The Forgotten Years: The Missing History of Indonesia's Mass Slaughter, Jombang-Kediri 1965-1966 (PhD Arizona State, 1997)

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Further reproduction prohibited without permission. === [PDF page 3] === THE FORGOTTEN YEARS: THE MISSING HISTORY OF INDONESIA’S MASS SLAUGHTER (JOMBANG-KEDIRI 1965-1966) Hermawan Sulistyo A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY May 1997 R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 4] === UMI Number: 9726200 Copyright 1997 by Sulis tyo, Hermawan All rights reserved. UMI Microform 9726200 Copyright 1997, by UMI Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. UMI 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, MI 48103 R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 5] === THE FORGOTTEN YEARS: THE MISSING HISTORY OF INDONESIA’S MASS SLAUGHTER (JOMBANG-KEDIRI 1965-1966) Hermawan Sulistyo has been approved May 1997 APPROVED: wL.i Chair Supervisory Committee ACCEPTED: Department Chair <j u o f t t i t u i L Dean, Graduate College R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 6] === ABSTRACT Following an abortive coup in Indonesia in October 1965 hundreds of thousands of Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) members and sympathizers were hunted down and slaughtered by military and civilian vigilante groups. One o f the largest mass killings in the twentieth century, this slaughter is among the least studied. To date, only the power struggle for national leadership in the capital has been thoroughly studied. For the killings themselves, only limited documents are available. As for oral history, the traumatic nature of the experience seems to have erased the memories of some witnesses and inhibits others from talking. Even those who won the power struggles of these years rarely speak of their victory. Guilt, perhaps, prevents them, and the fear of reprisal. The years of 1965-1966 are thus the forgotten years of modem Indonesian history. This is a study of those forgotten years, with a local focus upon the JombangKediri area in East Java and based on interviews and available documents. The findings are that there was no single pattern of killings that can be nationally applied: in some places they were orchestrated by the military; in some others, they were a violent manifestation of previous local conflicts. In the latter cases, the slaughters took place sporadically, in unsystematic, uncoordinated attacks, and person-to-person or small-group confrontations. Various cultural and structural factors came into play. The slaughters were not only a result of an “amok,” or of religious, political, or economic conflict. All of these elements were involved. The slaughters left a deep wound in Indonesian society. The wound is widely shared among members of the generation who experienced the event of 1965, a generation iii R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 7] === now passing from the scene. The only collective remembrance that exists is an official history based more on political necessity than on the factual events. In this official history everything is black and white; there are no grey tones, or colors. This study is designed to recapture and describe some of the complexities of these unfolding events and thus to help restore to the public memory a better picture of this forgotten history. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 8] === for tole who teaches me the unteachable R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 9] === ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This dissertation could not exist without the help and guidance from my Ph.D. committee. Dr. James R. Rush, my advisor, successfully shaped the last stage of my long intellectual journey. Ms. Beth Luey gave me more than I would dare to expect from a mentor. Dr. Mark R. Woodward always placed himself more as colleague than employer. I regret that after a long mentoring process, Dr. S.K. Batalden was on sabbatical. But Dr. Stephen MacKinnon was another best mentor I could expect. Dr. Noel J. Stowe also contributed much to broaden my intellectual horizon. For them all, I want to express my gratitude. This dissertation (and my study) was only made possible by generous help from the following institutions: The Center for Political and Area Studies, the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (PPW-LIPI); The American-Indonesian Educational Foundation (AMINEF), especially its Fulbright Program; Contemporary History Institute and the Department of History, Ohio University; Program for Southeast Asian Studies, Arizona State University; Scholarly Publishing/Public History Program, Arizona State University; the Ford Foundation (Jakarta and New York offices); Surya newspaper (Surabaya); Airlangga University Press (Surabaya). None is responsible for any parts of this dissertation. During the process of research and writing I received help from Gugus Analisis, an NGO in Jakarta, who let me use their "troops" as field assistants: Retno, Sugi, Udin, Etiek, Nila, Nina. Dadang (BScC Jakarta) and Pujihandi (Surya Kediri) were also field assistants in my fieldwork. The following institutions together provided me with facilities for conducting this study: Alden Library, Ohio University; Hayden Library, Arizona State R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 10] === University; Wason Collection, Cornell Library; Centers for Southeast Asian Studies at the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Northern Illinois University, University o f Califomia-Berkeley; Kahin Advanced Research Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Cornell University. Many people helped me at various stages of my Ph.D. study and writing this dissertation. I want to thank K.H. Yusuf Hasyim and Bu Lik of Tebuireng, General (Ret.) Soemitro, Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Purbo S. Suwondo, Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Hasnan Habib, the late Dr. Abdurrachman Surjomihardjo (LIPI), Dr. Mochtar Pabottingi (LIPI), Dr. William H. Frederick (Ohio University), Ms. Lian The-Mulliner and Jeff Ferrier (Ohio University), Dr. Benedict RO.'G. Anderson (Cornell University), Amrih Widodo (Cornell University), Ben Abel (Cornell University), Dr. Sardjono Jatiman (University of Indonesia), Drs. Arbi Sanit (University of Indonesia). Last but not least, I want to thank friends and families, who helped in various ways to ease the almost unbearable burdens. Mark Weitz, Jaime Aguilar, Justine and Brian McCormack, Elizabeth McMillen, Michelle Reynolds, Janet Fernandez, Dr. Peter Suwamo, Ko Kim Le, Alice Backlund, Trace Baker, Melissa Abney (A.S.U.); Herman Darmo, Uki M. Kurdi, Tiny Frida (Surya); Permias friends in Athens and Tempe. Finally, support from my families in Jakarta and East Java helped me to uplift much emotional strain during my study. Ayodya, Anditto, and ling suffered more than anyone else for my uncivilized attitudes during my study. vii R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 11] === TABLE OF CONTENTS Page xvi MAPS CHAPTER I. THE BLOODY HANDS: NATIONAL THEATER OF HORROR.................. 1. Gestapu and Gestok..................................................................................... 2. The revolution is not finished yet: prologue to Gestapu............................... 21 2.1. Guided Democracy........................................................................ 22 2.2. Economic situation......................................................................... 26 2.3. Inside the armed forces................................................................. 30 2.4. Inside the P K I................................................................................ 39 3. Red blood of the Reds: mass slaughters of post Gestapu............................. 49 n. WHO DID THIS?: HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE GESTAPU AFFAIR 55 1. Five Scenarios............................................................................................ 55 1.1. PKI as the mastermind.................................................................. 55 1.2. Internal affair of the arm y............................................................. 60 1.3. Sukarno was responsible............................................................... 62 1.4. Suharto was behind the plot.......................................................... 64 viii R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 12] === 1.5. The intelligence circle and C IA................................................... 65 2. Studies on the Gestapu Affair...................................................................... 69 3. Sources and research..................................................................................... 81 4. Mass slaughters: reconstruction of a missing history................................... 87 m. RED CANES AND THE WHITE SARONGS: SUGAR PLANTATIONS AND PESANTREN IN JOMBANG AND KEDIRI 100 1. Jombang and Kediri...................................................................................... 100 2. Loji and pondok: initial encounters........................................................... 108 3. Cooperations and confrontations.................................................................. 123 IV. MOTHERLAND IS PREGNANT: FROM CULTURAL CONFRONTATIONS TO VIOLENT POLITICAL 132 1. Economic and cultural settings.................... 132 2. Political groupings........................................................................................ 143 3. Land reform and unilateral actions.............................................................. 155 V. SLAUGHTERING THE REVOLUTIONARIES: PATTERNS OF KILLINGS 170 1. Gestapu and initial reactions......................................................................... 170 2. The operations.............................................................................................. 188 3. Politics, psychology, and personages of slaughters..................................... 214 VI. COLLECTING THE SCATTERED BONES: REALIGNMENT PROCESS IN THE AFTERMATH..................................... 226 1. Stopping the killings..................................................................................... 226 2. Healing the wounds...................................................................................... 233 3. Entering the 1971 general elections............................................................. 242 R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 13] === CHAPTER 247 1. Amok, or Malay frenzy, and other cultural explanations......................... 247 2. PKI provocation....................................................................................... 252 3. Religious conflict and Muslim holy w a r................................................... 253 4. Class conflicts.......................................................................................... 255 5. Aliran conflicts........................................................................................ 255 6. Lacking of national integration................................................................ 256 7. Outburst of economic pressures.............................................................. 258 8. Army revenge and state genocide............................................................ 259 263 APPENDIX A: NUMBER OF WORKERS BEFORE AND AFTER THE GESTAPU AFFAIR 293 APPENDIX B: LIST OF WORKERS OF P.N. GULA MERITJAN THAT WERE KILLED, NON-ACTIVE, SUSPENDED, DISCHARGED.............................................. 299 APPENDIX C: LIST OF WORKERS DISCHARGED DUE TO THEIR INVOLVEMENT 302 APPENDIX D: LIST OF WORKERS WHO FELL VICTIM IN POST-GESTAPU 306 APPENDIX E: A PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF CHAIRMAN OF ANSOR/B ANSER KEDIRI 313 R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 14] === GLOSSARY Abangan : Secular orientation of the Javanese; Clifford Geertz used the term for a belief system that mixed Hindhuism and Javanese mysticism. Agama : Religion Algojo : Executioner Alun-alun : Large public open field at the center of a town. Anak-anak : (Bocah-bocah, Central Javanese; Arek-arek, East Javanese), literally means "kids," but used as an in-grouping social identity. Ansor(Also Banser, or Banser Ansor): The youth wing of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). AURI : Angkatan Udara Republik Indonesia, Indonesian Airforce Becak : Tricycle. Biro Khusus: Special Bureau, a name designated by the military for a group of PKI members with covert activities under the leadership of Aidit. Brawijaya (Division): East Java Military Regional Command. Bupati : Regent, in charge of a regency. CIA . Central Intelligence Agency Cultuurstelsel: Forced cultivation system. Daerah : Region, usually refers to local administration. Dalang : Shadow puppet master, mastermind. Desa : Village. Dewan Djenderal (DD): Council of Generals. Diponegoro (Division): Central Java Military Command. Disekolahkan: To be sent to school, a disguised term to slaughter someone. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urth er reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 15] === Dwikora : Dwi Komando Rakyat, Two People's Command; operation against the formation of Malaysia, especially in north Kalimantan (Borneo). Gambyong : Sensual traditional social dance. Gemblengan: Martial art practice, with spiritual training. Gestapu : Gerakan September Tigapuluh, the September 30th Movement Gisikan : Riverbank Gubemur : Governor, in charge o f a province. Harian Rakjat: PKI's controlled daily newspaper, banned on 3 October 1965. llmu : Knowledge, also used to refer "magical power.” Istiqarah : Contemplating ritual to receive God's guidance. Jum'at legi : Friday night, believed to be the night of the ghosts. Kabupaten : Regency, administrative level under a province. Kampanye : Temporary worker at the sugar plantation. Kampung : Village (interchangable with desa). Kawedanan : District, administrative level under a regency (in 1965-1966, it has been abolished since). KBG (Kesatuan Buruh Gula): Workers union affiliated with the Nationalist Party (PNI). Kecamatan : Subdistrict, administrative level under a district (kawedanan) Kesaktian (sakti): Supernatural ability, commonly shown as the ability of being vulnerable. Kiyai : Islamic scholar and teacher. Kopkamtib : Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, Command for the Restoration of Security and Public Order. Kopra (Kotapraja) or Kodya (Kotamadya): City or municipal administration. xii R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 16] === Kostrad : Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat, Army Strategic Reserve Command. KOTl : Komando Operasi Tertinggi, the Highest Operational Command; the highest authority under Sukarno, consisted mainly of military officers; the command was mainly responsible for military operations in West Irian and North Kalimantan. Loji : Enclave of neighborhood of sugar plantation staffs. Lubang Buaja: Crocodile hole, a well that was used to dump the bodiesof the generals; also loosely used to refer "similar holes" prepared by the PKI. Ludruk : All-male traditional theater. Mahmillub : Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa, Special Military’ Tribunal. Ma'rifat : Someone who attains the highest spriritual wisdom. Masjid : Mosque. Masjumi : Madjelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Consultative Council), major Islamic political party. Nahdlatul Ulama (NU): Islamic traditional organization; was a political party. Nasakom : Nasionalisme-agama-komunisme, Sukarno's acronym for the union of nationalism, religion, and communism. Ndredeg : Frightening. Nekolim . Neo-kolonialisme dan imperialisme, neo-colonialism and imperialism. Olah kanuragan: Martial arts Operasi teratur: Orderly operation, killings by the military. Orang kuat : Strong man, referring to supernatural power. Orba (Orde Baru): New Order, referring to Suharto's regime. Orla (Orde Lama): Old Order, referring to Sukarno's regime. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 17] === Owatan : Spiritual training related to physical power. Pabrik Gula (PG): Sugar plantation, sugar factory. Panca Sila : Five Principles, basis of state propounded by Sukarno in 1945. Pemuda : The youth, a term applied loosely as political concept instead of age cohort definition. Pencak silat (or simply, silat): Traditional martial art. Pendopo : Official house of a regent. PKI : Partai Komunis Indonesia, the Communist Party of Indonesia. PNI : Partai Nasionalis Indonesia, Indonesian Nationalist Party. Politik aliran: The politics of "current," a term used by Clifford Geertz. Pondok pesantren: Used interchangably with its parts: pondok, or pesantren; traditional Islamic educational institution. Pemuda Rakyat (PR): Youth wing of the Communist Party of Indonesia. Priyayi : Javanese noble, applied loosely to include the bureaucrats. RPKAD : Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat, Special Forces of the Indonesian Army. Sana : There; referring to the enemy or foe. Santri : Pupil learning Islam in pesantren; also loosely used as social grouping for Muslim. Sarbumusi (Sarekat Buruh Muslimin Indonesia): Indonesian Muslim’s Workers Association, affiliated with traditional Islamic party NU. Sini : Here; referring to in-group identity. SOBSI : Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia, All-Indonesia Federation of Labor Organization—PKI controlled. Sukabumi : A retirement city in West Java; also a two-word meaning of "suka" (like) xiv R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 18] === and "bumi" (the earth), a disguised term for "sending someone to like the earth" (i.e. to kill). Supersemar : Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret, the 11th March Instructional Letter; a transfer of power from Sukarno to Suharto. Syahadat (kalimat syahadat): The first two-sentence fundamental oath in Islam. Ta'qlid : Total devotion to a teacher. Tasawuf : Islamic sufi school. Tawadu' : Total devotion to a teacher. Tjakrabirawa: Presidential Guard Regiment. Undang-undang: Laws Walikota : Mayor Wudhu : Cleansing ritual before praying. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 19] === NAMES AND SPELLING There is no standard naming in Indonesia. Most Javanese do not use family names as their last names, and many of them have only one name. Therefore, we find Sukarno and Suharto, with only one name. If they use first and last names, most would use their first names and many use initials for their last names. Therefore we find Major General Haijono M.T., Rusdi Anwar as Rusdi and not Anwar, and Willy Soedjono as Willy S. rather than W. Soedjono, and. But this is not a rule. Many Javanese, particularly those who use Arabic names such as Muhammad or Ahmad as their first names prefer to use their last names. But again, this is also not a rule. A rather applicable rule is found among non-Javanese ethnic groups. For the Bataks, for example, it is common to use last names, which are also family names. Therefore, we find A.H. Nasution for Abdul Harris Nasution. Following everyday usage in Indonesia, this study uses the name that the person chose to use; as a consequence, there is no consistent pattern in naming. Spelling is also another confusing subject for readers that are not familiar with Indonesian language. The spelling have been changed since the independence. The use of oe, for example, was replaced by u, but many still retained the old spelling of oe This study follows the latest spelling used by the language, except for names and other terms used in sources, such as titles of books. As with the names, it seems inconsistent, but this "rule" does not violate preferences of the people whose names appear here; it also does not violate standard procedures to ease future research on the same subject. xvi R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 20] === INDONESIA cri R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 21] === KOTAMADYA DATI I t KFCAMATAN. MOJO ROTO.: kegamatan! KCiwrw:{»()) cc: u u? * n *iCASajwiM (C C A M A 7 1 * ta S 2. R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 22] === OMV'tVM * MMAVJntfVM wvttNowwi TT I1VC1 IV H lVMnnv/M R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 23] === INTRODUCTION As one of the largest, yet least studied, mass killings in the twentieth century, the massive anti-communist program in Indonesia in 1965-1966 is by itself a compelling topic for academic study. The Indonesian massacres, which followed an abortive coup d’etat and a counter coup in the capital city of Jakarta, also present many challenges to the researcher, including scarcity of sources, and both psychological and political constraints. On a personal basis, my interest in this topic grew through several stages of experience over a long period of time. As a child in Madiun, East Java during this period, I witnessed quite a number of bodies floating in the Bengawan River almost on a daily basis. Many of the bodies were without heads. It was said that they were members of the Indonesian Communist Party (the PKI) or its sympathizers; therefore, they were “bad people.” For the children of the time, this scene was not extraordinary. Local political life had been tense and polarized for some years before the mass killings took place. Many of us were even involved in political activities as members of youth or student organizations affiliated with one side or the other, following a national pattern. But as happened with all children from the sixties, I came to enjoy a new life under the New Order regime and soon put the traumatic memories of 1965-1966 behind me. Now, Indonesian students studied the history of Indonesia in 1965-1966 in a positive light—as a watershed, a bridge from the old and dark age of the Old Order to a better life o f nationhood under the New Order. All Indonesian citizens learned that ex-members or sympathizsers of the PKI, or anyone who was in some way affiliated with the party or its subgroup, was bad. Hundreds of thousands of them were still in detention throughout the R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 24] === country, the most infamous incarcerated on remote Burn Island. This was the situation during my college years in the 1970s. Then two important incidents took place in 19801981. The first was the ousting from the University of Indonesia o f four students who happened to be my friends. Charged with inviting Pramoedya Ananta Toer (a famous writer affiliated with Lekra, a leftist artists organization) to campus, they were arrested and detained for six months. Meanwhile, I was writing a graduate thesis comparing the political ideas of Tan Malaka and D.N. Aidit, both of whom were communist leaders and chairmen of the PKI. Partly as a result of the Pramoedya incident, I was not allowed to hold an oral defense for the thesis. Subsequently I wrote another thesis on the Pesantren Tebuireng, a traditional Islamic educational institution located in Jombang, East Java. During fieldwork for this (second) graduate thesis, I heard stories about the killings in Jombang and in Kediri, an adjacent regency. My interest wakened, and continued to grow for several years to come. On my own, I started to conduct research and established rapport with several key informants; some of them turned out to be the executioners themselves. Based on a very limited number of published sources and more interviews, now conducted more extensively and systematically, I started to reconstruct the local setting at the time of the killings.1Based on a preliminary paper, I received a Fulbright scholar-in-residence grant to do more research in the U.S. This, in turn, led eventually to this dissertation. This is a topic that no Indonesian will talk about easily. It can be dangerous or considered provocative to do so. This is because there have been repeated political cases •Details on the methodology are appear in subchapter II.3. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 25] === involving the problem of the PKI. In Indonesia, up until now, someone who is proven to be an ex-member or sympathizer of the PKI is politically a dead person. Moreover, anyone who is an immediate family member, or even a relative such as an uncle or cousin, of a PKI member or sympathizer, is similarly stigmatized. Such “unclean” people cannot pursue a public career. He or she cannot, for instance, work as teacher, journalist, editor, writer. He or she is also prohibited from occupying positions considered strategic such as within the military and bureaucracy, or companies involving oil or public transportation. A brief discussion of sources also reveals how politically sensitive this topic is.2 All newspapers from 1965-1966 are missing from Indonesian library stacks. There are notes saying that, for security purposes, the newspapers are “held by Kopkamtib (Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, or Command for the Restoration of Security and Public Order).” All documents and studies on the period of 1965-1966 are also subject to tight security or even held by the military authorities themselves. When I started this study, most if not all sources available on the 1965 coup and its aftermath focused on the national politics. Not a single document, account, or study dealt with the killings, which took place mostly in the countryside. This dissertation, along with one or two other recent studies, seeks to rectify this by describing events in a specific region, namely the Jombang and Kediri Regencies of East Java. This dissertation has some clear limitations. Although it does review the national theater and provide a few new facts or clues for further research, it does not provide new interpretations of the Gestapu Affair. The focus of this study is not on national politics or 2More details in subchapter II.3. