A Study of 'Aisyiyah, an Indonesian Women's Organization, 1917-1998

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ProQuest Information and Learning 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA 800-521-0600 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 2] === Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 3] === A Study o f ‘Aisyiyah: An Indonesian Women’s Organization (1917-1998) By Ro’fah A thesis submitted to The Faculty o f G raduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment o f the requirements for the degree o f Master o f Arts Institute o f Islamic Studies McGill University Ju n e 2000 @ Ro'fah R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. 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This is achieved by analyzing the developm ent o f the organization its a vis other Muslim w om en’s organizations. It looks at the activities o f ‘Aisyiyah during the period extending from its birth in 1917 until the late Nrew O rder era o f the 1990s, with close reference to other w om en’s organizations. A comparison o f the activities o f ‘Aisyiyah with those o f other w om en’s organizations, and an analysis o f the response o f this organization towards such issues as polygamy, is also an important feature o f this work. While there was much common purpose, still, inevitable differences in perspective, even disharmony developed between ‘Aisyiyah and other w om en’s groups. This was due in many respects to its determination to maintain its identity as a Muslim w om en’s organization, while it at the same time faced certain limitations by virtue o f its being a part o f the Muhammadiyah. In general, however, ‘Aisyiyah is no different from other w om en’s organizations in Indonesia, all o f which have tried to represent w om en’s interests and have struggled for their enhancement, while at the same time being faced with the challenges posed by a constantly changing political situation. R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 7] === RESUME Auteur : Ro’fah Titre : Une analyse de ‘Aisyiyah: une organisation feminine indonesienne (19171998). D epartem ent : Insbtut des Etudes Islamiques, Universite McGill. Diplome : Maitrise es Arts Ce memoire porte sur le role de ‘Aisyiyah, la section feminine de I’organisation reformiste Muhammadiyah, fondee en 1912. L’objectif est d’analyser le developpement de I’organisation vis a vis les autres organisations de femmes musulmanes. La recherche examine les activites de ‘Aisyiyah depuis ses debuts en t9 l7, jusqu’a la fin de I’ere de I’O rdre Nouveau des annees 1990, tout en se referant aux autres organisations feminines indonesiennes. Une comparaison des activites de ‘Aisyiyah avec celles des autres organisations feminines, ainsi qu’une analyse des reactions de cette organisation sur certaines questions teiles la polygamie, sont aussi une importante caracteristique de cet ouvrage. Alors que Ton peut retrouver des objectifs communs, certaines differences inevitables et meme quelques discordes avec d’autres groupes de femmes o n t pu etre remarquees. Ce qui, par contre, tut le resultat inevitable de la determination de ‘Aisyiyah de maintenir son identitc a titre d’organisadon feminine musulmane, alors qu’elle devait faire face a certaines contraintes du au fait d’etre affiliee au mouvement Muhammadiyah. En general, toutefois, ‘Aisyiyah n’est pas differente des autres organisations feminines indonesiennes, puisque toutes ont tente de representer les interets des femmes et o n t lutte pour leur valorisation alors que, simultanement, ces organisations etaient confrontees par les detis imposes par une situation politique en constant changement. R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 8] === Acknowledgm ent This study could never have been completed without the help o f a great many people, to all o f w hom I would like to express my gratitude. Above all, I would like to extend my deepest gratitude to Prof. Sajida. S. Alvi, my advisor and thesis supervisor whose patience, criticism and valuable advice were invaluable to me in the course o f researching and writing this thesis, and in pursuing my other academic duties. My gratitude is also due to the D irector o f the Institute o f Islamic Studies, Prof. A.U. Turgay, and all the staff member o f the Institute for their support and assistance during my study in the Institute. Thanks are also extended to the Ministry o f Religious Affair o f Indonesia, and the Canadian International Development Agency, for providing me scholarship to study at McGill University. I would also like to thank the D irector o f the McGill-Indonesia Project, Wendy Allen, and her staff, who offered me so much help and friendship during my stay in Montreal. I would also to thank Ms. Salwa Ferahian, acting head o f the Islamic Studies Library, and Mr. Thomas Wayne for helping me to find the materials for my research. My thanks also go to Mr. Steve Miller who patiendy edited the English in this thesis. Most importandy, I am indebted to all members o f my extensive family, especially to my late father, Mudzakir, who passed away when I was fourteen and never had the chance to see my achievement, and to my mother, Roikhah, whose love and prayers have provided me with a great source o f support and inspiration. I am sure that this work is litde enough recompense for everything that she gave me, but I hope that she will take pleasure in my achievement in the years to come. My lasting gratitude is also due to my four sisters and three brothers who supported me morally and financially, and enabled me to pursue a better R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 9] === education. Thanks also to my seventeen nieces and nephews who have always made me smile and forget the problems I faced with the lovely calls, photos and cards that they sent to remind me o f home. Last but not least, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my beloved husband, A1 Makin, who sacrificed so much o f his times by staying for another year in Montreal to accompany me while I completed my studies. His love, encouragement and moral support were an important contribution for the successful completion o f this work. Ro’fah Montreal, May 2000 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 10] === Table of Content Chapter One: The Socio-Political Context o f the Birth o f ‘Aisyiyah I. The Ethical Policy and the Development o f N ationalism........................................7 A. Education: A Tool o f Social C h an g e............................................................8 B. Failure o f the Ethical Policy......................................................................... 10 C. Emergence o f N ationalism 12 III. The Indonesian W omen’s Movement and the Nationalist T re n d..................... 16 A. Kartini: A Symbol o f the Indonesian W om en’s M ovem ent....................17 B. The W omen's O rganizations.......................................................................19 IV. T he Formation o f ‘Aisyiyah....................................................................................23 A. ‘Aisyiyah and O ther Women’s Organizations in Java: A Comparison...25 B. The Symbolic Significance o f the N a m e................................................... 27 Chapter Two: ‘Aisyiyah in the Pre and Post-Independence Period I. Pre-Independence......................................................................................................30.A Organizational Development o f ‘Aisyiyah................................................30 B. The Activities o f Aisyiyah: The Religious Call and E ducation......... 31 C. ‘Aisyiyah and O ther Women's Organizations: A Comparison o f R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 11] === Ideas on Socio-religious R e fo rm................................................................. 35 D. Japanese Occupation 1942-1945:The Years o f Silence...........................45 II. Post-Independence................................................................................................... 50 A. ‘Aisyiyah’s Activities under the O ld Order. Social Development and the Emphasis on Family L a w.........................54 B. Marriage Reform and Communism: Disturbed Relations between ‘Aisyiyah and K O W A N I.............................................................................. 57 Chapter Three: ‘Aisyiyah in the New O rder Period: 1966-1998 I. Organizational Development o f ‘Aisyiyah..............................................................65 A. Autonomous Status and Cadre F o rm atio n............................................. 65 B. The Un-dynamic Leadership and Kinship Cadre Formation: A Sign o f Stagnancy?...........................................................67 C. The Autonomous Status o f ‘Aisyiyah: A D ilem m a................................70 II. ‘Aisyiyah Activities under the New O r d e r...........................................................71 A. The New O rder Policy on the W om en’s Movement: A Contradictory A ttitu d e......................................................................................................... 72 B. Dharma Wanita and PKK: A Sign o f Government Apostasy.............76 C. ‘Aisyiyah Program in Comparison: Islamization o f Development and Justification o f G overnm ent P ro g ram s............................................. 80 D. The Birth o f Indonesian Feminism: Another Challenge for ‘Aisyiyah?......................................................................................................... 98 C onclusion....................................................................................................................................... 95 Bibliography.................................................................................................................................... 99 vii R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 12] === T ransliteration For the Arabic words and names the system o f transliteration in this thesis follows that o f the Institute o f Islamic Studies, McGill University. Meanwhile, the Indonesian names and terms are written according to the following system: those which are derived from Arabic are transliterated according to the Arabic transliteration, for example: Ahmad Dahlan, rather than Ahmad Dahlan; the rest are written according to the new Indonesian spelling (Ejaanjang disempumakan) o f 1972. Some examples o f the differences between the old and the new Indonesian spelling are oe, j, ch, tj, dj which become respectively as: u, y, kh, c, j (for instance, Sukarno not Soekamo). However, some names and terms are written according to Indonesian convention, (for example, Muhammadiyah not Muhammadiyah; ‘Aisyiyah not ‘Aishiyah), The table o f Arabic transliteration is as follows: Short Long Dipthongs: In the case o f ta’ marbutah ( 6 ) h is written, and if it occurs within an idafah, it is transliterated with at. viii R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 13] === Introduction Throughout the history o f the Indonesian wom en’s m ovement, one o f the more com m on features o f its developm ent has been the affiliation o f m ost women’s organizations to larger “ male” institutions, be they political parties, professional organizations, student groups, o r even government institutions. When we observe specifically Muslim w om en’s organizations, the above tendency is even m ore apparent. With few exceptions, we see that som e o f the m ost well-known Muslim wom en’s groups— am ong them Muslimat NU, 1 Wamta Perti,2 and W anita Syarikat Islam 3— are in fact the female wings o f larger Muslim organizations. O ne such group, namely ‘Aisyiyah, the focus o f o u r study, is the female section o f the Muhammadiyah, o ne o f the biggest Muslim organizations in the country. T he affiliation o f those w om en’s organizations to their larger counterparts has largely invited the assumption that the form er— particularly those having a Muslim character— are merely complements to their parent bodies.4 This assumption in turn has led scholars to overlook the phenomenon o f w om en’s organizations altogether, when in fact their social involvement has contributed greatly to the development o f the country. Most observers, 1 Muslimat NU is the women’s section o f NU (Nahdathul Llama). Founded on March 29, 1946, it received autonomous status in 1956. Its parent body, the NLT, is widely considered one o f the biggest Muslim organizations in Indonesia besides the Muhammadiyah. Kowaru, Sejaruh Setengah Abad Pergerakan Wanita Indonesian (Jakarta: Balai Pus taka, 1978), 341. 2 This organization was affiliated to PERTI (Persatuan Tarbivah Islam, The Union o f Islamic Education). Wamta Perti was established in the same year as its parent organization, PERTI, in Bukit Tinggi, West Sumatra, on May 5,1928. Ibid, 311. 5 This group was formally established in 1953 as an autonomous body within the Syarikat Islam party. Before this year, however, Wamta Syarikat Islam was a unit in the party which responsible to manage all the female members o f the party. Ibid, 327. 4 See for instance Johan H. Meuleman and Lies Marcoes Natsir, eds., Wamta Islam Indonesia daiam Kajian Tekstual dan Kontekstuai (Jakarta: INIS, 1993), xiii. R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission. === [PDF page 14] === even women themselves, are likewise unaware that it is these organizations that should be given credit for the improved conditions o f the female population o f Indonesia. During the last twenty years, however, there has been a growing scholarly interest in Indonesian w om en’s organizations. As early as I960, Cora Vreede-De Stuers looked at the position o f women in Indonesian traditional society and the growth o f the Indonesian w om en’s movem ent both in the colonial and post-colonial periods.s Another study was done in the 1980s by Sukanti Suryochondro in which she analyzed Indonesian women’s organizations both as social movements and a set o f “formal groupings,” which grow from one period to another in connection with social development.6 Some more recent studies can also be cited, such as Saskia Wieringa’s dissertation, which examines Gerwani, a women’s organizations which was closely affiliated to the Com m unist party. Instead o f limiting her discussion to Gerwani, however, this study provides a historical examination o f the Indonesian wom en’s movement, particularly during the pre-independence period. Another recent study, conducted by Rifai, deals with the political participation o f Indonesian Muslim women since the colonial period and into the New O rder era.8 O ther approaches can be seen in the works o f Suryakusuma9 and McCormack.10 5 Cora Vreede-De Stuers, The Indonesian Woman: Struggles and Achievements (The Hague: Mouton and ‘sGravenhage, I960). 6 Sukand Suryochondro, Potret Pergerakan Wanita Indonesia (Jakarta: C.V Rajawali, 1984). 7 Saskia Wieringi, “The Politicization o f Gender Relations in Indonesia: The Indonesian Women’s Movement and Gerwani Until the New Order State” (Ph.D dissertation, University o f Amsterdam, 1995). * Nuriena Rifai, “Muslim Women in Indonesia’s Politics: An Historical Examination o f The Political Career of Aisyah Amini” (M.A. thesis, Institute o f Islamic Studies, McGill University, 1993). 0 Julia I. Suryakusuma, “State Ibuism: The Social Construction o f Womanhood in the Indonesian New Order” (M. A. thesis, Institute o f Social Studies o f The Hague, 1987) in which she observed the New Order policy in constructing the image o f women in Indonesia. R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 15] === Nevertheless, the Muslim w om en’s groups still suffer from a lack o f attention. ‘Aisyiyah, the oldest and possibly the broadest-based Muslim w om en’s organization, is no exception to this rule. The organization is usually regarded as a mere adjunct to the Muhammadiyah, and n o t as an organization in its own right. For this very reason, our study is expected to fill a gap by presenting the history and contributions o f this organization, which has had a significant and positive impact on Indonesian Muslim women for more than seven decades. A number o f scholars have, o f course, studied the Muhammadiyah itself, focusing either on its historical, political, ideological o r religious dimensions. Among those who have done so are Mukti Ali," Alfian,12 Jainuri,13 Syamsuddin,14 Peacock,15 and many others.16 10 Justine Doom-McCormack, “Organizing Women in Indonesia: The Language o f Women’s Organizations 1909-1930 and 1990-1996” (M.A thesis, Arizona University State, 1998). This is a study of criticism in the media o f women’s organizations in Indonesia, covering two periods; 19091930 and 1990-1996. 11 Mukti Ali wrote an annotated bibliography of materials on the Muhammadiyah for the period 1912 to 1956, which appeared as a thesis under the title “The Muhammadiyah Movement: A Bibliographical Introduction” (M.A thesis, Institute o f Islamic Studies, McGill University, 1957). 12 Alfian, ‘Islamic Modernism in Indonesian Politics: The Muhammadiyah Movement dunng The Dutch colonial Period, 1912-1942” (Ph.D. dissertation, University o f Wisconsin, 1969). In this work Alfian emphasizes the contribution o f the Muhammadiyah to the process o f social-political change in Indonesia. Jainuri, “The Muhammadiyah Movement in Twentieth Century Indonesia: A Socio Religious Study” (M.A thesis, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, 1992). In this work die author focuses on the socio-religious role of the Muhammadiyah from 1912-1990 and examines the basic ideology o f the movement and its implementation in the Indonesian’s religious and social life. He then examines the ideology of the Muhammadiyah in his “The Formation o f the Muhammadiyah’s Ideology, 1912-1942” (Ph.D. dissertation, Institute o f Islamic Studies, McGill University, 1997). u M. Sirajuddin Syamsuddin, “ Religion and Politics in Islam: The Case o f the Muhammadiyah in Indonesia’s New Order” (Ph.D dissertation, UCLA, 1991). This work, like Alfian’s deals with the political aspects o f the Muhammadiyah, with special reference to the New Order period. 15 lames L. Peacock, Gerakan Muhammadiyah Memumikan Ajuran Islam di Indonesia (Jakarta: Cipta Bina Kreadf, 1986). This book is an Indonesian translation of the author’s book entided Purifying the Faith: R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 16] === N one o f these works, however, deals with the role o f women within the movement in general, o r with ‘Aisyiyah in particular. Therefore, the present study is the first to examine the development o f ‘Aisyiyah as an institution. It also analyzes ‘Aisyiyah as a part o f the Muhammadiyah, but one which has evolved into a dynamic w om en’s organization in its own right. This study approaches the institutional developm ent o f ‘Aisyiyah by using a sociohistorical methodology. Hence the focus is o n reviewing the activities o f this organization, and analyzing the social involvement o f ‘Aisyiyah from its establishment in 1917 until the New O rder period o f 1966-1998. An account o f the political context has been included in order to show how it affected the development o f the organization. A comparative approach is also used in exploring the similarities and differences between ‘Aisyiyah and other w om en’s organizations in Indonesia throughout the period covered. In this way, we have tried to show how ‘Aisyiyah has grown as an organization and how it was involved within the Indonesian w om en’s movement as a whole. Such an approach also shows the affinity o f this organization to other women’s groups, even while maintaining its distinctive identity as a Muslim women’s organization. The primary sources o f this study are the official documents o f the organization, i.e., the reports o f its annual meeting (muktamarj, the journal o f the organization, its pamphlets, and program manuals. This thesis also consults the available secondary sources in Indonesian and English on ‘Aisyiyah and the Muhammadiyah. These latter, however, are The Muhammadiyah Movement in Indonesian Islam, which tried to observe Muhammadiyah as an Islamic reform movement. 16 For instance see AIwi Shihab, “The Muhammadiyah Movement and Its Controversy with Christian Mission” (PhX) dissertation, Temple University, 1995), which discussed the engagement o f Muhammadiyah with the Chnsdan missionaries, and Fathurrahman Djamil’s study on the ijtihad method o f the organization in his Metode Ijtihad Majlis Tarjih Muhammadiyah (Jakarta: Logos, 1995). R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 17] === very limited since only a few studies on ‘Aisyiyah have been conducted in Indonesian, and almost none in English. In discussing the other w om en’s organizations o r the w om en’s m ovement in general, the information presented is based primarily on existing studies. The thesis itself is divided into three chapters and a conclusion. Chapter one gives an account o f the political-historical background o f the birth o f ‘Aisyiyah. It examines the Ethical Policy introduced by the D utch at the beginning o f the twentieth century, and analyzes how the policy — which was actually designed to persuade the natives to support colonial rule -- led to the rise o f Indonesian nationalism. It also discusses the emergence o f Islamic modernism and the w om en’s movement: the two trends most closely connected to the idea o f nationalism and the two trends in which the roots o f the birth o f ‘Aisyiyah can best be traced. The chapter also describes the formation process o f the organization, and analyzes the significance o f its effort in the first ten years after its establishment. Chapter two focuses on the organizational developm ent and activities o f ‘Aisyiyah during the pre- and post-independence periods. The first part deals with the development o f the organization from the 1920s to 1940. Besides analyzing the activities o f ‘Aisyiyah, particular attention in this part is paid to the position o f the organizations among other women’s groups, achieved by discussing the position o f the organization on the issue o f polygamy in the first Indonesian w om en’s congress. The second part o f this chapter concentrates on the period o f the Japanese occupation during 1940-1945. It shows how the Japanese mobilization and politicization o f all social organizations forced the w om en’s movement, including ‘Aisyiyah to terminate its activities. The last part o f the chapter deals with the development o f ‘Aisyiyah during the Old O rder period o f 1945-1965. It investigates the influence o f the political context o f the Old O rder on ‘Aisvivah’s activities and policies. This investigation is presented in the context o f our discussion o f social development, which R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 18] === underscored the activities o f ‘Aisyiyah during this period, as well as in the conflict between ‘Aisyiyah and other women’s groups which arose as a result o f the communist ideas prevalent under the Old Order. This part also explores die continuing debate over the issue o f polygamy and how ‘Aisyiyah has maintained its position on the issue. Chapter three outlines the organizational development o f ‘Aisyiyah and its activities under Suharto's New O rder o f 1966-1998, and it too consists o f three parts. This chapter starts by analyzing some internal problems faced by the organization. Special reference is made to the issue o f cadre formation, and the dilemma o f its autonomous status which seems to underline the un-dynamic and un-progressive character o f ‘Aisyiyah. The next discussion o f this chapter is on the effect o f the New O rder's policy regarding the w om en’s movement. It looks at how the tight control o f New O rder regime not only forced ‘A isyiyah to design its activities in accordance with government programs, but also to provide the justification for those same programs. The last part o f the chapter deals with the effect that Indonesian feminism has had on the organization. It examines how an issue such as gender equality, which was raised by this new movement, has brought a new perspective on the w om en’s movement as a whole and in turn, a challenge for the continuation o f ‘Aisyiyah. Finally, this thesis ends with some concluding remarks. R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 19] === C hapter O ne The Socio-Political Context o f T he Birth of ‘Aisyiyah I. The E thical Policy and the Developm ent o f N ationalism By the end o f the First World War, the D utch had ruled Indonesia as a colony for about three centuries. All throughout this period, they had exploited the country’s natural resources,1 while at the same time neglecting the welfare o f its people. The philosophical legacy o f the French Revolution had not yet touched the imperial mindset. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, however, more enlightened notions o f liberty, equality and fraternity began to dominate debate within the Dutch parliament. There were calls for the government to alter its colonial policy toward Indonesia. These voices suggested investing the oppressed people o f Indonesia with rights and protecting them against economic exploitation. The first official expression o f this “new trend” in colonial policy was articulated by Baron van Dedem, a m em ber o f the Liberal cabinet (1891-1894), and was announced in 1891. He explained that the Dutch colonial governm ent sought to establish “the Indian finances on the sure foundation o f the increasing welfare o f the people (Indonesians).”' This speech marked a new era for colonialism. Henceforward, the dominant trends were to be 1One o f the most clear illustrations o f economic exploitation in Indonesia can be seen in the Dutch colonial policy o f Cultuurstebel (Cultivation System) o f 1830-60, whereby the nanves were forced to use one-fifth o f the rice fields to grow crops favored by European markets such as tea, spices and tobacco. L'nder Governor General Van den Bosch, the financial result of this cultivation system satisfied the Dutch government as it was reported to made 823,000,000 guilders between 1831 and 1877. For more information on the CultuurstelseL see Bernard H.M. VIekke. The Story of The Dutch East Indies (Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 1945), 156; idem, Nusantara: A History of The East Indian Archipelagt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1943), 269-276. : J.S. Fumivall, Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy (London: Cambndge University Press, 1967), 230-231. R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 20] === decentralization, economic efficiency, and social welfare. However, it was actually Van KoL, the third Colonial Minister after Van Dedem, who successfully overcame the hesitation o f the D utch government.3 Motivated by socialist convictions, Van Kol established a “welfare policy.” A nother Liberal party figure, C. T h. Van Deventer,4 continued Van Kol’s work by insisting o n greater colonial humanitarian concern and economic fairness.5 These “reform ” ideas led to the adoption o f the so-called “Ethical Policy,” which was officially announced by Queen Wilhelmina (1890-1948) in a 1901 speech declaring the government’s intention to “enquire into the diminishing welfare o f the people o f Java.”6 According to this new policy, the D utch government formally committed itself to abandoning its old imperial ways. The twentieth century would be a “new era o f guided initiation o f the Javanese people into m odem culture and European technical knowledge.” A. Education: A Tool ofSocietal Change T he most im portant o f these three goals was education. Its impact would be broadly and deeply felt. The supporters o f the Ethical Policy insisted on major improvements in the 3 Ibid. He was known to have said “ We must bring up the child in such a way that it can learn to dispense with our help.” See also Bernhard Dahm, History o f Indonesia in The Twentieth Century (London: Praeger Publishers, 1971), 14. 4 Van Deventer was a Dutch lawyer who worked with one of the large oil companies. He stayed in the country from 1880-1887. After his retirement in 1879 he joined the Liberal party. He introduced a new program, which provided moral and material welfare to the natives. Ibid. 5 In 1899, in an article entitled “Een Eereschuld’ (A Debt o f Honor), published in the Dutch journal De Gids, he argued that the Dutch owed Indonesians a debt for all the wealth taken from their country. This debt should be repaid by promulgating a new colonial policy, which emphasized Indonesian interests. Fumivall, Netherlands India, 231; M.C. Ricklefs, A History of Modem Indonesia: c. 1300 to the Present (London: The Macmillan Press, 1981), 143. 6 Ibid. 233. Cora Vreede-De Stuers, The Indonesian Women Struggles and Adrieitment (The Hague: Mouton and Co-‘s-Gravenhage, 1960), 48. R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 21] === education o f Indonesians. Fock’s historic budget o f 1907, for instance doubled the num ber o f government schools. However, there were differing ideas concerning the type o f education that should be provided. Idenburg and Governor-general van Heutsz favored basic and practical education o f the general masses, with vernacular languages serving as the medium o f instruction. By contrast, the first “ethical” director o f education, J.H. Abendanon, and the government’s adviser on Islamic affairs, Snouck Hurgronje,* preferred— to use Rickiefs’s w ords—“the elitist approach o f education,” where the content would be based upon the European style o f education. Consequently they thought that D utch would be the ideal language o f instruction.9 The idea behind this elitist approach was to produce a skillful and cooperative Indonesian elite that could perform the work o f Dutch civil servants, thereby reducing administrative expenses. A nother goal o f elitist education was to counter the political impact o f Pan- Islamism.10 Many observers have pointed out that the 8 Snouck Hurgronje (1857-1936) had graduated from a program in Islamic studies at the Rijkuniversiteit Leiden with a doctoral dissertation entitled Het Mekkaanscbe Fust (The Meccan Festival). He then became a teacher in the same university. In 1881 made a research trip to Mecca, assuming the Muslim name o f ‘Abd al-Ghaffar. Soon after returning from this trip he wrote his first major work. Mecca in the Latter Part o f the Nineteenth Century. It was this book which led the Dutch government in Indonesia to appoint him as their adviser, even after he had gone back to Leiden in 1906. As Alfian argues, the fundamental purpose o f Snouck Hurgronje’s recommendation concerning Islam in Indonesia was to “domesticate” it so that Indonesian Muslim would no longer be a threat to the Dutch. In his opinion, this aim could be achieved through better understanding between Indonesian Muslims and the Dutch. Therefore, in his survey he went deeply into the everyday life o f Indonesians. His conclusion was that Islamic values were useless, and therefore would never work as a means to modernize Indonesians. Based on this line o f reasoning he then insisted on the transmission of western values through education to erase the influence o f Islam in order to improve the prospects for Indonesians. For more information on Snouck Hurgronje see Alfian, Muhammadiyah: The Political Behavior of a Muslim Modernist Organisation under Dutch Colonialism (Yogyakarta: Gajah Mada University Press, 1989), 17-29; Ricklefs, A History of Modem Indonesia, 137138; Vlekke. The Story of The Dutch East Indies, 170-174. 