Nationalism and Confrontation in the Southeast Asian Islands: The Sources of Indonesian Foreign Policy

=== [PDF page 1] === This dissertation has been microfilmed exactly as received REINHARDT, Jon McEwen, 1936NATIONALISM AND CONFRONTATION IN THE SOUTH EAST ASIAN ISLANDS: THE SOURCES OF INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY. Tulane U niversity, Ph.D„ 1967 P olitical Science, international law and relations University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 2] === NATIONALISM AND CONFRONTATION IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN ISLANDS: THE SOURCES OF INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED ON THE SEVENTEENTH DAY OF APRIL,. 1967 TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF TULANE UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY on McEwen Reinhardt APPROVED: 'ob4rt E. Robins, Chairman David R. Deener Henry L. Mason Warren Roberts, Jr. William Shaw Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 3] === TABLE OF CONTENTS" ' Chapter THE FRAMEWORK OF CONFRONTATION...................... 1. Development and foreignpolicy...................... 2. The nature of the IndonesianState 1. The changing international system................. 2. Island Southeast A s i a............................. 15 15 19 NATIONALISM, REVOLUTION AND INDEPENDENCE: BACKGROUND TO CONFRONTATION............................... 29 30 III. 1. Colonial policy and the i m a g e s................ 30 2. The nature of nationalism: the internal image... 3. The struggle for independence: the external image.. 38 49 Independence: The First Phase......................... 1. Parliamentary democracy: the internal image.... 2. Parliamentary democracy: the external image.... 3. The 1957-1958 revolts and the images.. 55 55 66 75 GUIDED DEMOCRACY AND THE WEST IRIAN DISPUTE: THE GENESIS OF CONFRONTATION 81 The Internal Image 1. The establishment of Guided D e m o c r a c y............. 2. The political triangle"! ^... 7~. 3. Decolonization and the "Javanization" of Indonesia. The External Image 107 1. The West Irian C a m p a i g n.............................. 108 2. Neutralism, and anti-colonialism, and non-alignment. 122 THE FORMATION OF MALAYSIA AND THE INDONESIAN REVOLUTION: THE INTERNAL IMAGE 81 81 90 98 129 The Formation of Malaysia 129 1. Background to the p r o p o s a l............................ 129 2. Dynamics of the "Malaysia"n e g o t i a t i o n s.............. 137 3. Regional reaction to the p r o p o s a l................... 145 The Dialectic of the Revolution: the Internal Image 152 1. The sinistral triangle 153 2. Communism and the Indonesian R e v o l u t i o n............. 160 3. The "withering away" of the Revolution............. 173 11 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 4] === r V. THE CONFRONTATION OF MALAYSIA: THE EXTERNAL I M A G E............ 184n 1. The mediation,phase of the d i s p u t e................... 184 2* The course of the campaign. 190 195 Three Dimensions of Confrontation....................... The New Emerging Forces 2.- A "Pax Indonesia"......... Nationalism and e x p a n s i o n i s m........... Confrontation and Alignment............................. 215 1. Anti-colonialism and a l i g n m e n t...................... 215 2. The "Peking-Djakarta Axis"............................ 224 201 201 208 212 THE FUTURE OF CONFRONTATION................................... 229 The Internal I m a g e....................................... 230 1. Continuity and c h a n g e................................. 230 2. The Indonesian Stateafter the c o u p.................... 235 Nation-building and Foreign Policy..................... 241 1. Competing rationales of nation-hood................. 241 2. A Nusantara? or an A S A N E F O S?........................ 246 3. Alignment and the "independent and active" 252 APPENDIX A: A GLOSSARY OF INDONESIAN TERMS ....................... 257 APPENDIX B: EXPLANATION OF INDICES OF AGREEMENT FOUND IN TABLES.Ill, IV, VII AND VIII...................... 260 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 266 === [PDF page 5] === LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS AND TABLES MAP 1: MAP 2: TABLE I: FIGURE 1: TABLE II: TABLE III: TABLE IV: TABLE V: MAP 3: TABLE VI: TABLE VII: TABLE VIII: PRE-COLONIAL SPHERES OF INTEREST................... 26 COLONIAL SPHERES OF IN T E R E S T....................... 33 PARTY REPRESENTATION AND ALIGNMENT IN INDONESIA... 89-90 INSTITUTIONS OF GUIDED DEMOCRACY................... 91 GENERAL ASSEMBLY VOTES ON THE WEST IRIAN DISPUTE.. 113 INDONESIA, THE U.'S. AND THE U.S.S.R.: INDICES OF AGREEMENT, COLONIAL AND EAST-WEST ISSUES,1955-1963. 124 INDONESIA AND THE.BELGRADE NEUTRALS: INDICES OF AGREEMENT, EAST-WEST ISSUES, 1955-1963............ 127 COMMUNAL COMPOSITION OF "MALAYSIA"................. 131 EAST ASIAN SPHERES OF INTEREST................... 133 INFLATION IN INDONESIA, SEPTEMBER 1963-............. SEPTEMBER 1966.................................... 176 INDICES OF AGREEMENT, COLONIAL ISSUES, 1955-1963.. 249 INDICES OF AGREEMENT, EAST-WEST ISSUES, 1955-1963.. 250 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 6] === I. THE FRAMEWORK OF CONFRONTATION Foreign policy rests upon an image of the world.1 This study is devoted to an analysis of Indonesia's foreign policy beginning with the confiscation of Dutch property in 1957 and extending to the termination of the Malaysia confrontation in August 1966. Foreign policy was the field of activity that most accurately typified the style and basic nature of the Guided Democracy. Indonesian state under Indonesia's policy of confrontation reflected not only the dynamics of the political change the country was undergoing, but was also intimately connected with the process of nation-building in the Southeast Asian islands and the course of the post-colonial political readjustment in the area in general. Since it is quite likely that the patterns of governmental action established during the period will continue to affect the political future of Indonesia, the study will also consider the future "direction" and momentum of Indonesia's external relations and what changes, if any, can be antici pated during the coming phase of development. The examination of Indonesian foreign policy will involve an adaptation of the work of Kenneth Waltz and an understanding of two concepts: the internal image of the state and the external image of ^Charles Beard, A Foreign Policy for America (New York: Knopf, 1940), p. 5. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 7] === the interstate system.^ The internal image ( or dimension) of foreign policy focuses on the structure of the; state and the cultural environ ment in which a state functions. It concerns the groups in control of making state policy, the internal pressures under which they operate, and the scope of activity that is delimited for them by the social, demographic, economic and political underpinnings of the state. sheds light on the problem of what effect the various stages in a state's political or economic development have on state behavior. The external image (or dimension) of foreign policy is concerned with the international context in which the state pursues its national policy. It deals with the particular view a state holds of international reality, the reasoned response of a state to real or imagined threats presented by other states or power blocs in the international system, the role that a state assumes in the international environment consistent with its particular value system, and a delimitation of the immediate sphere of influence in which a state acts as distinguished from the internation al sphere in general. The conception of the "images" is based on the assumption that the external behavior of a state is reflected in— or is the image of— both the structure of the state and the nature of the international en vironment. This framework of analysis is adapted from Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959). In investigating the contribution which classical political theory has made toward understanding the causes of war, Waltz traces the conflict between nations to three levels of activity, or "images": the "first image" of war is found in human nature and in man's individual thought and behavior; the "second image" is traced to the nature of the internal structure of each nation-state; the "third image" is reflected in the anarchical international system. Waltz summarizes his findings by stat ing: "The third image describes the framework of world politics, but without the first or second images there can be no knowledge of the forces that determine policy; the first and second images describe the forces in world politics but without the third image it is impossible to assess their importance or predict their results" (p. 238). In this study, Waltz's first and second images will be combined within the in ternal image. For obvious reasons, it is difficult to ascertain indi vidual thought and behavior in a country; the personality traits of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 8] === The use of "images" as an analytical device is particularly helpful for two major reasons. First, they are of great value in facilitating an examination of the nebulous concept of the national interest. The national interest of states passing through the nationbuilding process often involves factors that are not of the utmost im portance to older, established states. Where national boundaries are subject to dispute, the concept of "nation" and "sphere of interest" can often overlap, and "foreign policy" and "national development" be come intimately connected. In this context, the conception of the images is useful in understanding the dynamics of nation-building in the Southeast Asian islands and the role Indonesian foreign policy is playing in this process. Secondly, the images aid in an "autonomous" analysis of a country’s international behavior. Although Indonesia's political alignment is of great interest to the cold war blocs, the external relations of the island nation should not be seen merely as an adjunct of the cold war. The roots of the political activity in the archi pelago often have little direct relevance to international communism and the global war of ideologies. Related to Indonesia's "autonomous" behavior is the additional problem of historical continuity and change. It is quite difficult to evaluate the nature and intensity of change that has taken place as a result of cultural interaction, and this is particularly true of new countries that have previously undergone a policy makers, however, will be examined, and some mention will be made of certain psychological factors inherent in a transitional society that are relevant to the conduct of foreign policy. 3In this context, see Bernard K. Gordon, The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 196^5*, especially pp. 1-8. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 9] === colonial overlordship.4 The concept of images is a helpful tool in examining the durability of the impact of Western rule on Indonesian politics and the viability of more indigenous modes of political be havior. It is thus that one can avoid some of the pitfalls of a Western-centric approach in the analysis of non-Westem politics.5 Before analyzing the external behavior of Indonesia during the: period in question, it is necessary to present a general introductory analysis of the Indonesian state in the context of the two images. The Internal Image Development and foreign policy. Many of the new states have been undergoing a process of change that has been called, among other ^See Ralph Braibanti, "The Relevance of Political Science to. the Study of Underdeveloped Areas," in Tradition, Value and Socio-Economic Development, eds. Braibanti and Joseph J v Spengler (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1961), pp. 144-152, for'a discussion of acculturation and political development. The methbdological problems of avoiding a Western-centric approach to the study of Indonesian history were first raised by J. C. van Leur, Indonesian Society and Trade ("Selected Studies on Indonesia by Dutch Scholars," Vol. I; The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1955). A major work in this context has been Soedjatmoko, et al., An Intro duction to Indonesian Historiography (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1965); see, especially, chap. 1, Mohammad Ali, "Historiographical Problems," pp. 1-23. Other relevant articles include Harry J. Benda, "The Structure of Southeast Asian History," Journal of Southeast Asian History, III, No. 1 (1962), 106-138; D.G.E. Hall, "On the Study of Southeast Asian History," Pacific Affairs, XXXIII (September, 1960), 268-282; John R. Smail, "On the Possibilities of an Autonomous History of Modern Southeast Asia," Journal of Southeast Asian History, II, No. 2 (1961), 72-102; and Justus van der Kroef, "On the Writing of Indo nesian History," Pacific Affairs, XXXI (December, 1958), 352-372. The most recent effort along these lines is by Harry J. Benda, "Decoloniza tion in Indonesia: The Problem of Continuity and Change,11 American His torical Review, LXX. No. 4 (July, 1965), 1058-1072. The importance of this latter work will be discussed below, pp. 231-233ff. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 10] === things, "modernization”6 or "nation-building" or"decolonization,"but what, for convenience, is usually referred to as some form of "development." An important issue to be considered in the analysis of the in ternal image is what relationship, if any, there is between the behav ior of states and the various stages of development through which they might pass. Of the many political theories that have been concerned with the issue, some place emphasis on the economic process, others on the political process. According to the Marxist theory of history,9 the stage of eco nomic development determines the actions of states. Capitalist states 6"Modernization" as a term or phenomenon has given rise to much controversy. At the basis of the confusion is whether the process of becoming "modern" means only becoming "industrializedj" or whether it involves the additional attributes of being "Western" or "democratic." Recently, the term "political modernization" has been in use. See, e.g., Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (eds.), Political Moderni zation in Japan and Turkey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964); and Rupert Emerson, Political Modernization: The Single Party System ("Monograph Series in World Affairs," No. 1; Denver: University of Denver, 1963). It is suggested that the interested student of "modernization" examine a very recent and basic book by Lucien W. Pye, Aspects of Politi cal Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), especially pp. 31-48. For more detailed studies, see Bert F. Hoselitz and Wilbert E. Moore (eds.), Industrialization and Society (The Hague: MoutonUNESCO, 1963), especially pp. 299-310; and David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), especially chapter 1. For a valuable critique of the concept of political development, see:: Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics, XVII, No. 3 (April, 1965), 386-431, who argues for an identification of political development "with the institutionalization of political organization and procedures"(p. 386). °The substance of the following three paragraphs is largely de rived from Waltz, pp. 80-158. The general outlines of Marxist theory are well known; several short but excellent commentaries are R. N. Carew Hunt, Marxism: Past and Present (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954);and H.B. Mayo, Democracy and Marxism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955); G. Lichtheiin, Marxism (New York: Praeger, 1961); and John Plamenatz,. Man and Society, II (London: Longmans, 1963), pp. 268-408. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 11] === are inherently belligerent; socialist states are peaceful.10 The basic source, of war-like conduct in the capitalist states is the class struggle between the proletariat and the exploiting capital-owning class. Later Marxists place emphasis on the imperialistic nature of capitalism.11 In order to overcome the inevitable crisis of overproduction, capitalist states seek additional markets and new sources of raw material and this expansionism leads to exploitive colonialism. Wars and the subjuga tion of men will only cease when the dialectical process of economic development has resolved the class struggle and produced socialism. Socialist states are by their very nature peaceful and progressive since there is no internal class conflict. On the other hand, the few genuine socialist states that do exist find themselves continually threatened due to capitalist encirclement.13 Because of this, the final withering away of the state has been postponed until capitalism has been defeated on a global basis.14 10See, e.g., Karl Marx and Friedrich Engles, Manifesto of the Communist Party, ed. Samuel H. Beer (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955), p. 16; and Marx, Capital, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Company, 1909-10), Vol. I, chapter, xxxi. 11 (New See V. I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism York: International Publications, 1939)7 ~" 12 See, e.g., N. S. Khrushchev. "Imperialism is a Threat to Peace," in Imperialism— Enemy of the People, Enemy of the Peace (Moscow:Foreign Language Publishing House, 1963), pp. 37-68, especially p. 50. The work of Rosa Luxemburg, a left-wing German Marxist, is also of particular interest in this context. 13 For the basis of the theory of "socialism in one state," see Joseph Stalin, "The October Revolution and Trotsky's Theory of Permanent Revolution," in Joseph Stalin: Selected Writings (New York: International Publications, 1942), pp. 11-28. 14See, e.g., N. S. Khrushchev, "The World Socialist System" in Socialism and Communism (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1963), pp. 65-89, especially pp. 74-5; and "Revolution and Wars," in The Revolutionary Working-Class and the.Communist Movement (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1963). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 12] === In contrast to the Marxist explanation of the behavior of nations, is the theory that capitalist countries, under the ameliorat ing influence of Western socialism, have developed into peaceful mixedeconoray welfare-state societies.15 According to this line of reasoning, it is the modern Marxist states that are belligerent. Under pressure to industrialize and advance technologically, these "communist” states have followed Russia's example and adopted Leninist-Stalinist solutions for their economic backwardness. In order to relieve the tensions in herent in rapid, forced economic development, the communist bloc has developed an aggressive foreign policy. The proposal behind the post war "containment” policy was based on this argument. It was suggested that if the expansionistic designs of the communist bloc countries were contained, there would have to be a corresponding process of political and social liberalization within the states, thus decreasing the likelihood of a belligerent external policy. The liberal school of thought that dominated international politics immediately after World War I was also concerned with the state's process of development, but placed emphasis on the nature of its political development. Woodrow Wilson was convinced that national self-determination was the key to peaceful relations among nations. It was Wilson's assumption that if each nationality were incorporated into a nation-state, all the resulting polities would live 15For a brief discussion of the failure of revolutionary Marxism in Western Europe, see Adam B. Ulam, The Unfinished Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 196^ ed.), pp. 133-168. 16See X. (George Kennan), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, XXVI, No. (July, 19H-7), 577-582. See, also, Kennan, On Deal ing with the Communist World (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), For a critique of this position, see Ulam, pp. 288-299. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 13] === harmony. 17 In the wake of the many nationalist movements that have sprung up in this century, the liberal.advocacy of national determina tion is especially relevant to the present study. The actual process of national development or nation-building during the past few decades, however, raises an important question as to.whether national unifica tion produces satisfaction or engenders further tensions and expansion— whether, in the words of Cobban,self-determination gives rise to selfdeterminism.18 Many new states feel that their national boundaries have not encompassed all potential nationals. This is especially true of the states whose present national boundaries are based on European colonial spheres of interest that cut across national groups or do not reflect the precolonial political order. The assumption of the liberalizing effect of national develop ment leads to further questions when examined in conjunction with the quest for economic development. To what extent is political or national development a product of econcaic development? Can a nationality be satisfied merely with corporate unification if the level of economic advancement does not satisfy the minimum expectations of the population? Ironically, it seems that the failure of a state to develop economically may produce the same results as that of a state successfully undergoing rapid industrialization; both create in the people what has been called "wolfish energies" which will need to be neutralized or rechanneled. The struggle against a threatening enemy, whether real or imagined, ■^See U.S., Congressional Record, February 27, 1920, LIX, No. 66, pp. 3783-3784-, for Wilson’s statement on self-determination and his protest on the adjustment of a territorial dispute between I,taly and the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom. For "self-determination" as a principle in international law, see Charles C. Hyde, International Law (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1922), 1175-1184. 18See Alfred Cobban, National Self-Determination (Chicago: Univer- Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 14] === serves to redirect potentially disintegrating energies away from the government and acts as an agent to unify support for government policies. One significant facet of this problem is that the failure to develop economically may have been the result of the failure to place chief emphasis on economic activity. One might argue that for many new countries the problem of forging national unity has received priority over the problem of economic viability. This is especially true of countries where a large percentage of the people can maintain them selves at a subsistence level without the benefit of a "developed" economy. In the last analysis, the effect of economic and national development on the external behavior of the state is dependent on the particular cultural environment in which the.state functions. A mean ingful application of the above discussion to Indonesian foreign policy cannot be made outside an examination of the nature of the Indonesian state. The nature of the Indonesian state. There have been several notable efforts in recent years to explain the basic nature of contem- ' porary Indonesia. The three analyses that will be examined below are particularly important in that each attempts to connect the actions and national goals of the Indonesian state to the unique cultural en vironment in the islands. These analyses are not mutually exclusive; rather each provides us with several "images" of the state, all of which will be of importance in the following chapters. Leslie Palmier^9 maintains that Indonesian politics revolves around a basic.ethnic conflict in Indonesian society between the ^Indonesia and the Dutch (London: Oxford University Press, 1962).. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 15] === 10~1 Javanese and non-Javanese. The.polarization of the political parties in the last days of parliamentary democracy and the corresponding dif ferences of opinion over what might be termed the bureaucratic and the entrepreneurial approaches to economic development are traced by Palmier t o.fundamental differences.in culture between Java and the*'outer islands."20 The Javanese territories, supporting a wet-rice (sawah) system of food production, developed a centralized, hierarchical political system, based on an aristocratic (prijaji).social structure. This society "placed a high valuation on government service /and' Was7 usually inimical to commercial activity." The occupational groups in which the- Javanese arc strongest emphasize those "arts in which they are expert, namely, teaching and government administration." The non-Javanese territories, while far from homogeneous, were generally characterized by either a shifting (ladang) cultivation or scattered mercantilistic principalities. These areas developed a wide variety of egalitarian social structures marked by the absence of an extensive centralized political administration. Among the non-Javanese, "trade has long been a natural way of life [_ and they/ emphasize the economic activity which is their forte." These cultural characteristics quite naturally led.to an economic imbalance between the groups. The inhabi tants of the non-Javanese territories are economically self-sufficient and are export-producing earners of foreign exchange. The Javanese, limited in space and rapidly growing in population, have become economi cally dependent importers and consumers, and are accused of reaping 20Ibid., p. 155 (unless otherwise noted, the quotes.in this para graph come from p. 155). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 16] === the real benefits of economic production since they control, most of the bureaucratically controlled "Indonesianized" economy. According to Palmier, the tension between Java and the Outer Islands has found an outward expression. Anti-Dutch sentiment (or anti-colonialism in general) has been raised whenever the Javanese have needed to assert their authority over other peoples of the archipelago. It has become routine to allege that every dissident movement in Indonesia (which, we have noted, is always in a non-Java nese territory) is somehow connected with either the Dutch or other foreign powers. Clearly, Palmier is connecting anti-Dutch (or anti-colonial) attitudes with the maintenance of Javanese control of Indonesia, and the militantly nationalistic foreign policy— a present-day extension of the traditional Javanese-bureaucratic state— is a means to this end. Somewhat in agreement with Palmier is Herbert Feith, who states that Indonesia’s historical development has left two general political cultures— the Javanese-aristocratic and the Islamic-entrepreneurial— whose differences were "sharp enough to presage serious difficulties for the process of maintaining consensus of the ends and proper procedures of government and politics." 22 More specifically, however, Feith's conception of Indonesia's post-independence development re volves around a growing conflict between two types of leaders within the ruling elite. On one hand there are the "administrators," or 21Ibid., p. 168. 22 The concept of "political culture" has gained wide usage in recent years. According to Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," Journal of Politics, XVIII, No. 3 (August, 1956), 391-409, it is a pattern of orientations to political action in which every political system is embedded. It is possible in this view for several separate political systems (e.g., the United States and England) to ^ exist within one political culture. On the other hand, Lucien W. Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation-building (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 122, n. 1, seems to reverse Almond's use of the term Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 17] === 12~i "problem-solvers": those leaders who are more concerned with economic and administrative problems, and who have developed skills that are most applicable for. the efficient functioning of the apparatus of the modern state. On the other hand, there are the "solidarity-makers": those leaders who are concerned with social and cultural integration and the development of national unity through the manipulation of mass front organizations, the articulation of national ideology, and the fashioning of a militant but influential foreign policy. 23 While the skills of both are equally necessary in the task of nation-building, the two groups tended to move further apart after independence and their ration ales gradually became mutually antagonistic. Feith maintains that the members of the administrator group, seeing government from a predominantly administrative and economic viewpoint, gradually lost the necessary political support needed for such policies. The solidarity-makers, eschewing the preoccupation with the-mundane process of economic development, advocated a style of government more attune to alleviating the frustrations inherent in a developing society. A large percentage of the people, cut off from traditional values, unsatisfied with the tedious progress of developing, confused by the tensions between the political parties and the military, increasingly sought for a return to the clarity of commitment in suggesting that the United States and England represent the same kind of political system, but have different political cultures. Samuel Beer, in Beer and Ulam (eds.) Patterns of Government (New York: Random House, 1963), pp. 32-72, sees political culture as the pattern of values, be liefs and emotions concerning "conceptions of authority" and "conceptions of purpose" and relates political culture to a theory of consensus and stability in government. For a critical survey of political culture, see Young C. Kim, "The Concept of Political Culture in Comparative Politics, "Journal of Politics, XXVI, No. 3 (May, 1964), 313-336. 23 For a discussion of Feith's elite types, see The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia.(-Ithaca: Cornell University Press, £962), pp. 113-122. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 18] === ri3 ~~i that had existed during the years of the revolution. The decline of the administrators, and the ascendancy of the.solidarity-makers was re flected in the collapse of parliamentary democracy and the.establish ment of Guided Democracy— an act symbolized by the revival of the 1945 constitution that had existed during the revolution against the Dutch. Guided Democracy, then, was the political system.of the "solidaritymakers," and its foreign policy was "intensely and flamboyantly active,11 characterized by acquiring the"insignia of national power and prestige."2^ Feith*s framework of analysis provides us with an intriguing - - look at the mechanics of politics in Indonesia, and helps to explain the rationale behind the formulation of a highly symbolic foreign policy. 25 However, in a provocative but stimulating review of Feith’s work,25 Harry Benda offers several important observations in evaluating The first problem Benda discusses is that of the proper perspective in viewing contemporary Indonesia— the 2tfIbid., p. 595. 25Herbert Feith,"Indonesia's Political Symbols and Their* Wielders," World Politics, XVI, No. 1 (October, 1963), 79-97. 25llDemocracy in Indonesia,” Journal of Asian Studies, XXIII, No. 3 (May, 196*0, 449-456. 27 Feith's categories can be traced back to the study of Max Weber who ties authority to social change in relating various typologies of authority.tosocial action, e.g., he identified the charismatic form of authority with a transitional stage of society. This kind of study is in the Western sociological tradition of classifying phenomena according to dichotomous schemes, in which it is maintained that social and cultural change is related to movement from one category,to the other: from tra ditional to m o d e m, communal to associational, Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft, etc. A recent work in this tradition is Fred W. Riggs, Adminis tration in Developing Countries (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964), who offers a median construct, the "prismatic” model, to analyze tra ditional societies. For a brief discussion and critique of the tra dition of dichotomous schemes,•:see Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation-building, pp. 33-38. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 19] === question of whether Western-centric values, attitudes or viewpoints have hindered the meaningful examination of non-Western politics in general and Indonesian politics in particular. He states that Feith's ideal types "appear deceptively evenly matched1.1 in the conflict that led to the ascendancy of Sukarno and his solidarity-makers. Further more, Feith "takes an unhistorical starting point, /viewing^ Indonesia primarily as a continuation of the country's recent history, while 28 largely /ignoring/ what has gone before." The modern era, which has had such an inordinant influence on contemporary Western scholarship, is only a very short interlude in Indonesian history.29 European culture and the colonial overlordship were not nearly so dynamic and disruptive of Indonesian culture as has generally been advocated. Consequently, Benda maintains, post-war Indonesian history must he viewed as the process of "decolonization," and the decline of parlia mentary democracy and the establishment of a "guided" democracy "must be primarily understood in terms of Indonesian historical continuity^ rather than in terms of a contemporary elite contest." 30 The tradition of analyzing the non-Western world according to ideal types "though generally useful, presents an inadequate framework for the.manifold peculiar characteristics of the decolonization process, characteristics 28Benda, Journal of Asian Studies, XXIII, No. 3, 452. 29 For a well-balanced, short history of Indonesia, seeJ.D. Indonesia (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1964). Legge, 30Benda, Journal of Asian Studies, XXIII, No. 3, 454. For the fullest development of Benda's ideas, see American Historical Review, LXX, No. 4, 1058-1072. See B.J.O. Schrieke; "Ruler and Realm in Early Java," in Indonesian:Sociological:Studies: Selected Writings of B. Schrieke, II (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1957) for an inordinate empha sis on historical continuity. For a criticism of the emphasis on con tinuity, see van der Kroef, Pacific Affairs, XXXI, 352-372. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 20] === that are by and large absent in the. modernization of non-^colonial coun tries."31 This problem "might be called the rectilinear fallacy, which presents change as a progressive, cumulative, unidirectional process, a process nowadays often called modernization." 32 Benda sums up his thoughts by stating: ... essentially what we have witnessed is the agonizing, difficult adjustment of Indonesia to its.own identity. It is not, of course, anything.quite as simplistic as a return to premodern, pre-Western continuity. It is, rather, a selective process of adapting resurgent continuity to a changing reality. It may be suggested that, substantially, the Java-centric— or really Djakarta-Acentric— polity is re capturing some of the political facets of the past, some of them in Western eyes distinctly less palatable than others. If it is intensely bureaucratic, cavalierly dis dainful of economic rationalism, vengefully repressive of Islamic competition, jealously assertive vis-a-vis the Outer Islands, and, finally, grandiosely exuberant in foreign affairs, it is in the final analysis only acting out its own logic. 33 The External Image The Changing international system. The external image of foreign policy is grounded in the assumption that each state w i l l.pur sue its own interests.whatever they may b e, in whatever ways e a c h.state 31 Benda, American Historical Review, LXX, No. M-, 1062. For Feith's comment on Benda's criticism, see "History, Theory and Indo nesian Politics: A Reply to Harry J. Benda," Journal of Asian Studies, XXIV, No. 2 (February, 1965), 305-312. 3% enda, American Historical Review, LXX, No. *»-, 1062. 33Ibid., pp. 1072-1073. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 21] === considers to be best. Each state is the final judge as to what.consti tutes its own national interest, and the acts of the states should be seen as neither ’'good" nor'"bad,” "rational" nor "irrational," but merely as reflecting the general value system within which the state is acting. In short, each state's action involves a reasoned response to the world about.it, based on a perception of what it conceives to be international reality. The national interest of many new states is hard to gauge due to the transitional nature of the world. With the collapse of colonialism and the creation of the many new African and Asian states, it has become increasingly apparent that the post-war worid is no longer the domain of the Western countries. As long as the world was largely a Western-centric world, as long as it was a sphere of interest to be divided among the Western powers, equilibrium in the region of Europe could assure equilibrium in the world. There is, however, no 34 See Waltz, pp. 159-223. The question of whether a state is determined.in its policies or voluntarily chooses a course of action is an old one. In the final analysis, policy-makers have free will in formulating the national interest because they.conceive (in Aristo telian terms) of "formal" and "final" cause (see Aristotle, Physics, ii, 1-9; and Waltz, p. 226). Policy-makers are, however, a product of their social, economic and political environment,.and consequently are somewhat limited in their actions.by the situational determinants of their cultural underpinnings. In a "revolutionary" setting, the rational choice of alternatives is narrowed even more— ^-especially if the state is guided by "romantic" leaders convinced that their own estimation of international reality is ineluctably correct (see below, pp. 182 and 206). Also, given the "permissive" nature of the inter national system in the absence of world government,, the action of one state determines in part the actions of others— regardless of the internal nature of any one state. (For a discussion of "permissive" and "effi cient" causes, see Waltz, pp. 230-238.) Finally, to the extent that the internal image emphasizes (or interprets) the history of a country as a "process of development," it will exhibit.deterministic characteristics. On this point, and on the "deterministic" and "voluntaristic" views of war, see Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp.446-447 and 1235-1239. It i s.worth noting that Wright's analy sis of war was based on'the deterministic point of view (p. 1235). See Hajo Holborn, The Political Collapse of Europe (New York: Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 22] === longer a "regional understanding" like the nineteenth century Concert of Europe that served to maintain the status quo, and the world today is characterized by many value systems and spheres of interest. In many non-Western areas 5 the remnants of the Western colonial values are intermingled with various other systems of values that were submerged and disrupted by. the colonial over lordship. It may be true that the world is only going through a period of adjustment and that in a matter of time the new states will be accomodated within a uni versal legal system, or that the scope and complexity of international law will expand and adapt to meet new transnational needs and activities. 36 To the extent, however, that the indigenous values are domi nating the pattern of action in the new states that are undergoing de colonization, a Western-centric value system is one in which many of the hew countries are not comfortable. The largely ineffectual action by the United Nations may be an indication that not only is.its prestige and authority to "maintain international peace and security" being called into question, but the general rationale on which.it operates to keep world order is also being challenged.3^ Indeed, one objection Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), who states: "The European wars of the nineteenth century produced shifts in.power, but they were shifts within the European political system and did not upset the system as such" (p.27). For a detailed "systematic empirical analysis" of Europe from 17401960, see Richard N. Rosecrance,'Action a n d:Reaction in World Politics (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1963). 3®See Oliver J. Lissitzyn, "International Law in a Divided World," International Conciliation, No. 542 (March, 1963), 57-69; and Richard A. Falk, Law, Morality and War in the Contemporary World (New York: Praeger, 19637T 37 It is almost commonplace to note that cold war tensions largely paralyzed the Security.Council and shifted the burden of keeping, the peace to the General Assembly. Yet, the Assembly's achievements in the Suez and Congo crises have recently been clouded by the dispute.over fi nancing the operations, and the unwillingness t o.force a showdown.over non-payment threatens to greatly inhibit action b y.future Assemblies. L§ee Vernon V. Aspaturian, "World Organization's.Three Phases," Yale Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 23] === 181 raised by Indonesia in withdrawing from the United Nations was that the international organization served the "imperialist” conception of what constituted "peace and security."38 In a similar context, Indonesia's foreign minister Subandrio stated: In our diplomacy, it is certain that we will oppose, for instance, the opinion that contracts from former times that were customarily applied on the basis of compulsion by states of larger size, continue to possess legality. According to the old view, even colonialism. itself was "legal."... In this connection, also, the whole of the.old concepts in inter national law need to obtain our very careful observation. There also seems to be a subtle but critical qualitative dif ference between established principles of international law and the national value systems of some new states. The concept of territorial sovereignty, for instance, is threatened today by the Communist— in par ticular the Chinese Communist1*0— conception of "wars of national libera tion. " This.application of communist.doctrine.reflects the..desire for Review, XLVI (Summer, 1957), p.551ff, who gives a gloomy assessment of the Assembly's peace-keeping capabilities. In addition, Stanley.Hoffman, "In Search of a Thread: The U.N. in the Congo Labyrinth," in.Norman J. Paddleford and Rupert Emerson (eds.), Africa and World Order (New York: Praeger, 1963); Lincoln P. Bloomfield; International Military Forces (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964); and Arthur L. Burns and Nina Heathcote, Peace-Keeping by U.N. Forces: From Suez t o:the Congo (New York: Praeger, 1963) all voice reservations about the.United Nation's ability to keep the peace. Cf. Bruce M. Russett, Trends in World Poli tics (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965), chap. iii, who analyses basic East-West, North-South splits in the world and in the United Nations. 38 See Indonesia, Supreme Advisory Council, Indonesia Not Satis fied with the U.N. since 1945::Declaration of t h e:Supreme:Advisory Council on the Withdrawal of Indonesia from the U;N. (Konsulat Djendral Republik Indonesia, New York: January 10, 1965), p. 1. 39 Subandrio, "Revolutionary Diplomacy," in Indonesia on t h e.March: A Collection of addresses by Dr. Subandrio (Djakarta: Department of Foreign Affairs, 1963), p. 272. 40 See article by Marshall Lin Piao, published in all major Chinese newspapers on September 3, 1965 and reprinted.in the New York Times on September 3, 1965. Marshall Lin draws global significance from Mao Tsetung's civil w a r.strategy of rural encirclement of the cities by referring to North America and Europe as "cities of the.world" and Asia, Africa and ^Latin America as "the rural areas of the world." Cf.Falk',1 pp. 33-35, 68^j Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 24] === 19-i a real social revolution to overturn the."old” order. Such revolutionary implications, however, are not unique to Marxism, but shared in common with other non-Western (and non-Communist) countries — particularly Indonesia. In short, the impact of the technologically superior and commercially dynamic West on a non-technological world has intro duced a heed or desire for change that the Western world finds hard to accept. A good case can be made for the fact that some new countries consider the Western conception of "peace" and "law" among nations to be static and not representative of a post-colonial world. Again, this is especially true of the concept of international order based on maintenance of the"status quo" of present national boundaries, where in many instances these boundaries only reflect the delimitation of colonial empires. In order to examine the.image of the world held by the Indo nesian polity and to formulate a working definition of Indonesian national interest, it is necessary to develop a conception of "island Southeast Asia" as a sphere of influence and as an area of conflicting nation-building rationales. Island Southeast Asia. The term "Southeast Asia" is little ' more than an academic convenience. It refers to the area bounded on the north by China, on the west by India and the Indian Ocean, on the south bT the outer extent of the Australian continental shelf (excludv ing the western portion of the island of New Guinea), and on the east 41 This phenomenon is largely t h e.subject of chapter.iv, below. Also note, in this context, Donald E. Weatherbae,"Indonesia1s.Revolu tionary Ideology," unpublished paper, Colloquium on Political Strategy, April 14, 1965, University of South Carolina, who-places great stress on the revolutionary content of Indonesia's global policy. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 25] === 20 by the Pacific Ocean, and includes the presently existing states of Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. In a certain sense the region subsumes various peoples that share a common cultural heritage; as a whole, however, Southeast Asia is not a cultural or geographical unit. The political and cultural diversity of the area reflects centuries of contact with exogenous influences that entered Southeast Asia along the trade routes stretching between India and China. deed, for the most part, politics in this century reflects the pain ful political reaction to the most recent of these outside cultural influences— European colonialism. The cultural readjustment to the withdrawal of colonial.rule has taken place in the context of chang ing and fluid social values. The process of trying to return to the mainstream of the region’s indigenous or "autonomous1’ historical development that was disrupted by the colonial overlordship presents a confusing picture to the outside (Western) world— especially if the process is not primarily concerned with modernication or development. And too, Western policies directed toward safe-guarding the.status quo— "peace"--often come into direct conflict with expansive policies of some nations in the region which do not consider Western conceptions of political equilibrium to be legitimate. The situation is, of course, further.complication by the cold war conflict and the difficulty many Western nations have in separating territorial aggrandizement from social revolution. JlO Sees e.g., Georges Coedes,'Les Etats HindoUises d *Indochine:et: d ’Indonesie (Paris, 19U8), who applies the -term les-etats hindoulses. to Southeast Asia to reflect the early "Hinduization" of the area. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 26] === In this atmosphere, it has not been easy t o.chart accurately the "national" political divisions that would have emerged in the ab sence of Western rule,.or that will now take place with the collapse of colonialism and the probable disengagement of Western power from the area. The decolonization process, however, has produced an in creasingly clear picture of at least one basic, and perhaps logical, division in the area— that between "mainland" and "island" Southeast Asia.43 One aim of this study is to justify the islands as an arena of political action separate and distinct from the mainland. This is not to say that political events throughout East Asia do not affect the islands, or that the social and political revolution sweeping Asia has nothing in common with the events in the islands, but rather that the process of decolonization that is taking place there is largely limited (and unique) to the area in question. The often cited "domino theory" that characterizes the countries on the mainland and in the islands as a teetering stack of dominos all on the verge of collaps ing if just one falls to communist expansion, is a cold war over simplification of East Asian politics.44 It is suggested that Indonesia's recent confrontation of Malaysia was only the latest chapter of a continuing contest for power in the Southeast Asia islands, and to this extent, it was divorced frpm the present cold war struggle. To a great extent this quest for 43This distinction has been.suggested from a geographical point of view; see Brian Harrison, South-East Asia (London: Macmillan, 1954), p. ix. This study will justify the division from a political point of view. I See, e.g., Arnold C. Brackman, Southeast Asia's Second Front: The Power Struggle in the Malay Archipelago (New.York: Praeger, 1966). The.dust cover on Mr. Brackman's book depicting a stack of toppling dominos curiously fails to reflect.the often incisive and "non-domino" analysis of regional policies included within his study. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 27] === 22~i hegemony can be traced to a traditional conflict between the two.politi cal and cultural archetypes ■'--the general.socio-political structure of which has already been outlined above— that has existed in the islands since the period of Indian influence that began around the first century The first of these "Indianized" powers to emerge was the Buddhist Kingdom of Srivijaya. Rising to prominence in southern Sumatra in the seventh century, it was a commercial power that dominated the maritime trade in the area.until about the thirteenth century. Set against Srivijaya and succeeding mercantilistic powers was a succession of major inland, bureaucratic kingdoms based on the island of Java, the first of which was the eighth century kingdom of Mataram. The history of the area has been marked by conflict in one form or the. other be45 tween these two political prototypes. Even under Dutch and British colonial rule, th e.difference in political culture was evident. The Netherlands' restrictive and intensive development of Javanese agri culture known as the "Culture System" not only indicates the predomi nance of the "central" island in the colonial system, but contrasts strikingly with Singapore's emphasis on free trade. After Srivijaya's decline beginning about the eleventh century, Java gained a predominant role in the archipelago that has not dimin ished. Though its hegemony was rivaled at various intervals— most notably by the Islamic commercial empire of Malacca in the fifteenth century— the island has been the.center of political influence and the balancing of fluctuating rivalries in the area. In this context, the Javanese conception of the state and.kingship.is of great importance.1*6 **5See Legge, p. 41. ^ S e e Robert Heine-Geldem, "Conceptions of the State and King[ship in South East Asia," Far Eastern Quarterly, II, N o. 1 (November, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 28] === The political and cultural life of the kingdom w a s, to a great extent, centered around the capital city. The court of the ruler was not only the center of the aristocratic (prijaii) administration, the military organization and the treasury, but it was also the.cultural and religious center of the kingdom. Underlying the capital-centered nature of "Indianized" Java was the cult of the God-king and the magico-religious conception of the kingdom as a microcosmic representation of the world. From an early time, the prosperity and harmony of the kingdom was conceived as a terrestrial reflection of cosmic harmony. The quest for a microcosmic order that would approximate the macrocosmic order, can be seen in the layout of the royal capital. The walls, moats and structures of the city were so constructed as.to re present a miniature of the universe as it was conceived in Brahmanic. and Buddhist scriptures and mythology. The design of the city centered on the dwelling of the ruler— the magical center of the universe— which was both palace and temple. It was believed that the success and prosperity of the kingdom was dependent on t he.inner magic and strength possessed by the king. The more harmonious and illustrious the kingdom became, the greater the proof of the magic power possessed by the king. To the extent his realm was a reflection of universal order and harmony, the king was equated with god. As the concept of divinity and kingship merged, the statues of the king acquired the likeness of the gods. "Spiritual excellence," Clifford Geertz states, "was correlated with political.eminence,"^7 a n d.the establishment of 19*f2), 15-30; later reprinted by Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, Department of Asian Studies, Southeast Asian Program, Data Paper.N o. 18, 1956. **7The Religion of Java (Glencoe; The Free Press, 1960), p. 232. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 29] === 20 a new royal house (kraton) or dynasty was often accompanied by a tre mendous release of political and cultural energy, directed toward what one might term bringing the realm into cosmic harmony. In this context, the Javanese conception of state, and king ship is important for P'-plaining the periodic phases of expansion the various Indianized empires. passed through during much of the pre colonial history of the island. A period of particular interest is that in East Javanese history from approximately 1275-1364.148, Accord ing to the usual interpretation of the epoch, Kertanagara, the last king of Singhasari, launched on an expansive and ambitious foreign policy in 1275 by dispatching an "invasion force" (pamalayu) for the conquest of Sumatra. This policy was presumed.to have been carried to its greatest heights by Gadja Mada, a patih (prime minister) of the succeeding Madjapahit dynasty who supposedly subjected most of the archipelago to his domination. The Dutch scholar C. C. Berg, however, departs significantly from this analysis and notes, a basic distinction between the policy of Kertanagara and Gadja Mada. Berg interprets the pamalayu not as an invasion but rather as the first.step in an attempt to link, through religio-magic rites, the four outlying.regions (nusantara) of Bali, Madura, Malayu and Tanjangpura in an alliance against Mongol imperialism. Despite the fact that Kertanagara was often portrayed as a drunkard and religious fanatic— e.g., by the Javanese epic the Pararaton— Berg contends that his "addiction to palm wine" and his celebration of Tantric Buddhist rites was a means by which he hoped to increase his magic powers and to cement a strong and Ufi For the best discussion of the.period, see D. G. E. Hall, The History of Southeast Asia (London: Macmillan, 1955), pp. 64-80. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 30] === lasting alliance. While Kertanagara's efforts were insufficient to forestall the Mongol invasion (and his death), the first rulers of the Madjapahit dynasty that was established after the Chinese withdrew from the area seem to have continued efforts to form the "holy alliance.11 It was only with the rise to power of Gradj a Mada in 1331 that the ear lier policies were abandoned, and Madjapahit embarked.on a program of military conquest whose success was recorded by t h e.court poet Prapanca in the epic called the Nagarakertagama. ^ While this period represents a proud era to most Indonesians, it is questionable as to just how great Madjapahit’s empire actually was (see Map 1). Accounts of great deeds and conquests like those recounted in the Nagarakertagama may have had the function of aggrandiz ing what may have been rather modest political units. Yet monuments such as the eighth century Buddhist monument, the Borobudur, attest to the great scale of activity inherent in such bureaucratic empires, and if the extent of Javanese influence in Southeast Asia is exaggerated, it is quite likely that nusantara was linked with Madjapahit in some degree of tribute-paying vassalage. Even Berg states that while the Nagarakertagama is not accurate history, its list of tributary states has perpetuated the myth of Javanese predominance in the area. The late Mohammad Yamin, for instance, argued that modern Indonesia had not yet extended its control to what had formerly comprised pre-colonial 49 For a summary of Berg’s views, see "Javanese Historiography--A Synopsis of its Evolution," and "The Work of Professor Krom," in D. G. E. Hall (ed.), Historians of South-East Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 13-23, 164-171. See, also, Berg, "The Javanese Picture of the Past," in Soedjatmoko, pp. 87-118. 50 See Rakawi Prapanca, The Nagara-Kertagama, trans. and ed. Theodore G. Th. Pigeaud,("Java in the Fourteenth Century: A Study_of Cultural History," Vol. IV; The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), chapter |Xii, "List of Domains," pp. 219-250. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 31] === Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. MAP 1: P F\E -C O LO N IA L SPHERES INTEREST Greatest extent of control by Srivijaya (Palembang), c. 1000. See John Cady, Southeast Asia: Its Historical Development (New York: McGz>aw-Hill, 1964), p. 69. (The central Java Sailendra dynasty may have ruled both Mataram and Shrivijaya briefly. Sailendra rule was transferred to Srivijaya c. 860. The center of Javanese power was moved to East Java, c.929.) .•I.--.-.-.---.-.--.: Madjapahit according to Prapanca in the Nagarakertagama, IV, pp. 219-250. See n. 50, p. 25. Madjapahit according to C. C. Berg. See n. 49, p. 25, Chapter I. ::(The expansive period of East Javanese history occurred c. 1275-1364. Earlier attempts at alliancebuilding (c. 1275-1292) were abandoned by Madjapahit prime minister Gadja Mada, who embarked on a /1policy of military conquest (1331-1364). The extent of his empire is disputed. It is likely,.however, that the outlying regions were linked with Madjapahit in some form of tribute-paying vassalage; and although the Nagarakertagama may not be accurate history, its list of tributary states is of great importance as a statement of historical myth. See Hall, A ^History of South east Asia, pp. 64-80,' fwf?, :=r-:.^v>fc === [PDF page 32] === Indonesia.at its greatest extent, and h e.concluded that:nusantara should be composed of "the Malay peninsula, the islands of Sumatra, of Kalimantan, of Java, the group now known as... the South Eastern Islands, the islands of Sulawesi, the.group of the.Moluccas and the territory of West Irian."®1 While Indonesia officially claims only the territory formerly controlled by the Dutch, the influence of a Nagarakertagama myth and ideas like Yamin's "greater Indonesia".would lend credence to the contention that the.delimiting rationales under lying nationhood in the archipelago are still very much in flux and do not necessarily correspond to the present geographical lines on the map. In summary, the process of decolonization in the islands has placed political and social values in flux. The first evidences of this were the collapse of Indonesian parliamentary democracy (the "colonial" model of government) and the subsequent establishment of a "guided" democracy (one "more in tune with the Indonesian soul"). It is suggested, however, that the later confrontations of "colonial ism" (the Irian Barat campaign) and "neo-colonialism" (the crush Malaysia campaign) reflect deeper and more fundamental motivations than simply anti-Western and anti-colonial feelings. While anti colonialism represents the natural desire to force out any power operating in what the Indonesians consider to be rightfully in their own sphere of interest, it also provides a means to oppose o r."confront" the establishment as a corporate unit of any indigenous force with which 51See H. Mohammad Yamin, A Legal and Historical Review of Indo nesia 's.Sovereignty over the Ages (Manila: Indonesian Embassy, Informa tion Section, May 25, 1959), p. 5. This point receives a fuller treat ment below;.see chapter.iv, pp. 212-215. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 33] === 28 i it must compete in the area. The process of readjusting to the with drawal of Western rule is, therefore, intimately tied up with the pro cess of nation-building. In the last analysis, what the world has been witnessing in the Southeast Asian islands is a competition for supremacy among politi cal cultures. The success or failure in the development of an "Indo nesian" national consciousness— not only in the "outer islands," but on a larger scale— may well depend on the ability of the ruling elite to export or gain acceptance for its cultural and political view of the world. It is suggested that for the most part, Indonesian foreign policy since 1959 has been the quest for hegemony in the islands by a solidarity-making, nationalist clique that reflected traditional Javanese values. It is a quest that was appropriately carried out i n \ the context of the modern phenomenon of nationalism. To what extent a confrontational nationalism represents only a transitional phase of social and political integration of Indonesia, to what extent the images and goals of an army-dominated (or an Islaraic-dominated) govern ment will differ from those of a "solidarity-maker" government,-and to what extent Indonesian policy will change under a program of economic rationalization will be among the major questions taken up in the following chapters. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 34] === II. NATIONALISM, REVOLUTION AND INDEPENDENCE: BACKGROUND TO CONFRONTATION ... all our rebellions and our splits, our political anarchy and adventurism, and all the steps taken.in the economic field which have created chaps, are the result of the fact that our national Revolution was not dammed up at the appropriate time. Those who say that our national Revolution i s.not completed are wrong indeed. Now come on, keep on fanning the flames of the leaping fire of Revolution, let us become logs to feed the flames of Revolution.2 For an adequate understanding of foreign policy under.Guided Democracy, it is necessary to examine the early development of the "images.11 In this chapter, the aims and effects of Dutch colonial policy will be briefly sketched as a background for an analysis of the nationalist movement in Indonesia. An understanding of the nature of nationalism in the islands is essential for understanding the nature of the internal image. The struggle for independence that immediately followed World War II is also of importance in that during this period the rudiments of Indonesia's view of the contemporary world was formed. Having traced the pre-independence images, attention will be directed to the "first phase" of Indonesia's political development as an •'■Mohammad Hatta, Past and Future (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1960), p. 15. Sukarno, "Like An Angel that Strikes from the Skies," August 17, 1960, in Toward Freedom and the Dignity of Man: A Collection of Five Speeches (Djakarta: Department of Foreign Affairs, 1961), p. 85. 29 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 35] === independent nation, noting the essential characteristics of parliamentary democracy, its changing power structure and values, and the.underlying cause of its collapse; Nationalism Colonial policy and the images. The.development of a Dutch colonial empire in Southeast Asia took place in four stages. During the first stage, beginning in the early seventeenth century, Dutch commercial interests in the islands were carried out under the aus pices of the privately controlled Netherlands United East India Company (Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie, V.O.C.). By 1650, the V.O.C. had monopolized trade in the islands and had created the nucleus of a Dutch-controlled sphere of influence. The paramount economic position of the Dutch at first did not disrupt the existing patterns of govern ment and commerce in the Indies to any great extent. As time passed, however, activities of the V.O.C. gradually shifted from spice trade to the production of agricultural commodities and the company was in creasingly forced to take sides in indigenous dynastic disputes on Java. By the end of the eighteenth century it had become the paramount power on the island. The operation of the company represented the first decisive step towards the.formation of a new empire, commercial at the outset like Srivijaya and Malacca, but gradually becoming predominantly terri torial, yet not in the true line of succession to ei ther, since the center of control lay thousands of miles away.3 As a consequence of its political involvements, the V.O.C found itself greatly.overextended and virtually bankrupt, and in 1799 3D.G.E. Hall, History of South-East Asia (London: Macmillan, 1955, Rev. ed. 1964), p. 251. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 36] === its asset's--as well as its position of political power— were taken.over by the Dutch crown. The "empireV that was inherited by the Dutch.state at the beginning of the nineteenth century had largely been gained in a gradual process that had little effected the "autonomous" social and cultural life of the general population.14' After the assumption of power by the Netherlands' government, however, the nature of colonial rule in the second stage became more intensive.*5 The policy of forced deliveries of commodities that had developed in the later years of company rule was continued under the Culture System established in the 1830's. This system of tribute was designed to exact produce from one-fifth of the peasant's land, but often ended by taking.rauehmore. Although the arrangement was extremely lucrative from the Dutch point of view j it increased.the weight of colonial rule.on the,Indonesian— This was basically van Leur's thesis in Indonesian Trade and Society (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1955), in particular, pp. 9596 and 268-289. The greater part of his works, however, was con cerned with Western economic influence prior to the nineteenth century, and he seemed to hint that later Dutch influence was more. important than Indonesian factors in shaping Indonesian history. See J. D. Legge, Indonesia (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Spectrum Books, 196*0, pp. 21-23 and 61-65. 