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 26] === the Gestapu Affair itself. It is not about the coup or counter coup or about military operations. Nor is it about party politics. Instead, it seeks to describe and analyze social tensions and conflicts and, ultimately, an outburst of violence in a local area where the post-Gestapu killings were especially intense. The goal is not only to provide a detailed local picture, but also to help bridge the huge gap between the national and local settings in our understanding o f this traumatic national event. The timeframe being used is a full century but with a concentration on the two decades of the 1950s and the 1960s. Special attention is given to the first half of the 1960s, prologue to the killings, and the period of 1966-1971, the epilogue. But the main concentration is on 1965-1966, when the killings actually took place. This broad timeframe is intended to emphasize a historical continuity, rather than discontinuity, in explaining the causes and assessing the impact of the killings. Chapter I reviews the chronology of what might have happened in the infamous Gestapu Affair of 1965 at the national level. It follows a chronology that is believed to be as close as possible to the actual facts, although it is impossible to wholly separate such presentations from conflicting interpretations of them. A subchapter describes military operations and political events in connection with the Gestapu Affair. This is followed by subchapters on the situation within the armed forces and the PKI at the time and finally by some conflicting data on the mass killings. The second chapter reviews the historiography of the Gestapu Affair and the mass killings. The chapter analyzes the existing literature by presenting five interpretations of the events in Jakarta. It offers critical assessments of each interpretation by reviewing its R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 27] === strengths and weaknesses. After a discussion of historiography, sources, and methodology, the chapter closes with a critical review of two other local studies focusing on Kediri and Bali. The next chapter describes the social setting in Jombang and Kediri, covering the century-long relationship between the sugar plantations and pesantrens in the area. It begins with a subchapter on Jombang and Kediri in 1965-1966, based on their physical characteristics, population statistics, and other relevant data. The next subchapter explores the historical roots of the region’s two distinct communities: the pesantren and Ioji (the sugar plantation). This is followed by a more detailed discussion of the two communities in the fifties. Chapter four covers the period from 1960 to August 1965. Divided into three subchapters, this section provides an immediate prologue to the mass killings. The first subchapter deals with the economic and social setting, the second with social groupings and political affiliations, and the third the increasingly violent political actions, following the adoption of the Land Reform Law in 1960. Chapter five describes in detail the immediate impact of the Gestapu Affair in Jakarta upon the balance o f local politics in Jombang and Kediri. This is followed by a lengthy discussion of the techniques and patterns of the mass killings in the two regencies. The chapter closes with a psychological and social assessment of the executioners and their accomplices. Chapter six analyzes the realignment process, starting with measures to halt the killings, followed by the healing process, and closing with a description of the impact of R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 28] === the New Order in Jombang and Kediri. The conclusion summarizes the factors that contributed to the mass killings and discusses the links between the local and national stages of conflict. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 29] === CHAPTER I THE BLOODY HANDS: NATIONAL THEATER OF HORROR 1. Gestapu and Gestok On the night of 30 September 1965-or, more precisely, approaching the dawn of 1 October 1965—certain army troops embarked on trucks to several points in Jakarta from their base in the vicinity of the capital city. The troops went directly to the houses of seven top-ranking army generals: General A.H. Nasution, Lieutenant General Achmad Yani, Major General Suprapto, Major General S. Parman, Major General Haijono M.T., Brigadier General D.I. Pandjaitan, and Brigadier General Sutojo Siswomihardjo. The goal of their mission was to seize the generals, alive or dead. They went back with seven victims, three of them already dead, having been shot on the spot. The others were later killed in Lubang Buaja, an area close to Halim Perdana Kusuma Air Force base. Known "history"1describes the killings in Lubang Buaja as an orgiastic fiesta, but witnesses and physical evidence have established that there was no such orgy.2 First Lieutenant Dul Arief, who led the troops in kidnapping the generals, demanded that they be executed without delay, but Major Sukresno, who was responsible 'Chapter II will elaborately deal with this issue. 2Confession of Maj. (Air Force) Gatot Sukresno [in the same following source, the name was spelled differently as Gathut Soekrisno] in G-30-S Dihadapan Mahmillub 2 di Djakarta (Perkara Untung), a published document by The Army's Judge School (AHMPTHM, 1966), pp.68-69. Visum et repertum of the bodies, in English translation from the original source of the medical examiner, appeared in Benedict Anderson's "How Did the Generals Die?" in Indonesia, No.43 (April), 1987 (Ithaca: Cornell Modem Indonesia Project), pp. 109-113. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 30] === for security at the airbase, was so nervous that he waited orders from his commander, Major (Air Force) Sujono.3 Unfortunately for the kidnappers, their number one target, General Nasution, managed to escape; instead, they took First Lieutenant Pierre Tendean, Nasution's adjutanct, who was mistakenly identified as the general. During the ambush of Nasution's house, however, his youngest daughter, aged five, was shot and later taken to the hospital. She was pronounced dead the next day. Initiators and proponents of these actions named their movement as Gerakan 30 September, or The September 30th Movement,4 but these events later have been called Gestapu (Gerakan September Tiga Puluh, more popularly spelled as Gerakan Tiga Puluh September, or The 30th September Movement).5 [Later, the events were officially called 3Names of troops and their duties are explained later in this section. 4The name was first coined in a meeting of a coup group on 29 September and then it was used in the first announcements by the movement. See Mahmillub dalam perkara Supono Marsudidjojo alias Pono, 3 vols. Typescript transcript, pp.32-33 (Uncatalogued doc., Kahin Center, Cornell University), and Dekrit No.l Tentang Pembentukan Dewan Revolusi Indonesia, signed in Jakarta on 1 October 1965 by commander of the movement, Lt. Col. Untung, and his four vice commanders—Brig. Gen. Soepardjo, Lt. Col. (Air Force) Heru, Col. (Navy) Sunardi, Lt. Col. (Pol.) Anwas. This decree was followed by another decree—Keputusan No. 2 Tentang Penurunan dan Penaikan Pangkat--to eliminate the military ranks above lieutenant colonel, issued on the same day and signed by Oentoeng. Both documents were included as attachments to the trial documents of Omar Dhani, in Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa, Putusan No. PTS017/MLB-XTV/O.D./1966 tgl.23-12-1966, pp.436-438, uncataloged doc., Kahin Center, Cornell University. 5John Hughes, the first American journalist to cover the movements, noticed that the term "Gestapu," the September 30th Movement, was first coined sometime after funerals of the bodies of mutilated generals on 5 October 1965. Indonesian Upheaval (New York: David McKay, 1967), pp. 137-138. But the term that had been used since the first announcement by Untung and counter reactions by Suharto, published in all newspapers, was G-30-S, without the slash /PKI, of course. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 31] === G-30-S/PKI (Gerakan 30 September/PKI, or the 30th September Movement/the Indonesian Communist Party). The whole affair was later called Peristiwa G-30-S/PKI (The G-30-S/PKI Affair).] Gestapu was followed by a series of counter actions, starting the very next day, 1 October 1965. Major General Suharto, commander of Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat (Kostrad), or the Army Reserve Strategic Command, led these counter actions; his maneuvers were later called Gestok (Gerakan Satu Oktober, or The October 1st Movement).6 These terms, Gestapu and Gestok and G-30-S/PKI, are important not only as denoting two separate phases of the unfolding events, or as a dividing term in political grouping between those who won the conflict and those who lost their power, but as distinctive academic discourses as well. They would later influence patterns of historiographical interpretation and analysis. Although some Gestapu and post-Gestapu events are still obscure, many common facts are known.7 The following is an account of what may have happened; disputed facts and interpretations will be elaborated in later chapters. Following the troop movements of 6The name was asserted as an "official" version as early as 1966-1967. A judge of the Extraordinary Military Tribunal (Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa) in the trial of Dr. Subandrio, allegedly involved in the coup, reminded Subandrio about the contrast meanings of the two terms. See G-30-S/PKI Dihadapan Mahmillub 3 (Jilid II) di Djakarta (Perkara Dr. Subandrio), a document published by the Army's Judge School (AHM-PTHM, 1967), p.60. Sukarno's preference to use the term Gestok was barred from the popular vocabulary due to its association with Suharto's counter movement. See Sukarno's use in Gerakan 30 September Pemberontakan Partai Komunis Indonesia: Latar Belakang, Aksi, dan Penumpasannya (Jakarta: Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia, 1994), p. 151. 7This chapter follows as close as possible to undisputed facts, while various interpretations of these events will be reviewed in chapter II. Critical assessment on the sources being used in this study is in subchapter II.3. R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 32] === 10 the dawn of 1 October 1965, an army officer named Lieutenant Colonel Oentoeng made an announcement through the national state-owned radio station (RRI, Radio Republik Indonesia). Oentoeng, commander of Battalion I of the Tjakrabirawa Presidential Guard Regiment, speaking on behalf of the troops, announced that he led a movement to save President Sukarno from an anticipated coup d'etat by a group of army generals known as Dewan Djenderal, or the Council of Generals. Oentoeng stated that the president was safe and being protected in an undisclosed area. Oentoeng also announced that Sukarno's government had been dissolved and was being replaced by revolutionary councils. Pending the formation of a National Revolutionary Council, he urged the people to form similar councils at the provincial and local levels. At the provincial level, each council should comprise no more than 25 people; at the regency (kabupaten) level, no more than 15 members; at the subdistrict (kecamatan) level, no more than 10 members; and at the village (desa, kampimg) level, no more than 7 members.8 Only hours after this first announcement, Oentoeng issued a decree on the formation of a national revolutionary council; the council was named Dewan Revolusi Indonesia, or the Council of the Indonesian Revolution. There were 45 leaders and members o f this council, with Oentoeng acting as chairperson of the council; he was helped by four vice chairpersons—Brigadier General (Army) Soepardjo, Lieutenant Colonel (Air Force) Heru, Colonel (Navy) Sunardi, and Lieutenant Colonel (Police) 8Dekrit No.l Tentang Pembentukan Dewan Revolusi Indonesia, in Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa, Omar Dani case, loc.cit., p.436. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 33] === 11 Anwas. The forty members of the council were supposed to represent various political groupings.9 Many of them later denied involvement in the Gestapu, by stating that Oentoeng cited their names without their consent. Missing from the list were most prominent figures from the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) and President Sukarno himself. Oentoeng's announcement, particularly the part about forming revolutionary councils, was to become one of the most debated issues in the Gestapu Affair. The army version o f Gestapu argued that if the coup group intended only to counteract the Council of Generals, then why would they need to dissolve the administration (of the operating Dwikora Cabinet) and form revolutionary councils.10But a counter perspective by Western scholars, pioneered by a collective work of Benedict Anderson, Ruth McVey, 9These names were (in order, as announced by Oentoeng): Omar Dani (Air ViceMarshal), Sutjipto Judodihardjo (Police Inspector General), E. Martadinata (Naval ViceAdmiral), Dr. Soebandrio, Ir. Surachman (Nationalist), Dr. J. Leimena, Fatah Jasin (Religious Group), K.H. Siradjuddin Abbas (Religious Group), Tjugito (Communist), Arudji Kartawinata, Siauw Ghiok Tjan, Sumamo S.H., Hartono (Marine Maj. Gen.), Sutarto (Police Brig. Gen.), Zaini Mansur (Central Youth Front), Jahja S.H. (Central Youth Front), Bambang Koesnohadi (PPMI), Sukatno (Central Youth Front), Rachman (Vice Secretary General, National Front), Hardojo (college student), Basuki Rachmat (Maj. Gen.), Ryacudu (Brig. Gen.), AmirMachmud (Brig. Gen.), Solichin (Brig. Gen.), Andi Rivai (Brig. Gen.), Sujono (Air Maj.), Leo Wattimena (Air Commodore), Dr. Utami Suijadarma, A. Latief (Col.), Umar Wirahadikusuma (Maj. Gen.), Mrs. Supeni, Mrs. Mahmudah Mawardi, Mrs. Suharti Suwarto, Fatah (Col.), Suherman (Col.), Samsu Sutjipto (Naval Col.), Suhardi (journalist), Drs. Suhartono (Police Col.), Djunta Suwardi, Karim D.P. (Journalist Association of Indonesia). It is interesting to note that many of these names, such as Basuki Rachmat and Umar Wirahadikusuma, were later among those who crushed Gestapu. Data from Keputusan No.l Tentang Susunan Dewan Revolusi Indonesia, in Omar Dani case, loc.cit., pp.439-440. 10Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Saleh, The Coup Attempt o f "the September 30 Movement" in Indonesia (Jakarta: Penmas, 1967?), p. 143. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 34] === 12 and Frederick Bunnell, insisted that this contention was not borne out by a careful analysis of the text; given the muddled character of the statement, it seemed doubtful that Oentoeng and his friends fully understood its possible implications.11 Moreover, while these scholars argued that the revolutionary council announced later in Jakarta was prepared in haste and with a lack of political sophistication,12the army's version insisted that preparations had been made much earlier. An assessment of the U.S. Embassy arrived at a similar conclusion that "soon learned that the list was a crude subterfuge, composed without their (the people on the list) knowledge."13 From the early morning of 1 October 1965, the situation in the capital city was very tense and uncertain. Only a few people knew who had taken the generals, although some of the kidnappers were identified by their uniforms as members of the presidential palace guard. Many who knew about the kidnappings knew nothing about the whereabouts of the generals, or their fates, and much less about what lay behind the dramatic events. Oentoeng's announcement gave only a hint of what happened. Confusion was widespread, even among high-ranking military officers, especially in the army, for all personnel involved in the kidnappings were from the army, at least judging by their uniforms. Suspicion and confusion were also shared by members of other services; many of them were in Jakarta to celebrate the upcoming armed forces day. “ Benedict Anderson and Ruth T. McVey, "A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965 Coup in Indonesia" (Ithaca: Cornell Modem Indonesia Project, 1971), fn.76, p.75. “ Anderson, and McVey, ibid., fn.78, p.75. “ Marshall Green, Indonesia: Crisis and Transformation 1965-1968 (Washington D.C.: The Compass Press, 1990), p.53. Green was then U.S. ambassador for Indonesia. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 35] === Amidst this situation, Nasution, who had been rescued by troops of the Jakarta Military Command, was brought to the headquarters of Kostrad. At the headquarters, he met with several generals who had not been the targets of the Gestapu movement. Among them was Major General Suharto, commander of Kostrad. Among those gathered, the line between "friends" and "foes" was obscure, since it wasn't clear who had been party to the Gestapu movement and who had not. Nasution nevertheless agreed that Suharto, the highest-ranking officer in the "standing order" of the army in the absence of Lieutenant General Yani, should take the necessary steps to control the situation.14 The shooting of his daughter had a major effect on his support for Suharto. The military operations of the Gestapu group did not go as smoothly as planned. Major (Air Force) Sujono, who was responsible for logistics, failed to provide the material, weapons, and ammunition for the rebel troops and the allied youths assigned to strategic posts throughout the downtown area of Jakarta. He could not deliver arms in sufficient number, and especially could not provide food in time.15 Knowing this, Major General Suharto tried to win over the troops, especially those from the Diponegoro Division, who were wandering in front of the presidential palace and who controlled 14The works by Anderson and McVey, op.cit., and by Notosusanto and Saleh, op.cit., are still the best descriptions for military operations. Using similar data, however, they arrived at different conclusions. On their differences, see details in chapter II. Other than these two works, only John Hughes' account, op.cit., provided another story on the military operations. 15"Beberapa pendapat yang mempengaruhi gagalnja "G 30 S" dipandang dari sudut militer," an document as a PKI’s internal evaluation on the failure of the movement; an attachment to documents on Supardjo trials, uncatalogued, n.d., Kahin Center, Cornell University, p.249. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 36] === 14 strategic spots in the Jakarta business district, including the RRI building. Suharto was now to begin the complicated but "traditional" Indonesian army process of undermining the unity of these units by opening negotiations with different levels of command within them.16 These efforts succeeded as Suharto took control over many rebel troops without a bloody fight; one of the reasons was that he himself had been a commander of Diponegoro Division. After controlling the radio station (RRI), Suharto made an announcement that the September 30th Movement was launched by "counter revolutionary forces."17 Other non-Diponegoro rebel units retreated to Halim Perdanakusuma air force base to join others already stationed there. Suharto then surrounded the air base with his Kostrad troops, although he had to face a threat from Omar Dani, the commander of the air force.18 By this time, it was known that President Sukarno was "secured" in this area. Threatening to use the dreaded Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat, or Regiment of the Special Para-Command Troops of the Army (RPKAD), or simply the army's special forces, to launch a deadly strike (while at the same time promising to forgive anyone who was involved but who did not understand the situation and stressing that only those 16Benedict R. Anderson and Ruth T. McVey, op.cit., p.35. 17CompIete text as attachment in Gerakan 30 September... op.cit., pp. 16-17. Detailed "battle" on information between the two sides is in Anderson and McVey, op.cit., pp.38-41. 18Omar Dani sent a radio message that Suharto should abandon his intent, since Halim was under the control of the Air Force; otherwise, Suharto would be challenged by the Air Force. Buku Harian Radio Pesawat Udara, document in Omar Dani case, loc.cit., p.447. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 37] === 15 responsible would be punished), Suharto gained the upper hand at the air base. This was a turning point for the whole movement, since the ability to strike Halim would collapse the rebel command.19 But it was not until 1:00 p.m. the next day (2 October), not long after President Sukarno left the area for Bogor,20 that Suharto ordered his troops to take control over the whole air base.21 Meanwhile, lacking in military experience, the youths (politically speaking, the pemudcr2) affiliated with the coup makers were confused; no one took any initiative. Many of them were not sure how to use the distributed weapons.23 Most of them never had a chance to use the weapons before they fled or were arrested. On 4 October 1965, the bodies of six slain generals and of General Nasution's aide were found in a deep well called Lubang Buaja at the airbase.24 Pictures of their bodies sparked national anger, which reached its peak after many people saw pictures of the 19Justus M. van der Kroef, Indonesia After Sukarno (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1971), p. 13. 20A city in West Java, located about 50 miles east of the airbase. There is a presidential palace in this city, mostly used for vacation. 21The troops were RPKAD and 328th/Kudjang Para Batallion, supported by two companies if armored troops; see, Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Saleh, op.cit., p.70. lite ra lly, the term pemuda means the youth. But on the Indonesian political landscape, the term is applied loosely as a political concept—to catch the spirit of the youth—instead of being used as defining an age cohort. A good review of this political term is in Benedict Anderson, Java in a Time o f Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971), esp. Introduction. “ A vivid personal account in Thalib Ibrahim, Rubuhnja RaksasaMerah (Jakarta: Penerbit P.T. Amanah, 1966), esp. pp. 19-22. 24Apparently, Omar Dani himself was not aware that the slain generals were dumped into a well within the airbase control. See his secret order to check the report on the well; attachment to the Mahmillub documents, Omar Dani case, p.457. R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 38] === 16 innocent five-year-old daughter of General Nasution who had been killed days before. The army celebrated armed forces day on 5 October, but not with its usual parade of troops and cheerful atmosphere. Instead, it commemorated the day with the funerals of the fallen generals in the Kalibata national cemetery. During the funeral ceremony, the bodies of the generals were carried on the tanks, symbolizing an anger and determination to avenge. General Nasution delivered a speech, but President Sukarno himself was not present. His absence might have been due to security considerations, but it was nevertheless viewed as scandalous.25 What followed was tumultuous, too complicated to reconstruct in a balanced fashion. In places where political tensions had been high in the previous months and years, there were fatal casualties, especially in Central and East Java and Bali.26 By the time of the Gestapu Affair, the Indonesian armed forces were at a low ebb, weakened by political factionalism, corruption, and all kinds of divisive elements such as ethnic and religious identity. They now attempted to consolidate themselves after the traumatic loss of the generals. The army had been in conflict with the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) for a long time. Now, that the PKI was under suspicion for killing the generals (although at 25John Hughes, Op.cit., p. 131. 26This does not mean that the fights did not take place in other areas, but these three provinces suffered the most. Anderson and McVey, Op.cit., pp. 46-53 give detailed political analysis on the four areas of Central Java—Semarang, Salatiga, Yogyakarta, Surakarta; Notosusanto and Saleh, op.cit., pp. 41-65 and 74-76 provide detailed military reports on the situation in Semarang, Yogyakarta, Solo, Magelang, Boyolali, Klaten, Kartasura, all also located in Central Java. No contemporary reports on East Java and Bali. A rather detailed study analyzing the situation in Bali is Geoffrey Robinson, The Dark Side o f Paradise (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1995), esp. pp. 286290. R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 39] === 17 this time, without evidence), the PKI would serve as the common foe around which the army could consolidate itself. A plan emerged. First, the party was to be proven as the mastermind o f the killings so that appropriate punishment could be given; second, the campaign against the would be used to unite the army. It was Suharto who led military and political maneuvers to promote these dual goals. The army then insisted that President Sukarno dissolve the PKI. With a ban on the party, and dispersal of its members, it would be easier for the army to seize control of the country and consolidate itself internally at the same time. But President Sukarno refused to ban the party. Already in the twilight of his charismatic career yet still a strong leader with wide popular support, Sukarno maintained his philosophical belief in Nasakom~the idea that Indonesian society should be based on three political/philosophical elements: nas-ionalisme (nationalism), a-gama (religion), and kom-unisme (communism). In political parlance, this conception meant that the elimination of PKI would unbalance the ideal nation based on the three fundamental pillars. Philosophically, as well as politically, the army’s demand to ban the PKI was an unacceptable condition to Sukarno. The army, however, could not coerce the ailing president, who was still very popular among the people. Despite this, systematic efforts by the army,27 fueled by deteriorating economic 27Since 10 October 1965, and continued for the rest of the month, the army issued several decrees to start a massive campaign cleansing the state apparatus from the proponents, or potential proponents, of Gestapu. With a radiogram No: T0269/A/G.5/1965 dated 10 October, Komando Operasi Tertinggi (KOTI), the highest authority, ordered all offices to hold a roll call every two days to find who was missing from the office. The radiogram also ordered that whoever was absent from the office (continued...) R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 40] === 18 conditions—the inflation rate had risen to three digits28—increasingly loosened Sukarno's grip over political variables in Jakarta. But the army was well aware of the popular support Sukarno still enjoyed, even in areas where Muslim resentment toward the PKI was explosive. It therefore moved carefully for fear of losing support from intellectuals and Muslim organizations for its efforts to redirect political affairs in Jakarta and some other important areas such as Java, Bali, and Sumatera. Finally, after a bitter political struggle against other services of the armed forces, as well as against the PKI and Sukarno himself, lasting six months, Suharto sent generals M. Yusuf, Basuki Rachmad, and Amir Machmud to meet President Sukarno in the Bogor presidential palace. In this meeting of 11 March 1966, Sukarno agreed to issue an "instructional letter" transferring authority to Suharto.29 This event is known as 27(... continued) should be temporarily discharge from their job. This radiogram was followed by several similar decrees. The Department of the Army issued Surat Keputusan Nomer: KEP1146/10/1965 on punishment actions of army personnels that were suspected as supported the Gestapu; and Surat Keputusan Nomer: KEP-1196/10/1965 on the formation of military regional and local military tribunals and trials of civilians that should be conducted by these tribunals. The chief of staff of the armed forces issued an order No. INS1015/1965 to support the first order issued by the Department of the Army; and the Supreme Court issued an order No.l28l/Sek/5334/M/65 to support the second order. Documents in Komando Operasi Pemulihcm Keamancm dan Ketertiban, Himpunan Surat-2 Keputusan/Perintah jang Berhubungan dengcm Kopkamtib 1965 s/d 1969 (Jakarta: Sekretariat Kopkamtib, 1970). 