Politics in Simalungun: A Study in Political Integration

=== [PDF page 1] === This dissertation has been microfilmed exactly as received 68— 5179 LIDDLE, Raymond William, 1938POLITICS IN SIMALUNGUN: A STUDY IN POLITICAL INTEGRATION. Yale University, Ph.D., 1967 Political Science, general U n iv e rsity M icrofilm s, Inc., A n n A rbor, M ich ig a n Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 2] === Copyright by RAYMOND WILLIAM LIDDLE 1968 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 3] === POLITICS IN SIMALUNGUN: A Study in Political Integration A DISSERTATION Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Yale University in Candidacy for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy R ^ William Liddle 1967 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 4] === SUMMARY The nroblen of political integration in a new state is explored through an analysis of political leadership and organization in the regency of Slmaiungun and its central city of Pematangsiantar in North Sumatra, Indonesia. Political integration is defined as including (1 ) a vertical dimension, which involves the closing of the gap between an urban, Western-educated, nationalist political elite and the largely traditional, rural population and (2 ) a hor izontal dimension, which involves a meshing together of disparate social groups within a framework of national loyalties and Institutions The population of Slmaiungun is divided into four ethnic and two religious groups. The Slmaiungun Bataks, indigenous to the region, are mostly Protestants, live in rural villages and engage in swidden agriculture. The South Tapanuli Bataks are Moslems, town-dwellers and engaged in trade or white-collar occupations. The Protestant North Tapanuli Batak group includes a substantial urban population and a rural population of wet-rice farmers. The non-devout Moslem Javanese, imported to Slmaiungun as plantation laborers, remain on or near the plantations. Plantation workers (mostly Javanese) and illegal squatters on plantation lands (North Tapanuli Bataks and Javanese) constitute a significant socio economic group among whom a sense of common interests is emerging. Of the five major political parties in Slmaiungun in the post independence period, four have been local branches of national organizations. The two major religious parties have become closely tied to the interests of particular ethnic groups: Masjumi (Moslem with South Tapanuli Bataks, and Parkindo (Protestant) with North Tapanuli Bataks. Because of the strength of ethnic-religious ties, and their easy convertibility into partisan loyalties, the religious parties have not developed complex organizational structures. The two major secular parties, PNI (Nationalist) and PKI (Communist), lacking this advantage, have attempted to build support among plantation workers and squatters regardless of ethnic-religious background. Because of the fragility ofiloyalties based on socio economic interests the secular parties have developed highly com plex, hierarchical, well-articulated organizational structures. The Slmaiungun Bataks supported a purely local ethnic political organization in the 1950s; in recent years they have not been affiliated with any party. The impact of the party system, and of the larger Indonesian political environment, has been generally dysfunctional for the creation of an integrated political system. Masjumi and Parkindo have tended to exacerbate deep-rooted primordial cleavages, and the PNI and PKI have in large measure failed to inculcate supraethnic partisan loyalties. Although the parties have provided an Institutional network linking Slmaiungun to the national polit ical process, several factors— the nature of party ideologies, organization and leadership, the decline of the parties as authori tative decision-makers— have combined to limit the local-national integrative capacity of the party system. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 5] === For Patricia, who made the sacrifices. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 6] === TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page I NTH ODU CTI ON CONTEMPORARY SIMALUNGUN/SIANTAR: A N OVERVIEW.. 11 PART ONE: SOCIO-POLITICAL CHANGE IN SIMALUNGUN TRADITIONAL GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY IN SIMALUNGUN III. 76 JAPANESE OCCUPATION AND NATIONALIST REVOLUTION. 116 PART TWO: CONTEMPORARY POLITICS IN SIMALUNGUN/SIANTAR THE PARTY SYSTEM A N D THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS. THE LOCAL PARTIES: OBJECTIVES, STRATEGIES AND ORGANIZATION...................................... 185 VII. BASES OF PARTISAN SUPPORT: VOTERS, MEMBERS AND L E A D E R S........................................... 229 VIII. PARTY LEADERSHIP: RECRUITMENT AND LINKAGE. 150 277 PATTERNS OF INTRA-PARTY F A C T I O N A L I S M.............. 328 SUKU SIMALUNGUN: A N ETHNIC GROUP IN SEARCH OF R E P R E S E N T A T I O N.................................... 386 LOCAL POLITICS AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION: AN EVALUATION...................................... k20 iii Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. kQk === [PDF page 7] === ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS A doctoral dissertation is the product of many influences, intellectual and personal, reaching back at least to the ex periences of undergraduate days. It is appropriate, there fore, to begin by expressing appreciation to Yale University, where I was privileged to be both an undergraduate and a graduate student, and to Yale's Directed Studies, Divisional Honors Ma^or II (Political and Economic Institutions) and political science graduate programs. To thank a university and its programs is in reality to thank its faculty; I would like to mention in particular David J. Braybrooke, Robert A. Dahl, Herbert S. Kaufman, Ivo J. Lederer and Charles E. Lindblom. In different combinations all of these individuals provided intellectual stimulation, moral support and personal friendship. Professors Kaufman and Dahl should perhaps be further singled out, as it was they who first urged upon me a career in political science. As a graduate student associated with the Yale Southeast Asia Studies program I benefitted greatly from exposure to the methods and concerns of scholars in other disciplines concerned with the problems of change and development in Southeast Asia and Indonesia. In anthropology, I learned much from Gerald C. Hickey; in economics, from Douglas Paauw; Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 8] === and in history, from Harry J. Benda. Also much appreciated was the kindness, patience and skill of Mr. and Mrs. Abdul Bony, who taught me the Indonesian language. Harry B e n d a ’s contributions to this dissertation go far beyond his formal role as a teacher of m o d e m Indonesian history. Prom the prospectus stage to completion, Professor Benda responded to every query and made valuable comments and criticisms on every chapter. His continuing support and concern were especially valuable in those dark days when the field notes seemed to defy analysis. If more of his suggestions had been adopted, the final product would undoubtedly be better. For valuable advice at critical points during the writing, appreciation is also due to Joseph LaPalombara and Hobert 0. Tilman of Yale University, John H. W. Small of the University of Wisconsin, and Bradley Richardson and John Orbell of The Ohio State University. For help with the statistical analyses in Chapter VII, I am Indebted to Joseph T. Crymes. Most of the tables were originally prepared by my wife, who also provided trenchant criticism of writing style and organization. Field work in Simalungun/Siantar in 1963-6^ was made possible by a grant from the Ford Foundation. For a year at the University of Chicago (196^-6 5 ) as a Carnegie Fellow of the Committee for the Comparative Study of New Nations, I am grateful to the Committee, the Carnegie Foundation and to Aristide Zolberg, Morris Janowitz and Clifford Geertz, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 9] === who commented, on various sections of Part One. Beyond his specific comments, Prof. Geertz* brilliant analyses of many aspects of Indonesian social and political life and his general discussions of the problems of n e w states have con stituted the single most influential source for my own analysis of politics in Simalungun/Siantar. In many respects my deepest debt is to the people of Simalungun/Siantar— politicians, civil servants, urbanites and villagers— who were willing to give freely of their time and energy to provide information and hospitality to the foreigner in their midst. A special note of thanks must be offered to the members of marga Purba whose hospitality included the induction of a sibontar mata into the marga, and to the members of marga Sitolubatu, whose kindnesses were many and whose friendship will never be forgotten. Finally, I would like to thank my parents, whose contributions have taken many forms. Despite misgivings and reservations about their s o n ’s choice of a career and his desire to travel to the far ends of the earth, their love and support has been unstintingly given. Whatever merits this study may have are thus the result of a collaboration in the broadest sense; its deficiencies, on the other hand, are my responsibility alone. fi. William Liddle Columbus, Ohio March 18, 1967 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 10] === INTRODUCTION AN APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF LOCAL POLITICS. IN A NEW STATE "One of the most serious problems facing the post revolutionary Indonesian political elite has turned out to be the maintenance of mutual understanding between themselves and the mass of the peasant population. The attempt to build up a m o d e m national state out of a plurality of distinct regional cultures has been hampered by the difficulty of communication between people still largely absorbed in those cultures and the metropolitan-based nationalist leadership more oriented to the international patterns of intelligentsia culture common to ruling groups in all the new Bandung countries.... "In such a situation, the Individuals and groups who can communicate both with the urban elite and with the rural followers of a particular local tradition perform an altogether critical function. It is these groups and individuals who can 'translate* the somewhat abstract ideologies of the *New Indonesia* into one or another of the concrete idioms of rural life and can, in return, make clear to the Intelligentsia the nature of the peasantry's fears and aspirations. Analyses of the creation of viable nations in Asia and Africa which simply focus on the political elite, as those of political scientists have tended to do, or simply on the peasant village, as those of anthropologists have tended to do, are necessarily incomplete. What is needed, in addition, is an analysis of the links between the two i.e., of regional leadership. A vigorous, imaginative regional leadership, able to play a cultural middleman role between peasant and metropolitan life, and so create an effective juncture between traditional cultural patterns and m o d e m ones, is in many ways the most essential prerequisite for the success, In democratic form, of the nationalist experiment both in Indonesia and else where." Clifford Geertz, "The Javanese Kijaji: The Changing Role -of a Cultural Broker, Comparative Studies in Society and History. Vol. II. No. 2. pp. 228-229. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 11] === Within the discipline of pplitical science the study of comparative politics has been immensely enriched and ex panded in recent years by the growth of interest in the pol itics of the newly-independent states of Asia and Africa. New theoretical approaches and concepts, many of them borrowed from other disciplines, cross-national quantitative analyses, elite studies, studies of whole political systems or of par ticular structures such as parties, armies or bureaucracies, have made ma^or contributions to our understanding of polit ical life not only within the new states but as a universal phenomenon. In most of these studies the basic unit of analysis— sometimes explicitly chosen, often only implicit— has been the independent nation-state, its creation, its developmental problems, the characteristics of its political and governmental structures and personnel In comparison with those of the older nations of Europe and America, and so on. Along with this expansion of the field of comparative politics there has emerged a small body of studies dealing with local government and politics in the new states. large part these works have not been set within the frame work of the whole political system— the nation-state— and its problems, but rather have confined their perspective to the analysis of a locality per s e.1 In the light of the prominence attached in the theor etical literature to the problems of “nation-building," of the "part-whole" relationship and the "gap" between local and Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 12] === national political life, this neglect is surprising. Edward Shils, for example, has written that "In almost every aspect of their social structures, the societies on which the new states must be based are characterized by a 'gap. 1 It Is the gap between the few, very rich and the mass of the poor, be tween the educated and uneducated, between the townsman and the villager, between the cosmopolitan or national and the local, between the modern and the traditional, between the rulers and the ruled. It is the *gap* between a small group of active, aspiring, relatively well-off, educated and In fluential persons in the big towns and an inert or indifferent impoverished, uneducated and relatively powerless peasantry."^ Olearly, there is much to learn about the present condition and future potentialities of the nation-state systems of Asia and Africa through analyses which focus on the nature and extent of this gap and on the political structures and elites which may or may not serve to bridge it. In particular it would seem that the creation of effective, stable and democratic political systems, and perhaps of the necessary conditions for economic development as well, depends to a significant extent on the achievement of at least a minimum of communication and articulation between the national elites and the various sub-national strata only recently brought within the nation-state framework. Political integration, a concept which has become of increasing importance in the field of political change and Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 13] === development, provides the basic analytic framework within which this study is set.-^ In our formulation, the concept includes two major dimensions or axes: (1) a vertical dimen sion, which we may call local-national political integration, which involves the closing of the cultural and political gap between an urban, Western-educated, nationalist political elite on the one hand and the masses of the largely tradi tional and rural population on the other; and (2 ) a hori zontal dimension, which involves a meshing together of dis parate social groups— kinship, ethnic, linguistic, religious, racial, socio-economic— within a framework of national loy alties and Institutions.^- In the older nations of Western Europe and North America (with some important exceptions) these processes are substantially complete; in the newer states of Asia and Africa they are barely underway. Successful political Integration, in both of its dimen sions, requires the development of supra-local loyalties, that is, loyalties which can transcend the former parochial or primordial ties to village, clan, tribe or kingdom and comprehend all of the peoples and territories of the new nation. It also requires the development of supra-local political institutions— government bureaucracies, political parties and interest groups— which can provide effective channels of communication between those who make authoritative decisions for the whole society, the national political elite, and those who are affected by the decisions, the predominantly Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 14] === rural m a s s e s. 5 The integrative role of regional political leadership, culturally as well as in terms of organization halfway between elite and mass, has been much neglected in the recent literature on political development. As Clifford Geertz has so concisely stated, however, a vigorous regional leadership which serves as a link between the national polit ical elite and the citizenry, translating the symbols, policies and programs of the center into village terms and transmitting popular demands and aspirations to the national policy-makers, is crucial to the success of the integrative experiment, both in Indonesia and elsewhere in the world of newly-emergent states. There have been to date few scholarly works dealing with the integrative or 11part-whole" problem in Indonesia. Political studies, including the works of J.D. Legge® and Gerald S. Maryamov,? have concentrated largely on legal-for mal aspects of governmental decentralization or on the national-level conflict within the political elite over the centralization-decentralization issue. Por our purposes, the contributions of cultural anthropologists to a deeper exploration of part-whole relationships in contemporary Indonesia have been more useful -than the rather narrowlyconceived political-governmental analyses. Most notably we have benefitted from the work of Clifford Geertz,® Hildred G e e r t z, 9 Edward M. Sruner10 and G. William Skinner et a l.,11 all of whom have dealt with the problems of cultural Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 15] === integration and the relationship of particular sub-groups and strata to the broader Indonesian society which is in process of formation. In some respects Indonesia*s Integrative problems are less severe than those of other new nations. Unlike neighboring Malaysia, Indonesia is not divided racially, al though it contains minority communities of Chinese, Indians and others; unlike India, Indonesia has not been divided over the question of language— the national language, bahasa Indonesia. Is the property of no single group and is spoken as a second language throughout the archipelago; unlike Pakistan, separated into eastern and western regions by more than a thousand miles of India, the Indonesian archipelago from Sabang to the northern tip of Sumatra to Merauke on the southeastern edge of West Irian Is a contiguous territory. Moreover, the commitment to national independence pervaded all levels of Indonesian society during the long years of Revolution from 1945 to 1949 and has served as a powerful cohesive force. On the other hand, Indonesia shares many of the malintegrative characteristics of other new nations. Its boundaries, and indeed the very idea of an Indonesian nation state, are a creation of Dutch colonialism. Ethnically, Indonesia contains over three hundred different groups speaking more than two hundred and fifty distinct l a n g u a g e s, ^ of which at least ten number one million or more members. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 16] === Of these the Javanese, comprising perhaps forty million of a total Indonesian, population of slightly over one hundred million, are by far the largest group. divisive factor. Religion is also a Although over ninety percent of the popula tion is Moslem, only a fraction of the Moslem community has been committed to the realization of an Islamic state; another group, led by such secular nationalist (but nominally Moslem) leaders as Sukarno, has firmly opposed Islamic political influence. The Christian minority has also been an active defender of its position in the political arena. Regionalism has also been of major significance in Indonesian politics,with the peoples of the foreign exchange producing Outer Islands (most notably Sumatra, Borneo, the Celebes and the Moluccas) In opposition to the foreign exchange consuming Javanese. Finally, the communications network, although on the whole more helped than hindered by the Island nature of the country, has suffered from the general lack of economic development and the broad expanse (over three thousand miles from east to west) of Indonesian territory. What, then, in the light of these problems, is the nature of the political relationship between the village and Djakarta? What kinds of organizations, what types of leaders, have emerged to link the countryside with the national political system of which it Is a part? On what basis have regional leaders cultivated and obtained, or failed to ob tain, the support of the populace? How have the villagers Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 17] === related themselves to each other and to the political system of independent Indonesia? In an attempt to find answers to these questions, this study presents a picture of one area, the regency of Slmaiungun and its central city, the munici pality of Pematangsiantar, and of the development of political structures and leadership in that region. The regency of Slmaiungun and the (administratively separate) city of Pematangsiantar, located in the province of North Sumatra, provide an excellent setting for an ex amination of the integrative problem in Indonesia. While no single regency or town can typify the immense diversity that characterizes contemporary Indonesia, Slmaiungun society is in itself so diverse that in a sense it is a microcosm of all-Indonesian politics. Several subdistricts (the adminis trative level below the regency) of Slmaiungun are character ized by a multiplicity of ethnic and religious groups, a plantation-based economy and large numbers of illegal squatters on plantation land, variables which may be found singly or in combination in other parts of the archipelago as well. In the highland area of the regency one ethnic group, the Slmaiungun Batah, predominates; in this region, less detraditionalized than any other part of Slmaiungun, the economy is based largely on subsistence dry rice agriculture. This pattern is also a common one, particularly in the Outer Islands of Indonesia. Pematangsiantar, an administrative and commercial center with a fast-growing multi-ethnic Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 18] === population, is in many respects typical of urban development in Indonesia. Beyond this internal diversity which permits valuable comparisons as to the nature and extent of political change in subdistricts dominated by plantations, in an urban en vironment and in a more traditional area, Simalungun/Siantar is perhaps most fascinating to the student of political development because of the enormous variety of cleavages which exist there. Ethnicity (the population is divided into four major indigenous ethnic groups, plus the Chinese*^), religion (Moslem, Protestant, Oatholic and animist), economic groups (urban and plantation workers, plantation squatters, traders, a white collar class, farmers), and ideological cleavages related to the national party system and to the struggle for independence all provide grounds on which men differ in their values, their attitudes toward politics and government and the goals for which they wage political combat. Detailed examination of politics in a region which contains so many of the conflicts and cleavages which affect political activity throughout Indonesia should provide interesting in sights and suggestive hypotheses concerning the nature of the Indonesian political process as a whole. Following an introductory chapter, this study is divided into two parts. In Part One the social transformation of SImalungun/SIantar in the twentieth century Is described. From a number of relatively Isolated, sparsely populated Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 19] === 10 ■traditional kingdoms inhabited almost exclusively by members of the Simalungun 3atak ethnic group, we trace the develop ment in the colonial period of the plantation economy, the inflow of migrant groups, the growth of towns, the intro duction and development of Islam and Christianity and finally the destruction of Dutch colonialism by the Japanese oc cupation and the subsequent nationalist revolution. Proceeding to the contemporary period, Part Two offers a detailed analysis of the nationally-based political parties and their affiliated organizations which have provided the major channels of political communication between the people of the region and the structures of regional and national government. Following the party analysis, Chapter 10 des cribes the development of political leadership and organiza tion within the Simalungun Batak community, where national political parties have failed to take deep root, as a sort of case study within a case study of the response of one ethnic group to the demands and challenges of post-independence Indonesian politics. Finally, in the concluding chapter the relationship between the local political environ ment in S imal ungun/S i an tar and the national polity of which it is a part is discussed more explicitly, drawing.together the threads of analysis and attempting to provide at least partial answers to the questions posed in this Introduction. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 20] === CHAPTER 1 CONTEMPORARY SIMALUNGUN/SIANTAR: AN OVERVIEW In the nearly two decades since the transfer of sov ereignty from the Netherlands to the independent Republic of the United States of Indonesia there has been considerable controversy over the relationship between national and re gional institutions of government.1 The basic issue, federal vs. unitary state, was decided at the very beginning of the post-independence period, when the various member states of the RUSI more or less willingly opted for a unitary governmental structure, the federal system having been dis credited as a Dutch attempt at divide et impera. Controversy over centralization vs. decentralization within a unitary structure has continued to the present day, however, and there have been several revisions of the laws relating to the powers, responsibilities and Institutions of local gov ernment. Regional boundaries have also been redrawn and new regions created on several of the ma^or islands. Under the present system of territorial administration in Indonesia, the island of Sumatra is divided into six provinces or first-level self-governing regions:2 At^eh, North Sumatra, West Sumatra, Riau, DJambi and South Sumatra. 11 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 21] === The provinces are divided into regencies (kabupaten) and municipalities (kotaprad.ja), called second-level selfgoverning regions, which are further divided into subdistricts and villages. The province of North Sumatra, extending from the primitive island of Nias off the west coast to the great rubber and tobacco plantations of the former East Coast Residency, contains eleven regencies and six municipalities.3 The regency of Simalungun is located about two hours* drive south and west on a paved all-weather road from the provincial capital of Medan, and is bordered on the north and east by the plantation areas of Asahan and Deli/Serdang, on the west by the regency of Karo, and on the south by the waters of mountain-ringed Lake Toba. Its population is 522,555, in habiting a total area of 420,638 hectares.^- Approximately in the center of the regency is the municipality of Pematangsiantar (also called P. Siantar or Siantar), a market and administrative center and the second largest city of North Sumatra with a population of 112,687.^ Structures of Local Government^ The head of the regency government in Simalungun is the Kepala Daerah (Regional Head, also called bupati or regent), who is appointed by the Minister for General Administration and Regional Autonomy (Menteri Pemerintahan Umum dan Otonoml Daerah) from lists of nominees presented by the regency leg islature (Dewan Perwakilan Rak.lat Daerah-Gotong Ro.long or DPRD-GR, Mutual Help Regional People*s Representative Council), Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 22] === R IA U NCIAL 1 -1. T H E P R O V IN C E O F N O R T H S U M A T R A Reproduced with permission of the copyright ow ne r Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission. === [PDF page 23] === or directly by the Minister if no suitable candidate is no m inated. The Regional Head is responsible both for general administration, carried out by the regional bureaucracy, and for coordination of the various central government bureaus located in the region; he is simultaneously the chief official of the self-governing region and, as a member of the ter ritorial bureaucracy Cpamong prad.la) of the Ministry of General Administration and Regional Autonomy, the local agent of the central government. He also serves as chairman of the DPRD-GR and is considered responsible to that body in the sphere of regional "household affairs," although he may not be dismissed by it. In recent years two new governmental bodies have been established: the Rational Front (Front Naslonal). a repre sentative institution charged with providing "social control" of and "social support" for the policies of the government; and the Land Reform Committee (Panitia Land-Reform). which oversees the execution of the Basic Agrarian Law and acts as a semi-3udicial body in the settling of land disputes be tween the plantations and the squatters who infringe on plan tation land. The Regional Head is ex officio chairman of both of these bodies. Assisting the Regional Head in the performance of his duties is a board of advisors and all purpose administrative assistants, the Daily Government Board (Badan Pemerlntah Harlan), whose members are nominated by the DPRD-GR and selected by the Regional Head of North Sumatra. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 24] === 15 The seventeen subdistricts (ket.lamatan) in Simalungun are headed by subdistrict officers (t.jamat). administrative officials of the territorial bureaucracy who are appointed by the Regional Head. At the subdistrict level there is no representative council, but both the Front Uasional and the Panitia Land-Reform maintain branches there, chaired by the subdistrict officer. The lowest unit of government is the village or village complex (kepengfauluan). of which there are 530 in Simalungun. Each kepenghuluan is headed by a village head (penghulu), who is according to law elected by the people. He is responsible for the settlement of disputes within the village and serves both as the general administra tive agent (and tax collector) of the central government and as the spokesman for his people to the subdistrict officer. Each kepenghuluan also contains a sub-branch of the Front Uasional• Since 1956 the government of the municipality of Pematangsiantar has been separate from that of the regency; since 1957, like the regency, it has had the status of secondlevel self-governing region. The structures of government are similar to those of Simalungun, except that the Regional Head is called walikota (mayor) rather than bupati, and there are no subdistricts, each of the ten village heads being directly responsible to the municipal government. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 25] === 16 Social Cleavages Simalungun/Siantar is a multi-ethnic, economically di verse region which has been subject to considerable social change in recent history. Toward the end of the nineteenth century Simalungun consisted of a number of traditional kingdoms (kerad.laan) and was peopled by about 75,000 Simalungun or Eastern Bataks, so called to distinguish them from the North Tapanuli Bataks around Lake Toba and in the S11indung Talley, the South Tapanuli Bataks in Angkola, Mandailing and Sipirok, and the Karo Bataks to the west of Simalungun (see map 1-2); all of these groups speak mutually unintelligible, although closely related, languages. The multi-ethnic characteristics of present-day Simalungun/Siantar are in large part a result of the Liberal Policy of the colonial period, which encouraged private European investment in Indonesia and led to the large-scale growth of tobacco, rubber, tea and palm oil plantations in the east coast lowlands of Sumatra. Javanese were brought in under contract to work on the plantations and, in parts of Simalungun, soon outnumbered the Indigenous Simalungun Bataks. North Tapanuli Bataks, skilled in the techniques of wet-rlce agriculture, were encouraged by the Dutch to migrate to Simalungun to provide food for the plantation workers; many of them had received a rudimentary education in Christian missionary schools and secured employment as plantation and government clerks. As the North Tapanuli Bataks came in and Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 26] === NORTH 30 miles 1 - Z. B A T A K. S U B - 6 K O U P 5 JN N O R T H S U M A T R A SOURCE: CLARK. E. CUNNINGHAM, THE T O B A - BATAICS TO EAST SUM ATRA, M l6RfrTI°M OF Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 27] === settled the hest rice land, the less aggressive Simalungun people moved into the less fertile foothills of the Bukit Barisan mountain range. During this period Pematangsiantar grew from a small village and seat of one of the traditional kingdoms to a commercial and administrative center large enough by the 1920s to become a municipality. Trading pros pects attracted a great variety of immigrants, including Moslem 3ataks from South Tapanuli, Ooastal Malays from the sultanates along the east coast, Minangkabaus from the west coast, Chinese and a smattering of people from other parts of the archipelago. As a result of this migration a network of small towns grew up throughout the region. In contemporary Simalungun/Siantar the principal social cleavages are ethnic, consisting of four main groups: the Simalungun Bataks, comprising perhaps thirty percent of the total population; the North Tapanuli Bataks, about twenty percent; the Javanese, about twenty percent; and the South Tapanuli Bataks, perhaps fifteen percent.7 Patterns of cleavages crosscutting or consistent with the ethnic are com plex; we shall briefly mention here the two most important, religion and social class. The combined regency/municipality population is about half-Chris tian and half-Moslem. The North Tapanuli and Simalungun 3ataks are predominantly Christian Protestant, although the latter group contains significant Islamic, Roman Catholic and animist minorities. For several decades one church, the HKBP (Hurla Kristen Batak Protestan. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 28] === 19 Batak Christian Protestant Church), served both ethnic groups. In 1952 the Simalungun Protestants, unhappy over what they felt to he North Tapanuli domination, gained autonomy within the framework of the HKBP; in 1963, with the establisliment of the GKPS (Gered.ja Kristen Protestan Simalungun. Simalungun Protestant Christian Church), they became completely separate. The Javanese and South Tapanuli Batak ethnic groups in Simalungun are both Moslem in their religious affilitation, but there is a vast difference between them in terms of a d herence to and practice of the Islamic faith. The great ma jority of Javanese in the region are of the abangan persuasion, a more syncretistic, animistic and Hindu-influenced variant of Islam, while the South Tapanuli people belong to the more devoutly Islamic santri element in Indonesian Islam.® It is largely this latter group which participates in religious activities, the Islamic educational system and Moslem social organizations. In the post-colonial period economic and occupational cleavages consistent with the ethnic divisions have begun to break down as a result of urbanization and increasing educa tional opportunities. The North Tapanuli Bataks remain, as a group, the most highly educated, and fill a disproportionate number of government and plantation offices. They also, with the Chinese, dominate the shops and market stalls of Siantar, but in the last decade they have come under increasing pres sure in this sphere from the Simalungun Bataks. Among the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 29] === less-educated North Tapanuli Bataks, the great majority are wet-rice (sawah) farmers. The South Tapanuli Bataks are mostly traders, teachers in Islamic schools or government officials, particularly in the small towns ringing the plan tations. The Javanese for the most part remain on or near the plantations, although many of them have moved to Siantar and other towns and found employment as servants or unskilled laborers. Finally, the Simalungun Bataks, while numerically the largest group in the regency, have only a very thin layer of educated, urbanized individuals; these are employed primarily as ministers in the Simalungun church, school teachers or government officials. Most Simalungun 3ataks are swiddeu or dry rice (ladang) farmers. In terms of residential patterns there is a relatively high degree of segregation along ethnic lines. The upland area of the regency is Inhabited almost exclusively by Simalungun Bataks, with some admixture of Karonese along its western border and North Tapanuli Bataks on the south. The plantation areas contain Javanese said North and South Tapanuli Bataks, but the Javsuaese live on the plantations, the North Tapanuli Bataks in villages near the plantations and in the small towns, and the South Tapanuli Bataks live mostly In the towns. The city of Siantar, in pre-revolutionary days, con sisted of two villages bisected by a river: Kampung Kristen, inhabited by North Tapanuli Bataks; and Kampung Melaju, con taining a majority of South Tapanuli Moslems end clusters of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 30] === Javanese and other groups. This pattern Is slowly breaking down, but in each of the ten village units in contemporary Siantar one or another ethnic group predominates. Patterns of Social Relationships and Elite Formation Social relationships in Simalungun/SIantar tend to be within rather than among ethnic groups. Por such strata as rural villagers and plantation workers this pattern is imposed by residential segregation and to some extent by lack of facility in the Indonesian language, the principal vehicle of communication among peoples of different ethnic groups (approximately 50% of the regency population is literate in Indonesian^), but it is also the dominant pattern among the more educated and the townspeople. Por the inhabitant of 3imalungun/Siantar, suku (ethnic group) is the prime deter minant of Identity within the larger Indonesian community. An individual's friendships and associations are built around his family (particularly for the various Batak groups.char acterized by extended family systems) and his neighbors. The North Tapanuli Batak sees his identity in terms of his own lineage segment, the larger patrilineage of which it is a part, the still larger territorial group which makes up a subdivision of North Tapanuli (e.g., Humbang, the Silindung Valley, Samosir), and finally all North Tapanuli Bataks (who form a single language group). In Siantar, where there are many patrilineages represented In the North Tapanuli wards, the village association (dongan sahuta) has taken on some Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 31] === 22 importance in neighborhood social life.*^ The Simalungun Batak places less emphasis upon extended family relationships, more on village of origin (which usually contains Individuals from several lineages) and on membership in the total Simalungun group, defined primarily as a linguistic-cultural entity. Por the South Tapanuli Batak devotion to Islam is an integral part of his identity, setting him off from other Batak sub-groups, and kinship and place of origin are rela tively less important. Among the Javanese the sense of a distinctive identity is related to the use of the Javanese language, the symbols of popular Javanese culture such as the wa.jang and ketoprak. and with Javanese mysticism. The Javanese have no extended family system. Among the more educated, particularly the civil servants and the politicians but also the merchant and entrepreneurial classes, work group associations assume greater importance, but even here social relationships are largely within one*s own suku. There is no coherent social elite based on wealth, education, high governmental or political status or other values which overarches ethnic differentiations. Instead, stratification patterns based on occupation and education have developed differently for each ethnic group and the individuals who fill the various status categories within each group associate rather more with each other than they do with people of similar attainments In other groups. Por the North Tapanuli Bataks these elites include the entrepreneurs, self- Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 32] === 23 employed professionals, civil servants, church leaders and school teachers; for the South Tapanuli Bataks- the religious leaders and teachers, merchants and civil servants; for the Javanese, the school teachers and politicians; and for the Simalungun Bataks, the church leaders, civil servants and school teachers. Por many Simalungun people the traditional aristocracy, though now shorn of all its power and position, retains high status. While the predominant patterns of relationships among the members of these elites are intra- rather than inter ethnic, the latter do exist, particularly among the civil servants and politicians. Some of the most interesting questions for the student of contemporary politics in Indonesia relate, in fact, not to the rather obvious problems of communal distinctiveness and separation but rather to the areas where the walls have been breached, where inter-ethnic relationships exist and where there Is tension and conflict between old and new patterns of behavior. The development of inter-ethnic contacts and channels of communication, both within Simalungun and between the region and the larger society and polity of which It is now a part, and the simultaneous heightening of ethnic consciousness are among the principal effects of the processes of social and political change in the late nineteenth and twentieth century, a subject with which we shall deal in Part One. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 33] === 24 Internal Diversity: Lover Simalungun, Upper Simalungun, the Road to Paranat and P. Siantar In terms of geography, economy, ethnicity, religion and politics the regency of Simalungun presents a picture of great internal diversity. For our purposes it is useful to group its seventeen subdistricts into three broad areas: Lower Simalungun (Simalungun Bawah), Upper Simalungun (Simalungun A t a s ). and the subdistricts located in the southern part of the regency along the road to Parapat, a resort town on the shores of Late Toba (see maps 1-3 and 1-4). The city of Siantar will be discussed separately. Lower Simalungun.— The core area of Lower Simalungun comprises the subdistricts of Bandar, Bosar Maligas, Tanah DJawa, Doloh Batunanggar and Siantar (not to be confused with the separate municipality of Pematangsiantar). Exhibiting similar characteristics, though not strictly a part of Lower Simalungun as the term is used by the inhabitants of the regency, is the subdistrict of Sidamanih, and we shall include it in this discussion. Lower Simalungun is a relatively flat, low-lying region, gently sloping upward from an altitude of So meters above sea level in subdistrict Bandar to 389 meters in subdistrict Siantar, and intersected by a number of shallow rivers running in a northeasterly direction which provide water for the ir rigated rice fields (sawah). The distinguishing mark of Lower Simalungun is the extensiveness of plantation agriculture, gjsL Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 34] === TEPING ng gi TlN&G I olfl! K a. h e a n • PAN SEKI5U-j POLOK / BUNTUON Tl&A SAL AT/ 1-3 T H E SOURCE: PEMERINTAHAN PAERAH B A L I& E REGENCY SlMALUN&UM, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 35] === it\JPKAPORA & TIN&&I TO ME7AN T.TINGSI T. BALAI <*>/ B a n d a r p e r p a s a n g a n SERg£LAWAN P.SIANTAR. / Tl&A BALATA tanah PJAWA TO ASA HAN REGENCY BOUNPARY S U B D IS T R IC T B O U N D A R IE S PAVED ROADS UNPAVED ROADS 10 S C A L E IN fAl LES 5A L I& E SIMALUNGUN LAPURAN TAHUN 1963 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 36] === UPPER. SIMALUNGUN LOW ER S IM A LU N G U N, SO U R C E: P E M E R I N T A H A N PAERAH P A R A P A T UPPER SIM ALL T K T. II S I M A L U N G U N Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 37] === S 1M A L U N G U N LO W ER P. S I A N T A R s im a l u n g u n ALUNGUN, LAPUPAN anp SCALE IN AML the roap TAHAN p a r a p a t Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 38] === 27 which covers approximately sixty percent of the total area. By subdistrict, the figures are as follows:11 TABLE 1-1 PLANTATION AGRICULTURE IN LOWER SIMALUNGUN Subdistrict Plantation Land (ha.) Total Arable Land of 12) Bandar 3osar Maligas Tanah Djawa Dolok Batunanggar Siantar Sidamanik 20,182.00 31,685.95 23,064.55 19,247.50 24,475.65 12,987.70 34,700 51,700 56,340 21,200 32,040 12,310 58.2 61.3 40.9 90.8 76.4 Totals 131,643.35 208,290 63.0 All other subdistricts 15,677.92 173,307 Source: Column (1) computed from The General Agricultural Condition of Simeloengoea. P. Sian tar: Guns el buKezaibu, 2602 (1942), p. 17• This data was collected in 1939. Column (2) computed from Djawatan Agraria, Kabupaten Simalungun, Saftar: Nama2 Perkebunan dl Kabupaten Simalungun. (Agrarian Service, Eegency of Simalungun, A List of Plantations in the Regency of Simalungun). P.Siantar, 1963* *There is an obvious error here, probably due to over lapping of plantation land listed as located in Sidamanlk, but part of which is actually in a neighboring subdistrict; the actual % of plantation land in Sidamanik probably approaches 90%. The principal plantation crop in Lower Simalungun is rubber; fiber and palm oil are also produced, and there are several tea plantations in the hillier areas of subdistricts Siantar, Tanah Djawa and Sidamanlk. The great majority of the plantations are run by the Indonesian government through, the Sumatran offices of the PPN (Pusat Perkebunan Negara. Government Estates Administration). Foreign concessions Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 39] === 28 (British and American) cover a total of approximately 23,000 ha. in Lower Simalungun plus another 2,000 ha. in other parts of the regency, and there are a small number of plantations with limited hectareage owned by Indonesian nationals.12 Village agriculture in Lower Simalungun consists largely of subsistence cultivation in wet and dry rice (ladang), al though some fruits and vegetables, both annual and perennial, are grown for sale in the local markets; there Is also a small holder rubber industry. TABLE 1-2 VILLAGE AGRICULTURE IE LOWER SIMALUWGUH Or op Harvested area (ha.) Wet rice 20,666 39.8 Dry rice Small-hoider rubber Var. vegetables Var. fruits 15,728 30.3 3,706 4,798 6,395 12.3 Commercial crops 614 51,907 99.9 Total Special characteristics 9,810 ha. in Tanah Ljawa, 3,713 ha. In Ketjamatan Siantar. Approx. 2,800 ha. in 3andar Approx. 4,000 ha. in Siantar, 1,000 ha. in Bandar Coconuts, cloves, tobacco, coffee Total arable land 208,290 Source: Adapted from Pemerlntahan Daerah Tkt. Simalungun, Lapuran Tahnn 1963. pp. 72, 77-80, 167. Total arable land computed from The General Agricultural Condition of Slmeloengoen, p. 17. The six subdistricts of Lower Simalungun are inhabited by a great diversity of peoples, the major groups being Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 40] === 29 Javanese, North Tapanuli Bataks and South Tapanuli Bataks, There are also a large number of Chinese located principally in the town of Perdagangan in subdistrict Bandar and to a lesser extent in Serbelawan (subdistrict Dolok Batunanggar) and Tanah DJawa (subdistrict Tanah Djawa). The indigenous people of the regency, the Simalungun Bataks, are found throughout the area, Indonesian census figures unfortunately do not list population by ethnic group, but do contain a table on place of birth which may serve as a rough indicator of the number of Javanese in the six subdistricts. TABLE 1-3 INHABITANTS OP LOWER SIMALUNGUN BORN IN JAVA Subdistrict Bora in Java Total Pop. ol Ik) Bandar Bosar Maligas Tanah DJawa Dolok Batunanggar Siantar Sidamanik 19,392 11,587 11,006 9,926 7,878 2,342 79,443 45,147 75,609 38,997 56,042 25,669 24.4 25.7 14.4 25.5 14.1 Totals 62,130 321,907 19.3 3,175 118,421 All other subdist. Source: Adapted from Bagian Sensus, Pemerintahan Daerah Tkt. II Simalungun, Laitar penduduk Kabupaten Simalungun (Census Section, Government of the Second Level Region of Simalungun, A list of the Inhabitants of Simalungun). These figures should of course be increased to include the large number of ethnic Javanese born in North Sumatra; a conservative guess would place the total figure at 30-35# Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 41] === 30 of the population of Lower Simalungun. The percentage of North Tapanuli Bataks may be estimated from the census data on religious affiliation, as all but a few Protestants and most Homan Catholics in Lower Simalungun are from this ethnic group. TABLE 1-4 RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION IN LOWER SIMALUNGUN Subdistrict Protestant Cath. Moslem Buddhist- Primitive Confucian 10.2 45.5 Subtotal 71.2 96.9 36.7 84,179 36,201 95,359 ( 99.8) (100.0) (100.0) 43,590 46,187 ( 99.3) ( 99.9) 62. 8 305,516 ( 99.9) 43.0 11.3 34,236 (100.2) 22.7 59.9 Bandar* Bosar Maligas Tanah Djavna Dolok Batunanggar* Siantar Totals 339,752 (100.0) 85.7 51.8 33.7 Sidamanik 42.0 Total 34.5 00 Source: Adapted from Pemerintahan Daerah, Tkt. II Simalungun, Lapuran Tahun 1963, p. 115. *In Bandar there are 160 Hindu Balinese, and in Dolok Batunanggar 28 Hindu Balinese and 9 ^others.* Excluding Sidamanik, where most of the Christians are members of the indigenous Simalungun Batak ethnic group, we may thus estimate the North Tapanuli Bataks as approximately 25% of the population. Thd South Tapanuli Bataks, the third major group in the area, are Moslems and represent the ma jority of the Islamic column in the above table after the Javanese have been subtracted. An educated guess as to the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 42] === 31 percentage of each ethnic group in the total population of Lower Simalungun (including Sidamanik), based on the above data, is as follows: TABLE 1-5 ETHNIC GROUPS IN LOWER SIMALUNGUN Ethnic Group Javanese North Tapanuli Batak South Tapanuli Batak Simalungun Batak Other Indonesian Chinese 35 25 20 10 Total 100 In terms of occupational and residential patterns in Lower Simalungun there is a relatively high degree of segre gation along ethnic lines. The Javanese originally came to the area under contract as plantation workers, and the m a jority remain on the plantations today, although many have moved to nearby villages and small towns where they have be come farmers and unskilled laborers. The North Tapanuli Bataks, in contrast to the Javanese, have a high proportion of educated people who are employed by the plantations or in government offices and schools (both religious and secular). The small towns of Tanah Djawa and Perdagangan contain a high concentration of North Tapanuli Bataks who are engaged in petty trade, shopkeeping, small industries, and various white collar occupations. The uneducated or less educated North Tapanuli people are wet-rice farmers and live along Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 43] === 32 the several rivers of the area; tensions created by religious and adat (custom and customary law) differences between them and the Moslems of varying ethnic groups Insure that their villages remain ethnically segregated. The South Tapanuli Bataks are also a more educated group; they are generally employed as traders in the towns or teachers in Islamic schools, although some work in subdistrict government offices or as clerks said low-ranking officials on the plantations. They are the predominant group in Serbelawan and are also represented in large numbers in Tanah Djawa and Perdagangan, as well as in the smaller towns said villages of the area. In many predominantly Javanese villages a few South Tapanuli people, who serve as religious leaders of the village, may be found. The Simalungun Bataks, the original inhabltsuits of the area, in some cases live in predominantly Simalungun villages, particularly in Sidamanik and In those villages which were once seats of the traditional kingdoms. Many of them, however, have seen their villages Increasingly populated by Javanese; in time they have become Javanized and retain little ethnic distinctiveness. With a few exceptions (particularly in Sidamanik and in the more remote areas), the Simalungun people of Lower Simalungun are Moslems. Finally, the Chinese live exclusively In the towns, particularly Perdagangan and Serbelawan, where they are engaged In trade, transport, and small manufacturing. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 44] === 33 The people of Lower Simalungun, both, during and since the Indonesian Revolution, have been more involved in nationalbased party and organizational political activity than those in other parts of the regency. The PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia. Indonesian Nationalist Party) and the P£I (Partai Komunls Indonesia. Indonesian Communist Party) have been es pecially active among the (Javanese) plantation workers and the (North Tapanuli Batak and Javanese) squatters on planta tion lands; these two social groups together constitute a majority of the population of the area. Parkindo (Partai Kristen Indonesia. Indonesian Christian /Protestanl£7 Party), while less active than the PNI or PKI, has found much support among the Protestant North Tapanuli Bataks, particularly in the towns and among the more educated white collar class, but also in the villages (especially those villages outside the plantation environment). The now-banned Mas.luml (until 1961 the largest Moslem party in Indonesia) had its greatest strength among the Moslem Bataks of South Tapanuli origin and was also influential among the minority of Javanese of santri persuasion; its leadership in the area came almost exclusively from religious teachers and wealthier traders of the South Tapanuli group. The other major ethnic group of Lower Simalungun, the Simalungun 3ataks, living outside the major urban concentrations and engaged in subsistence agriculture, have been for the most part politically passive, although some have supported the Nahdatul Ulama (Moslem Teachers' Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 45] === 34 Party) or one of tlie Simalungun ethnic movements such as KRSST (Kebangunan Rak.jat Simalungun Sumatera Timur. The Awakening of the Simalungun People of East Sumatra). The re sults of the Parliamentary elections of 1955 indicate the relative strengths of the parties. TABLE 1-6 THE 1955 PARLIAMENTARY EISCTIOKS IN LOVER SliVIALUNGUN Subdistrict PNI Bandar Bosar Maligas Tanah Djawa Dolok Batunanggar Siantar Sidamanik 34.8 30.1 30.0 14.3 26.8 33.3 29.9 34.1 18.1 22.5 24.0 15.5 18.1 18.0 10.1 15.0 21.7 16,650 (100.1) 26,427 (100.0) 10,739- (100.0) Total 30.1 20.0 19.3 15.4 15.3 138,920 PKI Mas.iumi Parkindo Other 29.4:% 18.5 15.0 15.2% 23.5 15.3% 12.8 17.3 Total 31^058 18,449 35,597 (100.0?$) (100.2) (100.1) (100.0) Source: Adapted from Pemerintahan Daerah Tingkat II Simalungun, _ Daftar: Perhitungan hasi!2 pemungutan auara dalam daerah Kabupaten Simalungun/ Pemilihan Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat, 29 Sept. 1955. (Government of the Second Level Region of -Simalungun, A List of the election results in the regency of Simalungun/Election of the Members of the People *s Repre sentative Council. ) T h e 15% of votes cast for other parties were scattered among 48 parties, associations and individuals. In Lower Simalungun the largest of these was Partai Buruh (Labor Party) with 4,289 votes (2,284 of them in Tanah Djawa), followed by KRSST with 3,124 votes (1,080 of them in Sidamanik), PSI (Partai Sosialis Indonesia, Indonesian Socialist Party) with 2,097 votes, NU with 1,099 votes, and Partai Katholik (Catholic Party) with 986 votes. Upper Simalungun.— The area which we have designated Upper Simalungun comprises the seven subdistricts of Raja, Dolok Pardamaian, Purba, Silimakuta, Dolok Silau, Silau Kahean and Raja Kahean. Upper Simalungun is hilly to mountainous, with altitudes above sea level ranging from 900 m. in Raja Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 46] === 35 to 1400 m. in Silimakuta. There are no navigable rivers (and few streams useful for rice-fleld irrigation), and land communications in many parts of the area are difficult. The population (78,297) is sparser than in Lower Simalungun, with a density of 50 persons per square kilometer (as compared to 160/sq. km. in Lower Simalungun). The population is very dispersed, living in villages with an average size of perhaps 500-750 persons, and, unlike Lower Simalungun, there are no major population concentrations with the exception of the town of Seribudolok (pop. 4-5,000). Geography, sparse popu lation, and the limited number of roads have divided Upper Simalungun into two parts: a core area located primarily along the paved P.Siantar— Kabandjahe road which passes through subdistricts Raja, Purba, and Silimakuta and branches off to Dolok Pardamaian, Dolok Silau, and the small town of Haranggaol in subdistrict Purba, providing the principal com munications link between Upper Simalungun and the governmental center of P. Siantar; and a fringe area comprising the sub districts of Silau Kahean and Raja Kahean, which may be entered only by an indirect route from Siantar through the regency of Deli/Serdang. In all major respects Upper Simalungun provides a strong contrast to Lower Simalungun. Plantation agriculture, is a very small part of the economy and is confined to the subdistricts of Raja Kahean and Silau Kahean, with a total hectareage of 5,579 ha. (1,538 ha. British and 4,041 ha. govern Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 47] === 36 ment-owned), all of it in rubber; the plantations occupy 13# of the total arable land (42,970 ha.) of these two sub districts, 13 Land available for village agriculture is thus much more extensive in Upper than in Lower Simalungun; be cause of this factor, the smaller population, and the dis inclination of the inhabitants to engage in the cultivation of irrigated rice, there is little population pressure on the land. Village cultivation is for the most part in dry rice, although there is some wet rice and a variety of annual and perennial crops are grown. TABLE 1-7 VILLAGE AGRICULTURE IN UPPER SIMALUNGUN Crop Harvested area (ha.) Dry rice Wet rice Small-holder rubber 9,929 2,576 2,240 49-7 12.9 11.2 Var. vegetables 4,262 21.3 Var. fruits 441 Commercial crops 522 19,969 99.9 Total Total arable land Special characteristics 1,952 ha. In Raja Kahean and Silau Kahean. Major vegetable crops are cassava, sweet po tatoes, & hot peppers. 39^ ha. planted in orange trees in Raja. 468 ha. in coffee. 124,163 Source; Adapted from Pemerintahan Daerah Tkt. II Simalungun, Laouran Tahun 1963. pp. 72, 77-80, 167. Total arable land computed from The General Agricultural Condition of Simeloengoen. p. 19. The great majority of the inhabitants of Upper Simalungun are Simalungun Bataks. Subdistrict Raja may be considered Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 48] === 37 the cultural heart of S imalungun Batakland, as it is here that the Simalungun language is "purest11 (i.e. there is relatively little use of loan words from other Batak langu ages) and the population is almost entirely Simalungun Batak. In the towns and villages along Lake Toba, in subdistricts Dolok Pardamaian and Purba, there has been some migration from the island of Samosir and other paxts of North Tapanuli; the population is consequently more mixed and the language spoken here has been considerably influenced by the incoming people. Further west, in subdistricts Dolok Silau and Silimakuta and in the town of Seribudolok there are a number of Karo Bataks, some Chinese, and a few Javanese families; to the north, in Raja Kahean and Silau Kahean, there is a group of Javanese plantation workers. The largest religious group in the area is the Christian Protestant, consisting mostly of Simalungun Bataks affiliated with the GKTS and of a few North Tapanuli and Karo Batak congregations in the border regions. The GKPS members are concentrated in what we have termed the core area of Upper Simalungun, along the Siantar-Kabandjahe road and in the area between the road and Lake Toba. The majority of Homan Catholics live in and around the town of Haranggaol in sub district Purba, while the Moslems (Javanese and Simalungun 3ataks) are found mostly in Silau Kahean and Raja Kahean. Finally, there is a large group who are not adherents of any Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 49] === 38 major religion but instead follow traditional religious practices and beliefs. These people are located in those parts of Upper Simalungun least accessible from the main road, and are mostly Simalungun Bataks (with the exception of Sllimakuta and Dolok Silau, where many of them are Karonese). TABLE 1-8 RELIGIOUS AFFILITATION IN UPPER SIMALUNGUN Subdistrict Prot. Oath. Moslem Primitive Raja Dlk, Pardamaian Purba Silimakuta* Dolok Silau Silau Kahean Raja Kahean* 58.1/6 36.6^ 21,971 (100#) 60.0 67.8 62. 1 23.4 20.8 45.7 19.2 26.8 32.2 31.6 12.3 33.8 71.9 52.4 22.1 7,860 13,096 10,383 6,782 11,045 7,160 (100.1) (100) ( 99.5) (100) (100) (100) Total 51.0 35.6 Total Source: Pemerintahan Daerah Tkt. II Simalungun 9 Laouran Tahun 1963. d. 115. *In Silimakuta there are also 52 Buddhists (Chinese); in Raja Kahean 3 Buddhists. The impact of national political parties and their af filiated organizations has been slighter in Upper than in Lower Simalungun. The worker-squatter appeals of the PNI and PKI have been inapplicable to an area in which there is a surplus of land and few plantation workers, and these parties have so far been unable to find other issues which might en able them to build an organizational base among the Simalungun people. While neither party has a large member ship in Upper Simalungun, the PNI through a number of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 50] === regency-level Simalungun Batak leaders has associated it self with, an anti-traditional, anti-aristocratic Simalungun element, and there is a considerable number of PHI sympa thizers in the area, particularly in subdistricts Purba, Dolok Pardamaian, Silimakuta and Dolok Silau. Despite the Christian majority in four of the seven subdistricts, Parkindo has also been unsuccessful in its attempts to build a large following in Upper Simalungun, principally because of the animosity of the Simalungun Bataks to the North Tapanuli Bataks who dominate Parkindo at both the regency and provincial levels. The most potent political forces in the area have been the relatively short-lived and now quies cent ethnic movements, whose appeal has been based on support for traditional authority, ethnic hostilities, and the wide spread feeling that "outsiders11 dominate the political and economic life of the regency; these movements have been led by members of the old aristocracy or their descendants and others who have been capable of manipulating traditional symbols and ethnic sentiments. One of these movements, KRSST, active from 1953-1956, was able to capture the greatest number of votes in the elections of 1955 In. five of the seven subdistricts, with an absolute majority in Raja and Silau -Kahean. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 51] === 40 TABLE 1-9 THE 1955 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN UPPER SIMALUNGUN KRSST Mas iumi Other 14.5% 6,205 Subdistrict PNI Par3cindo Total (100) (100) (100.1) ( 99.9) (100.1) (100.1) Raja Dlk. Pardamaian Purba Silimakuta Dolok Silau Sllau Kahean Raja Kahean 22.7 43.8 29.1 43.7 51.5 37.6 28.7 20.6 42.9 37.8 12.4 13.5 23.0 20.6 33.8 26.3 22.3 13.4 18.0 19.4 3,810 4,395 3,067 2,696 3,740 2,444 Total 43.7 19.8 19.9 Source: Adapted from Pemerintahan Daerah Tkt. II Simalungun, Daftar: Per hitungan has!12 pemungutan suara dalam daerah Eabupaten Simalungun/Pemillhan Anggota Dewan Perwakllajq Ra3c.1at, 29 Sept., 1955. The largest group in tiie Other column was AKRAP ST (Aksl Hak.lat Pemlllh Sumatera Timjar, Action of the Voting People of East Sumatra), an ethnic organization of the indigenous peoples of East Sumatra (Simalungun and Karo Bataks and Coastal Malays), with 1,776 votes (511 in Dolok Pardamaian, the rest scattered t3iroughout Upper Simalungun), followed by the PKI with 1,091 votes, Partai Katholik with 978 votes (689 la Purba), and Partai Buruh with 426 votes. The Road to Parapat.--Our third subdivision of Simalungun includes the subdistricts of Pane, Balata, Dolok Panribuan and Parapat, along with contiguous parts of subdistricts Siantar and Tanah Djawa. Tills area is hilly (from 700 m. in Pane to 920 m. in Parapat) and crossed by a number of small rivers whose waters irrigate the greatest concentration of wet rice fields in the regency, roughly 69% (including sub districts Siantar and Tanah Djawa) of all sawah land in Simalungun. (See map 1 - 5 ) ^ Exclusive of Siantar and Tanah Djawa, the agricultural situation in the area is as follows: Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 52] === /PANE TON&AK 1-5 I R R I G A T E D SOURCE: DINAS -F\^t=»T- L E V E L RICE F IE L P S P E R T A N I A N ' R A K.JAT D A E R A H T K T. \ 5UNVATER F-'E&ION O F N C R T H S U M A T R A ") t M-P. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 53] === p e p p a g a n &a n O p. s i a n t a r; ^ 'zyz&m , Tl & A "O PO LO K/ 10 SCALE l p s (s a w a h ) in s i m a l u n g u n \ S U f A A T E K A U T A R A ( O F F i C E OF P E O P L E ' S A G R I C U L T U R E., Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 54] === TABLE 1-10 VILLAGE AGRICULTURE ON THE ROAD TO PARAPAT Harvested area (ha.) Crop Wet rice Dry rice Small-holders rubber Var. vegetables Var. fruits Commercial crops Total Total arable land 7,700 1,938 2,900 50.6 1,84-7 750 12.1 75 15,210 48,234 99-9 12.7 19.1 Sources Pemerintahan Daerah Tkt. II Simalungun, Lapuran Tahun 1963. pp. 72, 77-80, I6 7. Total arable land computed from The General Agricultural Condition of Slmeloengoen. p. 17. Plantation agriculture is more extensive in this area than in Upper Simalungun, with a total area of approximately 10,000 ha. (21^ of total arable land). The plantations are located in the subdistricts of Pane, Balata, and Dolok Panribuan, and are planted in rubber and tea; about 75^ is owned by PPN, 20^ by the Bank Industri Negara (State Industrial Bank), and the remaining 5% by British interests.^5 Ethnically, the subdistricts along the road to Parapat are more diverse than Upper Simalungun, but unlike in Lower Simalungun one group, the sawah-cultivating North Tapanuli Batak, predominates. The North Tapanuli Bataks are clustered in the river valleys where there is an extensive system of irrigated rice fields, and they are by far the majority group in the market towns of Pane Tongah, Tiga Balata, Tiga Dolok and Parapat. Almost all of them are Christians, both Protestant and Catholic; an estimate of their percentage of total popu- Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 55] === lation may be derived from the following table. TABLE 1-11 RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION IN THE SUBDISTRICTS ALONG THE ROAD TO PARAPAT Subdistrict Prot. Cat h. Moslem Primitive Pane Balata Dlk. Panribuan Parapat 51.556 69.2 75.0 87.3 13.9 35.7^ 26.0 29,170 11.557 14,692 7,241 Total 64.4 22.1 Total (100^) (100) ( 93.9) Source: Adapted from Pemerintahan Daerah Tkt. II Simalungun, Lanuran Tahun 1963. p. 115. ♦The number of Moslems in Parapat listed in the Lapuran (7,164) is an obvious error; there are probably less than 500, but since no more accurate figure is available, this space is left blank. Included in the Parapat total above are 441 individuals listed in the Other Religions column. Allowing for a small percentage of Simalungun Batak Christians (most of the small group of dry rice cultivating Simalungun people in the region live in the hills away from the main road and the river valleys and follow traditional religious practices), we may estimate that about 70% of the population of the four subdistricts consists of North Tapanuli Bataks. The Javanese, as in Lower Simalungun, are located on the plantations in Pane and Balata, and represent about 20% of the population. South Tapanuli Bataks are a negligible group in this area. Political activity along the road to Parapat bears a closer resemblance to Lower than to Upper Simalungun in its intensity and its links with national political parties. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 56] === 44 might be expected, Parkindo is the largest party in terms of votes in the 1955 Parliamentary elections, but the PKI and PNI have both succeeded in building electoral support there. In these subdistricts the squatter problem is not as pressing as in Lower Simalungun, and the PNI and PKI have concentrated their recent organizational efforts on the plantation workers. In general it may be said that national-party politics in this area is centered in the towns and on the plantations and has left the villages, where Parkindo sympathies are strong but unorganized, relatively untouched. In this respect these four subdistricts (and the contiguous parts of Tanah Djawa and Siantar) differ from the more generally politicized re gion of Lower Simalungun. TABLE 1-12 THE 1955 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN THE SUBDISTRICTS ALONG THE ROAD TO PARAPAT Subdistrict Parkindo PNI PKI Mas jumi Other Total Pane Balata Dlk. Panribuan Parapat 28.1% 23.9 22.8 43.7 19.2% 20.9% 26.3 20.7 26.8 24.0% 14,342(100%) 22.1 4,232 (9 9.9 ) 25.9 5,726(100) 23.7 1,875(100) Total 27.4 20.9 24.1 20.9 26,175(100) Sources Adapted from Femerintahan Daerah Tkt. II S imalungun, D a ftar: Perhitungan has112 Pemungutan suara dalam daerah Kabupaten S 1malungun/Peml11han Anggota Dewan Perwakllan R a k d a t « 29 Sept. 1955* The largest group in the "Other" column was KRSST with 1,119 votes, followed by Partai Katholik with 9 3 7 9 IS I with 8 7 8, and Partai Buruh with 420. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 57] === The Municipality of Pematangsiantar.— In the twentieth century Pematangsiantar has grown from a small village seat of one of the traditional kingdoms of Simalungun to become one of Indonesia's larger cities, with a population of over 112,000 and an annual rate of increase of 6.5^, the highest in I n d o n e s i a. 1 ^ Instrumental in this process of growth has been the role of Siantar as a center of commerce and govern mental administration, both during and since the colonial period. Trade is the lifeblood of Siantar, employing about bQ% of the p o p u l a t i o n, w h o supply the plantations with such basic commodities as rice, sugar, cooking oil, kerosene and cloth and form the keystone of an elaborate network of small town markets in Upper sued Lower Simalungun and along the road to Parapat. Some of these goods are produced in the Simalungun/3iantar area, while others are imported from Medan, Java and abroad. As a major marketplace on the Medan- Padang road, Siantar is also a distribution center for a great variety of commodities which find their way into the markets of such towns as Balige, Tarutung, Sibolga and Padangsidempuan, and for a smaller number of products, such as oranges, pineapples, and small-holder rubber which are produced in Simalungun and marketed in Medan or abroad. one might expect, there are many trucking and bus firms in the city. Large-scale trade (much of which involves sales to the plantations) is almost entirely in the hands of the Chinese community (about 12^ of the population), but the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 58] === proportion of Indonesians in commerce involving less capital is considerably higher, perhaps 5 0% of the total. The shops along Siantar's two main streets axe about $0% Chinese owned, while in the Central Market the Chinese are a clear minority. Trucking firms are about $0% Chinese, 50$ Indonesian, and bus companies are almost entirely I n d o n e s i a n - o w n e d. A m o n g the Indonesian traders, two ethnic groups, the North Tapanuli Bataks (who are a majority in the Central Market and own most of the non-Chinese shops and tramsportation firms) and the South Tapanuli Bataks (who are the chief trading link with the small towns of the regency, particularly in Lower Simalungun) predominate. Industrial development, while considerably greater in Siantar than in any other town of Simalungun, runs a poor second to trade. The Office of People's Industry lists seventynine varieties of industry in the city, ranging from cigarette factories and weaving mills to service industries for the transportation companies to cabinetmakers and one-man sewing machines set up on the sidewalks. Of the largest factories, two (paper, with about ^50 employees; hemp, with 600 workers) are owned by departments of the central government, while the Chinese control cigarette production (2 large factories), the manufacture of incense (1^ plants) and the processing and exporting of small-holder rubber. One match factory (300 workers) is owned by an Indonesian of Minangkabau origin, and a large weaving mill is owned by a North Tapanuli Batak. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 59] === the smaller industries Chinese predominate or are on a par with North Tapanuli Bataks (and a few members of other ethnic groups, principally South Tapanuli Bataks), with the major exception of the 139 weaving mills, all of which are Indonesian owned (90^ North Tapanuli Batak, 10% Simalungun B a t a k ). ^ The labor force in Siantar, according to the census of 1961, is about 11^ of the population. A probable majority of the workers (particularly in unskilled occupations) are Javanese, 58^ of them coming from the wards with the highest concentra tion of inhabitants of Javanese descent (Melaju, Bantan, and K ot a ). Government is also a major employer, particularly among the educated, as Siantar has its own autonomous government and houses the principal offices of the regency government and those of subdistrict Siantar. It is difficult to estimate the number of government workers, as each division of the city and regency governments and a large number of local offices of central ministries maintain their own lists of em ployees. According to the census of 1961, 16^ of Siantar's population are civil servants (this would include the govern ment paper and hemp factories, skilled and unskilled laborers, and white collar employees). The city government is dominated by North Tapanuli Bataks (except in the unskilled labor category) with some admixture of Bataks from South Tapanuli, while the regency government employs, at the white collar level, about equal proportions of North and South Tapanuli and Simalungun Bataks. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 60] === 48 Siantar is also an educational center, its several general and specialized high schools, both government and private (Protestant, Catholic, Moslem and secular) drawing many students from all parts of the regency. Nommensen University, owned by the HKBP, maintains a theological semin ary sind a teacher training college in Siantar, and there sure smaller branches of the Islamic University of North Sumatra (UISU, Universitas Islam Sumatera U t a r a ) and the Universitas Nasional Indonesia (Indonesisin National University). Stu dents at all levels make up about 16% of the c i t y ’s population. Like the subdistricts of Lower Simalungun, Siantar has a multi-ethnic population, and contains at least a few rep resentatives of nearly all major ethnic groups in the Indonesian archipelago. The largest group is the North Tapanuli Batak, estimated at about 40% of total population, followed by the South Tapanuli Bataks (20%), tshe. Javanese (10%), the Chinese (12%), the Simalungun Bataks (8%) and other 20 groups (10%). In general, each group lives in its own ward or wards, or is concentrated in a few neighborhoods in one or more wards, although in some areas, particularly where government housing has been built for civil servants, there is a mixture of groups. The following table indicates the extent of ethnic segregation. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 61] === TABLE 1-13 RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION IN PEMATANGSIANTAR W ard (kampung) Christian Aeknauli Sukadame Kristen Barat Kristen Timur Tomuan Timbang Galung Baru Timbang Galung Lama 3antan Melaju Kota(Central City) 99% 95 95 90 80 50 17 13 10 Total 55 Moslem Buddhist Total 100) 7,^08 (1 0 0 ) 33 12 Source: Bagian Sensus Kotapradja P.Siantar, Daftar ichtisar penduduk Kotaprad.ja Pematangsiantar achir D.lunl 1963 mengenai: Agama. pekerdjaan. dan kewarganegaraan. Only the percentages and total N for each ward were~available from the Census Section, Aeknauli, Kristen Barat, Kristen Timur and Tomuan (see map 1-6 ) are separated from the rest of the city by the Bah Bolon River and are inhabited almost entirely by North Tapanuli Bataks, with the exception of a small group of Karonese in neighborhoods in Kristen Timur and Tomuan. Sukadame, a post-1950 extension of the city, has a probable majority of North Tapanuli Bataks and a large enclave of Simalungun Batak Christians. Timbang Galung Baru's Christians are mostly North Tapanuli Bataks, many of whom are civil servants; its Moslems are mostly Javanese, with some admixture of South Tapanuli and Simalungun Bataks. The Moslems in Timbang Galung Lama are largely of South Tapanuli descent, but there is also a amall minority of Simalungun Bataks. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The === [PDF page 62] === Sukadame. K o ta K r is te n T im u r Aeknauli S O U R C E -' PE PT - OF P U S L I C P E M A T A N G S IA N T A R. W OR KS, MU N I Cl PAL I T V Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. PI SIAN TA R === [PDF page 63] === Sukadame. WVeJaj u I T I m ba r \a \ I Gal una nnbang Lama alunq l 5aru Tom uan M U N IC IP A L IT Y REGENCY O F F IC E: O F F IC E S S IT E OF T H E O R IG IN A L PEM A TA N G CENTRAL ' P U B L IC MARKET P EM A TA N G SIA N TA R. WOKKG t MUM I Cl PALI T V P I S IANTAR., 1 9 5 7. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 64] === 51 Christians here are high status civil servants, merchants, and entrepreneurs of the North Tapanuli group who have in herited what was once a Dutch neighborhood, Bantan is 80^ Javanese, while neighboring Melaju is about 25^ Javanese and 55^ South Tapanuli Batak, with the former group living the parts of the ward bordering on Bantan, Finally, Kota, the central city, is predominantly Chinese with minorities of Javanese, Simalungun Batak Moslems (in the neighborhood where the original village of Pematangsiantar was once lo cated) and North Tapanuli Bataks. Political affiliations in Siantar, as indicated by the 1955 election statistics, reflect the major religious and ethnic divisions of the city. TABLE 1-1^ THE 1955 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN PEMATANGSIANTAR Party Masjumi Parkindo PNI PKI Other Total % of Vote 29.3 13.9 15.8 100.0 (16,605) Source: Adapted from Pemerintahan Daerah Tkt. II Simalungun, Daftar: Perhitungan has!12 pemungutan suara dalam daerah Kabupaten S lmalungun/Pemillhan Anggota Dewan NU, *t-21 votes; KRSST, 33° votes; Partai Kathollk, 37^ votes; Partai Buruh, 180 votes; and PSI, 136 votes. Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 65] === 52 Unfortunately election figures by ward are no longer available, but it is clear from interviews that Masjumi support was concentrated in the South Tapanuli Batak wards of Timbang Galung Lama and Melaju, Parkindo support in the North Tapanuli Batak areas, and PNI support, while more scattered throughout the city, had its hard core in the Javanese ward Bantan. Despite the banning of MasJumi in 1961 and the many other changes which have occurred since 1955 within the party system and in the relationship between the parties and the Indonesian polity, interviews conducted throughout the city support the view that political loyalties have remained essentially stable since the elections. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 66] === PAST ONE SOCIO-POLITICAL CHANGE IN SIMALUNGUN 53 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 67] === CHAPTER II TRADITIONAL GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY IN SIMALUNGUN Before the Indonesian Revolution of 19^5 abolished tra ditional institutions of government in Simalungun, the area was divided into seven kingdoms (keradjaan): Siantar, Tanah Djawa, Pane, Raja, Dolok Silau, Purba and Silimakuta (map 2-1). Five of the keradjaan (Purba and Silimakuta were the excep1 tions) were subdivided into districts as follows: District Keradjaan S iantar S 1damanik Bandar Siantar proper Tanah Djawa Glrsang Sipangan Bolon (Parapat) Djorlang Hataran (Balata) Dolok Panribuan Bosar Maligas Tanah Djawa proper Pane Dolok Batunanggar Pane proper Raja Raja Kahean Raj a proper Dolok Silau Silau Kahean Dolok Silau proper Origin of the Traditional Kingdoms The origin of the kingdoms of Simalungun is shrouded in legend and mystery. A number of writers describe the fifteenth Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 68] === SI v>s\ 3 HvraNvavx Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 69] === LOWER Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. PAERAH UPPER LA PU RA N SIMALUNGUN "TKT. II S I M A L U N S U N, SIM ALUNG UN, THE TAHAN AND PEMERINTAHAN ROAP 1963 PARAPAT SOURCE: === [PDF page 70] === his own keradjaan. With calmness and patience Tuan Si Pinang Sori replied: My kingdom comes from G o d himself. So Radja Nagur asked if he was bold enough to take an oath to prove that his kingdom was given to him by God. Tuan Si Pinang Sori answered *Yes, I am bold enough*, and remembering a dream that he had had, he struck the ground in the middle of his field and said: If this land is not truly my land and this water not truly my water given to me by God, may I be struck down by this oath which is heard by G o d himself. "After Tuan SI Pinang Sori had taken this oath Radja Nagur believed that G o d had appointed Tuan Si Pinang Sori to become radja over this land and from this point on Radja Nagur accepted Tuan SI Pinang Sori as Radja Raja. When It was time for Tuan Si Pinang Sori to marry he took a bou Nagur (daughter of Radja Nagur).... "Because of the excellent relationship between them, Radja Nagur permitted Tuan Si Pinang Sori to enlarge his kingdom and even many villages of Radja Nagur*s came under the authority of Tuan Si Pinang Sori.... "Prom this beginning the keradjaan of Raja became large and strong.... E a c h year more people and more villages came under its authority, and its territory became more extensive and its army larger, so, based on wealth, knowledge and goodness, Raja came into existence, from a lump of earth it expanded and expanded, partly as a result of war as is evi dent from the stories of all radja who cont inually fought the neighboring radja /for fourteen generations/ up to the Radja of Raja whom people called the Cruel Radja, that is the father of the /recently deceased/radja, Tuan Hapoltakan." By the last half of the nineteenth century what is now the regency of Simalungun was inhabited by about 50-75»000 swidden-cultivating Simalungun Bataks living in perhaps 150-200 villages suid village-clusters ranging in size from as few as 100 to as many as 1,000 inhabitants. At this time the kingdoms of Siantar, Tanah Djawa, Pane and Dolok Silau (the so-called radja maropat. or four kings) exercised hegenony over the greater part of Simalungun, their radja having the largest armies, the most wealth, and the greatest Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 71] === 58 number of villages and subjects directly under their control. These kingdoms were relatively small and had no clearly de fined borders, but instead consisted of a number of villages which recognized the sovereignty of the radja and paid tribute to him. Eac h keradjaan had its central village, or -pematang, where the radja and his officials resided; the inhabitants of the pematang (usually the largest village of the keradjaan) and a number of smaller neighboring villages were directly under the authority of the radja. Succession to the office of radja, according to the adat, passed from the incumbent to the eldest son of his ”first” marriage, i.e. marriage to the daughter of another radja. The adat seems to have been rather elastic, however, as in many cases brothers or sons other than the eldest succeeded to the thrones of Simalungun. The Distribution of Authority Within the pematang and its satellites the radja*s rule was apparently quite autocratic. He was acknowledged to possess supernatural power (called hidorat) and considered to be a god residing on earth (Debata na taridah. a visible god); these qualities served to legitimate any arbitrary actions he might take. The radja had, it is said, life and death power over his subjects and commanded their complete obeisance; they prostrated themselves in his presence and used a special "high” language when speaking to him.**' Outside the directly ruled territory of the radja the structures of government and the relationship of subordinate Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 72] === 59 rulers to the radja varied considerably from kingdom to kingdom, due to differing historical circumstances and processes of growth. Describing the institutions of traditional govern ment in Simalungun, the Dutch official J. Tideman wrote "Most of the kingdoms do not form a great unit, but a conglomeration of at times almost wholly independent parts, so that the comparison which has sometimes been attempted with the feudal system of the Middle Ages is not objection able. A good example is supplied by the kingdom of Siantar, where the subdivisions of Bandar, Sidamanik and to a lesser extent Sipoldas (earlier also Silampujang) are a type of vassals of the radja who have only certain adat obligations to him and formerly in time of war had to take care of troops. '* The largest and most autonomous of these subunits were the divisions of keradjaan Siantar referred to by Tideman and the regions of Djorlang Hataran and Dolok Panribuan in Tanah Djawa. According to the legendary histories of Simalungun, the rulers of Djorlang Hataran and Dolok Panribuan and the radja of Tanah Djawa were descendants of a common ancestor who had lived on the island of Samosir, while the rulers of Bandar and Sidamanik were descended from an earlier radja of Siantar.0 While recognizing the sovereignty of the radja, these rulers (called tungkat) exercised rather wide authority in their own areas. Each tungkat had his own pematang (with its satellite villages) in which he exercised direct author ity; he also ruled indirectly over a number of other villages within his region. In determining royal succession the tungkat had an im portant legitimating, and sometimes determinative, function. On the death of a radja they met to decide, following the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 73] === 60 rules of the adat, who would become his successor. In most cases the line of succession was clear and the tungkat had no real choice among candidates, but their role in confirming the legitimacy of the new radja was an important one, and it gave them a certain prominence vis-a-vis the radja. some occasions, when a radja did not want to be succeeded by his eldest son, the role of the tungkat became determinative, as they had the right to accede to or refuse the radja*s re quest. As custodians of the adat, the tungkat were also re sponsible, together with the radja, for the organization of keradjaan-wide celebrations and ceremonies. Besides the tungkat there were also villages and clusters of villages whose heads were called tuan huta if descended from a radja, penghulu if not. Some of these villages were dependencies of a radja or a tungkat, while others seem to have had a great deal of autonomy. The distinction between tuan huta and penghulu was an important one, as the office of tuan huta was hereditary while the successors of penghulu were often designated by the tungkat or radja. village headed by a penghulu had in general less autonomy than one ruled by a tuan huta. Within his territory the penghulu or tuan huta had con trol over the distribution of three types of lands land not presently under cultivation, land whose users had died with out leaving a male heir, and land which had been deserted by emigres. Usage rights over land once given to a villager Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 74] === 61 became hereditary. It is important to note that the radja and tungkat were also village heads in their pematang; what distinguished them from the more humble penghulu and tuanhuta was their wider territorial authority (principally fiscal and judicial), their greater number of directly-ruled sub jects, their command of armies, and their acknowledged greater possession of hidorat (supernatural power), although in some measure hidorat adhered to all officials of the keradjaan, particularly those who traced descent from the radja's lineage. Besides radja, tungkat, tuan huta and penghulu, the term parbapaan. loosely translated as high official or VIP, was also in use at this time. Parbapaan denoted non-hereditary officials of the keradjaan in the pematang and was also used to refer to the tungkat and to hereditary rulers of groups of villages within the keradjaan who did not have the status of tungkat and did not take part in the selection of a suc cessor to the radja. (Usually these territories had been won in war, and their ruler was allowed to keep his position after recognizing the sovereignty of the radja.) The term also referred to the territorial subdivisions of the keradjaan ruled by a tungkat or parbapaan, suggesting a lack of dif ferentiation between the office of ruler and the territory which he ruled. Until the coming of the Dutch the institutions of tra ditional government and the relationships between the various levels of authority were never very stable. We have stated Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 75] === 62 that towards the end of the nineteenth century the radja maropat of Siantar, Tanah Djawa, Pane and Dolok Silau exer cised hegemony over most of Simalungun, but there were many cracks in the structure. Dolok Silau was perhaps the weakest of the four kingdoms, and before the Dutch penetration the subordinate kingdoms of Baja, Purba and Silimakuta were al ready independent, their heads styling themselves radja. Dolok Batunanggar also considered itself an independent king dom, maintained a full complement of tungkat and village heads, and traced the history of its radja back thirteen generations.? Raja Kahean at this time probably consisted of a number of more or less autonomous villages which had never been ef fectively brought under any higher authority. In 1893 Tuan Dolok Panribuan, a tungkat of the keradjaan of Tanah Djawa, was visited by a missionary sent by the Dutch official J.A. Kroesen to request an audience for Kroesen and his party. In a report on the incident, Kroesen wrote: “The missionary came back with the information that Tuan Dolok Panribuan would not receive us and would not tolerate us in his village, that he would have nothing to do with the government; further that he would not recognize Radja Maligas /of Tanah Djawa/ as radja because the latter had become a subject of the ^ P u t c h / g o v e m m e n t; it might be that Radja Maligas understood the language of the Dutch, but he, Tuan Dolok Panribuan, did not understand that language. “When the.-misslonary told him that his predecessor along with Radja Maligas had already recognized Dutch sov ereignty, he replied that his brother who at the time was head, might have done so but he, Si Raimbang, was at present head and would recognize no superior authority; he would be the absolute ruler in Dolok Panribuan." Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 76] === 63 Conflict among radja was common too, usually involving attempts at expansion of the territory of one keradjaan to include villages under the authority of another radja. The last example of such an expansionist radja was Tuan Rondahaim of Raja, referred to above as the "Cruel Radja," whom the Dutch called a "modern Attila" and who seems to have been re sponsible for the final definition of the territory of keradjaan Raja. T o sum up the discussion to this point, we may say that the principal factors which determined the extent of a ruler’s authority outside the pematang were the size and ef fectiveness of his army, the proximity of a subordinate vil lage to the pematang, and the relationships among the radja, tungkat, parbapaan and tuan huta within a keradjaan. The separate territorial authority of these latter officials was the chief limiting factor to autocratic rule by the radja. As Kroesen wrote in 1899* "the chief business of the radja is always that his vassal...remains loyal to him."9 This statement applies not only to the radja and tungkat, but to hierarchical relationships at all levels of the traditional system as well. A key to understanding the inner dynamic of the king doms of Simalungun may perhaps be found in the ancient tra dition of village autonomy in North Tapanuli,10 from which the Simalungun Bataks migrated centuries ago. This tradition, upheld by the tungkat, parbapaan and tuan huta in their re Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 77] === 64 spective realms, seems to have constituted the dynamic force in pre-colonial Simalungun politics, constantly undermining the authority of supra-village rulers and over a period of generations creating n e w constellations of power and dis solving old ones. The kingdoms of the late nineteenth century, as we have described them, thus represent the final stage in the development of traditional institutions of government in Simalungun, a process which was soon to be sub stantially altered by the circumstances of colonial rule. Social Organization and Stratification It is perhaps appropriate at this point to discuss some aspects of social organization among the Simalungun Bataks as the institutions of kinship and village organization are relevant to an understanding of both the traditional polit ical system and contemporary politics. The kinship system of the Simalungun Bataks is, in its 11 essentials, the same as that of the North Tapanull Bataks. All Simalungun Bataks belong to one of four exogamous patrillneages (m a r g a ): Purba, Saragih, Damanik and Sinaga. The origins of the four marga may be traced to the island of Samosir in Lake Toba and the highland areas to the north and south of the lake, from which the Simalungun people mi grated (probably in successive small waves) many centuries ago. Each marga is further subdivided into lineages (nine each for Purba and Damanik, eight each for Saragih and Sinaga) which originated in particular villages founded and Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 78] === 65 inhabited by a segment of a marga. By the late nineteenth century, and perhaps much earlier, considerable mixing of marga (and lineages) had occurred throughout Simalungun, partly due to uxorilocal patterns of residence and partly to in sufficiency of arable land in some areas which forced the young men to move to other villages and other keradjaan. Continuous warfare and the sending of a radja*s sons and brothers to rule subjugated areas was probably also a con tributing factor. Within each karadjaan there were thus variety of marga; indeed it was common then, as it is now, to find representatives of all four marga and various line12 ages in a village with perhaps 500 inhabitants. The fundamental unit of social relationships among Simalungun Bataks is the nuclear family (Dutch visitors in the nineteenth century noted the prevalence of one-family houses as opposed to the more common multi-family dwellings in North Tapanuli). Above the nuclear family is the sanina, male descendants of one grandfather or great-grandfather, which forms the most elemental lineage segment. The sanina is linked with other lineage segments (of different marga) by marriage, i.e. the lineage segment to which one gives wives (called anak boru) and the segment from which one r e ceives wives (called tondong).1^ These three groups are the basic units of interaction in all life-crises (birth, mar riage, and death) and other adat ceremonies, they help to settle disputes within or between lineage segments or nuclear Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 79] === 66 families (in a dispute between two lineage segments, for example, the anak boru of each will act as peacemakers), and they define the status and determine the social behavior of the individual in relation to other members of the community. According to the adat, ego's anak boru is considered inferior to him, while his tondong is considered superior. As Clark Cunningham has written of North Tapanuli society, however, "The words 'superior* and 'inferior* do not involve harsh connotations. They denote a hierarchical status which appears at all adat ceremonies and which is recognized through respect in daily social relations. This tripartite system, based on the exchange of women between m a r g a s, involves socio-legal status which extends to all phases of daily life when the roles are played out according to tradition. The practice of assymetrical cross-cousin connubium, now rather moribund, once created strong affinal links between particular lineage segments among the villagers and among the radja (e.g. a succession of radja from kingdom A married daughters of the royal lineage of kingdom B). The importance of the more inclusive marga and lineage groups (as opposed to the lineage segments), embracing rel atively large numbers of people scattered throughout Simalungun, is confined to the rule of exogamy. These groups are un organized, with no leadership above the sanina level, and have only a limited importance in social relationships or in defining the individual's identity or loyalties. Unlike the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 80] === 67 North Tapanuli Bataks (for whom marga identification is much more Important) the Simalungun people have not maintained genealogical histories (except in the case of the radja). It is thus not possible, beyond the generation of grandfather or great-grandfather, to trace one's connections with margamates or affinally-related marga either within the village or, especially, in other villages. The village, as distinct from the marga, lineage, or lineage segment, has long played a central role in Simalungun society. Life-crises ceremonies are organized principally by the sanina, anak boru and tondong (who normally reside within the village), but the whole village takes part and there are relatively few participants from outside the village. As one informant expressed it, "itfhen my child marries, the chief participants and guests will be the people from my v il lage. Relatives from far away are not important to us, be cause it is our neighbors who can give us help when we need Assistance in clearing fields, repairing roads, building houses, etc. is organized on a village-wide rather than kin ship basis, often Tinder the leadership of the village head (now elected). The social importance of the village is.xaaognized by the Simalungun people, who cite it as a principal difference between themselves and the North Tapanuli Bataks. (Two North Tapanuli Bataks meeting for the first time will immediately determine the kinship connection between them, while a Simalungun Batak in a similar situation will first ask, "tfhat village are you from?") Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 81] === 68 T o illustrate the importance of the village as a unit of social organization and as a distinct focus for the loyalty of the individual it is useful to compare Simalungun with North Tapanuli, where the kinship system is almost identical but the relationship between kinship and village organization is quite different. On North Tapanuli, Edward Bruner writes as follows:1-^ "An average of six households form a hamlet (huta), the core of which consists of an exogamous patrilineage based on a line of descent from one male ancestor. In about twothirds of the hamlets in our region the inhabitants are limited to male members of the lineage together with their wives and unmarried children. This situation results from a strict adherence to the rule of patrilocal residence. However, in the remaining one-third of the hamlets, matrilocal residence has also occurred, that is, daughters of the lineage have brought their husbands to live in their ham lets. In either case, only families with a direct genealogical connection to the male ancestor who founded the hamlet have a right to live in it. There are no outsiders in a Batak huta. "Members of the village consisting of 38 hamlets... own land in common... and can trace descent from a single ancestor." In the North Tapanuli setting, kinship is thus the basis of hamlet and village organization, and land is owned in common by members of the founding marga. In the Simalungun village there are also no outsiders, that Is the village res idents form a community, but the community is not identical to the kinship unit. Several factors seem to be involved in the differentiation of the village from the kinship unit. Among these are the variety of marga and lineages (and thus the relatively small number of marga- or lineage-mates) r e siding in a single village, the fact that Individuals not Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 82] === 69 affiliated by birth or marriage with the inhabitants of a village were permitted to move there (more people meant more wealth for the ruler), and the absence of a marga rad.la or marga tanah (ruling or land-owning marga). Moreover, in the nineteenth century there was relatively little intercourse among villages; each village unit was reasonably self-suf ficient economically and regional markets were still under developed, and it was not necessary to seek wives outside the village. Even today it is difficult to get cooperation among villages separated by only a few kilometers for such purposes as road-building and repair. The amalgamation of small vil lages into village-complexes by the post-independence Indonesian government has had little effect on the predomin antly village-centered patterns of interaction. The traditional governments of Simalungun, while re lated to the kinship system, were neither based on nor legit imized by it (as was the case with the much smaller village kingdoms of North T a p a n u l i ). The radja of Dolok Sllau, Pane, Purba and Silimakuta were of marga Purba; of Tanah DJawa, marga Sinaga; of Raja, Saragih; and of Siantar, marga Damanik. Within the keradjaan the tungkat were of the same marga as the radja, while other parbapaan and village heads might not be, depending on whether their villages had been founded (or usurped) by a member of the royal lineage. In some cases a ruler defeated in war would be given a daughter of his new sovereign as wife; in thus becoming anak boru to the radja he formalized his position as a dependent. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 83] === 70 Several of the non-hereditary officials in the pematang were chosen on the basis of their kinship relation to the radja. The most important of these was the anak boru lopu (anak boru of the palace), a representative of the lineage segment to which the ruler gave his daughters in m a r r i a g e. ^ The anak boru lopu served as all-purpose assistant to the radja and, paralleling a similar duty of the anak boru among the villagers, was used as a negotiator of disputes between keradjaan. In the village there was a similar official, the anak boru huta (anak boru of the village), who assisted the village head in settling quarrels over land rights and other matters, and could succeed in the headship (as penghulu but not tuan huta) if the incumbent died without a male heir. A number of other officials, at various levels of government, were customarily chosen from the r u l e r ’s own lineage, and there is some evidence that these often passed from father to son, although in principle the ruler could select anyone he wished. The radja, tungkat, parbapaan, tuan huta and heirs ap parent, holding all governmental power and possessing hidorat, formed the top level of a three-tiered stratification system. The non-hereditary officials of the radja constituted a sub class of this aristocracy. A t the second level was the ma jority of the population of all marga and lineages (including members of the ruler's marga and lineage not in the line of succession), who all had the same rights and obligations toward Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 84] === 71 the ruler regardless of marga membership. At the bottom of the system were the slaves of the aristocracy, individuals captured in war and the children of illegitimate unions and of criminals who had been put to death. The most Important aspect of this stratification system was the clear differen tiation between an aristocracy born to rule and the common people who had no share In authority. In a description of the general characteristics of traditional government in Simalungun, Tideman indicates the extent of the gap which ex isted between the rulers and their subjects.3-? "The Simalungun kingdom is not an organized unit with a government which, according to Western concepts, looks after the general interest within the sphere of the unit, but rather... a complex of settlements that recognizes a radja as king, which radja rules for the benefit of himself and the members of his family or lineage." In North Tapanuli, it may be noted, this separation did not exist, all members of the founding marga (in patrilocal v i l lages this included all adult males) considering themselves anak ni radja (sons of the radja). The Coming of the Dutch Dutch penetration of Simalungun brought an end to the centuries-old process of growth, decline, amalgamation and distintegration of the traditional kingdoms. The campaign to extend Dutch rule throughout the Indonesian archipelago, guided by considerations of international politics and the expansion of Dutch and other European private enterprise, brought colonial power in force to Atjeh on the northern tip Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 85] === 72 of Sumatra, to Tapanuli through the ports on the west coast, to the fertile lowlands of the East Coast and, in the 1880s and 1890s, to Simalungun. With some exceptions (such as Tuan Rondahaim in Raja and Tuan Dolok Panribuan) the Dutch met little resistance from the traditional rulers. At least one factor involved in the ease with which the Dutch were able to establish themselves in Simalungun was that, according to Tideman, “The radja had noticed what enormous profits the cultivation of tobacco in Deli gave to the.Malay princes and began to be desirous that their land be made available also.**1® In 1838 Tanah Djawa came under Dutch rule, followed by Siantar in I889 and Pane a n d Raja in 1902. In I907 all seven kingdoms signed the famous Korte Verklaring (Short Declaration), in which the radja “admitted that his territory was under Dutch rule, undertook not to enter into political relations with foreign powers, and... agreed to comply with all such rules and orders regarding his State as Government should prescribe.,,19 The colonial government used this broad grant of power to effect many changes in the traditional kingdoms. In order to make the radja more responsible for the governing of their rather loosely-constructed kingdoms, it was necessary to rationalize the traditional governments by establishing clear lines of hierarchical authority and by determining the geo graphical boundaries of each keradjaan and its subdivisions. In most cases this process involved only minor structural changes. In Tanah Djawa the areas ruled by the tungkat of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 86] === 73 Djorlang Hataran and Dolok Panribuan along with the semiautonomous regions of Girsang Sipangan Bolon and Bosar Maligas became districts under the radja of Tanah Djawa; in each dis trict and in Tanah Djawa proper the already existing sub divisions (parbapaan) were retained by the Dutch. Similarly, the subdivisions of the kingdom of Siantar— Siantar proper, Sidamanik and Bandar— were left substantially intact. Dolok Batunanggar, a small kingdom claimed by the radja of Fane, two of the regions formerly under tungkat were attached to the Malay Sulaanate of Deli and were replaced by two smaller territories; the kingdom then became a district under the radja of Pane. Pane was thus divided into Pane proper and Dolok Batunanggar. The formerly autonomous villages in Baja Kahean were put under the authority of the radja of Raja, and Silau Kahean similarly became a district of Dolok Silau. Purba and Sillmakuta were accorded the status of keradjaan. Thus the kingdoms of Simalungun acquired their final form, which they retained until destroyed by the Revolution. In 1908 and 1911 maps were drawn setting the boundaries of the Onderafdeeling vein Simeloengoen (Subdivision of Simalungun, under a Dutch Controleur) and the Afdeeling van S imeloengoen en de Karolanden (Division of Simalungun and the Karolands, under an Assistant Resident), within the Residency of the East Coast of Sumatra (under a Resident). In 1913 the geo graphical boundaries of the seven kingdoms were established by law. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 87] === Effective control over Simalungun passed from the hands of the traditional rulers to the Dutch, Shortly after the signing of the Short Declarations, slavery was abolished, warfare was prohibited, the radja were no longer able to put their subjects to death (although they retained control over the administration of Justice within the keradjaan), and traffic in opium (a monopoly of the radja) was stopped. the six main sources of tax revenue, three (taxes on trade in and out of a kingdom, on goods sold in the markets, and on gambling) were p r o s c r i b e d. T h e radja of Siantar, con sidered unsuitable by the Dutch because he refused to permit Christian proselytization, was exiled and replaced by his son. In Dolok Batunanggar, where two n e w subdivisions had been created, the Dutch specified that the new rulers were to be chosen from marga Saragih and Purba respectively, although they did not designate particular individuals. To some ex tent the financial administration of the kingdoms was cen tralized by the colonial government with the establishment of a common treasury in 1908 under the supervision of the Ass i stant-H es i dent. T o the extent that any power remained in the hands of the traditional rulers, its locus shifted upwards to the radja. In rationalizing the governmental hierarchy the Dutch had stabilized the position of the radja as final authority In his kingdom and supported him in any disputes with his sub ordinates. A s one informant put its^l Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 88] === 75 "In the old days, the tungkat were fairly powerful. If united they could often overcome the will of the radja. Before the Dutch, for example, if a tuan huta didn*t like his anak "boru huta and wanted to replace him, and the tungkat agreed but the radja didn't, the tungkat would usually win. The radja was dependent in many ways on the support of his tungkat, with whom he shared authority in adat matters. After the Dutch came, whenever there was a dispute between a radja and a tungkat, the Dutch supported the radja and the radja won." Dutch colonial power thus transformed the traditional political systems of Simalungun from loosely-articulated and irregularly ruled keradjaan built upon and continually under cut by particularistic village loyalties to an artifically stable system of seven kingdoms with severely limited powers, rationalized levels of authority and clear-cut geographical boundaries. This transformation of traditional government was, however, but one aspect of the political development of Simalungun in the early twentieth century. Of perhaps more fundamental importance was the impact of a modernizing economy and the structures and processes which accompanied it, and the introduction of the world religions of Christianity and Islam. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 89] === CHAPTER III THE COLONIAL PERIOD The social cleavages of contemporary Simalungun, already partially described in our introductory chapter, were formed by the events of the colonial period, dating roughly from 1907 (the signing of the Short Declaration^ to 19*4-2 (the beginning of the Japanese occupation). The political expres sion of these cleavages, while it began in the colonial years, was for the most part confined to the revolutionary period, when the tensions produced by profound social change were released in the crucible of armed struggle, and to the post revolutionary years, when Simalungun/Siantar, no less than Indonesia as a whole, was engaged in a desperate search for new social forms to express the fundamentally altered values and belief-systems of the new Indonesia and to reconcile these new values with what remained of the traditional past. This chapter will be concerned mainly with the process of social change throughout the colonial period; its political expression will be described in the remainder of the dis sertation. In 1907 Simalungun was still almost wholly inhabited by Simalungun Bataks, under the rule of the traditional aris- 76 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 90] === 77 tocracy and relatively isolated from the other Batak sub groups in Tapanuli and Karo and the already flourishing plan tation economy in the Malay sultanates along its north eastern borders. Markets were still underdeveloped and the use of money, considered more as harta pusaka (inheritable wealth) than as a medium of exchange, was very limited. There were no population centers larger than the pematang of the traditional kingdoms, the largest of which numbered no more than 1,000 inhabitants. In general, villages were quite scattered and communication among them (along what one Informant described as djalan-djalan tikus, was difficult and intermittent. "mouse paths") The first Dutch controleur for Simalungun lived in Perdagangan on the northeastern edge of the territory under his responsibility. When Dutch authority became more firmly established, the controleur was moved in 1907 to Pematang Siantar, more than an "at that time still no insignificant Batak village," where a house was built for him in 1908. By 1912 the central location of Siantar was recognized by the Dutch and the Assistant Resident for Simalungun and the Karolands was placed there, the controleur becoming his assistant for Simalungun affairs.^In order to facilitate colonial administration and to prepare Simalungun for the coming of European planters, road construction was begun in 1906. The first road, between Siantar and Tebingtinggi, connected Simalungun with the plantation areas of the East Coast Residency; by I9O8 it was Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 91] === 78 possible to go by car from the east coast to Siantar. 1911 construction of a road from Siantar to Parapat and Tapanuli was begun, and in 1920 it was opened to traffic. By 1922 the main arteries of the contemporary road network had been built (although many of them were still unpaved), including the roads from Siantar to Tanah Djawa (built by the Handelsvereenlglng Amsterdam. Amsterdam Commercial Union), from Siantar to Perdagangan, and from Siantar through the kingdoms of Pane, Raja and Purba to Seribudolok (see Map 1-3)* The single railroad to Simalungun, paralleling the SiantarTebingtinggi road, was completed in 1916; a siding, built to service some of the plantations of Lower Simalungun, was opened in 1920. For the most part the Dutch made use of conscripted labor (heerendienst) in these projects.2 Lower Simalungun and the Road to Parapat The most profound changes produced by the colonial period occurred in Lower Simalungun and along the road to Parapat, the areas of plantation development and large scale immigra tion. In 1906 a representative of the British firm Harrisons and Crosfield, which had extensive plantation acreage in Malaya, introduced the high quality, high yield hevea brasiliensis rubber tree to East Sumatra.3 1907 Harrisons sold its property to a subsidiary, the United Serdang (Sumatra) Rubber Plantations L t d., which was the first company to be gin the cultivation of rubber in Simalungun with the opening of the Siantar Estate (approximately 1500 ha.) 1908. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The === [PDF page 92] === 79 most rapid growth of the plantations took place in the following decade and a half; by 1922 a total of 120,000 ha, (80^ of the total pre-World-War II plantation hectareage) had been leased by the traditional rulers to the plantation enterprises on 75 year terms. Rubber quickly established itself as the principal plantation crop in Simalungun, followed by tea, sisal, coffee and palm oil. In 1922 there were twenty rubber, fourteen tea, two sisal and ten "mixed” plantations, cultivating rub ber, tea, coffee and oil palas. Most of the plantations were owned by large syndicates whose capital was Dutch, British, and/or American, such as the Rubber Plantations Investment Trust Ltd., the Nederlandsch Indisch Landsyndicaat, the Eandelsvereeniging Amsterdam and the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company. ^ Underpopulation in East Sumatra and the unwillingness of the indigenous peoples of North Sumatra to work on the plantations required the European planters to import contract laborers from Java. In 1911 and 1912, the years of the rub ber boom, there was a great influx of Javanese; by 1920, according to Tideman, there were 4^,000 Javanese contract laborers in Simalungun and perhaps another 20,000 Javanese whose contracts had expired and who had settled in villages near the plantations or in the expanding towns. The Javanese represented approximately 37% of the total population of Simalungun (175,7^8) in 1920.5 By 1939 estate laborers and Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 93] === their families alone numbered 11^,573 of a total population of 369»099» ot unfortunately no figures are available on the number of Javanese ex-laborers at this time The graat majority of Javanese who became plantation laborers in Simalungun were from the poorest and most dis advantaged peasant segment of Javanese society. In The Religion of J a v a. Clifford Geertz distinguishes three main cultural types among the ethnic Javanese "grouped according to their world outlook— according to their religious beliefs, ethical preferences, and political ideologies." These three groups are the "abangan. representing a stress on the animistic aspects of the overall Javanese syncretism and broadly related to the peasant element in the population; santri. representing a stress on the Islamic aspects of the syncretism and generally related to the trading element (and to certain elements in the peasantry as well); and prijaji. stressing the Hinduist aspects and related to the bureaucratic element...*'7 It was primarily the first of these groups, the abangan, who came to Simalungun. The society from which they had come was relatively atomistic and weak in social organization and integration. The kinship system in Java, as Hildred Geertz has written, "is bilateral and nucleating,...the nuclear family of parents and young children stands essentially on its own and usually in a separate house, and obligations between kinsmen are minimal." Moreover, "there is a very high divorce rate,...and children frequently live Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 94] === in a series of different family groups during the course of their childhood. There are no corporate kin groups....Above the household there are no organized groupings for economic, ritual or other purposes.” In Java only the village unit (dukuhan) provided a measure of social integration, and even that was in most cases weak and unable to command the loyalties of its inhabitants. "Javanese village social structure, in sum, is exceedingly simple and vague in form. Above the family there are few organizations— either territorial, economic, religious, governmental, or otherwise— in which the individual finds a prescribed or definite position. The strongest felt ties are toward the formless and temporary assemblages of immediate neighbors and the circle of closest kinsmen."® Life on the plantations was turbulent and confusing for the Javanese, intensifying social disorganization and disintegration. Particularly in the early years, sanitary facilities were minimal and there was much overcrowding in the barracks-like pondok In which the workers were housed; from 1915 to 1919* Tideman reports, deaths per thousand plantation workers were consistently higher than for the East Sumatran population as a whole.9 During this period the ratio of male to female workers was high and it was dif ficult to establish normal family relationships. The at tempt to develop a sense of community within the pondok was also not very successful, as new workers were constantly Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 95] === 82 arriving and old ones were being transferred to other parts of the plantation. Cut off from their traditional political and cultural leaders, the prijaji, it was difficult for the abangan plan tation workers to develop an indigenous elite. Their life centered around the plantation and its activities; they were legally subjects of the Dutch government and not of the traditional Simalungun kingdoms, and their affairs were reg ulated largely by the plantation management, who even in volved themselves in the selection of pondok heads. The pattern of social stratification which developed was also plantation-oriented, comprising two principal status groups, the ordinary workers and the mandur (foremen); individuals who possessed special skills, such as the various types of tukang (artisans) were somewhere in between. Relationships between mandur and workers and between pondok heads and residents were at best uneasy, as these potential leadership groups were often seen as instruments of higher authority rather than spokesmen for the workers. Since wages were low and there was little opportunity for capital accumulation it was hard to break out of plantation society. At the end of their contract period many Javanese re turned to Java, but a substantial number remained in Simalungun, moving (with Dutch assistance) to their own vil lages near the plantations where they became subjects of the radja (but continued to be protected by Dutch officials from Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 96] === any interference by their nominal Simalungun overlords), Some gravitated to the growing towns, such as Serbelawan, Perdagangan, or Siantar, where they became tukang, unskilled laborers for the Chinese, or petty traders, and lived clustered together in their own neighborhoods. dren of most Javanese, whether in the towns, there were few educational For the chil pondok, villages or opportunities which might have encouraged the development of a modern elite. Almost no Javanese received enough education to become civil serv ants, although a few (principally the sons of mandur and town Javanese) became teachers in the so-called wllden scholen (unaccredited private schools) in the 1930s. The growth of a plantation economy in Simalungun and the importation of large numbers of workers presented a major problem to the planters and to the Dutch government: were the newcomers to be fed? How The indigenous Simalungun people, practicing slash-and-burn dry rice cultivation, barely produced enough food for themselves. In order to increase the supply of rice the Dutch made some attempts to convert the Simalungun Bataks to wet rice (sawah) cultivation in the river valleys and lowlands around the plantations, but were largely unsuccessful; in any event there were simply too few people in Simalungun to produce the necessary quantities of rice. The problem was partially alleviated by the opening of the road to the rice fields of Tapanuli which permitted easier transport of rice to Simalungun. But the valleys of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 97] === mountainous Ta?»anuli were already becoming densely populated and there was little land available for the opening of new fields, and this source provided only a limited amount of rice for the plantation workers. In order to further ease the problem of food supply the Dutch encouraged the migration of large numbers of North Tapanuli Bataks. from their homeland to Simalungun. Small groups of migrants began to enter Simalungun at about the time when the traditional rulers signed the short Declarations with the Dutch. With few exceptions they settled along the river valleys in Bandar, Tanah Djawa, Siantar and along the road to Parapat, where it was possible to construct extensive irrigation systems. In 1912 there were 1,760 North Tapanuli Bataks in Simalungun; by 1920 there were over 20,000 and by 1930 almost 50,000.11 The Increase in irrigated rice fields (registered with the government) was as follows: TABLE 3-1 IRRIGATED RICE FIELDS (SAWAH) IN SIMALUNGUN, 1913-19^2 Year Total sawah (ha.) 1913 1918 1923 1928 1933 19^2 3,700 7,097 7,959 720 ha. Source: A. Pandiangan, "Persawahan di Kabupaten Simelungun" (Wet-rice Cultivation in the Regency of Simalungun), in Kenang-Kenangan Pekan Pertundjukan Simelungun 10 Mel 195225 Mel 1952 (A Souvenir of the Simalungun Exhibition Pair, May 10, 1952-May 25, 1952), P. Siantar, 1952, p. 82. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 98] === Several factors contributed to the willingness of the North Tapanuli Bataks to leave their villages and journey to a strange land where, only a few years before, the few among them who visited Simalungun feared for their lives and wore amulets to protect themselves. Population pressure was certainly the key factor, and the traditional practice in North Tapanuli of young men leaving their villages of birth to found new villages in less populated areas encouraged emigration. Tideman comments that "Especially in the begin ning the possibility of obtaining the radjaship ^of a n e w village7#— i.e. a position as head, for which the Batak has great desire— was one of the incentives which spurred on the emigration from Tapanuli."12 The rust en orde established by the Dutch in Simalungun removed the fear of being killed or sold into slavery by the traditional rulers, and Dutch encouragement and assistance in building irrigation systems was also important, as was the improved system of roads. For the most part the immigrants came from the region of North Tapanuli known as Toba, on the southern shore of Lake Toba around the present town of Balige, but a consid erable number were from the Silindung Valley, where the town of Tarutung is now located (see map 1-1), and other regions were represented as well. Many of the migrants were already Christians, as German missionaries from the Protestant Rheinische Missionsgesellschaft (R M G ) had been working in Tapanuli since 1861 and had been particularly successful in Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 99] === 86 the Toba and Silindung areas where there had been no previous Islamic penetration.^3 The missionaries encouraged migration to East Sumatra, seeing the migrants as an aid in converting the peoples of that region to Christianity; one of the first areas of North Tapanuli Batak settlement in Simalungun, Bandar, had a resident missionary from the RMG as early as 1904 ^ The legal position of the North Tapanuli migrants vis-avis the Simalungun radja was for some years uncertain. first they were considered, like the plantation workers, subjects of the Dutch government, but in 1918 it was decided that all Indonesian inhabitants of Simalungun (except for the plantation workers) would henceforth be subjects of the radja. This caused a certain amount of discontent among the North Tapanuli Bataks, who considered themselves superior to the Simalungun people and did radja as overlords. not wish to recognize the As in the case of the Javanese villagers, however, the Dutch served as mediators between the newcomers and the Simalungun aristocracy (whose authority was in any event quite weak In Lower Simalungun by this time), and there was little actual Interference in village affairs by the radja or their subordinates. In particular there was no interference with the determination of who was to live in the new villages and how much land the newcomers were to be given; these matters were controlled by the Dutch. —In the first years of the migration some attempt was made to establish the n e w villages in Simalungun on a kinship Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 100] === basis similar to that of North Tapanuli villages* factors prevented such a development: Two (1) Individuals of many different marga were involved in the migration and were mixed together in the new villages, so that there were no localized lineages, and (2 ) no lineage could claim ownership of the newly-opened land, which was legally regarded as the territory of the traditional kingdoms, rights of usage being given to individual migrants. The basic unit of social organization in the Tapanuli highlands, the localized line age, thus could not be preserved in Simalungun and had to be replaced by other institutions. A t the level of village organization, a voluntary association, the dongan sahuta (village association, literally "friends of one village"), to which most villagers belonged, performed some of the functions of the localized lineage (assisting in adat • ceremonies, providing financial help in times of crisis). In small villages there was usually only one dongan sahuta which included the whole village, while in the larger vil lages and towns there might be several, each of which included a cluster of houses or the residents of one street. The dongan sahuta never became a focus for the loyalties of its inhabitants as had the multi-marga village units of the Simalungun Bataks. Instead the lineage remained strong and there was frequent communication with lineage mates in other parts of Simalungun and North Tapanuli; broader kin ship groupings also took on a new significance. In Tapanuli, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 101] === Edward Bruner has commented, “the localized lineage is a meaningful corporate group, but the higher level patrilineal segments are merely descent categories•"^5 in Simalungun, as in other parts of the East Coast to which the North Tapanuli Bataks migrated, the marga, consisting of a number of lineage segments with a common patrilineal name, became an important solidary unit. Where there was a substantial number of individuals with a common marga name, and particu larly in the town of Siantar, marga organizations were formed whose principal duties were to organize and coordinate adat ceremonies and to provide a measure of social security for their members, tasks which they shared with the dongan sahuta. Where the number of marga mates was too small to form an ef fective organization, two or more marga which traced descent from a common ancestor joined together for the same purpose. This reversion to more and more distant kinship ties as a basis for social organization was not difficult for the North Tapanuli Bataks, who can trace their genealogy through a series of (mythological) ancestors back to the first Batak, Si Badja Batak, and his two sons, from whom stem all of the present marga and groupings of marga. Beyond the loyalty to marga, region-of-origin also be came an important aspect of self-identification and identi fication of others for North Tapanuli Bataks In Simalungun. As a marga in North Tapanuli is generally located in a single, if often vaguely defined, area, an emigre could easily be Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 102] === 89 identified by his marga name as, for example, orang Toba or orang Sllindung (a Tobanese or a man from Sillndung). As a migrant he developed a certain loyalty to his place of origin and an affinity with others from his region. Differences among the various regions of North Tapanuli are slight, con sisting principally of minor dialect variations and dif ferences in adat, but they seem to have been meaningful enough to generate a sense of distinctiveness on the part of each regional group. No comparable loyalty to his adopted home (resulting in a self-identification as, say orang Tanah Djawa or orang Balata). emerged among the North Tapanuli Bataks in Simalungun, although several factors have tended to under mine the importance of both marga and regional identification, particularly in the late colonial and post-colonial periods. Among these factors are the frequency of intermarriage be tween people from different regions, the pressures on North Tapanuli Bataks throughout East Sumatra to be united against other ethnic groups which, it is felt, threaten their position in the area, and the role of Christianity in pro viding a sense of unity among North Tapanuli Bataks and a sense of the separateness of the group from other Sumatran peoples. It is worth noting that before World War II North Tapanuli migration went no farther than Simalungun; the Moslem Malay sultans to the northeast were hostile to Christian Bataks and devised various means of keeping them Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 103] === out. 16 North Tapanuli Bataks, in their homeland and in Simalungun, thus saw themselves as an island of Christianity in a sea of Islam, and their faith provided them with a measure of unity. T o some extent this sense of unity was reflected organizationally in the supra-regional HKBP (Huria Kristen Batak Protestan, Batak Christian Protestant Church), whose churches have been important centers of social life in the village and partially bridge regional differences. Not all of the North Tapanuli Bataks who migrated to Simalungun In the colonial period were wet-rice farmers. A s a part of their attempt to interest the people of North Tapanuli in Christianity, the missionaries had been very active in establishing schools at the village level. cording to Cunningham, the people "eagerly accepted" Western education, "no doubt seeing a route to association and ad vancement in the eyes of the Christian Dutch administrators, who had introduced Netherlands East Indies Government to the a rea.••.The zendlng school, or regional mission school, emphasized religious instruction, but also included practical reading, writing, and arithmetic. This school became a fixture in the community, serving to make the Christian Batak one of the most literate groups In Indonesia and paving the way for the great influx of Bataks into clerkships, and administratlve, educational, and technical professions." Missionary emphasis on education was a fortuitous development for the Dutch government and the European planters in Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 104] === 91 Simalungun who needed personnel to fill a wide variety of white-collar Jobs. As there were no plantations in Tapanuli few positions requiring education were available there, and they became, after about 1930, the predominant white-collar group. who were themselves usually uneducated but were required by the Dutch to keep records of government transactions. many North Tapanuli Bataks gravitated to Simalungun, where Some of them were even hired by the radja and tungkat, The indigenous Simalungun Bataks in Lower Simalungun were considerably disadvantaged by the growth of the plantations and the building of sawah. Seeing the rapid decline in land available for s l a s h - a n d - b u m cultivation and un willing to be assimilated to the culture of the North Tapanuli Bataks, many of them moved into the highland areas to the west of the Tebingtinggi-Siantar-Parapat the 1930s they were a small minority In Lower Simalungun, located mostly in and around the pematang. who r o a d; * 9 Most of those remained In Lower Simalungun (and those who lived in what we have called the ’’fringe area” of Upper Simalungun, bordering on areas of substantial Malay population) were converted to Islam by Coastal Maly traders and religious teachers; two of the radja, in Tanah DJawa and Siantar, also became Moslems. This contact between Simalungun Batak Moslems and Coastal Malays established a bond between the two groups which was to become a focus for political organization In the post-independence period. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 105] === 92 Urban development was an important component of social change in the colonial period. The largest of the new towns — P. Siantar, Tanah Djawa, Perdagangan and Serbelawan— were all located near the plantations and expanded around a pematang core. Each town varied from the others in its ethnic composition, but all included some Javanese and North Tapanuli Bataks and two other major groups, Moslem Bataks from South Tapanuli and Chinese. The Moslem Batak pattern of migration was rather dif ferent from that of the Christian Bataks of North Tapanuli. Where the latter were predominantly wet-rice farmers and entered Simalungun along the Tarutung-Balige-Parapat road, the former were most strongly attracted by the prospect of trade (although some of them, particularly those from Angkola, became rice farmers) and entered Simalungun via Hantauparapat and Asahan, settling primarily in Perdagangan, Serbelawan and Siantar. Both the North Tapanuli Bataks who sold their rice and the Javanese who bought it were part of a new money economy in Simalungun, and the South Tapanuli Bataks saw an opportunity to cash in on the new wealth. fortunately no statistics are available on the number of Moslem Bataks who migrated to Simalungun beyond a figure of ^,699 "Mandailingers*’ (Mandailing, ^Angkola and Sipirok are the principal subdivisions of south Tapanuli) cited by 20 Tideman from the 1920 census, and our own current (19636b) estimate (see Chapter I) of an approximate percentage of 15^ in Lower Simalungun and Z0% in the city of Siantar. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 106] === 93 The South Tapanuli Bataks, Islamized since the 18th century or earlier and possessing a large and active trading class, fit very closely Herbert Peith*s description of* the Islamic-entrepreneurial political culture in Indonesia,21 The kinship system of South Tapanuli is similar to that of other Batak groups, consisting of exogamous marga inhabiting particular areas. The effect of Islamization, however, has been to reduce the importance of kinship and regional af filiations and to place the Moslem Bataks within the frame work of a wider community, umrnat Islam (Islamic world or community), which includes other santri groups such as the Minangkabau and Coastal Malays. This enlargement of the group with which South Tapanuli Bataks identify themselves was particularly apparent among the migrants in Simalungun, many of whom dropped their marga name, using only a given (Moslem) name, south Tapanuli Bataks were thus often indis tinguishable from the smaller migrant groups of other Sumatran santris with whom they mixed in the marketplace and the mosque and with whom they lived in the santri kampung of the towns. Social intercourse between Moslem and Christian Bataks in Simalungun was almost non-existent apart from work and commercial relationships, as the latter group were infidels who ate pork (the principal ritual food in North Tapanuli) and, what is worse, allowed pigs to wander loose in their villages. Besides the trading element there was also a significant group of Moslem Bataks who became white-collar workers for Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 107] === the government, the plantations, and the radja. In the last half of the nineteenth century Minangkabau and South Tapanuli pilgrims in the Middle East had been strongly influenced by the Islamic reform movement with its stress on modern educa tion. Moreover, German missionaries, whose work in South Tapanuli predated their entrance into North Tapanuli, had also established schools, and some of their students were Moslems. Many of the migrants from South Tapanuli to Simalungun had thus acquired at least a rudimentary Westernstyle education. Until 1930 the Moslem Bataks seem in fact to have been the predominant educated group in Simalungun, but were thereafter outdistanced by the North Tapanuli Christians. South Tapanuli religious teachers also migrated to Simalungun, where they established Islamic schools and sev eral Islamic educational and social organizations. The most important of these were-the Aldjam*!jatul Waslijah. founded in 1930, and the Muhammadi.1a h. founded in 192?« 22 By the end of the colonial period, Aldjam'ijatul Waslijah had established an extensive network of branches and schools throughout Lower Simalungun and in Siantar city, while most of the Muhammadijah schools were located in Siantar. The influx of Chinese into Simalungun was greatest be fore World War I and declined thereafter, probably in re sponse to the economic slump in the early 1920s and the Great Depression. In 1920 there were about 10,000 Chinese in Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 108] === Simalungun and another 3*000 in the city of Siantar; by 1939 there were 6,339 Chinese in the city and only 3*060 outside Siantar, most of whom were in Perdagangan, Serbelawan, and Tideman divided the Chinese into two groups, "a well-to-do commercial class, which forms the predominant element in the busy commercial district of the capital city" and in other towns in Lower Simalungun, and a smaller group of unskilled laborers, only a few of whom worked on the plantations.2**' The Chinese were outside the authority of the radjas and, following the Dutch practice of "like over like," were headed by a Chinese "lieutenant" who was directly re sponsible to the Dutch government. Perhaps the most import ant role the Chinese played in the economy of Simalungun was as middlemen in the rice trade and money-lenders to the farmers, whose collateral was their rice crop. As Tideman commented, "this relationship now and then gave rise to clashes. In 1919 because of a slight provocation there was a very tense relationship between the Tobanese sawah-builders and the Chinese, so that rather extensive measures were necessary in order to prevent serious conflict."2^ Despite the tension, however, there were apparently no serious clashes between Chinese and Indonesians before the Revolution. Besides the Chinese there were small minorities of other nonlndonesian Asian groups, including Indians (7^0 in 1920; 1,010 in 1939) and a few Arabs. society were the Europeans, Completing the plural of whom there were 1,013 in 1920 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 109] === and probably somewhat fewer by the end of the colonial period. Only about half of the Europeans were Dutch, the remainder consisting of British, Germans, Swiss, Austrians, Americans and Japanese (who were given the legal status of Europeans). It is perhaps appropriate at this point to examine in some detail the development of the city of P. Siantar, the center of Dutch administration, of the market economy, and of the political life of Simalungun. In 1907 Siantar con sisted of probably fewer than a thousand Simalungun Bataks. Its growth since that time may be attributed to its central position as a crossroads, linking together Tapanuli, Karo and the East Coast, and its location in the center of the areas of plantation and sawah development. Inundated by various migrant groups, Siantar's population grew as follows: TABLE 3-2 POPULATION GROWTH IN SIANTAR Year Indon. Europ. Chinese Other Aslans Total 1920 1930 1939 1950 1963 6,096 9,711 17,731 3^,913 91,681 203 163 2,87^ A,96A 8,506 12,512 16,33^ 2 87 A 90 A 01 970 929 9,A60 15,328 26,638 A 8,A27 109,010 132 66 Source: 1920, 1930 and 1950 rows from Purba, Madja, "Pematangsiantar, Setengah Abad" (Pematangsiantar, a HalfCentury) in Kenang-Kenangan Pekan Pertundjukan Simelungun. P» 33 • Figures for 1939 from The General Agricultural Condition of Simeloengoen. p. 16. The number of Europeans in Siantar at this time was not listed. Figures for 1963 were computed from Bagian Sp>n5?us K n t n n r a H 1q -P- s i a « f o r > r»« Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 110] === Because of the special problems caused by the growth of the city, such as regulation of the markets, of housing, water supply, electrification, etc. and the desire of the European residents for a decentralization of authority, Siantar was separated from the keradjaan of Siantar in 191? and became a municipality directly under the Assistant Resident, who served as Mayor. All inhabitants of the city with the exception of the Simalungun Bataks (the pematang in the center of the city was not a part of the municipality) became subjects of the Dutch government. A municipal council (gemeenteraad) was established to provide a measure of "home rule” to the city;_its membership, consisting of 5 Europeans, 3 Indonesians and One non-Indonesian Asian (the Chinese lieutenant), was appointed by the Assistant Resident. The new municipality was given its own fiscal powers, and obtained its funds principally from property taxes, the rental of market space, and the income of the Public Works Department (mostly water supply) and the municipal slaughter house, a revenue structure which has been largely maintained in the post-independence period. Residential segregation and a measure of occupational differentiation of ethnic groups were characteristics of town life in Siantar from the early years of its growth. The first migrant groups, the North and South Tapanuli 3ataks, settled on the southern and northern banks of the Bah Bolon river respectively (probably due to their respective points Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 111] === of entry— the North Tapanuli Bataks came via Parapat and Tanah Djawa, the South Tapanuli Bataks via Perdagangan); these two settlements came to be called Kampung Kristen (Christian ward) and Kamoung Melaju (Malay, indicating Moslem ward). When substantial numbers of Javanese came to the city, they settled in their own quarter (Kamoung Djawa, Javanese ward, now called Kampung B a n t a n ) on the Moslem side of the river. The Chinese also lived to the north of the Bah Bolon in their own kampung, where they built shops and a central market with Dutch assistance. The Chinese quarter quickly became the center of economic life in the city and in Simalungun as a whole. The small group of Eucopeans lived clustered together in the vicinity of the Dutch government buildings, between the South Tapanuli Bataks and the Chinese, and the indigenous Simalungun people remained in the pematang. With some modification (see Chapter 1), this pattern still exists today. Occupational differentiation among ethnic groups, while it existed and played a role in ethnic separatism, was not nearly as clear cut as residential segregation. In the first decade of Siantar*s development, ethnic-occupational lines of division were fairly sharp— the North Tapanuli Bataks in Kampung Kristen were engaged mostly in sawah agriculture and were in but not of the urban community, the South Tapanuli Bataks were petty traders, the Javanese were unskilled laborers, the Chinese monopolized the central market, and the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 112] === r*i*-v*r,tchx:. Simalungun Bataks were isolated in the pematang, the land available to them for swidden agriculture constantly being shrunk by the growth of the town. Subsequent developments produced major changes in this pattern. The growth of Dutch administration, both for Siantar and for Simalungun, created a civil servant class composed of North and South Tapanuli and a few Simalungun Bataks. expanding population reduced the amount of land available for farming within the city limits and more and more people of all ethnic groups turned to petty trade. Under the in fluence of a few Coastal Malays who had come to Simalungun as traders and Moslem religious teachers, most of the Simalungun Bataks in Siantar were converted to Islam and at least partially integrated into the Islamic-entrepreneurial culture. Educational facilities, both private and governmental, were also developed during the colonial period and a sub stantial percentage of the cit y ’s children was exposed to at least a few years of elementary education. By the end of the 1930s there were a great number of village-level three year elementary schools scattered throughout Simalungun, about a dozen schools which offered a further two years beyond the primary level, four Dutch-Native Schools (HIS) which provided Instruction in Dutch (one of these was exclusively for sons of the Simalungun aristocracy), and one MULDC school (opened in 1938), a three year course open to graduates of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 113] === 100 the HIS. The higher level schools were all located in Siantar and their student bodies were of mixed ethnic origin and religious affiliation. Beginning about 1930, graduates of these schools who could not find suitable employment founded their own elementary schools, the unaccredited wilden scholen. finding jobs, as their diplomas were not accepted by the Graduates of these schools also had difficulty Dutch government. Three decades of colonial rule in Lower Simalungun thus witnessed the growth of common interests among individuals of different ethnic and religious groups but common educa tional background and occupations, particularly in Siantar. Town organizations based on common interests and not re stricted to members of one ethnic or religious group, such as sports clubs and the Taman Persahabatan. a recreation center founded and largely patronized by civil servants, were indicative of a partial bridging of ethnic separatism and a growing sense of pan-ethnic identity in the late colonial period. These developments did not include non- Indonesian Asians, whose organizations remained totally sep arate from those of the Indonesian population. Upper Simalungun In Upper Simalungun social change was slower in coming and affected a smaller segment of the population than was the case in other parts of the region. No plantations were opened, few outsiders migrated to the area, and the developllfetak— Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 114] === 101 ment of a market economy had only a limited impact on the life of the ordinary villager. What social change did occur in Upper Simalungun was caused primarily by three factors, Christianity, education, and improved communications. At a conference in Tarutung in January, 1903 the EMG decided to extend its mission to Simalungun. As some Simalungun Bataks in Bandar and other parts of Lower Simalungun (including the radja of Siantar) had already be come Moslems there was a sense of urgency at the conference, and by September the first missionary had arrtved in Sima liongun. Cooperation from some of the radja (who did not, however, become Christians themselves) was secured and in 190^ mis sions were opened in Bandar, Purba, Raja and Parapat. 190?, after the exile of the radja of Siantar, the missionary in Bandar was transferred to Siantar. Fluent in the North Tapanuli Batak language and accompanied by assistants and teachers from that area, the missionaries hoped to use their knowledge and experience to quickly convert large numbers of Simalungun Bataks to Christianity. But, unwilling to master the Simalungun language and unable to convert members of the traditional aristocracy (who must have seen Christianity as an attack on their own authority, which was rooted in the possession of supernatural powers and claims of divinity), their progress in the early years was slow. By 1928 there were only 31 Simalungun Batak Christian congregations with a total membership of 9 0 0 « ^ Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 115] === 102 The year 1928 marked a turning point for the Christian mission in Upper Simalungun. In that year a conference was held in Pematang Raja (the mission’s central office was lo cated there until 1952, when it was moved to Siantar) to commemorate twenty-five years of missionary work in Simalungun and to plan for the future. Lay leaders from each congregation were present at the meeting, as were the few elementary school teachers of ethnic Simalungun origin. The major decision taken by the conference was to drop the North Tapanuli Batak language in favor of the Simalungun language in all churches and church schools. A n advisory committee (Komite Na R a Harpodah) consisting of teachers and lay leaders was formed to prepare schoolbooks, a grammar of the Simalungun language, religious texts, a hymn book, a church periodical, and other publications. The subsequent conversion of the last radja of Raja gave an extra push to Christianity in Simalungun, and in the next decade the church grew more rapidly; by 19^0 there were 60 congregations with a membership of 5»700.27 A s in Tapanuli, the Christian missionaries in Simalungun concentrated on the development of educational facilities as a means of conversion. The first schools were built in Raja, Purba and Silimakuta; by the end of the colonial period there were perhaps 25-30 church-run three-year elementary schools with a total of 1,000 pupils.2® After 1910 some of the graduates of these schools became teachers and a few were Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 116] === 103 sent to Tapanuli or Java for further education. the first Simalungun minister was ordained. In 1929 By the last decade of colonial rule primary education was widespread in Upper Simalungun, particularly in the villages closest to the Siantar-Seribudolok road where today most lagers are literate of the vil in the Simalungun language and a sub stantial proportion are literate in Indonesian as well. Homan Catholic missionary activity in Simalungun did not extend beyond Haranggaol on Lake Toba until the 1930s, when a church was built near Pematang Ha^a. B y this time most of the accessible villages in Haja had become Protestant and the Catholics made no progress. They finally returned to Haranggaol, where the largest concentration of Catholics in Simalungun is still located. The construction of the road from Siantar to Seribudolok (begun in 1906) was an important event in Upper Simalungun, facilitating considerably communication between the govern ment and the radja and among the missionaries and the common people. The road also brought the Simalungun people into more direct contact with the North Tapanuli Bataks whose sawah lined the road from Siantar through Pane and almost to the borders of Haja, and with the other groups which had moved into Siantar. Market development was on a much smaller scale than in Lower Simalungun, but a few small towns grew up around markets where the Simalungun people sold vegetables, rice, fruit, and forest products and bought salt, sugar, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 117] === 104kerosene and cloth. Market days brought a variety of traders, principally North and South Tapanuli Bataks and Chinese, to Raja, Tiga Runggu, Seribudolok and other towns. Increased culture contact also encouraged the spread of the Indonesian language as a lingua franca in the region. Christianity, education and improved communications in Upper Simalungun had important consequences for social change. First, a new (albeit very small) class of educated and semi educated individuals, mostly affiliated with the Christian mission, was created. This group constituted a new elite In Simalungun whose authority was based on their learning and acceptance of Christianity and was unrelated to traditional authority. As the Simalungun Batak author of 60 Tahun Indjll Kristus di Slmalungun. a history of Christianity in Simalungun, wrote: "Seeing the Christians who were always going to church there were those who were of the opinion that the radja of the Christians was the minister, because his regulations were always followed. $,29 The ministers and teachers were the most mobile group in Upper Simalungun, and their contacts with other ethnic groups, particularly the North Tapanuli Bataks, were most frequent. Ethnic conscious ness grew rapidly among the educated Simalungun Bataks, who disliked having to learn the North Tapanuli language and resented having North Tapanuli Bataks as their superiors within the church and educational hierarchies. The Komite Na Ra Marpodah was the first organizational expression of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 118] === 105 this resentment. Its proposals in 1928 smacked, strongly of ethnic feelings, as did the later decision to build a Simalungun museum in Siantar and the effort to gain a degree of autonomy for Simalungun Christians within the HKBP church in the 1930s. Another organization, Simalungun Sapanriahan (Simalungun Unity), founded in 1936 to advance Simalungun culture and language, had strong anti-Worth Tapanuli overtones and was led by Simalungun officials of the Dutch government and the church-affiliated teachers. Another important consequence of change was the creation of a large group of primary school graduates whose education and exposure to urban life in Siantar left them dissatisfied with village life but unable to advance in the city. Lacking funds, they could not acquire the further education (for the most part, only the sons of the aristocracy and a few indi viduals selected by the missionaries received more than 3 years of schooling) which would fit them for positions as clerks in government or plantation offices. Lacking already successful urban relatives who could give them a start in commerce, they were hesitant to move to the city. As they were not members of the aristocracy, there was little hope for them to enter the traditional structures of government. Frustrated at every turn, these young men spent most of their time in the coffee shops of Baja, Tiga Runggu, Haranggaol and other towns, brooding over the barriers which had been placed in front of them but doing little to organize resis tance to the radja or the Dutch. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 119] === 106 Social Cleavages and the Development of Local Political Leadership This chapter has been designed to explore the emergence in the colonial period of patterns of social cleavage and stratification in Simalungun/Siantar which have had a pro found effect upon the characteristics of the local political leaders and organizations whose activities began in the 1930s and subsequently, in the revolutionary and post-revolutionary periods, played a key role in political change in the region. Before describing the early development of local leadership, let us summarize the patterns of cleavage and stratification which had taken shape by the last decade of colonial rule. The most basic social divisions in Simalungun/Siantar are religious and ethnic. At the mass level in particular there is little interaction, beyond commercial contacts, be tween Christians and Moslems. Extent of commitment to one's faith is of course a factor in the social distance between Christians and Moslems, and religious difference is less salient for the abangan Javanese than for the santri Sumatran Moslems. The large numbers of individuals who still prac tice some form of indigenous religion (most of whom are Simalungun Bataks) are largely irrelevant in terms of the tensions created by religious differences (and are irrelevant in the political arena as well) as they are the most isolated and the least participant of all groups in Simalungun. At the level of ethnic divisions, there are four major Indonesian groups, the Javanese and three Batak sub-groups. Although they share many common cultural characteristics, there is almost no feeling of unity among the Batak sub-groups. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 120] === This sense of separateness has occurred for several reasons: (1) Before the coming of the Dutch, there had been little interaction between the various Batak peoples; when travel lers from one area had visited other parts of Batakland they had generally met a hostile reception. Before the migration, therefore, the only attitudes which existed were those of mutual suspicion and fear. The Simalungun Bataks, even (and perhaps especially) those who had been converted to Christianity or Islam, felt strongly that their homeland had been usurped by outsiders. This attitude of hostility toward the interloper was mixed with feelings of inferiority, particularly among the more participant and mobile Simalungun 3ataks, which were caused by the greater educational attain ments, prowess in building sawah, and entrepreneurial, com mercial, and administrative abilities of the migrant Batak groups. The widespread belief that the North Tapanuli Bataks in their homeland practiced "village democracy," while the Simalungun Bataks were oppressed by a "feudal" monarchy, also contributed to the sense of inferiority among more educated Simalungun Bataks who were increasingly aware in the late colonial period of the importance which the out side world placed on democracy and popular sovereignty. The North Tapanuli Bataks, while discontented with their position as subjects of the Simalungun radja, felt no par ticular hostility to the Simalungun Bataks, but considered them an inferior or backward people who lacked initiative, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 121] === 108 drive, and the will to advancement. The North Tapanuli Bataks were also intensely aware of their position as a Christian minority in a predominantly Islamic world and they saw the South Tapanuli Bataks as a part of the threatening Islamic community rather than as fellow Bataks. For their part, the South Tapanuli Bataks viewed their Christian brethren as pork-eating Infidels; their own 3elf-identification, as we stated earlier, was as members of ummat Islam. Each Batak sub-group, and the Javanese as well, has a stereotyped view of itself and of all other groups. Clark Cunningham has described some of these stereotypes as he found them.in a village in East Sumatra which contained both Javanese and Christian North Tapanuli Bataks; his findings apply with equal strength to group attitudes in Simalungun/ Siantar.30 “The two groups (and others around them) usually dis tinguish the differences between Javanese and Toba Bataks as the difference between halus and kasar, or, roughly, re fined and coarse. "Many Javanese would use these terms meaning that they themsftlves are sopan (polite) and hormat (respectful) in contrast to the Batak who are crude and rather impolite. Extremists would carry this" further to consider the Batak as physically dirty, foul-mouthed, boorish and dishonest. A far extreme always points to the Batak ancestors as can nibals, saying *Orang Batak makan orang* (Bataks eat people). "The Batak will also use these terms but will quite naturally attach a different significance to them. He feels that the Javanese is too soft and retiring, too easily pushed around and incapable of standing u p for his rights and opinions,whereas the Batak is firm, aggressive, enter prising and individualistic. A n extreme group feels that the Javanese are too weak for their own good, docile to the point of accepting anything, untrustworthy because of their weakness, and, at a far extreme, gampang didjadjah (easy to be ruled) and the reason for Dutch mastery over Indonesia." Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 122] === Moreover the Bataks (particularly the North Tapanuli Bataks), unwilling themselves to become plantation laborers, have tended to look down upon the Javanese as a "coolie class." Stereotypical attitudes between Simalungun and North Tapanuli Bataks are remarkably similar to those between Javanese and North Tapanuli Bataks. The same words, halus (Simalungun) and kasar (North Tapanuli) are used and carry roughly the same connotations. 6<) Tahun Indjil Kristus di Simalungun contains some revealing passages.31 "There are those who say that Simalungun people are lazy, fearful, lacking in drive. On the other hand, if ex amined more intensively, this ethnic group has many good qualities: they are honest, deceit and thievery are rare among them, their feelings are refined, their spoken language is pleasant to the ear, their behavior is respectful. This behavior is certainly in part influenced by the rule of radja who had great authority. Such behavior is also characteris tic of Central Java, where the people were ruled by sultans whose level was very high above them. "In addition they think slowly and take a long time to make up their minds on a matter. For example, concerning a betrothal sometimes a boy will ask for a girl in marriage for three or four years before there is a decision. But if a position has been taken, that position is permanent and firm and will not be changed. Because of these character istics, they are not bold enough to act to carry out some thing or to oppose something. But they like to stall and to withdraw from something with which they do not agree. "Each person makes up his own mind and doesn*t want to merely follow others without reason." Stereotypes regarding South Tapanuli Bataks are colored more by their religious affiliation than by their supposed personality characteristics as members of an ethnic group. South Tapanuli self-appraisal and their appraisal by other Bataks in terms of religious differences have already been Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 123] === 110 described. Their relationship with the Javanese population of SImalungun, however, deserves special mention, as they have developed a closer relationship with the Javanese than with any other non-santri group. The abangan Javanese, as we have noted, are a cultural melange of Islamic, Hindu and pre-Hindu influences, and they tend to respect the Moslem Bataks as bearers of the Islamic part of their culture. many predominantly Javanese villages in Lower Simalungun there are South Tapanuli Moslems who run the village mosque and provide some religious Instruction to the Javanese. Ethnic and religious cleavages and tensions were not, however, the only consequences of social change In Simalungun/ Siantar. In Increasing numbers toward the end of the colonial period there emerged a group of individuals of a variety of ethnic groups and religious affiliations, largely urbanites, who were most intensely in contact with the non-Indonesian elements of what J. S. F u m i v a l l has described as the plural society in the Dutch East Indies— the Europ e a n s, who were the highest status group and held political power, and the Chinese, who were dominant in the local economy. Among those Indonesians who followed urban occupations, i.e. the petty traders, schoolteachers, entrepreneurs and government and plantation officials, there was daily interaction and common exposure to the frustrations inherent in a society in which Indonesians were at the bottom of the social, economic and political ladders. There was common exposure Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 124] === also to n e w ideas and attitudes, to the concept of inde pendence from colonial rule, to ideas of an Indonesian state and a restructuring of Indonesian society and economy. News papers were published in Siantar (and imported from Medan, the seat of the iiesidency of the East Coast of Sumatra), movie theatres were opened, and there was increasing contact between the urbanized and educated in Siantar and Medan. Western education, urban occupations and the conditions of urban life, and the improvement of communications were crucial factors in opening the gates to the diffusion of new values and attitudes which added new dimensions to the patterns of conflict and cleavage in Simalungun/Siantar. The local responses to the frustrations of the colonial period and the diffusion of new ideas were not uniform. The acceptance and growth of new values and attitudes was heavily conditioned by the variety of cultural and religious ex periences, the nature of ethnic loyalties and interethnic competition, and the variety of occupational and educational backgrounds of the inhabitants of the region. New cleavages overlapped, competed with and in some cases reinforced ethnic and religious conflict; at no level did new loyalties totally supplant the old. Patterns of political segmentation and organizational affiliation which emerged in the 1930s and after were influenced both by the strains of the local environ ment and by the dissemination of new values from beyond the local environment as Simalungun/Siantar became a part of a larger net work of social interaction. Newly-emerging local political elites Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 125] === 112 were affected by and had to deal with an increasingly com plex pattern of sentiments and loyalties; the ordering of these conflicts into a coherent local political system integrated into a national Indonesian polity was to become the great task of leadership, both local and national, after 19^ 5 Most of the n e w organizations which appeared in the colonial period were ethnic or religious in form and content and did not directly enter the political arena. Muhammadijah and Aidjam*ijatul Vfaslijah, rooted in the santri community and led by South Tapanuli Bataks, were of this type, as was the HKBP church, whose membership was principally North Tapanuli Batak. (The Simalungun Batak Christians, while officially a part of the HKBP, had their own districts in Upper Simalungun, separate from the North Tapanuli congre gations of Lower Simalungun). The HKI (Huria Kristen Indonesia, Indonesian Christian Church), which had a small membership in Simalungun, was also North Tapanuli Batak dominated but more nationalistically-inclined than the HKBP, from which it had split in order to establish a church which was totally free from European leadership. Among the Simalungun Bataks the Komite Na Ha Marpodah was ethnic and religious in its orientation, and other organizations which were formed in the colonial period (the Kongsi Laita, a group of lay evangelists, and the Parguru Saksi Ni Kristus, a bible study and evangelical group) were also church related. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 126] === 113 Simalungun Sapanriahan, which was concerned more directly with Simalungun culture and the development of educational facilities than with Christianity, was similarly non-political. After some sporadic and unorganized attempts at agitation in the 1920s, nationalist organizations began to take root in Simalungun in 1931 with the formation of branches of Partindo (Partai Indonesia, Indonesian Party) and Indonesia Muda (Young Indonesia). Partindo at the national level was the principal successor organization to the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) which had been founded by Sukarno and others in 1927 and subsequently outlawed by the Dutch. Partindo*s leadership “aimed at complete independence on a basis of non-cooperation but was considerably more moderate In the methods it advocated than the PNI had been." Released from Jail In 1931* Sukarno Joined Partindo in July, 1932 and “was made chairman by unanimous acclaim. Under his leadership that party immediately adopted a firmer nationalist line, and its growth accelerated enormously. 50 branches and 20,000 By mid-1933 it had members... " 32 The principal leaders of Partindo and its youth affiliate Indonesia Muda in Simalungun Included A d a m Malik, a South Tapanuli Batak (presently a member of Indonesians ruling triumvirate); the brothers Mohammad Kasjim and Abdullah Jusuf (in 1963-6^ North Sumatran provincial chairman of the PNI), North Tapanuli Bataks from Samosir V7hose trader father had become a Moslem in Medan and dropped his marga name; Sumarno Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 127] === 114 Hasibuan, a North Tapanuli Batak Moslem (in 1963-64 a member of the North Sumatran provincial legislature from the PKI); and several others, mostly of South Tapanuli origin. The early leadership consisted for the most part of educated and semi-educated men who had travelled widely, lived in various parts of North Sumatra, and had come into contact with nationalist figures in Medan and Java in the 1920s. Abdullah Jusuf, for example, had had five years of government schooling, four years in a Moslem school, and three years in the Methodist school in Siantar, after which he became a teacher in a madrasah (Islamic school) and a reporter for Warta Deli (The Deli News), a Medan newspaper established by the nation alist journalist Adinegoro. In 1929 Jusuf went to Bandung, where he witnessed the famous trial of Sukarno and other nationalist leaders in 1930; it was at this point, he said later, that he became a nationalist. The membership of Partindo in Simalungun was drawn largely from the small trader class, the school teachers (particularly in the wilden scholen and in Taman S i s w a. a secular, nationalist-oriented school with students from all religious and ethnic groups) and the Journalists; there were no civil servants among its members, as this group enjoyed the benefits of relatively high status and a reasonable wage and were fearful of Dutch reprisals. Severely restricted in their freedom to organize and agitate against the Dutch government, the active nationalists constituted only a small Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 128] === 115 elite group in Siantar and had even fewer members in the other towns of Simalungun. Branches of Partindo were set up in Serbelawan and Perdagangan, where the membership con sisted mostly of South Tapanuli Bataks and a few Javanese, and in Tanah Djawa, where it was led by North Tapanuli Bataks affiliated with the nationalistic HKI church. Unable to form a mass movement and completely shut out of the political institutions of the colonial government (the Dutch-appointed Indonesian members of the gemeenteraad were non-party civil servants and professional people), the leadership of Partindo in Simalungun concentrated on nation alist education and the creation of cadres through Indonesia Muda, efforts which were particularly successful in the private schools but left untouched the uneducated youth and the rural population. In 193^ Partindo was dissolved by the Dutch, a nd there followed a three-year organizational vacuum in Simalungun. In 1937 Gerlndo (Gerakan Rak.lat Indonesia. Indonesian People's Movement) was founded in Java by former Partindo leaders. Its members were militant nationalists, but in the situation Of the late 1930s were intensely aware of the threat of Japanese fascism and more disposed than Partindo had been to cooperate with the Dutch.33 Gerindo in Simalungun was similarly a continuation of Partindo, with the same leadership, and was active until the end of the col onial period. Its Simalungun/Siantar membership on the eve of the Japanese occupation was less than 250. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 129] === CHAPTER IV JAPANESE OCCUPATION A N D NATIONALIST REVOLUTION Despite the profound nature of social change in Simalungun in the colonial period— the growth of ethnic and religious differentiation and consciousness, the emergence of towns and of urban elites based on trade and education, the introduction of nationalist ideas and the emergence of an embryonic nationalist movement— the colonial government had effectively managed to keep the lid on growing tension and discontent. unassailable. Dutch power in the 1930s was supreme and The colonial system had achieved a high de gree of stability and there was no question as to the locus of ultimate authority, even in "indirectly" ruled territories such as Simalungun. The destruction of colonial authority came not as a result of indigenous opposition but because of the inability of the Dutch to withstand the military power of an aggressive and expansionist Japan. The colonial period in Simalungun lasted only half a century. On March 9» 19^2, after limited and ineffective resistance, the Dutch government in Java surrendered to the invading Japanese forces. Four days later1 the Japanese were in Simalungun, where they remained for nearly four years. 116 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 130] === 117 With the Allied defeat of Japan sin independent Republic of Indonesia, encompassing the territory of the former Dutch East Indies, was declared by the nationalist leaders Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta in Djakarta on August 17, 19^5• Republi can institutions of government were subsequently set up throughout the archipelago. Determined to regain their for mer colony, the Dutch launched a "police action" against the new Republic in July, 19^7 and succeeded in occupying all of East Indonesia (the Lesser Sunda islands, Celebes and the Moluccas), Borneo, and parts of Java and Sumatra, in cluding Simalungun/Siantar. In the territories under Dutch control fifteen "autonomous states" were established to pro vide a counterweight to the Sukarno-Hatta-led Republic. Simalungun was made part of the State of East Sumatra (Negara Sumatera T i m u r ). On December 27, 19^9» after negotiations at The Hague in which representatives from The Netherlands, the Republic and the Dutch-created states participated, sovereignty was formally transferred to a federal Republic of the United States of Indonesia, consisting of the revol utionary Republic of Indonesia and the fifteen states. Lacking sufficient indigenous support, the federal structure quickly collapsed in the months following the transfer of sovereignty. By August 17th, 1950, the fifth anniversary of the declaration of independence, all of the member states of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia had been reintegrated into the unitary Republic of Indonesia. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 131] === 118 The Japanese Occupation For purposes of military administration, the Japanese divided Indonesia into three areas: East Indonesia, under the Japanese Navy; Java (including Madura), occupied by the 16th Army; and Sumatra, under the 25th A r m y. 3 The installa tion of a Japanese military administration in Simalungun brought with it several changes in governmental structure and personnel. All Dutch men and women, including government officials and plantation administrators (and nationals of other countries hostile to the Axis Powers) were ultimately interned, although some were kept on until they could be replaced by Japanese or Indonesians. The Dutch Assistant Resident and a few other high officials were replaced by Japanese, while most other government and plantation Jobs formerly held by Europeans were given to Indonesians. Karoland was separated from Simalungun and given its own Japanese equivalent of an Assistant Resident (the Japanese term was Bunsyutyo). The traditional kingdoms of Simalungun remained intact in form but were largely bypassed by the Japanese who appointed their own administrative personnel at the district level (see Ch. 2, p. 5^) for rice collection, labor recruitment and civil defense. The Judicial system, in which separate courts had been provided for Europeans, for Indonesians under the authority of the traditional king doms, for Indonesians outside the territory of the kingdoms and for non-Indonesian Aslans, was reorganized into a single and uniform system.**' Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 132] === 119 In Siantar the gemeenteraad (city council) was dis solved and the office of Municipal Secretary, the chief ad ministrative post in the municipality below the Assistant Resident and formerly held by a Dutchman, was given jointly to an Indonesian and a Japanese "adviser." The c i t y ’s wards were divided into "blocks” or neighborhoods (k u m i ) under block leaders (k u m i t j o ) for the purpose of distributing rice and sugar rations.^ The block leaders were also instructed to provide the authorities with information concerning sus pected rice smugglers and other profiteers and were respon sible for the selection of youths for labor gangs and para military training. By developing their own governmental structures and staffing them with carefully selected indi viduals the Japanese hoped to be able to exercise more ef fective control over the population and to mobilize it for participation in the war effort. At the beginning of the Occupation the Japanese were widely regarded as liberators; welcoming committees composed of Moslem and secular nationalist leaders were o^ hand to greet them, and several of these individuals were apparently taken into the n e w government.^ In a few months, however, the atmosphere of jubilation changed to one of deepening discontent. In part the heavy-handedness of Japanese admin istrators, the fear of the Kempeitai (the Japanese secret police), and the oppressiveness of forced labor practices were responsible for the change of attitude, but perhaps more Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 133] === fundamental was the poverty which came to affect all strata of the population. Before the war it had been necessary to import rice in large quantities to feed the plantation workers and the growing urban population of East Sumatra. War-time conditions in Southeast Asia precluded large-scale importation of rice, forcing the Japanese to lower rice consumption in Simalungun in order to feed their own troops and to provide a minimum supply of rice to Indonesians in other parts of East Sumatra. The daily requirement of rice was estimated by the anonymous, but apparently Indonesian, author of The General Agricultural Condition of Simeloengoen (published in 19^2) to be 600 grams for an adult and 300 grams for a child. The ration determined by the Japanese-headed Economic Management Body (Badan Pengurus Ekonomi) in Simalungun was 400 grams per day for adults, 200 for children. The daily ration for October, 1942 was only 200 grams for adults and 100 for children; for November, it was raised to 400 grams for adults and 200 for children.? Deficiencies were ap parently partly made u p by the distribution of corn. Other necessities, such as cloth and kerosene, were also in ex tremely short supply. In response to a question about the standard of living in Simalungun in the 1960s as compared to that of the col onial period, a senior civil servant commented to the author: "That is not the important comparison. To measure the depth of suffering possible in Indonesia you must remember what we Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 134] === 121 went through during the Japanese occupation. The man with two shoes or enough rice to eat was a rarity.11 This official also traced the beginnings of corruption and bribery to the Japanese period, when fixed prices were established by the Economic Management 3ody for the purchase and sale of rice, corn and sugar, encouraging an extensive black market. course, he said, then it was not corruption, but was caused by extreme deprivation and the fact that those in charge of the compulsory collection of rice were mostly Indonesians who had little sympathy for J a p a n ’s war. Summing up the at titude of many, Madja Purba, later to become the first regent of Simalungun under the revolutionary Republic, wrote: "What shocks to the soul there were In that time of transition, we all know. Pear emerged among all groups, the code of honor disappeared entirely. Poverty ruled tyrannically."