5The question of cultural change in the islands.during the intensification of Dutch rule in the nineteenth century has also been examined by John R. W. Smail, "An Autonomous History of Southeast Asia," Journal o f.Southeast Asian History, II, No. 2 (July, 1961), 72-102. Smail suggests that the analysis of Indonesian history should not merely focus on political developments but on social and cultural considerations. Taking the argument of cultural continuity one.step further than van Leuf, he states that the Indonesian society retained its "autonomy" and resiliency despite the lack of political power to challenge the colonial rule of the technologically superior European culture. Avoiding an overemphasis on the colonial rela tionship, therefore, will allow one to isolate factors that will yield a truly autonomous history. One might question whether Smail is mere ly overemphasizing continuity at the expense of change; the.decoloni zation process taking place in Indonesia, however, certainly lends credance to Vhis highly stimulating thesis. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 37] === 32 1 particularly the Javanese— society and prevented the."villager from producing for the world market in his own right.” The third stage of colonial rule beginning about 1870 was known as the liberal or laissez-faire period, and represents the open ing up of new areas in the islands to development by private capital. The economic expansion under the Liberal Policy saw a shift in atten tion from Java to Sumatra, a change in the character of colonial ex ports from Coffee, sugar, tobacco and spices to rubber, oil, copra and tin produced on large estates and plantations, and an extension of Dutch colonial control to the outlying non-Javanese areas. This expansion of Dutch colonial control to the "outer islands" paralleled a similar consolidation of power by the British on the Malay penin sula and in northern Borneo (see Map 2). The extension of colonial spheres of influence is of great importance to the development of the modern Indonesian state. deed, the delimitation of power in the Southeast Asian islands during the liberal period largely determined the territorial boundaries of the two political entities that succeeded to the European interests in the area. A comparison of the colonial and pre-colonial spheres of interest, however, indicates that the Dutch consolidation of power did See Legge, p. 63. Of interest in this context is the example of the Bataks.in northern Sumatra. Encouraged by German missionaries to plant commercial crops, many Bataks began to build up a modest supply of capital, and armed with a mission education, they migrated in significant numbers to the coastal regions. Contact with the Dutch was slight during the stage of capital accumulation and this aided the development of a Batak "middle class" that has today largely dominated, manufacturing and industry not only in North Sumatra but throughout Indonesia. See, e.g., Karl J. Pelzer, "The Western Impact on East Sumatra and North Tapanuli," Journal of Southeast Asian History, II, No. 2 (July, 1961), 66-71; and Justus M. van der Kroef, Indonesia in the Modern World (Bandung: Masa Baru Ltd. 1956), II, pp. 8-9. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 38] === Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. IPM A P 2: COLOWl/lL 1878 SPHERES IN TE R E S T Dutch conquered Amboina and Ternate in 1605 and Banda in 1609, seizing control of the spice Portuguese. Portuguese influence ended with the loss of Malacca in 1641. With the 3 "open" ports of Makassar (1668) and Bantem (1684), English influence in the islands to Benkulen on Sumatra. (2) The spheres of influence in the western part of the archidelimited at the Straits of Malacca by the transferal in 1825 of Malacca from the Dutch to in exchange for Benkulen. Penang, Malacca and Singapore were consolidated as the Straits in 1829. (3) The Sultan of Brunei gave Sarawak to James Brooke in 1841, and the Sultan of Sulu ceded (sold?) land in the northeast portion of Borneo to the British North prneo Company in 1882. Both holdings became ritish protectorates, as did Brunei, in 1888. (The map is adapted from Soedjatmoko, et. a l., An Introduction to Indonesian His•."W toriography, 1&88 aapore 1900 1605. 1^09* oanda D u t c h E x p a m &»o m 1675 1816 P o f s t u g u e.s e. T im o r === [PDF page 39] === net subsume territory on the Malay peninsula and in northern Borneo that both Srivijaya and Madjapahit claimed to have controlled. The existence of these differences is of great significance in understand ing the latent expansionist sentiments in the post-colonial Indonesian government; It also raises questions concerning the extent to which the empires of Srivijaya and Madjapahit are a part of the historical pat7 terns of all the islands now comprising " Indonesia," and the extent to which the non-Javanese territories think of themselves as a part of an Indonesian polity prior to the imposition of Dutch colonial rule. Indonesia's nationalists in due course came to look back to the unity imposed by Madjapahit as the forerunner of the modern nation, but whatever one makes of Madjapahit's claim to suzerainty over areas outside Java, Madura and Bali, the old east-Java-based empire clearly never had anything like the political and administrative control that the Dutch imposed upon the archipelago in the early twentieth century.8 Although the direct investment of Dutch capital during the liberal period devised more extensive— as opposed to intensive— methods of extracting produce from the archipelago, colonial policy up through most of the nineteenth century was still rather conservative in nature. With the exception of some outer island areas, village agriculture re mained in its subsistence mode of production and the "indirect" colonial rule perpetuated the indigenous aristocracy in power. The last stages of Dutch policy, however, proved unwittingly to be a progressive as well as a conservative force8 and provided the environment for the emergence This question was raised by Herbert Feith, "History, Theory and Indonesian Politics," Journal of Asian Studies, XXIV, No. 2 (February, 1965), p. 307, in answer to Benda *s.review of Feith *s book, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia in Journal of Asian Studies, XXIII, No. 3 (May, 1964), 449-456. 8Legge, p. 81. John l&utsky, Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries; Nationalism and Communism (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1963), p. 42, llait see, also, pp. 38-44. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 40] === 35 of:dynamic,.even revolutionary, forces i n.the.islands. First of all, in producing for an economic system tied.to the fluctuations of the world market and dependent on development of an extensive communication and transportation network, the peasant had become subject to vast impersonal^forces reaching far beyond the psy chological confines of the local community which had represented his forebears' horizon for generations. Previous exogenous cultural forces had not impinged upon the peasant's way of life to the extent that Western acculturation had. Second, the pre-industrial tradesmen and craftsmen in the towns and cities also felt the impact of colonialism in that they could not compete successfully with mass-produced goods from Europe or with the.products of the commercial plantation organi zations.^-0 It is.not incongruous that the first nationwide political movement in the islands, the Sarekat Islam, began as an association of urban Muslim batik manufacturers and merchants which were opposed to the monopolistic colonial economic system.^ traditional elite suffered in the process. Finally, even the As a result of a rising incidence of social unrest at the close of the nineteenth century, the Dutch adopted a paternalistic "Ethical P o l i c y a n d instituted ^•°See in this context a well-defined, yet somewhat over-simplistic theory of the "dual" nature of colonial society and economy, in J. H. Boeke,The Structure of the Netherlands Indian Economy (New York, 194-2) and Economics and Economic Policy of Dual Societies as Exemplified by Indonesia (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1953). For criticisms of Boeke's thesis— namely, that the precapitalist Indonesian society was inherently incapable of economic growth— see Benjamin Higgins "The 'Dualistic Theory' of Underdeveloped Areas," Economic Development and Cultural Change, IV, No. 2 (January, 1956); and Manning Nash, "Southeast Asian Society: Dual or M u l t i p l e Journal of Asian Studies, XXIII, No. 3 (May 1964), 417-424, including Benjamin Higgins' "Comments," pp. 425-428, and Lucien W. Pye, "Perspective Requires Two Points of Vision," pip. -429-432. •^Founded in 1912, the Sarekat Islam was a protest movement against both the Dutch and Chinese that spread throughout the islands,particularly Sumatra and Sulawesi. While its appeal at the.village was conservative ajid traditional, it gave the urban nationalist leadership a channel for Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 41] === 36i a program of welfare benefits that was felt down to the.very "doorstep" of the villager. Despite being maintained in a position of nominal authority by the colonial administration, the traditional authorities, especially those in Java, suffered a loss of prestige in the eyes of the. general population as colonial rule became more direct and wide spread. Later colonial policy, therefore, disrupted the normal cultural patterns throughout various regions in the archipelago. 12 Although the indigenous culture was not enfeebled or destroyed due to acculturation as had been formerly assumed, the Indonesian society was forced to make a painful readjustment to the introduction of Western technology and values. In the long run, the Indonesian response to this acculturation process will most likely take place within the context of "autonomous" cultural patterns, the process of throwing off Dutch rule and resolving the problems created.by colonialism, however, has to date taken place 13 within a confusing set of values and rationales. The rationale be hind the Ethical Policy itself was confusing and ambivalent. Some stressed the need for redressing the exploitive nature of earlier policies}1* action. For a brief discussion, see, e.g., van Neil, The Emergence of __ the Modern Indonesian Elite (The Hague: W. van Hoeve,I960),pp. 101-I5F. l2See the investigatory report of the 1926-1927 revolts in Sumatra which will bear out this point in "The Course of the Communist Movement on the West Coast of Sumatra, Part I (Political Section)," in Harry J. Benda and Ruth T. McVey (eds.), The Communist Uprisings of 1926-27 in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), pp. 97-125. *®See Gabriel A. Almond and James Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University-Press, I960),pp.20-25. ^ T y p i c a l of this sentiment was that expressed in the influential novel,Max Havelaar by Multatuli (alias for Edward Douwes Dekker) who fo cused on the baneful abuses of Dutch colonial policies during the Culture System See, e.g., Justus M. van der Kroef, The Dialectic of Colonial Indonesian History (Amsterdam: G.P.J. van der Peet, 1963), pp. 39-48,for a discussion of the effect of this novel. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 42] === 37 "i others expressed the -responsibility of the Dutch for controlling the forces of change and.guiding the Indonesians through a period of adjust ment. The intent of the policy.according to some observers was to pro tect and preserve:Indonesian culture, the small farmer, his village and his customary (adat) law;15 others, among them Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje who was responsible for the official Dutch policy toward Islamic movements,16 suggested that only through education and guidance could the Indonesians be freed from their subservience to both.adat and 17 Islamic law and eased into the transition to a modern way of life. In short, the Dutch were faced with a choice of assimilating the Indo nesian into Dutch culture (much as the French attempted with the Vietnamese in Indochina) or effecting an association of separate WestIQ. ern and non-Western.traditions within one political system. Much ^ S e e J. S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India (New York: New York, University Press, 1956), p. 263ff. 16Snouck suggested a policy of religious tolerance separate and distinct from a policy of repression against Islamic political move ments. For a discussion of his thought, see Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun (The Hague; W.vani Hoeve, 1958)., pp. 20-31ff; and Benda’s, "Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje and the Foundations of Dutch Islamic Policy in Indonesia," Journal of Modern History, XXX, No.4 (1958), 338-347. l?Of interest in this context is the work of Justus M. van der Kroef. The Dialectic of Colonial Indonesian History, who discusses two antithetical themes of reformers and writers found throughout the colonial period: the universalistic theme that proposed an "identity of interests between the Dutch and Indonesians," and the particularistic trend that "emphasized socio-economic differentiation and subordination within tradi tional social structure and economic practice in Indonesia" (p.5). 18 See van Niel, pp. 36-8 ff. J.S.Furnivall states that the Indonesian.society was an associated or "plural" society. He argued that the Europeans, Chinese and Indonesians lived apart as separate communities lacking a common will, and that it is this plural division in Indonesia not a Boekean dualism between capitalism and pre-capitalism (see n. 8 above) that should be the focus of attention in analyzing colonial society. See in particular Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1 9 4 4 T. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 43] === of this confusion is also found within,a new;group of indigenous leaders that developed in the last decades of the colonial period, a group usually referred to as a "Westernized’' elite. The nature of nationalism: the internal image. The.modern phenoraenon of nationalism and the criteria for establishing the basis of a feeling of nationality are still subj ect to dispute. Certainly the existence of a Swiss nation calls into question the need.for a common language, and the Jewish national identity existing apart from a terri torial homeland for centuries brings into doubt the seemingly essential need for a common territory. Rupert Emerson suggests that an inter action of two elements has produced a vigorous sense of national iden tity: a disintegration of older societal forms and the emergence of the bourgeois and common man. 19 In the European experience, one motivating catalyst for the development of the nation-state was the rise of the urban bourgeoisie. The early.stages of nationalism in Indonesia, how ever, can be seen as existing apart from nationality, and in the long run, nationalism owed little to a developing economic middle class. 20 Inasmuch as Indonesian nationalism developed during the period in which Indonesia was a colony of a European nation, the phenomenon of nation alism in the islands, as in many other father colonies, has to be taken 19 From Empire to Nation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), p. 93, pub lished originally by Harvard University Press, 1960. 20 However, see.the interesting analysis by Jan M. Pluvier, Con frontations; A Study of Indonesian Politics CKiala Lumpur: Oxford Uni versity Press, 1965), who draws a parallel between the consolidation of power by the middle class leaders in France 1848-1851 and t h e.Indonesian elite, who in 1957 sacrificed."the democratic parliamentary system in favor of a strong man regime." Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 44] === in the context of anti^-colonialism and the creation of a "Westernized" intelligentsia.2^ The opportunities for receiving a Western education increased after the advent of the Ethical Policy, and this was an important step in the process of developing a group of intellectuals imbued with the values and goals of a technologically advanced society. On the other hand, while colonialism was the motivating force' behind the desire of the Westernized elite to effect the.modernization of the traditional society, it became at the same time an obstacle to obtaining these goals?2 The new elite found themselves in conflict with the existing political structure— not only the European leadership, but also the indigenous aristocracy— and, inevitably, ideas of modernization became intertwined with' the concepts of nationalism and anti-colonialism.23 21 Nation-building will also be discussed below (chapter iii, pp. 108121, and chapter iv, pp. 207-215) as an adjunct of foreign policy. There are, however, other more systematic and sophisticated approaches to the phenomenon of. nationalism. See, e.g., l&rl Deutsch, National ism and Social Communication: An Enquiry into the Foundations of National ity (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1956), who concludes that a nation or community which has developed a commonly ex perienced history "is a community of complementary habits and facilities of communication (p.70)." Also of interest in this connection is the highly stimulating paper by Robert 0. Tilman, "The Processes of Political integration," given at the 1964 meeting of the Southern Political Science Association at Durham, North Carolina (and presumably to constitute the first chapter in his forthcoming book on Malaysia) which was concerned with the differences between."territorial," "societal," "consensual," and "symbiotic" integration. 22 For a discussion of the ambivalent feelings of Westernized in tellectuals toward the West, see Rupert Emerson, "Paradoxes of Asian Nationalism," Far Eastern Quarterly, XIII, No. 2 (February, 195*+), 131142. See,also,Hugh Seton-Watson, Neither War Nor Peace (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 182-187; Edward Shils,"The Intellectual Between Tradition and Modernity: The Indian Situation." Comparative.Studies.in Society and History. S u p p I (The Hague: Mouton, 1961), pp. 5-22; and Lucien W. Pve. Aspects of Political! Development (Boston: Little Brown, 1965), pp. 89-112. 230n this point, see Kautsky, pp. 48-9. For a further discussion of the content of this paragraph, see S. N. Eisenstadt,."Sociological Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 45] === Given the absence of a native economic middle class of the kind that led to the development of the West, the Westernized intellectuals as a whole viewed government as the.only source o f.developmental capital and increasingly favored wresting political control from the colonial administrators whose ideas of modernization did not correspond to their own. The Ethical Policy was too often seen by many of the new elite as a program designed.to promote Dutch rather than Indonesian interests.21* This was especially true in that for the most part the intellectuals were not incorporated into the colonial ruling structure. Despite the fact that most of the new elite were small in number, and that the early nationalist movement was largely an urban phenomenon, the "nationalists" had the advantage of being detached from both the traditional way of life and the stigma of association with the colonial regime, and being able, for the most part, to transcend loyalties to particular.ethnic groups. The rise of the Western oriented, but anti-colonial group Aspects of Political Development in Underdeveloped Countries," Economic Development and Cultural Change, V, N o. 4 (July, 1957), 289-307. 21*Clifford Geertz, The Social.Context of Economic Change (Cambridge Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1956), substantiates the contention that Dutch policy had an inhibiting effect on the "native sector" of Indonesian economy. Taking exception to Boeke's thesis that a lack of capitalist incentive produced a dual economy and society, Geertz states that Dutch control and protection.over all phases of production tended to limit the kind and quality of development the Indonesian sector could achieve. In later works, The Development of the Javanese Economy (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1956), and Agricultural Involution: The Process of Ecological Change in Indonesia (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), Geertz develops the theory that colonial policy intensified use of land and tra ditional methods rather than encouraging an agricultural or productive revolution. Labor-absorbing (as opposed to labor-saving) and "labour.stuffed-sawah patterns" produced an "involuted" or an over-developed system that functioned separately from the European sector of the economy and that was incapable of a "rational" Western process of development. 25See, e.g., W. F. Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1956), pp. 86, 147-150. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 46] === group provided the.leadership necessary for crystallizing mass dis contents and formulating the.conception of an Indonesian nation.26 It must be stressed-at this po i n t h o w e v e r, that t h e.surface unity exhibited by the Indonesian nationalists in their anti-colonial program was negative in nature and tended to obscure some rather basic divisions among the Westernized intellectuals. This is a factor which became quite evident once the positive.task of development faced the leadership after national independence. The difficulties in effecting economic and political development in post-colonial Indonesia often caused the.objectives of national unity to take precedence over eco nomic development. This.theme is largely the subject of later chapters; yet in order to prepare the necessary framework, some mention of the divisions among the Indonesian leadership before independence should be made. At first.look, the most apparent division was between the older traditional aristocracy and the newer Westernized.intellectual; this distinction is misleading, however, since many of the traditional elite were also anti-colonial. One basic division that cut across the above groups was found among those who accepted salaried positions with the Dutch administration and the greater number of nationalists who chose, 27 for various reasons, t o.oppose.cooperation.with.t h e.colonial.government. 2SFor the early.development of the elite, the best source is van Niel, The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite. For a general.over view, see James H. Hysbergh, "The. Indonesian Elite," Far Eastern Survey, XXVI, No. 3 (March, 1957), 38-49. 27 See van Niel, p. 2 ff •.. who refers to them as functional and political elites. The former are those "who served... to keep a modern state and society functioning;" and the latter are "those Indo nesians who engaged'in political activities... involving some altera tion of the political status quo." Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 47] === This distinction was important during the early history of the.Republic in that tension within the bureaucracy developed between the "coopera tors" (co's), many of whom were non-Javanese,.and "non-cooperators" (non-co's), a large percentage of whom were Javanese nationalists.28 In the long run, if one can avoid the deceptive.oversimplification, the basic ethnic division noted earlier in Chapter I between the Javanese and non-Javanese is perhaps most valuable in determining the split in the ranks of the Indonesian elite. It must be stressed that many Westernized Indonesians— particularly the Javanese— assimilated the values of the traditional Javanese aristocratic (prijaji)culture, even though the older prijaj is themselves had actually lost power. While the con trast between a "Javanese aristocratic" and an "Islamic entrepreneurial" elite can be drawn with accuracy only in broad general terms at this point, as a general rule many of the "new prijaj is" did retain the stan dards of behavior and values of the older political aristocracy despite the"Westernizing" influences with which they came in contact. 29 There is a rural-urban split that should also be pointed out. While most of the nationalist agitation took place at the urban level, 28See Palmier, Indonesia and the Dutch (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 73-74. See,also, Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 83; and Selo Soemardjan, "Bureaucratic Organization in a Time of Revolution," Administrative Science Quarterly, II, No. 2 (September, 1957), 182-199, which concerns the filling of post-war bureaucratic.positions by virtue of "capability" or "acceptability." 29 The prijaji developed from the old court aristocracy, forming an administrative corp that served first the kraton and later the Dutch rulers. The predominance of prlj aj i values in Java illustrates the un even assimilation of Islam into the.region. Islam entered, the Outer Islands in a more orthodox, purer fashion, while it was greatly altered when it was absorbed in Java and was.subordinated to prijaji values. For one explanation behind the syncretic assimilation of Islam on Java, see A. H. Johns, MSufism As a Category in Iidonesian History," Journal of Southeast Asian History, II, No. 2, (July, 1961), 10-23. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 48] === there were at the village level, both-secular and ecclesiastic elites,30 carrying out a version of -the anti-colonial.struggle among themselves. The adat or secular chiefs were often opposed, especially within.the outer islands, by the Islamic leaders. The.so-called 1926 communist revolts were in a few places actually a product of tension between Dutch supported secular authority and the Islamic religious officials. Even within the Islamic community there was a division between the more reform-minded urban Muslims and the syncretic "orthodox” rural Muslims. This split, especially evident in Java, was reflected in the pre-inde pendence urban Muhammadyah association and the rural scholars party, the Nadahtul Ulama. The Indonesian nationalist movement, therefore, was less uni fied than Indian nationalism, and was represented by many rationales concerning the modernization and political development of an indepen dent Indonesia. The Islamic nationalists were the first to organize on an extensive basis when the Sarekat Islam was founded in 1912. major splits occurred within the movement, however. Two The Marxist element, never happy in union with advocates of an 11Islamic".staite, left the 30 For a discussion of "sacral" and "secular" elites, see Edward Shils, "The intellectuals and the Powers," Comparative Studies in Society and History, I (1958-1959), 5-22; and Harry. J. Benda, "Non-Western In telligentsias as Political Elites," Australian:Journal of Politics and History, VI, No. 2, (November, 1960), 205-218. 31 See Benda and McVey, The Communist Uprising of 1926-1927 in Indonesia, pp. xix-xxi. See, also, the Governor General *s Report"of January, 1927, "Political Note Concerning the Indonesian Communist Party" in ibid., pp. 1-17, which greatly increases the responsibility of the Comintern and the PKI for the.uprisings. For a more balanced view, see "Report of the Commission installed by.Government Decision No. X of January 26, 1927, to investigate the disturbances which took place in various parts of the Residency of Banten in November, 1926," ir ibid., pp. 19-96, and earlier cited.report "The Course of the Communist Move ment on the West Coast of Sumatra," fn. 12, above. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 49] === party in 1920, and the. more syncretic and rurally-oriented members with drew in the late 1920*s.because of the emphasis on reform and moderni zation of Islamic doctrine. Even within.the Marxist movement itself there was a significant dichotomy that came to a head with the unsuccessful communist uprisings in 1926. 32 The revolts -were notable failures in the big cities and were apparently precipitated due to an ill-timed directive issued by the Comintern in Russia. The legendary '’national” communist, Tan Malaka, who bitterly opposed the worker-based U r b a n up risings, broke with the Comintern over the issue of proletarian inter. nationalism, and emphasized the necessity of Pan-Asian solidarity, nation alism and a peasant-based mass movement for making a successful revolution. 33 The splits in the Islamic and communist movements were a sig nificant political factor both during and after the war of revolution against the Dutch. The succeeding generation of "secular" nationalists that domi nated the movement during the 1930's and during the war for independence against the Dutch had little coherent vision of a free Indonesia. post-independence developments were to indicate, however, the political philosophy of this group fell into two general categories: the "national ist" ideology.o f.Sukarno,.a.young.engineer, later embodied i n.his speech, — For a good discussion of the.period 1914-1927, see van Niel, pp. 101-252. See, also, Fred.R. von der Mehden, Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963'), pp. 54-73. 33 Tan Malaka wrote several influential treatises, among which were Dari Penjara ke Penjara (From Jail to Jail) and Massa Aksi (Mass Action) wherein he drew a blueprint for action largely followed by Sukarno during the years of Guided Democracy. For an.account of Malaka’s life and pro grams, see Hilliard.A. Hanna, "From Jail to Jail: The Saga of Tan Malaka" (WAH-1-’59, April, 1959)s a n d " T h e S a g a of Tan Malaka Continued" (WAH-1-'61, December 5, 1961)j American University Field Staff■Reports. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 50] === 45~~i Pantja Sila; and the views of democratic.socialists like Hatta and Sjahrir in conjunction with religious socialists drawing on reformist 34 Islamic doctrine. Sukarno's.philosophy was grounded.in the five princi ples (Pantja Sila) of nationalism, humanitarianism, representative government, prosperity and belief in one god. 35 These principles which officially form the basis of Indonesia*s.social and political philoso phy, are not self-defining, but should be examined within an " Indonesian" context. Of the five, nationalism h a s.received the greatest emphasis. The advocacy of a "national" rather than an " Islamic" Indonesia, together with the tenets of belief in god and representative government, were of outstanding importance in that they dealt a blow to the advocates of an Islamic state. Sukarno envisioned a state of religious "peaceful co existence" in which every person can worship god in freedom... /and/ mutual respect."36 He also justified a representative body where all factions in the country could be represented by issuing a challenge to the Islamic community: If we are really an Islamic people, let us work hard so that most of the seats.in the People's representative body that we will create are occupied by Islamic delegates.... Then the laws made by this representative body will naturally be Islamic laws too.37 It.should be noted, however, that although Sukarno advocated a 3i*See Jeanne S. Mintz, Mohammed, Marx and Marhaen (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 81. The substance of the following two paragraphs is taken almost entirely, except where.noted, from pp.81r89. 35Sukarno enunciated his five principles in a speech.before the Committee for the Investigation of Indonesian Independence set up under the aegis of the Japanese occupation. See "The Birth of Pantja Sila," speech, June, 1945 in Toward Freedom and the Dignity of Man, pp. 1-21. : Si this official translation the principles were "polished" into nationalism, internationalism, democracy, social justice and belief in god. 3 6Ibid., p. 18. 37Ibid., p. 15. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 51] === representative or "democratic" government in principle, the key to his personal political philosophy revolved around a.conception of cor porate nationalism. Such an orientation provided the major.ideological justification for the later establishment of Guided Democracy. Men like Sjahrir, on the other hand, laid.stress on the "demo cratic" nature of the anti-colonial revolution and the need for a more equitable distribution of production. He warned that those whose sole aim in politics was nationalism might find it expedient to sacrifice democracy, in the process (an obvious reference to the Japanese collabo rators and Sukarno himself). The Indonesian revolution is a "democra tic revolution of which the national revolution is only an offshoot. Not nationalism but democracy is the.number one aim." 38 Akin to the thought of Sjahrir was that of the Masjumi leader, Sjariffudin Prawiranegara, who emphasized individual initiative and responsibility in a republican— not a theocratic— state. Also, for many of the outer island Moslems, "democracy" meant a measure of regional autonomy as well. Finally, most of the nationalists advocated some form of a planned or nationalized economy, although the Masjumi leaders leaned more toward entrepreneurial than bureaucratic operations. One further characteristic of the.various nationalist groups should be noted, and that is the difference.between cadre-based and mass-based organizations. The pre-independence PNI (Indonesian National ist Party) is a case in.point. The dissolution of the party after Sukarno's first arrest in 1929 indicated a basic structural weakness in the organization.. A majority of the.former PNI members joined the Partindo, a party in many respects like the PNI in that its cohesion 38 From the Dutch edition of Sjahrir's:Our Struggle (Onze Strij d ), cited in Mintz, p. 86. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 52] === depended upon the.leadership of a few men..It is significant that men like Mohammad Hatta and Sjahrir preferred not to work with a mass-based party but to associate themselves with a small, politically conscious elite group known as the PNI-Baroe. Such a distinction is important for the understanding of modern Indonesian parties. Hatta and Sjahrir believed that without a strong, tightly knit organization, any political movement would disintegrate with the capture of the few top leaders. This contention was supported by the rapid rise and fall of the Partindo in 1933. With the return of Sukarno from his first exile, the Partindo, much like the PNI before it, mushroomed into an amalgamation of leftist and rightist factions. 39 The ephemeral quality of the mass movement, however, was again demonstrated by Sukarno’s second arrest in the same \ year. The party slowly disintegrated, and the nationalist movement was forced into much shallower channels than it had previously reached. contrast, the PNI-Baroe survived until the end of the Second World War even though four leadership echelons were arrested during the 1930’s. 40 Only a brief look at the political history of Indonesia shows a constant division and antagonism between the Javanese parties and the non-Javanese. Thus, even in pre-war opposition to Dutch rule, Sukarno’s Nationalist Party, based on the principle of an elite leadership and mass following, drew its support mainly from the Javanese;- the party led by Hatta and Sjahrir, on the other hand, based on the informed.dedication of all i t s ^ members, d r e w.its members mostly from the non-Javanese. 39For a. discussion of this phenomenon, see Soedjatmoko, ’’The Role of the Political Parties in Indonesia," in Philip W. Thayer Ced.) Nationalism and Progress in Free.Asia.(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), pp. 137-139. George McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), p. 93 41 Palmier, p. 153. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 53] === The victory of Japan.over the Southeast Asian colonial powers in the opening years of the Second World War for all practical purposes destroyed colonialism in the area. The Dutch in Indonesia.suffered far more than just a military defeat; they completely lost the prestige aud aura of invincibility that had made it possible to rule a vast empire with such a correspondingly small force of men. It is not within the scope of this paper to analyze the occupation in detail; the three and one half years of Japanese control, however, is a most important period in Indonesian history and several significant developments can be noted. First, many positions in the administrative apparatus were opened up to Indonesians, and nationalist leaders were allowed to organize on a country-wide basis through such organizations as the PUTERA, the Hokukai and the Masjumi. The Japanese had hoped to use these organizations as propaganda media. Through the efforts of Sukarno and other nationalists, however, they soon developed into means for estab lishing contact with groups and local organizations'throughout Java'"and Sumatra. Second, the Japanese administration was also heavy handed and often brutal, and the displacement and recruitment of many persons at the village level increased the.disruption of the traditional society. Third, the Japanese gave, in contrast to the Dutch, rudimentary mili tary training to the major ethnic groups. The PETA movement fostered under Japanese direction provided the-nucleus of what later became the Indonesian armed forces. The final significance of the occupation, was that the Japanese.fostered the eventual course, independence.of ^ F o r Japanese policy toward Islam during the occupation, see Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 54] === Indonesia. When it became evident in 1945 that the Japanese.could.not hope to win the war in.the Pacific, a Committee for the Investigation of Indonesian Independence (Baden Penjehdik Kemerdekaan Indonesia— B. P.K. I.) was established to effect a transfer of sovereignty. A most important question to be resolved at this time was t h e.territory.over which the nationalists should claim sovereignty. Over two-thirds of B.P.K.I. ad vocated ah Indonesia that would include a territory greater than that of the former Dutch East Indies, and 39 of the 66 delegates opted for all the islands of Borneo, Timor and New Guinea, and the peninsula of Malaya in addition to the Dutch, colonial territory.1*'4 Despite the fact that the Japanese decided.on July 21, 1945 not to include Malaya in the new state of Indonesia, the general sentiment of the Indonesian leaders on the scope of nation-hood is quite important for an understanding of future events. 45 T h e:struggle for independence: the external image. On August 17, 1945, in the wake of the Japanese military collapse in Southeast Asia, Sukarno and Hatta declared Indonesia's independence. The Indo nesian Republic, however, had to fight for four years before the Dutch finally relinquished sovereignty. During this time, the new nation survived the brunt of two major Dutch military actions (in July 1947 and December 1948) and two internal threats to its existence (one in 1946 by the "Trotskyite" Persatuan Perjuangan movement led by Tan Malaka For a good discussion of Japanese policies concerning Indonesian independence and of the events during the last year of Japanese rule, see Benedict R. 0*G. Anderson, Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics under the Japanese Occupation; 1944-1945 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961). 44 Ibid., p. 29. 45 See chapter v, pp. 212-215. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 55] === and.theother in 1948 precipitated by.the.more orthodox "Stalinist" PKE under the leadership of Musso). It is not the intent here to set forth a detailed examination of the.events during the revolutionary period, but rather to focus on the first impressions of international affairs formed by the leaders of the hew. Indonesian Republic. The view of the world that the Indonesian elite developed at this time had a significant effect on the development of foreign policy during the period of Guided Democracy. When the Allied troops returned to Indonesia after the Japanese surrender, they found a nationalist administration already functioning as a government. An unsuccessful attempt by the Dutch forces to re establish colonial authority led to the signing, in November 1946, of the Linggadjati Agreement whereby the Netherlands agreed to recognize the new Republic as the de facto authority over most of Sumatra and Java and to cooperate with the new regime in establishing a federal Indonesia. 47 Negotiations over the implementation of the treaty*s pro visions soon broke down, however, and the first "police action" against the Republic was launched in.July 1947. The Dutch action drew an im mediate angry response from India, and the Australian government requested United Nations intervention in the matter. When the Security Council met to consider the question, the Soviet government backed an Australian proposal calling for a withdrawal of Dutch troops to the points from which t h e.attack.w a s:launched.before:the negotiations• The United:States, 46By far the best account of the period is found in Kahin, Nation alism and Revolution. See also Charles Wolf, Jr., The Indonesian Story (New York: John Day, 1948). For the text of the Linggatjati.Agreement, see Alastair M. Taylor, Indonesian Independence.and the United Nations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), pp. 464-467. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 56] === however, offered a compromise proposal that was accepted.b y.t h e.Council on August 1, and that called for a cessation of hostilities, a settle ment of the dispute by arbitration, and asked that "the Council /be/ in£lg formed about the progress of that settlement.'.' Sjahrir, the.Republic's representative.at the.United Nations, asked the Council.for a commission to supervise its cease-fire order, and finally a Committee of Good Offices consisting of representatives from Belgium, Australia and the United States was dispatched.to the area, although it did.not arrive in Indonesia until the last week in October. The refusal of the Western powers to order the Dutch to with draw from the territory they had occupied left a great impression on the Indonesians. Although international pressure (mainly from the United States.and the United Nations) contributed greatly to the success of the struggle against the Dutch, many Indonesians ironically came out of the revolutionary period feeling that the American interests coincided more closely with the.colonial powers than with the newer countries. Despite the fact that Washington was beginning to apply pressure behind the scenes on the.Dutch, the Indonesians formed their early opinions of the Western nations, and especially the United States, from the overt positions as recorded in the United Nations debates and the votes taken in the Security.Council. George Kahin reports: The debates /in the United Nations/ were closely followed and long remembered in Indonesia and were influential in developing the attitudes of many Indonesians towards Russia and the United States. Whether or not American action 48 Security Council, Official Records, 2nd year, No. 83, 2199-2200. liQ For an account of the role of the United Nations in Indonesian inde-. pendence, see Taylor, Indonesian' ^dependence and the United Nations. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 57] === 52~j proceeded from a desire t o.avoid a Council deadlock.or a French veto, the refusal of the.UnitedStates.to back the.Australian proposal except in a drastically amended form was profoundly disillusioningto Indonesians.50 The United.States unfortunately was in a dilemma almost from the beginning with reference to the position of the Indonesian Republic. Although American sentiment favored national self-determination for colonial peoples, the United States found.it difficult to oppose Dutch interests in the islands since the Netherlands formed a vital link in the European alliance to contain Russian Cor Communist) expansion and influence. It was nevertheless generally believed in Indonesia that due to.Dutch dependency on American aid and credits the United States could have brought enough pressure to bear on the Dutch to have ended its military operation. There was also the widespread feeling that the operation never could have been undertaken in the first place without American and British equipment. 51 After many proposals and counter proposals the Netherlands and the Republic finally signed an agreement on board the U.S.S. Renville which provided, among other things, for a plebiscite to be held in the Republic territories of Java, Madura, and Sumatra to determine if the populations of those territories wanted to form a part of the Republic or another state within the proposed federal.state of Indonesia. The agreement, however, failed to provide for a withdrawal of troops, a restoration of Republican administration in areas occupied by the Dutch, or representation by the Republic in the interim, government pending a transfer of sovereignty. It was only with the greatest reluctance, and only with the personal assurances of the United States’ delegate, Dr. 50Kahin, p. 215 51For a discussion of the above sentiment, see ibid., p. 219-220. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 58] === .53n Frank Graham, that the American government would see to i t.that the Dutch would carry out its promises, that the Republican government agreed to the signing. 52 The United States and Australia at once drafted a plan (known as the DuBois-Critchley Plan) to implement the plebiscite, and to deter mine Republican representation to the envisioned federal parliament. The proposal, however, was rejected by the Dutch who felt that the Committee had overstepped its authority, and after repeated efforts to persuade the.Dutch government to implement the plan, the United States called home its delegate. The removal of the American representative from the negotiations created the impression in Indonesia that the United States had withdrawn from i.ts guarantee to underwrite the agree ment. This opinion was apparently reinforced by the fact that Marshall Plan aid given.to the Netherlands by the spring of 1948 amounted to some $506,000,000. 53 The second Dutch offensive at the close of 1948 resulted in the capture of the Republican capital of Djogjakarta and the arrest of Sukarno and his cabinet; international sentiment,.however, began to turn against the Netherlands' government. A Security Council resolution again called on the parties to end hostilities and requested the release of the political prisoners. 54 The Dutch in turn advised the Council that hostil ities would cease on January 1, 1949, but reserved the prerogative to "act against disturbing elements who.... endanger public security."55 52Ibid., p. 227-228. Dr. Graham believed that the areas over run by the Dutch.would vote to return to the Republic and that the Dutch would not dominate the proposed federal government. 5 3 ibid., pp. 249-250 ^ S ecurity Council j Official Records, 3rd Year, N o. 134,.. December 24, 1948, pp. 30-32. 55Cited in Kahin, pp. 342-3. Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 59] === As a result of the intransigent Dutch position, an unfavorable report on the truce was submitted by the. Committee of Good Offices, and an Asian conference on the-question was called by India in January, 1949. Finally, due to growing support in the United-States,Congress for cutting off all aid to the Netherlands, the Economic Cooperation Adminis tration (ECA) actually suspended on December 22, 1948 a $14,000,000 allocation to the Dutch. 56 A Round Table conference was convened at The Hague in October 1949, and American pressure on the Dutch in.support of a solution in which the Republic would have a dominating voice in the federal United States of Indonesia was significant in persuading the Netherlands to grant full independence to its colony. The promise of economic assis tance from the United States was well received by the Indonesians, even though a rather unfavorable colonial debt was assumed by the New Republic. After the transfer of sovereignty in December, the federal structure of the new state came under attack by the Republican leaders. Although a federal state was the logical form for the Indonesian nation to take in view of its ethnic and linguistic diversity, many national ists— especially many Javanese— viewed the federal system as an attempt by the Dutch to use their still strong influence in many of the outer islands to control the Republic. 57 As a result, the federal structure was replaced by a unitary state in August 1950. Given the bitter ex perience of four years of struggle with the Dutch, a large majority of 56See ibid., pp. 402-6. 57The Republic at the time was limited to Madura and parts of Java and Sumatra. For a detailed, and rather overdrawn legal analysis of the proposed federal state, see A. Arther Schiller, The Formation of Federal Indonesia.(The Hague: W. van Hoeve,.1955). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 60] === 55 ~ I the Indonesians probably felt that true independence.could only be won through revolutionary pnrity based on: non-cooperation and total opposition to colonialism in a l l i t s f o r m s — apparently including federalism. This is part of the reason why there w a s.tension.between the 11c o ’s".(those who either by choice or necessity cooperated with the Dutch).and the "non-co's" (those non-cooperators, many of whom were given the choice jobs in the Republican government) in the early years after independence. 58 It also helps to explain why the "Western democratic" system initially adopted by the Republic ultimately fell into disrepute. Despite the fact that the early cabinets were committed to orderly parliamentary government and economic rationalization, the revolutionary fervor and the active dedication to the building of a "new order" that accompanied indepen dence gradually revived in a society where domestic failures and political instability were increasingly associated with the parliamentary system. Although the reasons and events behind the decline of constitutional democracy are much too numerous and complex.to receive a thorough treatment in this paper, 59 several pertinent observations can be made that relate directly to an understanding of Indonesian policy during Guided Democracy. The following section will examine the major reasons behind the eventual collapse of parliamentary government in 1957. Independence: The First Phase. Parliamentary democracy: the internal image. Of major importance in the demise of the pre-195?.system was the cultural, ethnic.and ideological 58Palmier, pp. 73-5. 5Q The best treatment is found in Feith,9 The Decline of Constitutionil Democracy iii Ihdonesia. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 61] === 56—| antagonism between-the nationalist-rled. party groups and the MasjumiPSI faction. This trend towards partisan confli.ct-rr.one that eventual ly divided both the army and much of the civil service— was noticeable as early as the.Wilopo government that lasted from April 1952 until June 1953. It was during this time that the Nahdatul Plama (Muslim Teachers Association, or NU), a conservative Islamic faction of the Masjumi party, broke away and formed a new party, and that the Partai Kommunis Indonesia (PKE) established a working alliance with the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI).60 The Masjumi assumed a more,lconservative,, (Western liberal) position and the PNI-PKI nationalist bloc— joined in most instances by the NU— moved towards the "left.11 The conflict en compassed many governmental problems including the ideological founda tions of the.state, the reorganization of the army and the bureaucracy, the relationship between the central government and the regions, and economic and foreign policy. Whenever a seriously divisive issue arose and a cabinet took decisive action on it, the government almost always fell. There were also splits within both major factions, a fact that can in great part be explained by the role kinship plays in binding together the parties. Political organizations were often composed of cliques which on many important issues considered their own interests; before the welfare of the party as a whole. Party support for a cabinet was Usually withdrawn outside the Parliament, which meant that one of the groups in a party had decided its own turn had come to take 60Ibid., pp. 235-246. The radical nationalist faction of the PNI men who had worked with the Japanese and had been over-shadowed by the early Sjahrir and Hatta cabinets, captured control of the party at the P NI’s 1950 Congress and called for the.establishment of a revolutionary anti-capitalist bloc (ibid., p. 91). 6^See van der Kroef, Indonesia in the M o d e m World, II, p. 305. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 62] === power. 69 57 While Indonesia is formally a "unitary" state, it was, and is, politically a loose grouping of leaders and their followings fused into parties. As one writer reported: ... t o understand /Indonesian/ politics.you would have to know the biography o f.every leader from before the war until now and every quarrel or disagreement they and their families have had with each other.... Indonesian politi cal life is a kind of poker game played by a few thousand people all of whom have known each other much too long and too well.63 The leaders of the parties retained their position by their ability to distribute sufficient rewards and look after the welfare of their fol lowers, reflecting a major Indonesian social pattern known as bapakism. Although each bapak, or father, was accorded great respect when success ful, if the societal requirements of the leaders were not met, shifts from one clique to another were frequent. Kinship also implies ethnic origin. Central and East Java is the home of the Javanese, a group that comprises 45.6 percent of the Indonesian population, and from whom in the last national election held in 1955 the PNI drew 65.5 per cent of its support, the NU 73.9 per cent, 62 See George MeT. Kahin, ’’Indonesia,*' Major Governments of Asia, ed. George McT. Kahin (Ithaca:. Cornell University Press, 1963), p. 546; George MeT. Kahin, "Indonesian Polities and,Nationalism," in W. L. Holland (ed.), Asian Nationalism and the West (New York: Macmillan, 1953), 186-188; Soedjatmoko in Thayer, pp. 128-140, and Guy J. Pauker, "The Role of Political Organizations in Indonesia," Far Eastern Survey, XXVII, No. 9 (September, 1958), 132-3, 139. 63 Robert C. Bone, "The Future of Indonesian Political Parties," Far Eastern Survey, XXIII, No. '2 (February, 1954), 17. Feith, pp. 126-7; and Rupert Emerson, Representative Government in Southeast Asia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955), p. 27. The dysfunctional nature of bapakism as a cultural practice may not be so foreign to the development of political parties in the United States where the.parties are a loosely formed union of state and local factions, and in a real sense are united only by the election of a President every four years. See, e.g., Clinton Rossiter, Parties and Politics in America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, I960), chap. i. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 63] === and the PKI 7*1.9 per cent. The Mas jumi polled only 25.4 per-cent of its votes from these regions and less than 12 per cent of the.total Javanese vote cast. The Masjumi.polled almost half (48.7 per cent) of its votes outside Java, emerging as the leading party by far among that third of the population living in the Outer Islands.65 The PNI and the nationalist Javanese parties that to a large extent identified with the President, exhibited anti-capitalist and anti-foreign senti ments, and advocated an "Indonesian" culture, language and religious spirit. In cultural and religious outlook the PNI represented Javanism. Most of its leaders were Javanese and mem bers of the social group of the prijaji, the Javanese aristocracy which had in large part remained little affected by Islam. Combining a nominal adherence to Islam with contempt for Islamic orthodoxy, these Java nese aristocrats held syncretistic mystical beliefs which owe more to Hinduism than to any branch of Islam. Proud of traditional Javanese culture, they saw this as a basis for a new Indonesian civilization and looked to it to provide an alternative to cosmopolitan culture. The PNI, PKI and NU were thus able to support each.other, although pro fessing different ideological.bases. On the other hand, the Masjumi and the NU exhibited great differences, both recent and historic, despite the fact they both were Islamic parties. 67 Even though together the 65Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955 (Ithaca; Cornell Modern' Indonesia Project, 1957), p. 62 ff. In all of Java, which con tains about 65 per cent of the total population, the PNI obtained, 85.9 per cent of its parliamentary vote, the NU 85.6 per cent, the PKI 88.6 per cent, and the Masjumi 51.3 per cent. See also, Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, pp. 436-437. 66Ibid., p. 140. 6^Ibid., pp. 233-5; and Herbert feith, "Indonesia," in Government and Politics in Southeast Asia, ed. George MeT. Kahin (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965), 178,202-3. The differences between the Masjumi and NU at the national level is reflected within the santri community in the villages between those advocating religious modernism and those es pousing conservatism and a more syncretic type of Islam. See ibid., p. 189; and Clifford Geertz, "Religious Belief and Economic Behavior in a Central Javanese Town," Economic Development and Cultural Change, IV, Ne. 2 (January, 1956), 134-158. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 64] === three.major Islamic parties— the Masjumi, NU.and the Partai Sarekat 59 “ I Islam Indonesia (PSII) polled over 40 per cent of the votes.and gained over 42 per cent (110) of the seats in parliament as a result of the 1958 elections, they could not form a government. 68 It is of interest to note that the closest relations President Sukarno ever maintained with a Masjumi-led government was when.the.party still included the NU faction and Dr. Sukiman Wirjosandjojo, a Javanese and leader of the Masjumi left wing, was Prime Minister. 69 As a general rule, however, and especially after the 1955 elections, the pattern of party align ment corresponded increasingly with the deepest of communal cleavages— that between the Javanese-bureaucratic and the Islamic-entrepreneurial 70 political.cultures. The political history of the period can also b e.seen as the inability of the more Western-oriented group to consolidate power. The distinction between the "administrators’1 and the ’’solidarity-makers" has already been noted above 71 and although.both were committed to socialist ideals, the administrators were tied more to non-bureaucratic business interests, defended the dominance of Dutch capital in the economy in the interest of maximum production, and insisted that 68Pauker, Far Eastern Survey, XXVII, No. 9, 133. 69 Palmier, Indonesia and the Dutch, pp. 153-154. See also Leslie Palmier, ’’Indonesian-Dutch Relations,” Journal of Southeast Asian History, II, No. 2 (July, 1961), 29. 70 This communal division.at the village.level was between the santri and abangan communities and was particularly evident during the Madiun revolts when the communists, allied with the abangan elements, cruelly persecuted the santri businessmen and traders. See Justus M. van der Kroef, ’’Peasant and Land Reform in Indonesian Communism,” Jour nal of Southeast Asian History, IV, No. 1 (March, 1963), 46. ^ S e e pp. 11-13. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 65] === administrative as well as economic affairs be managed according to 72 skill and training, rather than service to the cause of the revolution. The small but influential Partai Soeialis Indonesia (PSI), headed by former Prime Minister Sjahrir, was, until its dissolution in 1960, a group closely related to the Western democratic socialist tradition, and was prototypically a-party of the administrator elite. 73 With the resignation of the Wilopo government in 1953, one can discern a turning point in the first phase of Indonesia's political development. The a d -; ministrators were gradually forced out of power by a group of men far less committed to fiscal stability and administrative efficiency. Most of the pi%-1953 political leaders were all but politically incapaci tated by 1958.^ The ruling elite that gradually succeeded the administrators and the one that exercised control of the Indonesian political system during the period of Guided Democracy was less concerned with the con trol of political ferment and more with the manipulation of groups, and less with an emphasis on legal processes and more with fashioning inte grative symbols and ideology. .This group of solidarity-makers was com posed primarily of former revolutionaries who operated most effectively in a political system that stressed traditional and charismatic authority. They advocated the "Indonesianization" of the economy and a channeling 72 Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, p. 127. For an additional discussion on the parties during parliamentary democracy, see Kahin in Kahin, pp. 609-618. 73 Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, pp. 129-131. 71L Ibid., pp. 604, and 113-121. See also Herbert Feith, The Wilopo Cabinet, 1952-1953: A Turning Point in Post-Revolutionary Indonesia (Ithacas Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1958). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 66] === of political unrest to reorient the country along more "nationalistic" or "revolutionary" lines. 75 The "nationalist" Marxist Murba party, many of whose members were personally close to the President, constitutes a cogent example of a solidarity-maker party. 76 With the administrators committed.to governmental problems of immediate urgency and the integrators concerned with the images of a distant utopian future,there existed a bifurcation of attitudes or a lack of consensus on governmental purpose. Within the dwi tunggal (duumverate) of Sukarno and Hatta this dichotomy was most convincingly demonstrated. Sukarno fashioned the revolutionary symbols and messianic assurances and Hatta made the administrative policy. Though no attempt was made to link long term goals with short term programs, the system at the highest executive level of government did manage to function for a while, even if imperfectly. 77 The estrangement of the Sukarno-Hatta partnership and the polarization of political forces that culminated in Hatta's resignation is symbolic of the direction taken by Indonesian politics under the two cabinets of PNI leader Ali Sastroamidjojo (19531955 and 1956-1957).78 The attempt of the earlier governments to fashion an efficient and non-political administration was reversed after 1953, and the ^5Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, pp. 605-606, and 113-131. 76Ibid., p. 131. 77 For a discussion of Sukarno as a political force and the role of the Presidency and the Vice-Presidency, see Kahin in Kahin, pp. 598606. 78 Of note is the contention of Palmier, Indonesia and the Dutch, p. 161, who links the break between the two men not so much to differ ences in fundamental ideologies or techniques of government— both were Marxist in outlook, against private.development of the economy in prin ciple, and disillutioned with the existing party system— but more to Java and anti-Java sentiment and the.fact that Hatta was increasingly considered the champion of the non-Javanese interests. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 67] === 62 emphasis of governmental policy was less concerned with maximization of production or administrative rationality and more with restricting the economy and broadening the scope of the bureaucracy.to benefit Indonesian nationals. The system of credits and licensing policy and the allocation of material to private businessmen opened up important positions in banking and importing and expanded the Indonesian small-holders segment of the export commodities field. However, the existence of many "Ali Baba" firms— businesses run by.Chinese with Indonesian front men— in addition to a gradually increasing incidence of graft and corruption greatly limited the positive effect of the government’s policy. These considerations coupled with increasing consumption, a growing population, 79 rising costs of living and chronic inflation, 80 the end of the Korean War economic boom, estate ’’squatting,’. ’ theft, smuggling and rebel-bandit activity provided many vexing problems for the state. 81 In general, the rising expectations of the Indonesian society for a ’’modern” or "national” style of life— not only for material benefit but also for increased status within the state apparatus— were 79 In October, 1954-, the population of Indonesia was listed at 77.987.000 of which 51,637,552 lived on Java (Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955, p. 62). The 1961 census showed a population of 97.085.000 and the country passed the 100,000,000 mark shortly before the end of 1963. See Karl J. Pelzer, "Physical and Human Resource Patterns,” in Ruth T. McVey (ed.), Indonesia (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1963), p. 13. ^ D u r i n g the 1953-1957 period, the cost of living in the city of Djakarta almost tripled, and the total money supply rose from 7.5 to 18.9 billion rupiahs. See Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesia's Economic Future," Pacific Affairs, XXXII, No. 9 (March, 1959), 70-72. 8*See Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, pp. 556-572, for a summary of the economic and administrative policy of the 1953-1957 period. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 68] === 63~l not satisfied. 82 Economically the costs of Indonesianization were high, and socially far too few were granted the position commensurate with the white collar jobs of leadership that were so avidly sought.83 The period from 1955 to 1957 was marked not only by organized regional smuggling and criticism of the government's export exchange policy, but also by increased disenchantment with the growing ineffectiveness of party politics. Also, in a rapidly changing Indonesian society the dilemmas created by choices between abangan or santri values, between an urban or rural environment, between a traditional or modern way of life in general were not easily resolved. Consequently, those that had been most affected by social change sought a clarity of moral commitment that had existed during the days of the revolution, they turned more and more to the integrative symbols and revolutionary fervor expounded b y the President.3^ Perhaps most damaging of all to the existence of parliamentary democracy was the unstable influence on the cabinet exerted increasing ly by forces that operated outside the constitutional governmental pro cesses. During the liberal period ... constitutional democracy worked as a set of "club rules" of political behavior, a system of restrained solutions of political issues which was made necessary by the existing distribution of power and possible by personal ties between the politically powerful. The system could be expected to last as long as power re mained dispersed and as long as personal ties within the political elite remained strong enough to bridge conflicts of interests and ideology.85 82See Edward Shils, "Political.Development in the New States C D, " Comparative.Studies in Society and History, II,No. 3 (April, 1960), 265 ff., for a discussion of. the "will to be m o d e m. " 83 For a personalized report on the. Indonesian white collar worker, see Willard A. Hanna, American Universities Field Staff Reports, WAH-15-^59. Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia,p.599. 85Ibid., p. 330. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 69] === Until the 1955 elections, the '.'set of club rules’? under which, the politi cal system operated functioned to a large extent due to the fact that the army was divided and that no monolithic mass party had emerged. Even in the periods when the army had cohesive strength it was either indecisive or effectively counterbalanced by President Sukarno. After the elections, however, the existing political order experienced from three extra-parliamentary forces a lenge to its legitimacy. persistent chal First, the army with new found (if temporary) unity was almost singlehandedly responsible for the fall of the first as well as the second Ali governments. The incident of the "Utojo Affair” where the army refused to recognize the Chief of Staff appointed by the cabinet led to the end of the first government, but of more signifi cance for future developments was the fact that Colonel Zulkifli Lubis, a major figure in the crisis, was the first man consulted before the Harahap government was formed.86 President Sukarno himself repre sented a second example of extra-parliamentary pressure. His exhor tation for a renewal of revolutionary fervor, his appeal to ”bury the parties” and his Konsepsi of February 21, 1957 calling for a govern ment coalition of the four major parties, represented increasingly hostile attacks on the constitutional system; yet, they were typical of his views expressed since 1952. Finally, the growing organizational strength of the PKI as evidenced by their election triumphs in 1955 and 1957 also established the party as a major force in the country even though it was still barred from participating in any cabinet. With the fall of the last Ali government, the balance of power in the society was radically altered in the favor of these extra- 86Ibid., pp. 394-409, 414. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 70] === constitutional forces. When Ali began his last cabinet the dominant conflict was between the PNI and Masjumi factions; the army still remained outside the political sphere; and the PKI, though strong, was isolated from the main governmental process. With Ali's resignation, most of the non-communist parties lost much of their importance. The Masjumi, along with the PSI, became a subordinate ally of the.regional movements led by the dissident army commanders, and the PNI, soon to suffer election losses at the hands of the PKI, strengthened its ties with President Sukarno. A "loose bi-polar" balance of power emerged consisting of the PKI, Sukarno (and his coterie of Murba supporters and other nationalists), and the central leadership of the army on one hand, and the military-civilian regional movement on the other. The parliamentary parties did not so much collapse, as did their system of legitimacy. The fact that political unrest could be so readily channeled against the existing system as a whole greatly facilitated 87 The term "loose-bipolar" is used by Morton Kaplin, System and Process in International Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957), "pp. 36-4-3, and though his system's analysis was constructed for international politics, the "loose-bipolar" concept as a macropoliti cal theory seems particularly applicable to Indonesia as a raicropolitical situation. The leading "bloc:actor" of the "Javanese" camp was the central government backed by. the powerful PKI while the regional military leadership of the key Sumatran.provinces comprised the nucleus around which the outer islands bloc formed. President Sukarno func tioned in the role of the "universal actor" since many of the regional commanders still professed loyalty to him.. The.Javanese-aristocratic bloc was able to eventually subdue the PRRI revolt because the central army command, initially uncommitted, "shifted" its allegiance to the Java-dominated central government. The nature of the present Indonesian system seems to be what Kaplan would designate as "hierarchical," though there is some question as to whether it would be "directive"or "nondirective" (pp. 48-50) given the autonomous bureaucratic nature of the Indonesian society. Cf., Donald Hindley, "Foreign Aid to Indonesia and its Political Implications," Pacific Affairs, XXXVI, No. 2 (Summer, 1963), 118. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 71] === 66 I the fail of "liberal democracy.” 88 With.that fall, the parties were not able to regain their.former importance, and other forces took their place during the events that transpired from March 1957 to.July 1959. Parliamentary democracy; the external image. Foreign policy received little attention during the tenure of the first two post independence cabinets. The policy orientation of the Hatta cabinet (December 1959 to August 1950) was reflected in the fact that diplo matic relations were established with all major Western and neutralist countries, but not with the Communist bloc countries.98 The Natsir cabinet (September 1950 to March 1951) like its predecessor was mild ly pro-Western; it avoided, however, American pressures to support its policies in Korea and the Far East and rejected an offer of military aid in October 1950. Indonesia’s representative in the United Nations played a conciliatory role in the Korean War debates and abstained in the vote to brand Communist Chinaes an aggressor. Both cabinets made little attempt to force action over the unresolved issue of West New Guinea, and their lack of initiative in general brought criticism from the nationalist segments in the country— particularly the PNI. The Sukiman government (April 1951 to February 1952), in con trast to the earlier cabinets, took more an active and partisan stand 88For an excellent recapitulation of the reasons behind the aban donment of the parliamentary system, see Feith, The Decline of Consti tutional Democracy in Indonesia, pp. 597-608. See also Kahin in Kahin, pp. 626-635. 89See Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia pp. 87, 175. "P eking sent an ambassador to Djakarta in August 1950 although Indonesia sent in exchange only a charge d 1affaire who arrived in FeJcing on January l*t, 1951. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 72] === in foreign affairs.91 Suleiman had carried out several raids against the resurgent PKI organization in August, and the government had been increasingly apprehensive about the effect that a growing and assertive Chinese diplomatic establishment in Djakarta would have on the Chinese community in Indonesia. In this light, Indonesia's foreign policy under Sukiman is of some interest since.it mostly focused chiefly on relations with the United States, and its pro-Western stance probably led to the eventual downfall of the government. The first controversial action the cabinet took was to sign the Japanese peace treaty in San Francisco. Most of the Indonesian press opposed sending a delegation to the peace conference since the treaty would be an American product and would compromise Indonesia's independent foreign policy. The treaty also had overtones of being connected with the suspected plans of the United States to establish military and security arrangements with the Japanese government, and it was feared that this would place Indonesia within the Western cold war bloc. The government, however, felt that signing the treaty would create a more favorable atmosphere in which to negotiate "fair and reasonable" reparations with Japan. In addition, it was held "that Indonesia was geographically and strategically in the Anglo-American sphere, and that it needed foreign help to protect it against the threat of communism, domestic and international." 92 There was apparent ly some feeling that a favorable solution of the West Irian affair could only be obtained in the context of cooperation and good will with 91For a discussion of the Sukiman government's policy, see ibid., pp. 192-206. 92Ibid., p. 195. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 73] === the West. Nevertheless, the treaty was signed by the Indonesian delegate Subarjo, but never ratified by the parliament. The most important controversy in which the cabinet became embroiled was over the acceptance of American aid in accordance with the terms of the Mutual Security Act of 1951. This Act reflected the effect of the Korean war on American policy, and marked a change in the rationale of economic assistance from "recovery" to "security."93 The key section of the Act was that concerning the-obligation of the country receiving assistance. The recipient of economic and techni cal aid had to commit itself to little more than a pledge "to cooper ate in the furthering of international understanding and good will and the promotion of world security (511b)." However, if a nation wanted to receive military aid as well, it had to (among other re quirements) make a full contribution, consistent with its political and economic capacity, its population, natural resources, facili ties and general economic situation, to the development and maintenance of its own defenses and to the defensive strength of the free world (511a /4/ ). In January 1952, Indonesia accepted Mutual Security aid. Whether for tactical reasons concerning the possibility of receiving military aid at a later date, or because Foreign Minister Subarjo was unaware that Indonesia could have received non-military aid under Section 511b, agreement with the United States was signed under Section 511a despite 93 See, e.g., John Kerry King, Southeast Asia in Perspective (New York: Macmillan, 1956), pp. 106-172. qii U.S., Department of State, American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents. II, Publication, 6646 (Washington: Government Print ing Office, 1957), p. 3074. 95Ibid., p. 3073. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 74] === the fact that there were apparently no military obligations under the treaty and no military aid was involved. 96 The agreement was formalized without the knowledge of most of the cabinet, and when it came to the attention of the government, many of the members strongly objected to subsection (4) of 511a, stating that phrase "and the defensive strength of the free world" should be removed, or that the United States should accept Indonesia's interpretation of the "free world." 97 Despite a subsequent clarification of subsection (4) by the American ambassador Merle Cochran, the Masjumi party decided it could not support the sign ing of the agreement for aid under the Act's terms, and the cabinet resigned. The significance of the pro-Western orientation of the Sukiman government was that it brought attention to the nature of Indonesia's "independent" foreign policy. Many felt that Sukiman and his color ful foreign minister Subarjo had strayed too far from non-alignment in world affairs, though there was some question as to just exactly what "non-alignment" or "neutralism" or "independence" in foreign re lations actually meant. Vice President Hatta's definition of an "inde-. pendent" policy was neither one of neutrality— "neutrality is an anti social status"— nor of involvement in a third bloc— third blocs "create new suspicions and new enmities"— nor one of alignment with a cold war bloc, but "active /policy?" to work energetically for the preservation of peace... through endeavors supported if possible by a majority of the members of the United Nations." 98 In this context, Herbert 96See New York Times, February 26, 1952, p. 1. 97 Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia,p.202. 88Mohammad Hatta, "Indonesia's Foreign Policy, "Foreign Affairs, XXXI (April, 1953), 441-452. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 75] === Feith maintains that almost all the nationalists agreed that an "independence'.' policy was /one7 of optimal independence of outside.countries,... / ItT was based on Indonesia's national interests, which Included world peace, and on the desire for maxi mum opportunity for Indonesians to shape their society as they themselves wanted to, to prevent Indonesia from becoming either another power's political or cultural appendage or an ideological battle field." The Wilopo cabinet (April 1952-June 1953), the last of the administrator cabinets, was primarily concerned with a number of in ternal problems and reflected the cautious policies of the Hatta and the Natsir governments.100 It was, however, with Wilopo's successor to office, the PNI leader Ali Sastroamidjojo, that the course of Indo nesian policy took a definite turn. During Ali's first tenure in office (July 1953-July 1955), "nationalist" forces developed a domi nant voice in the government and the President himself became an in creasingly powerful figure in the making of policy. PNI-Masjumi cooperation that had marked earlier cabinets was largely absent after 1953, and with the establishment of the Ali government, Indonesian politics as stated above, was expressed in a more "revolutionary" manner. Several important international events occurred during the Ali regime that opened up opportunities for a more assertive, less isolated foreign policy.101 First, the Korean armistice was signed on July 27 shortly after the government took office, and second, China had already launched its own version of a "peaceful coexistence" with a diplomatic "Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, p. 202. 100For Wilopo's official statement on foreign policy, see Hatta, Foreign Affairs, XXXI, p p. 446-147. 101For a summary of Ali's foreign policy, see Feith, The Decline of Constitutional.Democracy;in.Indonesia, pp. 384-394.. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 76] === offensive designed to insure regular and peaceful relations with the. other non-Communist.states of Asia. India, Burma and Indonesia especially welcomed what was considered to be a genuine desire on the part of the Chinese to become a responsible member of the inter national community. This attitude of the Southeast Asian countries, of course, was diametrically opposed to the American position which was still apparently committed to the overthrow of the Peking regime. In addition, Indonesia and the other neutral Asian states also found themselves in disagreement with the position of the United States on Indo-China. The American policy of containment when applied to Asia came into conflict with Asian nationalism. Obviously,many Southeast Asian countries identified with the Vietminh to some extent, having only recently emerged from colonial rule themselves. Hoping to exert influence for a peaceful solution to the war, the foreign ministers of India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia met at Colombo, Ceylon during the first week of the Geneva proceedings. It was at the meeting of the ’’Colombo Powers” that Indonesia suggested a summit level conference of the independent African and Asian states designed to relax Cold War tensions and rally AfroAsian sentiment in the struggle against colonialism. Although the initial response to the idea was not encouraging, India eventually lent its support to the conference after a meeting in June between Nehru and Chou En-lai at which the two announced the Panch Seela of Peaceful Coexistence. Despite the fact that China used the conference to create a favorable image throughout the non-Western world, in many respects the Bandung meeting was more important for thrusting Indonesia into Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 77] === 72 102 the world s t a g e. I n addition to being the host nation and providing the opening day keynote speaker in President Sukarno, Indonesia scored two important diplomatic victories while the conference was in pro gress. The first involved the signing of the Sino-Indonesia Dual Nationality Agreement. As stated above, relations with China had not been good during the tenure of the Sukiman government, and the question of the legal status of the ethnic Chinese living in Indonesia had been a problem since the establishment of the Republic. 103 The Round Table Agreement had stipulated that those Chinese who did not opt for Chinese citizenship would automatically be. considered Indonesian citizens. This, however, had led to some confusion since the Chinese government also considered them to be Chinese citizens. The treaty signed at the Bandung Conference in 1955 provided that native Chinese living in Indonesia (or people who possessed dual nationality) must make an active choice of either Chinese or Indonesian nationality; the citizen ship of those who did not choose would be determined by paternal ancestry. 104 This treaty represented an "unprecedented concession" on behalf of China to waive her traditional claim that all ethnic Chinese were Chinese nationals, and it marked the beginning of a cordial rela tionship between the two countries. 102 For an analysis of.the preparatory background and the meeting, see George McT. Kahin, The Aslan-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955 (Ithaca: Cornell University. Press, 1956). 103 See Donald E. Willmott, The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia, 1900-1958 (Ithaca; Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 19617T 104 For a text of the treaty and analysis of its provisions, see ibid., pp. 44-66, 120-134. See also David Mozingo, "The Sino-Indonesian Dual Nationality Treaty," Asian Survey, I, No. 10 (December, 1961), 25-31. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 78] === The second issue that received favorable.action by the con ference was that concerning Indonesia* s.claim t o.the Dutch territory of West New Guinea. The Dutch had largely refused to discuss the status of the territory, although the Round Table Conference had stip ulated that the future of the territory would be decided within a year on the basis of negotiations between the two countries.105 During 1954-, the first Indonesian infiltrations (or forays) into West New Guinea had begun to take place, and in August the government had introduced the issue into international diplomacy for the first time by requesting that the United Nations place the dispute on its agenda. Indonesia failed, however, to obtain the necessary two-thirds vote in the General Assembly to pass even a rather mild resolution providing for "a solu tion in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations."106 On the other hand, the Colombo Prime Ministers who met for the Afro-Asian preparatory conference at Bogor in December 1954 passed a declaration in favor of the Indonesian position, and when the Conference met at Bandung in April 1955, the delegates affirmed support for the Indonesian claim. 107 In.addition, the conference also supported the principle of anti-colonialism which gave an added boost to the Ali government's West New Guinea campaign. 108 At this stage, Indonesia's foreign policy was best described as active and vigorous. It was in creasingly coming more under the personal influence of Sukarno and his "revolutionary nationalism," and its "independent" stance was gradually 105See below, pp. 108ff. 10®General Assembly, 9th Session, GA/509, December 10, 1954. 107 See "Final Communique of the Asian-African Conference;" in Kahin, The Asian-African Conference, p. 82. 10®See ibid., p. 81. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 79] === taking on an anti-colonial bias. By 1955 the mold had been.cast for the formation of policy under Guided Democracy. Indonesia’s external behavior, however, had not then taken on the militant and flamboyant characteristics that wereto mark the later phase of political develop ment. The foreign policy of the last two parliamentary cabinets was mainly concerned with the explosive West New Guinea problem, but nei ther the Burhanuddin cabinet (August 1955-March 1956) nor the second Ali cabinet (March 1956-March 1957) was able to successfully negotiate a settlement with the Dutch or obtain a favorable vote in the United Nations supporting the Indonesian position. The general dissatis faction with the inability of later cabinets to follow-up the foreign policy successes scored at Bandung in 1955 was underscored by a ris ing incidence of domestic (regional)unrest evident throughout Indonesia. By the end of 1957, both the internal and external crises came to a simultaneous head. On November 29, the West New Guinea issue once again came up for a crucial vote, and, as in four previous debates, the pro-Indonesian motion failed to win the necessary two-thirds margin. 109 This diplomatic setback was followed the next day by an attempt to assassinate President Sukarno. The two events pushed the political crisis to a climax and triggered a series of events that opened a new phase in the political development of the islands. With in a few days a widespread campaign of seizure and nationalization of Dutch property was launched and many Dutch and Eurasian residents were evacuated to Holland, and the following March the parliamentary system was formally discarded with a proclamation of martial law throughout ■*-09General Assembly, 12th Session, A/PV 724, November 29, 1957. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 80] === the islands. This last action seems to h ave.pushed the regional leaders to a point of no return in their dissatisfaction with the central government in Djakarta. The 1957-1958 revolts and the images.110 The first or pre liminary stage of the regional revolts began with large scale "barter trade" of copra in North Sulawesi and rubber in North Sumatra which was usually sanctioned by regional military commanders. A period of personal clashes among key officers in the army leadership ensued, followed by scattered plots against the government and central army command— the most notable one attempted by the strongly "anti-communist" (or perhaps opportunistic) Colonel Lubis. Divergent political and eco nomic opinions within the army began to develop, paralleling those that had already divided the political parties. The second phase saw a series of bloodless coup d'etats take place, first in December 1956, when army-led councils seized power from the civilian governors in north central and south Sumatra, and next in March 1957, when a simi lar council was established in East Indonesia— at this time includ ing Sulawesi, the Moluccas and the Lesser Sundas. The Djakarta government reacted in an ambiguous manner to the regional challenge. Sukarno took advantage of Batak.ethnic enmity and the unrest among the estate squatters near Medan to re-establish Summaries of the events surrounding the revolts can be found in Herbert Feith and Daniel S. Lev, "The End of the Indonesian Re bellion," Pacific Affairs, XXXVI, No. 1 (Spring, 1963), 32-46; Justus M. van der Kroef, "Instability in Indonesia," Far Eastern Survey, XXVI, No. 4 (April 1957), 49-62; van der Kroef, "Disunited Indonesia,” Far Eastern Survey,XXVII. No. 4 (April,.1958):, 48-57; van der Kroef, "Disunited Indonesia II." Far Eastern Survey.. XXVII, No. 5 (May, 1958), 73-80; Feith. The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, pp. 578-538; and Willard Hanna, AUFS Reports. WAH-13-59. The best journal istic account is by James Mossman, Rebels in Paradise (London: Jonathan Cjape, 1961). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 81] === 76 central control over the vital NorfchpSumatra export producing area. Colonel Djamin Gintings, a Karo Batak, was sent to the area where, with the help of PKI-leaning estate workers, he wrested control of the region from the rebellious Colonel M. Simbolon, a Toba Batak. central and southern Sumatra, the central government refused to.recog nize the army-sponsored councils of Colonel Husein and Colonel Barlian; Djakarta nevertheless spent most of 1957 in negotiation with the regional commanders, both of whom continued to express loyalty to the President. The general demand of the regions was for greater economic autonomy and a Hatta-led presidential cabinet, which in essence would have been a Masjumi-PSI oriented government. Sukarno countered this demand with his konsepsi of a National Council and a gotong rojong (mutual help) cabinet composed of the PKI, PNI, NU and the Masjumi; but, as expected, he received support for his idea only from the PKI, PNI and the small Murba party. 111 The army's solution 119 to the problem was martial law and this action, of course, was taken when Ali’s government fell in March. 113 The effect was to legalize the power already assumed by the regional commanders, but it also gave the army's central leadership a greater hand in civilian affairs. When the PNI failed to put together a new coalition government, the President designated himself "citizen Sukarno" and formed an "emergency extra-parliamentary" cabinet headed by Prime Minister ^ ■ F o r a summary of Sukarno's views, see Kahin in Kahin, pp. 636640. 112 For a summary of the army's views, see ibid., pp. 640-64-3. 113 See Presidential Act 23/1957, later replaced by Presidential Decision 315/1959, The New Regulation on t h e.State of Emergency (mimeographed). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 82] === Djuanda. 114 Tae new government at once.set up a National Council, which, though possessing only advisory status, nevertheless weakened the elected parliament and strengthened the President1s.position since he had argued for it as a part of an over-all transformation of the parliamentary system. 115 The Council was composed of party members and representatives of functional groups and presaged the eventual infiltration of parliament by these same groups as well as members of the armed forces. In November, after a period of inactivity, the felations', be tween the regionalists and Djakarta again became strained. The seizure of Dutch property and the support of the army central command had placed the central government and Sukarno in a significantly stronger position. On February 10, 1958, an ultimatum was issued by the re gionalists through their spokesman Colonel Husein who demanded the resignation of Prime Minister Djuanda, the formation of a cabinet by either Hatta or Hamengku Buwono, Sultan of Jogjakarta, and that Sukarno assume a "constitution position." The Djakarta government refused, and five days later the regionalists in Central Sumatra and North Sulawesi 114 Under the 1950 constitution, one of the few explicit powers the President had was the right to designate those who were to form the new cabinet (formateurs), and in accordance with their recommendations, to appoint the new Prime Minister. The constitutional position of the President as the "Head of State" in relation to the "Government" was, however, rather vague. Consequently, Sukarno was free to interpret a number of issues in any way that he wished, and he often exercised a great influence on the actual operation of the "Government." His ac tion in designating himself "formateur" was clearly a "stretching" of the constitutional provision. See A.K. Pringgodigdo The Office of the President in Indonesia as Defined in the Three Constitutions in fKeory and Practice (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1957), p. 23. For a good discussion of the relationship between the President and the Government, see Kahin in Kahin, pp. 601-604. ^See Ruslan Abdulgani, "Indonesia's National Council: The First Year," Far Eastern Survey, XXVII, No. 7 (July, 1960), 97-104. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 83] === 78n proclaimed a rebel government,- the Pemerintah Revolusioner Republic Indonesia (PRRI), in the Minangkabau city of Padang, Sumatra, with Sjarifuddin Prawiranegara as Prime Minister. 116 Only Colonel Simbolon in Tapanuli gave signs of support for the PRRI, however, and though the Toradja people in Central and South Sulawesi, the Bandjarese in Kalimantan and the Atjehnese professed sympathy for the rebels and rendered at best half hearted support to Djakarta, they gave no commitment to the Padang government. The Darul Islam movement also failed to support the rebellion since its leadership was divided on the issue and it objected to the modern reformist orientation of the PRRI. But most important of all, the rich and strategic South Sumatran province under Colonel Barlian adopted a "wait and see" attitude. Due to surprisingly decisive action by the central government the rebel forces were soon limited to guerrilla action. By mid-May both Padang and Bukittingi had fallen to government forces and by the end of July with the fall of Manado in Sulawesi no major town remained in rebel hands.117 The sympathy of the United -States was not with the Djakarta ‘ government during the early stages of the revolution. American rela tions with Indonesia had not been warm since American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had branded neutralism and non-alignment as an "immoral and shortsighted conception. "... In addition, the general 116 The revolt in North Sulawesi, formerly a part of East Indonesia but now separate, was proclaimed under the Permesta ("the Charter for Universal Struggle") banner, and most participants regarded themselves as distinct from the PRRI though there were some Permesta ministers in the PRRI. See Feith and L e v, Pacific Affairs, XXXVI, N o. 1, 36. 117 See van der Kroef, Far Eastern Survey, XXVII, No. 5, 73-75. 118Cited in Oliver E. Clubb, Jr., The United States and the SinoSoviet Bloc in Southeast Asia (Washington: The Brookings Institution, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 84] === American view of Sukarno's West Irian campaign was that it was "Communistinspired"119 and the official position of the United.States in.the United Nations was to abstain whenever the Indonesia-Dutch dispute came before the General Assembly. 120 Given this background the rebels applied for SEATO assistance, and Secretary of State Dulles announced that the United States was adopting an attitude of "strict neutrality." 121 Other similar statements during the revolt gave substance to the general belief that the CIA and other "American allies" were giving major aid to the rebels. A few "soldiers of fortune" flew planes for the rebels, it was contended, based on Taiwan, 122 and in the thinking of many who had witnessed Nationalist Chinese activity in northern Burma, this was merely another joint-Kuomingtang-CIA venture. 123 Of the other countries in the region, Syngman Rhee’s offer to send South Korea soldiers to aid rebels was particularly resented by the Indonesians, and even the Philippines was suspected of allowing rebel aircraft sanctuary between missions. But more importantly for future events, the attitude of Malaya and the British territories during the revolts is of great interest. First, the wide-spread and lucrative smuggling between the outer islands and "Malaysia" that had preceded" the rebellion had been a constant source of irritation. In addition, the British were generally believed to 119Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesian Rebels and American Policy," United Asia, X (1958), pp. 212-217. ^Ogee.below, p. 122. 121Clubb, p. 89. 122Ibid., p. 90. The most famous of these "volunteers" was Bucky Pope, who was shot down while straffing Presidential palace in Djakarta, and later was tried and convicted. 123Dulles stated at the time that the United States was under no obligation to control the activities of the "soldiers of fortune." See New York Times, May 2, 1958, p» **• Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 85] === have permitted the rebels to use Singapore as a base of operations, and it was charged that Malaya and the north Bornean protectorates gave political asylum and direct aid to the rebels. In this light, Indonesian foreign Minister Subandrio’s charac terization of the revolts as "rebellion with foreign subversion" is not entirely unjustifiable. 125 Subandrio further depicted Indonesia's image of the region by remarking: If you look at a map of our country, you can see that we are surrounded by states which have associated themselves.in SEATO or which are members of the Commonwealth. As a matter of fact we are isolated.126 124 For one journalistic account of the revolt in the Celebes that describes northern Borneo as a hot bed of rebel activity, see William Stevenson, Bird's Nests in Their Beards (Boston, 1964), p. 193. 125Subandrio, "The Tasks of the Foreign Service," speech July 20, 1959,in Indonesia on the March: A Collection of Addresses by Dr. Subandrio (Djakarta: Department of Foreign Affairs, 19637, p. 97. The extent of American and British involvement in the rebellion can be found in Mossman, Rebels in Paradise, Stevenson, Bird's.Nests in their Beards, and David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Invisible Government (New York: Random House, 1963), pp. 136-154. 126Subandrio, Indonesia on the March, pp. 97-98. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 86] === III. GUIDED DEMOCRACY AND THE WEST IRIAN DISPUTE: THE GENESIS OF CONFRONTATION We should carry out the policy for the liberation of West Irian in a revolutionary manner, revolu tionary in terms of the language of the Indonesian National Revolution. The era of Guided Democracy can be conveniently divided into two periods: the first ending with the Indonesian takeover of West Irian on December 31, 1962; the second coming to a close with the military takeover of the government in March 1966. This chapter will be con cerned with the first period, focusing on the establishment of Guided Democracy, the nature of the tenuous but viable balance of political power that developed after the collapse of the parliamentary system, and the dynamics of the successful West Irian campaign. The Internal Image The establishment of Guided Democracy. The 1957 regional re volts set the stage for the emergence of a new internal balance of power in Indonesia. The revolts created, first of all, a crisis situation in which Sukarno soon became the chief source of political authority throughout S u k a r n o, "Like an Angel that Strikes from the Skies," August 17, 1960, in Toward Freedom and the Dignity of Man: A Collection of Five Speeches (Djakarta: Department of Foreign Affairs, 1961), p. 110. 81 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 87] === the country. In addition, the declaration of martial law propelled the army into a position of widespread political power; many military commanders were placed in strategic positions in the government admin istration, especially the operation of the newly confiscated Dutch property. Finally, in the midst of the turmoil, the Communist party won a decisive victory in the 1957 regional elections, demonstrating that it was the best organized and the most powerful political party in Indonesia. In this rather chaotic environment, a new system of government gradually began taking shape in Djakarta that was almost entirely a reflection of the political thought of the President. Sukarno had repeatedly expressed his disapproval of parliamentary government and the pluralistic political system ("free fight liberalism") that had existed prior to 1957. He advocated at the national level instead the musjawarah-mufakat process of decision-making found in the Indonesian villages. Such a process involves a "coming to the sense of meeting" (mufakat) through a subtle process of consultation (musjawarah). In this context, the political leader assumes a paternal (bapak) relation ship and personal rapport with the political community, and guides.it in a direction that best reflects the general interest and welfare. ^The PKI vote in Java alone rose from 5,477,207 to 7,514,197 in 1957. See Donald Hindley, "President Sukarno and the Communists: The Bolities of Domestication," American Political Science Review, LVI, No.4 (December, 1962), 915-926. T h e.votes of the four major parties in 1957 from Java (excluding Djogjakarta), Greater Djakarta, and South Sumatra show: PKI, 6,864,955; NU, 5,587,477; PNI, 5,503,294; Masjumi, 4,250,180. See J. D. Legge, Central Authority and Regional Autonomy: A Study in Local Administration, 1950-1960 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961), pp. 225-226; and Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955 (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1957), p. 65. This seems to be the conclusion of Jeanne S. Mintz, Mohammed, Marx and Marhaen (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 222-227. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 88] === Sukarno asserted: At no matter what level, the system can only work where there is leadership; there must be a leader capable of stating what the decision i&... There is a difference between our democracy and democracy of other places,... Democracy of the East, or more precisely Indonesian democracy, is a democracy accompanied by leadership.^ This conception of democracy obviously runs counter to the nature of the political process found in many Western parliamentary systems. Ideas of representation, either as a ’'delegate’' or "trustee," are almost totally absent, and parliamentary institutions and political parties are often viewed as merely serving the government to mobilize the energies of the population and organize public opinion.** There is little emphasis on the parties serving as "political brokers" to reduce the demands of the people to workable number of alternate choices and to effect an equilibrium of competing forces in the society.^ The people are often viewed "as an indifferentiated mass, whose interests are overwhelmingly common rather than mutually antagonistic." To the extent that the national leaders of Southeast Asia seek to act as representatives of all their peoples and not as brokers aggregating specific interests, they per form in much the same manner as did the dominant leaders Personal interview by George McT. Kahin, "Indonesia," in Major Governments of Asia, ed. George McT. Kahin (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), pp. 638 and n. 3. ^See Mohammad Hatta, Past and Future (Ithaca: Modern Indonesia Project, 1960), especially p. 12. For a discussion of the concept of political brokers, see Lucien W. Pye, "Administrators, Agitators and Brokers," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXII, No. 5 (Fall, 1958), 342-348, especially p. 346. See, also, Gabriel A. Almond, "A Comparative.Study of Interest Groups and the Political Pro cess,” American Political Science Review, LII, No. 1 (March, 1958), 274-. 278. Rupert Emerson, "The Erosion of Democracy," Journal of Asian Studies, XX, No. 1 (November, 1960), 1-8. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 89] === in the traditional Southeast Asian societies. It will be remembered that historically the rulers in the.region were conceived of as embodying all the interests of their people.® Therefore, Sukarno conceived of representation as ‘.'functional," not elected or popular. He proposed that representatives should be nomi nated "in family spirit" from various interest groups and parties by the bapak (Sukarno). Representation in this context, unlike the "dis ruptive" practices of the liberal electoral system, could express the national will as a "concentration of national strengths." Functional representation virtually dictated from the center would reflect the new principle of leadership, solve the crisis of authority, but differ from dictatorship in that there would be deliberation, consent and unanimity— and hence unity where before there was only dualism.10 According to Sukarno, the Indonesian concept of deliberation would abandon majority decision. Decisions by a representative body would be possible only if mufakat or unanimity was reached, and if this was impossible, the question would be referred to the President for a decision.11 Such an arrangement supposes Presidential leadership to be a repository of truth or inner wisdom, not merely an instrument of government. Hence, in Platonic terminology, there is a strong tendency to conceive of politics primarily in moral terms, as a quest for the °Lucien W. Pye, "Southeast Asia," in Gabriel A. Almond and James Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 124 See Indonesia, Supreme Advisory Council, Decision Respecting Spe cification of the Political Manifesto of the Republic of~Indonesia of the 17th of August 1959 (Djakarta: Department of Information, 1960), pp. 12-14. (Hereafter cited as Decision on the Political Manifesto.) 10Ibid., p. 9; and Sukarno, "The Rediscovery of Our Revolution" (here after cit ed as Political Manifesto), speech, August 17, 1959, in Toward Freedom and the Dignity of Man, p. 62. Cf. Jose Arseno Torres, "The Political Ideology of GuTcTed Democracy," Review of Politics, XXV, No. 1.• ^ S u c h a procedure was later passed as law. See Presidential Regu lation 28/1960, and Rules of Procedure of the Gotong-Rojong Parliament, fcrts. 103 and 104, cited in Selo Soemardjan, "Some Social and Cultural J Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 90] === 12 "good”— in Sukarno's words "the just and prosperous society." All action involving movement toward this goal, "deliberative" or "guided," is democratic. 13 This then was Sukarno's conception of government and.it largely reflected the actual nature of Guided Democracy as it came into being. Whatever power the President may have developed in shrewdly manipulat ing Indonesia's political forces, his position of dominance in govern ment during Guided Democracy and the aura of legitimacy that developed around his office is due in part to the fact that he was able to success fully project his image as the father of the "national" family who alone possessed the capability of directing and providing for the harmony and well-being of the country.^ "Guided Democracy," he maintained, "is the democracy of the family."^ The new konsepsi largely met with the approval of the army. The military in general had never been very happy with the parliamen tary system. The famous "October 17 Affair" was an attempt in 1952 by several officers to persuade Sukarno to take reins of the government and abandon the 1950 constitution. 16 George Kahin states rather Implications of Indonesia’s Unplanned and Planned Development," Review of Politics, XXV, No. 1 (January, 1963), 85. 12 See Guy J. Pauker, "Political Doctrines and Practical Politics in Southeast Asia," Pacific Affairs, XXXV, No. 1 (Spring, 1962), 4. 13 See Government Statement on the Implementation of Democracy with Leadership Within the Frame of Returning to the 1945 Constitution, made by First Minister Djuanda before the Plenary Meeting of the house of Representatives on March 2, 1959 (Washington: Embassy of Indonesia, n.d.), Ill See Kahin in Kahin, pp. 636-640, for a parallel discussion of the President1s views. 15 Political Manifesto» p. 62. 16 For an account of the important, but highly confusing "affair," see Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia |(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 246-273. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 91] === 86 categorically that it was the army that initially called for the " r e turn" to the 1945 Constitution and a system where principle power was delegated to t h e. P r e s i d e n c y. T h e increasing involvement of the military in politics, Kahin goes on to point out, can be traced to the fact that there was no "Sandhurst1. 1 tradition among the Indonesian officers as in the Indian army where most of the professional soldiers were trained in England and endowed with an attitude of the military as an instrument of civilian political authority.^® The Indonesian army emerged from the revolutionary period with the feeling that, having led the successful revolt against the Dutch, they were entitled to participate in the post-independence government. This feeling was reinforced by the training that most of the officers received from the Japanese during the Occupation which viewed the revolution as a source of legitimate political authority. 19 The army also believed, rightly or wrongly, that the pre-1957 cabinets sought to extend party factionalism among, the military leaders,, and the parties were blamed for destroying the unity of the army. addition, many of the less professionally trained members of the army were particularly embittered when the first few "administrator" govern ments sought to "rationalize" the military structure, i.e., to reduce 17See Kahin in Kahin, p. 662. 1 8Ibid., pp. 640-61. One might now question the "Sandhurst" legacy in former British colonies in view of the military regimes in Pakistan, Burma and most recently in Ghana and Nigeria. 19 Guy J. Pauker, "The Role of the Military in Indonesia," in John J. Johnson (ed.), The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Prince ton: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 201, 209, points.out that the. Japanese trained officers received only "tactical" not "strategic1. 1 training. They "lacked the training and habit of acting in accordance with broad stra tegic plans," and were continually involved on the fringe of politics, settling for"small gains, individual rewards, or at best tactical ob- Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 92] === 87 the size and nature of the army from a mass-based group to a technologically efficient force. 20 Finally, the military opposed the.parliamentary and popular electoral system due to the alarming growth of the PKI which had scored impressive gains in the 1957 regional elections and which would most surely have picked up more votes— perhaps an absolute parlia mentary majority— if the 1959 national elections had been held. With the President and the army fully committed to the destruc tion of the pre-1957 system of government there was little chance of its survival. In October 1956, while parliamentary government was in its death.throes, the President called on the nation to "bury the par ties11 and replace them with a national front and he hinted that he had a plan (konsepsi) of his own which 21 The konsepsi, "If I am asked, I will, God willing, announced on February 21, 1957, called for a coalition ("four legged") cabinet of all major political groups including the Communist party ("since I cannot ride a three legged horse") and for the formation of a national council representing all the major interests in the country and expressing a "common national will." 22 The new "working cabinet" formed after the resignation of Ali Sastroamidjojo's last cabinet the National Council 23 did not include any members of the PKI; was established, however, and this act was symbolic 20 For a discussion of the political pressure involved in the rationalization campaign, see Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, pp. 78-82, 171-172, 207-214. 21Cited in ibid., p. 517. 2^For a good discussion of the events surrounding the speech, see ibid., pp. 538-555. 23-phe Council was slightly altered after the revival of the 1945 Constitution and renamed the Supreme Advisory Council. The chairman of the council, Ruslan Abdulgani, has explained its composition and opera tion in "Indonesia’s National Council: The First Year, "Far Eastern purvey, XXVII, No. 7 (July, 1958), 97-104. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 93] === of the institutional changes that w e r e.to take place in the next two years. After the regional revolts were brought under control, the long proposed National Planning Council, headed by Muhammad Yamin, was estab lished. It included representatives from the PKI, PNI,.NU and Murba parties in addition to various functional groups, but conspicuously 24 excluded PSI and Mas jumi members. To leave no doubt as to the direction of the future shape of events, Sukarno revived the 1945 Constitution in August 1959 after a refusal to do so by the Constituent Assembly which had been elected in 1955 to draft a new constitution. Next, due to a dispute over the 1960 budget, the the elected President dissolved parliament (and all provincial and regional councils) in March 1960, and in the following June reappointed a new functional gotong rojong parliament, the Council of People's Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR). The DPR consisted of 283 members of whom only 129 were party representatives, and in a portentious note, the PSI and Masjumi were again excluded. The following month the parties were "simplified11 through a Presidential decree which proscribed the PSI and Masjumi; the remaining parties were subj ect to certain organizational regulations and loosely amalgamated in a national front whose activities were directed by a central board 26 Finally, in November, in 24 See Indonesia, Act No. 80 of The Year 1958 Concerning the National Planning Council (Djakarta: Ministry of Information, Special Release No. 56, 1959), p. 1-10. 25 Presidential Confirmations No. 3/1960, No. 6/1959 and No. 5/1960. See Legge, pp. 225-226. 26 See Presidential Act 7/1959 on Political Parties and Presiden tial Regulation 13/1960, and Presidential Regulation• 15/1959 on the. New National Front;.and "Like an Angel.That Strikes From the Skies,"pp. 94-6. The Masjumi and PSI were dissolved in accordance with the Act's |Art. 9 which prohibits the operation of parties which are "against the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 94] === 89 TABLE 1: PARTY REPRESENTATION AND ALIGNMENT IN INDONESIA Par>tya PBNPIR- 10 17 PNI- 36 57 PNI 44 PartindoIPKI- PertiNahdatul Ulama- MurbaPKI - ParkindoPartai Katholik— PSII- 13 45 32e 67 27 23 131 232 260 283 17 49 Independents S others Functional Groups Total 36 30 57 PSI---Masjumi- BPS Democratic League aThe full names of the parties are as follows: PRN (National People's Party), PIR (Greater Indonesia Association Party), PNI (Indo nesian Nationalist Party), Parkindo (Indonesian Christain Party), Partai Katholik (Catholic Party), PSII (Islamic Association Party of Indonesia), Murba (Proletariat Party), PKI (Indonesian Communist Party), PSI (Indo nesian Socialist Party), and the Masjumi (Consultative Council of Indo nesian Moslems). ^Seats in the Provisional Parliament, March 1951 (Herbert Feith, "The Dynamics of Guided Democracy" in Indonesia, ed. Ruth T. McVey (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files /HRAF/ Press, 1963), p. 345 cSeats in the Elected Parliament, August 1956 (ibid.). ^Seats in the appointed Gotong Rojong Parliament, July 1960 (ibid.). eThe PKI actually elected 39 and t h e.Partai Katholik six members (Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955. pp. 58-59. *Under NASAKOM, the President in his Decisions Nos. 128/1961 (April 12) and 440/1961 (July 21) officially recognized three nationalist (NAsj0, nalista) parties (PNI, IPKI, and Partindo), five religious (Agama) parties (NU, Partai Katholik, PSII, Parkindo, Perti), two communist iKOMunista) parties (PKI and Partai Murba). The Partindo broke away from the PNI in 1958; it was considered to exceed- the PNI i n.its nationalistic fervor and to be more totally committed to Sukarno’s "revolutionary" program. The Partai Murba was banned in January 1965 by President Sukarno mainly as a Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 95] === TABLE 1— Continued result of the September 30 revolt; the PKI was banned, on -March.11, 1966. There were two major.attempts.to form an organization.to check the leftward tendencies of Guided Democracy: (1) the Democratic League, formed in March, 1960, initiated primarily by members from the Masjumi and PSI, never proved much' of a threat to Sukarno and finally collapsed with the arrest of the leading members of the Masjumi and the PSI in January 1962; and (2) the Body for the Promotion of Sukarnoism (BPS), formed in August 1964 by leaders of the Murba and supported by right wing Muslim and Nationalist politicians and army officers, was proscribed in December 1964- by the President as being inconsistent with the concept of NASAKOM (see b&low, p. 158. accordance with the provisions of the 194-5 Constitution, Sukarno appointed a hew People's Deliberative Assembly (Madjelis Permusjawaratan Rakjat, MPR). The Assembly is the highest state organ under the 1945 Constitu tion and the body to which the President is constitutionally responsible, and with its establishment the major institutional framework of Guided Democracy was completed (see Figure 1). The political triangle. Notwithstanding the "guided" aspect of democracy in Indonesia, political power was diffused, not monolithic. One aspect of the loosely structured political system that developed in the country was the evolving triangular relationship between Sukarno, the army and the PKI. This "tri-polar" balance of power formed the basis of the tenuous and often confusing political equilibrium that characterized Guided Democracy and best illustrates the reasons for the political ascendency of President Sukarno. One advantage of the vaguely worded 1945 Constitution was that it did not restrict the free-wheeling, "manipulative" 27 style of the aim and goal of the state," and/or "are active in.,.. taking part in... or are clearly giving aid to a rebellion." The smaller parties which could not meet minimum organizational requirements of 150,000 members in at least 65 regencies were also banned. 27 For the "manipulative"and "bargaining" aspects of Sukarno's. ule, see Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 96] === Supreme. Ad v is o r y c o u n c il N A T IO N A L P l a n n in g C O U N C IL P R E.S IO IU N V ELECTED^X IV P A R> S ( O T O N O R O J O' C A 6IN E T P A K L I ANIENT Cd p p o RETOOLING A p p a ra tu s “ V 5 sl u lf7l2C p r e Km Ae c:V PEOPLE’S FRO NT MASS ORGANS ASSEMBLY MPR AND R E P R E S E N T A T IV E ORGANS n a tio n a l (K -O T l) CONSULTATIVE D E L IB E R A /T IV E OPERATIONAL Co m m a n d EKECUTIVE ORGANS aAdapted from Feith in McVey, Indonesia, p. 365. The arrows in dicate formal lines of authority. Actual practice, however, would indi cate that the President exercised a traditional "umbrella-like" authority over all institutions. See D. Mackinzie Brown, The White Umbrella (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958), p. 157. ^Sukarno’s relations with the appointed DPR paralleled the village system of government. He was not responsible to the DPR, but he could not dissolve it. The DPR could submit legislation, but it had to be rat ified by the President; in case of disagreement, the President had the power to issue "regulations" in lieu of statutes. cIn theory, Sukarno was subordinate to the MPR; in practice, he dominated the assembly during the period in question. The MPR, how ever, reasserted its constitutional authority in July 1966 by rescinding Sukarno’s "President-for-life" title, prohibiting him from issuing de crees and ordering a review of his "regulations" since 1959. ^The Pepertl (Supreme War Authority) was established to implement martial law. It was largely succeeded by the KOTI (Supreme Operational Command) which directed the West Irian and Malaysian campaigns. eAfter the military-sponsored FNPIB (Front for the Liberation of West Irian) was replaced by Sukarno's own National Front in 1960, the army established the BPPR (Body to Develop the Potential of the Function al Groups)as a means to bolster its organizational strength. ' F i g u r e. 1: In s t i t u t i o n s G u l d e.d D e m o c r a c y - Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 97] === 92 President to any set organizational procedures of decision-making. Although he was responsible to the MPR and was bound to work within its broad policy declarations, he effectively dominated the Assembly, and it met only infrequently-— though often enough to declare Sukarno "President for Life" in 1963. His assumed power to inact "regulations" and issue "decrees" if the DPR failed to reach unanimity, practically speaking, made him the sole legislator in Indonesia, and his self-proclaimed au thority to appoint and remove was a deft tool in equalizing and balan cing forces in the country. The President, however, lacked an organized base of power of his own, and the actual exercise of political authority was the result of a tacitly assumed division of powers between the army leadership and him self. The army took a leading role in many regional and provincial level governments (especially where the central government administration was not strong), 28 in supervising the confiscated estates, in suppressing the lingering remnants of the rebellion, and even in banning or regulating certain political movements considered dangerous to the nation's— and the army's— best interests. in the 29 Sukarno emerged unchallenged role of formulating and articulating state ideology and goals, 28 For a discussion of the pamong pradja and regional autonomy in administration, see Legge, pp. 1-61. 29 Some mention should be made of the army's initial success in organizing mass movement "cooperative bodies" t o.coordinate army activi ties among various functional groups and compete with similar PKI organi zations. The most notable efforts were the army-led Nation Front for the Liberation of West Irian (FNPIB)— later dissolved by the President— and the 1961 Body to Develop the Potential of t h e.Functional Groups which was accorded parliamentary representation. See, e.g., Guy J. Pauker, "The Role of Political Organizations in Indonesia," Far Eastern Survey, XXVII, No. 9 (September, 1958), 141; and Herbert Feith, "Dynamics of Guided Democracy," in Indonesia, ed. Ruth T. McVey (New Haven: Human Relations:Area File /HRAF/ Press, 1963), pp. 335-336. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 98] === and he fashioned almost singlehandedly the revolutionary symbols with which he sought to give the nation a sense of momentum "back to the rails of the revolution." 30 In addition, the President's nationalist lieutenants, Yamin, Saleh, Abdulgani, Subandrio and.others were placed in important government positions, building up sizeable followings within the administrative system (particularly the Education and Information Ministries) and mass organizations.31 There was frequent speculation concerning the reluctance of the military to seize complete control of the government. Although the army possessed the power necessary to maintain order, there were many reasons that inhibited outright take-over of government by the military. First, in a country passing through a painful decolonization adjustment there were few— many said, only one— sources of legitimacy, consensus and stability, and Sukarno's charisma seemed vital for the continued prestige of the army and its valid claim to power. 32 The image of the army was still tainted by the memory of the "October 17 Affair" and the regional revolts in 1957. There appeared, moreover, to be widespread civilian opposition to military government, 33 a feeling that was con stantly nurtured by the rapidly growing PKI organization. Second, it has been suggested that the military elite did not want to be "accused by history" for having destroyed the progress of democracy; 34this assertion, however, may well revert to a deeper v. 30Ibid., pp. 327-328. 31Ibid., p. 377. 3^Pauker in Johnson, p. 217. 33Feith in.McVey, p. 329. 3l*See Rude Pirngadie, "The Problem of the Government and the Army in Indonesia" (unpublished paper, Harvard University Center for Inter national Affairs, 1960), pp. 89-104. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 99] === reluctance to attempt the overthrow of bapak Presiden and/or a more 35 than superficial commitment to achieving mufakat. The lack of severe fighting during the 1957-1958 revolts and the amicable surrender terms support the contention that the rebels only intended to "jockey for position" and put a subtle pressure on the central government for more regional autonomy, but were forced to call their own bluff when Djakarta refused to meet their demands. 36 As James Mossman points out, the re volt "was surely the politest, most ambiguous civil war in modern history. "3^ Third, there were still some basic divisions within the mili tary ranks and this inhibited unified and positive action by the army. Similar to the dichotomies that divided the civilian elites, there were tensions between many of the younger and older officers, the latter of whom, having been prominent in the struggle against the Dutch, accused the former of not having the proper revolutionary zeal. The second manifestation of this split, and closely related to the first, is the division that exists between the Javanese-oriented officers and the Islamic-leaning officers of West Java and the outer islands. The Islamic officers became less enthusiastic about working within the militantly nationalistic Guided Democracy system, yet they were restrained Pauker in Johnson, pp. 217-219, refers to the shame or malu orientation of Indonesian society,- always wishing to please, never wanting to suffer a loss of face. This characteristic, Pauker states, when added to the deferent feeling of bapakism, results in a cultural deterrent to Sukarno's overthrow. The deliberate, almost subtle pro cess of removing President Sukarno from office after the 1966 coup is an interesting footnote to this phenomenon. 3®Herbert Feith and Daniel S. Lev, "The End of the Indonesian Rebellion," Pacific Affairs, XXXVI., No. 1 (Spring, 1963), 42. 37 James Mossman, Rebels in Paradise (London: Jonathan Cape, 1961), p. 7. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 100] === from taking concerted action by officers more i n.tune with the Java nese dominated government.38 The replacement of General Nasution by General Achmed Jani as Commander-in-Chief of the army in June, 1963 is an example of this problem. While both men were considered to.be anti-communist— Jani was later murdered in the "September 30" coup— the appointment of Jani was taken as a "swing to the left" due to the fact that he was more oriented to Sukarno’s policies. Perhaps the most important factor in the inability of the mili tary to take full power was the result of the President’s courtship and relations with the PKI. state party, 40 In the absence of a cohesive, monolithic he needed a strong countervailing power as an institu tional check to oppose the army and to insure his preeminent role in the policy-making process. suited to his needs. The communist organization was admirably The party claimed the largest membership of any Indonesian party and was supported by a mammoth network of affiliated "rice roots" movements and many communist sympathizing regional and local officials.^ The PKI was of great assistance to the President 38Pauker in Johnson, p. 208, 218-219. 39 Herbert Feith, "President Sukarno, the Army and the Communists: The Triangle Changes Shape," Asian Survey, IV, No. 8 (August, 1964), p. 970. 40 Sukarno made little attempt to form the loosely knit national front into an instrument of power for himself. It may be he feared the army might take it over or that the communists were much too well or ganized to be assimilated into the group. His real reasons may well have revolved around his commitment to synthesize opposing views and create a harmonious consensus in society, and to his amazing ability of playing off one opposing group against another. As Feith has pointed out: "Sukarno’s political style is manipulative rather than organizational" (Herbert Feith, "Indonesia," in Government and Poli t i c of Southeast Asia, ed. George McT. Kahin /Ithaca: Cornell Univer sity Press, 1965/, p. 242). ^ B y October 1962, the PKI claimed to have increased its member ship to two million, while, its four major functional organizations (BTI, SOBSI, Permuda Rakjat and Gerwani) claimed eleven million members. See Bindley, American Political Science Review, LVI, No. 4, 917. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 101] === 96 in helping to thwart a Hatta-led government in 1957 and providing a continuing obstacle to a less "revolutionary" oriented army government. This relationship, however, did not propel the communists into power. The benefits that were hoped to be gained by the PKI from nationalist agitation and economic decline were offset by serious dis advantages. Although the President acted as a buffer against repressive military action against the party, he virtually denied the PKI the access to power by parliamentary means when the often postposed 1959 elections were put off once more in 1962. Local and regional councils— often centers of communist power— were also "retooled" along with the national political institutions, and Sukarno made it clear that he would tolerate neither opposition nor criticism, contentions which were born out by the "simplifications" of the party system and the dis solution of the elected parliament in 1960. Hence, the PKI was under threat of repressive action should the Central Committee have decided on a more militant line of action and was generally reduced to working within a strict "Sukarnoist" line. In short, the party became, in Hindley's terminology, thoroughly "domesticated" or neutralized.^^ Ironically, Sukarno served the same legitimizing function for the PKI as he had done for the army. As Kahin notes: This has been a sort of double marriage of convenience wherein Sukarno is the bigamist: he has needed the army's support, and the top army officers have required his back ing: he has needed the Communist Party's support, and it has remained dependent upon him for protection against the army.^ ^ S e e ibid., pp. 915-6. 43 See ibid., pp. 915. See, also, Hindley, "The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951-1961" (Ph.D. Thesis, Australian National University, 1961), 591-64-8, later published as The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951-1963 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964). Kahin in Kahin9 p. 651. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 102] === 97 There was some speculation that due to.the declining economic situation the PKI might take over the government by acclamation;45 this possibility, however, became more remote as the militant opposition of the army, Islamic groups and outer island interests grew in relation to the party's growth. Also the bureaucracy seemed quite resistent to significant communist infiltration, just as it had to army control over administration. Finally, the more involved the Communist party became with the government, the more it became identified with a re sponsibility for the government programs and economic deterioration. The parliamentary democracy "out-groups" (e.g., Masjumi and PSI) found themselves— much as the communists had in the earlier "liberal" period— in the rather enviable position of being able to criticize the govern ment and communist action— however cautiously— without the onus of being associated with the government. Near the end of the period in question, internal pressures began to develop within the PKI— mainly from the Lukiman, "pro-Chinese" group— to abandon the Aidit, proSukarno "power through the parliament" line and change to a more mili tant program.1*^ The price of accepting the shade of Sukarno's "pitji"— though as effective as the traditional white umbrella— and the hostility of a politically potent army blocked all effective roads to power. Feith wrote in 1963: 45 Guy J. Pauker, Recent Communist Tactics in Indonesia (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1961). 