in Democracy in Indonesia: 1950s and 1990s (Clayton, Victoria: Center of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1994), 105. 852 Lucas, 104. 853 Lucas, 104. === [PDF page 333] === 333 the PKI scored 45 and 39 seats respectively.854 Meanwhile, the Army-sponsored party IPKI, only received four seats, while the PSI, an influential party among the educated elites, only received five.855 The performance of the PKI came as the most significant surprise to the political elite, and they gradually became viewed as a common enemy by most of the parties.856 Meanwhile, the elections also amplified the rift between the center and the regions, as most of the votes for Masyumi came from the Outer Islands, particularly Sumatra and South Sulawesi.857 Thus, the 1955 Elections did not solve the political problems of Liberal Democracy, but rather amplified it. The follow-up elections for the Constitutional Assembly later that year and the Regional Elections in 1957 also mirrored the disappointments of the 1955 Elections. If there was a single strand of thought that united almost all parties across the board after the 1955 Elections, it was the fear against further Communist influence. Owing to an overall collective fear of the current political parties against a growing Communist influence in the government, the PKI was not admitted to the Ali Cabinet.858 Thus, the PKI became the main opposition party at this time. After the Ali cabinet managed unilaterally to abrogate the Netherlands-Indonesian Union in February 1956 and cancelled the Round Table debt agreements 854 M.C Ricklefs, Sejarah Indonesia Modern 1200-2008, ed. Moh. Sidik Nugraha (Jakarta: Serambi Ilmu Semesta, 2008), 287. 855 Bourchier, Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia, 106. 856 Bourchier, 106–7. 857 Kahin and Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy, 50. 858 During the immediate months after the 1955 Elections, the major political parties (PNI, Masyumi, NU, PSI) was, for a brief moment, united by a common fear against PKI electoral victory. There was a serious possibility for an antiCommunist front consisting of these parties. Aliran politics, however, prevailed, and by 1957, this common agenda quickly withered on the vine. On the emergence of this “anti-Communist front” and its failure, see Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, 117–43. === [PDF page 334] === 334 in the following August, the PKI’s oppositional strategy focused towards the problem of West Irian, which seem to reach a stalemate.859 As we know, the West Irian issue has been part of a main political program for many cabinets, including this one. Internally, however, there were several themes that subsequently led parliamentary democracy into a crisis. The first was political. Challenges to the legitimacy of Liberal Democracy in the 1950s Indonesia were constant. Even the parliament itself, the beacon of parliamentary democracy, had faced challenges in maintaining its legitimacy, at least until Indonesia’s first elections in 1955. Up until that moment, it is fair to say that the parliament’s own political legitimacy is meagre at best. As Herbert Feith notes, the parliament was not elected—its composition was a product of the compromise made during the Round Table Conference between the Republic of Indonesia and the other Dutch-sponsored federal states.860 It was not exactly a product of the “Revolution,” and it is “difficult for it to contribute to a gradual transformation whereby the exercise of government power might have come to be justified by a rule-based process of gauging the people’s will, rather than by the Revolution.”861 Meanwhile, Feith also notes that the political parties of the time were “top-heavy, and they articulated the interests of groups in Djakarta much more effectively than those of regional groups.”862 Meanwhile, the executive is also weak: “it was frequently impossible for cabinets to oblige the civil service or the army to respond to party and parliamentary demands—a fact which led many groups to press their interests 859 Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200, 288–89. Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 321. 861 Feith, 321. 862 Feith, 322. 860 === [PDF page 335] === 335 directly through the bureaucracy rather than through parties and parliament.”863 Indeed, during this period the bureaucratic effectiveness of the civil service and other state apparatus were severely diminished, as its numbers swelled yet it is deeply fragmented into rivalrous factions due to the influence of the parties.864 At least as early as 1953, there has been criticism against the system. For instance, Roeslan Abdulgani wrote in August 1953: “in choosing a governmental system which accords with Indonesian personality” there were three choices: “just democracy, which often develops excesses and becomes a caricature of itself,” “a system of democracy with a ‘certain amount of leadership’ or more clearly ‘democracy with leadership,’” and “a system of leadership with ‘a certain amount of democracy’ added where necessary, or more clearly ‘a modified Führerprinzip.’”865 Further, Feith notes, there were four possibilities of an “alternative” political system floating around in political and public discourse at that time: “dictatorship,” “a strong man,” “Indonesian democracy,” or “democracy without its culturally alien elements,” and “a second revolution.”866 During the late 1950s, many of these political debates were broadcasted by the press through the various newspapers. However, the press during this time was politicized, as many newspapers were owned by the parties. Thus, political debates in the parliament was easily accessible for the society to engage with, and more often than not, the debates in the press were 863 Feith, 322. Howard W. Dick et al., eds., The Emergence of a National Economy: An Economic History of Indonesia, 18002000, Southeast Asia Publications Series (Crow’s Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin [u.a.], 2002), 173. 865 Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 326. 866 Feith, 327. 864 === [PDF page 336] === 336 vicious. The Army has long regarded the press as “provocative, divisive, sensationalist, and politically motivated.”867 The political factor is also fed by the juridical factor, in which the current constitution, the Provisional Constitution of 1950, was a provisional one. Just like the parliament, The Provisional Constitution of 1950 was also a product of political compromise: it was drafted by Soepomo, then Justice Minister for the federal Republic of the United States of Indonesia, and the constitution was adopted by the federal house, senate, and Republican parliaments on August 17, 1950, precisely when the federal state was dismantled and replaced with a unitary one.868 Both the Federal and Provisional constitutions lacked political legitimacy because they were not products of direct political consultation.869 Thus, after the General Elections of 1955, a Constitutional Assembly (Konstituante) was created, with members from various parties, tasked with drafting a new constitution. The new Konstituante started its work on December 1956.870 Nevertheless, as it was formed by representatives of the parties, the Konstituante was “deadlocked over the type of state that the Constitution should embody, including, in particular, whether the state should be based on Islamic law (shari’ah)—a proposition that had been a subject of debate well before Independence.”871 867 Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, 82. Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 96–99. 869, Simon Butt and Timothy Lindsey, The Constitution of Indonesia: A Contextual Analysis, Constitutional Systems of the World (Oxford: Portland, Or: Hart Pub, 2012), 7. 870 Butt and Lindsey, 4. 871 Butt and Lindsey, 4. 868 === [PDF page 337] === 337 This debate in the Konstituante further sharpened, especially after the Cikini Affair of November 1957, as it would often boil down between those who supported Islam as the ideological basis of the country (Masyumi, NU, etc) and those who are against it (PNI, PKI, etc).872 Thus by the declaration of national state of siege on March 1957, the Konstituante was deadlocked. Another important issue during the period was in regards to the State of War and Siege regulations, that were still active in many areas across Indonesia. It was not until late 1957 that the country managed to promulgate its own law on the state of emergency, and thus, the colonial 1939 Law on the State of War and Siege was continuously utilized during this time. In addition to the political and juridical factors within the central government, there was a clear emergence of economic problems that subsequently had a magnifying effect on political problems. After the transfer of sovereignty in 1950, generally Indonesia had to deal with reconstructing a still highly dualistic economy. In 1952, for instance, eight large Dutch trading firms controlled at least 60 percent of the country’s consumer goods imports, while private banking was still dominated by foreign banks, including the De Javasche Bank.873 The rural economy was still under-commercialized, with at least only 9.4 percent and 6.7 percent of the rice produced in Java and Madura was commercially milled.874 Chinese middlemen became the conduit of trading systems between the rural and urban sectors, and local credit and barter transactions were common, 872 Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, 150–51. Bruce Glassburner, ed., The Economy of Indonesia: Selected Readings, 1st Equinox ed (Jakarta: Equinox Pub, 2007), 78–79. 874 Dick et al., The Emergence of a National Economy, 174. 873 === [PDF page 338] === 338 indicating the low level of monetary supply in the regions, which differs starkly with the heavily industrialized and monetized urban areas.875 The opposition between Java and the Outer Islands was predicated upon a perceived economic mismanagement between center and the periphery. The imposition of a high export tax, the overvaluation of the Rupiah (which hurt exports), and Jakarta’s neglect of development in the Outer Islands was a constant theme. Indeed, commodities from the Outer Islands trade were oriented toward the outside world, such as Singapore and Penang, rather than Java.876 Nevertheless, the arrival of a new unitary state (negara kesatuan) in 1950 certainly necessitates a kind of centralization of the economy in order to the national budget in balance. However, for the Outer Islands this become the problem. The taxation of export earnings and the restriction and taxation of import through multiple exchange rates and import licensing were detrimental to the revenues of those in the Outer Islands.877 It was not long until this problem developed into political sentiments along ethnic lines. For instance, there were the widespread idea that national politics were too dominated by the Javanese, or the national economy were dominated by the Chinese-Indonesians (Tionghoa), thus blaming economic hardships to them.878 These problems became much worse when the Army was involved, as many of the regional commanders had forged links with local politicians in the Outer Islands in order to finance their units and gain personal profit. Army-sponsored smuggling became 875 Dick et al., 174. Dick et al., 179. 877 Dick et al., 179. 878 Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200, 289. 876 === [PDF page 339] === 339 a major issue, with a major case of copra smuggling in North Sulawesi in 1954-1955. When Jakarta tried to close down the port of Bitung, the main deep-sea port in North Sulawesi, the local army commanders sent an ultimatum to Jakarta, by which Jakarta had no option but to give in, as the regional government condoned the smuggling. Another scandal involved rubber smuggling in the port of Teluk Nibung, North Sumatra, in 1956. The Teluk Nibung debacle was started when the local Army leader, Colonel Maludin Simbolon. Simbolon was never charged for the smuggling scandal, and by July 1956, the adventurous colonel had signed an agreement with Jakarta, thus securing his rank and position in the Army.879 These scandals, dubbed the barter and smokkel (smuggling) scandals, became major headlines in the capital’s newspapers—and, hence, were the subject of debate in parliament. During much of the early 1950s, it was never possible to take down all of the Army officers involved in corruption or smuggling, as with the political parties so polarized between the Java and the Outer Islands and the bureaucracy so ineffectual, and the Army, which was the only thing that kept the country together, was split between centrist and regionalist officers.880 This cleavage was much amplified after the October 17 Incident in 1952. In 1955, a major development happened within the Army officer corps. On February 1725, 1955, centrist and regionalist Army officers initiated a conference in Jogjakarta, in which at least 270 senior and middle ranking Army officers participated. The Jogjakarta Conference of 1955 produced the Jogjakarta Charter (Piagam Jogja), which called for unity among the Army officer 879 880 Ricklefs, 289. Ricklefs, 289. === [PDF page 340] === 340 corps. Granted, many of the problems within the military—such as the position of the Army visà-vis the state, Army ideology, and the problem of the October 17 Incident—were not directly addressed by the resolution.881 However, the Jogjakarta Charter became an important symbol to the Army officer corps, as it indicated that Army unity as a political force was a possibility. Nevertheless, even after the adoption of the Charter, there still were still many political debacles within the Army. When the Burhanuddin Harahap Cabinet tried to elect a new Army Chief of Staff, the Army was only able to come up with Colonel Maluddin Simbolon, Colonel Zulkifli Lubis, and Colonel Gatot Subroto as their candidates. All of them were unacceptable to both the Army and the government, so the Army then proposed to promote Nasution instead. The return of Nasution to the position of Army Chief of Staff came with costs for Soekarno and the Army itself. Initially, his appointment did not face much protest from the regionalist parties such as Masyumi, as his political position in 1955 was far different than 1952: he realized that he had made mistakes during his first years of tenure as Chief of Staff—particularly in regards to the 17 October 1952 incident. Nasution realized the importance of Soekarno as a national symbol.882 As a precondition to his election as KSAD, Nasution had to announce the civilian supremacy over the Army (a principle which he always held on), while he calls for a new law that governs the 881 882 Sundhaussen, Politik militer Indonesia 1945-1967, 142–43. Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 443. === [PDF page 341] === 341 relationship between the Army and the government.883 Nasution framed this problem as part of his efforts as an Army reformer: The development of the armed forces must be dealt with by new legislation, especially concerning the acceptance of new members, and the allocation of a budget of not less than one third of the national budget... The security situation must be improved through structural changes in military administration and the formulation of a security policy and a comprehensive national policy that clearly outlines the competence and prerogatives of the army and political leaders.”884 In principle, Soekarno and the cabinet agreed with these requests. Nasution, who was in “forced retirement” due to his role in the 17 October, 1952 Incident, was then brought back as Army Chief of Staff on November 7, 1955.885 The Revolt of the Councils: PRRI and Permesta The chronic economic mismanagement, political jockeying within civil and military elites, and the widening sociocultural gap between the center and the periphery became the pretext for a 883 For a legalist like Nasution, these requirements were not so hard to accept. The principle of civilian superiority over the Armed Forces is contained in the active Defence Law, which was promulgated in 1954. However, the Law does not go into detail in terms of Army and government relations. See “Undang Undang Republik Indonesia No.29 Tahun 1954 Tentang Pertahanan Negara Republik Indonesia” (1954), art. 12,13. 884 A.H. Nasution, “Masalah Personil Angkatan Perang,” Pedoman, November 3, 1955; A.H. Nasution, “Masalah Personil Angkatan Perang,” Pedoman, November 1, 1955; Sundhaussen, Politik militer Indonesia 1945-1967, 168. 885 Sundhaussen, Politik militer Indonesia 1945-1967, 164–68. === [PDF page 342] === 342 series of crises that led Soekarno to declare Guided Democracy. The tension between civil and military elites in Java and the Outer Islands led to a series of military-led revolts, which were known as the Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (PRRI) and Perjuangan Semesta (Permesta) rebellion, which was categorized as an effort towards the disintegration of the country. However, the reasoning behind these “rebellions” was complex, as it was located in various locales, from Sumatra to Sulawesi. The diversity of these revolts are represented by their names: in Central Sumatra, it was the Banteng Council (Dewan Banteng) under Lt. Col. Ahmad Husein. In North and East Sumatra, there was the Elephant Council (Dewan Gajah) under Col. M. Simbolon, while in South Sumatra, there was the Garuda Council (Dewan Garuda) under Lt. Col. Barlian. In Sulawesi, there was the Perjuangan Semesta group that was declared in Ujungpandang (Makassar), led by Lt. Col. H.M. (Ventje) Sumual and Saleh Lahade. The logic and practice of emergency played an important role in the revolt of the councils. In the case of the Banteng Council in West Sumatra. The primary concern within the Sumatran councils—Dewan Banteng, Dewan Gajah, and Dewan Garuda—was mostly related to the concerning situation of demobilized soldiers and the poor state of Army facilities in Sumatra, particularly on housing, which was a constant fact since the early 1950s. The spread of military facilities such as barracks and forts in Sumatra were uneven, with areas considered “rebellious” by the colonial government such as Tapanuli or West Sumatra (Padang, Bukittinggi) having some facilities, yet in other areas such as East Sumatra and Riau, there were no facilities at all. In one instance in East Sumatra, TNI units stationed there were forced to live in former coolie housing.886 886 Leirissa, PRRI-Permesta: Strategi Membangun Indonesia Tanpa Komunis, 13. === [PDF page 343] === 343 Meanwhile, many of the demobilized soldiers in Sumatra were neglected by the state, and they often resorted to a life of crime in order to survive. One popular saying at the time was that “[it was] better to fight with the people or deal with the police, than fight with your own stomach,” revealing the dire situation of demobilized soldiers and veterans during that time.887 These conditions helped to enable the regional “barter” and smuggling operations, such as the one in Teluk Nibung (North Sumatra) and Bitung (Minahasa). These actions, which were illegal in the face of the law, led to increasing tensions between the regions and Jakarta, which was seen as a cesspool of corrupt and self-serving party politicians. The tension between the regions and Jakarta led to the break of communications between the regional military commanders and the Army headquarters. After breaking communications with Jakarta and taking command of the provincial government through the Banteng Council, Ahmad Husein immediately declared a State of Siege (staat van beleg) over Central Sumatra on December 20, 1956. Two days later on December 22, 1956, Simbolon also implemented a State of Siege in his area of North Sumatra. Meanwhile, Barlian took over civilian government through SOB 1939 regulations in South Sumatra.888 Here, we see the influence of the Army jurists that have just graduated from the Military Law Academy, as one of the earliest proponents of the Banteng Council, Captains Jusuf Nur and Jamhur Jamin, were graduates of the Academy.889 887 Gusti Asnan, Memikir Ulang Regionalisme: Sumatera Barat Tahun 1950-An, Ed. 1 (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2007), 167. 888 Hariyono, Penerapan Status Bahaya di Indonesia: Sejak Pemerintah Kolonial Belanda hingga Pemerintah Orde Baru [The Practice of the State of Emergency in Indonesia: From the Colonial Period to the New Order], 144–45. 889 Leirissa, PRRI-Permesta: Strategi Membangun Indonesia Tanpa Komunis, 37; Asnan, Memikir Ulang Regionalisme, 174. === [PDF page 344] === 344 Meanwhile on March 2, 1957, in Sulawesi, Permesta leaders Sumual and Lahade declared a state of siege over all of the areas of Territorium VII, which included Sulawesi, Maluku, and the East and West Nusa Tenggaras, including Bali. Sumual’s declaration of martial law was rather unusual, as it was not based upon the colonial State of Siege, but instead on Article 129 of UUDS 1950 and Governmental Regulation No.33 of 1948, which was by then already legally moot.890 The amount of attention given by the Councils to take over power through martial law indicates the importance of martial law as a legitimizing device to the actions of these military men, thus confirming the trend that the Army officers were paying much more attention to legal justification of their acts. Nevertheless, it was clear that the emergence of the Councils signified the first time that Jakarta had to face an open rebellion from Army units in the regions, thus posing a politically more significant threat compared to the Darul Islam and other gerombolans. Search for a Political Solution: State of Emergency and Presidential Decree of 5 July 1959 The revolt of the Councils, which gained full steam in mid-1957, was only one factor that led to the emergence of Guided Democracy. Another factor was the emerging discontent against the parliamentary system, which by 1956, was represented by almost all elements of the political elite, including Soekarno, Hatta, the Army, the press, and even some of the political parties themselves, most notably Murba (Proletarian), which was increasingly close to Soekarno.891 890 The Governmental Regulation refers to Law No.30 of 1948, which in turn refers to the 1945 Constitution and the UUKB 1946. As we know, the 1945 Constitution and the UUKB 1946 is surpassed by the Provincial Constitution of 1950 and the SOB 1939 in 1955. Leirissa, PRRI-Permesta: Strategi Membangun Indonesia Tanpa Komunis, 95. 891 Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, 26. === [PDF page 345] === 345 Within parliament itself, there was a sharp divergence of opinion in regards to the response against the regional councils and the need for the formation of a new cabinet. Masyumi, for instance, viewed the regional councils and their demand for autonomy as legitimate, as economic development was heavily skewed towards Java. They demanded that the second Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet be replaced with a non-party “business cabinet” (zakencabinet). Meanwhile the PNI, PKI, and the NU viewed the revolt of the councils as a threat to national unity.892 The tipping point for this political crisis was the role of Soekarno. As early as March 26, 1956, Soekarno had voiced concerns about instability within parliamentary democracy, urging that Indonesian democracy should “work on the basis of ‘real Indonesian democracy’ and not on the basis of ’50 percent plus one are always right.’”893 Rallying supporters through what he called the “spirit of the 1945 Revolution”, Soekarno became closer to the so-called “1945 Generation,” a group of people that were considered as originally part of the revolutionary pemudas. Important figures from this group included Chairul Saleh, who was a Tan Malaka follower during the Revolution and a gerombolan leader during the 1950s; Achmadi, a former Student Army (Tentara Pelajar) leader in Central Java; Mas Isman, another former Student Army leader from East Java; A.M. Hanafi; and Major Pamurahardjo.894 892 Lev, 26. Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 513. 894 Feith, 516. 893 === [PDF page 346] === 346 Most of these people were not members of a political parties and they were radical nationalists of the pemuda pedigree, which were, according to Herbert Feith, strongly solidaritymaker types.895 In addition, Soekarno also sought support from technocrats which reputation were untarnished by the “vices” of party politics of the 1950s. These people include the engineer Djuanda, former Foreign Minister Ruslan Abdulgani, the jurist and historian Mohammad Yamin, the former diplomat Subandrio, and the physician Johannes Leimena. While these technocrats were able and shrewd politicians, they were not members of any political parties and thus did not have any mass backing.896 On October 28, 1956, during a meeting with leaders of youth organizations, Soekarno spoke of the parties as a national disease that must be eradicated: Let us be frank about it, brothers and sisters, We made a very great mistake in 1945 when we urged the establishment of parties, parties, parties… Now that mistake is wreaking its vengeance upon us… Do you know, brothers and sisters, what my dream is as I speak to you now? … My dream is that the leaders of the parties would meet, would consul together with one another, and then come together to the decision of ‘Let us now join together to bury all parties.’ … I know that the young people who are politically aware do indeed want a nation that is not split by parties and more parties. I know that they don't support the youth groups which just follow 895 896 Feith, 516–17. Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, 48. === [PDF page 347] === 347 their father parties obediently… Exercise the sovereignty of youth! Do not just parrot the parties.897 In a speech two days later, Soekarno made his first mention of the new type of democracy that he envisioned: I do not want to become a dictator, brothers and sisters… That is against my spirit. I am a democrat. I am really a democrat. But my democracy is not liberal democracy… What I would like to see in this Indonesia of ours is guided democracy [demokrasi terpimpin, geleide democratie], democracy with leadership, but still democracy.898 On February 21, 1957, Soekarno unveiled his Konsepsi (Conception) speech in front of 900 palace guests. The speech, titled “Saving the Republic of the Proclamation,” (Menjelamatkan Republik Proklamasi) was broadcasted nationally by the Ministry of Information. The Konsepsi, which was the basis of Soekarno’s concept of Guided Democracy, consisted of several points. Soekarno first laid out the insecurity and instability that the country faced: Brothers and sisters, that the peace of heart of the Indonesian nation, the joy of the heart of the Indonesian nation in the past eleven years has often been disturbed by the conditions in the country.An image unfolds before our eyes, that since we had the Republic of Indonesia, since we proclaimed the Republic of Indonesia on 897 This translation is cited from Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 517. For originals, see Soekarno, Indonesia, Pilihlah Demokrasimu jang Sedjati. Djakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, 1956. 898 Feith, 518. === [PDF page 348] === 348 August 17, 1945, the hearts of the Indonesian people, which previously thought that the proclamation and the State would bring peace, happiness and pleasure, for eleven years each disturbed, it's almost possible to say permanently disturbed.899 Soekarno called for a “new style of government” (pemerintahan stijl baru), arguing that the current style was flawed as it was a Western-style democracy. Soekarno delivered a scathing criticism of parliamentary democracy, in which he called it “an imported democracy, a democracy which is not the democracy of Indonesia.”900 The Konsepsi introduced two political innovations. First, Soekarno called for a new shape of democracy through a new cabinet, which would be called as “gotong-royong cabinet” (Cabinet of Mutual Assistance), and was to include representatives from the political parties and other political groupings.901 Soekarno explained that the concept of gotong-royong, which roughly translates to “mutual assistance,” was a “native Indonesian word that describes the pure Indonesian spirit,” or “all members of the family at the table, all members of the family at the dining table and at the work table without any exception. This the embodiment of the Indonesian gotong-royong, the embodiment of the Indonesian spirit.”902 The second innovation was the establishment of a National Council (Dewan Nasional), which would consist of representatives from the “functional groups”, including farmers, laborers, intelligentsia, national entrepreneurs, Protestants, Catholics, 899 Dewan Nasional: Maksud Pembentukan, Sifat, Funksi, Tugas, Susunannja (Jakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, 1957), 23. 900 Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 542. 901 “Undang-Undang Darurat No.7 Tahun 1957 Tentang Dewan Nasional Dan Pendjelasannja” (1957), 27. 902 Dewan Nasional: Maksud Pembentukan, Sifat, Funksi, Tugas, Susunannja, 26–27. === [PDF page 349] === 349 Muslim clerics, women, youth, etc.903 Soekarno pictured the National Council as a second, or parallel, cabinet representing the people themselves: “On the one hand, it is like the parliament is filtered (diperas) into the cabinet, on the other hand, the living society, the vibrant, active, and dynamic society is filtered into a National Council.”904 The concept of functional groups, he explained, was “an alternative basis for organizing the nation,” a response to how ideological divisions embedded within party politics has caused political instability during the Liberal Democracy period.905 Soekarno’s Konsepsi shook Indonesian politics to its core. It was the clarion call for those who were critical of the constant political instability brought by parliamentary democracy. Meanwhile, the Konsepsi also boosted the PKI into the spotlight, as it showed itself as a major supporter of Soekarno after the President made it clear that he did not intend to abolish the parties. The parties remained important for the success of Guided Democracy, as Soekarno surrounded himself with non-party figures that lack the capability of mass mobilization. The direct result of this constant attack against the parties was the expanding popularity of the PKI. The PKI became increasingly popular during this time, as “it was the one major party which did not have either its prestige or its internal élan damaged by the general mood of antiparty sentiment, for it had neither participated in the much-cursed party cabinets, nor tied itself ideologically to constitutional 903 First introduced by the jurist Djokosoetono in 1957, the functional groups concept introduces the representation of various elements of society—such as workers, farmers, entrepreneurs, civil servants, consumers, the middle classes, and the Army—as an alternative to the political party system. See Bourchier, Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia, 110– 11. 904 Dewan Nasional: Maksud Pembentukan, Sifat, Funksi, Tugas, Susunannja, 30. 905 Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, 38. === [PDF page 350] === 350 democracy.”906 This was also the reason why the PKI, together with the PNI, the Murba Party, the PRN, the Baperki,907 and the Police Employee’s Association, gave their approval for the Konsepsi. Other parties such as Masyumi and the Catholic Party rejected it, while still others such as NU, PSII, Parkindo, IPKI, and PSI tended to be vague and ambiguous about the President’s new idea.908 However, massive support for the Konsepsi came from various mass organizations related to the PNI and the PKI.909 As we will see later, Soekarno himself would rely on the PKI for mass political support towards his program of Guided Democracy. Meanwhile, the Permesta declaration of state of emergency in Makassar on March 2, 1957 arrived immediately in response to Soekarno’s Konsepsi speech.910 The political situation then deteriorated quickly, as the regional councils’ response invited a slurry of criticism against the regions, sharpening the dichotomy between those who are pro-central authority and those who are sympathetic to the regions. Nasution and other high ranking officers were concerned that the declarations of the states of emergency in the regions would lead to a total disintegration in the Army. In response, Generals Nasution and Gatot Subroto came up with a temporary solution, which was to declare a nationwide State of Siege, would “legalize the power of military leaders over civilian affairs in such areas as Central and South Sumatra and East Indonesia[,] provide a 906 Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 540. The Indonesian Citizenship Consultative Body or Baperki was established in 1954 as a political party with the objective of equality for Chinese-Indonesians. See Frans H. Winarta, “No More Discrimination Against the Chinese,” in Ethnic Chinese in Contemporary Indonesia, ed. Leo Suryadinata (Singapore: ISEAS, 2008), 60. 908 Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 543–44. 909 Feith, 543. 910 Feith, 520–48. 907 === [PDF page 351] === 351 legal framework and over-all face saving formula within which the central government, particularly the central military leadership, could tackle the regional problem.”911 On March 14, 1957, at 10.00 AM, Ali Sastroamidjojo disbanded his cabinet and returned his mandate to Soekarno, while Soekarno declared a nationwide State of Siege (staat van beleg) 30 minutes afterwards.912 This declaration became one of the most hotly debated events in Indonesian history, as it was considered unconstitutional by some politicians, such as representatives of the Masyumi.913 According to Article 129 of the Provisional Constitution of 1950, which governs the declaration of a state of war and siege, the Presidential declaration had to be countersigned by the Prime Minister. However, Ali had already relinquished his post as Prime Minister, and yet he signed it. Nevertheless, in the name of emergency, the State of Siege was declared by Soekarno, in front of the Army Chief of Staff Nasution, Air Force chief Commodore Suryadarma, Navy chief Admiral Subiyakto, Attorney General Suprapto, and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Wirjono Prodjodikoro.914 Two days later, Masyumi chairman Mohammad Natsir condemned the decision as unconstitutional, as the declaration was countersigned by a demisionary Prime Minister, while Natsir was concerned that the state of emergency would led to more repressive actions against those who are critical against the state.915 Meanwhile, Ali defended his 911 Feith, 547–48. Feith, 548. 913 Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, 28. 914 Hariyono, Penerapan Status Bahaya di Indonesia: Sejak Pemerintah Kolonial Belanda hingga Pemerintah Orde Baru [The Practice of the State of Emergency in Indonesia: From the Colonial Period to the New Order], 158–59. 915 Antara, April 16, 1957; Hariyono, Penerapan Status Bahaya di Indonesia: Sejak Pemerintah Kolonial Belanda hingga Pemerintah Orde Baru [The Practice of the State of Emergency in Indonesia: From the Colonial Period to the New Order], 161. 912 === [PDF page 352] === 352 decision on grounds that “a minister who has a sense of responsibility, must act to save the country, even though he is no longer the incumbent.”916 In one of the major ironies of Indonesian history, the PNI and the PKI were the two staunchest supporters of State of Siege, at least in 1957. Indeed, according to Rocamora, the fact that the PNI had one of its major strongholds within the bureaucracy in Jakarta and the regions, it was actually the PNI that suffered the most due to the increasing influence of military rule under martial law regulations.917 Meanwhile, On March 18, 1957, PKI Secretary General D.N. Aidit declares that: The SOB regulations is a tool to concentrate all power in one hand. The problem now is, in whose hands the power is concentrated. During the Dutch colonial era, with the SOB, power was concentrated in the hands of the Governor General of the Dutch East Indies, it became clear for the interests of the Dutch colonialists. Now in the hands of the President/Supreme Commander Soekarno, an Indonesian democrat and patriot, therefore the aim of the declaration of a State of Siege should be considered democratic and patriotic.918 916 Sastroamidjojo, Tonggak-Tonggak Di Perjalananku [Milestones in My Journey], 376. J. Eliseo Rocamora, Nasionalisme Mencari Ideologi: Bangkit Dan Runtuhnya PNI 1946-1965 (Jakarta: Grafiti, 1991), 210. 918 “Peraturan SOB adalah alat untuk memusatkan segala kekuasaan pada satu tangan. So'alnya sekarang ialah, ditangan siapa kekuasaan itu dipusatkan. Di zaman pendjadjahan Belanda dulu dengan SOB kekuasaan dipusatkan ditangan Gubernur Djenderal Hindia Belanda, djadi terang untuk kepentingan kaum kolonialis Belanda. Sekarang di tangan Presiden/Panglima Tertinggi Soekarno, seorang demokrat dan patriot Indonesia, oleh karena itu tudjuan pernjataan keadaan darurat perang seharusnya demokratis dan patriotik.” Harian Rakjat, March 18, 1957; Hariyono, Penerapan Status Bahaya di Indonesia: Sejak Pemerintah Kolonial Belanda hingga Pemerintah Orde Baru [The Practice of the State of Emergency in Indonesia: From the Colonial Period to the New Order], 163. 917 === [PDF page 353] === 353 The irony became apparent early on, as the declaration of a nationwide State of Siege immediately provided the Army with significant authority in everyday socio-political life, including but not limited to politics, administration, economy, judicial system, and the press. The promulgation of martial law simply means that the civilian government is now subordinated to the military commands, an effect which was much more prominent in the regions compared to Jakarta. In the capital, Nasution and his staff still had to respect Soekarno, who was the de jure Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. This was not the case in the regions, in which the regional Army commanders held supreme authority through the state of siege.919 With the declaration of martial law, the rate of military intervention in non-military affairs rose exponentially. A Country under a State of Siege Under the state of siege, everyday governance was conducted normally, although many major decisions had to go through the new system of Central Military Authority (Penguasa Militer) or Central War Authority (Penguasa Perang Pusat, Peperpu) and its regional equivalent, the Regional War Authority (Penguasa Perang Daerah, Peperda). As during this time, the State of Siege is administered through the 1939 Law on the State of War and Siege, the Central War Authority was headed by Nasution, as the Chief of Staff of the Army. The task was simple yet 919 Lev, “The Political Role of the Army in Indonesia,” 351. === [PDF page 354] === 354 broad: “to plan, compile, decide, and supervise” efforts to restore and maintain public order and security so that development in all fields may be carried out.920 The Central and Regional War Authorities, led directly by the Inspector-General for Territorial Affairs and People’s Resistance, consists of a daily staff (Staff Harian) that has General (Umum), Security (Keamanan), Government (Pemerintahan), Development (Pembangunan), Financial-Economic (Financieel-Ekonomi, often abbreviated into Finek), and Information (Penerangan) sections.921 In accordance to the broad authority bequeathed upon them by the State of Siege, the sections administer a wide range of tasks. The General (Umum) section had the authority to work on legislative, religious, veterans, health, foreign affairs, and education and cultural affairs. The Keamanan section deals with defense, judicial, and labor affairs. The Pemerintahan on social, civil service and autonomy affairs; Pembangunan on communications, public works, planning, and agrarian affairs; the Finek on finance, economic, and industrial affairs, and the Penerangan on information and propaganda affairs.922 These sections were filled by experts and technicians (tenaga ahli) from military and civilian backgrounds, with support from civilian “advisors” (penasehat), which are “authoritative and characterful figures.” (tokoh-tokoh yang berwibawa dan berwatak).923 920 "Merencanakan, menyusun, memutuskan, dan mengawasi 1. usaha-usaha pengembalian / pemeliharaan keamanan dan ketertiban umum--menudju kearah keselamatan nusa dan bangsa; 2. agar usaha2 pembangunan disegala lapangan jang menudju kearah kemakmuran rakjat tetap dapat dilaksanakan djuga." Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat, “Surat Keputusan No.Kpts/PM/01/1957 Tentang Organisasi Dan Tata-Tjara-Kerdja Staf Penguasa Militer” (Kementerian Pertahanan Staf Angkatan Darat, March 22, 1957), 2, RA.6b 526, ANRI. 921 Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat, 2. 922 Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat, 3. 923 Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat, 2. === [PDF page 355] === 355 Many of the regional commanders (panglima) also became the Regional War Authority under the 1939 Law on the State of War and Siege. In the regions, however, Regional War Authorities were assisted by a staff harian, which consists of the local Army panglima, the civilian Governor, the local Police chief, the local Chief Prosecutor, and a representative from the local legislative assembly.924 Thus, the establishment of the Peperpu and Peperda signified the arrival of a militarized parallel government all over Indonesia that goes down from Jakarta to the provinces, roughly in a similar manner to the colonial system of residents, assistant-residents, and controleurs. So much was the powers of the regional commanders under martial law that Lev referred to the Army’s martial law governance as a form of “de facto federal arrangement.”925 After the inauguration of the new Regional Military Command (Komando Daerah Militer, Kodam) system in 1958, however, the administration takes a more Japanese flavor when Nasution inaugurated the new Army territorial system that extended to the smaller regions, from the cities and regencies through the District Commands (Komando Distrik Militer, Kodim), subdistricts (Komando Rayon Militer, Koramil), and the villages (Bintara Pembina Desa, Babinsa).926 After the declaration of a State of Siege, Nasution immediately gathered all of the Army senior commanders in the Army Headquarters in Jakarta. In the meeting that took place from March 15 until 20, 1957, the Army commanders discussed matters of national importance, including ‘the effort to reassert state authority, the implementation of the state of siege, unity 924 Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat, 4. Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, 81. 926 For an excellent graph on the comparison of these administrative systems, see Satō, War, Nationalism and Peasants: Java under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945, 26. 925 === [PDF page 356] === 356 within the army, the problem of the Dwi Tunggal, and the destruction of corruption and smuggling.’”927 Thus, under the State of Siege, the Army’s interpretation of matter of defense and security is beginning to broaden in scope, initially touching the spheres of economic management. The regional panglimas had authority to influence a wide range of policies and issues related to everyday governance. Consider then Colonel Soeharto’s Order of the Day as Commander of Tentara/Territorium IV Diponegoro on March 25, 1957, after he returned to his post in Semarang: …from the proclamation of independence until now, the Indonesian people in general have had unpleasant experiences. [Social] disorder, smuggling, corruption, subversive actions, unbalanced concurrency and contradictions are inhibiting factors for the country's development efforts… …SOB [Staat van Oorlog en Beleg] is not power, but firmness. Therefore, accept the SOB as a firm tool to resolve our unfinished struggle… With the SOB we must be firm in upholding the authority of the Republic of Indonesia… With the SOB we must firmly break through the convoluted bureaucracy.928 927 R.E. Elson, “In Fear of the People,” in Roots of Violence in Indonesia, ed. Freek Columbijn and J. Thomas Lindblad (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002), 176. 928 “…sedjak proklamasi kemerdekaan hingga saat ini bangsa Indonesia pada umumnja harus merasakan pengalaman jang tidak menggembirakan. Adanja kekatjauan, penjelundupan, korupsi, aksi subversif, kongkurensi jang tidak seimbang dan pertentangan-pertentangan merupakan faktor penghambat bagi usaha pembangunan negara… …SOB bukan kekuasaan, akan tetapi ketegasan. Oleh karena itu terimalah SOB itu sebagai alat jang tegas untuk menjelesaikan perdjoangan kita jang belum selesai ini… Dengan SOB kita harus tegas dalam mempertegak kewibawaan Negara Republik Indonesia… Dengan SOB kita harus tegas menerobos birokrasi jang berbelit-belit.” “Aksi Subversif, Korupsi, Dan Birokrasi Menghalangi Kita.” === [PDF page 357] === 357 A New Cabinet of Technocrats In April 1957, Soekarno appointed a new cabinet, purposefully designed to be dominated by non-political figures, in order to push back against the disintegrating force of party politics. The new cabinet, which he called a Work Cabinet (Kabinet Karya), with the technocrat Djuanda Kartawidjaja as its Prime Minister and Defense Minister, was known as a zakencabinet (“business cabinet”) in which the ministers were professionals, not merely representing any of the parties. However, Soekarno remained open to install representatives as a token to the parties: the First Deputy Prime Minister, Hardi, was a PNI man; the Second Deputy PM was K.H. Idham Chalid from the NU; and so on.929 However, with the arrival of the presidentially-appointed cabinet, it was clear that the life of the cabinet did not rely on party support in the parliament, but rather than the President’s wishes. One of the first acts of the new Kabinet Karya was to initiate a series of conferences intended to defuse the increasingly hostile situation between Jakarta and the regional rebels. The first of this, called the National Conference (Musyawarah Nasional, Munas), took place on September 10-14, 1957. The conference was attended by national figures from across the political spectrum, including representatives from the regional Councils. The topics discussed include the relationship between central and regional governments, economy and finance, the role of the Army, the political parties, and the role of Soekarno and Hatta. Meanwhile, from November 25 until December 4 of the same year, a National Conference of Development (Musyawarah Nasional 929 Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, 33–34. === [PDF page 358] === 358 Pembangunan, Munap) took place, which was attended by a wider audience, including almost all Army figures—except Lt. Col. Husein from Sumatra.930 The Munap resulted in a governmental fact-finding commission—the Committee of Seven (Panitia Tujuh) that was tasked with resolving problems within the Armed Forces. The Committee, whose members included Soekarno, Hatta, Dr. J. Leimena, Col. Azis Saleh, Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, and Nasution, dispatched a Fact Finding Commission to the regions. As a result, the Panitia Tujuh agreed to offer a general amnesty for all Army members who have participated in political, disciplinary, and criminal actions.931 However, the Cikini Affair happened in the midst of the Munap discussions, and these proposed amnesties were reconsidered by Soekarno. As if the Cikini Affair was not enough to imbue the society with a sense of terror, by the end of November 1957, another crisis has brewed: namely the nationalization of Dutch companies in Indonesia. On November 29, 1957, a UN vote for the status of West Irian, a long-time national goal for Indonesia, failed to fall in favor of Indonesia. On December 1, 1957, the cabinet voted for a series of reprisals, including allowing a nationwide strike on December 2, withdrawal of KLM landing rights in Indonesia, and prohibition of Dutch papers and magazines. On the next day, December 3, the government announced that no Dutch nationals are able to enter Indonesia, while almost 46.000 Dutch nationals were expelled from the country.932 It was during this day, that youth 930 Rachmat et al., Tantangan Dan Rongrongan Terhadap Keutuhan Dan Kesatuan Bangsa: Kasus PRRI, 10–12. Rachmat et al., 11. 932 William A. Redfern, “Soekarno’s Guided Democracy and the Takeovers of Foreign Companies in Indonesia in the 1960s” (Dissertation, University of Michigan, 2010), 98; Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, 49. 931 === [PDF page 359] === 359 groups and mass organizations affiliated with the BKS-PM and other BKS groups—which also includes Communist and nationalist groups—moved to nationalize Dutch-owned companies.933 The first companies to be nationalized was the Royal Packet Line (Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij, KPM) shipping company and the Geo Wehry trading company, which offices were taken over by their labor unions on December 4, 1957. These unilateral acts were followed by a wave of nationalizations of Dutch companies and estates across the archipelago.934 In total, there were over 700 Dutch firms that was seized by its laborers, and at least 33.000 Dutch citizens left Indonesia in the coming months.935 On December 10, 1957, Nasution, as head of the Central War Authority, announced that all of the nationalized companies are to be placed under Army control in order to maintain order and security for the companies and its laborers.936 In June 1958, the Army acted further, as Nasution installed Army officers as heads of the Central Administrative Committee of Dutch Industrial and Mining Enterprises (Badan Pusat Penguasa Perusahaan-perusahaan Industri dan Tambang Belanda, BAPPIT), the Committee for Trade Matters (Badan Urusan Dagang, BUD), and the New Government Estates Administration (Pusat Perkebunan Negara-Baru, PPN-Baru), the four state bodies that were created to manage the nationalized Dutch firms, factories, and 933 According to Loren Ryter, these nationalizations were not pioneered by communist and nationalist trade unions, but rather the BKS-PM. See Loren Stuart Ryter, “Youth, Gangs and the State in Indonesia” (PhD Thesis, University of Washington, 2002), 80–81. 934 Redfern, “Soekarno’s Guided Democracy and the Takeovers of Foreign Companies in Indonesia in the 1960s,” 98–99. 935 Redfern, 99. 936 Hariyono, Penerapan Status Bahaya di Indonesia: Sejak Pemerintah Kolonial Belanda hingga Pemerintah Orde Baru [The Practice of the State of Emergency in Indonesia: From the Colonial Period to the New Order], 245–46. === [PDF page 360] === 360 plantations.937 On June 25, 1958, Prime Minister Djuanda elected Colonel Dadang Suprayogi to head the Ministry for Economic Stabilization (Menteri Urusan Stabilisasi Ekonomi).938 The Ministry was responsible to oversee the nationalization process of the Dutch enterprises and to transfer them to the respective Ministries, among others.939 Thus, it was during this time that the Army first jumped “from the diving board of martial law, into the warm waters of the economy,” paving the way for the infamous Dwifungsi (Dual Function) of the New Order regime.940 Soekarno’s singlehanded declaration of a state of emergency, the formation of a new nonparty cabinet, and the shocking nationalization of Dutch companies immediately invited responses from PRRI and Permesta, who denounced Soekarno’s moves as unconstitutional under the Provisional Constitution of 1950. This created a polarization between Soekarno and the Army at the center, and the regional Army officers and opposition groups in the regions, which subsequently fed into the causes of the PRRI and Permesta rebellions throughout 1958. On February 10, 1958, The PRRI declared an ultimatum, dubbed the “Struggle Charter to Save the Country” (Piagam Perjuangan Menyelamatkan Negara) which was read by Ahmad Husein and the other Councils in Sumatra. The ultimatum called for a new cabinet, the return of Soekarno to its position as figurehead President according to the Provisional Constitution of 1950, and the assignment of Hatta and Hamengkubuwono IX to form a new zakencabinet (business cabinet).941 937 Karl J. Pelzer, Planters against Peasants: The Agrarian Struggle in East Sumatra, 1947-1958, Verhandelingen van Het Koninklijk Instituut Voor Taal-, Land- En Volkenkunde 97 (’s-Gravenhage: M. Nijhoff, 1982), 167–68. 938 “Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia No.131 Tahun 1958” (1958). 939 Awaludin Djamin, ed., Ir. H. Djuanda: Negarawan, Administrator, Dan Teknokrat Utama (Jakarta: PT Kompas Media Nusantara, 2001), 231–32. 940 Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, 87. 941 Leirissa, PRRI-Permesta: Strategi Membangun Indonesia Tanpa Komunis, 206–10. === [PDF page 361] === 361 Soekarno never replied to the ultimatum. Soekarno’s response arrived on February 15th, 1958, as the first Indonesian Air Force bombers flew over Padang (West Sumatra) and bombed the city’s military installations, while Permesta and PRRI figures were swiftly arrested under the orders of Nasution, and Sumual, Husein, and Simbolon were dishonorably discharged from the Army.942 As we have discussed earlier in Chapter IV, the operations were a success for the Army, as they succeeded to defeat the rebellious forces of the various Councils and retake control of major cities and small towns. At least on July 4, 1958, Prime Minister Djuanda recognized that “the joint efforts of the Government and the Chiefs of Staff in the military operations have achieved satisfying results, although it should be avoided to portray these operations as the victory of the center (Pusat) against the regions, but the operations were done to normalize the situation and enforce discipline among the military or civilians there.”943 At least on April 9, 1959, the political and the military value of the Councils’ rebellions have been already diminished.944 What is important here is that the Army’s success in conducting a swift and modern combined arms operation against the PRRI and Permesta rebels substantially boosted the Army’s political clout. It was a military success, and it proved the Army’s performance in maintaining the unity of the country, although the long process of pacification and normalization in the country 942 Leirissa, 212–14. Kementerian Penerangan, Mendjelang Dua Tahun Kabinet Karya, Penerbitan Chusus 46 (Jakarta: Kementerian 944 Kementerian Penerangan, 8. 943 === [PDF page 362] === 362 meant that the State of Siege that was declared on December 17, 1957 remained to be in effect at least until December 17, 1958.945 Guided Democracy, Guided Life Under continuous threat of national disintegration, there was a need for a new system of politics to justify the new normality under Soekarno’s authoritarian rule. This brought Indonesia towards the transitional process to Guided Democracy, which took place during much of late 1958 until early 1959. The first act, and most important, was the political parties’ support towards a postponement of the projected national elections of 1959. The major parties—PNI, NU, PSI, and Masyumi—was still reeling from their disappointment from the results of the 1955 Elections. Meanwhile, a fear of Communist electoral victory began to take hold across party lines. In April 16, 1958, the PSI daily Pedoman proposed the postponement of the elections, which was quickly followed by Masyumi and the Christian parties Parkindo and Partai Katolik.946 Certainly, this development played well with Soekarno’s agenda to “bury the parties.” The PKI, which was the only high-performing party during the 1955 and 1957 elections, were was quick to criticize this development as an “attack to the basic constitutional rights and democratic freedoms of the people.”947 Nevertheless, on September 22, 1958, Prime Minister Djuanda informed the Parliament that due to security 945 Kementerian Penerangan, 9. Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, 186. 947 Lev, 187. 946 === [PDF page 363] === 363 conditions, that the the 1959 elections was to be postponed for at most one year, and thus maintaining the current parliament.948 Thus, Soekarno’s idea of a new style of governance was gaining support. Soekarno had long floated the idea—in relation to his Konsepsi speech—of establishing a “Guided Democracy” to the cabinet at least four times, which resulted in cabinet approval on February 19, 1959.949 Having secured approval from the rest of the executive, on March 2, 1959, Prime Minister Djuanda gave a speech in front of the DPR titled “Pelaksanaan Demokrasi Terpimpin dalam rangka kembali ke UUD 1945.” In the speech, Djuanda outlined the meaning of Guided Democracy: The main meaning of the principle of guided democracy is as follows. The formation of a just and prosperous society cannot be carried out with the democracy that we have practiced so far, which is what is called liberal democracy. Such a democracy does not match the personality of the Indonesian people and the basis of life for the Indonesian people. Democracy must have discipline and must have leadership. Meanwhile, democracy is a tool and not an end. The goal is: a just and prosperous society, a society filled with material and spiritual happiness in accordance with the aims of the Proclamation of Indonesian Independence on August 17, 1945. As a tool, democracy in the sense of free thinking and free speech must be implemented by recognizing its limitations. These limits are the interests 948 Lev, 189. First was in a cabinet meeting on November 7, 1958 at Cipanas, Bogor; second in the cabinet meeting on December 5, 1958 in Bogor, third in another meeting on January 15, 1959 in Jakarta; fourth was in the January 26, 1959 meeting in Bogor. See Kementerian Penerangan, Mendjelang Dua Tahun Kabinet Karya, 16. 949 === [PDF page 364] === 364 of the people, morality, security of the state, national personality, and accountability to God. A just and prosperous society cannot be other than an orderly and guided society. Its economy is a guided economy. So the guided society is a society that is bound to the limits of the demands of justice and prosperity. To organize such a society, a pattern is needed, and to carry out that pattern, guided democracy must be used. (Italics original)950 On the idea of a return to the 1945 Constitution, it is widely accepted that this idea originated from Soekarno, who was in consultation with Nasution, who in turn was in conversation with the jurist Djokosoetono.951 However, there is the possibility that a similar idea was also floated by Djuanda, who was a technocrat and was not predisposed to the chaotic order of party politics. According to Mr. Abdul Wahab Soerjoadiningrat, who wrote Djuanda’s speech as Secretary to the Cabinet (Dewan Menteri) at that time, the idea of a return to the 1945 Constitution was as much Djuanda’s idea as it was Nasution’s or Soekarno’s: 950 “Adapun arti pokok daripada prinsip demokrasi terpimpin itu ialah sebagai berikut. Pembentukan masjarakat adil dan makmur tidak dapat dilakukan dengan demokrasi jang kita praktekkan selama ini, jaitu jang dinamakan demokrasi liberal. Demokrasi seperti itu tidak tjojok dengan kepribadian rakjat Indonesia dan dasar hidup bangsa Indonesia. Demokrasi harus mempunjai disiplin dan harus mempunjai pimpinan. Dalam pada itu demokrasi adalah alat dan bukan tudjuan. Tudjuan ialah: suatu masjarakat jang adil dan makmur, suatu masjarakat jang penuh dengan kebahagiaan materiil dan spirituil sesuai dengan tjita-tjita Proklamasi Kemerdekaan Indonesia pada tanggal 17 Agustus 1945. Sebagai alat, maka demokrasi dalam arti bebas berfikir dan bebas berbitjara harus berlaku dengan mengenal beberapa batas. Batas-batas itu ialah kepentingan rakjat banjak, batas kesusilaan, batas keselamatan negara, batas kepribadian bangsa, ddan batas pertanggungan-djawab kepada Tuhan. Masjarakat adil dan Makmur tidak bisa lain daripada suatu masjarakat teratur dan terpimpin. Ekonominja adalah ekonomi terpimpin. Djadi masjarakat jang terpimpin adalah masjarakat jang terikat kepada batas-batas tuntutan keadilan dan kemakmuran. Untuk menjelenggarakan masjarakat jang demikian itu diperlukan suatu pola, dan untuk menjelenggarakan pola itu harus dipergunakan demokrasi terpimpin.” See Keterangan Pemerintah Mengenai Pelaksanaan Demokrasi Terpimpin Dalam Rangka Kembali Ke U.U.D. 1945., Penerbitan Chusus 45 (Jakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, 1959), 4–5. 951 In fact, Nasution have spoken for a “return to 1945 Constitution” as early as 1955. For an excellent treatment on this line of argument see Bourchier, Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia, 104–6. === [PDF page 365] === 365 One day, Pak Djuanda entered his office and summoned me. Without introduction or explanation, he gave a handwritten letter to me. Return to the Constitution of 1945, followed by several points. He asked me to uitwerken [explicate]. Others may say otherwise, but as far as I know the idea of a “return to the 1945 Constitution” is from Mang Djuanda, not from Soekarno, or anybody else’s. I was the first person to write the outline. Djuanda then sent it to the President, who was in Yogyakarta with the recommendation of “Return to the 1945 Constitution through the Konstituante.952 Whether the idea was originated from Nasution, Soekarno, or Djuanda, it is clear that the idea of a return to the 1945 Constitution was already well circulated within Jakarta’s political elite. All of them realized the importance of justifying, through legal grounds, the major change in the political system after 1957. After Djuanda's speech in front of the DPR, it did not take long until Soekarno officially inaugurated Guided Democracy. On July 5, 1959, Soekarno declared his famous Dekrit Presiden (Presidential Decree), which calls for the disbandment of the Konstituante and a return to the 1945 Constitution. As the country was returning to its first constitution, there were several state bodies that had to be established. First was the People’s Consultative Council (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR), which was to be an upper house of the legislature. Another was the Supreme Advisory Council (Dewan Pertimbangan Agung), which was responsible for advising the 952 Djamin, Ir. H. Djuanda: Negarawan, Administrator, Dan Teknokrat Utama, 138–39. === [PDF page 366] === 366 President on state matters. Prime Minister Djuanda returned his mandate to Soekarno, who then appointed a new Presidential cabinet headed by himself.953 The new Presidential Cabinet, which was announced on July 9, 1959, included several military men in strategic posts, indicating the formal entry of Army officers into the executive branch.954 On August 17, Soekarno gave one of his most famous speeches, titled “The Rediscovery of Our Revolution,” (Penemuan Kembali Revolusi Kita). In the speech, Soekarno stated that, in support of his earlier Dekrit: 1959 is the year in which we—after almost ten years of bitter experience—return to the 1945 Constitution, the revolutionary Constitution. 1959 is the year we returned to the spirit of the Revolution. 1959 is the year of the Revolution's rediscovery. 1959 is the year of the "Rediscovery of our Revolution.955 Soekarno stated that the nation had lost track of its “Revolution,” as the “[revolutionary] soul has lost its vigor, and the country has bought its recognition of sovereignty in 1949 through various compromises.”956 Soekarno came up with a laundry list of “revolutionary enemies,” 953 Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, 294–95. These include Lt.Gen A.H. Nasution as Minister for Security and Defence; Colonel Dadang Suprajogi as Minister of Production; Maj.Gen. Hidayat as Junior Minister of Defence, Col.Dr. Aziz Saleh as Minister of Agriculture; Maj.Gen. Djatikusumo as Minister for Land Communications (Post and Telecommunications); Air Colonel Iskandar as Minister for Air Communications; Col. Dr. Satrio as Minister for Health; and Col. Sambas Atmadinata as Minister for Veterans. See Lev, 298–99. 955 “Tahun 1959 adalah tahun dalam mana kita—sesudah pengalaman pahit hampir sepuluh tahun—kembali kepada Undang-Undang Dasar 1945,--Undang-Undang Dasar Revolusi. Tahun 1959 adalah tahun dalam mana kita kembali kepada djiwa Revolusi. Tahun 1959 adalah tahun penemuan kembali Revolusi. Tahun 1959 adalah tahun “Rediscovery of our Revolution.” Kementerian Penerangan, Penemuan Kembali Revolusi Kita (The Rediscovery of Our Revolution), Penerbitan Chusus 60 (Jakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, 1959), 3. 956 Kementerian Penerangan, 6. 954 === [PDF page 367] === 367 namely “non-revolutionaries, Dutch sympathizers, reformists, conservatives, counterrevolutionaries, hypocrites, and thieves.”957 As part of Guided Democracy, Soekarno called for the “retooling” of all parts of the State, ranging from the executive, legislative, and Armed Forces to economic and social institutions.958 He also called for a political, economic, and social reordering” (herordening), in order to organize all activities into a single coordinated unit to pursue the bases and goals of the Revolution.959 On September 23-25, the newly established Supreme Advisory Council—which was led by Soekarno himself—unanimously announced that Soekarno’s 17 August speech in 1959 was to become the Political Manifesto (Manifesto Politik, Manipol), which would attain the status of a basic outlines of state policy (garis besar haluan negara).960 According to Daniel Lev, “Guided Democracy had an immense appeal…[because] it offered solutions, however vague, that were not to be found elsewhere, and they were solutions that struck numerous sympathetic chords, especially in Java.”961 At this period, Java was important as it was the main island of Indonesia that was heavily split under the free-rolling party politics of the Liberal Democracy era. Meanwhile, the economic and social problems were also more acute in the dense and overpopulated island. Guided Democracy brought major, changes to Indonesian society. The character of these changes were militarized as the Army would play an increasingly central role in politics. These changes were also significant, as it was not only deeply felt by the elites in the 957 Kementerian Penerangan, 7. Kementerian Penerangan, 24–25. 959 Kementerian Penerangan, 26–27. 960 Kementerian Penerangan, Manifesto Politik Republik Indonesia 17 Agustus 1959, Penerbitan Chusus 76 (Jakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, 1959), 7–8. 961 Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, 194. 958 === [PDF page 368] === 368 urban centers of Jakarta and Surabaya, but also by the commoners in the villages of Java and Sumatra. Nasution’s Second Army Reforms: The Territorial System In face of the major changes brought by martial law, the Army was also preparing itself for an expanded role in non-military affairs. In the field of military reforms, Nasution’s first move during his second tenure as Army Chief of Staff was to reform the Army organization from the center. This involved the transfer of officers through a regular “tour of duty” system, reforming the territorial system, the establishment of new inspectorates within the Army bureaucracy. These reforms included the introduction of the new system of Regional Military Commands (Komando Daerah Militer, Kodam) and the establishment of new inspectorates to deal with general auditing, education, and training. Beginning in 1958, Nasution replaced the old Tentara dan Territorium system of territorial commands into a new, Regional Military Command (Komando Daerah Militer, Kodam) system.962 In many places, the old territorium commands were split into several Kodam. For instance, Tentara-Territorium I, responsible for the whole of North and Central Sumatra, was separated into three: Kodam I/Iskandar Muda for Aceh, Kodam II/Bukit Barisan for North Sumatra, and Kodam 962 The old system of military territories (Tentara dan Territorium, T&T) was first established by Nasution in July 1950. The military territories comprised of T&T I Bukit Barisan for Aceh, North and West Sumatra, and Riau; the T&T II Sriwijaya for South Sumatra and Jambi; T&T III Siliwangi for West Java; T&T IV Diponegoro for Central Java, T&T V Brawijaya for East Java; T&T VI Tanjungpura for Kalimantan, and T&T VII Wirabuana for Eastern Indonesia, including Sulawesi, Maluku, Bali, and the Lesser Sundas. See “Indonesian Army Territorial Commanders === [PDF page 369] === 369 III/17 Agustus for West Sumatra, Riau, and the Riau Islands.963 A similar approach was also taken in Sulawesi and the rest of the Eastern islands, which was under Tentara-Territorium VII. Meanwhile, some Tentara-Territoriums maintained its territories, for example the Territorial command in West and Central Java became the Kodam VI/Siliwangi and Kodam VII/Diponegoro, the territorial command in East Java became the Kodam VIII/Brawidjaja, and so forth. Most of these Regional Military Commands, would maintain the same battalions and regiments from the earlier territorial system, while in some areas, former Territorial infantry regiments were elevated into new Kodams—such as the Kodam X/Lambung Mangkurat in South Kalimantan, Kodam XII/Tanjungpura in West Kalimantan, and Kodam X/Mulawarman in East Kalimantan. 964 In addition to the establishment of these new territorial-based command organizations, one of the the most important reforms were the establishment of new inspectorates such as the Inspectorate General for Territorial Affairs and People’s Resistance (Inspektorat Jenderal Teritorial dan Perlawanan Rakjat, ITDJENTEPE) which was first established in January 1956 and headed by Colonel Sadikin, a Siliwangi officer that was close to Nasution.965 Responsible directly to the Army Chief of Staff, the Inspectorate General for Territorial Affairs and People’s Resistance was to work on efforts related to the administration of martial law; conduct popular mobilization in the framework of territorial management and “people’s resistance”; assist with the rehabilitation of former freedom fighters and demobilized soldiers; and prepare intelligence reports 963 Pusat Sedjarah ABRI, Sedjarah AD (Departemen Pertahanan-Keamanan Pusat Sedjarah ABRI, 1971), 103–4. Pusat Sedjarah ABRI, 104. 965 Turner, A.H. Nasution and Indonesia’s Elites, 180. 964 === [PDF page 370] === 370 on social, political, and economic conditions deemed necessary by the Army commands.966 One officer designated to this Inspectorate was Lt. Col. (then Major) Pamurahardjo, who would go on to lead the various Civil-Military Cooperation Bodies (Badan Kerja Sama Sipil-Militer).967 The ITDJENTEPE oversaw Territorial Officers (Perwira Urusan Territorial, PUTER) and Territorial NCOs (Bintara Urusan Territorial, BUTER) that were posted in virtually every Army unit, from the provinces to the villages.968 After the formation of the Regional Military Commands (Komando Daerah Militer, KODAM) on April 14, 1960, the ITDJENTEPE was incorporated into the Army General Staff (Staf Umum AD) and its corresponding territorial commands as the Staff V for Territorial Affairs and People’s Resistance.969 Within the framework of the Army’s Territorial Management system, these territorial staffs were active in public affairs, popular indoctrination, and cultural activities, while establishing close contacts with civilian administration, religious and cultural organizations, youth groups, veterans, labor unions, farmers cooperatives, political parties and other functional groups in the regions.970 966 Inspektorat Djenderal Territoriaal dan Perlawanan Rakjat, Organisasi, Tugas Dan Tatatjara Kerdja Inspektorat Djenderal Territorial Dan Perlawanan Rakjat (ITDJENTEPE), Inspektorat Territorial Dan Perlawanan Rakjat (ITTEPE), Pembantu Inspektorat Territorial Dan Perlawanan Rakjat (PITTEPE), Perwira Urusan Territorial (Puter), Bentara Urusan Territorial (Buter) (Jakarta: ITDJENTEPE, 1959), 4. 967 “Pemindahan Pejabat-Pejabat Perwira,” Pikiran Rakjat, February 25, 1956. 968 Inspektorat Djenderal Territoriaal dan Perlawanan Rakjat, Organisasi, Tugas Dan Tatatjara Kerdja Inspektorat Djenderal Territorial Dan Perlawanan Rakjat (ITDJENTEPE), Inspektorat Territorial Dan Perlawanan Rakjat (ITTEPE), Pembantu Inspektorat Territorial Dan Perlawanan Rakjat (PITTEPE), Perwira Urusan Territorial (Puter), Bentara Urusan Territorial (Buter), 10–11. 969 Komando Daerah Militer X/Lambung Mangkurat, Kodam X/Lambung Mangkurat Membangun: Diterbitkan Dalam Rangka Peringatan Ulang Tahun Kodam X/LM Jang Ke-IV (17-VII-1958--17-VII-1962) (Kodam X/Lambung Mangkurat, 1962), 188; Dinas Sejarah TNI-AD, Sejarah TNI-AD, 1945-1973, Sejarah Perkembangan Organisasi TNI-AD (Bandung: Dinas Sejarah TNI Angkatan Darat, 1982), 231. 970 Sundhaussen, Politik militer Indonesia 1945-1967, 249. === [PDF page 371] === 371 Another move by Nasution was to continue the development of Army think-tanks in the field of governance and politics. As discussed in Chapter II, the most important of these thinktanks were the Military Law Academy and the Army Command and Staff College. Officers posted to the Military Law Academy conducted research on the operation and conduct of martial law, and many of these military jurists were deployed to fill new posts needed by the military in administering state of emergency laws. This attention towards martial law was represented by the Academy’s first Director, the martial law expert Mr. Basarudin Nasution, who was also Director of the Army Justice Directorate (Direktorat Kehakiman Angkatan Darat) from 1952 until 1956.971 A graduate of the Batavia Law School (Rechtshogeschool Batavia), Basarudin was trained by the conservative jurist Djokosoetono and he was one of the small amount of people that stayed in touch with Nasution during his “leper years” after the scandal of 17 October 1952.972 Basarudin has a particular interest in legalistic approaches to law and state of emergency. He often represented the Military Law Academy in several law drafting committees, most notably in the drafting committees for the 1954 Defense Law and the 1957 Law on the State of Emergency, which were both established in 1954.973 971 Corps Perwira-Siswa Akademi Hukum Militer, Peringatan 1 Tahun Sekolah Hukum Militer, 7,17; O.G. Roeder, Who’s Who in Indonesia (Djakarta: PT Gunung Agung, 1971), 252. 972 Bourchier, Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia, 105. 973 In 1954, representing the Army General Staff, Basarudin was part of the Defense Law Committee together with Wilopo (Defense Minister); Lt.Col. Dr. Sudjono which was replaced by Major S.Ali Junus (Army); Mr.F. Werbata (Navy); Rear Air Commodore Iskandar (Air Force); Zainul Arifin (Nahdlatul Ulama); Djerman Prawirawinata (Masyumi); Djohan Sjahroezah (PSI); and Manai Sophiaan (PNI). Meanwhile in the State of Emergency Law Committee, Basarudin represented the Army General Staff together with Lt.Col Widya (Defence Ministry); Lt.Col. A.Bustomi (Army Headquarters); Mr. Sudradjat (Ministry of Justice); Djanu Ismadi (Ministry of the Interior); Mr. Soehartono (Attorney General); and Adj. Police Commissioner Agoes Basoeki (Police). See Undang Undang Republik Indonesia No.29 Tahun 1954 tentang Pertahanan Negara Republik Indonesia; Kementerian Penerangan, Ichtisar Parlemen, vol. 9 (Jakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, 1954), 62. === [PDF page 372] === 372 Last but not least, in response to the declaration of martial law in April 1957, Nasution gathered the officer corps in a conference of army commanders in Jakarta in August the following year. The August 1958 Conference of Army Commanders adopted a resolution, which clearly stated the Army’s position within Guided Democracy in regards to its policy on security, economy, and politics: 1. In suppressing the rebellion, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia base the performance of their task on the conviction that when it is done, there will be no repetition of the political excesses of the past—such as ‘cow trading,’ the politicization of economic problems and the civil service, and so on. It is these rotten excesses that are the basic cause of our troubles. 2. The TNI [army] is determined, after this rebellion, to concentrate its power on putting law and discipline in order, and on cleaning up the state’s organization, both civil and military. 3. The government must guarantee that after the rebellion is suppressed it will intensify efforts [to improve] regional autonomy and national development, using a guide, inter alia, the results of the National Conference (Musyawarah Nasional) and the National Conference on Development (Musyawarah Nasional Pembangunan). === [PDF page 373] === 373 4. The TNI hopes that an expression of gratitude will be made to the soldiers who have fulfilled their duties loyally and to their suffering families.974 Disciplining the State under A State of Siege It is clear that the series of events by the end of 1957 necessitated a response against the sharpening of political contestation that were taking its toll on society. The Army, which was motivated to increase its role in politics, immediately took action. After the announcement of the State of Siege, it did not take long for the Army to use its newly-acquired authority to conduct activities that were beneficial for its own political position. Meanwhile, Army participation in the economy was enabled by Soekarno through his promotion of an agenda of “retooling.”975 The Army responded to this call, as reflected in the August 1958 conference of army commanders. Thus, under Guided Democracy, one of the first acts by the Army was to launch a campaign against corruption. Under the authority bequeathed to him through the State of Siege and under the banner of “retooling,” Nasution initiated an Army-led anti-corruption campaign on March 1957.976 Immediately after the promulgation of this ruling, many elites, including political party leaders and Army and Police figures, were arrested by the Army Military Police (Corps Polisi Militer, CPM) and supported by new corps of military jurists, mostly graduates of the Military Law Academy. Those arrested included Iskaq Tjokroadisurjo, Ong Eng Die, Adnan Kapau Gani, 974 Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, 204–5. Soekarno’s “retooling” agenda is excellently intepreted by Farabi Fakih as a “political purge,” in which those who were considered contra-revolutionary—or considered against Guided Democracy—were replaced by others that were more suitable. See Fakih, Authoritarian Modernization in Indonesia’s Early Independence Period, 158,221. 976 Hariyono, Penerapan Status Bahaya di Indonesia: Sejak Pemerintah Kolonial Belanda hingga Pemerintah Orde Baru [The Practice of the State of Emergency in Indonesia: From the Colonial Period to the New Order], 178–79. 