9 Ricklefs, A History ofModem Indonesia, 148. 10 The idea of '‘Islamic modernism,” particulady as stated by Muhammad ‘Abduh, found a strong response in Indonesia. The Indonesians who studied in Mecca brought the idea to Indonesia, where it developed a sense of nationalism with strong anti-imperialist overtones. This can be seen, for instance, in a movement founded by some Muslim leaders in Minangkabau in the mid 1910s. R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 22] === Ethical Policy succeeded in erasing the authority o f the traditional priyayi by producing a “new” lesser priyayi group.11 B. Failure o fthe Ethical Policy Despite the original philanthropic motivation that inspired the Ethical Policy, in practice it did not significandy increase Indonesian welfare. The failure may have been due to the fact that rapid population increases created insurmountable barriers for the socio economic agenda o f the Policy. In other words, efforts at improving welfare, especially o f poor peasants, had insufficient resources. At the same time, the Dutch government also failed to provide sufficient job opportunities for the growing western-educated group. Furthermore, as Alfian has argued, even for those who were lucky enough to get the chance to w ork in government (especially at the local and regional levels), they still felt their jobs to be beneath their educational training. Imperial prejudices perpetuated discrimination.1' This was one of the first Islamic movements to base its activities on the Islamic modernism and PanIslamism. Aware of the danger o f its political impact, the Dutch government tried to stop its spread. The advice of Snouck Hurgronje to provide a western education to Indonesians was one o f the aspects o f their policy to turn natives against Islamic modernism. George McTuman Kahrn, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Ptess, 1952), 46-48. 11 The term priyayi traditionally refers to the descendants o f a royal family, but the new connotation is used to mean “middle class” in terms o f economic, social or educational status. The new, ‘lesser priyayi' group emerged from the western education system introduced under the Ethical Policy, and enjoyed privileged access to governmental posts. However, they were still regarded as “lesser priyayi" because most o f them were not bom to the noble families. Koentjaraningrar, Javanese Culture (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985), 76-78; Ricklefs, A History ofModem Indonesia, 155. Fore more information on priyayi see Clifford Geertz, The Religion ofJava (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), 227-339. 12 Among the reforms brought about by the Ethical Policy there were a number that affected the political domain. These included the foundation o f municipal councils, provincial councils and most importantly the regency councils. The latter were set-up in rural areas and employed many native officials. They were basically designed as a '*quasi-democratic check” on the traditional authoritarianism of die ruling priyayi class. Dutch administrative interference with this institution, coupled with the native population’s parliamentary inexperience, however, ultimately led to a sense o f 10 with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 23] === Ricklefs explains that “Education produced some able and loyal officials, but it also produced a tiny dissatisfied elite w ho led the anti-colonial movements.”13 The wider educational opportunities for the natives created a new politically aware social class that hastened the emergence o f the idea o f nationalism. It is ironic that a policy designed to end oppressive colonial policies and thereby co-opt the natives, ultimately destroyed colonialism by turning the natives against its authors. C. Emergence ofNationalism It is widely accepted that 1908 was the starting point o f the rise o f nationalism. A key development was the formal establishment o f Budi Utomo (Glorious Endeavor), the first cultural—nationalist organization. The inspiration for the movement came when in 1907 Sudiro Husodo, a retired Javanese doctor visited STOVLA {School tot Opleiding van Inlandsche A/tsen: School for Training Native Doctors) in order to drum up support for his efforts to set up a scholarship program to westemschool for Javanese priyayi}* Due to the enthusiastic response expressed by the student o f STOVLA, H usodo’s idea evolved into a student organization. O n May 20* o f the following year, H usodo along with two STOVLA students, Sutomo and Gunawan Mangukusomo, officially bunched Budi Utomo’s nationalist mission. The fact that STOVLA became the center o f a nationalist movem ent is not surprising. The members o f Budi Utomo were either students o r graduates o f the western educational inferiority and incompetence. Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and The Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam Under The Japanese Occupation (Bandung; Martinus N’ijhoff, 1958), 34-35; Alfian, Muhammadiyah: The Political Behaiior, 38. 13 Ricklefs, A History ofModem Indonesia, 152. 14 Ibid, 156- 11 with p erm ission of th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 24] === system and therefore imbued with its philosophical traditions. In other words, Budi Utomo clearly represented the elite middle class o f the m odem Javanese priyayi. II. T he Trend o f Islam ic M odernism As mentioned earlier, at the turn o f the twentieth century, the dominant trends in nationalism were accompanied by the emergence o f Islamic modernism. Yet, the seeds o f Islamic modernism in Indonesia can be traced back to the beginning o f the nineteenth century. Three hajkis from Minangkabau, Hajl Mis kin, Hajl Muhammad ‘Arif and Hajl ‘Abd ar-Rahman, apparently brought the ideas o f the Wahhabi movem ent16 back with them from Arabia. In 1802 they launched w hat was known as the Padri movement. With the goal o f assigning Islamic law (sbari'ah) predominance over all o th er laws, this m ovem ent rejected the balance between ladat (customary practices) and Islam, and condemned ‘adat as being against shari'ah. Consequently, Islam had to be cleansed o f its customary elements. The influence o f the Padri movement, with its strong Wahhabi overtones, led the people o f Minangkabau at the turn o f the twentieth century to be more predisposed to the Islamic modernism ideas o f Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905). It was through a 15 The word hajt usually added to a Muslim name refers to one who performs ptlgnmage to Mecca. 16 This movement was founded by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1787) in Dirlva, a region in the Arabian Peninsula, in 1744. The name of Wahhabi however, was given it by opponents of the movement and then used also by European observers. Meanwhile its members called themselves Sluwahhidun (“unitarians).” Principally derived from the teaching o f Ibn Taimiyyah, (12631328) the general aim o f this movement was to cleanse Islam o f all bida’ (innovations), in order to make the community aware o f the authority o f the four sunm law schools, and the six book of tradition. It was stated that this movement was fully supported by the ruler o f Dirlya, Ibn Sa'ud and his successor ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, who not only accepted the doctrine, but also undertook its defence and propagation. They also looked to Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab as their religious adviser. D.S. Margoliouth, “Wahhabiva,” in Emyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1987), 1086-87. 12 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission. === [PDF page 25] === Minangkabau figure, Syekh Ahmad Khafib,17 that Islamic reform was first articulated in Indonesia.18 According to Alfian, there were two im portant notions he taught his students. T he first was a “liberal” attitude, which he personally exemplified by his own behavior, encouraging his students to perform ijtihad (independent reasoning) and arguing that its door had never been closed; while the second notion was the concept o f religious purity, in the sense that there was a need to purify Islam o f irreligious practices.19 Because o f its role in bringing the Islamic modernism to the Javanese context, the Sarekat Islam (SI) is widely considered to have been its forem ost representative, especially in 17 Ahmad Khatib, bom at Bukidnggi in 1855, was from Minangkabau. He went to Mecca in 1879 where he achieved the highest ranking position in religious teaching as imam o f the Shafi'i madhhab at the Masjid al-Haram. Although he never returned to his home country, his influence grew through the Indonesians who performed the pilgrimage or studied at Mecca and especially through his writings. He was noted for his liberal attitude. He encouraged his students to read works outside the Shafi'i madhhab, including those o f ‘Abduh, particularly his Qur'anic exegesis and his al-Vrwah atWulhqd, a periodical he published in cooperation with Jamal al-Din al-Afgfiarii (1838-1897). Ahmad Khatib was also known for attacking prevalent social customs and religious doctrines, more especially the inheritance law based on the Minangkabau matrilineal system which contradicts Islamic law. Deliar Noer, “The Rise and Development of The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia,” (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1963), 47-50; Alfian, Muhammadiah: The Political Behavior, 1013; Taufik Abdullah, Schools and Politics: The Kaum Muda Movement In West Sumatra (1927-1933) (Ithaca: Cornell Modem Indonesian Project Southeast Asian Program Cornell University, 1971), 7. 18 Four o f his Minangkabau students namely Syeikh Muhammad Tahir Jalal al-Din al-Azhari (1869-1956), Syeikh Muhammad Jamil Jambek (1860-1974), Haji ‘Abd al- Karim Amrullah (187519450) and Haji ‘Abd Allah Ahmad (1878-1933), spread the word. The spread o f the modernist message to other parts of Indonesia, Java in particular, owes much to the effort o f these four and the publications, institutions o f education, and political organizations that they founded. Muhammad Tahir Jalal al-Dfn al-Azhan, for instance, in 1906 published al-lmdm, the first Islamic periodical in the Malay language. Inspired by the example o f the journal al-Manar o f Abduh’s disciple, Rasliid Rida, oi lman vigorously advocated not only the purification o f Islamic practices but also reform in the education system in which the “secular subjects” should be added in the curriculum. Although the readership of al-lmam was concentrated in Minangkabau, it found many readers in Java, Kalimantan and Sulawesi, and in each o f these provinces branches were founded. 19Irreligious practices here means ‘adat activities which have come to be regarded as religiously valid. The conflict between ‘adat and Islamic practices had already begun in Minangkabau during the Padri movement with its ideas on purification. There were two conflicting groups active there, known as Kaum Tua (literally meaning the old group) who supported the continuation o f ‘adat 13 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 26] === view o f its emphasis on political matters. Founded on N ovem ber 11, 1911, the SI grew out o f the Sarekat Dagang Islam (Islamic Business Association), a cooperative trade organization based in Solo, Central Java. The basic aim was originally to protect its m embers (mosdy batik traders) from the encroachments o f Chinese entrepreneurs, following the success o f the Chinese revolution in 1911.20 From its origin as a purely economic organization, the SI evolved into the first Muslim political m ovem ent with mass support.21 It was driven by two ideological trends: Indonesian nationalism and Islamic modernism. Indeed, those responsible for the establishment o f the SI were the people whose background com bined a westem-style education, noble birth and a strong Islamic background.22 The next prom inent Islamic organization to appear was the Muhammadiyah, the parent organization o f ‘Aisyiyah. The Muhammadiyah was, in a sense, created by the collapse practices, and Kaum Muda (lit. young group) who insisted on cleansing Islam o f customary elements. Abdullah, Schools and Politics, 5-6. 20 In its further development its aims broadened into the nationalist sense o f achieving “the welfare, prosperity and greatness of the country.” With this in mind, SI proclaimed its existence as nationalist movement struggle for Indonesia as a whole. Noer, “The Rise And Development,” 162; Kahrn, Nationalism and Revolution, 66-7. 21 In 1919 SI claimed to have two million supporters. Ibid. 22 Among the most important figures who joined SI in its eariv years, was Umar Said Cokroaminoto. He would become its leader. Bom in 1882 to a noble and religious family, Cokroaminoto graduated from the Dutch Administrators’ school. This enabled him to obtain a position as chief assistant to a regent (patih). During 1907-1910 he continued his education in mechanical courses, and then worked as a Dutch employee tor two years. He left this position due to an invitation from Haji Samanhudi (Si’s founder) to join the organization. It was Cokroaminoto’s leadership—whose personal charisma led people to call him Ratu A dil (Imam Mahdi, Messianic figure)-that SI succeeded in attracdngmembers and in gaining legal recognition from the Dutch government. Another important figure in SI was Abdul Muis, a STOVIA graduate from Minangkabau, who joined the Department o f Education under Abendanon as a clerk. He left this work to become editor o f a progressive Indonesian magazine, Bintang Hindia. After returning from his pilgrimage to Mecca, he joined a daily Muslim journal, Kaum Xluda, which dealt with the Muslim community and Muslim issues (including the ideas o f Ahmad Khatib). Another young Minangkabau’s young man, Haji Agus Salim, strengthened the role o f Islam in SI. He contacted with SI in 1915 as a Dutch police officer. His task was to investigate this organization. His interest in and deep knowledge o f Islam — which he acquired during his work at the Dutch consulate in Jeddah in 14 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission. === [PDF page 27] === o f the SI.23 The ideological conflict within the latter, coupled with the government's strong reaction to Com munist political activities, led some modernist Muslims within the SI to re consider their decision to engage in political activities. Soon, this group o f like-minded individuals left to form a non-political Muslim organization. To their way o f thinking, this would be a m ore effective medium for the propagation o f Islamic modernism. Thus the Muhammadiyah was bom in Yogyakarta on N ovem ber 18, 1912, founded as a socio religious organization by Haji Alunad Dahlan.24 The early activities o f the Muhammadiyah were primarily directed towards building an infrastructure in the form o f educational institutions, journal publications, health centers, orphanages, and other socio-religious activities. Through all o f these institutions, the 1906-1909—led him to join the organization and leave his police work. It was due to Muis and Salim that SI was influenced by ideas oflslamic modernism. 23 The collapse o f SI was primarily caused by an internal ideological conflict. In 1917 a communist group began to take form within the ranks o f SI. Three years later, without abandoning their affiliation to SI, this group formally declared the foundation o f communist parry. This step sharpened the continuing tension between communist and non-communist groups of the party, particularly when the latter insisted on 1921 that SI members could not hold memberships in any other parties. Since then, non-communist SI members became less and less politically active, while the communists became even more militant. 24 Ahmad Dahlan was bom to a respectable family in 1869 in Kauman Yogyakarta, and was given the name Muhammad Darwis. His father, Kyai Haji Abu Bakr, was the Khatib (Friday sermon giver) in the mosque of the sultanate o f Yogyakarta. His mother, Sid Aminah, was the daughter o f a religious official (penghulu) in the sultanate. After his father died in 1896, Dahlan replaced him as the religious officials o f the Sultanate Mosque and became known by the name o f “Tibamn" (Khatib Amin). In 1890, he went to Mecca to pursue his studies and stayed there for one year, finishing his lessons on tafstr,jiqh and other Islamic subjects under the guidance o f a number of ‘ulama’, including Ahmad Khadb and Jamil Jambek, from Minangkabau. In 1903, he returned to Mecca and continued to study the same subjects. It was his period o f study in Mecca which introduced him to the Islamic modernist thought o f Muhammad ‘Abduh, although—as a few authors have suggested— his interest to this new trend was largely derived from his own learning. He developed connections with various Indonesian Muslim modernists during his involvement in several organizations. Ahmad Dahlan died on February 23, 1923 after having headed Muhammadiyah for eleven years. Achmad Jainuri, “The Muhammadiyah Movement in the Twentieth Century Indonesia: A Socio-Religious Study” (M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1992), 1-13; Achmad Jainuri, “The Formation of the Muhammadiyah’s Ideology 1912-1914” (Ph.D. dissertation, McGill University, 15 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 28] === Muhammadiyah attracted thousands o f new members and established its own mass following. In other words, benefiting from the political failure o f the SI, the Muhammadiyah emerged as the first widely accepted Islamic modernist movement. The social activities o f the Muhammadiyah, however, were in many ways a response to the activities o f Christian missionaries who, through the building o f schools, hospitals and other social activities, w on a considerable following. In fact many writers have suggested that besides propagating Islamic modernism, the main reason behind the establishment o f the Muhammadiyah was to counter the successes o f Christian missionaries.23 Nevertheless, despite rejecting all that came from the Christian West, Ahmad Dahlan expressed a high tolerance for Christianity. Although in essence a reformist movement, the Muhammadiyah differed from the SI due to its emphasis on a socio-religious agenda. Furthermore, with respect to nationalism, and particularly when compared to Budi Utomo which was based on combination between western and Javanese culture, the Muhammadiyah appealed to Islam as a weapon to oppose both traditional priyayi privilege and D utch authority. III. T he Indonesian W om en's M ovement and the N ationalist T rend. Just as the Ethical Policy o f the Dutch colonial administration spawned the nationalist movement, the women’s movement had its origins in the changes set in motion by this initiative. As mentioned earlier, the Ethical Policy brought wider opportunity for 1997); Usman Yadm and Alrrusar Hamid, ed., \bthammadiyah dalam Sorotan (Jakarta: Bina Rena Pariwara, 1993), 21-28,53; Alfian, Muhammadiyah the Political Behattor, 146. 25 Achmad Jainun, Muhammadiyah: Gerakan Reformasi Islam di Java Pada A uul Abad Keduapuluh (Surabaya: Bina Ilmu, 1991), 22; M.T. An fin, Muhammadiyah: Point Yang Berubah (Surakarta: Insntut Gelanggang Pemikiran Filsafat Sosial Budaya dan Kependidikan Surakarta, 1990), 40-51; Riddefs, A History ofModem Indonesia, 162. 16 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 29] === Indonesians to pursue a formal education. The director o f the Department o f Education, J.H. Abendanon, included in the new program o f education proposals for female education, especially for Javanese women o f aristocratic background. This idea, however, was never taken up seriously by the government, nor was it accepted by the Javanese elite. In the late nineteenth century female education was unthinkable in Javanese culture. Despite this resistance Abendanon continued to promote his ideas. In his eagerness to gain support, accompanied by his wife, he visited a region in central Java. There he m et the local bupati (chief o f the region) Raden Adipati Ario Sosroningrat. This visit would mark the dawn o f the women’s movement in Indonesia. A. Kartini: A Symbol ofthe Indonesian Women's Movement. Abendanon was very impressed with the daughter o f the bupati:, known as Kartini (1879-1904).“ Bom into the third generation o f an aristocratic Javanese family which had maintained close relations with the Dutch, Kartini was familiar with European culture.2" 26 Abendanon and his wife, Rosa Abendanon-Mandri, were a very important couple in Kartini’s life. After their first meeting, Kartini made contact with Mrs.Abendanon, and they exchanged correspondence for four years (1900-1904). Compared to Kartini’s correspondence with her other Dutch fhends, the importance o f this relationship lies in the fact that throughout this period Kartini faced—citing Cote’s words— “the reality o f her future life” where she was culturally and psychologically forced to choose between marriage and reaching her dream o f going to the Nethedands and continuing her studies. At this point Abendanon and his wife played rather conflicting roles. On the one hand, probably because o f Mr. Abendanon’s own political “ethical” ambition, they advised and supported Kartini’s plan to continue her studies in order to ensure both the Dutch government and the native rulers of the importance o f women’s education. On the other hand, it was Mr. Abendanon who, based on political reasons advised Kartini to cancel her study plans, which in turn led Kartini to opt for marriage. However, the Abendanon couple undoubtedly gave much to Kartini’s family as a whole. After the death o f Kartini, Mrs. Abendanon maintained a correspondence with Kartini’s other sisters, Rukmini and Kartinah. They also financially supported Rukmini after her husband’s death, including supporting her stepson during his own course o f study in the Nethedands. r The close association of the Kartini family with European culture began with Kartini’s grandfather, Pangeran Ario Condronegoro. As the bupati o f Kudus (northern part o f central Java) 17 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 30] === This had created high expectations in her that were being frustrated by the cultural restrictions o f Javanese tradition, and she was virtually confined to her home once she had graduated from her European elementary school at the age o f twelve. Through her friendship and correspondence28 with several D utch friends, including Mrs. Abendanon, she w on support for her ambition to ameliorate the social position o f Javanese women in particular, and the lives o f Indonesians in general.29 Kartini was convinced that education and in contrast to other Javanese aristocrats, Tjondrcmegoro was aware o f the importance o f European education for his male children. He invited a Dutch tutor, C.E. van Kesteren (who later became the editor o f the influential journal De Indische Gids), to provide such an education. Later on one o f Condronegoro’s sons Raden Mas Adipati Ario Condronegoro (Kartini’s uncle) replaced him as the Regent o f Kudus. Tjondronegoro was a prolific writer. He published numerous articles on education and on Javanese culture. Another o f Kartini’s uncles, Raden Pangeran Ario Hadiningrat was the Regent o f Demak. He was also known for his ideas on educational reform for Javanese nobility. Although Kartini’s own father was less eminent compared to his two brothers, he nevertheless was a progressive Javanese aristocrat who also paid close attention to educational issues. He not only provided a European education for all o f his children, but also supported for Kartini’s struggle. A description o f Kartini’s family background is given in one o f her letters to Steela Zehandelar dated May 22, 1899. Kartini, On Feminism and Nationalism: Kartini’s Letters to Stella Zeehandelaar 1899-1903, trans. Joost Gate (Victoria: Monash Asia Institute, Monash University, 1995), 28 Before Kartini began her monumental correspondence with Mrs. Abendanon and Stella Zeehandelaar, she already had a few Dutch friends, such as Letsy Detmar, her schoolmate. In 1895, she befriended her tutor in drawing, Mevrouw Ovtnk-Westenenk, which had a significant impact on Kartini’s development. She introduced Kartini to an important European feminist journal o f the time, De HoUandsche Lelie. She also introduced Kartini to Dutch organizations interested in Indonesian issues, such as De Echo and Nederlandsche TaaL Kartini began actively to contribute to these journals by writing articles and letters on women’s and Javanese issues. Kartini’s feminist views and interests developed further in her correspondence with Stella Zeehandelaar, a regular contributor to the De HoUandsche Lelie journal. With the help o f the latter Kartini became acquainted with another Dutch feminist author, Nellie van Kol. Her husband Henry van Kol, a Socialist parliamentary deputy, became an important figure in Kartini’s life, since he was instrumental in Kartini’s effort to obtain a scholarship to study in the Nethedands. In short, as Cote argues the friends o f Kartini were part of a colonial network o f progressive reformists who wanted to change the “nature o f the relationship” between the imperial government and its colonial subjects. Kartini, Lettersfrom Kartini: A n Indonesian Feminist 1900-1904, trans. Joost Cote (Victoria: Monash Asia Institute, Monash University, 1992), xuxv, Kartini, On Feminism and Nationalism, i v - x. 29 According to Cote, Kartini’s letters to Stella Zeehandelaar had four major themes: rejection o f aristocratic or Javanese courtly culture, rejection o f colonialism, reclaiming o f what may be termed “popular Javanese culture,” and a demand for access to progressive western intellectual culture and science. See also Sukanti Suryochondro, Potret Pergerakan Wanita di Indonesia (Jakarta: Penerbit Rajawali, 1984), 72-4. 18 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission of th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 31] === was the m ost effective instrument for improving social conditions, and for obtaining true emancipation for women. Years after Kartini’s death, however, the colonial administration showed still little concern for women’s education. Abendanon noted in one o f his governmental report that even as late as 1913 there was n o t single governm ent school provided for native girls. In Java and on some outer islands o f the archipelago, however, a few schools had been founded independendy by Indonesian women. The m ost active am ong the pioneers was a Sundanese woman, Dewi Sartika (d.1947), w ho established the Keutamaan Istri (Women’s Accomplishment) school, which opened in the very same year that Kartini died. Between then and 1912, Sartika founded nine other schools, a remarkable number for the time.30 The lack o f governmental attention to female education also led Th. Van Deventer to found a system o f girls’ schools in 1912, and these were named Kartini school in memory o f their original inspiration. The first school, intended for the daughters o f higher civil servants, opened in Semarang on 1913. Soon thereafter Kartini schools were opened in Jakarta, Malang and Madiun.31 B. The Women's Organisations The stories o f Kartini, Dewi Sartika and others suggest that any improvement in the status o f Indonesian women had to be accomplished by means o f individual efforts. It was soon realized, however, that to maximize the results it was necessary to work together within 30 Cora Vreede-De Stueis, The Indonesian Woman: Struggles and Achievements (The Hague: Mouton and 's-Gravenhage, 1960), 57-8; Suryochondro, Point Pergerakan. 80-1. For more information on Dewi Sartika see Kowam, Sejarah Setengah Abad Pergerakan Wanita Indonesia (Jakarta; Balai Pus taka, 1978), 10-11. 31 De Stuers, The Indonesian Woman, 59. 19 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 32] === an organization. This strategy was first articulated by Kartini’s three sisters— Rukmini, Kartinah and Sumantne— in a letter sent to several prom inent social figures, including Budi Utomo’s leaders. This letter subsequently appeared in the daily journal De Lacomotief published in Semarang on July 2, 1908, bearing the signature o f the Tiga Sandora (three sisters).32 The letter met with a warm response from nationalists who saw that the emancipation o f women could have positive implications for the anti-colonialist struggle. The Budi Utomo, more than any organization, supported the cause o f women’s rights. With their support the first Indonesian women’s organization, Putri Mardika (The Independent Woman) was founded in 1912. While still emphasizing the cause o f female education, and especially the need to find the financial resources that would enable women to pursue their studies,33 Putri Mardika supported Budi U tomo's emphasis on “cultural reform.” introduced new values, norms and ideas, and challenged w hat had previously been considered culturally inappropriate for women. Naturally it was concerned that women should gradually develop their self-confidence, express their opinions and actively involve themselves in the public domain. But it also addressed such controversial cultural practices as polygamy and child marriages, which had previously been criticized by Kartini. 34 Putri 32 Sucyochondro, Point Pergerakan, 84-5. 