46 Hindley, American Political Science Review, LVI, No. 4, 919920; and Feith in McVey, p. 220. 4^See Arnold Brackman, Southeast Asia's Second Front (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), pp. 254-256; and Donald Hindley, "The Indo nesian Communists and the CPSU Twenty-Second Congress," Asian.Studies, II, No. 1 (March, 1962), 21. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 103] === 98 When one looks at what has happened, to the.Communists as a result of Sukarnb-anny policies since 1958, one i s.forcibly reminded that this was a conflict.between partners in power and not the.rivalry of a group in control with one that was not. ^ Although this was an accurate.statement for the period in question, the triangle began to change shape after the lifting of martial law in May 1963. Decolonization and the "Javanization" of Indonesia. The period of liberal democracy has been one characterized as functioning best under the Western-oriented "administrators," and to a general ex tent as one best reflecting the interests of the outer islands. Similarly, Guided Democracy can be seen mainly as the political system of the "solidarity-making" nationalists, and as representing the in terests of the Javanese-bureaucratic culture. The period immediately following the breakdown of the parliamentary system also saw widespread reprisals against the Dutch and the advent of a general anti-colonial reaction throughout the society. Douglas Paauw states: "Indonesia... stands out for the rapidity with which she has destroyed Western social llQ and economic institutions implanted by colonialism." After the seizure of the Dutch firms in 1957, the government became increasingly involved in the licensing and distribution of commodity trading— often to the detriment of private entrepreneurs.88 **8Feith in McVey, pp. 339. 49 Douglas S. Paauw, "From Colonial to Guided Economy," in McVey, Indonesia, p. 155. 88See Leslie Palmier, Indonesia and the Dutch (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 97-110; van der Kroef, Far Eastern Survey, XXVII, 49-63; and Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy~Tn Indonesia, pp. 583-585. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 104] === In August 1959,. there was a devaluation of the rupiah and a confisca tion of all bank accounts over 25,000 rupiahs, the latter action fur ther entrenching bureaucratic control over business. Moreover, due to the loss of capital and technical skills the money-earning export crops and enterprises in the outer islands seriously declined. 51 regulation in late 1959 banning alien traders from operating in the rural areas also led to the exit of over 100,000 Chinese to the main land.^ After the decolonization process began, the cost of living rose steadily. 53 Aggravating the alarming inflationary situation was an equally alarming population growth, especially among the ethnic Javanese. In addition, the administration was lacking in skilled personnel, and was overextended and poorly organized for efficient government. The jurisdictions of the mushrooming ministries seriously overlapped, and this, coupled with a rapid military build-up in the West Irian campaign, made economic planning on4a meaningful basis 51 See Legge, pp. 201-24-6, for a discussion of provincial-central govemwant economic difficulties which highlights the government's poli cy during the period. See also D. W. Fryer, "Economic Aspects of Indo nesian Disunityj" Pacific Affairs, XXX, No. 3 (September, 1957), 195208; J.A.C. Mackie, "Indonesia1s Government Estates and Their Masters," Pacific Affairs, XXXIV, No. 5 (Winter, 1961-62), 388, 346-52; Karl J. Pelzer, "The Agricultural Foundations," in McVey, Indonesia, pp. 118154; and Paauw in McVey, pp. 171-201. For a discussion of the effect of the regulation and the army's role in the enforcement of its provisions, see David Mozingo, "New Developments in China's Relations with Indonesia," Current Scene, I, No. 53See, Everett D. Hawkins, "Job Inflation in Indonesia," Asian Survey, VI, No. 5 (May, 1966), 264-275. “^T he population figure for Java and Madura in 1961 was 63,059,000 out of an Indonesian total of 97,085,000 with a density of 477 per square mile. See projection tables of population increases.in Java from 19601990 based on varying fertility, mortality and out migration rates in Karl J. Pelzer, "Physical and Human Resource Patterns," in McVey, IIndonesia, pp. 21-22. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 105] === 100 almost impossible. 55 The deteriorating economic situation also encouraged among the lower bureaucrats and the.working classes a widespread— but shared--"corruption" in true gotong rojong spirit, and the "Javaneselike11 administrative structure began to exhibit a self-perpetuating, built-in equilibrium of its own. Consequently, the more the military benefited from the anti-colonial campaign and the more the bureaucracy profited from the "jndonesianization" of the economy, the more difficult it became to institute viable economic reforms to control inflation, stimulate production, and effect an economic rationalization of the econo The relative disregard for economic development, however, was in herent in the nature of the government under Guided Democracy. Feith has pointed out: "The problem of Indonesia's economy is socio political in the fullest sense. This observation is demonstrated most graphically by the ener gies and costs expended to acquire images of national status and a world-wide reputation. The quest for international predominance, first evident in the hosting of the 1955 Bandung Conference, was increasingly reflected in Sukarno's frequent world tours, 57 the completion of the stadium and facilities for the 1962 Asian Games and the 1963 Games of the Emerging Nations, the construction of the Freedom Mosque (if finished, the largest in the world) and the costly naval vessels, air craft and arms acquired from the Soviet bloc in 1961. Such endeavors ^ S e e, e. g., Boyd R. Compton, "Systems of Authority in Colonial and Independent Indonesia," paper presented for the Association of Asian Studies, April 3, 1962, p. 13; and Feith in McVey, pp. 371-383. 56Ibid., p. 258. ®^For a compilation of Sukarno's foreign tours from 1959-1963, see George Modelski, The New Emerging Forces (Canberra, Australia: The Australian National University, 1963), pp. 51-53. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 106] === were convincing indications of the willingness of the.government to mobilize a large percentage of the economic potential of the nation for the purpose of developing national prestige and unity and not for less "revolutionary" programs of economic stabilization.55 Another outstanding characteristic of Guided Democracy that should be examined was the emphasis placed on the use of integrative symbol and ceremony.59 President Sukarno's annual August 17 ritual, the independence day address, is of particular importance in this context. The 1959 speech, entitled "The Rediscovery of Our Revolution,"59 was later declared to be the Political Manifesto of the Indonesian nation and the propositions contained within.it were adopted as basic.state policy by a decision of the Supreme Advisory Council. The Political Manifesto is largely a justification of the reinstitution of the 1945 Constitution and a denunciation of the "dualisms" brought about by liberal "free-fight" politics and economics; it is also of great im portance in the ideological development of Guided Democracy. The disillusionment in obtaining a "just and prosperous so ciety," Sukarno argued, was mainly due to a deviation from the spirit and objectives of the revolution that were embodied in the principles 55See Donald Hindley, "Foreign Aid to Indonesia and Its Political Implication," Pacific Affairs, XXXVI, No. 2 (Summer, 1963), 107-119, for a slightly different interpretation of events, cf. Guy J. Pauker, "General Nasution's Mission to Moscow," Asian Survey, I, No. 1 (March, 1961), 13-22; and Justus M. van der Kroef*s.reply to this article, "Nasution, Sukarno and the West New Guinea Dispute," Asian Survey, I, No. 6 (August, 1961), 20-2. 59 Herbert Feith, "Indonesia's Political Symbols and Their Wielders," World Politics, XVI, No. 1 (October, 1963), 83. 60See Political Manifesto, pp. 37-76. 5^See Decision on the Political Manifesto; and Indonesia, Depart ment of Information, Handbook on the Political Manifesto (Djakarta, L 196l). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 107] === 102n of Pantja Sila. The Political Manifesto, therefore, was designed to guide the nation back to the ’.'rails of the revolution11 and to present the basis for "retooling1' the society for revolutionary action. included five central tenents which were purported to be a "dissemina tion of Pantj a Sila," namely: the 1945 Constitution (Undang-undang Dasar 1945), Indonesian Socialism (Socialisme Indonesia), Guided Democracy (Demokrasi Terpimpin), Guided Economy (Ekonomi Terpimpin), and Indonesian Identity (Kepribadian Indonesia). The first letter of each tenet was taken to form the acronym USDEK; the Political Manifesto was shortened to Manipol; and the new state philosophy was known as Manipol-USDEK.63 The Political Manifesto provided the justification for the "simplification" or harmonization of the party structure in 1960. All legitimate revolutionary activity was unified within three national front forces symbolized by the acronym NASAKOM— nationalism (NAsionalisme), religion (Agama) and communism (KOMunisme). It also supported an institutionalization of revolutionary authority in one (Sukarno) who understood "revolutionary logic" and the "principles and laws of the revolution." It further defined the objectives of the revolution and set three basic goals to be achieved by the nation: the continua tion of the anti-imperialist struggle to achieve a unitary republican state from Sabang (Sumatra) to Merauke (West Irian); the creation of 62 • Political Manifesto, pp. 44-47. The Pantja Sila, or the "five principles," were first expounded in a speech given June 1, 1945, later entitled "The Birth of Pantja Sila" (see Toward the Freedom and Dignity of Man, pp. 3-35). See Indonesia, Department of Information, Manipol-USDEK in Question and Answer (Djakarta, 1961), pp. 6-7; and Justus M. van der Kroef, "An Indonesian Ideological Lexicon," Asian Survey, II, No. 5 fin See Table I, p. 89. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 108] === the "just and prosperous" society to satisfy the basic needs of the people; and the establishment of internal security.®® While most of the symbolism manufactured by the President was much too vague and nebulous to provide meaningful national goals, the very ambiguity and abstract nature of the Manipol-USDEK-NASAKOM syn drome contributed to its utility. First, the communists were persuaded that the Manifesto was basically anti-imperialist; the army, on the other hand, considered it to be primarily an anti-communist creed. The state symbolism thus obtained a degree of loyalty from many diverse segments in the nation.®6 Second, the "total" nature of the symbolic orientation, the complete submission to the "revolutionary spirit," and the "retooling" of the governmental apparatus that led to the re tirement of many civil servants, tended to paralyze political energies and engender a stoical acceptance of the new system. Writing in 1953, Feith note<2 that: In general, government propaganda has s o.structured the mental worlds of members of the political public that they cannot reject particular ideological formulations on which the government insists unless they are prepared to break with nationalism itself.®7 Finally, the nationalistic themes of much of Guided Democracy's revolu tionary symbolism refocused potentially dangerous domestic energy and tension toward external enemies— or internal, as in the case of the resident Chinese— both real and imagined, the existence of which in hibited the attainment of the often promised "just and prosperous so ciety." The selection and nurturing of symbolic political situations ®®Political Manifesto, p. 72. ®®Feith, World Politics, XVI, No. 1, 88. ®7Ibid., p. 91. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 109] === 10^ i and interests— 'e.g., the campaign to "return" West Irian— solidified the idea of an "Indonesian will"and inculcated the feeling of belonging to an Indonesian nation.68 A related.condition that helps to explain the utility of sym bolic activity and its use to the exclusion of other approaches was the lack of elite cohesion and the highly bureaucratized nature of the Indo nesian nation. The functional lines which at one time divided politics from the administration were largely dissolved during Guided Democracy. 69 In the absence of a tightly-knit ruling elite3 the government often had to bargain with those in the bureaucracy whom it professed to command for the implementation of policy. Symbolic activity also furthered the interests of the "integrator" elite; a continuation of revolution ary fervor justified the ruling position of those persons— including many army officers advocating revolutionary elan— that had qualifications for office, but no technical ones.^6 political In a situation of organizational ambiguities where regulations are increasingly "inter preted" or sidestepped and administrative jurisdiction overlap, the wielders of political symbols function most effectively. Perhaps the most revealing example of the symbolic orientation and the true nature of Guided Democracy is evidenced by the National Planning Council’s Eight-year.Overall Development Plan which was pre sented in 1961. The plan contained 17 volumes, 8 parts and 1945 clauses— a structural tribute to the date of the proclamation of nesian independence. Indo The rather unrealistic and highly ambitious: ®6See Political Manifesto, pp. 75-76. 69Feith, World Politics, XVI, No. 1, p. 94. 70 See Selo Soemardjan, "Bureaucratic Organization in a Time of Revolution," Administrative Science Quarterly, II, No. 2 (September,.1957), 182-199, for an analysis of similar problems experienced during Lfche revolutionary period. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 110] === economic content of the plan 71 was ignored by the President who praised it for being "rich in fantasy." 72 There is ample evidence, therefore, for concluding that Sukarno's revolutionary nationalism--and its. relative disregard for economic de velopment— reflected, to a great extent, pre-European, Javanese values. It is quite natural that the long-smoldering disillusionment with Western values and the subsequent anti-colonial reaction in Indonesia would emphasize values that were of a pre-colonial, indigenous nature. Non-Javanese politics— from the ill-fated federal proposal in 1948 to the regional revolts in 1957-1958— were all tbo often connected with Western political values and policies. One must avoid, however, a rigid "single factor analysis" of Guided Democracy based on ethnic differences. 73 .It should be emphasized that the ascendancy of Sukarno and .. his "solidarity-making, symbol-wielding" clique did not represent the political system of all the Javanese.71*' There are in Indonesia a number of cross-cutting loyalties and "political cultures" (or 71 See D. D. Humphrey, "Indonesia's National Plan for Economic Development," Asian Survey, II, No. 10 (December, 1962), 12-21; and Guy J. Pauker, "Indonesia's Eight-Year Development Plan," Pacific Affairs, XXXIV, No. 2 (Summer, 1961), 115r-130. 72Feith, World Politics, XVI, No.. 1, 83. 73 Palmier's important study, Indonesia and the Dutch, has sometimes been criticized for reducing Indonesia's political problems simply to Java-non-Java tensions. ^Indeed, Jeanne S. Mintz,in Mohammed, Marx, and Marhaen, has suggested that Guided Democracy was not the mainstream of "Indonesian Socialism" and was a mere front for Sukarno's personal rule. She con cludes: "Put bluntly /Guided Democracy/ is a cloak for a power struggle, a facade built out of myths and slogans to shield a system of autocra tic rule" (p. 225). Cf. Donald Weatherbee, "Indonesia's Revolutionary Ideology," prepared for a Colloquium on Political Strategy, South Carolina University, April 14, 1965, who draws a valid parallel between ideology and the legitimization of authority; and "The Non-Modern Base of Indo nesia's Modernizing Ideology," paper prepared for the Association for Asian Studies, April 4, 1966 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 111] === "orientations to political action"), and to attribute political activ ity in the islands solely to tensions between an Islamic-entrepreneurial culture and a Javanese-aristocratic culture is to obscure a highly complex and fluctuating political process. Nevertheless, while noting the pitfalls of painting with a broad (and perhaps oversimplified) brush, Guided Democracy at this point can be characterized as a "neo-prijaji" political system— espesially to the extent that political decisions were increasingly made in the context of the inter-clique rivalry within Sukarno's palace coterie. In addition, the fact that Sukarno was not only head of state but also a figure synonymous with the revolution gave his office an al most king-like quality; and in placing increasing emphasis on ceremony and ritual, his position suggested that like early Javanese kings, the legitimacy he possessed had to be continually renewed and not taken for granted. 76 This was reflected in his repeated calls for the return to the "rails of the revolution" and the "revolutionary spirit" that existed during the fight for independence against the Dutch. In formulating the revolutionary tasks and the goals of the nation, the President also met the traditional expectation that the ruler should link the past with the present, restoring or maintaining "cosmic order." 77 Simi larly, the objective of achieving an "Indonesian identity" can largely 75 The terminology is from Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Politi cal Systems," Journal of Politics, XVIII, No. 3 (August, 1956),- 391409. H. M. Vlekke, Nusantara (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1959), p. 61. 77 See Robert Heine-Geldern, Conceptions of the State and King ship in Southeast Asia (Ithaca: Southeast Asian Program Data Paper No. 18, Cornell University Press, 1956), 11-13. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 112] === be seen as the desire to institute, through the use of symbols, regalia and ceremony, what van der Kroef refers to a s."societal homeostasis"— the Javanese obsession with peace and order in harmony— and to preserve this societal balance by establishing a modern "microcosmic" order 78 through the phenomenon of nation-building. In Chapter V, a more detailed examination of Indonesia’s ex ternal behavior will be specifically directed to an analysis of the intimate relationship between foreign policy and nation-building in the archipelago. Before undertaking such a task, however, it is neces sary to examine, among other things, the nature of Indonesian foreign policy during the dispute with the Dutch over the disposition of West Irian. The External Image The process of decolonization and the revival of revolutionary nationalism in Indonesia had its outward expression in the campaign to force the Dutch out of West Irian (West New Guinea). The West Irian dispute had been the major concern of Indonesian foreign policy since the Dutch granted the Republic its independence in 1949, and indeed, the very nature of Indonesia's external behavior during the period in question is intimately tied up with this dispute. The view that Indo nesia held of many other countries was greatly influenced by the.atti tudes and positions those countries took in reference to the "return" ^®Justus M. van der Kroef, "Javanese Messianic Expectations: Their Origin and Cultural Context," Comparative Studies in Society and History, I, No. 4 (June, 1959), 299-323. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 113] === of the territory. Finally, the West Irian campaign can be seen.in many ways as a preparation for the first phase of the later confrontation of Malaysia in 1963. The West Irian Campaign. The West Irian dispute passed through three phases in its development. For the first four years after inde pendence, the conflict was limited to bilateral negotiations within the framework of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union of the first Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet, however, the Indonesian govern ment decided to press its claim at the United Nations, and the issue was placed on the agenda from 1954 through 1957. Failing to receive passage on any of the resolutions introduced into the General Assembly, the Indonesian government finally adopted a more successful policy based on a skillful mixture of diplomacy and threats of military force that eventually effected the return of the territory in 1963. The basis of the issue goes back to the 1945-1949 period when the nationalists were alternately fighting and negotiating for their independence with the Dutch. Legally, the dispute revolved around the Indonesian claim that the Republic was the succeeding political sovereign to the territorial entity of Netherlands East Indies Government. 80 was maintained that the territory was a part of the island empire of The transfer of sovereignty to the.Indonesian nation of December 17, 1949, had envisioned a Commonwealth-like Netherlands-Indonesian Union, Although this Union was little more than paper pact to facili tate "mutual consultation," the first talks on implementing the Round Table Conference provision on West Irian were undertaken within its auspices in March 1950. The.Union was abrogated in April 1956. See George McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), pp..434 ff. ®®See Justus,M. van der Kroef, The West New Guinea Dispute (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1958), pp. 1-2. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 114] === Tidore, and that since t h e.Sultan of Tidore recognized the sovereignty of the Dutch government in 1874, the Dutch also acceded to the regions of West New Guinea.8^- Indonesia, therefore, gained the territory as a result of the 1948 Renville Agreement and the 1949 Roem-van Royen agreements, which presaged the Round Table Conference, and which pro vided for a "real and complete" transfer of sovereignty "throughout the Netherlands Indies."8^ In rejecting the Indonesian position, the Dutch stated that the 1949 Round Table Conference Agreement superseded all previous agreements, and that Art. 2 of the Draft Charter of the Transfer of Sovereignty provided that the status quo of the residency of New Guinea shall be maintained with the stipulation that within a year from the date of transfer of sovereignty to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia the question of the political status of New Guinea will be determined through negotiations. (Emphasis added.)83 Very little came of the first round of discussions between the two countries, and President Sukarno issued a major policy statement on the matter in the course of his independence day speech on August 17, 1950: ... the Irian question is a major issue to us.... The Irian question is a question of colonialism or non-colonial ism, a question of colonialism or independence.... In our present Constitution it is expressly laid down that the terri tory of our State comprises the entire former Netherlands Indies, that is from Sabang to Merauke. Thus,... Irian is also Indonesian territory, territory of the Republic of Indonesia— nottomorrow, not the day after tomorrow, but 81 For the fullest development of the legal argument, see Robert C. Bone, The Dynamics of the Western New Guinea (Irian Barat) Problem (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1962 ed.), pp. 9-231 82 83 Van der Kroef, The West New Guinea Dispute, p. 2. Quoted in Bone, p. 61. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 115] === n-cTI now, at this.very moment. T h e.Dutch de_facto.authority over Irian is recognized for* this year only.gt* Obviously,' Indonesia was claiming that de jure sovereignty had passed at the time of the Round Table Conference.85 The Dutch, on the other. hand, emphasized their desire to "exercise sovereignty... until the right of self-determination is utilized by the population of New Guinea,’’86 and, noting that the status of the area had not been resolved, maintained that "Netherlands sovereignty and the status quo are maintained." 87 (Emphasis added.) All legalities aside, however, the heart of the Indonesian claim to West Irian was to be found in nationalism. It was stressed that the inhabitants of the territory had been considered "as being a part of the Indonesian archipelago... for many hundreds of years. ... Before colonial days, West Irian was part of the Indonesian national state of Modjopahit (sic), one of the glories of Hindu- ®^Quoted in George McT. Kahin, "Indonesian Politics and Nationalism," in William L. Holland (ed.), Asian Nationalism and the West (New York: Macmillan Company, 1953), pp. 165-166. 85Bone states that this is the first time Indonesia claimed that de jure sovereignty of Indonesia over West Irian existed at the time of the Round Table Conference. See, p. 86, n. 24. 86Quoted in ibid., p. 93. 87 Quoted in ibid., p. 95. Art. 2 of the Draft Charter of the Transfer of Sovereignty had been careful to avoid mentioning "sovereignty" (ibid., n. 45). in a minor legal point, the Dutch claimed that the United Nations tacitly adhered to the separate status of the possession by ac cepting reports from the Netherlands on West New Guinea as a "non-selfgoverning" territory under Article 73e of the United Nations Charter. See van der Kroef, The West New Guinea Dispute, p. 8. For some early inter national politics aspects of the dispute, see L. Metzemaeker’s, "The West New Guinea Problem," Pacific Affairs, XXIV, No. 2 (June, 1951), 131!42. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 116] === Javanese civilization." .This sentiment was again.reflected in the attitudes expressed by the Japanese sponsored Committee for the Inves tigation of Indonesian Independence (B.P.K.I.) that met in.June 1945. When the B.P.K.I. voted on the question of national boundaries for the Indonesian Republic, 58 of 64 members wanted to include West Irian in the proposed state. 89 Finally, in counter to the Dutch assertion that the ethnic Papuans (as well as the fauna and flora of the islands) belong to the culture of the Australian continent, 90 Djakarta replied that the contention was "not relevant" since the cultural concept be hind the formulation of the modern state of Indonesia was Bhinekka Tunggal Ika ("Unity in Diversity") and that the island nation consisted of many ethnic and linguistic groups, some of which (e.g., Sulawesi, Maluku) were not even: of Malay stock.9^ In the sporadic discussions between the two countries during the next few years, Indonesia continued to insist that negotiations could only be concerned with ways and means of the transfer of sover eignty since only the issue of de facto sovereignty had been involved since December 27, 1950. The Dutch suggested in 1951 that the 88Sukarno, "Nationalism— a Young and Progressive Greed," address to the U.S. Congress, May 17, 1956 (Djakarta: Department of Informa tion, Vol. 1, No. 6325, September 2, 1963), p. 198. (Emphasis added.) It is interesting to note that Sukarno considered Madjapahit a national state, especially in view of its dubious political structure. 89See Benedict R. 0*G. Anderson, Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics Under the Japanese Occupation: 1944-1945 (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1961), p. 29. 90See Memorandum on Netherlands New Guinea (New York: Netherlands Information Service, Vol. 1, September, 1957), p. 1. 91 See Some Questions and Answers Concerning the Dispute Over West Irian (New York: Indonesian Mission t o.the United Nations, 1957), p. 8. See, also, Arend Lijphart, "The Indonesian Image of West Irian," Asian Survey, I, No. 5 (July, 1961), 9-16. 92Bone, p. 115. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 117] === 112 1 question be submitted.to the International Court of Justice, but Indonesia rejected the proposal on the grounds that the question was political not judicial. 93 In light of this stalemate, Indonesia turned to the United Nations for a solution to the problem. Begin ning in 1954, and for the following three years, the West Irian ques tion was placed on the General Assembly agenda. In none of these in stances, however, was Indonesia able to muster the required two-thirds majority needed to pass a resolution favoring negotiations on the issue (see Table II). As noted above, the failure of the Twelfth General Assembly to endorse negotiations between the disputants was followed in December 1957 by a large-scale anti-Dutch reaction volving the confiscation of Dutch property and businesses and the vir tual expulsion of some 46,000 Dutch nationals (including Eurasians) from Indonesia. Although, the West Irian campaign was temporarily sidetracked during the regional revolts that followed, by the begin ning of 1960 a sufficient degree of internal stability and security had been established to renew the campaign. This last phase of the dispute— and the one that is of great est importance for this study— was marked by a change of tactics. his 1960 independence day speech, President Sukarno called for the "liberation of West Irian in a revolutionary manner" and broke off diplomatic relations with the Netherlands. Speaking at the United Nations later in September, Sukarno stated: 93:Ibid.:. 94 See?,Like an Angel that Strikes from the Skies," p. 110. This move was made in conjunction with the banning of the Masjumi and PSI, an action the President had taken, only a few minutes. earlier in his speech. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 118] === 113 TABLE II: GENERAL ASSEMBLY VOTES ON THE WEST IRIAN DISPUTE: 1954-5 1956^-7 First (Political) Committee Vote3 34-14-10° 39-25-9° 42-28-lle General Assembly Plenaiy Vote3 34-23-3° 40-25-13° 41-29-lle (A) 53-41-9f (B) 41-40-21 (53) (55) (69) Votes Needed to Pass (40) 1957-8 1961 a»Yes" votes listed first, "no" votes second, "abstentions" third. ^Although the dispute was placed on the agenda in 1.955, there was no debate due to the Indonesian-Dutch Ministers Conference initia ted by the Harahap government to discuss the issue. The General Assembly unanimously passed a resolution expressing hope for a peace ful solution. See General Assembly, 10th Session, A/PV 559, December 16, 1955, p. 488. °Vote on an Indian, resolution "expressing hope" for continued negotiation on the basis of the provisions of the UN Charter. See General Assembly, 9th Session, A/C.1/735, November 30, 1954, p. 458; and General Assembly, 9th Session, A/PV 509, December 10, 1954, p.461. The vote in the General Assembly was on the first paragraph of the Resolution; the second paragraph failed to pass by vote of 33-23-4. ^Vote on an Afro-Asian resolution calling for the creation of a "Good Offices" committee. See General Assembly, 11th Session, A/C. 1/863, February 22, 1957, p. 318; and General Assembly, 11th Session, A/PV 664, February 28, 1957, p. 1263. eVote on an Indonesian resolution calling on the parties to find a solution with the aid of the Secretary General. See General Assembly, 12th Session, A/C.1/912, November 26, 1957, p. 252; and General Assembly, 12th Session, A/PV 724, November 29, 1957, p. 547. ^Two resolutions were introduced in reply to the Luns Plan for placing West New Guinea under UN Trusteeship. The Brazzaville Group in the UN sponsored a resolution calling for self-determination (A), and India introduced a resolution calling for negotiations under the "Good Offices" of U Thant (B). See General Assembly, 16th Session, A/PV 1066, November 27, 1961, p. 875-877. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 119] === We have tried to solve the problem of West Irian. We have tried bilateral negotiations,.,. We have tried using the machinery of the United Nations,... and now the Nether lands has left us no choice.but to stiffen o u r.attitude.... I tell you in all seriousness, the situation in West Irian is a dangerous situation, an explosive situation.^ In the absence of American willingness to support a "revolu tionary" solution to the dispute, General Nasution visited the U.S.S.R. in December 1960 and secured $450,000,000 in Soviet credit for military arms. 96 By 1961, it was increasingly clear that Sukarno was willing to risk war to obtain his ends. ized, 97 The National Front had been remobiland "volunteers" were being trained for the "liberation of West Irian." The dispute was again put on the United Nations agenda, but this time by the Dutch, who proposed "the granting of complete self-determination" to the people of New Guinea by placing the terri tory under the direction of the Trusteeship Council in preparation for eventual self-government.88 Again, the resolutions introduced in the Assembly to implement the proposal failed to gain the required number 95 Sukarno, "To Build the World Anew," in Toward the Freedom and Dignity of Man, p. 133. 96 See Pauker, Asian Survey, I, pp. 13-22, who links Indonesia's arms deal with a PKI-Army rapproachement. The U.S.S.R. had earlier advanced Indonesia $250,000,000 credit as a result of Khrushchev's visit in 1957. 97 This was actually the second variant of the National Front for the Liberation of West Irian (FNPIB) which had been formed by the army in 1959 after bringing together various military-sponsored Cooperation Bodies. Sukarno attacked the FNPIB for dealing-with "other things which do not directly concern the struggle for West Irian" (see "The Rediscovery of Our Revolution," in Toward the Freedom and Dignity of Man, p. 66). Most notable among the "other things" was a repression of Chinese traders and businessmen. 98 See General Assembly, 16th Session, A/PV 1016, September 26, 1961, pp. 89-91. Of parallel interest was the proposal sponsored jointly by Australia and the Netherlands to prepare the whole island (the eastern half of which is administered by Australia) for eventual in dependence. See van der Kroef, The West New Guinea Dispute, pp. 2708, Iciting Embassy of the Netherlands and Embassy of Australia Release, Noveny hber "6, 1957 (mimeo). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 120] === 115_ 1 of votes, and the campaign entered.its most crucial stage. Closely following India *s.invasion o f.Goa— and supposedly receiving some en couragement from it--Sukamo embarked on an effectively executed series of diplomatic ploys laced with ominous military t h r e a t s. H e colorfully described it as: 11A policy of confrontation accompanied by an extended hand. The sledge hammer accompanied by a call for friend- On December 19, 1961, the President issued his famous Trikora (Triple Command)— mobilize, frustrate the proposed Papuan state, and raise the Indonesian flag in West Irian— and throughout most of the next nine months, guerrillas were landed on the coast and air dropped into the interior of West Irian. Although the Indonesian forces met with a notable lack of success, Sukarno's "confrontation diplomacy" increased the international pressure for the revival of IndonesianDutch negotiations to end the dispute. The political sentiment in the Netherlands was rapidly swinging away from a military confrontation with Indonesia toward a solution designed to give up the territory without a loss of face;"*"^0 and significantly, the attitude of the United States had also begun to change. The Kennedy administration had declined a Dutch invitation in April to attend the ceremonial opening of the New Guinea Council— the first step toward the creation of an independent Papua— and the American government, much the same as in 1948, began to operate behind the scenes to persuade the Dutch government to make concessions. Sukarno, "A Year of Triumph," speech, August 17, 1962 (Djakartc Department of Information, 1962), p.;. 21. 100Kahin in Kahin, p. 683. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 121] === The willingness of the United States to abandon its silent advocacy of the status quo was tantamount to supporting the transfer of the territory to Indonesia since Sukarno had repeatedly demanded that the Dutch agree to a transfer of sovereignty before the talks could begin. The credit for military supplies given to Indonesia by the Soviet Union, and the increasing communist influence in the islands greatly alarmed the United States. Arnold Brackman maintains that Sukarno also capitalized on "Kennedy's desire for a fresh start in the relations between the neutrals and the West," and that the American President believed that the Indonesian leader would be a bulwark to communist expansion and would turn his energies to domestic reforms if West Irian were given to Indonesia.101 With a somewhat different point of view, Kahin states that the Kennedy administration "evidenced a much more knowledgeable understanding of the West Irian problem than its predecessor— including the effect the dispute was having on Indonesia’s domestic politics and foreign policy." 102 In any event, Sukarno skill fully "shifted the burden of keeping the peace onto Kennedy’s ders" 103 shoulby threatening to pursue c.a n forceful settlement of the issue if the American efforts at peace failed. The crisis reached its peak on January 15, 1962 when an Indo nesian torpedo boat was sunk off the Aru Islands with a loss of over 50 lives. Large scale conflict was avoided, however, and the trip of 101See Sukarno's speech, "Nationalism^— A Young and Progressive Creed," p. 199. In a meeting & April 1961 between Kennedy and Sukarno, the American President had apparently been impressed with Sukarno's.de sire to effect economic reform. 102Kahin in Kahin, p. 683. 103Brackman, p. 104-. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 122] === 117-| Attorney General Robert Kennedy to Djakarta i n.February indicated open ly that the United States was trying to find a solution that would flect Indonesia's interests. Due largely to the joint moral force of the United Nations and the United States, negotiations were resumed between the Indonesians and the.Dutch. Ellsworth Bunker— the mediator and U Thant's agent in the negotiations— suggesting that (1) the Dutch transfer "administrative authority" to the UN which would in turn hand the territory over to the Indonesians after an interim period, but (2) on the condition that a plebiscite be held to give the residents of the territory the right of self-determination. Although the Bunker plan embodied a means to save face for the Dutch, the Netherlands government still insisted that the plebiscite be held during, not after, the United Nations administration. As the negotiations unfolded during the summer, the Indonesians increased their military and diplomatic confrontation against the Dutch, and the United States and the United Nations in turn continued to apply moral force on the Netherlands government. Finally on August 15, 1962, a solution was reached— and just in time for Sukarno to make a triumphal announcement at his annual independence day ritual.10** Reflecting Bunker's «®mpromise proposals, the Agreement provided that the United Nations was to ad minister the territory until December 31, 1962, and then jointly with an Indonesian force until May 1, 1963. At that time, Indonesia would take sole possession of West Irian with the stipulation that sometime l ^ ' A Year of Triumph," p. 22. For a general discussion of the settlement, see Justus M. van der Kroef, "The West New Guinea Settle ment," Orbis, VII, No. 1 (Spring, 1963), 120-149. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 123] === before 1969 the.inhabitants of the area would have the chance.to determine whether or not they wished to remain with Indonesia. For Sukarno, 1962 was a personal "year of triumph." 105 He could point to the accomplishment of two tasks of the three point program set for the nation in 1959— the establishment of internal security and the liberation of West-Irian— and, rather cryptically, he promised "in a short time that will not be too long" to attack the solution of the remaining goal, that of providing the basic necessities and effect•1 AC ing economic stability. His "confrontation diplomacy" had kept the army from achieving the full glory of a military victory, and as long as the economy could stand the strain, he could point to the curious sort of coalition of convenience— one observer feared it was a military accomodation of the communists army and the PKI. 107 — that he had effected between the In addition to the technological development of the armed services as a result of the arms buildup and their control over the organizational growth and administration of the country, the military establishment as a whole had achieved for themselves an eco nomic status that a change in the system would have endangered. Like wise, the PKI and its agitational affiliates had continued to expand and prosper in the "revolutionary" atmosphere. They enjoyed the pro tection and the encouragement of the President while waiting for the 105 Text of the Agreement appears in the New York Times, August 16, 1961, p. 6. The General Assembly approved the agreement 84-0 with 11 abstentions, mainly from the Brazzaville group. See Paul van der Veur, "West Irian in the Indonesian Fold," Asian Survey, III, No. 7 (July, 1963), 332-337, for a discussion of the period from August 1962 to May 1963. For a discussion of the legal aspects of United Nations interim rule, see D. W. Bowett, United Nations Forces: A Legal Study (New York: Praeger, 1964), pp. 255-261. 106"A Year of Triumph," p. 39. 107see Pauker, Asian Survey, I, No. 1>, 13-22. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 124] === deteriorating economic conditions.to propel them to power by the acclama tion of the people or for a parliamentary victory through holding the often postponed national elections. This temporary rapproachement, however, should not obscure the fact that there was tension between the two groups and that ultimately the "revolution" could not reconcile the two antagonistic forces. The simmering, though somewhat latent, hostility between the army and the PKI is directly related to the ideological split that was developing within the world-wide communist movement. The nominally pro-Soviet tendencies of the p a r t y ® - - i. e., the "peaceful" tactics of gaining power— were sorely questioned in light of the Soviet military aid and its role in increasing the domestic political strength of the army to the disadvantage of the PKI. 109 Despite the fact that the party avoided taking sides in the ideological dispute, the prestige of pro-Peking elements in the organization was increased. The campaign had also helped the stability of the regime by rechanneling domestic di'sstisfact ion away from the seriously pressing problems of an explosive birth rate, a sprawling bureaucracy, inade quate transportation, dwindling productivity and growing food shortages. Although by Sukarno’s own admission three-quarters of the "national activities" had been utilized for the "realization of its national identity,"1‘L0 he had shown a remarkable ability to provide the Indonesian 108 The armed forces were not allowed to mount a full-scale invasion, but rather were limited to incursions of small groups, which, though im portant for bargaining purposes, were doomed to failure from their in ception. Cf. van der Kroef, Orbis, VII, No. 1, 127-218. 109 See Donald Hindley, "The Indonesian Communists and the CPSU Twenty-Second Congress," Asian Studies, II, No. 1 (March, 1962), 20-27. ^"°"A Year of Triumph," p. 37. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 125] === people with something to hope for and believe in, and his pledge to turn to the nation's economic problems was widely hailed and accepted at face value. In short, the President's popularity— and effectiveness— were probably at their peak during this time. Having completed the "liberation" of all former Dutch holdings, it was generally assumed that the nation would turn to the "third stage" of nation-building and move toward the long promised "just and prosperous society." The bulk of the Indonesian public welcomed the President’s independence day pledge to "overcome the bottle-necks and the difficulties of economic problems." Various responsible business men claimed that, considering population increases, estate production and exports were barely one-third of the 1940 level. The much praised, but highly idealistic, eight-year development plan that had been promulgated in July had largely been neglected due to the ex penditures on the West Irian campaign, and during the course of the 1960-1962 confrontation, Indonesia had accumulated an additional foreign debt of over $ 1, 0 0 0, 0 0 0, 0 0 0. The President, however, established an Economic Operations Command (with himself as Supreme Commander), and in November the highly respected Prime Minister Djuanda announced the drafting of a three year financial and economic stabilization plan. 113 Early in 1963, the government announced a 47 per cent reduction in the budget of the armed forces and the army leaders drew up a "rationalization" '^■^Guy.J. Pauker, "Indonesia: Internal Development or External Ex pansion," Asian Survey, III, No. 2 (February, 1962), 73. 112 Indonesia signed agreements with the Soviet bloc totalling $1,043,700,000. $593,700,000 was for economic development and $450,000,000 for arms purchases. Aid from the.United States from 1945-1961 totaled $545,000,000. See Donald Hindley, Pacific Affairs, XXXVI, No. 2, 107-119. 113 Pauker, Asian Survey, III, No, 2, 73-4, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 126] === plan whereby much of the military manpower.and skills was to be devoted to rural development. 114 An American economic survey team had visited the country in 1962 and gave.an optimistic report on the prospects of Indonesia staging an economic recovery.115 As a result, the Internation al Monetary Fund and the United States were receptive to granting loans and credits. Despite what the West considered to be encouraging signs, there were increasing rumblings in government circles concerning the "neo-colonial threats" in the northern part of the archipelago connected with the proposed federation of Malaysia. 0n December 8, less than a month before the "red and gold" was raised over West Irian, a short lived revolt broke out in the Sultanate of Brunei on the north coast of Borneo, and the justification for the next phase of Indonesia's con frontation was established. Before turning to this second phase of Sukarno1s confrontation with "colonialism" and "imperialism," however, it is necessary to ex amine. the West Irian issue from the viewpoint of Indonesia's place in world politics. The anti-Dutch campaign was instrumental in projecting Sukarno on the world stage as a spokesman for the Afro-Asian world. This international dimension of Indonesia's "revolutionary nationalism" is quite significant in that the often asserted independent and nonalignment character of its foreign policy underwent a basic change during this period. 114 Donald Hindley, "Indonesia's Confrontation with Malaysia: A Search for Motives," Asian Survey, IV, No. 6 (June, 1964), p. 904. 115See U. S. Economic Survey Team to Indonesia, Indonesia: Perspectives and Proposals for U. S. Economic Aid (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asian Studies, 1963). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 127] === 122 Neutralism, non-alignment and anti-colonialism. Indonesia's foreign policy and its conception of neutrality and non-alignment in world affairs was greatly influenced by its anti-colonial confrontation; support for the West Irian campaign, moreover, was often the yardstick used to measure the friendship of other countries. A good example is furnished by the attitude of the United States toward the dispute, and again demonstrates the post-war dilemma facing the United States con cerning the "colonial question." Although Washington supported the "principle" of self-determination, the American government needed its Western allies to bolster its defenses against Russian expansionism; and as so often happened on colonial issues in the United Nations, the United States voted with its allies or simply abstained in an effort to please both the "old" and the "new" world. The tacit acquiescence to the status quo in an atmosphere of revolutionary nationalism, how ever, was interpreted, even by some moderate countries, as an unfriendly position. 116 The policy of the United States government in abstain ing on the United Nations resolutions concerning West Irian was tanta mount to a negative vote where an absolute two-thirds majority was re quired for passage, and was viewed by Indonesia as being pro-Dutch in essence. In short, Indonesia's conception of neutrality did not re flect a maintenance of the status quo, and despite its advocacy of an "independent" course in world affairs, the anti-colonial sentiment that increasingly pervaded all of Indonesia's state policy gradually drew Djakarta toward an international position in support of a redefini tion of "neutralism" along anti-colonial lines. l i e See, e.g.,Frederick.Bunnell, "Indonesia's Foreign Policy in the 1960's: President Sukarno Moves From Non-Alignment to Confrontation," paper prepared for the Association for Asian Studies, May 14-15, 1965, p. 12. This paper was reprinted in Indonesia, II (October, 1966), 37-76. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 128] === 123 The ambivalence.in the evolution of Indonesia's.foreign policy is indicated in an analysis of Indonesia's voting record during a nine 111 year period within the.United Nations General Assembly (see Table III). Indonesia's index of agreement with the "anti-imperialist" Soviet Union ' on colonial issues was extremely high in contrast to its agreement with the United.States on the same issues. Outside the context of "anti colonialism," however, Indonesia's "neutral" disposition toward both the United States and the Soviet Union reflected.its attempt to steer clear of alignments with either of the super powers. With the possible exception of 1960 and 1961 when Djakarta was receiving Soviet aid.in its campaign against the Dutch over West Irian, Indonesia's attitude. toward East-West issues accurately demonstrated at least its desire for non-aligned stance in the Cold War. The strains that Indonesia's "internal revolution" put on its "independent and active" foreign policy are perhaps best illustrated by Djakarta's renewed bid for leadership in the non-Western world that had originally been launched in 1955 at Bandung. President Sukarno's speech to the United Nations in September 1960 is of great importance in this respect. 119 The Indonesian President had been chosen by five Afro-Asian nations (Ghana, Yugoslavia, India, Indonesia and the United Arab Republic) to present a resolution to the General Assembly urging 117 For an explanation of the sources and composition of this Table and Table IV,p.l27;Table VII,p.249;and Table VIII,p.250, see Appendix B, pp. 260-265, below. 118 Military aid received from the Soviet Union had little effect on Indonesia's alignment in world, affairs. See.Cecil B.Crabb,Jr.,The Ele phants and the Grass: A Study of Nonalignment (New York: Praeger 1965), pp. 31-33, who discusses why neutralist reliance upon the great powers during periods of military crisis does not necessarily signify any de parture from a policy of nonalignment. ^■^See "To Build the World Anew," address at the Fifteenth General Assembly of the United Nations, September 30, 1960, in Toward pf.eedom and [the Dignity of Man, pp. 121-149. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 129] === INDICES OF AGREEMENT,,COLONIAL AND EAST -WEST ISSUES, 1955-1963 Colonial Issues 1960 1961 1962 1963 1955-1963 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 U.S.S.R. 100 100 100 92 100 25 25 29 25 92 100 100 100 97.9 38 43 25 57 31.7 East-West Issues: 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1955-1963 (N=17)(N=9) (N=11)(N=106) U.S.S.R. 50 42 53 57 45 72 65 56 50 55.1 50 60 47 43 55 28 35 44 50 44.9 a lessening of tensions and further contacts between the United States and Russia after the U-2 incident had led to the collapse of the Big Power summit meeting in Paris. In his address to the delegates at the General Assembly, Sukarno depicted the contemporary world as being divided into three forces— the two cold war blocs and the non-aligned Afro-Asian world. Stating that the fate of humanity could no longer be decided by a few powerful nations, he forcefully suggested a role for the non-aligned group as mediators in the cold war.120 However, the President's view of international reality was strongly colored by nationalist and anti-colonial themes. The world is enriched and enobled by the leaders of sovereign nations newly established.... Nationalism, victorious, triumphant nationalism has wrought this change, and it is good.... But look around this world of ours. There are tensions and sources of potential conflict in many places.,. and you will discover that almost without exception imperialism and colonialism in one of their many manifesta tions is at the root of the tension of the conflict.... Imperialism, and the struggle to maintain it, is the greatest evil of our world. 120Ibid., pp. 127, 131. 121Ibid., pp. 130, 128-9. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 130] === In his address.to the non-aligned nations at Belgrade one year later, Sukarno had already begun to alter his image of the contemporary world, and anti-colonial themes took the place of his earlier.advoca cy of the non-aligned bloc as a cold war mediator. While stating form al approval of a policy of non-alignment, he declared: Non-alignment is not neutrality...; being non-aligned does not mean becoming a buffer state between two giant blocs. Non-alignment is active devotion to the lofty cause of independence, abiding peace, social justice and the freedom to be free.... Prevailing world opinion today would have us believe that the real source of in ternational tension and strife is ideological conflict between the great powers. I think that is not true. There is a conflict that cuts deeper into the flesh of man, and that is the conflict between the emergent forces for freedom and justice and the old forces of domination. ,.. This is the era of emerging nations and the turbulence of nationalism, the building of nations and the breaking of empires. ^ 2 In attempting to substitute a two-fold pattern of world poli tics for the generally advocated three bloc system, Sukarno ran into the opposition from the moderates at the conference, chiefly the high ly respected Nehru. Indeed, the very holding of the conference had been a subject of dispute. Sukarno had pressed hard for a second Afro- Asian conference— one that would have included an "anti-colonial1' Red China; Yugoslavia, the U.A.R. and a somewhat reluctant India, however, went ahead with plans for the non-aligned conference promising rather indefinitely to hold an Afro-Asian meeting at a later d a t e.. The 122See "Towards Friendship, Peace and Justice," speech, September, 1, 1961 (Djakarta: Department of Information, September 2, 1963, Vol. 1, no. 6318), p. 152. 123 At the Preparatory Meeting of the twenty non-aligned nations at Cairo, Subandrio tried to side step the. basic issue by stressing that the non-aligned conference should not "antagonize our brothers of Asia and Africa" but rather "pave the way to a second Asian and African conference in the not too distant future." See "Indonesia and NonAlignment," speech, June 6, 1961, in Indonesia on the March (Djakarta: Department of Foreign Affairs, 1963), p. 162. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 131] === 126 difference of opinion over the desirability of the two conferences demonstrated the beginning of a basic split among the leaders of the non-Western world. Indonesia (and Communist China) began to form the nucleus of a bloc— ^described by Modelski as the "radical wing of nonalignment"— that identified non-alignment with anti-colonialism and neo colonialism. On the other hand, the generally accepted and more moder ate conception of non-alignment advocated chiefly by India, saw the pressing problems of the world as ideological tensions within the "old world," and the role of the "third world" as one of neutrality and mediation in the cold war. 124- Although the sentiment of the meeting seemed to incline toward the radical orientation, 125 neither group gained predominance at Belgrade, and as late as 1963, the non-aligned leadership demonstrated at least surface unity. 126 Table IV indicates 124There is obviously much ambiguity in the term "neutralism." It first should be distinguished from "political neutrality" of the kind under which Laos and Austria became independent, or under which Switzerland has avoided involvement in European struggles for centuries. "Neutralism" or "non-alignment" (the two words are often used inter changeably) is not viewed by the "third world" as withdrawal or isola tion, but rather as some form of active participation in world affairs and being free to conduct one state's own policies without pressure or interference from another— even to choose a policy that parallels one of the big power's if it serves the national interest. See Crabb, pp. 6-39, who discusses the distinguishing features and nature of nonalignment. See, also, Lawrence W. Martin, Neutralism and Nonalign ment: The New States in World Affairs (New York: Praeger, 1962); "Nonalignment in Foreign Affairs,'? The Annals, Vol. 362 (November, 1965); and Paul F. Power (ed.), Neutralism and Disengagement (New York: Scribner's, 1964). 125 Much of the "radical support" came from the African states which were at the time greatly influenced by the events in South Africa, Angola, Algiers and the Congo. See Modelski, pp.32-33. For the atti tudes of the United States toward the conference, see Frederick Bunnell, American Reactions to Indonesia's Role in the Belgrade Conference (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Proj ect, 1964). ■^^The index on colonial issues was even higher. Disagreement over the "anti-colonial" context of non-alignment had little effect on the al most unanimous opposition to concrete colonial issues within the "third [world." Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 132] === 127 TABLE IV: INDONESIA AND THE BELGRADE NEUTRALS: INDICES OF AGREEMENT, EAST-WEST ISSUES, 1955-1963 1955 1959 1956 1957 1958 1960 1961 • 1962 (N=17) (N=9) 1963 (N=ll) 80 90 100 87 91 93 91 72 91 Yugoslavia 70 80 94 83 75 100 97 83 91 90 90 97 83 86 93 91 88 82 India U.-A.R. Average 1955-1963 (N-106) Average 1961-1963 (N=37) India 89.6 86.7 Yugoslavia 87.9 92.2 U.A.R. 89.2 86.7 a high index of agreement between Indonesia and the "Belgrade neutrals" on East-West issues dating from the first Bandung Conference, and al though India fell below 75 per cent in 1962 as a result of the SinoIndian border dispute, New Delhi did not abandon her non-aligned sta tus. 12^ The Chinese attacks on India, however, do seem to represent the beginning of a definite division that was increasingly discernible within the non-aligned, Afro-Asian world. Sukarno1s speech at Belgrade is also of importance i n.that first mention was made of the "new emerging forces" and the "old forces" and the necessity for "the non-aligned countries to ally themselves with these new emerging forces."128 This proposed ideological change in.the 127 It could be argued that India found more reason for remaining non-aligned, but this time non-alignment in the context of military pre paredness. If Indonesia and India began to move apart after the 19551963 period, it was Indonesia that moved toward alignment, not India away from non-alignment. See Crabb, pp. 208-211, for reasons why India remained non-aligned. Also for a discussion of the dilemmas facing India during 1962, see Werner Levi, "Indian Neutralism Reconsidered," Pacific Affairs, XXXVII, No. 2 (Summer, 1964),.137-147. 128 "Toward Friendship, Peace and Justice," p. 153. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 133] === 120n 1 structure of world politics, made more explicit by his speech at the airport on returning from the conference, was a redefinition of nonalignment that began to represent a parallel interest with the com munist bloc countries. It was a sort of a Marxist "two warring camps" thesis without overtones of a class struggle.129 It also formed the basis of Sino-Indonesian friendship, and was instrumental in overcom ing the internal problems the Indonesian government had had with the resident Chinese a year earlier. As the.cold war lessened due to the gradually developing American-Soviet detente, and as the Sino-Soviet dispute intensified, classical "three force" theories in world politics had less relevance than before. Non-alignment became as much a prob lem of avoiding a radical "anti-nekolim" (neo-colonialism, colonialism and imperialism) stand as with striking a neutral path in the cold war. By the end of 1963, the advocacy of the antithetical themes of the NEFOS ("new emerging forces") and the OLDEFOS (* old established forces") had seriously compromised Indonesia's role as a "non-aligned neutral.11 129 While Sukarno's ideology is not particularly concerned with economics, he does include a concept of economic exploitation in his theory by warning against the exploitation of nation by nation and the desire of the "old colonial powers.... to preserve as much as possible of their economic interests" (ibid., p. 154). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 134] === IV: THE FORMATION OF MALAYSIA AND THE INDONESIAN REVOLUTION: THE INTERNAL IMAGE ... the foreign policy of the Republic of Indonesia is a reflection of the Indonesian Revolution. This I regard as its most important characteristic. The Formation of Malaysia Background to the proposal. The proposal for a "Malaysia" consisting of the eleven states of Malaya, Singapore, the colonies of Sarawak and North Borneo, and possibly the Sultanate of Brunei was supposedly made in an off-hand remark by Malayan Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman in a speech to a meeting of foreign correspondents in Singapore on May 23, 1961. The concept of bringing together in a federation all the former British holdings in Southeast Asia hardly originated with the Tengku, however. Lord Brassey of the British North Borneo Company made a strikingly similar proposal at the end of the nineteenth century, and though the idea remained dormant until after World War II, it was revived by the British High Commission er for Southeast Asia, Malcolm MacDonald, who reportedly broached 'Sukarno ^•Subandrio, Indonesia's Foreign Policy (Washington: Embassy of Indonesia, 1964), p. 1. Stephen Runciman, The White Rahjahs (London: Cambridge Univer sity Press, 1960), p. 185. 129 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 135] === and Hatta on the subject in 1949.? Despite substantial sentiment toward effecting some form of a larger political grouping, British policy immediately after the war was designed to keep Singapore separate from the mainland. The British White Paper of January 22, 19461* proposed a Malay Union of the nine Islamic states on the peninsula including the Straits settlements of Penang and Malacca; due to Singapore’s "special interests," however, the island state was made a separate crown colony. Singapore's posi tion as the citadel of British military strength in Asia no doubt made the British reluctant to give up control over the island; but also in view of the Union’s liberal proposals to limit the tradition al powers of the Malay aristocracy and elevate.the Chinese to full citizenship, the inclusion of Singapore's large Chinese population in a Malayan state would have upset the racial balance between the Malays and non-Malays (see Table V). Although acceptance of the Union plan fell through, Singapore was successfully excluded from the succeed5 ing federation that was established in 194-8. The debate over the post-war Union and Federation proposals focused on the major political problem that faced Britain and Malaya (and all of Southeast Asia for that matter): namely, how to control See Mohammad Hatta, "One Indonesian View of the Malaysian Issue," Asian Survey, V, No. 3 (March, 1965), 140; and Sukarno, "Safeguarding the Republic of Indonesia," speech to the Grand Roll-up of the Indo nesian Volunteers, April 13, 1964 (Djakarta: Department of Information, April 14, 1964, Vol. II, No. 6407), p. 2, wherein he apparently refers to MacDonald as "the Englishman,... the architect of ’Malaysia."’ 4See Great Britain, Malayan Union and Singapore: Statement of Policy on Future Policy (London: HMSO, 1946, Crand. 6724). For a discussion of the proposals.leading up to the revised federal government, see Malayan Union, Constitutional Proposals.for Malaya: Report of the Working Committee (Kuala Lumpur: Malayan Union Government Press, 1947TI See, also, Federation of Malaya, The Federa tion Agreement, 1948 (Kuala Lumpur:•Federation of Malaya Government IPress, 1952). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 136] === TABLE V: COMMUNAL COMPOSITION OF "MALAYSIA" (IN THOUSANDS) Malays Chinese Indians and Pakistanis Borneans others Total 3,600 2,670 813 129 7,232 Singapore 238 1,279 142 41 1,700 Sabah 27* 110 293 42 475 Sarawak 137 243 392 780 Total 4,022 4,302 960 685 218 10,187 Brunei 45 22 14 .83 Total 4,067 4,324 960 699 220 10,270 Malaya The above figures are adapted from Malaysia, Malaysia in Brief (Kuala Lumpur: Department of Information, 1964), and are 1961 estimates except those of Brunei and those marked with an asterisk (*), which are based on 1960 census figures. The Malaysia government lists Malays and other related groups (including Borneans) as "Indigenous peoples." The communal percentage of the Malaysian population (given a distinction be tween Malays and indigenous Borneans) are as follows: Chinese, 42.23; Malays, 39.48; Indians and Pakistanis, 9.42; Borneans, 6.73; others, 2.14. If the Borneans and Malays are lumped together as "indigenous peoples," the communal balance is in favor of the Malays 46.20 to 42.23. The population of Sarawak includes 246,000 Sea Dyaks, 61,000 Dyaks, 46,000 Melanaus, and 39,000 of other groups. The population of Sabah consists of 152,000 Kadazans (Dusuns), 63,000 Bajaus, 72,000 Muruts, and 83,000 "Brueni Malays," Kedayans, and other minor groups. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 137] === 13*“ l politically or isolate from the influence of a Communist China, the largest concentration of overseas Chinese in the world. The focal point of the problem was the island of Singapore, whose population of over a million and half was approximately three-fourths Chinese. The island had been able to support a large population and boast one of the highest standards of living in Asia due to a thriving entrepot trade that had dated from its founding in 1819. The presence of a sizeable British military complex was also of great importance to the island’s economy. When first Indonesia and later Malaya attained inde pendence, however, many of the economic patterns of colonialism were broken as the two countries sought to move away from economic depen dence on the island. The economic readjustments accompanying decolo nization, coupled with the victory of the communists in China led to the growth on the island of militant Chinese chauvinism that was tinged with communist or pro-communist overtones. The growing ’’leftist" ten dencies of Singapore’s Chinese accented a longstanding fear and dis trust among the Malays in the archipelago against the economically powerful Chinese; in view of China’s re-emergence as a worid power, many began to speak of the overseas Chinese as a fifth column in a Chinese (or communist) expansion to the South. map published in Peking, According to a 1954 the southern-most point of Chinese hegemony extends to Singapore and the Malay peninsula, which,according to the map legend,was "Chinese land prior to imperialistic encroachments" One can hardly view the Chinese of Southeast Asia, however, as a tightly-knit vanguard of communist expansion. There are, first of all, See Jacques Jacquet-Francillon, "The Borders of China: Mao's Bold Challenge to Khrushchev," The New Republic, 148, No. 16 (April 20, 1963), pp. 18-22,for a reproduction and discussion of the map. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 138] === The 195*+ Chinese borders showing "Chinese land pri/or to the imperialistic encroachments'/and Ryukyu Islands(14), Korea(15), /parts of Russian Siberia(16), and Sakhalin Island(17). See note 6, Bgge Chapter|IV. ITMTEFyEST MAP 5 • EAST A S IAN. SPHEPyES ^{enst/Ae. x Allied with the West The extent of afp V-'-V-y:.Indonesian state according to the deliberations of the B.P.K.I., July 10, 1945. Peking— Pyongyang Axis, announced August 17, 1965, was a largely symbolic "alliance"— not formalized by treaty. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 139] === 134 significant differences between the more moderate peninsula Chinese and those on Singapore. The major Chinese party in Malaya proper, the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), has since 1957 been associated with Malay and Indian based parties in the unique Alliance Party coalition that has been in power since Malaya's independence; and for the most part, the peninsula Chinese did not support the communist insurrection— known by the typically British euphemism as "the Emergency"— that lasted from the establishment of the federation in 1948 until 1960. Even in Singapore, much of the Chinese cultural chauvinism may be only a reac tion to Malay political predominance— or in George Kahin's terminology a "cultural self-consciousness." There emerged in the 1950's what at first looked like a radical political grouping® but what eventually developed into a moderate anti-communist movement called the People's Action Party (PAP) under the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew.^° The PAP made its first limited election bid in 1955 under the slogam of "independence through merger" and despite being infiltrated For a brief description of the Malayan Alliance, see J. Norman Parmer, "Malaysia," Government and Politics of Southeast Asia, ed. Geroge McT. Kahin (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957), pp. 333339; for an excellent, detailed study of the Alliance in relation to the 1955 and 1959 elections, see K. J. Ratnam, Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1965), especially pp. 142-216. ®See "Indonesia and Malaysia," Pacific Affairs, XXXVII, No. 3 See, e.g., Singapore, The Communist Threat in Singapore (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1957, Sessional Paper, 33), a "white paper" alleging communist control of the PAP. ■^For a discussion of Singapore's politics, see Milton E. Osborne, Singapore and Malaysia (Ithaca:' Cornell University Press, 1964); and Michael Leifdr, "Politics in Singapore," Journal of Commonwealth Politi cal Studies, VI (May, 1964), 107-119. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 140] === by communist-oriented groups and subjected to two anti-communist purges by the first Singapore government, the party won 54-.1 per cent of the vote in the 1959 elections and captured a majority of the seats in the enlarged legislature. However, a policy of openly courting communist support for tactical advantage led to inevitable division within.the party. The split between those advocating merger and more radical elements agitating for "complete independence" reached a climax in July 1961, when the left wing, led by Lim Chin Siong, was purged. Tak ing about one-half the PAP's branch committees, the dissidents formed the Barisan Socialis; and the next month, they joined with the stri dently chauvinistic United People's Party (UPP) in opposition to the PAP. The immediate political consideration that faced the Malayan government in 1961, therefore, was the danger that the PAP might lose out to more radical elements unless some merger arrangement could be effected, and there was an increasing fear of Singapore becoming a Malayan "Cuba" or, in the words of Arnold Brackman, a "Yenan by the •*11 sea." Given this background, Rahman's seemingly offhand remark that Malaya, Singapore and the three Borneo states "be brought closer together in political and economic cooperation" raised widespread interest. While the integration of Singapore into a more viable political unit was the major goal of the proposal, it had become increasingly apparent that to make the merger with the island's large Chinese population palatable to the Malay political groups and to maintain the tenuous racial equilib rium, it was necessary to include in the federation the sizeable "nonChinese" populations in Sarawak, Sabah and hopefully Brunei. The communal ■^See Arnold Brackman, Southeast Asia's Second Front (New York: yraeger, 1966), chap. ii, pp. 5-41. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 141] === ratio in Malaya at the.time was roughly 50 per-cent Malay to 37 per.cent Chinese, and had Singapore alone been added the percentages.would have been reversed 43 per cent to 44 per cent in favor of the Chinese. Even though the Chinese would still outnumber the ethnic Malays in the Malaysian scheme (see Table V), the former would be more dispersed, the percentage of indigenous groups increased, and the Chinese question could be handled as an area wide security problem. A major impedi ment to the plan, however, was the gap in political, economic and edu cational development between Malaya and the Borneo colonies. While Sarawak and Sabah had profited from colonial status in the receipt of social services, the brief period of British rule that only began in 1946 allowed little preparation for self government. On the other hand, barring the rise of radical parties, and presuming an extension of the federal formula and constitution that favored the ethnic Malay, the lack of political maturity in northern Borneo might make it easier for the peninsula Malays to retain political power in their own hands. To the extent the Malayan Alliance could maintain loyal satellite parties in Sarawak and Sabah, the representation to the federal parliament might be better controlled. Finally, in the back of many minds was the fact that if a viable federation could not be achieved, the peninsula Malays and the ethnic Borneans might have to submit to Javanese domination to escape Chinese domination. Weighing these considerations, Rahman intro duced the Malaysian plan in Parliament, and it was approved on October 16, 1961.12 -*-2See Willard A. Hanna, "Part I: The Proposal/' Malaysia; A Federa tion in Prospect (American University Field Staff /_AUFS/ Reports, Vol. X, No. 1, WAH-l-’62), pp. 1-8. Unless otherwise noted, all AUFS Reports cited in this section are from Malaysia, A Federation in Prospect. The collection of.reports has been.reprinted as The Formation of Malaysia [_(New York: AUFS, 1964). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 142] === Dynamics of the "Malaysia11 negotiations. The first round of talks on the feasibility of the proposal took place almost immediately in London, and in a joint communique issued by the British and Malayan 13 governments, the federation was approved in principle and a Commission of Inquiry (later known as the Gobbold Commission) was appointed to as certain the sentiment in North Borneo. Opposition to the plan in Malaya came from forces of the right 14 and left. On one hand, the Islamic conservatives, mainly the Pan- Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP), opposed the plan in favor of a narrow Malay nationalism and the establishment of a Greater Malaya (Melayu Raya) which would include the whole archipelago in an anti-communist (that is to say anti-Chinese) front. The PMIP's leader, Dr. Burhannudin, also had avowed pro-Indonesian sympathies. The leftist Socialist Front— composed of the Malay Party Rakyat and the urban-oriented, largely nonMalay Labour Party— acting in conjunction with the Barisan Sosialis, bitterly opposed the establishment of an anti-communist, Malay-oriented administration that would be in control of internal security in the area. The Front branded Rahman's Malaysia proposal as being."directed against the progressive forces in the area," and as "a military threat to Indonesia." 15 Somewhat ironically, the Socialist front and the rightist PMIP share a pro-Indonesian orientation and the dream of a greater 13 ’'See Great Britain and the Federation of Malaya, Federation of Malaysia: Joint Statement by the United Kingdom and the Federation of Malaya (London: HMSO, 1961, Cmnd. 1563). 14 See,e.g., Hanna, "Reactions to the Proposal," AUFS Reports, ^ Ibid., p. 6. In a regional conference called in Kuala Lumpur by the Front in January 1962, the PAP was expelled by the socialist fraternity. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 143] === 138 ~ I Malay confederation. The leader of the Party Rakyat,. Ahmad Boestamam, was detained by the Malayan government in February 1963 due to a sub-, versive association with the Indonesian PKI during November 1961. Whether or not Boestamam's relationship with the Indonesian communists was instrumental in the PKI declaration of opposition to Malaysia in December 1961, he was quoted as being willing to work with the commu nists to realize his "life plan" to unite Malaya, Singapore, the Borneo territories, Indonesia, the Philippines and southern Thailand into a Greater Malaysia state. In Borneo, reaction to the proposal was cautious. When the Tengku first suggested the federation, most civil servants and local leaders would probably have preferred outright independence or a sepa rate Borneo federation. Seeing that Britain favored the plan, however, they had little choice and agreed when favorable constitutional provi sions and economic arrangements were promised. ^ Nonetheless, the Dyaks and the Chinese did not want Muslim Malay control in Sarawak. The Dyaks were content with the status quo since they had British pro tection; the Chinese, on the other hand, wanted to terminate the colonial relationship. Speaking largely through the nominally noncommunal, but predominantly Chinese Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP), ■^Quoted by Parmer in Kahin, p. 338; and Brackman, p. 87. For a discussion of Indonesia's "allies" in Malaya, see Malaysia, Indonesian Intensions Toward Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Federal Department of Informa tion, 1964-). ■^See Kahin, Pacific Affairs, XXXVII, No. 3, 256. For the sub stance of the remainder of this paragraph, see Hanna, "Part V: The Un known Component— North Borneo," X, No. 5, WAH-5-'62; "Part IV: Reactions in Borneo," X, No. 4, WAH-4-*62; "Part XVIII: Sarawak— From Colony to State," XI, No. 7 WAH-7-'63. See,also,Robert 0. Tilman, "The Sarawak Political Scene," Pacific Affairs, XXXVII, No. 4 (Winter, 1964-5), 412425. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 144] === 139 most Chinese advocated "independence— then federation" and called for a national plebiscite. In North Borneo, the Christian-oriented United Kadazan National Organization (UKNG) led by Donald Stephens, also initially opposed the Malaysia plan— again, it seemed, due to fear of Malay dominance. The UKNO was joined.in opposition to t h e.federation by the Sabah Chinese who distrusted the more radical (and economically powerful) Chinese in Singapore and (to a lesser extent) in Sarawak. In Brunei, the Party Ra'ayat, under the leadership of A.M. Azahri, ex ercised a wide-spread appeal with a platform opposed to federation and advocating what ultimately became a pro-Indonesian, Brunei nationalism. As a general statement, then, the major opposition forces revolved around some conception of Borneo regionalism. In July 1961, the SUPP's Ong Kee Hui met with Stephens and Azahari to form a front for achieving closer intra-Borneo relations. The coalition was rife with conflicting interests, however, and soon collapsed. Stephens' early misgivings about the proposal were dropped when he was assured of protection for Kadazan interests in Sabah, and his support for Malaysia increased after the Philippines lodged its claim for North Borneo in 1962. On the other hand, the SUPP remained opposed to the plan, cooperating openly with the Barisan Sosialis; and the radical wing of the party, led by.Stephen Yong, was branded in a British "white paper" as a communist front with links to the activities of the Clandestine Communist Organization (CCO) in the area. 18 Despite the sizeable opposition that developed, the British and Rahman pressed hard for the federation merger. The most important problems to be resolved as far as Singapore was concerned were those A Sarawak, The Danger Within (Kuching; Government Printing Office, 1963) Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 145] === affecting citizenship and the defense arrangements with Britain. a series of negotiations between Rahman and L e e, a unique arrange ment in the first matter was worked out whereby residents of Singapore would possess Singapore citizenship and Malaysian nationality.^® rights, however, Voting were restricted to the state of origin due to the more stringent citizenship requirements for non-Malays in Malaya. addition, Singapore was allowed only fifteen seats in the federal Parliament though its population should have entitled it to twentyfive. The state was, on the other hand, granted local jurisdiction in a number of areas— education, labor, health— and generous financial arrangements that were hoped to offset the unfavorable citizenship compromise. In regard to the naval and military bases, the British remained on the island under the provisions of the 1957 Anglo-Malayan defense treaty providing for assistance in case of external.attack, and the pact was extended to apply to the Borneo territories as well. 21 Rahman had narrowly avoided a cabinet crisis over the ratification of the treaty in 1957 due to the possibility that Malayan military facili ties might be used for SEATO purposes, and he reiterated that the Singapore base would not be used in conjunction with SEATO activities 19 See Memorandum Setting Out Heads of Agreement for a Merger Be tween the Federation of Malaya and Singapore (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1961, Cmnd. 33). 20 The wording of the agreement was later amended to change "nationality11 to "citizenship" in every place it appeared in the docu ment. However, voting restrictions on Chinese moving into Malaya proper from Singapore have made the wording change almost meaningless. See Robert 0. Tilman, "Malaysia: The Problems of Federation," Western Politi cal Quarterly, XVI, No. 4 (December, 1963), 907-908. 21 See Joint Anglo-Malayan Communique, London, November 23,. 1961, cited in Brackman, p. 47. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 146] === except with the.approval of the Malaysia.government, and then only if its national interests were involved. 22 The Lee-Rahman agreements were the subject of a heated.public debate and a shrewdly devised referendum that Lee’s PAP government presented to the voters on September 1, 1962. 23 The referendum dealt only with approval for the merger, although three alternatives were submitted: Merger on the basis of the Lee-Rahman agreements (A);."tlnconditional merger as a state on equal basis with the eleven other states i n.accor dance with the constitutional documents of the Federation of Malaya” (B); and ”on terms no less favorable given to the Borneo territories" Alternative A won by 377,626 of 561,559 votes, and although 144,077 blank ballots were cast in protest, Lee’s government declared that all blank'ballots would be considered as favoring merger. commenting on how-a democratic objective was achieved at the expense of democratic principles, Lee said, "We were meeting cardsharpers and we were not going in like spring chickens." An assessment of the sentiment in northern Borneo was under taken by the Commission of Inquiry headed by Lord Cobbold that had been established as a result of the first round of negotiations in London. The Cobbold Commission,consisting of two representatives each from 2 2 Ibid., pp. 47-48. 23 See Hanna, "Part XIII: Singapore— The Strategy and Tactics of Merger," X, No. 17, WAH-13-’62. See,also, Lee Kuan Yew, "The Battle for Merger," Towards Socialism, Vol. V (Singapore: Government of Singapore, 1962), a collection of a series of twelve broadcosts over Radio Singa pore between September 21 and October 9, 1961. 24 The referendum was designed to actually allow only one answer. "B” was unacceptable due to the unequal citizenship laws in Malaya, and "C” was not desirable since the Borneo conditions had not been de cided. 25 Hanna, WAH-13-’62, p..1. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 147] === Britain and Malaya, arrived in Borneo in February, 1962. After two months of hearings, sifting through thousands of letters and petitions, and meetings with local officials in Sarawak and Sabah, the committee published a candid report that was generally favorable to the Malaysia plan, but recommended certain constitutional safeguards in areas of religion, language, citizenship and immigration. 26 The Cobbold Report was the basis for a second round of talks held in London in July and August, and as a result, an intergovernmental committee under the chair manship of Lord Lansdowne was appointed to draft the constitutional framework of the new nation. 27 As the target date for the formation of Malaysia drew near negotiations among the parties in.question moved rather uneasily. last minute disagreement over Singapore's financial arrangements and trouble between the PAP and the Malayan Chinese Association threatened to disrupt the talks. In July 1963, however, the Lansdowne Report was approved in London by all the negotiating parties except Brunei, and August 31 was set as Malaysia Day. 28 Brunei's decision not to join the 76 See Great Britain, Report of the Commission of Inquiry, North Borneo and Sarawak, 1962 (London: HMSO, 1962, Cmnd. 1794). For an ex cellent discussion of the constitutional problems involved, see Tilman, Western Political Quarterly, XVI, No. 4, 897-911. 27 The Lansdowne Committee Report was presented to Parliament in February 1963 and accepted by each of the governments as a working basis for drafting the "Malaysian" constitution. See Great Britain and the Federation of Malaya, Malaysia: Report of the Intergovernmental Working Committee, 1962 (London: HMSO, 1963, Cmnd. 1954). 28 See Great Britain and the Federation of Malaya, Malaysia: Agreement Concluded Between the United Kingdom, the Federation of Malaya, North~~Eorneo, Sarawak and Singapore (London: HMSO, 1963, Cmnd. 2094). For additional background material, see T. E. Smith, The Background to Malaysia (London: Chatham House, 1963); R. S. Milne, "Malaysia: A New Federation in the Making," Asian Survey, III, No. 2 (February, 1963), 76-82; Gordon P. Means, "Malaysia— A New Federation in Southeast Asia," Pacific Affairs, XXXVI, No. 2 (Summer, 1963), 138-159; Robert Shaplen, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 148] === federation was due in part to inadequate financial arrangements;.i t,is quite likely that the real reasons were over the position and rank of the Sultan in the Conference o f.Rulers (composed of the rulers of the other Malay states in the Federation) and his chances of becoming head of State.29 An additional dimension to the Sultan’s decision was furnished, by the short-lived Brunei revolt organized by Azahari in December, 1962, and crushed only a few days later by British troops. tions behind the rebellion were somewhat complex and vague. The rootiva30 It has been suggested that one possible source of the trouble was that the Sultan had been slow to initiate needed (or perhaps workable) social changes and that Brunei's substantial oil wealth was dominated by the Sultan's feudal retainers. If this were the prime motivation, however, it is rather puzzling that Azahari acknowledged Sultan Sir Omar Ali Saifuddin as the constitutional and parliamentary head of state when the rebel leader proclaimed the Unitary State of Kalimantan Utara from his base in Manila on December 8. A more probable explanation for the revolt was that the Party Ra'ayat— in addition to many of the Sultan's own court followers— had little desire to see Brunei "swallowed up" in a Malaysian federation and indeed sought the restoration of Brunei's sovereignty over its "lost territories" of Sarawak and Sabah. The "The Imminence of a Nation," The New Yorker (April 6, 1963), 130-171; and Francis L. Staraer, "Malaysia and the North Bornean Territories," Asian Survey, III, No. 11 (November, 1963), 519-53H. 29See Hanna, "Part XXIII: Toward M-Day," XI, No. 14, WAH-14-'63, 30 See Hanna's three excellent reports, "Part XIV: Brunei— How to Emerge," XI, No. 2, WAH-2-'63; "Part XV; Brunei— How to Merge," XI, No. 3, WAH-3-'63; and "Part XVI: Brunei— Some Explanations," XI, No. 5, WAH-5-'63. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 149] === 144 federation plan would, of course, have frustrated these ambitions, and in order to forestall what seemed to be a move by the Sultan to join Malaysia, Azahai'i launched his rebellion. It also seems likely that the aims of the revolt were at least in harmony (if not undertaken in out right conjunction) with those of Indonesia; namely, a unitary North Kalimantan state with close ties to, and economic and political depen dence on, Djakarta. Azahari had wide connections with Indonesian officials, and he probably received training and aid from Sukarno's government for his own brand of "revolutionary nationalism" in northern Borneo. A The rebel leader also had-contacts in Manila with those who were pushing the North Borneo claim, and to confuse an already complex issue further, he supported the Philippines position even though it was inconsistent with his own newly declared state. Whatever the real reason for the revolt, the immediate effect was to call into question the Sultan's predisposition to merge in the upcoming federation. A final note should be made on the outcome of the local and state elections that were held in North Borneo and Sarawak preceeding the formation of the new state. In North Borneo, the first elections in that state's history were held between December 1962 and April 1963 with the pro-Malaysia Sabah Alliance Party (SAP) winning a landslide victory. 32 Though in actuality the party was only an amalgam of di verse political groups that often competed with one another for votes, 31 See Brackman, pp. 133-156. 32See Robert 0. Tilman, "The Alliance Pattern in Malaysian Poli tics: Bornean Variations on a Theme," South -Atlantic Quarterly, LXIII, No. 1 (Winter, 1964). For an analysis of Chinese voting in the elec tions, see Henry R. Glick, "The Chinese Community in Sabah and the 1963 Elections," Asian Survey, V, No. 3 (March, 1965), 144-151. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 150] === 145 The SAP captured 131 of 137 local council seats in.the first round of a three-tiered indirect election. By April, t h e.state-wide Legisla tive Council was formed with the SAP taking all the elective.seats, and on August 8, the Council unanimously approved a resolution endors ing Malaysia. Another three-tiered election was also held in Sarawak in the Spring of 1963 33 amid a growing incident of attacks on isolated. government outposts, many of which, it was alleged, were the result of Indonesian cooperation with the CCO. 34- The results of the elections, which were completed in June, were somewhat inconclusive, despite the fact that pro-Malaysia candidates won three-fourths of the local seats and elected 31 of the 36 candidates to the state legislative council. Unlike North Borneo, where the balance of power in the SAP was divided among Muslim Malays, Christian Kadazan and Chinese, the Sarawak Alliance was dominated by the Dyaks. The largely Malay PANAS party withdrew from the alliance j ust before the elections and further clouded the picture by collaborating with the SUPP in the second and third levels of the elections. However, when the Malaysia proposal was introduced for approval on August 21, only the 5 SUPP members voted against it. 35 The regional reaction to the proposal. Despite the passage of the Singapore merger referendum, the favorable Cobbold Report, and the ^®See Robert 0. Tilman, "Elections in Sarawak," Asian Survey, III, No. 10 (October, 1963), 507-518. 34See, e.g., Justus M. van der Kroef, "Communism and the Guerrilla War in Sarawak," World Today, XX, No. 2 (February, 1964), 50-60. For the view of the Malaysian government, see Malaysia, Indonesian Involve ment in Eastern Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Department of Information, 1964). 35See Hanna, "Part XXIII: Toward M-Day," XI, No. 14, WAH-14-»63, p. 3; and Brackman, p. 85. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 151] === 146 pro-Malaysian majorities as a result of the Bornean elections, the formation of Malaysia was the subject of widespread regional opposi tion that threatened to wreck the new state and in fact.led to the postponement of its establishment. The most important source of this opposition was Indonesia. One important consequence of the Brunei revolt was that it provided Indonesia with a justification to further its policy of confrontation that had been temporarily suspended after the West Irian settlement. The Indo nesian government had officially stated that it had no objections to the Malaysia plan when it was first suggested; however, its attitude changed. after Azahari's revolt, President Sukarno gave public support to what he considered a manifestation of a ’’new emerging force,"37 and the Indonesian ambassador to the United Nations, Sudjarwo, stated that while the Indonesian government "did not recognize the proclaimed inde pendent state of Northern Kalimantan... it obviously could not re frain from lending support, moral or otherwise, to the independence movement in those colonial territories."3® The first explicit announce ment of Indonesia's hostility to Malaysia was given by President Sukarno on February 13, 1963 when he asserted that "we are being encircled.... We do not want to have neo-colonialism in our vicinity. We consider Malaysia as an encirclement of the Indonesian Republic. Malaysia is the product of... neo-colonialism." 39 The next day he formally announced, 36See Subandrio's letter to the New York Times, November 17, 1961, p. 34. 37tondon Times, December 12, 1962, cited in A. G. Mezerik, MalaysiaIndonesia Conflict (New York: International Review, 1965), p. 21. 38See Security Council, Official Reports, S/PV 1144, p. 52. 39 See Sukarno, "We are being encircled," speech, February 13, 1963 in George Modelski, The New.Emerging Forces (Canberra, Australia: The [Australian National University, 1963), pp. 74-76. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 152] === "I now declare officially that Indonesia opposes Malaysia."4'0 147 The Philippine government also opposed the Malaysia plan by lodging a somewhat belated claim to North Borneo. The basis of the Philippine claim was that in 1879 the territory of North.Borneo was leased, not ceded, by the Sultan of Sulu to the British North.Borneo Company. According to Manila, therefore, the territory should not become a part of the proposed Malaysia federation, but should be re turned to the Philippines.4^ Before the claim was lodged, the Manila government had been on the friendliest terms with Malaya, both having launched in 1961 (in conjunction with Thailand) the cooperative effort called the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA). Somewhat to Thailand’s disappointment, however, the attitude of the Philippines changed after the active promotion of the Malaysia plan by Rahman, and Manila took a more pro-Indonesian position in regional affairs. President Diosdado Macapagal had taken office in 1961 in an atmosphere of a reviving Philippine nationalism and a general worsen ing of Philippine-American relations.4'2 The visible coolness toward Western powers that was beginning to take place was reflected in a grow ing pan-Malay sentiment and a desire to play a greater role in Asian polities. Sometimes dismissed as a "misplaced Latin American republic," 40Antara (Indonesian News Agency), February 14-, 1963 cited in Brackman, p. 14-9. 41 For the best analysis of the legal aspects of the claim, see Pacific© A. Ortiz, "Legal Aspects of the North Borneo Question," Phili ppines^ studies, II, No. 1 (January, 1963). See,also,K. G. Tregonmng, "The Glaim for North Borneo by the Philippines," Australian Outlook,. XVI, No. 3 (December, 1962), 283-291; and R. H. Leary, "Sulu and Sabah," Far Eastern Economic Review, IV (July, 1963). 42 See Martin Meadows, "Recent Developments in Philippine-American Relations: A Case Study in Emergent Nationalism," Asian Survey, V, No. 6 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 153] === there was m u c h.sentiment in the Philippines.for the development of a true Asian identity. The claim to North.Borneo "provided both a tactic and an opportunity.t o.fulfill some of this need." To couatek' "Malaysia," Macapagal suggested a Greater Malay Confederation to consist of the Philippines, and Malaya/Malaysia; Malayan officials, however, suspected that this was only a tactic to press its claim to North Borneo. After the Brunei revolt and Indo nesia’s statenwnMf of opposition t o.the federation, Macapagal began to amend his confederation proposal to include Indonesia. Pro-Indonesian sympathies and increased emphasis on a Malay union were accelerated when Salvador Lopez became Foreign Minister in June 1963; and correspondingly, the ASA concept fell into dormancy. It is perhaps only natural that the Malaysia proposal would have repercussions in the islands and that Malaya's two island neigh bors would react unfavorably to the plan. The situation, however, eased noticeably in April when the foreign ministers of the three coun tries met in Manila to prepare the groundwork for a possible summit conference on the issue. Sukarno gave every impression of launching on a meaningful program of economic stabilization at this time, and he seemed genuinely disposed.to ending what could turn into a costly endeavor. Besides, Macapagal's proposal for a Greater Malay Confedera tion and the idea of a summit conference where he could exercise his diplomatic skills seemed to appeal to the Indonesian leader. While "■^Bernard K. Gordon, The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia (Englewood Cliffs: Prent'ice-Hall, Spectrum Books,T966}, p. 21; pages 9-40 contains an excellent discussion of the claim in terms of Philippines foreign policy. Ibid., pp. 23. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 154] === ri49 "i Sukarno was in.Tokyo negotiating an agreement with American oil companies, he issued a somewhat surprising but dramatic invitation to Rahman to visit and talk with him for a few days. As the result of a "frank and amicable exchange of views" between the two leaders, the foreign minis ters of the three countries met again in Manila from June 7-11 in an historic meeting that marked the high point in relations between the two countries. 45 The report of the ministers, later known as the Manila Accord, affirmed that, inasmuch as "the three countries share a primary respon sibility for the maintenance of the stability and security of the area in order to preserve their national identities," the delibera tions were "a manifestation of the determination of the nations in this region to achieve a closer cooperation in the endeavor to chart their common future." As a consequence, the initial steps to institute Macapagal's Malay Confederation were taken when the ministers supported regular consultations between the three countries and the ultimate establishment of such machinery and 4 General Secretariat necessary to "achieve close understanding and cooperation in dealing with common problems relating to security, stability, economic, social and cultural problems." This grouping, eventually rechristened Maphilindo (MAlaysia- PHlLippines-INDOnesia) by Subandrio, was in the long run more of a semantical than a practical device; it did, however, symbolize a cert tain hopeful spirit— a peaceful, cooperative approach to solving the. region's problems.^ ^ S e e Malaysia, Tripartite Summit Meeting, Manila, July 30-August 5, 1963 (Kuala Lumpur: Department of Information, n.d.) pp. 1-3; or Indonesia, A Survey of the Controversial Problem of the Establishment of the Federation of Malaysia (Washington: Embassy of Indonesia, n.d.), ^ S e e in this context two AUFS Reports: Albert Ravenholt,"Maphilindj>: Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 155] === 150 The second outcome of the Accord was an approval of the pro posed Malaysian Federation, "provided the support of the people of the Borneo territories is ascertained by an independent and impartial authority, namely, the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his representative." The document also noted that the "inclusion of North Borneo in the Federation of Malaysia would not prejudice... the claim and the right of the Philippines to continue to pursue it, in accordance with international law and the principle of the pacific settlement of disputes." Finally it provided for a summit conference by the end of July to ratify the agreements. The congenial relationships were temporarily disrupted, when, on July 9, the Malaysian agreement was signed in London between Malaya and Britain on behalf of Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah, providing for a transfer of sovereignty to Malaysia on August 31, 1963. Sukarno was upset by the announcement, claiming that Rahman had broken his promise and violated the spirit of the Manila Accord by announcing a definite date for the federation. However, despite hedging until the last minute, the Indonesian President attended the conference with Rahman and Macapagal that met at Manila from July 30 to August 5, and the Accord reached a month earlier was ratified by the three governments. In a Joint Statement 47 by the three leaders, the United Nations Secretary General was asked to ascertain whether or not the recent elec tions in Borneo were fair and complied with the "principles of self- DrearnorAchieveable Reality," XII, No. 1, AR-l-'64, pp. 105-118; and Willard A. Hanna, "Maphilindo— A Confederation in Prespect?" XI, no. 15, WAH-15-*63, pp. 1-9. 47 See Tripartite Summit Meeting, pp. 6 - 8. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 156] === determination," and the leaders pledged to abide by his decision. flecting the great influence of Sukarno at the meeting, the governments also agreed that '.'foreign bases— temporary in nature— should not be. allowed to be used directly or indirectly to.subvert the national inde pendence of any of the three countries... and that /the parties/ will abstain from the use of arrangement of collective defense to serve the particular interests of the big powers." The leaders then issued a Declaration (bearing the unmistakable mark of Sukarno) that charac terized the three countries as "new emerging forces" in the region and pledged their support to combine efforts in the common struggle against colonialism and imperialism, and to take initial steps toward "frequent and regular consultation to be known as Musjawarah Maphilindo." Again, new arguments arose. On the eve of the arrival of the United Nations survey team in Borneo, Sukarno insisted on the holding of a plebiscite; and even after the team had started to work, a dis pute over the number of "observers" broke out. Rahman did agree to give the survey team time to complete their work; the Prime Minister was put under great pressure, however, to set a definite date for the transfer of sovereignty since indecision and delay might hurt the chances of success of the federation. Having little doubt of the favorable findings of the team, yet running the risk of angering Sukarno, Rahman announced on August 29 that Malaysia would be formed on September 16. Amid charges by Indonesia that Malaya had violated the Manila Agreements, the United Nation's team departed for New.York to prepare its report. The Secretary General, U Thant, made the findings public t*’8 Ibid., pp. 4-5. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 157] === on September 14 and concluded that the.elections in Sarawak and Sabah were "freely and impartially conducted." Reminding the three governments of their agreement to abide by his decision, Thant declared that it was his opinion "that there is no doubt about the wishes of a sizeable majority of the peoples of these territories to join the Federation of Malaysia* "l|'9 Despite the favorable findings, however, the damage of the premature announcement had been done. 50 The next day, Indonesia declared that it could not recognize the new govern ment; the Philippines, understandably in a difficult position because it did not wish to isolate Indonesia and destroy the warm relations between the countries, also decided to "defer recognition." 51 Malaysia Day, Indonesian mobs sacked the Malaysian and British em bassies and then returned the next day to burn the British embassy and a score of British residencies. With little choice in the matter, Malaysia broke off diplomatic relations with the two countries on September 17. The Dialectic of the Revolution: The Internal Image As the target date for the establishment of Malaysia drew closer, and particularly after the transfer of sovereignty agreement See Final Conclusions of the Secretary-General Regarding Malaysia, SG/1583, September 13, 1963. See Kahin, Pacific Affairs, XXXVII, No. 3, p. 269, who seems to place full blame for the events that followed on the premature statement. Malaysia's official excuse was that by law. the date had to be announced by August 31. See Malaysia, Malaya/Philippines Rela tions (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printing Office, n.d.),cited m Mezerik, p. 36. See below, pp. 188-180, for this writer's comments on Indo nesia's desire to end the confrontation. 51New York Times, September 16, 1963, p. 1. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 158] === 153 was signed in July 1963, the opposition against the proposed federa tion mounted within Indonesia. The following analysis will focus on the internal political development in Indonesia and its effect on the country's foreign policy. Two often posed theseswill also be evaluated in this context, namely: 1) that the political ascendency of the PKI was the prime factor in the confrontation of Malaysia; and 2) that the domestic political situation was such that a belligerent foreign policy was necessary to divert attention from a deteriorating economy. The sinistral triangle. The twelve month period following the West Irian settlement has often been treated as a time when Indo nesia stood at a crucial juncture in its development and was faced with the difficult and perplexing decision of whether to put into operation an economic stabilization program or continue along the path of revolutional nationalism. For a time it looked as if Sukarno was making a genuine effort to abandon the expensive political poli cies that had marked government activity since the fall of parlia mentary democracy six years earlier. With the turning of the anti- Malaysia tide in the Spring of 1963, the government took the first step toward putting into effect the long promised stabilization pro gram by issuing on-May 26 a series of fourteen regulations designed to implement ai!d commitments made by the American-led aid consortium and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Most of the major politi cal groups, however, were unhappy with the initial impact of the re forms, and the PKI in particular attacked the regulations as the "26 May 1963 detour" and charged (somewhat accurately) that the government had issued the stabilization plan only in the hope of getting Western Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 159] === aid. After the July Maphilindo meeting, the opposition to Malaysia within Indonesia reached such proportions as to obscure the need— and the desire— to effect the program of economic development. "Crush Malaysia,” in short, gradually preempted the "just and prosperous..53 society." The break with Malaysia in September, and the.burning of the British Embassy that followed was of much, more than diplomatic sig nificance. The attitude of the Western nations hardened as a result of Indonesia's action, and the United States ultimately withdrew from its aid commitments--much to the relief of the consortium's co-spon sors. The IMF also suspended the $50,000,000 credit it had extended earlier. This action, coming on the heels of Indonesia's decision to cut off all trade with Singapore and Penang, made the implementation of the 25 May Regulations practically impossible. The cost of living which had begun to level off during the summer months increased at an alarming rate after September, and from this point on, Indonesia's economy deteriorated at a rapid— but amazingly long-enduring— rate. The PKI's mammoth network of mass organizations greatly pro fited from the increased agitational and operational freedom which came with the lifting of the "state of emergency" on May 1, 1963, and ^ S e e Ewa T. Pauker, "Has the Sukarno Regime Weakened the PKI?" Asian Survey, IV, No. 9 (September, 1964), 1060-1061 ff. 5^For a more detailed account, see among others, Guy J. Pauker, "Indonesia: Internal Development or External Expansion?" Asian Survey, III,No. 2 (February, 1963), 69-75, and "Indonesia in 1963: The Year of Wasted Opportunities," Asian Survey, IV, No. 2 (February 1964), 687794; J.A.C. Mackie, "Indonesia: A Background to Confrontation," World Today, XX, No. 4 (April, 1964), 139-147; and Donald Hindley, "Indonesia's Policy of Confrontation: The Search for Motives," Asian Survey, VI, N o.6 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 160] === 155 the carefully nurtured myth of the party as a champion of democratic mass action gave the implementation of communist action an important psychological advantage.^4 One instance in particular is provided by the party's campaign directed against military control of the former Dutch enterprises. In the absence of restrictions on political activi ty that had existed under martial law, the communist affiliated labor and estate workers organizations increasingly demanded "democratic control" over the segment of the economy that was still largely under army administration. Not only did the party affiliates attempt to supplant army control over the former Dutch holdings, but in January 1964, they began a nationalization program of their own by seizing certain British properties in West Java and Djakarta. Faced with a fait accompli, the government assumed formal control over the communist appropriated enter p ris e s.^ Another aspect of the PKI's militant policy was its "agrar ian reform" program under which a campaign of widespread "squatting" and land seizures was attempted. Carried out under the direction of the com munist peasant organization, Barisan Tani Indonesia (BTI),^6this action ultimately gave rise to repeated conflicts with PNI and NU oriented land57 lords. A final note should be made on the extension of communist influ ence in local government. In March,Sukarno stated that the Tjatur Tunggal (the "four in one" local policy making bodies consisting of the military ^ S e e Daniel S. Lev, "Indonesia 1965: The Year of the Coup," Asian Survey, VI, No. 2 (February, 1966), 105. 55 See Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism and the Changing Balance of power," Pacific Affairs, XXXVII, No. 4 (Winter, 1964-65), 372. 56 See Justus M. van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1965), pp. 243-251, and 281-282, who discusses PKI-army tensions over communist land re form policy. See, also, van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism's Revo lutionary Gymnastics" Asian Survey, V, No. 5 (May, 1965), 217-232. 57 Lev, Asian Survey, VI, No. 2, 104. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 161] === 156 commander, police chief, civil governor and district attorney) should become the Pantj a Tunggal (“five in one") with the addition of a representative from the Nation Front— an institution in which the party 58 had already built up great strength. The party's position was further strengthened due to several important changes in the internal balance of power that took place after the break with Malaysia. 59 The sudden death of the highly respected First Minister Djuanda in November 1963 had triggered the first alteration in the balance of forces. Prior to that time it had appeared that the moderate ruling triumvirate of General Nasution, Djuanda and the Nationalist Ruslan Abdulgani would accede to the position of power in case something happened to President Sukarno. The cabinet that was formed in December 1963, however, did not inelude Nasution in the top ranks of the government, fiO and reflected a growing breach between the defense minister and Sukarno. It also marked a new phase in Sukarno's campaign to ease the General out of a position of power that had begun with Jani's appointment as head of the army in June 1962. In a further action, the General lost con trol over the supervision of the “loyalty of state officials" when Guy J. Pauker, “Indonesia: The PKI's Road to Power,'" in Robert A. Scalapino, The Communist Revolution in Asia: Tactics, Goals and Achievements (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 269-270. 59 The following two paragraphs are taken largely from Guy J. Pauker, “Indonesia in 1964: Toward a 'People's Democracy,'" Asian Survey, V, No. 2 (February, 1965), 88-97. 60 Nasution was given the post of Coordinating Minister in the Compartment of Defense and Security. See Susan Finch and Daniel S. Lev, Republic of Indonesia Cabinets, 1945-1965 (Ithaca: Modern Indonesia Project, 1965), p. 50. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 162] === 157 the Committee for the Retooling of the Government Apparatus (PARAN) that he chaired was replaced with the Supreme Command for the Retool ing of the Apparatus of the Revolution (KOTRAR) under the President’s personal guidance. As a consequence of these developments a new tri umvirate was formed under Sukarno's protection consisting of Foreign Minister Subandrio, Minister of Development and MPR Chairman Chaerul Saleh, and the less ambitious, non-party official. Dr. Johannes Leimena. The leadership of this grouping, however, was far from com patible. For most of 1964, palace politics were marked by tensions between those dedicated to implementing Sukarno's romantic nationalism and those "realists" who were growing concerned over the rising in fluence of the PKI and over Indonesia's economic decline. This con flict was manifest in a power struggle between Subandrio (the champion of the romanticists and highly distrusted by the military) and Saleh (one of the "last hopes" of the realists) for the position of "heir apparent" to Sukarno. The initial phase of the Subandrio-Saleh "confrontation" was tied in with the Murba's campaign to abolish all existing parties and to establish one all-inclusive national party— the kind which could be more easily influenced by the Murba. Saleh, who was a member of the Murba, advocated adoption of the plan; Subandrio, on the other hand, lent his support to the PKI, who, threatened with a loss of identity, bitterly opposed the idea. Although the proposal, was ultimately quashed by the President, conflict between the two men flared up again in September within the context of the formation of the Body for the Promotion of Sukamoism (BPS), a movement that was established largely Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 163] === due to alarm over the pro-communist pronouncements by the President in the August independence day speech. The BPS was the result of the efforts of a wide spectrum of anti-communist groups to mobilize the mass media in a campaign to arouse public opinion against the PKI and to neutralize its influence. Organized ostensibly as a "great debate" to clarify the "teachings of Sukarno," the movement numbered among its leadership the trade minister and Murba member, Adam Malik, and was supported by other important Murba leaders, chief of whom was Saleh. took steps to abolish the movement. In December, however, Sukarno Acting on charges by the PKI that the BPS was using his name "to disrupt national unity," the President skillfully exacted a promise from the ten legal parties (including the Murba) "to foster and maintain the revolutionary and progressive national unity with NASAKOM as its core." Then, somewhat unexpectedly, he banned the BPS and in January "temporarily suspended" the Murba party itself. The banning of the Murba and the BPS was considered as a severe setback to Saleh's prestige, and taken in conjunction with, the purge of the PNI's right wing later in August, the turn of events removed a considerable block of organized political opposition to the PKI. The President's action left Subandrio in an extremely favorable position, creating a possible front man for the communists in the like lihood that the indecisive balance of power in Indonesia would prevent the PKI from assuming outright power. The fact that Saleh and Subandrio were not the representatives of any substantial organized political group is an indication of the peculiar political stalemate that had developed between the army and the PKI and the almost "autonomous" nature of the political system Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 164] === itself. It also was difficult at this point to determine exactly to what extent the President was still functioning as dalang (the puppet master of the traditional Indonesian shadow play) of the nation's political forces. According to Herbert Feith, the Indonesian political system could "no longer be described as a coalition between President Sukarno and the military as roughly equal partners" as had been the case a year before. Sukarno had broken Nasution*s monopoly over the army leadership with the appointment of Jani and several other less strongly anti-communist Officers to chief positions, and although the army continued to wield strong influence in many fields, its highest officers were to some extent fragmented. They "no longer line up be hind a leader /xTe., Nasution7" who seeks to unite them in.support of army policies which are markedly different from the President's, i.e., on such a crucial issue as that of the PKI." 62 In such a situation, Feith maintained, Sukarno had become much more of a balancing fulcrum, regulating the actions of the two checkmated forces that had been the case previously. On the other hand, Arnold Brackman asserts that, due to the banning of the BPS and the almost blanket endorsement of the communist position in his 1964- speech, the communist organization had actually seized the initiative away from the President and his nationalist clique and thus Sukarno was forced to turn to the PKI "because it... offered the best prospect for Indonesia's unity after he was gone,... " 61 See Herbert Feith, "President Sukarno, the Army and the Communists: The Triangle Changes Shape," Asian Survey, IV, No. 8 62 Ibid., p. 977. ®^Brackman, p. 256. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 165] === In order to better evaluate the complex power relationships Indonesia, it is necessary to examine the political system and the communist movement in the context of what gradually became known as simply the "Indonesian Revolution." Communism and the Indonesian Revolution. In attempting to weigh the political impact of the Indonesian Communist organization on Indonesian politics and foreign policy during this second phase of Guided Democracy, it is necessary first to examine the changing quality of Sukarno's ideological pronouncements and the "autonomous" development of Indonesia's "permanent Revolution." Beginning in mid- 1963 and reaching a high point in his 1964- independence day '.'State of the Revolution" message, 64 the President's image of the internal structure of the state took on an increasingly mystic and romantically nihilistic tint. What was only implicit in the first two years of his regime, was made clearly explicit by the President during this period. stressed that "Indonesia has not embarked upon the course of utilizcc ing our newly won independence,.. for mainly economic development." Further, unlike many "copy nations" or "text book nations," the govern ment has not accepted "the conventional idea that all we need after independence is technical skills, capital and machinery with which to develop nation-hood." 66 The development toward "economic affluence" 64 This highly descriptive epithet was coined by Donald Weatherbee. See "Indonesiai's Revolutionary Ideology," prepared for a Colloquium on Political Strategy, South Carolina University, April 14, 1965, p. 31. 65 See "Reflections Upon the Indonesian Revolution," reprint of an article in May 1964 special issue of Le Monde, Paris, France (Washing ton Embassy of Indonesia, 1964), p. 10. 66 See "Let Us Transform the World," opening address at the Asian[ African Journalist Conference, April 24, 1963 (Djakarta: Department of j Information, 1963), p. 1 4, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 166] === 161 is possible only when a nation has been "mentally liberated" from all forms of colonial and neo-colonial domination. It is for these reasons that a nation's independence is not complete if marked merely by the substitution of a national administration for a colonial administra tion, but rather it must enter the "unavoidable second stage of nationbuilding" to eradicate the still lingering economic and military threats of the imperialist powers. 68 Indonesia entered this "second stage" in 1959, according to Sukarno, when the country was put "back on the rails of the Revolution" with the revival of the 1945 constitution. Sukarno's disavowal of economic development was taken a giant step further in his 1964 speech. Endowing the Revolution with the traits of the Banteng bull, and placing himself astride it, the Great Leader of the Revolution painted a picture of the Indonesian political process in almost anthropomorphic terms, possessing a logic and a "rav ing inspiration" of its own, and a nihilistic capacity for dynamism, romanticism— and destruction. 69 Reflecting the "corporate romanticist" philosophy of nineteenth century Europe, 70 Sukarno spoke to his people of the "mystique of permanent revolution": If there were no sense of the romanticism of struggle we should long ago have been crushed and hushed. We should long ago have been like a worm trodden dead under foot. ... It is because of this romanticism that we are getting stronger.... Yes! The Romanticism of Struggle— the "Reflections Upon the Indonesian Revolution," p. 13. ®®"Let Us Transform the World," p. 9. 69 See Weatherbee, "Indonesia's Revolutionary Ideology" for an excellent, systemized discussion of "the Revolution." 70 See, e.g., Peter Viereck, Metapolitik: The Roots of the Nazi Mind (New York: Capricorn Books, 1961 ed.), especially pp. 16-97, wherein he discusses "corporate" and "romantic" aspects of pre-Nazi German thought. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 167] === primeval source of strength.... Revolution is not., just a mere "event," not just an "occurrence." Revolution is a process; for decades at a time that process goes on. ... The Revolution is a long process which is dynamic which has to be kept going all the time, "Ever onward, no retreat.... " "Strike a blow— come on march aheadI" The thunder of Revolution... w e hear as a song, a sym phony, a chorus, like the roar.of the waves of the tumul tuous ocean pounding on the shore.... W e must put the romanticism (and) dynamism of the Revolution into the hearts of us all, in order that our Revolution and the Revolution of Mankind will be able to keep moving to keep on inflicting blows and building up, to batter down all obstructions that are planned and installed by the imperialist and colonialist. The above passage is of much more interest than mere rhetoric. Its tone and spirit reflect a basic change that was taking place in the internal dynamics of the state and in the role of the President himself. In the light of future events, it is suggested that despite all appear ances to the contrary, Sukarno did not do so much to stage "the Revolu tion" as he did to react to the events and situations about him,and that he had been caught up, along with the other political forces, in what he had described as the "river of the Revolution." There was little indication, for instance, that the withdrawal from the United Nations in January 1965 was part of a carefully weighed time table in Sukarno's "revolutionary diplomacy," and his precipitous action, which the govern ment had no choice but to ratify, indicated that things had indeed "got 79 out of hand." This is not to disparage Sukarno's uncontested role in balancing the basically antagonistic NASAKOM forces, or his almost mystical hold over the ethnic Javanese; in comparison with his position 71"A Year of Living Dangerously," speech, August 17, 1964 (Djakarta: Department of Information, August 17, 1964, No. 6413), pp. 3-4. 77 ^Pauker, Asian Survey, IV, N o. 2, 691. See,also*Eric Hoffer, The True Believer (New York: Harper and Row, 1951), pp. 129-166, for a discussion of the dynamics of the mass movement. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 168] === 163 at the height of the West Irian campaign, however, he now seemed to have much less control over the direction of the state than he had in the earlier period. The Indonesian state which had been put "back on the Rails of the Revolution" by one "crazed... /and?-... obsessed 73 by the Romanticism of Revolution"' now was running, like the eratic and devastating migrations of the lemmings, straight to its destruction. Flow on, 0 river of the Indonesian Revolution, Flow on with the strength of romanticism and the prowess of your dynamism in the direction and towards the goal that is determined by the dia lectics of Revolution;... Flow on down to the 111 Sea, do not stop.. The ideological superstructure of Indonesia's revolution also had a close affinity with communist doctrine. The President's pro communist stand in his 1964- speech was underscored by his tribute to the "efficacious science called Marxism." 75 In order to evaluate whe ther Indonesia;* s revolutionary vortex was sweeping the nation toward a communist takeover or whether the PKI too was unwittingly caught up in the "rhythm of the Revolution," it is necessary to examine the communist position toward the Revolution and toward the world communist movement in general. 73 The latter phrase is from the oft quoted passage that appeared in the President's 1960 speech "Like an Angel that Strikes from the Skies," in Toward Freedom and the Dignity of Man: A Collection of Five Speeches (Djakarta: Department of Information, 1960), p. 83: "I belong to that group of people who are bound in spiritual longing by the Romanticism of Revolution. I am inspired by it, I am fascinated by it, I am com pletely absorbed by it. I am crazed, I am obsessed by the Romanticism of Revolution. And for this I utter thanks to God who commands all nature!" ^ " A Year of Living Dangerously," p. 20. 75 Ibid., p. 6. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 169] === 164 In 1963, the PKI chairman Aidit made a conciliatory trip to Russia and China in hopes of healing the ideological split among the world's communist countries, and while in the Chinese People's Republic, he made a series of speeches on the PKI's position and role in Indonesia's continuing revolution. 76 Aidit stated that the Indonesian revolution.was part of the world's progressive forces, and was 'Inseparable from the world proletarian revolution which began in 1917 and which is now rapid ly developing."77 For the PKI, however, the period of "the Revolution," or Guided Democracy, represented the Leninist-Maoist stage of the national-democratic revolution, not a proletarian socialist revolution which was to follow later.7® During this national-democratic stage under the progressive leadership of President Sukarno, it was the task of the PKI (representing the vanguard of the future) to give the correct interpretation to the Political Manifesto, for "in the hands of the /Pkl7 and the people, the Political Manifesto is a weapon for uniting the Indonesian people in the struggle for complete national indepen d ence."^ Under these circumstances, the chief task of the party was to form an anti-imperialist United Front and to broaden the mass base of the party. 80 The PKI, therefore, advocated a strategy of revolution 76 D. N. Aidit, The Indonesian Revolution and the Immediate T asks of the Communist Party of Indonesia (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1964), a collection of three reports, developed September 2,4,25, 1963. 7 7 Ibid., p. 70. 78 Ibid., pp. 6 8, 84. Of course, one basic difference in the Indo nesian case is that in both the U.S.S.R. and China the party had real control of the state during the transitional"national-democratic" period. 7 9 Ibid., p. 37. 80 The program was adopted during the Fifth National Congress of the PKI in 1954. See D.N. Aidit, "The Road to People's Democracy for Indo nesia," Report to the Fifth National Congress of the PKI, March 1954 (U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Technical Services, Joint Publi cations Research Service /JPRS/, Translation No. 6551, 1961). See, | also, van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia, pp. 69-74. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 170] === “from top to bottom" and pressed for national elections and a gotong rojong government "with NASAKOM as the- fulcrum."81 Aidit stressed that the National Front represented the unity of the various revolu tionary "trends" of religion, nationalism and communism, but did not include the "comprador-bourgeoisie"— the "pro-imperialist" Masjumi and PSI which were banned in 1960— which directly’served the interests of the foreign capitalists.82 Similarly, the PKI supported Pantja Sila because it combined the various trends, not replaced them.88 How ever, Aidit warned that the party would oppose the "bourgeoisie-demo cratic" forces if they wa.vered "in the struggle against imperialism and feudalism" or threatened the independence of the party in the United Front— an obvious reference to the Murba*s attempt to form one mass national party. The program of the PKI, however, should not be viewed as simply an implementation of the Moscow line in opposition to Mao's "revolution from below." Aidit attempted to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet split and to disavow any subordinance to either Moscow or Peking. stressed that the relations between communist parties over the world should be guided by "the principle of equality and independence," and one should not interfere with the internal operation of the other. 81 Aidit, The Indonesian Revolution, p. 85. 82 Ibid., p. 73. 83 Ibid., p. 79. A good case could be made for the fact that the PKI had actually preceeded the U.S.S.R. in advocating a "peaceful road" to power; see Herbert Feith, The.Peeling'of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), pi 241-242. For a b r i e f d i s cussion of the two "lines," see Robert C. North, "Two Revolutionary Models: Russian and Chinese," in A. Doak Barnett (ed.), Communist Strategies in Asia (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 34-60. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 171] === 166 1 While following a Russian tactic in seeking power, the PKI was able, through the adoption of an independent stance in the international communist movement, to "Indonesianize" communist dogma, "and fully integrate the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the actual practice of the revolution in Indonesia." 85 Aidit justified the correctness of his strategy by stating in 1963: We have cooperated with the Indonesian bourgeoisie for more than ten years, during which the revolutionary force has steadily grown rather than diminished, while the counter-revolutionary force has met with many set backs. Even the open anti-communist clamour of five or six years ago is now condemned as a Communist-phobia to oppose unity.®® In contrast to the PKI1s claim of domestic autonomy, Aidit main tained— in an interesting play on the oft-stated maxim of Indonesian foreign policy— that internal independence was not neutralism in the international communist m oveme n t. 8^ He caustically attacked the Tito re visionists for advocating, at the expense of fighting imperialism and colonialism, a non-aligned "third road" in world affairs, and noted that Sukarno's progressive concept of the NEFO-OLDEFO antagonism was uniquely suited to the uncompromising opposition of communism to imperialism. 88 It was increasingly clear that by the end of 1963 the PKI— as well as the Indonesian government— was drawing closer to an alignment with Peking in international affairs.®® 85 Aidit, The Indonesian Revolution, p. 47. Ruslan Abdulgani was reported once to have remarked that Sukarnoism after all was only "Marxism without Atheism." See Brackman, p. 244. 86 Aidit, The Indonesian Revolution, p. 77. 87 Ibid., p. 47. 8 8 Ibid., p. 49. 