975 === [PDF page 374] === 374 and Sardju Ismunandar (PNI); Jusuf Wibisono (Masyumi); Zainal Arifin, K.H. Maskur, Ahmad Dahlan, and Abdul Manap (NU); Moh. Ali (PSII), Saroso (PSI), Mochtar Affandi (State Attorney Office); and Colonel Warsito, Lt. Col Harjono, Lt. Col. Suwondo, and Major Singgih (Army), while Sumitro Djojohadikusumo (PSI) was also summoned by the CPM, all based upon Military Authority regulations promulgated through the Article 19 and 20 of the 1939 Law on the State of War and Siege.977 Corruption and bureaucracy became the primary targets of the Army under its “retooling” agenda. On April 9, 1957, Nasution, as Central War Authority (Peperpu), promulgated a series of regulations on anti-corruption campaigns, which includes regulations on general corruption eradication efforts; on the investigation of property and its procedures; confiscation of property obtained through illegal measures; investigation teams on wealth and property (Team Penilikan Harta Benda); and the sales of confiscated goods.978 This was the first time in Indonesian history that the country has an anti-corruption campaign. However, this does not mean that the Army was the paragon of anti-corruption during that time, as the Army was also tainted with various cases of corruption and mismanagement.979 977 Hariyono, 180. The Central War Authority regulations and instructions mentioned here are Prt/PM/06/1957 tertanggal 9 April 1957 tentang Pemberantasan Korupsi; Prt/PM/08/1957 tertanggal 27 Mei 1957 tentang Penilikan Harta Benda; Instr/PM/010/1957 tertanggal 21 Djuni 1957 tentang Tjara Melaksanakan Penilikan Harta Benda; Prt/PM/011/1957 tertanggal 1 Djuli 1957 tentang Penjitaan dan Perampasan Harta Benda jang asal mulanja diperoleh dengan perbuatan jang melawan hukum; Instr/Peperpu/029/1958 tertanggal 9 Agustus 1958 tentang pengawasan dan pembatasan penggunaan barang jang disita-dan pendjualan barang-barang jang dirampas, among others. See Staf Penguasa Perang Tertinggi, “Pemberantasan Korupsi,” 1960, 1, RA.8B 518, ANRI. 979 One famous case was when Attorney General Gatot Tarunamihardja was investigating two Army officers over a smuggling (barter) case. The Kejaksaan hardly received support from the Military Police in pursuing the case, while Gatot was arrested by the Army under State of Siege regulations on June 1957. He was only released in August at the 978 === [PDF page 375] === 375 This did not stop Soekarno and Nasution to expand the Army’s role in corruption eradication efforts. On July 27, 1959, Soekarno and Nasution established the State Apparatus Supervision Agency (Badan Pengawas Kegiatan Aparatur Negara, Bapekan), which was the first national anti-cooperation agency.980 The Agency did not explicitly mention corruption eradication as its first mission, as it was primarily geared to conduct oversight on the working of state apparatuses. Bapekan was led by Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, who was Minister of Defence during the Revolutionary years, and he was regarded as a non-political idealist by the public.981 However, the Bapekan was only authorized to investigate and recommend solutions.982 Another organization established in January 1960 as part of the anti-corruption effort was the National State Apparatus Retooling Committee (Panitia Retooling Aparatur Nasional, Paran), led by Nasution together with Muhammad Yamin and Roeslan Abdulgani. Paran was a temporary and ad-hoc Committee, as it was meant to become the basis for a new upcoming Agency for State Apparatus Efficiency Management (Badan Pembina Effisiensi Apparatur Negara).983 Paran required all government ministers and senior directors to fill out forms to measure their personal assets and their political loyalty to the state.984 It also produced a new oath for the Civil Service, same year. Another famous case is the dismissal of Lieutenant Colonel Soeharto as commander of the Diponegoro Division on November 1, 1959, due to his participation in Army business activities. Soeharto was never arrested, however, because he had just been transferred to the Army Command and Staff College for a year. See Lev, “The Politics of Judicial Development in Indonesia,” 196–97; Elson, “In Fear of the People,” 177. 980 “Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia Nomor 1 Tahun 1959 Tentang Pembentukan Badan Pengawas Kegiatan Aparatur Negara” (1959); Abdul Haris Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, vol. Jilid 5:Kenangan Masa Orde Lama (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1985), 256. 981 Fakih, Authoritarian Modernization in Indonesia’s Early Independence Period, 224–25. 982 Fakih, 224. 983 Fakih, 226. 984 Fakih, 226. === [PDF page 376] === 376 the Pantja Satya, in the style of the Army’s Sapta Marga.985 Later in 1964, Paran was replaced by Supreme Command for the Retooling of the Apparatus of the Revolution (Komando Tertinggi Retooling Aparatur Revolusi, KOTRAR).986 Meanwhile, various political organizations that was focused on promoting regional autonomy was also shut down by the Army. One major example is the case of the Sundanese Youth Front (Front Pemuda Sunda) in West Java. Its leading figure was Didi Kartasasmita, who was a KNIL-educated officer who had served in the Siliwangi Division under Nasution and the former chief of the Biro Rekonstruksi Nasional. On May 20, 1957, the Jakarta Military Command arrested Kartasasmita, and he was thrown into the Jakarta Military Detention Center (Rumah Tahanan Militer). During his initial questioning by Major Sidik from the Military Law Academy, Kartasasmita was charged as being the ringleader behind the Permesta meetings in Makassar, an accusation which he denied vehemently—he had a strong alibi of being in Jakarta during the meetings and he never set foot in Makassar.987 During his time in jail, Kartasasmita was transferred to Cipinang Prison, another Military Detention Center in Madiun, and back to Jakarta, in which he met many prisoners from the regions. According to Kartasasmita, he felt that the prisoners were “deliberately detained (diamankan), as part of the governmental efforts to stem the regional movements.”988 Yet Kartasasmita remained in jail until August 19, 1958, by which he was released as a city prisoner (tahanan kota). Kartasasmita’s case is important because the Front Pemuda 985 Fakih, 226. David P. Mozingo, Chinese Policy toward Indonesia, 1949-1967, 1st Equinox ed (Jakarta: Equinox Pub, 2007), 222. 987 Sumarsono and Ramadhan, Didi Kartasasmita: Pengabdian Bagi Kemerdekaan, 274–75. 988 Sumarsono and Ramadhan, 276–77. 986 === [PDF page 377] === 377 Sunda was officially banned as a political organization, and his position as a former Siliwangi officer means that the SOB regulations were deployed indiscriminately against anyone or anything who was perceived by the Army as a threat to the state. On December 31, 1959, Soekarno issued an order (Penetapan Presiden) for the simplification of the political parties. In the order, Soekarno required all political parties to be based upon the UUD 1945, Pancasila, and the Manipol/USDEK while reserved the right to dissolve any political party that he deemed to violate the principles of Guided Democracy, including participation in rebellions.989 In early 1960, Soekarno would then dissolve the Masyumi and the PSI, two of the major opposition parties in the parliament. Martial Law and The Economy Under martial law, many elements of the economy came under the purview of the military. Military involvement in the economy was not limited to the management of nationalized Dutch firms or the enforcement of anti-corruption laws. There were a plethora of other economic roles taken by the Army, including taxation, management and issuance of business permits, establishment of strategic industries and projects, management of land ownership and housing policy, or even matters of immigration and surveillance of foreign subjects.990 989 “Penetapan Presiden Republik Indonesia Nomor 7 Tahun 1959 Tentang Syarat-Syarat Dan Penyederhanaan Kepartaian” (1959). 990 See Staf Penguasa Perang Tertinggi, Himpunan Lembaran Penguasa Perang Tertinggi Tahun 1960 (Jakarta: Penerbitan Tata-Usaha Lembaran Penguasa Perang Tertinggi, 1960); Staf Penguasa Perang Tertinggi, Himpunan Lembaran Penguasa Perang Tertinggi Tahun 1961 (Jakarta: Penerbitan Tata Usaha Lembaran Penguasa Perang Tertinggi, 1961); Staf Penguasa Perang Tertinggi, Himpunan Lembaran Penguasa Perang Tertinggi Tahun 1962 (Jakarta: Penerbitan Tata Usaha Lembaran Penguasa Perang Tertinggi, 1962). === [PDF page 378] === 378 The model for military involvement in the economy, however, was first done in West Java. On December 23, 1957, the Regional War Authority (Peperda) and Commander for Territorium III / Siliwangi, Colonel R.A. Kosasih, promulgated Regional War Authority Regulations (Peraturan Penguasa Perang Daerah) for Territorium III that regulates companies in order to streamline the collection of developmental taxes (Padjak Pembangunan, PPbn).991 In another Regional War Authority Regulation, Kosasih also enforced the normalization of valid receipts for every sale and purchase, which applies to almost every business outlets in the region, from restaurants and grocery stores to stores that sell electronics, watches or motor vehicle parts.992 The Regional War Authority regulation mechanism was also used to supervise against economic crimes (April 16,1958), regulate land use and ownership (April 10, 1958), justify the occupation of foreign-owned buildings (including houses) that were left by foreign subjects (May 10, 1958) declaration of particular companies as vital objects (May 18, 1958) and the regulation and surveillance of foreign subjects (August 1, 1958).993 In addition to all of this, on May 18, 1958, the Regional War Authority in West Java also declared many industries and governmental bodies in West Java to be “strategic institutions” 991 “Peraturan Penguasa Perang Territorium III No.18/12/SPP/1957 perihal penertiban perusahaan-perusahaan dalam rangka melantjarkan pemungutan Padjak Pembangunan (PPbn).” See Penguasa Perang Daerah Swatantra I, Himpunan Peraturan, Penetapan, Instruksi, Pengumuman Dan Surat Keputusan (Penguasa Perang Daerah Swatantra I Djawa-Barat, 1958). 992 “Peraturan Penguasa Perang Daerah Swatantra I Djawa-Barat No.1/2/P.P.D./1958 perihal Normalisasi tanda-tanda bukti (bon) jang sjah untuk tiap-tiap transaksi djual beli, dalam rangka melantjarkan pemungutan padjak.” See Penguasa Perang Daerah Swatantra I.Himpunan Peraturan, Penetapan, Instruksi, Pengumuman dan Surat Keputusan. 993 Peraturan Penguasa Militer Territorium III No.Perat.2/4/1957 perihal Sanksi hukuman atas Tindak-Pidana Ekonomi (April 16, 1958);Peraturan Penguasa Perang Daerah Swatantra I Djawa-Barat No. Prt.21/8/P.P.D./1958 perihal “Wadjib-daftar-diri” bagi Orang Asing tertentu, jang bertempat tinggal atau berada di Daerah Swatantra I Djawa-Barat (August 1, 1958). See Penguasa Perang Daerah Swatantra I. === [PDF page 379] === 379 (badan vitaal), which entails harsh restrictions on strikes or lock-outs during labor-management disputes. These industries covers a broad segment of the economy, from state-owned enterprises, railways, communications, hospitals, printing presses, plantations, and banks, among others.994 Many of these Peraturan Penguasa Perang Daerah were promulgated in the context of the counterinsurgency campaign against the Darul Islam in West Java. Under martial law, almost all of these issues became the authority of the military through its Central War Authority (Penguasa Perang Pusat), which became the Highest War Authority (Penguasa Perang Tertinggi) after the UUKB 1957 was replaced with a revised version of the law in 1959.995 Martial Law and The Press Under martial law, the press was severely regulated. Disciplining and ordering society necessitates an ordered public sphere, and the press became one of the earliest targets of martial law. The repression of the press under martial law contrasted significantly with the freedom of the prior period. 996 One of the first incidents of repression against the press under the State of Siege 994 Keputusan Penguasa Perang Daerah Swatantra I Djawa Barat No.100/5/P.P.D/1958 perihal penundjukkan perusahaan2/djawatan2 badan2 vitaal (May 18, 1958). See Penguasa Perang Daerah Swatantra I, 31–32. 995 “Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang Nomor 23 Tahun 1959 Tentang Pencabutan Undang-Undang No.74 Tahun 1957 (Lembaran-Negara No.160 Tahun 1957) Dan Penetapan Keadaan Bahaya” (1959). 996 It should be noted here that some cases of repression against the press also happened during the period of Liberal Democracy. In a well-known case, on April 8, 1953, Prime Minister Wilopo sued Asa Bafagih, a journalist for the small daily Pemandangan, under charges of illegally divulging state secrets. This case was related to Bafagih’s article claiming that the Wilopo government was planning to allow foreign investment in various industries in Indonesia. In an unstable political environment such as Liberal Democracy, news like this became the death-knell of cabinets. Bafagih was repeatedly subpoenaed by the Attorney General’s Office (Kejaksaan Agung) throughout 1952-1953, only to find the charges dropped by 1953, after a massive demonstration by the Indonesian Journalists Association (Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia, PWI) and its allied organizations. Another is the case of Indonesia Raja daily’s reporting of Roeslan Abdulgani’s corruption scandal with the State Printing Press director, Lie Hok Thay in August 1956. Lubis was briefly arrested on December 1956, and charged with “insulting and insinuating hatred towards government officials,” although he was released due to lack of evidence on July 1957. However, the former Pedoman === [PDF page 380] === 380 was the Army-sponsored series of newspaper bans in April 1957. On April 24, 1957, the Indonesia Raya, Pedoman, and Bintang Timur dailies were prohibited from publishing its papers for fortyeight hours by the Jakarta Military Command, which was acting as the local Peperda. The chief editor of the Merdeka daily, Yoesoef Iskak, was often summoned by the Military Police regarding articles in the newspapers. The Military Police told him that, “you have to be aware that there is the SOB (martial law), so you cannot write whatever you want.”997 Iskak later lamented that “when the Bintang Timur was banned, its editor-in-chief, Tahsin, went to meet Soekarno in the Bogor Palace. It turned out that Soekarno could not prevent the banning of newspapers, including the ones that supported him.”998 Overall, 1957 was a bad year for the press. Repression against the press during that year reached 125 cases, which was the highest since the revolution.999 During the following year, many of the regional newspapers were also shut down by the Army. These included the daily Suara Maluku (Ambon, January 15, 1958); Suara Andalas (Medan, January 30, 1958); Keng Po (Jakarta, February 21, 1958); Tegas (Aceh, February 25, 1958); Bara (Makassar, March 13, 1958); Pedoman (Jakarta; March 22, 1958); PIA, Indonesia Raya, and Bintang Minggoe (Jakarta, May 29, 1958), and others. Meanwhile, many journalists were also arrested by the Army, such as editor in chief Rosihan Anwar claims that the press was relatively free during Liberal Democracy. According to Anwar, “there was no censor, no pembredelan (banning). The government did not dare to act because the cabinets changed very quickly.” See Tempo, Pergulatan Demokrasi Liberal 1950-1959, 68–69, 70–73, 52-56. 997 Interview with Yoesoef Iskak as cited in Hariyono, Penerapan Status Bahaya di Indonesia: Sejak Pemerintah Kolonial Belanda hingga Pemerintah Orde Baru [The Practice of the State of Emergency in Indonesia: From the Colonial Period to the New Order], 176. 998 Interview with Yoesoef Iskak as cited in Hariyono, 176. 999 Hariyono, 176; Mahiddin, “Pembreidelan Pedoman: Sirnanya Suatu Harapan,” in H. Rosihan Anwar Wartawan Dengan Aneka Citra, ed. Tribuwana Said (Jakarta: Kompas, 1992), 112. === [PDF page 381] === 381 Enggak Bahau’ddin (Indonesia Raya daily, Jakarta), Sjar’ie Musjaffa and Sjahdan Salim Rahman (Indonesia Berdjuang and Terompet Islam dailies, Banjarmasin), and Jusuf Sou’yb (Lembaga daily, Medan).1000 Many of these newspapers were published in areas that were affected by the regional revolts. Martial law regulations became a tool for the Army to keeping the press in line with government policy at the cost of the freedom of the press. In the moments leading to the Musyawarah Nasional (Munas) on September 14, 1957, for instance, the Army often used the SOB regulations to threaten the press. Three days earlier, Nasution, in his capacity as Central War Authority, urged the press not to create a situation that might disturb the Munas, and they were only allowed to publicize news from government-approved sources such as the Information Minister Sudibjo or his representatives, with violators punishable under the SOB regulations.1001 On March 31, 1958, Ministry of Information (Kementerian Penerangan) gathered editors and journalists from all major news outlets in Jakarta. The Conference, which was conducted in a “familiar nature” at the National Radio (Radio Republik Indonesia) main studio at Medan Merdeka Barat, was meant to “strengthen relations between the government/War Authorities and the press, in order to achieve mutual understanding,” according to Minister Sudibjo.1002 Sudibjo called for the press to avoid publishing any news that might give the impression that there was a conflict 1000 P. Swantoro and Atmakusumah, “Pembredelan Pers Dalam Sejarah Indonesia,” in Beberapa Segi Perkembangan Sejarah Pers Di Indonesia, ed. A. B. Lapian, Penerbit Buku Kompas, and Indonesia, Cet. 2. (Jakarta: Penerbit Buku 1001 Mahiddin, “Pembreidelan Pedoman: Sirnanya Suatu Harapan,” 114. 1002 “Maksud pertemuan ini bersifat kekeluargaaan, disamping itu untuk merapatkan hubungan antara Pemerintah/Penguasa Perang dan Pers guna mentjapai saling pengertian.” See “Reportase Pertemuan: PemerintahPenguasa Perang-Pers,” Mimbar Penerangan, April 1958, 245. === [PDF page 382] === 382 between groups, ethnicities, or regions and to keep away from news that were sensational and propagandistic in nature. Meanwhile, Army Public Relations head Colonel Pirngadie called for the press to submit any news regarding the military to the War Authorities before publishing it.1003 More importantly, martial law regulations were used to hit anyone who spoke critically against the government’s security policy, which was the domain of the Army. On July 8, 1960, the PKI-affiliated newspaper, Harian Rakjat, published a report, written by Ir. Sakirman, criticizing Soekarno’s Guided Democracy as “a semi-fascist political and economic system that was more evil than Liberal Democracy.”1004 In the report, Sakirman continued to criticize many of the current cabinet ministers, including A.H. Nasution, Subandrio, Mohammad Yamin, Ipik Gandamana, Maladi, Ahem Erningpradja, and Djuanda.1005 This became a pretext for the Army to move against the PKI by arresting their leaders in Jakarta and banning the newspaper for some time. Soekarno called for the party leadership’s release, but regional commanders, acting under the authority of martial law, shut down the PKI in South Sumatra, South Kalimantan, and South Sulawesi in an incident called the Peristiwa Tiga Selatan (Three Souths Incident).1006 The investigation was only halted on April 13, 1961, on President Soekarno’s intervention. Other newspapers were not as lucky as Harian Rakjat. On November 1, 1960, the newspaper Times of Indonesia was banned by the government. Its chief editor, Charles Tambu, was close to the PSI figures such as Sjahrir, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, and others.1007 Tambu’s 1003 “Reportase Pertemuan: Pemerintah-Penguasa Perang-Pers,” 245–47. Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), 294, 297. 1005 Rosihan Anwar, Sebelum Prahara: Pergolakan Politik Indonesia 1961-1965 (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1981), 33. 1006 Sundhaussen, Politik militer Indonesia 1945-1967, 263. 1007 Anwar, Sebelum Prahara: Pergolakan Politik Indonesia 1961-1965, 13. 1004 === [PDF page 383] === 383 newspaper did not have the political backing like the Harian Rakjat, so it remained banned throughout the Guided Democracy period. Rosihan Anwar notes that in 1961, Tambu was penniless, despite having been an important figure during Indonesia’s negotiations at Lake Success in 1947.1008 Perhaps the most famous Indonesian journalist that was arrested by the Army under Soekarno was Mochtar Lubis, the vociferously critical editor-in-chief of the Indonesia Raya daily. The Indonesia Raya was Jakarta’s “‘leading muck-raking paper in Jakarta’, with a sensationalist style and an aggressive, investigative editorial policy.”1009 Although Indonesia Raya was not the largest of Jakarta’s newspapers, it had a reputation for its critical stance against the political establishment.1010 During the Soekarno period, Lubis was arrested by the Army several times, first during the Roeslan Abdulgani scandal, and later on July 14, 1961, after news of his speech in the International Press Institute in Tel Aviv reached Jakarta. His speech was viewed as “an attack on the Manipol and USDEK of Soekarno.”1011 Lubis was first held at the Jakarta Military Detention Center, and he was transferred on January 25, 1963 to the Madiun Military Detention Center, where he met various political leaders from the PSI and Masyumi, which was declared illegal due to their alleged participation in the PRRI-Permesta rebellion and the opposition against Soekarno’s 1008 Anwar, 13. According to David Hill, Indonesia Raya was among the fastest growing newspapers in Jakarta. Its circulation was in 1950 was 5,000 copies, in 1954 it was 10,000, and by 1955-57 it had grown to 20,000. In 1957-1958, the largest circulating dailies were Harian Rakjat (55,000 copies), Pedoman (48,000 copies), Indonesia Raya (47,500 copies), Suluh Indonesia (40,000 exemplars), and Abadi (34,000 exemplars), with most other papers selling less than 10,000 exemplars. See Hill, Journalism and Politics in Indonesia: A Critical Biography of Mochtar Lubis (1922-2004) as Editor and Author, 39. 1010 Hill, 40. 1011 Hill, 62. 1009 === [PDF page 384] === 384 dismissal of the elected parliament under Guided Democracy.1012 These figures include Yunan Nasution, Isa Anshary, Mohammad Roem, Soebadio Sastrosatomo, H.J. (Poncke) Princen, Sultan Hamid, and Anak Agung Gde Agung.1013 Lubis was only released from detention on May 17, 1966, after the fall of Soekarno. Thus, as this section has shown us, the expansion of Army role in regulating the press shows us how the process of military intervention in non-military affairs was very much accelerated under Guided Democracy. Dynamizing the People: Mass Mobilization under Martial Law It did not take long until the Army realized that in the pursuit of political order, it was necessary not only to regulate the political and intellectual classes, but also to organize and regulate popular forces. Through his martial law powers as Military Authority, On July 5, 1957 Nasution instructed the Inspectorate General for Territorial Affairs and People’s Resistance to consolidate all youth organizations under a single coordinating body.1014 A similar effort had been made earlier in regards to the various veterans organizations across the country, which was successfully amalgamated under the Veterans Legion of the Republic of Indonesia (Legiun Veteran Republik Indonesia, LVRI) in 1956 through the same Inspectorate General.1015 According to Lev, this earlier success was due to the special relationship between veterans of the Revolution and the Army. As 1012 “Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia No.200 Tahun 1960” (1960); “Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia 1013 Hill, Journalism and Politics in Indonesia: A Critical Biography of Mochtar Lubis (1922-2004) as Editor and Author, 62. 1014 Turner, A.H. Nasution and Indonesia’s Elites, 195. 1015 Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, 84; Turner, A.H. Nasution and Indonesia’s Elites, 195. === [PDF page 385] === 385 our earlier chapters have discussed, the Army had long been involved in organizing the veterans and demobilized soldiers as they were considered as a security problem that have to be solved. Thus, a similar logic was applied to the youth. The fact that the formation of a youth coordinating body was the first act in the Army’s operationalization of its Total People’s Resistance doctrine indicates the importance that youth had in the conception of national security. However, under Guided Democracy, the role of youth groups became important. This was due to the absence of elections, where these youth groups became the only way to show one’s importance to Soekarno through the capability of mobilizing the masses. Thus, control over the youth groups became an object of political contestation. On July 5, 1957, the Army formed a series of militaryled Cooperation Bodies (Badan Kerja Sama, BKS), which were to be officially under the auspices of the Inspectorate General of Territorial Affairs and People’s Resistance. The first Cooperation Body, named the Youth-Military Cooperation Body (Badan Kerjasama Pemuda-Militer, BKSPM), was created on June 17, 1957 in a meeting between Regional Military Authorities in the Army Headquarters.1016 In the BKS-PM, Army officers worked together with youth organizations, particularly the Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia (GPII), Pemuda Ansor (Ansor), Pemuda Demokrat (PNI-affiliated), and the Pemuda Rakyat (PKI).1017 The Masyumi-affiliated GPII was represented by Achmad Buchari, the NU-affiliated Pemuda Ansor by Wahib Wahab, the PNI- 1016 Bourchier, Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia, 113. David Reeve, Golkar of Indonesia: An Alternative to the Party System (Singapore; New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 119; “4 Org. Pemuda (Empat Besar) Tjiptakan Kerdja-Sama Dengan Penguasa Militer,” Madjalah Angkatan Darat, June 1957, No.6 edition, 9. 1017 === [PDF page 386] === 386 affiliated Pemuda Demokrat by S.Thaher, and the PKI-affiliated Pemuda Rakyat was represented by Sukatno.1018 According to its leader, Lt. Col. Pamurahardjo, the Youth-Military Cooperation Body was focused on countering Dutch “subversion,” and supporting the campaign to liberate West Irian. The Youth-Military Cooperation Body comprised of a range of youth organizations “from the extreme left to the extreme right.”1019 In 1956, Pamurahardjo, then still a Major, had organized meetings and rallies with youth groups in response to the trials of two Dutch nationals, Jungschlaeger and Schmidt, who were charged with subversion.1020 One of the major products of the BKS-PM was the political role of one youth group, the Pemuda Pancasila, which was first established as the youth wing of the Army-affiliated political party, IPKI (Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia).1021 The Pemuda Pancasila would later play a major role in the mass violence after the September 30, 1965 incident. In addition to the youth, the military also started to pay attention to workers, the press, and peasants for its military potential. In December 1957, the Army established a Worker-Military Cooperation Body (Badan Kerjasama Buruh-Militer, BKS Bumil), a Press-Military Contact Bureau in January 1958, and a Peasant-Military Cooperation Body in September 1958. In addition to the Youth-Military Cooperation Body, The Worker-Military Cooperation Body was one the 1018 “4 Org. Pemuda (Empat Besar) Tjiptakan Kerdja-Sama Dengan Penguasa Militer,” 9. Interview with Pamurahardjo in Turner, A.H. Nasution and Indonesia’s Elites, 195. 1020 Turner, 200. 1021 Ryter, “Youth, Gangs and the State in Indonesia,” 98–99. 1019 === [PDF page 387] === 387 most important of these bodies, as they played a major role in coordinating the military’s role in the nationalization of Dutch enterprises.1022 On May 19, 1958, Nasution as Central War Authority promulgated Central War Authority Regulation No. 022/1958 (Peraturan Penguasa Perang Pusat No.022/1958), which became Indonesia’s first conscription bill. The Regulation allows (and may require) every Indonesian citizen from eighteen years until forty years of age to be recruited for compulsory work in the fields of “security [and] maintenance of civil defense, as well as to carry out military activities according to their capabilities.”1023 The stated purpose of the program was broad enough: “to overcome or mitigate the consequences of invasion; maintain the morale of the population; maintain economic continuity; and to participate in compulsory military training.”1024 This policy was not only in line with Nasution’s arguments for the establishment of a general reserve force for the military, but it also provides the military with a legitimacy to recruit people into their ranks. This policy was also in line with the then-current law on defense, Law No.29 of 1954 on State Defense (UU No.29 Tahun 1954 tentang Pertahanan Negara), which states that it was the “right and obligation” (hak dan kewadjiban) of every citizen to participate in national defense, which could take the forms of “people who are trained to carry out resistance,” and an “Armed Forces” 1022 The BKS Bumil was led by Military Law Academy graduate Lt. Col. Amir Moertono, who was a proponent of the functional groups doctrine and later would be a prominent leader of the Golongan Karya Party during the New Order. Bourchier, Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia, 113. 1023 “Panggilan Terhadap Seluruh Warganegara 18-40 Th. Untuk Mendjalankan Kewadjiban MILITER,” Madjalah Angkatan Darat, June 1958, 48. 1024 “Panggilan Terhadap Seluruh Warganegara 18-40 Th. Untuk Mendjalankan Kewadjiban MILITER,” 48. === [PDF page 388] === 388 that consist of “voluntary and conscripted personnel.”1025 Nevertheless, article 11 of Law No.29 states that the conduct of any form of conscription (wajib militer) should be administered by a new law.1026 Thus, it is clear that Nasution took the initiative by promulgating his Central War Authority Regulation, bypassing parliamentary process. However, in the face of martial law, the central government did not have much room to halt this policy, and choosing to support it in the form of the promulgation of a conscription law, Law No.66 of 1958 on Conscription (UU No.66 Tahun 1958 tentang Wajib-Militer), on August 1, 1958.1027 On November 1958, Nasution gathered the War Authorities—namely, the regional Army panglimas—to a National Conference on War Authorities (Rapat Penguasa Perang Selruuh Indonesia) that was held at the Army Headquarters. The meeting, led by Nasution himself as the head of the Central War Authority, was attended by Third Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Johannes Leimena. In the meeting, Nasution and his fellow compatriots compiled a national report on the operationalization of martial law across the archipelago. In concluding the Conference, Nasution emphasized the need for “enforcing order and improvement,” which includes “more intensive and systematic supervision, including taking firm and appropriate corrective actions against errors and irregularities.”1028This is in regards to the 1025 “Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 29 Tahun 1954 Tentang Pertahanan Negara Republik Indonesia” (1954), arts. 1, 2, 3, 5. 1026 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 29 Tahun 1954 tentang Pertahanan Negara Republik Indonesia, art. 11. 1027 “Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia No.66 Tahun 1958 Tentang Wajib-Militer” (1958). 1028 “…perlu diadakannja penertiban dan perbaikan2. Dalam rangka ini termasuk pengawasan2 jg lebih intensip dan sistimatis dengan a.l. mengambil tindakan2 korektip jang tegas dan tepat terhadap kesalahan2 dan penjelewengan2.” “Rapat Penguasa Perang Seluruh Indonesia,” Madjalah Angkatan Darat, November 1958, 12. === [PDF page 389] === 389 continuing mopping-up operations against the PRRI and DI, while also pushing for enforcement in other areas. The most important recommendation, however, is the emphasis on how the Army needs a close cooperation from people to do this task.1029 This conclusion thus allows the Army, through its War Authorities, to push for the expansion of conscription, the National Front for the Liberation of West Irian (Front Nasional Pembebasan Irian Barat) and the various Cooperation Bodies (Badan Kerja Sama). At this time, these social organization efforts were generally unsuccessful to further the Army’s political agenda. Many parties and their subsequent organizations quickly realized the danger of participating in these Cooperation Bodies, and in 1958, the PKI announced that they would refuse to participate in these Army-sponsored bodies.1030 All of these groups were later coordinated through a National Front for the Liberation of West Irian (Front Nasional Pembebasan Irian Barat, FNPIB), which was established by Nasution in January 1958. Nasution aimed for the FNPIB as the only legitimate mass organization in the country, but the effort failed as Soekarno managed to influence the organization by placing people like Chaerul Saleh into the leadership council.1031 The FNPIB itself was one of the Army’s initial forays towards a more significant political role, particularly in regards to controlling and influencing the masses. From Peperpu to Peperti 1029 “Dan dalam hubungan ini tetap diperlukan adanja bantuan dari masjarakat, seperti jang telah ber-kali2 diumumkan oleh Penerangan Angkatan Darat…” See “Rapat Penguasa Perang Seluruh Indonesia,” 12–13. 1030 Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, 84. 1031 Bourchier, Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia, 113. === [PDF page 390] === 390 During Guided Democracy, the Army’s increasingly blatant incursion of control into the domain of administration, politics, communications (press), and the economy was given a clear blessing by Soekarno, as shown in his Independence Day Speech of August 17, 1960, famously titled Laksana Malaekat jang Menjerbu dari Langit, Djalannja Revolusi Kita,” or Djarek: And one must always be aware that the issue of security is not only a matter for the military, not only a matter for the police, but a matter for the whole people. Because of this, the Political Manifesto has emphasized that the people are involved in administering security, by intensifying the People's Security Organizations, with compulsory training for youth and veterans, with militias throughout Indonesia. Yes, about the whole people in general! In fact, as I just said, this security issue is intertwined with the political-psychological field, the socio-economic field, the field of foreign subversion. Therefore, in the successful implementation of the Political Manifesto in all fields lies the success of the restoration of security. Within the success of USDEK lies the success of the restoration of security.1032 Soekarno then continued to describe, in militaristic language, the necessary operations in restoring security: First: to carry out increasingly sophisticated and expansive combat operations… Second: to carry out increasingly intense and sophisticated territorial operations to separate the gerombolan from societal support and restore and re-establish the 1032 Iwan Siswo, ed., Panca Azimat Revolusi: Tulisan, Risalah, Pembelaan & Pidato Soekarno 1926-1966, vol. 2 === [PDF page 391] === 391 authority of the State… Third—and this too is absolutely necessary: to intensify mental operations, specifically in disciplining (penertiban) and rehabilitation (penjehatan) civil and military state apparatuses, both technically and ideologically… Fourth: as the first to third operations become more intense, there will be a greater number of gerombolans that will “return to the Republic’s bosom” (kembali ke pangkuan Republik)… Fifth: all of the efforts I just mentioned must be completed with follow up actions, as further operations for rehabilitation and development in the regions, so that territorial consolidation and stabilization can be attained, in order to achieve normalization and end to the State of Emergency.1033 However, Soekarno was also aware of the dangers of an Army takeover. Thus, Soekarno sought to mitigate this by positioning himself into the martial law apparatus after the return to the 1945 Constitution in 1959. Soekarno’s first step was through the promulgation of a slightly modified version of the 1957 Law on State of Emergency on December 16, 1959. The new 1959 Law on State of Emergency (Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang No.23 Tahun 1959), established the President as the sole supreme authority during states of emergency.1034 The pattern of military role in non-military affairs was then duplicated all over the country through a new Supreme War Authority (Penguasa Perang Tertinggi, Peperti), which issued and promulgated similar regulations and decisions. The restrictions on strikes or lock-outs on strategic industries, for instance, was implemented nationally on June 21, 1960, through a Supreme War 1033 Iwan Siswo, 2:118–19. “Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang No.23 Tahun 1959 Tentang Pencabutan Undang-Undang No.74 Tahun 1957 (Lembaran Negara No.160 Tahun 1957) Dan Penetapan Keadaan Bahaya” (1959), art. 3. 1034 === [PDF page 392] === 392 Authority (Peraturan Penguasa Perang Tertinggi, Peperti) regulation. In another case, taxation was also managed through a series of instructions and regulations that was issued by the Supreme War Authority.1035 Indeed, the only main difference between Central War Authority and the Supreme War Authority was the manner of its ruling. Under the 1959 law, all of martial law ruling went through Soekarno as President, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, and Supreme War Authority.1036 With most of the country under martial law, the Supreme War Authority became an organization where Soekarno can rule directly, through promulgating laws that bypass the bureaucracy of the parliament. Nevertheless, by maintaining the Supreme War Authority structure as a governmental institution, he extended his reliance on the Army as an institution of executive governance. Nevertheless, just like its predecessor, the Supreme War Authority was still very much dominated by the Army. The smooth operation of the Peperti machine, which was led by Soekarno as its head, Djuanda as its First Deputy, and A.H. Nasution as Second Deputy, relied upon its many staffs from the Army, most notably the Army jurist Lieutenant Colonel Soetjipto, SH, the Territorial Affairs officer Colonel S. Soekowati, and Colonel Basuki Rachmat, thereby maintaining the Army’s grip on day-to-day governance across the country.1037 Meanwhile in the regions, the regional Army commanders also kept their position as Regional War Authorities. In 1035 Instruksi Penguasa Perang Tertinggi No.3 Tahun 1961 tentang Pemungutan Padjak (Mar 13, 1961); Surat Staf Peperti No.0780/Peperti/1961 perihal Instruksi Peperti No.3 tentang Pemungutan Padjak. (May 14, 1961). See Staf Penguasa Perang Tertinggi, Himpunan Lembaran Penguasa Perang Tertinggi Tahun 1960. 1036 Peraturan Penguasa Perang Tertinggi No.4 Tahun 1960 tentang Pentjegahan Pemogokan dan/atau Penutupan (Lock-Out) di Perusahaan2, Djawatan2, dan Badan2 jang Vital. See Staf Penguasa Perang Tertinggi. 1037 Sundhaussen, Politik militer Indonesia 1945-1967, 271, 271 ff 105. === [PDF page 393] === 393 fact, the new Supreme War Authority system did not do much to weaken the Army’s role in politics, rather than strengthening it, as under the new martial law organization, the commanders were entitled to speak in the name of the President, rather than the Minister of Defense or the Army Commander in Chief as it was during the Central War Authority system.1038 Hence, in many ways, the transfer of authority from the Penguasa Perang Pusat to this new system of Penguasa Perang Tertinggi actually further legitimized military rule in non-military affairs. Conclusion In recalling his tenure in Indonesia, former United States Ambassador to Indonesia Howard P. Jones stated that it should be understood that Guided Democracy was not, as some have assumed, merely a cunning contrivance designed by Soekarno to enhance his own political power, although it had that effect. Serving Soekarno’s selfish purposes, it nevertheless represented a genuine search for a solution to the political chaos that had engulfed the country ever since independence.1039 On the other hand, former vice-president Mohammad Hatta wrote in 1960: 1038 Sundhaussen, 271. Howard Palfrey Jones, Indonesia: The Possible Dream, 1st ed., Hoover Institution Publications, 102 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), 245. 