28See details in subchapter 1.2.2. “ "Standard" copies are found in various sources, such as Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (Kopkamtib), loc.cit.; Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia, Gerakan 30 September... op.cit., pp.35-36. The wording was that Soekamo as president/highest commander/the greatest leader of revolution/someone with a mandate from the provisional parliament, ordered Lieutenant General Suharto to: (1) take all (continued...) R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 41] === 19 Supersemar (Surat Perintah SebelasMaret, or the March 11 Instructional Letter). It was primarily intended to give operational power to Major General Suharto to restore order and stability. But it could also be interpreted as conferring political power.30 The situation under which Sukarno signed this letter was unclear, although there was no indication that Sukarno was subjected to a disguised coup by the three generals.31 In any case, on the next day, 12 March 1966, Suharto announced the dissolution and banning of the PKI, followed by more systematic efforts all over the country to "crush the PKI."32 Although Suharto's authority to make such an announcement was later ^C... continued) necessary actions in order to maintain security and tranquility and the stability of of the government and the revolution, as well as to guarantee the personal safety and authority of the leadership of the president/highest commander/the greatest leader of revolution/someone with a mandate from the provisional parliament, and to adopt with determination all teachings of the greatest leader of the revolution; (2) coordinate as best as possible with commanders of the other services; (3) report all things that related to the above duties and responsibilities. 30Nasution, Ketetapan2 M.P.R.S. Tonggak Konstitusionil Orde Baru (Jakarta: C.V. Pantjuran Tudjuh, 1966), pp. 43-53. 31A footage on the official announcement of the transfer of power appeared in a documentary film Riding the Tiger, part III. In the film, where President Sukarno spoke in English when introducing Suharto, there was no hint of a stressful President being overthrown in a disguised coup; Sukarno seemed to be happy and even made some light jokes. Representing Sukarno, he issued a presidential decree No. 1/3/1966, containing three points: (1) to ban the Communist Party of Indonesia, including parts of its organization down from the center to local branches, and all organizations with similar principle or were under its umbrella; (2) to declare the Communist Party of Indonesia as illegal in all areas under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Indonesia; (3) that the decree is in effect on the day it was issued. Keputusan Presiden/Panglima Tertinggi Angkatan Bersendjata Republik Indonesia/Mandataris MPRS/Pemimpin Besar Revolusi No. 1/3/1966 as published in Kopkamtib, Himpuncm Dokumen, loc.cit. This decree was followed by (continued...) R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 42] === 20 disputed, he and his army group clearly had the upper hand. With a de facto power to control the bureaucratic apparatus, Suharto cleansed the government o f PKI members and symphatizers; cabinet ministers such as Njono were hunted down. Political power shifted in less than two years after the Gestapu Affair. Helped partly by popular resentments—with intellectuals, students, and pemuda who had joined the army—the new authorities rapidly seized full control. In general, the situation after Supersemar was an anticlimax. There could be no doubt the Old Order (Orde Lama, or Orla) had been eclipsed by the New Order (Orde Barn, or Orba). The provisional parliament, Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara (MPRS), provided a constitutional basis for Suharto's power grab when it finally stripped Sukarno of his political power. Suharto's rise to power after receiving this institutional basis was unchallenged, surpassing other potential candidates for national leadership such as General Nasution.33 32(... continued) another, issued as "instruction" on 14 March 1966, which stated that all political parties and mass organizations should not accept new members from the disbanded PKI. Instruksi Presiden/Panglima Tertinggi Angkatan Bersendjata Republik Indonesia/Mandataris MPRS/Pemimpin Besar Revolusi No: 1/3/Tahun 1966, in ibid. 33A CIA assessment in late November 1965 stated that "In the post-Sukarno era, Nasution probably would be the army's major candidate for national leadership." Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Current Intelligence, Intelligence Memorandum, "Leadership Prospects in Indonesia," art. 14, p.4, case #88119, Doc. #118 (Alden Library, Ohio University). R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 43] === 21 2. The revolution is notfinished yet: prologue to Gestapu Prior to 1965, tensions and conflicts had heavily clouded the political and social climate. After the transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands in 1949, Indonesia was experimenting with a liberal system of governance throughout the period 1950-1959. The experiment was considered "failed" by Sukarno, the founding father of the nation, as well as by the Army. A parameter of the failure was the inability of any party to maintain an administration that survived long enough to implement policies undisrupted by party conflicts. The longest administration was less than two years in office. One of the reasons for this condition was the lack of a majority party in the parliament. Four major parties— Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Masyumi, or the Council of Indonesian Muslims), Nahdlatul Ulama (NU, the Islamic scholar's organization), Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, the Communist Party of Indonesia), and Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI, the Indonesian Nationalist Party)—all shared almost equal percentages of seats in the parliament and local houses of representatives (provincial as well as regional/regency level). As a result of this perception, Sukarno, supported by the Army, proclaimed a new system of governance called Demokrasi Terpimpin, or Guided Democracy, instituted in 1959.34 Centered on Sukarno, this system was based on two pillars of political power, the Army and the PKI. Within the system, Sukarno always had to maintain a delicate balance 340 n the background of this perception, see Daniel Lev’s classic work, The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959 (Ithaca, N.Y.: original version published by Cornell Modem Indonesia Project, 1965; in book, Cornell University Press, 1977). R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 44] === 22 o f power between the two pillars.35 As a professional group, the military had no intrusive control over the PKI. By contrast, the PKI, through a strategy known as KKM (Keija di Kalangan Musuh, working inside the enemy's circle) had infiltrated almost all strategic political sectors, including the armed forces. 2.1. Guided Democracy Under Guided Democracy, Sukarno-led Indonesia to the left.36 Domestically, he applied the policies of Nasakomization to amalgamate three socio-political groupings that he saw as the roots of all other political mappings: the nas-ionalis (nationalist), a-gama (religious), and kom-unis (communist) groups, as mentioned earlier. Sukarno dreamt of having the three blended together into a progressive revolutionary force to promote a great Indonesia. Nasakom as a policy, or ideology as Sukarno proposed, received broad interpretations, from a perception that the policy should be a mixture of the three qualities into every one's personality, to the one that perceived this policy as a formal division of three political parties and that each bore one of the qualities. On paper, the praxes of the Nasakom philosophy went well. In practice, however, Nasakom resulted in a turbulent situation. On the international stage, Sukarno led Indonesia to pursue a position as leader of 35Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, revised edition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp.45-51. 36For further discussions, see Herbert Feith's classic works, The Decline o f Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962), and, "Dynamics of Guided Democracy," in Indonesia, edited by Ruth T. McVey (New Haven: HRAF, 1963) R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 45] === 23 a new world that differed from the western and communist blocs.3* But in reality, Indonesia leaned to the communist bloc—to PRC after the ideological split between the Soviet Union and China. Following this leaning, Indonesia was to counter nekolim (neo colonialism and imperialism) forces. Among many other tasks for Indonesia to fight the "greedy" nekolim were the struggle to fight for Irian Barat (West Irian),39 then still in Dutch possession, and to destroy the formation of Malaysia, which was seen as a puppet nation, made under a British scheme. To pursue such a policy, seen in conjunction with the military and diplomatic struggle to free Irian Barat, Sukarno launched Politik Konfrontasi, the politics of confrontation, to eliminate this British "Malaysian project." In general, during Guided Democracy, Indonesian foreign policies were set to maneuver among the big players: the United States, the. Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China.40 Two direct domestic implications from pursuance of this policy were a more roomy space for the PKI, now closer to Beijing than Moscow, and more U.S. interests put into Indonesian domestic affairs. During Guided Democracy, U.S. diplomats and politicians in the State Department split their opinions and shifted from one school of thought to another. Some of them wanted to pursue an active role to oppose Sukarno, while others believed a better policy was to maintain minimum involvement and avoid 38A classic work on Indonesian foreign policy during this period is Michael Leifer, Indonesia's Foreign Policy (London: Allen & Unwin, 1983). 39A critical assessment for a failed decolonization process is Kees Lagerberg's West Irian and Jakarta Imperialism (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979); the work is listed as a banned book by the Indonesian government. 40Franklin B. Weinstein, Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma o f Dependence: from Sukarno to Suharto (Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 1976). R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 46] === 24 direct involvement in Indonesian domestic politics.41 It was not until the first quarter of the sixties that U.S. State Department abandoned, though not completely, the idea of supporting elements of opposition to Sukarno, including providing weaponry to the PRRI/Permesta rebellion.42 In an atmosphere where revolutionary renditions are popular as mass hysteria, the first alternative policy was an easy target as a scapegoat of the devilish face of a capitalist power. This was the general situation of relationships between Indonesia and the U.S. prior to the Gestapu affairs. As part of its role as leader of the new world, Indonesia strongly opposed the formation of the former British colony into a new nation called Malaysia. Politik Konfrontasi was pursued by deploying the Armed Forces along the border. In a traditional notion of foreign policy as a reflection of the domestic political scene, this was later interpreted as PKI's systematic and successful efforts to dislocate the Army's power from the capital city, Jakarta, and other strongholds such as East Java. In the absence of the most powerful troops in Jakarta and Java, PKI had more room to maneuver. Under this pretext, the party increased its pressure on Sukarno to form a "fifth force," or militarized 41Ambassador Marshall Green noted: "Contrary to the public opinion that U.S. involvement in pre-1965 efforts to at least influence the domestic affairs, the Bunker Mission Report (April 21, 1965) supported the Howard Jones school of thought, insofar as its recommendations advocated that "we continue efforts to work with Sukarno, that we avoid taking actions that appeared to be punitive, and that we also avoid becoming involved in any efforts to play on devisive regional feelings or get involved in efforts to split the country," in Indonesia: Crisis and Transformation 1965-1968 (Washington, D.C.: The Compass Press, 1990), p. 15. 42An excellent critical study on the subject of U.S. involvement in the rebellion and its aftermath is Audrey R. & George McT. Kahin's Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia (New York: The New Press, 1995). R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 47] === 25 peasants and pemuda (youths). Although supported by the Air Force,43 the proposal was never realized, since the Army barred this idea, and it was too risky for Sukarno to adopt it into a policy. Thus, at the time of Gestapu, the PKI had virtually no military or para military apparatus at all. Sukarno, who himself was never a soldier or involved in an armed struggle against the Dutch—yet, under the Constitution he held position as the Supreme Commander o f the Armed Forces—was ideologically more and more inclined toward Communism. He believed that the Army, or at least some generals, posed an actual threat to his presidency, although it was almost impossible for any political power at that time to compete with his charisma. He was the founding father of the nation, regarded by his people in a way that "the king can do no wrong," at least openly. At the same time, he enjoyed his ideological make-up of Nasakom, which he had proposed as early as 1924. The Cold War situation seemed to fit into his perception of the course of history, concerning historical forces that were playing in the international fora of politics, the actors involved, and the available patterns and plots o f conflict, both in international and in domestic affairs. But, as a solidarity maker type of charismatic leader, Sukarno failed to manage the country effectively—in economic and administrative terms. He was engulfed by his own vision of a never-ending revolutionary process, by the outcry ofpolitik sebagaipanglima, or "politics 43Departemen Angkatan Udara R.I. "Tinjauan Intelidjen No: 008/65 Sekitar Nasakomisasi, Angkatan ke-V dan Bentrokan-2 Antar Golongan," secret document No: U/2035/17/2/Intell, as attachment to files of confession of Omar Dhani during the Mahmillub trials, p.399 revealed that the Air Force not only supported the idea but had been helping the people who lived around Air Force bases to have military training. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 48] === 26 as commander," so deep that political structure he built was crumbling down in a ruin called Orde Lama, or the Old Order. 2.2. Economic situation Despite the fact that Sukarno's Indonesia in the first half of the 1960s had a leading political position within the new world, its economic situation was fast declining. During eight years under the Guided Democracy, the inflation rate was advancing from two to three digits and even reached as high as 650% in 1965. But Sukarno insisted, telling foreign reporters, "Inflation itself is not harmful, except if there is starvation and poverty."44 Economic conditions were so much worse that it forced the government to take a strange decision, unpopularly known as sanering, i.e., to cut the nominal value of the currency, with every Rp 1,000.00,- (one thousand rupiah, the Indonesian currency) to become only Rpl.00.- (one rupiah) or a ratio of 1,000:1.45 This decision was to solve the following problems: Between 1954 and 1959 the deficit, the money supply and the cost of w t o i - is^ s. 45Due to high rate of the inflation, the dollar’s rate of the period is difficult to evaluate. This confusion can be seen from a report of the U.S. embassy, which noted that, "if based on the counter value of the West Irian rupiah, to which the new currency has been adjusted, US$1.00 would be about Rp.3.00 to Rp.4.00 in new currency. However, if we play with the exchange rate based on Rp. 1,000.00 in old currency which becomes Rp.l.00 in new currency, the transaction value for Rp. 1.00 of the new currency would be US$4.00. As known, the exchange rate for US$1.00 was Rp.250.00 in old currency. Thus, if rated back, we get US$1.00 = Rp.0.25 (in new currency), for US$4.00 is equal to Rp.l.00 (new currency)." U.S. Embassy Translation. Unit Press Review 1965-1966-1967-, section on 1965, p.6. (Wason Collection, Cornell University). R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 49] === 27 living all nearly trebled.46 By 1962, the government deficit and the money supply quadrupled and the cost of living quintupled. As prices rose the official exchange rate wobbled far out of line with the market rate.47 Statistically, the daily living costs of Rp 100.00 in 1957 (the beginning of the Guided Democracy) was on a par with the living costs of Rp348.00 by the end of 1960, five years before the Gestapu Affair, and had climbed to Rpl6,000.00 by the end of 1965 and Rpl50,000.00 in July 1966.4g As a result of this situation, many preferred to hold material goods, especially the basic necessities, rather than hard currency. Further data showed the macro-economic situation. Hard currency available throughout the country in late 1955 was recorded at Rpl2 billion, to become Rp48 billion by the end of 1960, and Rp2,714 billion in late 1965. By the end of July 1966, the records reached as high as RplO trillion. This increase-meaning the currency's reduced nominal value, or inflation—was mainly from the deficit in government spending, recorded at Rp23 million in 1961 to become Rpl,500 million in 1966. From 1963 and up to 1966, the government's deficit was larger than the government's spending. The last foreign debt incurred by the administration before the Gestapu Affair erupted was of US$270 million; most of the debt went to build grandiose and symbolic projects such as statues, monuments, and other political symbols. *6NYT 01-18-65. 47A0T 01-18-65. 48Data in A.H. Nasution, Ketetapan2... op.cit., pp. 73-80. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 50] === 28 Payment and interest to be paid in 1966 was as high as US$640 million, while the national earning only reached US$400 million. For import expenses and rehabilitation/consolidation, the government should have paid at least US$500-600 billion. In 1960, the deficit in the balance of payment was only US$84 million; it increased every year and reached its peak in 1966 with an amount of US$250 million. To control the situation, the government made new loans with heavier burdens to pay, such as deferred payment and special export/import loans. By the end of 1965 total foreign debt reached US$2.4 billion, while non-oil export revenue in 1955 was only US$775 million, and steadily dwindling to US$601 million in 1960 and US$424 million in 1965. A high-cost economy, stemming from inefficiencies and corruption inside the bureaucracy, contributed much to this decline. To worsen the situation, imports, mostly in the form of consumer goods, were not declining but rising sharply, recorded at US$499 million in 1955 to become US$664 million in 1960 and US$1,550 million in 1965. The imports were not decreasing for most payments were from foreign debts. Only in 1963 there was a hope, when a favorable trade balance was achieved by reducing the amount of imported (consumer) goods.49 From a $10 million deficit in 1961, a surplus of $31 million developed in 1962, with total exports of $678 million, and in 1963, with foreign shipments worth $697 million, the excess over imports climbed to $187 million.50 But as the previous data showed, this surplus was not enough to pay interest and loans which in 1966 reached almost four times ($640 million) what this surplus earned three years before. 49MT01-18-65. R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 51] === 29 The condition was so much worse that Sukarno's cabinet failed to cure it with any economic measures. The students and intellectuals were particularly concerned with the worsening situation. Trained in westem-style universities, they were trying to provide a counter-balance perspective on the economic cause. Concern was also present among the military, especially many of the western trained army officers. They invited some professors of economics, mostly alumni of the University of Califomia-Berkeley, to lecture at SESKOAD (Sekolah StafKomando Angkatan Darat, the Army College of Command Staff) in Bandung. Among them were Emil Salim, Mohammad Sadli, Widjojo Nitisastro, all of whom later, in the post Gestapu period, took part in designing a blueprint for a new economic system.51 But under the loud outcry of "politics as commander," these western trained economists' analyses were left idle. However, the inability of Sukarno's cabinet to solve the economic problems was a "leftist political blessing." What the PKI, and even Sukarno himself, needed was a scapegoat; and the capitalist powers, represented by the United States and its "allies" (particularly the U.K.) provided exactly what they wanted. Sukarno, the philosopher, not only ideologically shared the communist, or leftist, renditions but also felt the scapegoating as neatly fixed to the popular demands. Indonesia had had to suffer from Dutch imperialism and was now suffering from the capitalist U.S. and the U.K. Under this rubric of mass hysteria, two projects were to be finished: to free Irian Barat from the Dutch possession, and to contain or, if possible, to crush Malaysia. As if to 51This group was popularly known as "Berkeley Mafia," a much misused and misinterpreted term by later analysts; BIES (Bulletin o f the Indonesian Economic Studies), 1993, interview with Widjojo Nitisastro. R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 52] === 30 supplement the external scapegoat, domestic economic deterioration was to be blamed on the presence o f "capitalist" elements within the society. Those elements were the kapitalisbirokrat, or the capitalist-bureaucrats, more popularly known by its acronym, kabir. They were the ones who were abusing their strategic positions to drain economic resources. This fabrication was neatly fixed into the PKI's concepts of class interests.52 Many of the scapegoats were military personnel, so that the terms were always to become a direct challenge to the army. In the countryside, the scapegoats were tujuh setan desa (seven village devils).53 But it is misleading to think that the PKI was alone supporting Sukarno’s ideals of “nationalist marxism.” All elements of the society, at least on the surface, supported the president’s “revolutionary vocabularies.” The army itself was no exception. Mainstream armed forces’ political jargon always used vocabularies similar to those used by political parties. They also wholeheartedly supported the Irian Barat project, although the Malaysia project was a different story. 2.3. Inside the armed forces As a post-colonial military institution, composed of wide segments of the society, the armed forces in 1964-1965 was a fragmented institution.54 Rivalries among its three 52See, among others, Tesis 45 Tahun PKI: 23 M ei 1920-23 Mei 1965 (Djakarta: Jajasan "Pembaruan," 1965), p. 10. 53Chapter III will deal with this issue. 540 n the early formation of the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI), or the (continued...) R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 53] === 31 branches, and even with the police (which was also placed under the structure of the armed forces), were explosive. In addition, President Sukarno, as the chief commander, managed the armed forces more in political terms than in a professional administrative style. In these circumstances, President Sukarno manipulated interservice rivalries and used his ability to gain the personal loyalty of important army officers to undermine the cohesion o f the armed forces.55 All branches of the armed forces were represented in the state cabinet ministries, and the chiefs of staff from three branches held titles as cabinet ministers. As a result of the politicized armed forces, each branch was competing for power, money (through ministerial budgeting), and political ties not only with the president but also with other political parties. A glimpse look at the armed forces' budget gives a clue to its budgeting problems. From 1963, the armed forces' debts could not be paid. In effect, there were difficulties concerning the acquisition and maintenance o f armaments. Spare parts for military airplanes, radar, ships and other weaponry system were not available, so that many modem weapons at the time were laid idle.56 In 1959, the military budget (all-inclusive budget, including military operations) was allocated 32.26% of the government budget; in 54(... continued) Indonesian National Armed Forces, see Salim Said, Genesis o f Power: General Sudirmcm and the Indonesian Military in Politics, 1945-1949 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991); on subsequent period, see Ulf Sundhaussen, The Road to Power: Indonesian M ilitary Politics, 1945-1967 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982). 55Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics... op.cit., p.346. 56A.H. Nasution, Ketetapan2... op.cit., pp. 73-74. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urth er reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 54] === 32 26.71% (1964), and 41.54% (1965).57 In political rubric, the air force was close to the PKI, resulting in its relatively better structure o f weaponry than the navy and the army— not to mention the police, which had always lost out in the race for money and power. The navy and its marines were close to the traditional PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia, or the Nationalist Party of Indonesia) and to Sukarno himself. The police force was fragmented, with some leaning to the nationalist parties and some to the leftist parties. Within the army, the officers were split into various political affiliations. Many of them tried to remain neutral, while many others were divided into conflicting political outlooks, and some preferred to join the PKI. One body of the armed forces that was under the PKI's control was Biro Pusat Intelijen (BPI), or Central Bureau o f Intelligence, placed under Foreign Minister Subandrio and functioning mainly as the intelligence body for the politics of confrontation with Malaysia.58 In 1962, General A.H. Nasution, the most senior and respected army officer, was replaced as Wakil Panglima Besar Angkatan Bersenjata (Wapangsar), or vice highest chief commander of the armed forces.59 Since then, he had held post of Menteri Koordinator Politik dan Keamanan (Menko Polkam), or Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security, without operational command in hand. The army chief of staff, Lieutenant General Ahmad 57A.H. Nasution, ibid., p.75. 