® In order to increase rice production, the Japanese en couraged Indonesians to settle on the plantation land of Lower Simalungun, an area which had been inviolable during the colonial period. In many cases the Japanese ordered the clearing of overage rubber and other trees and the replanting of the area with rice and other food crops• This work was carried out by Javanese plantation laborers who were then resettled in villages on the newly-cleared land. Jungle land, also under concession to the plantations but still unexploited, was turned into rice fields by villagers (mostly Javanese and North Tapanuli Bataks) who took advantage of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 135] === the Japanese disregard for plantation rights and their policy of increasing food supply.^ in Lower Simalungun and throughout East Sumatra the amount of plantation land con verted to the production of food crops was considerable; as Karl Pelzer has written, "Whereas before 19^0 the plantations of East Sumatra generally bordered on one another or were separated only by narrow belts of village lands, leaving no room for further development or for the expansion of peasant agriculture, today the once solid plantation complexes are honeycombed with extensive squatter a r e a s. ^ According to figures published by the regency government in 1952, sawah land in Simalungun increased by 31# (from 9*723 Ha. to 12,723 Ha.) between 19^2 and 1 9 ^. 11 The total increase in Irrigated rice fields, and in land utilized for food pro duction in general, was certainly much higher than these figures suggest, as most of the incursions onto plantation land were organized by the villagers themselves and were not reported in government statistics. Beyond their efforts to increase the amount of land available for sawah, the Japanese also made a n extensive study of the agricultural situation in Simalungun, collecting data on crop diversity, soil conditions, the economics of rice production, etc.*-2 No evidence is available, however, as to whether they ever acted upon this information. Madja Purba has suggested that the exigencies of the war prevented the Japanese from carrying out their agricultural plans.*-3 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 136] === At the outset of the occupation, in Simalungun as else where in Indonesia, the Japanese adopted a harsh attitude toward indigenous organizations both of the political and non-political variety. According to Kahin, the Japanese did "not seem to have anticipated any real opposition from the nationalist leaders. They appeared to feel that they could exploit the resources of Indonesia for the benefit of their war effort without having to make concessions to Indonesian nationalism."± In Simalungun the nationalist organization Gerindo was banned and the nationalistically-inclined weekly newspapers of Siantar ceased publication. The Christian churches were subject to continual harrassment and their schools were taken over by the government. The Advisory Committee of the Simalungun division of the HKBP church was dissolved and its magazine Sinalsal (Hay) was banned.*^ Many prominent nationalist figures throughout East Sumatra, in cluding Saleh Umar and Jacub Siregar (PNI), Abdul Xarim M.S. (PKI) and Teuku Mohammad Hassan (later to become the first Hepublican governor of Sumatra) were arrested for antiJapanese activities.1^ After the first year of occupation the Japanese attitude toward the nationalist leaders began to change. Increasing numbers of Indonesians, needed for the war effort, were re cruited into such organizations as Heiho,1? a milltary-cumlabor auxiliary force of the Japanese Army, and Gyugun or?eta (an abbreviated acronym for Sukarela Tentara Pembela Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 137] === 124 Tanah Air, Volunteer Army of Defenders of the Fatherland), an army established for internal defense. Just how many youths in Simalungun received military or para-military training is not known, but the number was certainly consid erable. 60 Tahun Indjil Kristus di Simalungun. a history of the Christian church in the region, briefly mentions the existence of these organizations and states that “many /youths7 did not come back, because they died in battle.”1® The official history of the Revolution in North Sumatra, published by the Ministry of Information, asserted, doubtless with some exaggeration, that ”all the people were forced to drill and to know how to receive commands in a military manner.Ml9 The military atmosphere of the Occupation was in sharp contrast to the colonial period when even formal mili tary training was unavailable to most Indonesians in S imalungun/S iantar. In order to facilitate recruitment into their military organizations and to develop support in general for the war, the Japanese relied heavily on nationalist leadership and propaganda. The support of prominent East Sumatran national ist leaders was enlisted by offering them a role in the training of recruits. Kaid.jo Djikei Dan (Coastal and Sea Legion), for example, a unit designed to provide support troops for the Japanese in the coastal areas of East Sumatra, was apparently led almost entirely by former Gerindo leaders.20 As a result of this policy nationalist leaders were provided Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 138] === with a core of armed and trained supporters and national consciousness among the youth of the region increased markedly. On the latter point the Ministry of Information's official history reported that "Japanese militarism directed its propaganda most particularly to the younger generation of Indonesians. Nationalist agitation promoted by the Japanese found a place and a welcome in the heart and soul of the youth of Indonesia."21 And Madja Furba wrote, somewhat dra matically, that "Only the youth began to be conscious, to awake to know themselves and to depend upon their own power! Youth awakened."22 An opportunity for intensive nationalist indoctrination was provided by the creation of camps where specially selected youths were given intensive military training. In terms of the revolutionary and post-revolutionary leadership which it produced for Simalungun, perhaps the most important of these camps was TALA PSTA (Tanah Latihan Pemuda Tani, Training Field for Peasant Youth), located at Gunung Rintis in the East Sumatran regency of Deli/Serdang. TALA PETA provided a sort of advanced training for those who had shown leader ship capacity in the smaller camps and civil defense organi zations which had been established throughout East Sumatra. "The objective of TALA PETA was to create cadres who were disciples of Japan. Another intention of TALA PETA was to carry out preparations for a guerrilla organization which it was hoped would help the Japanese Army in the mountains Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 139] === 126 when and if the Allied army landed, that is a sort of total defense advance force which it was hoped by Japan could forge a pro-Japanese popular spirit in defense and s u p p l y.,,23 Only a few Japanese participated in the actual training, which was led by such prominent nationalist leaders as Saleh Umar, Jacub Siregar and Abdullah Jusuf who emphasized nationalist indoctrination and the techniques of guerrilla warfare. Many young men from Simalungun, particularly Simalungun Bataks, received training at TAIA PETA, where they became the nucleus of an armed guerrilla organization which was to play an important role in the impending revolution. At the mass level, one of the most important results of the policy of cooperation with Indonesian nationalism was that it permitted the widespread dissemination of nationalist ideas and popular identification with nationalist leaders throughout the archipelago. A principal instrument of this dissemination was the radio. "The Japanese considerably built up the archipelago's radio network, making sure that many of the villages and every city square had receiving sets....At prescribed hours the population was required to listen to their official broadcasts, including the frequent speeches of Sukarno.... *75 percent of their content was pure nationalism*."25 In Simalungun radio sets were mostly restricted to the wealthier Inhabitants of the towns (until it became clear that the Japanese were losing the war, at which point radios were confiscated), but were supplemented Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 140] === by loudspeakers (particularly on the plantations) and by word-of-mouth relating t>£ the content of nationalist speeches by itinerant merchants and other towns-people who maintained contact with the villages• The problem of Indonesian participation in the govern ment of the archipelago had been under consideration by the Japanese from at least early 19^3 • In June of that year Premier Tojo, in a speech bo the Japanese Diet, expressed the intention of taking "measures step by step envisaging the participation of the native population /T n Indonesia.7 in government to the extent commensurate with the degree of their ability, in the course of the year." Particular empha sis was given to Java "in view of the advanced conditions of the island and in response to the desire of the people there.1' ^ As a first step in the direction of increasing participation a Central Advisory Council (Chuo Sangi-in) was established in Djakarta on September 5th, with its members drawn largely from the ranks of the Moslem and secular nationalist leadership on Java. Local advisory councils were also created in Java, Sumatra and Borneo.2? By early 19^4 Indonesians in Simalungun/Siantar, as elsewhere, were becoming were losing the war. increasingly aware that the Japanese The steady thrust of the Allies from island to island in the Pacific was apparent from Japanese news repocts and from information brought back by returning Heiho. In April A l l i e d planes attacked the port of Sabang Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 141] === 128 in Atjeh, and in the following months raids were made on the oil tanks at Pangkalan Brandan, on the airfield in Medan 28 and on the port of Belawan near Medan, As the situation in the Pacific deteriorated, the de cision was made in Tokyo, announced on September 7, 1 9 ^, grant independence to Indonesia.^9 On March 1, 19^5 the Japanese intention to establish a Body for the Investigation of Indonesian Independence (Badan Penjelidlk Kemerdekaan Indonesia) was announced by the authorities in Java. The BPKI*s membership, which included secular nationalists, Moslem leaders, members of the traditional Javanese aristoc racy and several Chinese, was announced in April and shortly thereafter began discussions.3° In Sumatra a Central Advisory Council similar to the one created earlier in Java was established in Bukittinggi in June of 19^5* On the 25th of July, a Sumatran Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Independence was inaugurated in Bukittinggi, with a membership similar in its diversity to the BPKI on Java. To the author’s knowledge only one individual from Simalungun (Radja KallamsJah Sinaga, the radja of Tanah Djawa) served on the Sumatran Investigating Committee. Because of the shortness of time (the Japanese surrendered on August l^th, although they remained formally in authority in Sumatra until Allied troops arrived in October) and the difficulties of communication between Java and Sumatra and within Sumatra, neither of these bodies played Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 142] === 129 an important role in the events surrounding the capitulation of the Japanese and the onset of the Revolution.31 Revolution The Indonesian declaration of independence, proclaimed in Djakarta on August 17th, was not acted upon in North Sumatra for some weeks.32 Shortly before the declaration three Sumatrans, Abdul Abbas (South Tapanuli), Dr. Mohammad Amir (Minangkabau) and Teuku Mohammad Hassan (Atjeh)-^ had been appointed by their local military commanders to a new, all-Indonesian Committee for the Preparation of Independence and had been flown to Djakarta for the Committee's first session, scheduled to begin on August 19th. On the 2?th Hassan and Amir returned to North Sumatra with instructions to form a Republican government for Sumatra. Apparently fearful of an adverse Japanese reaction, they did not make their first move until September 17th, when a National Committee (Panitia Kebangsaan) was formed in Medan. On September 21st the Japanese in North Sumatra publicly announced their surrender to the Allies, stating that they were under instructions to maintain civil and military author ity in the region until the arrival of British troops. Des pite their instructions, the Japanese were hesitant to inter fere directly with the nationalist leaders. On October 3rd the independence declaration was made public and Hassan, the new Governor of Sumatra, began the formation of a cabinet. The next day Madja Purba, the highest ranking Indonesian Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 143] === official of the Japanese administration in Simalungun, re ceived a wire from the Governor requesting him to form a government in the regency. Shortly thereafter, in Purba*s words, "a Komite Nasional Kabupaten Simalungun /National Committee for the Regency of Simalungun/ was formed and a government was organized as required, complete with Offices as in the Japanese period, including Police (but not an army, because there was n o n e j. " ^ Purba*s task was simplified considerably by the fact that the Japanese, in the final days of the Occupation, had elevated Indonesians to newly created positions of nvice-head" of most important govern mental departments, thus creating a kind of embryonic Indonesian government which could easily be taken over by the Republic.35 Revolutionary activity in Simalungun lasted only until the first Dutch "police action" of July 2 9, 19*4-7, which re stored Dutch authority to the area until the transfer of sovereignty at the end of 19*4-9. The twenty-two months from September 19^5 to July 19^7 were a period of chaos, confusion and not a small degree of lawlessness in Simalungun. The traditional political order was destroyed and competition among armed youth-^ groups, many of which were independent of or only loosely controlled by the newly-established political parties and the Indonesian Army, served to under mine the fragile hold on the instruments of authority of the new Republican government of Simalungun. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 144] === In part the confusion stemmed, from the fact that the devolution in Simalungun began in a vacuum, without any pre existing leadership or organization which could command the allegiance of a majority of the population and channel the revolutionary fervor of the youth. Neither the traditional rulers nor the officials of the new government could fill this vacuum. The radja and lesser aristocrats (who in any event had no claim on the loyalties of non-Simalungun Bataks) had been discredited by years of cooperation with the Dutch and Japanese (and were considered by many to be "feudal" oppressors). Koreover, it was widely reported at the time of the Japanese surrender and the depublican takeover that several of the traditional rulers were organizing a reception committee for Allied troops and were arranging for food to be taken to the Dutch imprisoned in internment camps, thus further arousing the hostility of the revolutionaries.37 The new government of Simalungun consisted largely of rather colorless long-time administrators who, while capable of running a government, could not lead a revolution. Madja Furba, for example, was a 1932 graduate of the MOSVIA school for civil servants in Bukittinggi, had been employed by the Dutch government in Simalungun until 19^2 and had continued to work under the Japanese. He had not been active in the pre-war nationalist movement and (in 1963) did not even know who its leaders in the region had been. With the collapse of Japanese authority the traditional rulers and civil servants found themselves in a new and Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 145] === uncomfortable environment. The years 19^5-^6 saw a wide spread transformation of values throughout Indonesia, in which the popular conception of who had the right to govern shifted from the traditional aristocracy and the village elders to the young revolutionaries. In the eyes of large sections of the Simalungun public (particularly non-Simalungun Bataks in Lower Simalungun and P.Siantar), the militant revolutionary groups had as much or more claim to the legit imate exercise of power in the region as the civil bureauc racy, as it was the revolutionaries who possessed the special skills required for the creation and defense of an independ ent Indonesia. Even in remote villages it became common practice to address the young revolutionaries as bapak (father), an honorific used to denote the higher status of the person being addressed. The new government's ability to coordinate and oversee the activities of the revolutionary groups was thus severely attenuated by the special position of the latter as the chief bearers of the dominant revolu tionary values. Moreover, the government for a time had no armed forces beyond a small police force and was therefore powerless, even if it possessed the will, to impose itself on the armed youth. The first revolutionary acts of the youth involved the raising of the red and white national flag over government offices and private buildings in Siantar and elsewhere in the regency. The flag-raisings met with a lukewarm reception Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 146] === 133 from the government officials who wished to avoid a direct confrontation with the Japanese. There was, in fact, little resistance from the Japanese who similarly wished to avoid a clash with the youth. One flag-raising, however, on October 15th, precipitated the first revolutionary violence in Simalungun. In this incident a youth organization, the 3KPI (Badan Kebaktian Pemuda Indonesia. Body of the Service of Indonesian Youth), attempted to raise a flag over the central square of Siantar. According to the BKPI chairman, the flag-raisers and the organization*s nearby office were then fired upon by some Dutch officials and soldiers who were staying in the Siantar Hotel. A crowd quickly gathered at the hotel, some shots were exchanged and kerosene was poured on the building, which was then set afire. At this point the Japanese intervened and eventually the Dutch were evac uated to M e d a n. T h e Republican government of Simalungun, still in the process of being formed, took no action during the incident. The last few months of 19^5 and the beginning of 19^6 were a period of party and organization building in Simalungun, Apart from the Siantar Hotel affair there was no real con frontation between Indonesians and the Allied forces or the Dutch in the regency until the Dutch police action of 19^7. What fighting occurred in North Sumatra took place around Medan where the British (and later the Dutch) had established themselves. Simalungun was essentially a staging area, a Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 147] === supply depot and a recruiting ground for revolutionaries who took part All four in the fighting in the Medan Area. of the major political parties in post-inde pendence Simalungun— PNI, PKI, Masjumi and Parkindo— emerged during the early revolutionary period. Party organization at this time was minimal and concentrated at the regency level, and few attempts were made to enroll party members in the subdistricts and villages. Emphasis was placed in stead on guerrilla organization, and many revolutionaries served both as party and as guerrilla leaders. the circumstances important. Because of of the period the latter role was the more The party leadership*s tasks were to provide political guidance to their affiliated youth groups and to provide liaison between the youth and the government. cause of communication problems each party was more or less autonomous of its parent organization on Java throughout the Bevolution. The most important guerrilla organizations in Simalungun were Napindo. Barisan Harlmau L i a r, Barlsan Merah and Pesindo. Napindo (Nasional Pelopor Indonesia, Indonesian National Pioneers) was led for the most part by the former PartindoGerindo leaders of the 1930s (by late 19^5 most of these Individuals had joined the new PNI). Napindo*s members were mostly Javanese plantation workers, although the organization also included North and South Tapanuli Bataks. Its role in Simalungun was to provide troops and supplies for the Medan Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 148] === Area front, and its strength was heavily concentrated in Lower Simalungun. Barisan Harimau Liar (Wild Tiger Legion), with branches throughout East Sumatra, was based on the nucleus of revolutionaries who had been trained at TAIA PETA during the Japanese occupation. A combat rather than a supply organization, its membership in the regency was con centrated in Upper Simalungun and its leaders were Simalungun Bataks who had been at TALA PETA. Barisan Merah (Red Legion), affiliated with the PKI, included Javanese and North Tapanuli Bataks in its membership and was strongest in the plantation areas. Pesindo (Pemuda Soslalis Indonesia. Indonesian Socialist Youth) was apparently a kind of umbrella organiza tion for a variety of revolutionary groups in Simalungun who had no affiliation with a political party. Regency-level leaders had only loose control over groups calling themselves Presindo in all parts of the regency. In 19^-6-47 many of Pesindo*s constituent units broke with the organization and joined the PNI, PKI or the Indonesian Army. four organizations the Moslem G P U Besides these (Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia. Indonesian Islamic Youth Movement) and Hiz*bullah. both of which were affiliated with the Masjumi political party, were of some importance in the towns of Lower Simalungun. Among the North Tapanuli Christians, particularly along the road to Parapat, Parkindo’s Barisan Parkindo was also influ ential. In Pematangsiantar the earliest organizations were the above-mentioned BKPI and the BPI (Barisan Pemuda Indonesia. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 149] === 136 Indonesian Youth Legion), affiliated with a Medan organiza tion of the same name and led in Siantar by Sumarno Hasibuan, a journalist and former Partindo-Gerindo leader, and Eicardo Siaihaan, who was soon to become the commander of the Indonesian A r m y ’s 3rd Hegiment (Fourth Division) in S i m a l u n g u n. 3 9 Within a few months these organizations were succeeded by iPesindo (which enrolled many of the former JBKPI and BPI leaders and followers) and T j a p Rantai (Chain Brand), whose leadership (mostly North Tapanuli Batak) in cluded a wide variety of Communists and crypto-Communists, nationalists and unemployed youth spoiling for a fight, Barisan Parkindo had a large following among the more moder ate North Tapanuli Bataks, The second major outbreak of revolutionary violence in Simalungun was the East Sumatran Social Revolution of 19^6.^® On the night of March 3rd four Simalungun radja (Raja, Purba, Pane and Silimakuta) and many lesser officials and members of their families were assassinated. The radja of Dolok Silau was protected by his subjects and escaped assassination, as did the radja of Siantar and Tanah Djawa who were in Siantar city at the time. Although the Social Revolution was directed primarily'against the traditional aristocracy, also affected civil servants, doctors and other conspicuously well-to-do and Westernized individuals. What were the causes of the Social Revolution in Simalungun and who took part in it? From interviews and other Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 150] === 13? accounts of the event it is clear (as we indicated above) that by 19*1-6 there was widespread popular resentment and hostility toward the aristocracy. The Social Revolution was not, however, a popular uprising or a spontaneous expression of mass hatred. Rather it was a well-planned, carefully exe cuted series of assassinations organized by a few armed youth groups and carried out almost entirely in the course of one night. The identity of the specific groups and indi viduals who participated in the Social Revolution is still unclear because of the secrecy which surrounded it and the reluctance of the participants to talk about the period. The consensus of opinion among informants who were attive revolutionaries or civil servants at the time was that the most important role in both the planning and execution of the Social Revolution in Simalungun was played by Barisan Harimau Liar; pro-Communist and other youth groups were probably also involved, particularly in Lower Simalungun. The motives of these groups apparently stemmed from their concept of the goals of the Revolution and the kind of society which should be established in the post-revolutionary period; nationalist indoctrination at TAIA PETA had stressed theoevils of "feudalism*’ and the necessity of its destruction in order to achieve a just and prosperous s o c i e t y. E v e n before their exposure to nationalist ideology in the Japanese camps, Simalungun youths had become increasingly dissatisfied with their inability to improve their social status through Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 151] === 138 the normal routes of advancement in colonial society and attributed the lack of social mobility to the traditional aristocracy as much as to Dutch colonialism, as we suggested in Chapter III. Their experiences during the Japanese oc cupation and the fact that none of the radja declared them selves in favor of independence from the Dutch in the last months of 19^ 5 * only served to increase the hostility of the youth. Of no less importance as a motivating factor was the attempt to use the Social Revolution as an opportunity to balas dendam (take revenge) against particular members of the aristocracy. Saragih Has, the leader of BHL in Simalungun and the son of a village had in Tiga Has on Lake Toba (and thus a lesser aristocrat himself), was said to have had a personal grudge against the radja of Pane, and it was re ported that several other members of BHL had similar grudges. Finally, any attempt to assess the causes of the Social Revolution must take into account the patterns of conflict in the broader arena of Ea£t Sumatran politics. The distri bution of positions of authority under the Republican govern ment, headed by such moderate politicians and officials as Teuku Mohammad Hassan at the provincial level, Dr. Gindo Siregar at the Residency level and Madja Purba in Simalungun, was strongly opposed by radical nationalist and Communist leaders such as Saleh Umar and Jacub Siregar (PNI), Abdul Xarim M.S. and Luat Siregar (PKI), and the organizations, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 152] === such as BHL, Napindo and Barisan Merah, which ‘t hey headed. The Social Revolution throughout Bast Sumatra was coordinated and directed by these men and greatly enhanced their power and that of their allies at the local level, at least for a time, vis-a-vis the officials of the Republican government. A n immediate result of the Social Revolution was a hardening of the lines of cleavage in Simalungun, not only within the ethnic Simalungun community (which was divided between those who were pro- and those who were anti-BHL), but in the larger society as well. Differences and conflicts among the various revolutionary groups in the region were perhaps inevitable. A large number of organizations existed and there were great disparities among them in terms of financial support and the availability of weapons and supplies. Ethnic, religious and/or ideological diversity contributed further to the potentialities for conflict. From the beginning of the Revolution there had also been considerable mutual distrust and suspicion between the rad ical revolutionaries and more moderate elements in the local political leadership. In part this distrust stemmed from the fact that moderates and radicals measured each other in terms of different conceptions of status. The moderates, some of whom were active in party and organization politics and others not, were found most often in the ranks of the civil servants, professionals (ministers and other religious leaders, teachers, doctors), and local entrepreneurs. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Many === [PDF page 153] === of them were graduates of or had at least been exposed to advanced Dutch schools, were somewhat Westernized and had achieved positions of respectability in the pre-war world. The civil servants of this group had not participated in the nationalist movement during the colonial period and on the whole tended to take a wait-and-see attitude toward the Revolution; while not in favor of a return of Dutch power (it would have meant demotion for many of them), they were reluctant in the unclear political situation of 19b5-^6 take any positive action which might have unpleasant conse quences. Other moderates, however, such as the leaders of the Moslem educational and social organizations who became active in Masjumi and the North Tapanuli Christians who led Parkindo, were firmly committed to the nationalist cause. The revolutionary youths, in contrast to the moderates, had on the whole little formal education, spoke no Dutch and were far removed socially from the world of the pre-war Siantar elite. They were imbued with revolutionary fervor and determined to strike out against the returning Dutch and those Indonesians whom they felt to be sympathetic to the Dutch. In their eyes the moderates were tldak konsekwen (not consistent, i.e. not willing to make sacrifices for the Revolution); the moderates, on the other hand, tended to dismiss the youth as mere avonturiers (adventurers). Where the one group was most concerned with the maintenance of order, the other wanted to make a revolution. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 154] === In the wake of the Social Revolution, the radical youths vastly increased their influence in East Sumatran politics.^3 In April the PKI leader Luat Siregar became the East Sumatran Resident and the Tjap Rantai leader Urbanus Pardede, a Communist journalist of the 1930s who had been exiled to Digul, became regent of Simalungun. Pardede named his pred ecessor Assistant Regent and turned over all routine adminis trative matters to him, concentrating his own energies on the Siantar economy, of which he became the czar. All goods sold in Siantar went through the organization which he established, ERRI (Ekonomi Rakjat Republik Indonesia. People's Economy of the Republic of Indonesia), the profits from which were ap parently used to finance the youth groups which supported him.^ Pardede*s czardom was short-lived. His policies aroused the active hostility of several organizations of the region, especially Parkindo and the Siantar Pesindo. These groups secured the assistance of the recently organized Republican army (Tentara Reoublik Indonesia. Ar m y of the Republic of I n d o n e s i a ) w h o s e East Sumatran commander arrested Pardede in May. Some heavy fighting followed this action, in which Parkindo and Pesindo were allied with the TRI against Tjap Rantai (PNI-affiliated groups apparently remained neutral). The Army commander then reappointed Madja Purba as Regent, an action which was subsequently approved by the Republican government in Medan. At the East Sumatran level Luat Siregar was also removed from his post as Resident. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 155] === Although complete order was never achieved, either in Simalungun/Siantar or in East Sumatra as a whole, the Pardede affair was the last major internal crisis faced by the Republican g o v e r n m e n t T h e r e mental reorganization. followed a period of govern The provincial government moved its headquarters from Medan (part of which was under Dutch con trol) to Siantar. Following the destruction of the tra ditional kingdoms, Simalungun was divided on the Javanese pattern into four districts (kewedanaan, headed by a w e d a n a ) and seventeen subdistricts (ketjamatan. headed by a tjamat). The new subdistricts were based on the districts of the colonial period with the exceptions of the district of Pane proper, which was divided into subdistricts Pane and Dolok Pardamalan, and the kingdoms of Purba and Silimakuta, which had not been divided into districts in the colonial period and now became subdistricts. Both the regency and city governments were headed by a single regent (b u patl). whose position was equivalent to that of the former Assistant Resident. The regent was appointed by the governor of Sumatra, while the wedana were appointed by the Resident of East Sumatra and the t jamat were elected by delegates from each village in their subdistrict plus delegates from each political party and armed organization. In general these elections were monopolized by the revolu tionary groups (especially the P N I ), which had the advantage of organization and high status as the bearers of revolutionary Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 156] === values and the vanguard of the new Indonesia. The new tjamat were thus men who had acquired their governmental positions through revolutionary leadership and had little in common with the aristocracy which had preceded them or with the professional civil servants in Siantar. Negara Sumatera Timur**'? On July 30th, 19^7 Dutch troops attacked Simalungun. After sporadic fighting the revolutionaries and many Republican government officials fled the regency, regrouping in Tapanuli where they formed a Republican Government of the Regency of Simalungun in exile. A sizable group of civil servants, teachers and others elected to stay in Simalungun and accept employment from the Dutch government. In some areas of the regency, particularly in Upper Simalungun, a scorched-earth policy was carried out by the retreating forces and whole villages were burned to the ground. After several months of Dutch occupation a State of East Sumatra (Negara Sumatera T i m u r ) was formed as a part of the Dutch attempt to submerge the Sukarno-Hatta-led Republic in a federal union whose member states could be controlled or heavily influenced by the Dutch. Support for and partici pation in this enterprise was secured from what remained of the traditional aristocracy and others.^9 The regency of Simalungun became an onderafdeling (subdivision) of NST and its new government was headed by a Dutch Assistant Resident. Shortly before the transfer of sovereignty in December 19^9 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 157] === 14^ the Assistant Resident was replaced by an Indonesian in order to lend credence to the Dutch position that NST was not a puppet state. Although Indonesians of all ethnic groups remained in Simalungun after the Dutch takeover and worked for the new government, only those Simalungun Bataks who supported the claims of the traditional aristocracy were strongly com mitted to NST. Among most members of other ethnic groups, opposition to NST, rooted in a number of factors, was pro found. North Tapanuli Bataks and Javanese on and around the plantations, for example, feared that a continuation of Dutch influence in the region would facilitate the efforts of European plantation owners to reclaim land which they had been using since the Japanese occupation, South Tapanuli Moslems were opposed on religious grounds, and Simalungun Batak ex-revolutionaries feared reprisals under a regime controlled by the aristocrats. None of these groups had any reason to support the traditional aristocracy which had been from the beginning the mainstay of the Dutch-imposed regime. Finally, not least Important as a factor in the widespread opposition to NST was the deeply-held commitment to independ ence from colonial rule within the framework of the Indonesian Republic proclaimed in 19^5Without broad backing and under pressure from the re turning revolutionaries who held mass demonstrations in cities and towns throughout East Sumatra in late 19^9 and Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 158] === early 1950*^°NST could not endure after the Dutch props which had created it were removed. On May 13th, 1950 the NST government in Medan agreed to its incorporation into a uni tary state,51 and on August 15th, two days before the fifth anniversary of the proclamation of independence, Simalungun again became a part of the Republic of Indonesia. Conclusions The events which we have described in this chapter played a critical role in the development of political organization and leadership in Simalungun/Siantar. The ethnic, religious and socio-economic cleavages which had formed during the colonial period found their first political expression in the organizat_on of parties and armed youth groups during the Revolution. Notable examples of ethnic-religious organizations of the period were Parkindo (Protestant Christian and largely North Tapanuli Batak, although some Simalungun Bataks in Upper Simalungun also became Parkindo supporters), Partai Katholik (Roman Catholic and Simalungun Batak in Upper Simalungun, North Tapanuli Batak in Siantar city) and Masjumi (Moslem and predominantly South Tapanuli Batak). Secular ideologies which denied the relevance of ethnic and religious cleavages were represented chiefly by the PNI and PKI and their guerrilla organizations, whose support during the Revolution was strongest among the Javanese and North Tapanuli 3atak workers and squatters on the plantations but could be found in other parts of the region as well. The existence Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 159] === of organizations such as Barisan Harimau Liar, whose ideology was pan-Indonesian nationalism but whose membership was drawn almost exclusively from one ethnic group, suggests the complexity of the relationship between ethnicity and ostensibly non-ethnic ideologies and parties, a point which shall be developed further in the following chapters. At another level of analysis, at least three types of political leaders may be distinguished as of the time of the transfer of sovereignty. First, the traditional aristocracy among the Simalungun Bataks, although weakened in prestige and power during the years of colonial rule and occupation and finally ousted from its position of authority as a re sult of the Social Revolution of 19H-6, retained considerable support within the ethnic community and would be heard from again in the 1950s. The second group of leaders, the moderates, was made up of civil servants, professional men and local entrepreneurs. Their distinguishing characteristics were a measure of oc cupational and educational status, an incrementalist attitude toward social change and an opposition to the more violent and irresponsible actions of the youths. The moderate group was multi-ethnic; some of its members were non-party, while others joined organizations such as Masjumi and its affiliates, Parkindo, Partai Katholik, PSI and to some extent Pesindo and PNI. Although few members of this group opposed the Revolu tion, the depth of their commitment varied greatly. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 160] === The radical revolutionaries, our third leadership group, were in large measure children of the Japanese oc cupation, during which they had received military training and ideological indoctrination. The revolutionary group was also multi-ethnic, including Simalungun Bataks (in BHL), Javanese (in Napindo, Barisan Merah, Pesindo and other or ganizations ), North Tapanuli Bataks (most notably in TJap Rantai) and members of other ethnic groups as well. Their distinguishing features were a desire for a transformation of political and social life going far beyond the mere trans fer of sovereignty, a preference for militant revolutionary action and a relative lack of pre-war educational or oc cupational status. The line between the radical revolution aries and the moderates, although often blurred in the case of particular individuals, was drawn most sharply at the time of the Social Revolution and the Pardede affair. During the years 19^5-19^7 the widespread acceptance of nationalistic and revolutionary values as prerequisites to successful nation-building and policy-making thrust the radical revolutionaries into a position of prominence. Nith the transfer of sovereignty and the restoration of order in the region, the influence of the radicals declined and fchat of the moderates (some of whom had held governmental positions since the 1930s) increased. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the different points of view embraced by the two groups have provided a major source of tension and conflict among the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 161] === 148 various political parties and between some parties and the (mostly non-party) government officials of the region. This chapter concludes our examination of socio political change in Simalungun/Slantar with the establishment of the unitary Republic of Indonesia in 1950. This is not to argue that social change ended in 1950, but rather that the cleavages and conflicts of the local social and politi cal environment within which the politicians of contemporary Indonesia would operate had assumed their essential form. The post-revolutionary period is largely a story of the political parties and other nationally-oriented power centers (of which the Army has. been the most important), their attempts to secure influence and/or mass support in the region, their responses to and interaction with the local environment, and the effects of these activities on the integration of the region into the national political system. It is to this subject that we turn in Part Two. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 162] === PART TWO CONTEMPORARY POLITICS IN SIMALUNGUN/SIANTAR Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 163] === CHAPTER V THE PAHTY SYSTEM AND THE GOVERNMENTAL PHOCESS The regency of Simalungun and the municipality of Pematangsiantar are administrative subdivisions of the Republic of Indonesia, Local political life in the region, whether it involves the decision-making processes of local govern ment or the nature and characteristics of the local party system, is intimately bound up with, influencing and influ enced by, the national political process. Accordingly, we begin Part Two with a discussion of the development of the national party system before turning to an analysis of the parties in Simalungun/Siantar. Political Parties in Indonesia With the successful completion of the revolution for national independence, Indonesia’s political leaders and party politicians turned their attention to the struggle for control of the government of their new nation. In 1950 Indonesia became a constitutional democracy and a unitary state* two events which have had a profound impact on the development of the party system. Constitutional democracy and the prominent position it gave to the new Parliament (pewan Perwakilan R a k j a t, People’s Representative Council) 150 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 164] === encouraged the proliferation of political parties and assured them an important place in the national political process. In the first (appointed) Parliament "no less than 22 parties, organizations and parliamentary associations were represented. National elections for a Parliament and Constituent Assembly, whose seats were to be distributed on the basis of proportional representation, provided a further stimulus to party growth and the extension of party branches to all parts of the country. The years 1954-55* immediately preceding the elections, were a period of intense campaigning through out the archipelago. Pour parties emerged from the elections as major forces in the national scene: PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia. Indonesian Nationalist Party), with 22.3% of the vote; Masjumi (originally an abbreviation of Madjelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia. Council of Indonesian Moslem Associations) with 20.9%; NU (Nahdatul U l a m a. Moslem Teachers* Party) with 18.4%; and PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia. Indonesian Communist Party) with 16.4%. A further twenty-four parties and other organizations (with from 2.9% to 0.1% of the vote) were able to win one or more parliamentary seats.^ With the rejection of the Dutch-imposed federal Republic of the United States of Indonesia and the establishment of the unitary state, formal decision-making power in Indonesia was highly centralized in national-level governmental insti tutions such as the DPR and the central ministries. Indonesian politics became in large measure Djakarta politics. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 165] === 152 The chief goal of the political parties was thus to acquire a strong position in the DPR, from which most other benefits, and especially control of the various ministries and of bureaucratic patronage, flowed. In 1959 constitutional democracy in Indonesia succumbed to Demokrasi Terpimpln (Democracy with Leadership or Guided Democracy), a Sukarno-Army dominated power structure which sharply curtailed the role of Parliament and thus the influ ence of most political parties (the PKI being a notable ex ception) in national politics. Presidential Edict No. 7 of 1959 (“on the requirements and simplification of the parties")^ further shook the party system. To be permitted to exist, each party was required (1) to maintain branches in onefourth of the first and second level self-governing regions and (2) to officially declare its support of the return to the Constitution of 19^5 (which gave the President a much stronger and the Parliament a much weaker role than the 1950 Constitution), of the Pantja Sila as the foundation of the state, and of President Sukarno's Manifesto Poljtik as the basis of its program.^ All but ten parties were ultimately dissolved as a result of the edict, either because they were too small to fulfill the requirements of size or because they were unwilling to cooperate with the new order. In the former category were many small "personalistic" parties and parties of only ethnic and/or regional significance, while the latter group Included the largest Moslem party in Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 166] === Indonesia, Masjumi, and the small but influential PSI (Partai Sosialis Indonesia. Indonesian Socialist Party). It is customary to classify political parties in Indonesia by ideological orientation into two broad cate gories: (1) secular parties, represented in 1963-64 by the PNI, PKI, IPKI (Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia. Union of Supporters of Indonesian Independence), Partindo (Partai Indonesia. Indonesian Party), and Partai Murba (Proletarian Party); and (2) religious parties, represented by Parkindo (Partai Kristen Indonesia. Indonesian Christian Party), Partai Katholik (Catholic Party), NU, Perti (Persatuan Tarbl.1ah Islamljah. Islamic Educational Associa tion), and PSII (Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia. Islamic Association Party of Indonesia). This classificatory scheme, while overly simple as ap plied to politics in Simalungun/Siantar (as we shall see later on) is useful as a benchmark because it suggests the fundamentally different responses of various party elites to the problem of national integration. The secular parties, whose ideologies are based on variants of nationalism and/ or Marxism, deny the relevance of ethnic, cultural and religious cleavages for contemporary politics, condemning such cleavages as dysfunctional for the creation of a unified, modern nation. The Moslem parties (particularly NU and the now banned Masjumi), while similarly opposed to ethnic divisions, view the nation as a single Islamic community Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 167] === containing a few non-Islamic minorities. Their political goal is to make nation and ummat (the Moslem community) coterminous. The Christian parties, Parkindo and Partai Katholik, fit neither of these categories. As the repre sentatives of small (but, like the constituencies of the larger parties, ethnically diverse) minority groups, their raison d'etre is self-protection. For them, national inte gration is a function of the authoritative institutions of government within which conflicts are resolved or adjusted by bargaining among religious and other groups. Of the ten parties active in Indonesia in 1963-6^, the PNI perhaps comes closest in practice to the model of the secular integrative party. Throughout its history the PNI, more than any other party in Indonesia, has symbolized a revolutionary nationalism unrelated to any particular ethnic or religious group. During the colonial period the party was the principal vehicle of the nationalist movement in many parts of Indonesia (including Simalungun/Siantar, as was noted in Chapter III). Until recently it has been as sociated more closely than other parties with the figure of Sukarno, who was one of the leaders of the original PNI in the 1920s (but later disavowed partisan activity) and to whom the party owes its ideology of Marhaenism. For many Indonesians, as Sukarno is the personification of the nation alist movement so the PNI is its organizational expression. The party's Karhaenist ideology is an attempt to trans fer the elan and symbolism of the struggle against the Dutch Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 168] === 155 to the post-independence problems of nation-building. an analysis of the party system as of 1950, Herbert Feith described PNI ideology as follows:5 **PNI ideology was centered in the revolution. It was the formulation par excellence of the mood of nationalist political messianism characteristic of the old revolutionary fighters....^Marhaenism7 was a political creed stressing national unity and national culture and socialist or col lectivist economics. It affirmed the importance of demo cratic rights and opposed dictatorship, but condemned lib eralism and individualism, declaring them to be offshoots of capitalism. Based on an eclectic selection of ideas from Western and Asian nationalists, Western socialists, and traditional Indonesian social thought, Marhaenism re flected both the PNI's attachment to the symbols of the nationalist Revolution and the difficulties which the party faced in establishing a highest common factor of ideological orientation. ** In stressing national unity and national culture, Harhaenism specifically denies a legitimate role to ethnic and religious cleavages, and parties based on such cleavages, in Indonesian political life. The party's ideological appeal has thus been greatest among those, primarily Western-educated, Indonesians for whom nationalist values outweigh traditional ethnic and religious loyalties. Among the leadership, es pecially at the regency/municipality, provincial and national levels, the national idea is certainly the most “common factor of ideological orientation." The PNI's strength has not, however, been due solely to its nationalist orientation. In East and Central Java, for example, where the bulk of party members and supporters are located, the PNI has been heavily supported by the traditional Javanese aristocracy, now entrenched in the lower echelons Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission. === [PDF page 169] === of the government bureaucracy, who react negatively to the worker-peasant oriented PKI and the religious parties but may have little awareness of or interest in the nationalist content of party ideology. Because its base is largest and most firmly established in Java, the PNI has become strongly identified on the national scene with the interests of this group. In terms of electoral support and party membership, the PNI is characterized by a greater ethnic and religious di versity than any other major party. The party had its greatest electoral success in 1955 among the ethnic Javanese, who accounted for 65»5% of the total PNI vote (the population of Bast and Central Java, the home of the ethnic Javanese, contains 6% of the total Indonesian population). In the non-Javanese provinces the party also managed to win support, however, registering 10% or more of the vote in eight of the thirteen non-Javanese electoral districts. Party membership figures, as reported at the Tenth Party Congress in 19&3» show the proportion of Javanese (defined as party members from East and Central Java) in the party to be somewhat greater than their proportion in the population as a whole (5^«^% of party membership compared to if-5.6% of total population).7 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 170] === TABLE 5-1 PNI VOTE AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VOTE IN EACH ELECTORAL DISTRICT Electoral District West Nusatenggara Central Java East Kalimantan East Java West Java Greater Djakarta South Sumatra North Sumatra West Kalimantan North and Central Sulawesi Maluku South Kalimantan East Nusatenggara South and Southeast Sulawesi Central Sumatra Source: P. 78. PNI Vote {%) 37.1 33.5 25.0 22.8 22.1 19.6 14.6 14.0 13.6 4.15 Feith, H., The Indonesian Elections of 1955. The Indonesian Communist Party, like the PNI, opposes traditional ethnic and religious divisions^ unlike the PNI, however, PKI ideology is phrased primarily in terms of class conflict (i.e., the proletariat and peasantry allied with elements of the "national bourgeoisie” in opposition to the forces of feudalism and imperialism and the "compradore bourgeoisie.” ).® At the same time, for tactical reasons, the PKI has stressed its adherence to nationalist slogans and symbols and, particularly in East and Central Java, has relied heavily on a blending of Marxist ideology with the traditional "folk religion" of the ethnic Javanese.9 PKI support in the 1955 elections was much less broadly distributed than the PNI vote. Of a total 6,176,914 PKI Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 171] === 158 votes, 4-,625,710 (7^»9%) were cast in the electoral districts of East and Central Java. In the remaining thirteen electoral districts, the PKI won 10^ or more of the vote in only four. TABLE 5-2 PKI VOTE AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VOTE IN EACH ELECTORAL DISTRICT Electoral District Central Java East Java South Sumatra Greater Djakarta West Java North Sumatra Central Sumatra West Nusatenggara East Kalimantan North and Central Sulawesi South Kalimantan West Kalimantan South and Southeast Sulawesi Maluku East Nusatenggara Source: p. 78. PKI Vote (%) 25.8 23.2 12.1 12.0 10.8 10.8 5*75 76 ^.39 2.13 l.it4 .45 Feith, H., The Indonesian Elections of 1955. Both the PNI and PKI thus drew the great majority of their votes from the same basic constituency, the Javanese abangan population, and were the chief competitors for the support of that constituency. Outside of East and Central Java the PKI and PNI have also tended to be the chief compet itors for the votes and support of certain groups in the population, notably the transmigrant Javanese, the detraditionalized and uprooted, the plantation workers and squatters and the more secular minded Moslems or Christians to be found Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 172] === in varying proportions in nearly every ethnic group, comparison of the above table with Table 5-1 shows that all four of the electoral districts (excluding East and Central Java) in which the PKI received 10$ or more of the vote (South Sumatra, Greater Djakarta, West Java and North Sumatra) were districts in wThich the PNI also received more than 10$ of the vote. (It is worth noting that, outside East and Central Java, the greatest concentration of ethnic Javanese Is in these four electoral districts). Com?at±snn of the two tables also shows, however, that the PNI*s support outside East and Central Java was much greater and more broadly distributed than that of the PKI. In the four districts cited above, for example, the PNI averaged 17*75# of the vote, while the PKI*s average was 11.4$. Moreover there were several districts in which PNI strength was not paralleled by support for the PKI: West Nusatenggara West Kalimantan (PNI-13.7#* PKI-1.8$) and North and Central Only in East Java (PNI-22.8$, PKI-23.2$) and Central Sumatra (PNI-2.7$, PKI-5.75#) did the PKI win mere votes than the PNI. Both the similarities and the differences in the patterns of PKI and PNI electoral support are largely explainable in terms of the socio-cultural divisions of Indonesia; in par ticular, they are related to the existence of two main polit ical cultures, the Javanese-aristocratic and the Islamicentrepreneurial. Of these two cultures Herbert Feith writes Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 173] === •’The first of these /the Javanese-aristocratic7, which is the political culture of the great majority of Javanese, was born of state organization in the wet-rice-agriculturebased inland empires of Java, of shallow Islamization, and of a long period of intensive Dutch impact, which produced enormous densities of population, a hoilowing out of the structures of social integration, and an incapacitation of entrepreneurship. The Islamic-entrepreneurial political culture is one whose adherents are far more dispersed and socially disparate. They include the santris of East and Central Java, members of distinct communities of thoroughly Islamic faith. And they also include most members of such ethnic groups as the Minangkabaus, the Achinese, the Bandjarese, and the Buginese, and smaller proportions of the members of numerous other ethnic groups. Historically this political culture is a product of the maritime commercial towns and states of coastal Sumatra, North Java, Kalimantan and Sulawesi, of thorough Islamization, of a relatively slight Dutch impact, and of the revival of entrepreneurship in the present century. "Between these two political cultures as they existed in 19^-9 there were major differences of emphasis. It was not only that the one was contemptuous of economic pursuits and the other respectful, that the one was associated with support for a secular or broadly theistic or pantheistic state and the other with support for a state based on Islam. In ad dition, Javanese-aristocratic political culture involved a greater intensity of anti-Dutch sentiment than did Islamicentrepreneurial and at the same time a less intense hostility to the Chinese. Javanese-aristocratic political culture tended toward nativism, while Islamic-entrepreneurial was generally more raady to accept and incorporate influences stemming from the modern Nest. But Javanese-aristocratic political culture was far more fully sympathetic to socialist ideas than Islamic-entrepreneurial." The ideologies of the PNI and PKI have had their greatest appeal among adherents to the Javanese-aristocratic political culture, the ethnic Javanese of East and Central Java and their brethren who have migrated to other parts of the archipelago. Beyond this base the appeal of the PNI and PKI (and the smaller secular parties) has been limited by the pervasive influence of the Islamic-entrepreneurial (in some areas the "Christian-entrepreneurial") political culture. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 174] === The relatively more successful penetration of the Outer Islands by the PNI may be attributed to a number of factors, among the most important of which has undoubtedly been the PNI's special position as the vanguard and the focus of the nationalist movement. To those Outer Islanders with a measure of Western education, direct experience with the material and psychological frustrations of the colonial period, and a predisposition to a secular rather than a religious view of politics, nationalism has provided the most dynamic and attractive ideology. T o such individuals the PNI has represented a more "natural" organizational framework for the expression of their demands and the redefinition of their identity than the internationalist, class struggleoriented PKI. The widely accepted view that the PKI is anti-religion has also contributed to its lack of acceptance. Many Outer Islanders, opposed to the idea of an Islamic state or religionbased political parties (or simply opposed to the domination of local political life by the religious leaders of their community), still c nsider themselves to be devout Moslems or Christians and have thus found the secular but not antireligion PNI more attractive than the atheistic PKI. Of perhaps equal importance is the fact that the process of "hollowing out" of such structures of social integration as the nuclear and extended family and the village*-and thus the emergence of widespread feelings of alienation, uprootedness Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 175] === 162 and social malaise— has not been nearly as extensive in the Outer Islands as in Java, Even In urban areas in the Outer Islands kinship and village organizations, adapted to the conditions of city life, continue to perform their traditional 11 functions with considerable effectiveness. In Java the Communists have been the principal beneficiary of the con ditions of malaise; the lesser importance of this factor in the politics of the Outer Islands has meant a correspondingly reduced role for the PKI there. Of the five secular parties active in 1963-64, only the PNI and PKI enjoyed extensive popular support. The three remaining secular parties— IPKI, Murba, and Partindo— consist for the most part of small groups of leaders in Djakarta and the provincial capitals whose political influence is related more to the patterns and exigencies of intra-elite competition than to their ability to mob3ril*ze significant elements of the populace. IPKI was formeil in 1954 under Army leadership for the purpose of contesting the parliamentary elections, in which it received 1.4% of the total vote. Over 80% of IPKI's votes were cast in the electoral district of West Java. Originally supported by (then) Col. A. H. Nasution and a prob able majority of army officers, it has in recent years become associated with anti-Nasution factions within the A r m y. 12 IPKI is strongly anti-Communist. Partai Murba was founded in 1948 under the leadership of Tan Kalaka, a former PKI leader and Comintern agent. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The === [PDF page 176] === party's ideology is said to be Marxist-Leninist although, as Feith points out, "the instructions which the party's leaders gave to their cadres...reflected much less of Marxism and Leninism than of an inchoate messianic r a d i c a l i s m. the 1955 elections Murba polled.5 % of the vote, with about 60% of its support coming from West Java. More recently ■ Murba has been associated with several important ministers reportedly close to President Sukarno. In 1965 it joined in an anti-PKI campaign, as a result of which it was banned. ^ Partindo (not to be confused with the pre-war party of the same name) is a left-wing nationalist party established with President Sukarno's support by a PNI splinter group in 1953. Partindo has been unable to build a mass following and In the regions has had little success in its attempts to re cruit dissident PNI members. In national politics Partindo follows closely the PKI lead. Of the religious parties active in 1963-6^ Nahdatul Ulama had the largest following among adherents to the santri or Islamic-entrepreneurial political culture. Originally an educational and social organization, Nahdatul Ulama was founded in 1926 as a conservative reaction to the modernist Muhammadi.1ah religious organization and the politicallyoriented Sarekat Islam (Islamic Association). Modernist Islam in Indonesia was a development of the early twentieth century, based on the Islamic reform movement of Sgypt and India whose proponents found a receptive audience among the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 177] === 16^ growing merchant class of the coastal towns. The modernists sought a reformation of Islam that would cleanse it of nonIslamic local accretions and enable it to meet the challenges of Western science and technology.15 Muhammad1jah was the principal organizational expression of the modernist movement (particularly in Java), while NU represented the kolot (oldfashioned) syncretistic variant of Indonesian Islam. Feith writes, the NU ‘'stood opposed to too fast an accom modation of Moslem social regulation to the demands of modern life. At the same time it fended off many of the reformers' attacks on what they regarded as accretions to pure Moslem doctrine and practice. Thus it defended what was in fact the mainstream of Javanese Islam, an amalgam of Islamic beliefs with the earlier Hindu and pre-Hindu beliefs of Java.” 16 NU's greatest strength has been among the traditional syncretistic kiai (Islamic scholars) of rural Java,while Muhammadijah draws the bulk of its membership from the santri of Java's commercial towns. Opposition to the Dutch and to secular political organ izations led to increasing cooperation between NU and Huhammadijah, and in 1937 they established a federation of Islamic organizations, the MIAI (Great Islamic Council of Indonesia)In 19^3 Muhammadi3ah and NU became the prin cipal constituent organizations of Masjumi, the Japanesesponsored successor to MIAI. Cooperation between the two groups within Masjumi (reorganized as a political party during Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 178] === 165 the Revolution) continued until 1952, when NU left Masjumi and became a separate political party. NU's principal base of support has been in rural East and Central Java. In 1955 73»9/& of the NU vote came from these two districts. Beyond this base, the party received 10?b or more of the vote in four electoral districts. TABLE 5-3 NU VOTE AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VOTE IN EACH ELECTORAL DISTRICT Electoral District South Kalimantan East Java Central Java Greater Djakarta South and Southeast Sulawesi East Kalimantan West Java West Nusatenggara West Kalimantan South Sumatra Central Sumatra North Sumatra North and Central Sulawesi East Nusatenggara Maluku Source: p. 78. NU Vote (%) 48.6 34.1 19.6 15.7 14.3 10.7 1.57 Feith, H., The Indonesian Elections of 1955. In contrast to NU's predominantly rural base, Masjumi received much of its electoral support in Java from the Muhammadi jah-aff iliated santri of the commercial t o m s and villages located close to urban centers. Its supporters were also much more widely distributed throughout the archipelago; only 25.4$ of Masjumi voters lived in East and Central Java, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 179] === and the party won 10% or more of the vote in all of the re maining thirteen electoral districts. TABLE 5-4 MASJUMI VOTE AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VOTE IN EACH ELECTORAL DISTRICT Electoral District Masjumi Vote (%) Central Sumatra S outh Sumatra South and Southeast Sulawesi North Sumatra Maluku Nest Kalimantan South Kalimantan Nest Java Greater Djakarta East Kalimantan North and Central Sulawesi West Nusatenggara East Nusatenggara East Java Central Java Source: P. 78. 50.7 43.1 40.0 36.4 33.2 31*9 26.4 26.0 21.1 13.9 11.2 10.0 Feith, H., The Indonesian Elections of 1955. The broad distribution of the Masjumi vote, contrasting so markedly with the Java-centered support for NU, may be largely explained in terms of the modernist-kolot split in contemporary Indonesian Islam. For East and Central Java, this Is already clear from the foregoing discussion; its application to the Outer Islands should perhaps be discussed in greater detail. Modernist Islam, because of its emphasis on hard work, self-determination of o n e ’s position in life as opposed to fatalistic acceptance, and a strict separation of the religious and secular aspects of life,1® has had its Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 180] === 167 greatest appeal in the Outer Islands among the rapidly growing group of Moslem traders and entrepreneurs. As the emerging commercial classes of sixteenth and seventeenth century European towns turned to Protestantism to free them selves from feudal restrictions, so the Outer Island Moslems were concerned to develop a religious ethic which would be suited to their position and ambitions and which would re lease them from domination by the traditional aristocracy. These individuals were at first concentrated in the coastal towns but, as communications improved and the commercial net work became more complex (especially in Sumatra), modernist influences also spread to the interior. Masjumi, as the political party most closely representing the interests of the merchants and religious reformers, was thus the Mnatural,‘ party of a large segment of the Outer Island Moslem community. Besides the merchants and modernists, however, there is a sizable group of Moslems in the Outer Islands who are roughly parallel to the kolot santri of Java. Nearly every major ethnic group in Indonesia has felt the tension between those who prefer a more syncretistic Islam tied to the tra ditional authority structure and those who want to purify Islam, and reduce the influence of the adat. Why, then, since the latter group generally gave its support to Masjumi, did not the traditionalist element support NU? Depending upon the particular electoral district, there are clearly different answers which can be given to this question. In a broad Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 181] === sense, however, the relative lack of NU support outside of Java may perhaps be traced to the fact that traditional Islamic groups have been unable to develop an overarching, supra-ethnic sense of community among themselves. The var ious modernist groups, though ethnically diverse, have shared a common occupation-based culture in the coastal towns of Java, Sumatra, Borneo and the Celebes and a well-developed communications network. The traditionalist group© on the other hand share only a common opposition to modernism, and are divided by cultural differences and irregular communica tions. The sense of community enjoyed by the modernists gave Masjumi an organizational advantage; the relative ab sence of its counterpart among the more traditional Moslems hats set up a powerful barrier to united political action and organization. In some areas outside of Java, Islamic parties similar to NU in terms of theology and the kolot-modernist division have been established on a fairly limited territorial basis. One such party is Perti, founded in 1928 as a religious and educational organization in the Minangkabau region of the present province of West Sumatra. In the 1955 elections Perti received 1.3# of the vote, over 7Q# of which was in the electoral district of Central Sumatra (which included Minangkabau). The final Moslem party is PSI I. which split from Masjumi in 19^ 7. The PSII, Feith writes, "was not distinguished by Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 182] === a particular position on religious issues or by a particular view of current policy problems. Although it obtained the loyalty of local religious groups in certain of the areas where its prewar forerunner ^Sarekat Islam7 had been strong, its national strength was not comparable to that of the Masjumi.PSII's 1955 vote was 2.9# of the total vote cast, with its greatest strength in North and Central Sulawesi (22.9# of the total district vote), South and Southeast Sulawesi (10.3%) and South Sumatra (10.2#). In all other regions it won less than 6# of the vote. Of the two Christian parties the Protestant Parkindo is the largest, having polled 2.6# of the vote in the parlia mentary elections. At the national level Parkindo is es sentially a coalition of the several widely-dispersed Protestant communities in Indonesia, including the North Tapanuli Bataks in the electoral district of North Sumatra, the Ambonese in Maluku, the ninahasans in North and Central Sulawesi, the Toradja in South and Southeast Sulawesi and the Timorese in East Nusatenggara. In all five of these districts Parkindo obtained more than 10# of the vote. In no other district did it win more than 2%. The largest bloc of Parkindo votes came from the Christians of North Sumatra, who contributed 29# of the slightly more than one million votes obtained by the party. The second largest bloc came from East Nusatenggara (20%) and the third largest from North and Central Sulawesi (1^-#). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 183] === South and Southeast Sulawesi and Maluku contributed 12% and 11% respectively to the party's total vote, with the re maining 14% distributed among the four electoral districts of Java and the district of South Kalimantan TABLE 5-5 PARKINDO VOTE AS A PERCENTAGE OP TOTAL VOTE IN FIVE ELECTORAL DISTRICTS Electoral District Maluku North and Central Sulawesi East Nusatenggara North Sumatra South and Southeast Sulawesi Source: p. 79. Parkindo Vote (%) 32.8 19.1 18.04 13.6 10.6 Feith, H., The Indonesian Elections of 1955. Nithout hope of becoming a major national party (of a total Indonesian population of over one hundred million there are approximately three million Protestants), Parkindo's policies are directed toward protection of religious freedom and articulation of the interests of the various ethnic groups in the party. As Outer Islanders, these groups have a common interest in governmental decentralization, as producers for commercial markets they desire a minimum of restrictions on economic activity, and as representatives of the Protestant religious community they are united against an expansion of Communist power and influence. Finally, Partai Katholik has an even smaller base (there are slightly more than one million Indonesian Roman Catholics) Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 184] === than Parkindo. In 1955 Fartai Katholik won 2.0% of the vote, with its greatest strength in East Nusatenggara (40.7% of the votes in that district, representing 5 9 *6% of the total Partai Katholik vote). In no other electoral district did the party win as much as 6% of the vote. Partai Katholik*s policies have been similar to those of Parkindo. TABLE 5-6 PARTAI KATHOLIK VOTE AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VOTE IN FIVE ELECTORAL DISTRICTS Electoral District Partai Katholik Vote (%) 40.7 East Nusatenggara Maluku East Kalimantan North and Central Sulawesi North Sumatra Source: P. 79- 5.61 2.41 2.26 Peith, H., The Indonesian Elections of 1955. Slmalungun/Siantar: The Party System and the Local Governmental Process In 1963-64 eight parties maintained branches in Simalungun/Siantar: PNI, PKI, IPKI, Partindo, Partai Murba, NU, Parkindo and Partai Katholik. In terms of formal organ izational structure, all eight parties are essentially simi lar, with branches at each sub-national level of governmental administration from the province to the village. Simalungun each party branch (generally called tjabang) is further divided into sub-branches (anak tjabang) corresponding to the government's subdistricts, which are in turn sub divided into village-level ranting ("twigs"). In Siantar Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 185] === 172 city,where there are no subdistricts, most parties maintain only tJabang and ranting organizations. The reorganization of party branches and the formation of new parties in the region began with the transfer of sovereignty at the end of 1949. Organizational consolidation and expansion and the dissemination of party propaganda in tensified greatly during the 1954-55 election campaign, with only the most remote villages left untouched by partisan appeals. The elections were contested in the region by a total of 48 parties and other associations of voters, many of which were purely ethnic or regional organizations or the personal followings of locally prominent individuals. The election results showed that the appeal of these latter groups to the voters of the region was -light, with the ex ception of the ethnic Simalungun Batak organization KRSST (Kebangunan Rakjat Simalungun Sumatera Timur, The Awakening Simalungun People of Bast Sumatra) which won 8.3# of the regency vote. Of the four major national parties three— PNI, PKI, and Masjumi— won a total of 61.4# of the vote in Simalungun regency. Together with the nationally small but influential Parkindo their vote was 77.6# of the total. Siantar city Masjumi, Parkindo and PNI, with 81.5# of the vote, dominated the elections. In the absence of elections since 1955 it is difficult to measure with any precision the relative strengths of the parties as of 1963-64. Personal observations, extended Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 186] === TABLE 5-7 THE 1955 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN SIMALUNGUN/8IANTAR ?arty SIMALUNGUN Vote {%) PNI PKI Parkindo Masjumi KHSST Partai Buruh PSI Partai Katholik AKRA? S.T. G. Pentakosta Other Total SIANTAR Party Vote (%) Mas jumi Parkindo PNI PKI KRSST Partai Katholik Partai Buruh PSI Other 17.9 16.2 16.1 38.3 29.3 13.9 100.0 (191,452) Total 100.0 (1 6,6 0 5 ) Source: Adapted from Pemerintahan Daerah Tkt. II S imalungun, Daftar: Perhitungan hasi!2 pemungutan suara dalam daerah Kabupaten Simalungun/Pemi1ihan Anggota Dewan Perwakilah Rakjat. Sept. £9. 1955* Partai Buruh (Labor Party); AKRAP S.T. CAction of the Voting People of East Sumatra); Geredja Pentakosta (Pentecostal Church). conversations with party politicians, government officials and others, and numerous trips to villages in all parts of Simalungun indicate little change in eight years. Of the eight parties, only three have extensive popular support— PNI, PKI and Parkindo. Partindo, Murba and IPKI are parties with leaders but few followers, while Partai Katholik*s sup port is limited to the small minority of Roman Catholics in the area. NU has been unable to expand its base of support, even with the demise of Masjumi, whose followers (like those of KRSST) have for the most part withdrawn from the political scene since i9 6 0. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 187] === The role of the political parties in local government has varied considerably in the years since independence. fore 1957 party branch organizations played no formal role in local government. At the regency (kabuoaten) level the chief administrative official, the regent (bupati). was a member of the territorial civil service (pamong pradja) under the authority of the Ministry of Home Affairs and was ap pointed from Djakarta. Moreover, there were no regional legislatures or other governmental bodies in which the parties were represented and through which they might play a role in local decision-making. In 1957 a n e w law on regional government (Law No. 1 of 1957 “on the fundamentals of regional government *’) established first- and second-level self-governing regions corresponding to the former provinces and regencies/municipalities.^0 Simalungun and Siantar, formerly under one regent, had been separated in 1956 and each was now given the status of second-level self-governing region. Legislative authority in the new regions was vested in the Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Daerah (Regional People's Representative Council).^* Membership in the DPRD was allotted to the political parties on the basis of each party's vote in the 1955 parliamentary elections. Party representa tion in the Simalungun/Slantar Councils was as follows: Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 188] === 175 TABLE 5-S PAHTY REPRESENTATION IN THE REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVE COUNCILS (DPRD) OF SIMALUNGUN AND SIANTAR SIMALUNGUN Seats Party PNI PKI Mas jumi Parkindo KRSST Partai Buruh Partai Katholik PSI Total 30 SIANTAR Party Sea Masjumi Parkindo PNI PKI Total 15 Source: Data on file In offices of DPRD Secretaries, Simalungun and Siantar. Executive power in the Simalungun/Siantar governments was vested in a Regional Head (Keoala D a e r a h ) and a Regional Executive Council (Dewan Pemerlntah D a e r a h ) of which the Regional Head was ex officio chairman. The members of the DPD were elected by and from the DPRD (on the basis of pro portional representation of the parties in the DPRD) and were collectively responsible to it. In Simalungun the DPD consisted of two representatives from the PNI and one each from the PKI, Masjumi and Parkindo; Siantar*s three DPD mem bers were from Masjumi, Parkindo and PNI. Until further legislation could be passed, the Regional Head was also to be chosen by the DPRD (with the approval of the Ministry of Home Affairs) and could be dismissed by it. In 1957, in both Simalungun and Siantar, the DPRD merely ratified the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 189] === choices of the Ministry of Home Affairs for the office of Regional Head. Once the procedures of governing had been established, however, the DPRD members did not hesitate to use their statutory powers to criticize and check the ac tivities of the Regional Head and the DPD. In the next few years events beyond the control of local government combined to diminish the effect of Law No. 1 of 1957* reducing the power of the DIKD, the parties and in deed of civilian government in general. At about the time that the Simalungun and Siantar DPRD convened for their first sessions, the North Sumatran provincial army commander, Col. Maludin Simbolon, announced that he was severing all relations with the central government and temporarily assuming authority over civilian government in the province.22 Within five days the coup was reversed by Simbolon*s Chief-of-Staff, Lt. Col. Djamin Gintings, and the rebels were forced to flee to the highlands of Tapanuli. A state of war and siege (SOB), under which the military assumed many of the powers of the civilian government, was proclaimed by the new army leadership and remained in effect until May 1, 1963. In Simalungun/Siantar the impact of SOB was relatively mild. The major changes were that the regency and municipality army commanders became the de.lure superiors of the Regional Head, army officers were placed on the plantations to insure uninterrupted production, political party activity in the ■villages was: restricted, and the military attempted to exercise Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 190] === 177 control over party-affiliated labor, farmer, youth and women's organizations through the establishment of Bodies for Cooperation between the Army and Labor, the Army and Women, and so on. Civilian government functioned much as it had before, and the Army did not interfere with routine ad ministration or the activities of the DPRD. In I96I re strictions on the political parties were lifted and the Bodies for Cooperation between the Army and the various mass organizations became Inactive. Even after the return to full civilian authority in 1963, however,the Army remained the most powerful force In the political life of North Sumatra. During the period of this study it exercised its influence primarily by having the final say in the selection of the provincial governor and of second-level Regional Heads, most of whom (including the Regional Head of Simalungun but not of Siantar) were military officers. Since the Army leadership was divided into several factions along both party and ethnic lines, competition for these posts was intense. Once the Army placed its imprimatur upon a candidate, however,the final selection was a foregone conclusion. Within the regency and municipality governments, the dominance of the legislative branch was a short-lived phenomenon. The implementation of Guided Democracy meant a reversal of the limited trend toward regional autonomy and democratization which had been established by Law No. 1 of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 191] === 1957• Presidential Edict No. 6 of 1959 (as perfected in November, 1959)^ withdrew from the DPRD the right to dismiss the iiegional Head, who was restored to his pre-1957 position as both the representative of the central govern ment and chief executive of his region. The Regional Head also became ex officio chairman of the DPRD, thus weakening the autonomy of that body. The DPD was abolished and re placed by a Daily Government Board (3adan Pemerintah Harian), whose members, nominated by the DPRD but selected by the Governor of the province with the advice of the regency/ municipality Regional Head, were responsible only to the latter. Finally, the legislative power of the DPRD was fur ther weakened by a provision of the Edict which gave author ity to the Regional Head to "delay a decision of the Regional Representative Council...when in his opinion it conflicts with the main lines of state policy, the general interest, or legislation of a higher level. The DPRD did retain a measure of influence over the selection of the Regional Head and of.his chief administrative officer, the Regional Secretary. According to Edict No. 6 the DPRD nominates candidates for the position of Regional Head and submits its nominations to the Minister for General Administration and Regional Autonomy, who may accept one or reject them all. In the event of rejection, the DPRD sub mits a second list to the Minister, who again may accept or reject, if all are rejected, the new Regional Head is Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 192] === selected, by the Minister (with the approval of the President) from outside the DPRD list. In recent years, as we have already indicated, effective control over the selection of the Regional Head has been in the hands of the Army, although the political parties in the DPRD have also played a role. In the I96I selection of a Regional Head for Simalungun, for example, initiative in the nomination of the successful candidate (an army officer) was taken by Parkindo. In i960 the incumbent Regional Head of Siantar, a former revolutionary and long time civil servant, was nominated by the PNI and accepted by the military. And finally, in the nominations for a new Siantar Regional Head following the death of the incumbent in 1964, a provincial army faction succeeded in obtaining the support of the PNI and PKI for its candidate, who was then accepted by the Minister. 25 The selection of the Regional Secretary has been much more of a local process in which the party branches have greater influence. When a vacancy occurs, the Regional Head is required to submit a list of candidates (not less than three nor more than five) to the DPRD, which must select one. In two such elections witnessed in Simalungun/Siantar in 1964, the pre-nominations bargaining was confined to the Regional Head, the members of the DPRD and the parties which they represented, with no evidence of outside intervention. In 1961 the DPRD throughout Indonesia were reorganized and restyled DPRD-GR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Daerah-Gotong Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 193] === 180 Rojong, Mutual Help Regional People's Representative Council) to conform to the pattern of representation of “functional groups*1 (golongan k a r y a ) adopted b„ the national Parliament and designed by the S u k a m o - A r m y coalition to limit the in fluence o_ the parties. In the new DPRD-GR, half of the members were to represent political parties and half functional groups. In practice, since most voluntary associations in Indonesia are affiliated with political parties, the DPRD-GR were still dominated by the parties. In Simalungun/Siantar, partisan representation in the new legislatures was as follows:2° TABLE 5-9 PARTY REPRESENTATION IN THE DPRD-GR OP SIMALUNGUN AND SIANTAR SIMALUNGUN Party Seats SIANTAR PNI Parkindo PKI Partai Katholik IPKI Non-Party 12 PNI Parkindo PKI Non-Party Vacant Total 30 Total 15 Party Sea' Source: Adapted from data provided by Secretaries of DPRD-GR, Simalungun and Siantar. Even excepting the power of the military, the question of legislative vs. executive control of government in Simalungun/Siantar is, in the final analysis, largely an academic one. For most of the post-independence period local Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 194] === 181 government has had neither the funds nor the authority to govern effectively. With monetary inflation, bureaucratic expansion, and the unwillingness of the central government to increase the taxing power of the regions, the.Regional Heads and other officials have spent much of their time in Medan and Djakarta seeking subsidies which will enable them to meet the routine costs of administration. No funds are available to carry out development projects or even in some cases to maintain present facilities such as roads and markets. The legal sphere of authority of the governments of Simalungun and Siantar is also quite limited. While the Regional Head is considered the principal government official in his region, he has only coordinating authority over the police, the public prosecutor, the regional army commander, the public school system, the labor affairs office, the agricultural affairs office and a host of other local admin istrators whose first responsibility is to the provincial office of their ministry in Medan. In Siantar city local autonomy is somewhat broader than in the regency. During the colonial period Siantar had already become a municipality and was largely autonomous of higher administrative levels, with a local revenue base sufficient to cover expenditures. Despite the changes brought about since 19^9, Siantar has retained its autonomy to a considerable degree, including control over the all-important Public Works Office with its job- and revenue-producing water and electricity departments Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 195] === and the municipality slaughterhouse. As in Simalungun, how ever, many important government officials are neither ap pointed nor dismissed locally, and the municipality’s fiscal authority is insufficient to meet development needs. Thus, even during the 1957-1959 period of greatest legislative power in local government, few decisions of im portance for Simalungun/Siantar could be made at the local level. Since 1959, when the balance of local authority shifted back to the Regional Head, the DPRD and DPRD-GR have existed in a kind of limbo, unsure of their functions and of their raison d ’etre. Except on those infrequent occasions when a Regional Head or a Regional Secretary is to be chosen, the Councils have little of significance to discuss. The annual debate on the budget estimates for the coming year, particularly in the regency, is usually conducted in an at mosphere of grim hopelessness. Despite their extreme limi tations as authoritative structures of decision-making, how ever, the DPRD and DPRD-GR have not been entirely neglected by the parties because they represent one of the few channels of access to governmental authority at the local level. Moreover, they provide a measure of status and a small in come to the party leaders who serve as Council members. In 1962 a second representative body, the Front Nasional (National Front) was established at the regency/municipality, subdistrict and village levels in S imalungun/S iantar and given the responsibility of providing “social support” for Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 196] === 183 and "social control" of the policies of the government. its original conception the Front Nasional was designed to supplant the parties; in its implementation it became a loosely organized body with representatives from all parties and organizations, a permanent secretarial staff, and no authority beyond the making of recommendations to the Regional Head, who served as its chairman. In 1963-6^ the Front Nasional at the regency/municipality level met only rarely and its members presented few recommendations. In a number of subdistricts the Front was used by the subdistrict officer as an advisory body and some of its members were given specific tasks to perform, mostly of an informational and propaganda nature. At the village level the principal function of Front members was to read and pass on to the villagers the liter ature distributed to it by Front representatives from the sub district capital. Few village demands were transmitted up ward to the government through the instrument of the Front. Conclusions In 1963-6^ ten political parties existed in Indonesia, eight of which maintained branches in Simalungun/Siantar. The secular parties (the largest of which were the PNI and PKI), in their quest for national power, have attemptdd to cut across ethnic and religious cleavages in Indonesian society. To potential supporters they have offered ideologies variously based on nationalism and/or Marxism. The Moslem parties, particularly NU and, until its banning, Masjumi, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 197] === 184 have also sought multi-ethnic support but within the frame work of a program calling for a totally or at least pre dominantly Islamic polity. The Christian parties, repre senting small minority groups spread throughout the archipelago, have sought protection for group interests through partici pation in the political process but have had no hope of playing more than a peripheral role at the national level. In the early 1950s the political parties were a powerful force in national politics in Indonesia. With the introduc tion of Guided Democracy in 1959* the ‘'simplification" of the party system, and the concomitant rise to power of the Army, the parties* role in national-level decision-making declined precipitously. Only the PKI, which Sukarno used as a counterweight to the Army, was able to expand its influence during this period. In Simalungun/Siantar, the political parties briefly enjoyed an augmented governmental role with the':eBJ;aM.ishment in 1956 of at least potentially powerful regional legislatures. The proclamation of martial law and of Presidential Edict No. 6 of 1959 significantly diminished the autonomy of local government, the authority of the legis latures, the influence of the political party branches, and civilian authority in general. In 1963-64, although martial law was no longer in effect,the Army continued to dominate political life in North Sumatra. The Regional Head and other officials of the civilian government retained authority over local administration and the party leaders were permitted to organize and to participate in local government, but all operated under the shadow of Army power. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 198] === CHAPTER VI THE LOCAL PARTIES: OBJECTIVES, STRATEGIES AND ORGANIZATION In the immediate post-revolutionary period (1950-1955) partisan politics in Indonesia was dominated by the prospect of national elections. All parties had as their primary objective the development of as extensive a base of support as possible for the purpose of increasing their representation in Parliament. At the various sub-national levels, the role of party branches was almost wholly limited to the creation of mass support for the benefit of the national organizations in Djakarta. Since 1955 many important changes have taken place in the structures and processes of national and local politics: in 1956 regional legislatures with party representation were established, only to have much of their authority removed in 1959 and their membership reconstituted in I96 I; at the national level many parties were banned and the role of the remaining parties in governmental decision-making declined; martial law was declared in 1957 » restricting party activity until stability was restored to the countryside, and adding a powerful new force to the political scene. Despite these changes and disturbances, however, the prospect of future 185 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 199] === 186 elections never seemed very far away. Regional elections had been scheduled for 1957* "but were postponed indefinitely outftide of Java because of the rebellions in the Outer Islands, and proposals for new national elections were continually being discussed. Throughout the post-election years, therefore, the fundamental objective of local party branches remained es sentially what it had been earlier: the development and maintenance of mass support at the local level in preparation for future national elections and in order to enable the national party leadership to wield as much influence as pos sible in Djakarta. To this primary task the changes in power relationships, national and sub-national, and the introduction of local representative institutions added important new func tions: influence in local government and in the Army. In order to build mass support in Simalungun/Siantar the parties had of necessity to come to terms with the local social environment. Each party’s electoral and organizational strategy thus reflected both a response to the patterns of cleavage in the region and an attempt to reshape local polit ical loyalties in its own ideological image. In this chapter we examine the objectives of each of the eight parties locally active in 1963 -6 ^ and the strategies and organizational forms which they adopted to build local support and to obtain in fluence in the political process. Because of the electoral strength of Masjumi and its apparent continued hold on a large Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 200] === part of the population, discussion. it will also be included in this KBSST will be examined in Chapter X. The Secular Parties: PNI and PKI Since the early days of the Republic, the primary goal of both the PNI and PKI in SImalungun/Siantar has been to be come the predominant party in the region. Predominance is measured by the leaders of both parties in terms of electoral support (of particular importance before 19 5 5 * but & contin uing consideration), influence within numerically and stra tegically Important social groups, and (especially after 1956) influence in the structures and processes of local government. In their quest for mass support, the PNI and PKI faced a formidable obstacle: Marhaenism and Marxism-Leninism were (and continue to be) imported ideologies of little obvious relevance to the great bulk of the populace. To overcome this problem the two parties developed a basic strategy which re lied primarily on appeals to the material interests of the most uprooted and detraditionalized groups in the region, the plantation and urban workers and the squatters on plantation land. Many of the strengths and weaknesses of the PNI and PKI in Simalungun/Siantar in 1963- 6^ were directly related to their reliance on the support of these groups. Organizationally, the secular parties correspond in some respects to Maurice Duverger’s model of the mass party. Both parties place great emphasis on membership recruitment (either into the party itself or into its subsidiary organi- Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 201] === 188 zations) and both possess a "strongly articulated" or highly developed and hierarchically ordered complex organization. In terms of the basic elements of party organization, the PKI approximated the model of a party whose basic structural unit is the cell (although the lowest active organizational unit was in most cases the party subsection, which cor responded to the PNI*s sub-branch and was territorially rather than functionally-based), with daily contact among members, a high degree of party discipline and selection of local leaders by appointment from above. The PNI, on the other hand, fits more closely the model of a branch party, empha sizing quantity at the expense of quality and headed by elected leadership councils which direct the implementation of party policy in the subdistricts and villages.1 In Simalungun regency, PNI and PKI leaders have concen trated most of their efforts and expended the greatest part of their funds in Lower Simalungun. number of reasons. This has been so for a Perhaps most obvious is the fact that 72.6^ of the regency electorate in 1955 (7 3 -1J& of total regency population) was located in this area. To be the majority party in Simalungun a party must clearly be dominant in Lower Simalungun. The importance of this region extends beyond the percentage of the regency electorate which it represents, however, because of what has been described as the "high national-level political e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f the plantation workers and squatters who make up a probable Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 202] === majority of the (male adult) population there. Strikes, now illegal but still resorted to on occasion (e.g., the PKI-sponsored strike in East Sumatra, including Simalungun, in 1961 which resulted in the arrest and temporary jailing of many PKI union leaders), we 11-organized movements of squatters onto just-cleared plantation land (a favorite tactic of the PKI, less used by the PNI), or an action such as the PNI-inspired workers* takeover of the British planta tions in Simalungun in 196^, have high political visibility and effectively display the power and influence of their perpetrators. Moreover, a party with a large following on a particular plantation has influence with the plantation administration, a situation which can provide a variety of benefits, not the least of them financial, to the party and/ or its leadership. Both the PNI and PKI have made extensive use of sub sidiary organizations (called gerakan massa or mass movements) to develop a base of support in the plantation areas. The important role which the PKI accorded to these organizations was derived from the general strategic program of the party, the “national united front” policy, adopted by the party leadership in 1951 (when D.N. Aidit became first secretary). According to Donald Hindley, the Aidit leadership conceived of the national united front policy "as entailing unity in two separate spheres and of two dis tinct qualities: the unity of the masses directly led and controlled by the Party and its mass organizations, a dis ciplined unity embracing the truly revolutionary classes Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 203] === 190 /proletariat, peasants and petty bourgeoisie/i and the unity, in the form of friendship and cooperation, between PKI and the non-Communist political forces.... In the implementation of this policy, PKI has faced three main and inseparable tasks: (1) to build PKI into a disciplined, mass party; (2 ) to attract, mobilize, organize and lead the three most revolutionary classes— and to do the same for any other elements in society which might prove susceptible; and (3 ) to gain the tolerance and cooperation of as many as possible of the political forces that are not a n t i - C o m m u n i s t. ”3 For the PNI, on the other hand, development of mass organiza tions in Simalungun represented not so much one aspect of a coherent and detailed strategic plan as it did a response to the organizational threat of the PKI. PKI mass organizations in Simalungun included SOBSI (Sentral Organisasl Buruh Seluruh Indonesia, Central AllIndonesian Workers' Organization) and Its affiliated member unions, of which 3ARBUFRI (Sarekat Buruh Perkebunan Republik Indonesia. Plantation workers' Union of the Republic of Indonesia) was by far the largest, BTI (Barisan Tani Indonesia, Indonesian Farmers' Front), Pemuda Rakjat (People's Youth), GERWANI (Gerakan Wanlta Indonesia. Indonesian Women's Movement) and LEKRA (Lembaga Kebudajaan R a kjat. People's Cultural League). The most important of the PNI gerakan massa in Simalungun are PETANI (Persatuan Tani Nasional Indonesia. Indonesian National Farmers' Union), KBM (Kesatuan Buruh Marhaenis. Karhaenlst Labor Union), all of whose members axe affiliated with KBP (Kesatuan Buruh Perkebunan. Plantation Workers* Union), the recently organized K3KB (Kesatuan Buruh Kenderaan Bermotor, Motor Vehicle Workers' Union), Wanita Demokrat Indonesia (Democratic Women of Indonesia), Pemuda Marhaenis (Marhaenist Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 204] === 191 Youth) and LKN (Lembaga Kebudajaan National, National Cultural L eague). Each of the PNI gerakan massa maintains a hierarchical structure of branch organizations roughly parallel to that of the party, with horizontal as well as vertical formal lines of command, i.e. the executive leadership of the party at each level has responsibility for the supervision and direction of gerakan massa activities within its territorial jurisdic tion in cooperation with the gerakan massa branch organizations at the next highest level. In practice, organization leaders in the subdistricts and villages take their orders from regency gerakan massa officials, who are in turn directly integrated into or closely allied with the regency party leadership responsible for the planning of organizational drives and other activities. Unlike the Nationalist Party, the PKI admitted affiliation with only one of its mass organ izations, Pemuda Pakjat.^ There is no doubt, however, that all were under close party control. At least for Simalungun/ Siantar the locus of party control seems to have been in the provincial and national level party committees rather than with the local PKI leadership. PKI organizational efforts in Lower Simalungun began as early as 194-6, when local unions were established on the plantations and quickly affiliated with SOBSI, then the only effective labor organization in Indonesia and not yet com pletely dominated by the FKI • Prom 1950 to 1954- party control Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 205] === was gradually secured over SOBSI and its member unions in the region; in many cases, non-Communists were removed from positions of leadership and replaced by cadres imported from Medan and Djakarta. PKI-directed organizational efforts by BTJ and Pemuda Rakjat were also begun in the early 1950s. Intensive PNI gerakan massa organization in Lower Simalungun did not begin until 1953* when regency-level branches of K B M (then called KBKI, Kesatuan Buruh Kerak.iatan Indonesia. Labor Union of the Indonesian People) and PETANI were established to counter the Influence of the PKI-dominated organizations. Cadres were brought in from outside Simalungun and, as the local organizations grew, bright young local activists were given special training in organizational tech niques. A number of these activists became “full-timers," i.e. were given stipends by the party, and the most able rose rapidly in the party hierarchy. Regency-level and some village branches of Wanita Demokrat, Pemuda Marhaenis and LKN (groups of musicians and dancers who provide entertain ment at party affairs) were also established. By organizing such a wide variety of groups, both the PNI and PKI hoped to make party-related activities the focus of a "comprehensive pattern of social integration" as they had become on J a v a. 5 The specific organizational technique most favored by PNI and PKI cadres has been to gain the support of locally influential leaders by convincing them of the practical a d vantages for themselves and their followers of affiliation Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 206] === 193 with a nationally-powerful organization. The propaganda of gerakan xaassa leaders in Lower Simalungun has mainlystressed these advantages. Among the workers the protection available through membership in the union has been most emphasized. At recruitment meetings the most frequent theme of the speakers is that the organization will ensure Job security and oppose arbitrary actions of the plantation ad ministrators against the workers (firing, demotion, moving a worker from one part of the plantation to another). Since most of the plantations are now run by the state, it has be come increasingly difficult for KBM (which has emphasized the identity of its policies with the Government's, and particu larly Sukarno *s, programs) to use such traditional goals of labor unions as demands for higher wages in its propaganda to potential members. A n attack on plantation wage policy can easily be interpreted as an attack on the state.^ SOBSI was less bound by this restriction, but was careful to dis tinguish opposition to Sukarno (which it abjured) from op position to the "bureaucracy" (whose plantation policies it attacked)• Among the farmers living on the borders of the plantations, the greatest needs are for more rice fields and for acceptance by the government of their claims to land which they have al ready taken from the plantations. BTI and PET AN I have been instrumental in organizing local panitla tali air (irrigation committees), representing their interests before local govern- Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 207] === ment officials (to secure permits and equipment for the construction of new sawah), defending squatters* rights in the courts, and on occasion illegally proceeding with the acquisition of new land and the building of rice fields. Without the support of a supravillage organization the farmer feels powerless in the face of the plantations and the govern ment; with support he is willing to take action to defend and improve his economic position.? Since late 19&3 aiuch effort has been expended by the PNI on a new party affiliate, the KBKB, whose goal has been to break the monopoly of the SOBSI member union SBKB (Serikat Buruh Kenderaan Bermotor, Motor Vehicle Workers Union) among the workers in the transportation industry (buses and trucking). KBKB has become the special project of the young North Tapnuli Batak activists in the party (transportation workers sure mostly North Tapanuli Bataks), many of w h o m are also leaders of Pemuda Marhaenis. Realizing that the loyalties of the SBKB members were to the union leadership in each local branch (only a few of whom were Communists) and not to the union it self or to the PKI, the Moperas1 ” (operations, i.e. organi zational drives) of the KBKB cadres have most frequently in volved attempts fct infiltration of SBKB and recruitment of the latter*s leadership. This approach has had considerable success in several of the towns of Lower Simalungun and along the road to Parapat, although several of the operasi have met with violence and at least one life has been lost. Other PNI Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 208] === affiliates have also used this tactic with some success, particularly in the early 1950s when KBM and PETANI organizers faced already entrenched Communist-led labor and farmer organi zatlons. Both PNI and PKI mass organizations have also made ex tensive use of traditional art forms (especially among the Javanese), adapted to portray party heroes and villains or to include partisan propaganda, as a means of integrating party activity into the daily life of the village* Besides these pragmatic means of winning support, PNI gerakan massa propaganda in Lower Simalungun has emphasized the nationalist roots of the party’s ideology and revolutionary history* This propaganda has had three purposes: minimize the fissiparous tendencies of ethnic and religious cleavages, (2) to vilify the PKI, its chief competitor in the plantation areas, as the agent of an international conspiracy more dedicated to the interests of world Communism than to the Indonesian nation, and (3) to provide a firm basis of ideological commitment to ensure continued allegiance to the organization and to the party. The PNI has also stressed its belief in the importance of religion and the right of every individual to worship as he pleases (much of the prop aganda of the religious parties has termed the PNI anti religion), accusing the Communists in turn of atheism. More specific inculcation of Marhaenist ideology has been confined to indoctrination sessions for local leaders, the distribution Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 209] === of party pamphlets, and speech-making tours of the local branches regency leaders. (Begency PNI leaders claimed that between 1961 and 19^3 they took part in a total of 325 speaking engagements at the village and subdistrict levels.) It may be added that In the selection of speakers and the assignment of cadres to specific subdistricts much attention is paid to the ethnic makeup of the audience or potential membership; it is generally realized, for example that North Tapanuli Batak cadres will have little success among Javanese workers and that Javanese cadres will be unable to organize Batak farmers. In contrast to the PNI mass organizations, SOBSI, BTI and other Communist Party affiliates went to great lengths to deny any connection with the PKI or adherence to Communist ideology. Their propaganda, although phrased in familiar Communist terminology, was oriented largely toward local is sues and grievances in the attempt to recruit and hold members. At the same time, every effort was made to indoctrinate the local non-cadre leadership and membership with the views of the PKI on national and international issues. Even at the village level, resolutions condemning domestic "counter revolutionaries,M the Peace Corps, or government policies opposed by the PKI were frequently prepared and forwarded to Djakarta. Criticism of opposition organizations was much more subdued, in conformity with national PKI policy which proscribed open attacks against those organizations regarded Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 210] === 197 as potentially friendly or useful. less inhibited in this regard. The PNI has been much While PNI leaders, for example, openly referred in their speeches at party and gerakan massa meetings to the organizational successes of KBKB at the ex pense of SBKB, SOBSI leaders admitted to no conflict between the two organizations. In terms of claimed membership, PKI mass organizations were considerably larger than their PNI counterparts.® TABLE 6-1 PNI AND PKI MASS ORGANIZATIONS IN SIMALUNGUN PNI Organ!zat ion KBM PETANI Pemuda Marhaenis Wanita Demokrat LKN PKI Membership Organ! zati on Membership 4,092 12,200 2,500 489 100 SOBSI BTI Pemuda Rak^at GERWANI LEKRA 45,000 20,517 1,500 Source: PNI figures from Dewan Tjabang PNI Kabupaten Simalungun, Laporan Um u m (PNI Branch Council, Regency of Simalungun, General R e p o r t ). July, 1963, p. 1 5. PKI data from organization chairmen except for Pemuda Rakjat, which was obtained from the Political Affairs Office, Regency of Simalungun, and dated 1961. GERWANI and LEKRA figures not available, but are presumed to be low: GERWANI because the author found little evidence of its activity, and LEKRA be cause it is not a mass membership organization. For the most part organization branches are located in Lower Simalungun or in plantation areas in other parts of the regency. For PETANI a breakdown of membership and ranting and for Pemuda Marhaenis the distribution of ranting show the extent of concentration. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 211] === TABLE 6-2 PETANI MEMBERSHIP IN SIMALUNGUN Subdistrict Region* Siantar Tanah Djawa Bandar Pane Bosar Maligas Dlk. Batunanggar Sidamanik Tiga Dolok Balata No. of Total Source: anting No. of Members 23 30 15 **,000 3.500 2.500 1,200 1,200 1,000 1**,080 600 Data on file in office of PNI Simalungun, Dec., .♦Regions: L S, Lower Simalungun; US, Upper Simalungun; 1963 HP, Road to Parapat. TA3LE 6-3 PEMUDA MARHAENIS RANTING IN SIMALUNGUN Subdistrict Siantar Tanah DJawa Bandar Bosar Maligas SidamanIk Dlk. Batunanggar Pane Silimakuta R eglon No. of Ranting 19 12 Total Source: Dec., 1963. 56 Data on file in office of PNI Simalungun, The **,092 members of KBM are organized in twenty-nine sections of its plantation subdivisions KBP and are almost all located in Lower Simalungun. No data were available for the newly-organized KBKB. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 212] === 199 Although equally complete data were not available for the PKI organizations, the pattern of distribution was clearly the same. Of the 22 3TI sub-branches in the regency, the “great majority," according to the organization’s chairman, were located in Lower Simalungun with the greatest concentra tion in Tanah DJawa, Dolok Batunanggar and Bandar. Of SOBSI's *J-5>000 members, SARBUPRI accounted for J ^ 9000, all located in plantation sub-districts. SBKB's regency membership was 1,758, located in branches in the small towns of Lower Simalungun and along the road to Parapat. The remainder of the SOBSI membership was distributed among unions for govern ment laborers (mostly in Siantar), hotel and restaurant employees (in the resort town of Parapat) and forestry workers (Raja Kahean, Silau Kahean and S i l i m a k u t a ) A l t h o u g h Pemuda Rakjat leaders were unwilling to divulge information about their organization, the author found no evidence of active Pemuda Rakjat branches outside the plantation subdistricts. LEKRA*s membership, again concentrated in Lower Simalungun, was probably somewhat larger than that of L K N, and its level of professional skill was much higher. GERWANI, like Wanita Demokrat, existed largely on paper. PNI and PKI party organizatIons, as distinct from the mass movements, play considerably different roles In the implementation of the common worker-squatter strategy. parties maintain branches at the regency and subdistrict levels, called tJabang and anak tjabang (branch and sub Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Both === [PDF page 213] === 200 branch) by the PNI and seksi and subseksi (section and sub section) by the PKI. Below the subdistrict, the basic PNI unit is the territorially organized ranting, which must have a minimum of fifteen members (for this reason many PNI ranting encompass more than one village), while the PKI's basic unit was the kelompok (group), organized on either territorial or functional lines and with a membership not exceeding ten. T o become a member of the PNI in Simalungun is a fairly simple process, requiring only that the applicant register his name with his local ranting, state his acceptance of the party's ideology and program, and agree to submit to party discipline. Though the party constitution calls for the pay ment of d u e s, ^ there have been few attempts to collect them in the regency (with the exception of occasional solicitations for special purposes) and little is required of the ordinary member in the way of party work or ideological ptirity. In contrast to the PNI, PKI membership was difficult to obtain, requiring a period of candidacy (varying with the class origins of the applicant, his previous membership in another party and so on) during which the candidate member was given ideological training and party tasks whose execution was carefully watched, recommendations from persons who were already PKI members, and endorsement by the next highest party committee. Having joined the party, the PKI member was re quired to maintain a minimum level of party activity or face Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 214] === expulsion.11 In general, standards for admission and the performance of party tasks and obligations were strictly adhered to by the PKI In Simalungun, and membership was ac cordingly small. PNI regency-level leadership has concentrated primarily on the expansion of party membership in Lower Simalungun, and there is considerable overlap between the party and gerakan massa membership. In part this has been encouraged in order to increase the loyalty of the gerakan massa members to the PNI and to imbue them with at least a vague sense of common Karhaenist Identity. More important, however, is the fact that the power base of the dominant faction In the re gency leadership is concentrated in Lower Simalungun. These are the former Napindo leaders (see Chapter TV), Javanese for the most part, who have lived for long periods in Lower Simalungun, developed extensive contacts there during the Revolution, and are generally respected by the local popu lation (particularly, of course, by the Javanese) as men of stature and influence. Since the early 1950s these leaders have been dependent for their continuation and promotion in regency and higher party office on the support of the sub district branches in Lower Simalungun. The expansion of party membership in these subdistricts (producing an increase in the size of Lower Simalungun*s delegation at Party Conferences) has thus been of central importance to ^hem. Such calculations were largely irrelevant to the PKI leaders, whose party positions (in practice, though not Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 215] === 202 according to the party constitution) depended on the decisions of higher party committees rather than on periodic elections. The development of the PKI party organization in Simalungun/ Siantar -was in fact only a secondary concern of the higher party leaders, who apparently decided in the early 1950s to maintain only a small party organization in Simalungun and to concentrate on the development of the subsidiary organi zations. This decision was probably made on the grounds that an active, proselytizing party organization would serve, in the early stages of the development of support, to alienate more individuals than it would attract because of the strength of religious beliefs in the region. PNI and PKI party and subsidiary organization activities in Upper Simalungun have been much less intensive than in Lower Simalungun. In part the reasons for this comparative neglect are the small size of the population and (for the PNI) the lack of interest of the dominant faction within the regency leadership (which controls the disbursement of party funds) in the growth of the party in that area. More funda mental, however, is the lesser relevance of PNI and PKI Ideology and programs to the problems of Upper Simalungun. This Is so for two reasons: (1) the lack of specific griev ances related to conditions of employment (most people are self-employed farmers) or land tenure (there is an ample supply of swidden land). The worker-squatter strategy has thus been inapplicable to the social conditions of Upper Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 216] === 203 Simalungun. The strong feelings of communal solidarity among the less detraditionalized Simalungun people, intensi fied by their distrust and suspicion of the outsiders who now live in "their” territory. Party-based political organ ization is seen in Upper Simalungun as fundamentally divisive of ethnic unity, which is felt to be of crucial importance in counteracting the "takeover” of the economic and political life of the regency and municipality by non-Simalungun Bataks. The nationalism of the PNI and its emphasis on pan-ethnic unity and the class-oriented ideology of the PKI have thus had little appeal to the Simalungun Bataks. Despite these difficulties, the PNI has been able to develop some support in Upper Simalungun. The PKI, on the other hand, has no organization there apart from one sub section in Silimakuta. Support for the PNI stems from the activities of the Barisan Harimau Liar guerrilla organization during the Revolution. The former BHL leaders and their proteges now make up the bulk of the ethnic Simalungun Batak PNI leadership at both the subdistrict and regency levels. The appeal of these leaders to the ”anti-feudal” Simalungun Bataks seems to have remained undiminished in the nearly two decades since the Revolution, but little attempt has been made to expand the party beyond this base. In any event, in a small society all of whose members belong to one of four marga with strong inter-marga affinal relationships, the assassinated aristocrats had many relatives who have not Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 217] === been willing to join the party of the assassins. Even on revolutionary grounds, the appeal of the PNI is thus weak in Upper Simalungun (although stronger than that of any other national party). The subdistricts along the road to Parapat, with the exception of the plantation areas in Pane, Balata and Dolok Panribuan, have also been relatively neglected in PNI and PKI councils. In part, as In Upper Simalungun, this has been because of a lack of pressing social problems and the seeming irrelevance of party ideologies and strategies. Moreover, the PNI's old guard subdistrict leaders in this area, still oriented to and increasingly lost in the dreams of the Hevolution, have been unable to make the transition from the struggle for independence to the demands of party-building, and until recently there has been a lack of young North Tapanuli Batak cadres capable of revitalizing the subdistrict branches. By 1963-64 the cadre problem had become less severe and new beginnings had been made, particularly in the towns of Pane Tongah, Tiga Balata, Tiga Dolok and Parapat, where a nucleus of party activists'was being formed around Pemuda Marhaenis and KBKB. Both PNI and PKI activities in this area have focused primarily on the towns, with the vil lages unaffiliated with either party and remaining relatively isolated from party conflict. In Siantar city, both the PNI and PKI have suffered from a social environment which emphasizes ethnic and relig- Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 218] === 205 ious differences and loyalties and severely limits the ef fectiveness of partisan appeals framed either in terms of secular ideologies or pragmatic interests* PKI strategy in Siantar followed the pattern described for Lower Simalungun, with heavy emphasis on the development of SOBSI and its af filiates (BTI, of course, had no branch In Siantar). unions dominated organized labor in the city. SOBSI No single member union contained a majority of SOBSI members in the city parallel to SARBUPRI in the regency; rather there were a large number of unions such as SBKB (transportation workers), SSPDA and SBPU (government employees), SBLG (Electricity and Gas Workers), SBKA (railroad workers), SBHRT (hotel and restaurant employees) and SARBUFIS (theatre employees). The largest of these were SBKB (claimed membership of 2,500 be fore the organization of KBKB) and SEPDA (380 members), al though party control over the latter was somewhat uncertain. Pemuda Rakjat in Siantar had few members and was essentially a cadre organization; LEKRA*s membership, according to government data, was 80, and GERWANI was inactive. The PKI in Siantar also controlled IPPI (Ikatan Pemuda Peladjar Indonesia. Union of Indonesian Student Youth) with a member ship of less than 100, and was attempting without much suc cess to organize a branch of CGMI (Consentrasi Gerakan Mahaslswa Indonesia. Concentration of the Indonesian University Students* Movement) at the Christian Nommensen University. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 219] === 206 The PNI's city branch has been less concerned than its regency counterpart with the expansion of either party or gerakan massa membership. In large part this neglect may be related to the lack of interest of the dominant faction in the city party leadership, whose positions did not depend on the support of gerakan massa members, but rather on a coalition of party leaders each of whom could count on the support of a number of the party's ranting at the biennial Party Conference. These individuals were not willing to risk jeopardizing their leadership by a strengthening of po tentially competitive power centers in the party. Moreover, from 1956 until he lost his party office in 1963, the Siantar PNI chairman devoted most of his time to his great interest, city government (he is vice-chairman of the municipal Regional Representative Council), and not to internal party problems. The PNI gerakan massa in the city are considerably less developed than those in the regency. KBM, never very large, has fallen on evil days and now has almost no members, com pared with the 1961 total of 3 0 0.12 In part KBM's (and SOBSI's) difficulties have been due to the fact that Siantar is a commercial and administrative rather than an industrial center, and what industry it does have is very small-scale, with perhaps twenty-five or fewer workers per factory on the average. T o build a union on such a fragmented base requires an intensive effort which, even if successful, would produce Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 220] === 207 only a limited gain.1^ Moreover, K B M was a late arrival in Siantar and has lacked the dynamic leadership of SOBSI or the KBM regency organization. (The most active KBM leader in the city in recent years has been a North Tapanuli Batak school teacher, a man of moderate political views and a marked distaste for the sometimes violent tactics of union organ izers in Indonesia). KBKB's Siantar branch, led by an indi vidual preparing a challenge to the city party leadership, has been rather more successful; by mid-196^ it had acquired approximately four hundred members, almost all of whom were recruited from the PKI*s SBKB. Pemuda Marhaenis* Siantar branch until recently con sisted mostly of Javanese and Batak Moslems in Bantan ward and environs and had n o appeal for young Batak Christians, most of whom Joined the youth organizations of the HKBP church and Parkindo. Since i960 Pemuda Marhaenis has become largely North Tapanuli Batak at the city-wide leadership level and has begun to gain strength in the Christian areas of the city. LKN, with about 100 members, has been one of the most active of the PNI affiliates in the city, while itfanita Demokrat, GMNI (Gerakan Mahaslswa Naslonal Indonesia, Indonesian National University Students* Movement) and GSNI (Gerakan Slswa Naslonal Indonesia, Indonesian National High School Students* Movement) have few members and are largely inactive. A branch of Djamiatul Muslimin, a party affiliate which sponsors the dissemination of PNI propaganda under the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 221] === 208 aegis of Islamic religious Instruction, was being formed in 196*1- to appeal to the santri South Tapanuli Bataks and Javanese women (who, party officials said, are not interested in secular political organizations). Besides their activities with party affiliates, both the PNI and PKI have attempted to infiltrate various non partisan organizations such as the PGRI (Persatuan Guru Eepublik Indonesia, Association of Teachers of the Republic of Indonesia), Legiun Veteran (Veterans* Legion), Angkatan ***-5 (Generation of 19^5) and PPDI (Persatuan Pamong Desa Indonesia, Association of Indonesian Village Officials), A bitter PNI-PKI struggle for control of the leadership of Legiun Veteran and Angkatan **f-5 in the mid-1950s resulted in a vic tory for the PNI (with Army assistance), while PGRI has re mained relatively free of partisan influence, its leadership leaning more toward Parkindo than any other party, PPDI was reactivated in the region in 19&3 under covert PNI sponsor ship, and its regency-level leadership is dominated by the Nationalists, At the national level PPDI is controlled by the PKI.lif Beyond the goal of developing mass support, the PNI and PKI have also sought to increase their influence in the local governmental process. Since most high-ranking government of ficials in the region sore appointed from Medan or Djakarta, beyond the control of the regency/municipality party branches, party leaders have concentrated their efforts on the DPRD and DPD and later DPSD-GR and BPH. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 222] === In the DPRD, established in 1956, seats were allotted on the basis of the 1955 election returns and no party was able to alter the distribution in its favor. In both Simalungun and Siantar the PNI and PKI formed an alliance in order to win control of the Council leadership and of com mittee assignments. In the regency DPED the PNI-PKI coa lition also included Partai Buruh. Although this bloc con tained only fifteen of the thirty DPRD members it was able to gain both the chairmanship (PNI) and the vice-chairmanship (PKI) because of the lack of cooperation between Masjumi and the Christian parties. In Siantar the PNI and PKI joined forces with Parkindo, obtaining the chairmanship for Parkindo sind the vice-chairmanship for the PKI. The PNI, which was entitled to a seat on the DPD (along with Parkindo and Jlasjumi), agreed to this arrangement. Since 1956 legislative cooperation between the PNI and PKI, at times joined by other parties, has continued, particularly in the nomination of Regional Heads and the selection of Regional Secretaries. The dissolution of the DPRD and its replacement by the DPRD-GR was a happy event Tor the PNI, which was able to utilize a favorable set of circumstances to increase its leg islative representation in both the city sind the regency. Party and functional group nominees (two for each seat) were submitted to the Regional Heads and regency/municipality Army commanders for approval and recommendations and then sent to the North Sumatran Army commander and the Governor Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 223] === 210 (who was to make the final selection). In Siantar the Regional Head (a PNI sympathizer) and the municipality Army commander (not so much pro-PNI as anti-PKI), with the backing of their respective provincial superiors, cooperated with the branch PNI chairman In the nomination of functional group representatives. Of the eight functional group seats in the new DPRD-GR, three went to the PNI, one to Parkindo, one to NU, two were nonparty and one was left vacant. The PNI*s overall representation increased from two to five, while the PKI continued to hold only one seat. In Simalungun the PNI also cooperated (though less closely) with the Regional Head and regency Army commander. PNI representation in the regency DPRD-GR increased from nine to twelve, while PKI strength dropped from five to t h r e e. ^ ^>he PNI's rep resentation in the new Siantar BPH was two out of four (com pared to one out of three in the DPD). In Simalungun, where the BPH has been largely ignored by the Regional Head, only two of its four seats were filled in 1964 (by Parkindo and the PKI). Candidates for the two vacant seats, both of which were claimed by the PNI, were submitted to the Regional Head in 1963, but no further action was taken. Although the PNI has been generally more successful in establishing a modus vivendi with the A r m y leadership, both parties have sought military support. PNI-Army cooperation has been based primarily on a common desire to reduce PKI strength in the region rather than on;.ia pro-PNI bias within Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 224] === the Army. The Army*s policy is reflected not only in the selection of DPRD-GR members, but also in the predominant position of the PNI in the Bodies for Cooperation between the Army and the various functional groups and in the Armycontrolled Veterans* Legion and Generation of *^5« The P K I ’s first major opportunity to Increase its political influence through military support came in late 1956 and early 1 9 5 7 Immediately after Col. Simbolon’s coup, Djakarta announced the appointment of L t. Col. Djamin Gintings as S i m b o l o n ’s replacement. In the event that Gintings was unable or unwilling to oust Simbolon, the com mander of the 2nd Regiment (covering East Sumatra, with headquarters in Siantar city), Lt. Col. Abdul Wahab Makmour, was to act. After an unsuccessful attempt to assume power, Makmour moved to consolidate his position in preparation for a conflict with Gintings. In order to develop auxiliary support, he set up and provided arms to a para-military organization, the QPD (Organisasl Pengawal D e s a. Village Guard Organization). The OPD*s leaders in Simalungun were recruited from the PKI and Its subsidiary organizations, particularly SASBUPRI. No other parties or organizations In the region were given arms or permitted to participate in the OPD. Although It Is not certain that Makmour was himself a Communist, his mass support in Simalungun was based entirely on his relationship with the PKI. And conversely, PKI support in the Army was apparently largely confined to Makmour and several of his regimental officers. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 225] === 212 On September 28th, 1957 Makmour was arrested by Gintings and subsequently removed from his command by the Army Chief of Staff, General Nasution. T h e OPD members in Simalungun, ordered to turn in their weapons by October 5th, staged an attack on Siantar*s City Hall in the early morning of October 7th. After several hours of fighting, the OPD force^® was defeated and a general roundup of Communist leaders (few of whom actually took part in the battle) was carried out by the new regimental commander. PKI influence in the Army, in Simalungun/Siantar and in North Sumatra as a whole, fell to its B y 1963 the PKI nadir. seemed to have regained a measure of influence within the provincial military leadership. that year it supported (with Parkindo and Partindo) the candidacy of an army officer, Col. Ulung Sitepu, for Governor of North Sumatra. In 196^ a close relative of the Governor, Capt. Pandak Tarigan, was nominated by the Siantar PKI (and PNI) for the post of municipality Regional Head. Whether these two events represented an actual relationship between Col. Sitepu and the PKI, or merely an attempt by the PKI to curry favor with him, is not clear. Some evidence that an actual relationship existed is provided by the arrest in 1965 of both Sitepu and Tarigan for participation in the so-called GESTAFU (Gerakan September Tigapuluh. 30th of September Movement) A f f a i r. ^ In any event, although both the PNI and PKI had highly placed supporters within the Army during the period of this Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 226] === 213 study, neither could claim exclusive or even substantial Army support. On the plantations, for example, neither party obtained the cooperation of the Army, which has preferred to create a separate labor organization called SOKSI (Sentral Organisasi Karyawan Sosialis Indonesia. Central Organization of Indonesian Socialist Employees) to oppose the partyaffiliated unions. And finally, in any relationship between the Army and the parties, the latter have been distinctly junior partners. The Religious Parties: Parkindo. Partai KatholikT Masjuml and NU The objectives, strategies and form of organization of the religious parties have differed in several Important respects from those of the PNI and PKI. In the years immed iately preceding the elections all parties conducted extensive campaigns throughout the region. Since 1955* however, only the PNI and PKI have continued actively to organize the pop ulation at the village level. The religious parties, by contrast, do not have comprehensive strategic plans and do not conduct operasi to recruit new members. Instead, their leaders devote most of their political energies to the affairs of local government. Organizationally, the religious parties correspond roughly to Duverger *s model of the cadre party. Although formally similar to the secular parties, their party and subsidiary organizations are weakly articulated and their leaders sire relatively unconcerned with problems of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 227] === 21b membership recruitment. The basic unit of party organiza tion, formally the branch, in reality more closely resembles Duverger*s caucus, ”a group of notabilities, chosen because of their influence.”20 The most important reasons for these differences are related to the self-image which each party has of itself in relation to the national and local political processes and to the nature of the local support which each seeks. The PNI and PKI, as we have seen, regard themselves at least po tentially as representing the whole Indonesian people, un| differentiated as to religion or ethnicity. they seek support on the basis of Ultimately, their capacity to build a m o d e m Indonesia which will satisfy the emerging aspirations of people for a better life within the framework of a secular nation state. Their ideologies, at least within the Indonesian context, are universalistic— they apply to all Indonesians. At the same time, they bear little relation to the powerful ethnic and religious cleavages of the local com munity. Partisan appeals have had to be made on other grounds, by translating ideologies into programs which would strike a responsive chord in Simalungun/Siantar. The religious parties, as we indicated In the previous chapter, have differed in their approaches to the problem of national Integration, Masjumi and NXJ, identifying the interests of the religious community with those of the state, have viewed themselves as representing the totality of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 228] === 215 Indonesian political aspirations within the framework of Islam, while Parkindo and Partai Katholik have sought repre sentation on the basis of their minority status. Simalungun/Siantar, however, none of the four religious parties could claim to represent the whole of the local pop ulation. Instead, each has sought the support of particular segments of local society. Parkindo*s and Partai Katholik*s appeals have been directed toward the Protestant and Homan Catholic communities respectively, while Masjumi and NU have competed for the support of the santri Moslems. Prior to the elections, the objective of each religious party at the local level was to make the party organization and its views as well known as possible among the people whom it sought to represent in the national Parliament. In large part the local election campaigns of the religious parties were conducted via the established religious institutions of the community. HKBP ministers,for example, Inserted Parkindo propaganda into their Sunday sermons, and church lay leaders became active campaigners in their districts. Similarly, the Moslem imam (priests or religious leaders) and teachers in Islamic schools were pressed into service by Masjumi and Heavy emphasis was placed in electoral propaganda on appeals to religious loyalties, and the party was represented as the political arm of the religious community. Without exception, religious party leaders characterized the secular Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 229] === parties as anti-religion, implying that a national victory for the latter would lead to discrimination against the faithful (including, some of the more flamboyant politicians sure reported to have argued, desecration of graveyards and destruction of churches and mosques). The point which they wished to make was clear: a vote for the religious party was a vote for the community of believers, and a vote for any secular party was a vote against that community. In the years following the elections the religious parties have been relatively inactive, although rudimentary organizations have been maintained, particularly at the regency/municipality and subdistrict levels. Beginning in 1956 the regency/municipality party organizations took on an important new function, the nomination of candidates for seats in the regional legislatures (a process which has occurred twice, once in 1956 and again in i9 6 0 ) and the supervision of the activities of their DPRD and DPBD-GB members. At the subdistrict level, party leadership councils have been maintained so that periodic regency conferences to select new leadership and pass on their policies may be held. In the villages there is normally no formal leader ship structure, although one or more individuals regard them selves and are generally regarded as spokesmen for the party. The lack of active proselytizing in the post-elections period is largely a function of the nature of the support enjoyed by the religious parties. Because of the strength Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 230] === 217 of local religious loyalties and the close ties which were established between the religious parties and local religious institutions, these parties— Parkindo, Partai Katholik and Masjumi in particular— have had •'built-in11 support. The elections served as a catalyst in linking the party leader ship with those members of society who defined their personal identity in primarily religious terms and who saw the political process as a confrontation of religious groups. Moreover, as we shall see in the next chapter, ethnic dif ferences and loyalties have served to heighten the indi vidual's sense of identification with the religious parties. Post-elections inactivity is thus in some degree a measure of the success of the religious parties in obtaining the loyalties of large segments of the village population. The failure of any substantial number of Masjumi supporters to turn to another party after Masjumi was banned attests to the strength of the bond which was established. While the religious parties have been relatively in active in recent years compared to the PNI and PKI, they have not been blind to the threat presented by the organiza tional efforts of the secular parties in the plantation sub districts. In an attempt to counter the Influence of SOBSI, BTI, PETANI, K B M and other PNI-PKI mass organizations, the religious parties have also made use of subsidiary organiza tions. Parkindo's affiliates in Simalungun/Siantar include ?WKI (Indonesian Christian Women's Association), GAMKI Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 231] === (Indonesian Christian Youth Movement) and GMKI (Indonesian Christian University Students* Movement). In 196^ a member of Parkindo*s Leadership Council in Siantar city was actively organizing a branch of the n e w Parkindo labor union KESPEKHI (Indonesian Christian Workers* Union) among city government employees, Partai Katholik, less active in these areas, had women’s, youth and labor affiliates. NU*s most prominent local affiliates were its youth organization Pemuda A n so r and its women's group Musllmat M I, and the party was also in the process of building local branches of PERTANU (farmers) and SARBUMUSI (labor). Masjumi had been most active among women and laborers; since i960 its labor affiliate SBII (Indonesian Islamic Labor Union) has continued its activities under the name GASBIINDO (Association of Indonesian Islamic Labor Unions). Some of these organizations were quite large, at least in terms of claimed members. Parkindo*s PWKI, for example, had a claimed Simalungun/Siantar membership of just under 3*000, GAMKI claimed 1,000 members and GMKI Included nearly all of the students in Nommensen University’s two faculties, theology and education. NU's Siantar branch of Muslimat NU, with a membership of 500, was considerably more active than either its PNI or PKI counterpart. In the labor and farmer field, however, none of the religious parties offered serious competition to the PNI and PKI organizations. The activities of most of these organizations, in con trast to those of the PNI and PKI, had a distinctly non- Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 232] === 219 political cast. Their orientation was rather toward relig ious education, particularly for the women and youth but also in the case of the labor u n i o n s. Thus, when discussing the programs of their affiliates, party leaders stressed the educational aspect and showed little interest in appeals based on the needs of the squatters for more land or of the plantation workers for higher pay, better living and working conditions, job security and the like. Emphasis was placed on strict adherence to legality in the relationships between the organizations, on the one hand, and the plantations and government, on the other. A t least in the cases of Parkindo and Partai Katholik, another difference between the religious and secular parties was apparent. For the PNI and PKI, the party organization was paramount, directing and supervising the activities of its affiliates. Parkindo and Partai Katholik*s affiliates, on the other hand, were essentially self-contained organiza tions, financially independent of the party and communicating only infrequently a n d on leadership. a basis of equality with the party KESPEKBI to some extent represented a departure from this pattern, since it was explicitly created by the national party leadership to provide an alternative for Protestant workers to SOBSI, KBM and other secular unions. In Siantar, however, KESPEKRI was not organized by the dom inant party leadership but rather by dissidents who hoped to return to positions of influence within the party by de- Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 233] === veloping a mass base in the union. This use of an affiliate in order to gain positions in the party organization was a common strategy of PNI politicians, but had not been used by a Parkindo leader before 196^. NU's relationships with its affiliates more closely paralleled the pattern of the PNI, with the regency/ municipality party acting as a parent organization directing the activities of its children, and adopting a more positive strategy designed to increase the party and subsidiary organization membership. The greater activity of NU (rela tive to Parkindo and Partai Katholik, but still very limited compared to the PNI or PKI) was due largely to the fact that NU had not yet succeeded in obtaining the extensive support enjoyed by the other religious parties. Participation by the religious party leaders in local government has been confined for the most part to the Hegional Representative Councils. In the Siantar DPRD, Parkindo formed an alliance with the PNI and PKI in opposition to the Moslem parties and succeeded in obtaining the Council chairmanship. seven Masjumi and NU, although outvoted eight to in the full Council, chaired all three DPRD committees and were able to work closely with the first two municipal Hegional Heads (the first, who held office from 1956 to 1958, was a Masjumi supporter and the second, from 1958 to *959» was pro-NU). in the DPD. Masjumi and Parkindo were also represented In the DPRD-GR the PNI-PKI coalition (with the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 234] === 221 sometime support of NU and the Police, Army and Moslem Religious Leadership representatives) has been dominant, with Parkindo in the opposition, although there has been much cooperation across party lines. one seat Parkindo and NU each have on the BPH. In the S imalungun DPRD the religious parties were unable to unite among themselves or to enter the PNI-PKI-Partai Buruh alliance, and their influence was largely confined to the DPD, where Parkindo and Masjumi each had one seat. Since the appointment of the present Regional Head, the three religious parties represented in the DPRD-GR (Parkindo, Partai Katholik and N U ) have played a more influential role despite the fact that the PNI and PKI hold a majority of the Council seats. Military support for the religious parties in Simalungun/ Siantar has been minimal. The decline of Masjumi (several of whose national leaders supported the regional rebellions) coincided with the rise to political power of the Ar m y in the late 1950s, and the local branches of NU and Partai Katholik have been too small to merit military attention. Parkindo has been hampered by its identification with the North Tapanuli Batak community, of which Col. Simbolon was the chief representative within the Army, and its leaders were sus pected of supporting Simbolon*s coup. In i960 Parkindo was a major factor in the nomination of an army officer for the office of Regional Head in Simalungun, and has continued to Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 235] === work closely with him since his appointment. Despite this foot in the door, however, Parkindo*s support within the regency/municipality and provincial army hierarchies remains very limited. The Smaller Secular Parties: IPKI. Partai Murba and Partindo The smaller secular parties have had an almost insig nificant impact on politics in Simalungun/Siantar. IPKI established a branch in the region in 1956 under the leader ship of an ex-army officer of Simalungun Batak Moslem descent, and the party quickly became a vehicle by which a small num ber of Simalungun Bataks (both Moslem and Christian), mostly government officials but including some descendants of the traditional aristocracy, hoped to increase their local political influence. In 1962, a Javanese ex-army officer was sent from the provincial party office in Medan to re organize IPKI and develop mass support. Youth, labor and farmers* organizations were created and a party office in Siantar was opened as funds were made available by the pro vincial organization. Despite this increased activity, however, IPKI has been unable to compete with the PNI and PKI on the plantations. Its Simalungun Batak leaders, most of whom live in Siantar and have few contacts in Upper Simalungun, have not made a serious attempt to cultivate support among the members of their ethnic group. Partai Murba was founded in Simalungun/Siantar during the devolution, and in 1955 It received slightly over a Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 236] === 223 thousand votes, half of which came from labor union support in subdistrict Bandar. In the late 1950*s Murba became the personal instrument of a politically ambitious Simalungun Batak. Murba*s membership in 1963- 6^ was small and its af filiates existed almost entirely on paper. Partindo, at the national level a 1958 split from the PNI, was in Simalungun/Siantar a continuation of Permai (Persatuan Rakjat Karhaen Indonesia. Union of the Common People of Indonesia). In Java, Permai was a politicalreligious sect which combined traditional abangan Javanese religious beliefs with nationalistic Marxism;22 in Simalungun/ Siantar it was led by North Tapanuli Bataks of no clear ideological persuasion. vote in 1955 was 1,385, about 60$ of which was located in the plantation subdistricts of Siantar, Bosar Maligas, Tanah DJawa and Pane. Partindo in 1963- 6^ had perhaps the smallest following of any party in the region; its leaders were con stantly embroiled in internecine conflicts over control of the party and had little energy left for party development. Conclusions At root, all political parties in Simalungun/S iantar have had a common goals the development of as broad as pos sible a base of mass support. For the PNI and PKI the ulti mate objective has been the support of all the inhabitants of the region, while Parkindo, Partai Katholik, Masjumi and NU have, of necessity, limited their objective to that of gaining the adherence of their respective co-religionists. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 237] === The particular strategy adopted by each party to achieve its objective has been conditioned by the p a rty’s image of itself and its mission and the environmental factors with which it has had to contend. In planning their strategies, the various parties were confronted by different initial advantages and disadvantages. The religious parties, al though limited in terms of their maximum potential support in the region, possessed a powerful organizational and ideological advantage. Religion, as we have seen, plays a central role in the social life of most Christians and a considerable proportion of Moslems, and local religious leaders have high status in their communities. It was thus relatively easy for the religious parties to penetrate the villages by gaining the support of the established religious leadership. They became superimposed upon already existing organizational structures with pervasive influence in the community. In the process they converted religious communi ties into political communities as well, transforming religious leaders into political figures and strengthening the sense of separate Identity of each religious group. Because of their ideological distance from the cleavages of the region, the secular parties largely lacked a comparable link with established local leadership. They thus developed a strategic approach designed primarily to appeal to the more detraditionalized groups of plantation workers and squatters, regardless of religion or ethnicity. Where the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 238] === religious parties sought the politicization of religious communitiess the secular parties attempted to cut across religious and ethnic cleavages on the economic class Solidarity. basis of socio The PKI's reliance on the workersquatter strategy was almost total, while the PNI, both inside and outside the plantations, has also cultivated support based variously on ethnic loyalties and nationalist senti ments. Since the continued loyalty of local leaders and members of the secular parties has been felt to depend heavily on performance criteria, the PNI and PKI have been much more active at the village level than their religious counter parts. The secular and religious parties have differed not only in objectives and strategies, but in organizational structure as well. The structural differences between the secular (mass) and religious (cadre) parties would seem at least in part to be a consequence of the strategies and levels of activity developed by the party leaders in response to the conditions of the local social environment. For the secular parties, complex organization, strong articulation, a welldefined hierarchical pattern of decision-making, the use of the branch or cell as the basic organizational unit and mem bership recruitment drives have been necessitated by limited or non-existent primordial appeal. For the religious parties, the well-developed sense of religious community and the prior existence of religious organizations and leadership extending Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 239] === 226 to the village level have permitted a much more casual ap proach to party and subsidiary organization development. Additional support for this conclusion is provided by the attempt of NU, which largely lacks the advantages of the other religious parties, to model its own party and subsidiary organizations and its level of activity after the secular parties. The differences between the religious and secular parties which we have described have had important implications for the nature of party competition for mass support in Simalungun/Siantar. Since the major religious parties have directed their appeals toward distinct, non-overlapping con stituencies, they have not been in direct competition with each other.2 3 jjor have they been in competition with the secular parties, as the distinction between those who view political conflict in terms of religious cleavages and those for whom religion is less politically relevant is fairly sharp. The two major secular parties, on the other hand, have placed primary importance on the organization of the same constituency, plantation workers and squatters and the wage-laborer population of Siantar city and the smaller towns of the regency. Village-level party competition, then, whether for voters or members, has been largely confined to the contest between the PNI and PKI in the towns and in vil lages on or near the plantations. Communities divided in their partisan loyalties are common In these areas and rare Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 240] === 227 in all other parts of the region. This pattern of compe tition is directly parallel to the situation in Java where, of the four major parties (PNI, PKI, NU and Masjumi), direct competition for votes and support has been largely limited to the contest between the PNI and PKI for the loyalties of the abangan Javanese. As in S imalungun/S iantar, Masjumi and NU in Java have appealed to essentially different con stituencies. Beyond the primary objective of mass support, the party leaders in Simalungun/Siantar have also been concerned to increase their influence in the local structures of civil government and within the Army, which has played a prominent role in local political life since 1956. Of all the party branches in the region the PNI has been most successful in developing a working relationship with the Army but by 1963-64 the direction of influence seemed to be primarily Army-PNI rather than PNI-Army. Army support for the PKI, at Its peak during the tenure of Lt. Col. Makmour as East Sumatran regimental commander, fell sharply thereafter but may have improved to some extent in recent years. Religious party influence in the local military establishment has been minimal. In the regional legislatures of both Simalungun and Siantar the PNI has assumed a dominant position since the formation of the DPRD-GR. In the municipality it has also enjoyed the support of the Regional Head since 1959* while in the regency the present Regional Head has generally co- Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 241] === 228 operated with Parkindo, Partai Katholik and NU and opposed the PNI and PKI. Party conflict in the legislatures has not paralleled the pattern of competition for mass support, in which Parkindo, Partai Katholik, Masjumi and NU have been largely non-competitive and the PNI and PKI have attempted to organize the same constituency. In both the DPRD and DPSD-GR the PNI and PKI have in general been united. The Christian and Moslem parties, while able to cooperate on occasion with the PNI-PKI alliance, have opposed each other on most issues and particularly on matters of personnel such as the nomination of Regional Heads and the selection of Regional Secretaries. For the religious parties the crucial qualification of a candidate for one of these offices Is religious affiliation and compromise between the Moslem and Christian blocs has therefore been unattainable. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 242] === CHAPTER VII RASES OF PARTISAN SUPPORT: VOTERS, MEMBERS AND LEADERS In this chapter we turn from a discussion of objectives, strategies and organization to examine the relationship which has actually evolved between the party system and the cleav ages of the local environment. What is the nature of the constituencies of the various parties? At one level of anal ysis, the answer is obvious: Masjumi and NU have been sup ported by santri Moslems, Parkindo by Protestants and Partai Katholik by Roman Catholics. Where religious loyalties have been relatively weak or socio-economic or other concerns have taken precedence in shaping political loyalties, the secular parties have been able to obtain support. The relationship between the parties and the local en vironment becomes more complex, however, when we consider the impact of ethnic cleavages. In Simalungun/Siantar ethnic loyalties have generated ethnic animosities, and the events of the colonial and revolutionary periods did little, es pecially at the village level, to establish regular patterns of communication among individuals of different ethnic groups. Moreover, ethnic differences have in general been strengthened by religious loyalties. The great majority of North Tapanuli 229 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 243] === 230 Bataks are Christian Protestants, South Tapanuli Bataks are santri Moslems, and Javanese are largely abangan Moslems. Among the Simalungun Bataks Protestantism is the dominant religion, although there are significant minorities of Catholics, Moslems and animists. This convergence of religion with ethnicity has tended to strengthen group solidarity and to make cooperation dif ficult even where the differences in adat, language and culture are not great, e.g. between North Tapanuli Batak Christians and South Tapanuli Batak Moslems. Even among co-religionists of different ethnic groups, as in the case of North Tapanuli Batak Protestants and Simalungun Batak Protestants or South Tapanuli Batak Moslems and Simalungun Batak Moslems, the general pattern has been continued sus picion and separation rather than increased cooperation. Intra-ethnic group conflict (e.g., between North Tapanuli Bataks from Toba and Silindung, South Tapanuli Bataks from Mandailing and Angkola, Simalungun Bataks from Raja and Purba) has added still another dimension to the complex patterns of primordialism in the region. The effects of ethnic cleavage on partisan support have not been uniform. The secular parties, because of the nature of their appeal, have managed to encompass within themselves a considerable portion of the ethnic diversity of the region. The religious parties, however,— particularly Parkindo and Masjumi— have become the representatives not only of one Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 244] === 231 religious group but largely of one ethnic group as well. Although electoral and membership data for NU and Partai Katholik indicate a greater degree of ethnic mixture, these patties have also been closely tied to ethnic as well as religious interests. Bases of Partisan S u p p o r t; The 1955 Parliamentary Elections Examination of the election results indicates clear differences among the bases of support of the major parties in the regency. The most broadly integrative party was the PNI, whose supporters were drawn more evenly from all ethnic and religious groups than any other major party. While PNI strength was greatest in the ethnically mixed plantation sub districts of Lower Simalungun, the party was also able to win 20^ of the vote in both Upper Simalungun (Simalungun Bataks) and along the Hoad to Parapat (North Tapanuli Bataks). Support for the PKI In the regency was not as broadly dis tributed as the PNI vote; while the Communists won 20^S of the vote in Lower Simalungun and along the road to Parapat, they were unable to gain a following in Upper Simalungun. TABLE 7-1 THE PNI AND PKI IN THE 1955 PARLIAMENTABLY ELECTIONS, BY REGION {%) Region Lower Simal. Rd. to Parapat Upper Simal. PNI 30.1^ 19.8 PKI Other 20.0% 20.9 76.1 58.2 Total 100.0% (138,920) 100.0 ( 26,175) Total Regency 17.9 54.7 100.0 (191,452) Source: Adapted from Pemerlntahan Daerah Tkt. II 3 imalungun, D a f t a r:.... Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 245] === 232 For both the PNI and PKI, the six subdistricts of Lower Simalungun represented the core of party strength in the regency. These subdistricts, containing 72.6# of the regency electorate, accounted for 79.5# of the PNI vote and 80.8# of the PKI vote in Simalungun. The subdistricts along the road to Parapat, with 13*7# of the electorate, accounted for 10.5# sind 16.0# of the PNI and PKI vote respectively, while Upper Simalungun, with 13.8# of the electorate, was responsible for 9*9# of the PNI vote and 3*2# of the PKI vote. More specifically, the election results for the PKI show a strong correlation between the size of party vote and the presence or absence of plsmtations in a given subdistrict. In nine of the ten subdistricts in which the PKI won more than IQ# of the vote a large proportion (over 20#) of the arable land is plantation-owned. In only two subdistricts where plantations are located did the PKI win less than 10# of the vote, and these subdistricts (Raja Kahean and Silau Kahean) are isolated and difficult to reach from party head quarters in P. Siantar (see Map 1-3). F o r all subdistricts with plantations the mean PKI percentage of the vote was 19.8#; for all subdistricts without plantations the mean was 3.65#. When a product moment coefficient of correlation was computed for the degree of association between the PKI vote andthe percentage of arable land under plantation con cession, an r of.83 was f o u n d. F r o m these figures it may reasonably be inferred that the great majority of the PKI Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 246] === 233 electorate consisted of plantation workers (almost all of whom are Javanese) and squatters on plantation land (North Tapanuli Bataks and Javanese), the two dominant socio economic groups in the plantation subdistricts. The size of the PNI subdistrict vote, on the other hand, was independent of the presence or absence of planta tions. While the PNI did well In the plantation subdistricts, with a mean percentage of 2 3. ^, it did even better In the subdistricts without plantations, where it averaged 2 7.Jj# of the vote. The product moment correlation coefficient, com puted for the degree of association between the PNI vote and the percentage of arable land under concession, was only.18.2 The PNI electorate thus contained a mixture of individuals both inside and outside the plantation environ ment. Ethnically, at least three major groups contributed substantially to the PNI vote: Javanese (Lower Simalungun), North Tapanuli Bataks (Lower Simalungun and the Road to Parapat) and Simalungun Bataks (Upper Simalungun). To what extent South Tapanuli Bataks also supported the PNI is not possible to determine, as there are no subdistricts in which they are the predominant group. In contrast to the PNI and PKI, support for the two major religious parties, Parkindo and Masjumi, tended to follow rather than cut across ethnic divisions. Parkindo#s vote came largely from the North Tapanuli Bataks, concen trated in the subdistricts along the road to Parapat and in Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 247] === F I G. 7-1 PKI VOTE PY SUE? PI S T R IC T, C O M P A R E D WITH P L A N T A T I O N H F. C T A R E A G E A 5 A P E R C E N T A G E OF T O T A L. A R A B L E L A N D o/oPKI PLANTATION VOTE LANP 50 O 100 SUBPISTRIGTS VOTE. O PLANTATIONS A S % OF A R A B L E 90 LANP A- S I P A M A N I K 80 E?. P O L O K B A T U N A N G G A K C. S I A N T A R. 17. B A L A T A E. b o s a r a a a h g a s F. B A N PAR. G. T A N A H P J A W A 50 H. P OL O K. P A N R I B U A N I. P A N E 40 J. S I L A U K A H E A N K- R A J A 30 KAHEAN L.SILIMAKUTA tA. P U R g A 20 N- P A R A P A T O. P O L O K P A R P A M A I A N 10 POLOK. S I L A U <5- R A J A SUBPISTRICTS S O U R C E S: E L E C T O R A L - D A T A F R O M P E A A E R I N T A H A N P A E R A H T K T. I| S I M A L U N G U N P A F T A R:.... FOR. P L A N T A T I O N H E C T A R E A S E A S % O F A R A B L E L A N P, S E E T A B L E l-l A N P CH. 1, F-N. IZ. ANP 14. === [PDF page 248] === with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. C O M P A R E? WITH P L A N T A T IO N FIG. 7 - 2. P N I VOTE E Y 5 U B P I STK1CTS H E C T A R E A G E A S A P E R C E N T A G E OF T O T A L A R A B L E LANP. •frPNJ PLAN&TION LANP VOTE 50 Q 100 SUBP1STRICTS 45 90 A. S I P A M A N I K 80 40 B. P O L O K B A T U N A N G G A R C. S I A N T A R 70 35 P. B A L A T A E. B O S A R M A L I G A S 30 60 F. B A N P A R G. T A N A H P J A W A 50 H. P O L O K P A N R I B U A N I. PANE 40 J. S I L A U K A H E A N K. R A J A KAHEAN L. S I L I M A K U T A M. P U R B A 20 N. P A R A P A T O. P O L O K P A K P A M A I A N Q % P N I I VOTE O P L A N T A T I O N S AS °/'0 c LANP P. P O L O K ,ARABLE SILAU <3*. R A J A SUBPISTRICTS S O U R C E S: E L E C T O R A L P A T A F R 0 N \ PEAAER.I N T A H A N P A E K A H T KT. 11 S I M A L U N G U N, P A F T A R.: ___ FOR. P L A N T A T I O N H E C T A K E A G E A S % O F A R A B L E L A N P, S E E T A B L E M A N P C H.I, R N •12 A N P |4. === [PDF page 249] === Lower Simalungun. Despite the fact that 51% of the largely Simalungun Batak population of Upper Simalungun is Protestant, Parkindo*s vote in the region was less than 10%. TABLE 7-2 PARKINDO IN THE 1955 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, BY REGION Parkindo Vote Region Road to Parapat Lower Simalungun Upper Simalungun 15.4 Prot. as % of population N. Tap.Bataks as % of population 64.4% 34.5 51.0 below 60% 30 10 Sourcess Electoral data from Pemerintahan Daerah Tkt. II Simalungun, Daftar:.... Column 2 from Pemerintahan Daerah Tkt. II Simalungun, Lapuran Tahun 1963. p. 115. Column 3 estimated from Column 2 and interview data. By subdistrict the relationship becomes even clearer. For all subdistricts with a substantial North Tapanuli Batak population (over 20% of total subdistrict population) the mean Parkindo vote was 25.0%; for all other subdistricts the mean was 8.8%. The correlation coefficient, measuring the degree of association between the Parkindo vote and the percentage of North Tapanuli Bataks in the subdistrict popu lation was a high.86.3 Electoral and interview data also clearly reveal an inverse relationship between the size of the Parkindo vote and the extent to which a particular area with a sizable North Tapanuli Batak population was characterized by a plantation environment. In other words, in those villages with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 250] === Cfc s c> CQ I< cq o ec 111 fc_ z <c z& o l/l Ml CO o CQ J < < 3 Cl. in CQ O' t— IZ Lli < WI4I o: tf ILJUJU ZUI^ ^PCZ lli LD ^ LLI w i-F O xp, r tUo. tL%51D CD Do III H CiZ ZlL gvAUJh <£30/ oz5 z p Oj<-J D£ III ID Z (A,<iuz J ID 01^-} o z 5\a Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 251] === in which many of the North Tapanuli Bataks were squatters, i.e., their legal claim to their land was in dispute, the vote for Parkindo tended to be small; conversely, in regions where titles to land were not in question, the Parkindo vote was greater. In a North Tapanuli Batak village in sub district Siantar, for example, informants reported a con siderable division in partisan support, the major parties being the PNI, PKI and Parkindo. The principal concern of the villagers, expressed repeatedly in interviews, was the expansion of village rice fields, hemmed in on all sides by the plantations. Many villagers, members of BTI and PETANI, criticized Parkindo for its lack of interest in the problems of the squatter population. In a small town in aubdistrict Tanah Djawa, on the other hand, where land problems were much less pressing, informants reported a large Parkindo vote in 1955 and very little party or organizational activity of any kind in 196^. Interviews in other villages in Lower Simalungun and along the road to Parapat confirmed this general impression. Additional evidence for this hypothesis is provided by comparing "Parkindo support ratios" {% Parkindo subdistrict vote divided by % of North Tapanuli Bataks) in the six Simalungun subdistricts with a large North Tapanuli Batak For these six subdistricts the cor relation coefficient measuring the degree of association be tween the Parkindo support ratios and the percentage of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 252] === "CDO F i e. 7 - 4 P A R K I N D O S U P P O R T R A T I O S " |N SIX S U B P 1 6 T R I C T S WITH A L A R G E N O R TH T A P A N U L I B A T A K P O P U L A T IO N C O M P A K E P W I T H P L A N T A T I O N H E C T A K E A G E AS A % OF T O T A L A R A G L E L A N P FAKKINPO SUPPORT RATIO % PLANTATION LANP 100 5 U E P IS T R 1 C T S 80 80 A. S IA N T A R B. BA LATA Further reproduction prohibited without permission. C. TANAH DJAWA D. POLOK PANKISUAN 40 E. P A N E 30 F. PAR A PAT PARKlNPO S U P P O R T PLANTATION RATIO LANP SU^PISTRICTS. s fiu ^ 5 'E 5:_ELEC/Tc?.R A L - p A T A F R O M P E M E R. N T A H A N P A E R A H TKT. II S I M A L U N G U N, PAFTAK.:.... > P A N ^ Ll ^ > T A K. S A S A P E R C E N T A G E. O F S U & P I S T K I C T P O P U L A T I O N E S T I M A T E D F K o M INTERVIEW P A T A A N D T H E T A & L & O N R E L I G - I O U S A F F I L I A T I O N IN P E M E R I N T A H A N D A E - R A H TKT. II ’S IM A L U NOUN, T A -F-U.P-AN T A H U N 1 9 6 3, p. IIE. P A R K I N P O S U P P O R T R A T I O: °/o P A R K I N P O S U © P ) s r p. l G T V O T E P I V I P E P B Y % O F N O R T H T A P A N U L I P A T A K S IN TH'E S U B D l S T R | O T P O P U L A T I O N. F O R P L A N T A T I O N H E G T A R F A G E A S %, O F A R A B L E - L A N P, S E E T A T S L E | - | A N P CH. I, F.N- 12 ANP 14. === [PDF page 253] === plantation land was -.5^* indicating an inverse relationship "between the two variables. The vote for Masjumi was largely restricted to Lower Simalungun, the only part of the regency with a substantial Santri Moslem population, Masjumi*s vote was highest in subdistricts Bandar (2 9.4$) and Dolok Batunanggar (2^.0#), whose towns of Perdagangan and Serbelawan have the highest concentration of South Tapanuli Bataks in the regency. Sidamanik, where there are few South Tapanuli Bataks (but many Javanese and some Simalungun Batak Moslems), Masjumi's vote was only 7.9% of the subdistrict total. For Lower Simalungun as a whole, the Masjumi percentage of the vote was 19.3#* In the "core area" of Upper Simalungun, inhabited largely by Christian Simalungun Bataks, Ma s j u m i ’s vote was small but corresponded roughly with the proportion of Moslems (mostly Simalungun Bataks) in the population. In Silau Kahean and Raja Kahean, where the Moslem population is large and eth nically diverse (South Tapanuli Bataks, Simalungun 3ataks, Javanese and Coastal Malays) Masjumi did well, with 2 3.0# and 20.6# of the vote. Along the road to Parapat there are few South Tapanuli Bataks; the Moslem population in these subdistricts includes Javanese and smaller groups of Simalungun and North Tapanuli Batak Moslems. The Masjumi percentage of the vote in this region was only 6.7#.5 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 254] === TABLE MASJUMI VOTE IN THE 1955 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, BY REGION Region Lower Simalungun Upper Simalungun Road to Parapat Masjumi Vote Moslems as subdistrict pop. 19.32 22.1 Sources: Electoral data from Pemerintahan Daerah Tkt. II Simalungun, Daftar:.... Moslems as % of total subdistrict population from Pemerintahan Daerah Tkt. II Simalungun, Lapuran Tahun 1963 * p. 115. Without precise (and unobtainable) data on the ethnicity of the Moslem voters of the various subdistricts of the regency, it is not possible to be sure how much of the Masjumi vote can be attributed to the South Tapanuli Bataks. Among the Moslems of Lower Simalungun, according to village inform ants, the Masjumi vs. PNI-FKI division followed closely the cleavage between santri (South Tapanuli Bataks) and abangan (Javanese), although the author found Javanese villages in which a Masjumi vote of as much as 20% was reported. least part of this support may be attributed to the fact that the conflict between santri and abangan is rather less intense in Simalungun than in East and Central Java, despite the added complication of ethnic cleavage. In the predom inantly Javanese villages of Lower Simalungun it is common to find a few South Tapanuli or Simalungun Batak Moslems who serve as the spiritual leaders of their communities. During and since the election campaign, these individuals Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 255] === S U E 5 P I5 T R IC T, COMPARED WITH FIG. IS. THE M A S J U M I VOTE THE PERCENTAGE OF MOSLEMS IN THE SUUPISTRICT POPULATION UJz D Vfl Z ua c-tu tj\/o UJ 'S tuvO-j O tf'li 00 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. §«>tft === [PDF page 256] === 243 have provided a nucleus for Islamic political organizations (both Masjumi and N U ) and have been able to attract a minor ity of the Javanese in their villages to the religious parties.^ in the less densely populated subdistricts of Upper Simalungun and along the road to Parapat, most of Masjumi's support clearly came from non-South Tapanuli Batak Moslems. In the core area of Upper Simalungun in particular almost all of the Masjumi vote was contributed by Simalungun Bataks. Despite these qualifications, it seems clear that on a regency-wide basis the large majority of Masjumi voters were South Tapanuli Bataks concentrated in the subdistricts of Bandar, Dolok Batunanggar, Bosar Maligas, Siantar and Tanah Djawa (whose Masjumi voters accounted for 80# of the total Masjumi vote). Among the remaining parties, Partai Buruh received al most half of its slightly more than 5*000 votes in subdistrict Tanah Djawa, where it had some labor union support. PSI's vote was concentrated in Bandar and Bosar Maligas (together constituting 44# of the total PSI vote) and was based on the small PSI labor unions in those subdistricts. Partai Katholik, with a vote of less than 3*000, was strongest In subdistricts Purba (Simalungun Batak Catholics), Dolok Panribuan, Pane and Tanah Djawa (North Tapanuli Batak Catholics); these four subdistricts accounted for two-thirds of the party’s vote. Finally, almost all of N U ’s 1,673 votes came from the four subdistricts of Bandar, Bosar Maligas, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 257] === Tanah Djawa and Sidamanik, all in Lower Simalungun, Inter views in these subfilstricts indicated that the largest pro portion of NU voters were Javanese and Simalungun Bataks. Siantar city voters seem to have been motivated in their choice of party primarily by ethnic-religious loyalties, with the South Tapanuli Bataks supporting Masjumi, the North Tapanuli Bataks supporting Parkindo and the abangan Javanese favoring the PNI. Unfortunately, a breakdown of the vote by ward was not available (even from the ward heads, who keep few records) but it was clear from conversations with party leaders and others that the North Tapanuli Batak wards (Aeknauli, Sukadame, Kristen Barat, Kristen Timur and Tomuan) were solidly Parkindo, while the South Tapanuli Bataks in Timbang Galung Lama, Timbang Galung Baru and Melaju voted heavily Masjumi. NU*s small vote in Siantar was cast largely by the Simalungun Batak Moslems in the old radja's village in the central city and a tiny group of Coastal Malays in Melaju. The only solidly PNI ward in Siantar was the Javaneseinhabited Bant an, with the Javanese in Melaju and Timbang Galung Baru also voting heavily PNI. By making some rather tenuous assumptions about the population of Siantar at the time of the elections and the likely percentage of PNI voters in the Javanese sections and extrapolating from the election figures which are available, it is possible to conclude that Javanese voters accounted for perhaps 1,000 of the PNI's Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 258] === 245 2,310 votes, with the rest of the party vote probably dis tributed roughly equally (relative to proportion of popula tion) among all other ethnic groups.? In terms of electoral support, the Javanese seem to have been a more important element in the PNI city than in the PNI regency vote, con stituting the largest single ethnic bloc in the party column. The PKI, which received only 445 votes In the city, was unable to break the PNI hold on the Javanese and was able to offer no competition to Parkindo and Masjumi for the support of the Batak Christians and Moslems. A majority of the PKI's vote was probably cast by Javanese members of Communistaffiliated labor unions, with the remainder contributed by North Tapanuli Bataks who had been active in PKI-sponsored revolutionary groups in the late 1940s. The vote for the remaining three parties In Table 5-7 (Partai Katholik, Partai Buruh and PSI) was infinitesimally small. Bases of Partisan Support: PartyMembers Party membership figures, where available, show an eth nic distribution similar to the election results. Current membership in the PNI's regency branch is comparatively well distributed throughout the regency, with an anak tjabang in each of the seventeen subdistricts and ranting in 113 vil lages or groupings of villages. PNI membership in Simalungun according to the General deport issued by the Branch Leader ship Council in 1963, is 7,935* distributed among the sub branches as follows: Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 259] === TABLE 7-4 PNI MEMBERSHIP IN SIMALUNGUN, 1963, HANKED ACCORDING TO % OF TOTAL PARTY MEi'iDJixiSHlP xN EACH ANAK TJABANG Anak Tjabang Tanah Djawa Raja Kahean Siantar D lk• Batunanggar Silau Kahean Purba Dolok Silau Raja Bosar Maligas Pane Silimakuta Parapat Sidmanik Dlk. Panribuan Bandar Dlk. Pardamaian Balata* Total 906 Region 12.8 642 612 133 114 54 460 436 415 38 2 363 325 325 310 Source; Dewan Tjabang PNI Kabupaten Simalungun, Laporan U m u m, July, 1963, p. 9*Balata not included because of a conflict over seating its delegation; its membership in 1963 was less than 5 0. If the 1963 PNI Report accurately reflects the distri bution of party members in the regency, the subdistrict branches in Lower Simalungun contain 4 7.7^ of the total num ber of members, while the branches in Upper Simalungun con tain 4l.8^i (concentrated in Raja Kahean and Silau Kahean, plantation regions outside the “core area" of Upper Simalungun) and those along the road to Parapat 10.4^. In terms of votes at the Regency Party Conference held in 1964 (for which the Report was prepared) anak tjabang from Lower Simalungun were represented by a total of 19 voting delegates, while Upper Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 260] === Simalungun had 20 votes (7 of them in Raja Kahean and Silau Kahean) and the Road to Parapat sub-branches had 8. Compared with the election results, the sub-branches in Upper Simalungun would seem to be relatively larger in proportion to the electorate than those in Lower Simalungun. These membership figures should not be taken too literally, however, as lists of members are kept rather casually and numbers can be Juggled for the benefit of one or another faction at a Party Conference. At the 196^ Conference some questions were raised about the validity of certain anak tjabang lists, particularly those in Upper Simalungun. The author conducted interviews on several occasions with PNI leaders and others in subdistrict Raja, for example, which strongly suggest that PNI strength in the subdistrict is rather less than the number cited in the report. Although no data were available on the ethnicity of PNI regency-branch members, the subi district distribution clearly indicates a mixture of Javanese, North Tapanuli Bataks and Simalungun Bataks. PNI anak tjabang in Dolok Batunanggar and Bandar also contained a number of South Tapanuli Bataks. Membership in the PKI*s regency-level section was dis tributed among eleven party subsections, six of which were located in Lower Simalungun and four of the remaining five in the subdistricts along the road to Parapat. A s of 1 9 6 1 (the only year for which data were available), the PKISimalungun had 160 members, distributed as follows: R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 261] === 248 TABLE 7-5 PKI MEMBERSHIP IN SIMALUNGUN, 1961, RANKED ACCORDING TO % OF TOTAL PARTY MEMBERSHIP IN EACH SUBSECTION Subsection Tanah Djawa Dlk. Batunanggar Pane Bandar Siantar Bosar Maligas Sidamanik S tllmakutaa Balata Dlk. Panribuan Parapat 30 26 19 18 14 12 11 19% 16 12 11 160 100.5 Total Region Source: Data on file in Political Affairs Office, Regency of Simalungun, 1963. The government files from which the above table was compiled included a complete list of the names and occupations of party members, making it possible to prepare the following tables on ethnicity and employment. TABLE 7-6 ETHNICITY AND PKI MEMBERSHIP IN SIMALUNGUN, I96I Ethnic Group* Javanese North Tapanuli Batak Simalungun Batak Karo Batak 80 60 18 37.5 Total 160 Source: See Table 7-5• ♦North Tapanuli, Simalungun and Karo 3ataks are for the most part easily recognizable by their marga names: abangan Javanese names are also readily distinguishable. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 262] === TABLE 7-7 OCCUPATION AND PKI MEMBERSHIP TW qTM^TTTMCTTM 10^1 Occupation Parmer (petanl) Laborer (b u ruh) Trader (pedagang) Other (teacher) 99 55 62.*# Total 160 100.00 Source; See Table 7 -5 « Most PKI subsections were dominated by the members of one ethnic group rather than containing a mixture of groups, tfhat significance may be attributed to this fact is not clear, since the PKI seemed freer of ethnic tension than any other political organization in the region, and membership recruit ment was controlled by the Party Section Committee, which had no conceivable interest in the ethnic purity of party sub sections. The firmest figures available on PNI membership in Siantar city show a distribution comparable to our estimate of the distribution of party vote, with the largest ranting (there are no subdistricts in Siantar, and thus no party anak tjabang) in the Javanese ward Bantan. The three major ethnic groups represented in the city PNI branch are the Javanese, North Tapanuli Bataks and South Tapanuli Bataks, who together constitute about 90% of the membership. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 263] === 250 TABLE 7-3 ETHNICITY A N D PKI MEMBERSHIP IN SIMALUNGUN, BY SUBDISTRICT Subdistrict N.Tap.Batak Total 26 15 12 12 10 30 26 19 18 12 11 60 80 18 160 Tanah Djawa Dlk.Batunanggar ^ane Bandar Siantar Bosar Maligas Sidamanik Slllmakuta Balata Dlk. Panribuan Parapat 28 Total Sources Ethnic Grout? (N) Javanese Sim. Batak Karo B. 11 See Table 7-5. TABLE 7-9 PNI MEMBERSHIP IN SIANTAR, BY WARD Ward Bantan* Timbang Galung Lama Sukadame Tomuan Kristen Barat Kristen Timur Melaju Aeknauli Timbang Galung Baru Kota (Central City) 293 107 97 58 55 42 41 32 30 25 37.6* 13.7 12.4 Total 780 100.0 Source: Data on file in Political Affairs Office, Regency of Simalungun, Nov. 1963. (Heports were made by ranting, in some cases more than one from a ward, and were dated from I96I-I9 6 3.) *Bantan*s total not available in the government files and was obtained from the tjabang secretary, corroborated by the ranting chairman. The tjabang secretary*s membership figures differed from the above in the following wards: Aeknauli-63; Timbang Galung Baru-8 l. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 264] === 251 TABLE 7-10 ETHNICITY A N D PNI MEMBERSHIP IN SIANTAR Ethnic Group Javanese^ North Tapanuli Batak South Tapanuli Batak Simalungun Batak Karo Batak Other and Not Cleax*^ 376 208 59 17 79 **■8.22 26.6 10.1 Total 780 100.1 Source; See Table 7-9♦All 293 party members In Bantan assumed to be Javanese. ♦♦The residual category in the table is almost wholly composed of individuals with purely Islamic names (e.g. Abdul K o h a r, Mohammad J u s u f ) who could be South Tapanuli Bataks, Javanese, or Moslems from other parts of Sumatra or other islands. According to party officials, most of these individuals are of South Tapanuli origin (52 of them live in Timbang Galung Lama and Malaju, where the ranting party leaders are, with only one exception, South Tapanuli Bataks). South Tapanuli Bataks thus constitute perhaps 15^ of the city party's membership. By ranting, the ethnic affiliations of party members show a rough comparability with the distribution of ethnic groups throughout the city. The North Tapanuli Bataks con stitute the bulk of party membership in those wards in which their ethnic group is predominant (Aeknauli, Kristen Barat, Kristen Timur, and to a lesser extent Sukadame and Tomuan), aa do the South Tapanuli Bataks in their wards (Timbang Galung Lama and Melaju) and the Javanese in theirs (Bantan and Timbang Galung Baru, although in the latter ward the Javanese proportion of the population is considerably less than their percentage of party members). The few Simalungun Bataks in the party axe mostly from Sukadame and Kota, while the Karo Bataks are concentrated in Tomuan. LReproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 265] === 252 TABLE 7-11 ETHNICITY A N D PNI MEMBERSHIP IN SIANTAR, BY WARD (#) Ward N.T.B,• Aeknauli Sukadame Kristen Barat Kristen Timur Tomuan T.G. Baru T.G. Lama Bantan Melaju Kota 100# 57 87 83 38 Jav. 17 93 21 100 22 S.T.B. Sim.B. Karo 30 16 10 22 71 Total 100# (32) 100 (97) 100 (55) 99 100 (58) 100 (30) 101 (107) 100 (293) 100 96* (25) 71 32 12 Source: See Table 7-9. "All other and not clear" in Table 7-10 are here assumed to be South Tapanuli B a t a k s. ♦One member of the party in Kota is from Kalimantan (Borneo). According to the government data, petty traders and small businessmen are the largest occupational group in the PNISiantar, followed by white-collar employees (mostly govern ment officials and teachers In government and private schools) and laborers. PNI members in Bantan (for whom occupational data were not available) are mostly laborers and petty traders. TABLE 7 -1 2 OCCUPATION A N D PNI MEMBERSHIP IN SIANTAR (EXCLUDING BANTAN) Occupation Trade/Small Business White Collar Laborers Students Farmers Other 175 120 93 86 36# 25 19 18 Total ^37 101 Source: See Table 7 - 9. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 266] === In 1963 the PKI-Siantar claimed, a membership of 135* with an additional 270 candidate-members• According to govern ment files (which were not broken down into subsections or groups) PKI membership in 1961 was 100. 3ataks and Javanese represented 9^ North Tapanuli of the membership, and laborers constituted the largest economic group. TABLE 7-13 ETHNICITY AND PKI MEMBERSHIP IN SIANTAR, 19^1 Ethnic Group North Tapanuli Batak Javanese South Tapanuli Batak Slmalungun Batak 57 37 Total 100 Sources Data on file in Political Affairs Office, Regency of Simalungun. TABLE 7-1^ OCCUPATION AND PKI MEMBERSHIP IN SIANTAR, 1961 Occupation Laborer Trader Artisan (tukang) Parmer Teacher 54 22 13 Total 100 Sources See Table 7-13. The religious parties, as we have indicated in the previous chapter, are not, strictly speaking, membership parties. Rather they correspond more closely to Duverger's Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 267] === 25^ structural model of the cadre party, "a grouping of nota bilities for the preparation of elections, conducting camQ paigns and maintaining contact with the candidates.** For the purpose of reporting membership figures to the govern ment or to higher party officials, the local leadership has tended to assume that all members of the religious community, or at least all those who voted for the party in the 1955 elections, are also party members. Thus Partai Katholik, when required by Presidential edict to submit membership totals in 1961, reported 5*700 members in its Simalungun and Siantar branches. This figure is almost twice as large as the party's vote in 1955 and constitutes one-third of the total iioman Catholic (adult and child) population of the region. Parkindo's reported total was 16,263 members in the regency and 6,123 in the city. The General Heport issued by Parkindo- Simalungun in 1961, after listing the number of members by subdistrict, added this note: "Besides the results given above, there are still many members not yet listed, remembering the results of the 1955 elections in which Parkindo obtained 35*856 v o t e s. N U reported a membership of 1,972 in I96I, 300 more than its 1955 vote. For Masjumi no membership data were available. Of the three religious parties which reported their membership to the government, only NU provided a list of the names of members which could be used to indicate ethnic af filiations. In the regency, Simalungun Bataks and Javanese Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 268] === 255 each, accounted for almost 50% of the NU membership, while in Siantar city 22% of NU members were in the ”Other Moslem” category (mostly Coastal Malays and South Tapanuli Bataks). A high proportion of party members were women, in some sub districts accounting for half the membership. TABLE 7-15 NU MEMBERSHIP IN SIMALUNGUN (BY SUBDISTRICT) AND SIANTAR, 1961 (% ) Subdistrict Simal. Batak Javanese Other Moslem Total Bandar S iantar Tanah Djawa Dolok Batunanggar Bosar Maligas Raja Sldaiaarilk 32% 37 93 36 93 36 62% 51 57 49 100% 100 100 100 100 100 100 (607) (556) (123) Subtotal 49 100 (1,8 3 6 ) Siantar City 22 100 Total 99 (1,972) 47 15 Source: Data on file in Political Affairs Office, Regency of Simalungun. Parkindo*s data were available only in the form of sub district totals. T h e suspicion is strong that no real list of members was ever drawn up; rather, subdistrict Parkindo leaders were merely asked how many members they had, and they in turn asked village leaders to submit a figure. The results of this process were peculiar, as no Parkindo members were listed for Parapat, where the party was strongest in 1955* a figure of 1,371 was given for Raja, a Simalungun Batak sub- Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 269] === 256 district where the party has few supporters (Parkindo*s total vote in Ra j a in 1955 was 901), and Sidamanik was said to have 1,464 Parkindo members, compared to an electoral total of 1,932. Despite these deficiencies, the data indi cate the main source of Parkindo*s strength in Lower Simalungun, especially Tanah Djawa, and along the road to Paira pat. TA3LE 7-16 PARKINDO MEMBERSHIP IN SIMALUNGUN, BY SUBDISTRICT, I96I Subdistrict Tanah Djawa Bandar Siantar Sldamanik Raja Pane Balata Dlk.Batunanggar Purba Dolok Panribuan Bosar Maligas Silimakuta Total Region 6,297 2,147 1,723 1,464 1,371 782 737 543 456 331 211 201 38£ 13 11 16,263 99 Sources Partai Kristen Indonesia (Parkindo), Tjabang S imalungun, Lapuran U m u m. 1961. Ethnicity and Party Leadership The clearest contrast between the secular and religious parties in terms of their relationship to the ethnic cleavages of Simalungun and Siantar may be found at the level of the party and organizational leadership. While representatives of nearly every major ethnic group in the region serve as Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 270] === 257 leaders of the PNI and PKI and their affiliates, the relig ious parties* leadership has tended to be dominated by the members of a single ethnic group. The ethnicity of PNI and PKI leaders at the subdistrict level reflects in general the ethnic composition of the par ticular subdistrict. In Upper Simalungun two-thirds of the PNI anak tjabang leaders are Simalungun Bataks, with the principal exceptions of subdistricts Silimakuta and Dolok Silau, located on the border of Karo regency. Here the leadership has been for many years in the hands of a Karo Batak secondary school principal who has maintained con nections with the large and well-financed PNI branch in Karo. (Since the Revolution the PNI has been the strongest party in Karo; in 1955 it polled 59 % of the vote there.) The following table shows the ethnic affiliations of anak tjabang leaders in Upper Simalungun (leaders are he.re defined as peurty executive officials). TABLE 7-17 THE ETHNICITY OP PNI ANAK TJABANG LEADERS IN UPPER SIMALUNGUN (N) Anak Tjabang Simalungun Batak N.Tao. Batak Karo Batak Other Total Haja Dlk.Pardamaian Purba Silimakuta Dlk.Silau Silau Kahean Haja Kahean Total 20 30 Source: Data on file in office of PNI Simalungun. *Javanese *"*South Tapaunuli Batak. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 271] === In the four subdistricts along the road to Parapat the PNI anak tjabang leadership is primarily North Tapanuli Bataks TABLE 7-13 THE ETHNICITY OP PNI ANAK TJABANG LEADERS IN THE SQBDISTRICTS ALONG THE HOAD TO PARAPAT (N) Anak Tjabang North Tap, Batak Simalungun Batak Total Pane Balata Dolok Panribuan Parapat Total 17 Sources 21 See Table 7-17. In Lower Simalungun North Tapanuli Bataks also represent the largest group in the leadership, partly because they pre dominate In the towns (such as Perdagangan and Tanah Djawa) where the anak tjabang offices are located, while It is more difficult for the Javanese who live on the plantations to come to town for party meetings. A more important reason, how ever, is that the Javanese have tended to concentrate on the organization and activities of the gerakan massa in and near the plantations and have left the subdistrict party branches to the North Tapanuli Bataks. Differences from subdistrict to subdistrict in Lower Simalungun are attributable to the circumstances of party growth In each area. In Bandar, Bosar Maligas and Tanah Djawa the party was formed and led during the Revolution by North Tapanuli Bataks who have maintained their hold on the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 272] === 259 TABLE 7-19 THE ETHNICITY OP PNI ANAK TJABANG LEADERS IN LOWER SIMALUNGUN (N) Anak Tjabang N.Tap. Batak Javanese Bandar Bosar 14a11 gas Tanah Djawa Dlk. Batunanggar Siantar Sidaman ik Total 13 10 Source: leadership. Simal. Batak S.Tap. Batak Total 32 See Table 7-17. In these subdistricts the development of the gerakan massa has largely been in the hands of regency-level leaders who have bypassed the anak tjabang party leadership to work directly with workers and squatters. In Dolok Batunanggar and Sldamanlk there are comparatively few North Tapanuli Bataks (particularly in the towns of Serbelawan and Sarimatondang where the anak tjabang offices are located) and party growth in these areas has been to a great extent an effect of gerakan massa development. In subdistrict Siantar the party was established during the Revolution by a Javanese village head who has been able to maintain control of the anak tjabang leadership while simultaneously organizing PETANI, KBM and Pemuda Marhaenis. Each PKI subsection in Simalungun was led by two party officials, the first and second secretary. In Lower Simalungun two-thirds of the leaders were Javanese, while all Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 273] === but one of the eight subsection leaders in the subdistricts along the road to Parapat were North Tapanuli Bataks. Silimakuta, the only PKI subsection in Upper Simalungun, both of the officials were Simalungun Bataks. TABLE 7-20 THE ETHNICITY OP PKI SUBSECTION LEADERS IN SIMALUNGUN (N) Region N.Tap.Batak Javanese Sim.Batak Total Lower Simalungun Road to Parapat Upper Simalungun 12 Total 22 Source: Data on file in Political Affairs Office, Regency of Simalungun. Data on the ethnicity of PNI and PKI subsidiary organ ization leaders below the regency level were difficult to obtain, as in most cases these organizations do not maintain subdistrict branches and lists of ranting leaders were not available in party or government offices. In general, how ever, KBM and SOBSI leaders are Javanese (as nearly all plantation workers are Javanese), although there is some admixture of North Tapanuli Bataks (from among the whitecollar employees). PETANI chairmen in Siantar, Tanah Djawa and Pane (where there are subdistrict branches) are Javanese, North Tapanuli Batak and North Tapanuli Batak respectively; in these and other subdistricts PETANI and BTI ranting chair men are both Javanese and North Tapanuli Bataks,with the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 274] === 261 former group predominating. Pemuda Marhaenis and Pemuda Rakjat exhibit a similar ethnic mixture, while local KBKB and 3BKB leaders are almost all North Tapanuli B a t a k s. At the regency level party leadership positions in the PNI have been held by members of all the large ethnic groups in the region. From I96I-I963 the mambership of the Branch Leadership Council included two Javanese (first and third chairman), a North Tapanuli Batak Moslem (second chairman), a South Tapanuli Batak (secretary) and a Simalungun Batak (treasurer). The leadership elected in 196^ for the term I963-I965 consisted of two Javanese (first chairman and second secretary), one North Tapanuli Batak Christian (treasurer), two South Tapanuli Bataks (second and third chairman) and one Simalungun Batak (secretary). The gerakan massa leadership has had a heavier concetration of Javanese; PETANI and KBM are still dominated by this group, while Pemuda Marhaenis n o w contains some North Tapanuli Bataks as well and KBKB is entirely North Tapanuli Batak led. PKI party leadership in the regency in 1963 consisted of a North Tapanuli Batak (first secretary) and a South Tapanuli Batak (second secretary). The leaders of the PKI's affiliates were more ethnically diverse than their counter parts in the PNI. In Siantar city, the PNI ranting leadership reflects the general patterns of ethnic distribution of the various wards and of the party membership in the w a r d s • In ten out Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 275] === 262 TABLE?-21 THE ETHNICITY OP PNI GERAKAN MASSA LEADERS, REGENCY LEVEL (N) Gerakan Massa PETANI KBM. KBKB Pemuda Marhaenis Total N.Tap. Batak S.Tap. Batak Total 14 23 Javanese 3 octree: Data on file in office of PNI Simalungun. Wanita Demokrat was in process of reorganization, and an LKN regency-level branch was just being established. TABLE 7-22 THE ETHNICITY OF PKI GERAKAN MASSA LEASERS, REGENCY LEVEL (N) Gerakan Massa Javanese N.Tap. Batak SOBSI ETI Pemuda Rakjat Total S.Tap. Batak Simal. Batak Total 11 Source: Interviews with SOBSI and BTI chairmen. Rakjat from data on file in Political Affairs Office, Regency of Simalungun. Pemuda of twelve ranting (the exceptions are Kota and one of the two ranting in Tomuan, where no one ethnic group has a m a jority of the membership) all or all but one of the leaders are members of the same ethnic group as the majority of the party membership. "Tsee also Table 7- 1L) Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 276] === TABLE 7-23 THE ETHNICITY OP PNI BANTING LEADERS IN SIANTAR CITY (N) Ranting Aeknauli Sukadame I Sukadame II Kristen Barat Kristen Timur Tomuan I Tomuan II T.G. Baru T.G. Lama Bantan Melaju Kota Total N. Tap. Batak Javanese S.Tap, Batak Other Total 31 12 10 56 Source; Data provided by PNI Branch Secretary, ♦Karo. **Simalungun Batak. ♦♦♦Coastal Malay, bora in Kalimantan. Prom 1960-62 the tjabang level party leadership included three North Tapanuli Bataks (first vice chairman, secretary and treasurer), one Javanese (second vice-chairman) and one South Tapanuli Batak (chairman). The n e w leadership, elected at the 1962 Party Conference (actually held in I9 6 3 ) con sisted of three North Tapanuli Bataks (chairman, first vice chairman and secretary), one North Tapanuli Batak Moslem (treasurer) and the Kalimantan-born chairman of ranting Kota (second vice-chairman)• For the PNI gerakan massa in the city, North Tapanuli Bataks provide almost half of the members of all executive leadership boards and are dominant in Pemuda Marhaenis and KBKB. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 277] === 264 TABLE 7-24 THE ETHNICITY OF PNI GERAKAN MASSA LEADERS IN SIANTAR CITY Gerakan Massa N.Tap. Batak Javanese S.Tap. 3atak KBK KBKB Pemuda Marhaenis LKN Total 10 Source: S l mal. Batak Total 21 Interviews with PNI Gerakan Massa officials. Both PKI section leaders in Siantar in 1963-64 were North Tapanuli Bataks. SOBSI's leadership included three North Tapanuli Bataks and three Javanese; its subsidiary organizations SBK3 and SBKA were led by North Tapanuli Bataks and Javanese respectively, while 3 A R B U F I S ' leadership was half North Tapanuli Batak and half Javanese. Finally, Pemuda Rakjat in the city was led by a South Tapanuli Batak, with both North Tapanuli 3ataks and Javanese on the organ ization's leadership council. Both the PNI and PKI have attempted to maintain an eth nic balance in their nominations for seats on the prestigious regency and city Regional Representative Councils. The PNI's delegation in the Simalungun DPRD-GR includes two Javanese, two South Tapanuli Bataks and one Karo Batak. Representatives from "functional groups" affiliated with the PNI Include three Javanese, three Simalungun Bataks and one Karo Batak. In the Siantar DPRD-GR the PNI delegation consists of one Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 278] === 265 South Tapanuli Batak and one Coastal Malaryborn in Kalimantan; PNI functional group representation includes two North Tapanuli Bataks and one South Tapanuli Batak. The PKI's delegation in 3 imalungun included one Javanese, one North Tapanuli Batak and one Simalungun Batak, while the party’s single representative in the Siantar Regional Representative Council was a North Tapanuli Batak. At both the subdistrict and regency/municipality levels, Parkindo has been dominated by the North Tapanuli Bataks. According to the most recent General Report of the party (1961), all Parkindo subdistrict leaders in Lower Simalungun and all but two in the Road to Parapat subdistricts are North Tapanuli Bataks. In Upper Simalungun the leadership is al most entirely Simalungun Batak, but in four of the seven subdistricts of the region (Dolok Pardamaian, Raja Kahean, Silau Kahean and Raja) the party sub-branch has only one of ficial, while all other sub-branch councils in the regency have four or more members. The clear inference, confirmed by interviews and observation, is that the majority of Parkindo sub-branches in Upper Simalungun are one-man opera tions and almost totally inactive. At the regency level, five of the seven members of the party’s leadership council are North Tapanuli Bataks (first and second chairman, treasurer and two members), one is a Simalungun Batak (first secretary) and one a Karo Batak (second secretary). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 279] === TABLE 7-25 THE ETHNICITY OF PARKINDO SUBDISTRICT LEADERS, BY REGION (N) Region N.Tan.Batak Simal.Batak Karlo Batak Total Lower Simalungun Road to Parapat Upper Simalungun 26 21 28 23 Total 68 23 93 Source: Parkindo, Tjabang Simalungun, L a m r a n U m u m, 1961, pp. 1-3. In Siantar city Parkindo has ten branches with a total ranting leadership of 77* of whom 66 axe North Tapanuli Bataks. The remaining ward leaders include seven Karo Bataks (who together constitute the Parkindo leadership of a section of Kristen Timur ward called Kampung Karo), three Simalungun Bataks and one individual from the island of Nias. The city-wide leadership consists of seven North Tapanuli Bataks (first and second chairman, first and second secretary, treasurer and two ordinary members)# Parkindo*s represnntatives in the regency DPRD-GR include two North Tapanuli Bataks and one Simalungun Batak; in the city DPRD-GR all four Parkindo members axe North Tapanuli Bataks. Partai Katholik, with subbranches in both North Tapanuli and Simalungun Batak areas, has had a somewhat more diverse leadership. A t the regency level four party officials are Simalungun Bataks (first chairman, treasurer and two members of the leadership council), three sire North Tapanuli Bataks (second chairman and two members) and one is a Karo Batak Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 280] === 267 (member). In Siantar city, where there are few Simalungun Batak Homan Catholics, all four party leaders are North Tapanuli Bataks. Partai Katholik's two representatives in the regency DISD-GR (the party has no representatives in the Siantar Council) are Simalungun 3ataks. Nahdatul Ulama*s leadership at the ranting level in the regency (NU has no subdistrict branches) is predominantly Simalungun Batak. Of 37 party ranting, Simalungun Bataks are a majority on the leadership council and hold the chair manship of 2 9, with Javanese dominant in seven and one South Tapanuli Batak ranting chairman in a village in Bandar. The regency-wide party leadership council Includes five Simalungun Bataks and one Javanese (the party treasurer). In Siantar city N U ’s seven ranting are each led by a chairman and a secretary. Of the fourteen ranting leaders six are Simalungun Bataks, five are Coastal Malays and three are South Tapanuli Bataks. The city-wide leadership includes seven Coastal Malays (who hold most of the important offices), two Simalungun Bataks, two Javanese and one South Tapanuli Batak. NU*s two DPRD-GR representatives in the regency are both Simalungun Bataks; the p a rty’s Siantar DPRD-GR delegation includes one Simalungun Batak and one South Tapanuli Batak (who did not use his marga name and preferred to be considered a Coastal Malay). For Masjumi, firm data were available for only the regency/municipality level leadership. In Simalungun four Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 281] === 268 of the five members of Masjumi’s leadership council prior to i960 were South Tapanuli Bataks, while one was a Coastal Malay* In Siantar all Masjumi leaders were South Tapanuli Bataks. According to information from party leaders, the great majority of subdistrict and village level Masjumi leaders were also South Tapanuli Bataks. In the Simalungun DPRD Masjumi's delegation consisted of three South Tapanuli Bataks, one Simalungun Batak and one Javanese; its six Slantax DPRD representatives were all South Tapanuli Bataks. As a banned party, Masjumi has no representation in the DPRD-GR. The Party System and the Local Environment: Observations on the Data In Chapter VI we suggested that the secular parties have attempted to build support in Simalungun/Siantar by appealing across ethnic and religious cleavages to the socio-economic class interests of the detraditionalized workers and squatters, while the religious parties have sought the politicization of religious communities. The effects of these strategies in terms of partisan support actually achieved may now be spelled out. A fairly clear picture of differences among the various parties emerges from the data which we have presented. The most important distinction is between the secular parties— PNI and PKI— which have in fact obtained the support of indi viduals of a variety of ethnic and religious backgrounds, and the religious parties— Parkindo, Masjumi, and to a lesser LReproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 282] === 269 degree Paxtai Katholik and NU— which have been restricted not only to particular religious groups but also to particu lar ethnic communities. Beyond the basic similarity in patterns of support for the two secular parties, there have also been important dif ferences. In Simalungun the PKI was almost exclusively a plantation party, while the PNI has been able to build a substantial following in the plantation-less subdistricts of Upper Simalungun and the Road to Parapat as well as in Lower Simalungun. In Siantar city the PNI has built a solid base particularly among the Javanese population but also among a minority of South and North Tapanuli Bataks, while PKI support, at least as measured by the election returns, was neglibible. There are several reasons for the disparity between PNI and PKI support. Of central importance has been the unique identification of the PNI with the nationalist movement and the struggle against the Dutch. The party has been able to gain many supporters, irrespective of direct material inter ests, among those sympathetic to the goals of the Revolution. Although PKI guerrilla units also fought in the Revolution, the party did not share the spec'ial position of vanguard of the nationalist movement generally accorded to the PNI. Moreover, the PKI*s nationalist credentials were considerably discredited by its role In the Madiun Affair of 19^8, an event which was widely known in 3 imalungun/siantar among those involved in the Revolution. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 283] === The PNI's identification with nationalism and with the figure of Sukarno also gave it an air of legitimate authority, of being the inheritor of Dutch power, which attracted many members of the local Western-educated social and governmental elite— and those who looked to the elite for political leadership— particularly during the early post-revolutionary years. The PKI, as the chief opponent of the newlyestablished order, had no significant support among this elite. The PNI has also been the beneficiary of a certain amount of support based primarily on ethnic loyalties. cause of the prominent position of locally influential Javanese in the party leadership, the PNI has become identi fied, especially in Siantar city but also in the regency, as the party of the abangan Javanese. Similarly, in Upper Simalungun the PNI has had the exclusive support of those Simalungun Bataks who oppose the traditional aristocracy on revolutionary grounds but are in favor of a more influential role for their ethnic group in regency political life. The PKI had no comparable ethnic-based appeal In any part of Simalungun or Siantar. Finally, the association of Communism with atheism, a frequent theme in religious party (and PNI) propaganda, severely hampered the PKI*s electoral campaign in 195i*'-55» Among those individuals who were neither plantation workers nor squatters, for whom the party*s strategy had little appeal in any event, the stamp of atheism provided an additional Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 284] === 271 deterrent to PKI support. Even among North Tapanuli Batak plantation squatters who were members of* the PKI*s BTI, there are reported to have been many defections to Parkindo and even to the PNI. Such defections were apparently less com mon among Christian PETANI members, who were not as heavily cross-pressured by religious loyalties and economic interests. Neither inside nor outside the plantation regions has the tarbrush of atheism been effectively applied to the PNI. The transformation of the religious parties into religioethnic parties was not the intention of the party leadership, especially at the national and provincial levels. Even with Simalungun/Siantar, prominent party leaders have re sisted the tendency toward ethnic exclusiveness. Parkindo, for example, has attempted throughout the post-independence period to encompass within itself all of the Protestants of the region, including North Tapanuli Bataks, Simalungun Bataks, and the small group of Karo Batak Christians In Siantar city and subdistrict Silimakuta. The leadership councils of Parkindo have included representatives of all three groups. It has long been evident, however, that the party in the region (and In North Sumatra as a whole) is largely controlled by North Tapanuli Bataks. (but not The Karo Bataks in Siantar city in Silimakuta, where the pull of the PNI has been greater) have been willing to accept the political leadership of Parkindo, which appointed a leading member of their group to the DIBD. The Simalungun Bataks, however, have continued R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 285] === to distrust the North -Tapanuli Bataks who took over their rice fields in the early decades of the century and rose to positions of prominence under both Dutch and Republican rule. Simalungun Batak church leaders and ministers (who were until 1963 affiliated with the North Tapanuli-dominated HKBP church) admit to having spoken a good word or two for Parkindo during the election campaign and claimed still to be symoathetic to the party. Their sympathy did not extend to a willingness to provide a nucleus for parkindo organization in their dis tricts, however, and was outweighed by their bitter criticism of North Tapanuli Batak control of the party. Lay leaders and ordinary members of the Simalungun church were even more outspoken in their opposition to Parkindo. Partai Katholik's support in Simalungun has been more evenly balanced between Simalungun and North Tapanuli Bataks. Despite numerical equality, however, Simalungun Bataks have dominated the party leadership, especially in recent years when both the party and the Catholic Religious Leadership representatives in the DPRD-GR have been Simalungun Bataks. In Siantar city, where almost all Roman Catholics are North Tapanuli Bataks, there has been no possibility of multi ethnic support. Like Parkindo and the Protestants, Masjumi hoped to ap peal to all Moslems in Simalungun/Siantar. With few exceptions, however, its leaders were of South Tapanuli origin. When the national NU organization broke with Masjumi in 1952, a Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 286] === 273 number of Simalungun Batak Moslems (several of whom had par ticipated in the Dutch-sponsored Negara Sumatera Timur, State of East Sumatra, in the late 19^0s and had close ties with the rad^a of Lower Simalungun), politically ambitious but feeling themselves blocked by South Tapanuli dominance of Masjumi, turned to NU to provide them with positions of leadership. The difference between Masjumi and NU was thus almost purely an ethnic one (with pro- vs. anti-Revolution overtones) and had no relation whatever to the m o d e m - k o l o t split which provided the bases of support for the two parties in Java. Nor, apparently, has the limited Javanese support for both Masjumi and NU had modern vs. kolot implications; rather it was based on the prestige of particular village religious leaders and the willingness of the Javanese to accept non-Javanese leadership. Conclusions Prom the complex patterns of partisan support in Simalungun/Siantar three factors emerge as the most critical determinants of party choices ethnicity, religious affiliation and the impact of the plantation environment. Among the South Tapanuli supporters of Masjumi and the North Tapanuli supporters of Parkindo the first two factors are so completely intertwined that it is impossible to assign them separate weights. For many South and North Tapanuli Bataks ethnicity, religion and partisan affiliation have be come coterminous. To be a South (North) Tapanuli Batak means Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 287] === 27A to be a Moslem (Protestant) and a MasJumi (Parkindo) sup porter. Each party thus represents both an ethnic and a religious community. Support for Parkindo in subdistricts dominated by the plantation economy has been significantly less than in plan tation-free subdistricts. The intervening variable here has been the squatter status of many North Tapanuli Bataks. Economic pressure, reflected in the insecurity of land ten ure and the desire to expand village rice fields (which can only be done at the expense of the plantations), has tended to reduce the convertibility of ethnic and religious loyalties into support for Parkindo. The PNI and PKI, appealing directly to the squatters through PETANI and BTI, have been the beneficiaries of the squatter problem. Among the South Tapanuli Bataks, most of whom are petty traders in the small towns of Lower Simalungun rather than plantation squatters, support for Masjumi has not been affected by the appeals of the secular parties (or even by Masjumi's banishment). The two smaller religious parties represent at least a partial separation of religion and ethnicity. Partai Katholik, the party of a small religious minority, includes both North Tapanuli and Simalungun Bataks in its membership. Like Parkindo and Masjumi, however, it has also become to a significant extent the representative of an ethnic segment (Simalungun Bataks in the regency, North Tapanuli Bataks in the city) within the larger religious community. For the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 288] === 275 dominant groups in the party branches, ethnic and religious interests have been fused. NU, on the other hand, represents not a religious minority within Islam but rather two distinct ethnic minorities (Simalungun Batak Moslems, themselves a minority within their ethnic group, and Coastal Malays) who happen to be Moslem. In the distinction between Masjumi and NU the separation of ethnicity from religion is fairly com plete, although it tends to be sharper at the leadership level (where N U ’s leaders are nearly all Simalungun Bataks and Coastal Malays and Masjumi’s leaders were nearly all South Tapanuli B a t a k s ) than among the party members and sup porters (both parties had Javanese electoral support and Javanese members, and Masjumi also obtained many votes from Simalungun Batak Moslems). Support for the PNI is based primarily on the concern of plantation workers and squatters, many of them organized in KBM and PETANI, to improve their economic status, and secondarily on loyalties rooted in common ethnicity and rev olutionary experience, particularly among the Javanese in Lower Simalungun and Siantar city and a portion of the Simalungun Bataks in Upper Simalungun. Religious affiliation has been irrelevant as a factor in PNI support, except in the negative sense that the Javanese, as abangan Moslems, are not generally attracted to Islamic parties. Support for the PKI was limited tothe worker-squatter population and had no ethnic component. Because of the p a r t y ’s association Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 289] === with atheism, religious loyalties have had a pervasive neg ative effect on PKI strength, particularly outside the plantation areas. Finally, the impact of ethnic and religious loyalties on patterns of partisan support has perhaps been most marked in Siantar city. Thrown into close association with a wide variety of individuals of varying ethnic and religious groups, the resident of Siantar strongly identifies with his own com munity. Politically, he supports the party which most closely represents communal interests— Parkindo for the North Tapanuli Protestants, Masjumi for the South Tapanuli santri, PNI for the abangan Javanese. Parties which have no ethnic or religious base and which attempt to cut across communal lines, such as the PKI, have been notably unsuccessful in S iantar. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 290] === CHAPTER VIII PARTY LEADERSHIP: RECRUITMENT AND LINKAGE The differences between the secular and religious parties which we have described in the preceding chapters may also be related to the characteristics of party leader ship at the regency/municipality, subdistrict and village levels. For the PNI and PKI the lack of a substantial "nati ural" base of support related to the ethnic and religious cleavages of the region, the emphasis upon the goal of re gional predominance and upon the worker-squatter strategy to achieve that goal have had important consequences for the recruitment of party and subsidiary organization leadership. First, as we have already pointed out, the leaders of the PNI and PKI come from a variety of ethnic and religious back grounds. Second, a particular type of leader, the profes sional politician who devotes full time to party and organ izational activities, has dominated the leadership councils of the secular parties, especially at the regency/municipality but also at the subdistrict levels. Third, a particular subtype of professional politician, the organizational cadre or activist, has been most successful in rising to higher positions of leadership. Finally, below the subdistrict level 277 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 291] === 278 subsidiary organization and to some extent party leader ship is frequently exercised by individuals whose primary orientation is to the village and whose sense of partisan commitment is weak. Within the secular parties, therefore, the link between supra-ivillage and village leaders (and thus between supra-village leaders and the general membership) is often tenuous and fragile. The religious parties, with the partial exception of NU, faced an entirely different local environment. By the end of the colonial period cohesive religio-ethnic communities were well established in Simalungun/Siantar, with their own organizations and leadership, and lacking only in political spokesmen. The objective of the religious parties was thus simply to provide political leadership to these communities, and for this purpose they required neither an extensive new organization nor the kind of total commitment so necessary for the success of the secular parties. For these reasons few religious party leaders are professional politicians; most have full-time employment outside of politics and engage in partisan activities in their spare time. Kany of them, from the regency to the village level, have achieved a level of education far superior to that of all but a few secular party leaders and had been generally recognized as community spokesmen before they became politically active. They have tended to be recruited from the religious and secular edu cational systems, the government bureaucracy and, to a lesser Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 292] === 279 extent, from the moderately successful entrepreneurial and merchant class in the community. Communication between the regency/municipality, subdistrict and village leadership is much less frequent than in the case of the secular parties. At the same time, because of the shared ethnic-religious bond, the general acceptance of the party leaders as community spokesmen and the already established network of religious organizations on which these parties were built, there is considerable cohesion between the regency/municipality leader ship and the village membership. The Secular Parties Most of the leaders of the PNI and PKI and their af filiates, especially at the regency/municipality but also at the subdistrict level, are professional politicians who owe their stature in the community and their level of income to the positions which they have achieved in the party hierarchy. They come from humble backgrounds, the Javanese as sons of plantation workers or themselves former plantation workers, the North Tapanuli Bataks as migrating farmers or sons of migrants, the South Tapanuli Bataks from a petty trader or religious teacher origin and the Simalungun Bataks from nonaristocratic peasant families. The level of formal education which they have achieved is low, although higher than for the population as a whole. In the early 1950s men with higher eduefctlon and independent standing In the community (doctors, teachers, civil servants) formed a higher percentage of PNI Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 293] === (but not PKI) leadership; by 1955 most of these individuals had left the party’s leadership councils, as they were not willing to compete in the rough-and-tumble world of PNI politics and had little in common with the radical national ist spirit of the more militant revolutionaries. The older generation of secular party leaders, age forty or over, are in fact almost all former revolutionaries, active participants in the struggle for independence against the Dutch. The Revolution was a critical turning point in their lives, for this was when they Joined the party and be came imbued with the nationalist idea or the vision of a Communist society. Originally inspired by revolutionary zeal, they have come to view partisan political activity in the post-independence period as a channel of personal advance ment as well as a means of reaffirming their commitment to the values of their youth. Few of them are much concerned with questions of ideology; the older PNI leaders view their party much more in nationalist than in Marhaenist terms, and the PKI leaders* image of Communism did not seem to extend beyond a vaguely defined utopia of prosperity, equality and social harmony. Both groups were uncomfortable when dis cussing party ideology; their lives clearly revolved around the immediate concerns of the local organization and they were content to leave more fundamental problems to the pimpinan atasan (higher leadership). The youthful leaders of Pemuda Marhaenis, Pemuda Rakjat, KBKB and the various student and cultural organizations are Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 294] === 281 the major exception to this general pattern, as they are of the post-revolutionary generation. These individuals are aspiring professional politicians who have consciously chosen political careers in preference to other possible channels of personal advancement. Particularly among those unable to continue their education beyond elementary or Junior high school and thus enter the bureaucracy or officers* corps of the armed services, party politics is seen as an attractive career which offers an escape from the anonymity of the rural desa or urban kampung. Alternative careers, for example as private entrepreneurs, seem to offer less hope of success and have been somewhat tainted in an ideological environment which has excoriated capitalism as exploitation de 1 *homme par l'homme (Sukarno*s phrase).^- Moreover, partisan political activity satisfies a desire to contribute to nation-building, to follow in the footsteps of the revolutionary generation which preceded them. On the whole, the young PNI and PKI leaders have been more ideologically oriented and less given to compromise with leaders of other parties than their elders. For the PNI it is possible to distinguish three main types of leaders according to the personal styles which they have adopted in their quest for party office; these are the organizational activists, the administrators and the old revolutionaries. Particularly in the regency party, it is the organizational activist who has been most successful. In the early 1950s a number of individuals, mostly Javanese, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 295] === 282 rose rapidly to positions of prominence within the party as a result of their organizational efforts among the plantation workers and squatters. Their strategy was to build what party leaders call a “basis," i.e. a substantial and loyal personal following, among lower level leaders and rank and file members whom they had recruited primarily into the gerakan massa but also into the party itself. These bases are mostly located in Lower Simalungun and are heavily Javanese in membership. The present chairman of the PNI-S imalungun, Umbar Subroto, is representative of the organizational activists. Subroto, a Javanese, was born in Purwokerto, Java in 1917 into a peasant family. After receiving five years of elementary education and two years of teacher training, Subroto left Java in 19^2 and came to Simalungun, where he joined the PNI in 19^5 sutid became a Napindo company commander in Lower Simalungun. In 1950 he was elected to the PNI Branch Leader ship Council in Simalungun and in 1953 led. the organizational efforts of both PETANI and KBM in Lower Simalungun. In 1959 he became the third highest ranking official in the regency party and in 1961 was elected chairman. Subroto is a Moslem, but of the abangan variety, and has little interest either in Islam or in traditional Javanese culture. As a party leader he is most at home in planning “operasi" and cultivating the support of subdistrict and village leaders. Neither an ideologue nor a polished speaker, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 296] === 283 he is uneasy before large crowds and tends to leave detailed explanations of Marhaenism to others. His ambition is to follow in the footsteps of his predecessor and become North Sumatran provincial chairman. T o build and maintain support for his position as party and gerakan massa leader, Subroto has leaned heavily on the Javanese subdistrict and village leaders in Lower Simalungun and on his personal following on the plantations. Other party leaders (both friends and opponents) greatly respect his influence among the Javanese population of the regency. A few other Javanese leaders in the regency PNI have similar bases of support, but these are much smaller numerically and territorially than Subroto's, usually restricted to a few villages, plantation workers* local unions, or at most a subdistrict. Their careers have been closely tied to Subroto*s. In Siantar city the organizational activists are North Tapanuli Bataks who began to exert Influence in Pemuda Marhaenis around i960 and KBKB in 1963* The present chairman of Pemuda Marhaenis and first vice-chairman of the PNISiantar, H.W.D. Tampubolon, is representative of this group. In i960, Tampubolon returned to Siantar after six years in Medan, Djambi and Djakarta (where he had attended PNI cadre courses and become an official of the Djakarta branch of femuda Marhaenis). After securing his control over Pemuda Marhaenis In Siantar, Tampubolon gradually expanded his in fluence over the party ranting in the Christian wards of the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 297] === city, which he was instrumental in reorganizing. In 1961 he became a member of the municipal Regional Representative Council, representing the Youth functional group, and in 19^3 was elected first vice-chairman of the party. In late 1962 another North Tapanuli Batak, Paul Siringoringo, emerged to prominence in the city party by spear heading the newly-formed KBKB organization. The son of a plantation foreman in Karo, he had attended elementary school in Karo and a Muhammad!3ah teachers' training school in Padang Sidempuan (South Tapanuli). During the 1930s Siringoringo lived in Karo, where he was most active in church af fairs (he is a member of the Protestant H K I ), and in 19^5 joined the Karo-based PNI guerrilla group called Naplndo Halillntar, led by Selamat Ginting (now a national-level PNI leader). In 1951 Siringo-ringo moved to Siantar where, with help from Karo Bataks prominent in the city's numerous bus companies, he acquired a few buses and became a nengusaha bis ("Bus entrepreneur"). In 1961 he became a member of the regency DPRD-GR (representing the PNI) and in the same year was elected treasurer of the Siantar PNI (largely because of his financial contributions to the party). The growth of the KBKB in the city was due primarily to Siringo-ringo's efforts, and its leadership consisted mostly of individuals personally loyal to him. (KBKB has had something of the atmosphere of a company union in Siantar, as its non-cadre leaders are mostly from lower management echelons rather than the common Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 298] === 285 laborer group). Siringo-ringo was also active in the partyranting in Sukadame and Tomuan, and in 19&3 was elected chairman of the PNI-Siantar. The second type of PNI leader, the administrator, has had more limited but still substantial success in the party. The administrator’s strategy is one of non-participation in factional conflicts and strict devotion to party duty, comp arable perhaps to the role of the non-political civil servant exemplified by the British bureaucrat. When combined with an aptitude for record-keeping, financial management and general administrative ability, this strategy produces secondrank leaders who rise in party office despite changes in the chairmanship and their lack of a basis. A few North Tapanuli Bataks in the regency and municipality parties and rather more South Tapanuli Bataks (there are relatively few South Tapanuli Batak,-PUT members in the regency, and they are not as heavily concentrated in particular sub-branches, so that an aspirant South Tapanuli Batak politician finds it dif ficult to build a basis of his own in the PNI) are repre sentative of this type. The most successful of the administrators is Zainuddin Hasan, until 1963 chairman of the PNI-Siantar. The son of a moderately well-to-do South Tapanuli Batak trader, Hasan was educated in Siantar and Bandung (HIS and MULO). In 19^5 he joined the PNI and during the Revolution was a Napindo leader in Simalungun and a party propagandist in Atjeh, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 299] === 286 Tapanuli and West Sumatra. With only a small basis among the Moslem Bataks in Siantar, Hasan rose in the party hier archy as a propagandist and administrator under the wing of Abdullah Jusuf (then regency PNI chairman, now North Sumatran chairman), who selected him to organize the Siantar branch when it was established in 1957* For the following five years Hasan led the party without substantial opposition, devoting most of his time to the affairs of city government. The third type of party leader, the old revolutionary, has been the least successful in winning high party office. The lack of success of this group stems from their inability or unwillingness to expand the base of support which they acquired during the Revolution. Unlike the organizational activists or the administrators, the old revolutionaries are often part-time politicians, devoting most of their time to commercial activity or regular employment as school teachers or civil servants. Typical of the old revolutionaries sire the North Tapanuli Batak anak t jabang chairmen in Lower Simalungun and the R o a d to Parapat who built the party branches in their subdistricts during and immediately after the Revolution. As we indicated earlier, the development of the gerakan massa, carried out by cadres under the direction of the regency leadership, served to undermine the local authority of the old revolutionaries, who now command the direct al legiance of only a part of their membership. In some areas, in fact, their continuance in office rests on the sufferance of the regency party chairman, Subroto. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 300] === The most prominent Simalungun Batak PNI leader in the regency, Aloysius DJulan Purba, is in most respects an old revolutionary. Purba was born in Tapanuli around 1920 into a Simalungun Batak Christian non-aristocratic family and raised in Upper Simalungun and Siantar, where he received most of his formal education (five years elementary school). After the Revolution he attended a MULO school in Djakarta and Junior high school in Siantar, but did not graduate. TALA. PETA during the Japanese occupation, Purba Joined the PNI In 19^5 and was a leader of Barisan Harimau Liar in Upper Simalungun during the Revolution. Although he has lived most of his adult life in Siantar, he considers Haranggaol in subdistrict Purba his home and has his base of support within the party in the subdistrict branches of Upper Simalungun. massa. He has no ties with any of the party gerakan In the late 1950s he was a member of BAPOST (Badan Penuntut Otonom Sumatera T i m u r. Body to Demand East Sumatran Autonomy), a non-party organization of the indigenous peoples of East Sumatra (Simalungun Bataks, Karo Bataks and Coastal Malays) which demanded the separation of East Sumatra from Tapanuli (see Chapter X). Prom 1959-61 Purba was second secretary of the PNI Branch Leadership Council and since 1961 has been a member of the regency DPRD-GR, representing the Leglun V eteran, of which he was chairman for a time. Purba differs from the North Tapanuli Batak old revolutionaries in thfcthe has actively sought higher party office, challenging Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 301] === rather than acquiescing to the dominant role of the organ izational activists. His local prestige and chances for financial success are also more closely tied to the party, as he has no regular employment beyond his membership in the DPRD-GR. Leadership styles in the PKI are not strictly comparable to those in the PNI, as advancement within the Communist party was unrelated to periodic elections and the building of personal bases. Moreover, there was a fairly strict separation between party and subsidiary organization leader ship; at least within Simalungun/Siantar, success in a party affiliate did not normally lead to a position in the party itself. Since the reorganization of the party in the early 1950s (there were at that time two groups calling themselves PKI) PKI leadership in Simalungun and S iantar has been relatively stable. In the regency only two individuals have held the post of first secretary since 1952, and one man ha« led the party in Siantar since its separation from the regency branch in 1957. Like the PNI leaders, those individuals prominent in the PKI in 1963-64- were of the revolutionary generation and were full time politicians. They were not organizational activists, however, and seemed to have little connection with the leaders of the party affiliates, who were more closely directed from Medan and Djakarta. On the basis of inter views with PKI leaders and observation of their activities, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 302] === 289 it seems apparent that their selection as leaders was de signed to provide a certain image of the party to nonCommunists and potential PKI supporters— an image of devotion to the nationalist ideals of the Revolution and of moderation in politics, religion and personal style of life. (Sumatrans were also given preference over Javanese, presumably because the PKI was generally regarded by Sumatrans as Javanesedominated. ) The party organization was thus primarily a facade intended to provide respectability; the real work of the PKI in the region was performed by the affiliated organizations• The first secretaries of the PKI in Siantar and Simalungun, K. Sitanggang and Abel Tampubolon, both North Tapanuli Bataks, exemplified the spirit of moderation. Sitanggang was born in Tapanuli in 1916, the son of a teacher in a missionary school, and received his formal education (HIS, MULO) in Medan. In 1936 he moved to Siantar, where he worked as a teacher and became a member of Indonesia Muda, the nationalist youth organization. During the Revolution he was active in the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) and a variety of guerrilla groups and fled to Tapanuli when the Dutch occupied Simalungun. He claims not to have joined the PKI until 1951» in that year he was also selected as PKI first secretary for Simalungun/Siantar, giving up this post the following year to Sumarao Hasibuan, a former prominent PNI leader who apparently left the PNI for personal rather Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 303] === 290 than ideological reasons. In 1957» with the formation of a PKI Section in Siantar city, Sitanggang became its first secretary. Tampubolon, the son of a lay leader in the Batak Protestant Church, was born in Tapanuli in 1905 and educated (five years elementary school) at a mission school in Siantar. In the 1930s he was employed as a chauffeur on a plantation in subdistrict Tanah Djawa, and was active in the nationalist movement there as a leader of Partindo and Gerindo. In 19*4-6 Tampubolon joined the PKI because, he said, it was a "move ment that would help the people." Prom 1950 to 1959 he was PKI first secretary in Tanah Djawa, and in the latter year became first secretary of the PKI-Simalungun. Both Sitanggang and Tampubolon are Christians (HKBP and HKI respectively) but by their own admission only infrequently attend church. Examination of their speeches in the regency and city DPBD and DPRD-GR conversations with them and with others about them, revealed little evidence of political fanaticism. Both men lived simply but comfortably (Sitanggang in a government-provided house) and were continually con cerned to demonstrate that their leadership of the party did not make them different from other members of the community or the local political elite. Like other Communists, however, they were for the most part rejected by members of their ethnic group, who were suspicious of the hidden motives be hind attendance at church services or even adat functions. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 304] === They were also kept at armfs length by non-Communist poli ticians and government officials, who saw them not so much as individuals and members of a common political elite, but as automatons who carried out to the letter instructions from their party superiors. At the same time they were not regarded as "true** Communists, i.e. committed ideologues, but rather as men who used the party for personal career reasons and were in turn used by the party to promote its current goals in the region. Several experienced non-Communist politicians expressed to the author the opinion that in the event of a Communist takeover in Indonesia, Sitanggang, Tampubolon and other local PKI leaders would quickly be "retooled” (a euphemism for demotion or dismissal). The leaders of SOBSI, BTI and Pemuda Rakjat were the organizational activists of the PKI in Simalungun/Siantar. In contrast to the moderation and embourgeoisement of the party leadership, the leaders of the affiliated organizations were more rigidly ideological and proletarian in their style of life. Often they, like the party leaders, had lived most of their lives in Simalungun, but many were cadres im ported from Medan or other plantation areas in East Sumatra. Taat Pohan, until 19&3 chairman of SOBS I-Simalungun and K. Sllitonga, chairman of BTI-Simalungun, are representative of the FKI's organizational activists. Pohan, a South Tapanuli Batak born in 1923 in the regency of Deli/Serdang, East Sumatra, was the son of a Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 305] === plantation clerk. After graduation from a trade school in Tebing Tinggi in the late 1930s, he worked as a plantation clerk in the regency of Asahan, East Sumatra, and in 19^5 joined the youth organization Pesindo and the SOBSI af filiate SAR3UPRI. After the Revolution he was first a SARBUPRI cadre and then chairman of SOBSI in Asahan. 1956 he was sent by the SOBSI provincial leadership to Simalungun, where he was assigned the task of reactivating the local organization (during the election campaign, some SAR3UPRI leaders, mostly at the ranting level, had formed an alternative SARBUPRI organization which offered candidates of its own rather than give support to the PKI). In 1961 Pohan led the SOBSI strike against government-owned planta tions in Simalungun, for which he and other SOBSI-SARBUPRI leaders (over 200 in all) were briefly arrested by the mili tary. In 1963 Pohan left Simalungun to become 2nd vice chairman of the provincial SOBSI leadership council; during the period of this study he frequently returned to Siantar and apparently continued to be closely connected with the day-to-day conduct of the organization’s affairs. Silitonga, a North Tapanuli Batak, was born in Pane Tongah in 1920 and, like Pohan, had a trade school education. His exposure to the PKI began in 19^5 when he joined the Communist-led Barisan Merah. In 1950 he became a BTI cadre in Tanah Djawa, then chairman of BTI in the subdistrict, and finally in 1958 chairman of BTI-Simalungun, replacing an Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 306] === 293 open PKI member who had been transferred by the provincial BTI leadership to Tapanuli. Like all other SOBSI and BTI leaders interviewed, Pohan and Silitonga denied affiliation with any political party. Their public statements, the resolutions which they framed and the vocabulary which they used to describe Indonesia’s and Simalungun*s current problems, however, indicated a greater degree of facility with Marxist terminology and categories than was possessed by the party leaders. In con trast to Sitanggang and Tampubolon, neither Pohan nor Silitonga were "public men," appearing frequently before non-Communist audiences or spending time in idle conversation with other politicians in the offices of local government. When in Siantar, Pohan was most often in the SOBSI office, reading reports and discussing organizational affairs; Silitonga spent much of his time making the rounds of BTI ranting on the plantations. Like the leaders of PETANI, KBM and KBKB, they were most at home in their role as activists and organizers. In the final analysis, it is the similarities rather than the differences between the PNI and PKI leaders which are most striking. Despite differences in partisan affiliation and ideological orientation, their careers and even their political views are remarkably similar. Almost all of them have had some formal education (though not enough to prepare them for careers as civil servants or licensed school teachers) Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 307] === 29^ and some exposure to various parts of Sumatra or beyond. Often in interviews they would spontaneously refer to personal ignominies which they had suffered at the hands of the Dutch (in contrast to the leaders of the religious parties— Parkindo, Partai Katholik and NU in particular— who almost never mentioned such experiences). Although several of them had spent at least part of their student years in religious schools, none were religious leaders in their communities. Nearly all of them had eagerly joined revolutionary guerrilla organizations as soon as they were formed, and many had been guerrilla leaders• The PNI and PKI leaders also shared a common attitude toward the role of political leadership and organization in revolutionary and post-revolutionary Indonesia. They strongly believed that ethnic and religious differences were irrelevant to the problems of a modern— or modernizing— society, and they had little use for the traditional and religious leader ship of the region. This attitude was of course particularly strong among the abangan Javanese leaders, few of whom had any interest in Islam as a religion, let alone as a basis for political organization, but it was also characteristic of the North Tapanuli Bataks and members of other ethnic groups who became PNI and PKI leaders. be radically transformed, If Indonesia were to they argued, religious and tra ditional leaders and institutions would have to give way to a political organization which could win the support of all the Indonesian peonle, regardless of religion or ethnicity. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 308] === 295 What they meant by a radical transformation they could define in terms of ultimate goals— general prosperity, social justice, an end to economic exploitation, the creation of a unified nation— but only vaguely in terms of specific means. During the devolution the means had seemed clear enough— victory over the Dutch would more or less automatically usher in a new world. In the 1950s and 1960s the complex ities of nation-building and their roles as activists and implementers rather than as policy-makers led them to accept the simple notion that party victory was the key means toward the realization of the new Indonesia. The specific content of party policy and ideology, which in any event they played no part in formulating, could thus be safely left to others. Their memories of why they had joined one guerrilla group rather than another were often cloudy, but when probed the common responses were that "Laskar X was the only one in my area," or "I followed the advice of a friend." Aside from their preference for secular as opposed to religious political organization, therefore, their initial choice seems to have been largely accidental, that is, unrelated to party ideologies• Once having joined a guerrilla organization and having discovered the channels for upward mobility which its af filiation with a political party provided, the PNI and PKI leaders tended to stick with their original choice. The longer they remained within the party and the more successful Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 309] === 296 they were in achieving their personal political ambitions, the firmer their tie to the party became. Ideological com mitment, the Marhaenization and Communization of the leaders came both chronologically and in order of importance after the initial loyalty to the party as an organization which provided them with a channel of upward mobility had been established. (Courses in ideology were a specific feature of leadership training in the PKI; more diffuse indoctrina tion, including speeches by higher party leaders, reading of party pamphlets which are only infrequently distributed, etc have been more characteristic of the PNI). In sum, the leaders of the PNI and PKI- in Simalungun/ Siantar in 1963- 6^ represented a single political elite. In their lack of higher education, their revolutionary mil itancy, their opposition to traditional and religious polit ical leadership and organizations, and in their status as professional politicians they were a unique group. What distinguished the leaders of the one party from those of the other was not so much ideological commitment as It was organizational loyalty. So far in this chapter we have been discussing the active, professional PNI and PKI politicians found primarily at the regency/municipality and to some levels. extent subdistrict There is another group of leaders, however, numer ically far larger than the above, who are of immense im portance to the current and future strength of the secular Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 310] === 297 parties. These are the village-level leaders who provide the link between the membership and the professional poli ticians. PKI local leaders (actually at the subdistrict rather than the village level) shared with their superiors in Siantar a career orientation (although many of them had full-time employment outside the party) and a hope for future status through positions of party leadership. Because of the careful screening of potential party members and leaders and the intensive ideological indoctrination, they were con sistently and unequivocally loyal to the party. Most PNI ranting leaders are also thoroughly committed to their party, although they do not normally share the career orientation of the higher level leaders. In part their loyalty has been based on the identification of the PNI with the nationalist movement and the party's appeal to those who supported the devolution. Another advantage of the PNI has been the continued support given by many village Javanese to the Javanese regency and subdistrict leaders of P2TANI, KBM and the party itself. Based fundamentally on common ethnicity and the general respect won by the PNI leaders during the Revolution, this tie has been assiduously cultivated and, in recent years, expanded to include a large group of young Javanese cadres. In Siantar city, the high status of a Javanese school teacher and prominent PNI leader has been primarily responsible for the support given to the party in the Javanese wards, and a similar pattern of support Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 311] === explains the loyalty of the smaller group of South Tapanuli Bataks. When these leaders have disappeared from the scene, the strength of the party in Siantar may be somewhat problematic. In Upper Simalungun and among the non-squatter North Tapanuli Bataks in the small towns of Lower Simalungun and along the road to Parapat PNI support has depended neither on personalities nor on appeals to material interests, but rather on disaffection from the locally dominant social and political elites. Those Simalungun Bataks, to some extent nationalistically inclined, who oppose traditional authority and the dominance of the church in village life have found a congenial home in the PNI and have seen their leaders rise to regency-level office in the party. Parkindo, led by North Tapanuli Bataks, has been unattractive even to those Simalungun Bataks most involved In the affairs of the church. Similarly, many North Tapanuli Bataks with a measure of sec ular Western education and occupational status not dependent on the HKBP church and church-school hierarchies (e.g. public school teachers, government officials, some private entrepreneurs) have tended to resent the pervasive influence of the HKBP and Parkindo. These Individuals and their almost entirely town-based followings have chosen to affiliate politically with the PNI, a powerful alternative hierarchy which provides them with organizational backing in their opposition to the local religious leadership and at the same time does not involve a total rejection of community values. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 312] === 299 Neither of these groups has been attracted to the Communist Party in any significant numbers, since PKI membership results in virtual ostracization from local society. Since no other party of any national stature can provide equivalent support, and since many of the local leaders have developed firm loyalties to the party during and since the Revolution, the PNI seems likely to continue to attract minority elements among the Simalungun and North Tapanuli Bataks in these areas. At least some PNI ranting leaders, however, exhibited only weak commitments to the party. This was particularly apparent in Siantar city, where a number of North Tapanuli Batak ward heads Joined the party and became its ranting leaders in the late 1950s and early 1960s as the PNI gained ascendancy In municipal government. Local PNI leadership positions served to strengthen their hand in dealing with the PNI mayor and the PNI vice chairman of the DFRD. These ranting leaders were quite capable of shifting with the political winds, as several of them did in 1964 when they wrote letters of support for a non-PNI mayoralty candidate actively and indeed passionately opposed by the branch party leadership. In contrast to the party leadership, village-level sub sidiary organization leaders are frequently only loosely connected with and intermittently loyal to the party. Their primary orientation is to their village, and they affiliate with an organization in order to further specific village Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 313] === interests or to enhance their own political influence among their followers within the village. Thus a panitia tali air (irrigation committee) will become a ranting of BTI or PETANI because these organizations have influence with the govern ment or provide protection if the villagers decide illegally to expand their rice fields at the expense of the local plan tation. Similarly, a plantation worker influential among his fellow workers may join SARBUPRI or KBP in order to gain the necessary political resources to make demands upon the plantation administration and simultaneously to solidify his own local power by meeting the expectations of his followers. If the party is unable to meet their demands these leaders are likely to seek support elsewhere. In the most extreme case related to the author, a local leader in Tanah Djawa who had a substantial following among bus company workers had been in and out of PS I, Masjumi and PKI labor unions be fore he joined the PNI's KBKB in 196^. The PNI and PKI have of course been aware of the tenuous loyalties of village-level leaders and their followers and have paid considerable attention to ideological indoctrination and to the placing of regular party cadres In key positions on local leadership councils. These efforts have met with only limited success, howwver, as an examination of the recent history of labor unions in the region will show. Membership in the P N I ’s KBM Simalungun branch, as of 1963, was ^, 092. This figure represents a considerable Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 314] === 301 drop in the two years since the Conference of 1961, which reported a KBM membership of 10,776 (according to the organ ization's chairman— the report itself was not available). The reasons for this decline are related to (1) a split in the national KBKI (as the PNI labor union was called until 1963) leadership which resulted in the formation of two separate organizations, one independent of party control and under the influence of the Minister of Labor (this group retained the name K B K I ), the other remaining under the PNI (and changing its name to KBM) and (2) the emergence in late 1962 of a new labor organization, SOKSI (Sentral Organisasi Karyawan Sosialis Indonesia, Central Organization of Socialist Employees of Indonesia), a "company union" led in East Sumatra by plantation administrators and retired army of ficers and unaffiliated with any political party. The impact of the KBM-KBKI split in Simalungun was limited to a few plantations, as only one PNI labor leader of any prominence in the regency threw in his lot with the Minister of Labor. SOKSI, however, at least in part through a policy of providing gifts of clothing and other commodities to potential leaders and members combined with threats of transfer to less at tractive employment, succeeded in a very short time in be coming one of the largest labor organizations in Simalungun, with a claimed membership of over 11,000 in April, 1964.3 KBM has been severely weakened on many plantations by the development of SOKSI. Although SOBSI's membership figures Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 315] === 302 do not indicate a similar decline, conversations with union leaders of all political persuasions and visits to various plantations (not to mention S03SI*s furious anti-SOKSI prop aganda) suggest that its membership loss has been at least as great as KBM*s. In Siantar city, the establishment of SOKSI in the two large government-run factories (hemp and paper) ended both KBM and SOBSI organizational efforts there. The defection of the two largest KBM affiliates in the city (locals in the Public Works Department of the city government and in the privately-owned match factory) to the KBKI has almost obliterated KBK's Siantar branch. The extent of the decline of both KBM and SOBSI illus trates the continuing dependence (despite more than a decade of organizational effort) of both organizations on the sup port of local leaders whose partisan affiliation is based on pragmatic and often temporary considerations. And, to the degree that village PNI ranting leaders and members have entered the party via the gerakan massa, linkage within the party itself is also tenuous. As the emergence of SOKSI has so dramatically demonstrated, the fragility of loyalties among the worker-squat ter population of Lower Simalungun has been the most critical weakness of the secular parties. The Beligjous Parties The leaders of the religious parties at the regency/ municipality and subdistrict levels are neither organizational Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 316] === activists, administrators, nor even, in many cases, old revolutionaries. Since these parties have not been oriented toward the development of a mass base tied to the organiza tion by the services which it performs, the skills of the activist have not been in demand. Similarly, since party organization is minimal, with no party headquarters other than the home of the chairman, few formal meetings of either leaders or the general membership and almost no activities for which funds must be obtained or distributed, the religious parties require little in the -way of administration. Finally, at least two of the four religious parties— Parkindo and Partai Katholik— emerged in Simalungun/Siantar not only to contribute to the winning of national independence but also to protect the interests of the religio-ethnic community and of particular elite groups who were in some measure dis advantaged by the excesses of the Revolution. This is not to argue that the religious parties were in their inception anti-independence or pro-Dutch. On the contrary, as organizations they (with the exception of NU, which did not exist in the region until 1953) supported the Proclamation of Independence and participated in the Revolu tion with guerrilla and para-military forces of their own. At the same time, a substantial portion of their leaders in 1963-6*4-, although contemporaries of the leaders of the secular patties, had been either politically inactive or only casual or intermittent freedom fighters in the 19*4-5-^9 period. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 317] === few of them (particularly in the case of N U ) had been sup porters of the Dutch-created State of East Sumatra, and only a small number had been highly committed revolutionaries of the type most commonly found in the secular parties. The leaders of the religious parties in Simalungun/ Siantar are essentially the political spokesmen of religious and ethnic communities. They are men of independent stature, m o d e m education and employment who were active in the affairs of the church or religious organizations before they became politically active. Their acceptance of positions of party leadership has had the effect both of legitimizing the party as the principal articulator of community interests and of establishing them more firmly within the larger intra-com munity elite while requiring, in the absence of elections, only minimal levels of political activity. One of the most striking differences between the secular and religious parties is the latter*s almost complete lack of youthful leadership. While the secular parties have many cadres of the post-revolutionary generation, not only in the gerakan massa such as Pemuda Marhaenis and Pemuda Rakjat but in the party organization as well, almost no religious party leaders are under the age of forty. Their youth organizations, even at the university level, are either largely inactive (e.g. Parkindo*s GMKI at Nommensen University) or led by the older generation of party leaders (e.g. NU's Pemuda A n s o r ). This absence of youthful leadership is Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 318] === 305 indicative, not of a rejection of the religious parties by the younger generation, but rather of differences in the nature of leadership recruitment between the two types of parties. Instead of rising to positions of leadership after years of cadre activity (as in the case of the secular parties) the leaders of the religious parties have generally been coopted into leadership positions after having attained a measure of success in non-political activities. Leader ship recruitment has thus tended to be lateral (from the community) rather than vertical (upward within the party). Since the religious parties do not, therefore, provide chan nels of social and financial mobility, the ambitious young political careerist has turned instead to the PNI or PKI and their subsidiary organizations, where examples of the suc cessful cadre abound. The frustration of activist-minded youth was exemplified by the North Tapanuli PNI cadre in his twenties who, explaining to the author why he left P a r k i n d o ’s youth organization for Pemuda Marhaenis, said that “all they ever do is pray and sing hymns. Nhat we need is action!M The majority of santri Moslem and Christian youth, however, seem as committed to the religious parties as their fathers. Efforts by the P N I ’s GMNI and the P K I ’s CGMI to organize at Nommensen University, for example, have been almost totally ineffective. Although Parkindo*s GMKI rarely had meetings and many of the students could not name the organization’s leaders, nearly all considered themselves GMKI members or supporters. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 319] === With these introductory remarks, let us turn more specifically to an examination of the leadership of the four religious parties, Parkindo was established in Simalungun/ Siantar in 19^5 by North Tapanuli Batak Protestants, most of whom were members of the HKBP church. The goals of the Parkindo leadership of 19^5 were threefold— to contribute their efforts to the struggle for independence, to provide protection for themselves and the Christian community as a whole and to attempt to moderate the radicalism of the Hevolution through participation in region-wide revolutionary institutions. These early leaders were government officials, school teachers (predominantly in HKBP schools) and private entrepreneurs. As a group they were well educated by the standards of the time, spoke Dutch, and patterned their life styles after those of the Dutch. In the radical atmosphere of the period, they appeared to many (particularly non-North Tapanuli Bataks) by virtue of their partial assimilation to Dutch culture as at best lukewarm to the goals of the Hevolution. Caught up in the spirit of the Social Revolution, some of the more fanatic guerrillas in such groups as Barisan Harimau Liar and Pesindo (not to mention those individuals whose motivation was simple looting) murdered or confiscated the belongings of anyone who looked prosperous, who seemed to have personally benefitted from the colonial period. Moreover, several incidents occurred, in particular the assassination of the wife and child of a prominent Batak Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 320] === Christian doctor in Siantar, which were in some quarters attributed to Moslems bent on precipitating a holy war against the Christian community. As the Christian leaders viewed this situation and the vacuum of authority which permitted such threats to their personal and group security, the only solution was to create political and para-military organizaj tions of their own. tfith the return of the Dutch to Simalungun, Parkindo was temporarily disbanded. Some of its leaders, like those of the secular parties, fled to the Republic-controlled Tapanuli highlands, but most remained behind and continued in their former occupations. label of co-(operator) This latter group, despite the applied to them by the non-co secular party leadership, had no difficulty re-establishing themselves as Parkindo leaders after the Revolution, activity has been a sine qua non tfhile revolutionary for secular party leaders, the issue has never arisen within Parkindo, where leadership capacity is measured in terms of (at least outward) commitment to Christian values and to the interests of the community rather than participation in the Revolution or devotion to revolutionary ideals. Parkindo was reborn in the region in 1950 but did not become fully active again until 195^* when campaigning for the elections provided an incentive to establish a formal leadership structure at the regency and subdistrict levels and to develop links with the villages. The n e w leaders were Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 321] === of the same background (In many cases they were the same individuals) as those of 19^5— civil servants, teachers and entrepreneurs, most of whom were lay leaders in the HKBP church. Within the Batak community they represented the modernizing segment of the elite. Their claim to community leadership was based on the possession of a modern education and modern employment and their consequent ability to deal with the non-Batak world of Pematangsiantar, Kedan and Djakarta. Leadership in Parkindo, an organization whose principal r e sponsibility was to deal with the outside world \as the political representative of the ethnic and religious com munity, was attractive because it added legitimacy to their role as community spokesmen. The assumption of political leadership by the modernizing elite found ready acceptance among the North Tapanuli Bataks of simalungun/Siantar, who have for decades been oriented toward the kind of success which the members of this elite have achieved. In Tapanuli, many Bataks reported to the author, there has long been a dual system of elites— the modernizers, well-educated and close to the HKBP church, and the traditionalists, marga leaders and adat experts whose influence is greatest in the less accessible upland areas. In Simalungun, perhaps because of the pioneer mentality of the migrant North Tapanuli Bataks and the fact that it was the attractiveness of social and economic mobility which first brought many of them to the region, traditional leaders Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 322] === 309 have had little political influence. Although still im portant in the settling of village disputes, the organization of adat rituals and the operation of the supra-lineage organ izations created on an all-Simalungun or all-Siantar basis to provide assistance in life-crisis ceremonies and a measure of social security to their members, few of them are active in Parkindo or any other political party. Nor does the Batak villager turn to the marga leader or adat expert for polit ical advice or information about, for example, how to get along in the city; instead he consults the educated elite, who are presumed to have experience with and wisdom in these matters. There are thus two spheres of influence in the Batak village: the sphere of family and intra-Batak affa i r s, in which the traditional leader is still influential; and the sphere of Batak relations with non-Bataks and the modern world, in which the modern elite and its political arm, the Parkindo leaders, are granted full authority. Not all of the occupational sub-groups which make up the modern elite are represented in the leadership of Parkindo, Despite their active role as Parkindo propagandists during the election, few ministers have become party officials, partly because of the general feeling that political activity is inappropriate to their position as spiritual leaders. Moreover, it has been party policy to discourage ministers from seeking leadership positions because of a desire to keep Parkindo free of control toy any particular church hierarchy. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 323] === Another segment of the modern elite, the most affluent Christian businessmen (it will be remembered that North Tapanuli 3ataks, after the Chinese, have been the most economically successful of the ethnic groups in the region), have also declined to participate directly as Parkindo leaders although they made sizable contributions to the p a rty’s campaign chest in 195^-55* Perhaps because of their de pendence on the good will of the central government (textile manufacturers, for example, have benefitted handsomely from government subsidies) these individuals have been wary of partisan commitments which might put them on the wrong side of the political fence in the highly unpredictable future. Moreover, because of their wealth, these individuals have been able to establish good, relationships with city, regency and provincial government officials independently of party mediation. Party support has thus seemed irrelevant (and often contrary) to their personal and economic interests. Most of the Parkindo leaders of 1963- 6^ were thus parttime politicians whose political activity was in addition to their regular employment. Only a few, in fact, most of them regency/municipality level leaders, were regularly en gaged in political activity of any kind. These few included the party chairmen, one or two other members of the party leadership council, and the p a rty’s representatives in the DPRD-GR, BPH (technically no longer members of the party be cause of their rank as senior civil servants) and Front Nasional. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 324] === 311 At the subdistrict level, this group included the sub branch party chairmen (whose degree of activity varied from subdistrict to subdistrict but was generally low) and Parkindo*s representatives in the subdistrict Front Nasional (largely inactive bodies). Unlike the political efforts of the secu lar party leaders, then, those of Parkindo*s leadership were largely oriented toward participation in the affairs of local government rather than the development of a base of support. Moreover, while nearly all of the secular party leaders at the regency/municipality and subdistrict levels (especially in Lower Simalungun) were regularly involved in political activity, only a handful of Parkindo leaders were more than minimal participants in local politics, whether of the intra- or inter-party variety. The chairman of Parkindo*s regency branch, D j. P. Nainggolan, is typical of the more active party leaders in the region. Born in 1920 on the island of Samosir in Lake Toba, Nainggolan was educated in Simalungun (six years ele mentary school) and in Medan and Djakarta, where he received training as a hospital assistant and malaria specialist. During the Revolution he worked in a plantation hospital in subdistrict Tanah Djawa and was instrumental in establishing a Parkindo branch there in 19^6-^7. After the return of the Dutch in the latter year he remained in Tanah Djawa and did not resume political activity until 1950, when he became chairman of Parkindo in the subdistrict and a member of the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 325] === party's regency-level Branch Leadership Council. «^hen the DPRD was created in 195& Nainggolan was one of its three Parkindo representatives and man of Parkindo-Simalungun. in I96I he was elected chair Throughout this period he con tinued to be employed as a malaria specialist in Tanah Djawa and, after 1961, in the General Hospital in Siantar city. Since 1956 most of Nainggolan*s political activity has revolved around the affairs of the DPHD and DPRD-GR, where he has been a skillful exponent of Parkindo policy and a superb tactician in inter-party conflict. He meets infre quently with his Branch Leadership Council, preferring in formal discussions with its most prominent members concerning important decisions in the DPRD-GR and occasional trips to the subdistricts to confer with sub-branch leadership. most none of his time is spent on the expansion of party membership or the development of subsidiary organizations. In his view, it is preferable to deal directly with plantation administrators and regency government officials (many of whom are also North Tapanuli Batak Christians) when contro versies arise over such matters as squatters' rights rather than to build a mass organization which would require skills and personal commitments generally unavailable within the party. Active in church affairs, he was a prominent figure in a conflict over control of the HKBP which occurred during the period of.this study. His knowledge of Batak adat, how ever, is limited and he has been impatient with the demands Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 326] === 313 ■which attendance at adat ceremonies place on his time. Like many educated B a taks, he favors a thorough-going reform of the adat in order to simplify and shorten the many complicated rituals which he feels to be unnecessary and incom patible with an urban way of life. Parkindo leaders below the subdistrict level are members of the same elite as the leaders in Siantar and the smaller towns of the regency. In most North Tapanuli Batak villages visited by the author, no formal Parkindo leadership structure existed, although one or more villagers were generally recog nized as party spokesmen and the links with higher party leadership. In all cases, these individuals stood out from the other villagers by virtue of their education, their position In the village as school teachers or civil servants in the subdistrict capital, and their membership on the governing board of the local church. Their supra-village contacts with members of the modern elite are nearly as ex tensive as their contacts with fellow villagers, and they often travel to Siantar or even to Medan on personal or jobor church-related business. Despite the frequency of their contacts with fellow elite members, there is little political content to the com munication. The regency party chairman, we have indicated, makes only occasional trips to the subdistricts and is In even less contact with the villages. Similarly, village •t-arkindo leaders rarely see Nainggolan or other regency Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 327] === leaders in Siantar. Even in Parkindo*s Siantar city branch, faciliated by geographical proximity, formal or informal meetings are extremely rare. of the Siantar Branch Leadership Council were, in fact, unconsulting the records of the most recent Party Conference where communication between municipality and ward leaders is Two of the most active members able to name half of the party's ten ward chairmen without (I96I ). The reasons for this apparent communications gap lie in the nature of Parkindo's relationship with its members and supporters. Without an interest in expanding membership or deepening the loyalties of those already affiliated with the party, there is little for subdistrict or village leaders to do and little reason for frequent communication between party leaders at the various levels. Instead all that is required is to maintain a minimal organization so that the villagers are aware of the p a r t y ’s continued existence. The regency chairman's visits to the subdistricts have thus been designed largely to heighten the local leader's (and through him, all those who consider themselves Parkindo members') sense of participation in regency affairs (without, in fact, requiring much real participation) and to maintain the regency-subdistrlct-vlllage link for the purpose of future party con ferences and the seemingly never very distant general elections. The leadership of Partai Katholik may be passed over briefly here as it does not differ significantly from that Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 328] === of Parkindo except in its somewhat greater ethnic diversity. Like Parkindo, Partai Katholik is essentially an electoral party. Its internal organization is minimal, with little activity below the regency level or in Siantar city (where it was too small to obtain a seat on the DPRD or DPRD-GR), and heavily dependent on the organizational structure of the church. Partai Katholik*s leaders are members of the educated elite, are employed as teachers, civil servants and entrep reneurs and are active in the affairs of the church. Like the Parkindo leaders they tend to be recruited laterally and are almost all of the pre-independence generation. They have been generally accepted as the political spokesmen for the tightly-knit Catholic community, and had little difficulty in winning a majority of the small Catholic vote in 1955* Much of the analysis of the Christian parties applies also to the former leadership of Masjumi in Simalungun/Siantar. Masjumi's regency/municipality and subdistrict leaders, mostly South Tapanuli Bataks, were migrants or the sons of migrants who had come to ^imalungun with the development of Pematangsiantar as a commercial and administrative center during the colonial period. In terms of education and oc cupation they were a fairly homogeneous group, representative of what Herbert Peith has called the Islamic-entrepreneurial political culture, emphasizing Islam at the expense of adat and commercial or other m o d e m economic activity at the ex pense of agriculture. Where the North Tapanuli Batak migration Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 329] === included both sawah farmers (by far the largest group), es caping from the increasingly crowded agricultural conditions of their homeland, and the more educated youth seeking modern employment, few Bataks from South Tapanuli came to Simalungun to farm, Rather, the great majority had received a measure of Western-style education in schools established by the Islamic modernists and reformers, who placed great emphasis on the purification of Islam from traditional adat practices and on the development of modern technical and commercial skills. They came in search of careers as merchants and government or plantation officials. (Modern education had in fact come earlier to South Tapanuli than to North Tapanuli, and in the early decades of the century South Tapanuli Bataks far outnumbered North Tapanuli Bataks in the Dutch government and plantation administrations and on the staffs of the r a d j a. ) The ambitious young merchants and aspiring civil servants who came to Simalungun were accompanied by religious leaders and teachers (often the roles were combined in a single indi vidual) motivated by a desire to minister to the spiritual needs of the growing South Tapanuli population in the region and attracted by the opportunity to bring Islam to the animistic Simalungun Bataks. Religious schools, at first independent and later under the aegis of social and educational associations such as Aldjam*i jatul tfaslijah, Al-Ittihadijah and Muhammadijah, were established in the 1920s and 1930s. South Tapanuli Batak social organization, to a large extent Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 330] === 317 liberated from the adat and traditional leadership, was centered around these associations and their schools in the small towns of the regency. Village-level schools and mosques, staffed by the graduates of the town schools, were increasingly brought within the Islamic organizational framework. 1963 As of 7&% of the 132 Moslem elementary and secondary schools (madrasah rendah dan landjutan) in Simalungun/Siantar were run by the various associations.^ By the time of the Revolution the Moslem associations had achieved a near monopoly over both the spiritual and secular leadership of tne South Tapanuli Batak community and had drawn into their orbit members of other ethnic groups as well, including the recently-converted Simalungun Bataks, some Javanese and a scattering of other Sumatran Moslem mi grants to the region. During the Revolution these associations provided the principal recruiting grounds for G P U (Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia. Islamic Youth Movement of Indonesia), the first specifically political Moslem organization in the region, and for the Hizbullah guerrilla band. These early Masjumi leaders, unlike those of Parkindo, were militant revolutionaries, motivated more by the desire to drive out the Dutch infidel than by a desire to protect their community or to keep the Revolution within moderate bounds. Masjumi*s guerrillas were in fact generally regarded as among the fiercest, most aggressive and fanatic revolutionaries in the region. Sri*. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 331] === Masjumi in the post-independence period was dominated by the leadership of Aidjam'ijatul Waslijah, the largest Moslem association in the region (with of all madrasah). All five members of the executive board of the p a rty’s re gency leadership council at the tj.me of its dissolution were affiliated with Aidjam*ijatul Waslijah, either as association officials as teachers and administrators in its schools. Besides their associational duties, all of them were also employed by the government in its Office of Religious Affairs. In the subdistrict branches Aldjam*ijatul Waslijah also pro vided the majority of Masjumi's leadership, although Muhammadijah and Al-Ittihadijah were represented as well. In the Siantar city branch the leadership was divided among members of Aidjam*ijatul Waslijah and Muhammad1jah, since the latter organization had its largest following in the city. As in the regency party, most of the Siantar leaders were employed by the government’s Religious Affairs Office. As in the case of the Christian parties, and for es sentially the same reasons, a close bond existed between the regency/municipality and village Masjumi leadership despite a weakly-articulated party organizational structure. For the most part village leaders were of the same ethnic group as the regency/municipality leaders and were members of a common elite whose values were those of the Islamicentrepreneurial political culture. Even before Masjumi ex isted in the region they had been closely associated in the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 332] === 319 Moslem educational and social organizations. The formation of the party thus required only the establishment of a coalition of these organizations and the superimposition upon them of a party structure and leadership hierarchy. Given the goals of the party, the homogeneity of its leader ship, the communication network available through the as sociations and the widespread electoral support which it received from the santri community, a highly articulated organizational structure along the lines of the PNI and PKI was felt to be redundant and of little value. It was u n necessary, according to Masjumi leaders, to strengthen a link which was already firm. Masjumi's position in Simalungun/Siantar as of 1963- 6^ would seem to confirm the leaders* estimate of the firmness of party support. In the aftermath of the party*s dissolution, few leaders at any level defected to other parties. Instead they have preferred to wait, maintaining their connections with each other through the still active associations. Similarly, the former Masjumi membership simply withdrew from the political arena, remaining loyal to the party which they saw as the only true representative of their community’s interests. In the event of a rebirth of Masjumi, a strong probability as of this writing, the local organization will undoubtedly spring back into existence almost as though it had never been banned. Nahdatul Qlama at the national level is a Moslem edu cational and social organization founded in 1926 to represent Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 333] === the syncretistic traditions of Indonesian Islam in opposition to the modernist reform movement led by Muhammadijah. operation between the two variants of Islam, forged during the colonial period in opposition to the Dutch and maintained during the periods of occupation and revolution, broke down in 1952 with the establishment of NU as a separate political party. In S imalungun/S iantar, the history of NU began in 1953» when a branch of the organization as a political party was founded. Prior to that time NU as an educational as sociation had been totally inactive in the region; the ten elementary schools run by NU in 1963-6*4- all postdated the formation of the party branch. The driving spirit behind the creation of NU*s Simalungun/ Siantar branches was Hadji Djamil Dahlan, an ulama (Islamic scholar and teacher) of South Tapanuli Batak ancestry but born in East Sumatra and regarding himself as a Coastal Malay. Hadji Djamil first came to Simalungun in 19^7» taught for a time in the schools of Islamijah (no longer active in the region) and Aldjam*ijatul Waslijah, where most of his students were Simalungun Bataks. In the 1920s he be came the official ulama in the court of the radja of Siantar and was also active as a proselytizer and mosque-builder throughout Simalungun. During the Revolution, along with many Simalungun Batak Moslems and Coastal Malays (Islam in East Sumatra, it will be recalled, wae closely tied to the traditional aristocracy, which stood to lose the most from Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 334] === 321 the Revolution) he was an active supporter of Negara Sumatera Timur and an advisor to those radja who had escaped the Social Revolution. With the formation of the unitary Republic, Hadji Djamil and other indigenous East Sumatran Moslem leaders were politically inactive for a time. Masjumi, they explained to the author, was unattractive because of the dominant position of Muhammad!jah (which, they argued, does not officially sub scribe to any of the four schools of Islamic law) within the party at the national level. NU, on the other hand, ap pealed to them because they were in agreement with its strict adherence to the sjafi'ie interpretation of Islamic law. This argument, based on supposed doctrinal differences be tween the two parties, loses a great deal of its force when it is realized that the leaders of Masjumi in Simalungun were not for the most part from Muhammadi jah but from A i d jam* i jatul Waslijah which, like NU, accepts the sjafi'ie interpretation.^ In reality, the differences between Masjumi and NU leaders were based not so much on the issue of religious interpretation as on revolutionary background and ethnicity. Where the leaders of Masjumi had been active in G P U and Hizbullah, their counterparts in NU had been supporters of NST or politically inactive during the Revolution. Where the leaders of Masjumi were for the most part South Tapanuli Bataks, the founders of NU were mostly Simalungun Bataks (Including Hadji Djamil, who had spent the greater part of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 335] === 322 his life among Simalungun Bataks and spoke their language) with a sprinkling of Coastal Malays. Shut out of Masjumi by revolutionary and ethnic barriers, they turned eagerly to NU because it provided them with an opportunity to participate in local politics and to wield a measure of influence within a nationally powerful organization. Neither in the two years preceding the parliamentary elections nor in the succeeding decade has NU been able to recruit a large following in Simalungun/Siantar. Parkindo and Masjumi, as we have seen, were successful because they were able to identify themselves with important ethnic and religious groups which had a sense of community, an established leadership, and an organizational network to which the party could relate itself, either explicitly as in the case of Masjumi (Aidjami*atul Waslijah, Muhammadijah and Al-Ittihadi^ah were formally affiliated with the party) or implicitly as in the case of Parkindo (where the HKBP and its lay leadership provided the backbone of Parkindo organization without any formal relationship between party and church). NU*s leaders, on the other hand, have had to build their party without the support of any religious organization and with no possibility of obtaining the loyalties of that majority of the santri community composed of South Tapanuli Bataks. Their major hope of support lay in the Simalungun Batak Moslem community, which at most represents 15^ of the Simalungun Bataks in the region, and whatever other non-South Tapanuli santri Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 336] === (principally Coastal Malays and Javanese) could be brought within their orbit. The recruitment of NU ranting leaders was accordingly heavily based on ethnicity. Regency and municipality leaders, because of their previous contacts with the Simalungun Batak Moslem community as religious leaders and teachers, were able to establish ranting wherever members of this group could be found. The ranting leaders, in turn, brought into the party their personal followings, composed of Simalungun Bataks and those Javanese who looked for political as well as religious leadership to the Simalungun Batak ulama in their villages. Even within the small Simalungun Batak Moslem community, however, the NU leaders do not seem to have won majority support. Their influence has been greatest in Lower Simalungun and Siantar city, where the radja of Siantar and Tanah DJawa and several lesser aristocrats were converted to Islam during the colonial period. In Upper Simalungun, however, the aristocracy had not been converted to Islam but rather supported or were at least tolerant of Christianity. The NU leaders thus had fewer contacts with the Upper Simalungun Moslem minority, who preferred to support Masjumi in 1955 and still remain largely aloof from NU, despite sporadic organizational efforts by the regency leadership. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 337] === Conclusions The nature of party leadership and of leadership recruit ment in 3 imalungun/Siantar has varied considerably between the secular and religious parties. At the regency/municipality level and to a lesser extent in the subdistrict branches, the secular party leaders are professional politicians and members of a common political elite with many shared values and experiences. While their initial choice between the PNI and PKI was in large part accidental and dependent upon personal associations and circumstances of village guerrilla organization, loyalties were quickly developed and reinforced by success in achieving status within the party and by formal and informal processes of ideological indoctrination. The leaders of the religious parties, on the other hand, are part-time politicans whose status in the community is at least partially independent of the party and based on their membership in the modern elite and on positions of leadership in non-political organizations. Their loyalty is not to the party as organization but rather to the party as articulator of the political interests of the religio-ethnic community with which they identify. It would be analytically neat to be able to draw the further conclusion that, whereas the leaders of the religious parties tend to see their individual identity in ethnicreligious terms, identifying with their own ethnic-religious community and viewing the outside world as hostile to the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 338] === interests of the group, the secular politicians are seeking a new identity in the broader national community. And in deed, dissatisfaction with ethnicity or religion as a basis for political loyalty in independent Indonesia was one of the most frequently expressed views of PNI and PKI leaders alike. Actual behavior, however, observed in patterns of friendship and intra-party factionalism, indicated that ethnic ties are almost as strong among the secular politicians as among the leaders of Parkindo, Masjumi, NU and Partai Katholik. (The evidence for this assertion, presented in the following chapter, applies only to the PNI. In the absence of fac tionalism in the PKI it was not possible to evaluate the importance of ethnic loyalties to the Communist leaders. Their daily associations, to the extent the author was able to observe them, fit the general pattern characteristic of non-Communist politicians, i.e., intra- rather than inter ethnic group). There is also a marked contrast between the secular and religious parties in terms of leadership linkage, of the bonds which connect leaders at the regency/municipality, subdistrict and village levels and thus the leadership with the body of party members and supporters. For the PNI and PKI, party (as distinct from subsidiary organization) leadership at the village level seemed, for the most part, firmly committed and unwaveringly loyal. In the PKI, firmness of commitment was related to such factors as the careful screening of members Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 339] === 326 and. leaders, Intensive ideological training and the small size of the membership. In the PNI. it is related to the revolutionary background of village leaders, their devotion to nationalist ideals and opposition to local religious leadership, whether of the Moslem or Christian variety, and their personal loyalty to particular regency/municipality level leaders. For the large number of workers and squatters affiliated with the secular parties through the subsidiary organizations, however, no such firm bond exists. Rather, as we have seen, the alliance of local leaders with the party is based on pragmatic interests and local village con cerns, is often temporary, and can be severely weakened by an event such as the formation of SOKSI (or, in a more extreme case, the recent banning of the PKI and all its affiliates). If the PNI and PKI can be weakened by outside manipu lation, the religious parties seem virtually indestructible. The combination of ethnic and religious bonds, the homogeneity of the party leadership at all levels and the general ac ceptance of the leadership role of the modern elite have been potent forces in creating intense partisan loyalties not only among the village leadership but among members and sup porters as well. In the great majority of North Tapanuli Batak villages in the subdistricts along the road to Parapat and in those parts of Lower Simalungun unaffected by the plantation environment, for example, village-level community leadership is united in support of Parkindo. Opposition to Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 340] === 327 the party is all but unthinkable in these areas, and there are few alternative local leaders around whom such opposition could be organized. Kasjumi's virtual monopoly of the religious leadership of the South Tapanuli Batak community makes its position similarly secure, and the same is true for Partai Katholik on a much smaller scale. Of the four religious parties, only NU has failed to take deep root in Simalungun/Siantar, although its local leadership, held to gether by common ethnicity and past association with the traditional aristocracy, is also unlikely to turn to any other party to express itself politically. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 341] === CHAPTER IX PATTERNS OF INTRA-PARTY FACTIONALISM Thus far in our analysis we have found that the secular and religious parties have shared the fundamental objective of building mass support in Simalungun/Siantar but have dif fered in their strategic priorities, their organizational forms, the loci of their support in relation to the social, economic and cultural cleavages of the region, the charac teristics of leadership recruitment and thenature of the linkage between members and leaders and among leaders at dif ferent levels of party organization. Differences observed in patterns of intra-elite factionalism between the secular and religious parties were primarily a function of two factors, the value to party leaders of the positions (either within the party itself or in the regency and municipality Regional Representative Councils) for which they competed and the nature of the relationship among party leaders at the various organizational levels from the village ranting to the national party executive. More striking than the differences between the two types of parties is the general importance of ethnicity as a basis of factional alignment. In all cases of conflict where two or more ethnic groups enjoyed substantial representation in 328 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 342] === 329 the party leadership (PNI-regency, PNI-city, NU-city) pat terns of factionalism have had a substantial ethnic component. Even in Parkindo's regency branch, where non-North Tapanuli Bataks have had only minimal representation, ethnic-based conflict has been pronounced. Of all parties with an ethnically-mixed leadership only the PKI has avoided internal conflict. In both the FNI*s Simalungun and Siantar branches there has been considerable factionalism in recent years. Positions of leadership within the party have been valuable to the PNI leaders because of their commitment to partisan political activity as a career and because alternative channels of social and economic advancement are them. not generally open"to Each of the regency/municipality PNI leaders competing for party office has built a personal base of support in the subdistrict and village organizations largely among party members of his own ethnic group. Factional lines have thus taken on a definite, continuing and fairly rigid form in which the preferences of nearly all party anak tjabang and ranting are known. Moreover, there has been intense conflict within the provincial and national party organizations, whose leaders look to the various groups in the regency/municipality branches for support, thus exacerbating local conflict and making the local stakes higher. In the PKI, too, party leadership was a career and party office brought considerable prestige, although the financial Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 343] === 330 rewards were more modest than for PNI leaders. Despite this similarity between the two major secular parties, the local FKI branches were notable for an almost complete lack of (at least observable) conflict after the reorganization of the party in the early 1950s. This absence of factionalism in the PKI was due primarily to strict adherence to party dis cipline and to the fact that the party sections, and the subsidiary organizations as well, were tightly controlled (particularly in the selection of leaders) from above; moreover, in the party as a whole there was apparently little conflict after the rise to power of D.N.Aidit in 1951In the religious parties factionalism has been more characteristic of the city than of the regency branches and has tended to take the form of conflicts between and among the branch party leadership and its representatives in the Regional Representative Council, with only minimal partici pation from higher- or lower-level party organizations. These characteristics are related to the greater emphasis of religious party leaders on influence within local government (control over the party is thus pursued as instrumental to this goal rather than for its own sake) and the fact that the government of Siantar has greater authority within its borders than its Simalungun counterpart. Because of the weak artic ulation between religious party leaders and members and among leaders at various levels, the regency/municipality branches have been relatively more autonomous, both in terms Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 344] === 331 of control from above and below and involvement in higherlevel leadership conflicts, than the local branches of the secular parties. Finally, relative ethnic homogeneity and the fact that religious party leaders do not enjoy the in tense, ethnically-rooted personal loyalty that is accorded to many PNI leaders have made primordial factors somewhat less relevant (although far from absent) as a basis of conflict. The Secular Parties In the PNI, factionalism is primarily a function of the conflicting personal ambitions of various leaders and po tential leaders who draw their support from an ethnic con stituency. Issues (whether related to the implementation of party policy or to decisions to be taken by the DPRD-GR) have played only a minor role in party factionalism except when they have been closely tied to the personal aspirations of particular party leaders. Ideological differences (in terms of the interpretation of Marhaenism) do not seem to have been present at all. For those who come out on top of the struggle for positions of leadership within the PNI the rewards are great. The status of a politician in the highly-politicized Indonesian society is high, particularly if he combines his party position with a government post (such as DPRD-GR or Front Nasional representative) as is commonly the case. Moreover, high party and government posts bring to their Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 345] === holders a considerable degree of financial security, a re sult both of "favor trading" between politicians and indi viduals who need special dispensations or assistance from government agencies and use the politicians as go-betweens, and as a result of the peculiar arrangements by which party activities are financed. In theory (according to the Party Constitution) the party's treasury is to be filled by "(a) subscriptions, contributions and dues of the members, (b) legal income, and (c) non-binding contributions." practice, at least in Sima lung un/Si an tar, no dues are col lected and funds come entirely from individual contributions. Prom 1961-6 3, according to the General Report issued at the 1963 Regency PNI Conference, personal contributions of the regency chairman accounted for two-thirds of total party in come.2 The chairman in turn apparently (there is no clear evidence on this point) obtained most of his funds either directly from the provincial party chairman, with whom he is allied, or from sources jointly available to both, and from private individuals who support the work of the regency party (and the leadership of the chairman). There is thus no system of accounting for party funds and no way of knowing what percentage of contributions given directly to the chair man actually reaches the party coffers, a procedure which clearly works to the personal advantage of the leadership. In the first post-revolutionary decade, 1950-1960, there was little evidence of overtly-expressed factionalism within Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 346] === the PNI in Simalungun. The regency leadership for most of this period was in the hands of Abdullah Jusuf. Jusuf's leadership in the local party was based on his unique position as a man of high revolutionary status and on his ability to command the allegiance of men of diverse ethnic backgrounds. In part this was because he was both a North Tapanuli 3atak and a Moslem by birth, and so personally spanned the gulf between North Tapanuli Christians and South Tapanuli Moslems. His revolutionary experience (not only in Simalungun, but throughout East Sumatra) had also provided him with close ties with the Javanese PNI leaders who had been active in Napindo. Because of this diverse background, Jusuf was seemingly above ethnic conflicts— a "pure,** unhyphenated Indonesian. Jusuf also understood the importance of patronage in maintaining intra-party harmony and saw to it that all ethnic groups were represented on the Branch Leadership Council and in the party's DPRD and DPRD-GB delegations. Since Abdullah Jusuf*s elevation to the provincial chairmanship, fissiparous tendencies have emerged within the regency leadership. In part this may be attributed to the fact that his successor, Subroto, as a Javanese, lacks Jusuf's pan-Indonesian aura, and to Subroto's continuing re liance on Javanese associates, whom he has placed in key posts. More serious, however, has been the problem of resurgent Simalungun Batak PNI leaders, who feel that their group has gotten short shrift from both Jusuf and Subroto with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 347] === 33^ (who is allied with Jusuf in provincial party politics), and that their ambitions for higher party and government office have been thwarted. Hesentment on the part of the Simalungun Bataks began to build up over the nomination of a candidate for Regional Head in i960. Under Presidential Edict No. 6 of 1959 the DPRD nominates candidates for the position of Regional Head; the Minister for General Administration and Regional Autonomy then accepts one of these candidates or he may reject them all. If the latter occurs, the DPRD submits a second group of candidates to the Minister, who again may accept or reject. If all a_e rejected, the new Regional Head is selected by the Minister (with the approval of the President) from out side the list of candidates. In i960 the PNI after much discussion nominated its then chairman, Jusuf. In the first round all candidates were rejected, and the Simalungun Batak group then attempted to promote the candidacy of an army of ficer of Simalungun Batak descent who had already obtained the support of Parkindo. The combination of forces within the PNI leadership was too strong, however, and Jusuf was renominated despite his certain failure. Embittered by this action, the single Simalungun Batak PNI representative in the DPRD voted for the army officer and was subsequently suspended from the party for indiscipline. By January 196^, when the 19&3 regency Party Conference was held (it had been postponed from the previous July), Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 348] === 335 the lines of cleavage within the party were clear. incident in friarch of 19^3 * involving a letter of support for the candidacy of the Regional Head of Simalungun (the abovementioned Simalungun Batak army officer) to become Governor of North Sumatra, had resulted in the suspension of two Simalungun Bataks and the expulsion of a third from party membership, thus further sharpening the conflict. At the Conference, the delegates were divided into two blocs, those who favored the reelection of Subroto as party chairman and an opposition group led by one of the suspended leaders, Aloysius Djulan Purba. The core of the Purba faction at the Conference consisted of the delegations from Raja, Purba, Raja Xahean, Silimakuta and Dolok Silau, with a total of seventeen votes. The first three of these subdistrict branches are largely Simalungun Batak in membership, and their leaders were personally loyal to Purba. The support of Silimakuta and Dolok Silau was ob tained through an alliance with the Karo Batak leader in the area, who has long been an opponent of the Jusuf group in the party and a supporter of the provincial-level faction led by the former provincial chair nan Selamat Ginting, also a Karo Batak. The Purba faction had also hoped to win support from some delegations in Lower Simalungun and along the Road to Parapat but was unsuccessful. In large part this was due to skillful maneuvering by Subroto. In Dolok Batunanggar, for Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 349] === 336 example, the chairman of the subdistrict party, a South Tapanuli Batak named Nasution, had early announced his sup port for the Purba group. (He had apparently disassociated himself from Subroto and Jusuf after a personal dispute with the latter a few years previously.) Wifch the suspension of Purba from party membership, Nasution became the faction’s candidate for party chairman. (There were no Simalungun Bataks still in the party who had sufficient stature, and Nasution's titular leadership was useful a broader ethnic base to the group. in terms of giving Nithin PNI circles it is most dangerous to be accused of "sukuism".) Just prior to the Conference, anak tjabang Conferences were held in various subdistricts, including Dolok Batunanggar, where a pro-Subroto group ousted Nasution from the chairmanship, thereby depriving the Purba faction of three additional votes at the regency Conference. In those subdistricts of Lower Simalungun (such as Tanah Djawa and Bandar) where the party leadership is North Tapanuli Batak but a substantial proportion of the membership is Javanese, the penalty for opposing Subroto did not need to be spelled out. It is worth noting also that there was to some subdistrict leaders (particularly along the road to Parapat) an air of illegitimacy about the Purba faction, since its leader had been suspended from the party. The argument that Purba was somehow not a true Marhaenlst be cause of his suspension (despite the rather obvious fact that Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 350] === the suspension was a political maneuver) carried some weight, particularly among the older generation of party leaders. The intra-party cleavage at the 1963 Conference thus consisted essentially of a group of Simalungun Bataks allied with Karo Bataks in opposition to the dominant group of Javanese who were allied primarily with North Tapanuli Bataks. At first glance this alliance pattern appears to contain strange bedfellows (particularly the latter group of Javanese abangan Moslems and North Tapanuli Batak Christians); in fact it is a reflection of a common pattern of cleavage in the wider arena of Simalungun and of East Sumatran politics, the cleavage between indigenous people (Simalungun Bataks, Karo Bataks, Coastal Malays) and migrant groups (North Tapanuli Bataks, South Tapanuli Bataks, Javanese). The antagonism between the indigenous groups and the migrants in the early decades of this century was described in Chapter III; more recently it has erupted over a proposal to divide North Sumatra into two first-level self-governing regions (provinces), Tapanuli and East Sumatra. The migrant groups (particularly the North Tapanuli Bataks) fear that such a development would result in a monopolization of the East Sumatran government by the indigenous peoples and the introduction of discriminatory practices perhaps to the extent of restricting further migration. Within the PNI in Simalungun, the emergence of a group of assertive Simalungun Bataks has created the fear that Simalungun control will mean Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 351] === the exclusion of migrant groups from party councils. It is also darkly rumored (not completely without foundation, but much exaggerated— see Chapter X) that there is a secret Simalungun Batak organization, composed of representatives of the political parties and some government officials and church leaders who are conspiring to infiltrate and take over all parties and their affiliated organizations. Betvreen the two groups there seemed to be no major dif ferences of opinion on issues related to party ideology. The key issue at the Conference concerned the suspension of the two Simalungun Batak party leaders, with the Purba faction naturally opposing the suspension and the Subroto group sup porting it. Some informants argued that the cleavage was in reality a left-right division, with the leftists (Subroto and at the provincial level Jusuf) more Marxist in their ideological orientation than the rightists (Purba, presumably allied with Ginting). In fact there seemed to be no dif ference between the two factions on this issue, which is in any event a minor one at the regency level because such matters are decided in Djakarta. Both groups were anti-Communist (in actions, if not in public statements) because of their belief that a national victory for the PKI would mean their organ izational obliteration and because the PKI was the PNI's chief competitor for the political loyalties of the wolrker- squat ter population. On matters of DPRD-GR policy, however, the two factions did differ in their attitude toward cooperation Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 352] === with the PKI. While the Subroto group was willing to co operate with the Communists in matters of government person nel (such as the selection of a Regional Secretary in 1964-), the Purba faction would have preferred an alliance with the Simalungun Bataks in the DPRD-GR. Where the Subroto group, with the PKI, consistently opposed the policies and programs of the (Simalungun Batak) Regional Head, the Purba faction would have preferred close cooperation. The division here was not ideological, but rather rooted in the desire of the Simalungun Batak PNI leaders to promote the appointment of members of their own ethnic group. On this issue they were consistently opposed by the PKI. A more reasonable interpretation of the cleavage in the Simalungun PNI is to see it in terms of the competition for the provincial party leadership between Abdullah Jusuf and Selamat Ginting. Jusuf*s base of support has been the regency of Simalungun and the city of Siantar, and it is highly probable that Ginting has closely followed develop ments in this region. The Karo 3atak party chairman in Silimakuta is an ally of Ginting, and most members of the Subroto faction believe that Purba also supports Ginting. (Purba himself denied that he had even thought about pro vincial party affairs, as did Naaution.) The indigenous (Ginting-Purba)vs. migrant (Jusuf-Subroto) cleavage may also be a factor here. It would be a mistake, however, to characterize the PNI in Simalungun as a collection of ethnic blocs using a national Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 353] === narty affiliation for their own purposes. The reality is rather more complex than such a simple analysis suggests. Reduction of the patterns of cleavage to ethnicity fails to explain, for example,the role of Nasution, the South Tapanuli Batak who was the titular leader of the Purba faction at the Conference, the other South Tapanuli Bataks in the party who supported Subroto or remained neutral, the position of the Javanese Pemuda Marhaenis leader in subdistrict Silimakuta who aligned himself with the Purba faction, or the small group of Simalungun Bataks who supported Subroto. A more fundamental explanation of intra-party faction alism lies in the career orientation of most PNI politicians, the nature of competition for party office, and the importance of the ethnic tie in Simalungun society. The organizational activist, like Subroto, or the old revolutionary, like Purba, depends initially for support on the basis which he has been able to create. To some extent the lpyalty of the basis is related to the leader’s devotion to party duty, his respon siveness to the interests of his followers and his general organizational ability, but the fundamental cement is common ethnicity. Having established a firm basis among members of his own group (and in the process perhaps becoming a subdistrict party or gerakan massa leader), the aspiring leader may then attempt to negotiate alliances with similar leaders, either his own or of other ethnic groups. At the same time he Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 354] === establishes connections with party leaders at the next highest level (to whom he can give support in party Conferences in return for his own elevation to higher party office). These vertical alliances are of major importance as they pro vide a prime source of financial support for local party activities, there being no regularized factionally-neutral distribution of funds within the party. The wealth or poverty of local party organizations and their leaders, par ticularly at the village, subdistrict and regency/municipality levels (where locally obtainable funds are somewhat limited), is thus directly related to the system of factional alignments which extends from Djakarta to the villages. The above analysis is clearly applicable to Subroto, who built a basis among the plantation Javanese during the Revolution, expanded it in his years as PETANI and K B M chair man, and formed an alliance with the North Tapanuli Bataks in order to retain his party chairmanship in 19^3• His re lationship with Abdullah Jusuf and Javanese PNI leaders in Djakarta would seem to assure him of greater successes in the future. North Tapanuli Batak leaders, whose support has been limited to particular subdistricts, also depend on an ethnic basis, though less heavily now (when so many of their members are Javanese) than formerly. This group has on the whole been less motivated to rise in the party hierarchy, partially be cause their non-party income is fairly high (from entrepreneurial Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 355] === activities, fairly extensive wet-rice farming or teaching) and might decline if they devoted much time to party affairs or moved to the city. They are thus content with the Subroto leadership which permits them to retain control of the sub district branches. These comments do not apply, of course, to the younger North Tapanuli Batak cadres to whom we re ferred in the previous chapter. Djulan Purba*s rise in the party has followed a course similar to Subroto*s. With the transfer of sovereignty Purba returned to his village of Haranggaol where he became subdistrict PNI chairman, a post which he held for eleven years. He never succeeded in building a large party following, however, either in Purba or in Upper Simalungun as a whole. In 1952 Purba moved to Siantar, retaining his subdistrict chairmanship and his close ties with the subdistrict party by frequent visits home, and simultaneously expanding his relationships within the party and with other prominent Simalungun Bataks. For a variety of reasons, perhaps the most Important of which are his small basis, the distrust which his primarily Simalungun Batak associations generated among potential allies, and the general fear of Simalungun as sertiveness, Purba has not been as successful as Subroto, al though his (apparent) alliance with Ginting may bring some rewards in the future. In an interview held in early 196^, after the regency Party Conference, Purba was asked about the relationship Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 356] === between participation in suku affairs and partisan political activity. He replied that in Indonesia a politician must be involved in a combination of the two, in which both ele ments are equally important for a successful political career. To illustrate his point, he discussed the political careers of two prominent Simalungun Bataks. ,8X 58 (a member of the provincial PNI leadership Council), he said, has no chance of becoming provincial PNI chairman or even regency chair man because he has failed to attend to his basis, has per formed no services for Simalungun, is devoted one hundred percent to the party and zero percent to his (extended) family and ethnic group. "Y” (a judge in Medan and PNI mem ber without office in the party), on the other hand, has strong suku connections but few ties outside the group. Moreover he was deeply involved in the movement for East Sumatran autonomy and has since continued to be too openly "suku-minded11 in an ethnically assimilationist ideological environment, thus reducing considerably whatever influence he might have had in the PNI or in the wider North Sumatran and all-Indonesian society. A judicious combination of re lationships within and without the suku, combined with the proper political viewpoint— which Purba defined as prokemerdekaan (independence) with a tinge of revolutionary spirit— was the key to success in the PNI and in Indonesian politics in general. Recounting his own career, Purba said that the secret of his limited success in Haranggaol and other parts of Upper Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 357] === Simalungun was constant attention to his adat obligations. Influence within the ethnic group depends largely, he said, on pergaulan (association). A man who has achieved some success outside the group in the larger, secondarily-connected Indonesian society can easily be influential among his own people if he is diligent in attending adat functions, helps relatives and village-mates when they come to the city, con tributes to projects like church-building, the Seminar on Simalungun Culture held in 196*4- (of which Purba was co-chair man) and so on. If he had not fulfilled these obligations, he would be considered to have ignored his family and his suku and would lose considerable standing in the community. Without this standing and the connections It implies, he could persuade few people indeed to join the PNI. His failure to win the party chairmanship for his faction Purba attributed to tactical mistakes (such as signing the letter supporting the Regional Head for Governor, for which he was suspended from the party) and the superior financial resources of the incumbent. Factionalism in the PNI-Siantar is similar to that In the regency party, with ethnic support groups providing the power bases of the various leaders and ties with the provin cial party leadership contributing important resources to the struggle for control of the party. Until 1963 the chairman of the PNI in Siantar was Zainuddin Hasan, the South Tapanuli Batak administrator described in the preceding chapter. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. From === [PDF page 358] === 1957 until about 1962 Hasan led the party without opposition by forming an alliance with the Javanese ranting leader in Bantan, who became second vice-chairman of the party tjabang, was supported for a seat in the city DPRD and later nominated as a member of the BPH. Until i960 the North Tapanuli 3atak element in the party was weak and there were few ranting leaders in the Christian wards. The most prominent North Tapanuli Batak in the party at the time, a school teacher and KBN leader, became tjabang secretary and was a close ally of Hasan. Financial assistance came primarily from Abdullah Jusuf and a few wealthy South Tapanuli Bataks in Siantar, and was filtered through Hasan. No statement of income or ex penditures was available from party leaders or presented at the City PNI Conference in 19&3» when asked about finances, party officials responded that they had “very little money," a probably accurate statement in view of the fact that the party had no paid activists and did not even maintain an office in the city until 196^. With the emergence of the organizational activists H.w.D. Tampubolon and Paul Siringo-ringo, opposition to the leader ship of Hasan began to grow. 3y the time of the city Party Conference in 19&3 Siringo-ringo (reported to be allied with Selamat Ginting, with whom he had been associated in Haro during the Revolution) and Tampubolon (who had quarreled with Hasan over a seat on the BPH) had formed an alliance to chal lenge the incumbent tjabang leadership. The Justification Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 359] === which they offered, for their opposition was that Hasan had neglected the primary task of party-building and that the party needed dynamic new leadership which would reinvigorate the ranting and the gerakan massa. (Hasan had in fact de voted most of his energies to the problems of city govern ment, in which he was Vice-Chairman of the DPRD-GR, and had been instrumental in increasing the party’s influence in local government •) Because the national PNI regulations governing party conferences make no provision for a situation in which there are no anak tjabang, the city PNI had adopted a one-ranting one-vote rule (regardless of the number of members per ranting) as a convention in 1958. This rule gave the opposi tion faction (whose strength was broadly distributed among several ranting with few members) an advantage over the in cumbent (whose support was limited to a few ranting with many members). The delegate strength of the Siringo-ringo- Tampubolon group was entirely in the North Tapanuli Batakled ranting (Aeknauli, Sukadame I and II, Kristen Barat, Kristen Timur, Tomuan I and II), all of which voted for Siringo-ringo for chairman. H a s a n ’s North Tapanuli Batak ally was unable to influence even the ranting leadership in his own ward to vote for Hasan. Timbang Galung Lama and Melaju (led by South Tapanuli Batak proteges of Hasan) voted for the incumbent, as did the Javanese-led ranting in Bantan and Timbang Galung Baru. Kota, whose Kalimantan-born Koslem with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 360] === chairman had shared with Hasan one of the two PNI seats in the first city DPRD established In 1956, also remained loyal. Hasan thus lost his position as chairman of the PNISiantar primarily because the Siringo-ringo-Tampubolon faction was able to call upon the ethnic loyalties of the North Tapanuli Batak ranting leaders who constituted a majority of the delegates to the Conference. The change in leadership also led apparently to a realignment of the S iantar party in provincial PNI politics (from Jusuf to Ginting) and a shift in the source of party finances (from Jusuf and wealthy South Tapanuli Bataks in Siantar to the friends of Siringo-ringo in the transportation industry and whatever support Ginting may provide). It is not clear how long the new leadership will remain in power, however, for their base of support seems to be much less firm than that of either faction in the regency party. In the PNI-Simalungun the leaders of both factions have de voted years of organizational activity to the cultivation of their bases. The emergence of Siringo-ringo and Tampubolon Is a more recent phenomenon. The support which they received from the North Tapanuli Batak ranting leaders at the £arty Conference does not seem to have developed any deep roots, as it is based on an ethnic appeal which has yet to provide any substantial benefits to the North Tapanuli Batak party members. It seems likely, however, aside from the fate of any particular set of leaders, that the emergence of a new Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 361] === S'-jS group of North Tapanuli cadres and the expanded role of the North Tapanuli Bataks in the gerakan massa will mean the continued dominance of the PNI-Siantar "by leaders from this ethnic group. In the PNI, then, factionalism among the regency/muni cipality leadership is rooted in the competition for power among various present and potential leaders whose local sup port rests primarily on an ethnic base, an element which gives a pronounced ethnic overtone to all intra-party con flict. With such a powerfully divisive force at work within the party (ethnic affiliations are by their very nature mutually exclusive, except in rare cases such as that of Abdullah Jusuf, and in Simalungun/Siantar religious differences serve in the main to reinforce ethnic cleavages), how is cohesion maintained? In part, of course, we have already answered this ques tion by describing the nature of factionalism within the party as a competition among individuals (whose support groups are based primarily on ethnic ties) rather than as a con frontation of ethnic blocs. Alliances among leaders of dif fering ethnic origins, the lack of solidarity among party leaders from one ethnic group (the majority but not the totality of whom are usually agreed on specific m atters) and the existence of ''neutral'* party leaders of all ethnic groups all serve to mute ethnic hostilities. Another factor which contributes to the maintenance of party cohesion is the rather abstract but deeply felt sense Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 362] === of commitment to the PNI. Most of the older leaders have been associated with the party at least since the Revel ut i on and have built up an emotional attachment to it which makes it difficult indeed for them to sever their affiliation. Moreover, as has been stated previously, the party is for most leaders the only vehicle which provides them with an op portunity to enhance their personal wealth, status and power. An attempt to acquire a position of leadership in another party, although it has been done, presents many serious ob stacles. The potential rewards for compliance with the rules of party discipline are great, and the penalties for dis obedience are severe. The effectiveness of these mechanisms of party discipline was clearly evident at the time of the selection by the Regency DPRD-GR in 196^ of a Regional Secretary, the topranking administrative assistant for local affairs of the Regional Head. For the Simalungun Batak PNI members In the DPRD-GR, at the time in disfavor in party councils, ethnic pressures were intense and opposed to the p a rty’s choice of the incumbent North Tapanuli Batak. General acceptance of the values of party discipline and the primacy of the branch party over the DPRD-GR representatives (including those who were technically functional group representatives) combined with the threat of suspension or expulsion from the party were sufficient in this important election to prevent defection. Similarly, PNI DPRD-GR members In Siantar city in 196^ were Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 363] === called upon to nominate a Regional Head. The branch party leadership’s candidate, who was not personally favored by at least two PNI DPRD-GR representatives (including the former party chairman, Hasan, the single most influential individual in the DPRD-GR), nonetheless received the full support of all PNI party and functional group representatives. Asked in an interview why he did not oppose his party’s candidate in the DPRD-GR, Hasan replied with a long and obviously deeply felt statement as to the importance of discipline for ultimate party success, a goal to which he was strcRgJjr committed. To conclude this section it must be stated that the future holds no promise that the present slightly precarious co hesion within the PNI leadership in Simalungun/Siantar will continue. Although the older leaders who shared a common revolutionary experience are beginning to give way to the new who share a common (though only vaguely defined) ideological orientation, there is every sign that the ethnic support group will continue to be of central importance to the aspiring politician* Moreover, the older generation of North Tapanuli Bataks in both the city and the regency, who made few demands on the party leadership, is being replaced-by an aggressive group of cadres who must be assimilated into the leadership structure. In Siantar city there is a strong possibility that the new leadership in consolidating its control will eventually alienate important elements of the Javanese and South Tapanuli Batak membership despite H a s a n ’s commitment Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 364] === to party discipline. In the regency there is the possibility that an intensified but unsuccessful campaign by the Purba faction might result in embitterment (and expulsion of the faction*s leaders) and the withdrawal of the bulk of Simalungun Batak members from the party. Finally, a renewed and prolonged battle over East Sumatran autonomy (fairly un likely by 1964 because many of the demands of the indigenous groups— more schools in their areas, more high officials of indigenous stock, etc.— had been substantially met) might well prove to be the PNI-Simalungun*s Achilles* heel. The PKI in Simalungun and Siantar was apparently free of internal conflict during the period of this study. the confusion immediately following the devolution, there had been two groups of leaders in the region calling them selves PKI, one representing the remnants of the guerrilla band Tjap dantai (see Chapter IV) and the otharconsisting of former members of the P S I ’s Sjarifuddin faction.^ This strug gle was resolved, presumably in favor of the Sjarifuddin group, with the selection of K. Sitanggang as party chairman in 1951* (Sitanggang had been a member of the PSI-Sjarifuddin during the devolution; no PKI leader Interviewed in 1963-64 had had any connection with Tjap Hantai). From 1951 on, only one publicly-known incident occurred to mar the internal unity of the PKI— the defection of some SABBUPSI leaders (who were not actually PKI members) during the election campaign of 1954■ 55* which precipitated the dispatch by the provincial SOBSI leadership of Taat Pohan to reorganize the local union. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 365] === The striking contrast between the PNI and PKI in terms of patterns of factionalism is related to a number of factorss (1) the lack of factionalism in the PKI's Central Committee (compared to the intense factionalism among the PNI's national and provincial leaders); (2 ) the very limited autonomy of local PKI party and subsidiary organizations and the high de gree of discipline demanded by the party (in the PNI dis cipline was also required of all party leaders, but the scope for local decision-making and opportunities for the expression of divergent opinions were much greater); and (3 ) the purely formalistic nature of PKI internal elections (compared to the open competition for delegate support in PNI party conf erences). Shifts in PKI leadership in Simalungun/Siantar were thus a result of decisions made by higher party committees. These decisions seemed to have been based primarily on evaluations of performance (especially for subsidiary organization leaders) or considerations of image (in the case of the party itself). In the P K I ’s subsidiary organizations a regular pattern of leadership succession was apparent. If an organization chairman was removed from his post either to become an of ficial at the provincial level (as in the case of Pohan) or because he failed to carry out satisfactorily the tasks as signed to him (as apparently occurred in 3 OBSI-Siantar and Pemuda Hakjat-Siantar in 196*0, he was succeeded by the first vice-chairman. All other members of the organization’s leadership council were moved up accordingly, and one or more ranting- Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 366] === level leaders were then brought in to fill the vacancies at the bottom. In most cases these latter individuals were young cadres who had been sent to Simalungun from other parts of East Sumatra and were being groomed for future positions of greater responsibility. Because of the stability of the PKI party leadership in the years following the Revolution, no clear pattern of suc cession emerged. Sitanggang had been second secretary of the regency party section when he was selected for the post of first secretary in Siantar in 1958; his second secretary in Siantar had been first secretary of the Siantar sub-section before 1958. In Simalungun, Tampubolon rose in i960 from first secretary in Tanah Djawa to first secretary of the regency section. His second secretary had previously been active in SBKB and SARBUPRI (as a legal adviser but not a member of either organization) and had been the p a r t y ’s star campaigner in 195^-55 among the Moslem Bataks in the regency (he had once been a member of Muhammadi3ah and was generally conceded to be a devout Moslem). From 1957 on, he had been a representative of the PKI in the regency DFRD, DPD and later BPH, but had held no party leadershi.p post before i960. The Religious Parties Conflict within Parkindo's Siantar branch has been al most continual since its separation from the regency Parkindo organization in 1958. The patterns of factional alignment have not been comparable to those in the PNI, however, for Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 367] === Parkindo,s Siantar leaders have neither formed stable fac tions among themselves nor established bases of support among the ward leaders and members upon whom they are dependent for election to party office. Moreover, since the overwhelming majority of Parkindo leaders and members are North Tapanuli Bataks, ethnicity has not played a prominent role in intra party factionalism.^ Rather the pattern has been one of shifting alliances, only partially related to primordial cleavages within the North Tapanuli Batak community, among municipality-level leaders whose primary purpose is to obtain influence within city government. In this competition for local influence there has been no connection between factional alignments in the municipality and those in the provincial and national party organizations. On only two occasions have provincial party leaders partici pated in local conflicts, both times in an advisory capacity at the request of the municipality branch leadership. Party leaders at the various levels— municipality, provincial and national— have generally held the view that conflicts at each level should be worked out among the cerned. individuals con Thus the major issue dividing Parkindo’s national leaders in the late 1950s and early 1960s— whether and to what extent the party should participate In the institutions of Guided Democracy (North Tapanuli Bataks in Parkindo’s central leadership could be found on both sides of the issue) — had no repercussions on factional alignments in Parkindo’s LReproduced ““with permission " ofs‘ the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 368] === The first major conflict within the Parkindo leadership in Siantar involved the selection of a Municipal Secretary by the Siantar Regional Representative Council in 1957Parkindo*s candidate, a party leader and civil servant named Herman Hutagalung, was also supported by the PNI and PKI and defeated the candidate of the Moslem parties by a vote of Shortly after the election two Parkindo DPRD mem bers decided that they had made a mistake and requested that the election be reviewed by the DPRD. Their opposition to Hutagalung was based on their support for another Parkindo candidate, a civil servant of higher rank than Hutagalung and a brother of one of them. Apparently a bargain had been struck within Parkindo prior to the election, in which Hutagalung would receive the nomination and the other candi date would be supported by Hutagalung for a promotion within the city bureaucracy. When the promised promotion was not given, the two DPRD members asked for the review, receiving the support of part of the ivIasjumi delegation. The controversy continued off and on for over a year, with assertions of Hutagalung*s misconduct in office being brought up on several occasions, but the opposition ’was never able to muster enough votes to force a review. A series of meetings in 1953 between the Parkindo 3ranch Leadership Council and the party*s legislative representatives finally brought a decision to support Hutagalung and the issue was not raised again in the DPRD.7 Opposition continued however Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 369] === on a variety of lesser matters throughout the life of the DPRD and the dissidents continued to support the promotion of their candidate within the bureaucracy. This lack of unity seriously weakened Parkindo*s influence in the DPRD, as the opposition faction (whose votes were crucial in a closely divided Council) was often absent or simply refused to accept instructions from the branch leadership. Since the party did not possess the legal right to recall its rep resentatives from the DPRD, only one alternative remained to the branch leaders— expulsion from the party— and they hesitated to take this step for it would only make the break permanent and would have no effect on the expellees* DPRD status. The second controversy arose in 1959 over the sudden withdrawal of Gustav Pakpahan, Parkindo*s representative in the Regional Executive Council (DPD), the executive body of the city government. The DPD had been chosen in 1957 "by the DPRD from among its own membership on the basis of proportional representation (1 Parkindo, 1 Masjumi, 1 PNI). By 1959» with frequent criticism of the DPD by DPRD members and rumors of DPD corruption circulating throughout the city, all three DPD members resigned. The Parkindo chairman quickly called a meeting of the Branch Leadership Council, at which Pakpahan was reprimanded for failing to consult the party leadership. No decision on a successor to Pakpahan could be reached, however, and an emergency session of the Party Council (Dewan Partal). consisting of the Branch Leadership Council, the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 370] === DPRD representatives and delegates from the ten party ranting, was called to discuss the problem. Advice was also solicited from the provincial Parkindo leadership. The ranting leaders at this meeting voted overwhelmingly to support the chairman’s position, requesting that all Parkindo DPRD representatives submit their resignations to enable the branch leadership to select a new, more unified and disciplined DPRD group. When the vote was taken Pakpahan and P^H. Marpaung (chairman of the DPRD and a leader with Pakpahan in the cooperative move ment in Simalungun/Siantar) left the meeting, signiflying their refusal to resign their DPRD membership.^ The branch leadership was thus frustrated in its attempt to enforce its will on the DPRD members. When the DPD was reconstituted a short time later Parkindo's DPRD representatives were unable to reach agreement. The party's seat remained empty for the last year of the life of the DPD and Parkindo's influence in city government declined still further. In the DPRD-GR, established in 1961, the three Parkindo representatives were L. Napitupulu (a wealthy Siantar business man and party treasurer since 1957)* Sutan M. Hutagalung (a member of the Faculty of Theology and Assistant to the President of Nommensen University, and an American Ph.D.) and P.H. M a r p a u n g. C o n f l i c t within this group soon flared over the selection of a Parkindo candidate for the BPH. Marpaung (who was now branch party chairman) wanted the post for himself but was opposed by Napitupulu and Hutagalung, whose candidate Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 371] === 358 was a civil servant and. member of Parkindofs Branch Leader ship Council. After a clash in the DPHD-GR, Napitupulu and Hutagalung succeeded in persuading Marpaung to drop his candidacy. The seeming unity following the BPH affair was short lived, for the DPRD-GB soon turned to Siantar's most pressing problem, the administration of the Office of Public Works. The city's water and electricity had been declining in quant ity and quality for several years— in 1959 the Regional Head had issued a general order prohibiting new installations— and the DPRD-GR conducted several investigations to determine the causes of the problem and to try to work out solutions. Increasingly criticism was directed toward the head of the Public Works Office, a North Tapanuli Batak Parkindo sympa thizer named T.H. Hutabarat, who was accused, among other things, of political expediency, technical incompetence and deliberately disobeying the 1959 standfast order. Hutabarafc's severest critics in the DPRD-GR were Hutagalung and Napitupulu (who had acquired an encyclopedic knowledge of the city's water and electrical systems); his only consistent defender was Marpaung, who appealed to party unity, and the necessity to have a Parkindo man in such an important post. As in the case of the controversy over the DPD, the party leadership (Marpaung in this case) was unable to enforce its will on the DPRD-GR representatives. The right of recall had still not been given to the parties and, for Parkindo, no Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 372] === other effective sanctions existed. In the secular parties, as we have seen, control was firmly in the hands of the party leadership. In the PKI, discipline was total and unquestioned, with the local leaders and DPRD-GR representatives always following instructions from t*.e higher party leadership. the PNI regency branch, despite restiveness on the part of the Simalungun Batak DPRD-GR members, the party leadership under Subroto was able to enforce discipline by threatening suspension or expulsion from the party, a severe blow to the career aspirations of a PNI leader. A n d in the PNI city branch, after the change in party leadership, loyalty on the part of the DPRD-GR members (two of whom were members of the faction defeated at the Party Conference) remained firm, despite differences over the candidate for Regional Head. Parkindo*s control over its DPRD-GR representatives was much weaker because party discipline is not a strongly held value of the party leadership or Its legislative representa tives and because expulsion from the party is an ineffective sanction. Marpaung, the champion of party discipline in the DPRD-GR, when he was party chairman, had with Pakpahan been its leading opponent when he was a DPRD member opposed to the policy of the branch leadership. For Marpaung, as for other Parkindo leaders, the value of party discipline depended on his own position within the branch leadership. The threat of expulsion from the party held few terrors for Napitupulu and Sutan Hutagalung, who were prominent members Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 373] === of the local elite both within and beyond the North Tapanuli p.nT.TTiunity- Napitupulu *s wealth and.Mutaga.i.ung *s educational, attainments and position within the University and church hierarchies assured them of an Influential role in Siantar politics with or without party support. Moreover, both had personal contacts with Bataks and other Christians influential in Djakarta politics. Their attitude toward the Branch Leader ship Council was one of total detachment, for they realized that their position in the DPRD-GR, barring unforeseen events in national politics, was secure. To follow the lead of Marpaung, they felt, would deprive them of their influence in city government and of their opportunity to bring about necessary administrative reforms. They were both to a con siderable extent anti-party, in fact, holding the view that "petty partisan politics," the competition among parties for control of personnel in particular, was destructive of good government. They attempted, in the case of Hutabarat, to wield influence on a non-partisan basis in the interests of improved water and electricity distiibution. If at some later time they were removed from the DPRD-GR on grounds of indiscipline or in a general reorganization such as took place in 1961, so be it. They would still be able to Influence government and party policy from the outside. By 1963-6^ at least three factions were Identifiable among Parkindo*s municipality leaders: Napitupulu and Hutagalung, dominating the Parkindo DPRD group and unconcerned Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 374] === 361 with control of the party; Marpaung, who apparently had lit tle support from other municipality-level party officials but many ties in the ranting based on his years in the cooperative movement and his friendship with Hutabarat (who, in his capacity as Public Works director, was a patron to several ward leaders in both Parkindo and PNI); and Pakpahan, now out of party and DP&D office and estranged from Marpaung be cause of a power struggle for control of the cooperatives, who was allied with Herman Hutagalung (eased out of his job as Municipal Secretary in 1963) and attempting to regain in fluence in Parkindo through the new labor affiliate KESPEKHI. It is difficult to relate these patterns of factional alignment to the various cleavages within Siantar*s North Tapanuli 3atak community. The distinction between adat leaders and the church-oriented elite, for example, does not seem to have provided a basis for party factionalism, since the adat leaders played no role in Parkindo politics, at the ward or municipality level. Kinship and regional ties have played a more conspicuous, if complex and ambiguous, role. Among the North Tapanuli Bataks, it will be remembered, kin ship affiliations are based on the exogamous patrilineage (marga). which traces its descent from a common male ancestor, and on the affinal relationships among marga. In North Tapanuli the localized lineage (a segment of a marga) and affinally related lineages are the principal focus of village social organization; In Simalungun/Siantar, where the localized Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 375] === lineage does not exist, ifcs~social welfare and ritual functions are performed by formally organized marga associations and the localized but non-kinship dongan sahuta (friends of one village), which mediates neighborhood disputes and assists the marga organizations in organizing and financing adat ceremonies and providing a measure of social security to the members. Beyond ties based on kinship and village affiliation, migrant North Tapanuli Bataks identify with their region of origin, vaguely demarcated subdivisions of Tapanuli among which there are small variations in dialect and adat. Regional identification is in many cases an extension of marga loyal ties, since ego*s marga and the marga to which it gives and from which it receives wives tend to be located in the same region. The most clearly differentiated of these regions are the Silindung Valley around the North Tapanuli regency capital of Tarutung and the Toba area to the south of Lake Toba, whose urban center is the town of Balige. The dongan sahuta has played no role in village or citywide politics in Siantar, since it is viewed by its members purely in terms of the services which it provides within the village and has not become a focus of political loyalties. Marga and regional affiliations have been of greater importance. Identification with these groups provides a means by which the individual, either as voter or party member, can dis criminate among various candidates. Thus, candidates for ward head in the Siantar ward elections in 1952 were reported Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 376] === 363 to have conducted their campaigns almost entirely on the basis of marga and regional loyalties, and voters were said to have made their choices primarily in terms of these factors. In Parkindo politics, while party leaders are willing to use regional and marga loyalties to strengthen their own position, none saw themselves as representatives of a par ticular group and none were prepared to support a marga- or region-mate at the expense of their own influence within the party or city government. In only the first of the three ex amples of intra-party conflict which we have discussed did loyalties related to marga or region seem to play a crucial role. Herman Hutagalung (from Silindung) was supported for Municipal Secretary by party leaders from various regions and marga but opposed in the DPRD by two Tobanese (who sup ported the candidacy of a fellow Tobanese). In the second conflict, the allies harpaung and Pakpahan were from Toba and Samoslr Island respectively and had no family connection; their alliance was based on years of friendship and a common interest in maintaining their influence vis-a-vis the party leadership (whose chairman was from Toba). At the Party Council meeting called to discuss Pakpahan's withdrawal from the DPD, eight out of the nine ranting leaders present, re gardless of marga and region, were united in support of the branch chairman because they felt that Pakpahan and the DPRD representatives should follow party instructions rather than operate independently. in this case, their loyalties as Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 377] === 364 party leaders to the interests of the party organization vs. the DPRD representatives superseded, primordial affiliations. The three factions observed in 1963-64 were characterized by mixed marga and regional affiliations: Silindung (Sutan Hutagalung) and Toba (L.Napitupulu); Silindung (Herman Hutagalung) and Samosir (Gustav Pakpahan); and Toba (P.M. Marpaung) supported by Silindung (T.H. Eutabarat) and ranting leaders from various marga and regions. It is probable that the lack of regular interaction be tween membership and leadership in Parkindo-S iantar has ob scured to some extent the very real, if largely potential, importance of marga and regional loyalties in internal party politics. Throughout the seven years of the party's existence in Siantar the Branch Leadership Council and the DPRD and DPRD-GR representatives have acted for most purposes as if the ranting leadership and membership did not exist. Formal meetings or informal communications between ranting and branch have been extremely rare, and only two Party Conferences (in 1958 and 19 6 1 ) have been called. In 1963-64, in fact, no municipality level leader was sure as to just who the ranting leaders were, since the ranting organizations have been needed only for the purpose of electing the branch leadership, a function which they had not performed since 19 6 1. is at the ranting- and municipality-level Party Conferences that marga and regional loyalties are most likely to assert fte themselves. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 378] === Unfortunately, there is little concrete evidence to support this assertion since the Conferences of 1953 and I96I were largely free of conflict. In 1958 a high-ranking civil servant (of Tobanese origin) won the general support of the ranting delegates and was elected chairman without opposition, while in 1961 only P.H. Marpaung actively sought the office and was supported by Pakpahan (who did not push his own candidacy because- of the opposition to him over the DPD affair). Since the split between Marpaung and Pakpahan, a future conflict over the chairmanship has become likely, and it is possible to speculate on the nature of a Party Conference in which these men are the principal o p p o n e n t s. ^ If such a Conference had been held in 196 ^, it would have been preceded by ranting-level Conferences to elect new leadership and delegates to the municipality Conference. Marpaung and Pakpahan would have been very active in the ranting, courting influential marga-mates and members of affinally-related marga and individuals from their respective regions. The outcome of the Conference would not have been simply a matter of marga and regional arithmetic, however, since such loyalties are very complex and do not carry the same weight for all North Tapanuli Bataks. Regional loyalties have been complicated by frequent intermarriage among migrants from different regions, vague regional boundaries and the fact that many marga have branches in more than one region, so that various ties may conflict Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 379] === in a single individual. A Parkindo member of marga Sitindjak (from Samosir, and distantly related to marga Pakpahan ac cording to Batak g e n e a l o g i e s ^ ) married to a Marpaung, for example, might well yield to Marpaung family pressure in preference to the regional tie. Or, alternatively, nonprimordial factors such as a close personal or business re lationship with Pakpahan or a supporter of Pakpahan might play the deciding role. Within the marga, politically-transferable loyalties tend to vary directly in relation to the genealogical dis tance between individuals. The more distant the family re lationship (i.e. from sons of e g o ’s father or grandsons of ego's father's father) the less likely that support will be forthcoming. At greater genealogical distances non-primordial factors often outweigh the marga tie. Moreover, lineage and marga groups are not normally large enough in Siantar (even when affinally-related marga are included) to form a sub stantial voting bloc at municipality or even in some cases ranting Conferences.^ Despite these limitations, it is clear that marga and regional loyalties are a prominent feature of Worth Tapanuli Batak social relationships in Simalungun/Siantar, and that their effects spill over into party politics and government. The marked predominance of Tobanese in key positions in the city government bureaucracy, for example, was attributed (by government officials from both Toba and Silindung) to a Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 380] === preferential policy on the part of Herman Hutagalung*s predecessor as Municipal Secretary. The opposition to Hutagalung was thus based in part on the desire to maintain Toba hegemony over bureaucratic promotions. The struggle for control of the HKBP church, which reached a peak in 1964 when a dissident group left the HKBP to form a new church, also had strong marga and regional overtones. In this conflict the dissidents, mostly from Silindung and including the majority of the well-educated elite (and most of the faculty at Nommensen University's Siantar and Medan branches) were opposed to the incumbent church leaders, largely from the Toba area, whose patron was an extremely wealthy Medan businessman and PNI member, a self-made man with an apparent contempt for formal education. Parkindo leaders all claimed that the church controversy, in which some of them actively participated, was not carried over into party politics, but the evidence suggests otherwise. The conflict in the DPRD-GH between Marpaung (who supported the church leadership) and Sutan Hutagalung (a leading member of the dissident group, who stood to lose his University professorship if defeated), for example, was certainly ex acerbated by the struggle for control of the church. Marga- and region-based loyalties, then, are an important ingredient in Parkindo's internal politics but are not sufficient to assure success in an attempt to capture the party chairmanship or to wield great influence in party Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 381] === or DPRD-GR councils. Primordial loyalties must be strengthened and expanded by alliances based on other kinds of relation ships. In the case of a contest for the party chairmanship each candidate would attempt to win the support of other municipality and ranting leaders by promising them a seat on the Branch Leadership Council or governmentally-dispensed favors (such as construction contracts or government employ ment or promotion) in return for the marga, regional and other support which they could deliver. Both Marpaung (most noticeably in his relationship with Hutabarat) and Pakpahan (with Herman Hutagalung and through KESFEKRl) were clearly attempting to develop such support in 1964. In contrast to their Siantar counterparts, the leaders of Parkindo-Simalungun have been relatively unencumbered by factional conflicts. In large part the absence of competition has been a result of the lesser desirability of the prize: influence in government. During the colonial period Siantar had already become a municipality and was largely autonomous of higher administrative levels. In the post-independence period, Siantar has retained its autonomy to a considerable degree, including control over the all-important Public Works Office. The government of Simalungun, on the other hand, while several of its bureaus and offices were eventually given legal autonomy and placed directly under the authority Regional Head, depends to a much greater extent for its income on provincial and national assistance. And, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 382] === despite legal autonomy, many regional officials are actually appointed from Medan and/or Djakarta. Beyond a few key personnel, of whom the most prominent are the iiegional Head (whose appointment, after local DPRD-GR nomination, is actually made by Djakarta) and the Regional Secretary, there is little worth fighting for in the regency government. Most decisions of importance for Simalungun are made at higher levels or by officials (such as the police chief and regional military commander) not responsible to the regency government. Among the dominant North Tapanuli Bataks in Parkindo*s Simalungun branch there have been no major conflicts since the formation of the party. Prom 1955-1961 the party was led by Amos Silitonga, born in Silindung in 1901 and a long time teacher and HKBP lay leader in Simalungun. After the regional rebellions, which began in North Sumatra in late 1956, Parkindo had lapsed into almost total inactivity. Distrusted by the military because the rebellion had been led by North Tapanuli Batak Army officers, Parkindo*s leaders (none of whom actually defected to the rebels, although many were apparently sympathetic to their cause) were for a time forbidden to travel outside Siantar except under military escort. At the most recent Party Conference, held in 1961, the ageing Silitonga was replaced by the younger, more ag gressive Dj.P. Nainggolan who, as a medical worker, was permitted to travel freely and could restore at least a min imal link among the regency, s. subdistrict end village leaders. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 383] === Nainggolan's strongest backing at the Conference came from the leadership of the Tanah Djawa sub-branch, largely his personal creation, but there was little opposition to his candidacy from other subdistricts. As a reward for his long service to the party, Silitonga was nominated to Parkindo's seat on the regency BPH. Like Silitonga and other party leaders, Nainggolan ac cepted the view that party-building in the subdistricts and villages was unnecessary given the firmly-established link between community and party. Most of his political activity thus centered around the DPRD-GR. Although this body has been largely engrossed in trivia and enveloped in an atmos phere of futility, two matters of some importance have re quired its attention: the nomination of a Regional Head in 1961 and the election of a Regional Secretary in 1964. both of these decisions Nainggolan played an influential role. The party's original nominee for Regional Head, a North Tapanuli Batak provincial civil servant, proved unacceptable to the central government and was rejected in the first round of nominations. Aware that the constellation of forces in Djakarta and Medan looked most favorably on anak daerah (literally children of the region) and military officers for the post, Nainggolan consulted his Branch Leadership Council, whose Simalungun Batak member suggested a Simalungun Batak Army officer (and a relative by marriage of the Minister for General Administration and Regional Autonomy) then stationed Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 384] === 371 in Djakarta. The officer was contacted,, indicated his willingness to accept the position, and was subsequently nominated by Parkindo (with the support of Partai Katholik, KRSST, PSI, all of whose representatives were Simalungun Bataks, and one PNI defector, also a Simalungun Batak) and approved by Djakarta. In the election of a P.egional Secretary in 196^ Parkindo's candidate was the incumbent, a North Tapanuli Batak Parkindo sympathizer. Although acceptable to the other major parties represented in the DFRD-GR (PNI and P K I ) because of his rep utation for impartiality, Parkindo*s candidate was apparently initially rejected by the Regional Head (reported to be under pressure from prominent members of his ethnic group to sup port a Simalungun Batak) who was responsible for the nomin ations to the DPRD-GR. In the end, Nainggolan's influence and persuasive power with the Regional Head, whom Parkindo had staunchly and consistently supported through three years of PNI and PKI criticism, was a major factor in the nomina tion and reelection of the incumbent. In both of these examples Nainggolan played a key role not only within the DPRD-GR but also within his party. Por the most part members of Parkindo*s Branch Leadership Council have been xvrilling to accept his advice on policy and person nel and he In turn has been careful to consult with them, usually on an individual basis, on Important matters. Neither his period as party chairman nor in Silitonga's has the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 385] === party been rent by the kind of disputes characteristic of Parkindo's Siantar branch, regional loyalties have been deliberately integrated into the party’s leadership structures in the selection of the Branch Leadership Council (two mem bers from Silindung, one each from Samosir, Toba and Humbang, plus one Simalungun Batak and one Karo Batak), the DPRD (two members from Silindung, one each from Toba and Samos ir and one Simalungun Batak) and the DPRD-GR (one member each from Samos ir and Silindung and one Simalungun Batak). this division of seats no significant regional group among the North Tapanuli Bataks was excluded, and no party leader interviewed suggested dissatisfaction with his group's rep resentation or influence within the party. Even the schism within the HKBP had no observable impact on the regency leadership despite the fact that Nainggolan was a prominent member of the dissident group. Only one cloud marred the horizon of Parkindo unity in Simalungun in 196^: the tension between North Tapanuli and Simalungun Bataks. For several years only one Simalungun Batak, a civil servant named Lodewijk Purba, has played a role of any prominence in the party. Generally regarded by members of his ethnic group as a stooge of the North Tapanuli Bataks, Purba had no personal base of support in his sub district of birth or in Upper Simalungun as a whole and only limited connections with the Simalungun 3atak church hierarchy. By 1964, having been promoted to a high-ranking post in the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 386] === 373 government bureaucracy, he was no longer a member of Parkindo but continued to hold his seat in the DPRD-GR and had also become chairman of KSSPEKHI-Simalungun (whose prin cipal targets in the regency were government-employed day laborers, clerks and lower echelon civil servants, many of whom are Simalungun Bataks), Increasingly close to the Regional Head (whose name he had originally suggested to the party leadership), Purba was suspected of plotting the eventual takeover of Parkindo with the support and connivance of the Regional Head and Simalungun church leaders {who were known to be antipathetic to North Tapanuli dominance of the party). The relationship between Purba and Nainggolan was par ticularly tense during the election of the Regional Secretary, as it was feared that a last minute attempt might be made by the Regional Head, with Purba acting as his legislative dep uty, to exclude the incumbent from the list of nominees and force a Simalungun Batak candidate on the DPRD-GR. Although this maneuver did not in fact take place, perhaps because it had little chance of success and would have had severe rep ercussions,^ the suspicion remained that it had been planned. If a Simalungun Batak Parkindo leader with a substantial following in Upper Simalungun should emerge in the future, this cleavage seems certain to grow deeper. Factionalism within the remaining three religious parties need not be discussed in detail, as conflicts, where they Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 387] === 37^ existed, were generally similar to the patterns described for parkindo; minimal involvement of higher party leaders in local affairs, weak articulation between regency/munici pality leaders on the one hand and subdistrict and village leaders on the other, an emphasis upon influence in the institutions of local government and a subordination of the role of the branch leadership, and factional alignments re lated to ethnic and, rather less prominently, regional dif ferences. Partai K a t h o l i k ’s city branch, with too few sup porters to win a seat in the DPRD or DPRD-GR, was in cold storage in 1964- while awaiting new national elections; the party’s regency branch, its DPRD-GR representation and to a lesser extent Branch Leadership Council dominated by Simalungun Bataks, was also free of observable conflicts, although some tension between Simalungun and North Tapanuli Bataks was reported by leaders of other parties. As in the case of Parkindo, factionalism in Nahdatul Ulama was marked in the city branch and largely absent in the regency. The basis of conflict in NU-Siantar was a competi tion for influence in city government between two ethnically distinct groups of leaders; Simalungun Bataks and Coastal Malays. When the DPRD was organized in 1956, the Coastal Malays were in control of the branch leadership and selected their chairman as the party's DPRD representative. By I960, when nominations for the DPRD-GR were submitted to the govern ment, the Simalungun Batak faction was dominant and nominated Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 388] === 375 one of its members, I.B. Saragih, the son of a village head in the Simalungun Batak quarter of Siantar during the col onial period. In 1961 the Malay group again gained control of the party and nominated its former DPBD representative to the BPS. Saragih refused to accept his party’s instructions, however, and nominated a member of his own faction to the position.1^ In 1964 Saragih (along with five other members of the DPRD-GR, mostly from the PNI) was accused of accepting a bribe from a candidate for the post of municipal Regional Secretary and was expelled from the party, an action which had no effect on his DPRD-GR status. In Simalungun, NU's Branch Leadership Council and DPRD-GR membership (NU had no representation in the earlier DPRD) were firmly controlled by Simalungun Bataks among whom there was agreement on all important matters. Despite the fact that a considerable proportion of the NU membership is Javanese, this group held few leadership positions either at the regency or ranting level and exercised no observable in fluence on party decisions. The former leaders of Masjumi, continually under attack in 1963-64 by the spokesmen of Guided Democracy and much of the government-supervised Indonesian press as counter revolutionaries, were reluctant to discuss party affairs. Like the leaders of other parties, thejr tended to discount intra-party factionalism in an attempt to present a picture of unanimity behind the banner of Islam. Without the op- Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 389] === portunity directly to observe internal party conflict as was possible with the PNI. Parkindo and NU, evidence of factionalism must be pieced together from the official trans cripts of DPRD sessions. These documents indicate a familiar pattern: conflict in the city branch and its absence in the regency. Prom the party*s founding in 1957 until its dis solution in 1961, Mas jumi-S iantar *s leaders could not agree on the membership of the Branch Leadership Council, an issue on xfhich the DPRD delegation was similarly split. In 1959 Masjumi's representative in the DPD, like Parkindo*s Pakpahan, resigned without consulting the party leadership and was replaced by a member of the opposing DPRD group. Two principal lines of cleavage, organizational/doctrinal (Aldjam*ijatul Waslijah vs. Muhammadijah) and regional (South Tapanuli is divided, in terms of adat and dialect differences, Into three regions: Mandailing, Angkola and Sipirok) are reported to have existed among the Masjumi-Siantar leader ship. Neither of these patterns could be established on the basis of the DPRD documents, although they were reported by both Masjumi and non-Masjumi politicians to play a role in determining factional alignments.”® It is probable, as in the case of Parkindo-Siantar, that these loyalties were most useful during Party Conferences in the competition for the party chairmanship and lesser offices, and tended to give way to ad hoc alignments in the inter-Conference period. In Masjumi-S imalungun, organizational/doctrinal dif ferences were overshadowed by Aldjam*ijatul waslijah's dom- Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 390] === 377 ination of the party. Regional differences among the South Tapanuli Batak regency party members existed, did the ethnic cleavage among South Tapanuli Bataks, Simalungun Bataks and Javanese. Since, as in the case of Parkindo and NU, few members of the latter two groups were represented in the party leadership at the regency, sub district or ranting levels, ethnic differences had little effect on internal party decision-making. Moreover, few decisions of importance were taken by the DPRD during the short life of the party in the region, so that ethnic-based differences had little opportunity to emerge. Conclusions Three patterns of intra-party factionalism emerge from the above analysis. In the PNI competition is directed toward the winning of positions of leadership within the party, with ethnicity providing the main basis of factional alignment. At Party Conferences, the aspiring leader de pends primarily on a personal support group composed of mem bers of his own ethnic group and secondarily on alliances which he is able to forge with other party leaders possessing similar bases of support. Factionalism at the regency/ municipality level is further exacerbated by the involvement of local party leaders in provincial and national conflicts and by the system of personal and financial alliances ex1 tending from Djakarta through the regency/municipality branches and down to the village ranting. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 391] === 378 Like the PNI, the PKI was a multi-ethnic party led by professional politicians whose main ambition was advancement within the party or its subsidiary organizations. Unlike the PNI, however, factionalism was not characteristic of the PKI*s regency and municipality branches since absolute dis cipline was required of all party leaders and members and decisions as to personal advancement were not made within the local party and were not dependent on personal bases of support. Moreover, for over a decade the Aidit leadership had a monopoly on authority within the national party and possessed total control over the distribution of funds for local party and organizational activities. Within this monolithic structure important resources for intra-party competition at the local level were simply not available. In the religious parties, specific locally-implemented programs designed to build mass support and requiring the participation and financial assistance of provincial and national party organizations have been largely absent. the regency/municipality level the most jealously-guarded value is local autonomy, the right of the local branch, within broad national policy guidelines but without inter ference from above, to select its own leaders, make its own decisions regarding local affairs and settle its own internal disputes. Because of the lack of emphasis on party-building and the weakly-articulated party organizations at the sub district and village levels, the branch leadership has been Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 392] === 379 relatively autonomous of lower party units as well. The principal goal of the religious party leadership— both as individuals and as party leaders— has been to obtain influence within the institutions of local government rather than to rise within the party. The presence or absence of factionalism has been directly related to the importance in the eyes of the party leaders of the Regional Representative Councils and of the regional government as a whole. Intra party competition has thus been more marked in Siantar, where regional government has broader authority, than in Simalungun. As in the PNI, ethnic cleavages have provided the principal bases of factional alignment in the religious parties. Where these cleavages are largely absent, as in Parkindo-Siantar and Masjumi-Siantar, factions have tended to be temporary and shifting rather than permanent and stable. It is perhaps useful at this point to summarize analyt ically some of the main points discussed in the last four chapters. In our examination of party objectives, strategies and organization we identified two basic types of party, religious and secular, and suggested that at least in some respects they correspond structurally to Duverger's cadremass party distinction. Our findings with regard to party membership, the recruitment of leaders, leadership linkage and patterns of intra-party factionalism add further support to this argument. In the religious (cadre) parties, es pecially Parkindo, Partai Katholik and Hasjumi, party leaders Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 393] === maintain no membership lists and tend to assume that party support in the 1955 elections is equivalent to membership. Leaders are part-time politicians recruited laterally from the ethnic-religious community and its non-political organ izations, tend to have high educational and/or occupational status and exhibit considerable independence from those who consider themselves party members. Each level of party leader ship is also more or less autonomous of the levels above and below it. Subsidiary organization leaders are in general not subordinate to or controlled by the party leadership. With regard to the relationship between party leaders and DPRD or DPRD-GR representatives, the latter have tended to be dominant or at least equal to the former in their influence over party policy-making. In the secular (mass) parties, on the other hand, ex pansion of party (or subsidiary organization) membership has been a matter of highest priority; the PNI-Simalungun, for example, keeps membership charts posted in its Siantar office showing the latest increases in party and organization en rollment, and its leaders devote much of their time to operasi in the villages. Party and subsidiary organization leaders are full-time career-oriented politicians chosen (in the case of the PNI) at regular party conferences or (in the case of the PKI) by appointment from above. They are of UJW71V relatively low status in terms of educational background and occupation. The division of labor among party leaders at the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 394] === 381 village, subdistrict, regency/municipality, provincial and national levels is demarcated with some precision, and the leadership at each level is responsible for the execution of party programs and policies and the supervision of lowerlevel party and organizational activities. In both parties the subsidiary organization leaders are clearly subordinate to the party leadership. In the relationship between party leaders and DFHD or DPRD-GR representatives, the former have been dominant, absolutely in the case of the PKI and generally for the PNI as well. In Duverger's analysis, electoral arrangements are given considerable prominence as an explanation, first, for the number of parties in the political system and, second, for differences in the internal structure of the parties. Multimember districts, list voting and proportional representation tend to produce a multi-party system in which the parties are strongly articulated and highly centralized, while single member districts and simple majorities favor a weakly artic ulated, decentralized two-party system. The adoption of universal suffrage is also seen, in the European context, as having encouraged the external (to Parliament) growth of mass parties and as tending to transform cadre into mass parties.*9 Other political scientists have argued that, al though electoral arrangements may play a role in the de termination of types of party systems and forms of party organization, a more basic factor is the extent of consensus Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 395] === 382 and cleavage in the society. Two-party systems thrive best in a pragmatic, non-ideological, homogeneous social environ ment, while multi-party systems are characteristic of societies deeply divided by a multiplicity of social and ideological cleavages. The parties in a two-party system are normally non-ideological cadre-type parties, and those in multi-party systems tend to be of the more highly ideo logical mass (branch and cell) type.^® In Simalungun/Siantar, where both types of party exist siae-by-side, these arguments do not seem to provide a suf ficient explanation for structural differences. While it is undoubtedly true that the elections of 1955» for a Parliament whose seats were to be distributed on the basis of propor tional representation, provided a major spur to partisan activity in the region, the parties* organizational structures were essentially set at the beginning of the post-revolutionary period and have not changed in any fundamental sense since that time. It is also true that Simalungun/Siantar (and Indonesia as a whole) is deeply rent by a variety of social and ideological cleavages, and that the existence of the multi-party system is to a significant extent a consequence of these cleavages. Both the religious and secular parties are, in fact, ideological parties in the sense that they are committed to particular systems of ideas and world-views. The parties* structural forms, however, are not the re sult merely of the existence of social and ideological Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 396] === cleavages and of* a party system based on those cleavages. The root cause of structural (and most other) differences between the two types of parties, as we have suggested prev iously, lies in the particular relationship of each party with the local social environment and the division of the population into ethnic, religious and socio-economic groups. The religious parties have been able to build with some ease on the sense of ethnic-religious solidarity and the pre-existing religious organizations, while the secular parties have been forced to develop a mass party form of organization in order to build support among the plantation workers and squatters whose sense of common interests and class loyalty is relatively weak. The PNI-Siantar, less of a mass party than its regency counterpart because of the firmness of its ethnic base among the urban Javanese and the great difficulties inherent in an attempt to expand very far beyond that base, and NU, more of a mass party than the other religious parties because of its lack of primordial support, attest to the importance of these environmental factors. At least for Simalungun/Siantar, then, cadre party organization is related to high levels of primordial iden tification, while mass party organization is related to the partial displacement of primordial Identification by much weaker socio-economic loyalties. To what extent this finding nay have application to other parts of Indonesia, and to other new states as well, is an interesting subject for Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 397] === future research. It might be hypothesized that parties with secular, modernizing ideologies are, in a competitive situation, more likely to develop a mass party form of organization than are parties with a traditionalist or primordial orientation. Or, from a broader and more devel opmental perspective, we might predict that, with increas ingly higher levels of economic modernization, cadre party organization is likely to give way to that of the mass party. This might occur regardless of the nature of a party's ideo logical commitment, as detraditionalization will force religious-primordial parties into a more competitive relation ship with secular, modernizing parties. Qualifications to such hypotheses, based on the Simalungun/ Siantar data, would include the effects of different types of economic growth, e.g. Pematangsiantar vs. Lower Simalungun, and of uneven rates of growth, e.g. Upper Simalungun vs. Lower Simalungun. In the former case, as we have seen, ur banization and the growth of an economy based on trade have not had the detraditionalizing effect on primordial loyalties and attachments to the religious parties which has been ex perienced by the wage workers and squatters on the plantations of Lower Simalungun. In the latter case (to be examined in detail in the following chapter) the relative lack of social and economic change at the village level and the feelings of ethnic solidarity and hostility to outsiders have combined to substantially close off Upper Simalungun to the activities Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 398] === of the national party system, in marked, contrast to the multi-party, highly politicized and (at least between the PNI and PKI) highly competitive situation in Lower Simalungun. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 399] === CHAPTER X SUKU SIMALUNGUN: AN ETHNIC GROUP IN SEARCH OF REPRESENTATION Sin Raja sini Purba, Sin Dolog sini Panel, Naidja pe lang marubah, Asal na marholong atel. From Raja or from Purba, From Dolog or from Pane, One's origin doesn't matter, As long as he has compassion. — A Simalungun Batak proverb The relationship between ethnicity and the party system in 3 imalungun/Siantar is a complex one, as we have seen in the preceding chapters, and it is an oversimplification to view party politics in the region as merely an extension of eth nic loyalties and conflicts. It is also true, however, that there is a considerable measure of ethnic group identification with particular parties; North Tapanuli Bataks with Parkindo, South Tapanuli Bataks with Masjumi, and the Javanese, al though perhaps more divided in their partisan loyalties, with the PNI. Of the four major ethnic communities only one, the Simalungun Batak, has failed to support a national party. The purpose of this chapter, a kind of case study within a case study, is to explore the political development of suku Simalungun and the attempts of its leaders to relate them- 386 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 400] === 387 selves and their community to the politics of independent Indonesia. Social Change Among the Simalungun B a t a k s: The Differentiation of Elites and the Development of Political Loyalties Before the arrival of the Dutch toward the close of the nineteenth century, political leadership in Simalungun was monopolized by the traditional aristocracy. Although compe tition for power between and within the kingdoms of Simalungun was apparently common in the pre-colonial period, it was ex clusively a game of the aristocracy. Invested with supernaturally-sanctioned authority (which defined the gap be tween elite and non-elite), they also dominated the religious and economic lives of their subjects. No alternative leadership groups or institutions existed in the society which might have mounted a challenge to their dominant posi tion. Marga and lineage groups, generally numerically small in any particular locality and/or integrated into the tra ditional power structure, lacked formal organization and were incapable of opposing the aristocracy. Dutch colonial rule brought rust en orde to Simalungun by prohibiting warfare among the keradjaan and by strengthening the position of the radja over the tungkat and tuan huta. At the same time, the Dutch presence sowed the seeds of future conflict by opening channels to individual advancement within the society not dependent on the traditional elite. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 401] === 388 creasingly In the twentieth century there emerged a new elite group among the Simalungun Bataks whose claim to in fluence rested not on traditional supernatural grounds but on modern education, leadership of the Christian and Islamic religious communities and, to a lesser extent, commercial and entrepreneurial success. Westem-style education, provided both in Christian and Moslem schools, created a new civil servant class whose skills were required both by the Dutch in their government and plan tation offices and by the radja and tungkat In their own in creasingly westernized administrations. The development of Pematangsiantar auad other towns as commercial centers serving the needs of the plantations and the much-enlarged population of the region simultaneously contributed to the rise of a small merchant and entrepreneurial class among the educated Simalungun 3ataks. The growth of Christianity and (on a smaller scale) Islam also entailed the creation of an indigenous religious leadership centered in the church and church-school hierar chies and in the Islamic madrasah and social organizations. The authority of the n e w religious leaders was based on their knowledge of the new truths of the religions of Christ and Muhammad and, perhaps most importantly, on their possession of the means to advancement in the secular world, a modern educational system. It was In general unrelated to the tra ditional aristocracy and divorced from its world-view, which Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 402] === had heretofore provided the religious basis of the society. Although the religious elite offered no challenges to the political power of the traditional aristocracy— Moslem leaders and religious teachers in particular were too closely tied to the radja and, in any event, Dutch power made challenges well-nigh impossible— its influence in the society was per vasive. By the 1930s, then, the traditional elite had begun to lose its grip on Simalungun society. While still dominant politically, its authority (particularly that of the radja over lesser aristocrats) was heavily dependent on Dutch support and only grudgingly accepted by the n e w elites which had achieved status in non-traditional spheres of activity. The Japanese occupation contributed further to the dif ferentiation of elites and the decline of the aristocracy. Higher positions in the plantation and government bureaucracies than had previously been open to them were given to Simalungun Bataks (and other Indonesians). At the village level re sentment toward the aristocracy became more widespread, as the radja and tungkat participated in the organization;,of the infamous Japanese forced labor system. Many villagers left home for the Japanese work gangs and never returned. Finally, military and para-military training alloyed with nationalist indoctrination in camps such as TALA PETA greatly enlarged the group of young, partially-educated Simalungun Bataks willing openly to oppose the continuation of traditional Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 403] === political institutions. When the Japanese withdrew, it was this latter group which dealt the death blow to the kingdoms of Simalungun. Political loyalties in traditional Simalungun were pri marily territorial- rather than kinship-based and were di rected toward the village, parbapaan and keradjaan in which the individual resided and to whose rulers he was subject. The typical Simalungun Batak village contains a variety of marga and sub-marga groups, many of which are unrelated by marriage or descent. The basic unit of social interaction in the Simalungun village, the sanina, consists of the sons of ego's father or grandsons of his father's father and is not large enough or inclusive enough to provide a basis for village-wide social organization. For assistance in clearing his fields and harvesting and processing his crops, for pro tection against attack by outsiders and against the depre dations of evil spirits, the individual in traditional society was dependent on fellow villagers with whom he often had no kinship tie and on the political leadership of the village and of the more inclusive units of which it was a part. In the post-colonial period loyalties to village and keradjaan have continued in the form of regional identifi cation. Hegionalism has been particularly strong in sub district Raja, where the Simalungun language is considered to be purest and whose nineteenth-century Radja Rondahaim is Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 404] === celebrated as an anti-colonial hero, and in subdistrict Purba, once the target of Rondahaim's expansionism. It has become increasingly common to find individuals who identify themselves both by marga and region (e.g. Johannes Purba-Raja, signifying marga Purba from subdistrict Raja) rather than simply by marga or sub-marga. The division of the Simalungun Protestant Christian Church (Geredja Kristen Protestan Slmalungun) into three districts (one centered in Raja, one in Purba and the third encompassing the rest of Simalungun and East Sumatra) also reflects the cleavage between the two areas, as does the church's concern to maintain a regional balance in its central leadership. Supra-village kinship ties have generally been weak and ineffectual as determinants of political loyalties. In the pre-colonial period communication between keradjaan was dif ficult and infrequent, genealogies were not kept, and ties with relatives who migrated from one area to another were quickly lost. Despite improved communications and increased travel the Simalungun Batak has continued to identify pri marily with his village and only secondarily with fellow members of his sub-marga or marga. In recent years a few attempts have been made to establish marga associations in Siantar and Medan. These associations, at least in Siantar, have had a negligible effect on social organization within the Simalungun Batak community. In some cases, however, particularly where marga divisions have coincided in part Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 405] === 3 92 with territorial loyalties (e.g., the large number of members of sub-marga Purba Pakpak in the former keradjaan of Purba and of various subdivisions of marga Saragih in keradjaan Raja), regional cleavages have had some kinship overtones. Traditional cleavages in Simalungun society, whether regional or kinship based, have been greatly mitigated in the twentieth century by the emergence of new reference groups which cut across rather than reinforce the older divisions. With the introduction of Christianity and Islam many Simalungun Bataks of all marga and regions turned to the new religious leadership for guidance in secular as well as in spiritual affairs. Others, particularly in the more remote villages relatively unaffected by the events of the twentieth century, remained undivided in their loyalties to the ancien regime. Since the traditional aristocracy everywhere toler ated and sometimes closely cooperated with the religious leaders, this cleavage never developed into open hostility, either at the village level or between the two elite groups. During the Japanese occupation and the nationalist revolution, still another segment of the Simalungun populace rejected both the traditional and the religious elites in favor of the new revolutionary leadership in organizations such as Barisan Harimau Liar. This final cleavage, which reached its greatest intensity in the Social Revolution of 19^6, ran much deeper in Simalungun society, as it required many individuals to take a direct stand for or against the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 406] === traditional elite. Although strongest in keradjaan Purba and parts of keradjaan Pane bordering on Lake Toba, the rev olutionary group included members of all four marga and sub jects of every keradjaan in Simalungun. Finally, all of these cleavages, the traditional and the modern, have been tempered by the position of the Simalungun Bataks as a minority group in their homeland. a total regency/municipality population estimated at nearly 650,000 in 1963 and a provincial population of over five million, probably fewer than 200,000 are Simalungun Bataks. In the nineteenth century there was little unity among the Simalungun people, who identified themselves as residents of a particular village and subjects of a particular keradjaan rather than as members of a common ethnic group. Hostility toward the non-Simalungun Batak, although It certainly existed, was seen not as something pitting one ethnic group against another but as pitting one village or kingdom against another; It was in any case largely confined to the border areas. Not until the migrations of the twentieth century did the Simalungun Batak, increasingly in competition with indi viduals from different cultures, begin to feel a sense of ethnic unity based on common language, culture and member ship in one of the four Simalungun marga. The intensity of this new identification varied from individual to individual depending upon the nature and extent of culture contact, but by the end of the colonial period few Simalungun Bataks were Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 407] === unaware of their common identity and the differences between them and the various migrant groups. A s a result of these differences and of the threat presented by non-Simalungun Bataks influential in the economic and political life of the region, kesatuan Simalungun— Simalungun unity— became a principal theme of post-independence political activity. The 1950s: The Rise and Fall of Ethnic Political Organizations After a brief lull following the dismantling of the Dutch-sponsored State of East Sumatra (NST), Simalungun Batak politicians began to prepare for the coming election campaign. The community’s political leadership was divided into three broad groups: the remnants of the traditional aristocracy and other individuals sympathetic to the idea of a political organization which would directly represent the Simalungun Bataks, the religious leadership, and the former leaders of militantly revolutionary organizations. Simalungun Batak civil servants, merchants and entrepreneur's did not form a separate bloc but Instead affiliated themselves with one of the three groups. Most members of the first group of leaders became active in KBSST (Kebangunan BakJat SImalungun Sumatera T i m u r. The Awakening of the Simalungun People of East Sumatra), an ethnic organization restricted to the Simalungun Batak com munity.^ K HSST’s objective was to obtain a seat in the national Parliament or, failing that, representation in the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 408] === proposed North Sumatran provincial legislature on behalf of the entire Simalungun Batak community. Financed by a wealthy Simalungun Batak businessman in Djakarta, the organization was led in the region by the former tungkat of Dolok Batunanggar. Its leadership at the regency and subdistrict levels cut across most of the cleavages described in the pre ceding section, including former aristocrats and non aristocrats from all regions and of all marga as well as Christians, Moslems (including the former tungkat and the Djakarta businessman), and the followers of traditional re ligious practices. Only the militant revolutionaries and their supporters remained entirely aloof. The religious elite was divided in its partisan loyalties. The Protestant leadership was heavily cross-pressured, torn between a desire to support the party of Protestantism (Parkindo) and yet deeply sympathetic to the objectives of KRSST. For many years Protestant leaders had opposed North Tapanuli influence in their church. By 1952, with the establishment of the HKBP-S (for Simalungun), they had suc ceeded in gaining autonomy within the Batak church, but their final goal— total separation— was not to be achieved for another decade. T o many of them Parkindo was not much more than the political extension of the HKBP, and was similarly dominated by North Tapanuli Bataks. They saw little possibility of an influential role for Simalungun Bataks in Parkindo. Many ministers and teachers resolved Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 409] === their Internal conflict by limiting their political propa ganda to anti-Communist and, less frequently, anti-PNI sermons and speeches. A smaller number came out boldly for Parkindo or for KBSST. Since Simalungun Batak Catholic lay leaders in subdistrict Purba played a prominent role in the regency leadership of Partai Kathollk, the Catholic leader ship found it less difficult to resolve the conflict between church and suku. By supporting Partai Katholik one could be pro-suku and pro-church at the same time. The Moslem elite was also divided. MU was established by Simalungun Bataks who had been closely associated with the traditional aristocracy and had participated in NST. With the support of the Simalungun Moslem community and what ever other ethnic groups (such as Coastal Malays and Javanese) could be attracted to the party, and the financial assistance of NU*s national leadership, they hoped to carve an inde pendent role for themselves in local politics. Other Moslems, similar in background to the NU leaders, felt that a party based largely on an appeal to perhaps fifteen percent of the ethnic group would be too small to play an effective role either in Simalungun or in the national NU organization, and gave their support instead to KBSST. Finally, Simalungun Moslem leaders who had fought against the Dutch found both KBSST and NU unattractive and turned to Masjumi. The secular revolutionary leadership was less divided in its partisan affiliation than the religious elite. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Most === [PDF page 410] === 397 Simalungun Bataks who had participated in the Revolution were members of Barisan Harimau Liar. In the early 1950s the former leaders of BHL who continued to be politically active were, with few exceptions, PNI supporters and leaders. The results of the 1955 elections showed that the SImalungun Batak community, and particularly its Protestant and animistic sub-groups, was highly receptive to the idea of direct political representation of the ethnic group. KBSST*s leaders had framed their appeal not in terms of loy alty to the traditional aristocracy or a restoration of tra ditional rule (which they knew to be impossible) but rather on the basis of ethnic solidarity in opposition to the mi grant groups. Its popularity in Upper Simalungun was comp arable to the support which the ostensibly non-ethnic parties Parkindo, Masjuml and PNI received from the North Tapanuli, South Tapanuli and Javanese communities respectively. In the seven subdistricts of Upper Simalungun KBSST*s mean percentage of the vote was ^3,7%, and the party won a clear majority in Raja and Silau Kahean. In the regency as a whole, with 8.3^ of the vote, it was the fifth largest party. The second most popular party In Upper Simalungun was the PNI, with a mean of 19.8^ of the vote. The PNI*s support was concentrated In subdistricts Slllmakuta and Dolok Silau (where many of the voters were Karo Bataks) and subdistricts Dolok Pardamaian and Purba, both of which were former BHL strongholds. The low PNI vote in Raja (7.8^) reflected not Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 411] === 398 TABLE 10-1 THE KBSST VOTE IN SIMALUNGUN IN THE 1955 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS Subdistriot Region KBSST Vote (as % of subd. vote) 51.3 Raja Silau Kahean Purba Dolok Silau Raja Kahean Slllmakuta Dolik Fardamaian Subtotal: Upper Simalungun All Other Subdistricts (Mean) Total: Simalungun Regency Siantar City 43.8 37.6 29.1 22.7 Source: Adapted from Pemerintahan Daerah Tkt. II Simalungun, Daftar:,.., the regional cleavage between Raja and Purba but rather the absence in that subdistrict of indigenous BHL-PNI leadership, (The best-known leader of BHL in Raja left North Sumatra soon after the Revolution,) Of the remaining parties, Parkindo won a mean 9*3^ of the vote in Upper Simalungun (with its greatest support in Raja, Raja Kahean and Dolok Pardamalan) and Masjumi obtained 7*2/6, which included most of the Simalungun Batak Moslem voters in the region and a substantial proportion of non-Simalungun Bataks in Silau Kahean and Raja Kahean, Partai Katholik’s vote, less than 4$ of the regional total, was concentrated in subdistrict Purba, NU received negligible support In Upper Simalungun, with most of its small vote in the regency/municipality coming from Siantar city and the Lower Simalungun subdistricts of Bandar, Bosar Mallgas, Tanah Djawa and Sidamanik, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 412] === TABLE 10-2 THE VOTE FOR PNI, PARKINDO AND MASJUMI IN UPPER SIMALUNGUN, BY SUBDISTRICT {%) Parkindo Mas jumi 28.7 20.6 42.9 37.8 12.4 13.5 23.0 20.6 19.8 Subdistrict PNI Raja Dolok Pardamaian Purba Silimakuta Dolok Silau Silau Kahean Raja Kahean Total Source: See Table 10-1, For a more complete table on the 1955 elections in Upper Simalungun, see Chapter I, Table Despite its sizable vote in Upper Simalungun, KBSST failed to achieve its objectives of national and/or provin cial representation. By 1957* when the regency DPRD was in augurated, its most prominent leadership had turned to other activities and organizations, allowing second-rank leaders to fill its three DPRD seats. Until formally dissolved in I961,2 KBSST existed in name only, with no leadership other than its representatives in the DPRD and no organization in the subdistricts. In December 1956 the North Sumatran army command sta tioned in Medan rebelled against the central government.^ Although the rebels were quickly driven out of East Sumatra and into the highlands of North Tapanuli, the authority of the government was not fully restored in many rural areas of Simalungun until 1959* I» these unsettled conditions a new Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 413] === organization called Rondahaim (after the former Radja of Raja) was created in Upper Simalungun by former KBSST activ ists. Rondahaim’s goals were twofold: (1) to provide pro tection to the Simalungun Batak community through its own para-military force and by establishing liaison with both rebel and government troops; and (2 ) to promote economic development in Upper Simalungun by organizing such projects as road building and school and market construction. Because of its sometimes heavy-handed attitude toward the local pop ulation, its tendency to dragoon villagers into Its work gangs, and the fact that nearly all of its leaders were from Raja, Rondahaim was never widely supported. With the gradual return of security and the government presence in Upper Simalungun Rondahaim soon disappeared. The army rebellion and its defeat precipitated a shift in political power in North Sumatra from civilian government to the military, and within the military from one faction to another. A state of war and siege (S O B ), giving the army vastly increased powers over civilian government, was de clared and not formally ended until 1963* Since the rebel lious army officers were mostly North Tapanuli Bataks, the group as a whole came tinder suspicion and its military and civilian leaders went into eclipse In provincial politics. Under the new army commander, a Karo Batak, the indigenous peoples of East Sumatra began to press claims for the division of North Sumatra into two provinces: East Sumatra, to be run Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 414] === by Karo and Simalungun Bataks and Coastal Malays; and Tapanuli, to be left to the North and South Tapanuli Bataks, The organizational expression of the movement for East Sumatran autonomy was BAPOST (Badan Penuntut Otonom Su mat era Timur. Body to Demand East Sumatran Autonomy), established some months prior to the army rebellion but not really active until 1957* In Simalungun, where it had branches at the regency /municipality and subdistrict levels, BAPOST*s leader ship was more inclusive than that of previous ethnic-based organizations. Beyond including members of the small Karo Batak and Coastal Malay communities, BAPOST was widely sup ported by the Simalungun Batak political elite irrespective of religious, regional and traditional-revolutionary cleavages. Only the few Simalungun Bataks in the PKI, under party in structions, refused to support the movement. Within the PNI the emergence of BAPOST provided the first sign of dissension. DJulan Purba and most other Simalungun Bataks in the regency and subdistrict leadership became active BAPOST leaders, while Abdullah Jusuf, Umbar Subroto and the North and South Tapanuli Bataks and Javanese in the party lent their support to GAS (Gerakan Anti-Seoaratls. Anti-Separatist Movement), an organization created to oppose BAPOST. Simalungun Bataks affiliated with Parkindo also supported the movement for autonomy, increasing their alienation from the dominant North Tapanuli leadership (who, under suspicion as possible rebels, abstained from all political activity in this period). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Des- === [PDF page 415] === 402 pite apparent high-level support (particularly within the military), mass meetings, demonstrations and implied threats of violence, the demand for a separate East Sumatra was in the end unacceptable to the central government and BAPOST went the way of KBSST and Bondahaim. In its wake it left an intensified sense of ethnic identity both among the Simalungun Bataks and among their opponents. As the last of the ethnic organizations, it also left an organizational vacuum in Upper Simalungun. The 1960s; A n Organizational Vacuum The fall of BAPOST signified the beginning of a new era in ethnic politics in Simalungun in which the organizational link between the Simalungun Batak villager and the urban po litical elite declined but ethnic influence in regency gov ernment increased. In the 1950*s ethnic organizations had proved singularly ineffective as means to gaining influence in government. The experience of KBSST had shown that, while an ethnic political party could win the support of a con siderable segment of the Simalungun people, there were simply too few Simalungun Bataks to enable such an organization to dominate regency politics, let alone play a role on the pro vincial or national stage. Equally important, the dissolution of KBSST and the failure of BAPOST made It abundantly clear that overt sukuism and regionalism were unacceptable to the national government. By the end of the decade Simalungun Batak politicians had lost their taste for ethnic organizations• Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 416] === The organizati onal vacuum left by the decline and sub sequent dissolution of KBSST has not been filled by any of the remaining parties. Begency-level party leaders have, in fact, paid less attention to Upper Simalungun than to any other part of the regency. While minimal organizational structures have been maintained, no attempts have been made to create mass membership parties or subsidiary organizations with regular programs of activity reaching into the daily lives of the population. Nor has there been a continuous link between the urban party leaders and the village popu lation whom they claim to represent in party and government councils. Parkindo's regency leadership, including its Simalungun Batak member, has almost totally ignored the sub district party leaders in Upper Simalungun. NU, Partai Katholik and the PKI have also been largely inactive in the region. Simalungun Bataks in the branch PNI organisation have communicated more frequently with the subdistrict and village leadership, whose support they need at Party Conferences, but they have for the most part neglected the tasks of party- and organization-building. In the late 1950s and 1960s, some Simalungun Bataks in Siantar became active in IPKI (former KBSST supporters and descendants of the aristocracy), Murba and to a lesser extent Partindo (former revolutionaries), but they made no substantial effort to organize in the villages. The failure of the national political parties to develop a mass base in Upper Simalungun has not been entirely the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 417] === fault of the regency party leadership, for each of the national parties is limited in terms of its potential support, Homan Catholics and Moslems are too few to enable Partai Katholik and NU to play a prominent role in the region, and Parkindo has been handicapped by its identification with the North Tapanuli Batak community. Among the large percentage of the village population which supported KBSST and felt little enmity toward the traditional aristocracy, there has been active hostility toward the revolutionary leaders of the PNI, PKI, Murba and Partindo. The PKI has been further bur dened by its identification with atheism and by its un willingness to represent ethnic interests, such as the de mand for Bast Sumatran autonomy. IPKI's leaders, while of aristocratic blood and formerly supporters of KBSST, are either civil servants or youths without substantial political experience or contacts in the villages • The first-rank leaders of KBSST have in the 1960s turned away from politics altogether. In the absence of partisan links, upward communication between the Upper Simalungun villager and the regency govern ment has been severely hampered. Official government channels, in the persons of the subdistrict officer (appointed by the Hegional Head in his capacity as regent) and the village head (according to law, popularly elected), have not provided an effective alternative to the party organizations. The relationship between the subdistrict officer and the village Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 418] === head has been largely formal and paternalistic. For some yego's after the Revolution most subdistrict officers in Upper Simalungun were outsiders who did not speak the Simalungun language. More recently these posts have been given primarily to Simalungun Bataks, but their function— to represent the central government to the people rather than the people to the government— has, in the eyes of the villagers, remained the same. Communication between the sub district officer and the people within his jurisdiction is largely limited to meetings with the village heads called to convey instructions emanating from the Regional Head or his superiors. The village head tends to be somewhat awed in the presence of higher authority, and his sense of sub ordination is increased by the formality of the setting, his imperfect understanding of the Indonesian language (used as the official language at such meetings) and by the fact that the subdistrict officer is normally flanked by the subdistrict representatives of the police and army. The village head also knows from personal experience that attempts to soften the impact of government instructions (e.g., a reduction in the quantity of rice which his village must supply to the government at a fixed price below the market value) or to make other requests of the subdistrict officer will mostly be unavailing. In one case a village in subdistrict Raja had been trying to obtain government assistance in the building of a road for seven years without Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 419] === success. In this instance the main channel used by the vil lagers was the official village head-subdistrict officer link, although direct representation to regency and even provincial administrators had also been made. The local military and police representatives, most of whom are not Simalungun Bataks and do not live in the subdistrict to which they are posed, are even less useful as channels for the expression of village demands than the subdistrict officer. Even the village head is often regarded in Upper Simalungun as the last link in the downward chain of command rather than the first link in an upward chain of represen tation. Although he is popularly elected or— as has been the case when vacancies have occurred in recent years— cho sen by the subdistrict officer after consultation with prom inent villagers, the consolidation of small villages or hamlets into village complexes for purposes of administrative efficiency has meant that to many of his constituents the village head is an outsider. The village complex of Baringin Haja in subdistrict Raja, for example, consists of five separate hamlets. the last village election, held in 1953» three candidates, one from each of the three largest hamlets, were nominated for the post of village head. The vote was divided along hamlet lines, with the candidate from the largest hamlet emerging victorious. In 1964, when the author visited Baringin Raja, the village head was held in low esteem, par- Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 420] === tlcularly'. out aide his own hamlet. Considered primarily a tax- and rice-collector and bearer of instructions, he rarely visited the other hamlets under his authority and played no role in their internal affairs. Hamlet disputes were taken to him as a last resort and only after all attempts at mediation by family members and village elders learned in the adat had failed. According to the villagers, who Jealously guarded their trad.itions of hamlet autonomy, such failures were extremely rare. The subdistrict and village branches of the Front Nasional, an institution created to provide a channel for the dissemination of official propaganda and to enable the government to exercise greater control over the activities of the political parties, have also been ineffective as in struments for the expression of popular demands. In the sub districts of Upper Simalungun, FN members (appointed by the Regional Head upon recommendations from the subdistrict of ficer) are mostly unaffiliated with the political parties, reside in the subdistrict capital and have little contact with the villages. The seventeen-member FN anak tjabang in Raja, for example, consisted of the subdistrict officer (as chairman), the army representative, two representatives from the PNI, one representative each from the PKI, Parkindo and Partindo, six non-party school teachers and civil servants, the Protestant minister, two non-party farmers and one Raja businessman. It met infrequently and then only for the purpose of receiving instructions from the regency Front Nasional. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 421] === 408 In the village the PN ranting membership (appointed by the subdistrict officer on recommendations from the village head) usually contains a selection of village elders, church lay leaders, the local schoolteacher and, where they exist, political party representatives. Its use has been limited to its function as the terminal point for the dissemination of PN pamphlets and newsletters, whose contents are supposed to be passed on orally to the villagers. Most PN ranting members do not bother to read this literature, which they regard as irrelevant to their own and their village's problems. Without effective political organizations or official governmental channels of communication, contact between the village and the regency government tends to be based on personal relationships. The link between the villager who goes to Siantar to make a request on behalf of his village and the government official or other member of the political elite who receives him may be the tie of family, village, region, past association or merely common membership in the ethnic group. Since the appointment of a Simalungun Batak as Regional Head (see below) the range of officials amenable to such contacts is fairly broad. Although not a party leader or member, the villager may also state his case to a party politician or member of the DjFHD-GR who is a Simalungun Batak, or to an official of the church who will relay It to the appropriate government official. These channels have been employed much more commonly In recent Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 422] === years than they had been in the 1950s but with only limited success. A principal obstacle to the success of this in formal and personal kind of representation, as to that of party-related representation, has been the relative power lessness of regency government and the lack of resources with which it can meet local demands • During the period of martial law (1957-1963) the regional military commanders were of somewhat greater importance to the Simalungun Batak community as a source of social and political action. In Siantar city the A r m y ’s regional com mander from 1955 to 1958 was a Simalungun Batak.^ In the period of greatest insecurity in the countryside, he became the critical link between the many villagers who fled Upper Simalungun for the safety of the city and the municipality government. As the ultimate possessor of authority under SOB, he was able to secure land and building permits and day laborer jobs in the city government for the refugees. The combined regency/municipality Army commander from 1961 to 1963 was also a Simalungun Batak and several local develop ment projects, particularly the building of village schools, were carried out with his assistance. Plans for the con struction of a commercially valuable connecting road between Raja and Sindarraja in subdistrict Raja Kahean under the army's civic mission program were also initiated by the Army commander (who was a grandson of the former Radja of Raja) in this period. With the return to full civilian authority Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 423] === in 1963 the power and freedom of action permitted to the army leadership in Simalungun/Siantar diminished considerably. When a Karo Batak was subsequently appointed regional mili tary commander, the link which this office had provided be tween the villagers of Upper Simalungun and the regency political process was broken. Regency-Level Leaderships The Search for Unity Continues While the Simalungun Batak political elite in Siantar has failed to develop an organizational base in the villages in recent years, its influence in regency-wide politics has increased considerably. The turning point in the group's fortunes came in i960 with the appointment, after nomination by the DPRD, of a Simalungun Batak army officer as Regional Head. A Protestant (but married to a Moslem) born in the former keradjaan of Purba and somewhat distantly related to the radja, the n e w Regional Head was a professional soldier who had spent most of his adult life in Java. Already wellconnected nationally and with the provincial military leader ship in Medan, his most critical problem was to build support in Simalungun. Like the party leaders whose careers we have already described, his first concern was to establish him self as a leader of his own ethnic community without, inso far as possible, alienating non-Simalungun Batak members of the regency political elite or Jeopardizing his support in Medan and Djakarta. He adopted a strategy of cultivating Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 424] === 411 both the Simalungun Batak urban elite (of all parties and organizations) and simultaneously developing personal support in the villages independent of the party politicians. The Regional Head's first major project after his inaug uration, important for its symbolic as well as its practical value, was the asphalting of the Haranggaol-Tiga Runggu road in Upper Simalungun. This project produced the first clash with PKI and (non-Simalungun Batak) PNI leaders in the DPRD, who were already opposed to him because of his provincial and national allies. In the ensuing years he continued his activities in Upper Simalungun, assisting in economic develop ment projects such as the privately-financed planting of orange groves, arranging periodically for the supply of agri cultural implements, seeds and fertilizer to the village pop ulation at fixed government prices, and so on. Where pos sible, he appointed Simalungun Batak subdistrict officers and other officials, such as the Head of the Department of General Administration (the immediate superior of the subdistrict officers), and he lobbied successfully in Medan for the appointment of Simalungun Bataks to the posts of Head of Cultural Inspection and Head of the Agrarian Service. has also been active in adat affairs, and in 1964 organized and financed an Impressive and well-attended ceremony in which a prominent aristocratic ancestor's remains were moved to an elaborate new resting place. 1964 Seminar on Simalungun Culture, of which the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 425] === hiz the chief organizers, provides an excellent illustration of the care taken to balance the need for ethnic support with the requirements of the national polity. The motto of the Seminar, hung over the main street of Siantar, was: Berantas Kebuda.laan A s l n g, Bina KebudaJaan Nasional Bersumber Kebudajaan Daerah (Combat Foreign Culture, Build National Culture Rooted in Regional Culture), The first part of the motto reflected a campaign, instigated by the PKI and sup ported by President Sukarno and several political parties, to prohibit the importation of Western films and other para phernalia of popular Western culture into Indonesia; the second part paid homage to Indonesian nationalism, and the third part was intended to win the support of the Simalungun Batak community. In the selection of Seminar participants, the organizers were careful to exclude or to give only subordinate roles to individuals linked with the traditional aristocracy and former KRSST activists, as well as some leaders of BAPOST who were thought to be too openly "suku-minded, w The result was to diminish the value of the Seminar as a scholarly con ference designed to explore Simalungun culture (since the most prominent adat specialists were mostly former aristocrats and KRSST supporters) but to enhance its value as a demon stration to Djakarta (Ruslan Abdulganl, then Minister of Information, gave the opening speech on behalf of the g o v e m of the suku's contributions to the Revolution and its Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 426] === loyalty to the regime. Despite the exclusion of "nonrevolutionary" political leaders, the Seminar was well at tended by delegates from all subdistricts with a substantial Simalungun Batak population and contributed handsomely to the organizers' reputations in the villages. The Regional Head's greatest opportunity to unite the Simalungun Batak political elite under his leadership occurred shortly after his inauguration in 19^0, when the old DPRD was abolished and machinery for the establishment of a new DERD-GR was set in motion. Two nominees for each seat in the new body (to be divided among party and functional group representatives) were requested from all legal parties and organizations with the final choices to be made by the Governor of North Sumatra on the recommendations of the Regional Head of Simalungun and the provincial military commander (who was in turn to receive recommendations from the regency/municipality mili tary commander). Prom each party and organization the Regional Head requested, and in most cases received, at least one Simalungun Batak nominee. Por unorganized functional groups such as Adat, National Entrepreneurs, Cooperatives (of which there were many different kinds with no peak organ ization) and the Protestant and Catholic Religious Leader ship he played a leading role in the actual selection of nominees. His support for NU and IPKI representation in the DERB-g r (neither party had members in the DPRD) was also crucial, in the end, after months of complicated bargaining Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 427] === within the regency (mostly with the parties) and at the provincial level (mostly within the military), Simalungun Batak representation was increased from eight to fourteen, including two NU members, one member each from Parkindo, PKI, IPKI and Partai Katholik, and the representatives of the Police, Veterans (also a PNI leader), Protestant and Catholic.Religious Leadership, Women (the chairman of the PNI's Wanita Demokrat), National Entrepreneurs (a PNI leader), Cooperatives and Adat (a KBSST representative in the old DFHD)•^ The A r m y ’s seat in the new body went to a Karo Batak. Since the inauguration of the DPRD-GR cooperation be tween the "Simalungun bloc”? and the Regional Head has been close and, on matters of secondary concern to the party leadership, fairly effective. The bloc obtained informal representation on every committee of the DIHD-GR, enabling its members to keep the Regional Head informed of all com mittee activities designed to undermine his position or op pose his policies. It also lent support in committee and in the full Council to the Regional H e a d ’s annual budget recom mendations and backed various projects, such as the acquisition of plantation concessions (as a means of increasing regency government revenues) and the production of a film on the Revolution in Simalungun, which he proposed. Despite common ethnicity and the personal obligations of the Simalungun Batak members to the Regional Head, without whose support they would not have been appointed, the bloc Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 428] === has not been able to unite on important issues, particularly with regard to the selection of government personnels ethnic differences have constituted the chief nexus of fac tionalism within the parties, so the principal obstacle to ethnic unity in the DPRD-GR has been loyalty to party. the most extreme case, the P K I ’s Simalungun Batak DPRD-GR member refused to attend the occasional meetings of the bloc or to cooperate with it in any way* The PNI's Simalungun Bataks were more willing to promote bloc activities and even assumed informal positions of leadership within it. In 19^3» however, they overstepped the boundaries of party discipline by signing a letter supporting the candidacy of the Regional Head for the governorship, for which two of them were sus pended and a third expelled from party membership. The limitations of the Simalungun bloc were clearly in evidence during the selection by the DPRD-GR of a Regional Secretary in 196^. Many Simalungun Bataks, within and with out the DPRD-GR, took the position that such an important office, second only in responsibility to the Regional Head, ought to be given to a member of the indigenous ethnic group of the regency. Informal meetings, attended by some members of the bloc and by a number of civil servants and other Interested individuals who were not members of the DPRD-GR, were held to discuss the problem, and pressure was applied on the Regional Head. In the final analysis, however, non-ethnic factors played the deciding role. The Regional Head, perhaps afraid of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 429] === losing Park In d o 1s support and concerned that an attempt to push a fellow Simalungun Batak might make him appear too suku-conscious, provided only hesitaftti leadership. Within the DPBD-GB, Simalungun Batak PNI members, under suspension because of their previous letter of support for the Hegional Head, chose to adhere to the party line; a Simalungun Batak candidate. rather than support NU*s leaders insisted on a Moslem Simalungun Batak, Partai Kathollk's DPBD-GB repre sentative wanted the Secretary-ship for himself, and even Parkindo's Simalungun Batak leader (although n o longer per mitted by law to be a party member) was apparently wary of future reprisals from his party. When the final selection took place the candidate of the PNI, PKI and Parkindo, a North Tapanull Batak, won a two-thirds majority. The nominee generally assumed to be the candidate of the Simalungun bloc won only two votes, both from non-party functional group representatives. Bather than vote for a non-Moslem, NU walked out of the meeting. On this important issue kesatuan Simalungun was unattainable. Conclusions Between the Simalungun Batak community and the political system of Independent Indonesia there has evolved a unique pattern of relationships. Of the four major ethnic groups in the regency only the Simalungun Bataks have failed to develop an affiliation with a national political party. Since the banning of KBSST most Simalungun Batak villagers Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 430] === have had no organizational link with the regency-level po litical process. What representation and influence they have in Slantar is based largely on personal relationships between individual residents of Upper simalungun and members of the regency political elite, and on the need of the Regional Head and other urban politicians for community support. For the most part, however, the people of Upper Simalungun do not participate in regency politics, where the political game is played by the elite in an organizational vacuum. Since the selection of a Simalungun Batak Regional Head in i960, the urban party leaders have enjoyed a con siderable increase in their influence in regency politics. This influence has been based not on the support of the vil lages, which they have been unable or unwilling to organize effectively, but on the patronage of the Regional Head and his provincial and national allies. In the years 1960-196^ cooperation among the members of the elite, cutting across marga and regional divisions and evan to some extent re ligious and traditional-revolutionary cleavages, was possible on many issues. Confronted by a choice between suku and party, however, cooperation could not be maintained. Simalungun unity, rooted as much in the personal ambitions of the politicians as in their desire to advance the in terests of the suku, has proved to be a fragile flower. The transition from traditional to colonial to post independence politics has been a difficult one for the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 431] === 418 Simalungun Batak community. Small in numbers, internally diverse, hemmed in by other, larger ethnic groups, the suku and its leadership have been unable to play a significant role in the determination of their own destiny. Their most critical weakness has been their Inability to affiliate with a national political party, for it is only through some form of supra-local coalition, on a multi-ethnic basis, that the group can hope over the long run to enter the mainstream of Indonesian political life. The representation of group interests through the Regional Head and, for a time, the local military commanders, has provided only a short-run, partial and tenuous substitute for effective political organ ization and successful integration of the group into the political fabric of the nation, Suku Simalungun is caught in a bind. More than any other social group in the regency, the Simalungun Batak villagers of Upper Simalungun have been cut off from the political processes of independent Indonesia. The only kind of organization which has been able to win their support has been based on ethnic exclusiveness, a principle which is unacceptable to the dominant political elite and dysfunctional for the achievement of the group's individual and collective goals. Conversely, those few Simalungun Batak politicians, most of them residents of Siantar, who have associated themselves with national political parties have been unable to build support among their potential constituencies in Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 432] === the villages. The Simalungun people and their leadership have thus not been able to develop the kind of political organization, rooted in the villages and linked with the national political system, which might enable them over time to achieve effective representation and a measure of inte gration into the national political process. Moreover, with continued Army dominance of Indonesian political life, the prospects for the development of effective and Influential political organization do not seem bright. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 433] === CHAPTER XI LOCAL POLITICS A N D POLITICAL INTEGRATIONS A N EVALUATION Much of the recent literature on political and social life in Indonesia and other new states has emphasized the importance of the cultural and political gap between a national political elite and a tradition-encrusted, predom inantly rural peasantry. In this view, politics in the new states is dominated by an urban elite which does not share the values or the way of life of the rural majority, and popular participation in government is accordingly severely restricted, “One of the most pressing problems facing the post-revolutionary Indonesian political elite," as we quoted Clifford Geertz in the Introduction to this study, “has turned out to be the maintenance of mutual understanding be tween themselves and the mass of the peasant population."1 If national unity and political democracy are ultimately to be realized in Indonesia, this gap must be closed or at least narrowed by the development of groups and elites intermediate between the purely national and purely local levels, a process which we have termed vertical or "local-national" political integration, ^20 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 434] === Prom a somewhat different perspective, that of politi cal life within the various sub-national administrative regions, students of Indonesian politics and society have also asserted the general importance of an urban elite— rural mass cleavage, G. William Skinner, for example, has argued that "in moving from local up into regional levels of the socio-political structure, the villager almost im mediately and universally encounters leaders and officials, groups and causes, which are predominantly town- and eliteoriented, The administrative officials are town-based, often not from the local area, and of markedly superior educational attainment and social status. Organizations based at regional levels are largely urban in character, and their leaders are seldom farmers,,..Above the local level, the villager is hard put to find leaders who genuinely identify themselves with the values of the rural population." Regional representative institutions, the DEED and DPRD-GR, and the parties and other organizations represented in them, are also seen as dominated by the urban elite. The Australian historian J. D. Legge has written that "Member ship of representative councils has reflected the narrowness of Indonesia's political elite. Even at the kabupaten /regency/ level council members could hardly be regarded as representative of the rural community which formed the great mass of constituents, and at the provincial level the con nection was still more tenuous. By far the greatest single occupational group to be found on councils has been formed Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 435] === ^22 by civil servants, a fact which is reminiscent of the local bodies established during the colonial period. Other groups were small traders, religious leaders, teachers, labor leaders, and industrial workers. come from the peasantry."^ Only an isolated few nave Finally, with reference to the whole of regency government, Legge asserts that ttit serves the interests of the elite, which has never belonged to, or has escaped from, the desa /village/. Within the second-level regions of Simalungun and Siantar, as elsewhere in Indonesia, the existence of an urbanrural gap is am undeniable fact of political life. We have seen its effects most notably in the relationship between the villagers of Upper Simalungun and the Simalungun Batak politicians and bureaucratic officials in Siantar. In the 1950s political leaders who attempted to build organizations representative of the interests of the rural Simalungun Batak population were ultimately unsuccessful. Their disappearance from the political arena has resulted in a situation in which the majority of members of the Simalungun Batak community has no' organizational link to the institutions of supravillage government-— Although Simalungun Batak party poll-----ticians, government officials and Army officers have attempted fr° articulate what they consider to be the interesrts^rfljhhe____ community as a whole, they have done so for the most part without the benefit of organized rural support or more than intermittent communiaation with the villages* Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 436] === To argue, however, as Legge and Skinner have done, that regional institutions of government, both executive and legislative, and regional political organizations and their leaders serve the interests of the urban elite and not those of the rural masses is Insupportable both on theoretical and (at least for Simalungun/Siantar) empirical grounds. Legge*s generalization, derived from occupational data on DEED mem bers, is not very meaningful because it depends on a generally discredited theory of functional representation, to the effect that only a peasant can represent a peasant. In fact, there is no a priori reason why, for example, a lawyer can not represent a predominantly working-class district in an American state legislature, or why an Indonesian civil servant cannot represent a rural constituency. Is not who or what the The important point individual DPRD or DPRD-GB member is, in terms of education or occupation, but rather what constit uency he represents and what the nature of his relationship is with that constituency. Moreover, in the light of the empirical evidence on political leadership and organization which we have presented, it seems clear that the importance of the urban elite— rural mass (or, in Siantar, urban elite— urban mass) cleavage at the regency/municipality level has been much exaggerated. Within Simalungun/Siantar the most critical socio-political gap is not vertical or pyramidal, that is, between elite scad non-elite. Rather it is horizontal or segmental, that is, a Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 437] === gap among different social groups based variously on primordial— mainly ethnic and religious— loyalties and socio economic class interests. While the regency/municipality leaders of these groups and the organizations which represent group interests are predominantly urban, at least in terms of current place of residence, their followers are spread throughout the region and are found in both urban and rural areas. In Simalungun/Siantar (and, we suspect, in other parts of Indonesia as well) the urban or rural origin, the level of educational attainment and the type of employment of party and organizational leaders and Begional Representative Council members, while certainly relevant, sure not central to an analysis of the problems of political representation and integration. What is central is an explication of local political leadership in terms of (1) the kinds of social groups which are represented (or not represented) in the political process, (2) the kinds of organizations, local and supralocal, with which these groups affiliate or which claim to represent them, (3) the nature of the leader-follower relationship within each organization, and (^) the nature of the relationship between local and national leaders, organlzations and processes. ghe Integrative Revolution in Simalungun/Siantar Before turning specifically to an evaluation of local political leadership and organization, it is useful to re- Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 438] === examine the development of social and political cleavages in Simalungun/Siantar In the light of what Clifford Geertz has termed the "integrative revolution." In a recent article Geertz has argued that there is a tendency in many new states toward "the aggregation of independently defined, specifically outlined traditional primordial groups into larger, more diffuse units whose implicit frame of reference is not the local scene but the 'nation*— in the sense of the whole society encompassed by the new civil state* In Simalungun/Siantar this aggregative process has been proceeding along several different dimensions for well over half a century. One major dimension is the development of a sense of ethnic identity, of membership in a group defined and limited by common language, adat and, in most cases, as sumed kinship ties. Among the peoples of North Sumatra— the most important of which are the North and South Tapanuli, Simalungun and Karo Bataks and the Coastal Malays— the ethnic group as a self-perceived coherent social unit did not exist prior to the twentieth century. Individuals had relations with individuals, lineage groups with lineage groups and vil lages with villages, but few regular patterns of interaction existed above this level and there was little sense of be longing to larger social or political units. The Simalungun Batak keradjaan and the Malay sultanates of the East Coast provide a partial exception to this pattern, but they too were fairly small territorial units and it is uncertain to Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 439] === Ur26 wh4t extent the individual identified himself with their socially distant elites and primarily exploitative governments 5 During the colonial period improved communications and the growth of commercial and administrative towns brought large numbers of individuals from various regions into fre quent and prolonged contact with each other for the first time, and the sense of ethnic distinctiveness and ethnic community began to grow. Simalungun Bataks, for example, resented the invasion of their homeland by outsiders who did not speak their language, did not follow their adat and were not members of one of the four indigenous marga. North Tapanuli Bataks, confronted by other groups, realized that they too possessed a common language and adat despite regional differences. Their sense of community was further strengthened by their common status as agricultural pioneers and by their ability to trace an assumed kinship connection with any other North Tapanuli Batak.^ In Siantar city, they congre gated in their own kampung on the east side of the Bolon river, and in the rural villages they also lived apart from other groups. South Tapanuli Bataks, who came to Simalungun primarily as traders, similarly lived in separate neighborhoods in Siantar and the smaller towns of Lower Simalungun. The Javanese, brought by the Europeans to work on the great rubber and tea estates, formed a highly Isolated enclave, separated from the Sumatran peoples not only by adat and linguistic differences but also by residential segregation Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 440] === 427 and their employment as contract laborers (a status considered inferior by all other groups). The development of religious loyalties, simalt»neously intensifying ethnic cleavages within Simalungun/^iantar and opening channels of communication beyond the region, consti tutes a second dimension of the integrative revolution. tween South and North Tapanuli Bataks the critical cleavage has not been adat and linguistic differences (although these differences exist) but rather the conversion of the former group to Islam and the latter to Christianity. Among the South Tapanuli Bataks, in fact, adherence to the adat and use of the indigenous language tended to decline as Islamic law and the Malay (now Indonesian) language gained acceptance.7 The adat-language gap between South Tapanuli Bataks and Javanese was also intensified by religious differences, the former group being much more thoroughly Islamized than the latter. Between the North Tapanuli and Simalungun Bataks, the common acceptance of Christianity and common membership in the BKBP church has not contributed markedly to a diminution of ethnic animosity, in part because of the dominant position of North Tapanuli Bataks in the church hierarchy from 1907, when the first missionaries came to Simalungun, until 1964, when the Simalungun Protestant Christian Church became a fully independent body. The introduction of Christianity and Islam also widened the scope of primordial loyalties, however, by giving the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 441] === 428 peoples of Simalungun/Siantar a set of values and institu tions which they shared with groups in other parts of the Indonesian archipelago* The santri Moslems of Simalungun had much in common with other Moslem communities in Sumatra, the north and south coasts and the western part of Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and indeed throughout the Islamic world* The bond of religious community was further strengthened by the growth of Islamic social and educational organizations, the institution of the hadj (pilgrimage to Mecca) and by the very concept of ummat Islam* The Indonesian Protestant com munity included not only North Tapanuli and Simalungun Bataks, but also Niaslans, Ambonese, Minahasans and even some Javanese. Conferences among the leaders of the various Protestant churches, the establishment of a common theological school in Djakarta (then Batavia) in 1934, the creation of the Dewan Geredja Indonesia (Indonesian Council of Churches) in 1950 and the growth of such organizations as the Indonesian Christian Women's Association provided an Institutional frame« work for the development of supra-ethnle religious loyalties* Finally, Roman Catholicism, both as a set of religious beliefs and as an institution, provided a link between such disparate peoples as the Simalungun Bataks of keradjaan Purba and their coreligionists in Flores, East Nusatenggara* Like the Moslems, Indonesian Christians have also been a part of world-wide religious communities and have been affiliated with inter national religious organ!zati ons• lain Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 442] === ^29 A third aspect of the integrative revolution, so far less pronounced than those which we have described above, has been the development of supra-ethnic regional loyalties. In the 1950s many Simalungun Bataks felt a sense of common cause with the other Indigenous peoples of East Sumatra, the Karo Bataks and Coastal Malays, in opposition to the pre dominance of Tapanuli Bataks in the provincial government (and military establishment) and in various second-level governments of East Sumatra. When regional animosities were directed against them, the migrant peoples, including both Tapanuli Bataks and Javanese, were also able briefly to work together for the preservation of the North Sumatran province. Neither of these blocs has been able to form a more enduring community, however, as ethnic and religious differences have been too deep and pervasive. Since i9 6 0, in fact, Simalungun Batak cooperation with Karo Bataks has declined as a result of the struggle to acquire positions of influence within the provincial military establishment and in civilian government. The impact of the plantation economy in Simalungun/ Siantar has contributed a fourth dimension to the integrative revolution, i.e., the emergence of a rudimentary sense of a common fate among the relatively detraditionalized plantation workers and squatters of Lower Simalungun. Javanese, North Tapanuli Bataks and smaller proportions of other ethnic groups have shared a common socio-economic status and a common op position to plantation administrators and the A r m y and Police Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 443] === officers and government officials who have opposed their claim and demands. As time goes on it is possible that the sense of shared interests which the plantation environment has fostered suaong individuals of widely varying religious and ethnic backgrounds will develop into a profound and en during sense of community, but as of the present this has clearly not occurred. Patterns of residential segregation, linguistic barriers and the continued importance of traditional ethnic stereotypes and hostilities all militate against the reintegration of these groups into a cohesive social class, as does the fact that both the Javanese and especially the North Tapanuli Bataks in Lower Simalungun have continued to maintain (and place a high value upon) relationships with members of their respective ethnic groups in other parts of Sumatra, in Java and indeed throughout the archipelago. Both groups are thus imbedded in an extensive network of ethnic-based social relationships which tends to intensify their sense of ethnic identity and distinctiveness and to reduce the integrative effect of common socio-economic status.® Finally, superimposed upon all of these diverse cleav ages and loyalties, there has also developed an identification with the Indonesian nation. The sense of common membership in a nation spreading far beyond the borders of Simalungun/ Siantar first began to emerge in the early decades of the twentieth century. Members of a new elite, based on the attainment of modern education and commercial or government Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 444] === 431 employment and including, in varying proportions, individuals from every ethnic group in the region, travelled to Medan, to Padang, to Java and elsewhere. In their travels and in their relationships with one another they discovered a common hostility to the foreigner and, eventually, a common desire to assert their Independence from the Dutch within the framework of the colonially-demarcated boundaries of the Dutch East Indies. Of course, not all members of the local elite were equally committed to the goal of national independence or to the same post-independence political objectives. Among those individuals active in pre-war nationalist organizations and later to become PNI and PKI leaders, the fire of opposition to the Dutch burned strong and the ultimate objective was the creation of a secular state. Among a large part of the Moslem leadership opposition to colonial rule was also strongly felt, but the post-independence objective was an Islamic state. Among other groups and individuals the nationalist movement was less popular. Simalungun Batak and Coastal Malay Moslem leaders saw national independence as a direct threat to the authority of their patrons in the Dutch-supported traditional kingdoms and sultanates, and many Simalungun Bataks of all religious persuasions retained their loyalties to the aris tocracy despite the appeals of nationalist politicians. Many North Tapanuli Bataks who were well-placed in the plan tation or government administrations or were prominent in Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 445] === ^32 the church hierarchy tended to view nationalist organizations with mired emotions and were doubtful as to their future in an independent, predominantly Moslem, Indonesia. Despite the small size and the internal divisions of the nationalist elite and the reluctance of many locally prominent individuals to identify themselves with the nation alist cause,the impact of nationalism on local society has been profound. The events of the four-year physical revolu tion against the restoration of Dutch rule were of crucial importance in strengthening among the elite and extending to the population as a whole the sense of belonging to a common nation. Although guerrilla organizations were commonly formed along ethnic and religious lines, members of all groups sup ported and participated in the Hevolution. By December 19^9 the active opponents of independence were defeated and dis credited and Simalungun was officially a part of the Republic of Indonesia. Among the members of the n e w political and governmental elite the idea of nationhood had by then taken deep root. In local society as a whole, through the medium of the revolutionary leadership, it had gained widespread acceptance in at least rudimentary form. During the period of this study, intensive and repeated interviews were con ducted with a great many party politicians (from both legal and banned parties), government officials, army officers, religious leaders and others at the regency/municipality, subdisttict and village levels. Among this elite an attitude Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 446] === 1+33 of hostility (or resignation) toward the Djakarta regime was common but anti-national or separatist sentiment was rare in the extreme. As of 196^, at least, national loyalties seemed we 11- establi shed. The integrative revolution, then, has taken several forms in Simalungun/Siantar. Loyalties to village, lineage and kingdom, while still operative, have been aggregated into ethnic, religious, regional and socio-economic ties most of which reach beyond the borders of the region and whose "implicit frame of reference is not the local scene but the ’nation*.