1039 === [PDF page 394] === 394 Soekarno’s ‘guided democracy’ has become a dictatorship… …Soekarno’s creation will not last longer than Soekarno himself… …when he is gone his system will fall automatically like a house of cards.1040 In this chapter, I have argued that that Soekarno’s Guided Democracy emerged not merely as an effort of the centralization of power by Soekarno, the Army, and the PKI. Guided Democracy regime was the end-product of a long political experiment, an experiment that was designed to break through the perceived limitations of the prior parliamentary democracy system. In its essence, I argue that Guided Democracy was the search for a new kind of order— whether it was political, economic, or social. The first initiative, of course, came from Soekarno. In the search for this “new order,” Soekarno redeployed the idea of an “unfinished revolution” to legitimize his own return to government, creating a regime that was legitimized as “the true heirs to the 1945 Revolution.” In the course of establishing this new political order, Soekarno sought an alliance with Nasution and the Army for the creation of order. However, revolutions necessitate quick, dynamic action in order to preserve its momentum, often in the form of mass mobilization. Hence, Soekarno found himself also allied with the PKI—the Army’s archenemy—which was also searching for a way to survive in this new political order. Thus, Soekarno (and the PKI) and the Army, the three main power brokers in the Guided Democracy system, was locked in a “relationship characterized by both common endeavor and continuing competition and tension between more or less equally matched partners.”1041 1040 1041 Mohammed Hatta, “Dictatorship in Guise of Guided Democracy,” Civic Affairs 8, no. 5 (December 1960): 30. Feith, “Dynamics of Guided Democracy,” 325. === [PDF page 395] === 395 By 1959, however, the Army was much more experienced—and increasingly wellequipped—in the tasks of martial law administration and the maintenance of order. During this time, the PKI was still mobilizing itself behind the scenes in support of Soekarno. Meanwhile, Soekarno did not have the solid backing of the Jakartan elites—in fact, he alienated many by deciding to “bury the parties.” Thus, Soekarno turned towards the Army, with its capability of employing martial law and counterinsurgency techniques, to support his project. Thus, when a national crisis brewed across the country as a result of the PRRI/Permesta revolt or the Darul Islam insurgency, it did not take long for the Army to utilize what they have in store, albeit still with the consent of Soekarno and the PKI. The declaration of a State of Siege in 1957 was the crucial turning point here, as it provided the Army with wide-ranging powers across almost all aspects of socioeconomic and political life. Meanwhile, Soekarno (and the PKI) also benefited from the arrival of extraconstitutional rule as it enabled him to launch his long-awaited Guided Democracy. Through the State of Siege, the Army immediately took actions to discipline the society. From restricting the activities of political parties, anti-corruption campaign, and control over nationalized economic firms, the Army was at the forefront of Guided Democracy. Meanwhile, the Army also conducted successful military operations against the PRRI-Permesta, and later the Darul Islam. The Army did not have much difficulty in justifying these actions, as they had the support of Soekarno. Nevertheless, it is clear that revolutionary politics necessitates a control of the masses and mass action. Thus, it did not take long until the Army played a role in forming mass organizations, such as the various Badan Kerja Sama. Soekarno also realized this necessity, and he also formed === [PDF page 396] === 396 the Front Nasional, which was designed as mass organization for nationwide indoctrination of Guided Democracy principles. Indeed, Guided Democracy was initially formed to create order out of the cluttered and messy nature of Liberal Democracy. Its structures were well-placed to create exactly that. Its ideology, however, is a revolutionary ideology, and thus Guided Democracy immediately became a contradiction in itself, as the regime subsequently amplified the main political problem of the 1950s—the problem of mass politics. In time, political polarization became the norm in Soekarno’s Guided Democracy, as the society was increasingly split within the Army and the PKI, with Soekarno as the ambivalent leader on the top that often made use of both sides.1042 More often than not, it was Soekarno that publicly vindicated the Army’s participation in non-military affairs. Soekarno himself have publicly shown support and praise to the Army’s performance in maintaining security—and thus contributing to the establishment of the political order sought through Guided Democracy. An example is this excerpt, from Soekarno’s Independence Day speech of August 17, 1962, aptly titled “The Year of Triumph” (Tahun Kemenangan): The results of three years, during which at the start of the uprising of the so-called D.I.-T.I.I. Kartosuwirjo and P.R.R.I.-PERMESTA in the year the Kerdja Cabinet started, they controlled one-sixth of the territory of the Republic of Indonesia with an estimated strength of approximately 125,000 combat personnel, with 45,000 1042 Robert B. Cribb, “From Total People’s Defence to Massacre,” in Roots of Violence in Indonesia, ed. Freek Columbijn and J. Thomas Lindblad (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002), 238. === [PDF page 397] === 397 weapons, heavy and light. Now almost the entire (95%) of the territory of the Republic of Indonesia has freed from the rebel gerombolans. So far, 23,495 people have been killed and 133,365 people have returned to the Republic of Indonesia, while the weapons we have seized were 40,317 guns, heavy and light. Also, most of their subversive activities so far we have been able to break or fail. None of this will work if there are no sacrifices from us. All efforts to restore security have claimed victims from us, namely 3,736 people died from soldiers of the Armed Forces and the Village Security Organizations; and 6,213 members of the public; injured 5,164 people from the Armed Forces and the Village Security Organizations, and 4,375 members of the public. The result of all the efforts we have made, as I have just mentioned, was the arrest of Kartosuwirjo on June 4, 1962, which was then followed by the gradual surrender of hundreds of his followers.1043 It was clear that through martial law, the central government vis-à-vis the Army were able to conduct more effective counterinsurgency operations against the DI and the PRRI-Permesta, thus paving the way for the consolidation of power in Jakarta. As power was “integralized” within the President’s hands, democracy was transformed from “liberal democracy’s terrible clutter into autocracy’s horrible chaos.”1044 Indeed, as Theodore Friend would say, the regime “[was] hiding 1043 1044 Iwan Siswo, Panca Azimat Revolusi: Tulisan, Risalah, Pembelaan & Pidato Soekarno 1926-1966, 2:242–43. Theodore Friend, Indonesian Destinies (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), 50. === [PDF page 398] === 398 two directly contradictory and irreconcilable visions, neither one democratic: guardianship of the military and dictatorship of the proletariat.”1045 It was only a matter of time and momentum until these forces clashed, and when it does, the advantage would simply lay with those who have better equipment, organization, experience, and legitimacy. 1045 Friend, 70. === [PDF page 399] === 399 CHAPTER VI: SOEKARNO’S LAST REVOLUTION: SOCIETAL MOBILIZATION DURING GUIDED DEMOCRACY, 1960-1965 Introduction On December 19, 1961, President Soekarno stood before a crowd of roughly one hundred thousand people in the Northern Square (Alun-Alun Lor) of the Yogyakarta Palace. The political situation was tense, as Indonesia’s political negotiations with the Dutch for the return of West Irian, both through bilateral and multilateral avenues, had fell into an impasse. Soekarno read a long speech, which ended in the following call to the people: Thwart the formation of the puppet state of Irian that is being created by the Dutch, Raise the Red and White [Indonesian flag] in West Irian, and prepare for a general mobilization to defend the independence and unity of the homeland and the nation!1046 Five days prior, Soekarno had inaugurated the formation of a Supreme Command for the Liberation of West Irian (Komando Tertinggi Pembebasan Irian Barat), led by himself and the Army, Navy, and Air Force Chiefs of Staff. Formed under the aegis of martial law, the Supreme Command for the Liberation of West Irian spearheaded the formulation of policy against West Irian.1047 Soekarno’s speech of December 19, 1961 which be known as the “Three Commands of the People” (Tri Komando Rakyat, Trikora). Together with the formation of the new Mandala Command (Komando Mandala) in eastern Indonesia, the formation of the Supreme Command for 1046 “Komando Pembebasan Irian Barat: Mobilisasi Umum,” Sinar Harapan, December 19, 1961. Yayasan Badan Kontak Keluarga Besar Perintis Irian Barat, 25 Tahun Trikora (Jakarta: Yayasan Badan Kontak Keluarga Besar Perintis Irian Barat, 1988), 48; Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, 48. 1047 === [PDF page 400] === 400 the Liberation of West Irian and Soekarno’s Trikora speech inaugurated a new phase of Guided Democracy that would be characterized by mass mobilization. Central to the mobilization efforts during this period was the concept of the volunteers (sukarelawan), a paramilitary force recruited from various elements of society. The sukarelawan received military training, and some of them were sent off to infiltrate West Irian (and later, Malaysia). On February 11, 1962, the initial group of sukarelawans left Djakarta’s Tandjung Priok Harbor for military bases on the Outer Islands. Ultimately destined for West Irian, this allegedly 10,000-strong force consisted of Central Javan, East Javan and Sumatran volunteers recruited from various elements of society, from civil servants to college students.1048 Much of the volunteers program, sponsored personally by Soekarno through the National Front and was trained by the Army, was symbolic—many of these people never eventually reached West Irian or Malay shores. The importance of the volunteers, however, is what the idea represents both to Indonesians and international observers alike: the volunteers provided a picture of a state and society that was in a constant state of popular mobilization to pursue its goals. Most importantly, the sukarelawan program symbolized how the state and society became increasingly militarized. In this chapter, I argue that the Guided Democracy regime (1959-1965) inaugurated not only a new wave of political control, but also a pattern of social mobilization that was unprecedented in Indonesia’s post-revolutionary history. This pattern of mobilization, in collaboration with the wave of political control discussed in the previous chapter, was encased in 1048 “10.000 Sukarelawan Pembebasan Berangkat,” Sinar Harapan, February 12, 1962. === [PDF page 401] === 401 the veneer of “revolution.” Mobilization was driven by far more concrete dynamics, namely the governmental call for volunteers for the purpose of national prestige; competition between political forces—which includes the parties, Soekarno, and the Army; and the Army’s own concern with building up civil defense forces. Here, I examine Soekarno’s Guided Democracy regime as a government that tried to incorporate almost every aspect of life within the purview of the political will and goals of the “Great Leader of the Revolution” and to continue the efforts on the “unfinished revolution.” As with any other revolutions, the idea itself necessitated not only societal guidance, but also mobilization of forces. Under Guided Democracy, societal mobilization was built upon several logics. First was the campaign against West Irian. Second was the return of mobilized people as a social force through the sukarelawan (volunteers), a concept which took cues from the revolutionary-era pemuda ideals. Third was the expansionary nature of Soekarno’s revolution, which did not stop after the transfer of West Irian, but continued to become the Konfrontasi against Malaysia. It was during these episodes in Indonesian history, that the country established various rules, institutions, and discourses that were militarized in nature. These rules, institutions, and discourses were militarized, as they thrived under the frameworks of militarization that was already in place, namely martial law and counterinsurgency. Nevertheless, in Guided Democracy, there were three forces at play, namely Soekarno, the Communists and its sympathizers, and the Army and their anti-Communist allies. Initially these forces coexisted with each other under the vague call to “complete the revolution”. Nevertheless, when domestic socioeconomic factors became increasingly dire and Soekarno’s personal appetite === [PDF page 402] === 402 for anti-imperialist expansionism seem to bring Indonesia into a collision course against the West, the domestic political scene also moved into loggerheads with each other. Unlike the PKI, the Army benefited from its long experience in military administration and counterinsurgency; and during Guided Democracy their role in politics was further legitimized through its position in martial law and the executive and legislative branches of government. And as in any political contestations, organization is crucial for a political victory. This chapter begins with a discussion of Soekarno’s war campaign against the Dutch in West Irian at the height of the Guided Democracy regime. Since Soekarno’s presidential decree of July 5, 1959, Indonesia experienced a continuous state of emergency. At first, the State of Emergency was invoked to solve the political impasse in Jakarta. Under the Central Military Authority (Penguasa Perang Pusat), martial law was widely used to curb political dissidents, censor newspapers, and establish Army influence over economic affairs. Later, the political debacle with the Dutch regarding West Irian also provided a use for the instruments of martial law. Under martial law, Soekarno and the Army was able to justify its efforts of organizing and mobilizing popular forces for the campaign against West Irian. While the nationwide state of emergency was subsequently lifted after the liberation of West Irian in 1962, the country remained under control of the security forces as Soekarno continuously relied on the Army to rule the country. The chapter then discusses Soekarno’s campaign of Konfrontasi (1962-1965) against Malaysia. It was during Konfrontasi that society became thoroughly mobilized through the sukarelawan system, a concept that was not only promoted by Soekarno, but also by the Army and === [PDF page 403] === 403 the PKI. Throughout the late 1960s, Indonesia experienced a period of societal mobilization that was unprecedented in Indonesian history except during the revolution of 1945-1949. The Army’s experience with the social Cooperation Bodies (Badan Kerja Sama, BKS), the Front Nasional, and the recruitment and training of sukarelawans subsequently became the building blocks for new political action fronts that were initially designed to mobilize the people for an upcoming conflict. It was through the National Front that the regime recruited and trained volunteers (sukarelawan) in military methods. The chapter ends with the nationwide drama of October 1, 1965, where these forces were subsequently mobilized and deployed against a new enemy, namely the PKI, thus leading to the demise of Soekarno’s Guided Democracy. Dynamizing the People: The Dewan Nasional and Front Nasional The arrival of Guided Democracy dismantled the earlier political order of Liberal Democracy by the emasculation of the political parties and the centralization of power within the executive. This creates a problem, in which the political parties were left without an outlet for political representation. Soekarno’s solution for this problem, indeed one of the major innovations of Guided Democracy in Indonesian political life, was the establishment of extraconstitutional state bodies, for the purposes of mass mobilization that accommodated the influence of Soekarno, the Army, and the PKI. The first of these were the National Council (Dewan Nasional), which was a governmental council outside of the cabinet and parliament that was responsible directly to the President. The National Council was established on May 6, 1957 through Emergency Law (Undang-Undang Darurat) No.7 of 1957. The Council’s tasks were to provide guidance (nasehat) in regards to governmental and societal issues to the President, which was to be relayed on to the === [PDF page 404] === 404 cabinet. The members of the council included those who were part of the functional groups1049 in society, those who were able to engage with regional issues (persoalan daerah), military and civilian functionaries, and cabinet ministers.1050 This was the first time in Indonesian history that a representative state organ included members from the functional groups and the regions.1051 The National Council members consists of 42 people from all elements of society. One of the most significant factors that separated the Dewan and the parliament was that it was filled with representatives of the functional groups: Roeslan Abdulgani (Vice Chairman); Deputy Prime Minister; Army Chief of Staff; Navy Chief of Staff; Air Force Chief of Staff; Attorney General; Chief of National Police; Munir and Ahem Erningpradja (Labor); S. Sardjono and Sastrodikoro (Farmers); Sujono Atmo and Dahlan Ranumihardjo (Youth); Achmadi (former freedom fighters); Notohamiprodjo (national entrepreneurs); Henk Ngantung (Artists); Armunanto and B.M. Diah (Journalists); S.K. Trimurti and Rangkajo Rasuna Said (Women); Sukarni and Sidik Kertapati (1945 Generation); Achmad Chatib and K.Fatah Jasin (Muslim clerics); W.J. Rumambi (Protestants); Sugriwa (Hindus); Prof. Tan Tjoe Som and E.F. Wens (Citizens of foreign descent); Indra Tjaja and Nja’ Diwan (Sumatra); Iwa Kusumasumantri and Katjasungkana (Java); Lt.Col Hasan Basri and Tjilik Riwut (Kalimantan); Andi Mappanjutti (Sulawesi); Prof.Ir. H.Johannes and 1049 First introduced by the jurist Djokosoetono in 1957, the concept introduces the representation of various elements of society—such as workers, farmers, entrepreneurs, civil servants, consumers, the middle classes, and the Army—as an alternative to the political party system. See Bourchier, Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia, 110–11. 1050 Undang-Undang Darurat No.7 Tahun 1957 tentang Dewan Nasional dan Pendjelasannja, art. 1,2,3; Dewan Nasional: Maksud Pembentukan, Sifat, Funksi, Tugas, Susunannja, 9–10. 1051 In the Dewan Nasional, the functional group(golongan-golongan funksionil) representatives include those of “farmers, laborers, intelligentsia, national entrepreneurs, Muslim clerics, Catholics, Protestants, women, youth, “The 1945 Generation,” and so forth.” Meanwhile, “those who are able to engage with regional issues” refers to “figures from the regions themselves” (tokoh-tokoh atau orang-orang terkemuka dari daerah-daerah itu sendiri) See UndangUndang Darurat No.7 Tahun 1957 tentang Dewan Nasional dan Pendjelasannja, art. Explanation, Art.4. === [PDF page 405] === 405 Muhammad Djambek (Nusa Tenggara); Prof.Dr. G. Siwabessy and Muhd. Padang (Moluccas); Rumagesang and N.L. Suwages (West Irian).1052 Most of these people were not de facto party members, and the Council’s membership was heavily skewed towards those who were considered as the “1945 Generation.” Thus in many respects, the National Council was significant because it served as the “bridge between the Parliament and the Government”.1053 According to Lev, the Council provided Soekarno and the cabinet with legitimacy vis-à-vis the political parties and the now-emasculated parliament. In essence, it was designed to be a direct replacement for the party system of representation under Guided Democracy.1054 Yet, Soekarno was not the only actor encouraging mass mobilization. As we have discussed earlier, Nasution had already been working to build a National Front organization designed to organize and consolidate the various national forces towards a single goal, namely the liberation of West Irian. Soekarno’s response to the Army’s efforts in establishing a new mass organization was essentially, to create a new one. This new mass organization was to be named the Front Nasional. The National Front was created by Soekarno through Presidential Regulation No.13 of 1959 (Peraturan Presiden No.13 Tahun 1959 tentang Front Nasional), which stated that the 1052 While many of these people were assigned as representatives of their respective functional groups, this does not mean that they were not aligned to particular political parties. “Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia No.158 Tahun 1957” (1957). 1053 Dewan Nasional: Maksud Pembentukan, Sifat, Funksi, Tugas, Susunannja, 46. 1054 Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, 37. === [PDF page 406] === 406 organization was designed as a “mass organization” (organisasi massa) with three goals: the completion of the Indonesian National Revolution; total development (pembangunan semesta) of a just and prosperous society; and the return West Irian into Indonesia.1055 The task of the Front Nasional was to “gather and consolidate the revolutionary forces in society and lead the people to complete the National Revolution in the fields of development, social welfare, and defense and security; while conducting close cooperation between every governmental apparatuses, civilian and military, to achieve a common struggle between the government and the people.”1056 Although all Indonesians could apply to become members of the Front Nasional, there were in fact three membership levels: the first was the “board” (anggota pengurus), made up of local leaders (pemimpin2 rakjat setempat) who were responsible for the smooth implementation of the Front’s programs. The second level was the “vanguard” (anggota pelopor), or leaders capable of mobilizing “the masses”. The third level was “regulars,” (anggota biasa), who formed the bulk of the Front’s manpower. The only common requirements for all FN members was that they be at least 18 years of age, follow the Front’s programs, and pay dues.1057 The Front Nasional was the first national mass organization that incorporated the new functional groups (golongan karya) on a large scale. 1055 “Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia No.13 Tahun 1959 Tentang Front Nasional” (1959), art. 1,2. Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia No.13 Tahun 1959 tentang Front Nasional, arts. 3, Penjelasan Art.3. 1057 “Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia No.166 Tahun 1960 Tentang Peraturan Rumah Tangga Front Nasional” (1960), arts. 1, 4. 1056 === [PDF page 407] === 407 In January 1962, party members were allowed to sign up for Front membership.1058 Thus, the Front Nasional represents a political compromise that was characteristic during Guided Democracy, by which it did not only incorporated representatives of the various functional groups (including the Army), but also representatives of the political parties including the PKI. The secretary-general of the FN was Sudibjo, a PNI man. The Vice-Secretary for Special Affairs (Bagian Chusus) and Vice-Secretary for Action Units (Kesatuan Aksi) were Lt. Col. Achmadi and Lt. Col. Djuhartono, both from the Army. The Vice-Secretary for Indoctrination and Propaganda was Drs. Imam Pratiknjo, the scholars-intellectuals (sardjana/tjendekiawan) functional group, and the Vice-Secretary for Organizational Affairs was Anwar Sanusi from the PKI.1059 In fact, almost all of the major party leaders became Front members. In 1962, FN’s leadership was a smorgasbord of Indonesian party elites, including D.N. Aidit (PKI); Mochamad Noch (IPKI); Asmara Hadi and I.Roestama (Partindo); Ali Sastroamidjojo and S. Hadikoesoemo (PNI); Wasid Soewarto and Bambang Singgih (Murba Party); V.B. Saka (Catholic Party); M.Siregar and Chr.J.Mooy (Christian Party, Parkindo); K.H. Siradjuddin Abbas (PB Perti); Arudji Kartawinata and Harsono Tjokroaminoto (PSII); K.H. Idham Cholid and H. Saifuddin Zuhri (PB N.U.)1060 At its inception, the Front Nasional was in many respects a vehicle for mass organization and popular mobilization that could incorporate the Army and the PKI together with the other 1058 Rex Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Soekarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965, 1st Equinox ed (Jakarta: Equinox Pub, 2006), 101. 1059 Pengurus Besar Front Nasional, “Surat Keputusan Sementara Sekretaris Djendral Front Nasional No.2/Kpts/1961 Tentang Pembagian Tugas Antara Sekretaris Djendral Dan Wakil2 Sekretaris Djendral.,” May 17, 1961, RA70 252, ANRI. 1060 Sekretariat Pengurus Besar Front Nasional Bagian Organisasi, “Daftar Nama2 Anggota Front Nasional Dari Golongan Politik” (Front Nasional, March 22, 1962), RA.70 274, ANRI. === [PDF page 408] === 408 elements of society. Its Special Affairs section was designed to maintain connections with friendly countries, especially members of the Asia-Africa Conference; to organize national potential (potensi nasional) and prepare “West Irian cadres,” (tenaga kader Irian Barat) for the future struggle against West Irian. Meanwhile, the Indoctrination and Propaganda section was responsible for training Front cadres, propagandists (djuru propaganda), and for instilling patriotism through arts and sports. The Action Unit was the most substantial one, as it is designed to establish Work Units (kesatuan kerdja) and Action Units (Kesatuan Aksi) for the purpose of coordinating and organizing Front vanguards, cadres, and other societal elements into a “revolutionary mass action force” (kesatuan aksi massa revolusioner) in support of development projects, movements for land-reform or to increase production, or even mass rallies, all in accordance to the Front’s program.1061 At the height of the Konfrontasi against Malaysia in 1964, selected members of this “revolutionary mass action force” became the Revolutionary Cadres (Kader Revolusi), who were the primary source of volunteers (Sukarelawan) trained to participate in the upcoming planned invasion of Malaysia. Therefore, even with the emasculation of the parties, politics in Guided Democracy remained volatile, albeit more integrated and focused in its nature under the leadership of Soekarno. The Front itself, however, also included the PKI, which clings to the organization in a relationship that is more correctly represented as symbiotic rather than parasitic. In the absence of a meaningful parliamentary apparatus, the PKI—as with other parties—resorted to mass 1061 Sekretaris Djendral Pengurus Besar Front Nasional, “Surat Keputusan Sekretaris Djendral Pengurus Besar Front Nasional No.1/Kpts/1961 Tentang Pedoman Kerdja Bagian, Biro Dan Urusan Sekretariat Pengurus Besar Front Nasional,” May 18, 1961, RA70 214, ANRI. === [PDF page 409] === 409 mobilization in order to maintain the growth of the party, which the party was good at. Thus, the arrival of the Front Nasional became a new opportunity to be exploited. That being said, this does not mean that the Party did not have its reservations to the Front. In February 1960, Aidit stressed the PKI’s concerns that the Front Nasional is not a political party, and it should not be, or else it will be met with “the opposition of the people.”1062 However, as the PKI relied on Soekarno’s support for its survival, it enthusiastically supported the activities of the Front Nasional. Nevertheless, the Front, which has a pyramidal structure which extends to the regions, institutionalized the PKI’s influence within the state. Additionally, the Front also provided the Party with a direct line with Soekarno, who in turn also needed the PKI to mobilize the masses in support of his own agenda. After the Front’s Central Board was announced on August 15, 1960, the PKI were amply represented in the National Front by Aidit and Njoto, while other Communist representatives, such as the Peasants Front (Barisan Tani Indonesia, BTI) chairman Asmu, labor union (Serikat Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia, SOBSI) representative Munir, and People’s Youth (Pemuda Rakjat) chairman Sukatno were also admitted to the leadership.1063 Meanwhile, the bulk of the Front’s membership was substantially augmented by the PKI’s mass-based organizations mentioned above. After 1961, the Front Nasional became Soekarno’s personal vehicle for mass mobilization and indoctrination. In initiating national indoctrination, Soekarno established the Panitya Pembina 1062 Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Soekarno, 100. Rex Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Soekarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965, 1st Equinox ed (Jakarta: Equinox Pub, 2006), 101. 1063 === [PDF page 410] === 410 Djiwa Revolusi (Committee for the Development of the Spirit of the Revolution, Pabindjir) in 1960.1064 The overall responsibility of the project was bequeathed to Roeslan Abdulgani, who was the vice chairman of the Supreme Advisory Council (Dewan Pertimbangan Agung), and later became the Coordinating Minister for Relations with the People (Menteri Kompartemen Hubungan dengan Rakjat, Menko Hubra).1065 The Pabindjir became a think-tank for Soekarno’s ideological indoctrination during Guided Democracy, as it was meant to establish policy guidelines and teaching materials for the national indoctrination project. On February 9, 1961, Soekarno promulgated Presidential Instruction No.1 of 1961, which initiated the formation of “Indoctrination Teams” (Team-Team Indoktrinasi) at all levels of government. According to the instruction, the purpose of these teams were to conduct “widespread, intensive indoctrination of all civil servants and the general public as necessary, in order for mental retooling and the “cultivation of soul” (pembinaan djiwa) and thought that is in accordance with the foundations, nature, and goals of the Indonesian Revolution based on Pancasila and Manipol/USDEK as the outlines of national policy (garis besar haluan negara).”1066 1064 “Keputusan Presiden No.10 Tahun 1960 Tentang Pembentukan Panitya Pembina Djiwa Revolusi” (1960). Born in Surabaya, Roeslan was one of the 1945 Generation leaders. He participated in the November 10, 1945 battle in the East Javan city. He served as the Secretary General for the Bandung Asian-African Conference in 1955, and become Indonesia’s Foreign Minister during the Second Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet (March 1956 until April 1957). During Guided Democracy, he served as the vice-chairman of the National Council (1957-1959) Supreme Advisory Council (1959-1962), Minister of Information (1962), and Coordinating Minister for Relations with the People. See Retnowati Abdulgani-Knapp, A Fading Dream: The Story of Roeslan Abdulgani and Indonesia (Singapore: Times Books International, 2003). 1066 Manipol/USDEK was Soekarno’s conceptualization of Guided Democracy ideology. Manipol, a shorthand for Manifesto Politik, refers to Soekarno’s speech on August 17, 1959. Meanwhile USDEK stands for 1945 Constitution (Undang-Undang Dasar 1945), Indonesian Socialism (Sosialisme Indonesia), Guided Democracy (Demokrasi Terpimpin), Guided Economy (Ekonomi Terpimpin), and Indonesian Personality (Kepribadian Indonesia). “Instruksi Presiden No.1 Tahun 1961 Tentang Pembentukan Team-Team Indoktrinasi” (1961). 1065 === [PDF page 411] === 411 On February 22, 1961, Soekarno instructed the Pabindjir to issue basic materials for indoctrination. This included seven of Soekarno’s speeches on the Revolution and Guided Democracy.1067 These works were later published as the “Seven Bases of Indoctrination” (Tudjuh Bahan Pokok Indoktrinasi), which were widely distributed among the indoctrination teams.1068 In January 1962, Roeslan reported to Soekarno that the Panitya has conducted short indoctrination courses in youth organizations, university students, leaders of state-owned industries and companies, and civil servants across the provinces.1069 Late that year, the Pabindjir massively expanded its indoctrination programs through the training of new “core cadres” (kader inti). These new cadres, which was trained in the Panitya’s complex in Cipayung, consisted of 221 men from 44 cities across Indonesia, from Aceh in Sumatra to Manokwari.1070 These cadres were to establish indoctrination cells in their respective hometowns. Through the Front Nasional and the Pabindjir, Soekarno vis-à-vis the PKI found a way to implement mass indoctrination for the people. The Trikora Campaign against West Irian and the Rise of the Sukarelawan After the formation of the Front Nasional in 1959, it did not take long for Soekarno to utilize the massive potential that comes with the popular mass organization. The first opportunity arrived in the growing antagonism between Soekarno and the Dutch over the issue of West Irian. 1067 Soekarno, “Surat Presiden Republik Indonesia No.682/PR/61 Kepada Panitya Pembina Djiwa Revolusi,” February 22, 1961, RB.10 571, ANRI. 1068 Departemen Penerangan, Tudjuh Bahan Pokok Indoktrinasi (Jakarta: Pertjetakan Negara, 1961). 1069 Dewan Pertimbangan Agung Republik Indonesia, “Surat Dewan Pertimbangan Agung No..../Ind/DPA/62 Tentang Laporan Indoktrinasi,” January 5, 1962, RB.10 218, ANRI. 1070 Banoe Fatakoen, “Surat Panitya Penjelenggara Coaching/Latihan Kader Inti Panitya Pembina Djiwa Revolusi No.11/63/M Perihal Pesan J.M. Dr. H. Roeslan Abdulgani,” January 2, 1963, RA.37 2143, ANRI. === [PDF page 412] === 412 Soekarno hinted at his intention in his Independence Day Speech of August 17, 1961, which was famously titled Revolusi, Sosialisme Indonesia, Pimpinan Nasional (Revolution, Indonesian Socialism, and National Leadership, abbreviated Re-So-Pim”): Truly, brethren, now has come the time for us to make a more unified determination for the struggle for West Irian and for the struggle for West Irian. The struggle to liberate West Irian is part of the struggle to abolish imperialism and colonialism throughout the world, as assigned by the third article of the Government's Triprogram… …Politics is the formation and application of power. ('Politiek is machtsvorming en machtsaanwending.') Therefore, we arrange power. And the power of the Republic is getting higher and higher, getting bigger and bigger, so that on this Holy Day it can be emphasized that the Indonesian nation already feels strong to face Dutch imperialism in Irian. We feel strong in Confrontation with the Netherlands in all fields—in any field. We accept the challenges of the Netherlands in the political, social and economic fields, with challenges in each of these fields. We even accept challenges in the military field from the Netherlands, with challenges from the military on our side! Recently, I have shouted this in Medan: 'This is Indonesia's chest, where is your chest,'—and that clearly depicts that we now have a politics of Confrontation, and that we feel strong.1071 1071 Soekarno’s Independence Speech of August 17, 1961. See Iwan Siswo, Panca Azimat Revolusi: Tulisan, Risalah, Pembelaan & Pidato Soekarno 1926-1966, 2:201–3. === [PDF page 413] === 413 On December 19, 1961, Soekarno read his famous Three Commands of the People speech in Jogjakarta, which officially initiated the campaign to “liberate” West Irian from the Dutch. The arrival of open conflict against the Dutch in West Irian played a role in the revitalization of the Front Nasional’s efforts in mobilizing the people, as it “began to develop considerable strength, channeling mass demands and arranging demonstrations to back up government policies.”1072 According to Rex Mortimer, “the PKI supplied most of the popular constituency of the Front, and the party came to exercise strong influence in the [regional] leadership councils.”1073 This trend increased incrementally throughout the 1960s. It was in March 1964, at the height of Soekarno’s campaign against Malaysia, that the influence of the National Front in regional governance reached its peak. In March 1964, the government established a system of “Tjatur Tunggal or quadrumvirate of governor (or regency head or mayor), army commander, police chief, and public prosecutor,” of which the chairmen were members, nominees, or at least vetted by the PKI.1074 On April 2, 1964, The Tjatur Tunggal system became the Pantja Tunggal (quinquevirate), which also includes the bureau chief of the local Front Nasional, thus institutionalizing the Front’s influence in regional governance.1075 Civil Defense: Military Training for the People As the country gradually geared up for war, the state and the Army initiated several policies that built on Nasution’s “middle way” doctrine. First was the general mobilization of the people, 1072 Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Soekarno, 101. Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Soekarno, 101. 1074 Mortimer, 101–2. 1075 “Keputusan Presiden No.71 Tahun 1964 Tentang Pantja Tunggal” (1964). 1073 === [PDF page 414] === 414 and second was the formation of a Civil Defense corps (Pertahanan Sipil), which consisted of groups of trained citizenry that was not only ready mass mobilization, but also as an auxiliary force to support direct military operations. On February 6, 1962, Soekarno promulgated Governmental Regulations in Lieu of Law No.1 of 1962 on General Mobilization of the People, which laid out the guidelines for a nationwide conscription of citizens from the ages of 18 to 50.1076 Thirteen days later, Soekarno established the Civil Defense Organization (Pertahanan Sipil) through a Presidential Order.1077 The Army and Ministry of Defense followed this policy with a Ministry Regulation on Civil Defense, which arranges the implementation of civil defense as a concept. According to the Regulation, Civil Defense was designed to be a part of “non-military defense,” which was an integral part to the concept of Territorial Warfare.1078 The main purpose of Civil Defense system itself was to organize trained citizenry in supporting military operations; defend against external and internal enemies; maintain public order and continuity of governance; to provide social welfare; and maintain the smooth running of the economy.1079 The concept of Civil Defense was based upon the Army’s interpretation of Law No.29 of 1954 on State Defense (UU No.29 Tahun 1954 tentang Pertahanan Negara), which required the 1076 “Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang No.1 Tahun 1962 Tentang Pemanggilan Dan Pengerahan Semua Warga Negara Dalam Rangka Mobilisasi Umum Untuk Kepentingan Keamanan Dan Pertahanan Negara” (1962). 1077 “Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia No.48 Tahun 1962 Tentang Pembentukan Organisasi Pertahanan Sipil Dalam Rangka Usaha Mempertinggi Serta Menggalang Kewaspadaan Nasional” (1962). 1078 Hadisumarto, Nusa Tenggara Timur (Pemerintah Daerah Tingkat I bersama Djawatan Penerangan Daerah Tingkat I Nusatenggara Timur, 1962), 489. 1079 Hadisumarto, 490–91. === [PDF page 415] === 415 Army to prepare and deploy all forces in society (seluruh tenaga rakjat) in participation in national defense.1080 Specifically, Law No.29 of 1954 ensured that national defense was not only done through an “Armed Forces” that consists of “voluntary and conscripted personnel,” but also from “people who were trained to carry out resistance.” (rakyat yang terlatih untuk menjalankan perlawanan).1081 Thus, under this legal framework, volunteers were recruited from almost all elements of society. The framework of Civil Defense was based upon two major elements, namely the training of civil servants, state employees, and students under the banner of Civilian Employees Military Training (Latihan Kemiliteran Pegawai Sipil, LKPS) and the People’s Introductory Defense Course (Pendidikan Pendahuluan Pertahanan Rakjat, P3R). According to the SESKOAD, both frameworks were inspired by the system of pre-military training in Yugoslavia and the Reserve Officers Training Corps in the Philippines (which was in turn based on the ROTC system in the United States).1082 It was through the LKPS and the P3R that the Army increasingly forayed directly towards militarizing the state and society. For instance, in January 1962, the Directorate General of Post and Telecommunications of the Ministry of Communications (Dirjen PTT) formed a West Irian Corps of the PTT (Corps Irian Barat PTT).1083 According to one account, 5,000 PTT employees 1080 Herlan Prawiradiwirja, “Pembahasan Sistem Pendidikan Angkatan Darat Kita.,” Karya Wira Djati (Madjalah Resmi Sekolah Staf Dan Komando Angkatan Darat), 1962, 240. 1081 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 29 Tahun 1954 tentang Pertahanan Negara Republik Indonesia, art. 1082 Prawiradiwirja, “Pembahasan Sistem Pendidikan Angkatan Darat Kita.,” 243. 