89For a discussion of the PKI's relative orientation in the world communist movement, see Donald Hindley, "The Indonesian Commu nist Party and the Conflict in the International Communist Movement," China Quarterly, XVII (July-September, 1964), 99-119. LReproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 172] === 167 In view of the PKI's powerful position in Indonesian politics, it is important to make a brief.note of the party's disposition and influence in the region as a whole. Unlike the communist movements in Malaya and the Philippines that never quite recovered from the failures of the militant communist strategy of the late 1940's, the PKI had made a speedy comeback by tying its fortunes to the radical nationalism of President Sukarno; and gaining, support among the overcrowded ethnic Javanese. The party, however, realized the shortcomings of evolving into a largely Java-oriented movement. 90 With such a limited power base, it feared that it might become little more than a permanent appendage of the President, or if it were to seize power on the cen tral island that such action would precipitate an outer islands "secession" and isolate the party in an economically dependent state. In short, the PKI had the same problem as the Javanese-oriented central government: that of extending control to the more militantly Islamic outer islands. The proscription of the Masjumi and PSI was an initial advan tage to the party in its campaign to spread its influence throughout the non-Javanese territories, and after martial law was rescinded, the party enjoyed great success, particularly in South Sumatra, the Medan area of Northeast Sumatra, South Sulawesi and South Kalimantan.^2 Aidit's ®®For a brief discussion of the socio-economic situation in Java and how it has both aided the PKI in building its mass support and hin dered it in its "road to power," see Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia, pp. 3-18. 91 See Brackman, pp. 246-249 ff. P K I.activity had been temporarily banned in the "three Souths" in 1960 while the army still maintained military authority. See, e.g., van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia, pp. 227-267, for a discussion of the period. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 173] === 168 good will mission to Moscow and Peking in 1963 and his "declaration of independence" further enhanced the PKI1s claim to communist leadership in the Malay world. Despite the growth of the PKI as an autonomous force in the islands, on the other hand, there were impediments to extending its influence into Malaya. Most important was the fact that the communist movement in Malaya (and Singapore) drew its support almost entirely from the Chinese ethnic group and that the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and the Singapore Communists were under the control of the Chinese Communist Party, This consideration takes on added significance when one notes that both the Malay peninsula and Singapore fall within the sphere of influence Peking staked for itself in 1954 (see Map 3). The communist movement on the peninsula, however, was greatly fragmented. As a result of the twelve year emergency, there were in effect two communist movements: the remnants of the MCP that had retired to the Thai-Malay border and a few of the northern cities, and the various communists and crypto-communists in southern Johore state and Singapore. 94 Therefore, in spite of organizational ties to the Chinese communists, the PKI apparently had widespread contacts with both of these groups. More over, according to Brackman, Peking allowed the communist movement in Singapore to pass temporarily into PKI control as a result of Aidit*s endorsement of the Chinese foreign policy line in the Sino-Soviet dis pute.9^ There is also some evidence that the PKI penetrated the Malay society in helping the MCP to recruit the Malay community. However, 93 See Francis L. Starner, "Communism in Malaysia: A Multifront Struggle," in Scalapino, The Communist Revolution in Asia, pp. 221-255. 9 t*Ibid., pp. 231-3. 95 See Brackman, p. 252 96 Ibid., pp. 253-4. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 174] === 169 the formation of the Malaya National Liberation League (MNLL) in March 1965 seems to indicate that the Chinese communists were interested in reunifying the communist movement in Malaya and Singapore and in re asserting that the MCP's area of activity clearly fell within Peking's sphere of interest. 97 The Bornean states, on the other hand, appear to have been relegated to the PKI's area of operation. The situation again is not clear cut since the CCO in Sarawak draws its followers almost exclu sively from the Chinese community. In addition, much of the training and direction of CCO men for subversive activity in Sarawak was given by the Indonesian army not by the PKI. Nevertheless, with the excep tion of the Sulu Archipelago, China has not included any of the Indo nesian or Philippine islands within.its "overseas borders," and, given the parallel interests of both the CCO and the PKI in breaking up the federation, the Indonesian and Sarawakian communists probably coordi nated their efforts to a great extent. While the CCO may have held doubts about an alliance or annexation with Indonesia due to the mis treatment of Chinese in 1959-1960 and 1963, the Borneo communists took note that the PKI alone of all the political groups had defended the Chinese minority, and that the PKI seemed to be leaning toward a Chinese line in the Sino-Soviet dispute. 99 97 See New York Times, January 14, 1966, p. 4, citing earlier aid given by China to the MNLL. However, see David Mozingo, Sino-Indonesian Relations: An Overview, 1955-1965 (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1965), p. 63, who maintains that "whether the PKI or Sukarno was in power in Djakarta" Peking had conceded the Malaysian area to Indonesia. 98 See van der Kroef, World Today, XX, esp. pp. 56-60. See, also, John.O. Sutter, "Two Faces of Konfrontasi: 'Crush Malaysia' and the Gestapu," Asian Survey, VI, No. 10 (October, 1966), 529. 99 See Brackman, pp. 208-212. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 175] === In light of the above, if one assesses the regional problem— and Indonesia's "apertura a sinistra" ~rfrom the viewpoint of the aims and goals of the "communist enterprise," there is some element of validity in Brackman's statement that the PKI, as a nationalist Communist party, was spreading Djakarta’s wings....It is, therefore, not inconceivable that Aidit had won Sukarno’s deepening support by unfolding a long-term strategy to restore a Java-based Madjapahit empire in modern communist dress. However fanciful this suggestion may seem, the PKI’s declaration of independence and its spread ing regional activity served as a warning of things to come if the PKI came to power in Indonesia, whether by default, acclama tion, intrigue, or armed struggle. This is the somber back ground against which the Malay power struggle was unfolding in the mid-1960's.100 In a similar vein, Herbert Feith writes: It is often said that the President is deeply concerned with the question of how history will regard him. He certainly has considerable admiration for Communist regimes... and a profoundly historicist view of history... and is likely to be unhappy about the possibility of being succeeded by any regime which would see him as a reactionary. Could it be that he has consciously set out to work for the establishment of a Communist Indonesia after his death, that he wants to be Moses to Aidit’s Joshua?l°^Such sentiments are scarcely out of keeping with the statement Sukarno made January 31, 1965 on the CBS program Face the Nation. When asked to comment on the possibility of the communists coming to power in Indonesia, the President answered: "I said I don't care about this so long as they are not damaging or making trouble against the state."1°2 100 Ibid.,.p. 256. ■^Peith, Asian Survey, IV, No. 8, p. 978. Somewhat the same con clusion was reached by Guy J. Pauker. See Pauker in Scalapino, pp. 282285; and Pauker, "Indonesia: The Year of Transition," Asian Survey, VII, No. 2 (February, 1967), 140. I n c ited in Brackman, p. 102. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 176] === For all its regional influence and widespread domestic organi zation, however, the PKI still operated under some formidable political disadvantages. The contention that the PKI played t h e.leading role in Indonesia’s domestic affairs and was the prime motivating factor in the Malaysia confrontation is subject to serious qualification. First, the party had not made serious inroads into the army's leadership, and while some officers like Air Force Chief Marshal Omar Dhani or some army divisions like the Central Javanese Diponegoro division were sympathe tic to the communists, the military blocked every attempt by the PKI to exercise control over the armed forces. Having failed at direct infiltration, and even some guarded overtures at accomodation, 103 the party proposed in 1965 that "ideological commissars" be appointed to the armed services. Still later, Aidit suggested, with some support from the Air Force, that a "Fifth Force" of armed peasants and workers modeled along China's "citizen's militia" be formed as a supplement to the three armed services and the police to guard the country from the en croachments of the "nekolim."'^ Such a force, it was believed, would fall easy prey to communist control due to the PKI's already large and still disciplined mass organization. Nevertheless, the army was able to successfully avoid the implementation of such programs, and in the last analysis, despite its often divided ranks and lack of political acumen, a direct threat to its position of power presented by the "commissar" and "third force" proposals may have stung its resolution 103 For a discussion of the PKI's ambivalent attitude toward the army, see Pauker in Scalapino, pp. 272-274. •^^See New York Times, June 10, 1965, p. 3. 105 See New York Times, August 27, 1965, p. 2. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 177] === 172 to take positive action at the first available opportunity.^-0® any rate, the military presented a formidable— and increasingly wary— power block to the ambitions of the communist organizations. The party also faced a growing opposition from what can loosely be described as an "Islamic bloc." Badly fragmented in the past, the threat of a communist takeover had gradually fostered the growth of a cogent body of opinion embracing many political segments ranging from former Masjumi supporters to orthodox Islamic teachers, from Moslem army officers to the powerful anti-communist Islamic Students Organization (HMS— and later known as K A M I ). ' of separateness about the PKI. In addition, there was a quality In spite of the fact that official government ideology and goals closely approximated communist doctrine— indeed it seemed at times that the PKI was in the vanguard of Indonesian revolutionary pronouncements— the party remained outside the "nationalist" political clique that formed the heart of the government. As Daniel Lev has commented: Though non-Communist political leaders paid lip service to Sukarno's idea of Nationalism-Religion-Communism combi nation (NASAKOM)... they remained deeply afraid and resentful of the radical threat which the PKI posed to their social, economic and political interests. They looked to the army, which frightened them less than the PKI, for ultimate protection. 106 The army may well have become alarmed at the statement in the President's 1965 independence day speech which assured that "Every citizen shall have the right and the duty to participate in the defense of the state." See "Reach to the Stars! A Year of Self-Reliance" (Djakarta: Department of Information, 1965), p. 43. In this context, see Donald Hindley, "Political Power and the October 1965 Coup in Indonesia," Journal of Asian Studies, XXVI, No. 2 ■*"°®Lev, Asian Survey, VI, No. 2, 105. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 178] === 173 In summary, the community of interests that existed between the PKI and the solidarity-making elite— i.e., the pro-Chinese policies, the opposition to Malaysia and the politics of mass movements— should not be seen as a prelude to the "communization" of the country in accor dance with the dictates of what Brackman has called the "communist enter prise." Aided with the knowledge of later events, the PKI must be seen as an adjunct— though an important one— to the Frankenstein-like revolu tionary movement. If the regime at times appeared to be following the lead of the PKI, it may well have been because the communists had truly become "Indonesianized." 109 Not wishing to dismiss completely "the expansionistic appetite... of the Communist enterprise" in the South east Asian islands, it is nevertheless maintained that indigenous and traditional factors are of much greater value in explaining contemporary Indonesian politics than reference to the designs of the international communist movement. The logic of succeeding events has more meaning when viewed from this perspective. The "withering away" of the Revolution. Perhaps the most meaning ful comment that one could have made about the internal balance of power before the September 30th coup was that noted by Ruth McVey in drawing attention, to the similarity of the Indonesian situation in the 1960’s with China in the 1920’s: "Is Sukarno Indonesia's Sun Yat-sen, and is 109 Subandrio, for instance, is reported to have said: "There is no cause to fear that Indonesia will become Communist, but on the contrary, the other way around, we will Indonesianize the "Com" element prevailing in the community." See Arther J. Dommen, "The Attempted Coup in Indo nesia," China Quarterly, XXV (January-March, 1966), 166. For an assess ment of the possible strategies and approaches open to the PKI during the period, see Ewa Pauker, Asian Survey, IV, No. 9, 1058-1070. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 179] === 174 Army Chief Nasution.its.Chiang Kai-shek?" centered upon the dependence of the PKI on Sukarno and whether in a post-Sukarno Indonesia the army and the Communists could have established a nutual accomodation. The answer was prematurely provided by the events surrounding the sudden but quickly crushed coup attempt in October 1965. The ultimate cause as well as the actual events themselves will perhaps be debated for years.111 Without a doubt the economy had almost totally collapsed and the inflationary situation that existed in the larger towns and cities had not only reduced a large portion of the population to a bare subsistence but had created a wide-spread resent ment against Sukarno's revolutionary policies. In view of the continu ing rise of prices since the coup, however, it is not totally incon ceivable that the government could have continued to operate for some months, even years, under the circumstances (see Table VI). It also seems— unless some conclusive proof is represented to the contrary— that the October 1 coup was not directed by the PKI as the army later charged. Despite Aidit's confession of having masterminded the plot, 112 the PKI-army stalemate was probably broken by no more than an inter army coup involving a small number of the communist affiliated youth, and it was only in the aftermath that the surviving army leadership, ^■^See Ruth T. McVey, "Indonesian Communism and the Transition to Guided Democracy," in Barnett, Communist Strategies in Asia, p. 188. McVey *s monograph is the best balanced and insightful short work on the PKI prior to the coup. ‘'"There are several general accounts of the coup: Lev, Asian Survey VI, No. 2, pp. 105-110; Dommen, China Quarterly, XXV, 144-170; and Sutter, Asian..Survey, VI, No. 10, 523-546; and Hindley, Journal of Asian Studies, XXVI, No. 2, 237-249. 112 Excerpts from Aidit's.confession are reprinted in Dommen, pp. 168-170. For an account of the coup that places prime responsibility for developing the plot on the PKI, see Sutter,pp. 534-546. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 180] === 1751 TABLE VI: INFLATION IN INDONESIA, SEPTEMBER Unofficial Rates, Rp/§U.S. September 1963 June 1964 November 1964 March 1965 July 1965 October 1965 November 1965 December 1965 January 1966 March 1966 September 1966 900-1200b 1800 4500 5000 10,000 17,000 22,500 30,000° 40,000 60,000-100,000 140,000 1963 - SEPTEMBER 1966a Price of Rice, Rp/liter 130 215 255-320 340-500 1350 1600 2300° 3200 5000-6000 7000 aThe data in this table were compiled from New York Times Asian Survey. and ^Official rate was 45 Rupiah's per dollar, based on the 1959 Monetary Reform. cMonetary Reform of December 1965, placed the new Rupiah's worth at 1,000 of the old Rupiah. The figures after December are multiplied by 1,000. apprehensive of recent communist moves to subject the army to civilian control and no longer unwilling to use force, seized the opportunity to eliminate its chief rival to power. The account that follows is a brief— and at this time somewhat speculative— description of the bloody but cautiously circuitous events that led to the political eclipse of the PKI and the President and the rise to power of a military-led triumvirate. The inter-army putsch took place on October 1 amidst a web of palace intrigues and rumors concerning the President's health impending CIA-inspired army takeover. and an The action was apparently initiated by officers associated with the.Diponegoro division, in conjunction with certain Air Force officers at the Halim air base near Djakarta. Untung, a battalion commander in the elite palace guard Lt. Col. (Tjakrabirawa) Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 181] === 176 regiment, but formerly a commander of the 454th battalion in the Diponegoro, persuaded his old 454th group and an East Javanese battalion (530th) that were in Djakarta for the October 5th Armed Forces Day show, to surround the presidential palace to protect Sukarno from an imminent coup by a CIA-financed "General's Council." Later, after Sukarno had been persuaded by Untung to go to Halim base to escape the fictitious coup, the conspira tors, with the aid of some communist youth (Pemuda Rakjat) volunteers which had been trained at the Halim base, kidnapped and murdered six lead ing generals (including Chief of Staff Jani) and wounded Defense Minister Nasution. Then Untung and his followers, styling themselves as the "30th of September Movement" (the acronym of which is Gestapu), captured Radio Republik Indonesia from where they broadcast the take-over of the govern ment by a 45-man Revolutionary Council as a precaution to foil a General’s plot against the President and to carry out the goals of the revolution 113 as set forth in the President’s 1965 Independence Day speech. The membership of the Council was in the best NASAKOM style, but its members had not been consulted and the Council largely lacked political coherence. However, one of the members, Chief of the Air.. Force, Marshall Dhani, supported the coup and the purge in the army "of those elements who are manipulated by foreign subversives and who endanger the Indonesian Revolution." 114 Elsewhere, with the exception of Dogjakarta where the coup followers killed the garrison commander, little happened, and in a matter. 113 For a transcript of Untung's broadcasts, see Indonesia, I (April 1966), pp. 134-149. This first issue of this biannual journal published important documents pertaining to the "September 30th Movement." ^■•^See Indonesia, I, 143. Dhani and Aidit later flew to central Java after apparently being unsuccessful in persuading Sukarno to join them. See Denis Warner, "Indonesia's Communists: Down But‘Not Out," Reporter, November 18, 1965, 25-26. See, also, Dommen, China Quarterly, |XXV, pp. 146-147. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 182] === 177 of hours, the revolt was crushed. Major General Suharto, commander of the army's Strategic Reserve Forces (KOSTRAD) quickly moved against the conspirators.^-® A former commander of the Diponegoro, Suharto persuaded the 454th and the 520th to cease operations, and then easily retook the radio station. He ordered President Sukarno, who though in a-politically delicate position probably knew nothing of the coup,-*"*-® to leave the base, and the next day loyal troops without opposition marched into Halim field where they found the bodies of the dead generals. Despite later assurances from Sukarno that the incident was only "a minor thing in the great ocean we call revolution," 117 the army was furious over the generals' deaths, and although army hostility toward the left-oriented Air Force was at first publicly quieted, Dhani was dismissed 118 from his post. On the other hand, a campaign against the PKI was launched almost immediately, and soon after a general anti-communist pogram ignited. The anti-communist purge was joined by most of the non communist groups in the country— particularly the Islamic youth and the more mystic Islamic elite— and the massacre spread throughout the islands. The number of persons killed in the "civil war" that followed has ranged from Sukarno's official estimate of 87,000 to 400,000, and by all accounts the terror and bloodshed has been great. 119 115 See Suharto's almost apologetic explanation of why he took charge of the countercoup forces and his account of the events surrounding thie action, ibid., 160-178. 116 For a report that Sukarno aided and then abandoned the "September 30" group, see New York Times News Service, Winston-Salem Journal, October 6, 1965, p. 13. See Sukarno's own statement, Indonesia, I, 153. 117 New York Times, October 17, 1965, p. 3. 118 See Suharto's statement on recovering the bodies and his charge of air force involvement in the matter, Indonesia, I, P. 159. See,also,p. 170, 177. Dhani was later sentenced to death for his role in the.coup attempt. See n. 130, below. ^ ^ S e e New York Times, August 24, 1966, p. 1. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 183] === 178 There were, of course, many killed for non-political reasons: old feuds were resolved, business "prospects" were improved, and many Chinese were simply murdered on "general principles." For the most part, however, communists and suspected communists were the target of the purge. There was at least circumstantial evidence against the communists due to the involvement of the Pemuda Rakjat, Rakjat, and the party newspaper, Harian contributed to the impression by supporting the "correctness of the action." 120 Despite the fact that many PKI militants may have become involved with the coup, however, it is probable that the major communist leaders were caught by surprise. There was little coordinated communist effort in the days that followed, and it is hard to believe that the PKI would have embarked on such an ill-timed coup attempt given the seeming success of its United Front strategy. 121 While the nation was running amok in its "holy war" against the communists, a sharply contrasting, cavalier, almost genteel realign ment of political power was taking place in Djakarta. With the eclipse of the PKI as a political force, the entire power structure in the country had been altered. Without the countervailing communist power, the Presi dents political position was seriously limited. The army, however, was quite aware of his still important symbolic and personal authority and was careful to maintain the fiction of his preeminent leadership. This consideration, plus the fact that many officers— even Suharto— showed great deference not only to the President himself but to many of his pro grams, gave Sukarno some room to maneuver; the process of significantly 120 See Indonesia, I, p. 184. 121 See Dommen, pp. 154-157, who discusses various theories concern ing the extent of the PKI involvement in the coup. See, also, Hindley, Journal of Asian Studies, XXVI, No. 2, 246-249, for an analysis of the (PKI's lack of action after the coup. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 184] === 1.79 limiting his constitutional authority took some ten months, and it was not until March 1967 that the MPR finally removed him from office. The first phase of the campaign was the shifting of governmental authority away from the cabinet toward the army-controlled Supreme Operational Command (KOTI). On December 14-, Nasution, Abdulgani and the popular Sultan of Djogjakarta, Hamengku Buwono, were named as deputy commanders of KOTI directly responsible to the President, and the organi zation appointed its own officers to handle military, economic and sociopolitical affairs. 122 Command,was ousted. Subandrio, who had formerly held the top post in the Though forced to make these concessions, the Presi dent argued for the creation of a new communist party to restore the harmonious NASAKOM-like balance to Indonesian politics— and revive the basis for his own powers. In February, Sukarno countered the army's attempt to ease him out by boldly dismissing Nasution as Defense Minister and Martadinata (an ally of Nasution) as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. week later KOTI was abolished and replaced by the Command for Crushing Malaysia (Kogam) -under more direct control by the President."*"^ The move apparently caught the army off guard, and demonstrated that Sukarno was still able to inhibit the political effectiveness of the military leader ship by taking advantage of the divided loyalties within the military. Whether it was from fear of forcing an inter-army clash or civil war, or the lack of psychological stamina to compete in the world of palace intrigue, or the desire to bide the army's time and let Sukarno continue while the blame for the economy continued to fall on the shoulders of the President's leftist cabinet members, Nasution did not contest his removal. •*~^ N e w York Times, December 15, 1965, pp. 1, 7. ^ 3New York Times, February 22, 1966, pp. 1, 4. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 185] === With the army seemingly stymied, the "Generation of 1966" took over. The Indonesian.Students Action Command (KAMI) demonstrated support for Nasution and Suharto, and called for a purge of the radical nationalists in Sukarno’s cabinet. 124 Finally with pressure exerted through a newly formed coalition of most of the legal parties and groups in Djakarta, IOC the Pantja Sila Front, and the persuasive presence of the elite Siliwangi Division, Suharto pressed Sukarno into transferring executive power to him on March 11, 1966. 226 The communist party was officially banned, and Subandrio and fourteen other Ministers were held under virtual house arrest at the Bogor palace. The transfer took place in a face-sav ing, deferential, but confusing manner, with Suharto pledging support to Sukarno and Sukarno maintaining he was in full control of the country. What followed was a skillful demonstration of how to constitu tionally pull off a coup. The army continually maintained outward allegi ance to President Sukarno and his policies— and indeed Suharto seemed quite serious when in April he expressed reluctance to rejoin the UN or to end the confrontation 127 — while proceeding to reduce him to a figure head through a subtle enforcement of the 1945 Constitution. On March 28, a new cabinet Presidium was announced whose three most important members composed a new ruling triumvirate: Suharto in charge of security and de fense; Buwono in charge of economic affairs; and Adam Malik as Foreign Minister. Nasution was made Deputy Supreme Commander of Kogam in 124 New York Times, February 25, 1966, pp. 1, 4; February 26, 1966, pp. 1, 3; March 4, 1966, p. 4; March 21, 1966, p. 14; and The Christian Science Monitor, March 9, 1966, pp. 1-2; and March 11,1966, p. ^•^ N e w York Times, March 8, 1966, p. 5. 126New York Times, March 13, 1966, pp. 1,12;March14, 1966, p. 11. -*-2^New York Times, April 10, 1966, p. 1,9. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 186] === concession to Sukarno who did not want him reinstated as Defense Minister^28 Sukarno's movements were controlled and his visitors monitored, and two powerful anti-communist but pro-Sukarno regional commanders, Generals Adjie and Soerjosumpeno, were removed. Newspapers again became outward ly, but subtly,, critical of the President, and in the relaxed atmos phere several former Masjumi and PSI political prisoners were released. When the MPR met m 199 July, the stage was- set for Sukarno's legal removal. At its opening session, the MPR elected Nasution as its President, and quickly affirmed the executive powers that were transferred to Suharto some three months earlier. Sukarno made an impassioned plea to "continue the Revolution," but the Congress which only three years before had voted him President for Life largely ignored his protestations. After a week of closed sessions, the MPR announced the adoption of a number of resolutions that reduced Sukarno to a figurehead. He was stripped of his title "President for Life," was forbidden to issue decrees (and a review of all his ordinances and decisions since 1959 was ordered) and a commission was established to "consider his teachings." The MPR also banned communist ideology and all institutions not provided for by the constitution (e.g., the NASAKOM National Front). The Assembly authorized Sukarno to form a cabinet by August 17 and extended Suharto *s executive powers until elections were held— no later than July 5, 1958. In a "political note," the MPR stated that Indonesia should return to the United Nations and it welcomed steps to solving the Malaysia dispute. As a concession to Sukarno, who did not want Nasution as his constitu tional successor, Suharto was designated "acting President" in the ~*~2% e w York Times, March 28, 1966, pp. 1, 18; March 29, 1966, p. 17. 129 The following paragraph is largely drawn from the New York Times, July 6, 1966, pp. 1-2; July 7, 1966, pp. 1, 5, 7; July 26, 1966, p. 7. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 187] === event the President should become ill or leave the country. Later in the month, over Sukarno's protests, a new Ampera cabinet (another acronym meaning "Message of the People's Suffering") was formed with a five-man Presidium again under the leadership of Suharto, Buwono and Malik. In an obvious attempt to isolate the President, it was announced that the cabinet would deal directly with the Presidium. Suharto made himself cabinet chairman, with authority over the army, navy and the air force, and retained responsibility for defense and security as well as demobilization and veterans affairs. Malik was placed in charge of political affairs, is presently the Foreign Minister and has control over the Interior, Justice and Information Ministries. Buwono was re tained as economic chief, and now supervises the Ministries of Commerce, Finance, Telecommunication, Maritime Affairs, Agriculture and Planta tions. Finally, Sukarno's Revolution suffered what seemed to be the coup de grace, when, on August 11, Malik signed a formal agreement end ing the confrontation of Malaysia and restoring diplomatic relations between the two countries. 130 130 New York Times, August 12, 1966, p. 7. Although Sukarno's politi cal power had been effectively neutralized by the end of the summer, it was not until the following March that he was removed from office; and even this action was carried out in a highly cautious and ambiguous manner. Beginning in September after the Malaysia settlement, a series of show trials was staged, apparently in an effort to expose the moral corruption of the previous regime and to emphasize the close (and traitorous) associa tion of leading Sukarno lieutenents with pro-communist activity. When former Air Marshal Dhani a n d.Subandrio were sentenced to death, it was rumored that the Suharto government was building a case to try the Presi dent himself— if not for involvement in the coup attempt, then for dere liction of duty in office. Student groups again demonstrated against Sukarno, and in February, the DPR passed a resolution calling for his re moval from office. In the last analysis, however, the outcome was less decisive. When the MPR met in March, Suharto was appointed "Acting Presi dent," but with the full duties, privileges and honors of the Presidency that had once been the exclusive property of Sukarno. At this time, it is still unclear whether Sukarno will be allowed to move freely among his several Presidential residences, whether he will be asked to leave the country, or whether he will eventually be brought to trial. The delicacy |of the musjawarah-like "liquidation" operation, however, illustrates that Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 188] === 183 With the termination of the Malaysia campaign, the.histori cal period covered by this study is completed. In order to adequately understand the confrontation "syndrome," however, it is necessary to examine the regional and international context within which Indonesian foreign policy was conducted and the effect that confrontation had on the "non-aligned and independent" activity of the Djakarta government in world affairs. the Indonesian political process is a most delicate and subtle phe nomenon. For a recent analysis of the events surrounding Sukarno’s removal from office, see Pauker, Asian Survey, VII, No. 2, 138-150. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 189] === V. THE CONFRONTATION OF MALAYSIA: THE EXTERNAL IMAGE ,.. Indonesia1s foreign policy is correctly regarded as an instrument of the Indonesian Revolution, but at the same time the foreign policy must safeguard the Revolution, must carry out the objectives of the Revolu tion in the international sphere, and must try to ensure that the Revolution is not. obstructed from without.^" The course of events during the three year Malaysia confronta tion perhaps best reflects the basic nature of Indonesia's "revolu tionary" nationalism. The campaign also marks the radical culmination of Indonesia's "independent and active" foreign policy. The following chapter will examine the dynamics of Indonesian foreign policy during this, crucial period in the context of Djakarta's bid for interna tional leadership and regional supremacy. The "Crush Malaysia" Campaign The mediation phase of the dispute. Immediately following the diplomatic break that occurred with the establishment of Malaysia, Sukarno vowed to "crush" the new federation. Although guerrilla forces had been operating in Borneo since the Brunei revolt, activities were ■^Subandrio, Indonesia*s Foreign Policy (Washington: Embassy of Indonesia, 1964), p. 1. See Sukarno, "Crush Malaysia," radio broadcast speech, 25 September, 1963, reprinted in George Modelski, The New Emerging Forces (Canberra, Australia: The Australian National University, 1963), pp.80- 86. 184 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 190] === stepped up after "Malaysia Day." Britain, with subsequent support from Australia and New Zealand, countered the Indonesian opposition by pro mising to aid the new federation and to honor its "defense obligation to the full." The renewal of the crisis underscored a difference of opinion between Britain and the United States. While both exhibited agreement in the long-term policy of maintaining the viability of non-Communist states as a bulwark to Chinese expansion, the United States was reluc tant to offer all-out support for the British and Malaysian positions. Despite the suspension of American aid and the growth of the PKI, the United States still regarded Indonesia— and Sukarno— as the major neutral and anti-communist force in Southeast Asia, and since the American govern ment was becoming more deeply involved in Vietnam, it did not want the risk of fighting in a wider "two-front" conflict. It is in the light of these considerations that President Johnson dispatched his Attorney General, Robert F. Kennedy, to the area in an attempt to bring about a cease-fire in Borneo and a peaceful settlement of the dispute. Kennedy arrived in Tokyo on January 16 and began a week of meetings with the parties in dispute. As a result of the Kennedy talks, Indonesia agreed to a cease fire and a tripartite foreign ministers conference to be held at Bangkok in early February. At the conference it was decided by the ministers See Michael Leifer, "Anglo-American Differences Over Malaysia," World Today," XX, No. 4 (April, 1964), 156-166. ^See Statements of President Sukarno of the Republic of Indonesia and Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy of the Un'l'tecTstates o F Americaj (Washington: Embassy of Indonesia, January 24, 1964). For a general syn opsis of the negotiations that followed, see Michael Leifer, "Indonesia and Malaysia: The Diplomacy of Confrontation," World Today, XXI, No. 6 “ with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 191] === that Thailand would supervise the truce.until an eventual Summit Con5 ference could be held. However, a major problem arose at the meeting concerning the withdrawal of troops. Malaysia insisted that Indonesia should withdraw its troops in recognition of Malaysian sovereignty be fore a cease-fire could be "fully effective"; Indonesia maintained, on the other hand, that withdrawal was possible only within the context of a general political settlement and insisted that a cease-fire did not entail a withdrawal. Attempts were made during the month to effect the disengagement of Indonesian troops, but the Djakarta government in sisted on the right to reequip its troops and maintain the status quo during negotiations. This basic disagreement caused the collapse of a second Bangkok meeting of foreign ministers held early in March, and for all practical purposes, ended the Kennedy cease-fire. In April, Rahman formally announced that he considered the cease-fire to be off, and disclosed his intent to conscript men from the ages of 21-29. counter Malaysia's "general mobilization," Sukarno held a rally on April 13 of "21 million volunteers" to crush Malaysia. Despite the seemingly hopeless situation, Macapagal again capitalized on Indonesia’s persistent willingness to negotiate the issue. In June, the Philippine President, acting almost as a mediator though he himself was a party to the dispute, obtained a compromise agreement from Sukarno and Rahman See Joint Communique of the Bangkok Ministerial Meeting, Feb ruary, 1964, reprinted in A. G. Mezerik, Malaysia-Indonesia Conflict (New York: International Review Service, 1965), pp. 114-115. For Sukarno's explanation, see "Safeguarding the Republic of Indonesia," address at the Grand Roll-up of the Indonesian Volunteers at Meredeka Palace, April 13, 1964 (Djakarta: Department of Information, II, No. 6407, April 14, 1964), p. 4. ^See ibid. This speech contains a general review of Sukarno's version of the dispute up to that time. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 192] === whereby Indonesia, would withdraw its forces simultaneously with a resumption of preparatory negotiations for a Summit Conference in Tokyo.® Though some withdrawals were noted, the conference was imperiled from the start by continued Indonesian troop movements, When the three leaders met on June 21, the perenial disagreement on the issue of with drawal again threatened to break up the conference. Macapagal, however, intervened and proposed that a four nation Afro-Asian conciliation commission be appointed "to study the existing problems between the three countries and submit recommendations for their solution." Both Sukarno and Rahman announced their agreement with the proposal; the latter, however,again attached the provision that all hostilities against Malaysia must cease forthwith. Since Indonesia refused to make further withdrawals until some progress could be made on the "political solution," the Tokyo conference came to a close after only one day, and the conciliation conference was never convened. The fundamental impasse over the presence of Indonesian troops in Borneo reflected very basic differences in the regional perceptions held by the antagonists.'*'0 Malaysia saw the problem in line with tra ditional sovereignty; if Indonesia would respect the principle of non intervention in Malaysia's internal affairs and withdraw its troops, See Release No. 8, October 9, 1964 (New York: Malaysia Mission to the United Nations), cited in Mezerik, p. 46. See The Tokyo Summit Communique, June 20, 1964, reprinted in Mezerik, p p. 115-116; and Malaysia's proposed Summit Communique that was rejected by Indonesia, reprinted in Mezerik, pp. 116-117. "*"°The following three paragraphs are drawn in part from Bernard Gordon's excellent discussion on the Summit Conference and Indonesia's motives behind the negotiations based on actual transcripts of the meet ing. See The Dimensions of Conflict i n:Southeast Asia (Englewood Cliffs, [ff.J.: Prentice-Hall, Spectrum Books, 1966), pp. 98-116. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 193] === 188 a basis for resolving the.dispute would be.established. In contrast, Indonesia's Foreign Minister Subandrio rejected all notions of military violations of Malaysia's sovereignty and seemingly advocated force, and the threat of force, as legitimate-even moral— political activity. In reference to Indonesia's non-recognition of Malaysia, he stated: "We are not aggressors since Malaysia is not in existence." He main tained further that the guerrillas and volunteers have a deep political consciousness. They are struggling for a political objective. They are fighting for the independence of those people there from colonialism and imperialism.... The only basis for this question is to regard it as a political problem, not a military one.-®--'Indonesia's insistence that the withdrawal be in conformity with a political settlement brings up another aspect in the negotia tions that is of great importance in understanding the nature of the dispute. It was suggested that Sukarno had genuinely explored ways to end the confrontation as early as the spring of 1963. The President and his nationalist cabinet obviously viewed the new federation with much concern— if not a little envy— and first declared the confronta tion because the period immediately following the Brunei revolt seemed to present an excellent opportunity to take advantage of initial dis content with the proposed political grouping. It is likely, given his earlier success during the West Irian crisis, that Sukarno felt the "Malaysia" time table could be interrupted— and perhaps postponed in definitely— with little cost and effort by his government. It appears, however, that once having lodged his initial objection to Malaysia and traded insults with Rahman, Sukarno sought some means of temporarily curtailing the confrontation when a cheap victory was not in sight. ^ C i t e d in ibid., p. 111. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 194] === 189 The distinctly hostile attitude of Indonesia that was evidenced in the announcement of the confrontation in February had been greatly mollified by April and had largely disappeared by the June 1963 summit meeting with Rahman. Nevertheless, this new phase of the confronta tion— reflecting the "spontaneous" nature of the Revolutionary regime— had developed a dynamism of its own, and could not be stopped at this stage simply by Presidential fiat. Consequently, Indonesia’s repeated willingness to negotiate the Malaysia issue may be an indication of something more than merely a diversionary "West Irian like" tactic of confrontation. Bernard Gordon suggests that President Sukarno decided to end the confrontation some months after it began, but found he would not be able to do so until he could convince the more rabid opponents of Malaysia that he had extracted every concession and ex hausted every approach, and that Indonesia faced no other choice. -*-2 In short, it seems plausible that, to release himself from his commit ment to "crush" Malaysia, the President may have turned once again to the tactic that had served him so well in the West Irian crisis, i. e., mobxli zation of international "moral force." Maphilindo seemed to be the perfect solution. Not only did this agreement take the decision out of Sukarno's hand and refer it to the United Nations— the same organization that had presided over the return of West Irian— but the loose grouping also presented the President with the opportunity to assume a position of regional leadership. 13 While it may be that no "ascertainment" of the wishes of the Bornean people could •^ I b i d., p. 108. This writer had arrived at a similar conclusion that is now largely substantiated by Gordon's published transcripts of the meeting. 13 See below, pp. 210-211 for a further development of this point. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 195] === ultimately have been sufficient justification for ending the campaign, or that due to Indonesia's ideological orientation other means would later have been sought to "crush Malaysia," the negotiations surround ing the 1963 Maphilindo Conference suggest that Sukarno was willing, if not anxious, to end that particular phase of the confrontation. The President— or perhaps his more moderate advisers— seemed ready to withdraw his troops if he did not have to take responsibility for it. His ready acceptance of the Afro-Asian conciliation commission a year later suggests once more that he was trying to find some superior moral force— this time Afro-Asian sentiment— to extract him from an unfruit ful venture. When Rahman argued for further troop withdrawals before the establishment of the commission, Sukarno maintained: "It is for the commission to suggest the pulling-out of guerrillas.... What ever decision or suggestion the commission makes, I shall accept." It was clear that the Indonesian leader did not want to withdraw while, during, or before the deliberations of the commission. "The idea is that after the commission has submitted its various recommendations. I pull out some. Then some more. That's my standpoint."111 The course of the campaign. After the failure of the June Summit, there were no further negotiations until the period following the trans fer of power to the military-led cabinet in March 1966. In the absence of mitigating negotiations, the revolutionary tone and tempo of the campaign stepped up considerably. On August 17, while the President was endorsing a decided pro-Peking alignment in world affairs during his independence day speech, the scope of the confrontation was greatly broadened with the landing of Indonesian guerrilla forces on the Malaya II I I ^ I b i d., p p. 114-115. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 196] === 191 peninsula. These landings were followed by others on September 3, and as a result, Malaysia requested a meeting of the United Nations Security Council to bring charges against Indonesia. 15 When the Council met, Indonesia did not deny it had invaded Malaysia, but explained that its "volunteers" had landed in Malaysia only after a sustained effort to solve the problem peacefully. At the completion of the debate, Norway introduced a rather mild resolution calling upon the parties "to refrain from all threat or use of force and to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of each other." 17 Although the measure did not pass due to a negative vote by the U.S.S.R., the action represented a loss of prestige for Indonesia. The African states on the Council, Ivory Coast and Morocco, voted with the majority, and the former in particular "profoundly regreted" the extension of the guerrilla war to the "non-contested part of the territory of a sovereign member state of the United Nations." At the second meeting of the non-aligned nations at Cairo in October, Indonesia suffered a further setback with Malaysia in its "war of gaining world support." Although Sukarno was able to muster enough support to have Malaysia barred from the meeting, the Declaration adopted by the Conference rejected an Indonesian sponsored resolution to denounce 15 The September 3 attacks were probably made in conjunction with a racial riot that broke out in Singapore that same day. See Michael Leifer, "Communist Violence in Singapore," Asian Survey, IV, No. 10 Security Council, Official Reports, S/PV 1144, September 9, 1964, pp. 2-30. ^Security Council, Official Reports, S/PV 1152, September 17, 1964, pp. 1-31. 18Security Council, Official Reports, S/PV 1149, September 17, 1964, | pp. 47, 48-50. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 197] === 192~~1 Also during the meeting, Ghana offered its good offices "to help Indonesia and Malaysia to settle their differences as brothers." 20 This overture was of great value to Malaysia in its drive for international recognition since it seemed to indicate the elevation of the new federation to an 'equal status within the AfroAsian group; a settlement brought about by a non-aligned nation as influ ential as Ghana would certainly have helped to remove the neo-colonial epithet that had been somewhat unfairly foisted on Malaysia by Indo• nesia. 21 Ghana had earlier joined with India and the other nations of the British Commonwealth at the Prime Ministers' Conference in July in expressing support of Rahman's efforts "to pressure the sovereign inde pendence and integrity of his country."22 Malaysia established rela tions with Nigeria and the UAR early in the year, and in later November, Rahman returned from a trip to North Africa and announced that diplomatic missions would soon be exchanged with Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. After a slow start in the game of "international solidarity mak ing," therefore, Malaysia was beginning to increase its viability in world affairs, In view of Malaysia's progress in gaining international acceptance, it may well have been that by the end of 1964.Sukarno would 19 20 See discussion of the conference, pp. 220-221 below. Press Release, October 9, 1964). M134 (Washington: Malaysia Information Service, 21 See Table VII, p. 249, chapter vi and accompanying text for a discussion of Malaysia's anti-colonial stance in world affairs. See, also, Robert 0. Tilman, "Malaysian Foreign Policy: The Dilemmas of a Committed Neutral," paper prepared for the Asia Society and the Asso ciation for Asian Studies, Conference on "The Foreign Policies of the Southeast Asi.m States," May 14-15, 1965, pp. 22-23. 22 Commonwealth Prime Ministers Communique, July 15, 1964, cited in Mezerik, pp. 40-41. 93 New York Times, December 6, 1964, p. 7. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 23 === [PDF page 198] === 193 no longer have even submitted to a settlement of the issue by an AfroAsian commission. It was becoming increasingly apparent that the ''moral force" of the NEFO, especially the Afro-Asians within the United Nations, was not behind Indonesia's radical interpretation of anti-colonialism when weighed against support of the more important principle of the United Nations as the "protective shield for smaller powers." In December, Indonesia reached a point of no return in its inter national alignment over the seating of Malaysia in the Security Council. Malaysia and Czechkoslovakia had been elected a year earlier to split a two year term in the Council with its seat during 1965. the Southeast Asian, country taking On December 31, Sukarno announced that Indonesia would pull out of the organization if Malaysia was seated. 25 ment had little choice after this statement, and on January 7 its formal withdrawal from the organization.26 The govern submitted Sukarno's rash, and according to Brackman "desperate," action will be discussed below in a larger context; in reference to the Malaysia dispute, however, the move further enhanced the political viability of the federation in world opinion and correspondingly forced Indonesian foreign policy into even narrower channels. The military aspects of the war during 1965 also suffered setbacks. As a result of new attacks on the mainland in December and the following 24 Brackman, Southeast Asia's Second Front (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 239. 25 See statements in Antara, January 5, 6, and 11, 1965, reprinted in Mezerik, pp. 118-120. See Declaration of the Supreme Advisory Council on the Withdrawal of Indonesia from the U.N., January 10, 1965 (New York: Consulate General, Republic of Indonesia); and SubandrioT s Formal Notification of Indonesia's Withdrawal from the U.N. (sic) dated January 20, 1965 (Washington: Embassy of Indonesia). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 199] === March 1965, the British vastly increased their sea power in the area* This move, plus the raids on the North Vietnamese shipping facilities by the United States in the Gulf of Tonkin, seemed to have somewhat of a sobering effect on the Indonesian military, and the scope and in tensity of guerrilla activity decreased noticeably. The unexpected "secession" of Singapore in August 1956 had a further effect on the military aspects of confrontation inasmuch as the separation of Singapore from Malaysia caused the Indonesian military effort to shift back to its earlier policy of subversive pressure in northern Borneo. 27 Reasoning that the necessity and logic of including the Borneo states had ended with Singapore's withdrawal, Indonesia hoped that increased pressure on the "crack" in the federation would produce a complete "break" of Sarawak and Sabah with the Malay peninsula. It must be pointed out, however, that from a military point of view, the Borneo campaigns, like those of West Irian dispute some three and four years earlier, were al most completely ineffectual. The anti-communist purges in Indonesia"beginning in October virtually suspended the confrontation, and the status of the "crushMalaysia" campaign remained unchanged until after General Suharto's con solidation of power the following March. At that time, Indonesia began to cautiously move toward a settlement of the issues. In an attempt to cushion the impact of ending the three year confrontation,Malik explored the possibility of resuming relations with Singapore. the Recognition of island state was made on April 9, although announcement of the accord was withheld pending a settlement of the Malaysia issue. 28 ^Brackman, p. 24-2. 28New York Times, April 12, 1966, p. 12. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 200] === May, Sukarno rather surprisingly announced that he was willing to have a talk with Rahman "about a peaceful settlement of the issue." 29 When acting Malaysian Prime Minister Abdul Razak asked Indonesia to set a time and a place, however, Sukarno demurred and tried to forbid Malik from making the necessary arrangements. 30 Malik nevertheless set up a meeting with Malaysia for the weekend of May 27 in Bangkok, and in a test of determination with Sukarno he dispatched a group of Indonesian military officers, all of whom were in charge of units in the confron tation campaign, to Kuala Lumpur in a demonstration of Indonesia's sincerity to end the campaign. 31 On June 1, "practical steps" toward terminating the undeclared war were announced from Bangkok by Malik and Razak, 32 and finally on August 11, a formal agreement was signed between the two countries bringing the confrontation to a close. agreement provided for a resumption of diplomatic relations, The and Malaysia assented to let Sarawak and Sabah "reaffirm as soon as prac ticable, in a free and democratic manner through general elections, their previous decision about their status in Malaysia." The dynamics of the campaign. 33 An assessment of the motivations behind the confrontation of Malaysia reveals a complex of ambivalent political pressures within Indonesia. A number of explanations have been offered to explain the internal motivations for Indonesia's external ^ N e w York Times, May 16, 1966, P- 6. ®°New York Times, May 21, 1966, P- 1. 31New York Times, May 28, 1966, P- 1. 3% e w York Times, June 2, 1966, pp,. 1, 9. ^ N e w York Times, August 12, 1966, p. 7. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 201] === behavior. Coming so close on the heels of the West Irian campaign, the economic structure of the nation was scarcely prepared for the new venture, and most of the Indonesian people seemingly approached the prospects of economic stabilization with great expectation. Yet appar ently, when the opportunity arose, most of the major groups, including the army, supported the confrontation and continued to support it despite many chances to end the campaign. The search for motivations behind the Malaysia campaign is not an easy task. It has been contended that the PKI was the real motiva ting factor in the campaign, that confrontation provided the communists with a multi-purpose opportunity to sabotage economic development both in Indonesia and Malaysia, to extend their influence throughout the archipelago, and to enhance the party as a true, trustworthy "national movement" without the taints of international communism. While the role of the PKI as the prime determinant of the Malaysia crisis is subject to serious qualification, as noted above, it cannot be doubted that the party played a substantial supporting role in the campaign. It has been pointed out that there were many vested interests tied to confrontation in both its West Irian and Malaysian phases. Certainly many groups— not the least of which was the army— stood to lose their economic advantages in a stabilization and "rationalization" program and preferred a gradually inflating "revolution" to a period of austerity that would surely be difficult and unpopular. 35 Similarly, it has been This seems to be the general theme in Brackman's Southeast Asia's Second Front, esp. pp. 86-132, 24H-266. However, in many instan ces his analysis is much more probing and thoughtful. 35 See, e.g., Willard A. Hanna, "The Indonesian Crisis: Early 1963 Phase," American University Field Staff Reports, WAH-8-'63, XI, No. 8, pp. 1-13, who discusses both economic and psychological aspects of the confrontation. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 202] === 1971 maintained that a foreign crisis was needed by the ruling elite to perpetuate its position in power and to divert attention from the corrupt and deteriorating economy. It was argued in this context that a "small crisis" (e.g., the question of Portuguese Timor ) was not sufficient to satisfy the need for a "diversion" and that only the Malaysia ques tion could have provided the "sustained" crisis that was required to nurse the nation along its revolutionary path. 37 It has also been suggested that Indonesia's external objectives were only a means of keeping the army and the communists in "domestication" or "checkmate," that foreign policy served as a kind of domestic "balance of power.38 Another variation of this view maintainedthat an additional reason for the army's support of the campaign was the need to counter, and perhaps neutralize, the grow ing "nationalist statue" of the PKI.^9 All the above explanations are well based arguments, 40 and since the Malaysia confrontation was obviously the product of a number of factors working in conjunction, all are valid to varying degrees. How ever, even taking the arguments collectively, they seem to stress a mechanistic interpretation of domestic politics and lack a comprehensive I ■I-I III 36 For a discussion of the Timor problem, see Donald E. Weatherbee, "Portuguese Timor: An Indonesian Dilemma," Asian Survey, VI, No. 12 37 See Brackman, p. 127. 38 See Dato Muhammad Ghazah bin Shafie, Confrontation: A Manifestation of the Indonesian Problem (Kuala Lumpur: Department of Information, 1964), pp. 22, 26. 39 See George McT. Kahin, "Indonesia and Malaysia," Pacific Affairs, XXXVII, No. 3 (Fall, 1964), pp. 263-4. 40 See Donald Hindley, "Indonesia's Confrontation with Malaysia: A Search for Motives," Asian Survey, IV, No. 6 (June, 1964), 904-913, who discusses most of the above "domestic determinants." See also Kenneth Waltz, Man the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), chap. viii, who systematically considers the problem of | relating the various determinants, or "images," of war. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 203] === 198 i quality; in short, they fail.to reflect that, in words of Harry Benda, "the Indonesian river is flowing m o r e and more in an Indonesian bed."^-*There is a need to cast the Malaysian and the West Irian disputes in a larger conceptual context. It has been suggested by Frederick Bunnell that the key to Indonesia's foreign policy— and especially the Malaysia crisis— was to be found in the "ideological-psychological" motivations of a President who had the "determinant role in the emergence of Indonesia's confrontation policies." 42 According to Bunnell, Sukarno em braced the Marxist-Leninist view of international affairs, the idea of a "dialectical struggle" between the old capitalist states and the new evolving states, and this formed the basis of his foreign policy. addition, the "dynamic of the policy" was grounded on the "psychologi cal need for self-respect felt by a political elite long-humiliated by colonialism." While the ideological-psychological impulses were not the exclusive elements behind the President's policies, they appeared to be the decisive ones. Bunnell concludes: To be sure these vague ideological-psychological impulses did not prescribe specific courses of action, but they did set long term goals, maintain fears and establish priorities. Moreover, as Guided Democracy persisted in its efforts at indoctrination, it is likely that the state ideology tended to take a firmer hold on both the political bureaucratic elite and the political public. An atmosphere and a momentum was generated that in turn reinforced the predilections of the original authors. Even the president could not be immune to this secondary effect of indoctrination programs.^ 41 See "Decolonization in Indonesia," American Historical Review, LXX, No. 4 (July, 1965), 1073. 42 See Frederick P. Bunnell, "Indonesia's Foreign Policy in the 1960's: President Sukarno Moves From Non-Alignment to Confrontation," paper prepared for the Asia Society and Association of Asian Studies, Conference on "The Foreign Policies of the Southeast Asian States," May 14-15, 1965, reprinted in Indonesia, II (October, 1966), p. 38. 43Ibid., p. 2. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 204] === Although Bunnell1s.theory has little room.for domestic determi nants, it does present a valuable insight into.the nature of the ideo logical framework within which the Indonesian political system operated. It is also along these lines that George Kahin discussed the Malaysia confrontation. Kahin suggests that Indonesia feels she has a moral right to leadership in Asia— a right even superior to that of India— based on its size, armed power, and revolutionary path to independence, and this right certainly includes that of hegemony over the areas populated by Malay peoples. Consequently, there is a resentment in Djakarta that a Western power (Great Britain) should "arrogate the right to direct the political destiny of people ethnically similar to Indonesians in areas immediately across their borders." There was, and is, a deep feeling among the Indonesian leaders that the boundaries of their country are colonially determined, and even moderates feel that Indonesia has as much right as Kuala Lumpur to control the north Bornean states of Sarawak and Sabah. Another element in this attitude, Kahin maintains, is the belief that "Malaya itself is a semi-indepenhC dent, feudalistic anachronism unrepresentative of the Malay people." In the eyes of many Indonesian officials, independence without revolu tion is not real independence, but merely a front for continued nial rule. colo Having fought against intransigent.Dutch colonialism, many Kahin, Pacific Affairs, XXXVII, No. 3, pp. 260-261. Cf. Bunnell, p. 76, who believes that Sukarno possessed an "undaunted faith in the historical inevitability of his new emerging, forces prevailing... and the eclipse of the influence of the West by the resurgence of Asian nations led by a militantly anti-imperialist vanguard centered in Djakarta and Peking." tfSIbid., p. 261. 46Ibid. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 205] === 200 Indonesians cannot believe that British colonialism was enlightened enough in 1957 and again in 1963 to grant full independence without a revolution and consequently believed that Malaya's independence was not "pure" or "complete." The Malaysia plan, therefore, was a means by which the reactionary Malay elite,through cooperation with the British, extended its power into northern Borneo. "Malaysia is the marriage between Malay feudalism and British colonialism." In addition, Kahin maintains the Indonesian nationalist elite believe that Malaya and the British were sympathetic, if not helpful, to the PRRI-Permesta rebels, and they are distrustful of present de fense arrangements with Malaysia in general and Singapore in particu lar. Remembering the pre-colonial Srivijaya-Mataram rivalries, the Indonesian leaders also suspect that Malaysia still hopes to lure Sumatra away from the Republic to a "greater Malaya" federation with the peninsula. Along the same lines, Kahin suggests that Sukarno equated British policy in north Borneo with the "Malino Policy" of the Netherlands, whereby many Indonesians feared that the Dutch, "ruling through traditional 'feudalist' aristocracies in the outer islands," hoped to control the largely Java-based Republic. Finally, Kahin argues, many Indonesians are apprehensive about the overseas Chinese as a possible "fifth column" for mainland China's expansionistic de! signs, and believe that Malaysia will eventually be dominated by the 50 Chinese. 47 Ibid. Donald E. Weatherbee, "Indonesia and Malaysia: Confronta tion in Southeast Asia," Orbis VII (Summer, 1962), 339, states that the usual Indonesian epithet for Rahman is boneka— puppet. 48 Kahin, Pacific Affairs, XXXVII, No. 3, p. 263. 49Ibid., p. 261-2, n. 10. 50 Ibid., p. 264-5. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 206] === Using the thoughts of Bunnell and Kahin as a point of departure, Indonesia’s policy of confrontation and its foreign policy in.general will be examined in the context of its militant anti-colonial nationalism. Three Dimensions of Confrontation The New Emerging Forces. The concept of the New Emerging Forces (NEFO) which took definite form in Sukarno's speech to the first confer ence of the Non-Aligned Bloc at Belgrade, quickly developed into the dominating theme of Indonesian foreign policy and Indonesian political philosophy. It was given organizational form in November 1963 when Indonesia held the highly successful Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO) and was to have been the catalyst for the proposed Conference of the New Emerging Forces (CONEFO) in the spring of 1966. The fully developed theory of the NEFO presents an excellent picture of the Indonesian perception of international reality during the Guided Democracy period. 