33 It is reported that in 1915 Putri Mardika had already obtained full scholarships for two girls in KBS, one in the Dutch school, and three gids in the Kartini school. Ibid. 34 Through a weekly publication called Surat Kabar mtmperhadkan pihak ptrtmpuan burnt putra di Indonesia (A Review Fostering the Interests of Indonesian Woman), these issues were continuouslv discussed. De Stuers has noted that in 1915 two editions were focused on child marriage under the headline “A Custom Which must be Brought to an End.” Another article focused on the issue of polygamy. In the following year, 1916, three volumes were devoted to neglected children and criminal youth. From 1917 to 1918 nine articles were published on the harms of child marriage. Seven editions in 1919 covered the new discourse on Javanese culture as well as a conference held on women’s issues in Paris. De Stuers. The Indonesian Woman, 62. 20 with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 33] === Mardika was a m odem organization equipped with an awareness o f the possibilities o f the print media as a means o f propaganda. The crusade o f Putri Mardika therefore became a part o f the social m om entum being generated by the nationalist press. O ther women’s organizations were invited to join the struggle. In about the same year as Putri Mardika was established, several other women’s organizations were founded both in Java and the outer islands o f the archipelago. Java for example, witnessed, between 1915 and 1920, the foundation o f Pawijatan Wanito (The Educated Woman, 1915) in Magelang, Wanito Hado (The Efficient W oman, 1915) in Jepara, Purborini (1917) in Tegal, Wanita Susilo (The Well-Bred Woman, 1918) in Pemalang, Putri Budi Sejati (The True Girls, 1919) in Surabaya, and Wanito Utomo (The Glorious Woman, 1920) in Yogyakarta.35 Meanwhile in three areas o f West Sumatra, namely, the towns o f Minangkabau, Bukit Tinggi and Padang Panjang, three w om en’s organizations were formed: Kerajinan Amai Satia (Diligence o f Faithful Mother, 1914), Sarekat Kaum Ibu Sumatra (Association o f Sumatra’s W omen, 1920), and Keutamaan Istri Minangkabau (The Accomplishment o f Minangkabau’s Women).36 In 1917, women in Sulawesi, the eastern part o f Indonesia, formed Pengasih Ibu Kepada Anak Turunan (The M other’s Love for Her Offspring) abbreviated as PIKAT.37 Besides these independent women’s organizations, some o f the nationalist movements began to form women’s sections in their organizational structure and invited women to join their membership. Following the example o f Budi Utomo and Putri Mardika, the Muhammadiyah established ‘Aisyivah, in 1917. Three years 35 De Stuers, The Indonesian Woman, 63; Sukanti Survochondro, Potret Pergerakan, 86; The Department of Information Republic o f Indonesia, The Indonesian Women's Movement: A Chronological Survey ofthe Women's Movement in Indonesia (Djakarta: Department o f Information, 1968), 8-10. 16 Ibid. 21 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 34] === later, the Sarekat Islam formed its women’s section, Wanudiyo Utomo. This name was later changed to Sarekat Perempuan Islam Indonesia (SPII). A t the same time m ost o f the nationalist youth movements began to encourage female participation. Youth o f Java (1915), Federation o f the Young People o f Sumatra (1917), Youth o f Minahasa (1918), and Youth o f Ambon (1919) all joined this trend. All o f this was clearly reflected in Adi Negoro’s statem ent that “Soal Kaum ibu lahir di %aman abad ke 20 sebagai adik kandung dari pada soalkebangsaan Indonesid'(Fem inism was bom in the twentieth century as the younger sister o f Indonesian nationalism).31 Simultaneously, another trend strengthened the crusade o f Indonesian women. This was the rise o f w om en’s publications which began to appear in greater volume due to the spread o f education and literacy. These were either published by women themselves o r as independent publications. Besides the Putri Mardika periodical, there were the journals ai Syarq (the East) o f Sarekat Kaum Ibu Sumatra, Suara Penmpuan (The Voice o f Women) in Padang, Penmpuan Bergerak (The Active Woman) in Medan, Wanita Swara (The voice o f Woman) in Pacitan, Panuntun Istri (The Woman’s guidance) in Bandung, and Uteri Utama (The Noble Woman) in Solo. The issues addressed in the journals reflected the concerns o f the various movements: polygamy, child marriage, and female education. The ideas o f independence and anti-colonialism also figured prominendy. Therefore, as modem organizations, the w om en’s associations realized the need for a medium to raise the awareness o f w om en’s social emancipation in a w ider audience, and to develop a network with other organizations. Nevertheless, one reality persisted in the wom en’s movements, just 37 Ibid. 38 De Stuers, The Indonesian W’oman, 66. 22 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 35] === as it did in the nationalist organizations: dependence on the elite, notably those who had benefited from a European education o r belonged to aristocratic families. IV. T he Form ation of ‘Aisyiyah The w om en’s movement grew as an integral part o f the growth o f nationalist awareness. The Budi Utomo’s decision to create Putri Mardika may well have influenced Ahmad Dahlan, w ho was also a Budi Utomo member, to take the same step in establishing ‘Aisyiyah in 1917. At the same time, however, the idea o f ‘Aisyiyah may have had its origins in the activities o f Ahmad Dahlan and his wife Nyai Ahmad Dahlan,39 w ho had been active in women issues since 1914. While developing and spreading the Muhammadiyah movement Ahmad Dahlan devoted some o f his time to teaching a classroom full o f young girls in Kauman. He was very conscious o f the importance o f female education.40 Relying primarily on the help o f his wife, Dahlan decided to increase his efforts by inviting girls to stay in his house in order to benefit from longer hours o f learning. This developed into a M Nyai Ahmad Dahlan (or Sid Walidah) was b o m in 1872 in Kauman Yogyakarta, the same town where Ahmad Dahlan was bom. She was the fourth o f seven children o f Kyai Haji Muhammad Fadhil, a religious official [penghubi) and religious leader in the Sultanate of Yogyakarta. Like others in Kauman, Nyai Ahmad Dahlan’s family was in the batik trade [saudagar batik). Her family background was very much similar to that o f her husband. Nyai Ahmad Dahlan was not the only wife o f Ahmad Dahlan. Ahmad Dahlan was also married Nyai Abdullah, Nyai Rum, Nyai Asiyivah, and Nvai Silihan. It is unclear however, if this involved polygamy or if he was married to them at different times. Nvai Ahmad Dahlan died on May 31,1946. She gave birth to four daughter and two sons. Suratmin, Xjcd Ahmad Dahlan Pahiawan Nasimat Amaldan Perjuangannya (Yogyakarta: Bayu Indra Grafika, 1990), 1729. 40 The first group of school gids were the daughters o f Dahlan’s relatives and friends tn Kauman. They were all associated with the Muhammadiyah, and were only six in number Siti Bariyah, Siti Dawimah, Siti Dalah, Sid Busvto, Sid Wadingah, and Sid Badilah Zuber. This school however steadily grew to become an altemadve for parents who could not send their daughters to government schools (which did not accept female students) or to the European schools (which were reserved tor Dutch and prryayi children). These six giris were trained intensively and were later to form the nucleus o f ‘Aisyiyah. 23 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 36] === girl’s dormitory, the first one in Java. Nyai Ahmad Dahlan was responsible for its management. Dahlan’s aspiration to educate women was expressed further in the formation o f a religious training group for female laborers working in the many batik home industries around Kauman. T he group was know n as Sopo Tresno (Javanese phrase meaning, “anyone who loves”). Its purpose was to encourage women to love learning reading writing as well as studying Islam.41 O n the advice o f Haji Mo 1thtar, a prom inent Muhammadiyah member, Ahmad Dahlan developed Sopo Tresno and his dormitory for girls into a more stable organization, to be known as ‘Aisyiyah. His hope was that it would help the Muhammadiyah by acting as a partner in conveying the Muhammadiyah’s ideas on Islamic reform to women, in particular those dealing with matters o f concern to them. Ideologically, the formation o f ‘Aisyiyah was based on Ahmad Dahlan’s belief that women and men are equal in the eyes o f God; both have the same obligation to society and to serve G o d ’s will,41 which he saw as confirmed in Q.9:71: The Believers, men and wom en, are protectors, one o f a n o th er they enjoin what is just, and forbid what is evil: they observe regular prayers, practice regular charity, and obey G od and His Aposde. O n them will G od pour His mercy: for G od is Exalted in power, Wise.43 41 Noer, "The Rise and Development," 124; Suratrrun, Nyai Ahmad Dahlan, 31; Anfin, Muhammadiyah: Point, 81. 42 Arifin, Muhammadiyah: Point, 82-3; Suratrrun, Nyai Ahmad Dahlan, 72; Baroroh Baned “Islam and the Modernization o f Indonesian women” in Taufik Abdullah and Sharon Siddique, eds., Islam and Society in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute o f Southeast Asian Studies, 1986), 149; Yusuf Abdullah Puar, Perjuangan dan Pengabdian Muhammadiyah (Jakarta: Pus taka Antara, 1989), 233. 43 A. Yusuf Ali, The Holy Q ur’an: Text, Translation and Commentary (Maryland: Amana Cocp, 1983), 461. 24 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission of the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 37] === Under the guidance o f Nyai Ahmad Dahlan, and the organizational supervision o f K.H. Mochtar, nine girls from Dahlan’s girls’ school were selected to manage ‘Aisyiyah and were given specific responsibilities within its organizational structure.44 In terms o f its legal status, the Sopo Tresno and the girls’ dormitory which form ed the embryo o f ‘Aisyiyah were independent bodies belonging solely to Dahlan’s family. Later on, with its formal inauguration, ‘Aisyiyah became a part o f the Muhammadiyah.45 From its establishment in 1917 until 1928, the major concern o f the ‘Aisyiyah was to spread awareness o f its message. Accordingly, the ‘Aisyiyah’s activities during this particular period were carried out in order to introduce the view that Islam regards women as equal to men, both religiously and socially. Like other women’s organizations at that time, the ‘Aisyiyah also advocated cultural reform. Its specific emphasis, however, was the reinterpretation o f existing views, which regarded women as inferior. A. ‘A isyiyah and Other Women's Organisations in Java: A Comparison In the first stage o f its development ‘Aisyiyah’s position am ong other w om en’s organizations was similar to the position o f the Muhammadiyah vis a vis the Budi Utomo. According to Jayawardena, the nationalist m ovement as well as the movements for w om en’s emancipation in most Asian colonies, including Indonesia, were characterized by three com m on elements: first, “the desire to carry out internal reforms in order to modernize their 44 The organizational structure was set up in the following manner: 1) Siti Bariah (chief); 2) Sin Badilah (secretary); 3) Sin Aminah Harawi (finance); 4) Ny.H. Abdullah (staff); 5) Ny. Fatimah Wasaal (staff); 6) Siti Dalalah (staff); 7) Siti Wadingah (staff); 8) Sid Dowunah (staff); 9) Sid Busyro (staff). Suratmin, Syai Ahmad Dahlan, 70. 45 At this stage ‘Aisyiyah was not yet an autonomous otganizadon. It was not until 1936 that ‘Aisyiyah had the right to set up its own programs and acdvides, and have its own basic organizational rules (AD ART) as an autonomous organization within Muhammadiyah. 25 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 38] === societies, with the hope that it will enable them to com bat imperialism; second, the tight against pre-capitalist structure, especially ruling dynasties and religious orthodoxy, that stood in the way o f needed internal reforms; and third, the assertion o f a national identity on the basis o f which people could be mobilized against imperialism.”46 When this perspective is employed in analyzing the Budi Utomo and the Muhammadiyah, it can be seen that while the Budi Utomo challenged Dutch colonialism and the authority o f traditional prijqyis through a fusion o f European and Javanese culture, the Muhammadiyah based its struggle on the values o f Islamic modernism. In short, both o f them struggled against the same problem, but using different approaches. The same tendency can be seen in a comparison between ‘Aisyiyah and other nationalist women’s organizations such as Putri Mardika or Wanita Utomo. All o f these organizations expressed their desire to lead their members in the fight against colonialism and to carry out internal cultural reforms for the purpose o f modernizing society, and especially the position o f women within that society. As mentioned earlier, the latter was manifested primarily in their demand for women’s education, for a better legal position for women, and for changes to the Javanese cultural attitude towards women. They differed, however, in their ideological outlooks. Nationalist w om en’s organizations such as the Putri Mardika, whose pioneers were mostly European-educated, eagerly adopted Western models and strategies in its struggle for cultural reform. In other words, die women in those organizations advocated a form o f “Western feminism.” The ‘Aisyiyah, on the other hand, whose philosophy was Islamic, based its cultural reform on “ m odem interpretation” o f Islamic teachings. Clearly, the ‘Aisyiyah’s wish was to create what 46 Kuiran Jayawerdana, Feminism and NadonaBim in the Third World (London and N'ew Delhi: Zed Book Ltd, 1986), 3. 26 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 39] === it considered the ideal woman according to Islam, in order to replace the Javanese cultural concept which tended to subordinate women. fl. The Symbolic Significance ofthe Name The ‘Aisyiyah’s cultural reform agenda as described above can be seen in many aspects o f its activities during the first ten years after its establishment. Even the use o f the name ‘Aisyiyah indicated its aim o f cultural reform. Derived from the name o f one o f the wives o f the Prophet, ‘A’ishah(d.A.H.58/A.D. 678), the name ‘Asiyiyah was finally selected among several other proposed names.47 It was a reflection o f what the Muhammadiyah idealized in Muslim women; a wife, who is independent and able to be socially active, just like ‘A’ishah. Such an ideology was natural to a culture like that found in Kauman, which was a “matriarchal society” in the sense that women were m ost often the breadwinners.4* Most housewives in Kauman controlled the batik industry along with other home-industries. They were businesswomen and traders. Furthermore, according to Kuntowijoyo’s analysis, the establishment o f ‘Aisyiyah also stood for the role o f m other o r wife, while the Muhammadiyah took the role o f father o r husband. This combination was part o f an effort 47 One o f the names proposed was Fatimah, the name o f the Prophet Muhammad’s daughter. Due to a possible association with the Shi’is this name was dropped. Kuntowijovo “Arah pengembangan Organisasi Islam Indonesia: Kemungkinan-kemungkinannya” in Lies Marcoes and J.H. Meuleman, eds., Wanita Islam Indonesia Dalam Kajian Tekstual Dan Kontekstual, (Jakarta: INIS, 1993), 130; Suratmin, Nyai Ahmad Dahlan, 70. 48 The strong position of women in Laweyan, Kauman, Kota Gede where ‘Aisyiyah was formed and flourished is reflected in the honoric tide “Mbok Mase.” Adopted from Javanese, mbok means “mother” and mase means “the older brother.” This is a paradoxical term {mbok is feminine while mase is masculine and is always associated with the breadwinner) meant to represent the dual function o f women in Laweyan as housewives or mother and at the same time as die breadwinner. See Sudacmono, “Munculnva Kelompok Pedang Batik di Laweyan pada Awal Abad XX,” (M.A. thesis: Universitas Gajah Mada, Yogyakarta, 1987); Kuntowijovo, Arah Pengembangan Organisasi Islam, 130. 27 with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 40] === to maintain the Islamic concept o f ^aa/jah (a pair). In other words, ideologically, the Muhammadiyah and the ‘Aisyiyah were envisioned as m other and father, a family. The family concept embodied here was meant to contrast with that o f a Javanese noble family. where the m other has very little status and the children belong solely to the father.49 Hence, ‘Aisyiyah symbolized an active m other involved in the decision-making process within the family, a clear rejection o f the total obedience expected from a wife in Javanese culture, an idea known as suwarga nunut neraka katut.*0 If the Islamic concept o f family was reflected in the relationship between ‘Aisyiyah and Muhammadiyah, it also signaled changes to Muslim religious culture.51 It established and reserved musalla (an area reserved for prayer smaller than a masjid) for women and run by women. Beginning in 1922, and with the moral support o f Ahmad D ahlan,52 this policy was designed to offer Muslim women the chance to perform religious rituals publicly. The step was taken by ‘Aisyiyah in response to a situation where religious practices, both mu'amalat (social intercourse) and ‘ibadat (ritual), were dominated by men.53 49 Kuntowijovo provided an illustration o f what he perceived as the priyayi family concept, i.e., one that excluded the mother figure. He noted that the divorced wife o f Manglcunegara VII was hired by her former husband to become the babysitter o f her own children. The children were her husband’s children, and their mother no better than a caregiver. Ibid. 50 This term is an expression o f the nonexistence o f women as independent persons. They belong totally to the husband and, therefore, should give them total obedience. Even if their husbands should be condemned to hell, the wives were expected to accompany them. 51 ‘Aisyiyah programs o f cultural reform, according to Federspiel, were part o f the effort of the Muhammadiyah to put Islam above tadat. Howard M. Federspiel, “The Muhammadiyah: A Study o f An Orthodox Islamic Movement In Indonesia,” Indonesia 10 (October 1970): 74. 5- The establishment of the first women’s mosque was a unique occurrence in Java, where previously there had been no such tradition. This institution, however, rapidly spread. Bv the early 1930s for instance, the ‘Aisyiyah had established a number o f women’s mosques. For example Garut, West Java, built such a mosque in 1924, followed by Acceh in 1928. Arifin, Sluhammadiyat. Point, 84; Pimpinan Pusat ‘Asiyiyah, Sejarah Ptrtumbuhan dan Perktmbangan 'Aisyiyah (Jakarta: Seksi Penerbitan dan Publikasi Pimpinan Pusat ‘Aisyiyah, 1992), 30. 28 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 41] === T he religious concerns o f the ‘Aisyiyah, as embodied in it’s call for a women’s mosque, it’s suggestion that the veil be worn, and its campaign for more extensive religious training, enabled Muslim women to participate more publicly in religious life. The importance o f ‘Aisyiyah in this regard is evident from Pijper’s observation in 1934: “The Muslim w om en’s movement in the last ten years has revealed what religious energy lay hidden in the heart o f Indonesian women, especially those o f lower and middle classes; this movement increased their religious consciousness and their knowledge o f the religion.”54 Through Suara ‘A isyiyah, a monthly periodical first published in 1926, the ‘Aisyiyah further strengthened its efforts in expressing its Muslim identity. In quite a short period o f time, therefore, ‘Aisyiyah emerged as the foremost m odem Muslim w om en’s organization within the context o f the resurgence o f Indonesian women. W hat made it distinct, however, was n o t simply the tact that it was genuinely a Muslim organization. Rather, in contrast to other w om en’s associations which represented the priyayi, the presence o f ‘Aisyiyah was an articulation o f the resurgence o f the middlelower class, o r to use De Stuers’s terminology, the “petite bourgeoisie,” just another analogy o f the Muhammadiyah and Budi Utomo. 53 Lies Marcos-N'atsir,” Antara Amal Dan Tuntutan Profesional ‘Aisyiyah’ in Mayling OevGardiner, Mildred Wagemann, Evelyn Suleeman and Sulastri, eds., Penmpuan Indonesia Dulu dan Kini (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1996), 163. 54 G-F. Pijper, Fragmenta Islamica (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1934), 27 as cited by De Stuers in The Indonesian Woman, 66. 29 with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 42] === CH A PTER TWO ‘AISYIYAH IN T H E PR E- AND POST- IN D EPEN D EN C E PERIO D This chapter will discuss the developm ent o f ‘Aisyiyah during the pre- independence period, which covered the years o f 1920s —1945, and the post-independence period, which includes the Old O rder government o f 1945 —1965 under the leadership o f Sukarno. Each o f these periods reflects the different positions o f ‘Aisyiyah compared with those o f other women. Yet in general, this organization shared in comm on the same features as those o f other women organizations, which were largely influenced by the nation’s political situation. Pre-Independence A. Organisational Development of Aisyiyah ‘Aisyiyah’s expansion in the first decade o f its existence depended primarily on the decision o f its parent body, the Muhammadiyah. At the 11* annual Muhammadiyah meeting held in 1922, for example, Ahmad Dahlan encouraged all branches o f the organization to establish a local ‘Aisyiyah section. In this way, ‘Aisyiyah began to expand geographically, not only in Java but also on other islands, just as the Muhammadiyah had done previously. By 1940, there were 546 branches o f ‘Aisyiyah in existence, spread throughout Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi. In spite o f this broad distribution, however, it should be noted that the leadership o f the m ovem ent remained largely in the hands o f Ahmad Dahlan’s family and triends, in particular the six Kauman girls tfom Ahmad Dahlan’s girls’ school, who were trained to assume leadership post in ‘Aisyiyah.1 In ‘During the pre-independence period (1917-1944) the leadership o f ‘Aisyiyah was concentrated in four individuals: 1) Banyah (the first leader o f ‘Aisyiyah) who was elected for three successive years (1917-1920) and for two more years (1927-1929); 2) N'yai Ahmad Dahlan, who headed ‘Aisyiyah during the period o f 1921-1926, and then was re-elected in 1930; 3) Siti Munjiah, 30 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 43] === other words, the nationwide character o f ‘Aisyiyah’s support base was n o t reflected in the leadership structure. During this period, ‘Aisyiyah’s status was still far from that o f an autonomous organization within the Muhammadiyah. Although already forming a section within the Muhammadiyah in 1923, it was no t until 19362 that the organizational-legal basis o f ‘Aisyiyah was established, which formally regulated its competency and its operational sectors. Yet even at this stage, except in the case o f detailed operational matters, ‘Aisyiyah’s activities were still directed by the Muhammadiyah. B. The Activities o f Aisyiyah: The Rtiigous Call and Education In analyzing ‘Aisyiyah’s activities throughout this particular p e rio d —and in the following period as well—one flnds that the majority o f them had a lot in com m on with the activities o f other w om en’s organizations. Indeed, w hat ‘Aisyiyah began to undertake in this phase included “the central activities,” such as preaching Islam, the provision o f education and the erection o f social infrastructures, which lent it the character o f a socio-religious organization. This statement could be best explained by the fact that until recent times, ‘Aisyiyah has consistently carried out these activities, and continues to develop them in order to keep pace with rapid social change. who held ‘Aisyiyah's leadership for four years (1932-1936); and 4) ‘Aisyah Hilal (the daughter o f Ahmad Dahlan, who was elected for the first time in 1931, and was then re-elected to lead ‘Aisvivah from 1939 to 1944. Pimpinan Pusat ‘Aisyiyah, Sejanh Pertumbuhan and Perkembangan ‘Aisyiyah (Yogyakarta: Seksi Penerbitan dan Publikasi Pimpinan Pusat ‘Aisyiyah, 1992), 125-126. 1 This regulation, which was entitled Kaidah Muhammadiyah Bagian 'Aisyiyah (Muhammadiyah Regulation o f the ‘Aisyiyah Section) was formally introduced at the 25th Muhammadiyah congress in 1936. This regulation stated that ‘Aisyiyah is responsible for managing women’s schools and mosques, for providing religious guidance to all female members o f the Muhammadiyah and for training young women members. Asri Mawadah, “Sejarah Awal ‘Aisyiyah,” (B.A. thesis, IAIN Yogyakarta, 1988), 63. 31 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 44] === From its beginnings, religious preaching was the main focus o f ‘Aisyiyah. Programs such as the building o f women’s mosques, the celebration o f Islamic events, establishing religious training classes for women,1 and the training and sending o f muballigkat (Islamic preachers) to remote areas, were among the tasks that received the m ost attention.The founding o f educational institutions, which formed another o f the core activities o f ‘Aisyiyah was also one o f the organization’s main vehicles for transmitting religious education. Indeed, as was noted in the previous chapter, education in this period was seen by w om en’s m ovem ent as the only means o f achieving such progress, and o f solving the problem o f backwardness.4 According to McCormack, just like other organizations, ‘Aisyiyah adopted the Muhammadiyah position favoring the modem and western style o f education. It differed however, in terms o f placing an emphasis on the importance o f balancing— o r in McCormack word’s “bridging the gap” between— m odem education and religious instruction.5 It was dear from the position o f ‘Aisyiyah (and the Muhammadiyah) that they both saw education as part o f an effort at maintaining their identity as m odem Muslim organizations. 3 Inspired by Sopo Tresno (a religious group for women workers discussed above in chapter 1), ‘Aisyiyah formed a religious training in l919for women, called Wa al-‘A sr (adopted from the name of a sura o f the Qur’an, but also referring to the time when this activity was held namely after the 'asr (afternoon) prayer). Besides studying Islamic teachings, the participants were encouraged to save some money daily, for which this group acted as a bank. Anyone who wanted to close their account would be encouraged to give some o f their money to the ‘Aisyiyah. It was an effective way to collect funds for the organization, which were used for many activities. Ibid, 73-74; Abdul Munir Mulkhan, Pemikinm fLH. Ahmad Dahlan dan Muhammadiyah Dalam Perspective Perubahan Social (Jakarta: Bumi Aksara, 1990), 32. 4 The ability to read, made even more possible by the Dutch under their Ethical Polioallowed natives to compare their conditions to people in other countries, especially those in West..As result, they became aware that their people were left behind those in the west who were more educated and more knowledgeable. Justine Doom McCormack, “Organizing Women In Indonesia: The Language o f Women’s Organizations 1909-1930 And 1990-1996,” (M. A. thesis, Arizona State University, 1998), 35-44. 32 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 45] === Among the ‘Aisyiyah schools established in this period was a kindergarten school Founded in 1919 and called Frobel, it was am ong the first kindergartens established and managed by the native people o f Indonesia. A nother school that came into existence at about the same time was Kweekschool Muhammadiyah Istri (Muhammadiyah’s School for Female Teachers), established in 1923. A t the time both o f these schools were reserved for female students. Later on, the Frobel school was to become co-educational, although the Kweekschool Muhammadiyah Istri has continued to be reserved for female students until the present The foundation o f the Kweekschool Muhammadiyah Istri led to the formation o f other important organs within ‘Aisyiyah. In 1930, the ‘Aisyiyah’s congress was held in Bukit Tinggi, West Sumatra, where the idea to develop an organization for students o f the Kweekschool was put forward. The organization, known as Siswo Proyo Wanito, was expected to serve as a medium for students to develop their intellect and skills, while at the same time fiinctioning as a factory for producing ‘Aisyiyah cadres.6 In 1931, Siswo Proyo Utomo was renamed as Nasyiatul ‘Aisyiyah, and the group retooled as a youth section o f ‘Aisyiyah, which remains active to this day. Above all, in terms o f its activities, the 1930 ‘Aisyiyah congress decided on the formation o f five sections within ‘Aisyiyah which were to be responsible for different activities, i.e.: Siswo Proyo Wanito, responsible for the development o f the youth o f the organization; the Madrasah section, which was to manage all ‘Aisyiyah’s schools; Tabfigb, supposed to deal with all matters concerning the Islamic call: Wa 5 Ibid. 47. 6 One o f the results o f the 21st ‘Aisyiyah congress held in 1932 in Makassar (the area nowknown as Ujung Pandang) was a suggestion that all ‘Aisyiyah branches should establish Sisuo Pnyo Wanito. It was hoped that the members o f this organization would be able to deliver the Islamic call to their society, propagating Islam to the people around them, which would in turn enable them to 33 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 46] === al-A pi, which was expected to raise grants for needy students in ‘Aisyiyah’s school; and the al-Dhakirat section, which was responsible fo r collecting funds for the organization.7 The nation-wide base o f ‘Aisyiyah popularized these activities at every level and throughout the country. Indeed, once a program was approved by an ‘Aisyiyah congress, each branch o f the organization was obliged to implement it. These activities served a dual function, for while they constituted ‘Aisyiyah’s main contribution to the society, they were also a means o f socializing and o f proliferating ‘Aisyiyah itself. In addition, the strong message o f nationalism was also another feature o f ‘Aisyiyah activities during this particular period. After the 1928 Youth Congress which produced the Sumpah Pemuda (Youth Pledge),* the Muhammadiyah and ‘Aisyiyah tried explicitly to conform to its spirit. The first manifestation o f this policy was the decision to change o f the names o f all Muhammadiyah and ‘Aisyiyah schools, sections or activities into Indonesian o r Arabic terms, rather than Dutch, in the hope that these names would clearly reflect their identity as Indonesian as well as their status as Muslim organizations at the same nme.9 establish an ‘A isyiyah branch in their own milieu. ‘Aisyiyah. "Persidangan Tertoetoep Didalam Congres Besar ‘Aisyiyah ke 21 Di Makasser," [n.d.], 180. Pusat Pimpinan ‘Aisyiyah, Sejarah Pertumbuban dan Perkembangan, 41-2; Suratmin, Xyai Ahmad Dahlan Pahlawan Nastonab A n a l Dan Perjuangannya (Yogyakarta: Bayu Indra Grafika, 1990/, 85. 