1083 Departemen Penerangan, 20 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka, vol. 6 (Jakarta: Departemen Penerangan Republik Indonesia [Ministry of Information, Republic of Indonesia], 1965), 377. === [PDF page 416] === 416 tha enlisted, which was subsequently filtered to a group consisting of 201 men.1084 During the early stages of its formation, seventeen of these telecommunications engineers were mobilized and trained by the Army in Cibogo, West Java, led by PTT engineer Pratomo, while the commander of the Corps, engineer Sabarsoediman, was trained in the SESKOAD in Bandung.1085 The training at Cibogo consisted of two weeks of basic military knowledge and techniques in self-defense (judo), intelligence, espionage, and sabotage.1086 The pattern of recruiting volunteers from the civil service was also evident in other ministries and companies across Indonesia. In March 1961, the Jakarta Regional Military Command conducted LKPS trainings for civil servants working in the governmental ministries, state owned enterprises, financial institutions, and others. These trainees were educated in Tanjung Timur, a military barracks that was allocated for the purpose, for at least one month.1087 The LKPS was also replicated in other Regional Military Commands, such as in West Kalimantan (Kodam XII/Tandjungpura)1088, Sumatra (Kodam II/Bukit Barisan),1089 East Nusa 1084 Tenggara (Kodam XVI/Udayana),1090 South Kalimantan (Kodam X/Lambung Departemen Perhubungan Direktorat Jenderal Pos dan Telekomunikasi, Sejarah Pos Dan Telekomunikasi Di Indonesia: Masa Demokrasi Terpimpin (Jakarta: Direktorat Jenderal Pos dan Telekomunikasi, 1980), 34. 1085 Departemen Penerangan, 20 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka, 1965, 6:378. 1086 Departemen Perhubungan Direktorat Jenderal Pos dan Telekomunikasi, Sejarah Pos Dan Telekomunikasi Di Indonesia: Masa Demokrasi Terpimpin, 34. 1087 Dinas Sejarah Militer Komando Daerah Militer V/Jaya, Sejarah Pertumbuhan Dan Perkembangan Kodam V/Jaya, Pengawal-Penyelamat Ibukota Republik Indonesia (Jakarta: Kodam V/Jaya, 1974), 284–85. 1088 Komando Daerah Militer XII/Tandjungpura, Tandjungpura Berdjuang Sedjarah Kodam XII/Tandjungpura, Kalimantan Barat (Pontianak: Semdam XII/Tandjungpura, 1970), 150. 1089 Komando Daerah Militer II/Bukit Barisan, Bukit Barisan Tetap Djaja Kenang2an Hari Ulang Tahun Bukit Barisan Ke XV, 21 Djuni 1951-21 Djuni 1966 (Medan: Pendam II/Bukit Barisan, 1966), 57. 1090 Hadisumarto, Nusa Tenggara Timur, 464. === [PDF page 417] === 417 Mangkurat),1091 Central Java (Kodam Diponegoro)1092 and many others. On January 15, 1962, three hundred young civil servants—including twenty-five women—from the Ministry of Health were trained by the Army for three months to prepare for an eventual invasion of West Irian.1093 Similarly, in the Ministry of Finance, government employees and students from the Directorate General of Taxation (Ditjen Pajak) and its service academy, the Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Keuangan Negara (STIKN), was trained in basic military techniques by the Army. Just like Nasution’s conscription order in May 1958, the LKPS was established through a Ministerial Instruction, rather than a Law. The framework for the LKPS were designed around Ministerial Instruction No.III/B/0020/61 of March 22, 1961, issued by A.H. Nasution who was then the Minister of National Security (Menteri Keamanan Nasional). According to the Ministerial Instruction, the LKPS consisted of courses on military and defense matters related to Territorial Management, mental indoctrination, and technical training, for the duration of two weeks to one month. The military aspects of program were built upon basic military training on infantry techniques, small arms, land navigation, military discipline, Territorial Management, martial law, and investigation (penyidikan). Mental indoctrination consisted of lectures on Pancasila and Manipol-USDEK, while technical education were on administration, farming, etc. During training, the recruits were to be given Army-issued uniforms, and the instructors were assigned by the local Governor or Regional Military Command chief. Funding for the program came from the Ministry 1091 Komando Daerah Militer X/Lambung Mangkurat, Kodam X/Lambung Mangkurat Membangun: Diterbitkan Dalam Rangka Peringatan Ulang Tahun Kodam X/LM Jang Ke-IV (17-VII-1958--17-VII-1962), 124. 1092 Rosihan Anwar, Soekarno, Tentara, PKI Segitiga Kekuasaan Sebelum Prahara Politik, 1961-1965 (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2006), 49. 1093 “Sukarelawan2 Dep. Kesehatan Mulai Dilantik,” Sinar Harapan, January 15, 1962. === [PDF page 418] === 418 of National Security, and the local committees were to submit reports to the Ministry after the conclusion of each cohort.1094 The LKPS trainings were, in essence, useful for providing the civilians a glimpse of Army life, which enables a sense of familiarity and practical interoperability between both elements. According to Hussein Kartasasmita, during April-July 1962, he and other Ditjen Pajak employees received extensive military training, where they were trained in using Lee-Enfield rifles, Sten submachineguns, and Bren light machine guns.1095 The students from the STIKN was deployed to Pagarajen, Cisarua, West Java for training with more advanced weaponry such as the M1 Garand rifle and machine guns. At the end of their training, Santoso Brotodiharjo, then Director General of Taxation, sang the military song “Condrodimuko” in front of the Ministry of Finance volunteers.1096 Similarly, customs officers and investigators from the Directorate General of Customs and Excise (Direktorat Jenderal Bea dan Cukai) of the Ministry of Finance was also mobilized and trained by the Army, numbering to nine platoons at least, in one training session.1097 In 1962, civil servants from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and their spouses also participated in two-month military indoctrination and training courses, which consisted of basic military training and indoctrination from Armed Forces officers.1098 1094 A.H Nasution, “Instruksi No.III/B/0020/61 Tentang Pelaksanaan Rentjana Operasi Follow-Up Keamanan Tahun 1961 Dalam Bidang Latihan Kemiliteran Bagi Para Pamong Pradja Dan Pegawai Sipil Di Daerah2 Dan Badan Pelaksanaannja” (Menteri Keamanan Nasional, March 22, 1961), RA.6b 2118, ANRI. 1095 Hussein later became the Secretary for the Directorate General of Taxation of the Ministry of Finance. Hussein Kartasasmita, Memoar Seorang Petugas Pajak, 2003, 47. 1096 Kartasasmita, 47. 1097 Komando Daerah Maritim III TNI AL, 12 Tahun Kodamar III (Dinas Penerangan Kodamar III, 1963), 187–88. 1098 Departemen Penerangan, 20 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka, 1965, 6:74–75. === [PDF page 419] === 419 Similar military training courses were also conducted in the Ministry of Justice, where almost all of the State Prosecutors (djaksa) were required to be well-versed in infantry techniques and the military knowledge from command and staff courses in the SESKOAD.1099 On August 11, 1962, 254 volunteers from the Indonesian Red Cross and the Ministry of Health participated in military training with the Navy, eventually becoming militarized on August 11, 1962.1100 Throughout 1960-1961, freshly graduated doctors and dentists were mobilized through the Ministry of Health, as they were distributed to various areas of the country with support of the martial law administration and they were trained in basic military knowledge by the Army.1101 On March 27, 1962, the Secretariat of the Front Nasional also published an order to its all of its employees to participate in military training, with exceptions for those who are already serving in the Armed Forces.1102 It is clear that the LKPS provided the Army with a legal framework not only for mobilizing the people under the banner of Revolution, but also as an ideological training machine that would keep the “hearts and minds” of the people close with the Army. Furthermore, these training sessions also provided the setting for civilians to learn skills and hierarchies that that were associated with the military. In addition to the LKPS, military training was also expanded to college and junior high school students under the framework of P3R. Initially, the P3R was designed to become a 1099 Departemen Penerangan, 6:642–43. Komando Daerah Maritim III TNI AL, 12 Tahun Kodamar III, 183. 1101 Departemen Kesehatan RI, Sejarah Kesehatan Nasional Indonesia, vol. 2 (Jakarta: Departemen Kesehatan Republik Indonesia, 1980), 89–90. 1102 “Keputusan Menteri/Sekretaris Djenderal Front Nasional No: 045/KPTS/PBFN/III/62” (Front Nasional, March 27, 1962), RA70 226, ANRI. 1100 === [PDF page 420] === 420 framework for military training for students—twelve to fifteen year-olds that were junior high schools (Sekolah Landjutan Pertama) or outside of it—to be introduced in military knowledge.1103 The training consisted of mental and physical conditioning (pembinaan kesadaran dan djasmani), and special training on military marching techniques and visits to military objects (including museums and Army facilities).1104 Martial arts techniques, such as the traditional Javanese Pencak Silat, was also taught in schools as part of the P3R framework, as one of many “means of promoting civil defense.”1105 However, just like the conscription in 1958 and the LKPS scheme above, it appears that Nasution again used his role as Central War Authority to provide the government with a fait accompli: the legal basis for the P3R was an Instruction from the Central War Authority, dated January 8, 1959.1106 Meanwhile, the draft law for the P3R, proposed only on February 14, 1962, was never promulgated by the Parliament.1107 In addition to civil servants, the P3R also targeted university students. The P3R framework first materialized in the various state universities across the country through the formation of Student Regiments (Resimen Mahasiswa, Menwa). In West Java, a similar Student Regiment was also formed, called the Mahawarman Regiment (Resimen Mahawarman). One of the first and most 1103 R Hidajat, “Surat Menteri Keamanan Nasional No.Rah/DM/003522/1961 Perihal Rentjana Undang-Undang Tentang P3R” (Menteri Keamanan Nasional, December 28, 1961), RA 6b 803, ANRI. 1104 Hidajat. 1105 Lee Wilson, Martial Arts and the Body Politic in Indonesia, Verhandelingen van Het Koninklijk Instituut Voor Taal-, Land- En Volkenkunde, volume 299 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2015), 56. 1106 Instruksi Penguasa Perang Pusat No. Inst/Peperpu/059/1959. See Pusat Perlawanan dan Keamanan Rakyat, Partisipasi Rakjat Dalam Usaha Pembelaan Negara 10 Tahun WANKAMRA HANSIP, 19 April 1962-19 April 1972 (Jakarta: Pusat Perlawanan dan Keamanan Rakyat, 1972), 231. 1107 The draft law was written as “unfinished” in a Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly Report in 1972. Madjelis Permusjawaratan Rakjat Sementara Republik Indonesia, Laporan Pimpinan MPRS Tahun 1966-1972 (Jakarta: Penerbitan MPRS, 1972), 128. === [PDF page 421] === 421 prominent Student Regiments, the Mahawarman Regiment was first established in Padjadjaran State University as the “University Students Compulsory Training” (Wajib Latih Mahasiswa, Walawa) on May 13, 1959 under authority of Siliwangi Division / Third Military Regional commander (Kodam III/Siliwangi) Colonel R.A Kosasih, who was the Regional War Authority at that time.1108 The Walawa was attended by students from every state university in Bandung. After the announcement of volunteer recruitment for West Irian, the Walawa units were transformed into a “Multipurpose Student Regiment” (Resimen Mahasiswa Serba Guna) on January 15, 1962, which subsequently became the Student Regiments.1109 In Jakarta, the Fifth Military Regional Command (Kodam V/Jaya) inaugurated Mahajaya Regiment (Resimen Mahajaya), the region’s Student Regiment (Resimen Mahasiswa), on May 17, 1962. The Mahajaya Regiment boasted 3,440 college students, trained and mobilized, that were recruited from universities in and around the capital.1110 In Yogyakarta, the local Student Regiment, titled the Mahakarta Regiment (Resimen Mahakarta), was established on January 20, 1963.1111 These Student Regiments were attached directly to their respective Regional Military Commands. While many of these student 1108 Siliwangi Division Commander Letter No.Kpts.40-2/5/1959. See Universitas Negeri Padjadjaran, Buku Peringatan Tri-Panca-Warsa Universitas Negeri Padjadjaran, Bandung, Indonesia, 1957-1972 (Bandung: Universitas Negeri Padjadjaran, 1972), 40. 1109 Hasyrul Moechtar, Mereka Dari Bandung Pergerakan Mahasiswa Bandung, 1960-1967 (Jakarta: Alumni, 1998), 35. 1110 Dinas Sejarah Militer Komando Daerah Militer V/Jaya, Sejarah Pertumbuhan Dan Perkembangan Kodam V/Jaya, Pengawal-Penyelamat Ibukota Republik Indonesia, 283–84. 1111 Anwar, Sebelum Prahara: Pergolakan Politik Indonesia 1961-1965, 327. === [PDF page 422] === 422 troops were trained in basic military skills, many of them were also tasked in liaison units, distribution of smallpox vaccines, and other non-military roles.1112 Having the Army as its primary sponsor does not mean that the policy was solely supported by the Army. During the inauguration of the Mahakarta Regiment in Jogjakarta, Foreign Minister Soebandrio, who was close to the PKI, said that “Indonesians have no choice but to conduct confrontational politics (politik konfrontasi) against Malaya, as Malaya is a collaborator of neocolonialism and neo-imperialism that is hostile towards Indonesians.”1113 In addition to the Student Regiments, there were compulsory military training that had to be followed by all college and university students. According to student activist Cosmas Batubara, he remembered having to participate in military training, including military maneuvers and weapons handling, in Lapangan Banteng, which was attended by every university student in Jakarta.1114 Batubara’s account was echoed by Indonesian archeologist Ayatrohaedi, who was a then a student at the University of Indonesia. Ayatrohaedi remembered the training session at Lapangan Banteng and a maneuver excursion at a rubber estate in Parung were “fun” (penuh dengan keceriaan) and “enjoyable” (menyenangkan).1115 The pattern of military recruitment under P3R was not limited to the Army, as the Navy also created similar student units. On July 6, 1962, the Navy established Battalion Karta Tirta, 1112 Dinas Sejarah Militer Komando Daerah Militer V/Jaya, Sejarah Pertumbuhan Dan Perkembangan Kodam V/Jaya, Pengawal-Penyelamat Ibukota Republik Indonesia, 284. 1113 Anwar, Sebelum Prahara: Pergolakan Politik Indonesia 1961-1965, 328. 1114 Cosmas Batubara, Cosmas Batubara, Sebuah Otobiografi Politik (Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2007), 74. 1115 Ayatrohaedi, 65=67 Catatan Acak-Acakan Dan Catatan Apa Adanya (Jakarta: Dunia Pustaka Jaya, 2011), 163– 65. === [PDF page 423] === 423 which consisted of university students that were studying any aspects related to marine communications and sciences. The Battalion became a naval unit under the command of the Third Regional Maritime Command (Komando Daerah Maritim III, Kodamar III).1116 The battalion recruits came from various Marine Fisheries Department across the country.1117 The formation of these student regiments expanded the then-already close collaboration between the Armed Forces and major universities, which was first established in on July 4, 1962, when the SESKOAD signed a cooperation agreement with Universitas Indonesia, Bandung Institute of Technology, and Padjadjaran University for collaboration in education and training.1118 According to one document, by early 1966, the various units within the Resimen Mahasiswa consisted a force of around 150,000 soldiers, 10,000 non-commissioned officers, and 47 officers.1119 It also has its own doctrine, the Prabhawantara, which was designed around the Army’s Tri Ubaya Çakti.1120 In addition to these military training initiatives, Militarization was also evident in other sectors, especially in state-owned companies. From February until August 1962, the Navy procured and directly controlled many of the ships owned by the national shipping companies Pelni, Djakarta Lloyd, Sang Saka, Sriwidjaja Lines, Indonesian Fortune Lines, Pelumin, and the national oil company Permina, in addition to the Navy Hydrographic Service and the Ministry for 1116 “Jon ‘Karta Tirta’ Akan Diresmikan,” Merdeka, July 7, 1962. Komando Daerah Maritim III TNI AL, 12 Tahun Kodamar III, 183. 1118 Soedirman, “Pidato Sambutan Dan Seskoad,” Karya Wira Djati (Madjalah Resmi Sekolah Staf Dan Komando Angkatan Darat), 1962, 222. 1119 Kepala Biro P.L.P.T & Wala Mahasiswa, “Letter No. P-10/H/PLPTWALAWA/I/66 Perihal Konsep Doktrin Resimen Mahasiswa” (Biro Pendidikan & Latihan Perwira Tjadangan dan Wadjib Latih Mahasiswa, Departemen Perguruan Tinggi dan Ilmu Pengetahuan, January 14, 1966), 1, RA.37 1997, ANRI. 1120 Kepala Biro P.L.P.T & Wala Mahasiswa, “Letter No. P-10/H/PLPTWALAWA/I/66 Perihal Konsep Doktrin Resimen Mahasiswa.” 1117 === [PDF page 424] === 424 Communications’ Shipping Service. These mobilized ships numbered to at least 40 vessels and their corresponding crews, which were allocated towards supporting roles in face of the upcoming invasion of West Irian.1121 These initiatives were also expanded to strategic industries, such as the Surabaya-based shipbuilder PT. PAL. On March 12, 1962, the Department of the Navy issued an instruction for the East Javan naval commands to enlist naval engineers in the PT.PAL as reserve officers, thus bringing effective military control over the strategic industry..1122 Thus, as this section shows us, that Soekarno’s confrontational policies against the Dutch in the pursuit of West Irian became beneficial for the Army to expand its encroachment in nonmilitary affairs. This fact is evident through the proliferation of military training programs for the volunteers program conducted by the Army. Sukarelawan Missions to West Irian Some of the sukarelawans being trained by the Army were deployed to West Irian on infiltration missions. Under the provision of the Army, these former engineers and accountants were trained to be sent out in dangerous missions to incite a guerrilla resistance from the West Irianns against the Dutch. There were at least three major missions that managed to land in West Irian, albeit without these mobilized civil servants as their main elements. First was the story of Pasukan Gerilya 100 (Guerilla Force 100, PG 100) under Lieutentant Antaribaba of the Army, which managed to land in Etna Bay, the Southern side of West Irian on November 27, 1960. The 1121 Komando Daerah Maritim III TNI AL, 12 Tahun Kodamar III, 184–85. “Surat Keputusan Menteri/Kepala Staf Angkatan Laut Tgl 12 Maret 1962 No.1541.1” (Departemen Angkatan Laut, March 12, 1962), RA 27a 3, ANRI. 1122 === [PDF page 425] === 425 taskforce, armed with small arms and consisting of mostly 29 West Irianns that were trained by Indonesians, were landed to gather intelligence for further military operations, obtain a base area to conduct further guerrilla operations, and conduct Territorial Warfare in West Irian.1123 Another force is the Pasukan Gerilya 200 (Guerrilla Force 200, PG 200) under Pembantu Letnan Satu (Chief Warrant Officer) Djamaludin Nasution, landed near Sorong on September 14, 1961 with a force of 39 men with the same task. From to March 23, 1962, four other Guerrilla Forces, numbered PG 300 to 600, were sent to West Irian with an increasing number of personnel. Most of these forces failed to reach their objectives as they were continuously harassed and hunted down by Dutch forces, with the sinking of Guerrilla Force 300 in the Battle of Aru Sea the most famous example of these military adventurisms.1124 Other sukarelawan battallions, such as one Battalion Karya Jaya I from the Jakarta Regional Military Command, was deployed to Mandala Command areas on February 7, 1962 to help in non-military operations, such as establishing airfields.1125 The Battalion consisted of 500 men from the Perintis Irian Barat from the Badan Pembina Potensi Karya of the Army General Staff and 300 men from the P3TK unit of the Department of Social Affairs (Departemen Sosial).1126 As the numbers indicate, it is clear that these operations served mostly only symbolic purposes in the struggle against the Dutch in West Irian. 1123 Yayasan Badan Kontak Keluarga Besar Perintis Irian Barat, 25 Tahun Trikora, 97. Nevertheless, many Army officers that were involved in these operations gained renown and experience which helped them later in their career, such as their overall commander from the Army General Staff, Major Roedjito, which would later retire as one of the Deputy Chiefs of the Intelligence Coordination Bureau (Badan Koordinasi Intelijen, BAKIN).Yayasan Badan Kontak Keluarga Besar Perintis Irian Barat, 103. 1125 Yayasan Badan Kontak Keluarga Besar Perintis Irian Barat, 36. 1126 Yayasan Badan Kontak Keluarga Besar Perintis Irian Barat, 36. 1124 === [PDF page 426] === 426 Soekarno’s Irian adventure managed to attain world attention when, in October 1960, General Nasution went to the United States to purchase a substantial amount of arms for the campaign, which he returned empty-handed. When Nasution went to visit Moscow in January 1961, however, the reception was completely different. Nasution managed to secure a massive loan from the Soviet premier Khrushchev, totaling around 450 million dollars.1127 These Soviet credits were subsequently used to obtain state-of-the art weaponry—of which many were still on frontline service in the Soviet Union. These equipment included a number of the supersonic Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21 Fishbed fighters, Tupolev Tu-16 Badger long-range medium bombers and transport planes and helicopters. For the Navy, Indonesia obtained six Whiskey-class attack submarines, six destroyers, and a Sverdlov-class light cruiser, named aptly as KRI Irian. Many of these equipment, manned by mixed Soviet-Indonesian crews, were clearly obtained to prepare for an eventual invasion of West Irian.1128 The invasion, designated as Operasi Djajawidjaja, was planned for August 1962. If the military operation went as planned, would be Indonesia’s largest combined arms and amphibious operation.1129 However, the increasing amount of military aid from the Soviet Union and the fear of an open war in Southeast Asia alerted the United States, which was wary of the possibility of increasing Soviet influence over Indonesia. Although in hindsight, the American concern that Indonesia is “veering to the Left” at this time was relatively unfounded, it became clear for 1127 Frederick P. Bunnell, “Guided Democracy Foreign Policy: 1960-1965 President Soekarno Moves from NonAlignment to Confrontation,” Indonesia, no. No.2 (October 1966): 47. 1128 Guy J. Pauker, “The Soviet Challenge in Indonesia,” Foreign Affairs 40, no. 4 (July 1962): 615. 1129 On the Operasi Djajawidjaja, see Yayasan Badan Kontak Keluarga Besar Perintis Irian Barat, 25 Tahun Trikora, 143–48. === [PDF page 427] === 427 Washington that the competition over West Irian had the possibility of turning into another flashpoint for the Cold War.1130 Hence, the United States government sent a letter to the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, “warning that the West Irian policy of the Dutch would inevitably lead to physical conflict, and thus constituted an imminent threat to world peace.”1131 While the Armed Forces are gradually ramping up their infiltration campaigns against the Dutch, diplomatic efforts were also pursued by Indonesia in the United Nations. On August 15, 1962, Indonesian and Dutch delegates were gathered in New York to sign an agreement on West Irian, with a nationwide ceasefire declared three days later. On October 1, 1962, the Dutch subsequently relinquished control of West Irian to the United Nations, with Indonesian taking over in May 1963. Eventually, and in a manner not unlike the 1945-1949 revolution, the “liberation” of West Irian was achieved by diplomatic pressures in the United Nations. The direct consequence of the West Irian military build-up, however, was clearly evident in the political constellation of Jakarta. Under Soekarno’s call for mobilization, both the Army and the PKI were provided the opportunity and justification for the expansion of their policy of recruitment and mass mobilization. As policies for societal mobilization was gradually stepped up, both the Army and the PKI gradually benefited from this nationwide institutionalization of revolutionary rhetoric. However, as the West Irian campaign ended relatively peacefully, the Armed Forces did not have the opportunity to launch its massive military operation. Thus, initially, it was Soekarno who benefited from the victory over the West Irian campaign. 1130 Bunnell, “Guided Democracy Foreign Policy: 1960-1965 President Soekarno Moves from Non-Alignment to Confrontation,” 49, ff.20. 1131 Jones, Indonesia, 190–91. === [PDF page 428] === 428 However, it should be noted that the PKI also benefited greatly from the campaign. During the campaign, the PKI increased the numbers of its own cadres and sympathizers. In July 1962, the PKI’s Peasant Front (Barisan Tani Indonesia, BTI) claimed at least 5.7 million members, the labor union (Serikat Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia, SOBSI) boasted 3.3 million members, and later in 1963, the youth and women’s organization People’s Youth (Pemuda Rakjat) and Indonesian Women’s Movement (Gerakan Wanita Indonesia, Gerwani) claimed at least 1.5 million members each. The PKI itself stated that it has over 2 million members by the end of 1962, thus cementing its status as the largest Communist party in a non-communist country.1132 The Pemuda Rakyat and other party-associated social organizations were instructed to volunteer for the West Irian campaign, thus giving way to a further suspicion of Communist infiltration of the Armed Forces. Nevertheless, it was not easy for Nasution and his ilk to resist this continuous recruitment, as the expansion of the Navy and Air Force would inevitably expand recruitment.1133 Meanwhile, the Army also benefited through the establishment of military training programs for the volunteers, which greatly expanded its influence over certain elements of society, such as the civil service and students. Additionally, the military also obtained funding for its institutional expansion through the creation of these new training programs and the procurement of arms. Ultimately, however, it was not only the Army and the PKI that benefited from the campaign. The political position of Soekarno, as the great leader of the revolution, was greatly reinforced through popular mobilization and the endurance of legal apparatuses designed to 1132 1133 Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1200, 327. Pauker, “The Soviet Challenge in Indonesia,” 618. === [PDF page 429] === 429 maintain his power. At the height of the West Irian campaign, and in an effort to centralize the command and control of the entire war, Soekarno established a Supreme Command for the Liberation of West Irian.1134 The authority of the Command, which was inherently based upon martial law authority and consolidates the Armed Forces under direct presidential control, was the first time that Soekarno held operational control of the whole Armed Forces apparatus, or at least on paper. Thus, in a legal standpoint, it was from this moment that executive authority over the Armed Forces—and as long as martial law is still in place—is absolute. Nevertheless, as we would later see, the limits of this authority was not constrained by the martial law status itself, which will be shown in Soekarno’s next military adventure against the newly-established Federation of Malaysia. End of Martial Law and Konfrontasi against Malaysia After the liberation of West Irian, the nationwide state of war that was first declared in 1957 was lifted on December 28, 1962.1135 The state of war was replaced by a new “state of civil order” (keadaan tertib sipil). However, the new legal status did not mean that the country returned to a state of normalcy prior to 1957. Soekarno made this clear in his speech during his official speech on the abrogation of the state of emergency, on May 1, 1963: 1134 The full title of the command was the Supreme Command for the implementation of the objectives and principles of Presidential Decree No.618 of 1961 on the liberation of West Irian (Komando Tertinggi untuk melaksanakan tudjuan dan dasar Keputusan Presiden No.618 tahun 1961 tentang pembebasan Irian Barat Tanah Air Indonesia). See Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1200, 327; “Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia No.620 Tahun 1961 Tentang Pembentukan Komando Tertinggi” (1961). 1135 “Penetapan Presiden Republik Indonesia Nomor 4 Tahun 1962 Tentang Keadaan Tertib Sipil” (1962). === [PDF page 430] === 430 Today, May 1, 1963, is a very important day, which can be noted as a historical turning point in the struggle and revolution of the Indonesian nation. How not! On this day, the state of emergency in the entire province of Indonesia is officially abolished, the state of emergency that has been going on for several years in our country, even since we proclaimed our independence in 1945. The state of emergency that resulted in the suppression and violation of rights and freedoms individuals because it is necessary to be able to overcome and eliminate the dangerous situation itself......The government together with the tools of power and all the people have succeeded in completing two programs from the government's three programs, namely: the restoration of security and the Liberation of West Irian.1136 However, Soekarno warned that the end of martial law does not mean that the Armed Forces, the state, and the people should return to normalcy: 1136 Hari ini, hari tanggal 1 Mei 1963, adalah hari jang sangat penting, jang dapat ditjatat sebagai titik peristiwa sedjarah dalam rangka perdjoangan dan revolusi bangsa Indonesia. Betapa tidak! Pada hari ini setjara resmi keadaan bahaja diseluruh wilajah Indonesia dihapuskan, keadaan bahaja jang telah berlangsung beberapa tahun dinegara kita, bahkan sedjak kita memproklamirkan kemerdekaan kita pada tahun 1945. Keadaan bahaja jang mengakibatkan penekanan-penekanan dan penjimpangan-penjimpangan hak-hak dan kebebasan-kebebasan perseorangan karena diperlukan untuk dapat mengatasi dan menghilangkan keadaan bahaja itu sendiri… …Pemerintah bersama-sama alatalat kekuassaan dan seluruh rakjat telah berhasil menjelesaikan dua program dari Triprogram pemerintah jaitu: pemulihan keamanan dan Pembebasan Irian Barat.…Dengan kemenangan-kemenangan dikedua bidang diatas, tidak berarti bahwa perdjoangan seluruhnja telah selesai. Tidak! Perdjoangan masih djauh daripada selesai… …Kembali ke keadaan tertib sipil tidak berarti kembali ke keadaan sebelum berlakunja keadaan bahaja ditahun 1957 dahulu… …saja sebagai Pemimpin Besarmu, akan tidak segan-segan untuk mengambil tindakan-tindakan terhadap siapapun jang akan menjelewengkan revolusi kita, ataupun akan mengingkari Negara Proklamasi jang berdasarkan Pantjasila. Soekarno, “Amanat P.J.M Presiden/Panglima Tertinggi Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia Pada Hari Penghapusan Keadaan Bahaja,” May 1, 1963, RA 70 299, ANRI. === [PDF page 431] === 431 ...With the victories in the two fields above, it does not mean that the entire struggle is over. No! The struggle is still far from over......Returning to a state of civil order does not mean returning to the situation before 1957......only as your Great Leader, will not hesitate to take actions against anyone who will distort our revolution, or will deny the State Proclamation based on Pantjasila...1137 Soekarno’s message, which was broadcasted nationally, echoed a similar warning that had been repeated many times by Army representatives: the abrogation of the state of emergency did not mean that the Army would simply return to the barracks. For example, on April 20, 1963, the Chief for Information of the Jakarta Army Regional Command (Kodam V/Djaja), Major M. Ali Siregar, stated that the change of legal status from the state of war towards the new state of civil order (keadaan tertib sipil) was a state of normalcy that is inherently different to the situation prior to the first declaration of a State of Siege in 1957.1138 On June 11, Brig. Gen. S. Sukowati, Assistant V to the Army Chief of Staff, called for more vigilance in the Armed Forces, as the abrogation of the state of emergency did not mean an absence of threat against public order and security.1139 Indeed, the new keadaan tertib sipil did not mean that the policies that were conducted under martial law was reversed. Many of the political prisoners arrested under martial law, such as Mohammad Roem, Soebadio Sastrosatomo, and Mochtar Lubis were not released after the 1137 Soekarno. Merdeka, April 20, 1963; Hariyono, Penerapan Status Bahaya di Indonesia: Sejak Pemerintah Kolonial Belanda hingga Pemerintah Orde Baru [The Practice of the State of Emergency in Indonesia: From the Colonial Period to the 1139 Merdeka, June 11, 1963; Hariyono, Penerapan Status Bahaya di Indonesia: Sejak Pemerintah Kolonial Belanda hingga Pemerintah Orde Baru [The Practice of the State of Emergency in Indonesia: From the Colonial Period to the New Order], 313. 1138 === [PDF page 432] === 432 abrogation of the state of emergency, which further indicated that under the “new normal,” of keadaan tertib sipil, martial law rules remained to be undisturbed, and the Army would remain to participate in non-military affairs.1140 The continued Army participation in non-military affairs eventually became part of Army policy. In a speech on June 16, 1963, Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Ahmad Yani calls for more military participation in state affairs: “In the face of the current state of civil order, we as members of the Armed Forces, an instrument of the revolution, functions as a means of security and a functional group (golongan karya) are allowed to rest just yet.”1141 Indeed, after May 1, 1963 there remained a feeling of, according to M.C.Ricklefs, “an ambivalence about the future,” as the Armed Forces was concerned that the lifting of martial law would see their budgets cut down and political influence diminish; the PKI feared that winding down of revolutionary mobilization would hamper its growth, and Soekarno was wary that the end of the Irian campaign would halt his effort of reviving national unity, thus leaving the Guided Democracy agenda withering on the vine.1142 Thus, another flashpoint was necessary in order to keep the floodgates of revolution open. The opportunity arrived on Soekarno’s doorstep in the form of a short-lived rebellion in the small kingdom of Brunei Darussalam in North Borneo. In December 1962, A.M Azahari, leader of the Brunei People’s Party, initiated a rebellion against the planned Malaysian Federation 1140 Anwar, Sebelum Prahara: Pergolakan Politik Indonesia 1961-1965, 361. “Dalam menghadapi keadaan tertib sipil kita sebagai anggota Angkatan Bersenjata jang merupakan suatu alat revolusi jang berfungsi selaku alat keamanan dan golongan karya belum diperkenankan istirahat.” Merdeka, June 19, 1963; Hariyono, Penerapan Status Bahaya di Indonesia: Sejak Pemerintah Kolonial Belanda hingga Pemerintah Orde Baru [The Practice of the State of Emergency in Indonesia: From the Colonial Period to the New Order], 313. 1142 Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1200, 328. 1141 === [PDF page 433] === 433 and in favor of an independent Brunei. Azahari was in Indonesia during the Indonesian Revolution, and he was in contact with Nasution, who was symphatetic to Azahari’s aims. However, contacts between Indonesia and the Bruneian rebels were quickly dominated by Soebandrio, who was head of the Central Intelligence Board (Badan Pusat Intelijen). In January 1963, Soebandrio, as Foreign Minister, declared resistance against the formation of the Malaysian Federation, defining Indonesia’s foreign policy as a policy of “Confrontation.”1143 On September 16, 1963, Malaysia came into being, and in support of Soekarno’s policy, the PKI went to the streets in mass demonstrations against the formation of the new nation, with massive riots against the British and Malayan Embassy in Jakarta. In retaliation, Malaysia severed diplomatic relations with Indonesia on September 17, 1963, and Indonesia responded in favor on September 21st. Four days later, Soekarno stated that “he would ‘gobble Malaysia raw’ (ganyang Malaysia).1144 Whether Soekarno wanted to annex Malaysia—or parts of it—or not, it was clear that for citizens in both sides of the Straits, Konfrontasi was heading to a new level. Initially, the main beneficiary of the politics of Konfrontasi was the PKI. The PKI’s strategy, which consisted of adapting to the distribution of power within Guided Democracy, is aptly outlined in Aidit’s lecture on February 26, 1963 to the students at the Police University (Perguruan Tinggi Ilmu Kepolisian, PTIK): In the political power of our country now there are not only compradors, bureaucratic capitalists, and landlords, but also people who are pro-people, who are 1143 1144 Ricklefs, 329. Ricklefs, 330. === [PDF page 434] === 434 supported by the workers, peasants, democratic intellectuals, and other democrats. Thus, political power in our country has two aspects, that is, a pro-people’s aspect and an anti-people’s aspect.1145 In a move that directly departs from the Stalinist line, Aidit’s statement clearly delineates the existence of two social groups that were in enmity of each other within the single system of Guided Democracy. Aidit further elaborated this theory of a “state with two aspects” in a speech in Peking, on September 1963: The state power of the Republic of Indonesia is a contradiction between two opposing aspects: the first aspect is that which represents the interests of the people. The second aspect is that which represents the interests of the people’s enemies. The first aspect is embodied in the progressive attitude and policy of President Soekarno. …The second aspect is embodied in the attitude and policy of the rightists and die hards...1146 Subsequently, Aidit argued that the PKI’s main political aim is to empower the “pro-people’s aspect” and destroy the “anti-people’s aspect,” as shown in a series of lectures in the National Front from September to November 1964, stating that “the important problem in Indonesia now is 1145 1146 Translation adopted from Mortimer. Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Soekarno, 133. Trans. Adopted from Mortimer. Mortimer, 134. === [PDF page 435] === 435 not to smash the state power as is the case in many other states, but to strengthen and consolidate the pro-people’s aspect… and to eliminate the anti-people’s aspect.”1147 The arrival of Konfrontasi, directly helped the PKI’s position by providing them with many opportunities to be exploited, whether it was in foreign or domestic policies.1148 Soekarno’s vehement-sounding call for national mobilization against the forces of neo-colonialism, for instance, is certainly in accordance with the party’s interest in mass mobilization of the people. Meanwhile, the foreign crusade against a nascent Western-influenced state also provided the PKI with a political goal that was in line with Soekarno’s own ambitions. However, it should be noted that the PKI were also wary of the potential of the use of the Konfrontasi crisis as a pretext to “reinvoke martial law powers,” while implying that “the generals were seeking to extend hostilities in order to provoke a situation that would facilitate ‘Bonapartist’ solutions to domestic problems.”1149 Ultimately, however, in the purposes of balancing the Army’s influence, Soekarno’s proposal of a political coalition of Nationalist, Islamist, and Communist parties—later abbreviated as Nasakom (Nasionalis, Agama, Komunis)—also played well for the party’s political position.1150 According to Rex Mortimer: The uses of the Malaysia campaign for the PKI were at the same time symbolic and instrumental: symbolic in the sense that while the party’s policy statements were 1147 Mortimer, 135. Mortimer, 203–4. 1149 Mortimer, 109. 1150 Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, 48. 