** In the post-independence period local group interests and demands have been articulated within the over arching framework of national loyalties and, for the most part, national institutions. Among the most important of these institutions has been the party system. The Party System and the Integration of Local Social Groups Of the five political parties which have been successful in obtaining mass support in Simalungun/Siantar, four— PNI, PKI, Parkindo and Masjumi— axe (or were) national parties, i.e. parties which have a substantial following in other parts of Indonesia and have exercised considerable influence at one time or another in national politics. was a purely local organization. The national parties, attempting to win local support primarily for the purpose of strengthening their position on Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 447] === the national scene, have found a response in Simalungun/ Siantar because they have been able to articulate the inter ests of significant local groups. While they have largely attained their own objectives, however, their effectiveness as instruments of political integration at the local level has been extremely limited. Despite their attempts to pro vide a supra-ethnic ideological basis for political loyalties, the parties have for the most part been unable to overcome this most important of all local cleavages. The major religious parties, Parkindo and Masjumi, have sought support on the basis of religious solidarity but have succeeded only in politicizing local ethnic differences. While widening the gap between the two largest rellgio-ethnic communities, the Moslem South Tapanuli Bataks and the Protestant North Tapanuli Bataks, they have done little to narrow the ethnic cleavage among co-religionists, i.e., North Tapanuli and Simalungun Batak Protestants, South Tapanuli, Coastal Malay and Simalungun Batak Moslems. In terms of ethnic exclusiveness they have differed little from KBSST, the only major political organization in the region whose raison d*etre was pure and simple ethnicity. The secular parties* contribution to the integration of local social groups within a broader framework of political loyalties has been only slightly greater than that of the religious parties. The PKI in particular was too narrow ideologically, too limited in its local policies and programs Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 448] === 435 and too autocratic in its selection of leaders to enable it to aggregate a broad diversity of local interests. While the PKI was the only party in the region entirely free of dependence on primordial support, its appeal was restricted to those relatively detraditionalized plantation workers and squatters who place socio-economic interests before ethnic and religious loyalties. In much the same way that the religious parties have articulated the interests of particular ethnic communities, the PKI represented the interests of a single socio-economic group,9 Because of the shallowness of class loyalties (and the tenuousness of the linkage between those loyalties and identificatlon with the PKI or its mass organizations) among the workers and squatters, even the support of this group was uncertain, especially in a crisis such as followed the formation of SOKSI, Unlike the PKI or the religious parties, the PNI has managed to put together a broadly diversified base of support which combines ethnic loyalties, opposition to the traditional authority structures, non-primordial socio-economic interests and the more diffuse but pervasive sense of national identity. Despite its relatively high degree of inclusiveness, however, even the PNI has been an uncertain Instrument of political integration in Simalungun/Siantar, At the ranting level aulti-ethnic membership and leadership have been largely prevented by residential separation. Linguistic barriers (many villagers only Imperfectly understand Indonesian), the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 449] === 4 36 prevalence of cultural stereotypes (even where there are no hostile implications), and the party policy of assigning only Javanese cadres to Javanese areas or North Tapanuli 3atak cadres to North Tapanuli Batak areas have contributed to the maintenance of ethnic separation within the multi ethnic party. Moreover, as in the case of the PKI, the loy alties of many subsidiary organization members and some party members, particularly in the plantation areas, axe not notably firm. Only among the regency/municipality leadership has there been a real intermingling of individuals of different ethnic, religious and socio-economic backgrounds. Despite the prev alence of deep personal commitments to the party, conflicts among these leaders have been frequent and severe in recent years. Intra-party factionalism has tended to intensify rather than reduce the distinctiveness of ethnic groups within the party, as each leader depends primarily on ethnic loyalties for support at party Conferences. The PNI*s integrative potential, while greater than that of any other party in the region, has in practice been only partially realized. The Party System and Local-National political Integration Besides their efforts to bridge the gaps dividing local social groups, the political parties have also provided an institutional network linking Simalungun/Siantar to other Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 450] === parts of Indonesia and to the national political process. Part In do and Masjumi, at the local level reflect ins cleavages rooted as deeply in ethnicity sis in religion, have in national politics been multi-ethnic parties based on an overarching sense of religious community. Their North and South Tapanuli Batak supporters, members and leaders in the region have been linked with Protestants and santri Moslems, respectively, from a variety of ethnic groups scattered throughout the archipelago. Local PNI and PKI partisans have similarly participated in political networks of national significance. Of all the major social groups in Simalungun/Siantar, only those Simalungun Bataks who supported KBSST have had no supraregional organizational link. The effectiveness of the party system as a n instrument of local-national political integration has been hampered, however, both by factors internal to the parties and by their declining role in authoritative decision-making at all levels of government. Neither individually nor collectively have the parties provided a really effective means by which the Indonesian villager or town-dweller can express demands on government and have reasonable expectations of a hearing. Within the parties the relationship among leaders, members and supporters ia tenuous. The leaders of the religious parties, from the national to the subdistrict; level, are for the most part self-appointed, self-renewing oligarchs who only infrequently communicate with each other Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 451] === or with their village constituencies. (Masjuml in particular was often compared to an elephant with beriberi.) Decisions on party policy at each level are made, caucus-style, by a few individuals, members of the party’s leadership council or its legislative delegation, without the participation or often even the knowledge of lower level leaders and those who regard themselves as members. Party Conferences are in frequently held and normally involve only minimal participa tion by the delegates, who tend to ratify rather than actually choose the new leadership council. Between Conferences, party activity at the subdistrict and village levels drops to near zero. While the regency/municipality leaders do in fact attempt to articulate in the DPRD-GR what they believe to be the interests of their constituents they do so without an actual dialogue. With few exceptions the party members accept the idea that the formulation of party policy is the job of the leaders and have been content with their passive role. For them it is the existence of the party as the protector of community interests which is important; the details of policy may safely be left to the leadership. Because of the shallowness and the pragmatic orientation of party loyalties, the secular party leaders in Siaalungun/ Slantar have maintained a closer connection with subdistrict and village leaders hi ppand membership, particularly in Lower Simalungun, than have the religious patties. In the PNI the intensity of competition for regency-level positions of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 452] === leadership has also been a factor in making leaders more responsive to the demands of their supporters9 For the national leadership of both parties, however, the representa tion of local interests has been seen primarily as a means to national party victory rather than as an end in itself. Their ultimate objective has been ideological conversion of the local population rather than the transmission of the demands of particular local groups.10 Where the religious parties at the national level articulate sets of values which are already widely accepted and understood by their supporters at the local level, the secular parties formulate national policy proposals in terms of Harhaenist and MarxistLeninist ideologies which are largely foreign to the village population. While one or another of these ideologies may someday provide a basis for the national-level integration of diverse local groups, they have not yet done so. Ultimately, the usefulness of the party system as an instrument of political integration both among the social groups of S imalungun/S iantar and between these groups and the national political process is greatly dependent on the role which the parties are permitted to play in authoritative decision-making at both the national and regional levels. It is here that the deficiency has been greatest. In the early and mid-1950s Parliament was the central decision-making institution in Indonesia and the political Parties were of major importance in the national political Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 453] === process. In the regions, Law No. 1 of 1957 represented a potentially major step toward a devolution of authority and a greater role for the party branches in local government. The establishment of Guided Democracy in the wake of the regional rebellions ended party predominance at the national level and substantially reversed the trend toward regional autonomy and legislative control of regional government. The political parties, reduced in number to ten, operated on the periphery of the new power structure and were heavily dependent on Presidential favor for their continued existence and for influence within the government. The reorganized national Parliament (DPR-GR), stripped of much of its de jure and de facto authority, functioned primarily to legitimate Presidential decisions, and the regional DPB.D-GE were simi larly weakened. Party influence in the DER-GR and DERD-GR was further diminished by the mixture of governmental. Army and party responsibility in the appointment of party repre sentatives and by the absence of the right to recall legis lators who disobeyed party instructions. In Simalungun/Siantar, as we have seen, the impact of these factors was felt most strongly by the religious parties and somewhat less by the PNI, while PKI discipline was unaffected. The linkage between the parties and the people whom they claim to represent has also been weakened in the Guided Democracy period by the absence of elections. While each Party has claimed popular approbation, none has been required Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 454] === to formulate policies and programs for the solution of national and regional ills or to put their proposals or their candidates to the test of voter support. In Simalungun/ Siantar the impact of the repeated postponement of elections has been greatest on the religious parties, which have been largely inactive in the subdistricts and villages since 1955* Its effects have also extended to the PNI and PKI leaders, however, who have concentrated on the organization of plan tation workers and squatters (a highly visible group in Djakarta) to the exclusion of other groups in local society. The selection of DPRD-GB. members on a non-electoral basis also had the effect of creating very unrepresentative bodies, with PNI predominance in both the city and the regency and a Simalungun Batak delegation In the regency out of pro portion to its percentage of the population. South Tapanuli Bataks and santri Moslems in general were, of course, heavily under-represented because of the banning of Masjumi. The ideological environment in which political conflict has been waged since 1958 has also had a stultifying effect on the parties and on their local-national Integrative 11 c a p a c i t y. I n the early days of the Republic an attempt was made to provide an ideological framework for national unity through the concept of Pantja Sila, the five principles of nationalism, internationalism or humanitarianism, repre sentative government, social justice and belief In God, first formulated by Sukarno in 19^5* As originally conceived, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 455] === - 44-2 Pant3a Sila "was intended to contain within it the political interests of the Islamic and Christian, gentry and peasantry, nationalist and communist, commercial and agrarian, Javanese and 'Outer Island' groups in I n d o n e s i a " ^ on a loose, plur alistic basis. By the mid-1950s Pantja Sila had substan tially lost its original meaning and had degenerated into a weapon used by each group contending for power to oppose all other groups. After 1958, Pant la Sila was no longer a central symbol of state ideology, having been removed from its place of honor by the new symbols of Guided Democracy, in particular Manipol-USDEK (the Presidential Independence Day speech of 1959 and its five main points— the Constitution of 19^5» Indonesian Socialism, Guided Democracy, Guided Economy and Indonesian Personality or Identity) and Nasakom (the unity of Nationalists, Religious People and Communists). The new symbols were designed not to incorporate all of the diver gent strands of Indonesian social thought into a loose frame work of national unity, as Pantja Sila had been, but rather to impose national unity on the basis of a renewed revolu tionary militancy and an assumed mystical ethnic unity of all the Indonesian people. Although the party system con tinued to exist, the cleavages which it represented were denied legitimate expression in the political process. the name of national unity, all parties were required to accept the state ideology as their own and were instructed Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 456] === to propagate it through the institution of the Front Nasional. Rhiwwftira Tunggal Ika— Unity in Diversity— was to be achieved by the '’creation and recreation of mystique"1^ rather than by meeting the specific demands of the public. Under these circumstances the national parties and their local branches have been ineffective representatives of their respective constituencies. The process of authoritative decision-making for the national polity has taken place be hind closed doors among cliques and factions within the Army, the civil bureaucracy and the Presidential entourage. the provincial and regency/municipality levels, the most important decisions— on the operation of plantations and other abate-owned enterprises, on the selection of Regional Heads, and on matters of internal security— have been made primarily by the Army,3-** and the routine administration of local government has been left to the civil bureaucracy. At all levels of government the parties have been more ob servers and clients than participants and patrons. This is not to argue that in the Guided Democracy period there has been no representation of local interests or that all elite-mass connections have been broken. Both the Army and the civilian bureaucracies have attempted to fill the vacuum left by the subordination:': of the party system. John Small has termed the North Sumatran Army leadership a kind of “armed provincial assembly” 15 and a similar appellation tev> could be applied to the civil service. Both groups (or more Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 457] === 444properly factions within them), as we have seen in this study, have attempted from time to time to articulate the interests of social groups to which they belong or among whom they wish to build support. Thus, to cite a few examples, Lt. Col. Makmour of the East Sumatran 2nd Begiment distributed arms to Sarbupri's members in order to strengthen his position within the Army; the regional military commander in Siantar in 1957-58 obtained housing permits and government jobs for the refugee Simalungun Batak population; the Regional Head of Simalungun has in a variety of ways promoted the interests of the Simalungun Batak community since i960?- and in 1964- a Karo Batak clique within the provincial A r m y leadership ob tained the post of Siantar Regional Head for one of its members. While a number of such examples can be given, they do not add up to effective representation or integration of local group interests in the political process. No matter how internally diverse they are or how faithfully they mirror the social divisions of the society as a whole, military and civilian bureaucracies can not function as legislatures. They are not so much forums in which the interests of various social groups can be integrated as they are social groups in their own right. Their members constitute professional elites and are neither responsible to nor dependent upon (except in the broadest sense) the support of the general public or any specific section of it. The strength of any particular faction or group within the bureaucracy is Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 458] === dependent not on the size, cohesiveness or support of its cognate in the society, but on factors bureaucracy itself* internal to the Moreover, each of the bureaucracies has its own interests as a social group to promote and de fend which tend to take priority over demands which originate outside the group. In sum, Army officers and civilian gov ernment officials, to the extent that they have represented local interests, have done so in a haphazard and Intermittent fashion without benefit of any organizational link with the groups whose demands they have expressed. Generally speaking, the ordinary Indonesian has no way of making his voice heard within these "assemblies." The Present end the Future From the viewpoint of political integration, Guided Democracy, both as a set of political institutions end as an ideology, represented a step backward. Political party and subsidiary organization leaders at the national level, in Slmalungun/Siantar and elsewhere in Indonesia who were at least in some measure representative of and responsible to the public were shunted aside in favor of a regime in which all important decisions were made by non-representative institutions under the cover of an artificial and imposed conception of national unity. Indonesian politics was awash on a flood of rhetoric and sloganeering designed to obscure socio-political diversity rather than to provide it with a meaningful ideological and institutional framework. Beneath Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 459] === 446 the rhetoric, conflict among the members of the elite was intense but for the most part removed from the masses of the population* In this pattern of elite dominance and mass isolation, Geertz has argued, can be seen a revival of an ancient tradition in Indonesian politics, the "theory of the exemplary center, the notion that the capital city (or more accurately the king's palace) was at once a microcosm of the supernatural order.,.and the material embodiment of political order. The capital was not merely the nucleus, the engine, or the pivot of the state; it was the s t a t e. " ^ Under Guided Democracy "the supra-local polity, the national state, shrinks more and more to the limits of its traditional domain, the capital city— Djakarta— plus a number of semi independent tributary cities and towns held to a minimal loyalty by the threat of centrally-applied force. The political system of Guided Democracy rested on an inherently unstable balance of power among the Army, President Sukarno and the Communists. Its collapse In the aftermath of the unsuccessful coup attempt of October 1, 1965 was marked by the destruction of the PKI, the physical an nihilation of much of its leadership, and the reduction of President Sukarno's role to little more than that of an unwilling figurehead. Under the leadership of the Army, the new regime has moved to end its conflict with Malaysia and to tackle in apparent earnest its enormous economic problems. Political prisoners, leaders of the banned parties and of the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 460] === regional rebellions, have been released and elections have been promised for 1968, Pantja Sila (or new symbols similar to it) may be restored to its former prominence in state ideology. Despite these hopeful signs, it is not yet clear whether the new regime will be better able than the old to provide a solid basis for national unity. In the final analysis, the realization of national unity in Indonesia will depend not on the disappearance of primordial and other sub national loyalties— an unlikely occurrence in any event— but on their incorporation into a competitive, bargaining political process capable not only of aggregating diverse demands but also of producing effective policy for economic and social development. The events of the past do not sug gest an easy future. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 461] === Notes: Introduction 1. Por example: L. Gray Cowan, Local Government In west Africa, New York: Columbia University Press, 195b, a com parison of local governmental institutions in Nigeria and French West Africa; Fred G. Burke, Local Government and Politics In U g a n d a, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 196^, an attempt to develop a typology of local political systems based on a case study of three localities in Uganda; F. G. Bailey, Politics and Social Change: Orissa in 1959. Berkeley: Univeciity of California Press, 19&3* goes beyond the purely local level, examining the relationship between parliamentary democracy and traditional political organization at three levels (village, Legislative Assembly constituency and state) in the Indian state of Orissa. Studies of local government and politics in Indonesia Include: Robert R. Jay, "Local Government in Rural Central Java," Far Eastern Quarterly. XV (1956), pp. 215-229; Bobert R. Jay, Religion and Politics in Rural Central J a v a. N e w Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, Cultural Report Series, 1963; Peter R. Goethals, Aspects of Local Government In a Sumbawan Village (Eastern Indonesia). Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program. 1961; Leslie H. Palmier, Social Status and Power in J a v a. London: Athlone Press, i9 6 0; Soelaeman Soemardi. Regional Politicians and Administrators in West Java (1956): Social Backgrounds and Career Patterns. Cornell University, unpub. M.A. thesis, 1961. "Political Development in the N e w States I," Comparative Studies in Society and History. Vol. II, i9 6 0, 3* A useful summary of definitions of political inte gration may be found in Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 358 (March. 1965). pp. 5^-64. reprinted In Jason L. FInkle and Richard W. Gable, Political Development and Social Change, N e w York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966, For a definition of political integration similar to ours but with a somewhat different terminology, see James S. Coleman and Carls G. Rosberg, Jr., eds., Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical A f r i c a. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 196^, esp. pp. 8-9» Por our purposes national integration is regarded as a broad, subsuming process, whose two major dimensions are (1 ) political Integration, which refers to the progressive bridging of the elite-mass gap on the vertical plane In the course of developing an integrated political process and a Participant political community, and (2 ) territorial inte gration, which refers to the progressive reduction of cultural and regional tensions and discontinuities on the horizontal process of creating a homogeneous territorial | ^ ^ P O l i t i c a l community." Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 462] === 5. Por a distinction between integration as the crea tion of national loyalties and as a process of institutional development, see Joseph LaPalombara a n d Myron Weiner, “The Impact of Parties on Political Development,” in LaPalombara and Weiner, eds•, Political Parties and Political Develop ment, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966, pp. 413 ff. 6. Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia: A Study in Local Administration 1950-1960, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961. ?• Decentralization in Indonesia; Legislative A s p e c t s. Interim Reports Series, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1957» and Decentralization in Indonesia as a Political Problem. Interim Reports Series, M o d e m Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1958* 8, "The Javanese Kijajis The Changing Role of a Cultural Broker," Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. II, No. 2, pp. 228-249, and '*£he Integrative Revolution, Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New states," in Clifford Geertz, ed., Old Societies and New States. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1965* PP* 165-157• 9. "Indonesian Cultures and Communities," In Ruth McVey, ed., Indonesia. New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, by arrangement with HRAF Press, 19^3* PP» 2^- 9 6. 10. "Kinship Organization Among the Urban Batak of Sumatra," Transactions of the New lork Academy of Sciences. Series 2, No. 22 (1959-1960), pp. 11&-124-, and. "‘Urbanization and Ethnic Identity in North Sumatra," American Anthropologist, Vol. 63, pp. 508 -520. 11. Local. Ethnic and National Loyalties in Village Indonesia: A Symposium. Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, Cultural Report Series, 1959 (articles by Edward M. Bruner, Clifford Geertz, Hildred Geertz, Peter R. Goethals, Andrea Wilcox Palmer, G. William Skinner). 12. For an analysis of the components of the integrative problem in smveral n e w states, see Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution, Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in Clifford Geertz, ed., loc.c i t. 13. Hildred Geertz, "Indonesian Cultures and Communities," in Ruth McVey, ed., ojo. clt., p. 2A. 1^. The role of the Chinese community in Simalungun/ Siantar politics is beyond the scope of this study. general the Chinese in the region have operated politically at two levels: (1) as Individuals, many of the wealthier Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 463] === Chinese have developed mutually beneficial personal rela tionships with important government officials; (2 ) at the group level, their interests have been represented by trade associations and by Baperki (Badan Permus.1a war a tan Kewarganegaraan Indonesla« Consultative Body for Indonesian Citizenship) • The Chinese do not directly participate either individually or collectively, in partisan politics in the region, although it is widely believed that they have been a major source of funds for the local Communist Partv leadership. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 464] === Motes: Chapter I 4-51 1. A bibliography on the development of regional government in Indonesia is available in J.D. Legge, Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia: A Study in Local Administration 1950-1960. 2. According to Undang-undang No, 1, 1957 (Law No. 1, 1957)» a basic law on regional government, Indonesia is divided into first, second and third level self-governing regions, supplanting the former administrative levels of province, residency, regency, district, subdistrict and village (or village complex). In practice this system has been put into effect only at the first and second levels (corresponding to the former provinces and regencies), and no decision has as yet been made concerning the third level. In early 196*1- it was announced that all residency and dis trict level administrative offices were to be abolished (they had in any event become largely non-functioning), leaving the present arrangement as follows: Province (first level self-governing region) Regency or municipality (second-level self-governing region) Subdistrict Village or village complex Law No. 1 is available in Departemen Penerangan Republik Indonesia, Almanak Lembaga-Lembaga Negara dan Kepartaian (Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia, Almanac of State Institutions and Parties). Djakarta, 1961, pp. l531S9. It is excerpted in J.D. Legge, op. c i t., Appendix C, pp. 258-269. The regencies are: Deli/Serdang, Langkat, Karo, Simalungun, Asahan, Labuhan Batu, Tapanuli Utara, Dairi, Tapanuli Tengah, Tapanuli Selatan and Nias. The municipal ities are: Medan, Pematangsiantar, Tandjung Balai, Bindjai, Tebingtinggi and Sibolga. See Depart emen Dalam Negeri dan Otonomi Daerah, Ichtisar Daerah Admlnistrasi Seluruh Indonesia (Department of the Interior and Regional Autonomy, Summary of Administrative Regions Throughout Indonesia), Djakarta, 1962, pp. A2-45. Pemerintahan Daerah Tkt. II Simalungun, La pur an Tahun 1963 (Government of the Second Level Region of Simalungun, Report for 1963), P. Siantar, 1963, p. *F. •5* Figure supplied by the Kepala Bagian Sensus, £ Spra(i^a Siantar (Head of the Census Section, Municipality Siantar), July, 1963* Pauline D. Milone, “Contemporary urbanization in Indonesia," Asian S u r v e y. Vol. IV, No. 8 (August 1964), p. 1005, gives the population of Siantar as Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 465] === 452 114,870 and ranks it 2lst of all Indonesian cities. The largest city in North Sumatra is Medan, with a population of 479,098. The prefix pematang in the Simalungun Batak language indicates the capital of a traditional kingdom; while the formal name of the municipality is Pematangsiantar, it is usually referred to simply as Siantar. 6. The following discussion is based in large part on J.D. Legge, o p. c i t., esp. Chs, II, IV, VI and VII, and des cribes governmental Institutions in Simalungun/Siantar as of 1963-64. 7. These are crude estimates, based on census data concerning religious affiliation and place of birth and on informed guessing. See below, Tables 1-3* 1-4-, 1-5* 1-8, 1-11, 1-13. 8. On the abangan-santri distinction, see Clifford Geertz, The Religion of J a v a. Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press of Glencoe, i960, esp. pp. 4-7. 9. Bagian Sensus, Pemerintahan Daerah Tkt. II Simalungun, Daftar penduduk Kabuoaten Simalungun (Census Section, Government of the Second Level Region of S imalungun, List of the inhabitants of the Regency of Simalungun), P. Siantar, 1963. 10. For an^ianalysis of the importance of the lineage segment, the patrilineage, etc. as determinants of villagers* loyalties in North Tapanuli, see Edward M. Bruner, ’’The Toba Batak Village,'* in G. William Skinner, ed., Local. Ethnic and National Loyalties In Village Indonesia: A Symposium, pp. 52-64. On the effects of urbanization (in Medan) on North Tapanuli Batak social structure, see Edward M. Bruner, “Kinship Organization among the Urban Batfck of Sumatra," Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences. 22, Series II, 1959* and Edward M. Bruner, "Urbanization and Ethnic Identity in North Sumatra." American Anthropologist, Vol. 63 (1961). K a --11. The actual area under plantation control is somewhat smaller than these figures indicate due to the large number of squatters who illegally occupy plantation lands. U n fortunately no figures are available to support this assertion. 12. Djawatan Agraria Kabupaten Simalungun, Daftar: Nama2 Perkebunan dl Kabupaten SImalungun (Agrarian Service, Regency of Simalungun. A List of Plantations in the Regency of Simalungun). P. Siantar, 1963. In 1964 the British plantations were taken over by the Indonesian government and operated by Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 466] === **•53 13* Arable land figures from The Ganeral Agricultural Condit 1 on of SImeloengoen. P. Siantar: Gunseibu-Kezaibu, 2602 (1942), p. 17* Plantation hectareage from Djawatan Agraria, Daftar: Nama2 Perkebunan di Kabupaten Simalungun. Plantation hectareage as a percentage of arable land is 19# in Silau Kahean, 7# in Raja Kahean. 14. Computed from Pemerintahan Daerah Tkt. II Simalungun, Lapuran Tahun 1963, p. 72. Total wet rice area is 30,94-2 ha., of which 21,223 ha. is located in the four subdistricts along the Road to Parapat plus subdistricts Siantar and Tanah Djawa. Although Map 1-5 is the most recent available, personal observations indicated to the author that it con siderably understates the extent of sawah agriculture along the road to Parapat, particularly in subdistricts Dolok Panribuan and Tanah Djawa. 15« In Balata, plantation hectareage as a percentage of total arable land is 73%* in Dolok Panribuan, 28#; and in Pane, 22#. Computed from The General Agricultural Condition of 3 Imeloengoen. loc. cit., and Djawatan Agraria, o p. cit. The British concession was taken over by the Indonesian Government in 1964. 16. Milone, l o c. cit. I?. Computed from Bagian Sensus, Kotapradja P. Siantar, Daftar ichtlsar penduduk Kotapradja Pematangsiantar achlr pjuni 1963 mengenai: Agama. pekerdjaan. dan kewarganegaraan. (Census Section, Municipality of P. Siantar, A summarized list of the inhabitants of the Municipality of Pematangsiantar as of the end of June, 1963. concerning: Religion, occupation. and nationality), P. Siantar. 1963. These statistics, based on the 196I census, are open to some qusstion, particularly in the Occupation category, as it is not specified whether the percentages represent working population or total pop ulation. Based on personal observations, they seem to be roughly accurate, and we use them only as gross indicators of the municipality’s economic differentiation. 18. Estimates supplied by Djawatan Lalu-Lintas DJalan (Traffic Service), P. Siantar, 1963. 19• Figures supplied to the author from files of Dinas -LBemindusterian Rakjat (Office of P e o p l e ’s Industry), P. Siantar, 1963. 20. These figures are only approximations based on census data concerning religion and on interviews and personal observation in the various wards. See below, Table 1-13. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 467] === 45^ Notes: Chapter II 1. The General Agricultural Condition of SImeloengoen, pps 1-3e These fourteen districts (in this source actually called head-districts, but elsewhere usually referred to as districts), plus the keradjaan of Purba and S ilimakuta and the division of Pane proper into Pane and Dolok Pardamaian, became the seventeen subdistricts of the post-independence regency of Simalungun. 2. Tideman, J., SImeloengoen: het land der TlmoerBataks in zijn vroegere isolatie en zljn ontwlkkeling tot een deel van het cultuurgebled van de oostkust van Sumatra (Simalungun: the land of the Eastern Bataks in its former isolation and its development into a part of the plantation area of the east coast of Sumatra), Leiden: S. C. van Doesburgh, 1922, pp. 3 3, 50-56. Siahaan, N. Sedjarah Kebuda.laan Batak (A History of Batak Culture), Medan: C. V. Napitupulu & Sons, 196*+, p. 7. Siahaan, A.N. and H. Pardede, Sedjarah Perkembangan Marga2 Batak (A History of the Development of the Batak Marga)7 Balige: "Indra," n.d., p. 11. Saragih, J.E., "Kesenian Simalungun" (The Arts in Simalungun), a paper presented to the Seminar Kebuda.laan Simalungun (Seminar on Simalungun Culture), February 196*4-, p. 1. Saragih, J. tfismar, "Silsilah Marga2 di Simalungun" (A Chronicle of the Marga in Simalungun), a paper presented to the Seminar Kebudajaan Simalungun, February 196*4-, p. 2. 3. Title page and page one missing. Translated into Indonesian by J. E. Saragih, Kepala Inspeksi Kebudajaan (Head of the Cultural Inspectorate) of the Regency of Simalungun. *4-. Just how arbitrary and oppressive the radja were is a matter of some debate. Dutch writers and Simalungun Batak ^-revolutionaries interviewed by the author considered them to be extremely so, while other Simalungun Bataks felt that the tales of cruelty and oppression were much exaggerated. Tideman, op. cit., pp. 93-9*1-. 6. in ibid., pp. 50-83 the legendary history of each kingdom is recounted. Interview with the last tungkat of Dolok Batunanggar, Badja Purba, now a retired government official. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 468] === 8. Kroesen, J. A., "Eene reis door de landschappen Tandjung Kassau, Siantar en Tanah Djawa, Residentie Oostkust van Sumatra*' (A trip through the regions of Tandjung Kassau, Siantar and Tanah Djawa, East Coast of Sumatra Residency), Ti.ldschrlft voor Indisohe Taal-. Land- en Volkenkunde, Deel x x x ix ( 1 8 9 7 ) » p p. 2 2 9 - 3 0 4. 9. Kroesen, J.A., "Nota omtrent de Bataklanden (special Simeloengoen)" (A note on the Bataklands ^especially Simalungun7 ), Tijdschrlft yoor Indlsche Taal-. Land- en Volkenkunde, D e e l X L I (1899)* P» 2 5 7. 10. See for example J.C. Vergouwen, The Social Organi zation and Customary Law of the Toba-Batak of Northern Sumatra. The Hague: Martinus Nljhoff. 196^, pp. 114— 115. 11. On the North Tapanuli Batak kinship system, see Clark Cunningham, The Postwar Migration of the Toba Bataks to East Sumatra. New Havens Yale University southeast Asia Studies, 19^8; Edward M. Bruner, "The Toba Batak Village," in G. William Skinner, e d., o£. cit.; Vergouwen, o£. cit., pp. lf-6 6; J. Keuning, The Toba Batak, Formerly and N o w, Ithaca: Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project, Translation Series, 1958, pp. *4— 8. 12. Based on interviews with J.E. Saragih, Kepala Inspeksi Kebudajaan Simalungun. In the late 194-Os Mr. Saragih revisited his village of birth (in Raja, where a majority of the inhabitants are of marga Saragih), found 51% of the villagers were of marga Purba, 30% Saragih, 10% Sinaga and 9% Damanik out of a total population of 352. On a visit of my own to the village Baringin Raja (also in subdistrict Raja) I found approximately 50% Saragih, 20% each Purba and Sinaga and 10% Damanik of a population of 2 5 0. 13* In North Tapanuli the equivalent terms are boru and hulahula. 14-. Cunningham, on. cit., p. 2 5. 15. Bruner, op. cit., p. 54-. 16. Since his daughters usually married into more than one marga, the radja had a choice as to who would become the anak boru lopu; this choice did not extend to the daughters of his "fisct wife," who were married to other radja. some cases the anak boru lopu was (or was believed to be) a direct descendant of the husband of the oldest daughter of the first radja. 17. Tideman, og. cit., pp. 9I-92. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 469] === ^56 18. Ibid.. pp. ^7-48. 19. Furnivall, J.S., Netherlands I n d i a. Cambridge: University Press, 1944-, p. 537. 20. The others were a tax on forest produce, uang media (table money) collected on civil disputes, and fines. There were also several forms of tribute, usually payable in kind. hNota van toelichting betreffende de Slmeloengoensche landschappen: Siantar, Panel, Tanah Djawa en Haja" (A note of explanation concerning the Simalungun Segions: Siantar, Pane, Tanah Djawa and Raja), Tijdschrlft voor Indlsche Taal-. Land- en Volkenkunde. Deel LI, 1909* PP* 527-567. 21. Interview with Bandar Alam Purba Tambak, former radja of Dolok Silau and now head of the Agrarian Service, Hegency of Simalungun. 181 Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 470] === 457 Notes; Chapter III Tideman, cit,, pp. 213-215. 2. The description of road and railroad building is from ibid,, pp. 20-3 2. 3. Allen, G.C., and Donnithorne, Audrey G., Western Enterprise in Indonesia and Malaya. London; George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1957* PP. 118-119* 4. Tideman, og. cit., pp. 302-304. In 1963-64 rubber was the dominant plantation crop (46% of total plantation hectareage), followed by palm oil (20#), tea (18#) and sisal (14#). These percentages are computed from Djawatan Agraria, Kabupaten Simalungun, Daftar: Nama2 Perkebunan di Kabupaten SImalungun, P. Slantar, 1963* 5. Tideman, op. cit., p. 84- and pp. 195-209. of P. Siantar not included. Population 6. The General Agricultural Condition of Slmeloengoen. p. 16. Population of P. Siantar not included. Geertz, Clifford, The Religion of J a v a, pp. 4 and 6. 8. Geertz, Hildred, "Indonesian Cultures and Communities," in McVey, Huth, ed., Indonesia, pp. 4-7-48. For a more ex tended treatment of the Javanese kinship system, see Geertz, Hildred, The Javanese Fstmily. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961. Tideman, op. cit.. p. 205, gives the following figures: I ear Deaths/thousand pop.. East Coast of Sumatra Deaths/thousand for plantation laborers in SImalungun 1915 1916 1917 11.28 10.18 11.08 22.3 19.2 18.28 11.45 14.03 37.78 26.49 1918 1919 10. A reflection of the importance of a sense of comJavanese may be seen in the nature of current (1963-64) labor-management disputes in Simalungun, of which well over half are concerned with attempts by the management to transfer workers from one part of a plantation to another, interviews with officials of the PPN and Goodyear Tire and iiuDber company• Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 471] === 458 11. Figures for 1912 and 1920 from Tideman, oj3. cit., pp. 186 and 187; for 1930, from Cunningham, Clark E., op. cit., p. 86. 12. Tideman, o p. cit., p. 18?. 13. Muller Kruger, Dr. Th., Sedjarah Geredja di Indonesia (A History of the Church in Indonesia), Djakarta: Badan Penerbit Kristen, 1959, PP* 182-185. 14. Tideman, oj>. cit., p. 186. 15. Bruner, Edward, “Kinship Organization among the Urban Batak of Sumatra," Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences, Series 2, NoZ ^2 (1959-1960), pi 119* 16. Cunningham, o p. cit., pp. 87-88. 17. The HKBP was founded in 1930, with headquarters in Pearadja (Tarutung). While not the only North Tapanuli Batak church, it is by far the largest, with nearly 750,000 members (of a total Sumatran Protestant population of almost 1,200,000) in 1958. See Muller Kruger, op. cit.. pp. I9 O-I98 and Lamplran (Appendix). Until 1963 Simalungun Batak Protestants were also members of the HKBP. 18. Cunningham, ag. cit., p. 51» 19. Ibid.. p. 85. 20. Tideman, oj>. c i t.. p. 187* 21. Feith distinguishes between two main “political cultures" in Indonesia, the Javanese aristocratic and the Islamic-entrepreneurial. The latter “is a product of the maritime commercial towns and states of coastal Sumatra, North Java, Kalimantan and Sulawesi, of thorough Islamization, of a relatively slight Dutch impact, and of the revival of entrepreneurship in the present century.1* Its main features, in contrast to the Javanese-aristocratic political culture, are a respect for economic pursuits, support for an Islamic state, less anti-Dutch but more anti-Chinese sentiment, a readiness "to accept and incorporate influences stemming from the modern West," and a lesser sympathy for socialist ideas. Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, Tgiz, 22. HAMKA (H. Abdulmalik Karim Amrullah), Sedjarah Islam dl Sumatera (A History of Islam in S u m a t r a ), Medan: Pustaka Nasional, 1950 (2nd e d. ), p. 42. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 472] === 23. For 1920* Tideman, on. cit., p. 209; for 1939, The General Agricultural Condition of Simeloengoen. p. 16. Tideman, loc, cit. 25. Ibid.. p. 210. 26. 60 Tahun Indjil Kristus di Simalungun (60 Years of the Gospel of Christ in Simalungun), P. Siantar: Pimpinan Pusat Geredja Kristen Protestan Simalungun (Central Leader ship of the Simalungun Christian Protestant Church), 1963, p. 29. 27. 60 Tahun Indjil Kristus dl Simalungun. loc. cit. 28. Unfortunately there are no figures available on the number of schools in the colonial period; the earliest total is for 1953 (29 schools with 1200 students) given in 60 Tahun Indjil Kristus dl Simalungun. p. 73. As no new schools were built during the Japanese occupation (19^2-19^5) or the Indonesian Revolution (19^5-19^9)» these figures probably describe accurately the immediate pre-war situation. 29. Ibid., p. 2^. 30. Cunningham, op. cit.. pp. 133-13^. 31. 60 Tahun Indjil Kristus di Simalungun. p. 8. 32. Kahin, George M c T., Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 19f>2, pp. 92 and 9^. 33. Kahin, ojo. cit., p. 9 6. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 473] === b 60 Notes: Chapter IV 1. The date March 13th Is given in Madja Purba, "Pematangsiantar. Setengah Abad," (Pematangsiantar, A HalfCentury), Kenang-Kenangan Pekan Per tu n d.1ukan Slmelungun 10 Mel 1952— £5 Mel 19^2 (A Souvenir of the Simalungun Exhi bition Pair, May 10, 1952— May 2 5, 1952), P. Siantar, 1952, 2. The best general account of the Revolution is George McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. 3. At the beginning of the occupation, both Sumatra and Malaya were under the 25th Army, with headquarters in Singapore* In 19^3 the two areas were placed under separate military administrations, and 25th Army Sumatran headquarters was moved to Bukittinggi, West Sumatra. Por a description of the structure of Japanese military government in Indonesia, see M.A. Aziz, Japan's Colonialism in Indonesia* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 19f>5* PP* 15^-162, and Willard H* Elsbree, Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements 19^0-19^-5. Cambridge, Mass*: Harvard University Press, 1953* PP« 77-78. Selected documents on the administration of Sumatra may be found in Harry J. Benda, James K. Irikura and Kolchi Kishi, Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia: Selected Documents* New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1965, pp. 169- 19?. M. L. S laglan, "Peradilan didaerah Kabupaten Slmelungun," (Justice in the Regency of Simalungun), KenangKenangan Pekan Pertundjukan Slmelungun. pp. 44— £ 5 • Japanese residing in Indonesia were beyond the Jurisdiction of the new court system. The General Agricultural Condition of Simeloengoen, Organisasi P, an underground Islamic anti-Dutch organization centered primarily in Atjeh, was also reported to have had a small following In Siantar which helped to wel come the Japanese. Reference to Organisasi P In East Sumatra may be found In Aziz, o p. cit., pp. 1 ^ 8 -1 4 9. According to Benda, pre-invaaibxr: Japanese attempts to win support among Indonesian Moslems were apparently more successful in Sumatra (particularly Atjeh and West Sumatra) than in Java. Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising S u n. The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1958, pp. 163-166. ?• The General Agricultural Condition of SImeloengoen. pp. 72-73 and p. 16a. These figures apparently refer to uncooked rice (beras). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 474] === 461 8. "Pemerintahan Chusus dl Kab. Slmelungun,H Kenangypnangan Pekan Pertundjukan Slmelungun. p. 17. 9. Pslzer, Karl J,, "The Agrarian Conflict in East Sumatra," Pacific Affairs. Vol. XXX, No. 2 (June, 1957), pp. 155-15^ See also Cunningham, op. c i t., pp. 89-90. 10. Pelzer, oj>. c i t.. p. 156. 11. A. Pandiangan, "Persawahan di Kabupaten Slmelungun," (Wet-Rice Cultivation in the Regency of Simalungun), KenangKenangan Pekan Pertund.1ukan Slmelungun-. p. 82. Earlier figures may be found in Table 3-1 • Madja Purba, loc.cit., writes that only one major sastah. developmnnt project was carried out by the Japanese in Simalungun. This project was located in Huta Baju, district Tanah Djawa, and eventually encompassed 3500 ha. 12. The study was the above-cited The General Agricultural Condition of Simeloengoen. 13* Madja Purba, loc. cit. 14. Kahin, oj>* c i t.. p. 103. Elsbree, oj>. cit., p. 45, characterizes the Japanese attitude as one of "'wait and see' — would cooperation with the nationalists prove feasible; what measures might military developments demand?" 15» See Th. Muller Kruger, Sedjarah Geredja di Indonesia. p. 192, and 60 Tahun Indjil Kristus dl Simalungun. pp. 30-31 • 16. Kementerian Penerangan R.I., Republik Indonesia. Propinsl Sumatera Utara (Ministry of Information of the Republic of Indonesia, Republic of Indonesia. Province of North Sumatra). Medan, 1953, P. ^0. This is the official history of the Revolution in North Sumatra. 17* Hels soldier; Ho: 2nd class reserve. Aziz, op. c it.. P* 229 (fn.3). Heiho was established in Sumatra in May, 1943, and was open to elementary school graduates between the ages of 18 and 30. Japanese recruitment propaganda in Sumatra emphasized the "opportunity for the youth of Indonesia to Join in devoting their energies to defend Greater East Asia against the colonialists." Drs. O.D.P. Sihombing, Pemuda Indonesia Menantang Faslsme DJepang (Indonesian Youth Challenges Japanese Fascism), Djakarta: "Sinar DJaya," 1962, PP. 138-139. 60 Tahun IndJll Kristus dl Simalungun. p. 30. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 475] === 46 2 19« Kementerian Penerangan R.I., op. cit.. p. 1 9. Aziz, op. cit.. p. 230 (fn. 3) lists the number of* Peta soldiers in Java at the time of the Japanese surrender as 37,000, and Gen. A. H. Nasution writes that the Japanese were able "in a period of about a year to organize 50-60 battalions in Java and about the same number in SumatraMalaya." See his Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Army), Vol. I, Bandung/Djakarta: Gahaco, 1963 (originally published in 1956), p. 8 5. 20. Interview with Abdullah J u s u f, North Sumatran PNI chairman in 1963-64 and a former member of Kaidjo Djlkei Dan. 21. Kementerian Penerangan H. I., o p. cit., p. 20. 22. Madja Purba, loc. cit. 23. Kementerian Penerangan./S.I., op. cit., pp. 2 0-21. 24. Interviews with Abdullah Jusuf, A. Djulan Purba and DJatongam Saragih (respectively PNI and Partindo leaders in Simalungun who received training at TALA PETA). 25. Kahin, op. cit., p. 108. See also Elsbree, o p. cit., p. 123, who writes that "in 1944 the Communications Bureau of the Sumatran Military Administration began the task of pro viding radios for publicity purposes for every town and vil lage throughout the island and announced that its goal was one radio for every three thousand inhabitants." Elsbree's source for this information was Office of Strategic Services, Programs of Japan in Sumatra, with Biographies, compiled by Research and Analysis Branch, Honolulu, T. H., 19^5» P. 15. The lateness of the date given would indicate that the ef fectiveness of the radio as an instrument of nationalist indoctrination was somewhat less in Sumatra than in Java. 26. Japan Year Book 1943-44. p. 202, quoted In Elsbree, op. cltTI p. 84. 27. Ibid., p. 8 5. In North Sumatra there were ap parently three councils (called Sangi K a l ) in Atjeh, East Sumatra and Tapanuli, established in early 1 9 ^. See Kementerian Penerangan B.I., loc. cit. Neither the Central Advisory Council nor the local councils had any real power. 28. Kementerian Penerangan H.I., op. cit., p. 21. 29. The limited nature of the projected grant of inde pendence, even as late as July 19^5, is discussed in Benedict 0 G. Anderson, Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics Under £he Japanese Occupation: 1944-1945. Ithaca: Cornell university Modern Indonesia Project, Interim Reports Series, PP. 3^-35. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 476] === ^63 30. On the BPKI, see ibid., pp. 16-32. 31. The membership of the Committee is given in ibid.. 36. On the Sumatran Central Advisory Council and the Committee, see Dr. G.W. Overdl jkink, Het Indonesische Probleem. De Feiten (The Indonesian Problem, The Facts), 32. This section is based largely on DJabatan Penerangan H.I., Propinsi Tapanuli-Sumatera Timur, Perdjuangan Rale3at Tapanuli— Sumatera Timur (Information Service of the Republic of Indonesia, Province of Tapanuli— East Sumatra, Struggle of the People of Tapanuli— East Sumatra). 1950, p. 92, and Kementefciaa Penerangan R.I., on. cit., pp. 22-23, 27-3^. According to Madja Purba, nothing was known of the inde pendence declaration in Simalungun until after the Japanese surrender statement on Sept. 21, and the public announcement of independence was not made until Oct. Mad^a Purba, loc. cit. 33. On the regional identification of the Sumatran delegates see Anderson, oj>. c i t.. p. 63 (fn. 183). 3^. Madja Purba, op. cit., p. 18. The Komite Nasional at this time was actually called the Komite Nasional untuk daerah Keradjaan.2 Simalungun (National Committee for the region of the Kingdoms of Simalungun)• 35* Kementerian Penerangan R.I., 033. cit., pp. 21-22. The elevation in rank did not occur until after Aug. 9« Anderson, o p. cit., p. 12, compares a similar situation in Java to a relay race, in which "the two bureaucratic directorates ran things side by side until the baton of power was finally relinquished to the Indonesian leadership." 36. The word "youth** as used here is a translation of the Indonesian pemuda and signified a revolutionary state of mind rather than a specific age group, though the members of most armed groups were in fact young. On the revolu tionary youth, see Small, John R.W., **0n the Style of the Indonesian Revolutionaries," Paper No. 8 9, International Conference on Aslan History, University of Hong Kong, Aug. 30-sept. 5, 1964. 37 • Interviews with former revolutionaries in Simalungun and Kementerian Penerangan, op. cit., p. 22. An attempt was made in January 19^6 at a meeting of the Komite Nasional for East Sumatra and the traditional rulers to persuade the latter to democratize their governments. A l though an agreement was reached, the sultans and rad ja ap parently made no changes in their administrations. Ibid., p. 7 6. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 477] === 46438. Badan Kebaktian Pemuda Indonesia, Kenan g a n: 15 October 1945. Hantjurnja Kubu Nica/Siantar Hotel (A Reminiscences October 15, 1945, The Destruction of the Nica ^Netherlands Indies Civil Administration/ Fortification/ Siantar Hotel), P. Siantar, 195?• 39. On the BPI in Siantar see DJabatan Penerangan HI, propinsi Tapanuli— Sumatera Timur, ojo. cit.. p. 98. Sumarno Hasibuan was a PNI leader in the late 1940s and early 1950s, then Joined the Communist Party. On Hicardo Siahaan see Nasution, oja. cit.. p. 211. According to Nasutlon, the BPI (which he calls the BPHI (Barlsan Pemuda Republik Indonesia. Youth Legion of the Republic of Indonesia) ) in East Sumatra was led by former Peta members. Ibid., p. 11*4-. On the BPI in Medan see DJabatan Penerangan R.I. Propinsi Tapanuli— Sumatera Timur, o p. cit., pp. 92-93 and Kementerian Penerangan R.I., op. cit., pp. 29-30. 40. Information on the Social Revolution may be found in: DJabatan Penerangan B.I., Propinsi Tapanuli— Sumatera Timur, op. cit.. pp. 100-101; Kementerian Penerangan R.I., op. cit., pp. 76-78 and passim; G.W. Overdijkink, op. cit.. pp. 86-87; Henri J.H. Alers, 0 m een rode of groene Merdeka. 10 Jaren binnenlandse politiek Indonesle 1943-1953 (For a Red or Green Independence, 10 Years of Internal Politics in Indonesia 19^3-1953)* Eindhoven: UitgeveriJ Vulkaan, *956, pp. 116-117; and Kahin, op. cit., pp. 178-181. See fn. 24. 4-2. An account of the East Sumatran situation may be found in Kahin, oj>. cit., pp. 178-183* See also the other sources cited In f n. T o. 4-3. This section Is based largely on interviews with I.H. Napitupulu, a former Siantar Journalist and leader of the Siantar -^esindo organization during the Revolution. 44. On the ERRI in Medan, see Kementerian Penerangan B.I., op. cit., p. 112. 4-5. The TRI's Fourth Division (East Sumatra) was or ganized between December 194-5 and February 194-6. Its first commanding officer was Kol. Achmad Tahir, former Peta and SFI leader, and its troops were recruited largely from BPI. See Nasution, op. c i t.. pp. 159-160 and p. 204-. The name TRI was used from January 194-6 to June 194-7, when it was changed to TNI. Reproduced w ithperm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 478] === 4-65 4-6. Continuing difficulties with the youth groups in East Sumatra are mentioned in Ibid., pp. 327-3 2 8. See also Muhammad Radjab, Tjatatan di Sumatera (Notes on Sumatra), Djakarta: Balai Pus taka'] 19^9* PP« ^9-71 for an interview in July 194-7 with Timur Pane, one of the most colorful of the guerrilla leaders. 4-7* On the Dutch "police action" and NST, see Kementerian Penerangan RI, op. cit., pp. 14-6-153 and 215-229; DJabatan Penerangan RI, Propinsi Tapanuli— Sumatera Timur, o p. cit., pp. 110-116; Alers, op. cit.. pp. 155-156. 4-8. According to 60 Tahun Indjil Kristus di Slmalungan. "all houses along the main road from Simpang Raja to Serlbudolok were burned by the troops. In this burning 26 buildings owned by the church were also burned." 4-9. The motives of those who participated in NST were varied. The traditional aristocracy, of course, had little to lose and much to gain from an autonomous East Sumatra in which they would share power with the Dutch. Some former Republicans also cooperated with the Dutch for personal reasons or because the events of 194-5-47 had convinced them that a Republican government could not assure order in the region. See for example the case of Siantar*s Dr. Nainggolan, described by Kahin, op. cit.. p. 180 (fn. 52 ), and Nainggolan*s own brief statement in Kementerian Penerangan RI, pp. cit., p. 219. --50. On the movement for the dissolution of NST and the reaction of NST supporters, see Kementerian Penerangan RI, 033. cit., pp. 34-0-385; DJabatan Penerangan RI, Propinsi Tapanuli— Sumatera Timur, op. cit., pp. 138-168; Alers, op. cit.. pp. 222-223. 51. Kahin, op. cit., pp. 4-60-4-61. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 479] === Notes - Chapter V 1. Feith, H., The Decline of Constitutional Democracy lu ISuOiiSSls« p. 3.22 • 2. Ibid.. pp. 434-437* These figures are for the parliamentary elections, held on September 2 9, 1955. 3. Penetapan Presiden No. 7/1959 tentang Sjarat-sjarat dan Penjederhanaan Kepartaian. available in Departeman Penerangan Hepublik Indonesia, Almanak Lembaga-Lembaga Negara dan Kepartaian. pp. 423-426. 4. The Pantja Si la or Five Principles (nationalism, internationalism or humanitarianism, representative govern ment, social justice and belief in God), formulated by Sukarno during the Japanese occupation, was a major symbolic weapon of the opponents of an Islamic Indonesian state in the 1950s. (In the 1960s it became a weapon of the opponents of the PKI.) The Manifesto Politlk was Sukarno*s Independence Day speech In 1959; its main points are summed up in the acronym USDEK (The Constitution of 1945, Indonesian Socialism, Guided Democracy, Guided Economy and Indonesian Identity). See van der Kroef, J.M., "An Indonesian Ideological Lexicon," Aslan Survey. Vol. II, no. 5 (July, 1962), pp. 24-30. Feith, H., op. cit., pp. 139-140. 6. Feith, H., The Indonesian Elections of 1955. p. 62. All election figures In this chapter, unless otherwise noted, are taken directly or adapted from Feith, on. cit., pp. 58-91* 7. Dewan Pimpinan PNI, Laporan Umum kepada Kongres ke-X Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI Leadership Council. General Report to the Tenth PNI Congress). Purwokerto. 1963. pp. 34-56. 8. Hindley, Donald, The Communist Party of Indonesia. 1951-1963. Berkeley and Los Ang e l e s: University of California Press, 1964, pp. 29-5 9, esp. pp. 37-38. 9* Geertz, C., "The Integrative Revolution," in Geertz, C., ed., Old Societies and New S t a t e s, p. 133* 10. Feith, H., The Decline of Constitutional Democracy In Indonesia, pp. 31ZJ2Z----------------- ------------------TT 11# See Bruner, E., "Kinship Organization Among the urban 3atak of Sumatra," Transactions of the N e w York Academy of Sciences. Series 2, No. 22 (1959-1960), pp. Il8-l24. 12. Feith, H., op. cit.. pp. 405, 533* Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 480] === -467 13. Ibid., p. 132. See also Kahin, George McT. Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, pp. 313-319. 14. Lev, Daniel S., "Indonesia 19^5: The Year of the Coup," Asian Survey, Vol. VI, No. 2 (Feb., 1966), p. 104. 15. Benda, Harry J., The Crescent and the Rising S u n, pp. 45-46. See also Geertz, C., The Religion of J a v a, po. 125-126. 16. Feith, ££. cit., p. 136. pp. 143-61. See also Geertz, 00. cit., 17. Benda, ojg. cit., pp. 89-90. 18. Geertz, oj>. cit., p. 149. 19. Feith, 0£. cit.» pp. 138-139- 20. Undang-undang No. 1 tahun 1957 tentang Pokok-pokok Pernerlntahan Daerah. available in Departemen Penerangan Hepublik Indonesia, od. cit.. pp. I63-I8 9. Translated ex cerpts are in Legge, J. D., Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia, Appendix C, pp. 258-2 6 9. 21. The DPRD were actually established in late 1956 under the authority of Law No. 14 of 1956. Until 1959 they were called DPBDp (Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Daerah peralihan, Transitional Regional People's Representative Councils). 22. On Simbolon's coup and its aftermath, see Small, JohnR.W., "The Military Politics of North Sumatra December 1956— October 19 57 *** unpublished paper, Cornell University, n.d. 23. Penetapan Presiden R.I. No. 6 tahun 1959 tentang Pemerintah Daerah (dlsempurnakan). in Departemen Penerangan Republik Indonesia, op. cit.. pp. 190-202. Translated ex cerpts are in Legge, J.D., op. cit., Appendix D, pp. 270-274. 24. Article 15, paragraph 2 in Legge, J.D., ojo. cit., 25. The candidate was the nephew of Col. Ulung Sitepu, then Governor of North Sumatra. In 1965 both the Governor and his nephew were implicated in the GESTAPU (Gerakan September Tlgapulufa. 30th of September Movement) A f f a i r, re moved from their posts and arrested. 26. These figures are based on the party representatives plus the DPRD-GR members from functional groups affiliated with or dominated by a particular party. In Simalungun, party representation was: 5 PNI, 3 Parkindo, 3 PKI, 2 NU, 1 Partai Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 481] === Katholik and 1 IPKI. The functional group representatives included 7 PNI members (Veterans, Youth, Women, Generation of *^5* Farmers, Labor and National Entrepreneurs) and 1 Partai Katholik member (Catholic Religious Leadership), The unaffiliated group included representatives from the Army, Police, Moslem Religious Leadership (who was said to be pro-PNI), Protestant Religious Leadership, Cooperatives, Adat (custom and customary law group), and intellectuals (after 1962 this seat was vacant). In Siantar, party rep resentation was: 2 PNI, 3 Parkindo, 1 PKI and 1 NU. Functional group representatives included 3 PNI members (Youth/Women, Labor and Cooperatives/National Entrepreneurs), 1 Parkindo member (Protestant Religious Leadership) and 1 NU member (Moslem Religious Leadership). The Police and Army representatives were non-party. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 482] === 469 Notes - Chapter VI 1. Political Parties. Their Organization and Activity In the Modern S t a t e, New York; John Wiley & Sons. 1963. p p. 23-36, 41-47, 63-90. In terms of finances, neither party corresponds to the mass party mod£; the PNI is heavily dependent for financial support on personal contributions from its regency-level leadership (who in turn obtain some of their funds from provincial party leaders— see Chapter IX) while the PKI depends upon disbursements from higher party committees and, according to non-Communist informants, on contributions from the local Chinese community. 2. Feith, H. The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, p. 125>I Hindley, op. cit.. p. 49. 4. Agitation and Propaganda Department, Central Com mittee of the Communist Party of Indonesia, Material for the Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of Indonesia. Djakarta, 1958, p. 137« The draft revision of the PKI Constitution, included in this volume, describes the relationship between Pemuda Rakjat and the party as follows: "Article 68: The 'People's Youth* ('Pemuda Hakjat*) declared itself at its Vth Congress to be the loyal and trusted as sistant of the Communist Party of Indonesia. The Central Leadership of the 'People's Youth' accepts the leadership of the CC of the C.P.I. "Organizations of the 'People's Youth* must give effective assistance in implementing the Party's policies and decisions, as well as submit suggestions to the Party Committee at the same level. "Article 69: Party organizati ons at all levels must pay close attention to the work of the 'People's Youth' in the ideological and organizational spheres, must give it guidance in education in Marxist-Leninist theory for its members, and take care to guarantee close ties between the 'People's Youth* and the broad masses of the youth." 5« Geertz, Clifford, "The Javanese Village," in Skinner, G.W., ed., op. cit., p. 3 7. On this point, see Hawkins, E. D., "Labor in Trans ition," in McVey, Ruth T., e d., Indonesia, esp. p. 270. 7» This observation is also made by Karl Pelzer in The Agrarian Conflict in East Sumatra," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXX, No. 2 (June, 1957), p. 154. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 483] === 8. It may be taken as a rule of thumb in Indonesian politics that the higher the claimed membership, the more unreliable the claim. In particular, the figures for PETANI, SOBS I and BTI would seem to be Inflated. Interview with SOBSI officials. 10. "Anggaran Dasar Partai Nasional Indonesia,** in Departemen Penerangan Republik Indonesia, Almanak LembagaLembaga Negara dan Kepartaian. p. 4^2. 11. Agitation and Propaganda Department, Central Com mittee of the Communist Party of Indonesia, on. c i t., pp. Il4-121 (Chapter 2, Articles 5-22). 12. Interview with the KBM first vice-chairman. 13. Certain industries have presented special problems. The textile industry, for example, consisting of 139 pri vately-owned weaving plants (138 of which have fewer than 50 employees), is dominated by North Tapanuli Bataks who tend to hire members of their own and related marga. Union ization, predicated on the idea that there is a divergence of interest between the workers and their employers, has not been able to take hold among the family-oriented textile workers. Hindley, 033. cit., pp. 170-171. 15. In Siantar the PNI and PKI supported the same candidates for Regional Head in i960 and 196^ and Regional Secretary (with Parkindo) in 196^. In Simalungun the PNI and PKI (with Partai Buruh) nominated the same candidate for Regional Head in i960 in the first (but not the second) round of nominations and were allied (with Parkindo) in the selection of a Regional Secretary in 196^. 16. For a more detailed discussion of the selection of DPRD-GR members In Simalungun, see Chapter X. 17. This discussion is based on Small, John R.W., "The Military Politics of North Sumatra December 195&— October 1957»" supplemented by interviews. 18. Small, on the basis of press reports, says that the attacking force numbered 300. Ibid., p. ^2. Informants In Simalungun estimated It at between 500 and 1,000. 19. On GESTAFU, see Lev, Daniel S., "Indonesia 1965s The Year of the Coup," Aslan Survey. Vol. VI, No. 2 (February 1966), and Sutter, John 0., "Two Faces of KONFRONTASI: 'Crush Malaysia' and the GESTAPU," Asian Survey. v °l. VI, No. 10 (October 1966). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 484] === 20. Maurice Duverger, on. cit.. po. 17-23, iH-^7, 21. PNI-PKI strength was fifteen of a total of twentynine actually-occupied seats in 1963. 22. Geertz, C., The Religion of J« v a, pp. 112-113. 23. This includes the two Moslem parties as well as Parkindo and Partai Katholik. Support for Masjumi and NU came from two different segments of the santri Moslem pop ulation, based not on religious or doctrinal cleavages (or, as in Java, on urban-rural and modernist-traditional syncretist differences) but on ethnicity and revolutionarytraditional differences. See Chapters VII and VIII. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 485] === Notes - Chapter VII 1. The correlation coefficient r and Pig. 7-1 were derived from the following table j PKI Vote by subdistrict, compared with plantation hectareage, Subdistrict Sldamanik Dolok Batunanggar Siantar Balata Bosar Maligas Bandar Tanah Djawa Dolok Panribuan Pane Silau Kahean Baja Kahean Silimakuta Purba Parapat Dolok Pardamaian Dolok Silau Baja Plantation Ha./ Arable Land 98% 91 76 73 61 58 28 22 19 PKI Vote 18.1 29.0 30.1 13-7 20.7 20.9 11.5 2. The correlation coefficient r and Pig. 7-•2 were derived from the following t able: PNI vote by subdistrict, compared 'with plantation hectareage. Subdistrict Sidamanik Dolok Batunanggar Siantar Balata Bosar Maligas Bandar Tanah Djawa Dolok Panribuan Pane Silau Kahean Baja Kahean S ilimakuta Purba Parapat Dolok Pardamaian Dolok Silau Baja Plantation Ha./ Arable Land 98% 91 76 73 6158 28 22 19 PNI Vote 29.9% 26.8 33.3 16.8 26.4 30.0 26.3 19.2 42.9 20.6 26.8 28.7 37.8 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 486] === 473 The correlation coefficient r and Fig. 7-3 were de rived from the following table: Parkindo vote by subdistrict, compared with the estimated percentage of North Tapanuli Bataks in the subdistrict population. Subdistrict N. Tap. Batak/ Total Subd. Pop. Parkind Vote 75 70 60 50 45 20 20 10 22.8' 23.9 23.5 28.1 18.1 18.0 15.2 12.4 14.5 13.5 Parapat Dolok Panribuan Balata Tanah Djawa Pane Siantar Sidamanik Bandar Dolok Batunanggar Dolok Pardamaian Purba Silimakuta Bosar Maligas Raja Raja Kahean Dolok Silau Silau Kahean The six subdistricts with the largest North Tapanuli Batak population were chosen. The correlation coefficient r and Fig. 7-4 were derived from the following table: Parkindo Support Ratios in six subdistricts with a large North Tapanuli Batak population compared with plantation hectareage as a % of total arable land. Subdistrict Plant.Ha./ Arable Land N.T.B./ Subd.Pop. Parkindo Vote Parkindo Support Batlo Siantar Balata Tanah Djawa Dlk. Panribuan ?ane Parapat 73 28 22 45;* 70 60 75 50 85 18.1^ 23.9 23.5 22.8 28.1 43.7 .40 .34 .39 .30 .56 .51 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 487] === By teubdistrict, compared to the percentage of Moslems in the subdistrict population, Masjumi’s vote was as follows: Subdistrict Bosar Maligas Dolok Batunanggar Bandar Siantar Sidamanik Tanah Djawa Pane Baja Kahean Silau Kahean Balata Dolok Pardamaian Raja Dolok Panribuan Silimakuta Purba Dolok Silau Parapat Moslems/Subd. Pop. Masjuml Vote 97% 87 71 52 43 37 36 32 27 26 18.556 24.0 29.4 15.5 15.0 20.6 23.0 6. A considerable proportion of Javanese support for Masjuml may be attributable to Javanese women, whose interest in Islam is much greater than that of their husbands. The tendency for women to support the religious parties and to urge their husbands to do so is common in the region. Parkindo*s women’s organization FrfKI played an important role in the election campaign, as did Mas juml *s Muslimat Masjumi and NU*s Muslimat NU. PNI leaders in Siantar ex pressed much concern over the success of Muslimat NU among the Javanese women of Bantan. The activities of their own women’s affiliate, Wanita Demokrat, in Bantan were heavily religion-oriented. 7. 15,605 votes were cast in the Siantar election, rep resenting a third of the est. 1955 population of 5 0,000. (The population of Siantar in 1950 was 48,427; by 1963 it had more than doubled, but most of this growth took place during the rebellion of 1957- 1960, when security was better in the city than in the countryside. A further 10-15*000 people were incorporated into the city in i960 when the city limits were extended). Assuming that the proportion of voters to population was reasonably consistent from ward to ward, there were roughly 1,000 to 1,500 voters in Bantan. Bantan*s vote was 60% PNI (many of the Javanese women prob^ Toted ^or Mas juml, whose women’s organization was strong there) something like 600-900 of the P N I ’s 2,310 votes came from Bantan alone. Add to that another 200 or so votes from Javanese in other wards and one arrives at the figure of 800 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 488] === to 1100, or one-third to one-half of the total PNI vote. Such an estimate is obviously not very reliable, and is of fered only to give an indication of the ethnicity of PNI voters in Siantar. Duverger, Maurice, Political Parties, p. 6^. 9. Partai Kristen Indonesia, Tjabang Simalungun, La puran Umum.(Indonesian Christian Party /Parkindo/, Simalungun Branch, General R e p o r t ). P. Siantar, 1961, p. ^ and Partai Kristen Indonesia, Tjabang Kotapradja Pema tang siantar, La pur an (Indonesian Christian Party /Parkindo7» Siantar Branch, R e p o r t ) P. Siantar, 1961, p. 3. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 489] === Notes - Chapter VIII 1. Alternatives vary of course from group to groups for the Javanese, who have little opportunity for education, little interest in religious careers and few commercial or entrepreneurial connections, politics is most attractive; among the North Tapanuli Bataks, education is more widespread and entrepreneurship more highly valued, and fewer young men seek political careers; among the Simalungun Bataks, the church and its school system offer the most highly valued path to personal advancement, followed by careers in the civil service; and finally, careers in commerce or religious education are attractive and generally available to South Tapanuli Bataks. 2. HIS— Dutch-Native School, a seven-year elementary school; MLJLO— More Extended Lower Education, a continuation of the HIS. Interview with S OKBI-Simalungun chairman. Pemerintahan Daerah Tkt. II Simalungun, La our an Tahun 1963. p. 121. 5« The central ministry to which this Office is sub ordinate was controlled by Masjumi until 1953, when the Religious Affairs portfolio was given to NU. See Feith, H., The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, pp. 538-339* At the local level Masjumi leaders remained pre dominant until the late 1950s. 6. Strictly speaking there are no doctrinal differences among Indonesian Moslems, all of whom belong to the sjafi’ie school of interpretation. They do not argue that Muhammadijah or any other Islamic organization belongs to any other school. The conflict within Indonesian Islam is thus quite different from the situation in countries (such as Iraq) where there are Moslems adhering to different schools. (Personal com munication to the author from Harry J. Benda). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 490] === 477 Notes: Chapter IX 1. Kongres Ke-IX Partai Nasional Indonesia, Anggaran Dasar Partai Nasional Indonesia (Ninth Congress of the PNI, Constitution of the P N I ), Solo, July i960, Chapter 6, Article 11. PNI-Simalungun Statement of Income. 1961-1963. Contributor First Chairman (Subroto) Second Chairman Amount 860 --2,013 3*000 44,000 18,000 750 500 Third Chairman Secretary Treasurer Contrib. from R.M. Hutabarat* 11 D. Rangkuty J.W. Saragih *' Jahja Hasibuan Monthly contributions from PNI members of the DPRD-GR Total 158,554 3*675 231,352 Source: Adapted from Dewan Pimpinan Tjabang Partai Nasional Indonesia, Laporan U m u m. P. Siantar, July, 1963, p. 18. These figures undoubtedly grossly underestimate true party income, but are substantially accurate in terms of the proportion contributed by the chairman. *At the 1963 Conference R.M. Hutabarat became the new treasurer of the party. 3. The qualifying adjective is used because it was im possible to get detailed information about internal party affairs from PKI leaders comparable to that obtained for other parties. Nonetheless, the author feels reasonably cer tain that the analysis of the PKI, based on Interviews with PKI party and subsidiary organization leaders and nonCommunist politicians, is substantially accurate. 4. On the PSI*s Sjarifuddin faction, see Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, pp. 258-276 and passim. 5. The Karo Batak community has had one representative on the Branch Leadership Council, who also served as a member of the DPRD from 1956-1961. Neither he nor his constituency have made many claims on the party leadership or participated in party conflicts. 6. The various parties In the newly-created DPRD had divided themselves into two blocs, a Moslem group with 7 votes Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 491] === ^78 (6 Masjuml, 1 N U ) and a "Pantja Sila bloc*' with a total of 8 votes (5 Parkindo, 2 PNI, 1 PKI). The symbol Pantja Sila in the 1950s reflected opposition to the Indonesian Islamic s t a t e proposed by Masjumi. Later, with the banning of Masjuml, it was used to imply anti-Communism. Lapuran2 sidang Dewan Plmpinan t jabang Parkindo Kotapradja Pematangslantar, pada ^gl. 15 September dan 6 Oktober 1958. (Reports of the meetings of the Branch Leadership Council, -Parkindo-Siantar, Sept. 15 and Oct. 6, 1958.) 8. Lapuran Sidang Dewan Pimpinan T jabang Parkindo Kotapradja Siantar pada tanggal 3 Mel. 1959. (Report of the meeting of the Branch Leadership Council, Parkindo-Siantar, 3 May, 1959.) 9. Lapuran ringkas sidang Dewan Partai Parkindo pada tanggal 8 Mel 1959. (Brief report of the meeting of the Parkindo Party Council, Hay 8, 1959.) 10. The representative of the Protestant Religious Leadership functional group was also a Parkindo supporter, but took no part in internal party conflicts. 11. Feelings of loyalty to o n e ’s region and hostility to individuals from other regions are not purely a matter of adat and dialect differences. Regional identification among migrant North Tapanuli Bataks has been strengthened by such factors as the differential rate of educational growth in Toba and Silindung— missionary schools came earlier to Silindung— and attributions of group superiority and in feriority based on educational attainments. Among the migrants real or imagined partiality to o n e ’s own regional group, for example in government appointments and the church hierarchy, has been a principal source of resentment to individuals from other regions. 12. Tine following paragraphs are based on discussions with Parkindo city and regency leaders who were themselves attempting to estimate the likely outcome of a Party Confer ence which they expected to take place in the near future. 13. See for example tfasinton Hutagalung, Tarombo-Marga nl Suku Batak (Marga Genealogy of the Batak Pe o p l e ), MedanT Fa.Sihardo, 1961, p. 59. 1^. Edward Bruner writes that in North Tapanuli "the members of the lineage usually do not band together for political purposes, since the major lines of tension in the social system are not one lineage versus another but rather brother against brother. If one man from a localized lineage Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 492] === 479 were running for office against suiother Batak from a distant area, he would undoubtedly receive the support of the vast majority of those in his own kinship group, irrespective of his party affiliation. But in any election on the local level the candidates are almost alsays members of the same lineage as well as the same village, and, in the Batak system of reckoning relationships, are often brothers. The choice which must then be made tends to segment the descent group. Frequently brothers align themselves with different political parties." “The Toba Batak Village," in G. William Skinner, ed., op. cit., p. 62. in Simalungun, where there is a plethora of marga in the North Tapanuli Batak village, rivalry among real or classificatory brothers in local politics is less prevalent than lineage and marga solidarity. 15. For a discussion of this election from the Simalungun Batak viewpoint, see Chapter X. 16. According to Presidential Edict No. 6 of 1959 (as perfected in November, 1959), Article 10, par. 2, the DPRD-GR and not the party Branch Leadership Councils has the right to nominate to the BPH. See Legge, J.D., op. cit.. p. 272. 17« The impact of Islam has rather successfully under mined the importance of the extended family among South Tapanuli Bataks, and marga and lineage-based support groups were absent from internal Masjumi politics in Simalungun/Siantar. 18. In the selection of a Masjumi DPD representative in 1957* the party's DPRD representatives divided Into two factions with mixed regional and organizational affiliation. In 1959 9 when the party again selected a DPD representative, the factions had shifted slightly. Supporting a candidate from Mandailing without any organizational affiliation were three Masjumi DPRD members from Mandailing, two of whom were leaders of Aldjamijatul Waslijah and one of whom was a member of Muhammadijah. Supporting a second Masjumi candidate, from Sipirok and chairman of Muhammadi jah (who won the seat with the vote of non-Masjumi DP&D members) was an Ittihadijah leader from Sunda (West Java). 19. Maurice Duverger, op. cit.. pp. 44-45, 65-6 7, and the general discussion of the relationship between party and electoral systems, pp. 206-255. See also his “Electoral Systems and Political Life," in Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown, ed., Comparative Politics, Notes and Readings. Homewood, 111. s The Dorsey Press, rev. e d., 1964, pp. 251263 (reprinted from “The Influence of the Electoral System on Political Life," The International Social Science Bulletin, Vol. 3 /Summer, 19517*) esp. pp. 256-25S. Duverger qualifies his argument by stating (p. 258) that there are a number of exceptions, including the party system Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 493] === of Great Britain and the Communist parties of all countries. He concludes that "These examples indicated the limitations of the influence exercised by the electoral system; the influence of the ballot seems to be greater with regard to the number of parties than to their internal structure.” 20. See for example Prank J. Sorauf, Political Parties in the American System. Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown, 196-4-, Ch.^. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 494] === <4-81 Motes: Chapter X 1. Another ethnic organization, AKRAP ST (Aksi Rakjat Pemilih Sumatera T i m u r. Action of the Voting People of East Sumatra"!* designed to appeal to all the indigenous peoples of East Sumatra, also contested the elections. Simalungun it won only 1,776 votes, one-third of which were in Dolok Pardamaian, the home subdistrict of AKRAP*s Simalungun chairman. 2. Under Presidential Edict No. 7/1959 on the simpli fication of the party system. 3. For a detailed analysis of the military situation in North Sumatra in 1956-57 see Small, John R.W., ’’The Military Politics of North Sumatra December 1956-October 1957,'* unpublished paper, Cornell University, n.d. Discussion of the autonomy movement at the East Sumatran level may be found in Small, op. cit., pp. 36-37* By 1963-6^ the issue of East Sumatran autonomy was dead as far as East Sumatrans were concerned, for their objectives had largely been realized. Although the provincial military commander was a Javanese, most military officers with ter ritorial authority or command of troops in East Sumatra were indigenous East Sumatrans (wlthl: a high percentage of Karo Bataks). In the sphere of civilian government, the North Sumatran governor was a Karo Batak and most second-level Regional Heads were East Sumatrans, many of them born in the regencies and municipalities which they headed. The autonomy shoe was now on the other foot, and demands for the separation of North Sumatra into two provinces began to be heard from the North Tapanuli Bataks. In early 196^ a resolution to this effect was passed by the DPRD-GR of North Tapanuli. 5* This post was abolished in 1961 when the regency and municipality were combined to form a single military region. in the old DPRD there were three Simalungun Batak members from KRSST and one each from the PNI, Parkindo, Masjuml, Partai Katholik and PSI. 7* The designation given to the group by non-Simalungun Bataks. Simalungun Bataks in the DPRD-GR deny that such a bloc exists. a few months previously the Karo Batak Regional Head of Tebingtinggi, who had apparently engineered the selection of a Karo Batak Regional Secretary, was attacked by the PKI, PNI and several other parties and subsequently "retooled." Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 495] === 482 Notes: Chapter XI 1. Geertz, Clifford, "The Javanese Kijaji: The Changing Sole of a Cultural Broker,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. II, No. 2, p. 228. 2. Skinner, G. William, "The Nature of Loyalties in Rural Indonesia," in Skinner, G. William, Ed., o p. cit., p. 53. Legge, J. D., op. cit., p.134. Legge's generaliza tions are "based on a study of the membership of eight secondlevel (regency) DPRD in East Java and four In West Sumatra, and of the membership of the East Java first-level (pro vincial) DPRD. He found that from one-third to one-half of the members of the twelve second-level councils and 23 of the 69 members of the East Java Council were civil servants. 4. Legge, J. D., o p. cit., p. 94. Al s o quoted in Skinner, G. William, e d., o p. cit., p. 5« 5. Geertz, Clifford, "The Integrative Revolution, Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New states," in Geertz, Clifford, e d., Old Societies and New S t a t e s, p. 153* and passim. 6. North Tapanuli Bataks claim that all the Batak people are descended from a single ancestor, and so it is also possible to trace kinship connections to the marga of South Tapanuli, Simalungun and Karo. Batak genealogies normally relegate these groups to a minor position, however, and individuals of different Batak sub-groups are not in fact very interested in (and some deny) their common ancestry. 7. This process has not occurred among the Christian North Tapanuli Bataks, despite missionary prohibition of many adat ceremonies and the widespread use of Indonesian as a second language. In 1964, in fact, traditional North Tapanuli music, closely associated with the pre-Christian indigenous religion, was experiencing a revival. 8. It is important to nt>te that the emergence of socio-economic class-oriented attitudes has been almost en tirely restricted to the plantation areas. In Siantar city these attitudes are much weaker and were, as we indicated in Chapter VII, of little relevance as determinants of party choice in the 1955 elections, in which ethnic-religious loyalties played the key role. 9. The insignlficant number of PKI voters In Siantar city was directly related to the failure of the party to appeal to other than rather narrowly-conceived socio economic interests• Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 496] === 483 10. On the general applicability of this point to left-wing and nationalist parties in the new states, see S.M. Lipset, "Political Cleavages in 'Developed* and 'Emerging’ Polities," in Erik Allardt and Yrjo Littunen, Cleavages. Ideologies and Party Systems: Contributions to Comparative Political Sociology. Helsinki: Transactions of the Westermarck Society, Vol. X (1964), pp. 51-52. 11. This discussion is based largely on Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," in Apter, David E., ed., Ideology and Discontent. New York: The Free Press, 1964, pp. 65-7 1. 12. Ibid., p. 6 8. 13. Ibid.. p. 69. 14. Peith, Herbert, "Indonesia," in Kahin, George McT., ed., Governments and Politics inSoutheast A s i a. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2nd ed., 1964, p. 243. 15« Small, John H. W., "The Military Politics of North Sumatra, December 1956-October 1957»" P« 8. 16. Geertz, oj>. cit., p. 66. 17. Ibid., p. 6 9. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 497] === BIBLIOGRAPHY Agitation and Propaganda Department, Central Committee of the Communist Party of Indonesia, Material for the Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of Indonesia, Djakarta, 19^8. 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Kroesen, J.A., "Nota omtrent de Bataklanden (speciaal Simeloengoen)" (A note on the Bataklands /especially Simalungun7) * Tljdschrift voor Indische T a a l -. Landen Volkenkunde. Peel XLI (1899). Kroesen, J.A., "Rapport betreffende de aanvaarding van de onderwerping aan het Nederlandsch oppergezag van het landschap Tanah Djawa" (Report concerning the acceptance of subjection to Dutch authority of the region of Tanah Djawa), Tljdschrift voor Indische Taal-. Land- en Volkenkunde. Peel XLI (1&99). LaPalombara, Joseph and Myron Weiner, eds., Political Parties and Political Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1906. 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H., Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Army), Vol. I, Bandung/D Jakarta: Ganaco, 1963 (originally published in 1956)• "Nota van toelichting betreffende de Simeloengoensche landschappen: Siantar, Panel, Tanah Djawa en Raja" (A note of explanation concerning the SImalungun regions: Siantar, Pane, Tanah Djawa and Raja), Tljdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde. Deel LI, 1909« Qverdijkink, Dr. G.W., Het Indonesische Probleem. De Felten (The Indonesian Problem, the F a c t s ), 's-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 19*^6. Palmier, Leslie H., Social Status and Power in Jav a. London: Athlone Press, I960. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 503] === Partai Kristen Indonesia, TJabang Kotapradja Pematangsiantar, Lapuran (Indonesian Christian Party /Parkindo7, Siantar Branch, Report), P. Siantar, 1961. 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Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 504] === 60 Tahun Indjil Krlstus dl Simalungun (Sixty Years of the Gospel of Christ in Slmalungun), P. Siantar: Plmpinan Pusat Geredja Kristen Protestan Simalungun (Central Leadership of the Simalungun Christian Protestant Church), 1963"60 tahun Indjil Krlstus" (Sixty Years of the Gospel of Christ), Pangarah (magazine of the Simalungun Christian Protestant Church), Vol. 16, No. 10 (Oct. 1963). Skinner, G. William, ed. Local. Ethnic and National Loyalties in Village Indonesia: A Symposium, New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, Cultural Report Series, 1959Smail, John R.W., "On the Style of the Indonesian Revolution aries," Paper No. 8 9, International Conference on Asian History, University of Hong Kong, August 30-September 5*1964. Smail, John R. W., "The Military Politics of North Sumatra December 1956-Qctober 19^7.** unpublished paper. Cornell University, n.d. 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Siantar: Tideman, J., Simeloengoen: het land der Timoer-Bataks in zijn vroegere isolatle en zijn ontwikkeling tot een deel van het cultuurgebled van de oostkust van Sumatra (simalungun: the land of the Eastern Bataks in its former isolation and its development into a part of the plantation area of the east coast of Sumatra), Leiden: S.C. van Doesburgh, van DiJk, P.A.L.E., "Rapport betreffende de Si Baloengoensche landschappen TandJoeng Kasau, Tanah Djawa en Si Antar" (Report concerning the Simalungun regions Tandjung Kasau, Tanah Djawa and Siantar), Tljdschrift voor Indische T a a l -. Land- en Volkenkunde. Vol. 37 (1894). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 505] === Vergouwen, J.C., The Social Organization and. Customary Law of the Toba-Batak of Northern S umatra, The Hague; Martinus Nljhoff, 196^. (a translation of Het Rechtsleven der Toba-Bataks, *s-Gravenhage: Mart inus Nijhoff, 1933.). 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