8 In October 1928, an Indonesian Youth Congress was held in Jakarta. Still in the context o f nationalism, the congress, which was organized for the purpose o f creating “Indonesian Unity,” produced a monumental agreement generally known as the Sumpah Pemuda (Youth Pledge). This pledge consisted o f three ideals: one fatherland, Indonesia; one nation, Indonesia; and one language, Bahasa Indonesia. 9 As a result o f this policy the name o f Frobel was replaced by Bus tan al-Atfal (an Arabic translation o f kindergarten, written in the Indonesian language as Bustanul Atfhal), while the Kweekschool Muhammadiyah Istri was renamed as Madrasah Mu’allimat. In the Muhammadiyah itself, the “Indonesianization” was more deariv reflected. For instance, N'ormaalschool, Schakdschool, MULO, and AMS respectively renamed as Sekolah Guru Muhammadiyah, Sekolah Sambungan Muhammadiyah, Sekolah Pertengahan Muhammadiyah I, and Sekolah Pertengahan Muhammadiyah II. Most importantly, beginning in 1938 with the Angganm Dasar (Organizational 34 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 47] === A nother step was the decision to adopt Bahasa Indonesia as the official language for all ‘Aisyiyah congresses, publications and organizational documentation. ‘Aisyiyah furthermore ordered its branches to include training o f Bahasa Indonesia in their activities. Thus, in a similar manner to o ther women’s organizations, and in keeping with its own agenda as a Muslim organization, ‘Aisyiyah spent the pre-independence period trying to ameliorate the position o f women. This was manifested clearly in ‘Aisyiyah’s contribution to providing for female education, albeit with a strong Islamic element. Another way it achieved this was through participating in the spread o f nationalist and anti-colonialist sentiment. In addition, benefiting from the spread o f the Muhammadiyah, ‘Aisyiyah enjoyed a wide audience which helped it form a broad base, something that few o f the other w om en’s organizations could claim. O n e could argue that this last point added to its nationalist credentials. C 'Aisyiyah and Other Women's Organisations: A Comparison ofIdeas on Socio- Religions Reform As the 1920s witnessed the resurgence o f the Indonesian w om en’s movement through the birth o f several new w om en’s associations, w hether along religious, regional or nationalist lines, the idea o f unifying the movement became an im portant part its agenda. In other words, the whole idea o f nationalism as the driving ideology o f the time had led to the need for bridging the differences between the movements, which in turn would enable women to develop a sense o f togetherness and thus allow them to participate in the struggle for independence. Particularly, the sense o f national unity expressed in the Sumpah Pemuda (Indonesian Youth Pledge) o f O ctober 1928, inspired the women’s organizations to Basic Regulation) o f Muhammadiyah, the name Indonesia replaced that o f Hindia Beianda (the name o f Indonesia under Dutch colonialism). Abdul Munir Muikhan, Pemikiran Ahmad DahLm, 38. 35 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 48] === consolidate their efforts and to cooperate more hilly. In addition, according to Douglas, the idea o f cooperation as a means to “achieve more autonomy and influence” was derived horn the fact that while these organizations clearly represented nationalist sentiments, their role was unfortunately regarded as “subsidiary.”10 To correct this perception, three prominent w om en," and seven major women organizations (Wanita Utomo, Wanita Taman Siswa, Puteri Indonesia, ‘Aisyiyah, Wanita Katolik, the women’s section o f Jong Islamieten Bond, and the women’s section o f Jong Java), joined forces to hold the first Kongres Wanita Indonesia (Indonesian W omen’s Congress) in Yogyakarta, December 2 2 -26,1928.12 Attended by thirty women’s associations, this congress represented a turning point in the history o f the women’s movem ent in Indonesia, as it laid the foundation for its development. A t a time when— according to Douglas— “the only test o f the legitimacy o f each organization came to be whether that organization was committed to the overarching goal o f nationalism,” the importance o f this congress lay in its contribution to legitimizing the role o f w om en’s organizations within the nationalist movement, and therefore, as full partners in the whole political process. 10 Stephen A. Douglas, “Women in Indonesian Politics: The Myth o f Functional Interest” in Sylvia A. Chipp and Justin J. Green, eds., Asian Women in Transition, (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University, 1980), 160. 11 They were: 1) Mrs. Soekonto, head at a Dutch-Native school and a member o f Wanita the Utomo Committee; 2) Mrs. Suwardi, the wife o f Ki Hadjar Dewantoro (the founder o f Taman Siswa); and 3) Miss Soejadn, a head mistress at Taman Siswa and member o f the Putn Indonesia Committee. Cora Vreede-De Stuers, The Indonesian Woman: Struggles and Achievement (Hague: Mouton and Co-'s-Gravenhage, 1960), 89. 12 Sukanb Survochondro, Point Pergerakan Wanita di Indonesia (Jakarta: Rajawali, 1984), 89; De Stuers, The Indonesian Woman, 89; Kowani, Sejarah Setengah Ahad Pergerakan Wanita Indonesia (Jakarta: Balai Pus taka, 1978), 29; Ani Idrus, Wanita Duh, Sekarang Dan Esok ( Medan: Waspada, 1980), 50; Department O f Information Republik o f Indonesia, The Indonesian Women’s Xloiements: A Chronological Survey o f the Women’s Movements in Indonesia, (Jakarta: Department o f Information, 1968), 11; Kuman Jayawardena, Feminism And Sectionalism in the Third World (New Delhi: Zed Books, 1986), 150. 36 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 49] === For ‘Aisyiyah, the importance o f this congress lies in the fact that it marked a further stage in the development o f the organization. For nine years (1917-1928) the organization had concentrated largely on internal matters. In fact, the involvement o f ‘Aisyiyah in this congress was the first formal organizational contact with other women’s organizations. It therefore, inaugurated ‘Aisyiyah’s participation in the nationalist movement and its reception into part o f the network o f Indonesian women’s organizations. It was hard to argue that the congress conveyed any specific political message- The fundamental issues addressed within the congress were hardly political in nature. Rather, the major focus was on the issues o f female education and family law, i.e., the position o f w om en in marriage law and the issue o f child marriage,13 which had basically been the main concern o f the women’s movem ent from the beginning. Two well-known lawyers were invited to speak on the legal position o f women: R. Supomo, who spoke from the perspective o f customary law, and Ali Sosroamidjojo, w ho approached the issue from the point o f view o f Islamic law. Among others, the issue o f polygamy seems to have attracted considerable attention due to its controversial and debatable nature, and the fact that it “divided” women into two groups. Wieringa describes the debate thus: The Christian organization, and the non-religious organization on the one hand, and the Islamic w om en’s group on the other hand, however, were deeply and decisively divided on a central issue: polygamy. The Christian and non religious wom en’s organization saw polygamy as an unpardonable humiliation for women, against which they actively fought; the Islamic w om en’s organization only wanted to improve the conditions under which polygamy was allowed to occur, not to abolish the institution itself.1* 13 A comprehensive and insightful study o f the issue o f child marriage in Indonesia has been conducted by Susan Blackburn and Sharon Bessel, and reported on in their article “ Marriageable Age: Political Debates On Eariv Marriage in Twentieth Centurv Indonesia,” Indonesia 63 (April 1997): 107-141. 14 Saskia Wierenga, The Perfumed Nightman: Some Notes on The Indonesian Women VMovements (Hague: Institute o f Social Studies Working Paper, 1985), 8-9. 37 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 50] === ‘Aisyiyah was am ong the Islamic groups that expressed their disagreement w ith the demand to abolish polygamy during the Congress. In a speech delivered by Siti Munjiyah, an ‘Aisyiyah representative, enhded “Derajat Penmpuan” (The Status o f Women), she argued that while ‘Aisyiyah did n o t encourage the practice o f polygamy, it disagreed with any move to eradicate it, since it was justified by Islamic teaching. 15 Munjiyah further maintained that marriage was the only institution that placed w om en in a respectable position in society, and therefore, polygamy was a better solution than the practice o f prostitution o r illicit polygamy which, in her view, degraded women to the status o f mere sexual objects.16 In spite o f the divergent positions taken by participants on the polygamy issue, the Congress ended with an agreement on to found the Perikatan Perhimpoenan Istri Indonesia (Federation o f Indonesian Women), usually abbreviated as PPII. With its main agenda being “to improve the social position o f women and family life as a whole,” the PPII immediately sent to the governm ent three principal requests decided on by delegates: an increase in the num ber o f girls’ schools; the institutionalization o f ta'fiq talaq, and the provision o f assistance to widows and the orphans o f Indonesian civil servants.1 A w om an’s legal position in marriage, child mamage and female education continued to be the major concerns o f the PPII a t the subsequent annual meetings o f 1929, 15 The original text is as follows: “...(if you wonder} why Islam legalizes polygamy and gives the right o f divorce into the hand of men (husband)? Does it mean that Islam subordinates women? If you do have such questions, we would like to answer by a question in return: “Is there any benefit for women in being prostitutes or illiddv poligamized rather than by being legally married? Do not misunderstand; if we have this question in mind it does not mean that we support the practice o f polygamy or encourage men to perform it...” Pimpinan Pusat ‘Aisyiyah, Sejamh Pertumbuhan dan Perktmbangan, 159-60; Suratrrun, Nyai Ahmad Dahlan ), 124. 16 Ibid. 38 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 51] === 1930, 1932 and 1933. At the same time, the polemic on polygamy had already become part o f the “national” debate, which motivated many elements o f society, including male nationalist figures, to voice their opinions. This tendency may explain Jayawardena’s claim “that monogamy, education, and freedom o f m ovem ent for women were seen as marks o f modernity, development and civilization, and therefore, the reformers tried to embody these factors in their political platform and activities.” 1' A m ong others, the m ost radical and “uncompromising approach” to the issue was expressed by Istri Sedar, a newly founded women’s association.19 In January 1931, Istri Sedar, under the leadership o f Suwami Pringgodigdo, participated in the Congress o f Asian W omen held in Lahore where a resolution in favor o f the abolition o f polygamy was passed.10 In the wake o f this decision, Istri Sedar drew further attention at its meeting held in June 1931 in Jakarta to Mustapha Kemal’s abolition o f polygamy in Turkey, and called for the same policy to be applied in Indonesia. In an article entitled “The Question o f Polygamy,” Pringgodigdo explicitly rejected all forms o f polygamy and argued that “the 17 De Stuers, The Indonesian Woman, 89; Jayawardena, Feminism and Nationalism, 150; Kowani, Sejarah Setengah Abad, 35. 11Jayawardena, Feminism and Nationalism, 12. 19 Established in Bandung in 1930, Istri Sedar showed itself to be a women’s organization o f critical importance. Through its journal entitled Sedar (Alert), this association struggled for the improvement o f women in all classes o f society, especially working class women, and insisted on the adoption of a “national education policy” to serve the needd o f masses. Most o f the members belonged to Partai National Indonesia (PNI/Indonesian National Party); a nationalist political party established by Sukarno, who was arrested in 1929. This background led Istri Sedar to express its political interest at its congress in 1932 where it demanded women’s participation in politics. This organization also harshly criticized the male nationalist organization, which, considered the women’s movement as subordinate to the nationalist movement. Suwarsih Djovoseputro, the first leader o f Istn Sedar even called this tendency “tyrannizing” women. Jayawardena, Feminism and Nationalism, 151-2; De Stuers, The Indonesian Woman, 91-92; Saskia Wieringa, “The Politicization o f Gender Relation in Indonesia; The Indonesian Women’s Movement and Gerwani Until the New Order State” (Ph.D. dissertation, University o f Amsterdam, 1995), 78. 39 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 52] === Indonesian w om an has a right to justice and independence, and polygamy is the very denial o f justice and independence.”21 Furthermore, the refusal on the part o f Istri Sedar to join the PPII may have been based on the assumption that, as a federation o f various organizations, the PPII could hardly “take a decisive step” on the issue o f polygamy. A week after the Istri Sedar meeting referred to above, a counter—argument was offered by various Muslim associations. At a meeting organized by the Jakarta branch o f Sarekat Istri (the women’s section o f Sarekat Islam) many Muslim w om en’s associations protested against Istri Sedar’s support for the resolution to abolish polygamy at the Lahore W omen’s Conference. Slightly different views on polygamy, however, were noticeable within the religious groups themselves. The Young Muslim’s Association, for instance, expressed a “m odem interpretation” o f the issue. O ne o f its members, Soepinah Isti Kastiati, put forward the view that in practice polygamy “has become nothing other than disguised prostitution.”22 She therefore argued that, based o n the spirit o f Islam, the practice should be abolished. She called for a further and more thorough study o f Islam in order to find “the best way to contend with polygamy.”22 In response to this polemic, ‘Aisyiyah maintained its traditional position. Using the same argument as stated by Munjiyah at the first congress— the 1932 ‘Aisyiyah annual meeting in Bukit Tinggi, West Sumatera— the organization continued to reject demands to 20 Besides Istri Sedar, PPII also sent delegates to this congress. De Stuers, The Indonesian Woman, 91; Jayawardena, Feminism and Nationalism, 152. 21 De Stuers, The Indonesian Woman, 107. 22 This opinion was expressed in her article in the |oumai o f the Youth Muslim Association, E l Fadjar. Ibid, 105. 22 Ibid. 40 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 53] === abandon polygamy.24 A t a time w hen polygamy was seen as the ultimate symbol o f women’s oppression, such a position invited bitter criticism. It was no surprise that Istri Sedar was among those who strongly opposed ‘Aisyiyah’s views. This organization even went so far as to condemn the practice o f sex segregation observed by ‘Aisyiyah at alm ost every meeting in which male members o f the Muhammadiyah were present.25 This practice, according to Istri Sedar representatives, was a clear indication that Islam subordinated women. In feet, ‘Aisyiyah’s position on polygamy was representative o f the Muhammadiyah’s attitude toward women. According to Federspiel, while the Muhammadiyah expended every effort to encourage the social involvement o f women, it also maintained the opinion that both women and men hold different roles, and that a w om an’s role is m ore limited than that o f a man.26 In this way, com pared to other Muslim organizations, the Muhammadiyah's attitude toward women may be regarded as liberal, but “it was not liberal at all for secularist group. »»27 24 It should be noted that some o f ‘Aisyiyah’s members did not favor polygamy. Wieringa recorded in her interview with Mrs.Mangunpuspito (leader o f the Masyumi women’s branch and a former member o f ‘Aisyiyah) and Hayinah Mawardi (three times elected as ‘Aisyiyah leader) that personally they never accepted the idea o f polygamy. The only reason they “excused” it was the fact that Islam permits this institution. Wieringa, “The Politicization o f Gender,” 81. 25 This separation was originally advocated by ‘Aisyiyah in response to the events that occurred in Bengkulu on January 21,1939. On this occasion, Sukarno (the Indonesian first president) left in the middle o f meeting held by the Muhammadiyah due to the use o f a curtain {tabit), which separated women and men and prevented them from seeing each other. Sukamo regarded this practice as a symbol o f women’s slavery. Eventually, Sukarno’s behavior caused many adverse comments from many Muslim leaders. However, an effort to accommodate this opinion was made by the Muhammadiyah and ‘Aisyiyah in that they no longer used the curtain, but stall maintained die segregation o f the sexes. CT~M. Penders, The Life And Times O f Sukarno (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1974), 34; M.T. Anfin, Muhammadiyah: Point Yang Berubah (Surakarta: Insntut Gelanggang Pemikiran Filsafat Sosial Budaya dan Kependidikan Surakarta, 1990), 84. 26 Howard M. Federspiel, “The Muhammadiyah: A Study o f an Orthodox Islamic Movements in Indonesia,” in Indonesia 10 (October 1970). 27 Ibid. 41 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 54] === O n the other hand, the slighdy “ambiguous” view o f the Muhammadiyah and ‘Aisyiyah on women’s issues can be traced to their expansion into other regions where they had to make certain adjustments to their programs in order to be in harmony with local custom. In some cases, the adjustments were made in direct response to the complaints o f local religious leaders about the Muhammadiyah’s decisions on certain issues, for example, such as those made at the congress held in Bukit Tinggi, March 14-21, 1930. This congress noted the harsh debate concerning the presence o f female speakers in a mixed audience between Kyai Haji Mas Mansur, a leader o f Central Board o f the Muhammadiyah from Java, and Haji Abd al- Karim ‘Amrullah, a leader o f the local branch o f the organization. Convinced that it violated ‘adat boundaries and was also forbidden in Islam (haram), ‘Amrullah showed his antagonism toward the ‘Aisyiyah practice o f allowing its members to speak in front o f a mixed audience.28 Mas M ansur held a different point o f view and did not agree with the textual evidence with which Amrullah backed up his judgment. His concern for the spread o f the Muhammadiyah, coupled with his respect for the local leader, however, did not allow him to reject outright Amrullah’s ideas. Finally, they were able to agree that it was makruh (not recommended) in Islam for women to speak in public when men are present. In keeping with this agreement, the speech o f the ‘Aisyiyah’s representative to the congress was canceled. 28 In his book “Cermin Terus” Amrullah further explained the position o f women in Islam, in which he presented his views on ‘Aisyiyah’s other activities that encouraged the public appearance o f women, such as performing Id prayer in the field (in Indonesia the idea o f performing *Id prayer in a field, not in a mosque, was largely known as one o f the Muhammadiyah’s distinctive practices), and for making trips without muhrim. This book also deals with some details concerning women, ranging from the appropriate length o f women’s clothes to a woman’s position in marriage. Hamka, Ayahku (Jakarta: Penerbit Widjaya, 1950), 121-122; Taufik Abdullah, School and Politics: The Kaum Muda Movement in West Sumatra 1927-1933 (Ithaca: Cornell Modem Indonesian Project, South Asian Program, Cornell University, 1971), 93. 42 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 55] === Such cases suggest that in its effort to arrive at an interpretation o f Islam that liberated women, die Muhammadiyah was unable to change fully the existing views concerning women, w hether cultural o r religious. Consequently, its modernist outlook, in the sense that the Muhammadiyah was trying to make Islam compatible with social advances, encountered an ‘unwelcome’ response from both religious and secularist groups. The religious groups considered the Muhammadiyah’s position as amounting to a form o f rationalization o r even a de-sacralization o f Islam, while the secularist groups regarded religion as a barrier to reform and social change. The Muhammadiyah’s position in this respect was mirrored in the experience o f ‘Aisyiyah. The continuing debate on polygamy, as discussed above, implied that the congress in particular, and the Indonesian women’s movement in general, were more concerned with family law, i.e., w om en’s legal rights, rather than other issues.29 This tendency reflected and represented the ideological basis o f the women’s movement in Indonesia, at least until the The PPII was short lived. At the second Indonesian Women’s Congress, which took place in Jakarta on July 20-24, 1935, it was decided that the congress should be a permanent institution, under the name Kongress Wanita Indonesia (unabbreviated). This institution was a representative body linking all Indonesian women’s organizations that would hold regular meetings. Due to the Japanese occupation, this group only succeeded in holding two further congresses during the pre independence penod, in 1938 and 1941. In the meantime, while the issue o f the legal position o f women still attracted considerable attention, other issues were gradually introduced and formally set up as a program. Three o f the most important included the struggle to combat illiteracy, the effort to improve the legal position o f women workers (kaum buruh) and the right to vote. The issue o f the right to vote could be considered as the first explicit demand by women for full participation in the political arena. In fact, the demand itself, which was first heard at the 1938 congress, was an appositive reaction toward a governmental policy stating that Indonesian women had “die right of eligibility to certain elective offices” (“passive suffrage”), but did not have the right to vote (“active suffrage”). Coupled with their disappointment over the 1935 proposal, a protest meeting attended by eighteen women’s associations was held to express their concern over the issue. At the next congress, held in Semarang on July 1941, the political interests o f women were further manifested by the decision o f the congress to work actively toward founding an Indonesian parliament, whereby women had the full right to vote and be selected for public office. These political activities, however, in no way mean that political issues distracted the women’s movement from other issues, and family law in particular. Barbara N\ Ramisack, “Women in South East Asia” in Barbara N. Ramusack and Sharon Sievers, eds., Women in Asia: Restoring Women's History, (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1999), 100-103; De Stuers, The Indonesian Woman, 95. 43 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 56] === N ew O rder period. In other words, as Wahidah Zein argues, while there was an acknowledgment o f the need on the part o f women to be educated and participate in society, their primary role was nonetheless that o f “a m other.”50 The strong sense that m otherhood is a w om an’s chief role was reflected in the establishment o f H ari Ibu (Mother’s Day) which is celebrated each year on December 22, in commemoration o f the first Congress. An essay that won the first prize in a competition held in honor o f M other’s Day reflects this idea: Today we celebrate Mother’s Day in order to extol...the merit o f women in so far as she is a m other to her children, to her husband, and to society. It is to m other the task o f managing the household budget falls; it is she who raises and cares tor the children, who guards the welfare o f the family and dedicates herself to the interest o f society...It is the m other w ho gives form and character to the community, for she is the one w ho prepares the children to become its worthy m em bers...This date, Decem ber 22, 1928, is looked upon as the day on which the Indonesian woman became fully aware o f her lot, her duties, her position and her part in society.31 T he ideal o f motherhood also finds its place in Jayawardena’s theory. She believes that the w om en’s movement emerged in many Asian countries once they had experienced “the era o f imperialist and capitalist expansion.”12 With time, as in foe case o f Indonesia, it became an integral part o f each nationalist movement. In this context, foe question o f the role and status o f women emerged as an important issue. From foe perspective o f the colonial authorities, “local women had to be educated to be good wives and mothers to the professional and white-collar personnel who were being trained to man o f foe colonial economy.”11 For the male nationalist reformers who tried to modernize and civilize their 30 Wahidah Zein, “Feminism in Indonesia: A Movement Between The West and The Muslim Society” in Jumal Studi Indonesia 8 (August 1998): 48. See also Kathy Robinson, “Kartmi’s Vision and foe Position o f Indonesian Women” Mankind 17 (April 1987): 104-105. 31 De Stuers, The Indonesian Woman, 90. 32Jayawardena, Feminism and Nationalism, 8. 33 Ibid. 44 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 57] === society, on the other hand, women were an essential com ponent o f this effort and needed to be as educated and “adequately” westernized as themselves, in order to be “civilized housewives and m others” for the next generationw It is apparent that the women’s movem ent in Indonesia, in which ‘Aisyiyah took part, was n o t an exception to this rule. D. The Japanese Occupation 1942-1945: The Yean ofSilence The Dutch surrender to the Japanese on March 8, 1942 was another pivotal juncture in Indonesian history as it marked the beginning o f the Japanese military occupation o f the country. Their promise o f Asian brotherhood, as explicitly stated in their slogan “we come as an older brother,” along with their anti-Western propaganda, enabled them to succeed in mobilizing and politicizing the masses. Indeed, at an early point in Japan’s occupation, most Indonesians o f almost all backgrounds conceived o f them as “liberators” who had brought the dream o f independence closer and made it more tangible.35 Soon, however, the true nature o f the Japanese occupation began to manifest itself. Even as early as 1942, the military authorities began controlling political organizations and put pressure on the growing nationalist sentiment. The first step they took was to dissolve all nationalist and religious organizations, including women’s groups, and put in their place a M Ibid. 35 Besides these promises, on a practical level there were certain other factors which neutralized Indonesian suspicions. Kahin mentions some o f them: they had very few military personnel, which forced them to offer opportunities to Indonesian to fill their administrative posts. The contacts that Japan made with the Indonesian Muslim groups, especially since the M.I.A.I (Great Islamic Council of Indonesia) confess, October 1939 — which Japanese representatives attended— was also another reason to welcome Japanese overiordship. George McTuman Kahin, Nationalism and Reivlution in Indonesia (Itacha: Cornell University Press, 1952), 102-103; Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945 (Bandung: Martinus N'ijhofF, 1958), 103-104, M.A. \zxz, Japan's Colonialism and Indonesia (Leiden: Mardnus N'ijhofF, 1955), 200-208 45 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 58] === new body, the Triple A Movement, which was introduced on April 29, 1942.36 This organization was short-lived, however, due to a decline in economic well-being and the resulting disenchantment with the Japanese. By the end o f the same year, Japan had already lost the support o f the masses, and was faced with the opposition o f prom inent nationalist leaders such as Sukarno, Hatta and Shahrir. To regain this support, Japan decided to replace the Triple A with an all-inclusive nationalist organization called the Pusat Tenaga Rakyat (Central o f People’s Power), known by the abbreviation Putera, on March 9, 1943, which promised to grant self-government to Indonesia. In the case o f the women’s movement in particular, the Japanese presence forced women to take a step backward in their crusade. The consolidation o f all w om en’s associations, strong governm ent control and the economic downturn meant that such issues as a marriage bill o r suffrage were no longer essential items on the national agenda. In general, Indonesian women during this period found themselves relegated to their traditional role, as they had to face shortages o f daily necessities like food and clothing.37 Their m ost im portant concern was finding an efficient way to use the family’s resources o r to take other simple steps to cope with the situation. This does n o t mean, however, that the agenda o f independence was put on hold. The underground guerrilla movement, which offered the only possible way to continue the struggle for independence, was maintained by some nationalist leaders, and also included a few women in their political action. 36 Triple A stood for Japan’s propaganda message: ‘Japan the Leader o f Asia, Japan the Protector of Asia, and Japan the Light o f Asia.” This group was designed “to mobilize” Indonesians o f all backgrounds to give support to Japan in the Second World War. Ibid. }T It was recorded that clothing shortages caused a drop in school attendance and a decline in social activities. People no longpr visited family or friends due to a lack o f proper clothing. Anton Lucas, “Images of the Indonesian Woman During the Japanese Occupation” in Jean Gelman Taylor, ed., Women Creating Indonesia: The First Fifty Years (Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, 1997), 70-71. 