58For instance, BPI took charge o f military training given in Indonesia to rebel youths, mainly of Chinese descent, from Sabah and Sarawak. Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca and London. Cornell University Press, revised edition, 1988), p.60. 59The title Panglima Besar Angkatan Bersenjata (Pangsar), or the highest chief commander of the armed forces, was held by the president himself. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 55] === 33 Yani, thus also held the position of minister of the army in the cabinet. By the army's "standing order," i.e. the command lines, Major General Suharto, the commander of Kostrad, was to replace Yani in case the latter was absent. This fact alone later became one o f the much debated topics on the role of Suharto in the Gestapu Affair. As basically the second man in command, after Yani, Suharto did not appear as one of the targets on the PKTs list. In early May 1965 rumors spread about the existence of Dewan Djenderal, or the Council o f Generals, who would take control if Sukarno became incapable o f running the state as president. The rumor was passed on by Brigadier General (Police) Soetarto, the then chief of staff of Biro Pusat Intelijen (BPI), or Central Bureau of Intelligence, to Soebandrio, the then first deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, who was also acting as the nominal head of BPI.60 The message confirmed that Dewan Djenderal was preparing to take a more active role to launch a coup against President Sukarno. Related to this, on 15 May, Subandrio received an envelope at his home; inside was what was later known as the Gilchrist Document. It was a letter draft of the British Ambassador's assessment of the situation. The document contained statements that the British would help in the efforts made by "our local army friends" to oust Sukarno. Believing that this document was authentic,61 Subandrio then passed it on to “ Confession of Subandrio, in G-30-S Dihadapcm Mahmillub 3 (D jilidI) di Djakarta (Perkara Dr. Subandrio). A published document by the Army's Judge School (AHM-PTHM, 1967), pp. 58-59. 6IThe official history suggested later that this document was a fake. See Nugroho Notosusanto, Tercapainya IConsensus Nasional 1966-1969 (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, (continued...) R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 56] === 34 Soetarto and later to Sukarno. The document was found in a resort villa belonging to Ambassador Gilchrist, when the villa was plundered by the Pemuda Rakyat. In a meeting between Sukarno and the chiefs of staff of all branches of the armed forces (all held positions as cabinet ministers, since every branch was a ministry) at the presidential palace, Sukarno asked Yani whether there any units or troops should be suspected as "our local army friends" in the document. Yani replied that there were no such troops, but probably there were individual officers who could have some American friends. Yani even reported that he assigned Major General Suparman and Brigadier General Sukendro to make contacts with the British and American embassies to collect information to be passed to him.62 In another question, the president asked whether there was a Council of Generals (DD) and whether this DD evaluated his policies. While acknowledging the existence of the DD, and that he himself presided over this council, Gen. Yani denied that its function was to evaluate presidential policies.63 In addition to the deployment of army troops in Politik Konfrontasi, or the confrontation with Malaysia, PKI and leftist elements within the armed forces gained another advantage from the Cold War situation. Before the split between Moscow and (...continued) 1985), p.24. But researchers with the police laboratory, where this document was later tested, confirmed it as authentic; interview with sources. Apparently, police laboratory only tested the technical authenticity of the paper. A careful content analysis on the English wording concluded that the document was fake. See laboratory document as attachment to Mahmillub, Omar Dani case, pp.402-403. “ Confession of Rear Air Marshal Sri Muljono Herlambang, who replaced Omar Dhani as air force chief of staff, in Subandrio's case, op.cit., vol.2, p. 113. 63Mahmillub, Subandrio case, op.cit., p.78. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 57] === 35 Beijing, the armed forces received most of its armaments from the Soviet Union. In the early 1960s, Indonesia had possessed strategic missiles that could reach as far as Australia and mainland Asia. The air force itself possessed, among other powerful armaments, two squadrons of middle-range bombers TU-16 (Tupolev), as well as some Migs (Mikoyan Gurevich) from Mig-16 and Mig-17 to Mig-21, the most advanced combat airplane at the time. This is not to mention the large number of rifles such as the widely used AK-47.64 But Sukarno's shifting policies to move closer to Beijing resulted in the halt of acquisitions of new arms and even ammunition and spare parts for the available armaments from the Soviet Union. The PRC tried to replace the AK-47 semi-automatic rifles with Tjung. The air force, which was close to Sukarno's leftist policies,65 took the advantage, so that they were the ones who used most of the Tjung rifles, besides some police forces (the Indonesian police was part of the armed forces, and not placed under the Ministry of Interior as in other countries). In mid-September 1965, for instance, under an order of from President Sukarno, Air Force Chief-of-staff Vice Air Marshal Omar Dhani went to a secret mission to China, where he reportedly negotiated a purchase of Chinese weapons, "probably for the PKI."66 65Quite probably they chose this leaning as a strategy to compete with the army. “ Marshall Green, op.cit., p. 55, footnote. In his confession, Omar Dani stated that he managed to get 100,000 rifles from China, 25,000 of them would be used by the Air Force, but no statement on the use of the rest. Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa, Omar Dani R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 58] === 36 A closer look at the acquisition and distribution o f armaments and weaponry for the armed forces shows a pattern o f political factionalism among divisions of the armed forces prior to the Gestapu Affair. The shift in political leaning of the air force, from Moscow to Beijing, in arms acquisition had to be done carefully. A clear association with the shift in PKI's policy, also from Moscow to Beijing, could result in the halt o f arms supply from the Soviet Union. The army, by contrast, continued to enjoy arms supply from Moscow, even in the uncertain situation in the weeks following the Gestapu Affair. An intelligence memo reported that "arms deliveries have continued to reach Indonesia without interruption over the past six weeks. There is no indication that they will be cut off."67 To complicate the situation, the air force has its main base in Halim Perdanakusuma, which was to become the area where the leftist youths received military training, and the area where the Lubang Buaya was located and the bodies of the kidnapped generals found. The air force also had its second largest base in Madiun, East Java, where the communists rebelled against the central government in 1948; and thus, apart from purely military considerations, a post factum reconstruction related this location as a symbol of communist revivalism.6®Besides the air force, the navy and especially its much feared marines was the second largest receiver of Soviet arms. Their main base was located in the vicinity of Surabaya, capital of East Java. Because of interservice rivalries, the army also 67CIA Intelligence Memorandum, "Indonesian Army Attitudes toward Communism," Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Current Intelligence, 22 November 1965, Case # 88-119, Doc #119, point 7. 6®Soemitro; interview. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 59] === 37 was not very close to, if not dangerously competing with, the navy, adding a more difficult situation to handle in East Java politics. As also shown in subsequent crises and the chaos that resulted in the mass killings, the army and especially its dreaded special forces, RPKAD, had to move very carefully in East Java, since the marines were infamous as the "Sukamoists."69 With their bases in East Java (Surabaya and Probolinggo), the marines were extremely popular among East Javanese.70 More than in any other province, the armed forces in East Java suffered the most from interservice rivalries and internal factionalism. In Madiun, the western part of East Java, there was the Iswahyudi airbase, the largest air force base in Indonesia. Next to this airbase was the station of the Battalion 530, which was involved in the Gestapu Affair in Jakarta. In the eastern part of East Java, the marines had their large stronghold in Probolinggo. In this area also was stationed Battalion 514. This battalion was the only force consisting mostly members of the ex-Hizbullah, the Islamic guerilla troops during the 69Soemitro admitted that he was assigned as the East Java commander in immediate post-Gestapu term to undermine these Sukamoist stronghold; he confessed that he had to face even his own brother, who was then a district head (wedana). Interview. M. Jassin, who replaced Soemitro as regional commander, also admitted that his main task was to cleanse the army from Sukarno's influence. Jassin was the commander who discharged Colonel Willy Soedjono as Komandan Korem (Danrem), or regional commander of Madiun-Kediri residencies on charges of being Sukamoist. Interview. 70Soemitro; interview. In his recollection, Pipit Rochijat described how the youth despised the army special forces, RPKAD, when they finally showed off in Kediri one year after the Gestapu broke out; interview with Ben Abel, "Pipit Rochijat Tentang Pembunuhan Massal-65 (2)," KdpNet, 22 Oct. 1996. My personal recollection confirmed this pride of the East Javanese in their marines. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 60] === 38 struggle for independence.71 But this strong Islamic orientation was typical only of Battalion 514.72 Many if not most members of the armed forces in East Java were at least symphatizers o f the PKI. Particularly strong were Battalions 513 stationed in Blitar, and Battalions 511 and 512 stationed in Malang;73 in the general elections of 1955, PKI garnered 80 percent of the votes among members of this Battalion 512, Rampal, Malang.74 Surabaya also was the host of the largest naval base. A strike at the Tanjung Perak naval base in March 1965 showed how factionalized the armed forces were. During the strike, about 750 navy officers refused to report at the naval center in an attempt to force the dismissal of the navy commander, Rear Admiral E. Martadinata.75 The New York Times reported: The younger officers sent a delegation to Jakarta early in February. The group presented a petition to Presiden Sukarno, asking him to dismiss Adm. Martadinata. It accused him of mismanagement. The petition was said to have complained of alleged corruption in the higher navy ranks and to have contended that younger officers were not being promoted fast enough because older men were refusing to retire. There are about 31,000 men in the navy, including 7,500 officers. This means that 10 percent of the officers were on strike.76 71Iwan Gardono Sudjatmiko, "The destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) (a comparative analysis of East Java and Bali)," Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1992, p.121. 72An ideological leaning to Islam is always associated with green, since this is a symbolic color of Islam. ^Sudjatmiko, loc.cit., p. 123. 74Interview, General Soemitro. 1SNYT 03-11-65. 16NYT 03-11-65. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 61] === 39 2.4. Inside the PKI Under the leadership of Aidit, who was helped by four comrades, the PKI recruited more followers than at any time in its history.77 In 1952, only a year after he took the chairmanship, the PKI had fewer than 8,000 members; in 1964, it claimed to have three million. The PKI's various affiliates also enjoyed the enormous growth in members. Within the same period, its “under organization” of peasants, the Barisan Tani Indonesia (BTI), or the Indonesian Peasant Front, grew from some 800,000 (September 1953) to 1,500,000 members in April 1964; by this time, its youth wing organization, the Pemuda Rakyat (PR), or the People’s Youth, had a membership of some 2,000,000; and its women’s wing organization, the Gerakan Wanita Indonesia (Gerwani), or the Indonesian Women’s Movement, recorded 1,750,000 members.78 There are two explanations for the PKI's growth. First, the PKI pursued a radical and aggressive strategy so that the party attracted an enormous number of followers and sympathizers in a short time.79 Second, the PKI adopted shifting tactics, turning from ^The five comrades used the term "Pendawa Lima," which was associated with the five mythical heroes (adapted from India) from the story in popular shadow puppet show. These five men indeed laid the foundations for the PKI's development in a critical early modem phase of the party that was called "open office" in Yogya (1951-1952). See Soeryana, "Soedisman: the organisator and 'the king maker1that failed." Typescript document, 1985; pp. 154-156, held at Wason Collection, Cornell University. Elaborated notes on the five comrades found in pp. 154-184. Soeryana was a founder of the PKI. 78Leslie H. Palmier, The Communists in Indonesia (London: Zed Books, 1973), p.234. 79Iwan Gardono Sudjatmiko, loc.cit. Also see, Guy J. Pauker, "The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Indonesia," in The Communist Revolution in Asia: tactics, (continued...) R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 62] === 40 armed struggle to a united front.®0 These two factors explain the party’s political advance. But there was also a philosophical base that appealed to the masses. On a philosophical level, ingenuity and flexibility were the hallmarks of PKI ideology in the period 1959-1965, the praxis that was required for survival and political advance.®1This was an indigenous rendition of marxism and communism, such as a conception of class conflict based on various types of occupation already present in the society. But the PKI's "indigenization of communism" adopted by the five comrades, inherently contained weaknesses, as reviewed by a PKI figure: "Cadre recruitment was subjective, without sufficient considerations of the local situation, especially of the differences found in socio-cultural aspects."®2 Thus, there are two levels of explanation for the success and failures, rise and demise, of the PKI. One is organizational, at a praxis level of applied marxism and communism. The second is theoretical, supporting the praxis, and even pratical levels, such as structure of the party, strategy, and tactics. Moreover, at both the theoretical and practical levels, the PKI concentrated mainly on political maneuvering. It never developed an avant-garde party with a highly disciplined internal structure or a capacity to engage in coordinated attempts to defend itself physically. n (... continued) goals, and achievements, edited by Robert A. Scalapino (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, second edition, 1969), pp.284-287. ®°Donald Hindley, The Communist Party o f Indonesia, 1951-1963 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964). 81Rex Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1974), p.400. ®2Soeryana, loc.cit. p. 156. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 63] === 41 PKI's organization was structured as follows.83 The highest authority was held by Congress, comprising representatives from regional and local branches. Congress appointed members of Central Comite (CC), or Central Committee. Under the CC was the Politbiro, or Politbureau, run by Dewan Harian Politbureau, or Daily Council of the Politbureau. At the regional/provincial level there was Comite Daerah Besar (CDB), or Larger Area Committee. The CDB controlled Comite Seksi (CS), or Section Committees, which were operating in the regencies and municipalities. The CS was further divided into Somite Subseksi (CSS), or Subsection Committee, responsible for the area of a kecamatan, or subdistrict. A CSS was again divided into several Comite Resort (CR), or Resort Committees, each responsible for a village. In addition, there were similar institutions called Comite Pulau (CP), or Island Committees, each of which was responsible for an area designated as a small and isolated island. In 1954, the Fifth Congress decided that the party would adopt the strategy called Keija di Kalangan Musuh (KKM), or Working Inside the Enemies,84 elaborated as follows. The party adopted the strategy known by its acronym, MKTBP, or Metode Kombinasi Tiga Bentuk Peijuangan, or Combined Method of Three Forms of Struggle.85 The method “ Sources from AD-ART (Konstitusi) Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), a mini format book (Jakarta: Comite Central Partai Komunis Indonesia, 1964), pp.67-74; also see, Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa dalam Perkara Supono Marsudidjojo alias Pono, 3 vols. Typescript transcript, pp. 12-13 (Uncataloged doc., Kahin Center, Cornell University). 84Mahmillub, Pono case, loc.cit., p. 14. 8SD.N. Aidit, Masjarakat Indonesia dan Revolusi Indonesia, an official doctrine of the PKI, typescript document held by Kopkamtib, No.28/BKT/1967, Chapter I, section 1, (continued...) R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 64] === 42 consisted o f three forms of struggle: (1) guerilla warfare in the villages, especially by peasant workers and poor peasants; (2) revolutionary actions by the workers, especially transportation workers in the cities; (3) intensive work inside the armed forces.*6 One of the strategic targets was the armed forces, especially the army. Considering the risks of such a strategy, Chairman Aidit established personal contacts with his confidants, most notably Sjam, a mysterious figure who later played a decisive role in the Gestapu Affair. Sjam then also established personal contacts with PKI members at the CDB (provincial) levels. In East Java, his aide was Rustomo,*7 with clandestine membership reaching 200 members.*8 In early August 1965, President Sukarno was seriously ill; and on August 4, he was heavily vomiting. As one of the politicians closest to the president, Aidit had a chance to bring with him Chinese doctors. The following unverified events are alleged to have taken place: the doctors told Aidit that there were only two alternatives for the president, either he died or he would become paralyzed. Sukarno could survive only on the condition *5(... continued) article 4; also see Sudisman, "Tegakkan PKI jang Marxis Leninis untuk Memimpin Revolusi Demokrasi Rakjat Indonesia (Otokritik Politbiro CC PKI)," typescript document held by Kopkamtib, No.34/BKT/1967, p.8. This strategy only appeared implicitly in the (1961) PKI Constitution article 56. *6D.N. Aidit, loc.cit', Sudisman, loc.cit. *7Mahmillub, Pono case, loc.cit., p. 16. **Guy J. Pauker, "The Rise and Fall...," loc.cit., p.291. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 65] === 43 that he changed his lavish lifestyle, which apparently he would not do.*9 If the president died or was paralyzed, the political struggle was left between the Army and the PKI, without the president as a balancing power. In either condition—whether he died or was paralyzed—the political balance would be tested and the PKI had to face an uncertain situation. In any case, Aidit informed members of the "Politbiro Plus" or "Politbiro yang Diperluas" (Extended Politbureau) in a meeting held sometime after August 17 about the existence of the Dewan Djenderal. He passed on the information he had received from a reliable source, Brig. Gen. Soetarto, that the council was making serious preparations to launch a coup.90 Note here that the rumors of the council had been spreading since May, while the information about Sukarno's illness came to the surface in early August. For Aidit and the Politbiro, the situation was something like a fire being ignited in already heated charcoal. As mentioned above, Aidit passed on information about Sukarno's serious illness to the extended Politbiro.91 He also provided an analysis of the political situation, passing on another piece of information not only on the existence of Dewan Djenderal, but also its 89Dr. Siwabessy, one of Sukarno's native doctors, confirmed this statement. See his confession in Nasution, op.cit., p.67. Sukarno was known as womanizer; in 1965 he had four wives, and was still notorious for his chasing women in every chance he had. ^Confession of Peris Pardede, a member candidate of PKI's Politbiro as appeared in G-30-S Dihadapan Mahmillub I (Perkara Njono), a published document by the Army's Judge School (AHM-PTHM, 1966), pp. 123-33. 91This extended organizational structure is in AD-ART (Konstitusi) Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), loc.cit.; for PKI's Central Committee and its members, pp. 67-74. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 66] === 44 possible maneuvers, in his analysis, Sukarno's failure to lead the government due to health problems would swing the political balance to the army's side, which so far was the only contender for PKI. Thus, two questions arose. First, would the army launch a "coup" to topple Sukarno before he died? Second, would it be more fruitful to launch a pre-emptive strike than a counter-strike if the army had really launched a coup? Aidit left these questions to the Politbiro; but they divided the assignments. Members of the Politbiro had duties to systematically inform lower echelons of the party, while Aidit himself took on the task of informing and consulting Sukarno on the situation. In a final analysis, it was expected that the Dewan Djenderal would very likely launch a military coup on October 5, 1965, when most important military units would be present in Jakarta to celebrate Armed Forces Day.92 In addition to his information about the Dewan Djenderal, Aidit also informed the Extended Politbiro that a group of "progressive revolutionary officers" from the army would take actions to counter Dewan Djenderal. He also asked the attending members of the politbureau whether Sjam and Pono, two members of CC-PKI, had already made contacts with those "revolutionary officers." It is not clear whether the two were acting on orders from Aidit himself, or they took actions on their own initiative. Politbiro then made some preparations. In early September, Panitia Aksi (Action Committee) led by Njono, began to recruit and send members of PKI, Pemuda Rakjat, SOBSI, to the Tjililitan area Reconstructed from Mahmillub's documents, cases of Untung, and confessions of Pono and Sjam. R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 67] === 45 (this was the name as known to the participants; later, it was found that the exact location was Lubang Buaja, about two miles from Tjililitan). Starting from September 2, around 2,500 "rakyat" (literally "people") received militray training in Lubang Buaja. Most of them only knew that they were received training to become "sukarelawan Dwikora," the Dwikora volunteers, with the task of combatting nekolim and its puppet country, Malaysia.93 But by the end of September (24?), Njono told them that instead of combatting the nekolim (Malaysia), they would help the progressive revolutionary officers in their efforts to guard President Sukarno against Dewan Djenderal. In addition, Njono told the "troops" that Murba and Masjumi, two 'natural enemies' of PKI, were supporting Dewan Djenderal.94 Sjam, Njono, and Pono moved further. Contacts were made with some regular Armed Forces troops to form the core military tactical force of the (later) Gestapu movement. They consisted of a company from Battalion I Tjakrabirawa Regiment, the presidential guard, two platoons from the Brigif I Djaja (Infantry Brigade I of the Djakarta Raja Regional Command), two regii (squads) Para Brigade, one battalion of PGT (Pasukan Gerak Tjepat, Air Force Special Force), one battalion of Jon 454 (Battalion 454) from Diponegoro Division in Central Java, and one battalion of Jon 530 (Battalion 530) 93Politik Konfrontasi with Malaysia is rendered into political and military operations called Operasi Dwikora. 940 n the validity of Mahmillub's documents being used in this section, see subchapter II.3. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 68] === 46 from Brawidjaja Division in East Java.93 Contacts were also made with Pemuda Rakjat and Gerwani, the youth and women's wings of the PKI, numbering as many as 2,000 people, mostly from the "training field" in Lubang Buaja.96 The time was set up: September 29, 1965. To increase its tactical power, help was sought from the tank division stationed in Bandung. Capt. Suradi and Pono, who were responsible for securing the help, told Untung that the tank division was already in Jakarta, preparing to participate in the celebration of Armed Forces Day on October 5. They also informed Untung that Lt. Susilo commanded the troops. But the three of them later found out that there was no officer by the name of Lt. Susilo among the troops. But Untung, who was assigned as commander o f the movement, finally decided that with or without any additional forces, let alone the tank division, the show must go on. On September 29, he ordered military assignments. In addition to the personnel from the armed forces, trained pemuda (youths) were told to prepare their posts and sectors.97 Oentoeng divided three groups of troops—Pasopati, Bimasakti, and Pringgodani— with different assignments. The Pasopati troops numbered about four companies: one company from Battalion I Tjakrabirawa Regiment, one company from Battalion 454, one company from Battalion 530 Para, two infantry platoons of Brigif I Djaja, some personnel 95Data taken from Untung in G -30-S... (Perkara Untung), op.cit., p.40, and from Mahmillub, Pono case, loc.cit., p.29. 96Ibid. ^Reconstructed by data from Mahmillub's documents, cases of Untung, Omar Dani, and confessions of Pono and Sjam. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 69] === 47 from the special forces of the air force, and a Cavalry Regiment. This very mobile troop was assigned to kidnap, alive or dead, the targeted generals. Each target had to be done by a platoon. But two companies were assigned to the houses of General Nasution and Lieutenant General Yani respectively, since both houses were heavily guarded. First Lieutenant Dul Arief and Second Lieutenant Siman, both from Tjakrabirawa, took charge as commanders of this Pasopati troop. The second troops, Bimasakti, was placed under the command of Capt. Suradi ofBrigif I/Djaja. His task was to take control of vital objects and territories, such as radio station RRi (Radio Republik Indonesia). The troop consisted of (less than) one battalion from Jon 454, (less than) one battalion from Jon 530 Para, and the pemuda from six sectors. This troop was also expected to support the Pasopati.98 The third group, Pringgodani, was assigned under the commanding officer of Maj. (Air Force) Sujono, with the main duty of securing the military base of Lubang Buaja. The troop consisted of one battalion of PGT/AURI and the pemuda trained at Lubang Buaja. The Pringgodani was also responsible for providing logistics for the other operating troops as well as taking charge of receiving the kidnapped generals in Lubang Buaja. In addition to the assignments of these three groups, the Pemuda Rakjat was prepared to receive some guns and ammunition. But as the actual story showed, they received only some of the weapons, with limited ammunition, in the very late stage of the operation.99 "Ibid. "Ibid. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 70] === 48 On a philosophical and theoretical level, the PKI under the five comrades adopted an indigenization of marxism and communism. Beneath the praxis o f MKTBP lay the localized communist parlance. Instead of using the capitalist mode o f production as the explanation for people's misery, the party used a simple concept o f three basic causes of the misery of the people:100 1. The imperialists, above all the American imperialists, the principal enemy of the progressive peoples the world over; 2. In the villages, the Seven Village Devils--1) evil landlords who refuse to carry out the provisions of the Basic Agrarian Law and the Law on Sharecropping Agreements; 2) evil officials who defend the interests of the evil landlords; 3) evil middlemen who squeeze the peasants; 4) bureaucratic capitalists who abuse their power to enrich themselves by exploiting the peasants; 5) village bandits who become the henchmen and bullies of the landlords; 6) moneylenders; 7) bloodsuckers who trap the peasants into life-long indebtedness; 3. In the cities the Three City Devils, civilian and military: 1) bureaucratic capitalists; 2) embezzlers; 3) corrupt officials. These concepts clearly did not follow the tenets of orthodox marxism, but they appealed to the peasantry-perhaps, as Harry Benda has suggested, because they addressed the decay or decline of certain key social institutions in the village world.101 Rex Mortimer, a leading marxist scholar of Indonesian communism, discusses the PKI's growing following 100Sudisman, "Analysis of Responsibility: defense speech of General Secretary of the Indonesian Communist Party at his trial before the Special Military Tribunal, Jakarta, 21 July 1967," translated with notes by B.R.O'G. Anderson (n.d.; Wason collection, Cornell University), p.8. 101An observation by Harry J. Benda, as quoted and elaborated by Rex Mortimer in "Traditional Modes and Communist Movements: Change and Protest in Indonesia," in Peasant Rebellion and Communist Revolution in Asia, edited by John Wilson Lewis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974), pp.99-123. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 71] === 49 among Javanese peasants this way: Village support was won largely by demonstrating, by vigorous welfare activities, that the PKI was the party most concerned with the villagers' overall interests. Membership was greatly increased by these means, especially in Central and East Java, but the depth of peasant commitment earned by such moderate methods was shallow and, outside the more militant squatter and estate areas, based to a considerable degree on the leadership of well' to-do villagers.102 It was only a logical consequence then, when this fragile and artificial construct of philosophical base was swept away by the Gestapu Affair; what was left was not a militant mass or even communist cadres; what was left was a hopeless and powerless peasantry. 3. Red blood of the Reds: mass slaughters ofpost Gestapu The bloody conflicts started in Jakarta with the kidnappings and killings of the generals, followed by direct confrontations beetwen the army officers and members of the two sides in the capital city. But, after a short interregnum, the red blood soon flowed throughout the country. Central Java was to become the first killing field; in this province the military was determined to launched military operations.103 With little resistance, the army, spearheaded by RPKAD, hunted down Aidit, who fled to Central Java, and crushed 102Rex Mortimer, Indonesian Communism... op.cit., p.276. 103Media reports in the second half of October and continued throughout November 1965 contained results from such military actions. This study does not deal with Central Java, although diversification in larger patterns of killings are reviewed in the concluding chapters. Pictures of these military operations are in Supersemar: Surat Perintah 11 Maret dalam tulisan dan foto-foto (Jakarta: Badan Penerbit Almanak Republik Indonesia, 1977), pp.80-84. R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 72] === 50 the unprepared PKI stronghold there.104 A CIA report assessed that the operation was risky for the army's prestige: For six weeks the Indonesian Army has been engaged in a major campaign against the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). Party members and sympathizers are being rounded up and interned by the military; others are being purged from local government positions; and in Central Java PKI adherents are reported to be shot on sight by the army. The army has risked much of its prestige and political future on this campaign. It wants to ban the PKI and to cripple the party permanently, but its attitude toward Marxism is far more complicated than simple anti-Communism.105 The army, nevertheless, conducted and completed the operations not only against officials of the PKI but also against ordinary members and symphatizers of the party in this province. By contrast to the military operations in Central Java (and later in other places), in areas where social and political tensions had been built, within two and three weeks after Armed Forces Day on 5 October 1965, the first victims fell in continuing civilian conflicts, which were halted temporarily by the Gestapu Affair in Jakarta. The killings, whether in the form of military operations or civilian conflicts, took place almost throughout the country, with some provinces suffering more than others. From the moment that the first 104Detailed operations, analyzed from newspaper reports while the operations were still going on, is in Anderson and McVey, op.cit.; also see Hamish McDonald, Suharto's Indonesia (Honolulu, University Press of Hawaii, 1980), pp. 51-52. An typescript detailed intelligence on-the-spot report on the capture of Aidit, with the title "Laporan Faktuil Tentang Proces Penangkapan Aidit" (Factual Report on the Process of Capture of Aidit," is held as uncataloged document at Kahin Center, Cornell University. 10SCIA Intelligence Memorandum, "Indonesian Army Attitudes toward Communism," Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Current Intelligence, 22 November 1965, Case #88-119, Doc #119, point 1. This important document, unfortunately, was declassified in a heavily sanitized form. About half of the content was taken out or blackened. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 73] === 51 casualties fell, problems of interpretation emerged. To date, it is impossible to arrive at a fair judgment of what drove the killings and who should be responsible. A PKI analysis contended that the killings were a result of extremely broad instructions issued by General Nasution, more or less to the effect that the Communists must be eliminated root and branch, and that action should be taken against anyone suspected of being connected directly or indirectly with the September 30th Movement. On the basis of these instructions mass killings were carried out. Does the court agree with me that General Nasution should be brought to account for these mass killings?106 In any case, unverified reports from East Java, Central Java, Bali, some parts of West Java, scattered places in Sumatra, all provinces in Kalimantan (with the highest number of victims in South Kalimantan), parts of Sulawesi, and other outer islands set high numbers of casualties. It is very difficult to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion on the number of people killed in the post-Gestapu actions. As early as December 1965, a team from the army had officially concluded that 78,000 people had been killed throughout the country, while the killings continued until almost a year later. There has been a great variety of estimates, from this lowest of 78,000 to 2 million. A general consensus usually arrived at numbers between 500,000 and 600,000 victims. Every single number has its own political baggage. Some facts added to the difficulties. First, there are no statistics or regional (let alone local) censuses that could be compared, say, between the period prior to and 106Sudisman, "Analysis of Responsibility: defense speech of the General Secretary of the Indonesian Communist Party at his trial before the Special Military Tribunal, Jakarta, 21 July 1967," translated with notes by B.R.O'G. Anderson (n.d.; Wason Collection, Cornell University), p.21. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 74] === 52 immediately after the Gestapu Affair and the killings. Local leaders who survived the turbulent period either minimized or exaggerated the actual number of victims. There was also a possibility that the surviving leaders would make up statistics to eliminate their local foes, regardless o f the foes' political inclinations. Secondly, there was an unrecorded moving of people from one area to another, from one province to another. The lowest estimate of people killed probably was drawn from the recorded number of those who were really killed. By contrast, the highest estimate was based on the number of missing persons, which included a number of people who moved to other areas, and multiple counting of bodies found. Again, there are no reliable statistics for any estimates of the victims throughout the country. The following records showed some estimates: Table107 Source108 Estimate casualties National: Adam Malik (in Hughes, p. 186)109 Anderson (Indonesia 40 [1985], p.53; also in Cribb) Anderson and McVey (p.63) Brackman (reasonable figure; p. 125) Brackman (p. 114) Caldwell and Utrecht (in Cribb) Contenay (in Cribb) Dahm (in Cribb) 160,000 500,000-1,000,000 200,000 150,000 70,000 500,000 100,000-200,000 200,000 10?This is an update of similar data in Robert Cribb, op.cit., pp. 12-13. Except cited as "in Cribb," all data were verified with their original sources. I08Complete data on sources are listed in the Bibliography. 109Adam Malik was the Indonesian foreign minister. He was quoted by Hughes as previously said 100,000-200,000. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 75] === 53 The Economist (in Cribb) 1,000,000 Fact Finding Commission (official; in Hughes, pp. 185) 78,000 Member of the commission (in Hughes, pp. 185-186) 780,000 Feith (the Nation; p.9) 150,000 Frederick (in Cribb) 750,000 Fryer and Jackson (in Cribb) 100,000-500,000 Grant (in Cribb) 200,000-300,000 Henderson (in Cribb)110 400,000-200,000 Hughes (p. 188) 200,000 Kirk (in Cribb) 150,000 Kopkamtib (from Palmos in Cribb)111 1,000,000 Legge (in Cribb)112 250,000 Lyon (p.71) 200,000-500,000 Mellor (in Cribb) 2,000,000 Mody (in Cribb) 500,000-1,000,000 Moser (in Cribb) 400,000 Neil (in Cribb) 750,000 The New York Times (08-24-66; cited as Topping in Cribb) 150,000-400,000 The New York Times Magazines (05-08-66; cited as King in Cribb) 300,000 Paget (in Cribb) 100,000-300,000 Palar (in Hughes, p. 186)113 100,000 Palmier (in Cribb) 200,000 PKI regrouped Politbureau (quoted in Brackman, p. 114) 200,000 Pluvier (in Cribb) 500,000-1,000,000 Polomka (in Cribb) 150,000-300,000 Repression and Exploitation (in Cribb) 500,000-1,000,000 Ricklefs (in Cribb) 500,000 Robinson (p.273; quoting Cribb) 500,000-1,000.000 Sievers (in Cribb) 200,000-400,000 Sloan (p.71) 300,000 110Cribb did not explain why it is 400,000-200,000 and not 200,000-400,000. ,nThis Kopkamtib source has never been verified. See Cribb's notes in op.cit., p.8, fh. 16. Another argument to doubt this data is that the first announcement only cited 78,000. 112Cribb cited that first Legge used 200,000-250,000 and then 250,000. 113L.N. Palar (spelled as Pilar in Hughes) was the Indonesian ambassador to the R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 76] === 54 Admiral Sudomo, Kopkamtib commander (in Cribb) Sukarno (in Hughes; p. 185) Sullivan (in Cribb) Tomquist (p.234) Turner (in Cribb) Vittachi (in Cribb) The Washington Post (in Cribb; also in Hughes, p. 184) Wertheim (in Cribb) (over) 180,000 450.000-500,000 87.000 300.000-500,000 100.000- 1,000,000 300.000-600,000 300,000 or less 300.000-500,000 500.000 400.000 Bali: ABRI (quoted from Robinson; p.273 fn 2) 40.000 Balinese leaders (quoted from Robinson; p.273 fn. 2) 100.000 Member o f Fact Finding Mission (in Hughes, p. 185) 100,000 Soe Hok Gie (p. 165) 80,000 Robinson (p.273; quoting Soe Hok Gie in Cribb) 80,000 Robinson (p. 273 fii.2) 40,000-100,000 50.000 Wertheim (in Robinson, p. 273 fn. 2) 100.000 The New York Times (01-13-66) 100,000 (01-13-66; quoting a "British exjpert") 150,000 Central Java: Hughes (p. 188) 100,000 70,000 East Java: An army general (in Hughes, p. 188) 100,000 60,000 Jombang: Rusdi Anwar This study Kediri: Syafii Soleiman 2,000-5,000 3,000-3,500 total "orderly operations" "inorderly operations" This study114 20,000 15,000 5,000 8,256-13,760 n4See the calculation in chapter II.4. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 77] === CHAPTER II WHO DID THIS? HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE GESTAPU AFFAIR 1. Five scenarios It is almost impossible to draw a clear cut conclusion about who was behind the bloody actions of the Gestapu movement. Obscure positions and the lack o f either written sources or witnesses all contributed to speculations concerning the mastermind of the Gestapu Affair. Although it is beyond this study to determine who was the mastermind, or more precisely, the degree of involvement of the belligerent parties, it is important to present theories, interpretations, and speculations about the actors in the national theater of the Gestapu Affair. There are at least five versions. 1.1. PKI as the mastermind The first, and the only "official" history of the Gestapu Affair is that PKI was the mastermind.1 According to this version, for various apparent reasons, PKI was alone in ‘A chronological review of development of this version and the following versions is in the next subchapter. There are at least three "standard works" of this version: Nugroho Notosusanto & Ismail Saleh, The Coup Attempt o f the "September 30 Movement" in Indonesia (Jakarta: Penmas, 1967); Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, Gerakan 30 September Partai Komunis Indonesia (G.30.S./PKI) (Jakarta: Sekretariat Kopkamtib, 1978); Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia, Gerakan 30 September Pemberontakan Partai Komunis Indonesia: Latar Belakang, Aksi, dan Penumpasannya (Jakarta: Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia, 1994). Scholars often referred included in this camp of anti-communist version are, among others, Arnold C. Brackman, Guy J. Pauker, Donald Hindley, Leslie H. Palmier, Anthony C.A. Dake; for comparison, see F. Tichelman, "The Communist Party of Indonesia: a bibliographical impression of the main trends," Occasional Paper No.6, James Cook (continued...) R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 78] === 56 taking the blame. Supported by the historical incident of the Madiun Affair in 1948, where the party rebelled against the central government, this version contends that PKI had systematically built its strength, leading to the Gestapu Affair. As an explanation for the involvement or role of the military, this version argues that the PKI suceeded not only in infiltrating and indoctrinating the leftist and communist military forces but also in directing the latter, especially non-officer soldiers, to rebel against the legitimate authority. This version, believed and taught by the military as the official history o f Indonesia,2 was followed by scholars and leading figures known as taking sides against marxist studies, such as Arnold Brackman, Guy Pauker, and Marshall Green. But as Rex Mortimer noted, academic attitudes toward the PKI have been affected in more direct ways by the climate of opinion created by the events o f 1965-66.3 The following "supporting facts" are cited as evidence. First, PKI had set up Biro Khusus, or the Special Bureau, as an invisible, nonstructural organ of Chairman Aidit purportedly to infiltrate the armed forces. A reconstruction of the role of this Special Bureau was based on the findings of links between members of the Special Bureau and larger connections with members of the Politbureau and Committee Central (CC-PKI) and military circles in the Gestapu movement. But, as a "nonstructural organ" of the party, there was no clear definition on its scope of operations. There was even actually no name ‘(...continued) University of North Queensland, 1980, p.4. 2See subchapter H.2.1. below. 3Rex Mortimer, Indonesian Communism..., op.cii., p. 10. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 79] === 57 for this "party organ."4 "Members" of the "Special Bureau" heard for the first time about the name of their organization during their trials, apparently coined by the interrogators from the army.5The central figure in the link was the mysterious Sjam. This figure who was later found playing an important role in the movement, became liaison officer between Biro Khusus CC-PKI and the military men such as Untung. One counter version, as shown below, suspected that Sjam was actually a military agent implanted within the PKI to set up the party in a dangerous game.6 A careful study by Harold Crouch showed that this version was not at all wrong; at least the involvement of some PKI leaders in the Gestapu Affairs is evident.7 This was also admitted by Sudisman, the only figure out of five PKI leaders that who put on trial. Sudisman confessed: I have no intention of denying that certain PKI leaders were directly involved in the September 30th Movement. Not at all. As I have already made clear, there were prominent PKI figures, myself included, who were involved in the September 30th Movement.8 4Confession of Bono alias Walujo, a witness in the trial of Supono Marsudidjojo; typescript transcript, uncatalogued document held at Kahin Center, Cornell University, pp.22-23. sIbid., p.27. The army officially admitted that they coined the term. See, The Central Investigation Team, Operational Command for the Restoration o f Security and Order, The Special Bureau o f the Communist Party o f Indonesia (special document, in English, held by Kopkamtib, no data), pp.4-5. 6See subchapter 1.2 below. 7Harold Crouch, among others, made a strong argument in "Another Look at the Indonesian Coup," Indonesia, 15 (April) 1973, pp. 1-20. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 80] === 58 Comparing the involvement of certain PKI leaders with previous similar incidents, such as the rebellions involving Masyumi and PSI, Sudisman argued that: The actions of those leaders of the PKI who were involved in the September 30th Movement should have been kept strictly separate from the PKI as a party, which knew nothing about the September 30th Movement. But of course this did not happen.9 Apparently, the PKI leaders miscalculated several factors. Firstly, they thought that the events would lead to the direction of increased tensions and rifts within the Armed Forces and especially the Army. In reality, the finding of the bodies of the slain generals sparked a boomerang effect, intensified by the absence of President Sukarno from the funerals, so that in effect it became a prime consolidating factor for the Army. Secondly, without any military knowledge they miscalculated the strength of battalions and companies in a real combat situation. They also miscalculated the power and influence that the middle rank officers had on their professional hierarchy. Despite the fact that the Army suffered from internal rivalries and rifts, these conditions were misrepresented in the mind o f the PKI leaders as potentially helpful for their operations. Thirdly, they miscalculated the Army's persistence in cornering Sukarno into a relatively defensive position. And lastly, there was no pre-Gestapu discussion on the possibility of becoming a losing side in the political game.10 Factual reconstruction of this version was mostly based on corroborative and abundant evidence from the trials during the Special Military Tribunals and related 9Ibid., p.7. I0Confession of Sjam in the trial of Supono Marsudidjojo, typescript transcript, uncatalogued document held at Kahin Center, Cornell University, p.49; also confession of Bono alias Walujo, loc.cit., p.46. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 81] === 59 documents such as transcripts of interrogations by special prosecutors of the army. But a CIA analysis provided a detailed treatment evaluating the validity of such interrogation reports of the people arrested by the military and concluded that the version was not fabricated by the army to have a scapegoat.11 The first problem with this version was that its proponents were the winning parties—military officers and government bureaucrats. Also, much supporting material for this version appeared very late in the reconstruction of the Gestapu, when the new regime started to fear the sensitivity of the issue and closed its door to open discussion. Scholars in this mainstream were suspected of bias in their views.12 But again, as Crouch showed, "The evidence presented to the Mahmillub trials does not in fact prove that the officers involved in the coup attempt were acting as mere agents of the PKI."13 Yet, decades after Crouch proposed that "while the evidence that the PKI leaders were indeed deeply involved in the coup attempt seems overwhelmingly strong, conclusions commonly drawn on the basis of the trial evidence in regard to the nature of its involvement and its motives seem open to question," these questions remain unsolved.14 11Research Study: Indonesia 1965—The Coup That Backfired (December 1968), Appendix II, pp. 311-316. l3Harold Crouch, "Another Look..." loc.cit., p. 11. uIhid., p. 18. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 82] === 60 1.3. Internal affair o f the army. At the opposite extreme of analysis on the Gestapu Affair lay an interpretation claiming that the coup and counter coup were an internal affair of the army. In its 2 October 1965 issue, only one day after the announcement that Oentoeng made, Harian Rakjat, the PKI's daily, published an editorial not only supporting the Gestapu but also stating that the whole affair was purely an internal affair of the army. Several key points were considered to support this version.15 First, and above all else, was the fact that the kidnapped and kidnappers were army personnel; no civilian was involved in the ambush on the night of the Gestapu Affair. Second, there was no reasonable need for PKI to gamble with wiping out the generals coercively while the party enjoyed its most favorable development and power. The army version identified two main evil geniuses. One was Lieutenant Colonel Oentoeng, who, during the PKI uprising in Madiun in 1948 had for a while fought on the side of the Communists.16The other was Army Brigadier General M.S. Supardjo, long known for his pro-Communist sympathies, who at the time of the Gestapu Affair was commander of the Army’s Strategic Reserve Command stationed in West Kalimantan. Still other military officers, for example a number o f field-grade officers of the Diponegoro division in Central Java, also played not insignificant roles in the coup attempt in their liHR 10-02-65. On the next day issue, “Podjok Tjaberawit” (a “marquee” that usually in a short cynical sentence as an informal policy endorsement) stated that the newspaper supported and delivered sympathy to the movement; HR 10-02-65. l6Justus M. Van der Kroef, Indonesia After Sukarno (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1971), p.10. R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 83] === 61 area. But since they were far from the Jakarta scene they tended to remain outside the spotlight. Added to this was the evidence from the events that took place inside the military in the latter half of 1968, when for months scores of military from all major services were arrested for alleged complicity in the Gestapu Affair. From the arrests, the number o f conspirators in the army was far greater than was originally supposed. One cannot be sure, however, that some of the army’s arrests during and since 1968 were not actuated by keeping alive a “Red scare” in order to justify the army’s emergency power.17 According to this version, the evidence presented to the Mahmillub trials, especially the testimony of the officers involved, did not prove that the coup attempt was masterminded by the PKI.18 Although the army’s aim in conducting the trials was to demonstrate that the PKI initiated the coup atempt, there were indications that the idea to purge the top army leadrship had originated among the “progessive officers” as suggested by Sudisman rather than the PKI as claimed by Sjam.19 The main proponent of this version was the Cornell Paper,20 which Harold Crouch has convincingly criticized weaknesses of this version.21 17Ibid l8HaroId Crouch, The Army and P olitics..., op.cit., p. 112. 19Ibid: 20Special treatment on this work, in addition to Harold Crouch’s criticism on the version that this work proposed, is in the next subchapter. 2lHarold Crouch, The Arm y..., op.cit., pp. 112-118. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 84] === 62 1.3. Sukarno was responsible Based on extensive interrogation reports on Sukarno’s adjutant, Colonel Bambang Widjanarko, Anthony Dake proposed a thesis that President Sukarno himself was orchestrating the Gestapu Affair.22 Although the thesis was the least appealing in the academic field, it was nevertheless shared by many circles, including the military.23 The U.S. embassy shared this version, that “Sukarno’s own role in the coup became increasingly suspect, particularly as a result of his appearence at Halim air base, his conferring with the coup plotters, his giving shelter to several of the Communist Party leaders, and his failure to show any sympathy for the slain generals.”24 This view continued to assert that, if indeed Sukarno had any involvement in the cold-blooded decision to eliminate the top army leadership, it was probably based on his awareness that only the army, and especially its leaders, stood between him and his Nasakom goal, including the creation of a fifth armed force and Nasakom advisory councils to act as a kind of pro communist thought police within the military establishment.25 22Anthony C. A. Dake, In the Spirit o f the Red Banteng: Indonesian Communists between Moscow and Peking 1959-1965 (The Hague: Mouton, 1973). ^The army established a special team to investigate the involvement o f Sukarno. The team arrived at a conclusion that Sukarno was deeply involved. Their report, however, never been published. Documents as an attachment to Mahmillub, Omar Dani case, pp.407-415. 25Ibid. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 85] === 63 In a much stronger accusation Anthony Dake argues: It was Sukarno himself who initiated the ‘Untung coup’ hoping that he could remain its controlling force, the magician who could lay the ghosts he was conjuring up... But it spelled the beginning of his doom, and in his ego-induced mania of arrogance he was struck with a blindness which, in the event, was not only to destroy him but barely failed to plunged the country itself into the abyss as well.26 Harold Crouch, however, doubted this version. He argued that the thesis was weak, since it relied “on the largely uncorroborated testimony of one witness who had every reason to cooperate with his interrogators and whose earlier testimony in court gave no indication of the later revelations.”27 If Widjanarko’s testimony was true, two parallel movements might have been planned against the generals—one by Sukarno through Brigadier General Sabur, commander of the presidential palace guard, and the other by the Gestapu movement.2* When the movement led by Oentoeng went into action first and Sukarno was so informed during the evening through Oentoeng’s letter, he apparently decided not to commit himself until the situation became clear. Sukarno’s involvement was, then, largely unconscious. The Widjanarko evidence indicated that Sukarno was favorably disposed toward a movement aimed at the army leadership, but it is hardly sufficient to support Anthony Dake’s conclusion that the president masterminded the Gestapu Affair.29 27Crouch, The Army..., op.cit., p.121. 2>Ibid., p. 122. 29Ibid. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 86] === 64 1.4. Suharto was behind the plot This version believed that Suharto was actually behind the plot. There were some suspicious facts concerning his role. As commander of the Kostrad and the general who normally acted for the army commander when the latter was abroad, Suharto was the most important general omitted from the list of those abducted on 1 October. Moreover, together with the Jakarta commander, Major General Umar Wirahadikusumah, Suharto had control of the troops that could be used to defeat the coup attempt.30 W.F. Wertheim, the leading scholar of this version, argued that Suharto may have been in league with the plotters.31 Suharto was apparently dissatisfied because the army leadership was failing to meet the Communist challenge and thus used the Gestapu movement as a means of implicating the PKI in a treacherous action that gave the army a pretext for moving against the party. In this theory, Sjam was probably Suharto’s agent who had infiltrated the PKI rather than the PKI man who had become an army informant.32 W.F. Wertheim has shown that Suharto had links with all the main army officers involved in the Gestapu Affair. As a former commander of Central Java’s Diponegoro division, Suharto was naturally well known to the dissidents in Central Java, and the three key army officers in Jakarta—Oentoeng, Latief, and Supardjo—were all personally acquainted with Suharto. But such evidence was hardly enough to support the view that 30Ibid., p. 123. 31W.F. Wertheim, “Suharto and the Untung Coup—the Missing Link,” Journal o f Contemporary Asia, 1 (Winter), 1970, p.52. i2Ibid. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 87] === 65 Suharto was involved in the plotting of these officers.33 Wertheim discovered the “missing link” in an interview held by Arnold Brackman with Suharto in 1968. Suharto told Brackman that while he was visiting his son in hospital on the night of 30 September, he met Latief, who inquired about his son’s health. According to Suharto, “Today I realize that he did not go to the hospital that evening to check on my son, but, rather, to check on me.”34 W.F. Wertheim suggested, however, “There is at least reason to assume that, through this meeting, Suharto got some information about plans for a coup” and in fact the relationship between Suharto and the plotters may have been even closer.35 Speculations about Suharto’s role in planning and executing the Gestapu Affair was rising when he made inconsistent stories about his meeting with Latief. But there was no evidence to support this version other than his short meeting with Latief at the hospital and his past connection with some of the “progessive officers” from Central Java. 7.5. The intelligence circle and the CIA This version argued that the intelligence circle of the army initiated on its own or with help from foreign intelligence agencies, notably from the U.S. and China. Using two transcripts from the trials of Njono and Oentoeng, Coen Holtzappel, who was led this school of interpretation, concludes that neither the PKI nor its chairman, Aidit, ever 33Crouch, op.cit., p. 123. 34Arnold C. Brackman, The Communist Collapse, op.cit., p. 100. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 88] === 66 developed any political deal with the movement, or with members or leaders o f it.36 We may therefore conclude that the Pringgodani group developed no contacts with communist organizations other than those which were needed with regard to the Halim Training Scheme. Nevertheless the PKI got the blame for being the initiator of the 30 September Movement. It was the political activities of the Pringgodani group, and especially of its commander Sujono and its political expert Sjam, which were finally responsible for placing that blame.37 This version concludes that there was no concrete and independent evidence for the existence of secret relations between Aidit and the movement. Moreover, all witnesses who might have produced evidence against their existence were eliminated. Oentoeng’s inquiries about them were blocked by Sjam. Finally, there was the party’s decision not to make contact with the movement. It is therefore possible to form the hypothesis that Pringgodani’s efforts in connection with an eventual cabinet formation were fake, and were actually intended to compromise Aidit and the PKI in a very devious way. At the same time the Pringgodani task force was a primary power center in the movement which could afford to deviate at will from its own official aims.38 Supporting facts were that the Pringgodani task force killed three of the kidnapped army generals at the Halim air force base and probably also ordered the murder of the other three generals. By these acts they 36The two sources, published by the Army's Judge School (PTHM), have been mentioned, op.cit.-, other than these two, he only made use of Harold Crouch’s The Army..., op.cit., and Basuki Gunawan, Kudeta Staatsgreep in Djakarta (Boompaperback, 1968). 37Coen Holtzappel, “The 30 September Movement: A Political Movement of the Armed Forces or an Intelligence Operation?” in Journal o f Contemporary Asia, 9, no.2, 1979, p.227. "Ibid., p.228. R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 89] === 67 compromised Oentoeng’s operations as well as the whole Gestapu movement. Indirectly the president was also compromised. The Pringgodani also deliberately and with considerable skill compromised Aidit and the PKI.39 A lacking of sources to cross examine is apparent in Holtzappel’s version, even for facts such as “Omar Dhani was finally sentenced to death and executed.”40 The key figure in this version was Major (air force) Heru Atmodjo, who decided to carry the responsibility for an operation which ultimately had such disastrous consequences for the nation as a whole, and turned out to be fatal to his own supreme commander, Air ViceMarshal Omar Dhani. Also central was Colonel (later Brigadier General) Supardjo, who had been a close assistant to Brigadier General Sukendro of the Army Intelligence Service at the time. Supardjo was in an excellent position to spread rumors via various public and internal army channels. There is some chance that he belonged, together with Brigadier General Sukendro, to the circle of men who decided on the murder of the generals and the compromising of the PKI. Coen Holtzappel contends, it is conceivable that those men received help from another circle of “outlaws” (Masyumi); he says that forbidden political parties had excellent ground for ‘putsch-efforts.’41 19Ibid., p.231. ^Omar Dani was indeed sentenced to death by the Mahmillub judge order; see Omar Dani case, loc.cit., and especially with the following order “Surat Keputusan No.:KEP-094/KOPKAM/12/1996 ttg. Fiat Executie,” dated Jakarta, 24 October 1966; He was not, however, executed was finally released in 1996. R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 90] === 68 Involvement of foreign countries, particularly their intelligence services, was also cited to support this version. The U.S. embassy stated that “even more suspect than Sukamo as an accomplice in the coup was Communist China.”42 Further, the assessment continued: It was widely known within a day of the coup that twelve separate Indonesian delegations were in China at the time of the coup, which coincided with China’s National Day (October 1). These delegations included ones headed by Deputy Prime Minister Saleh and the head of the National Defense Unit. There was also a large PKI delegation in Peking that day which, unlike previous PKI delegations to China, did not include any top-level PKI officials. They undoubtedly remained in Indonesia because o f the critical events about to unfold there. Later it became known in the Army that the Chinese in Peking had a complete list of the assassinated generals by 11 a.m. on October 1, hours before their names were announced in Jakarta. The Chinese government list included the name o f Nasution, who had escaped assassination, but whose inclusion suggested that Peking had an advanced copy of the target list.43 But the U.S. embassy itself was later accused of making up another “complete list,” this time to help the military cleansing of PKI members and sympathizers. Although this version concentrated more on the bloodbath in the time immediately following the Gestapu Affair, it also accused the CIA of involvement from before the Gestapu. The version was first put forth when Kathy Kadane, a journalist working for States News Services, published an article in the Washington Post, “U.S. Official’s Lists Aided Indonesian Bloodbath in ‘60s," followed by a similar article in the New York Times, “CIA i3Ibid. R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 91] === 69 Tie Asserted in Indonesia Purge.”44 But there was no evidence of CIA involvement in preGestapu politics.45 2.1. Studies on the Gestapu Affair Historiographically, the period 1964-1966 has so far been the forgotten years in Indonesian history. Studies on this period have been hindered, understandably, by several factors, from scarcity of related sources to the political contents for such studies. Moreover, almost all studies to date focused on the Gestapu Affair in the national theater of conflicts, or on the degree of involvement of the PKI and President Sukarno himself, as well as Suharto's obscure position. These studies have tried to explain causes and flows of events in Jakarta and related national issues; they have not dealt with the immediate impacts of Gestapu, i.e. the mass killings. Only three studies dealt with regional and local issues of the immediate post-Gestapu killings, which barely enough to reveal the richness in patterns and landscapes of conflicts for a better understanding of the interlocking factors that contributed to the killings.46 “ The Washington Post, 05-21-90; NYT 07-12-90. 45See chapter I. ‘“'Robert Cribb, ed., The Indonesian Killings 1965-1966: Studiesfrom Java and Bali (Clayton: Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1990); Iwan Gardono Sudjatmiko, "The destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) (a comparative analysis of East Java and Bali)," Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1992; Geoffrey Robinson, The Dark Side o f Paradise (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1995). All three will be reviewed below. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 92] === 70 In 1966, only a year after the Gestapu Affair erupted, the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara (MPRS), or Provisional Parliament, passed a Congressional Law47 which stated that the study and dissemination of any forms of Marxism-Leninism—and therefore also the study of PKI—is forbidden,except for academic purposes, which would be further regulated by a law.4®For foreign Indonesianists, working outside Indonesia, this period is actually open to scrutiny. Relatively abundant materials and resources are located in various libraries outside Indonesia. By contrast, almost no Indonesian scholar has a chance, or more precisely the courage, to do research on this topic; as a result, no study is available from a vernacular perspective other than the official history popularly known as the "white books." The first publication to deal with the Gestapu Affair was Fakta-fakta Sekitar Peristiwa Gestapu (Facts on the Gestapu Affairs), published by the Information Center, the Army Headquarters. The book contained three "Special Publications" which had formerly been published separately on 5 October, 5 November, and 5 December 1965. Quite probably the first publication in the series was published within days after 5 4®This Undang-Unckmg or law has never been realized. So technically, it is still illegal to study communism and or its political praxis. Up to now, there is only one center of study to deal with communism and communist party, i.e. Dinas Penelitian dan Pengembangan Masalah-masalah Komunis (Office of Research and Development of Communist Affairs), placed under Pusat Sejarah Departemen Hankam (the Center for Historical Studies, Department of Defense). Except official publications, which are mainly for educational purposes, no document or other sources related to the 1965-1966 events are available to the public or researchers. Newspapers of the period of 1965-1966, for instance, are missing from any library stack and are held by the military authority. Chapter ff.3 will elaborate this issue of sources and materials. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 93] === 71 December 1965, although no publication date was provided. The Preface for the Special Publication No. 1 was dated as early as 5 October 1965, meaning that preparations were made immediately after the Gestapu Affair broke out. One o f the purposes stated in the Preface of Publication No. 1-the preface was signed by the head of the Information Center, the Army Headquarters—was to inform the people that the Gestapu Affair was not merely an internal army conflict. This most important, yet controversial theme, was elaborated by later studies.49 This could be interpreted to mean that in a matter of days, or even hours, the army had already constructed a story to be used as a political instrument and to be projected as an effective propaganda tool in the future to crush the communist forces. Further interpretation can be drawn, which later proved quite effective, that the army used this very same propaganda tool as an official history, and the only history of the period 1965-1966, propaganda that was purportedly to build a legitimate base of collective remembrance and consciousness for supporting a new regime. In other words, it was a matter of reconstructing a future history in an a priori manner. But analysis of the construction of history as such is a post factum fabrication. It is hard to imagine that in a situation of chaos, factionalism, and intense conflict, some army officers had thought up and anticipated a fabricated story far beyond their contemporary situational needs; a visionary paradigm was a later construction. It is indeed undeniably true that the army used this "construct" or version of propaganda against the PKI, but 49See, among others, Benedict Anderson and Ruth T. McVey's study, reviewed below. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 94] === 72 there is little basis to state that the construct was planned from the beginning to be projected as a "future history." Nevertheless, the army's first efforts to construct a certain image o f these events for the contemporary masses proved to have far-reaching consequences, not only political but also historiographic. There could be another view, that within the same short time span, the announcement by the movement, that the conflict was only an internal army matter, had an effect particularly among the politicians; the Preface for these publications also stated that some politicians believed in the content of Oentoeng's announcement. Furthermore, later studies siding with this construction of history were heavily influenced not only by Oentoeng's statement but by the overall leftist political atmosphere as well.50 Unavoidably, both leanings of historiography are trapped between the dichotomies o f what were later popularly called the "army's version" and the "PKI's version." This split started as early as the first fact emerged, and would be further elaborated by later works. The first part of the book itself was mostly composed of clippings from daily newspapers published in Jakarta in early October 1965. Although it included three news pieces from Warta Bhakti, a leftist newspaper, which clearly had a pro-coup group leaning, the clippings were mainly taken from the rightist or army newspapers—Berita Yudha, PAB, Antara. Interestingly enough, news from Warta Bhakti was included without any apparent censorship or editing. The whole approach of the book seemed to show bold facts, yet it quoted only from selected sources. This included reports from Kodams 50Benedict Anderson's admission in the Preface of Java in a Tim e... op.cit. can probably be cited as an example of this influence. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 95] === 73 (military commands at the provincial level) on the regional situations in the post-coup period. Some of these reports were detailed, and some were short and only a general outline o f the situation. None have the usual tight army standard of reporting. Quite possibly these reports are either in their condensed forms or with prior editing, due to their military loads. As intended, readers o f this book would get a strong impression o f who were the bad guys and who were the good guys. As a propaganda tool, the book seemed to reach its goals without any serious effort to present anything but bare facts. However, these publications might be doubted as having an effective impact on the masses, since this Special Publication was particularly intended for the military men themselves and had limited distribution. Messages of the book, which were not too clear in the beginning and took clear shape only by the end (with a much stronger propaganda flavor), were: (1) the Gestapu Affair was not an internal problem of the army; (2) it was an "adventurous action" taken by some middle rank officers who were under the influence of the PKI through its Special Bureau {Biro Khusits), an allegedly political arm of the party inside the armed forces; (3) the PKI initiated the coup through those influenced officers; and (4) the PKI showed its devilish nature by repeating the Madiun Affair (PBCI's abortive coup against the central government in 1948). These theses were to be followed by later "official versions" such as Notosusanto's work.51 At about the same time (publication date, 10 January 1966) a comprehensive study was completed by a group of scholars from Cornell University. The title was "A 51Notosusanto and Saleh, The Coup Attempt... op.cit., reviewed below. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 96] === 74 Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965 Coup in Indonesia," but it is more popularly known as the Cornell Paper, or White Paper.52 Written by Benedict Anderson and Ruth T. McVey, this study scrutinized facts from Jakarta and provincial newspapers, covering the period of September-December 1965, and constructed a very sophisticated scenario as well as four alternative possibilities of the flow of events in 1965. This work was to become the most controversial study on the attempted coup, followed by a persona non grata status for Anderson to enter Indonesia since April 1972. Curiously enough, despite the political tension that arose between the Indonesian government and the Cornell group, invaluable materials were officially brought to and deposited at Cornell University.53 The main thesis of this Cornell Paper is that the coup was actually an internal conflict within the Army—an "academically" original thesis, but politically not original since it leaned toward the views of some leftist politicians, as mentioned above. The thesis was presented and outlined in a very sophisticated framework, i.e. (Central) Javanese “Benedict Anderson and Ruth T. McVey, "A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia," Interim Report Series, Modem Indonesia Project, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, 1971. This study was first circulated among a limited audience to get some comments. But apparently someone had copied it and this copied copy was circulated in Indonesia. That made a big stir since the killings were still going on, lasting until a year later, and the conclusions of this paper countered the official perspective and general atmosphere of communist-phobia in 1966. See Anderson's Introduction of 1971 edition of this monograph. Apart from its weaknesses, I still regard this report as "comprehensive." 53Apparently, there was a hope in the part of the Indonesian government (or more precisely, Major General Ali Murtopo on behalf on the Indonesian government) that the materials would be used as new evidences to change the Cornell Paper version. But before all materials were safely deposited in Cornell the political climate changed, Ali Murtopo lost his power and only "some luggages" rest in Cornell, with no one ever seriously scrutinized them. Tempo reports, and a receipt of the deposit held at Kahin Center. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 97] === 75 cultural determinants, such as puritanism achieved through meditation. In practice, this appeared in, for instance, the selection of Thursday night (malam Jum'at) for launching the movement. Thursday night was a night for melekan, the Javanese practice of staying up all night in prayer, meditation or ascesis to draw on the power of the supernatural world.54 According to this thesis, some frustrated "Young Turks" from the Diponegoro Division, located in Semarang, the capital city of Central Java Province, initiated the movement. These officers were mainly from the middle ranks (captains to colonels) who opposed their seniors (the generals) who lived in the corrupted Jakarta, the capital city. Anderson and McVey give the cultural outline of the core group who launched the coup. One of the reasons why the Cornell Paper reached such a conclusion was its discontinuity approach to events of the Gestapu Affair. The study treated Gestapu as an event relatively separate from the preceding events leading toward the movement, and from the killings that followed. This approach was understandable, since this study was done when the killings were still taking place. As a separate event, a plot was needed to explain the rationale behind the coup action, and a cultural framework seemed to fit neatly with the pattern of actions. The writers even felt comfortable using--in the opening of every chapter or section-quotations from the book of Nagarakrtagama, from the thirteenth century Javanese kingdom. A (Central Javanese) cultural framework can also be imposed since the writers used only "surface facts" taken from newspapers. In 1967, Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Saleh published what would be the (only) official version of the Gestapu Affair. Written as an elaborated version of an earlier 54Anderson and McVey, op.cit., p. 11. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 98] === 76 Notosusanto work,55 which had been published only about a month after the coup, this study relied heavily on the materials from the Extraordinary Military Tribunals (Mahmillub, Mahkamah Militer Luarbiasa) which conducted the trials of some key actors in the Gestapu Affair.56 Written in English, this work was clearly meant to counter the Cornell Paper's arguments.57 In writing this book, the authors had a chance to visit the United States and the Netherlands, to "observe the campaign against the New Order, by posing the rebel's view of the affair."58 But the book neglected any "newspaper facts," and merely tried to look into the flow of events under the surface through the materials. These materials were published in 1966, with contents including transcriptions of confessions and witnesses' testimonies, without any editing.59 However, the work did not exploit these sources and used them in a sophisticated theoretical fabric, resulting in a rather 55"40 Hari Kegagalan 'G-30-S'" (40 Days of the Failure of the September 30 Movement). S6Nugroho Notosusanto (Lt. Colonel) was then Director of the Institute of History of the Department of Defense and Security; Ismail Saleh was a professional military officer (Lt. Colonel), instructor at the Army Staff and Command School and a member of the Judge Advocate's corps of the Army. Notosusanto died with the rank of Brigadier General (Tit.) while serving as Minister of Education and Culture; Saleh as Minister of Justice and later as Chairman o f the Supreme Court. "Interestingly, this book does not mention Cornell Paper at all. Instead, it mentions Brackman, Hindley, Kroef, Pauker, and Scalapino's works. ""Preface," pp.2-3. 