1148 === [PDF page 436] === 436 couched int eh terms of the destruction of the Malaysian edifice their actual aim was the inculcation of a radical mood in Indonesia rather than the promotion of an external venture; instrumental in the sense that the development of the spirit and outlook sought by the PKI was calculated to strengthen its hand in internal politics at the expense of its rivals and enemies.1151 In short, Guided Democracy and the Konfrontasi was a boon for the PKI. However, as we will see, it was not only the PKI that benefited from this campaign. “The Martial Approach”: Mobilization of Society during Guided Democracy Both the West Irian campaign and Konfrontasi was as beneficial to the Army as they were for the PKI. It was during the West Irian campaign and Konfrontasi that Soekarno paved the way for the return of military administration that was first done during the Revolution. On July 19, 1963, Soekarno inaugurated a new Supreme Operations Command (Komando Operasi Tertinggi, KOTI), which replaced the West Irian-era Supreme Command for the Liberation of West Irian— which was in turn a direct descendant of the martial law-era Supreme War Authority (Penguasa Perang Tertinggi, Peperti). In contrast to the Supreme War Authority, the Supreme Operations Command was led by a mix of military and civilians, with Soekarno as its head, Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Ahmad Yani as its chief of staff, Foreign Minister Soebandrio as First Deputy (Intelligence), Air Commodore Sri Muljono Herlambang as Second Deputy (Operations), and Minister of Information Achmadi as Third Deputy (Mobilization). Without a precise goal such 1151 Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Soekarno, 204. === [PDF page 437] === 437 as the liberation of Irian Barat, however, the new Supreme Operations Command has goals that were much more vague: its main purpose was to coordinate “security operations on the implementation of government programs in general, especially in the field of Confrontation against counter-revolutionary elements, elements of colonialism and imperialism in all of their manifestations, as well as safeguarding the implementation of economic programs,” while it was responsible to evaluate, plan, control, and oversee these efforts through the coordination of “every executive element and national potential.”1152 These broad tasks were entrusted to a Joint Chiefs of Staff (gabungan), which consisted of intelligence, operations, mobilization, logistics, and political-economic and social Staffs.1153 As we can see above, the formation of the KOTI staff was a direct imitation of the Army General Staff (Staf Umum Angkatan Darat). Thus, the KOTI became a mirror image of the Army within the national government itself. Between the five staffs within the KOTI, the most important and influential one was the Deputy V / Political, Economic, and Social Affairs (later known as G-V KOTI), which was headed by Brig.Gen. Soetjipto S.H., a military jurist that was a graduate of the Military Law Academy. Many important New Order figures, such as Sudharmono, Moerdiono, and Amir Moertono, who were graduates of the Military Law Academy, served in G-V KOTI. The G-V KOTI, which was responsible for almost every non-military affairs, was a training ground for many of the New Order era civil-military officers. The G-V KOTI was working closely with the Assistant V for Territorial 1152 1153 “Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia No.142 Tahun 1963” (1963), art. 1,2. Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia No.142 Tahun 1963, art. 4. === [PDF page 438] === 438 Affairs at the Army General Staff, Brigadier General S. Sokowati. The G-V KOTI was, in many ways, a predecessor for the Army’s domination over national politics. At the height of Konfrontasi, the authority of the KOTI was expanded tremendously. The central committee became a shadow-cabinet of sorts, which helped coordinate most of Soekarno’s anti-imperialist policies. This includes its role in mass mobilization, which subsequently elevated the role of KOTI into one of the most important apparatuses of Guided Democracy. During Konfrontasi, the pattern of mobilization that has started during the West Irian campaign expanded into a national movement for a sukarelawan command. On March 16, 1964, in a Cabinet meeting with the nationwide Tjatur Tunggal leadership, Soekarno called for a nationwide movement of volunteers (gerakan sukarelawan di seluruh Indonesia) in order to bolster the nation’s revolutionary resilience, to face the Malaysian neo-colonialist project, and to support KOTI operations.1154 Responding to Soekarno’s call, On March 18, 1964 KOTI Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Ahmad Yani issued a communique, stating that every activity in regards to the sukarelawan, which includes recruitment, training, and deployment, are to be administered by KOTI.1155 This means that every political organizations, youth movements, and institutions have to submit their members’ data to the Front Nasional, and then to the KOTI. On April 13, 1964, in a massive show of force, Soekarno spoke in front of approximately one million sukarelawans, in a “Mass Rally of Volunteers” (Appel Besar Sukarelawan) in front of 1154 Departemen Penerangan, 20 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka, 1965, 6:351. Ahmad Yani, “Pengumuman Kepala Staf Komando Operasi Tertinggi No.1 Tahun 1964,” March 18, 1964, RA.37 2091, ANRI. 1155 === [PDF page 439] === 439 the Merdeka Palace in Jakarta. The rally was attended by volunteers from various elements of society, from “mass organizations, students, university students, youth, workers, women, scouts (Pramuka), laborers, farmers, journalists, artists, and others.”1156 Roughly one month later, on May 3, 1964, Soekarno announced, in front of another massive rally of volunteers, the call for a Volunteers Action Command (Komando Aksi Sukarelawan), which was better known as the Twin Commands of the People (Dwi Komando Rakyat, Dwikora): “Strengthen the resilience of the Indonesian revolution and assist the revolutionary struggle of the peoples of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei to dissolve the puppet state ‘Malaysia’.”1157 Two weeks after the announcement of Soekarno’s Dwikora, KOTI released its initial sukarelawan recruitment plan for the purposes of military support operations (perbantuan militer), which involved 5,500 men spread across the country’s twentyfive provinces, from Atjeh to West Irian.1158 What was important in both mass rallies, however, is Soekarno’s claim that he was speaking to “twenty-one million volunteers all across Indonesia.” although its precise number and the quality of its training was questionable at best. Rex Mortimer notes that as the Army kept close watch over who was given small arms, “it was a customary sight in Djakarta and the provinces,” 1156 “21 Djuta Sukarelawan Indonesia Digembleng,” Mimbar Indonesia, May 1964, 35. See the cited work for full text of the speech. Soekarno, Dwikomando Rakjat Untuk Pengganjangan “Malaysia.” Amanat Pada Appel-Besar Sukarelawan Pengganjangan “Malaysia” Pada Tanggal 3 Mei 1964 Didepan Istana Merdeka Djakarta, Penerbitan Chusus 314 (Jakarta: Departemen Penerangan Republik Indonesia [Ministry of Information, Republic of Indonesia], 1964), 26–27. 1158 Ahmad Yani, “Instruksi Kepala Staf Komando Operasi Tertinggi No.7/KOTI/Tahun 1964,” April 27, 1964, RA.37 2091, ANRI. 1157 === [PDF page 440] === 440 in late 1964, “to see units of volunteers from workplaces and offices drilling in waste lots, but most of them were armed with nothing more lethal than sticks.”1159 Meanwhile, Soekarno expanded the scope of the sukarelawan program into non-military fields. On August 14, 1964, Soekarno institutionalized a National Volunteers Movement (Gerakan Sukarelawan Indonesia) through Law No.9 of 1964. The law states that the national movement was to be led by Soekarno himself, while the regional leaders were to be done through the Pantja Tunggal under the Governor/Regional heads.1160 The law also stated that the volunteers were to be deployed not only in military or security-related tasks, but also in the field of general resilience (ketahanan dalam segala bidang), whether in politics, military, economics, or cultural aspects.1161 Again it was the KOTI, who became the administrators of this new task. Roughly one month later, on September 14, 1964, Soekarno established Regional Authorities to Implement Dwikora (Penguasa Pelaksana Dwikora Daerah, Pepelrada) across Indonesia, which was directly responsible to the KOTI.1162 The Pepelrada was authorized to deploy many of the emergency powers that was entrusted to the military through martial law, including “the authority to detain individuals up to thirty days without trial, impose curfews, restrict movements of “dangerous” people, and seize property.”1163 The Pepelrada was also to be responsible for the mobilization and 1159 Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Soekarno, 243. “Undang Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 9 Tahun 1964 Tentang Gerakan Sukarelawan Indonesia” (1964), art. 3. 1161 Undang Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 9 Tahun 1964 tentang Gerakan Sukarelawan Indonesia, art. Memori Pendjelasan, Art.1. 1162 It is important to note that the composition of Pepelrada varied by province—in some places it was dominated purely by the Army, in other areas a combination of civil and military men. I am indebted to Douglas Kammen for making this point. 1163 Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, 76. 1160 === [PDF page 441] === 441 recruitment of the sukarelawan in the regions. Here we see the dual logic of control and mobilization in play again. The pattern of militarized mobilization was also evident in the field of economics. On April 24, 1962, Soekarno established the formation of a Supreme Command for Economic Operations (Komando Tinggi Operasi Ekonomi, KOTOE), which was responsible to himself for the overall guidance of the economy and the drafting of programs to immediately provide the people with food and clothing (sandang-pangan). Its seventeen members included many important figures of state institutions related to the economy, such as the Minister for Central Bank Sumarno, Bank Indonesia Drs. Khouw Bian Tie, and Bank Negara chief Jusuf Muda Dalam. However, four of them were military men—Major General Suprajogi, Lieutenant General Hidayat, and Colonel Achmadi.1164 Meanwhile, the secretariat, was almost purely manned by Army officers, many graduates of the Military Law Academy.1165 In accordance to the militarism typical of the period, seventeen members of the Command were given military rank, including First Minister Djuanda, Soebandrio, Bank of Indonesia governor Mr. Sumarno, and Dr. J. Leimena who were all given four-star military ranks.1166 This act was followed up by Soekarno on December 3, 1962, in which he inaugurates the role of the 1164 “Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia No.26/PLM.T. Tahun 1962 Tentang Komando Tertinggi Operasi Ekonomi” (1962). 1165 These officers include Colonel Sujatmo from the Military Police, Navy Colonel Sudiarso, Lieutenant Colonel Sukamto Sajidiman (Director of the state enterprise PN Pembangunan Niaga), Lieutenant Colonel Jusuf Ramli, and Lieutenant Colonel Suhardiman of the Army-sponsored labor union SOKSI. See Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia No.26/PLM.T. Tahun 1962 tentang Komando Tertinggi Operasi Ekonomi. 1166 Justus M. Van der Kroef, “Indonesia’s Economic Difficulties,” International Journal 17, no. 4 (1962): 399; Djamin, Ir. H. Djuanda: Negarawan, Administrator, Dan Teknokrat Utama, 215. === [PDF page 442] === 442 Armed Forces in economic projects conducted by the Ministry of Production and Ministry of Distribution through Karya operations (Operasi Karya).1167 Through the Karya operations, the Army is deployed in community development projects, building roads, schools, and other infrastructural projects across the country.1168In commenting to the establishment of the KOTOE and the Armed Forces’ role in the economy, The Economist stated that “civilian members have been put into military uniform to sustain the metaphor of a martial approach to economics. The martial approach is indeed a fact of Indonesian life.”1169 Putting aside the questions of quantity and quality, it is clear that the idea of mass mobilization through the volunteers program were taken to a whole new level during Konfrontasi. and the Army was utilizing the program to justify its expansion in non-military affairs through paramilitary recruitment and training. Considering its long experience in recruiting and training non-military forces in counterinsurgency operations, the Army was one of the most experienced institutions in the country to do such a task. During Konfrontasi, the Army focused on training volunteers from the civil service and the students. On March 21, 1964, the Departments of Land Transportation, Post and Telecommunications, and Tourism established a Volunteer Brigade of Transportation and Telecommunications (Brigade Sukarelawan Angkutan dan Telekomunikasi), which was to be assigned to various tasks under the command of KOTI.1170 From the State Post and 1167 “Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia No.371 Tahun 1962 Tentang Operasi Karya Angkatan Bersendjata” (1962). 1168 Further on the Operasi Karya, see Siagian, “The Operasi Karya: The Involvement of the Indonesian Army in Rural Development.” 1169 “A Warrior in Chaos.” 1170 Departemen Perhubungan Direktorat Jenderal Pos dan Telekomunikasi, Sejarah Pos Dan Telekomunikasi Di Indonesia: Masa Demokrasi Terpimpin, 68. === [PDF page 443] === 443 Telecommunications (Post dan Telekomunikasi, PTT) alone, the brigade had at least 13,000 volunteers by the end of 1964.1171 Similarly, a Volunteer Brigade of Development and Civil Defense (Brigade Sukarelawan Pembangunan-Hansip) was also established in the Ministry of Information (Departemen Penerangan) on June 9, 1964, which consisted of a volunteers brigade that was four battalion strong, which also included students from the Department’s service academy, the Akademi Penerangan.1172 On September 7, 1964, civil servants working at ministries under the Coordinating Ministry for Popular Affairs (Kementerian Koordinator Kompartemen Hubungan dengan Rakjat), such as the Ministry of Information, the National Archives (Arsip Nasional), National Film Council (Dewan Film Indonesia), were required to undergo compulsory sukarelawan training.1173 Their training, which was conducted by the 7th Cavalry Battalion of the Jakarta Military Regional Command, began on October 1964 and included courses on military marching, basic weapons training, and self-defense.1174 Similarly on July 2, 1965, the Coordinating Ministry for Agricultural and Land Affairs established the Volunteer Brigade for Self-Reliant Production (Brigade Sukarelawan Produksi Berdikari).1175 Meanwhile, the Student Regiments, which were formed early on during the West Irian campaign, were also often deployed in internal security operations during Konfrontasi. According 1171 Departemen Perhubungan Direktorat Jenderal Pos dan Telekomunikasi, 68. “Schema Org. Brig. Sukarelawan Pembangunan-Hansip Dep.Pen.,” July 9, 1964, RA.37 616, ANRI. 1173 Menteri Koordinator Kompartimen Perhubungan dengan Rakjat, “Surat Keputusan Menteri Koordinator Kompartimen Perhubungan Dengan Rakjat No: 21/MK-PR/KPT/1964,” September 7, 1964, RA.37 2093, ANRI. 1174 Menteri Koordinator Kompartimen Perhubungan dengan Rakjat, “Surat No.081/MK-PR/PII-1/1965,” April 30, 1965, RA.37 2093, ANRI. 1175 Menteri Koordinator Kompartimen dan Agraria, “Surat Keputusan Menteri Koordinator Kompartimen Pertanian Dan Agraria No.KOMP/P.148/T.U.Pd.Ch/1965 Tentang Pedoman Kerdja Brigade Sukarelawan Produksi Berdikari,” n.d., RA.37 466, ANRI. 1172 === [PDF page 444] === 444 to M. Harjono Kartohadiprodjo, who was a student at University of Indonesia Faculty of Law and a Company Commander in the Mahajaya Regiment, the Regiment was deployed in urban security operations. During the 1961 Thomas Cup in Indonesia, Harjono’s unit was responsible for the security of the Athletes Housing Complex in the Senayan Sports Complex.1176 During the 1962 Asian Games, the Mahajaya was seconded by the Army to the Ministry of Health in a mass vaccination drive against smallpox in Tanjung Priok and Cilincing.1177 During the 1963 Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO), the Mahajaya was again responsible for security at the sports complexes, under direct command of the Army General Staff.1178 In May 1965, around forty professors and lecturers from Universitas Indonesia was trained in the Lecturer Cadre Training for Defense and Security in Higher Education (Latihan Kader Dosen untuk Pertahanan dan Keamanan dalam Lingkungan Perguruan Tinggi). Those participating included jurists Mardjono Reksodiputro SH, Benjamin Mangkoedilaga, Girindro Pringgodigdo SH, and Mohammad Daud SH, Dr.dr.Moegie Alibasyah (doctor), Prof.Dr. Nugroho Notosusanto (historian), economists Hoediatmo Hoed and Drs. Hariri Hardi, linguist Drs. Benny Hoed, and others. Harjono, who was an assistant lecturer at the Faculty of Law, was also included in the group.1179 1176 M.Harjono Kartohadiprodjo was the son of Universitas Indonesia Faculty of Law Professor Soediman Kartohadiprodjo. Soediman is the older brother of the Army intellectual Sajidiman Soerjohadiprodjo. M.Harjono Kartohadiprodjo, Melangkah Di Tiga Zaman (Jakarta: PT Elex Media Komputindo, 2021), 91–92. 1177 Kartohadiprodjo, 93. 1178 Kartohadiprodjo, 93. 1179 Kartohadiprodjo, 97. === [PDF page 445] === 445 The professors and lecturers were trained in basic military knowledge in the Civil Defense Headquarters at Salemba Raya for one month, from May 26 until June 26, 1965. The training included leadership and emergency management, marching—with full load sans the ammunition—for ten kilometers, and a night march. Harjono himself, was assigned to carry a Bren light machine gun, as he was one of the younger members of the group. The training was concluded by A.H Nasution himself, in full military manner, on June 26, 1965.1180 During Konfrontasi, the military (and PKI) mobilization of society became much more evident in many other elements of everyday life. One significant aspect was in music. Since early 1964, the PKI-affiliated cultural organization LEKRA and its affiliate, Lembaga Musik Indonesia, argued for the necessity of organizing a music that was “in line with the national personality (musik jang berkepribadian nasional)”.1181 National music, which were to be aligned with the national personality embodied by the Revolution and its Great Leader, Soekarno, was to be a guideline, to defend the national culture against the “corrupting influences of Western music.”1182 During 1964, popular, Western-influenced music such as the Beatles and Indonesian rock-and-roll such as the Koes Plus group were repressed by the government, with the support of the LEKRA and the blessing of Soekarno.1183 Meanwhile, revolutionary tunes with marching rhythm were encouraged and popularized throughout the national radio. Steven Farram has noted that there was over fifty 1180 Kartohadiprodjo, 97. Rhoma Dwi Aria Yuliantri, “Bersama LEKRA Dan Ansambel; Melacak Panggung Musik Indonesia,” in Ahli Waris Budaya Dunia: Menjadi Indonesia 1950-1965 (Jakarta: KITLV-Jakarta, 2011), 468. 1182 Yuliantri, 472–73. 1183 On the anti-Beatles and Koes Plus campaign, see Steven Farram, “Wage War against Beatle Music! Censorship and Music in Soekarno’s Indonesia,” Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs 41, no. 2 (January 2007): 247–77. 1181 === [PDF page 446] === 446 of songs relating to the Konfrontasi against Malaysia, with some of the most popular ones including the song Ganjang by the Simanalagi choir and orchestra: Bersiaplah Tengku aku datang menentang maksudmu Hadapilah Tengku aku akan merintang niatmu Semangat bangsaku ‘kan membara setiap penjuru Kita berjuang membela keadilan di dunia Kita menuntut merdeka bagi semua bangsa Bangkitlah serentak Afrika Asia (Be prepared Tengku, I am coming to obstruct your plans Face up Tengku, I will block your intentions The enthusiasm of my nation will set alight every corner We fight to defend justice in the world We demand independence for every nation Rise up [together] Africa and Asia.)1184 1184 Steven Farram, “Ganyang! Indonesian Popular Songs from the Confrontation Era, 1963–1966,” Bijdragen Tot de Taal-, Land- En Volkenkunde / Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia 170, no. 1 (January 1, 2014): 7, https://doi.org/10.1163/22134379-17001002. === [PDF page 447] === 447 In addition to songs about the Konfrontasi, there were also popular songs about the sukarelawan, pictured as brave young men (and women) fearlessly advancing towards the front-line to crush the enemy. One of the most popular song is Madju sukarelawan (Advance, volunteers), written by Sudharnoto and sung by the Orkes Kutilang and Ansambel Gembira1185: Madju sukarelawan Bulat semangat tekad kita, Barisan Sukarelawan Indonesia Bedil dan sangkur. Siap bertempur, Tiap tantangan kita lawan, pantang mundur. (hey) Awas imperialis durhaka Pasukan rakyat kita kuat perkasa Ini dadaku, mana dadamu Kamu menyerang, kita ganyang jadi abu Ayolah kawan, buruh tani, pemuda, dan angkatan kita 1185 Farram states that a version of the song, recorded by Zaenal Combo and J Koesnoen and friends, appeared on the Lokananta label together with three other militaristic, marching songs: Menudju medan perbatasan (Towards the border battlefields, written by Dewo Mulyo), NASAKOM bersatu (NASAKOM united, written by C.Simandjuntak) and Indonesia tetap merdeka Indonesia stay free, written by C. Simandjuntak). Lokananta is a state-owned recording label. See Farram, 9 ff 13. === [PDF page 448] === 448 Maju melawan, siap senjata dan cukupkan sandang pangan. Pastilah menang, pastilah menang, pasti menang Revolusi ’45. Our determination is unanimous, Indonesian Volunteer Front Rifle and bayonet. Ready for battle, Every challenge we face, never retreat. (hey) Watch out for the ungodly imperialists Our people's army is mighty This is my chest, where is yours [If] you attack, we’ll crush you to ashes Come on, comrades, farmers, youth, and our generation Forward to fight, ready weapons and enough food and clothing. Will win, will win, will win, Revolution of '45.1186 1186 Rhoma Dwi Aria Yuliantri, “LEKRA and Ensembles: Tracing the Indonesian Musical Stage,” in Heirs to World Culture: Being Indonesian 1950-1965 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2012), 436. === [PDF page 449] === 449 Meanwhile, the image of the sukarelawan was also pictured in a new, 10-cent and 50-cent banknotes issued by Bank Indonesia. These banknotes according to Farram, honored the male volunteers (sukarelawan) and their female counterparts (sukarelawati) although their use were fairly limited as the prevalent inflation in the country means that the banknote did not find much use during the time.1187 It is clear, however, that these “pocket-sized revolutions” were part of Soekarno’s wholesale effort of popularizing the national campaign against Malaysia.1188 Another element of militarization is the regimentation of work, whether it was in the public or private sector. We have seen the pattern of sukarelawan mobilization in state ministries and state-owned enterprises. During Konfrontasi, however, this pattern was magnified much more. On June 24, 1965, Soekarno ordered laborers, students, and farmers already enlisted as Dwikora volunteers to conduct simultaneous roll calls (appel-appel serempak) in their places of work.1189 Indeed, the role of militaristic roll calls (appel) was often replicated in almost every aspect of society in Indonesia during Konfrontasi. The Communists were no exception, as it was noted by Agus Sudono, that PKI actions in the regions during the Aksi Sepihak—which we will discuss later in this chapter, was often patterned by a show of force of laborers and peasants, such as a vigilance roll call (apel siaga) in the local town or village square.1190 Students, whether they were Soekarno supporters or denunciators, also operated through the same tactics. 1187 Farram, “Ganyang! Indonesian Popular Songs from the Confrontation Era, 1963–1966,” 9–10. For the impact of currency design to imperial policy, see Alvita Akiboh, “Pocket-Sized Imperialism: U.S. Designs on Colonial Currency,” Diplomatic History 41, no. 5 (November 1, 2017): 874–902, https://doi.org/10.1093/dh/dhx044. 1189 Soekarno, “Resapkan Dan Amalkan ‘Lima Azimat’ Revolusi Indonesia,” Warta Perdagangan, July 6, 1965, 6. 1190 A. F. Sigit Rochadi, Gerakan Buruh Indonesia: Perlawanan Dan Fragmentasi, Cetakan pertama (Jakarta: Bumi Aksara, 2020), 86. 1188 === [PDF page 450] === 450 Another pattern of militarization that was evident during much of Guided Democracy was the prevalence of military uniforms and honorary military ranks that were given to civilian figures. Foreign Minister and First Deputy Prime Minister Soebandrio wore the uniform of an Air Force Air Marshal (Marsekal Madya Udara), Second Deputy Prime Minister (Wakil Perdana Menteri II) J. Leimena wore the uniform of an Navy Admiral (Laksamana), while Third Deputy Prime Minister (Wakil Perdana Menteri III) Chaerul Saleh wore the uniform of four-star Army general.1191 Roeslan Abdulgani, the Minister for the Front Nasional, also received an honorary rank of a four-star Army general in 1964.1192 Meanwhile, Minister of Information Achmadi, who was also the Deputy for Mobilization in the KOTI, was given an honorary rank of a one-star general (Brigadir Jenderal).1193 Of course, this militaristic trend was started first by none other than Soekarno, whose military uniform was rather ubiquitous. Since the advent of Guided Democracy, Soekarno has always been seen wearing his uniform as Supreme Commander (Panglima Tertinggi) of the Armed Forces, complete with five star on his epaulettes and service ribbons and medals on his chest.1194 These uniforms did not only serve an aesthetic purpose, as the functional aspects of these uniforms and honorary military ranks were clearly evident in a country that was continuously ruled through martial law. Nevertheless, with the massive expansion of volunteer units, the “uniformization” of Indonesian society reached a whole new level under Konfrontasi. 1191 “Pelantikan Direksi B.P.U.-Niaga`,” Warta Perdagangan, May 5, 1965. Abdulgani-Knapp, A Fading Dream, 177. 1193 Sundhaussen, Politik militer Indonesia 1945-1967, 282. 1194 Sundhaussen, 241. 1192 === [PDF page 451] === 451 Last but not least, militarization, is also evident in the positioning of Army officers in strategic posts within the government and the state-owned enterprises. In the new cabinet introduced after the Presidential Decree of 1959 (Kabinet Kerdja I), at least one-third of the ministers were active members of the armed forces.1195 Meanwhile, under the functional group system, the armed forces were represented as a golongan karya in the Gotong-Royong People’s Representative Council (DPR-GR) and the Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly (MPRS), while five officers became provincial governors in 1960.1196 In addition to the clearly militaryrelated post of Minister for Defense and Security (later Minister for National Security) held by Gen. A.H. Nasution, there were many cabinet posts occupied by military men. Indeed, many of the strategic ministerial posts that were directly related to the recruitment of sukarelawans were held by military officers, either the Army, Navy, Air Force or the Police. In the First Working Cabinet (Kabinet Kerdja I, July 1959-February 1960) and the Second Working Cabinet (Kabinet Kerdja II, February 1960-March 1962), there were a number of Armed Forces representatives within the cabinet. Nasution himself, as Minister for Defense and Security, oversees the Ministries of Defense, Justice, Police, and Veterans. Meanwhile the Coordinating Minister for Production, responsible for the management of state-owned and nationalized enterprises, was held by Army Lieutenant General Dadang Suprajogi, a former Siliwangi officer. Suprajogi oversees the strategic posts of Ministry of Agriculture (under Army Colonel dr.Azis Saleh), Ministry of Public Works, and Ministry of Labor. Meanwhile, the Minister for Land Communications and Post, Telegraph, and Telephone was held by Army Lieutenant General 1195 1196 Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, 47. Crouch, 47–48. === [PDF page 452] === 452 G.P.H. Djatikoesoemo, while the Minister for Health was held by Army doctor Major General Prof.Dr.Satrio. Meanwhile the Minister for Interior and Regional Autonomy was held by Ipik Gandamana, a former IPKI politician close to the Army. Hence, Armed Forces has a significant role in the cabinet, overseeing strategic posts such as policing, justice, and economic administration.1197 Throughout Guided Democracy, the Armed Forces’ posts in the executive were expanded further. During the First Dwikora Cabinet (Kabinet Dwikora I, September 1964February 1966). Out of ninety-seven posts in the cabinet, the military held thirty-five.1198 All of these positions subsequently helped the Army to effectively coordinate its efforts in mobilizing the people. Thus, it is clear that the Armed Forces did not only dominated mobilization efforts in the grassroots level, but also the cabinet. The Army versus the PKI During much of the late 1960s, the Army and the PKI, two of the strongest forces in Indonesian politics, were in a fierce competition that gradually moved towards virtual confrontation. On January 18, 1964, in accordance to the heightening confrontational policy against Malaysia and the United Kingdom, PKI-affiliated estate workers union Sarbupri (Sarekat Buruh Perkebunan Republik Indonesia) seized control of sixteen British-owned rubber, tea, and coffee plantations in West Java. Within the next two days, Communist trade unions and the Pemuda Rakjat seized Shell and Unilever factories and warehouses in Djakarta. The government 1197 1198 Sundhaussen, The Road to Power, 256–57. Based on the official website for the Cabinet Secretary of the Republic of Indonesia, www.setkab.go.id. === [PDF page 453] === 453 and the Army responded immediately by sending in military “control teams” that were charged with protecting and supervising the British companies.1199 The second, and more significant offensive was the “unilateral actions” (aksi sepihak) that were launched in June 1964. According to Mortimer, the aksi sepihak campaigns represented a “unique facet of the PKI’s drive to power, in that it was the only major struggle” that the party initiated outside of parliamentary methods.1200 The unilateral actions, meant to implement the land reform laws of 1959-1960, was violent. The campaigns, which consisted of PKI villagers seizing properties and land from rural landowners in Central Java, East Java, Bali, West Java, and North Sumatra, were marred by violent conflict between the PKI and local landlords (many Muslims and PNI supporters), bureaucrats, army managers, and, in the case of East Java, the santri supporters of NU.1201 On October 15, 1964, in Djatibarang, West Java, a mob of two thousand BTI and Pemuda Rakjat attacked seven state forestry policemen, while in the next day, three Forest Service officials were “maltreated” by the PKI-sponsored mobs.1202 Some legal action was taken against the perpetrators, but by December 1964, this so-called Indramayu Affair was largely forgotten in the press. Within the confines of the aksi sepihak, direct conflict between the PKI and the Army was inevitable, which unraveled itself in the incident in Bandar Betsy, North Sumatra, on May 14, 1965, which was widely reported on the national press.1203 Thus, as a consequence of both the 1199 Justus M. van der Kroef, “Indonesian Communism’s ‘Revolutionary Gymnastics,’” Asian Survey 5, no. 5 (May 1965): 219. 1200 Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Soekarno, 277. 1201 Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1200, 332. 1202 van der Kroef, “Indonesian Communism’s ‘Revolutionary Gymnastics,’” 221. 1203 The Bandar Betsy Incident happened when hundreds of PKI-affiliated masses occupied a state-owned rubber plantation in East Sumatra. The local NCO guarding the plantation section, Pembantu Letnan Dua Sujono, was killed === [PDF page 454] === 454 PKI-led offensives against Western enterprises and the landowners in the rural areas of Java, there was a general sharpening of competition between the Army and the PKI. The competition between the Army and the PKI were also evident in the field of discourse, especially in media and historiography. In the context of feature films, the story of the poet and screenwriter Asrul Sani is representative here. In 1961, Asrul directed his second movie, Pagar Kawat Berduri (1961), which was produced by Usmar Ismail and Djamaluddin Malik’s PERFINI studio.1204 Set during the Revolution (1945-1949), the movie tells a story about how self-declared freedom fighters (pejuang) does not always reflect their personal motivation in participating in the Revolution. The movie climaxed in the conversation between a well-educated Dutch officer, Koenen, and Parman, a captured Indonesian pejuang about the justness of their role in the war which ended in the suicide of the Dutch officer. This movie was heavily criticized by “leftists” (PKI, LEKRA and their sympathizers) as it was argued that it created sympathy for the Dutch officer, which was against the revolutionary cause argued by Soekarno. The movie was proposed to be censored by the National Film Censorship Board. It was only after Soekarno’s own decision that the movie is not against the “revolution,” that it was released to the public. However, as many of the cinemas were controlled by PKI-affiliated labor unions, the movie failed in the market.1205 by the masses. See Mohammad Abdul Ghani, Jejak Planters Di Tanah Deli: Dinamika Perkebunan Di Sumatra Timur, 1863-1996 (Bogor: PT Penerbit IPB Press, 2019), 56. 1204 This was Asrul’s second movie. The first one, Titian Serambut Dibelah Tujuh (1959), was screened in 1959. All of his movies were produced through Usmar Ismail and Djamaluddin Malik’s PERFINI Studio. See Misbach Yusa Biran, “Asrul Dalam Film,” in Asrul Sani 70 Tahun Penghargaan Dan Penghormatan, ed. Ajip Rosidi (Jakarta: Pustaka Jaya, 1997), 118–19. 1205 Biran, 119. === [PDF page 455] === 455 One year later, Asrul joined the Lembaga Seniman dan Budayawan Muslimin Indonesia (LESBUMI), which was designed to be a front for artists and writers directly affiliated with the Nahdlatul Ulama. Filmmaker Usmar Ismail became the general chairman of LESBUMI, while Asrul became the first chairman.1206 On the film front, LESBUMI and LEKRA competed with each other, especially during the LEKRA-sponsored 1964 Aksi Pemboikotan Film Imperialis Amerika Serikat, which did not only target American-made movies, but also Indonesian or any movies that were considered as supportive towards the American cause. As a result of this action, many movie theaters in Indonesia went out of business: from seven hundred and fifty in the early 1960s, only half remained in 1965. Meanwhile, film studios such as PERSARI and PERFINI stopped producing Indonesian films after 1962.1207 In early 1964, the LEKRA committed itself to a cultural offensive by calling for a total boycott of American newsreels and films. As their agenda coincided with Soekarno’s own concern with how Western culture is “an affront to ‘Indonesian identity’,” this campaign became one of “the party’s major agitational platforms.”1208 It did not take long until this campaign against American “cultural imperialism” paved the way for open violence. On December 4 and December 7, 1964, angry mobs consisting of thousands of PKI youths and students stoned and sacked the libraries of the United States Information Service (USIS) in Jakarta and Surabaya, resulting in the 1206 Biran, 121. Biran, 124. 1208 Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Soekarno, 244. 1207 === [PDF page 456] === 456 burning of thousands of books.1209 It is clear that Communist and anti-Communist forces in Indonesia were at loggerheads not only in the case of the economy, but also in culture. Another example is the competition in historiography. In 1964, the Front Nasional, which was inherently dominated by PKI cadres and its sympathizers, published a national history monograph, titled the History of National Movement, 1908-1964 (Sejarah Pergerakan Nasional, 1908-1964), which was published by the Front as the main historical corpus in the FN’s indoctrination programs.1210 As with most of the Front Nasional indoctrination materials published during the period, the monograph was based upon the various speeches and lectures presented in the Front Nasional’s Kursus Kader Revolusi Angkatan Dwikora, coordinated by former Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo and edited by PKI representative Anwar Sanusi. In a tendency that puts emphasis on the revolution and the role of the political left in national history, the monograph states that “the history of the national movement [in Indonesia] is part of the history of people’s movements in the world.”1211 According to Ruth McVey, it was the position of the PKI that “history become too important to be left to the historians.”1212 In 1964, the Army and its most prominent historian, Nasution, responded to this PKI monograph by assigning a taskforce of historians from the University of Indonesia Faculty of Humanities (Fakultas Sastra UI), led by Nugroho Notosusanto. The team subsequently published 1209 van der Kroef, “Indonesian Communism’s ‘Revolutionary Gymnastics,’” 217. Team Pembantu Sedjarah Pergerakan Nasional, Sejarah Pergerakan Nasional, 1908-1964; Berdasarkan Kuliah2 Sedjarah Pergerakan Nasional Kursus Kader Revolusi Angkatan Dwikora (Djakarta: Pengurus Besar Front Nasional, 1964). 1211 Team Pembantu Sedjarah Pergerakan Nasional, 7. 1212 Ruth Thomas McVey, “The Enchantment of the Revolution: History and Action in an Indonesian Communist Text,” in Perceptions of the Past in Southeast Asia, ed. David Marr and Anthony Reid (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann, 1979). 1210 === [PDF page 457] === 457 A Short History of the Armed Struggle of the Indonesian People (Sedjarah Singkat Perdjuangan Bersenjata Bangsa Indonesia), which was endorsed by the Army. The Short History emphasized the story of the Communist treachery in Madiun. Within the same year, in response to the PKIdominated Front Nasional’s efforts in rewriting Indonesian historiography, the Armed Forces General Staff formed the Special Bureau for History (Biro Chusus Sejarah Staf Angkatan Bersendjata), which would later become the Armed Forces Historical Center.1213 In the wider cultural sphere, the competition between anti-communists and the PKI was evident in the Manifesto Kebudayaan debacle. On August 17, 1963, a group of intellectuals, led by the literary critic H.B Jassin who were opposed to the PKI-affiliated LEKRA, proclaimed a “Cultural Manifesto” (Manifesto Kebudayaan, Manikebu), which calls for a national culture that is free from the domination of any ideology—“art for the sake of art itself.” The Manifesto, while clearly endorsing the Pancasila as a national ideology, was heavily attacked by the PKI, Lekra, and the PNI as a “bourgeois, non-revolutionary, and ‘universal humanist’ deviation” to the national revolutionary project. On May 8, 1964, Soekarno banned the Manikebu movement, providing the LEKRA and the PKI with a clear victory.1214 The Issue of a “Fifth Force” and The Tragedy of October 1, 1965 In 1965, the PKI continued its gradual offensive against the Army. On January 1, 1965, the PKI Politburo stated in its daily, Harian Rakjat, that the foremost task of the party was “the 1213 1214 Asvi Warman Adam, Bung Karno Dibunuh Tiga Kali? (Jkarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2010), 79. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1200, 332. === [PDF page 458] === 458 crushing of the capitalist bureaucrats (kapitalis birokrat).”1215 Rex Mortimer notes that the euphemism was used not only to indict those who were implicated in economic malpractices at the time, but more importantly, it also referred to the Army leaders that were politically opposed to Soekarno and the PKI.1216 Popular mobilization—through the sukarelawan program and other military training— became a field of contention between the Army and the PKI. The PKI has been widely supportive of the volunteer movement, as it provided them with nationalist prestige and the possibility of training its members in the use of small arms.1217 In reality, however, the Army kept close watch on the volunteer trainings: in April 1962, Pemuda Rakyat leader Sukatno complained that while almost quarter of a million Pemuda Rakyat members were enrolled in the program, they were never trained by the Army.1218 It was in 1965, however, military training for the people became the primary target for the PKI’s renewed political program. In early January 1965, Aidit proposed to Soekarno an idea of a “Fifth Force”—an armed militia consisting of organized peasants and laborers—to complement the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Police.1219 Soekarno’s initial response to these proposals of a “Fifth Force” was ambiguous at best. On a radio speech on January 14, 1965, Aidit stated that Soekarno has responded favorably to his proposal.1220 The PKI expanded Aidit’s proposal, adding the idea to establish “Nasakom advisory 1215 Harian Rakjat, January 1, 1965. Cited in Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Soekarno, 379. Mortimer, 379. 1217 Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Soekarno, 243. 1218 Mortimer, 117. 1219 Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, 87. 1220 Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Soekarno, 381. 1216 === [PDF page 459] === 459 teams” that were to be attached in Army, Navy, Air Force, and Police units.1221 Eventually, on a meeting at the National Resilience Institute (Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional, Lemhannas) on June 1, 1965, Soekarno himself urged for the Army territorial commanders “to give serious consideration to the fifth force proposal.”1222 Of course, the Army responded with caution to this intervention on military policy, with General Yani stating, on June 14, 1965, that “the matter of a fifth force was entirely up to the president to decide.”1223 However, the responses from the other services were much more positive with Air Force commander Air Marshal Omar Dhani agreeing, and announcing that Marxism should be taught in the Air Force Command and Staff College, and Air Force units in the regions could receive instruction in Marxism from outside of the Air Force, while the Navy commander Admiral R.E. Martadinata stated that the fifth force idea is “a positive question in revolutionary development.”1224 By this time, it was clear that the Army was inherently opposed to the idea of arming farmers, peasants and laborers. According to Mortimer, the Army’s opposition was primarily motivated by political concerns: they were worried that this new force would open the gates for further PKI influence in the Armed Forces.1225 However, certainly other institutional concerns also influenced the Army’s fear of losing its monopoly over violence. First, there was the Army’s firsthand experience in dealing with the problem of the gerombolan and the regional rebellions. 1221 Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, 87. Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Soekarno, 382. 1223 Mortimer, 382. 1224 Mortimer, 382–83. 1225 Mortimer, 383. 1222 === [PDF page 460] === 460 The Army was concerned that the arming of peasants and laborers into a new militia force would create problems that were not dissimilar to what the Army had worked hard to resolve throughout the 1950s. However, the Army were not purely indifferent to the idea of a trained citizenry, which framework has been put into place by the Civil Defence and sukarelawan frameworks—all in accordance to the national defense policy that was already adopted by the Army themselves. This was reflected in General Yani’s statement by the end of June 1965, who said that “when the nekolim (neocolonialists and imperialists) attacks us, every Indonesian will be armed, not only the peasants and laborers.”1226 The concept of the a new militia, through adapting the framework of the sukarelawan training and with potential small arms support from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), was meant to support Indonesian anti-imperialist struggles and Soekarno’s Nasakom doctrine. According to Taomo Zhou, the Chinese government’s response was “encouraging but cautious,” as PRC Premier Zhou Enlai stated to First Deputy Prime Minister Soebandrio that “the militia can defend the motherland’s territory, airspace, and territorial waters… militarized masses are invincible.”1227 In late June 1965, Soekarno sent a delegation of sukarelawan to the PRC, North Korea, and Vietnam in order to learn about the militia in these three countries. In Beijing, People’s Liberation Army General Luo Ruiqing told the delegation that “whether you can follow the Chinese experience is a question only you can answer for yourself based on the situation in Indonesia. Our experience is just for your reference. Every country’s circumstances are different. 1226 Pikiran Rakjat, June 26, 1965. Cited in Sundhaussen, Politik militer Indonesia 1945-1967, 339. Taomo Zhou, Migration in the Time of Revolution: China, Indonesia, and the Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019), 157. 1227 === [PDF page 461] === 461 We all have to start from the specific conditions of our country.”1228 It is clear that Chinese support towards the PKI’s idea for a fifth force is ambivalent at best. Thus, what motivated the PKI to launch this aggressive proposal on military reforms, which was clearly the domain of the Army? According to David Mozingo, the PKI’s motivation for the “Fifth Force” proposal was a product of the party’s desperate need to maintain the political momentum it had since early 1965, thus it had to continue the pressure its archenemy, the Army, to achieve its political goals.1229 It was clear, however, that Aidit and the other Politburo members realized that the goal of arming the peasants and laborers was next to impossible without a massive production of arms, which the PKI did not have. The other possibility was the arms imports from China. However, as Zhou pointed out, it was unlikely that the 100,000 small arms that was promised by China to Soekarno, reached Indonesia in time before September 30, 1965.1230 Here lies the inherent contradiction in PKI’s policy vis-à-vis the country’s militarization. The PKI wanted to establish a militia, although they know that almost all of the expertise, materiel, and instruments of military training was, in fact, in the hand of the Army, although the PKI did receive support from the other services—most notably, the Air Force, where token amounts of People’s Youth members were trained in the Halim Air Force Base leading to the night of October 1, 1965.1231 1228 Zhou, 157. Mozingo, Chinese Policy toward Indonesia, 1949-1967, 224. 1230 Zhou, Migration in the Time of Revolution, 158–59. 1231 Like any other information on the events around October 1, 1965, there is very limited information on how many Pemuda Rakyat were trained by the Armed Forces. According to one account of an American journalist, the Communist forces trained by the Air Force in Halim base amounted to 3,700 members of the Pemuda Rakyat and Gerwani. See Arnold Brackman, The Communist Collapse in Indonesia (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1969), 60. 1229 === [PDF page 462] === 462 By the second half of 1965, the tense situation produced by the political polarization between the Army and the PKI became so dire that it only needed a single spark that would drive both sides into a collision course. This momentum arrived on the night of October 1, 1965, when group of Tjakrabirawa Presidential Guards unit kidnapped and assassinated six Army generals from the Army High Command, and took control of strategic facilities in Jakarta. The so-called “September Thirtieth Movement” paved the way for Army reprisals against the PKI, which would subsequently lead to the military authoritarian regime under Soeharto. Conclusion This chapter has argued that the Guided Democracy regime (1959-1965) inaugurated not only a new wave of control, but also a pattern of social mobilization that was unprecedented in Indonesia’s post-revolutionary history. This pattern of mobilization, in collaboration with the wave of social control discussed in the previous chapter, was encased in the veneer of “revolution.” A direct result of this pattern of control and mobilization under “revolution” was a militarization of society. Here, I examine Soekarno’s Guided Democracy regime as a government that tried to incorporate almost every aspect of life within the purview of the political will and goals of the “Great Leader of the Revolution” and to continue the efforts on the “unfinished revolution.” As with any other revolutions, the idea itself necessitates not only the societal guidance, but also the mobilization of forces against an “enemy,” first the Dutch and later the British and Malaysians (and the Americans). The direct consequence of this pattern was the militarization of state and society under Guided Democracy. === [PDF page 463] === 463 As this chapter has shown, the beneficiaries of this militant policies were not only the PKI, but also the Army. The first major opportunity for mobilizing forces arrived during the West Irian campaign of 1961. It was after that moment, when Soekarno issued his Three Commands for the People (Tri Komando Rakjat), that the Army was provided with a political legitimacy for the mobilization of forces. The mobilization efforts were most evident in the prevalence of military training for volunteers (sukarelawan) that was originally designed to recruit manpower for the upcoming invasion of West Irian. The Army, with its Civil Defence framework, provided training to a number of social groups, including but not limited to civil servants, students, university professors, and college students, to be trained under the LKPS and P3R schemes. This framework allowed the Army to play a role in social mobilization, which was outside of the purview of military affairs. After the end of the West Irian campaign in 1963, the Army—and Soekarno— continued the recruitment process by calling for a confrontational stance (Konfrontasi) against Malaysia, thus expanding the call for sukarelawan. In fact, Soekarno’s Twin Commands for the People (Dwikora), which “officially” inaugurated the Konfrontasi against Malaysia, clearly stated that the country was to expand its recruitment of volunteers. Of course, the Army was more than happy to do this, as this was in accordance to their doctrine of People’s War and Territorial Management, while the policy also means that the Army was to maintain its political and juridical legitimacy that was provided to them through martial law. The expansion of conflict with Malaysia paved the way for a process of militarization of society, which was evident in several aspects. First was the mobilization of forces and expansion of military training to civilians as we have discussed earlier in this chapter. Second was the cultural militarization, as evidently shown by the prevalence of popular music and images that was === [PDF page 464] === 464 circulated in the population, such as the Konfrontasi marches and the Sukarelawan-themed currency. The circulation of these symbols were significant, as they imbued the society with militaristic ideals. Third, and most decisively, was the Army’s own discomfort over the increasing polarization between the Army and the PKI, in which both sides were actively competing to gain benefit from the revolutionary fervor precipitated by Soekarno’s Konfrontasi policy against Malaysia. Indeed, as we would know from hindsight, that it was the third factor that subsequently paved the way for total societal militarization, as the Army and the PKI gradually fought each other. Societal mobilization under the veneer of revolution was beneficial for both the Army and the PKI, but as time goes by, it is clear that the Army gradually had the upper hand, and decided that it needed to intensify that advantage. The Army’s systematic program, which embedded volunteers in military units, clearly became a conduit for the transfer of military knowledge from the Army to certain elements of the people, such as the civil service and the students. It was during the campaigns against the PKI, that the Army again deployed its logic of counterinsurgency and emergency. The immediate response to the Thirtieth September Movement was silently bloody, but efficient. It was Major General Soeharto, who was then the commander of the Army’s Strategic Reserve Force (Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat, KOSTRAD) who took the helm. The legitimacy for Soeharto’s—and the Army’s—move to power was ensured by the prevalence of martial law authorities and militarized organizations throughout society. On October 1, 1965, Soekarno appointed Major General Soeharto to “restore security and order,” in relation to the G30S, and Major General Pranoto Reksosamudra as the daily caretaker === [PDF page 465] === 465 for the position of Army Chief of Staff.1232 It was during this period that Soekarno vis-à-vis Soeharto established the Operations Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, KOPKAMTIB), which was responsible for coordinating all efforts to “restore order and stability” after the events of September 30, 1965. Two weeks later, Soeharto was appointed as the Army Chief of Staff, and thus the Chief of Staff for KOTI. It was through KOTI that Soeharto managed to consolidate martial law powers under his umbrella. In a clever legal move, on November 12, 1965, the KOPKAMTIB became the Koops/Pemulihan Kamtib, one of the main commands of KOTI.1233 This strategic move was significant for Soeharto, as positioning the KOPKAMTIB under KOTI means that it receives the extrajudicial legitimacy from the state of exception embodied by the KOTI as an institution. Consequently, this enables Soeharto and the Army to conduct its anti-G30S operations without any meaningful legal constraints. In many elements, the KOPKAMTIB was a direct continuity of the Army’s “logic of emergency,” as it was the heirs of the Central War Authority (Peperpu), Supreme War Authority (Peperti) and the Supreme Operations Command (KOTI). Under this new arrangement, many of the Regional Authorities to Implement Dwikora (Pepelrada), the KOTI’s regional arm, was brought into the arm of the KOPKAMTIB, eventually became the Special Regional Executor (Pelaksana Khusus Daerah, Laksusda) of the KOPKAMTIB that would later be responsible for 1232 Anwar, Sebelum Prahara: Pergolakan Politik Indonesia 1961-1965, 552. Markas Besar Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, 40 Tahun Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Jakarta: Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, 1985), 22. 1233 === [PDF page 466] === 466 coordinating the mass murders of alleged Communists and its sympathizers throughout much of 1965-1966.1234 Meanwhile, the Army have also moved swiftly on the field. From October to December 1965, Soeharto sent the Army Para-Commando Regiment (Resimen Para-Komando Angkatan Darat, RPKAD) for a tour of Central Java and Bali to commence anti-Communist operations.1235 During the operations, the RPKAD utilized well-tested counterinsurgency tactics and strategy of mobilizing local people and youths. In Central Java, the RPKAD trained local youths, mostly Muslims and nationalists that were armed with “bamboo spears, farm implements, swords, daggers, slingshots, and bows and arrows—to defend their villages.”1236 The RPKAD provided this force with basic training, firearms, and coordination to uproot local PKI chapters in the villages.1237 These extrajudicial killings and mob violence, which extended well into the late 1960s, are well-known, as a plethora of historical accounts have been written to date. It was on March 11, 1966, when Soekarno provided Soeharto with a Presidential Order Letter (Surat Perintah) empowering the Army general to restore security, the militarized administrative frameworks of Guided Democracy was completely taken over by Soeharto. The letter empowers Soeharto to “take all steps necessary to guarantee security, order, and stability of 1234 Kolonel Ckh Soekarno, SH, “Hukum Tatanegara Militer Indonesia Suatu Pertumbuhan Fakta,” Yudhagama, December 1982, 66–67. 1235 David Jenkins and Douglas Kammen, “The Army Para-Commando Regiment and the Reign of Terror in Central Java and Bali,” in The Contours of Mass Violence in Indonesia, 1965-68 (Singapore: Asian Studies Association of Australia in association with NUS Press and NIAS Press, 2012), 83–102. 1236 Jenkins and Kammen, 88. 1237 Jenkins and Kammen, 89. === [PDF page 467] === 467 government.”1238 After Soekarno issued the letter, Soeharto immediately announced the dissolution of the PKI, while the Kopkamtib, under KOTI, operated in the regions through the Pepelrada system. This legal arrangement remained until 1967, when KOTI and the Pepelrada was dissolved, while Kopkamtib became integrated with the Army General Staff, thus institutionalizing its position as an inherent part of the Army’s organization.1239 Martial law powers, however, remained in the Kopkamtib, which became the Army’s institutionalized and legalized vehicle to initiate the pogroms against the PKI—and beyond. The Supersemar was merely a symbol that finally legitimized—through a state of emergency—the complete military control over the state by symbolically transferring executive power from Soekarno to Soeharto. Thus, by 1966, it barely matters whether the Supersemar was a pure fabrication of history, or whether it was signed by Soekarno under duress. The crisis and confusion that blanketed the country in 1965 was enormous: the institutions for a new government was already in place, while the emotions that were capitalized upon by Soekarno had come home to roost. The emotions that have been spilled on the streets, evident through the student demonstrations and the frequent clash between Communist and antiCommunist groups—also augmented the feeling of disorder at that time. It was in this moment, in the face of a national crisis, the revolution did not only consume its own sons, but also its Great 1238 Tanter, “Intelligence Agencies and Third World Militarization: A Case Study of Indonesia, 1966-1989, with Special Reference to South Korea, 1961-1989,” 215. 1239 Markas Besar Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, 40 Tahun Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, 22. === [PDF page 468] === 468 Leader, Soekarno, thus paving the way for the arrival of the New Order military regime under Soeharto. === [PDF page 469] === 469 CONCLUSION On August 20, 1980, the Indonesian Armed Forces (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia) initiated a nationwide program of civic action. Launched by Minister of Defense and Security / Commander of the Armed Forces General Muhammad Jusuf and titled “The Armed Forces goes to the Villages,” (ABRI Masuk Desa, AMD) the program indicates a significant shift in Indonesian military politics.1240 The program was significant, as its first operation—dubbed Operasi Manunggal I, was conducted simultaneously over two weeks, in every operational areas of the seventeen Army Regional Commands (Komando Daerah Militer). In the program, “company-sized units would spend weeks at a time in the rural areas engaged in what can be called civic actions programs to demonstrate the unity of ABRI and the people.”1241 These programs also promoted one primary function of the Army, namely the territorial function, by carrying out “territorial supervision and controlling functions,” as since its inception in 1980, a Village Guidance NCO (Bintara Pembina Desa, Babinsa) has been assigned to virtually every village in Indonesia.1242 The ABRI Masuk Desa program “form an important part of the military’s imagebuilding project[,] as it promotes “the theme of the total integration of the armed forces and the people” and the program was launched in 1980 as an effort to revitalize the concept of the ABRI 1240 Staf Teritorial Mabes TNI-AD [Territorial Staff of the Indonesian Army Headquarters], Tinjauan ABRI Masuk Desa (Tahap I) [Overview of the ABRI Masuk Desa (Phase I)] (Jakarta: Staf Teritorial Mabes TNI-AD, 1980), iii. 1241 Donald E. Weatherbee, “Indonesia’s Armed Forces: Rejuvenation and Regeneration,” Southeast Asian Affairs, 1982, 278. 1242 Subekti Priyadharma, Internet and Social Change in Rural Indonesia: From Development Communication to Communication Development in Decentralized Indonesia, Research (Wiesbaden [Heidelberg]: Springer VS, 2021), 37, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35533-3. === [PDF page 470] === 470 as “the people’s military.”1243 Indeed, the reach of the ABRI Masuk Desa was total: it was conducted in more than ninety-six villages within forty-seven regencies (Kabupaten) and cities (Kotamadya) accross the nation’s twenty-two provinces.1244 However, the ABRI Masuk Desa program is, in many ways, the pinnacle of militarization in Indonesia. The program itself served a dual function: as a platform for the military’s imagebuilding project and a honest desire for the Army to play a role in the nation’s development—thus maintaining the security apparatus until the lower levels of government, the desa. At least according to one observer, this program is considered as successful in winning the hearts of the people: in the eve of the Reformasi in 1998, “ABRI members are respected and trusted by the public formally and informally. Many from the lower rungs have been chosen voluntarily by the public as village headmen and chairmen of social and sports organizations[,] while one successful ABRI programme aimed at making friends with the people” is the AMD.1245 The support for the program was also evident not only in the rural areas, but also in the urban middle-classes. One important indicator is how the Army and the government helped to popularize the program through a series of cultural products, including the popular song ABRI Masuk Desa, composed by popular composer Aloysius Riyanto and sung by Johan Untung: Menggelegar semangat era Pembangunan 1243 McGregor, History in Uniform, 137; Honna, Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia, 60. Numbers compiled from Staf Teritorial Mabes TNI-AD [Territorial Staff of the Indonesian Army Headquarters], Tinjauan ABRI Masuk Desa (Tahap I) [Overview of the ABRI Masuk Desa (Phase I)]. 1245 Amir Santoso, “Democratization: The Case of Indonesia’s New Order,” in Democratization in Southeast and East Asia, ed. Anek Laothamatas (Thailand: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997), 36. 1244 === [PDF page 471] === 471 Menandai citra luhur kemerdekaan Bergetarlah tanah persada, sampai ke ujung wilayahnya, Kita membangun negeri yang tercinta Hati terharu menyambut kedatangannya, Tampang tegap meyakinkan, gagah perkasa Mereka pembela bangsa, mereka sahabat kita, Penuh semangat ABRI Masuk Desa. Rakyat dan ABRI sejiwa, tulang punggung indondesia, Bersemarak nusantara menuju makmur sentosa, Jangan ragu-ragu, pantang mundur terus maju, Untuk ABRI sukses Dirgahayu! The blazing spirit of the era of Development, Marking the noble image of our independence. Let our homeland vibrant, up to the end of its territory, We build our beloved country. Our hearts are touched to welcome their arrival, A sturdy look that is convincing and valiant. They are the defenders of the nation, they are our friends, Enthusiastically ABRI enters the village. === [PDF page 472] === 472 The people and ABRI are one soul, the backbone of Indonesia. The whole archipelago cheered towards peace and prosperity, Never hesitate, never give up, and keep moving forward, Long live our Armed Forces!1246 The story of the AMD program represents the apex of militarization, as the program represents not only an instrument of control and mobilization. The program also shows how the Army, having consolidated its rule in the politically tumultuous urban middle-class milieu, started to project its rule and influence over the desa, the smallest unit of government in Indonesia. Just like many of the stories discussed in this dissertation, the AMD were built upon the historical experiences of martial law and counterinsurgency during the colonial, wartime, revolutionary, and post-revolutionary years. By 1966, the ABRI was fully aware that security and development are the two sides of the same coin. Hence, the AMD was not merely another tool in the New Order’s arsenal of governance. It was a product of a plethora of institutional predecessors that were built throughout the 1950s. As Chapter IV has shown us, the AMD has its roots in the Siliwangi Division’s civic action programs and Bhakti operations, conducted in post-gerombolan pacification efforts—which in turn took notes from colonial counterinsurgency and pacification strategies. 1246 For the full song, see Second Kamerad RAR, “ABRI Masuk Desa - Song of ‘ABRI Masuk Desa’ Program - With Lyrics,” Youtube.com, March 10, 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FVAdwD1pkRM; On Aloysius Riyanto, see “Aloysius Riyanto,” in Ensiklopedi Nasional Indonesia (Cipta Adi Pustaka, 1990), 231. === [PDF page 473] === 473 In addition to development, it is also crucial to remember that, in many ways, the Indonesian experience of the state has always been an institution that was in a “crisis mode.” During colonial rule, there was this constant threat of Indonesian nationalists in the 1930s and the looming specter of Japanese invasion during much of the late 1930s until 1942. When the Japanese invasion finally came in 1942, the colonial state was replaced by a military occupation in the context of a global war, in which the Western enemy looms beyond the horizon. When Indonesia declared its independence in 1945, the country immediately had to face the threat of a returning British and Dutch forces, while internally it was by the mélange of political organizations and struggle groups over the conduct of the Revolution. After the physical phase of the revolution subsided in 1950, the nascent Republic had to deal with the gerombolan problem and armed crime. In 1957, there were open rebellions against the country. In 1961-1966, the country was virtually at war with the Dutch in West Irian, and the British in Malaysia. In many ways, these violent episodes of history served as the dramatic mise-en-scène that foreshadowed the advent of a militarized state, thus significantly conditioning society towards its militaristic trajectory. In 1950s-1960s Indonesia, military intervention into the civilian sphere derived its legitimacy from a strategic and calculated amalgamation of the concepts of state of emergency and counterinsurgency. These concepts emerged from a long historical process, yet it was during the 1950s that they resurfaced, subsequently (re)conditioning the state and society for eventual military authoritarian rule. This project contends that examining this process of militarization is crucial to understanding the nature and enduring impact of military authoritarianism in Indonesia. === [PDF page 474] === 474 The process of militarization in Indonesia accelerated significantly when Soekarno declared his Guided Democracy regime in 1959. During Guided Democracy, the state pursued its goals within the framework of a revived “Indonesian Revolution.” Initially, the state’s agenda was to reestablish social order, create economic growth, and foster national unity. However, the goal of Guided Democracy was inherently incompatible with its methods, which was mostly encapsulated under revolutionary-style mass politics. Fomenting revolutionary ideals gradually brought the state and society into a snowballing pattern of ordering and mobilizing, which subsequently become intertwined and was deeply compatible with martial values. Consequently, Guided Democracy failed to engage with the ingrained problems of Liberal Democracy that it originally meant to solve. The aliran problem, for instance, became much more significant under the mobilizing policies of Guided Democracy. The government’s reliance on the Army as its tool also became a springboard for further military role in state affairs. During Guided Democracy, the Armed Forces became increasingly important as Soekarno moved towards confrontational foreign policies, which in turn expanded its institutional and technological capacities. The Army also become part of the ruling elite through the functional groups system, thus gradually increasing its predominance in politics. Furthermore, militarized symbolism became the norm in Guided Democracy, as the country was steeped in “revolutionary” ideals and practices—such as the sukarelawan program, the campaigns against the Dutch in West Irian, and the Konfrontasi against Malaysia. Hence, the state’s pattern of ordering and mobilizing actually perpetuated militarization, thus paving the way for the fall of Soekarno under the hands of the Army in 1966. === [PDF page 475] === 475 The overthrow of Soekarno in 1966 was never solely an Army affair. It was not a coup d’etat in a traditional sense, where an Armed Forces officer gathered a number of men, brought them to the center of government, and immediately forced the President to step down. At most, it could be interpreted as a “creeping coup d’etat.”1247 The transition to the New Order was a gradual process, where broad political coalitions that found themselves against Soekarno joined forces with the Army to depose Soekarno and his Guided Democracy regime. It was through this gradual process that the anti-Soekarno group, coalescing around the Army, were able to slowly but effectively gain political power, thus leading to the establishment of the New Order, a military regime with its self-stylized national consensus that would rule Indonesia for thirty-two years. In many elements, the broad political coalitions that have supported the emergence of the New Order built upon the various institutional bases produced by the long process of militarization. The New Order, for instance, were initially built upon a continuous state of emergency—a rule by martial law—through institutions such as the Army and the KOPKAMTIB. The new military regime also relied upon its own, time and tested, tactics and strategies of counterinsurgency, which was reflected in the widespread use of social forces during the mass killings of 1965-1966. Both patterns were direct continuities from the Guided Democracy period. Hence, the story presented here tries to argue that the transition from Guided Democracy to the New Order was as much a historical continuity as much as it was historical change. Furthermore, many of these 1247 For an argument along these terms, see Baskara T. Wardaya, Membongkar Supersemar! Dari CIA Hingga Kudeta Merangkak Melawan Bung Karno (Yogyakarta: Galang Press, 2009). === [PDF page 476] === 476 historical developments were not solely made or designed by Indonesia’s “men on horseback.”1248 In 1965, the Indonesian state and society has been so militarized—prepared, organized, and geared towards violence—that it only took a single flashpoint to light the fuse of violence. That crucial moment arrived on September 30, 1965, when a failed coup attempt permitted an widespread, Army-led, anti-Communist pogrom that eradicated the party’s influence in Indonesian society. Examining militarization during the Liberal and Guided Democracy periods helps to explain the efficacy and speed of the anti-PKI purges and Army operations during the mass violence of 1965-1966. At the core of this efficacy was the Army’s utilization of popular forces— the paramilitaries, youths, labor unions, student unions, etc.—in the massive campaign against the PKI. Perhaps it was true, that the Army started to hand over small arms to “Muslim students and unionists”–the HMI and other labor unions—as early as October 1, 1965.1249 Indeed, during that date, Muslim youth leaders, including NU’s Subchan Z.E, met with Major General Umar Wirahadikusumah, Jakarta’s Military Regional Commander to discuss their role in fighting the Communists, which received warm support from Umar.1250 Meanwhile, on October 4, politicians and youth leaders from the NU, PSII, Catholic Party, IPKI, and their respective mass organizations established the Action Committee for the Crushing of the Counter-Revolutionary Movement of September 30 (Komite Aksi Pengganyangan-Gerakan September Tigapuluh, KAP-Gestapu), which calls for the dissolution of any political parties and organizations with links with the 1248 S. E. Finer and Jay Stanley, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (New Brunswick, N.J: Transaction, 2002). 1249 Peter Dale Scott, “The United States and the Overthrow of Soekarno, 1965-1967,” Pacific Affairs 58, no. 2 (1985): 244. 1250 Sundhaussen, Politik militer Indonesia 1945-1967, 372–73. === [PDF page 477] === 477 September 30 Movement.1251 In the Second General Meeting of the KAP-Gestapu on October 8, 1965, they announced that they have managed to gather five hundred thousand members from all over Indonesia.1252 Meanwhile, as early as October 17, 1965, the RPKAD “shock troops” under Colonel Sarwo Edhie Wibowo were also sent to instigate their own massacre operations across Central and East Java (and later, Bali).1253 However, as the chapters in this research has shown, it should be highlighted that by the virtue of the long process of militarized physical and technical training conducted by the Guided Democracy regime, many of these “students and unionists” were already well-trained to operate in tandem with the military and to wield military-grade weapons. If they were not provided such weapons, they were already well trained in military skills and tactics—or at least, coordination and organization. The close coordination between the Army and the students were very much evident in Indonesian student activist Soe Hok Gie’s account of the Jakarta branch of Action Committee of Indonesian Students (Komite Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia), a student organization that was responsible for the mass demonstrations against Soekarno in early 1966. KAMI was established on October 25, 1965, by student unions under the sponsorship of Minister of Higher Education and Science Maj. Gen. Sjarif Thajeb.1254 According to Cosmas Batubara, “the students were very 1251 Sundhaussen, 376. Sundhaussen, 378. 1253 Jenkins and Kammen, “The Army Para-Commando Regiment and the Reign of Terror in Central Java and Bali,” 83. 1254 Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia, Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 67. 1252 === [PDF page 478] === 478 close with the Army at that time,” and figures such as Soeharto and Brigadier General Alamsjah Ratu Perwiranegara often attended KAMI meetings.1255 On January 10, 1966, KAMI announced their famous “Three Demands of the People” (Tri Tuntutan Rakyat, Tritura), which called for the the dissolution of the PKI, reorganization of the government, and the lowering of prices for basic goods and services.1256 During its mass demonstrations, KAMI members often coordinated with the Army—in this case, the Jakarta Military Regional Command chief of staff Colonel Witono—to discuss demonstration plans in support of Tritura.1257 On January 10, 1966, the KAMI-led students demonstrated across Jakarta, from their headquarters in the University of Indonesia campus at Rawamangun to the State Secretariat building, next to the Istana at Merdeka Square. According to Gie, the students were halted by the troops of the Cakrabirawa Presidential Guards and their armored cars, yet the students only lied down on the street while yelling “Long Live ABRI!”1258 After KAMI was disbanded by Soekarno, many of their prominent members were housed by the Army Strategic Command base at Kebon Sirih.1259 Thus, it is clear that the students were clearly showing that they stand with the Army. The role of the student demonstrations were significant—their strike on March 11, 1966 forced Soekarno to evacuate the Istana Negara towards Bogor where he eventually signed the famous March 11 Order (Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret, Supersemar), 1255 Batubara, Cosmas Batubara, Sebuah Otobiografi Politik, 7. Hefner, Civil Islam, 68. 1257 Soe Hok Gie, Catatan Seorang Demonstran (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1983), 160. 1258 Gie, 166. 1259 Batubara, Cosmas Batubara, Sebuah Otobiografi Politik, 113. 