46 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 59] === N or were women excluded from the mobilization and politicization efforts undertaken by Japan. It was in this context, that the policy o f Japan to maintain the existence o f a w om en’s movement, either by establishing women’s sections in Triple A and Putera, o r by founding the Fujinkai (details given below), should be defined. In other words, the only reason that the Japanese could see for allowing w om en to be part o f their political platform was their importance to the war effort and to Japanese plans for a Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. This tendency is demonstrated clearly in the activities o f w om en’s associations, particularly o f Bans an Pekerja Perempuan Putera (women’s branch o f Putera) and Fujinkai. N o t much needs to be said about the women’s section o f the Triple A movement as this group was so short-lived. Meanwhile the Barisan Pekerja Perempuan Putra (Troops o f Young W omen Workers) did engage in some social projects ranging from fighting illiteracy' to the setting-up o f health-care centers, weaving circles and other programs. The organization itself attracted a wide following since it was established in almost every region, while at the national level this organization was managed by prominent figures, some o f whose names have already been mentioned.3* However, the most important, best- known and deeply-rooted w om en’s group during this period was clearly the Fujinkai. The necessity o f this Japanese-made group can be seen in this description: In February 1940 the cabinet decided to create Dai Nippon Fujinkai (Greater W omen’s Association) by merging existing w om en’s associations and making membership compulsory for all women above the age o f twenty. In close connection with the local administrative sub-unit, Fujinkai carried out activities that were considered to be suitable for it, such as preparation o f comfort kits to be sent to soldiers, the collection o f recyclable articles, encouragement o f saving, crusades against luxuries such as perm anent waves and colorful kimonos, and care o f those 38 Among those were; Mrs. Sunarvo Mangunpuspito, Mrs. S.K Tnmurti, Mrs. Sukann Suryochondro and Mrs. Sunaryati Sukerru. All of them were the key figures in certain pre-war women's associations. Kowani, Sejarah Setengah Abad, 59. 47 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 60] === households whose men were on the battlefields. As the war situation deteriorated for Japan, Fujinkai assumed more and more militaristic features, and preparing for the landing o f the Allied Forces which was considered eminent, w om en’s com bat forces armed with bamboo spears were created nation-wide in June 1945 out o f network o f Fujinkai.19 Indeed, as can be seen from the above statement, Fujinkai was a multi-faceted phenom enon. O n the surface, people could certainly see that it was founded on and for Japanese interests, particularly in view o f its objective “to mobilize women’s labor to support the Japanese army.” To this purpose Japan, on a practical level, recruited and exploited w om en through several activities, which included producing uniforms for soldiers, setting up public kitchens, encouraging w om en in rural areas to contribute to solving the wartime economic crisis,40 and even providing entertainment for the troops.41 O n another level, however, the Japanese used women — according to Sato’s analysis — to spread the ideology o f hoko, a Japanese concept o f “obligatory service to the state,” which took the form o f indoctrination o f women ensure that they behaved appropriately and in keeping with the wartime situation.42 For instance, the media was required to encourage women to save and to 39 Shigeru Sato, “War and Peasant: The Japanese Military Administration and Impact on the Peasantry of Java 1942 -1945” cited in Anton Lucas, Imags ofthe Indonesian Women, 54-55. 40 The new agricultural system introduced by Japan proved inappropriate for the nee plantations, especially in Java, and this is another crucial cause o f the food crisis. Other types of crops, such as cassava, were then encouraged to be planted as a substitute. The target of this particular message were women living in the rural areas. 41 The Japanese occupation is often considered the worst period for Indonesian women as thousands o f them were enslaved and forced to provide sexual services for the Japanese army. Most o f these women who were later called as jugun ianfu (the comfort girls), were usually recruited by job offers. Hoping to work in restaurants or elsewhere, they were instead trapped in “comfort stations,” effectively legalized military rape camps. At the beginning o f 1993, the issue o f jugun ianfu and other war rape victims emerged and became a hot topic in the Indonesian media, when some o f the former jugun ianfu asked their political representatives to seek compensation for them from the Japanese government. For more information on the issue see A Budi Hartono and Dadang Julianto ro, Derita Paksa Perempuan: Kisah Jugun Ianfu pada \lasa Pendudukan Jepang, 1942-1945 (Jakarta: Pus taka Sinar Harapan, 1997). 48 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 61] === avoid luxuries, when in reality there was no money to save, and no possibility o f enjoying luxuries in the first place. Nevertheless, the Fujinkai contributed to erasing the gap between elite and non-elite women. In other words, as a medium o f mass mobilization, Fujinkai included women on all levels regardless o f their class or ideological differences. This, in turn, brought a new ethos to the women’s movement, whereby women belonging to the elite could no longer dominated it. The only exception to this situation was the fact that in its organizational structure, Fujinkai was totally hierarchical, since the membership was obligatory for wives o f civil servants, whose position in the organization corresponded to that o f their husbands in the governm ent structure. The hierarchical structure therefore tended to maintain the power o f the elite priyayi, and in some cases resulted in other negative tendencies, for instance, the association o f Fujinkai with romusha (forced labor).43 It was also through Fujinkai that some activists from the prewar women’s organizations continued to meet. This enabled them to maintain their networks, barter information and even participate in the underground movement to prepare the way for independence. In addition, the military training provided, which consisted o f physical exercise, air raid drills, and even political speeches was beneficial to many young women both within and outside Fujinkai, thus helping them to prepare in practical ways tor the revolution that was to come in 1945.44 *- Anton Lucas, Images ofthe Indonesian Woman, 52-53. 43 One o f the tasks of local officials during the Japanese penod was to recruit people into romusha (there was a weekly quota to be filled). Practically, the recruitment was often delegated by officials to their wives who automatically were members o f Fujinkai or even the heads o f the local branches o f Fujinkai. Ibid. 55-56. 44 It was the Jakarta branch o f Fujinkai (Jakarta Tokobetsu Si Fujinkai), which provided military training to their young female members. Kowani, Sejarah Setengah Abad, 60. 49 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 62] === Given their commitment to the above activities and their supposedly “wholehearted devotion” to the Japanese war effort, Indonesian w om en’s organizations, including ‘Aisyiyah, had neither the means nor the opportunities to pursue their own agendas during this period. Formally ‘Aisyiyah had to take part in Fujinkai, since all its activities, including its schools, were officially banned. The only permissible activity was the provision o f religious training classes {ptngajian), but even here the issues discussed had to be written down, and a copy to be sent to the Japanese occupation authorities.45 This policy was another part o f the Japanese attempt at controlling and even stifling the growing awareness o f and struggle for independence. To conclude our discussion o f the achievements o f wom en’s movements, including ‘Aisyiyah, during the pre-independence period, it can be said that women’s groups functioned as part o f the nationalist struggle, while at the same time carrying out efforts aimed at social reform designed to improve the status o f women. The way in which they translated the ideas o f nationalism and reform into practical reality, however, were diverse, and were usually in line with the various ideological bases that underlay each organization. We have also seen how there was a cleavage o f sorts between religious groups, such as ‘Aisyiyah, and non-religious groups. Nevertheless, the spirit o f unity seems to have transcended these differences, as was proved by the great effort to maintain unity within the w om en’s movement. II. POST- IN D EPEN D EN C E During the twenty years that followed the Proclamation o f Independence in 1945, Indonesians witnessed several major political changes and crises, o f which the post- 50 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 63] === independence revolutionary w ar^an experim ent with liberal democracy,47 guided democracy (1957-1965),4* and communist upheaval49 were the m ost important. Under the leadership o f Sukarno, whose era is widely referred to as the Old O rder period, there were, at least, two tendencies in evidence. Firstly, as a newly founded nation, Indonesia was in the process o f searching for its identity, and seeking the best model to unify its extremely heterogeneous 45 Mawaddah, “Sejarah Awal ‘Aisyiyah,” 92. 46 The first five years o f Indonesian independence (1945-1950) saw a persistent effort by the Dutch to reoccupv Indonesia, which then led to die Revolutionary War. The return o f the Dutch was made possible by the help o f the Allies, especially the British and Australian armies which came to Indonesia to accept the Japanese surrender. At least two major military aggressions on July 20,1947 and December 18,1948 were launched by Dutch. This situation led to the United Nation’s calling for a cease-fire and to mediate a diplomatic agreement between Indonesia and Dutch. Several agreements were signed, most o f which the Dutch violated. On December 27, 1949, however, the Dutch formally transferred sovereignty over Indonesia. For more information on the war see M.C. Ricldefs, The History ofModem Indonesia (London: Macmillan Press, 1981), 201-221; R.O.G. Anderson, Java in a Time of 'Revolution: Occupation and Resistance (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972); Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 134-212. 47 The period between 1950-1957 was widely known in Indonesian history as the Liberal Democracy era. This particular moment was characterized by the consensus o f key figures on creating a democratic state. This was manifested primarily in the establishment o f a number of political parties, which played a prominent role and even controlled the army. Among the biggest parties were PKI (Indonesian Communist Party), Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimm Indonesia: Council o f Indonesian Muslim Association) and NU ( Nahdatul Ulama Party). Ricklefs, The History of Modem Indonesia, 225-244. 48 When President Sukarno realized that Liberal democracy had stimulated many rebellions that endangered the unity o f the nation, he announced in eadv 1957, what he called ‘Guided Democracy” by going back to the 1945 Constitution. The era was characterized by the strong political control of the President through his Nasakom (Nasionalisme (Nationalism), Agama (Religion) and Komunis (Communist)) doctrine. The dose relationship between Sukarno and die PKI, which overshadowed the Nasakom doctrine, was generally viewed as an effort to bring the Communist party into power. Baladas Ghasais, Indonesian Politics. 1955-1959: The Emergence of Guided Democracy (Calcutta: K.P. Baghi, 1982); Oey Hong Lee, Indonesia Government and Press During Guided Democracy ( Hull: Center for South East Asian Studies, Hull University, 1971); Ricklefs, The History of Modem Indonesia, 245-271 49 The well-known Communist coup d'etat on September 30, 1965 ended the period of Guided democracy, even the whole Old Order period. In this bloody coup, the PKI came under suspidon for killing, in sadistic fashion, six army generals. It was also this coup which “introduced” Suharto onto the Indonesian political scene, which at that time safeguarded Sukarno and took over control o f the armv. The end o f the Old Order also marked the end o f Communism in Indonesia. 51 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission. === [PDF page 64] === society- Secondly, considerable attention was paid to efforts at building the nation, a process to which all elements were invited to contribute. The resulting political climate greatly influenced the evolution o f the women’s movement, which under the Japanese occupation had been kept in stasis. Its re-appearance was marked by the return o f Kowani as the voice o f the women’s organizations, while at the same time numbers o f other women’s groups came into being. This new environm ent o f freedom allowed Kowani to adopt more progressive actions, e.g., by inviting m ore groups to join it and by addressing a broader rang? o f issues. Several times Kowani had to change its name o r its organizational structure50 in order to m eet the demands o f its members as well as its political context. However, during 1945-1965 Kowani was always able to hold its annual meeting on a regular basis. In the meantime, the effort to improve the position o f women in marriage remained the major concern o f Kowani. D uring this period, its efforts were primarily directed at forcing the government to impose a new-“reform ed” marriage bill, in which an improved position would be secured for wives.51 This initiative received an impetus with the 50 The name was changed three tunes. In the 1949, at its annual meeting, Kowani established a secretarial unit, called the Badan Kontak. Consisting o f 19 women’s groups, this group opretaed independendv from Kowani, but it managed almost all organizational aspects o f Kowani such as its budget, external reladons, and information. The presence o f this unit brought fundamental changes in Kowani’s structure as it left Kowani nothing more than an administrative office which bridged contacts between its members, without having any right to make independent decisions. A year later, at its 1950 meeting, this unit was re-united with Kowani and formed a new organization called Konggres Wanita Indonesia (unabbreviated). The last re-organization took place on February 1969, when the name o f KOWANI (abbreviated) was re-used to replace Konggres Wanita Indonesia. A further change was the acceptance o f Pancadla as the sole ideological basis o f the organization, and the foundation o f Majelis Permusyawaratan (Board o f Deliberation) as the highest authoritative council within Kowani. Kowani, Sejarah Setengan Abad. 106-160; Wieringa, “The Politicization of Gender,” 139, De-Stuers, The Indonesian Woman, 118; Department o f Information, A Chronological Survey ofthe Women’s Slovement in Indonesia (Jakarta: Department o f Information, 1968), 17-18. 51 Given the variety o f marriage laws existing at this time—Christian law for Christian citizens, Dutch law for the Europeans, and their own customary law for the Foreign orientals 52 with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 65] === promulgation ot* Act. No. 19 concerning the widow’s pension,52 which was m et with huge demonstrations throughout Indonesia on December 19, 1953, organized by Perwari. From the women’s groups’ perspective, besides being wasteful o f the governmental budget, this act also implicidy encouraged the practice o f polygamy. The demonstrations actually succeeded in persuading the government to revoke this act and to draft instead a new marriage bill. Circumstances worsened, however, when in the face o f continuing demands for the marriage bill, Sukarno took a second wife (June 1954).53 For the women’s groups, Sukarno’s embracing o f polygamy was little short o f “political betrayal,” particularly when they considered the encouragement, advice and favor he had shown through his public acts and statements, which had had a positive impact on the changing role o f women’s organizations. (Chinese, Arabs and Indians)—Islamic law often came in for criticism on issues such as polygamy, and the absolute right o f husband to issue a divorce. Maria Ulfah Santoso, a Kowani’s leader, for instance, stated that on the practical level, Islamic law regulated marriage in a way that differed from the spirit o f the Qur’an. The new-proposed marriage bill also aimed to produce a single marriage law for all Indonesians. Maria Ulfah Santoso, “Short Summary o f the Position o f the Indonesian Women in the Republic o f Indonesia” in Women’s Affairs in Indonesia (Ottawa: Information Division of Indonesian Embassy, 1959), 9. 52 The act consisted of two points: 1) “A male civil servant could designate several wives as having the right to draw a widow’s pension. If he designated more than one, the total amount o f the pension would be twice as much as that for the one wife.” 2) “Since this measure meant an increase in government expenditure, the contribution payable by every male civil servant toward this pension whose scale had been increased, should be fixed at 7 percent o f his base rate and at 2 percent for female civil servant.” “The civil servant who practiced polygamy would have to pay an extra 2 percent for each additional wife, with further maximum o f 4 percent, so that this total contribution could not exceed 11 percent.” De Stuers, The Indonesian Woman, 127; Survochondro, Potret Pergerakan Wanita, 100-101. 53 There were plenty o f rumors concerning Sukarno’s flamboyant lifestyle, in particular his personal predilection for women. People often considered his sexual adventures as emblematic o f the sexual prowess of Javanese kings. The list o f women in Sukarno’s life ranged from stewardesses on international flights to the daughters o f Indonesian nationalist leaders. All o f these rumors, especially his extramarital activities, were a major concern to the women’s movement at that time. For more information about Sukarno’s private life see Sukarno, A n Autobiography as Told to Cindy Adams (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Metill Company, 1958); C.L.M. Penders, The Life And Times ofSukarno (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1974); Abu Hanifah, The Tales of Revolution (Svdnev: Angus and Roberstson, 1972). 53 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 66] === A. 'Aisyiyah’s Activities under the Old Order Social Development and the Emphasis on Family Law. T he spirit and euphoria awakened by Indonesian’s newly-won independence were channeled by ‘Aisyiyah into its program o f social development, at least during the first ten years o f Indonesian’s nationhood. The organization may well have seen this as the best way in which to contribute to the national effort, especially when we consider the fact that upheavals in the political system during this period left little opportunity to the governm ent to focus on socio-economic development. The presence o f women’s organizations, including ‘Aisyiyah, which placed the social activities in the foreftont o f their agenda to some extent, made up for the governm ent’s inability to deal with this area o f concern. For ‘Aisyiyah, social development took the form o f establishing an infrastructure. particularly in the fields o f education, health services, and charitable activities. By 1963, for instance ‘Aisyiyah had succeeded in founding numerous Badan Kesehatan Ibu dan Anak (Maternity and Child-Welfare Centers), orphanages, and girls’ homes, and had managed several o f the Muhammadiyah’s Pembina Kesejahteman Umat (best known by its abbreviation: PKU, Center for Public Health).54 In the area o f educational institutional development, ‘Aisyiyah’s principal accomplishment was the establishment o f a number o f vocational schools for women, such as Sekolah Bidan (School for Nurses) and Sekolah Guru Taman Kanak-kanak (School for Kindergarten Teachers).55 The 1960s even witnessed ‘Aisyiyah’s attem pt at establishing “ Ummul Mukminin," a university which would have focused on Arabic- Islamic literature, although this dream was never realized. 54 In fact all of these institutions were founded during the colonial penod. BKIA for instance, was founded in 1934, while PKU was established in 1921. Independence, however, provided greater possibilities for ‘Aisyiyah to develop the public infrastructures in terms o f extent and size. Mawaddah, “Sejarah Awal ‘Aisyiyah,” 88-91; Pimpinan Pusat ‘Aisyiyah, Sejarah Pertumbuhan dan Pcrkembangan, 38. 54 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 67] === Nevertheless, besides these regular activities, som e new-established programs were instituted to answer the demands o f the situation. Clearly, the continuing requests by w om en’s associations to reform the marriage regulations led ‘Aisyiyah to pay m ore attention to the problems affecting family laws, ranging from writing manuals on “creating a happy family”56 to forming family consultation bureaus.57 Given the criticism by other w om en’s groups o f ‘Aisyiyah’s position on polygamy and its support o f Act.19, these programs conveyed the message that Islam did have a “positive” concept o f marriage. This positive concept was based on the conviction that a women was an equal partner in marriage, and that child-marriage should be discouraged; the two central points that underlay the w om en’s movement’s demands. In one part o f the manual on “the happy family,” for instance, it was stated that marriage should be based on the willingness o f both parties to enter into the contract.51 Their mutual agreement was essential, for if either o f the parties were to become dissatisfied with the other during the course o f the marriage, they would each have an equal right to terminate the contract.59 A nother part o f the manual gives advice to parents o r walk (guardians) on the subject o f the marriage o f their offsprings. Among other considerations, there are the ages o f the children (including the age differences between groom and bride), the need for the consent o f both parties (avoiding torced-marriage), and the importance o f 55 Ibid, 43. 56 The book entitled Slendirikan Rumah Tanggu Bahagja (Producing a Happy Family) was first published during 34* Muhammadiyah congress o f 1959 in Yogyakarta. It covered several topics such as Islam and family, rights and duties for husband and wife, the importance o f mamage, polygamy, and others. ‘Aisvivah, "Mu’tamar Chusus ‘Aisvivah Dalam Mu’tamar Muhammadivah ke 34 di Yogyakarta," 1959,'3-18. 57 The bureau was founded in 1956 with the cooperation of the Ministry o f Religious Affair, and later formed BP4 (Badan Perkantnan. Perselisihan dan Perrtratarr. Consultation Bureau for Mamage and Divorce). Pimpman Pusat ‘Aisyiyah, Sejarah Perumbuhan dan Perkembangan, 43. 58 ‘Aisyiyah, '’Mu’tamar Chusus ‘Aisvivah," 5. 55 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 68] === the mother’s involvement in the decision o f whether o r n o t to accept a marriage proposal (the father is not the only decision-maker).60 Similarly, in response to the issue o f polygamy, ‘Aisyiyah still held the view that it was not an “evil” which stood in die way o f ameliorating women’s status within marriage. However, compared to its earlier position, ‘Aisyiyah tended to offer a more “rational” explanation for defending polygamy. In so doing, the organization referred to the Q ur’an 4: 3 and 129, verses which stress that polygamy can only be practiced within certain limitations, the m ost important o f these being equal treatm ent o f wives on the part o f the husband.61 In addition, ‘Aisyiyah further “justified” this institution by providing at least two other arguments. Firsdy, polygamy is an honorable system, which can protect sick o r barren wives from divorce, while at the same time preventing a husband from committing adultery (^ mm).62 Secondly, it should be realized that the verses on polygamy were revealed as a solution to a demographic problem that had arise in time o f war, when a great many men had been killed, and hence, there were not enough males to ensure marriage.62 In stating these justification::, ‘Aisyiyah seems to have been influenced by the modernist exegetes, who, according to Jansen, argued that polygamy was not technically in accordance with the spint 59 Ibid. « Ibid, 12-13. 61 Ibid, 18. The two verses o f the Qur'an are as follows: If ye fear that ye shall not be able to deal justly with the orphans, marry women of your choice, two, or three, or four, But if ye fear that they shall not be able to deal jusdy (with them) then oly one, or (a captive) that your right hand posses. That will be more suitable, to prevent you from doing injustice (Q: 4: 3). Ye are never able to be fair and just as between women, even if it is your ardent desire: But turn not away (From a woman altogether), so as to leave her (as it were), Hanging (in the air). If ye come to a friendly understanding and practices self restraint, God is oft- forgiving, Most Merciful (Q: 4:129). A Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur’an: Text. Translation and Commentary (Maryland: Amana Corp., 1983), 179 and 221. *- Ibid. 56 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 69] === o f the Q ur’an.64 Moreover, when the two verses are considered as a whole, modernists would say that justice among the wives was “impossible,” and therefore monogamy was in tact the right form o f marriage.65 In other words, ‘Aisyiyah clearly did not intend to encourage the practice o f polygamy, but as an Islamic organization, it did not want to oppose a practice that was, in terms o f external appearances, condoned by Islamic teaching. B. Marriage Reform and Communism: Disturbed Relations between ‘Aisyiyah and Kowani. Given the emphasis placed by the women’s movem ent on the need to reform marriage regulations and abolish polygamy, it should come as no surprise that during this period, ‘Aisyiyah continuously faced challenges in its relations with other w om en’s groups in Kowani. This, however, was n o t the problem o f ‘Aisyiyah alone. O ther Islamic w om en’s organizations, such as Muslimat (the women’s section o f Masyumi), Muslimat NU (the w om en’s section o f Nahdatul Llama) and GPU (Indonesian Islamic Youth Organization) were very much in the same position. Nevertheless, it should be realized that the position adopted by Islamic w om en’s groups on such controversial issues as polygamy, Act 19 and the marriage bill could be traced back to the position o f their parent organizations. In other words, to some extent, 63 Ibid. 64 J J G. Jansen, The Interpretation ofthe Koran in Modem Egypt (Leiden: Brill, 1974), 92. 65 Ibid. Muhammad ‘Abduh was one o f the modem exegetes who best reflected this tendency. ‘Abduh maintained that justice in polygamy is something “impossible,” to attain because when a husband feels in his heart that he likes one of his wives more than the other, that already can be considered an injustice. In the light o f such interpretation, the permission for polygamy in Islam was highly limited {mudayyiq), even darurah. Rashid Rida, Tafsir al -Qur'an al-Karim (Cairo: Matba’ Muhammad ‘Ali Subavh, [n.d]), 347-348. In his treatise, al-Islam wal-mar’a, ‘Abduh even called for the abolition of polygamy, based on his opinion that polygamy has already became a corrupt practice which neglects the values of justice and equality, and is thereby “no longer conducive to the 57 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 70] === their “dependent status” m eant that these groups had to follow the lead o f their male counterparts. W hen women’s organizations finally succeeded in bringing the proposal o f a mamage bill to the 1959 parliamentary session, almost all Muslim parties rejected the proposal, due to their disagreement with some points o f the draft, especially the abolition o f polygamy and talaq (repudiation). A representative o f the Muslim parties, Tuan Sidi Mardjohan, delivered the speech outlining the reasons for their objection: Among other considerations (it has to be noted that] w om en age more quickly than men do. Sometimes even though they are o f the same age when they marry, yet when a women has already given birth to two o r three children, her figure has already declined one hundred to three hundred percent from the figure she used to have. It is very rare that a woman is as the old Bugis clothes, the more it is used, the more it shines; the majority o f women generally fade quickly while men are still strong and their lust still powerful and they are still boiling with sexual desire...66 In the event there were few options open to Islamic w om en’s organizations-- which were mostly the female wings o f Muslim organizations o r parties -- except to adopt the same attitude as their parent bodies, or at best, formulate more logical arguments in support o f their position, which is w hat ‘Aisyiyah did. The tendency o f these Islamic women’s associations to maintain harmony with their male counterparts was indeed exemplified by ‘Aisyiyah. Even though in 1951 ‘Aisyiyah had already obtained its autonomous status, which gave it the right to set up its own activities, and to make its own decisions,6' nevertheless, in m ost external matters validation from the community welfare.” Barbara Stowasser, Women in the Qur'an, Traditions, and Interpretation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 121. 66 Nani Suwondo, Kedudukan Wanita Indonesia dalam Hukum dan \lasyarakat (Jakarta: Ghalia, 1981), 91; as cited in Wieringa, “The Politicization o f Gender,” 148. 67 The autonomous status which was given to ‘Aisvivah in 1951 was still limited by certain conditions, among them the fact that ‘Aisvivah would not have control over its own budget or the right to establish its own branches. P.P. Muhammadityah, Piagam Radon Qtonoom (Yogyakarta: P.P. .Muhammadiyah, 1951), 14-16. It was not until 1966 that ‘Aisyiyah’s autonomous status was fully established. 