59There were 17 cases altogether, but only three were published: G-30-S Dihadapan Mahmillub. I (Perkara Njono), 1966; G-30-S Dihadapcm Mahmillub 2 Di Djakarta (Perkara Untung), 1966; G-30-S Dihadapan Mahmillub 3 (2 vols.) di Djakarta (Perkara Dr. Subandrio), 1966?. All were published by Pusat Pendidikan Kehakiman AD (AHM-PTHM) [The Army's Judge School], R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 99] === 77 unconvincing academic work. By adding long lists of appendices taken mainly from military sources, the book looked more like a propaganda tool than an academic study. After these two publications - the Cornell Paper and Notosusanto's works —many studies were published in the period between 1967 and 1971.60 However, after 1971 there are not many studies on the Gestapu Affair; there are more studies on the New Order. But the previous two extreme historiographic leanings continued to exist. The Cornell Paper by this time already influenced most studies by foreign Indonesianists—although some Indonesianists preferred to side with the official version. Folowing the previous school, mainly laid by the Cornell Paper, many of these studies that focus their works more on the New Order than on the Gestapu Affair specifically, took for granted what the existing versions offered. These stuidies tended to blame the new regime as being responsible for the mass killings in the post-coup period; and particularly tended to see the army as the prime actor orchestrating a theater of horror throughout the country. At a theoretical level, these characteristics created a good framework for a later paradigm which assumed that the new regime needed to build a strong administration and a state-centered socio political life, so that taking a bloody path seemed required.61 By contrast, the Army's version began to be regarded by Indonesian society as the only history of the period; this was the kind of constructed history that was then being taught in schools, from elementary to college. “ A complete list can be found in the bibliography. 61An assumption that I believe persists up to the latest debate (in the late 1980s and early 1990s) on the state vis-a-vis society approaches in reading the Indonesian political affairs. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 100] === 78 The importance of the Cornell Paper, and later studies that followed this paper’s leanings can be seen from the seriousness with which the Indonesian government viewed it. In 1975 the government formed a group of scholars to study western works on the coup in order to decide whether it would be wise to write a counter "white paper," intended to target the Cornell Paper rather than reach a general audience. The government assigned a group of Indonesian scholars to respond more objectively to works by foreign scholars.62 However, after doing some serious research, the group concluded that there was no need to publish a counter "white paper." The group recommended that the government should not publish any new official version, and considered that the "white book" written by Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Saleh was sufficient as an official version.63 Publication of a new white book would only spark and open unnecessary debates. Defining four historiographic issues —data on the events; background; involvement of the belligerent parties; post G-30-S events and situation ~ the Working Group explored almost all major works up to 1975. These include a work published in 62"Laporan Kelompok Keija Penilaian Kepustakaan G.30.S. Karya Para Penulis Asing" (Report o f the working group on evaluation of the works on the G.30.S. Affair by foreign writers), monograph, limited circulation, p.n. The government intention was delivered by Admiral Sudomo, the then Chief of Staf of Kopkamtib (Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, Operation Command for the Restoration of Security and Order), by letter No. K-134/KOPKAM/V1/1975 dated June 4, 1975. This report is inseparable from the main, 103 page-long report entitled "Kesimpulan Beberapa Penulis Asing Mengenai G.30.S." ("Conclusions of Some Foreign Writers on the G.30.S."). R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 101] === 79 French and another in Russian.64 The working group considered the Cornell Paper's conclusion premature, for it did not use the results of trials o f key actors, which were held later.6S Without expressing its own opinion, the working group concluded from those works reviewed that the dalcmg (mastermind) of the coup was still unknown. However, in terms of data on the events, the group recognized the Cornell's report as most complete. Meanwhile, in 1976 copies of a declassified CIA report were circulated as hot material.66 Divided into four sections-the coup itself; the movements of key figures up to the time of their capture or lost power such as Sukarno; the plan for the coup; review of events leading up to the coup--the report was intended "to let the facts speak for themselves."67 The two most important conclusions of this study focused on the role of the PKI and Sukamo in the Gestapu Affair. On the role of the PKI, this report concluded, "Although the Indonesian coup, as it was carried it out, was in every respect the planning of the PKI, other people besides the Communists were involved in the plot to eliminate the top army leadership."68 On the role of Sukamo, however, the study was still somewhat “ Indonesian translations of these works are included in the group's report. “ Cornell Paper includes confessions of Njono, before his trial, taken from Antara report, December 2, 1965. “Research Study: Indonesia-1965, The Coup That Backfired, written in 1968 by Helen Louise Hunter, was declassified in May 1976. 61Ibid., foreword. “Ibid., p.266. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 102] === 80 inconclusive.69 Later, despite previous recommendations from the Indonesian scholars that the government should not publish a white book, the State Secretariat published one in 1994.70 The book provided no new facts or light, and was presented in a standard format for a general audience. This "white book" seemed like a simplification of Notosusanto's work. Other studies on the attempted coup are divided between these two extreme versions: they either side with the "official version" or choose the leaning of the Cornell Paper. But most, if not all, of them deal with the national theme, i.e., the attempted coup. Other than three works cited above, there was no comprehensive study on the regional level. Since the focus was mostly on the national stage, these studies also focused their analyses on the political conflicts and tried to search for a political rationale behind political actions. The Cornell Paper is so far the only study that tries to explain cultural bounds of political actions. In this mainstream of writing, it is more difficult to explain the relationship between the drama played on the national stage and the horror showed in the regional theaters. And it is even harder to show the relationships between the national plot of the coup and the regional plays of the killings. Therefore, the only apparently "reasonable" explanation is that the army or the new regime applied a blueprint of a massacre throughout the country. 69Ibid., pp.279-286. 10Gerakan 30 September Pemberontakan Partai Komunis Indonesia: Latar Belakang, Aksi, dan Pemimpasannya (Jakarta: Sekretariat Negara RI, 1994). R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 103] === 81 3. Sources and research It has been decades since the Gestapu Affair, and still not much can be said about the affair itself, let alone about the post-coup mass slaughters. Quite understandably, several factors played a role here, including the emotional and political.71 By a congressional law (TAP MPRS No. XXV/MPRS/1966), any study of Marxism-Leninism, the PKI, and all topics related to the Gestapu Affair are forbidden. Under this law, however, there is a provision that scholarly study would be permitted under a new law that would further regulate details of this kind of study. But this law has never been written. Part of the reasons is clear: political necessity prevents such a law. Within less than a decade, all written sources on Indonesia’s second largest political party, which had millions of members and supporters, were gone. Technically, it is still illegal to study communism and/or its political praxes. Pending further regulation by the law, there is only one center of study dealing with the study o f communism and communist parties in general (not necessarily the Communist Party of Indonesia), that is Dinas Penelitian dan Pengembangan Masalah-masalah Komunis, or Office for Research and Development of Communist Affairs, which is placed under the Pusat Sejarah Departemen Pertahanan dan Keamanan, or the Center for Historical Studies, Department of Defense and Security. Without a permit from this office, no one can do research on those topics. In addition to constraints in legal and political technicalities for conducting research, the social climate is also not favorable. 71Cribb elaborates these factors, reviewed below. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 104] === 82 In this situation, no documents or other related sources are available to the public or researcher. Newspapers from the period 1965-1966, for instance, are missing from any library stack and are held by the military authority. Even secondary sources are difficult to find in Indonesia; many of them which partly or wholly deal with the Gestapu Affair, such as the Cornell Paper and Harold Crouch's Army and Politics, are included on the list of banned books. As was shown in the previous subchapter, the existing historiography on the topic of the Gestapu Affair as such was developed since the early 1970s, when the new regime needed a constructed history to shape a collective remembrance that fitted into its own frame of interests. As a consequence, much more critical treatment must be applied in using these secondary materials, especially those published by the government and the army. Only clear facts were taken from these materials, and even this is done carefully, comparing them with other sources (primary documents). An example of this process is the text of Supersemar, or the instructional letter of 11 March 1966. The text is included in many "official" secondary sources, but a crosscheck with copy documents from the original text in 1966 shows that there was no fabrication on the wording. Thus, a general rule adopted here is that only certain interpretations are taken as textual and treated as a school of thought, and very critical assessment is applied when dealing with materials or documents included in such texts. Due to developments of historiography as shown in the next subchapter, text and documents that appeared in the period immediately after the Gestapu Affair can be treated less critically. An example is the Mahmillub documents. Almost all studies by western scholars have analyzed the reliability of these sources, and the trials R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 105] === 83 were open to the public. Those attending the trials included foreign journalists and scholars such as Harold Crouch. That only certain parts (such as on the critical role of Sjam) require as careful treatment as sources that appeared later. Outside Indonesia, however, there are relatively abundant materials available for research. Almost no new secondary materials or new interpretations have appeared since the late 1970s, but these materials are available everywhere and open to scrutiny. In the early 1970s, Lieutenant General Ali Murtopo asked the authors of the Cornell Paper to revise their work. The authors replied that as scholars, they could not change their opinion unless they were supplied new evidence.72 For this and other unclear reasons—quite probably for security of the documents—the army brought some copies and original materials o f the Gestapu Affair, mostly taken from the military tribunals, to Cornell University in Ithaca, New York. But the project to save all materials at Cornell has never been completed; Ali Murtopo lost his power, and the authors of the Cornell Paper never started another project. To date, no researcher has made use of these (many) uncatalogued documents deposited at the Kahin Center at Cornell University. Fieldwork for this study was conducted under these conditions for intermittent months and years, from 1993-when I was assisted by three full-time and five part-time field assistants in three-month fieldwork—to summer 1996, when I was helped by another field assistant. Various methods have been applied, from standard library research to document search as in abandoned warehouses of the sugar plantations, from interpretation of the existing secondary works to oral history. Due to specific characteristics of the 72The source for this section declined to be disclosed. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 106] === 84 fieldwork, this study relied heavily on oral history methods. This is in line with a belief that "oral history can contribute a substantial counter to officially received history and officially defined policy, by empowering people to generate alternative understanding and approaches."73 Also, considering the fact that only non-traditional sources were available, oral history was appropriate for a local historical study such as this one. Frisch has argued: Oral history has been fueled by a diversely grounded impulse to escape the bounds of academic history, to break the bonds of traditionally defined source materials and their implicit biases, to broaden participation in the process of historical interpretation, and to empower the people who actually make social history in their lives and struggles to reappropriate it for their own purposes.74 To avoid anxiety from the informants, instead of adopting a narrow, limited focus on the mass killings, I applied a broad theme of local history. This strategy proved to be beneficial in two ways: it paved easy access to an official permit and sources, and it gave a historical track to the past. I stretched the time span back to a century ago. But while interviewing key informants, the topic was always shifted and focused on the period of 1965-1966. So the interviews were done according to the following procedures. At the beginning, I would pick up any person—in a purposive random sampling— who lived in the area during the period 1964-1971.75 Then, in an unstructured interview format, he was asked to give a narrative personal history—birth, education, career, and so on; the goal was to draw a broad outline of local history through a collective 73Michael Frisch, A Shared Authority: Essays on the Craft and Meaning o f Oral and Public History (1990), p. 178. uIbid., p. 159. 75Understandably, all interviewees were men. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 107] === 85 remembrance, by stressing the strong patterns from these individual interviews.76 In every interview, the general theme was the informant's "personal history," with a thick description of the period before and after 1965. This technique managed to avoid curiosity, although many, if not most, of them knew that the research topic was the killings. When the story reached the period 1964-1966, the questions were asked very carefully, in detail. In many cases, the interviews were repeated several times on this particular period. After these first interviews, names mentioned by those interviewed were sorted out, especially those who were associated directly in the local affairs during the time the killings took place. Names that appeared in more than one interview were classified according to their importance, ranked by the first informants. Through this "star" system, the interviews moved as close as possible to the main actors playing the political games in Jombang and Kediri in 1965-1966. Unfortunately, many of them had died or moved to other places. But many still lived in the area. Crosschecks were made between interviews, and field visits confirmed most information contained in the interviews. An example is a visit to a killing field in Ngrayut, Kediri, and to various gisikan, or riverbanks of the Brantas river where most slaughters took place.77 But aside from technical difficulties, most interviews with the executioner went well. 76I took adavantage from a guideline in Jeremy Brecher, History From Below: How to Uncover cmd Tell the Story o f Your Community, Association, or Union (New Haven, Connecticut: Advocate Press/Commonwork Pamphlets, 1988 edition). 77During these visits, I was accompanied by a former executioner. R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 108] === 86 The most difficult stage in this oral history was locating the military personnel and the survivors. Other than high-ranking military officers, such as the regional commanders o f East Java (Kodam Brawijaya), all military men present in Jombang-Kediri during the period being studied had moved elsewhere. This is understandable, due to the rotation of their duties. Similarly difficult to find were the ex-PKI members who survived the slaughter. Only one survivor was found in Jombang, but he would not speak. One survivor was found in Trenggalek, a neighboring regency of Kediri; an interview with him was used with another consideration, that Trenggalek is also quite close to the killing fields in Kediri. In addition to materials sorted out from oral history, this research also made use of scattered written documents from local warehouses (of the sugar plantations), or from personal documents of local figures, whenever such documents available. Most of the information in these documents were taken for granted, for there is no reason to be critical of this information; the list of workers reportedly missing or killed, for instance, is included in this category of documents. But these documents pose another problem: inconsistencies. In two official documents from P.G. Meritjan, for instance, there are different data on the number of employees being killed. Names on the official lists were also confusing, because many Javanese use the same name (without last name); different spelling of the same name is also another problem. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 109] === 87 4. M ass slaughters: reconstruction o f a missing history One year of mass slaughters is one forgotten year not only in Indonesian history, but also in the world history of great atrocities, pogroms, revolutions, genocides, and other similar types of mass killings. In addition to the various domestic factors outlined above that hindered studies on the massacre, Brackman proposes several external views that contribute to this lack of attention.7* Fantasies, fables, and myths have a deep hold on the Malay world and this was certainly a mitigating factor.79 In addition to the fertile imagination of the average Malay, it is difficult to assess the extent of the massacre for other reasons. There is an inexplicable lack of photographic evidence. If one assumes that "one or two million" persons were slain in a five-month period, the almost total absence of photographs raises doubts. Moreover, eyewitness accounts by trained observers are also difficult to come by.80 In a scholarly situation where fieldwork was difficult to conduct and written documents were rare, if any, no scholar would risk studying the massacre. In 1990, however, Robert Cribb published The Indonesian Killings o f 1965-1966, a compilation of articles, documents, and eyewitness accounts. This was the first work dealing with the killings in regional settings. In addition to an introductory chapter, the book consisted of five scholarly articles, two military reports, and three eyewitness accounts. In the 78Arnold C. Brackman, The Communist Collapse in Indonesia (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), pp. 114-128. 19Ibid., p. 123. i0Ibid., p. 124. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 110] === 88 introduction, Cribb cited three problems: information, philosophy, and interpretation.81 As for information, there were relatively few Western journalists or academics in Indonesia at that time; travel was difficult and often dangerous and the scope for collecting accounts for the killing at close hand was limited; and coverage in the domestic as well as the foreign press was limited.82 On philosophy, Cribb referred to the incomparable scale and pattern o f the killing with other atrocities such as the Holocaust, the Cambodian case, and other mass killings.83 On the third, he referred to a loophole in historiography, presented as a gap between the national and local dimensions. He argued: The killings were precipitated by a national event, the attempted coup in Jakarta and they involved avowedly national actors--the army, the PKI, organized Islam—and yet the relatively scanty information we possess suggests that a host o f local factors in each region determined the scope and scale of each bout of killing.84 Even with the three problems Cribb cited, conflicting views on the problems themselves still exist. On the difficulty and danger of travelling, for example, Brackman held another view. Quoting a reporter for the Christian Science Monitor, Brackman believed that "despite indications of tensions, the fact remains that this reporter and an American woman friend were able to drive through the area with absolutely no untoward incident and with every courtesy from these warm Javanese."85 There was no indication 8lRobert C. Cribb, op.cit., pp.3-37. t2Ibid., pp.3-14. t3Ibid., pp. 14-20. "Ibid., p.21. 8SBrackman, op.cit., pp. 124-125. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 111] === either that other foreign journalists such as John Hughes and reporters from the New York Times were having difficulty in travelling around,®6 although the U.S. embassy admitted this problem.87 Thus, the problem lay more on the second, philosophical, level than on the informational one. Although moving in the right direction, in his conclusion, Cribb failed to build a strong argument bridging the national and local dimensions as he intended when reviewing the third problem—interpretation.88 Part of the reason was that the book contained only scattered data from the daerah, or regional-local settings, too insignificant and weak to build a clear bridge between the two pictures. Yet, his proposed agenda for bridging this gap in historiography was too important to be neglected. In spite of its richness in local details, Cribb's work contained serious mistakes, that would lead to wrong analysis. One striking example was the mistakenly identified military hierarchy of commands. The regional hierarchy should go down from Kowilhan (Komando Wilayah Pertahanan, or Area Defense Command), in charge of several provinces. Kowilhan, which was abolished in early 1980s, controlled several Kodam (Komando Daerah Militer, or Military Regional Command) which were responsible for defense and security at the provincial level. In turn, Kodam controlled several Korem (Komando Resort Militer, or Military Resort Command) responsible for an area of, but ®6John Hughes, op.cit., esp. pp. 152-183. Reports from reporters appeared in The New York Times several times; on the situation in Central and East Java appeared in NYT ®*Chapter VII (Conclusion) deals with the tracks Cribb started in his "problem of interpretation." For his goal, see p.21. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 112] === 90 not necessarily, one residency (karesidencm, consisted of several regencies or kabupateri). Under Korem was Kodim (Komando Distrik Militer, or Military District Command), responsible for an area of regency or kabupaten. Kodim controlled Koramil (Komando Rayon Militer, or Military "District" Command), responsible for a subdistrict administrative area o f kecamatan. Koramil did not exist in 1965-1966; instead, the official name at that time was Uterpra (Unit Teritorial Peijuangan Rakyat, or People's Struggle Territorial Unit).®9 Cribb wrongly referred to Korem as a military command at the kabupaten, or regency level, and Kodim as a military command at the kawedanan, or subregency ("district") level.90 He also wrongly referred to the terms desa, kelurahcm, Rukun Kampung, and Rukun Warga.91 In later administrative usage, the term desa referred to village, while kelurahcm to administrative neighborhood in the cities. But in 1965-1966 desa and kelurahan were interchangable terms for village. Under the village level, there was no administrative unit, although Rukun Kampung (equivalent to dukuh, consisting of a couple dozens to hundreds of households), Rukun Warga (sometimes equivalent to ®9Again, this military structure has undergone some changes. Kowilhan has been abolished, the status of Kodam has been enhanced that in some cases is responsible for an area larger than a province, and Korem in some places replaces Kodam in the provincial level. Uterpra had been replaced by Koramil, which added a new position, Babinsa (bintara pembina desa, or petty officer in charge of village "cultivator") under its command. Note, however, that an area military command did not necessarily coincided with civil administrative unit. Kediri and Jombang for instance, in the sixties were placed under Korem of Madiun, although Kediri retained a status of a karesidenan (residency). ^Cribb, "note on administrative and military terms," op.cit., pp.xiv-xv. 9lIbid. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 113] === 91 Rukun Kampung, but in many cases smaller than Rukun Kampung), and Rukun Tetangga (the smallest unit o f neighborhood association, consisting o f 20-50 households) served as administrative auxiliaries. Such misinterpreted terms could lead to misleading analyses, such as in determining the levels of decision making for the killings, and the degree and scale of cooperation between the miltary hierarchy and the vigilante groups. But apart from its weaknesses, this study was the first to look at the regional and local situations and to apply a non-elite approach. This effort at least served as a provisional filler for the gap between national and local pictures. Yet, no single theme emerged from the book, other than scattered pictures of horror. Although Cribb's own assertion was only to mapping interpretations, general impressions from readers of the book would be that a blueprint was applied and orchestrated by the Army on a national scale to kill the alleged Communists; and the victims appeared as innocent. In other words, the whole picture was a view from the victims. This kind of writing—from the victim's point of view—also appeared in scattered sources, mainly memoirs,92 stories and other literary works.93 This becomes a kind of remembered history from the losers. By contrast, the winners, represented by the Army, have their own history, the only history of 1965-66. But there were other winners who kept silent. These included some primary actors who ^The best account is Pipit Rochijat, "Am I PKI or non-PKI," Indonesia, 40, 1985, pp. 37-52; a lengthy version, but in less careful remembrance, appeared in an interview by Ben Abel in KdPNet, a mailing list maintained by Pijar (Jakarta), 22-31 October 1996. 