51 According to Sukarno, the pre-eminent formulator of Indonesian state ideology, most of the world is embroiled in a struggle for "social justice" called the Revolution of Mankind, and within this Revolution of Mankind, a great confrontation is taking place— a confrontation between the NEFO and the OLDEFO. The NEFO is ^ F o r the two best sources of a full development of the NEFO syndrome, see "Let Us Transform the World," address, April 24, 1963, at the Asian-African Journalist Conference (Djakarta: Department of Information, 1963); and "Reflections Upon the Indonesian Revolution," reprint of a May 1964 special issue, in Le Monde, Paris, France (Wash ington:. Embassy of Indonesia, 1964). See also, Modelski's introduc tions to the edited selections in The New Emerging Forces, especially pp. ii-viii. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 207] === 202 composed of Asian, African, Latin American and "socialist" countries, and constitutes the dynamic element in the Revolution that is fighting for national independence, social justice and abiding peace. domestic parlance, the NEFO, in combining the "socialist," nationalist and Islamic countries into an anti-colonial bloc, represents a sort of NASAKOM National Front writ large.)52 The OLDEFO (Old Established Forces) are presumably the non-progressive ruling elements of the capitalist (imperialist) states and are the reactionary forces of domination that must be destroyed by the NEFO. The great overriding issue, the "source of all tension in the world," is colonialism, neo colonialism and imperialism (nekolim). The struggle of the NEFO, how ever, is not completed with the attainment of national independence and the victory over colonialism; rather this is only the first stage of a continuing revolution. The OLDEFO have still managed to prevent the establishment of abiding peace and social justice through new and insidious neo-colonial schemes. Neo-colonialism is manifest in the OLDEFO*s attempt to maintain a hold on the NEFO's economics and to sur round the NEFO with subversive military bases in an effort to preserve the vested interests of the old order. The "unavoidable" post independent task of the new nations, therefore, must be the waging of a "continuous revolution" to confront, defeat and contain neo-colonialism in order to finally achieve "the just and prosperous society." It is within this context that Sukarno sought to rally AfroAsian support for Indonesia’s struggle against Western infringement in 52 See comment of Sukarno in his 1955 independence day speech, "Reach to the Stars! A Year of Self-Reliance" (Djakarta: Department of Information, 1965), p. 38, wherein he states that the NEFO are an "International NASAKOM, that is a combination of all nationalist states, with religious states and communist states on a world scale.... " Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 208] === the Southeast Asian islands, and to promote national unity under his own charismatic leadership. The first concrete proposal to consoli date NEFO support came in the form of the Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO), held in November 1963. 53 The impetus for GANEFO grew out of a quarrel between Indonesia and the International Olympic Committee (I.O.C.) over the staging of the Fourth Asian Games in Djakarta during August and September 1962. When Indonesia refused to issue visas to Nationalist China and Israel, the Indian Vice President of the Games, Sondhi, threatened to ask for removal of official sanction from the sports event due to the injection of political considerations into the affair. Public opinion was raised almost immediately against Sondhi and he was forced to leave the country. In February 1963, the I.O.C. suspended Indonesia from participating in the.upcoming Olympic Games unless Djakarta apologized to Sondhi, Israel and Nationalist China and promised that the incident would never happen again. Sukarno was predictably infuriated; he soon, however, turned an embarrassing situation to Indonesia's own advantage by immediately announcing prepara tion for GANEFO. The President made it clear that his games were directed against the I.O.C. in particular and the imperialists in general. Characterizing the Olympics as a tool of the OLDEFO, he stated: I propose to be frank. Now let's frankly say sports have something to do with politics. Indonesia now proposes to mix sports with politics, and let us now establish the Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO). 53 For the most complete discussion of GANEFO, see Ewa T. Pauker, "GANEFO I: Sports and Politics in Djakarta," Asian Survey, V, No. 4 ^Sukarno, "Let Us Establish the GANEFO," address, April 27, 1963, at the opening of GANEFO Preparatory Conference (Djakarta: Department of Information, August 10, 1963, No. 5310), p. 86. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 209] === Pak Bandrio has clearly said.that sports cannot be separated from politics. Therefore, let us now work for a sports asso ciation on the basis of polities. We do not want to put on any masks; let us create a sports association on the basis of the new emerging forces. Let us organize a sports federation among the nations representing these new emerging forces, brothers, a sports federation within our own house... with in our own family because all members of the new emerging forces are our relatives.55 "'Like Indonesia's persistent request for a second Afro-Asian (Bandung) Conference, the idea at first received lukewarm response. However, ten countries, including the U.S.S.R. and China, met in late April to plan the events, and by November, the GANEFO opened with 51 countries represented— India most noticeably absent. The quality of the participants was generally poor due to the fact that many nations did not send their best teams for fear that they would be disqualified in the 1964 Olympics. Despite the lack of over all athletic excellence, however, GANEFO was of great political sig nificance. Indonesia registered an impressive diplomatic victory as the games originator and host nation, and did a creditable job in staging events. The costs of GANEFO were also quite low in relation to the political dividends that Indonesia gained. Russia built the sports complex (used earlier in the Asian Games), and China provided most of the foreign exchange to finance the travel costs of the par ticipants and donated 80 per cent of the sports equipment.5^ GANEFO was also tremendously popular within Indonesia and many Indonesian groups were given the opportunity to participate personally in the Sukarno, "Sports cannot be separated from politics," speech at the opening of the Conference of National Front Committee, February 13, 1963, reprinted in Modelski, p. 89. 55See ibid., pp. 90-93. ^Pauker, Asian Survey, V, No. 3, 181, 184-5. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 210] === 205 endeavor's success. But most importantly, the games served as an international forum from which Indonesia could "project an image of strength and influence" and gather support for its "crush Malaysia" project which was at this time in high gear as a result the break with the new federation in September. GANEFO also provided China with significant political prestige. In the actual course of the games, Peking scored an impressive victory in its international sports debut winning 68 gold medals to 27 for the runner-up Soviet Union. 58 But more importantly, China greatly out-dis tanced the Russians in the diplomatic circles in one of the early "battles" of the Sino-Soviet dispute. The cultural contingent attached to the Chinese delegation was very popular and astutely apolitical in its performances and shows. In addition, Sino-Indonesian friendship— if not a rapproachment— was becoming more and more of an actuality; as an indication of the cordial relationship developing between the two countries, Sukarno reserved a public gesture of welcome for the Chinese representative alone.^ The GANEFO was instituted on a permanent basis when a GANEFO Council Congress (consisting of all the participating nations) formed an executive board 'consisting of the twelve sponsoring countries plus Mexico and Cuba. A permanent headquarters and secretariat were set up in Djakarta,GANEFO Continental Committees for Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe were established, and GANEFO II was scheduled for 1967 with. the U.A.R. as tentative host nation. 58 60 See chart of the winners, ibid., p. 181. 5^Ibid., pp. 172, 181. ®°Modelski, pp. 93-95. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 211] === 206 One indication of the international influence of the games was the I.O.C.'s decision in June 1964- to rescind its suspension of Indonesia. The I.O.C.*s constituent sports federations (Athletics and Swimming), however, barred the individual athletes who had participated in GANEFO I. Despite having scored a significant moral victory, Sukarno demanded that all Indonesian athletes were to be made eligible,. and in a show of strength, several GANEFO participants were included in the Indonesian. Olympic delegation when it arrived in Tokyo. The federations, neverthe less, refused them permission to compete, and as a result, Indonesia, along with North Korea, withdrew from the games. The logical culmination of the "NEFO syndrome" was to have been an international Conference of the New Emerging Forces (C0NEF0). Sukarno first suggested a CONEFO in his 1963 independence day message and a year later he announced that the project had been "raised to the level of becoming reality." The desirability of holding the conference was greatly increased after Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations, and the President took immediate steps to that end by rushing the con struction on a complex of assembly buildings and pertinent regalia, e.g., a large monument depicting a heroic NEFO figure breaking the chains of OLDEFO domination. Finally, on the tenth anniversary of the first Afro-Asian Conference, Sukarno formally announced that the CONEFO would be held some time in the spring of 1966. ®Asee Sukarno, "The Forceful Echo of the Indonesian Revolution," address, August 17, 1963, reprinted in Modelski, p. 124; and "A Year of Living Dangerously," address, August 17, 1964 (Djakarta: Department of Information, August 17, 1964, No. 6413), p. 17. ^ S e e Sukarno, "After Ten Years Still: Onward, Never Retreat I" speech, April 18, 1965 (New York: Consulate General of Indonesia, 1965), p. 15. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 212] === The proposal to hold a CONEFO and Indonesia's.solidaritymaking style of foreign policy in general had its roots in political concepts going back to the pre-colonial era. In this context, the traditional quest for a microcosmic order that approximated a macrocosmic world order was reflected in the modern revolutionary policies of the Indonesian government. The best example of this was in the President's 1960 speech to the United Nations in which he suggested that Indonesia's own national experience could help to lessen the East-West confrontation. 64 With the great powers of the world divided between "the teachings of Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence" and "the teachings of the Communist Manifesto," Sukarno stated that Indonesia's doctrine of Pantja Sila "has a universal sig nificance" and can be applied internationally to reduce the tensions of the world. Arguing that the.very essence of the United Nations rests on the basis of nationalism and internationalism, and skipping lightly over the principles of belief in God and social justice, Sukarno stressed that the activity of the General Assembly could best be reorganized along the Indonesian decision-making process of musjawarah and mufakat instead of relying on "resolutions and amendments and votes of majorities and minorities." Pantja Sila's And as if in proof of viability as a workable doctrine that could synthe size the world-wide confrontation of ideologies, he asked the Assembly to observe the NASAKOM-like delegation that had accompanied him, 63 In this context, cf. Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, Mythology and the Tolerance of the Javanese (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1965), pp. 1-30, especially, p. 7. 64 See Sukarno, "To Build the World Anew," address, September 30, 1960, in Toward the Freedom and Dignity of Man: A Collection of Five, Speeches (Djakarta: Department of Information, 1960), p. 121-149. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 213] === including, among others, General Nasution, PKI Chairman Aidit and the nationalist, Ali Sastroamidjojo. He reminded the Assembly that the Asian-African Conference at Bandung had been conducted by the methods of masjawarah, and he advocated incorporating the Pantja Sila into the UN Charter. What was implicit in this speech had become perfectly clear by 1964-. Sukarno had begun to cannonize the microcosmic Indonesian Revolution and make it the basis for the macrocosmic Revolution of Mankind. With himself as chief spokesman and dispenser of inspira tional and ideological guidance, the President elevated Indonesia to the leadership of the revolutionary alliance of the NEFO in its inevitable confrontation with the reactionary OLDEFO. 65 With Djakarta as the ideological and cultural seat of the NEFO and the capital of GANEFO and CONEFO, it is perhaps not entirely illogical to suggest that the plan reflects the capital-centric nature of the pre-colonial Java-based kingdoms— the literal magic center of the universe. this context, national-building becomes not so much the formation of the nation-state, but rather the establishment of the "nation-universe.1 A "Pax Indonesia," How should one, therefore, interpret Indo nesia’s militant nationalism and its "international solidarity-making"?. 65 See in particular, "Reflections on the Indonesian Revolution," and "A Year of Living Dangerously." 66 See J. D. Legge, Indonesia (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: PrenticeHall, Spectrum Books, 1964), p. 169, who suggests the unique nature of Djakarta in Indonesian politics and the need for further research into the phenomenon. Cf., comment in Denis Warner, "Sukarno, the Would-be Emperor," Reporter, May 20, 1965, p. 24; and the interesting article by Bernard Kalb, "Jakarta: The Sukarno Orbit," New York Times Magazine, October 30, 1960, pp. 14-15, 54-60, in which Djakarta is characterized as"a planet that comes to life only in the fitful sunlight of the ^nation’s President." Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 214] === The answer may stem partially from the need felt by many Indonesian leaders to "justify to their own public and to foreign opinion... their own authoritarian regime." However, the heart of the matter more likely lies in an examination of the intent behind the NEFO con cept. At Belgrade in 1961, Sukarno stated: the basic purpose of /this present conference/^ is to draw the non-aligned countries into a co-ordinated accumulated moral force in order to help preserve world peace and bring about a new stable equilibrium based on world order of social justice and prosperity.®® If one takes this statement in conjunction with a statement by Foreign Minister Subandrio in February 1962, the creation of this "coordinated accumulated moral force" takes on new dimension. In speaking to the trainees of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Subandrio characterized Indonesian diplomacy as an "instrument of revolution," and stated that "without an understanding of the direct connections existing between national interests and the principles of the National Revolution... our diplomats will be drowned in the mere formalities of conventional diplomacy. In light of the above, it is suggested that the West Irian conflict (colonial confrontation) and the subsequent Malaysia campaign (neo-colonial confrontation) are a part of the same two-fold process, namely: social and political integration and the delimitation of a sphere Suggested by Modelski, p. vi. "Toward Friendship, Peace and Justice," speech, September 1, 1961 (Djakarta: Department of Information, September 2, 1963, V. 1, no. 6318), p. 158. 6^'Revolutionary Diplomacy," lecture to the officials of the Department of Foreign Affairs, undergoing military training, February 8, 1962, in Indonesia on the March (Djakarta: Department of Foreign Affairs, 1963), p. 268. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 215] === 210 of interest in the Southeast Asian archipelago. What the Indonesia solidarity-makers desired is roughly what many Java based regimes in the past have desired— the Dutch should not be excluded from this— and that is hegemony throughout the archipelago. And it is quite natural in a modern age where ideas of nationhood abound, but where the rationales of nationhood are not well developed, that the Djakarta government, reflecting traditional political styles, should attempt to expand its sphere of interest through the advocacy of a "revolutionary" nationalism tied to establishing a new world order. As George Modelski comments: Herein lies the importance of Indonesia's solidarity-making for its South-east Asian policies. Indonesia aspires to be a "great nation in Asia" and in South-east Asia in particu lar. Its activities on behalf of the solidarity of the New Emerging Forces lend it status, authority and support for its claims within this region.... For the conflict over West Irian has already shown how adept Indonesian leaders are at mobilizing international support for regional aspira tions. In this context, Maphilindo takes on a new dimension. There is good reason to believe that the Indonesian leadership viewed Map hilindo as much more than simply a cooperative organizational approach to solve regional problems peacefully. The clauses in the Joint State ment dealing with (1) the "temporary nature" of foreign bases in the area, (2) the pledge to "abstain from the use of arrangements of collec tive defense to serve the particular interest of the big powers," and (3) the desire expressed in the Manila Accord to assume "a primary responsibility for the maintenance of the stability and security of the area from subversion in any form or manifestation," was clearly an indication that Indonesia considered Maphilindo as a substitution of 70Modelski, p. v. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 216] === 211 its power for that of the West in keeping regional security— a sort of "Indonesian Monroe Doctrine." 71 David Mozingo contends that "in effect, Djakarta had offered to accept Malaysia and to join Maphilindo upon the understanding that the British and United States presence in the region would gradually be replaced by Indonesia’s hegemony." 72 If one assumes that Indonesia placed roughly this interpretation on Maphilindo, that it wanted a "Pax Indonesia" rather than a "Pax Britannica," 73 there is no reason to assume that Djakarta was not sin cere in the desire to abide by the Manila agreement. If indeed Sukarno considered the doctrine of "Musjawarah Maphilindo" as giving him the right to be consulted on (and perhaps veto) all regional developments, it is not implausible that he considered Rahman's premature announce ment of Malaysia as a violation of the Manila agreements. In this light, it is also quite likely that Sukarno considered the Maphilindo agreements as a basic recognition by the other signatory countries of Indonesia's pre-eminent position in the islands. Rahman, on the other hand, obviously viewed the agreement as an extraordinary act, voluntar ily negotiated— but not required by a sovereign state— in the interest of peace in the archipelago. 71 See Subandrio, "Statement in General Debate of the Nineteenth Regular Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on 11 December, 1964," (Washington: Embassy of Indonesia, n.d.), p. 7, who draws a parallel between the Monroe Doctrine and confrontation of neo colonialism. ^ D. P. Mozingo, Sino-Indonesian Relations: An Overview, 19551965 (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, July 1965T, p. 56. 73 See "Statement of Ambassador Palar of Indonesia in Exercising His Right of Reply to Statements Made by the Delegates of Malaysia and the United Kingdom, September 30, 1963" (Washington: Embassy of Indo nesia), p. 7; and "Statement by H. E. Ambassador Palar, Permanent Repre sentative of Indonesia to the United Nations Delivered at the Plenary Session on October 1, 1963, in Reply to Lord Home, British Foreign Secretary," (Washington: Embassy of Indonesia, n.d.). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 217] === Nationalism and expansionism. plausible to accept at face value In light of the above, it.is official government pronouncements that the object of Indonesia's "crush Malaysia" campaign was ideally to create a loose, "greater Malay" grouping, consisting of a "free" (and separate) Malaya, Singapore, Sabah*Brunei, and Sarawak,74 which would become more easily susceptible to Indonesian political and cul tural dominance. This consideration, however, leads to an examination of another side of Indonesia's confrontation policies and that is what is held to the long-standing expansionist sentiment among many of the nation alist leaders, not the least of which is the President himself. Bernard Gordon points out: "Indonesia is perhaps the only Southeast Asian state in which irredentism is openly cited by leading local officials as a possible impetus for governmental action." This "Greater Indonesia" sentiment is identified most prominently with the ultra-nationalist Muhammad Yamin, formerly head of the National Planning Commission, who died in October 1962. As late as 1958, Yamin asserted that the modern Indonesian nation is the "rightful" succeed ing entity to all the territory of pre-colonial Nusantara, consisting of the "Malay Peninsula, the islands of Sumatra, of Kalimantan, of Java,... the group now known as Nusa Tenggara (the South-eastern Islands), the islands of Sulawesi, the group of the Moluccas and the territory of West Irian." 76 Yamin was convinced that Indonesia would See "Safeguarding the Republic of Indonesia," p. 2. 75 Gordon, p. 80. See his discussion of Indonesian expansionism, pp. 80-87; Weatherbee, Orbis, VII, pp. 342-34-3. 76Muhammad Yamin, A Legal and Historical Review of Indonesia's Sovereignty over the Ages (Manila: Indonesian Embassy, 1959), p. 5. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 218] === 213 eventually assimilate the above territory ("thanks to the working of the forces of nationalist independence in Southeast Asia") and that his sentiments were widely shared by other Indonesian leaders. Some evaluation of the extent of the assumed expansionist feelings in Indonesia can be gathered by examining the feelings of Yamin, Sukarno and Hatta just prior to the declaration of indepen dence in 1945. A record of their statements is preserved in the de liberations of the Investigating Committee for Preparation of Indonesia's Independence (B.P.K.I.) sponsored by the Japanese and established by Sukarno in March 1945 to discuss framework of an independent Indonesian state. 77 One problem debated in a special subcommittee was the extent of the territorial boundaries of the new state. Yamin, as expected, presented the opening argument for a greater Indonesia, stressing the historical basis for such a claim., He was particularly insistent on the inclusion of the Malay peninsula within the projected nation for "geo-political" and security reasons. 78 Sukarno supported Yamin, stating that "despite the danger of my being accused as an imperialist, Indonesia will not become strong and secure unless the whole Straits of Malacca is in our hands." 79 He advocated, in "100 per cent... agreement with the view held by Mr. Yamin," that Indonesia should extend to "Malaya and Papua" and urged the Committee 77 See The Territory of the Indonesian State: Discussions in the Meeting of the Investigating Committee for Preparation of Indonesia's Independence, extracted and translated from the book Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, Vol. I (Kuala Lumpur: Federal Department of Information, 1964), cited at length in Gordon, pp. 80-87. There is some question, however, as to the accuracy of this translation, and an overemphasis on expansionism as the chief characteristic of Indonesian foreign policy.should be avoided 78Ibid., pp. 2-6. 79Ibid., p. 31. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 219] === 214 to read the.Nagarakertagama..He maintained that at no time had he said that "my struggle was confined to... the former Dutch held territory..., that neither on moral grounds nor on the grounds of international law are we obliged to be the inheritors of the Dutch."®0 Finally, he stated eloquently that God has determined that certain parts of the world should form single units,... and when I look at the islands situated between Asia and Australia and between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, I understand they are meant.to form a single entity /and/... independent Indonesia should extend to Malaya and He was careful to note, however, that the Philippines was already inde pendent and that its sovereignty should be respected. In contrast, Hatta said that the proposed state should be con fined to the area of the Dutch East Indies. Branding Yarnin’s views as imperialistic and reflecting those of Nazi Germany, he argued that the nationalists did not have the capacity to administer a Greater Indonesia and should exclude West Irian from the Republic. I am inclined to say that I do n6t need Papua and that it should be left to the Papuan people themselves.... regards Malaya, let us not claim it for ourselves. If we were to do so it would appear as if even before getting in- ^ dependence we already were pursuing an imperialistic policy. It was clear that the weight of opinion was on the side of Yamin and Sukarno, and when the Committee was asked to choose among several territorial alternatives, 39 voted for the former Dutch East 80Ibid., p. 20. ^Ibid., pp. 21-22. Substantially the same statement was made in his Pantja Sila speech before the same Committee; yet in the official version released by the Indonesian government, the phrase "should extend to Malaya and Papua" is omitted. See "The Birth of Pantja Sila," address before B.P.K.I., June 1, 1945, in Toward Freedom and the Dignity of Man, p. 11. 82 Hatta*s views are found in The Territory of the Indonesian State, [pp. 16-19. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 220] === Indies, plus Malaya, British North Borneo, Brunei, Sarawak, Timor and New Guinea; 19 just for the Dutch Indies; 6 for the Dutch.Indies 83 and Malaya, but excluding New Guinea; and two for other combinations. The Japanese, of course, had the final say, and on July 27, at a meet ing attended by military administrators from Java, Sumatra, Malaya, and the Naval territories of the eastern islands, it was decided that Malaya would not be included in the new Indonesian nation. Sukarno was informed of this decision in Saigon in August, and although there was obviously support in Malaya for joining Indonesia, he declared independence only over the territory of the Dutch East Indies. has since stated that Indonesia has no territorial claim to Malaysia; on the other hand, his reference to the pre-colonial empire of Madjapahit as a "national state" 86 may be a more accurate indication of his true sentiment. Confrontation and Alignment Anti-colonialism and alignment. After GANEFO, Indonesia con tinued its campaign for a second Bandung conference. Despite the fact 83 Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics Under the Japanese Occupation (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Interim Report Series, 1961), p. 29. 84 According to Gordon, who had access tothe Nishimura-Kishi study, the Japanese were considering preparing only "Java and the near by islands" as an independent state. In an interview with Gordon, Kishi also stated that because of the "different stages and patterns of development," Japan "never contemplated... that Malaya would be incorporated with Indonesia." ‘See Gordon, p. 85, n. 50. 85 See "Safeguarding the Republic of Indonesia," p. 1. ftfi See Sukarno, "Nationalism— A Young and Progressive Creed," address to the United States Congress, May 17, 1956 (Djakarta: Depart ment of Information, September 2, 1963, No. 6325), p. 198, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 221] === that the Sino-Soviet conflict and many bilateral disputes (e.g., the Sino-Indian border war) had badly split the Afro-Asian world, twenty new nations had emerged since the 1961 Belgrade meeting and Sukarno anxiously sought to add their support for his confrontation policies. With what was rapidly becoming a ’’rival" non-aligned meeting scheduled for Cairo in October 1964, Djakarta pressed diligently for an AfroAsian conference since its wider membership would include Pakistan and China— two increasingly friendly (and anti-Indian) but aligned nations.8^ Despite the general lack of enthusiasm evidenced by other Afro-Asians, Indonesia’s efforts were supported by China and Pakistan. Peking was still saddled with a radical reputation in world opinion due to its 1962 invasion of India and wanted a forum within which to demonstrate its peaceful role in the forging of Afro-Asian unity. addition, the Chinese leaders hoped to consolidate two years of intense effort at winning friends in Africa and to use what it hoped would be considerable African support as a means of countering Russian influence in the Afro-Asian world. Pakistan, in reaction to the Western support given Indian during the border clashes with the Chinese, had hopes of using the meeting to project a more neutrhl stance in world affairs, and possibly to effect a working agreement with China against India. In April 1964, a preparatory conference was held in Djakarta which. was attended by twenty-one nations. Indonesia proposed that unity could be achieved among the Afro-Asian states, despite the many existing disagreements, if the major theme of the conference was anticolonialism. 88 India, on the other hand, saw only disunity among the 87 See Franklin B. Weinstein, "The Second Asian-African Conference: Preliminary Bouts," Asian Survey, V, No. 7 (July, 1965), 359-373,for a thorough discussion of the events leading up to the abortive Afro-Asian. meeting. ' 88Ibid., p. 361. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 222] === Afro-Asian group based on conflicting national interests and was fearful that a meeting would only accelerate the already disintegrat ing bonds of the "third world." It is also likely that,remembering the Bandung and GANEFO successes of China, India did not want to pro vide Peking with another chance to consolidate support for its policies. The major dispute at the conference was India's proposal to invite Malaysia and the U.S.S.R. 90 China bitterly opposed the atten dance of Russia since it hoped to use the conference as a means to elicit support against the Soviet Union. The Chinese were joined by Indonesia who accused India of attempting to obstruct the meeting and embarrass Peking. Indonesia also strongly opposed the invitation of Malaysia, but smoothly suggested that differences with the federa tion would soon be settled and that the invitation should be merely postponed. The question of both invitations was ultimately resolved by referring it to a special sub-committee for a later decision. One further source of contention concerned the date of the conference. Despite pushing for an early meeting— hopefully before the 1964 Cairo Non-Aligned Conference— Indonesia, China and Pakistan finally acqui esced in holding the assembly in March 1965. The Djakarta preparatory conference revived the long simmer ing moderate-extremist division among the Afro-Asian states and indi cated that the split in the "third world" bloc was beginning to parallel the increasingly bitter Sino-Soviet dispute. It was also becoming evi dent that as the colonial experiences of many new countries faded 89Ibid., pp. 361-362. Ibid., pp. 365-369. See also Guy J. Pauker, "The Rise and Fall of Afro-Asian Solidarity," Asian Survey, V, No. 9 (September, 1965), 426-428. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 223] === 218^ deeper into history and as local bilateral disputes strengthened con ceptions of national interest and national sovereignty, anti-colonial ism was no longer the rallying cry to weld Afro-Asian solidarity that it had formerly been. Despite the fact Sukarno had won endorsement for a second "Bandung" meeting, there were a number of signs that be cause of his "crush Malaysia" campaign., he was rapidly loosing the moderate non-aligned backing that had been such an indispensable ad junct to his foreign policy. For purposes of examining Indonesia's alignment in world affairs, the Malaysian confrontation can be divided into two periods. The first period, extending from September 1963 to mid summer 1964-, was marked by a more flexible attitude on Indonesia's part. attempt was made to reach a settlement with Malaysia, and if Sukarno's intentions at the June Summit Conference can be taken at face value, he was willing to submit to a decision by an Afro-Asian Commission concerning the dispute. In short, it seems that attempts at media tion and;.,the promise of attaining a settlement tempered the tone of Indonesian militancy. Beginning with the attacks on the Malaysian peninsula in August, however, the nature of Indonesia's foreign policy noticeably changed. In his independence day speech, Sukarno proclaimed from the "podium of the Revolution" a "year of living dangerously," and within the next fourteen months, Indonesia's stance in the inter national sphere was altered radically— or, as he put it, the wheel was "slammed around" in accordance with the dictates of "the raving 91 inspiration of Indonesian history." Noting that the Western coun tries no longer had leaders with a capital "L" like Disraeli, Bismarck, 91 "A Year of Living Dangerously," pp. 1, 4. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 224] === Mussolini and Hitler, and showing pleasure that "our opponents are right now all cocking their ears to listen to what the Great Leader of the Revolution is saying," the President proceeded to break all but diplomatic ties with the West and closely allied himself with China (and against the United States) on almost every international issue of consequence. He branded American intervention in Vietnam as aggression and a "trampling" of the Geneva agreements, and even charged Washington with intimidating Cambodia. He placed the United States behind every threat to Indonesia that had existed since the regional revolts in 1957-58, even to the point of laying the blame for the failure of the "ascertainment" in northern Borneo to the "incorrect behavior of Michelmore," a U. S. citizen and U Thant's deputy in the matter. Finally, calling attention to the Joint State ment of Johnson and Rahman whereby the United States pledged support to the Malaysians, Sukarno ominously warned that "should relations between the Republic of Indonesia and the United States of America become worse, the reasons for this will not lie with the Republic of Indonesia." The delegation sitting at the speakers stand included repre sentatives from Korea, Vietnam and Cambodia, and was indicative of the future direction of Indonesia's foreign policy. The President did not lose the opportunity to point out the international NASAKOMin-miniature that was symbolized by their presence: 'Let the imperialists look at the three cf us: one who is a Prince /Sihanouk of CambodiaT", one_who is a Marxist-Leninist _ /the representative of North Korea/ and the other one /Sukarno/ is NASAKOM compressed, but all three of them are patriots, all three of them fight imperialism.... I am announcing to the whole world, to all friends and foes, that no evil spirit, no Jinn, no devil can prevent Korea, Vietnam., Cambodia and Indonesia 92Ibid., p. 14. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 225] === from becoming friends and uniting in the march towards a New World without exploitation de l ’homme par 1 1homme1 99 Sukarno then suggested the existence of a wider "revolutionary-pro gressive" front consisting of Ethiopia, Mali, Algeria, Guinea, Ghana, Kenya and the U.A.R. in Africa; British Guiana, and Cuba in Latin America; and Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Philippines, North Vietnam, North Korea, Cambodia and China in Asia. These were the countries whose support the President most likely wished to consolidate at the 1965 Afro-Asian conference and which, he hoped, would eventually com pose the core assembly for his proposed CONEFO. Sukarno intensified his efforts at gathering adherents for his militant position at the non-aligned meeting in Cairo. The Indonesian President made forceful (if somewhat strident) efforts to articulate his theory of world order in classical cold war terms. He noted that the problem of security is no longer a problem directly re lated to the big powers.... They are equally strong and will not wage war against one another, since war to them means total annihilation in which they would loose every thing.... But the problem of security is still grave. However, it now resides in security connected with the struggles for independence, and in the struggle of the developing nations once independence has been won. He pictured world peace as a problem of how to achieve security for the developing areas in the face of the attempt of the "old forces" to maintain their former interests. He then strongly advocated "non 93 Ibid., pp. 12-13. Willard Hanna reports that this often quoted French phrase has been "Indonesianized" by the less sophisticated Indo nesian peasant as "lumpelum," and although the meaning must certainly be obscure, the mere mention of the words elicits a feeling of indigna tion toward the enemies of the state. See Eight Nation Makers (New York: St. Martins Press, 196M-), p. 29. 9**"A Year of.Living Dangerously," p. 12. 95 "The Era of Confrontation," address to the Second Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries, Cairo, October 6, 1964 (Djakarta: Depart ment of Foreign Affairs, 196I+), p. 15. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 226] === aligned solidarity" in the context of a novel variation of a theme of "peaceful coexistence." Peaceful coexistence is not. a problem between powers of equal strength, especially because the imperialist forces are using their strength to dominate the weaker develop ing countries.... There will:be peaceful coexistence between developing countries and imperialist states, only when we can face them with equal strength. And that equal strength we can obtain only through solidarity among us. Let us make no mistake about that! We have no alternative to solidarity. The final declaration of the conference, however, did not reflect an adoption of his view of confrontation and non-alignment. In fact, the section dealing with the "Elimination of Colonialism, Neo-colonialism and Imperialism" made no mention of Malaysia, and the passage concerned with the "Settlement of Dispute without the Threat or Use of Force" reaffirmed the principle that "all states shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political indepen dence of any state.... " To Sukarno's chagrin, the moderate forces were clearly in charge of the conference. 97 The direction of Indonesia's changing alignment in world affairs became clearer in November when full diplomatic relations were estab lished with North Korea, an embassy was opened in North Vietnam, and Djakarta recognized the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front. 98 In December, Chinese Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, visited Indonesia 96Ibid., p. 21. 97 See Declaration Adopted by the Second Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, Cairo, 5th to 10th O c t o b e r 1964, attached to ibid., pp. 3035, 45. 'See also, G. F. Hudson, "The Neutrals and the Afro-Asians," World Today, XX, No. 12 (December, 1964), 542-548, especially page 546. 98See Mozingo, pp. 67-74 for a general review of the PekingDjakarta alignment. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 227] === where he pledged full support for the "crush-Malaysia" campaign and offered some $50,000,000 worth of credit to bolster the Indonesian economy. Indonesia’s withdrawal from the United Nations the next month was "resolutely supported" by China, and Subandrio led a large,high level civilian-military delegation to Peking two weeks later where virtually complete Sino-Indonesian agreement on international issues was announced. There was also an announcement of increased technical and economic cooperation between the two countries that started specu lation that China might offer to help Indonesia develop a nuclear bomb. A massive celebration was staged in Djakarta in April to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the first Afro-Asian conference and to create the right spirit for the second meeting in Algeria the following June. Sukarno laid the cornerstone of the C0NEF0 assembly hall and delivered a forceful address which* among other things, announced a "confrontation with the United Nations" and hinted of national liberation movements extending to the Pacific islands. 99 Algerian conference, however, did not take place. The long hoped for Ahmad Ben Bella, the President of Algeria, was deposed by a coup on June 19 just ten days.before the meeting was to open, and although the succeeding govern ment of Colonel Houari Boumedienne continued with plans for the con ference, it was put off at the very last minute and ultimately never held. The meeting had at no time been greeted with any great enthu siasm, and in anticipation of a battle over the seating of Malaysia and the Soviet Union, most delegates seized on the opportunity to postpone the gathering. The collapse of the second Afro-Asian conference 99See "After Ten Years, Still-Onward, Never Retreat!" speech, April 18, 1965 (New York: Consulate General of Indonesia, 1965), pp. 10, 8. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 228] === was a serious defeat for Indonesia and China and constituted a rejec tion of the "warring camps" doctrine held by Djakarta and Peking.'*’00 Indonesia's "year of living dangerously" had all but isolated Djakarta from the non-communist world community. Partly due to the fear that Sukarno's radical ideology was simply a principled cover for expansionism, and partly due to the disappointing and often disturbing performance by the government in other areas of activity, the effica cy and appeal of NEFO theory of world order greatly declined in 1965. In short, increased recourse to agitational, chauvinistic policies (what Brackman, in reference to the burning of the British Embassy, has called "gutter politics")^'0'*' the hopelessly inefficient and in flated economy, and finally the President's own peevish, vain and ex cessively ambitious behavior all greatly lowered the esteem and respect that Indonesia had once commanded in international affairs. 102 Quite obviously, Sukarno's failure to mobilize world opinion for his national-regional ambitions was an indication that his perception of international reality was not an accurate evaluation of either world sentiment or regional disposition. With Indonesia's decline in international statue, and its inability to rally a "coordinated accumulated moral force" to under write its policies and justify its revolutionary regime, Djakarta was almost by necessity, and ideological logic, forced into a closer alliance with China. Although it has been argued that the prime motivating element in Indonesia's foreign policy was regional interests in conjunction with the socio-political problems of nation-building, it '*'00See Pauker, Asian Survey V, No. 9, 425-432. ^■^Brackman, p. 202. ■ ^ S e e Modelski, p. vii. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 229] === 224 should not be forgotten that symbols and ideology have an autonomous power of their own— that "once launched they acquire a life and momenturn of their own." 103 What Modelski has referred to as "an all-per vading air of hypocracy" that surrounded "Sukarno's great edifice of words" may reflect the fact that to an extent, the President and his revolutionary solidarity makers became victims of. their own "revolu tionary style" of foreign policy and were confined in their actions by the inherent logic of his "revolutionary symbols." 104 Given the assumption that solidarity-making was the lifeblood of the Guided Democracy regime, the more Indonesia’s international alliance-making was forced into narrower channels, the narrower became the appeal of its revolutionary logic and the more radical agitational groups were favored at a domestic level. The process simply fed upon itself, and to this extent Indonesia’s movement to the left in international affairs was more a product of revolutionary inertia than a conscious long-range policy. The "Peking-Djakarta Axis." While it can be argued that Indonesia was "forced" to turn to China in the face of dwindling AfroAsian support, there is also good reason to believe that China had actively sought an Indonesian alliance for at least a decade. 105 convergence of interests with Indonesia revolved around the one immediate problem both shared: the expulsion of the "nekolim" (Western) powers from East Asia so that both could consolidate control over their tra ditional spheres of interest. Chinese accommodation with Indonesia, -*-°^Ibid., p. viii. 105 This is Mozingo's thesis. |largely from Mozingo, pp. 1-5. ^^ I b i d., p. vii. The following paragraph is drawn Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 230] === however, was pursued in spite of many provocations and concessions— most notably at the expense of the overseas Chinese in the islands. The banning of alien retail traders in rural areas by the Indonesian government and the expulsion of aliens from residence in West Java in 1959-1960 severely strained relations between the two countries. Yet, by 1961, Sino-Indonesian differences had been largely resolved, and China had signed a document implementing the Dual Nationality Treaty first approved at the Bandung Conference in 1955. Indonesia's "crush Malaysia" campaign also presented a problem for the Chinese. The Chinese were faced with the consideration of whether on the one hand a breakup of Malaysia would turn the overseas Chinese to China for protection against Indonesia and bring a dis united "Malaysia" under Chinese influence, or whether a Malaysia of separate states would create a situation where Indonesia would domi nate the islands as well as Malaya and Singapore— the latter states which China included in her own sphere of interest. Again, events would seem to indicate that due to the exegencies of the Vietnam war, China conceded Malaysia (and the possible control of the over seas Chinese) temporarily to Indonesia in return for support against 106 the United States' intervention in Vietnam. Finally, the significant role played by the Soviet Union in Indonesian affairs from 1960-1962 tended to alienate Peking from Djakarta. However, with the return of West Irian and the reluctance io r x See Mary F. Somers Heidhues, "Peking and the Overseas Chinese: The Malaysian Dispute," Asian Survey, VI, No. 5 (May, 1966), who points out that China preferred to see "the Malaysian Federation divided be tween a Malaya which included Singapore, and a 'unitary' North Kali mantan" (p. 285). This conclusion would correspond to conclusions reached earlier in this study. See above, pp. 168-169. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 231] === of the U.S.S.R. to extend the same political support to Indonesia in the Malaysia campaign, Russian influence (if indeed it was ever as significant as many reports contended) declined rapidly. As Indonesia (and the PKI) moved away from "Russian orientation" toward a position of militant anti-imperialism, a Sino-Indonesian alliance was gradually achieved. ~ Indonesia's close relations with China were coupled with a hostile attitude toward the United States. 107 Relations with Washing ton had notably soured when American aid was suspended after the "crush Malaysia" campaign was launched in later 1963, and in March 196H, Sukarno formally expressed his anger by telling the United States to "go to Hell with your aid" in the presence of Ambassador Howard Jones. The Indonesian government allowed the PKI to enforce a boycott on American films a few months later, and in late August seized the United States Information Service (USIA) in Jogjakarta. The following month the training of Indonesian military officers and technicians in the United States and exchange study grants were pro hibited. An increasing incidence of anti-American demonstrations and bureaucratic harassment (e.g., the refusal to handle USIA mail) led to a series of attacks on USIA headquarters in Surabaya and Djakarta, and by March 1965, the Information Service closed up its operations. That same month, Djakarta took control of American rubber estates and other businesses in Sumatra and seized all foreign owned oil companies, three of which were American owned. 108 Ellsworth 107 See Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism1s Revolution ary Gymnastics," Asian Survey, V, No. 5 (May, 1965), 217-232, for a de tailed account. See, also, Frank.M. Trager, "The U. S. And Indonesia— A Tragedy in Diplomacy,"New York Times Magazine,August 29, 1965,pp.26-27,70-76. 108 See New York Times, April 25, 1965, pp. 1 and 6, for a short } review of the confiscations. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 232] === Bunker visited Djakarta on March 21 in an attempt to restore friendly relations with Indonesia hut his mission was largely unsuccessful. When Washington appointed Marshal Green as new ambassador to Indonesia in July, he was the target of demonstrations and protests, and within the next two weeks, the consulates in Surabaja and Medan were attacked. The announcement of the Djakarta-Phnompenh-Hanoi-PekingPyongyang "anti-imperialist" Axis in Sukarno's speech on August 17, 1965 was the culmination of his revolutionary foreign policy and officially removed Indonesia from the ranks of the non-aligned. 109 For those who were expecting a dramatic announcement of a nuclear test ("a Chinese bomb with an Indonesian senario")^® or a breaking of relations with the United States, the speech was anti-climatic and seemed to reflect a lessening of "revolutionary dynamic." However, Sukarno threatened to nationalize the remaining American property in Indonesia if the United States continued its "hostile attitude" and, in a move to develop berdikari (self-reliance)— one of the five "charms of the Revolution" he coined during the speech— he withdrew from the World Bank. The "Axis" existed barely a month and a half before the October coup, and since the anti-communist campaign and the attacks on the Chinese embassy that followed 111 ended the alliance for all 109 See Sukarno, "Reach to the Stars I A Year of Self-Reliance," p. 16. See also New York Times, August 18, 1965, p. 6; August 22, 1965, IV, p. 3; August 25, 1965, pp. 1,3; and Denis Warner, "The PekingDjakarta Axis," Reporter, September 23, 1965, pp. 25-27. ^ ^ D enis Warner’s phrase, ibid., p. 25. ■*"*“*"See, e.g., New York Times, April 17, 1966, p. 3. It was re ported that documents linking Subandrio with Chinese foreign minister Chen Yi in plotting the September 30 coup were discovered by Indonesia's generals. The coup attempt has increasingly been linken with China's Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 233] === 228 ~1 practical purposes, it is difficult to assess its international im print. The only major incident during that time was the sacking of the Indian Embassy as a protest to India's "aggression" against Pakistan during the Kashmir dispute. The action, however, was symbolic of the extent of Indonesia's realignment in world affairs and provided his tory with an ironic footnote. The letter of protest sent by the Indian government to Djakarta noted regretfully that India had been "second to none" in its support for Indonesian independence, and "along with Indonesia had sponsored the first Afro-Asian conference at Bandung." supposed desire to dominate Indonesia. See, e.g., New York Times, March 16, 1966, p. 1; and John 0. Sutter, "Two Faces of Konfrontasi," Asian Survey, VI, No. 10 (October, 1966), p. 542. 112 See New York Times, September 11, 1965, p. 8. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 234] === VI. THE FUTURE OF CONFRONTATION One by one, most of the artificial dams, economic, political, but above all psychological, of foreign overlordship are breaking down. The Indonesian river is flowing more and more in an Indonesian bed; the game being played is, once again, Indonesian.^ In terms of the future development of Indonesian foreign policy, how must one assess the phenomenon of "confrontation"? Should it be seen as the last phase of a fluctuating historical rivalry be tween a politically sophisticated (and often expansionistic) Java and a commercially oriented Sumatra-Malaya counterforce, or was it merely the current modern phase of a struggle that will be carried out in other contexts and by other means? To what extent will a confronta tion-like policy remain as an adjunct to the process of nation-build ing in the Southeast Asian islands? The answers to the above questions lie in the nature of the political change that the Indonesian state is currently undergoing and in the ability of the present ruling elite to solve the problems inherent in the formation of a viable and stable nation-state. The future of confrontation, therefore, will be assessed in terms of the historical continuities and changes that are most likely to affect the internal development of the Indonesian state and its role as a leading power in Southeast Asia. ■^Harry J. Benda, "Decolonization in Indonesia," American Histori cal Review, LXX, No. 4- (July, 1965), 1073. 229 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 235] === 230 The Internal Image Continuity and change. It was stated in Chapter III that the ideological underpinnings of Guided Democracy has roots deep in the Javanese prijaji world view and as a governmental system reflected the style of the traditional Javanese aristocratic state. It was em phasized, however, that the government was by no means composed entirely of ethnic Javanese, but rather included many Sundanese, Sumatrans and other outer islanders. The system, in short, was clearly loose enough to accomodate many different groups who, even though professing dif ferent degrees of loyalty for the regime, found ways to live within the system and even support it in many of its policies when faced with the alternative of civil war. The crucial questions to be asked at this point, however, are: (1) were the romantic, solidarity-making leaders necessarily grounded in the Javanese political culture? and (2) were they inevitably pro pelled to::powdr as- a- nhtural:'consequence of the post colonial politi cal development? While it is impossible to "prove" the inevitability or uniqueness of any historical event or process, a recent interchange One can, of course, find "revolutionary" parallels throughout the world. Certainly the case of Ghana under Nkrumah is remarkably similar in this instance. For some notable attempts at typifying the kind of regime found in Indonesia during the period in question as well as other forms of developing political organizations, see, e.g., Edward Shils, "Political Development in the New States (Parts I and II)," Comparative Studies in Society and History, II, Nos. 3 and 4 (April and July issues, 196017 265-292, 379-403; Shils, "The Military in the Politi cal Development of the New States," in John J. Johnson (ed.), The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton: Princeton Univer sity Press, 196277 PP* 7-68; Lucien W. Pye, "The Non-Western Political Process," Journal of Politics, XX, No. 3 (August, 1958), 468-486, and "Administrators, Agitators and Brokers," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXII, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 236] === 231 of ideas on the rise of Guided Democracy between Harry Benda and Herbert Feith will help to furnish a framework within which the problems of historical continuity and change can better be discussed. This "debate" is instructive not only- in providing a counterpoint for considering the "future of confrontation," but also in presenting the student of comparative government with a stimulating exchange of thoughts on the problems and pitfalls of "comparing" and analyzing the phenomenon of political development. Benda’s approach to the analysis of Indonesian politics and his objections to Feith’s evaluation of the country's post-independence development as an "elite struggle" has been sketched in Chapter I. His comment that Feith's problem-solving and solidarity-making elites "appear deceptively evenly matched "is central to the problem of the inevitability of the emergence of Guided Democracy. Benda argues that it might be "more illuminating" to suggest that the problem-solvers' efforts to continue a rational administra tion and to maintain a modern economic system both born of and identified with the apolitical colonial status quo, were doomed once Indonesia started to overcome the colonial "deviation" and once Indonesian (especially Javanese) history found its way back to its own moorings.... The odds were from the very outset far more heavily weighted against constitutional democracy than most sympathetic students..., including Dr. Feith and myself, have been so far willing to admit.** No. 5 (Fall, 1958), 34-2-348; and David E. Apter "System Process and the Politics of Economic Development," in Bert F. Hoselitz and Wilbert E. Moore (eds.), Industrialization and Society (UNESCO-Mouton, 1963), pp. 135-158. See Harry J. Benda, "Democracy in Indonesia," Journal of Asian Studies, XXIII, No. 3 (May, 1964), 449-456, a review of Feith’s The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia; and Herbert Feith, "History, Theory and Indonesian Politics: A Reply to Harry J. Benda," Journal of Asian Studies, XXIV,.No. 2 (February, 1965), 305-312. The following analysis cannot, of course, match the thoroughness of these well-written and carefully constructed articles. ^Benda, Journal of Asian Studies, XXIII, No. 3, 453. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 237] === In the "context of Indonesian history," Benda continues, the problemsolvers were a "foreign element within the social and ideological world of Indianized Indonesia, especially Java." The solidarity-makers, while speaking in "deceptively modern terminology," were, on the other hand, representative of that "specifically Javanese culture." Those areas least touched by the Indianization process, i.e., most of the outer islands, were much more easily Islamized and "posed fewer obsta cles to the domestication of Westem-style economic behavior and 'problem-solving* attitudes in general than Java." Therefore, he con cludes, instead of asking "'Why did democracy fail in Indonesia"'" the real question should have been "'Why should it have survived?'" Benda then sumarizes his arguments under three headings.^ First, Western-style modernization has "not yet struck deep roots due to its genesis under and identification with "foreign domination." The advocates of modernization consist of "a small, virtually alienated minority whose integration into the mainstream of post independence Indonesian history was... hindered by the Indonesian Revolution" which sought to destroy the Westernization "deviation." Second, while it is highly probable that Indonesia will modernize in the future, and that "change will come to loom larger than continuity," it is "crucial" to Benda's argument that "the ways in which this transformation will take place will very likely be Indonesian derived," and the process of modernization followed by the West (as well as that of Japan, Russia or China) may have little relevance to Indonesia's future. The Western assumption that modernization can be "rapid, yet democratic rests... on the hope rather than on inference from historical fact." Third, Benda believes that "our adherence to essentially Western developmental 5liid., pp. 454-456. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 238] === 233~”J models" leads the West to emphasize parallels in evaluating the pro cess of political development. Any study of the "Western-educated intellectual, the Western trained civil servant, the Western influenced officer,... even the Western style entrepreneur,... is ultimately bound to remain a study of the transitional if not the ephemeral." While they are "comparable phenomena" and represent a "world-wide his torical epoch," they are "isolated particles in the historical land scape of each society." As the non-Western world begins to reassert itself, "diversity will triumph in the long run and render compara tive studies far more difficult and complex." Benda concludes with a graphic analogy: ... t o put it differently, the long dog of history is bound to reassert itself and to make it increasingly difficult for the short generic tail to go on wagging it with impunity, under the convenient, scientific cloak In answer to Benda’s assertions, Feith acknowledges a lack of attention in his book to "traditional notions of legitimacy, to tradin tional values and more broadly, to culture." He maintains, however, that the political ascendancy of the Javanese prijaji world view was not a "natural consequence" of decolonization, that "given a few changes of circumstance in which the transition from a pluralistic to an authori tarian political order had been achieved at the expense of the communist rather than the Mas jumi-So cialis t-regional group," the solidarity makers might not have risen to a position of predominance. Feith notes that the pluralistic system (or, borrowing Apterfe term, a "reconciliation 6Ibid., p. 456. ^Feith, Journal of Asian Studies, XXIV, No. 2, 307. Feith’s book, however, did include an excellent "cultural" introduction to Indonesian politics. See The.Decline of Constitutional Democracy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962T, pp. 19-45. 8Journal of Asian Studies, XXIV, No. 2, p. 307. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 239] === system” ) had a certain durability and support, and existed because power was widely dispersed. The system failed only when the two major repositories of extra-parliamentary power (Sukarno and the army) de cided to unite and destroy it. In addition, while colonialism may have been a "deviation" in Indonesian history in that Westernization was not absorbed in "pure doses," Feith points out that (1) "Indonesian history is not the history of Java,... certainly not... of the ethnic Javanese," and (2) Colonial Indonesia was introduced to an industrialized world in which it would have to compete when it became independent, and this meant that Indonesia would have to develop the capacity,to cope with economic and administrative problems. The heart of Feith’s argument is in rebuttal to Benda's general thesis: /_Benda/ seems to be so intent on looking at the Western impact on the non-Western world in cultural terms that technology is left virtually out of account. Yet the West came to the rest of the world as the bearer of a technology which was not only different but superior (as well as the bearer of a culture which was merely different). It was of course possible for non-Western governments to reject this technology as the Chinese government did for much of the nineteenth century, but this was invariably at considerable long-term cost to their regimes. For they were forced to operate in an international environment in which the technologically advanced states had preponderant power. This was an environment in which strong rewards were offered to regimes which were flexible enough to adopt the more highly devel oped technology and allowed their social structures and cultures to be transformed to the extent that this was required. And I would argue that very much the same rewards are offered to the governments of technologically backward countries today— notwith standing the fact that some of them have succeeded, on the basis of diplomatic virtuosity and only fairly limited technological advancement, to acquire positions of considerable power and prestige in the international community.^ While noting the pitfalls of comparing the "sequential or developmental dimension" of states since this brings one inevitably to the confusing See Apter in Hoselitzand Moore, pp. 135-158. 10Feith, Journal of Asian Studies, XXIV, No. 2, 311. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 240] === and ambiguous theory of "modernization," Feith nevertheless concludes that it is in the need to "operate a variety of modern technical facilities" that comparative studies will find its "principle raison d'etre," that "modern technology and economy organization in all of the new states" will provide "an enormously fertile field for compari sons, both among the new states... and between them and countries that have already passed through... a ’Great Transformation. Using the above discussion as a point of departure, some attempt should be made, insofar as possible, to place the Indonesian political system of Guided Democracy in historical perspective. The Indonesian state after the coup. A number of events took place throughout 1966 that indicated the Indonesian state was under going a substantial "retooling." After executive authority was trans ferred to General Suharto in March, the new Suharto-Malik-Buwono cabi net pledged support for a stabilization program cum private enterprize that was widely hailed as a reversal of Sukarno’s policy of state controlled "revolutionary" development. 12 The MPR's action in June 1966 to strip the President of most of his constitutional power was followed by a call for a revival of parliamentary democracy and national elecIQ tions, and the termination of the Malaysia campaign in August pre saged the eventual return of Indonesia to the United Nations when the General Assembly met in October. It should not be assumed, however, i:LIbid., p. 312. 12 New York Times, April 13, 1966, pp. 1, 8. 13 New York Times, June 6, 1966, p. 2. ^ N e w York Times, August 12, 1966, p. 2; and September 23, 1966, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 241] === that the political pendulum has swung totally back to the political advantage of the problem solvers. Behind General Suharto*s cryptic remark that *'we are already left," 15 is the indication that the politi cal leadership emerging in Djakarta cannot be characterized by either of Feith's "ideal type" elites. What is likely is that the new regime is very much "Indonesian derived" but at the same time concerned with the "efficient discharging of economic functions." Until a better term comes along, or a clearer indication of what is happening develops, one might'characterize the post-coup leadership as reflecting an "Indo nesian-syncretic" political culture. It is still not clear whether the new regime is moving into some kind of "reconciliation system" or toward a more restrictive, nondemocratic system. Whatever form the Indonesian state takes, it will be faced with several serious administrative problems. The first of these concerns the sprawling, over inflated and (by Western standards) corrupt central government bureaucracy. The new leadership will have the task of not only effecting economic stabilization, but adapting the largely "Javanese" bureaucracy (pamong pradja) to accomplish the job. Despite the recent sanction of private enterprise to spur the economic recovery of the country, the critical factor in Indonesia’s economic development will probably depend on the viability of the non1C entrepreneurial groups. The regime must also eventually face the problem of regional autonomy. The issue of control over the outlying regions was bypassed during the period of confrontation but was one of the crucial factors in the 1957-1958 revolts. The problem is not just ^ N e w York.Times, March 13, 1966, p. 12. ■^See Benda, Journal of Asian Studies, XXIII, No. 3, 455, n. 18. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 242] === one of economics (although the regions would like more control over the foreign exchange they earn instead of having to "barter trade" for a regional "cut") but of administrative autonomy inasmuch as many regional army officers often rule their commands almost like "war lords." 17 Perhaps the most immediate problem facing the regime concerns the growing tension between the remaining non-communist political groups in Central and East Java. 18 These regions, former strongholds of the PKI, may well have become a political vacuum; at least the political sentiments of the abangan in the region have lost a valuable and articulate outlet in the PKI network of organizations. Although the PNI is also influential among the abangan, its 5.nfiuence has been temporarily reduced due to a purge of its left wing in the wake of the anti-communist campaign. Set against the PNI is the NU, now by various accounts the largest party in Indonesia. Both are reportedly preparing for conflict with the other, and periodic clashes between Muslim and Nationalist youths has intensified the strained relations 17 See J. D. Legge, Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia: A Study in Local Administration, 1950-1960 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961); Gerald S. Maryanov, Decentralization in Indo nesia as a Political Problem (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1958); and Legge, "Central Supervision and Local Government in Indo nesia," Australian Journal of Politics and History, III, No. 1 (May, 1957), 79-95. 18 For recent comment on Indonesian internal politics, see a series of four articles by Seymour Topping in the New York Times, August 22-25; see, also, Denis Warner, "Indonesia's Communists: Down but Not Out," Reporter, November 18, 1965, pp. 23-26; Donald Kirk, "The Struggle for Power in Indonesia," Reporter, February 24, 1966, pp. 38-40; Warner, "Indonesia's Unfinished Revolution," Reporter, July 14, 1966, pp. 28-33; Seth S. King, "The Great Purge in Indonesia," New York Times Magazine, May 8, 1966, pp. 25, 89-92; Kirk, "Suharto is the Name, Not Sukarno," New York Times Magazine, July 24, 1966, pp. 18-19, 31-39; and Kirk, "Sukarno's Holdouts in Central Java," Reporter, September 8, 1966, pp. 39-41. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 243] === between them. Much of this tension can be traced to the period that immediately preceeded the coming of the Dutch.. The introduction of Islam into Indonesia created another cultural grouping at the Javanese village level that was not strictly within the Javanese world view. The result of. the impact of Islam on Java— no matter how syncretic the effect may have been in its relation to its purer absorption in the outer is lands— was the development of the santri tradition which soon engaged in competition with, and often existed as community complexes inter spersed among, the more animistic, Indianized community of the abangan tradition. 19 The two "communist coups" of 1948 and 1965 at the village level were to a great extent a struggle between the abangan and the 20 santri. Such an over-simplified picture of the tensions between the abangan and the santri communities, however, fails to take note of the basic "reformist-orthodox" conflict within the Islamic tradition itself. Despite their differences, both the PNI and the rural-based NU fear a revival of the Masjumi-PSI party bloc in Djakarta, and it is quite possible that a rejuvenated "reformist" Muslim party will again drive the NU and PNI into an uncomfortable but necessary alliance to insure their political base of power. in the past an almost mystical reverence for the bapak Presiden ("father President") and opposed moves by the more progressive Islamic students and Djakarta political groups to remove the President from 19 There is a wealth of material concerning this ethnic dichotomy. See, e.g., Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960); and Robert R. Jay, Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, Cultural Report Series, No. 12, 1963). 20 Ibid., especially pp. 26-27, 96-97, 101-105. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 244] === 239 office and abandon his NASAKOM p o l i c i e s.It is also quite likely that, in addition to their opposition to the Djakarta Muslims, the PNI and the NU used "loyalty to the President" as a means to block a stabil ization and land reform program. Both parties are essentially quite conservative, and the landowners among their ranks fear a redistribu tion of land holdings. In addition, the PNI, which is especially strong in the bureaucracy, opposes an economic "rationalization program since it would reduce significantly the number of civil servants in the administration. Therefore, the santri-abangan conflict has been further complicated (and perhaps temporarily deferred) by a growing rural-urban dichotomy. This point has been underscored by President Sukarno who prophetically reminded the delegates to the MPR convention in the summer of 1966 that "the will of the people in Djakarta is not the will of all the people." 00 McVey’s observation that China in the 1920's is analagous to Indonesia in the 1960's takes on additional meaning in this context. 23 The army has had its "Shanghai," the communist organization is in ruins, and the country is facing a program of economic rehabilitation that will take many years. A much needed austerity program will cer tainly not make the present government very popular, and it is quite possible that corruption— or rather bureaucratic gotong-rojong "shar ing"— is so much a way of life that a less than autocratic regime will 2% e w York Times, July 3, 1966, IV, p. 4. New York Times, July 7, 1966, p. 7. 23Ruth T. McVey, "Indonesian Communism and the Transition to Guided Democracy," in A. Doak Barnett, Communist Strategies in Asia (New York, Praeger, 1963), pp. 188-189. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 245] === 24-0 fail to provide the proper conditions for the growth of the economic underpinnings of the nation. In addition, even the most modest tech nological development is often a tedious and demanding process; and given the rapidly growing population of Java, the process of economic development will no doubt create a great amount of social discontent, frustration, and what the Chinese Legalist Lord Shang has called "wolfish energies" that will need to be redirected away from the government. 24 The eclipse of the communist organizations, in short, has solved few of the political problems that led to the rise of Guided Democracy; and as a consequence, it is not inconceivable that politi cal groupings will again become polarized or hopelessly divided in some other manner, and that Indonesia will again take a more "revolu tionary" path. Even if the "Great Ascent" 25 is successful, it is still likely to generate a substantial social and cultural dynamism given the pre dilection of many Indonesians (Javanese) to political action. Histori cally, cultural and political preeminence was of much more importance in political expansion than military superiority; quite often the es tablishment of a new royal house or dynasty accompanied a great re lease of political and cultural energy. The expulsion of Western power, and the rise to prominence in 1957 of a Java-centric, militantly revolutionary regime in Djakarta, seems certainly to have created expansionistic conditions not unlike those found in Indonesian history. 24 See, el.g:., the discussion by Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 149ff, 81-82. Title from the short, introductory work by Robert Heilbroner, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 246] === 24-1 Similarly, since it is quite probable that any future Indonesian government will continue to function within a modified facsimilie of a Javanese world view, a successful program of technological develop ment would hardly be incompatible with an extroverted regional policy. In short, present conditions in Indonesia indicate there is still a substantial, if somewhat latent, capacity for a future renewal of "con frontation." Nation-Building and Foreign Policy .Competing rationales of nation-hood. In the preceeding section, an assessment of confrontation was made in the context of historical continuity and change. The future of a confrontation policy is also tied to considerations of the viability of the nation-states within "island" Southeast Asia. Unfortunately, the delimiting rationales under lying nation-hood in the area do not necessarily correspond to the pre sent national boundaries on the map. It has been pointed out in the pages above that the present national boundaries are often considered to be somewhat artificial to the extent that they correspond to the colonial spheres of interest and not to pre-colonial spheres of inter ests (see Maps 1 and 2). Given the extension of Malaya into northern Borneo in the form of the Federation of Malaysia, the Indonesian cam paign to separate the Bornean states from the peninsula, and the claim of the Philippines to Sabah (formerly British North Borneo), it can be further suggested that the various nation-building rationales seem to come into geographical and cultural conflict at northern Borneo. cept for the accident of colonial administration— and this is not to Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 247] === discount the fact that the heritage of British rule may be of signifi cant value in uniting the area— it.is by no means self-evident that the inhabitants of Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei are more logically a part of a Malaysian Federation than of an Indonesian or a Philippine Republic. In view of this situation, it can be noted that (excluding pro posals of some sort of "Greater Malay Union") there are currently, within the confines of the islands, three major rationales upon which a nation could be established, and which would include the pivotal area of northern Borneo. tant. The Indonesian rationale is perhaps the most impor It is based on the motto of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika— loosely trans lated "Unity in Diversity"— and symbolically encompasses "all human beings who, according to geopolitics ordained by God Almighty, live throughout the unity of the entire archipelago of Indonesia from the northern tip of Sumatra to Irian." Although the modern state of Indonesia is officially limited to the "nation" lying within the boun daries of the former Dutch colonial empire, in proclaiming nationalism "from Sabang to Merauke" as a rallying cry against the Dutch, no north ern limits were included. The expansionist sentiment in the pre-inde pendence B.P.K.I. meetings has already been noted, and the terms "Bhinneka Tunggal Ika" and "from Sabang to Merauke" certainly could include not only all of Borneo, but the Malayan peninsula as well. The desire to keep the "national identity" free from foreign threat and the phenomenon of what one writer has referred to as the "mystic of permanent revolution" 27 lends credence to a conception of nationhood Sukarno, "The Birth of Pantja Sila," speech, June 1, 1945 in Toward Freedom, and the Dignity of Man (Djakarta: Department of Foreign Affairs, 1961), p. 12. 27 Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesia: The Mystique of Permanent Revolution," South Atlantic Quarterly, LXIV, No. 1 (Winter, 1965). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 248] === 243~1 "expanding" beyond the confines of the Dutch East Indies. This is especially relevant when viewed in conjunction with the second rationale to be examined— the rationale that has been termed a "Malay Malaysia." The conception of a "Malay Malaysia" is the one upon which the present federation is established, and it is based upon guaranteed privileges for the Malay community but with mutual benefit for all communal groups. this kind of nation. There is strong Indonesian feeling against It has already been suggested that for many Indonesians,Malayan independence was not a "pure" independence. The "notion that purity and progress are achieved only through bloody revolu tion" is an indictment often leveled at Malaysia where there was no revolutionary struggle that preceded nation-hood. 28 In addition, the "neo-colonialist" ties with Great Britain and the "feudal" character of the state derived from the prominent place accorded to the traditional Malay rulers in the government have often put Malaya in a politically and culturally inferior light in the eyes of the more revolutionary oriented Indonesians. Of course, there is probably an element of envy coloring the Indonesian view of Malaysia given the relative viability of the Malaysian economy. From a cultural point of view, however, it appears that many Indonesian leaders (particularly those reflecting prijaji values) consider themselves superior to the Malaysian "little brothers. There is considerable sentiment for another rationale in support of what is called a "Malaysian Malaysia." 30 This conception is also in II I I ■— 111 28 Bernard K. Gordon, "The Potential for Indonesian Expansionism," Pacific Affairs, XXXVI, No. 4 (Winter, 1963-1964), 393. 29 The writer wishes to thank Mr. Willard A. Hanna for the above observation. 30 See Lee Kuan Yew, The Battle for a Malaysian Malaysia (Singapore: LMinistry of Culture, 1965)1 See also J. Forman Parmer, "Malaysia 1965:, | Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 249] === opposition to Malaysia as presently constituted, but unlike Indonesia's "feudal" and "neo-colonial" objections, it opposes "Malay predominance" in the federation and advocates a Malaysia where Malays, Chinese and Indians alike share a political equality that is not compromised by a privileged position for any one community. This conception has been most recently advocated by Singapore's Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, and is one which has a special appeal for many Chinese in the islands— a sort of Chinese version of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika. Lee's insistence on non-communal, non-Alliance politics was probably a great factor in the "secession" of Singapore in September 1965. The PAP, under the direction of the Singapore Prime Minister, contested the 196*4- Malayan elections on the peninsula against the Chinese component of the Alliance, the MCA, and challenged the MCA's right to speak for the Malayan Chinese inasmuch as it had failed to push for Chinese interests adequately within the Alliance. Although the PAP won only one of eleven seats contested, Lee's continued "challenge of the 1957 terms of independence" and his opposition to the whole constitutional rationale behind Malaysia and the Alliance pattern of politics put great pressure on Rahman to disassociate the rest of Malaysia from Singapore. Fear ing a split within the Alliance if he failed to take action, the Tengku was forced to ask for Singapore's withdrawal from the federation. In spite of the egalitarina principles embodied in a "Malaysian Malaysia," it also provides the basis for possible Indonesian opposition to Malaysia. This is brought to light in a recent article by former Indonesian Premier and Vice-President, Mohammed Hatta, a man once highly Challenging the Terms of 1957," Asian Survey, VI, No. 2 (February, 1966), 111-117; Jean Grossholtz, "An Exploration of Malaysian Meanings," Asian Survey, VI, No. *4 (April, 1966), 227-2*4-0; and R. S. Milne, "Singapore's Exit from Malaysia," Asian Survey, VI, No. 3 (March, 1966), 175-188. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 250] === 245 regarded by the outer islanders and one who could be viewed as repre senting non-Javanese (or non solidarity-maker) opinion. Hatta fears Chinese domination in the federation and is convinced "that the forma tion of 'Malaysia* would result in the elimination of a state which the Malay, people could call their own, and its de facto replacement by a second China..., dominated both politically and economically by the Chinese." 31 Such an occurrence would have dire effects not only for the Malays, but also for the Indonesians since a "Chinese Malaysia" would have very strong ties to mainland China. Hatta favors the estab lishment of three separate countries for the three major groupings in the area: "the State of Malaya for the Malays, the State of Singapore for the Chinese, and the State of North Borneo for those who are of Malay-Indonesian stock together with those Chinese who are old-time residents. The Indonesian military could easily support such reasoning, especially given the leftist tendencies of many urban Chinese in Malaysia. The army could well view the control of Chinese and/or communist activi ties in the federation as an area-wide problem, closely connected with the anti-communist campaign at home. In addition, given Indonesia's avowed preference for separate, independent states in Borneo, three (or more) smaller states would be easier to control or influence than a larger united federation. Therefore, while the military— and even the Islamic forces— might find it difficult if not repugnant to fully as cribe to a mystical nationalism and militant anti-colonialism, there ^ S e e Mohammed Hatta, "One Indonesian View of the Malaysian Issue," Asian Survey, V, No. 3 (March, 1965), 141. 32 Ibid. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 251] === are, in the event of a threat of a leftist takeover in Malaysia, other reasons for opposing Malaysia as it presently exists. A Nusantara? or an ASANEFOS? The extent to which the above rationales are successful may depend on the ability of the cultural system that underlies the rationale to export or gain acceptance for its view or conception of the nation. There are other considerations, however, that could well redirect Indonesia’s hegemonial energies and ' perception of its leading role in the islands away from confrontationtype conflicts. Instead of visualizing Indonesia as necessarily an expansionistic nation seeking to reunite its pre-colonial nusantara, Indonesia’s role within Southeast Asia could be "internalized.” Bernard Gordon suggests that a regional association combining the features of a Maphilindo and the cooperative Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and including Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indo nesia and possibly Burma and Cambodia would help to provide Djakarta with a "framework for a grand foreign policy role -in Asia," but at the same time integrate Indonesia into the development of the area "with practical efforts at cooperation.” 33 Gordon maintains that such an association (he calls it ASANEFOS--the Association of Southeast Asian New Emerging Forces) would provide a rationale within which both the solidarity-makers and the problem-solvers could work hand in hand, and within which socio-political integration could be achieved in conjunction with economic development. He maintains: 33See Bernard K. Gordon, The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, Spectrum Books, 1966), p. 191. See pp. 14-1-193, for a stimulating discussion of "regional coopera tion." See, also, George Modelski, Indonesia and Her Neighbors:Policy Alternatives for the West (Princeton: Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1964), pp. 20-30,for an examination of policy alternatives facing Indonesia. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 252] === A regional effort along new lines, if it.is to be established, and to attract the willing support of Indonesia, must meld two quite different perspectives; a hard-headed knowledge of the needs and requirements of economic and political development (and how regional cooperation can help achieve those goals), and a strident— sometimes flamboyant— Asian nationalism. Both are already to be found in every one of the Southeast Asian c countries. A new effort at regional cooperation, if it is to succeed, will have to combine the energies of both. Clearly, it would contain more of the trappings of the new Asian national ism than was displayed by ASA, which was dominated by three rela tively conservative nations. At the same time, the new effort. would have to be far more meaningful and concrete than the very vague Maphilindo.... Without Indonesia, any effort in the region can be nothing more than transitional; with Indonesian par. ticipation,a new effort at regional cooperation would represent a potential giant step toward stability— both in Southeast Asia and in Indonesia. Disregarding all Western predilections for a;"peaceful*" solu tion to regional problems, some sort of regional grouping would seeming ly present the best arrangement for political stability. Regional co ordination would be more likely to provide the means to diminish the "Chinese problem" by incorporating the economic power and entrepre neurial potential of the overseas Chinese into an area-wide economic development program; efforts at hegemony, on the other hand, are sure to exacerbate communal tensions as was evident in the withdrawal of Singapore from Malaysia. A regional association might also constitute the means of disengaging the West from Southeast Asia. What the United States now badly needs in Vietnam is that which Indonesia needed to end the Malaysia crisis during the 1964 negotiations: a political "solution" (or at least a "way out") provided by the moral force and prestige of a regional alliance. Although it is generally agreed that the withdrawal of Western power would create a'political vacuum in the region, it is hard to believe, in the face of growing nationalist sentiment, that the Western powers can long remain in Southeast Asia. 34 A viable regional Gordon, The Dimensions of Conflict, pp. 192-193. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 253] === 248 force,- however, could provide an acceptable substitution for the. essen tial stabilizing military power that the United States obviously be lieves it is providing for the region. It may be much too premature to speak of such a development, and it may be that the ability of such a group would be woefully inefficient to provide a politically stable atmosphere in which transition from political disintegration to national development can be eased; in the long run, however, the chance of a politically stable Southeast Asia may well rest on the viability of such a regional cooperation. Is there a community of interests that would support an "ASANEFOS"? An examination of the voting behavior of the seven South east Asian states in the United Nations General Assembly as reflected in Tables VII and VIII presents a cautiously optimistic picture. Table VII indicates a substantial agreement on colonial issues among Indo nesia, Burma, Malaysia and Cambodia with the Philippines rounding out the bloc at a somewhat lower level. The high level of cohesion, how ever, could be expected from countries that were former colonial possessions. Thailand, having never been a colony, might understand ably not be as concerned about colonialism as the other ex-colonies; nevertheless, it maintained an index of agreement of 75 per cent and over with the other Southeast Asian countries. The vote of Laos is somewhat misleading since it had the highest abstention and non-vot ing rate among the seven countries and often showed a tendency of vot ing with the United States during much of the period covered by the survey. Somewhat in contrast to the "community of interests" indicated by Table VII, the indices of the states on East-West issues reveal a Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 254] === TABLE V I I: INDICES OF AGREEMENT, COLONIAL.ISSUES,.1 9 5 5 -1 9 6 3: 03 94.6 Indonesia 68.if 75.0 83.3 88.1 89.5 Burma 69.7 78.8 84.8 90.9 94.0 Malaysia 78.8 81.9 84.8 88.6 Cambodia 80.3 82.8 Philippines 78.3 82.9 Thailand 76.1 85.3 Laos certain polarization of attitudes toward the cold war. The grouping of the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand indicated in Table VIII took con crete form in 1961 with the establishment of the ASA. Although no such bloc formed along the other "pole" among Cambodia, Burma and Indonesia, it is'of significance that when the three countries were invited to join the ASA, all were cool (if not curt) in rejecting membership. The reluc tance of Djakarta, Rangoon and Phnom Penh to become associated.with the ASA was due in part, no doubt, to the suspicion that the organization had political overtones and ties to the West given the membership of Thailand and the Philippines in SEATO. However, Cambodia also was carrying on a bitter verbal war with Thailand at the time, and Indo nesia, of course, was "confronting" Malaysia. Cambodia was eventually Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 255] === TABLE V I I I: INDICES OF AGREEMENT, EAST-WEST ISSUES, 1 9 5 5 -1 9 6 3: Indonesia 55.7 54.3 60.1 60.8 83.7 Burma 60.1 59.5 65.6 74.1 89.4 Cambodia 60.0 60.0 63.3 61.7 Laos 80.3 86.1 85.3 Malaysia 92.8 86.4 Philippines 90.4 89.5 Thailand inserted in Sukarno's "Peking-Djakarta axis," and despite the fact Sihanouk apparently was not happy with being included in the alliance, he did maintain fairly close ties with Indonesia during the 1960's. 35 Burma by this time had largely removed itself from any alliance con siderations as the nation turned inward after the second military take over by General Ne Win in 1962 Although Table VIII seems to have revealed the existence of a bi-polar regional configuration and the existence of real barriers to regional cooperation, several factors are worth noting. First, Indo nesia no longer seems wedded to Sukarno's bitterly anti-colonial foreign policy or his opposition to Malaysia. The more radical members of the Indonesian ruling clique have been eased out of office, and while one 35 Richard Butwell maintains that Sukarno even solicited Cambodia’s support for Maphilindo. See "Malaysia and Its Impact on the Inter national Relations of Southeast Asia," Asian Survey, IV, No. 7 (July, tL264), 944. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 256] === can scarcely maintain that Djakarta will become pro-Western in its external relations, there seems to be a definite tendency toward area-wide cooperation. Thailand Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, apparently at Malik's suggestion, visited Indonesia in the summer of 1966 for talks concerning regional coordination, and Malik has pre viously mentioned Indonesia’s desire to participate in such an undertaking. 36 Second, there.seems to be a growing realization that mean ingful economic development, and perhaps even ethnic harmony, can only come through a coordinated regional effort. 37 The foundation of Malay sia itself can be seen as an attempt to integrate on a viable basis a region with common economic and communal problems in the hopes that within a federation these problems could best be resolved. The ASA and Maphilindo, though quite unalike in the spirit and intent of their organizations, were still further indications that the Southeast Asians themselves were thinking in terms of an intraregional, indigenous association. Even the attempt to "Crush Malaysia" should not be inter preted as inimical to regional association, but rather as an attempt to restructure the basis of the grouping. Although it is doubtful that at the present time Burma and Cambodia are interested in joining an ASA or Maphilindo-like organization, if Indonesia associates with a larger regional grouping, and if economic and cultural advantages accrue from these earlier efforts, Cambodia and Burma may be induced to join later. ^ N e w York Times, August 30, 1966, p. 5. 37 Gordon, The Dimensions of Conflict, pp. 144-161. Gordon main tains that the impetus to regionalism is the result of increased inter action and contact among the states that has taken place since the war and that was not possible during the period of colonial rule. In this context, see, also, Waltz, pp. 187-233, who discusses the implications for peace and war in a region devoid of "natural harmony." Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission. === [PDF page 257] === 252 1 Moreover, remote as the chances may now seem, a unified Vietnam would make, in the long run, a valuable (and more than likely an anti-Chinese) addition to a cooperative venture. In short, while Table VIII has accurately indipated two pre-1963 "cold war" blocs within Southeast Asia, there are a number of issues— not the least of which is the fear of China— that would serve as a bridge between the two poles and form the basis of a coordinated regional effort. Any discussion of Indonesia’s future role in Southeast Asia must also be taken in the context of China’s regional objectives and the disposition of the two cold war protagonists— the United States and the Soviet Union— in the area. Alignment and the "independent and active" foreign policy. From a cultural point of view, the Djakarta-Peking axis that was formed in August 1965 has been seen as the political expression of the expan sionist tendencies of two dynamic, East Asian cultures: China pushing southward, seeking to exercise paramount influence on the mainland; and Indonesia pushing northward in an effort to exercise hegemony in the archipelago. One commentator has described this phenomenon as a grand Chinese design in which Indonesia was to serve as the "bottom lever of a vast nutcracker which would split all /Western7 Singapore to Burma and Vietnam." 38 resistance from Others, however, fear that China has not placed any limits on its southward expansion, and like Hatta, they believe that the overseas Chinese are a ready-made "fifth column" for Chinese expansionism and the nucleus of China’s desire to create a 38C. L. Sulzberger, "Foreign Affairs: The Nutcracker Suite," New York Times, April 10, 1966, IV, p. 8. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 258] === 253 "second China." How must one evaluate the suggestion that "in the future there will be only two languages in Asia, namely, the Indo• 39 nesian language and the Chinese language." What are the political implications of the Peking-Djakarta Axis and what is the future for "peaceful coexistence" between the two powers in East Asia? David Mozingo suggests that China and Indonesia may well be following mutually compatible objectives in the area; moreover, he states that there is little chance that Indonesia’s confrontation policies were anti-Chinese or that Indonesia will become China-phobic in the future.11'0 First, he reasons, few people agree that China wants to dominate Indonesia politically. Even if China were to expand into the islands, the United States and Russia would likely oppose such a move; and if they failed to stop an imperialistic China, could not expect to do much on its own. Indonesia Second, Mozingo states, Indo nesia fears the Malaysian Chinese not for their ties to the mainland (which may after all be overrated) but due to financial ties to the West. Even if Indonesia's policy toward Malaysia was based on fear of the overseas Chinese, repression of them would tend to drive them toward a pro-Chinese (and pro-communist) position. Third, accommoda tion with China could possibly lead to a mutually agreeable division of East Asia and insure a "Greater Indonesia." It is also quite possi ble that Peking and Djakarta may be economically attracted to each other 3^Chinese People's Republic Consul General Li Chu-sheng address ing the Chinese community in Tegal, Java, November 1958, cited in David Mozingo, Sino-Indonesian Relations: An Overview, 1955-1965 (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1965), p. 85. 40 Mozingo, pp. 75-84. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 259] === 254 since Indonesia has many of the natural resources needed to feed China’s growing industry. Finally, Mozingo concludes, there are convincing historical precedents for mutual accomodation. China has no navy, and traditionally outlying regions were hard to hold; even before the com ing of Islam and the Western powers, China recognized the hegemony of the pre-colonial kingdoms of Srivijaya (c.672-c,1320) and Madjapahit (c.1135-.1528). Besides, Chinese imperialism has traditionally been cultural not military. Intriguing though the above thesis might be, it must be pointed out that a Chinese "Drang nach dem Suden" and an Indonesian "Drang nach dem Norden" might not necessarily result in accommodation and a peace ful division of interests. China's traditional behavior could well undergo significant modification during the process of industrializa tion. If China remains belligerent and if it develops the means to deliver its "nuclear devices," considerations such as the lack of a navy or the difficulty of holding outlying regions become much less convincing. In the long run, if one assumes an eventual Western with drawal from the area, the real nature of conflict in East Asia will likely he a "confrontation" between a Chinese-influenced cultural sphere and an Indonesian-influenced cultural sphere. To the extent the Chinese state remains communist, it will be opposed by an "anti-communist" Indo nesia (or an Indonesian-led, regional grouping); and to the extent China becomes an imperialist power in the archipelago, Indonesian policy will be "anti-colonial" and "anti-imperialist." Arguments for a Sino-Indo nesian accommodation are truly convincing only when directed against the expulsion of Western power. There is also a serious overlap in the professed spheres of interests of the two nations (see Map 3), and in Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 260] === the absence of a common "Western" enemy, both would clash over the ultimate political disposition of the Malay peninsula. In the last analysis, regardless of whether Indonesian foreign policy is "expan sive" or "cooperative," a confrontation against any power— Dutch, British or Chinese— that Djakarta believes to be operating in the area considered rightfully to be in its sphere of interest is a natural and logical course of.action to take. The ultimate objectives of the Soviet Union and the United States in Southeast Asia are also tied up with these considerations. Despite the fact that American involvement in Vietnam has seriously threatened recent indications of cooperation between, the two cold war powers, and despite the fact that the policies of both countries toward Indonesia were misunderstood by the other, it now appears that Moscow and Washington may actually be pursuing parallel course? of action in the region. The fact that both countries avidly attempted to cul tivate Indonesia’s friendship despite the most trying of circumstances^ may reflect the emergence of a mutually acceptable but tacit long range policy in which a strong and viable Indonesian state could ultimately constitute the essential and pivotal link in a future "WashingtonTokyo-Djakarta-New Delhi-Moscow axis" for the "confrontation of China." ^ T h e United States' stormy relations with Indonesia has been summarized in Frank N. Trager, "The.U.S. and Indonesia— a Tragedy in Diplomacy," New York Times Magazine, August 29, 1965, pp. 26-27, 7076. Even the seemingly substantial Soviet influence in Djakarta was subjected to the strains of Indonesia's anti-colonial foreign policy. Despite Moscow's unequivocal support for Djakarta's claim to West Irian, the Soviet government seemed to approve the Malaysia campaign only re luctantly and then mainly to bolster.its waning influence in Indonesia and to counter the Chinese charge that it had abandoned the Asian Revolution. See Nadia Derkach, "The Soviet Policy Towards Indonesia in the West Irian and Malaysian Dispute," Asian Survey, V, N o. 11 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 261] === To the extent that the cold war of the next few decades pits China and its allies against the rest of the world (including the United States and the Soviet Union), Indonesia’s cooperation in such a loose Washington-Moscow alliance would constitute alignment. Such an align ment, however, would not carry the stigma that an earlier cold war alliance would have, and if it comes in the context of regional leader ship (and national-regional security), it will still be within the bounds of an "active and independent" foreign policy. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 262] === APPENDIX A: A GLOSSARY OF INDONESIAN TERMS abangan— a Javanese cultural tradition associated with the peasantry and one in contrast to the santri and prijaji traditions. The abangan culture is commonly a syncretic mixture of animism, Hinduism and Islam. adat— traditional, indigenous customs and law as distinct from Islamic or Western norms or codes. ASA (Association of Southeast Asia)— a cooperative endeavor formed by the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand, now limited mainly to cultural and. technical coordination. Bhinekka Tunggal Ika— the Indonesia state motto, loosely trans lated as "Unity in Diversity." B.P.K.I. (Investigating Committee for Preparation of Indonesia’s Independence)— committee of nationalist leaders established by Sukarno with Japanese sanction in March. 194-5 to deliberate over basic principles of the independent Indonesian state, and out of which came the "1945" Constitution" and the "Pantja Sila." CONEFO— Conference of the New Emerging Forces, proposed (but never held) for the Spring of 1966, and founded as a rival to the OLDEFO's United Nations. dwi tunggal— a duumvirate, or more specifically. the governing coalition of Sukarno and Hatta in the early days of the Republic, which, as long as it lasted, was symbolic of an accomodation between the problem-solvers and the solidarity-makers. FNPIB— the army-established Front for the Liberation of West Irian which was dissolved and replaced by Sukarno's own Nation Front in 1960. GANEFO— Games of the New Emerging Forces, held November 1963, and established as a rival to the OLDEFO's Olympic Games. gotong rojong— literally "mutual helpfulness," but more generally a complex set of interrelationships whereby both work and wealth is shared within an extended family or village complex; often associated with the abangan tradition. KAMI (Student Action Command)— association of Islamic college students, who, along with their high school counterpart (KAPPI), acted as a vital pressure group in forcing the President from constitutional power. Konsepsi— Sukarno's 1957 proposal that called for a "four-legged," NASAKOM cabinet, composed of the PNI, NU, Masjumi al*d PKI. 257 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 263] === KOTI (Supreme Operational Command)— the body for the direction of the Malaysian confrontation, later transformed into a "second cabi net" after the October 1965 coup, but abolished in February 1966 and replaced by Kogam (Command for Crushing Malaysia). Masjumi (Consultative Council of Indonesian Moslems)— A now proscribed party largely representing the interests of the santri community and more specifically embodying the ideology of the reformist Islamic movement. Muhammadj ah— an urban, reformist Islamic movement that was directed against the syncretic elements in "orthodox" Islam.'and formed the basis of the Masjumi party. Maphilindo— a summit level regional consultative grouping of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines formally established in Manila, July 1963. mufakat— an acceptable and workable consensus that emerges from musjawarah. Murba party— sometimes known as the Murba group, and consisting of the radical, nationalist clique from which many of Sukarno's personal advisors were drawn; the party was founded by the followers of the "Trotskyite" communist Tan Malaka. musjawarah— a deliberative and subtle process of consultation out of which arises a consensus or mufakat; after musjawarah, the con sensus is traditionally pronounced by the sesepuh or leader of the community. Nagarakertagama— epic poem by the Madjapahit court poet Prapanca in which the boundaries of the Madjapahit empire were delimited; C. C. Berg disputes the historical accuracy of the poem, but notes its great value as a historical myth. Nahdatul Ulama (MU)-— a rural, "orthodox," somewhat reactionary Islamic movement directed against the Muhammadjah, and later, breaking off from the Masjumi in 1952 to form a separate political party; largely Javanese oriented. NASAKOM— an acronym developed by President Sukarno to symbolize the unity of the three kinds of revolutionary, "legal" political parties— nationalist (NASionalisme), religious (Agama), and communist (KOMunisme). NEFO (New Emerging Forces)— the progressive dynamic forces in the world that carry out the Revolution of Mankind in the context of confrontation with the OLDEFO. nekolim— an acronym that Sukarno attributed to the late General Jani symbolizing "neo-colonialism, colonialism, and imperialism." nusantara— literally, "other or outer islands" as seen from Java; the concept has been assimilated to views of a Greater Indonesia. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 264] === 259 OLDEFO -(Old Established Forces)--the reactionary, repressive forces in the world that attempt, through neo-colonial guises like Malaysia, to maintain control over the NEFO. Pantja Sila— literally, "five principles," taken from Sukarno's pre-independence address to the Japanese-sanctioned B.P.K.I., and which later became the philosophical basis of the Indonesian state; the five principles are: nationalism, intermaterialism, democracy, social justice and belief in God. Permesta— a rebellion ("the Charter of the Universal Struggle") that was-proclaimed in North Sulawesi about.the same time the PRRI government was announced in Central Sumatra. PKI-Partai Komunis Indonesia, or the Indonesian Communist Party. PNI— Partai Nasional Indonesia, or the Indonesian Nationalist Party. prijaji— the aristocratic, traditional bureaucracy that developed in Java. The prijaji formed the governing apparatus of the Javanese kratons (ruling houses) and were later kept in tact by the Dutch to administer the island. The prijaji tradition while nominally Islamic, consists of a transcendental orientation to obtaining cosmic unity and social cohesion, and formed the basic philosophy of Guided Democracy. PRRI— the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia, proclaimed in Central Sumatra in February, 1958. See Permesta. PSI— Partai Sosialis Indonesia, or the Indonesian Socialist Party which, though small, was influential, along with the Masjumi, in the early parliamentary cabinets. santri— the Islamic tradition, distinct from the abangan and the prijaji. The santri tradition, however, is composed of two antagonistic elements, the orthodox but syncretic Muslims led by the Javanese ulama, and the reformist Islamic element represented by the merchants and traders. ulama— Islamic teachers. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 265] === APPENDIX B: EXPLANATION OF INDICES OF AGREEMENT FOUND IN TABLES III, IV, VII AND VIII The indices of agreement (IA) shown in Tables III, IV, VII and VIII are derived from the following formula - f- t J / 2g x 100 in which t_ equals the total number of votes under consideration, f equals, the number of votes on which Indonesia and state x w e r e in full agreement (yea-yea; nay-nay; abstain-abstain), and £ is the number of votes that Indonesia and state ji were in partial agreement (yea or nay on the part of one and abstain on the part of the other, or the reverse). This formula seems most preferable for the purposes of this study when compared to other methods. by Hovet, and Riggs Two well-known earlier studies analyzed bloc voting in the United Nations, but both began by first postulating the existence of certain blocs and groups and,then measuring cohesion. Hovet1s percentages of cohesion were derived from "identical" (all states voting the same way), "soli darity" (all states not voting against the other but at least one abstaining) and "divided" (at least one state disagreeing with the rest) votes; Riggs used comparatively the same method although one of the See Arend Lijphart, "The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly: A Critique and a Proposal," American Political Science Review, LVII, No. 4 (December, 1963), 902-917; and a follow-up study by Robert 0. Tilman, "Malaysian Foreign Policy: The Dilemmas of a Committed Neutral," paper prepared for the Asia Society and the Association of Asian Studies, Conference on "The Foreign Policies of the Southeast Asian States," May 14-15, 1965, pp. 1-57. Thomas Hovet, Jr., Bloc Politics in the United Nations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Robert E. Riggs7~Politics in the United Nations (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1958). 260 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 266] === 261 categories measured those votes where 15 per cent or less voted differently from the majority. In these studies, not only was the selection of the bloc arbitrary, but cohesion was based on how these groups voted with the majority, and the indices were not really com parable for groups of different sizes, i.e., a smaller group had a greater chance of achieving an identical vote.4 Leroy Rieselbach^ suggests the use of a Rice index of cohesion assigning an index of.0.0 that is determined by where fifty per cent of the bloc votes affirmatively, and 100.0 where all members vote either for, against or abstain on an issue. In Rieselback's adaptation of Rice’s method, the problem of how to weigh abstentions is avoided; its most serious drawback, however, is that again it is not possible to determine the membership of the bloc with any accuracy. A modified Rice index first suggested by Herman Beyle is based on percentages of agreement for pairs of voters voting alike on a roll call. An index of 0.0 is where a pair of voters agree on no issues and 100.0 is where complete ^See Hayward R. Alker, Jr., '’Dimensions of Conflict in the General Assembly," American Political Science Review, LVIII, No. 3 See the discussion of Lijphart, p. 906-908. Leroy N. Rieselbach, "Quantitative Techniques for Studying Voting Behavior in the UN General Assembly," International Organization, XIV, No. 2 (Spring, 1960), 291-306. The index, with some modification, has also been used by Ernst B. Haas, "System and Process in the Inter national Labor Organization," World Politics, XIV, No. 2 (January, 1962), 339-352. Developed by Stuart A. Rice, Quantitative Methods in Politics (New York: Alfred.A. Knopf, 1928), pp. 208-209. Herman C. Beyle, Identification and Analysis of AttributeCluster-Blocs (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931), pp. 26-83. The Rice-Beyle technique, e.g., was used by C. Herman Pritchett, The Roosevelt Court: A Study in Judicial Politics and Values, 1937-1947 (New York: Macmillan, 19487, pp. 32-45, 240-252. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 267] === agreement is recorded. Lijphart's index of agreement is based on the Rice-Beyle technique with one exception: the problem of abstentions is "solved" by letting a partial agreement equal one-half the weight of a complete agreement. The one outstanding advantage of the Rice-Beyle method is that it not only measures agreement but aids in determining the bloc as well. It is particularly valuable in this study inasmuch as Tables VII and VIII are designed to single out a "community of interest" within a given group of states where such a community is not altogether known beforehand. There are a number of methods which could have been used to select the issues for the study. One might have isolated a series of votes by a bloc on a prolonged regional crisis, i.e., the Congo crisis. However, there have been no comparable conflicts in Southeast Asia of this magnitude— West Irian hardly qualifies with only seven important votes— and testing the attitudes of the Southeast Asian states on a conflict as far removed as the Congo crisis often yields over-simplis tic attitudes. One could also have chosen from several other means that have been suggested for separating the issues: Haas argues that Assembly politics have been "balanced" between Cold War demands and demands of under-developed countries; Stoessinger maintains that the two basic conflicts in the United Nations have been Communist-non Communist conflicts and the struggle between the nationalism of the new countries and the old empires of Europe;'1'0 and Bloomfield contends that Rieselbach, pp. 292-294-, suggests the use of the Rice-Beyle method mainly for this purpose, i.e., determining blocs in pre-determined groups. Ernst B. Haas, "Regionalism, Functionalism and the Universal International Organization," World Politics, VIII, No. 2 (January, 1956), 238-263. ■^John G. Stoessinger, The Might of Nations (New York: Random Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 268] === there is a North-South conflict that cuts across East-West issues, where nations outside the East-West bloc "pursue their own goals of political independence, economic improvement and racial dignity. This study, however, will follow the lead of Robert Tilman who has devised a logical (though "non-quantitative") isolating issues. 12 method of Tilman limited his analysis to East-West (cold war) issues and colonial questions, but rather than rely on personal discretion to determine the categories (no matter what names are given to them), they were determined as follows: the resolutions were first sorted for colonial issues in which there was complete disagreement between an avowed colonial power (Portugal) and an avowed anti-colonial power (Indonesia); 13 setting these aside, the remaining resolutions Lincoln Bloomfield, The United Nations and United States Foreign Policy (Boston: Little Brown, 1960). Alker also accepts the East-West, North-South conflicts as the "most frequent conflicts" within the Gen eral Assembly. See American Political Science Review, LVIII, No. 3, p. 64-7; and Hayward R. Alker, Jr. and Bruce M. Russett, World Politics in the General Assembly (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 218252. 12 In lieu of an "arbitrary" method of selecting the issues, Alker and Russett suggest a very complicated factor analysis of General Assem bly votes by which the issues are divided automatically by computer process into a number of categories depending on whether the factor matrix is rotated or unrotated. See, Alker, American Political Science Review, LVIII, No. 3, 642-657; and Bruce M. Russett, "Discovering Vot ing Groups in the United Nations," American Political Science Review, LX, No. 2 (June, 1966), 327-339. For a critical comment on factor analysis, see John E. Mueller, "Some Comments on Russett's 'Discovering Voting Groups in the United Nations,'" American Political Science Re view, LXI, No. 1 (March, 1967), 146-148. 13 The selection of Indonesia for the anti-colonial power could be challenged inasmuch as Indonesia is the subject of this study. Indo nesia, however, was the most vociferous and avowed anti-colonial state in the United Nations, and since many of the conclusions of this study revolved around the radical anti-colonialist stand of Indonesia, no con flict was perceived in making Indonesia the paragon of "anti-colonialism." In addition, Indonesia's claim that Malaysia was "soft on colonialism" has even less validity if Malaysia's anti-colonial record is compared to a norm derived from Indonesia's own record. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 269] === were carded for complete disagreement between the principal antago nists of the cold war, the United States and the Soviet Union.^ all but three instances the "colonial sorting" proved to have selected resolutions that had colonial-anti-colonial characteristics. In the interest of common sense, the three exceptions were placed into the East-West category. Although many objections might be raised to this technique of grouping issues, if one assumes that states vote accord ing to their national self-interests, "then it seems logical that a resolution on which Portugal and Indonesia cast opposite votes con cerns an issue viewed completely differently by the two political systems whose dominant ideological values are so far apart." 15 The resolutions were taken from the Yearbook of the United Nations as Lijphart suggested. Tilman used the Official Records of the General Assembly because the Yearbook listed only "important" roll call votes according to the judgment of the Secretary General. In the last analysis, however, it is difficult to decide how to evaluate a number of similar or repetitive votes in the committee and on the floor of the General Assembly; often the important votes take place in the Committee and in these cases it is misleading to treat the Assembly vote on the same issue with as much weight. Consequently, the ^ Again, following Tilman, it seemed necessary to sort the colonial issues before the East-West issues inasmuch as the Soviet Union tended to vote consistently on the side of former colonies, while the United States was often found on the side of colonial or former colonial powers. Rather than argue that in this case the colo nial become a part of the cold war, it could be pointed out that the U.S.S.R. exhibited what Alker has referred to as a "ehamelon-like nature" in reference to non-Westem states. Similarly, Hovet main tains that rather than dominating the behavior of African groups and factions, Russia often associated with proposals of the African states to "stress the fact that the United States is not a friend of Africa." See Thomas Hovet, Jr., Africa in the United Nations (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1963), p. 185. ^Tilman, p. 54, n. 38. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 270] === judgment the Yearbook on the "importance" of issues was accepted. One final comment should be made about Guttman scaling. 17 The Guttman scale analysis was not used in this study for several reasons. First, Tables VII and VIII were basically concerned with a "community of interests," and a Guttman analysis starts with a pre selected group. Secondly, Table III was testing for agreement be tween pairs of states and Table IV for Indonesian agreement with only a "bloc" of three states; and in this case, since agreement was quite high, a Guttman scale would have been inconsequential. Third, the Guttman method is valuable only when dealing with items that are "scalable" or "unidimensional," and in the case of the Southeast Asian states, it was hard (-and "artificially arbitrary") to collect a series of regional issues where there was none that had developed naturally, i.e., such as the Congo crisis. A scale was attempted, for the sake of trying, on the Congo crisis, but as the issues were probably seen only along simply structured "colonial-anti-colonial" lines or were at best vague to states so far removed from the "region, it was difficult to get any meaningful results. Even then, similar votes on the same issue were recorded only once to preclude weighing the outcome of one resolution too heavily against single-vote issues of equal importance. See Hovet, African in the United.Nations, p. 230. 17 See Rieselbach, pp. 297-304, who advocates its use, and ex plains its adaptation to General Assembly roll calls. 18 See Lijphart, American Political Science Review, LVII, No. 4, 904-905, for a general critique of Guttman scaling. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 271] === BIBLIOGRAPHY Documents Federation of Malaya. The Federation Agreement, 19*4-8. Federation of Malaya Government Press, 1952. Kuala Lumpur: Great Britain. Malayan Union and Singapore: Statement of Policy on Future Policy. London: HMSO, 1946, Cmnd. 6724^ Report of the Commission of Inquiry, Worth Borneo and Sarawak, 1962. London: HMSO, 1962, Cmnd. 1794. Great Britain and the Federation of Malaya. 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Washington: Embassy of Indonesia, _____. Statement in General Debate of the Nineteenth Regular Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on 11 December, 1964. Washington: Assembly of Indonesia, n.d. Indonesia. Indonesian Mission to the United Nations. Some Questions and Answers Concerning the Dispute Over West Irian. New York, 1957. Indonesia. President (Sukarno). "The Era of Confrontation.11 Address, October 6, 1964, to the Second Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries, Cairo, United Arab Republic. Djakarta: Department of Foreign Affairs, 1964. "The Forceful Echo of the Indonesian Revolution." Address, April 18, 1965, at the Tenth Anniversary of the First AsianAfrican Conference at Bandung. New York: Consulate General of Indonesia. 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 273] === 268 ~ I "Let Us Establish the GANEFO." Address, April 27, 1963, at the opening of the GANEFO Preparatory Conference. Djakarta: Department of Information, August 10, 1963, No. 6310. "Let Us Transform the World." Address at the Asian-African Journalist Conference, April 24, 1963, Djakarta: Department of Information, 1963. "Nationalism— A Young and Progressive Greed." Address, May 17, 1956, to the United States Congress. Djakarta: Depart ment of Information, Vol. I, No. 6325. September 2, 1963. "Reach to the Stars I A Year of Self-Reliance." Address, August 17, 1965. Djakarta: Department of Information, 1965. "Reflections Upon the Indonesian Revolution," reprint of a May 1964 special issue in Le Monde, Paris, France. Washington: Embassy of Indonesia, 1964. "Safeguarding the Republic of Indonesia." Address, April 13, 1964, at the Grand Roll-up of the Indonesian Volunteers. Djakarta: Department of Information, II, No. 6407, April 14, 1964. Toward Freedom and the Dignity of Man: A Collection of Five Speeches. 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February 28, 1957. 12th Session. A/C.1/912, November 26, 1957. 12th Session. A/PV 724, November 29, 1957. 16th Session A/PV 1016, September 26, 1961. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 275] === 270 16th Session A/PV 1066, November 27, 1961. Secretariat. Final Conclusions of the Secretary-General Regarding Malaysia. SG/1583, September 13, 1963. Security Council. Official Reports. S/PV 1144, September 9, 1964. S/PV 1152, September 17, 1964. S/PV 1149, September 17, 1964. 2nd. Year, No. 83. 3rd. Year, No. 134. Books Aidit, D. N. The Indonesian Revolution and the Immediate Tasks of the Communist Party of Indonesia. Peking: Foreign Language-Press, 1964. Alkeri Hayward R., Jr., and Russett, Bruce M. World Politics in the General Assembly. New Haven: Yale University Press,- T965. Almond, Gabriel A., and Coleman, James (eds.). The Politics of the Developing Areas. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960. 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Ithaca: Cornell University Press, I960. Beyle, Herman C. Identification ancl Analysis of Attribute-Cluster-Blocs. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931. Bloomfield, Lincoln P. International Military Forces. Brown and Company, 1964. Boston: Littl§, _______. The United Nations and United States Foreign Policy. Little Brown, 1960. Boston:. ■... Boeke, J. H. Economics and Economic Policy of Dual Societies and Exemplified by Indonesia. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1953. _______. The Structure of the Netherlands Indian Economy. 1942. New York, Bone, Robert C. The Dynamics of the Western New Guinea (Irian Barat) Problem. Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1962 ed. Bowett, D. W. United Nations Forces: A Legal Study. 1961. New York: Praeger, Brackman, Arnold C. Southeast Asia's Second Front: The Power Struggle in the Malay Archipelago. New York: Praeger, 1966. Braibanti, Ralph, and Spenglef, Joseph J. (eds.). Tradition, Value and Socio-Economic Development. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1961. Ralph Braibanti, "The Relevance of Political Science to the Study of Underdeveloped Areas," pp. 144-152. Bunnell, Frederick. American Reactions to Indonesia's Role in the Belgrade Conference. Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1964. Burns, Arthur L.,and Heathcote, Nina. Peace-Keeping by U.N. Forces: From Suez to the Congo. New York: Praeger,” 963". Clubb, Oliver E., Jr. The United.States and the Sino-Soviet Bloc in Southeast Asia. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1962. Cobban, Alfred. National Self-Determination. Chicago Press, 1948. Chicago: University of Coedes, Georges. Les Etats Hindouises d 'Indochine et d 'Indonesie. Paris: E. de Boccard, 1948. Crabb, Cecil B. Jr. The Elephants and the Grass: A Study of Nonalign ment. New York: Praeger, 1965. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 277] === 272 Deutsch, Karl. N ationalism and Social Communication: An Enquiry into the Foundations of Nationality. Cambridge: Massachusetts" Institute of Technology Press, 1956. Emerson, Rupert. From Empire to Nation. Cambridge: Press, 1960. Harvard University . Political Modernization: The Single Party System. Denver: Monograph Series in World Affairs, University of Denver, 1963. . Representative Government in Southeast Asia. Harvard University Press, 1955. Cambridge: Falk,Richard A. Law, Morality and War in theContemporary New York: Praeger, 1963. World. Feith, Herbert. The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962. . The Indonesian Elections of 1955. Indonesia Project, 1957. Ithaca: Cornell Modern The Wilopo Cabinet, 1952-1953: A Turning Point in PostRevolutionary Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell Modern~lhdonesia Project, 1958. Finch, Susan, and Lev, Daniel S. Republic of Indonesia Cabinets, 19451965. Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesian Project, 1965. Furnivall, J. S. 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South-east Asia. Hatta, Mohammad. Past a n d.Future. Project, 1960. Heilbroner, Robert. 1963. London: Macmillan, 1954. Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia The Great Ascent. New York: Harper Torchbooks, Hindley, Donald. The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951-1963. University of California Press, 1964. Hoffer, Eric. The True Believer. Berkeley: New York: Harper and Row, 1951. Holland, W. L. (ed.). Asian Nationalism and the West. Macmillan, 1953. New York: Kahin, George McT. "Indonesian Politics and Nationalism," pp. 65-196. Hoselitz, Bert F., and Moore, Wilbert E. (eds.). Industrialization and Society. The Hague: Mouton-UNESCO, 1963. Apter, David E. "System Process and the Politics of Economic Development," pp. 135-158. ..Hovet, Thomas, Jr. Africa in the United Nations. western University Press, 1963, Bloc Politics in the United Nations. University Press, 1960. Hunt, R. N. Carew, Marxism: Past and Present. Company,.1954. Evanston; North Cambridge: Harvard New York: The Macmillan Jay, Robert R. Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java. New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, Cultural Report Series, No. 12, 1963. Johnson, John T. (ed.). IThe Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962. Pauker, Guy J. "The Role of the Military in Indonesia," pp.185230. Shils, Edward. "The Military in the Political Development of the New States," in pp. 7-68. Kahin, George McT. The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956. . Government and Politics of Southeast Asia. University Press, 1965. Ithaca: Cornell Feith, Herbert. "Indonesia," pp. 183-278. Parmer, J. Norman. "Malaysia," pp. 281-371. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 279] === 27‘t Major Governments of Asia. 1963. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, Kahin, George McT. "Indonesia," pp. 535-700. Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. University Press, 1952. Ithaca: Cornell Kaplan, Morton. System and Process in International Politics. John Wiley and Sons, 1957. New York: Kautsky, John. Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1963. Khrushchev, N. S. Imperialism— Enemy of the People, Enemy of the Peace. Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1963. The Revolutionary Working-Class and the Communist Movement. Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1963. Socialism and Communism. House, 1963. King, John Kerry. 1956. Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing Southeast Asia in Perspective. New York: Macmillan, Legge, J. D. Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia: A Study in Local Administration, 1950-1960. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961. Indonesia. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964-. Lenin, V. I. Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism. 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"Quantitative Techniques for Studying Voting Behavior in the UN General Assembly," International Organiza tion, XIV, No. 2 (Spring, 1960), 291-306. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 288] === 283 Shils, Edward. "The Intellectual Between Tradition and Modernity: The Indian Situation," Comparative Studies in Society and History, Supp. I. The Hague: Mouton, 1961. ~ _ _ "The Intellectuals and the Powers," Comparative Studies in Society and History, I (1958-1959), 5-22. "Political Development in the New States (Parts I and II)," Comparative Studies in Society and History, II, Nos. 3 and 4 (April and July issues, 1960), 265-292, 379-403. Smail, John R. "On the Possibilities of an Autonomous History of Modern Southeast Asia," Journal of Southeast Asian History, II, No. 2 (1961), 72-102. Soemardjan, Selo. 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Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 292] === B I O G R A P H Y The author was born in Thorsby, Alabama on February 8, 1936. He attended public schools in Birmingham, Alabama and was graduated from Birmingham-Southern College in June 1959 with a B.A. in English. He entered Tulane University in September 1961 and received his M.A. in Political Science in June 1964. For the past three years he has been teaching in the Department of Political Science at Wake Forest College. Since leaving Tulane, he has been the recipient of a Pied mont University Center Faculty Fellowship for the summer of 1965 and will be on a leave of absence from Wake Forest for the summer and aca-: demic year 1967-1968 on a National Defense Foreign Language Fellowship at Yale University. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.