58 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission. === [PDF page 71] === Muhammadiyah was still required. For certain controversial issues, such as the government’s proposed Family Planning program,6* ‘Aisyiyah even left up to the Muhammadiyah leadership, deferring to the latter’s decision on the issue. The limitations placed on ‘Aisyiyah’s autonomy are described by Baried69 in the following passage: He (Muhammadiyah leader) is our counselor. I f the counselor is good, he will let ‘Aisyiyah find its own way. But if the counselor is bad he can restrict ‘Aisyiyah. Muhammadiyah has the veto right on our decision but is very rarely applied. They also can fire members o f the ‘Aisyiyah’s board, which they have done in the past. We cannot fire them and we don’t have a veto in their organization. You see, it is rather like a husband-wife relationship.70 Besides the issue o f polygamy, the split between religious and non-religious groups in the m ovement during the O ld O rder period was the result o f the prevalence o f communist ideology, which vividly colored the political situation. In this respect, Sukarno, the president at the time, was the one w ho was m ost often blamed for the situation.1 After 68 It was not until 1963 that Muhammadiyah approved the Family Planning Program (known in Indonesia as Ktkarga Berencana). This is why when in 1957, ‘Aisvivah, together with other Kowant members, were invited by die US to observe women’s organizations in that country, representatives o f ‘Aisyiyah did not participate in a session discussing family planning issues, because its validity was still debatable for many Muslim groups including the Muhammadiyah. Baroroh Baried, “Islam and Modernization o f Indonesian Women,” in Taufik Abdullah and Sharon Siddique, eds., Islam and Society in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute o f Southeast Asian Studies, 1986), 150. 69 Baroroh Baried was ‘Aisyiyah’s leader for five years: 1965, 1968, 1971, 1974, and 1978. Bom in Kauman, she was a professor at the Faculty o f Arts, Gajah Mada University, Yogyakarta. Pusat Pimpinan ‘Aisyiyah, Seyarah Pertumbuhan, 126; James L. Peackok, Gerakan Muhammadiyah Memurmkan Ajaran Islam Di Indonesia, trans. Staf Ahli Cipta Kreatif (Jakarta: Cipta Kreatif, 1986), 60. *° Wieringa, “The Politicization o f Gender,” 154. 71 Indeed, it is worth noting that Sukarno very much influenced, and to some extent politicized the women’s movements, even though his personal behavior was often the target o f harsh criticism by the latter. During the revolutionary struggle, for instance, he called upon women to participate in the struggle in the pages o f his book entitled, Sarinah. He lectured other nationalist leaders on the importance o f women’s involvement in the revolutionary process, and described them as “the second wheel o f our chariot, the second wing o f garuda (the eagje of Indonesian National symbol).” Late in the period o f guided democracy, Sukarno’s call for the mobilization o f women was realized, particularly in the case o f West Irian but also in that o f the confrontation with Malaysia. He had invited women in one o f his speeches to become sukarelawati (female military volunteers), and he 59 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission of th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 72] === the election o f 1955, the PK I (Indonesian Communist Party) and Sukarno became closer. The fear that both felt toward the growing power o f the army strengthened their alliance, while the proclamation o f Guided Democracy, to use Wieringa’s phase, served to enshrine “this party’s policies couched in Sukarno’s language.”72 In the background o f this alliance, the PK I’s women’s section, Gerwani,73 had emerged as the w om en’s group closest to the president, and was gradually beginning take advantage o f its strong position -among other w omen’s associations, particularly within Kowani. Com pared to the others, for instance, Gerwani expressed greater interest in political practice and was more mass-based, in the sense that it invited more women to join, especially peasant women. This can be seen from the organization’s activities. O n the one hand, Gerwani carried out several activities in tandem with other women’s associations, such as setting up literacy classes, establishing educational institutions, and providing health centers, as well as other social activities. The group also participated in some important Kowani events, such as demonstrations in succeeded. In addition, as Douglas states, the symbolic priority that his government had was to favor women's political participation, and he truly believed that cooperation between the sexes was key to the ongping Indonesian revolution. Douglas, Women in Indonesia Poiitics, 165-166; Susan MacFarland, “Women and Revolution in Indonesia” in Mary Ann Tetreault, ed., Women and Revolution in Africa. Asia, and the New World (California: University o f South Carolina Press, 1994), 199-200. For further information on women’s mobilization in the case o f Irian see Saraswan Sunindyo, “When Earth is Female and the Nation is Mother Gender, the Armed Forces and Nationalism in Indonesia,” Feminist Review 58 (spring 1998): 7-12; Hedina, Pending Emas di Belantara Irian (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1985). 11 Wieringa, “The Politicization o f Gender,” 118. 71 Established on 4 June 1950 under the name o f GERWIS (Gerakan Wanita Indonesia Sedar (Movement o f Conscious Indonesian Women), this organization was a fusion o f six women’s associations: Rukun Putri Indonesia (Association o f Indonesian Young Women), Persatuan Wanita Sedar (The Union o f Alert Women), Istri Sedar (Conscious Women), Gerakan Wanita Indonesia (Indonesian Women’s Movement), Wanita Madura (Madurese Women), and Perjuangan Putn Republik Indonesia (The Struggle o f Young Indonesian Women). At an earlier stage in its history, Getwis was not formally affiliated with PKI, although there was a strong indication that PKI made important contributions to the foundation o f this organization. The name Gerwani (Gerakan Wanita Indonesia: Indonesian Women’s Movement) itself was used after its second congress on 1954, indicating the change o f this organization into a “huge” mass group. Wieringa, “The Politicization o f Gender,” 172-183. 60 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 73] === support o f marriag? reform and participation in the National Front o f W est Irian. O n the other hand, it differed in that it paid considerable attention to issues affecting women workers, demonstrated, for instance, in Gerwani’s seriousness in campaigning for the legal rights o f wom en workers in rural areas.74 Above all, Gerwani’s Marxist philosophy often led to disharmony with other women’s groups within Kowani, n o t only religious groups like ‘Aisyiyah and Catholic Women, but also non-religious groups as well. The strongest opposition to Gerwani and its influence on Kowani, however, came from the religious groups, Muslim groups in particular. The m ost visible evidence o f this tendency was manifested at the 1948 general meeting o f Kowani. O n this occasion, four Islamic w om en’s associations; ‘Aisyiyah, Muslimat Masyumi, Muslimat N U, and G PU found themselves in opposition to the other wom en’s groups when they insisted that Kowani terminate its membership in the W ID F (W omen’s International Democratic Federation) due to the Com m unist elements within the latter. At the time the request was unsuccessful because the congress came to decide that, the help o f the VCTDF, was key to Kowani’s submission o f a protest to United Nations concerning Dutch aggression.5 For ‘Aisyiyah in particular, the growing political importance o f the Communist group during the period o f guided democracy led the organization to find often that its way was banned, or to use Baried’s words, “all the time, a red light was given.” With Gerwani especially, ideological conflict was unavoidable, although the confrontation was not always •* Ibid, 178. ~5 At its 1950 meeting, however, Kowani announced its withdrawal from WIDF due to the decision o f some Muslim women’s groups to leave Kowani. Wieringa, “The Politicization of Gender,” 97; Kowani, Sejamh Setengah Abad, 112. 61 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission. === [PDF page 74] === centered on, o r articulated along religious lines. The following description by Baried gives an idea o f the situation: O ur Islamic religious principles simply do not coincide with Com m unist principles. For instance, they do not respect o u r central teaching, that there is o n e G od. That is vital to us, our inspiration derives from th a t I do n o t know exactly what Communism is, but I do know that they do not adhere to that principle. So there were many clashes between us. They were often very rude. They would spread gossip about us, for instance that ‘Aisyiyah was against government. For Gerwani the political goal was always m ore im portant than the means by which to reach it.'6 Despite certain fundamental disagreements, ‘Aisyiyah tried to remain active in all o f Kowani’s activities, seeing the virtue o f Kowani in maintaining the group’s unity and harmony between its members. ‘Aisyiyah sent representatives to several major Kowani events and made its members serve as Kowani representatives at international forums. In its relations with other wom en’s organizations, the management was handled by Seksi L’rusan Keluar (Section o f External Affairs), founded in 1958. With special emphasis on foreign affairs, the responsibility o f this section ranged from welcoming international guests, attending overseas invitations, communicating with other w om en’s organizations, nationally and internationally, and propagating ‘Aisyiyah through printed or electronic media. To be able to carry out such activities, therefore, one o f the requirements o f joining this section was to have mastered English or Arabic. In sum, ‘Aisyiyah went further in enhancing its image as a m odem Islamic women’s organization that actively participates in developing the new-founded country. To conclude, ‘Aisyiyah and o th er women’s organizations were clearly active participants in the struggle to achieve, defend and give meaning to Indonesian independence. However, a quite essential change occurred along the way. Before independence, their '6 Wieringa, “The Politicization o f Gender,” 155. 62 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 75] === common “enemies” were the colonial officials, but now their opponent was, to use Wieringa’s words, “the male Indonesian politician.”77 In o th er words, as De Stuers suggests once independence was obtained and women’s status gradually improved, men began to consider them as “competitors.”7* This can be seen in the “regressive policies” that followed in response to demands for a marriage bw, o r Act 19. Moreover, a boundary between the “male political field” and “ female social needs” was created through the implicit exclusion o f women from the political domain. This was described by Sukarno in Sarinab. ...harm ony can only be achieved when both [men and women] have an equal position. But each o f them has their own kadrat (nature). For whoever sins against the natural laws will eventually be demolished by Nature itself. Nature may be patient...but she cannot be conquered.79 As a result, the role o f m otherhood both within the family and in society, a prominent feature o f the women’s movem ent in the past, was given renewed impetus. For ‘Aisyiyah, however, this was exactly w hat it wanted. Clearly, the reform and modernization that it sought for women was ultimately designed to create conditions favoring the “good m other” as implied by Baried: Release housewives from being chained only to responsibilities and duties m the household. They can leave their home to do something, which is necessary to upgrade themselves to be m ore useful to settle their household,...conscious about their position and function as the saviors o f the young generation, as the mother o f society...M —Wieringa, “The Politicization o f Gender,” 136. ~8 De Stuers, The Indonesian Woman, 163-164, Susan MacFadand, Women and Resolution, 202. ' 9 Sukarno, Sarinah, 15 as cited by Wieringa, “The Politicization o f Gender,” 137. 80 Wieringa, “The Politicization o f Gender,” 137 63 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 76] === CHAPTER T H R E E ‘AISYIYAH IN THE NEW ORDER PERIOD: 1966-199& In the previous chapter we saw how the failed communist coup o f September 30, 1965 ultimately led to the demise o f the Old O rder regime. Following the coup itself, political instability and economic crisis dominated public life, leading to a series o f protests and demonstrations expressing popular disappointment with the governm ent’s response to the attempted coup, and with Sukarno in particular. Led by KAMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia: The Indonesian Student’s Action Front), many groups, including Indonesian w om en1, formed the action wings and participated in these demonstrations. The basic demand o f the protest came to be known as TRITURA ('Tiga Tuntutan Rtf*ytf//Three People’s Demands), and consisted o f a call to ban the PK I (Communist party), to disband the Dwikora Cabinet and to reduce die prices o f basic necessities. The growing wave o f protests and demonstrations forced Sukarno to write a directive to Suharto,2 widely known as SUPERSEMAR (Surat Perintah Sebelas M aret/Eleventh March’s Instruction Note). It was on the basis o f this letter that Suharto justified his decision to take control o f the country, and even assume the office o f president.3 1 The women’s groups who participated in the demonstration were united under KAWI (Kesatuan Aksi Wanita Indonesia/United Action o f Indonesian Women). This group was formed on March 6, 1966, from a number o f women who decided to assist the student demonstrations independently, without waiting for Kowani. Stephen A. Douglas, “Women in Indonesian Politics,” in Sylvia A. Chipp and Justin J. Green, eds., Asian Women in Transition (London: The Pennsylvania State University, 1980), 172-3. 2 It was widely believed that this directive consisted in Sukarno’s instruction to Suharto— the commander of the Army’s strategic reserve forces (Kostrad)—“to take all steps to reestablish domestic tranquility and to safeguard Sukarno’s personal safety and authority.” Justus M. van der Kroef, Indonesia after Sukarno (Vancouver University o f British Columbia Press, 1971), 17; Ailsa Zainu’ddin, A Short History ofIndonesia (Victoria: Cassel Australia, 1968), 272-275. 64 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 77] === T he P K I and all its affiliates were formally disbanded on March 12, 1966. Nevertheless, the attem pted coup had been a traumatic experience for Indonesia, leaving a mark on its political, social, and cultural life. As a result, the PKI’s image was forever afterwards tarnished in the minds o f the people, lending support to the New O rder policy o f trying to “cleanse” the country o f all elements o f communism, making it almost a taboo subject.4 O ne could even say that it was this communist tragedy which provided the justification for the New O rder government’s decision to apply a tighter political control over the nation, a characteristic feature o f this regime. I. Organizational Development o f ‘Aisyiyah A. Autonomous Status and Cadre Formation In the very same year that the New O rder was established (1966), ‘Aisyiyah received the decision concerning its autonomous status within the Muhammadiyah.5 Unlike the 1951 decision, however, this renewed autonomous status placed ‘Aisyiyah on the same level as other independent bodies within the Muhammadiyah— a status the organization has enjoyed until today. Besides giving ‘Aisyiyah the right to manage its own programs, and its own budget, it also resulted in an organizational restructuring, whereby a series o f hierarchical levels6 were directly applied. In addition, this hierarchical structure was seen as an effective 3 The validity o f SUPERSEMAR is continuously debated, and these debates have even increased after the fall o f Suharto on May 1998. The debate resolves around whether or not this letter actually exists, since it provided justification for Suharto to take the power from Sukarno. 4 This can be seen in many government regulations. For instance, one can never be accepted as government employee, or get access to any governmental post, if anyone of his/her family has, or was suspected to have, relanons with communist groups. 5 Pimpinan Pusat ‘Aisyiyah, Sejaruh Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan "Aisyiyah (Yogyakarta: Seksi Penerbitan dan Publikasi Pimpinan Pusat ‘Aisyiyah, 1992), 44. 65 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 78] === way for the organization to socialize its programs, even to the lowest grassroots level, and to m onitor the development o f the organization. It seems that the autonomous status o f ‘Aisyiyah encouraged its leaders from the start to work seriously to develop the organization. This is evident from the 1974 ‘Aisyiyah general m eeting held in Ujung Pandang, where the organization decided to establish a unit to be responsible for recruiting and training cadres, which was to be called the Biro Kaderisasi.7 Originally founded as a small unit within the organization, it was upgraded in 1985 to a section, called Bidang Pembinaan Kader (Section o f Training o f Cadres), thus forming as one o f the six sections within ‘Aisyiyah.1 Among the programs sponsored by this section, and the one that got the m ost attention, was the training center for cadres, known as Pondok Hajjah Nuriyah Shabran. O perated in cooperation with various Muhammadiyah and other Islamic universities,9 the target o f the program was female university students, who were recruited and trained in several extra Islamic subjects in special classes, usually held in 6 Hierarchy here refers to the administrative ranks o f the government, which— from highest to lowest—started with nasional (national),prapinsi (provincial), kabupaten (district) and kecamatan (sub district level). In concordance with this stratification ‘Aisyiyah has its office both at the national and local levels; in provinces, districts and sub-districts. Usually there is only one branch at the province level, but there are a number o f branches at the district and sub-district levels. 7 Previously, the task relating the cadre was in the hand o f the Biro Organisasi (Organization Unit). Pimpinan Pusat ‘Aisyiyah, Sejarab Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangm, 44. 8 In 1985, the other fives sections, which were already established in 1930, were renamed as follows: 1) Bogan TabSgb (Islamic call); 2) Bogan Pendidikan and Kebudayaan (Education and Culture); 3) Belgian PKCJ (Center for Public Health); 4) Bagian Pendidikan Pammedis (Education o f Paramedic); 5) Bagian Ekonomi (Economic). 9 The training o f the first group took place in 1986 in cooperation with one of the University of Muhammadiyah in Solo, Central Java. Although the program was open to the public, most the participants were members LMM (Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah/Muhammadiyah’s [University] Students Association). Pimpinan Pusat ‘Aisyiyah, Sejarah Pertumbuhan, 45. For more information on IMM see Farid Fathoni AF, Keiahinm Yang Dipersoaikan: Seperempat Abad Ikatan Slahasisva Muhammadiyah (Surabaya: Bina Dmu, 1990). 66 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 79] === the late evening.10 It was obvious that this program was expected to produce cadres who were well prepared morally, academically, and organizationally. B. The Un-Dynamic Leadership's Succession and Kinship Cadre Formation: A Sign ofStagnancy? Yet, the cadres’ greatest concern seems not to have been solving the problem o f leadership. Even at this stage, and as had previously been the case, the ‘Aisyiyah leadership was still dominated by “the old faces” from Kauman, who often stood for re-election several times. W hat was new during this period, however, was the awareness that this tendency was “a problem,” and one that had to be solved. This can be seen, for instance, in the decision taken prior to die 1985 general meeting by Baroroh Baried, ‘Aisyiyah’s president, to resign, o r at least refuse to become a candidate for the following election.11 The only reason she offered was die fact that she had already headed the organization for twenty years, and this, according to her, hindered the process o f regeneration.12 Indeed, the 1985 annual meeting o f ‘Aisyiyah resulted in the election o f a new president, Elyda Djazman, to replace Baried. However, die same cycle o f stagnation has begun once -again to set in since, until recendy, Djazman has continued to serve as president, while until 1995 Baried was regularly returned to the office o f vice-president. In fact, the above pattern—long leadership and the dom inadon o f people around the family and ftiends o f “ the founding father” within the organization—can also be found 10 The subjects taught ranged from courses in the Arabic language to organizational matters, especially those that applied to the Muhammadiyah and ‘Aisyiyah. The evening classes could be organized easily, because the students in this program lived in the dormitory. 11 Surya Muda, Kepemimpinan dan Wamta Dalam Muhammadiyah: Gagasan ALL Basavedan dan Tanggapan-tanggapan (Yogyakarta: Surya Muda, 1985), 19 and 28. 67 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 80] === in the Muhammadiyah. Bhaskara, for instance, has noted that both Dahlan and his direct successor Ibrahim, led the Muhammadiyah for ten years. Moreover, in the course o f its history the organization has had only two non-Yogyakarta-based leaders; Mas Mansur (1937) from Surabaya, and Sutan Mansyur (1933) from Padang.13 O ne o f the main reasons behind this phenom enon seems to be the tact that as a non-profit and broad-based organization whose concerns are mainly charitable, only those with strong psychological connection with ‘Aisyiyah— such as the people around the founding father’s family— would hardly refuse the responsibility to lead the organization.14 Moreover, according to Marcoes, the cadre formation in ‘Aisyiyah (and the Muhammadiyah as well) still relied primarily on family and kinship, which while it proved to be very effective, nevertheless weakened the organization due to the resulting lack o f open management and criticism.15 This also caused difficulties at the operational level due the factthat the relationships developed within the organization depended more on kinship ties than on professionalism.16 The following quotation comes from Lina,1' an ‘Aisyiyah activist, which suggests such a situation: 12 Ibid. She was elected as the president o f ‘Aisyiyah for five successive terms: 1965-1968, 1968-1971,1971-1974,1974-1978, and 1978-1985. Pusat Pimpinan ‘Aisvivah, Sejarah Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan, 126. 13 Harry Bhaskara, “Muhammadiyah Faces The Future,” in Rusli Karim, ed., Muhammadiyah Dalam Ktidk Dan Komentar (Jakarta: Penerbit Rajawali, 1986), 150-151. u Baried, for instance, has said that there were many members who refused to be elected as leader, or at least to the board, o f both the Muhammadiyah and ‘Aisyiyah. Surya Muda, Kepemimpinan dan Wanita, 28. 15 Lies Marcoes, “Antara Amal dan Tuntutan Professional di ‘Aisyiyah" in Mayling Oey Gardiner, Mildred L.E. Wagemann, Evelyn Seleeman, and Sulastri, eds., Perempuan Indonesia: Dulu dan Kini (Jakarta: Gramedia Pus taka L'tama, 1996), 160-161. 16 Ibid. 68 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 81] === For me personally, my activities in ‘Aisyiyah are part o f doing my duty to my parents, since they made sacrifices to build organization. Actually, the only reward is the chance to do charity work. I only think o f my responsibility to continue to work for my parent’s goal. From the point o f view o f m odem organizational management, this type o f cadre formation may n o t be good, but I think kinship is one o f the reasons ‘Aisyiyah continue to survives as an organization." Marcoes goes even further, arguing that the lack o f professionalism in the management o f ‘Aisyiyah’s activities was also caused by die motives o f its members. As a religious organization, ‘Aisyiyah always encouraged its members to base their efforts on the hope o f finding favor with G od, and n o t for any other compensation.19 For this reason, ‘Aisyiyah could not expect its members to devote themselves to any activity for its own sake.20 Similarly, new members who joined the organization, and who came to manage its activities, were more often motivated by strong desire to find a means o f pleasing and worshipping God. The situation as it existed therefore hardly led to professionalism in management, which in turn contributed to the sluggish development o f some o f the programs. 17 Lina was bom to a family o f Muhammadiyah activists. Her father was a founder of the Muhammadiyah branch in a village 111 Sumedang, West Java. In support o f her husband, her mother, Masnah, she oversaw the foundation of ‘Aisyiyah’s kindergarten, health service and religious dass at that village. It was Lina who continued the work o f her mother. She headed the ‘Aisyiyah’s kindergarten which was located behind her house, while at the same time she teaching in a Muhammadiyah high school in Sumedang. Ibid, 150-151. 18 Ibid, 160-161. 19 Ibid, 165. 70 Ibid. 69 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 82] === C. The Autonomous Status of'Aisyiyah: A Dilemma The 1985 meeting also raised another important issue. A t the 1978 meeting it had been decided that there were to be no female members on the Muhammadiyah’s board.21 In other words, there was an explicit, clear-cut division where the Muhammadiyah was to be tor men, and ‘Aisyiyah for women. This “division” was reinforced as a result o f the autonomous status o f ‘Aisyiyah which made it m ore independent, even though ‘Aisyiyah remained a part o f the Muhammadiyah, and had to respect the wishes o f its parent body. phenomenon, coupled with the absence o f representatives This latter o f ‘Aisyiyah on the Muhammadiyah board, gave the impression that ‘Aisyiyah simply acted on the orders o f the parent organization.22 Bearing this in mind, prior to 1985 meeting, AR. Baswedan, a prom inent Muhammadiyah figure, asked the organization to allow ‘Aisyiyah members to serve on the central leadership board. He argued that a step such as this was a way to revitalize the organization, which was starting to be seen as unprogressive and stagnant, even by its own members.23 Baswedan stated further that the presence o f ‘Aisyiyah representatives in the Muhammadiyah would not only be emblematic o f gender equality in Islam, but would also erase the gender bias which seemed to define the roles o f the Muhammadiyah and ‘Aisyiyah, in the sense that the tatter's role was limited to “peripheral” social activities, while the form er was responsible for much bigger issues.24 :iIbid, 9. = Ibid, 12. 23 Ibid, 3. The critics o f the stagnancy or “walking on the spot” o f the Muhammadiyah continue until the present time. See for instance, M Fadhilah Zaidie, “Tajdid Muhammadiyah: Sang Pembaharu yang Jalan di Tempa;,” TIRAS, July 13, 1991; Mochtar Naim, Muhammadiyah Telah Berhend Jadi Gerakan Tajdid,” n Lsman Yadm and A1 Misar Hamid, eds., Muhammadiyah Da/am Sorotan (Jakarta: Bina Rena Pariwara, 1993), 225. Ibid, 5,16,22. 70 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission of the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 83] === The above situation was a sign that ‘Aisyiyah, though having functioned as an organization for m ore than fifty years, was by the middle o f the New O rd er period being confronted with several internal problems, such as cadre development and organizational renewal. A t this point its dynamism as an organization, widely considered to be among the most m odem in outlook, began to be questioned. In addition, the issue o f ‘.Aisyiyah’s position within the Muhammadiyah, as seen in Baswedan’s case, underscored the implicit dilemma facing this organization. Indeed, ‘Aisyiyah was only one o f several independent organizations within the Muhammadiyah.23 However, the fact that it specifically represented the women members o f the organization, coupled with its absence from the Muhammadiyah’s central board, had reinforced ‘Aisyiyah’s image as a separate organization, o r as an “independent” Muslim w om en’s organization. In this position, ‘Aisyiyah was often faced with questions that demanded more freedom o f movement com pared to other autonomous groups within Muhammadiyah. Such a position has raised a dilemma in the minds o f ‘Aisyiyah leaders: that o f w hether to become more involved within the Muhammadiyah o r to be totally independent in its decision-making and actions. II. Aisyiyah Activities under the New O rder We saw in previous chapters that ‘Aisyiyah’s existence was always closely bound to the socio-political context. In other words, like other women’s organizations, ‘Aisyiyah’s 25 Besides ‘Aisyiyah, there are several other autonomous organizations within Muhammadiyah such as: 1) Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah [University] Student’s Association); 2) Ikatan Pelajar Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah [High School] Student’s Association); 3) Pemuda Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah Youth.Association); 4) Nasyiatul ‘Aisyiyah; 3). Tapak Sud (Muhammadiyah Karate Association); and 6) Ikatan Guru Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah Teacher’s Association). Musthafa Kamal, Chusnan Yusuf and Rosyad Sholeh, eds., Muhammadiyah Sebagu Gerakan Islam (Yogyakarta: Penerbit Persatuan, 1988), 129-133; Yusuf Abdullah Puar, Perjuangan dan Ptngabdian Muhammadiyah (Jakarta: Pustaka Antara, 1989), 120. 