1256 === [PDF page 479] === 479 signing over broad martial law powers to General Soeharto in the interest of “reestablishing order.”1260 The main argument of this dissertation is that the Indonesian military gradually intervened in non-military affairs through actions that were ultimately justified through a combination of these two logics, namely the growing reach of legal emergency powers—or martial law—and an everexpanding series of military counterinsurgency strategies. These interventions were especially noticeable during the Liberal and Guided Democracy periods of the 1950s-1960s. While the underpinnings of military intervention in non-military affairs were inspired by colonial and revolutionary legal and military concepts, these foundations were reshaped and put into practice during the military reforms and counterinsurgency operations of the 1950s. The transition to Guided Democracy in 1959 further accelerated military intervention in non-military affairs by replacing parliamentary democracy with a politics of mass mobilization, establishing a political atmosphere that was conducive for the Army to exert its political might. In other words, the Indonesian military gradually intervened in non-military matters by leveraging the expansion of emergency powers and the implementation of counterinsurgency strategies, with Guided Democracy serving as a catalyst for an increased military engagement in the political realm. The historical legacy of emergency powers in Indonesia is a lengthy one. As Chapter I has shown us, the use of emergency powers has been one of the defining features that have shaped the 1260 Hefner, Civil Islam, 69. === [PDF page 480] === 480 creation and maintenance of modern states, from the colonial state of the Netherlands East Indies until the Republic of Indonesia. Indeed, emergency powers were often used by both colonial and republican states in their efforts to deal with political challenges against the state and threats to social order. There was a “logic of emergency,” or the common usage of emergency powers in response to everyday challenges against state power and threats to social order, that was deeply entrenched in colonial law, that continued to shape postcolonial legal doctrines. This logic of emergency was then embedded in Indonesian legal and political culture, where it remains until today. The story of emergency powers—or a State of Exception, to use the Agambenian term— began at the inception of the modern state in the archipelago, namely the Netherlands East Indies, in 1854.1261 Under the colonial constitutions of 1854 and 1925 (Regeeringsreglement 1854 and Indische Staatsregeling 1925), the Governor-General maintained an exceptional constitutional authority to detain and exile people in the purpose of maintaining peace and order. These emergency clauses—later known as the exorbitante rechten clauses, were often used to suppress Indonesian nationalist activities. Meanwhile, at the dawn of the Second World War, the colonial state also promulgated the colonial Law on the State of War and Siege of 1939, which was designed to defend and protect the colonial state. This second, exceptional constitutional authority, is also ensured by the colonial basic law, and it was also bequeathed upon the Governor-General as the head of state. Originally designed to counter the threats of uprisings, rebellions, wars, and natural disasters, the Law was 1261 Agamben, State of Exception. === [PDF page 481] === 481 also often used in the containment of societal undesirables—such as the citizens of an enemy state—and the mobilization of the populace towards total war. However, as we all know, the law failed to prevent the colonial state’s demise, as the colonial order crumbled under enemy pressure. It was the Japanese invasion in 1942 that effectively relegated the story of the Netherlands East Indies into the dustbin of history. The influence of colonial emergency powers, however, remained in the archipelago long after the Dutch left. Prior to the Proklamasi in 1945, the Indonesian state enshrined emergency powers into its newly-designed Constitution of 1945 (Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, UUD 1945). In the case of the Republic of Indonesia, emergency powers was held by the new head of state, the President, rather than the Governor-General. The exorbitante rechten was also eradicated from the pages of the Constitution of 1945. However, the President’s exceptional authority remained through the clauses on the declaration of a state of emergency (keadaan bahaya). In 1946, the Indonesian parliament promulgated its first emergency law—the Republican emergency law of 1946 (Undang Undang Keadaan Bahaya Tahun 1946, UUKB 1946), which was very loosely based upon its colonial predecessor. However, as it was created in the context of the Indonesian National Revolution, in the promulgation of the 1946 emergency law there was a clear effort towards the reinterpretation of the principles contained within the colonial emergency law. For instance, while the President retains the authority to proclaim a state of emergency, the administration of emergency powers has been significantly decentralized by the establishment of the National and Regional Defense Councils. In a sense, these councils “democratized” the administration of emergency powers under the Republican state, as the conditions for their === [PDF page 482] === 482 organization appear to provide an additional "rule of the game," in contrast to the blank check in the colonial law. Meanwhile, the Councils were also not purely manned by military men, as they contain many of the elements of the Republican civilian government in many regions, thus reflecting the spirit of civil-military cooperation in the struggle for the Revolution. Thus, the Revolution made its mark on the development of Indonesian martial law. It is important to note, however, that these councils remain illiberal as state entities, as they were still extra-constitutional in nature. This “revised version” of emergency powers was thoroughly tested during three important political events during the Indonesian Revolution of 1945-1949. The first event, the July 3, 1946 Incident, involved the kidnapping of Prime Minister Sjahrir, which precipitated a domestic constitutional crisis within the Republican government. The July 3, 1946 was significant, as it was the first-ever coup attempt in the history of independent Indonesia. During the crisis, Soekarno invoked his emergency powers for the first time in order to maintain a continuity of government. The second crisis was the First Dutch Invasion of Java and Sumatra (or “police action”). Codenamed Operation Product (Operatie Product), the purpose of the invasion was to secure resource-rich areas in Sumatra and Java, including the oil and coal fields around Palembang and the plantations around Medan. Main Javanese ports, such as Jakarta, Semarang, and Surabaya was also targeted by the Dutch, which resulted in the occupation of significant parts of West Java, Madura, and East Java by the end of 1947. During this first invasion of Java, a state of emergency as invoked, the 1946 Law on the State of Emergency was activated, and the National and Regional Defense Councils played a major role in governance. From July 10 until August 1947, the Councils === [PDF page 483] === 483 had to promulgate many rulings and regulations on various topics, from the management of refugees, military expropriation of property, mobilization of society, to the restrictions on transporting money and gold. In many ways, this was the first time that the military intervened in non-military affairs. Meanwhile, the emergency nature of these Council regulations, made them illiberal by design, as these regulations were never discussed and passed by parliament. The third political crisis examined was the Communist coup attempt in Surakarta and Madiun in 1948, dubbed the Madiun Affair of 1948. During the Affair, an alliance of leftist parties and labor organizations around the Indonesian Communist Party, the Front Demokrasi Rakyat (FDR), tried to take over power in Surakarta and Madiun, in order to bring the revolution towards a different path. Throughout much of August-September 1948, there were many skirmishes between TNI forces loyal to the Republic and those who were pro-FDR. During this challenge against Republican authority, Soekarno again utilized emergency powers in order to take full executive control. From September 16, 1948, Prime Minister Hatta and the National Defense Council declared Surakarta, Semarang, Madiun, Pati, Kedu, and Banyumas Residencies as military areas, thus enabling the Army to operate without civil constraints against the FDR rebels. This was the first time that the nascent Army played a role in direct governance. Meanwhile, on September 20, civil and press liberties was dramatically reduced in the Republican capital Jogjakarta. This third crisis ended with loyalist TNI forces clearing Surakarta and Madiun from the rebels, killing many of its ringleaders, including the Communist leader Musso and former Prime Minister Amir Sjarifuddin. === [PDF page 484] === 484 Through the examination of sociopolitical crises in 1946, 1947, and 1948, it is clear that the continuance of the logic of emergency in Indonesia has far-reaching ramifications for Indonesian politics at large. While the Proklamasi in 1945 have assumed the birth of a new, revolutionary, and Republican state that is fundamentally different from its colonial predecessor, it is clear that the “logic of emergency” persists, as it subsequently became one of the more significant aspects of governance in Indonesia, affecting the nation’s legal and political landscape in the following decades. The historical continuity reflected by the “logic of emergency” is just one element that Indonesian state inherited from the Netherlands Indies colonial state. The second element is rather more coercive than a set of rules, namely military doctrine, strategy, and tactics. Indeed, as Chapter II has shown us, Dutch colonial warfare and counterinsurgency techniques have played an important role in becoming the one of the predecessors of Indonesian military ideology. Counterinsurgency warfare in the Indonesian archipelago was first conducted during the colonial pacification wars of the Netherlands East Indies, from the Java War to the Aceh Wars. Throughout this long experience of waging “small wars” against “native enemies,” the Dutch colonial state and its Army, the KNIL, developed a “logic of counterinsurgency” that was not only shaped by their experiences in colonial campaigns, but also informed by international advances in colonial warfare, particularly those of the French. Here, two main elements of colonial counterinsurgency warfare emerged: the importance of controlling the population, and the crucial role of mobile military forces. === [PDF page 485] === 485 Colonial counterinsurgency was codified by the KNIL during the Aceh Wars. The use of military troops for population control, such as the “civiel-militaire gezaghebber,” established the precedent for military role in governance. Meanwhile the establishment of mobile forces such as the elite gendarmerie corps “Maréchausée” signifies the important of mobile, elite military forces that was designed not only for war, but also for policing and governance. These methods were successful, as the Dutch were able to pacify Aceh and the rest of the archipelago throughout much of the late 20th century. The experiences of the Aceh Wars were then imprinted on the minds of the colonial military and political elite, who then developed the VPTL manual for the KNIL. However, the legitimacy of colonial warfare techniques seemed to collapse almost overnight, when the system dramatically failed under the enormous pressure of the Japanese invasion of Java in 1942, which resulted in the almost immediate surrender of the KNIL. Nevertheless, these colonial methods of warfare would emerge again in Indonesian history after the end of Revolution in 1949. Just like the colonial-era emergency legislation, colonial counterinsurgency methods has had a considerable impact in the establishment of Indonesian military ideology and doctrine. Military elites in Indonesia, such as A.H. Nasution—who studied colonial warfare techniques during his time as an officer in the KNIL—subsequently reinterpreted colonial counterinsurgency methods into revolutionary ones. In his famous treatise, Pokok-Pokok Perang Gerilya, Nasution did not only established the principles of guerrilla warfare, but also the main conceptions of counterinsurgency strategy, emphasizing the importance of geographic and === [PDF page 486] === 486 demographic control of the population through the employment of territorial forces and the need for mobile strike units. It was during the 1950s, when the newly independent Republic faced a range of security issues including Army mutinies, violent crimes, and regional rebellions, that this theory were redeployed. The tried-and true counterinsurgency approach inherited from the colonial era was used, but it has to adapt to new realities: the new Indonesian Republic was no longer a colonial state, but it was a negara hukum (a state of laws). Hence, military counterinsurgency techniques could not be implemented without the enactment of emergency powers. The Indonesian state then came up with a new Republican emergency law, the 1957 Law on the State of Emergency, which replaced the colonial Regulations on the State of War and Siege of 1939. As a direct result, we can see the Army—and the state— began to redevelop the two “logics” of counterinsurgency and emergency into a coherent ideology. In the Army, these developments were evident in their technical and strategic education institutes, such as the Army Command and Staff College and the Military Law Academy, which was founded in 1951 and 1952 respectively, under the auspices of a Dutch Military Mission. It was during this brief moment in the history of military science in Indonesia that the colonial heritage of Dutch counterinsurgency warfare was transferred to the TNI officer corps. During this period, the colonial counterinsurgency manual VPTL, was adopted by the TNI officer corps in the Army Command and Staff College and other schools. Meanwhile, theories of martial law and state of emergency were studied and continuously developed through the legal training at the Military Law Academy. Both of these service academies produced two of the most === [PDF page 487] === 487 important elements of the Army officer corps, namely the flag officers that would become divisional commanders, and the Army jurists that would operate the martial law system. These two institutions were crucial in providing the theoretical and institutional bases for the further development of the logics of emergency and counterinsurgency in the Indonesian state. Dutch colonial warfare and counterinsurgency techniques have played a crucial, yet understudied, impact on the creation of Indonesian military ideology. The establishment of counterinsurgency strategy and emergency powers were both colonial and post-colonial tools of the nation-state: both allowed for the protection and extension of state power and influence. In other words, the making of the “Dwifungsi” as a concept was not purely an ideological invention of the New Order military state, a political innovation by Army generals, or the sole invention of A.H. Nasution: the concept had its roots in Aceh, as shown by the emergence of the civil-military officer and “dubbelfunctie” concepts in the KNIL during the 1920s-1930s. The transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch at the end of the Indonesian Revolution in 1949 have marked a new chapter in the history of Indonesia. However, the country still faced enormous challenges in the transition to a post-colonial state: the infrastructure was in shambles, the bureaucracy was plagued with problems, and the national economy was almost completely destroyed by a decade of war and revolution. As Chapter III has shown us, one of the most important problems facing the new Indonesian state was the prevalence of armed, violent criminals. Violent crimes were evident both in urban and rural settings. The proliferation of small arms, competing armed groups, and the limited institutional capacity of the young Indonesian state to contain, accommodate, or eliminate these === [PDF page 488] === 488 challenges became a serious challenge for Jakartan elites. Some armed groups, which were later called as “gerombolan,” expressed unrest on various issues, such as religious and economic themes. Meanwhile, other groups openly rebelled against state authority through various forms of brigandage, which was translated into violent armed crimes. Thus, in the 1950s, the high level of violent crimes had a detrimental impact on the life of the nascent Republic, thus handicapping its development. It was during this moment, in the 1950s, the idea of the “pemuda” (youth) became transformed into a new term, the “gerombolan.” This new term, deployed and utilized not only by the state apparatuses but also by the people, encapsulates how the threat of violent gerombolan groups were evident in almost every area of West, Central, and East Java. There were three factors that enabled widespread insecurity in the 1950s. First was the problem of the proliferation of small arms, where firearms were considered as part of everyday life, thus posing a challenge to maintaining peace and order. The second factor was the persistence of armed groups, where former revolutionary freedom fighters or Army units that were demobilized often followed a life of brigandage. The third factor is the limited insititutional capacity of the state to mitigate these crime waves. Initially, this chronic “gerombolan” problem was not initially viewed as a national emergency. It was considered as an excess of the Revolution as a process, which is part and parcel of the transition from a revolutionary to a post-revolutionary society. However, it did not take long for the state to consider these crime waves as a national challenge that needs to be dealt with, or, in the case of the Army, as a pretext to further military intervention in civilian affairs. === [PDF page 489] === 489 The state’s response towards domestic insecurity emerged in the late 1950s. It was during this period that the Indonesian state took action against the “gerombolan” problem. As Chapter IV has shown us, the state's actions to mitigate insecurity were guided by the emergency and counterinsurgency logic, which involved both direct and indirect actions. Indirect actions included "non-invasive" regulatory measures taken in urban and rural areas, such as the anti-firearms and counter-gerombolan campaigns, mobilization of civilians in the form of private security organizations and territorial forces, and Army takeovers of property. Direct actions were represented by military and police counterinsurgency operations that often involved civilians. The methods used in the state's indirect and direct actions were adopted from the colonial state, reinterpreted for new uses in the post-revolutionary era by the nascent Indonesian state. It was in the context of these direct and indirect counterinsurgencies, that the Army developed its capabilities that would form the institutional basis for military intervention in nonmilitary affairs. While it was marred by rampant internal factionalism and was challenged by the continuous necessity of addressing insurgencies, the Army continuously conducted institutional reforms, particularly related to the agenda of “reorganization” and “rationalization.” During this process, the Army had to design a demobilization program that would minimize the risk of the former soldiers of joining the gerombolan. This issue was not purely an Army matter, as it was part of the agenda of the Hatta, Natsir, and Sukiman cabinets. Thus, the Army and the government produced a demobilization plan that included reassigning veterans and demobilized soldiers into a National Reserve Corps (Corps Tjadangan Nasional, CTN). Those veterans and demobilized soldiers of the CTN would then be assigned as the Army’s reserve force that was assigned to work in governmental projects so they would gradually adapt themselves to civilian life. Another === [PDF page 490] === 490 solution was to channel these veterans, reservists, and demobilized soldiers into transmigration programs, by which they would be trained in industries, public works, agriculture, trade, and other skills. The CTN, with its sister program the Bureau for National Reconstruction (Biro Rekonstruksi Nasional, BRN), became part of the intergovernmental agency National Bureau for Demobilization (Biro Demobilisasi Nasional). Thus, it was during this period that the Army first conceptualized the use of the military in non-military operations, or civic actions. In the context of indirect counterinsurgency actions, the Army’s internal reforms became crucial, as the lessons learned in demobilization gradually became part of the Army’s repertoire of counterinsurgency, which was then subsequently deployed against insurgents such as the Darul Islam. When President Soekarno declared a nationwide state of siege in March 1957, the Army unleashed its counterinsurgency strategies—and consequently, its political agenda to intervene in in non-military affairs—in full power. The successful counterinsurgency campaigns against the Darul Islam became the pilot project for the TNI's counterinsurgency agenda. Methods learned in the campaigns against the Darul Islam was quickly reproduced across the various Regional Military Commands. The basic principles of the Army’s doctrine were predicated upon two elements, namely the formation of territorial forces and mobile strike forces. The formation of Territorial forces were shaped and deployed through the use of territorial army units and local forces under pagar betis. Meanwhile, mobile strike forces were developed all over the country, epitomizing in the formation of special forces units, the Army’s Para-Commando Regiment (Resimen Para-Komando Angkatan Darat, RPKAD), the Air Force’s Quick Reaction Forces (Pasukan Gerak Tjepat, PGT), the Navy’s Marines (Korps Komando, KKo, now the Indonesian Marine Corps), and the Police’s Mobile Brigade (Brigade Mobil, Brimob). === [PDF page 491] === 491 The logic of counterinsurgency, which entails the deployment of territorial forces and mobile forces in war, gradually institutionalized into TNI doctrine as the Doctrine of Territorial Warfare (Doktrin Perang Wilayah) in 1962. This indicates a significant shift, as what started as a particular strategy in winning certain kinds of wars became codified into how an army should operate in all circumstances. After this point, the TNI became an army of counterinsurgency, which paved the way for the social-political role of the Army under the dwifungsi doctrine and subsequently leading to the militarization of the state during the Guided Democracy period. At the same time, the state's efforts to clamp down on insecurity were gradually ramped up, with security becoming the top agenda for the Indonesian state. The tumultuous events of the 1950s gradually took its toll, shaping major changes in Indonesian political life. On November 1957, an assassination attempt against President Soekarno took place in Cikini. This pivotal moment thrust the unsettling specter of the “gerombolan” quandary upon the minds of Indonesian elites, thus accelerating the gradual transformation of Indonesian politics from the party-led Liberal Democracy into Guided Democracy, which was dominated by Soekarno, the Army, and the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party). Indeed, as Chapter V shows us, that Soekarno’s Guided Democracy rose as a reaction to break free from the perceived inabilities and inefficiencies of the Liberal Democracy system, which was mired by party politics and parliamentary disputes. Soekarno’s Konsepsi in 1957 was a watershed in Indonesian political history, ushering a new type of state that was more centralized, militarized, and more concerned with the preservation of (revolutionary) order. === [PDF page 492] === 492 Guided Democracy was essentially a centralized authoritarian regime dominated by Soekarno, the Army, and the PKI. But, the regime was more than just an attempt by these institutions to consolidate power. It was the culmination of a long political experiment that aimed to transcend the multifaceted boundaries of Liberal Democracy, which dominated Indonesian political and social life for much of the 1950s. The causes of Guided Democracy were extensive and complex, as I have shown in Chapter V. However, the pursuit of political order and security was one of the most important. During Guided Democracy, Soekarno and the Army endeavored to instill order in the political, economic, social, and legal sectors. In order to achieve this, they implemented martial law and revitalized the concept of Revolution, both of which were intended to circumvent the constraints of Liberal Democracy. Party politics was replaced by extra-parliamentary popular mobilization through new mass organizations such as the National Front and the Panitia Pembina Djiwa Revolusi. Meanwhile, the State of Siege, announced in 1957, provided the Army with broad powers to restore security—and practically almost every element of the country's political, economic, and social life. Additionally, under martial law, Soekarno established military-style state apparatuses and commands such as the Supreme Operations Command (Komando Operasi Tertinggi, KOTI), Supreme Economic Command (Komando Tertinggi Operasi Ekonomi, KOTOE), Supreme Command for the Retooling of the Apparatus of the Revolution (Komando Tertinggi Retooling Aparatur Revolusi, KOTRAR). The Guided Democracy regime introduced not only a new wave of sociopolitical control, but also a pattern of social mobilization unprecedented in Indonesia's post-revolutionary history. === [PDF page 493] === 493 This pattern of mobilization was cloaked in the guise of "revolution," and it was pushed by the political will and aims of Soekarno, the "Great Leader of the Revolution," who aspired to bring practically every element of society under the control of his government. Soekarno’s revolutionary leadership was also followed by Indonesia’s political elites, making Guided Democracy seem like a smorgasbord of political ideas that was coated by “revolution.” As Chapter VI has shown, a revolution requires not just societal guidance, but also the mobilization of forces. As a result, societal mobilization became an important part of Soekarno's Guided Democracy regime. Societal mobilization was subsequently revived by Soekarno through the return of the idea of mobilized individuals as a social force through the concept of sukarelawan, or volunteers. This concept was inspired by pemuda ideals from the revolutionary era, which emphasized youth mobilization as a means of attaining unity and social progress. In other words, the sukarelawan was a way to channel the energy and enthusiasm of young people and other volunteers in the service of the state and its aims, whether through community work or military service. The massive energy contained within the sukarelawan ideal then had to find an outlet. Soekarno found this outlet in two historical events. First was the struggle against the Dutch for West Irian, now known as Irian. This campaign involved public mobilization and was viewed as a way for Indonesia to affirm its sovereignty and legitimacy on the global stage. Second was the Konfrontasi against Malaysia, which began in 1963 and continued until 1966, was the third way Soekarno's revolution spread. Soekarno's anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist worldview, which saw Malaysia as a puppet state of the Western powers, exacerbated this conflict. Subsequently, Konfrontasi entailed the mobilization of military and civilian troops and was viewed as a means of increasing Indonesia's influence and legitimacy in the region. Soekarno's Guided Democracy === [PDF page 494] === 494 administration aimed to achieve its political aims through societal mobilization, which was fueled by revolutionary rhetoric and Soekarno's image as the "Great Leader." While this mobilization was first viewed as a means of achieving political stability and economic progress, it ultimately led to the regime's own breakdown in the mid-1960s as tensions rose between the Army and the PKI. Guided Democracy was established with the aim of restoring order to the chaotic and tumultuous nature of Liberal Democracy. However, its ideology was unapologetically revolutionary, leading to a paradoxical situation where the government became a contradiction in itself. The revolutionary and dictatorial nature of the regime exacerbated the major political problem of the 1950s, as mass politics and political divisiveness increasingly became the norm. Meanwhile, structural problems such as economic growth, political upheaval, and insecurity remained unaddressed. Guided Democracy, effectively, replaced aliran-fueled parliamentary debates battles with mass rallies; the gerombolan threat with the specter of Western (neo)colonialism in West Irian and Malaysia; and party corruption with Army control over socioeconomic life. In the end, Guided Democracy replaced the did not eliminate the problems of political upheaval, economic decline, and insecurity that afflicted Indonesia since the early 1950s. While Guided Democracy was a real attempt to find a solution to the political divisiveness that had plagued the country since 1950s, it ultimately failed to achieve its goals. Consequently, when a politically polarized society was plunged into social instability and economic collapse, it paved the way for the rise of a new regime, one that was bound for social order and economic development that was directly led by Indonesia’s men-in-arms. === [PDF page 495] === 495 Several important points have been raised in this study. First was the pervasiveness and impact of emergency powers in Indonesian legal and political culture. Understanding this continuity is critical for assessing the balance between state power and individual rights within the current Indonesian government, as well as the possibility for emergency powers to be abused.The “logic of emergency,” deeply entrenched in the colonial and post-colonial laws of Indonesia, continue to deeply shape Indonesian legal and political culture. In 1999, the Reformasi-era government under Presidents B.J. Habibie (May 1998-October 1999) initiated a new law on the state of emergency. The new draft law, Rancangan UndangUndang Penanggulangan Keadaan Bahaya (RUU PKB) was designed to replace the old 1959 Law on State of Emergency. This initiative invited massive student demonstrations throughout Indonesia. However, this did not stop the state from implementing emergency measures. In response to violence in East Timor and the Moluccas, Habibie and his successor, Abdurrahman Wahid (October 1999-July 2001), implemented martial law using the 1959 Law on State of Emergency. Meanwhile, demonstrations against the new draft law continued. In 2001, an amended version of the draft law was considered in the DPR, but it was never adopted by the parliament.1262 Despite being obsolete, the 1959 Law on the State of Emergency remained as the country’s law on the state of emergency today. Second, this study emphasizes the impact of Dutch colonization on the formation of Indonesian states. Post-colonial regimes' adoption and reinterpretation of colonial emergency 1262 On the controversies regarding the 1999 RUU PKB, see Lukas Luwarso, Negara Dalam Bahaya: Kontroversi Seputar RUU Penanggulangan Keadaan Bahaya (Jakarta: Elsam, 2001). === [PDF page 496] === 496 powers and counterinsurgency practices have, perhaps inadvertently, influenced the role of the military in Indonesian culture and politics as well as the state's approach to internal security. Even today, twenty-five years after the fall of the New Order, the field of internal security remains to be the domain of the Army. Third, this study examines the historical development of the Indonesian military’s involvement in non-military affairs, particularly in relation to security sector reforms. The Indonesian military has a long tradition of involvement in governance, the economy, social affairs, and law enforcement. This historical experience has had far-reaching consequences on the broader pattern of civil-military relations in Indonesia, particularly in terms of democratic governance and militarization of the state. In order to completely understand this behavior, it is crucial to focus on the military itself as an institution, as emphasized in this dissertation. In fact, numerous vestiges of militarization can still be found today. At the time of writing, the Army still retains its Military Regional Commands and its Territorial sections, while it still continue to use its “Total People’s War” as its fundamental military doctrine. The relevance of these issues persists to this day. In 2020, the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) was considering a new draft law to the People’s Consultative Assembly (DPR) to amend the existing Law No.34 on the Armed Forces (Undang-Undang No.34 Tahun 2004 tentang Tentara Nasional Indonesia). In a nod to the Dwifungsi of the past, the proposed draft law includes, among others, counter-terrorism as part of military operations other than war (operasi militer === [PDF page 497] === 497 selain perang).1263 Furthermore, there has been a significant change regarding the number of ministries and state institutions that active service members may occupy, expanding that figure from ten to eighteen ministries and institutions.1264 Both of these expansions has raised concerns among Indonesian civil rights organizations such as Imparsial, Elsam, and KontraS, who are worried that this change could set a precedent for the return of Dwifungsi, potentially leading to further democratic backsliding. 1265 One scholar has linked this trend to the intra-organizational dynamics of the military officer corps that are plagued by promotional logjams—which creates “too many officers but too few positions available.”1266 Fourth, this research also highlights the nature of illiberal politics in Indonesia, particularly on its reliance on societal mobilization and political control that was often justified by vague and broad concepts such as “revolution.” These aspects have significant implications for understanding the impact of mass politics, public opinion, and the enduring legacy of authoritarian rule on societal cohesion and economic development. Despite Indonesia’s transition to democracy in 1998, the country continues to face vulnerability to political instability when faced with illiberal populism. An illustrative example was the mass protests that took place in Jakarta on December 2, 2016. 1263 Tsarina Maharani, “Ketua Komisi I DPR Nilai Pelibatan TNI Atasi Terorisme Sesuai UU,” Kompas.com, August 10, 2020, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2020/08/10/11480811/ketua-komisi-i-dpr-nilai-pelibatan-tni-atasiterorisme-sesuai-uu. 1264 Achmad Nasrudin Yahya, “Kekhawatiran Publik Akan Kembalinya ‘Dwifungsi ABRI’ Di Tubuh TNI,” Kompas.com, May 11, 2023, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2023/05/11/05450011/kekhawatiran-publik-akankembalinya-dwifungsi-abri-di-tubuh-tni. 1265 “‘Ancaman Kembalinya Dwifungsi ABRI’ - Aktivis Tolak Usulan Perluasan Prajurit Aktif Di Jabatan Sipil Dalam Revisi UU TNI, Jubir TNI: ‘Mengapa Tidak Diseminarkan Saja?’,” BBC Indonesia, May 12, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/articles/cq53qelv905o. 1266 Evan A. Laksmana, “Reshuffling the Deck? Military Corporatism, Promotional Logjams and Post-Authoritarian Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, July 4, 2019, 1–31. === [PDF page 498] === 498 These protests, led by conservative-radical Islamist groups such as the Front Pembela Islam, resulted in the removal of Jakarta’s Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), who was accused of blasphemy and subsequently convicted.1267 Of course, populism is not unique to Indonesia. However, it appears that the ghosts of the aliran politics of the 1950s and the 1960s remained at large. Fifth, this study underscored the difficulties that post-revolutionary societies frequently encounter. Among these challenges were political insecurity, economic decline, and social insecurity. These difficulties have affected the course of Indonesian politics in the 1950s and 1960s, resulting in the formation of new regimes and new approaches towards governance. It was during this difficult periods that new states turn towards its “tools,” which includes the Army. In other words, post-revolutionary periods are better understood as a period of “creative destruction,” which often resulted in the establishment of new state institutions. The shape of these new institutions, however, were not always “progressive,” and the actors involved was not always “liberal,” as we have seen in this research. In conclusion, this research have shed light on historical factors that have shaped contemporary Indonesian politics, thus providing valuable insights into the contestation and 1267 It should be noted here that Ahok was an “administrator”-type figure., as he often produced policies that are technocratic in nature. He is also a “double minority,” as he is a Christian and Chinese-Indonesian (Tionghoa) descent. On a foreign correspondents’ coverage of the protests, see Sara Schonhardt and I Made Sentana, “Indonesia Muslims Push to Jail Christian Politician Accused of Blasphemy,” The Wall Street Journal, December 3, 2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/indonesia-muslims-push-to-jail-christian-politician-accused-of-blasphemy1480664455. === [PDF page 499] === 499 balancing of power between the state and society and the role of the military in non-military affairs, and how these historical legacies continue to shape present-day challenges and opportunities. In 1983, Benedict Anderson argues that the emergence of Soeharto’s New Order, a strong state, was very much a continuity—or a return—to the colonial model of governance. This was reflected by the New Order’s reliance on civil servants, just like the colonial civil service (Binnenlands Bestuur), while its developmentalist social policy mirrored the “Ethical Policy” of late colonial Netherlands Indies.1268 The New Order economy was also geared back towards the supply chain of global capitalist order, just like how the colonial state was a reliable supplier of raw materials for Europe and America.1269 Most importantly, security and defense policy during the New Order was geared towards preparing for counterinsurgency operations and policing internal threats, just like the KNIL.1270 Even its conquests—such as the invasion of East Timor in 1975—bears “little sense in terms of economic profitability or even of military security.”1271 In short, and in referring to the late colonial state, Anderson contends that “the New Order is best understood as the resurrection of the state and its triumph vis-à-vis society and nation.”1272 This idea of a strong state was also discussed by David Bourchier, who traced the ideological origins of a strong, centralized state in Indonesia. His argument was that this tradition of a strong state in Indonesia originated with the illiberal tradition of organicist theory in 1268 Anderson, “Old State, New Society: Indonesia’s New Order in Comparative Historical Perspective,” 114–17. Anderson, 111–13. 1270 Anderson, 118–19. 1271 Anderson, 97. 1272 Anderson, 109. 1269 === [PDF page 500] === 500 Indonesian legal-political thought, which was in turn based upon the legal historicists in Dutch law schools such as Leiden and Utrecht. This “illiberal tradition,” later to be repackaged and reinterpreted by Indonesians as a “family state,” became the basis of the New Order’s political ideology, which was predicated upon the notion of the country being a one, big, happy family.1273 In many elements, the incisive macroanalyses by Anderson and Bourchier is true. However, as Marx would say, “men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.”1274 The “strong state” did not simply emerge in triumph against the “society and nation” by pure subjugation alone, nor it won public support by purely promoting the idea of a state as one big happy family. A political (and ideological) consensus usually emerge from a compatibility between the political elites’ goals and the demand of the people. Rather than a “family state” or a “neo-colonialist state,” there was a consensus, at least at the elite level, for a secure and prosperous state. As with any issues in politics back then, this consensus was far from stable. The stories of former revolutionary activists, gathered by Anton Lucas in 1994, is telling here. In criticizing Soeharto’s military authoritarian regime, Suryono Darusman states that “there is democracy, and there is Pancasila Democracy. Those are two different things, entirely different things. Pancasila Democracy is not democracy. It’s one man 1273 1274 Bourchier, Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia. Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (New York: International Publishers, 1990), 15. === [PDF page 501] === 501 rule.”1275 However, Darusman also recognized that Liberal Democracy didn’t work, as there were “too many parties, too many opinions, [and] too many ambitions.”1276 Most of these activists however, gave credit to Soeharto’s New Order in improving the economic condition. According to Wahyono Sunarto: When Bung Karno went overseas, the price of rice went up, there were queues, and then there was no rice. Every time Bung Karno went overseas this happened. This is Pak Harto’s strength. Bung Karno would talk a lot but didn’t follow up his words with actions. Bung Karno would say don't talk to hungry people about politics. Don’t give hungry people speeches, give them food, he said. It’s Pak Harto who has done this. Bung Karno was messed about by politicians. Pak Harto is the only one who has filled Indonesian stomachs. There are no queues for rice when he returns from overseas. But their personalities are far apart...there is a mountain in Kalimantan called Mt. Soeharto…1277 The stories discussed in this dissertation clearly showed that this consensus was born through the gradual process of militarization, which provided both the state and society with a compatible goal, which in turn paved the way for authoritarianism. This consensus, which was 1275 Suryono Darusman was a former member of the prewar nationalist students’ association Indonesia Moeda. He participated in the Three Regions Affair in 1945, and in 1947 he went to Singapore as obtain weapons and supplies for the Revolution. His older brother, Maruto Darusman, was executed during the Madiun Affair in December 1948. Later he worked for the Indonesian government as a diplomat in Africa and Eastern Europe. He is the father of former Indonesian Attorney General Marzuki Darusman and jazz composer Candra Darusman. See Lucas, “The Failure and Future of Democracy: Conversations with a Group of Former Revolutionary Activists,” 109. 1276 Lucas, 103. 1277 Wahyono Sunarto was a Brebes-based former pemuda leader. Lucas noted him as an admirer of Mohammad Hatta. See Lucas, 109. === [PDF page 502] === 502 gradually established during the tumultuous decades of 1950s and 1960s, necessitated the overthrow of the old regime of Liberal and Guided Democracy. However, in one of history’s great ironies, it was exactly this consensus that unwittingly conjured the emergence of a new kind of authoritarian Leviathan, the military authoritarian regime of Soeharto, in 1966. === [PDF page 503] === 503 REFERENCES Archives National Archives of the Republic of Indonesia, Jakarta RA.11. Kabinet Presiden RI 1950-1959 RA.12. Kabinet Presiden Republik Indonesia Serikat 1949-1950 RA.27A. Arsip Angkatan Laut dan Departemen Angkatan Laut RA.37. Sekretariat Menko Hubra 1963-1966 RA.6B. Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia (1945) 1959-1968 RA.70. Front Nasional RA.8A. Sekretariat Negara Kabinet Perdana Menteri Tahun 1950-1959 Jilid I RA.8B. Sekretariat Negara Kabinet Perdana Menteri Tahun 1950-1959 RA.8C. Sekretariat Negara Kabinet Perdana Menteri Tahun 1950-1959 Jilid II RA.62 Komando Operasi Tertinggi (KOTI) 1963-1967 RB.10. 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