71 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 84] === concerns and activities were seen as a barometer o f change. Djazm an’s statement that ‘“Aisyiyah tries always to give a critical response to changes o f situation, showing its basic character as a reform movement”26 tends to assume that ‘Aisyiyah played a very active role in social change. However, at this point the question that should be raised is w hether it was ‘Aisyiyah that had more o f an impact on the situation or w hether it was m ore the case that the socio-political context which affected ‘Aisyiyah’s development. This question is particularly im portant considering the fact that in the New O rder period, the latter situation appears to have been the rule. A. The New Order’s Policy on the Women’s Movement: A Contradictory Attitude The w om en’s movem ent in the New O rder period received greater government support and attention, while at the same time— as was the case with other mass organizations— it also became subject to stricter government control o r “close scrutiny.” Such a contradictory attitude can be traced back to the political platform o f the New Order, where it was clearly stated there that the main agenda o f the government was to restore the economic well-being o f the country.27 In order to achieve this goal, the government began to promote what it called Pembangunan Nasional (National Development). Development was tied almost exclusively to economic progress, with the ultimate goal o f making Indonesia part o f the “global economic network and industrialization.”2®O ne o f the main policies introduced to ensure the achievement o f this goal consisted in attracting foreign investment, 26 Suara ‘Aisyiyah, 8 (1998), 14. 77 Siti Ruhaini Dzhuhayahn “Role Expectation and Aspiration o f Indonesian Women: SocioReligious Analysis,” unpublished, paper presented in The International Conference on Women in Indonesian Society: Access, Empowerment and Opportunity, Jakarta 1-4 December 1997,13. 72 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 85] === but this in turn meant that the government had to ensure national stability.29 In other words, development and national stability emerged at the forefront o f government discourse under the New Order. In light o f this, governm ent support for women increased, especially in the area o f development. In 1973, fo r instance, the Minister o f Internal Affairs issued a statement that “whereas in the past the developm ent o f the nation had been virtually the sole responsibility o f the state, the time had com e for all Indonesians to accept that responsibility and become a part o f the process.”30 W omen were to be no exception. Meanwhile, the governm ent tried to exert greater control over society in the name o f national stability. To achieve this the New Order started in the 1970s to centralize power, simplify political parties and strengthen its control over mass organizations, including women’s groups.31 The issue o f w om en and development gained further justification with the participation o f Indonesia in the United Nation’s First Conference on Women, which took place in Mexico in 1975. This conference led the New O rder government to officially adopt the idea o f Women in Development (WID) that resulted from the conference.32 In Indonesia, MIbid. » Ibid. 30 Nonna Sullivan, “Gender and Politics in Indonesia,” in Maila Stivens, ed., Why Gender Matters in Southeast Asian Politics (Clayton: Center o f Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), 62. 31 Istiadah, Muslim Women in Contemporary Indonesia: Investigating Paths to Resist the Patriarchal System, (Clayton: Center o f Southeast Asian Studies Monash University, 1996), 9; Julia Survakusuma, “State and Sexuality In New Order Indonesia,” in Laurie J. Sears, ed., Fantasizing The Feminine in Indonesia (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1996), 95. 32 One o f the more important points, that resulted from this conference, was the significance of the issue o f women in development, pardculadv with special reference to the Third Wodd. This idea was developed from the belief that most o f the policies in development programs in feet do not always been a positive implications for women. Rather, it often results in various negative implications, especially for poor rural women. Based on this assumption, the conference— which also launched the UN’s announcement o f the Decade o f Women—propagated the idea o f 73 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 86] === the adoption o f the idea was manifested in the form o f “constitutional recognition” o f the social status o f women, which stated in the 1978 G B H N (Garis-garis Besar Haitian Negara/ The Principle Outlines o f State Policy)*3 that women have the same rights, responsibilities, and opportunities as men to participate hilly in development.34 The Junior Ministry o f W omen’s Affairs (Menten Muda Urusan Peranan Wanita) was formed in the same year and given the responsibility o f raising the profile o f women in development.35 O ne o f the most im portant programs carried ou t by the Ministry o f W omen’s Affair’s in the early years o f its existence consisted in developing cooperation with other departments.36 This cooperation was manifested in the establishment o f a unit in each o f those departments called the Seksi Pemngkatan Peranan Wanita (Section for Improving the Participation o f Women) which was usually responsible for designing and managing certain special programs in individual departments aimed exclusively at women.3' Furthermore, the com m itm ent o f the government to include women was also demonstrated by the promulgation o f a new Marriage Law on January 2, 1974. Although development showing a higher level o f concern for women, usually called Women In Development (WID). Mavling Oey Gardiner and Sulastri, “Kesinambungan, Perubahan Dan Perempuan Dalam Dunia Laki-Laki” in Perempuan Indonesian, 4-5; Sita van Bemmelen, “Jender dan Pembangunan: Apakah yang Barn?” in T.O. Ihromi, ed. Ka/ian Wanita Dalam Pembangunan (Jakarta: Yavasan Obor Indonesia, 1995), 188-9; Yulfita Rahardjo, “Perbedaan Antar Studi Wanita Dalam Pembangunan Dan Studi Wanita” in Kapan Wanita, 1-5. 33Justine Doom-McCormak, “Organizing Women in Indonesia* The Language o f Women’s Organization, 1909-1930 and 1990-1996,” M. A thesis, Arizona State University, 1998,80-82. 34 Sukanti Suryocondhro, “Timbulnya dan Petkembangan Getakan Wanita di Indonesia” in Penmouan Indonesia, 62. 35 In 1983, the status o f Junior Minister was changed to hill Minister. Ibid. 36 There were 14 departments that developed their cooperation with the.Ministry of Women Affairs. Suryocondro, Ibid,- Rahardjo, Perbedaan Antar Study, 10. 74 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 87] === polygamy was still justified, some provisions o f the bill were expected to guarantee a better position for w om en.3* The fact that this new law applied to all Indonesians, regardless o f their origin o r beliefs, could also be seen as a response to the call by women’s organizations for a unification o f the marriage law. Indeed, considering the long battle over marriage law reform,39 as well as the political controversy that surrounded this promulgation,40 this new law was a great victory for women’s groups. 37 The Department o f Industry, for example, set up a program that provided training for women to enable them to manage various home-industries ranging from food production to garments. Ibid. 38 Substantive changes to this bill, which was seen as in favor of women, were stated in the articles concerning polygamy, divorce and registration o f marriage. In polygamy for instances, articles 3,4, and 5 determined that the proposal o f polygamy should be submined to the court with the enclosed approval letter of the first wife as a prerequisite. Similarly, unlike the previous condition where there was almost no limitation for husbands to grant divorce, the new marriage law advocated that legally a divorce would be accepted only if it is performed before the court. The Indonesian Marrugi Lam (Jakarta: Marriage Counseling Bureau, 1988), 10-11,21. 39 As mentioned in an earlier part o f this thesis, ever since the first women’s congress the pressure for changing the marriage law remained as an important part o f the agenda o f women’s movement. In the post-independence period (1945-1973), this pressure in fact did stimulate various groups, including government departments, to draft several proposals o f reforms. None o f these proposals, however, ever succeeded in being passed, due to conflicting interests in the society, especially between Muslim and Christian groups. Nevertheless, some “patchwork reforms” were bom as a result o f the pressure. Among the most important were: 1) Law No.22/1946 which obliged Muslims to register their marriages, divorce sand reconciliation; 2) Decree o f the Minister o f Religious Affairs No. 15/1955 declaring the standardization o f ta'Kqtalaq; 3) several judicial reforms in adat law concerning the position o f women, for example, that all Supreme Court decisions on all adat law should grant the widow the right to sufficient support from her former husband, her right to share the marriage property apart from the sufficient support, and rights to inherit a share o f the above property. June S. Katz and Ronald S. Katz, “The New Indonesian Marriage Law: A Mirror o f Indonesia’s Political, Cultural, and Legal System,” The American Journal of Comparative Law, 23 (1975): 658-659. 40 The proposal for the bill was brought to the House o f Representatives on July 31, 1973. While four other parties in the parliament were in favor o f the proposal, the Union Faction Party (PPP), as the Islamic representative, was the only group which showed any opposition. Following this a number o f young Muslims held huge demonstrations, including the two-hour seizure of the House of Representatives. The disagreement of the PPP was based on the reason that some articles were not in line with Islamic law. Some political considerations, however, were behind this objection. Among others was the fact that the Ministry o f Religious Affair was excluded from drafting the proposal. Finally, consensus with the Union Faction was reached after the President promised to delete all the non-Islamic articles from the bill. Katz ‘and Katz, The Indonesian Marriage Law, 660-663; 75 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 88] === The promulgation o f the new law also removed a source o f conflict between ‘Aisyiyah and other women’s organizations, especially since ‘Aisyiyah did n o t express any reservations over its implementation. W hat made this possible was the fact that no attem pt had been made in the new law to outlaw polygamy. This law gave an impetus behind a new tendency in ‘Aisyiyah, namely, a stronger resemblance with other w om en’s organizations. M ore evidence in support o f this assumption is discussed below. B. D bam a W anita and P K K A Sign o fGovernment Apostasy The strong control exercised by the New O rder over the w om en’s movement, as mentioned above, was demonstrated in diverse ways. The first step taken involved giving funding to Kowani, which resulted in greater government involvement in and control over this organization.41 Yet, the role played by Kowani under the previous regime, and more importantly, the taint o f Gerwani and its communist ideas within the organization, were matters o f concern to the government. For this reason, the latter tried to establish what it called a “non-political women’s movement.” The foundation o f Dharma Wanita, a government-sponsored women’s organization, was directly in line with this policy. Formed on August 5, 1974, Dharma Wanita served as an important vehicle for the governm ent in involving women in national development.42 Subsequendy, Dharma Wanita functioned as an umbrella organization, or replacement,42 for the many associations o f wives o f civil servant Muhammad Kamal Hasan, Muslim Intellectual Responses to \eu> Order Modernisation in Indonesia (Kuala Lumpur. Dewan Bahasa dan Pus taka, 1982), 146-147. 41 Istiadah, Muslim Women in Contemporary Indonesia, 9. 42 Kowani, Sejarah Setengah Abad Pergerakan Wanita Indonesia (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1978), 278-279. 76 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 89] === that had been formed at an earlier period. Membership in Dharm a Wanita was made compulsory for the wives o f civil servants and female civil servants alike. Its organizational structure was, moreover, hierarchical, where a w om an’s position in the organization was determined by her husband’s position in the service; thus, the wife o f a minister automatically became the head o f Dharma Wanita in that department, the wives o f governors heads o f Dharm a Wanita at that level, and so on.44 In Suryakusuma’s words, “The wife’s educational background, organizational skill, and political inclination are o f no consequence; only the husband’s position counts.”45 Underlying this organization, which according to Suryakusuma was a similar one for American military wives, were two tendencies. Firstly, Dharm a Wanita retained the pattern o f the domination o f the elite class within the women’s movement. Secondly, Dharma Wanita reflected the fact that civil servants were a potent political force and source o f authority in the New O rder, besides the army. It was civil servants and their wives who were expected to become the controlling link between government and people, a backbone o f national policy and models o f loyalty towards the state. The establishment o f D harm a Wanita was followed by the foundation o f the PK K (Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga/Family Welfare Movement), another governmentsponsored organization which— unlike Dharma Wanita which operated at the elite level o r “official circle”— fimctioned at the grassroots level, and targeted both urban and rural 43 In the earlier years o f its establishment, there were 19 associations o f wives o f the civil servants from various departments, which were all united in Dharma Wanita. Kowani, Sejarah Setengah Abad, 281; Isdadah, Muslim Women in Contemporary Indonesia. 9. 44 Julia I. Suryakusuma, “State and Sexuality in New Order Indonesia,” in Fantasizing The Feminine, 99; Rebecca jane Chapman, The Significance of Famify Planning/or Women in Indonesia (Clayton: Center o f Southeast Asian Studies Monash University, 1996), 19. 45 Survakusuma, Ibid. 77 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 90] === society throughout the archipelago. The P K K was set up by the D epartm ent o f Internal Affairs, based on the Presidential Decree N o 28, 1980, as a “grassroots w om en’s organization” aimed at helping the governm ent by improving and creating a social order in accordance with the Pancasiia.”*6 As an organization with such a broad scope, therefore, the PK K was closely in touch with the demands o f rural communities, and involved directly in efforts at improving their welfare. This was reflected in its activities, which ranged from reducing illiteracy among rural women, to providing training in the various skills involved in w om en’s domestic duties, and enabling them in the process to supplement their family's income.47 Officially, the PK K ’s program had to comply with the ten main themes that were already set up by government.4* Interestingly, all o f these ten points referred to ideal living conditions, such as clothing, childcare, shelter, nutrition, and hygiene which lay beyond the capacity o f most Indonesian families, especially those in rural areas, who became the main target o f the PK K.49 Moreover, the PK K was similar to the Dharma Wanita in operating 46 Chapman, Ibid. 47 The programs o f Dharma Wanita and the PKK basically underlined the fact that the mobilization o f women in the development process o f the New Order Indonesia was designed to raise their social and economic condition. On a practical level, however, the emphasis was given to the economic aspect, in which the idea o f increasing women’s income became a main target. It was not surprising, therefore, to see that the idea, which was usually called as “economic empowerment” for women, was adopted not only by Dharma Wanita and PKK, but also by other women’s organizations. Philip J. Eldridge, Non-gpvemment Organisations and Democratic Participation in Indonesia (Kuala Lumpur Oxford University Press, 1995), 153. 48 These ten points are: 1) Comprehension o f Pancasiia (Pengbayatan dan Pengamaian Pancasiia), 2). Mutual Help (Cotang Royong); 3) Food (Pangtn)', 4) Codling (Sandan^', 5) Housing and Household Management (Perwnahan dan Tata Laksana Rumah Tangga)', 6) Education and Skills (Pendidikan dan Ketrampilan)', 7) Health (Kesehatan); 8) Developing Cooperation (Pengembangan Kehidupan Berkaperasi), 9) Preserving the emotional and physical security and tranquil environment o f the home (Keiestarian Lingkimgan Hidup)-, 10) Developing family attitudes appropriate to the modernization process and future planning (Perencanaan Sehai). Mutawali, Peranan Wanita Dalam Pembangunan Desa (Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1987), 117, as cited in Chapman, The Significance. 21; Sullivan, “Gender and Politics,” 68. 49 Sullivan, “Gender and Politics,” 70-71. 78 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 91] === with a hierarchical organizational structure; therefore, the wife o f the village head would automatically determine the priorities in that community. As government-sponsored organizations, PK K and Dharm a Wanita could hardly deny the political and ideological mission embedded in their programs. Both groups were n o t only a principle means for the governm ent to include women in development, b u t also a medium for the government to disseminate its concept o f the ideal role o f women (role expectation), which could subsequently determine the position o f women in the whole political process. Evidence o f this argum ent can be seen, for instance, in the so-called Panca Dharma Wanita (Five Responsibilities o f Women) which were prom oted by the PK K and Dharm a Wanita, namely t50 As loyal backstop and supporter o f her family As caretaker o f the household As producer o f future generations As the family’s prime socializer As Indonesian citizen Many writers have argued th at the above concept o f Panca Dharma Wanita carried a strong overtone o f motherhood, o r in Suryakusuma’s words “State Ibuism,”51 emphasizing the domestic role o f women, as well as their role as the critical agent o f the family.51 Furthermore, this concept is seen as deriving from the state ideology o f the New O rder, 50 Sullivan, Ibid, 64; Chapman, The Significant*, 20; Surya Kusuma, “State and Sexuality,” 101; Saraswati Sunindyo, “Murder, Gender, And The Media” in Fantasising the Feminine, 124. 51 Ibuism comes from the word “Ibu” means mother. It refers to Panca Dharma Wanita in Suryakusuma’s use. The term Ibtdsm was also used by Madeion Djajadiningrat-Nieuwenhuis who stated that in the New Order society the role o f mother (Ibu) was not limited to taking care o f the children. Rather, the New Order ideology gives them responsibility to hold the task o f building the national state. Suryakusuma, State and Sexuality, 101; Madeion Djajadiningrat-Nieuwenhuis, “Ibuism And priyayization: Path To Power?,” in Elsbeth Locher-Scholten and Anke Niehof, eds., Indonesian Women In Focus: Past And Present Notion, (Dordrecht: Foris Publication, 1987), 45-46. 52 Sullivan, “Gender and Politics, 64-5; Chapman, The Significance, 18; Suryakusuma, State and Sexuality, 100-1; Dzhuhayatin, “Role Expectation And Aspiration,” 14-15. 79 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 92] === which held up the family as the key indicator o f the success o f development and modernization. As Suzanne Brenner states ..the Suharto’s regime tried to create an image o f a stable, harmonious, prosperous society built on a foundation o f moral, apolitical, middle class families.” She says further “T he New O rder family, like the government party Golkar, was portrayed not as a political entity but as functional unit, a part o f national whole, that was entrusted with guarding the security, morality, and well being o f its members and o f the nation at large.”53 Since family played such an im portant role in this ideology, women were vital to its success. They were expected by the state to be responsible for guarding the moral, indigenous culture and national tradition through the family. The government felt it necessary to maintain the traditional role o f women, since this would yield the desired result. The traditional role here, however— as appears to have been the case in the previous period— is broadly interpreted, meaning a woman’s role as a mother (or wife) not only in the family, but also in the society. This was demonstrated in the area o f social activism, which increasingly became the province o f women’s organizations, thanks to support o f the government. The latter saw social w ork as the ideal role o f women— if not their only role— in bringing about development. C!Aisyiyah Programs in Comparison: Islami^ation o f Development and Justification fo r Government Programs. Fasting during Ramadan creates pious people, the kind o f people who are needed in the “Take-Off” era o f development, in the era o f globalization, approaching the twenty-first century. For that reason, we must think rationally about how we begin our life after this m onth o f fasting. (Suam 'Aisyiyah, February, 1995) 33 Suzanne Brenner, “On the Public Intimacy o f the New Order Images o f Women in The Popular Indonesian Print Media,” Indonesia 67 (April 1999): 14-15. 80 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission of the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 93] === The above passage, taken from the ‘Aisyiyah’s official journal, is but one articulation o f how in this phase ‘Aisyiyah tried hard to prove its credentials as a women’s organization, which like others, contributed enthusiastically to the process o f national development. Considering the political context o f the time, which was marked by governmental involvement in and control over women’s organizations under the slogan o f development, ‘Aisyiyah towed the governm ent line in order to be socially and politically acceptable. It is no t surprising therefore, to see how ‘Aisyiyah’s activities during this period were carefully designed to contribute to national development. As far as regards the various social and charitable activities that were already in operation, such as educational institutions, orphanages and health centers, ‘Aisyiyah’s efforts were directed toward satisfying government expectations more than anything eke. Indeed, most o f those activities were funded independently by ‘Aisyiyah with only meager financial aid from the government.54 Above all eke the ksue o f women in development was taken much more seriously by ‘Aisyiyah. Having said this, it cannot be denied that the PK K and Dharma Wanita—both o f them government creations— served as models, or references, for other w om en’s organizations, including ‘Akyiyah. T hk can be seen for instance in the several new programs and activities designed by ‘Akyiyah during thk period. Among others was the program, known as Pembinaan Wanita Desa (Guidance for Rural Women) which was launched at the organization’s 1978 meeting. According to Baried the ultimate objective o f the program was to provide information and training to rural women, which in turn would make them more aware o f their duties as Muslims, to understand thetr rights and 81 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 94] === responsibilities in the family and society, and to equip themselves with various skills that would enable them to support the family.55 The decision to make rural women the main targets o f the program, coupled with other aspects, such as an emphasis on family values and economic empowerment for w om en gave this program a close resemblance to similar projects organized by the PKK. By selecting five villages as a pilot p ro ject,56 the program could be seen as a first step for ‘Aisyiyah toward developing cooperation with overseas foundations, especially as it was financially supported by the Path-Finder Fund.57 This resulted in the organization being seen increasingly as an N’G O, a category o f organization which likewise makes a considerable contribution to the country’s social and economic development. In its further development, Pembinaan Wanita Desa was supported and completed by other programs. In 1984, for instance, ‘Aisyiyah announced a new program called as JQoriyah Thayibah (Prosperous Village). Its focus on rural development meant that the program functioned as sort o f augmentation o f Pembinaan Wanita Desa. Instead o f focusing only on 54 For example, out o f about 3,000 ‘Aisyiyah kindergarten schools throughout the archipelago, only ten percent receive financial support from the government. McCormack, “Organizing Women in Indonesia,’’ 82. 55 Baroroh Baried, “Islam and the Modernization o f Indonesian Women,” in Taufik Abdullah and Sharon Siddique, eds., Islam and Society in Southeast Asia, (Singapore: Institute o f Southeast Asian Studies, 1986), 152; Pusat Pimpinan ‘Aisvivah, Sejarah Pertumbuhan and Perkembangpn, 52. 56 The selected areas were Bogor, Tangerang, Banml, Sleman and Sidoarjo. In each location ten QRG (Qur’anic Reading Group) were selected as implementers groups. Pusat Pimpinan ‘Aisvivah, Sejarah Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan, 44. 57 Besides Path-Finder, there were some other ‘Aisvivah activities which were funded by several overseas foundations such as: 1) N'OVTB which gave funds for the foundation o f the building of ‘Aisyiyah Nurses School in 1972-1975; 2) OEF (Overseas Education Fund), which provided the opportunity for ‘Aisyiyah to send its delegates to receive management training in the US during 19721975; 3) UNICEF, which in cooperation with the Ministry o f Religious Affair, funded the 1988 program developed by ‘Aisvivah and known as FQKHA (Kesehatan Ibu and Kelangsungan Hidup A n a k/ Health Service for Mother and Children). Ibid, 89-91. 82 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 95] === rural women, however, the objective o f Qoriyah Thayibah was the under-developed village, with all its natural and human resources. As its name suggested, the idea behind the program was an expression o f ‘Aisyiyah’s wish to participate in the process o f achieving the ultimate goal o f national development, namely, to create a healthy and prosperous society. The program involved developing a carefully selected village58 in order to help it pursue a better quality o f life in various aspects, particularly in education, health and family economics.59 The activities covered by this program ranged from providing scholarships, to granting credit for home industries; indeed the ‘Aisyiyah members active in this program were expected to invite the villagers to participate actively and contribute to the whole process o f the program.60 The program was first implemented in 1989 by selecting a small village in Bantul, Yogyakarta; currently there are seven other provinces that manage such a village.61 In addition, the importance o f the family in the New O rder’s ideology led ‘.Aisyiyah to develop further the family aspect o f the Pembinaan Wanita Desa, through a program called Ktlnarga Sakinah (Happy Family)62 which was first established at the organization’s 1985 meeting. Having as its goal the development o f the five ideal aspects in a family’s life (religion, education, health, and economic and social relationships within and between 58 The selected village itself was named Desa Binaan ( The Developed village) 59 Ibid, 66; Marcoes, “Antara Amal dan Tuntutan Professional ‘Aisyiyah” in Perempuan Indonesia, 162. 60 Pimpinan Pusat ‘Aisvivah, Sidang Tanwir Aisyiyah II Periode 1990-1995 (Yogyakarta: Pimpinan Pusat ‘Aisvivah, 1994), 26 61 During the 1990-1995 period, it was expected that each ‘Aisvivah branch at a district level would focus on developing at least one village- Ibid. 62 Keluarga Sakinah is defined as “a family which able to provide love and affection to all o f its members, enabling them to possess the feeling o f safety, harmony, peace, and happiness, and to pursue well-being in this world and hereafter.” Pimpinan Pusat ‘Aisyiyah. Indikator Keluargt Sakinah (Yogyakarta: Pimpinan Pusat ‘Aisvivah, 1993), 5. 83 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 96] === families), Keluarga Sakinah was very much similar to the Pembinaan Wanita Desa. It differed, however, in the fact that while die latter was focused on rural society, the form er was created with the urban population in mind, with particular emphasis on the middle class family. At the same time, the main focus o f the project— which according to Kuntowijoyo constituted a response to the issue o f the family crisis occurring in Indonesia’s cities— was n o t on physical development, but rather on the furtherance o f moral and religious values with the principle aim o f preserving the institution o f the family. It was not surprising therefore, that the project manual— entided Tuntunan Menuju Keluarga Sakinah (Guidance to Create a Happy Family)— included a num ber o f points that applied especially to middle class urban families. For instance, in dealing with the issue o f child education, the manual advises parents to tram their children from an early age to sleep in separate rooms, where an alarm clock, a personal calendar and a large chest o f drawers should be placed.63 Parents are also advised in its pages to provide private tutors for their children to help them with their studies, and to encourage their children to have extra activities after school.64 Similarly, with respect to the economic situation o f the family, it is obvious that the guidance in the manual was directed at families with a stable economic status. Take for instance the suggestion that in order to manage a family budget, housewife should place her monthly budget in different envelopes, so that each o f them would be spent only on specific expenses ranging from food and school tuition to various unpredictable expenses.65 63 Pusat Pimpinan ‘Aisvivah, Tuntunan menuju Keluarga Sakinah (Yogyakarta: Pimpinan Pusat 64 Ibid, 43. « Ibid, 60-63. 84 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 97] === Over the years, ‘Aisyiyah’s involvement in governm ent programs has expanded. For instance, during the period 1985-1988 ‘Aisyiyah took part in Kowani’s program aimed at preserving the environment. The organization also expressed its concerns over the issue o f women workers by taking the practical step o f founding the Bcdd Latihan Kerja Wanita (Job Training Center for Women), designed to produce skilled w om en to fill job openings, and to reduce the numbers o f unemployed.46 Furthermore, when the issue o f legal protection for exported women workers became a subject o f debate, and led many women’s organization to force government to pay m ore serious attention to the issue, ‘Aisyiyah took a step further by visiting Saudi Arabia to observe at first hand the conditions o f those working there.47 It should be noted however, that the decision to participate in socializing the government’s programs has n o t prevented ‘Aisyiyah from carrying on the mission o f Islamic preaching o r from maintaining its character as a Muslim organization. This can be seen in the strong emphasis on “Islamic morality” that ‘Aisyiyah tries to inject in m ost o f its activities, such as Pembinaan W anita Desa. The dissemination o f the religious message in this program was easily accomplished because the program was implemented through the ‘Aisyiyah Q ur’anic Reading G roup (QRG), which included five main subjects in its curriculum.48 With such an objective and approach to its implementation, those who 66 Aisyiyah’s concern over the issue o f unemployment was also shown by its placement of graduates o f its Nurses Academy in Muhammadiyah and ‘Aisvivah clinics all over Indonesia, ensuring that all o f them gpt a job after graduation. Through this program, the organization assisted the government in reducing unemployment. Pimpinan Pusat ‘Aisyiyah, Laporan Kebyaksanan Pimpinan Pusat ‘Aisyiyah (Yogyakarta: Pimpinan Pusat ‘Aisvivah, 1990), 30; Pimpinan Pusat ‘Aisyiyah, Sidang TanuirAisyiyah I Periode 1990-1995 (Yogyakarta: Pimpinan Pusat ‘Aisvivah, 1992), 30-32. 47 Eighty percent o f the exported Indonesian female workers went to Saudi Arabia, while the rest were scattered in several Asian countries like Malaysia, Singapore and Korea. The visit itself was in 1993, with the permission o f the Minister o f Employment. Pusat Pimpinan ‘Aisyiyah, Sejarah Pertumbuhan, 91; Pimpinan Pusat ‘Aisyiyah, Sidang Tanuir, 17. 85 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 98] === participated in the program had no doubt that it was designed by and for Muslim women. This impression becomes clearer when one looks at the manual o f the program.69 In dealing with the issue o f creating the keluarga sejahtem (happy family) for instance, the focus o f discussion in the manual is on such themes as how to cultivate Islamic values in the family, how to create an ideal wife-husband relationship from the Islamic perspective, and how to develop a harmonious neighborhood o r other social environment. In some cases, however, the Islamic element inserted by ‘Aisyiyah in its programs has led the organization to present a different perspective from that o f the governm ent on certain issues. The family planning program represents one such tendency. It is widely known that among other aspects, o f government’s family planning program has as its guideline restricting parents having to only two children.'0 ‘Aisyiyah’s family planning propaganda, by contrast, does n o t refer to any limitation on the num ber o f children due to “ the fear o f no t getting a share o f G o d ’s blessing.”71 Rather, the objective o f this program 6S The six subjects reflecting these objectives were: 1) The true belief in one God; 2) Disseminating Islamic teaching based on the Qur’an and Hadith; 3) Health education; 4) N’utntion; 5) Family planning; 6) Home economics with the stress on job training for income-generating activities. With this cumculum, the intermediate performance objectives o f the first year of implementation o f this program (1979) were: a) Train 30 ‘Aisvivah leader to implement the program; b) Select 50 QRGs to participate in the program; c) Attract a minimum o f 2,000 women (50 groups o f 40 members each) o f childbearing age to participate in the program with emphasis on women between ages o f 20-35; d) Maintain a family planning discontinuation rate less than 5 percent, e) Encourage at least 55 percent o f non-users to accept family planning by the end o f the program year, f) Reach at least 10,000 ‘Aisvivah members with family planning information in the Islamic context through the work o f the Qur’an teachers trained program. Baried, Islam and The Modernisation, 152. 69 The manual itself was entitled Keluarga Sejahtera (Well-being Family), which was printed by the organization to be distributed to each QRG. It may also be due to the religious emphasis o f the program which led ‘Aisvivah to transfer the program from the management o f economics secnon over to the tahSgh section. 70 The restriction to having a limited number o f children, aimed to decrease the growth of the population, was actually applied to ail citizens. However, among other groups, civil servants were the group most affected by this regulation. For instance, their medical care plan—which was provided by gpvemment—covered only up to the third child. 86 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission. === [PDF page 99] === was directed more towards improving the physical and spiritual well-being o f one’s children, which in turn would produce “a worthy person in the eyes o f the G od.”72 In keeping with this philosophy, ‘Aisyiyah does not permit permanent contraception methods, like tubectomies and vasectomies, and has even applied certain limitations on the use o f IUDs. 3 The differences from government policy, however, are n o t regarded as essential in nature, in the sense that they are not overly stressed, so as not to place ‘Aisyiyah in direct opposition to the gpvemment. The above activities make it clear that ‘Aisyiyah was for the m ost part forced to conform to the New O rder government’s agenda. Compared to Dharma Wanita, PKK, or even Kowani, ‘Aisyiyah may have been more independent in its activities in terms o f government financial support. Yet, given the dghdy controlled political situation ‘Aisyiyah had litde choice but to follow and adopt the New O rder’s ideology and policies in pursuing its own activities, particularly in the area o f development. And this has made ‘Aisyiyah much more similar to other women’s organizations. Furthermore, strong government control obliged obligated ‘Aisyiyah— even while expressing its distinctive message as a Muslim organization— to justify the government programs. Family Planning, Pembinaan Wanita Desa, and Qoriyah Thayibah all illustrate to varying degrees how ‘Aisyiyah tried paint the government’s programs as conforming to Islamic teaching. There is no doubt, moreover, TI ‘Aisyiyah’s view was representative o f the decision o f the Majlis Tarjih (Legal Council of the Muhammadiyah) which stated that limiting the number o f children is hardm since Islam encourages Muslims to have many offspring. To support this argument Majlis Tarjih quoted Q:ll:6 “ There is no moving creature on earth but its sustenance dependeth on God: He knoweth the time and place o f its definite abode and its temporary deposit: ail is in a dear record.” Marcoes, Antara Amal dan Tuntutan, 151. Fathurrahman Djamil, Metode Ijtihad Majlis Tarjih Muhammadiyah (Jakarta: Logos, 1995), 81-82. Marcoes, Antara Am al dan Tuntutan, 151; Djamil, Metode Ijtihad, 83. 87 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 100] === that this complicity was o f huge benefit to die government, since it translated and socialized government policies for the Indonesian Muslim audience. D. The Birth of Indonesian Feminism: Another Challengefor ‘Aisyiyah? The Nairobi Forward Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women (NFSL) policy, which was ratified in 1985 by all UN members, including Indonesia, and which raised the issue o f equality, developm ent and peace, was probably one o f the main factors behind the birth o f a new phenom enon in the women’s m ovem ent in Indonesia.74 The establishment o f several women’s N G O s,75 which has resulted in an “alternative” or “counter discourse” ‘for 73 Baried, Islam and The Modernization, 151. The most important limitation in using an IL'D according to the Majlis Tarjih was the requirement that it should be implanted by a female doctor. Djamil, Ijtihad Majlis Tarjih, 91. 74 This amendment formed a part o f the Women’s Decade o f the United Nations, and the development o f the idea o f Women in Development (WID). Endah Triwijati,” LSM Perempuan Transformatif: Gerakan Altemanf Pemberdayaan Peremuan,” in Perempuan Indonesia: Dulu dan Kint, 355-356. 75 Among the more well-known newly founded women’s NGOs were: 1).Kalvanamitra: Founded in Jakarta on 1984, this group is quite vocal on the gender issues, as the reason for its establishment was the concern o f its founders over gender inequality in society. Instead o f action programs, Kalyanamitra —which has strong links to students and lecturers in the University of Indonesia— focuses more on research and publication, which enables women to share information. Its concern with gender inequality has led this organization to raise such issues as gender-based divisions, or violence against women both at home and in the workplace. Eldridge, Non Government Organizations, l61-162;Triwijati, LSM Perempuan Transformadf 362-363 2) Yavasan Anisa Swasti (widely known by its abbreviation Yasanti) This group was formed by six young women in 1982 in Yogyakarta, with the aim creating an alternative to the PKK. Yasanti’s strategy was to educate women, especially women textile workers around Yogyakarta, by giving them skills training which would enable women to identify and solve their problems at the workplace. Another important program o f this group involved conducting a legal education class undertaken in co-operadon with Yogyakarta Legal Aid Institute. Through this class, women workers were educated to be aware o f their rights, i.e. to demand overtime payment, be able to read job contracts or achieve higher wages. Eldridge, Non Government Organization, 160, Isdadah, Muslim Women In Contemporary Indonesia, 10. 3) Yayasan Solidantas Perempuan (Foundation o f Solidarity for Women). This NGO was founded on December 10, 1990 by four women whose expertise was in law and politics. Due to the seniority of its founders, this organization was basically expected to be an umbrella organization for other women’s NGOs, and to serve as a pressure group on the government. Concerned above all with the gender-gap, this organization aggressively struggled to 88 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission of th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 101] === existing w om en’s organizations, is a prom inent feature o f this new phenom enon. Despite their different goals and targets, it is clear that these new organizations had at least one thing in common, namely, the desire to abolish the patriarchal system. One obvious drawback to this system, according to these newer groups, is the gender-based division o f society, whereby women are limited in role to the domestic sphere, while men dominate the public sphere. Since this system is socially and culturally constructed, the organizations demanded that it be reviewed and even dismantled, in order to create an atmosphere which guarantees gender equality, putting an end to the domestication o f women. With this perspective in view and by referring to the NFSL, these new organizations— often referred to as feminist groups— began to criticize the idea o f Women in Development that had served as a reference for the New O rder governm ent in setting up its policy on women. One particular criticism voiced by these organizations was that Women in Development, which had always linked the role o f women to their position within the family, had failed to erase the existing gender divisions in society.” More importandy, they saw the N ew O rder government’s ideology, which emphasized family values and the tradidonal role o f women, merely as an extension o f the domestication o f women. Furthermore, that ideology was seen as totally patriarchal, gender-biased and even repressive o f women. This latter perspective led to the view that the new w om en’s movem ent was actually a reaction against the New Order, and that their common goal was to “search for a way to challenge” it.'8 make women aware o f their rights, especially economic and reproductive rights. At a practical level, like Yasanri, this group pays a great deal o f attention on women’s workers, in particular, the domestic workers and the exported women workers. Triwijati, L S \t Perempuan Trunsformatif, 368-369. *6 For details see McCormack, “Organizing Women in Indonesia,” 95-103. ~ Triwijati, LSM Perempuan Trans/brmatif, 356. 89 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 102] === Voicing this strong message o f gender equality, the new organizations offered a novel and critical perspective on the dominant issues facing women. O n the issue o f w om en’s participation in development, for instance, McCormack, tells us that one o f these new organizations argued that instead o f the PKK, D harm a Wanita, o r other women’s organizations involved in social causes, those who should be given credit for contributing more to development were women laborers who were “working for low wages under poor conditions” in support o f industrialization.79 Moreover, while Dharma Wanita and the governm ent promoted the idea o f peran ganda (double role), whereby women were supposed to lead an existence in which domestic and public life were in constant harm ony,10 the new w om en’s N G O s condemned peran ganda as simply imposing a double burden on women. Besides, according to these N G O s, the government’s idea o f a double role, in the sense that it provided an opportunity for women to participate in development at the national level, seemed to suit only the elite o r at least middle class women whose careers were seen merely as supplemental to their husband’s income. In other w ords, the government’s definition o f the double role had little to do with the “double role” played by poor women in rural areas, where life was more a m atter o f survival rather than improving standards o f living. 78 Soendari, “Potret pergerakan Perempuan Indonesia: Berjuang Melawan Kediktatoran Orde Baru” as cited by Isriadah, Muslim Women in Contemporary Indonesia, 10. 79 McCormack, “Organizing Women in Indonesia,” 99. 80 The idea o f the dual role for women emerged in women’s discourse at the beginning o f 1980, when the process o f modernization and industrialization began to take off. The demand for greater industrialization had led die government to invite women — who in general -already had greater opportunity to pursue high education — to participate in the various sectors of the industrialization process. This invitation opened the chance for women to get involved in public life -and to be active in production. However, the ideology o f the state whose concern was very much focused on the domestic role o f women was still maintained. As a result, there was a new expectation from the state that the ideal woman is one who is able to keep the balance between her domestic and public life, between her reproductive and productive function and between being a mother or wife and a wanita karir (career women). McCormarck, “Organizing Women in Indonesia,” 87-89; 90 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 103] === T he criticisms expressed by the newly-founded groups extended even to the use o f the term wanita (women). Meaning “mature woman,” wanita is a Javanese word which in the past was seen as a contraction o f wani di tata (being ready to be controlled)." Beginning with Sukarno’s period and until Suharto’s time this w ord was widely used by government. w om en’s organizations, and society as a whole. Considering its inferior and pejorative meaning, the use o f this word was criticized by the new groups as implying the subordination o f women. Instead o f wanita, these groups prom oted the use o f the idiom perempuan (female), which was regarded as more liberating for women and free o f gender bias. Besides the government, the newly-tounded groups also criticized existing w om en’s organizations, including ‘Aisyiyah, and their activists. According to the feminist groups, the activities o f m ost women’s organization, for w hom the emphasis was mostly on education, social activities, and health services, simply perpetuated the gender gap. In other words, social welfare activities were perceived as an extension o f the domestic role imposed on women. Wardah Hafidz, for instance, has stated that m ost o f the programs undertaken by Indonesian women’s organizations, including Muslim ones, were clearly intended to perpetuate the traditional role o f women.82 She also states that after the women’s m ovem ent had accomplished its goals, i.e., the promulgation o f the marriage law o f 1974, an egalitarian Triwijad, LSAI Perempuan Transformatif, 356; Chapman, The Significance, 18; Dzuhavatin, “Role Expectation and Aspiration.”16. 8t Ibid, 4; McCormarck, “Organizing Women in Indonesia,” 97. 82 Wardah Hafidz, “Organisasi Wanita Islam dan Arah Pengembangannya,” in Lies Marcoes and J.H. Meuleman, eds., Wanita Islam Indonesia Dalam Kafian Tekstual Dan Kontekstual, (Jakarta: INIS, 1993), 137. 91 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 104] === constitution and equal opportunities in education, it lost its m omentum and its significance.83 Some o f the organizations even felt that they have already accomplished their tasks, while m ost o f the rest were trapped in romanticism, merely remembering and maintaining w hat they had already achieved.*4 The strong control o f the New O rder government worsened the situation because it discouraged any critical and innovative attitude on the part o f those w om en’s organizations.*5 Dealing specifically with ‘Aisyiyah, Lies Marcos offers a similar criticism. She argues that despite several exceptions, the division o f tasks between ‘Aisyiyah and the Muhammadiyah mirrored the polarization o f duties in the family, which is totally subject to gander bias.*6 The m other is for instance supposed to deal with the domestic sphere; educating and taking care o f the children, all o f which is embodied in ‘Aisyiyah’s activities o f providing education and health for society. The father, on the other hand is seen as responsible for the public domain; he is the breadwinner, and performs other “male” tasks, as manifested in the Muhammadiyah’s programs which revolve around politics, organizational policy and relations with the governm ent.87 W hat is noteworthy, therefore, is the fact that the feminist groups have brought a new perspective to bear on women’s organizations in Indonesia. They have questioned and challenged the dom inant concept o f the ideal role o f women embodied in the w om en’s organizations offered by the New O rder government. We see then, that activities like 83 Wardah Hafidz, “Gerakan Perempuan Dulu, Sekarang, dan Sumbangannya kepada Transfotmasi Bangsa,” in Fauzie Ridjla, Lusi Margivani, and Agus Fahri Husein, eds., Dinamika Gerakan Perempuan (Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana, 1993), 96. 84 Ibid. 85 Ibid. 86 Marcoes, Anlara Amaldan Tuntutan, 162. 87 Ibtd. 92 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 105] === education and social welfare, which had previously been considered as the ideal fields o f activity for w om en’s organizations, have come to be viewed as reinforcing gender bias. It is n o t the concern o f this thesis to pass judgm ent on whether or n o t this new paradigm has succeeded. It suffices here to say that it is an ongoing process, which still colors the discourse o f the women’s movement, even after the fall o f the New O rder. Given this context, ‘Aisyiyah, as a part o f the women’s movement, must be influenced by this paradigm. Moreover, since the organization is Islamic in character, it can be expected to contribute its Islamic perspective to this new discourse. In short, ‘Aisyiyah has constantly made an effort to maintain, and even develop its programs. It is also true, however, that the organization has increasingly been affected by the given political context. Thus the more the New O rder government strove to include women in its development programs, the more ‘Aisyiyah and o th er organization have been forced to contribute to the state and society. Nevertheless, the strong control exercised by the New O rder had deeply influenced the actions o f the organization. This can be seen from the expression by ‘Aisyiyah o f its desire “ to contribute to development” as an answer to the New O rder’s expectations, which put the theme o f development at the forefront o f their political platform. Furthermore, while its relationship with o th er women's organizations seems no longer to be a problem for ‘Aisyiyah, this period has witnessed the emergence o f several internal problems. The cadre formation process, and die attendant question o f its regeneration and dynamism, as well as its status with respect to the Muhammadiyah have proven to be am ong the organization’s m ost fundamental challenges. In addition to these internal issues, the gender issue, which has begun to draw the attention and concern o f the Indonesian w om en’s movement may be regarded as an external challenge facing ‘Aisyiyah. 93 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 106] === While such problems are to be expected due to the age o f ‘Aisyiyah, they need to be addressed for the sake o f further development o f the organization. In other words, these issues seem to serve as an indicator o f w hether o r n o t ‘Aisyiyah, as a Muslim women’s organization, will be able to respond and adjust to the rapid social and cultural transformation that Indonesia is presendy facing. 94 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 107] === Conclusion ‘Aisyiyah, from its birth to its later development, was deeply involved in the socio political and historical evolution o f Indonesian society, which in turn colored the structure, ideology, and activities o f the organization. As may be seen from the above discussion, the very birth o f the organization was itself the product o f a certain historical context, namely, the rise o f Indonesian nationalism in the early twentieth century. It was this trend that gave birth to the Indonesian w om en’s movement, o f which ‘Aisyiyah formed a part. So when Budi Utomo— the pioneer nationalist group— founded its wom en’s section Putri Mardika, other organizations, including the Muhammadiyah, were inspired to take the same step. This last point is also significant in that, since its establishment, ‘Aisyiyah has always worked alongside other women’s groups, and has often shared the same struggles, concerns, and activities with them. This was true to the extent that ‘Aisyiyah began to identify m ore with the wom en’s movement than with the Muhammadiyah, its parent body. However, right from the start ‘Aisyiyah differed from most other wom en’s groups, not only because it was Muslim in identity, but also because o f its representation o f lower and middle-class interests. The latter characteristic is especially notable since m ost other women’s organizations dealt only with a few elite, educated people and pursued activities which did n o t impact upon the grassroots level o f society. Moreover, the distinctness o f ‘Aisyiyah, due especially to its Islamic ideology, was reflected in many other respects, causing the organization often to present different perspectives o r stands on different issues. For example, just like other w om en’s groups active in the first half o f the twentieth century, the main goal o f ‘Aisyiyah in its early days was to reform cultural values which were thought to oppress women. Yet, while many o f the other groups looked to Western models for 95 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 108] === guidance, ‘Aisyiyah sought its justification in Islamic teachings. This position was dem onstrated in the idea behind calling the group ‘Aisyiyah in the first place. Named after ‘A 'ishah, the Prophet's wife, it reflected the organization’s view that the traditional role o f a wife in the Javanese family needed to be replaced by the Islamic concept, according to which the wife should play an active role in the family’s decision-making process, just as ‘A ’ishah did. For Muslim w om en in particular, ‘Aisyiyah’s influence had brought about a change in the m anner o f their religious participation. Praying in mosques, receiving religious training, and even wearing a veil were all signs o f a new consciousness on the part o f Muslim women that they could publicly participate in religious observances, something that they had never experienced before. Returning to our discussion o f the influence o f the socio-historical context on the development o f this organization, we can see that, as it was bom during the early nationalist period, ‘Aisyiyah at first made national independence the main theme o f its activities. During the first two decades o f its existence, the organization actively participated in building networks and uniting Indonesian women’s organizations in support o f the liberation effort. O ne result o f this was the holding o f the first Kongres W anita Indonesia, which established the foundations o f the Indonesian wom en’s movement. During the Old O rder era, on the other hand, we noticed that the idea o f developing the newborn country became the main focus o f ‘Aisyiyah’s activities. The concentration shifted to social development: m ore schools were founded, more health centers were built, and more programs were begun. Nevertheless, in maintaining its distinct identity as a Muslim organization, ‘Aisyiyah often found it hard to get along with other w om en’s groups. The ‘Aisyiyah’s position in the debate on polygamy and the marriage bill during the period between the first women’s congress and the end o f the Old O rder is but one illustration o f the problem. The issue o f communism R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 109] === under Sukarno’s government provides another example o f strained relations between ‘Aisyiyah and its peers such as Gerwani and Kowani. The strong political and historical influence on ‘Aisyiyah’s development was also expressed in its readiness to cooperate with the government in power. While this has led the organization to be elastic and adaptive, it has also made ‘Aisyiyah more pragmatic and opportunistic. It has helped ‘Aisyiyah survive in spite o f shifts in the Indonesian political climate, although it has also led to the unprogressive and sluggish development o f the organization. This can be seen in the performance o f ‘Aisyiyah during the New O rder period. The tight control o f the New O rder governm ent over social organizations, including w om en’s groups, forced ‘Aisyiyah to give full support to the idea o f national development which was aggressively prom oted by the New O rder regime. O ne could even say that ‘Aisyiyah provided justification for the government’s national development policies, and seldom, if ever, opposed these. The political situation has also led ‘Aisyiyah to take the activities o f Dharm a Wanita and PK K as models for their own initiatives. As a result, the organization produces few original o r truly reformist concepts, especially when compared to the new-founded women’s N G O s, which are more concerned with the contemporary and practical issues facing Indonesian women. In other words, ‘Aisyiyah in its debut tended to reflect the priorities o f the reform ist Muhammadiyah, both culturally and religiously, but it has moved gradually ever since towards the status quo. Wre may conclude then by stating that there is an apparent cleavage within ‘A isyiyah between idea {ajarari) and practice (amai). In practical terms, ‘Aisyiyah no doubt contributes greatly to the causes of Indonesian women generally and those o f Muslim Indonesian w omen in particular. The establishment o f numerous educational institutions, mosques, health centers, and orphanages shows that the organization is concerned with the problems 97 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 110] === faced by Indonesian society as a whole. In terms o f ideas and concepts, however, it is difficult to say that ‘Aisyiyah is reformist. Its defense o f polygamy during the pre independence period, and furthermore its rejection o f the marriage bill under the O ld O rder regime represented a conservative approach, in the sense that it did not show any awareness o f the cause o f liberating women. This is n o t to mention an unprofessional national board o f ‘Aisyiyah, in which tenure is based on a kinship system still affiliated to the Kauman family, and die absence o f ‘Aisyiyah representation on the Muhammadiyah’s national board. The lack o f a progressive o r reform ist attitude on the part o f the organization can also be partly attributed to its dependency on the Muhammadiyah. As a part o f this organization, ‘Aisyiyah cannot disregard the policies already set up by its parent body, which has often led to sluggishness on the part o f ‘Aisyiyah in responding to certain issues o r solving problems. In other words, if ‘Aisyiyah were given greater independence o r a position equal to that o f the Muhammadiyah, a new degree o f progressiveness could be reached. 98 R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission. === [PDF page 111] === Bibliography Abdullah, Taufik. 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=== [Page 7] === ABSTRACT Author: Ro'fah Title: An Analysis of 'Aisyiyah: An Indonesian Women's Organisation (1917-1998). Department: Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University. Degree: Master of Arts This thesis deals with the role of 'Aisyiyah, the women's section of the reformist organisation Muhammadiyah, founded in 1912. Its aim is to analyse the development of the organisation in relation to other Muslim women's organisations. The research examines the activities of 'Aisyiyah from its beginnings in 1917 to the end of the New Order era of the 1990s, while also referring to other Indonesian women's organisations. A comparison of the activities of 'Aisyiyah with those of the other women's organisations, as well as an analysis of the organisation's reactions to certain issues such as polygamy, are also an important feature of this work. While common objectives can be found, certain inevitable differences and even some disagreements with other women's groups could be noted. This was, on the other hand, the inevitable result of 'Aisyiyah's determination to maintain its identity as a Muslim women's organisation, while it had to face certain constraints due to being affiliated with the Muhammadiyah movement. In general, however, 'Aisyiyah is no different from other Indonesian women's organisations, since all of them tried to represent women's interests and fought for their advancement while, at the same time, these organisations were confronted with the challenges imposed by a constantly changing political situation. iii [Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.]