930ne of the best of its kind is Sri Sumarah dan Bawuk (Sri Sumarah and Bawuk), a two-piece story by Umar Kayam. Curiously, this work was not mentioned by Keith Foulcher, "Making History: Recent Indonesian Literature and the Events of 1965," in Cribb, op.cit., pp. 101-119. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 114] === 92 were involved to different degrees in crushing the PKI. They were the non-Army executioners, leaders of various vigilante groups contesting the PKI and its onderbouw organizations. So far, no written source has emerged from these people, no history of their own. In this scholarly situation, in 1985-1987 Geoffrey Robinson conducted the first fieldwork on the subject of violence in Bali. The period covered was a century, but the most important part of the study was the period of the killings in 1965-1966. This study was defended as a Ph.D. dissertation at Cornell University in 1992, and finally was published under the title The Dark Side o f Paradise:Political Violence in Bali.9* Parts of this study appeared elsewhere, before and after publication of the book, almost without change or revision.95 Robinson contended that the existing literature on Bali has been preoccupied with the notion of a harmonious society and with exotic treatments of Balinese society. The picture of historiography, then, was inconsistent with various acts of violence that occurred throughout the island's history. Since these acts did not fit into the pattern, they were regarded as anomalies. 94Geoflfrey Robinson, The Dark Side o f Paradise: Political Violence in Bali (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1995). “ Chapter 5 of the book appeared as "State, Society, and Political Conflict in Bali, 1945-1946," in Indonesia, 45 (April), 1988, pp. 1-48; chapter 10 appeared as "The Economic Foundations of Political Conflict in Bali, 1950-1965," in Indonesia, 54 (October), 1992, pp.59-93; chapter 11 appeared as "The Post-Coup Massacre in Bali," in Making Indonesia: Essays on Modem Indonesia in Honor o f George McT. Kahin, edited by Daniel S. Lev and Ruth McVey (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1996), pp. 118-143. All pages cited here refer to the pages of the book. R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 115] === 93 Using a political economy approach, Robinson showed that "massacre as culture" was misconstrued in the essential features of Balinese "character," culture, and religion; it was in fact inherent in the political and historical context o f the killing.96 In his conclusion, Robinson argued that outside structural factors—national as well as internationaloverlapping with internal strains in Balinese society to play a role in Bali's history of violence. In this context, he explained the massacre of 1965-1966. But as a review noted, "Robinson states repeatedly that, besides political and economic factors, it is also important to observe the cultural specificities of Bali, [but] we are never told precisely what these cultural factors actually were, nor how they played a role in conceptualizing politics and conflicts in the Balinese setting."97 In this structural framework, Robinson reviewed the 1965-1966 killings. But the facts were so scarce that he relied heavily on secondary sources such as the works by Robert Cribb, John Hughes, Guy Pauker, Marshall Green, W.F. Wertheim, Benedict Anderson, and other standard works.98 On this, Henk Schulte Nordholt commented, "I miss an additional local perspective on political developments in Bali, especially when it concerns the massacre of 1965-1966. In this respect I also miss a more precise description of the role of the PNI gangs, the so-called Tameng Marhaenis. They are only mentioned in 97Henk Schulte Nordholt, book review section, Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en Volkenkunde, KITLV, Deel 152, 2e Aflevering, 1996, p.330. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 116] === 94 passing, but seemed to have been a vital element in the logistics of the killings."99 Admitting that "most Balinese have been afraid to talk or write about the coup and its bloody aftermath,"100Robinson’s sources unavoidably fell into a category of "according to so-and-so" stories.101 Although it successfully showed the structural context of the killing, Robinson's study remained typical in presenting the "good-bad guys" play. Nordholt noted, the killings... were mainly done by military from Java. Robinson's analysis is also a verdict, because it cannot be denied that both Suharto, actively supported by the USA, which was very well informed about what happened, local commanders, and leaders of PNI gangs deliberately organized the massacre of thousands of innocent people. By playing up the cultural peculiarities o f Bali, and depicting the PKI as the embodiment of evil as a result of which victims 'volunteered' to be killed, the responsibility for this criminal act has been deliberately obscured and moved into the elusive realm of culture.102 If the killings were military operations, the study did not explore the procedures and figures of the operations. Also lacking was a description and analysis of the land reform programs and unilateral actions prior to the massacre. Despite a strong macro analysis of data on landownership and other land-related facts,103 Robinson failed to describe the increasing tensions that to some degree contributed to "cultivating violence." 101Direct citations mostly from secondary sources, while a few from "secondary witnesses; see esp. footnotes #93 on p.298, #98 and #101 on p.299, #103 on p.300. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 117] === 95 At about the same time Geoffrey Robinson conducted his study, Iwan Gardono Sudjatmiko conducted research on a similar subject. Also defended as a Ph.D. dissertation at Harvard University in 1992 under the title "The Destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) (A Comparative Analysis of East Java and Bali),"104 this study started from a sociological discourse. But the two scholars apparently were not aware of each other's work. Robinson did not use Sudjatmiko's study, although the book appeared three years after the latter's dissertation was filed with UMI microfiche. Sudjatmiko's work, similarly, did not use materials being used in Robinson's study.105 Considering the scale of their studies, and the timeframe in which the studies were conducted, it was interesting to note that the two used very different sources. Utilizing documents, Robinson's study stretched back a century to trace violent acts in a pattern, assuming the acts were not just anomalies. By contrast, in a typically sociological study, Sudjatmiko provided a comparative picture of East Java and Bali. He applied a model construction combining three factors-army disloyalty, percentage of challengers [to the authority], and political affiliation of public figures-to describe, and predict, the likelihood of a revolution. Using this model, 104Iwan Gardono Sudjatmiko, "The destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) (a comparative analysis of East Java and Bali)," Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1992. 105Sudjatmiko only made use of Robinson's article of "State, Society,..." in Indonesia, loc.cit. The reason was that Sudjatmiko defended his dissertation in July 1992, and the rest of Robinson's articles were published after this month. But other than the use of this source, there was no indication at all that the two were aware of the other's research; sources being used by Robinson and Sudjatmiko were almost exclusive to each other. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 118] === 96 Sudjatmiko then picked three areas each in East Java and Bali to explain the causes of conflicts and the impact of PKI policies on the destruction of the party and demolition of its followers after the Gestapu Affair. For East Java, he chose three regencies, based on the mix between PKI and santri (NU) votes: Magetan, where the PKI was strong; Kediri, where PKI's strength mixed with NLPs strength; and Jember, where NU dominated. For Bali, he chose three regencies according to PKI's influence: Buleleng (strong), Klungkung (medium), Tabanan (weak).106His conclusions were, among others, that the PKI's revolutionary strategy beginning in 1963 led to conflict during 1963-1965; that the PKI's destruction was not a unique phenomenon--it was similar to failed communist power grabs in China in 1927, Indonesia in 1948, and Singapore in the 1950s; and complete Hinduization had not created religious divisions among the Balinese that could be exploited by the PKI, as had occured in the case of the santri and abangan in East Java.107 More interesting, however, was his conclusion: Employing an analytical model that combines public figures, social challengers and military dignitaries, we gain a better understanding of the impact of the mobilization prior to 1965 and the violence following the coup.... the violence must be seen primarily as a shortcut to ultimate victory.108 Despite its strength in the model, Sudjatmiko's study contained some flaws, methodological as well as theoretical. First, methodologically, there is a danger of drawing 107This conclusion was confusing, for the previous sentence read: "In regard to the political mobilization, we find that Balinese Hinduismfailed to hinder the development of the PKI." (Italics are mine). R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 119] === 97 a misleading comparative picture when applying micro portraits and representations for a larger landscape. This "Skocpolian school" would be an advantage if applied for a large comparative analysis, supported by selective data and facts that fit into the model being used.109 In a micro picture, false data can contribute to a serious flaw in the conclusion. A clear example from Sudjatmiko's study was the role played by Mr.W, who was described an important figure connecting village and urban politics... a member of NU (Islam Orthodox party) who lived in the village but who worked in the city of Kediri (20 km from the village) as a member of the regency parliament as well as an official in the Office of Religious Affairs. Through him, the community asked the assistance of Ansor leaders in the neighboring pesantren who had arrived to support non PKI forces within the villages.110 This figure is unidentifiable, although the description fits Syafii Soleiman. Drawing a far reaching conclusion about the impact of public figures on the scale of violence based on what are quite probably exaggerated facts is a serious academic flaw. In contrast, the concept of "cultural broker," used in this study to explain the communal role of kiyais in the killings, was drawn from a cultural analysis and "thick description," not inference from a theoretical model.111 109Sudjatmiko worked under Theda Skocpol in the Department of Sociology, Harvard University. Skocpol is best known for her comparative works on the revolutions, States and Social Revolutions: a Comparative Analysis o f France, Russia, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). Comparative analysis with big issues, then, became her "trademark." m See subchapter III.2 on this concept and the role of a kiyai. R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 120] === 98 With all their strengths and weaknesses, the works by Geoffrey Robinson and Iwan Gardono Sudjatmiko on the massacre and destruction o f PKI in Bali nevertheless shed some light on the historiography of the post Gestapu killings. Geoffrey Robinson has convincingly showed the continuity of the history of violence in Bali. He also has successfully showed various factors—particularly economic factor and external [national and international] factor—that had contributed to the mass killings in 1965-1966. One of Iwan Sudjatmiko's contributions to the historiography o f the mass killings is his clear mapping of local social groupings and their political affiliations. However, the two still lack clear inferences between the national theater of politics and the local play of horror. The whole edifice—if it is possible to construct such an edifice—of the national theater of horror cannot be built without local components. Thus, this study is designed to fill the historiographic holes left by the existing works. By reconstructing a local picture, in the area where the fiercest fightings took place, this study tries to show some strains and themes o f continuity as well as discontinuity. Separating these strains from each other, and refuting a longitudinal process of tensions would only result in a need of a scenario that could be fictitious. By portraying the interwoven factors—not only those lead to the events but those that occurred long before the pogroms, and the impacts stretching far into the future—this study attempts to braid a theme of continuity for these forgotten years in history. It is also assumed here that local edifices do not support parallel constructions somewhere else; nationally, the pictures and patterns vary too widely from one area to another. It is, therefore, quite misleading to draw a conclusion on the national level based R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 121] === 99 only on a particular area such as Central Java, Bali, or East Java. Thus, this study does not pretend to show a general pattern applicable for the whole landscape of violence. Instead, it attempts to show peculiarities and specificities from a strong case. In this spirit, understanding politics is not rendered as picturing only the upper layers of the society; a non-elite approach is as important and crucial as the "standard political history." Without an understanding of local structural and cultural context, it is impossible to arrive at a proper comprehension of the existing political strains. In other words, a cultural approach is as important as a structural one. In the case of this study, the whole system of the sugar industry can best be illuminated by structural aspects of its operations. A structural or marxian approach, therefore, is a helpful tool for analysis. Theories and approaches of this kind would satisfactorily explain, to take an example, how price fluctuations in the world market have their impacts on the life of the peasants and workers of the industry. However, this approach is useless for analyzing the dynamics of the pesantrens. PKI's failed policies in dealing with the peasants were proof of the inappropriateness of the structural approach applied to the peasantry as a whole. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 122] === CHAPTER m RED CANE AND THE WHITE SARONG1: SUGAR PLANTATIONS AND PESANTRENS IN JOMBANG AND KEDIRI 1. Jombang and Kediri Jombang is located about 100km (60 miles) west of Surabaya, the capital city of Propinsi Jawa Timur, East Java Province. Administratively, the area is a kabupaten, a regency, which is formally called by its administrative level, Daerah Tingkat II (second level of administration). A bupati, regent, is in charge for this administrative unit, placed directly under the provincial government, which is called Daerah Tingkat I (first level of administration). Kediri, located about 50km (30 miles) southeast of Jombang, is also a kabupaten. But, the capital city of the kabupaten is under a separate administrative unit called, in 1965, kotapraja (popularly known in that time by its acronym, Kopra), and since 1970, kotamadya (city or municipal administration), since it is a larger city than Jombang. A walikota, or mayor, is in charge of Kotamadya Kediri. A bupati or walikota is partly elected by the local legislative assembly or house, and partly appointed by the central government. The system was basically the same in 1965-1966, but with the enactment of Undang-Undang Pemerintahan Daerah, or the Law on Local Administration, in 1974 the system put more emphasis on the central government than provincial or local authorities. First, the local house elects several candidates for the •These terms ("red canes" and "white sarongs") refer to the sugar plantation's community and the pesantren's community, respectively. I will elaborate the terms as concepts in this chapter. R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 123] === 101 position; then they send the names of the candidates to the gubemur or provincial governor (of East Java). The governor will approve or disapprove the candidates and, in turn, send the names to the minister of home affairs in the national capital. The minister decides who will fill the position, and he will ask the president to sign a decree for the chosen candidate to assume his position. Once appointed, a bupati or walikota is a subordinate of the governor.2 Under the New Order regime, a bupati is "less political" than under the Old Order: until 1965-1966, a bupati was always a political appointee, chosen from the strongest political party in the area, while in the New Order, most bupatis are middle-ranking military officers entering their retirement. Before the Gestapu Affair, in Jombang and Kediri they were always members (or at least symphatizers) of, and endorsed by, Nahdlatul Ulama. But the bupati of Jombang carried heavier political baggage than bupatis of other areas, since he had to compete for power locally with leaders of a great number of politically active pondok pesantren, Islamic educational institutions, as well as with the management of the sugar plantations. By contrast, the bupati and walikota of Kediri faced less "competing power" from the pesantren and the PGs because fewer influential PPs were located in the area, although the regency was larger than Jombang. In both areas, however, the bupatis and walikota have always meddled in and sometimes been directly engaged in sugar plantation affairs, such as land lease for cane fields. The plantations, known as Pabrik Gula or PG (sugar factory), were always in need 2A failure to understand the government, military, and political hierarchies could result in a misunderstanding of certain power plays. See an example of this confusion in Robert Cribb's work, op.cit. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 124] === 102 o f vast areas o f land for planting the sugar cane. Since their establishment, the PGs had never had, in their possession, enough acreage to plant all they desired to. The PGs owned some fields, but much more had to be rented from from the peasants.3Rural agricultural land therefore became a domain of conflicting interests involving the PGs, local authorities, and peasants, as well as the provincial and central governments. In a typical scenario, peasants were plunged into contractual situations with the PGs, irrespective of their willingness to do so. In cases where peasants resisted renting land to a PG, for example, the authorities often meddled in the matter, using their coercive bureaucratic power to force the peasants to make a contract anyway, for reasons to be elaborated below. Jombang and Kediri regencies are located at the central axis of East Java (see map).4 Except for some small hilly areas to the north of Kediri, they occupy plains and possess a relatively stable humid climate that is well suited for sugar cane plantations. Cane fields are scattered here and there, interrupted by wet and dry rice fields. Low elevation (Jombang, 130ft; Kediri, 178ft above sea level), the area receives heavy rainfall (150-250 mm monthly) from September through February/March; the months from March to August are dry (less than 150 mm). The killings took place during the wet season; the rivers were full of water and sometimes flooded; the corpses decomposed easily, creating 3This issue will be elaborated in section 2 below. 4Except when stated, all statistical data hereafter are taken from Djawa Timur Dalam Angka Tahun 1970 (Sensus dan Statistik Propinsi Djawa Timur, 1971), and Jawa Timur Dalam Angka Tahun 1971 (Kantor Sensus dan Statistik Propinsi Jawa Timur, 1972?, 2 vols.), scattered pages. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 125] === 103 a stench. Through the area flows the Brantas River, a relatively large river with an average width o f 100-150 meters and a depth of 1-5 meters. This river became infamous as the site for most of the slaughters and disposal o f the victims. Several little rivers also empty into the Brantas River. A look at the population of both areas will help in evaluating whether demographic pattern had any influence in economic competition over the scarce resources. Jombang had a population of 578,513 in 1955; 686,362 in 1961; 777,634 in 1969;s and 788,157 in 1970. Occupying an area of 1,159.501cm2, Jombang by the end of 1960s had a population density of 679/km2. Kediri had a total (regency and city) population of 926,783 in 1955;6 1,076,954 in 1961; 1,197,348 in 1969;7 1,217,052 in 1970. Occupying a total (regency and city) area of 1,026.61 km2, Kediri by the end of the 60s had population densities of 1,089/km2 (regency) and 2,639/km2 (city).* Kediri regency was divided into four 5Penduduk Djawa-Madura: Hasil Registrasi Penduduk (Population o f JavaMadura: Results o f Population Registration) 1969 (Jakarta: Bagian Penduduk dan Tenaga Kerdja, Biro Pusat Statistik, 1972), p.84-85. ''Penduduk Djawa-Madura, op.cit., p.79 for the city (kotamadya) and p.95 for the regency (kabupaten). *A note on all statistics: annual data was not available between 1955 and 1961, and between 1961 and 1969. Data on 1955 was based on a national census intended for general elections; data on 1961 was based on a (November 1) census. In 1969, the government compiled a national population registration, mainly also for the purpose of general elections in 1971. Regional data from East Java (1970) reveals a big gap in statistical calculation. Data taken in 1969 were calculated to make a projection of population in the previous years (based on average annual population growth of 2.38 percent). Jombang in this projection had over 50,000 than its real population in 1969, and Kediri over 20,000 than its population in the same year. I chose to leave the gaps between 1955-1969 unfilled rather than make an unsubstantiable projection. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 126] === kawedanan, subregencies (Papar, Kediri, Ngadiluwih, and Pare), which further divided into 19 kecamatan, districts, and finally into 344 villages. The city of Kediri itself was divided into three districts and 46 villages.9 There are no meaningful demographic data, such as a local census on the population or other statistics on social-economic conditions, for the period between 1961 and 1969. Survei Sosial dan Ekonomi Nasional (Susenas), or National Social and Economic Survey, a partial census conducted nationally with a smaller sampling than the regular population census, which covered the period from December 1963 to January 1964, did provide some helpful data on some aspects o f life in East Java, but it was no help for any analysis of local demographic changes in 1965-1966, for the statistics only provided some statistical calculations on the population (not taken from a census).10 The area is an old historical site, especially Kediri. Kediri was the capital city of Daha, a kingdom preceding the famous Majapahit kingdom of the 11th-13 th centuries A.D. Jombang and Kediri were aiso close to the capital of the Majapahit kingdom, which was located in today's district of Trowulan, less than twenty miles east o f Jombang, and forty miles east of Kediri; therefore, they are believed, at least by oral tradition, to have been under the influence of Majapahit's culture. In the history Java, Daha and Majapahit were known as strong kingdoms that were destroyed by outside powers. In the case of ^irektorat Jenderal Cipta Karya Departemen PUTL, Direktorat Tata Kota dan Tata Daerah, "Kota Kediri: Kompilasi Data," 1977, pp.l, 11, 23. 10"Survey Sosial Ekonomi Nasional Tahap Pertama (Desember 1963-Djanuari 1964): Sifat2 Demografi Penduduk Djawa-Madura," Pusat Penelitian dan Perkembangan Statistik, Biro Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, Laporan No.l; Laporan No.2 is o f some use for enriching cultural settings in this and next chapters. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 127] === 105 Majapahit, the new incoming Javanese Muslims (of the new Mataram kingdom in Central Java) defeated the Hindu Javanese o f Majapahit and drove their ruling families with some followers from the areas of (now) Trowulan, Jombang, and Kediri to the island of Bali. Reaching Kediri from the main road of Surabaya-Madiun one first arrives in Jombang. From this city, there are two main roads to Kediri: one goes by the district of Papar, the other by the district of Pare. The town of Pare, located between Jombang and Kediri, is the place where a team of graduate students from Harvard University and an anthropological linguist from Yale conducted important research in 1952-1954.11 Clifford Geertz, a member of the team, was later to become one of the most influential anthropologists of his generation. Two of his most appealing theories for students of Indonesia, drawn from his field research in Pare (called Mojokuto in his works), are the politik alircm ("political current"), and the trichotomy of worldviews and lifestyles that, he says, characterize the Javanese people--the priyayi, santri, and abangan. Although this study does not follow these theories, their main points are nevertheless helpful as points of departure toward a more comprehensive picture of the cultural landscape of Jombang and Kediri. In his politik aliran, Geertz argued that Indonesian political life was built on vertical lines of political affiliation; the society was divided into political "currents" that flow from above to the lowest levels in the villages. He developed this concept into two stages. First, aliran was defined as a worldview, consisting of three social groupings: "Foreword by Douglas Oliver in Alice G. Dewey, Peasant M arketing in Java (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962). This and other works from the Modjokuto Project became classics for modem students of Indonesia. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 128] === 106 abangan (the animistic aspect of Javanism), priyayi (a Hinduistic component), and santri (an Islamic aspect).12Later, he redefined his concept of aliran as two social movements containing certain core organizations: the santri (practicing Muslims) and the abangan and priyayi (nominal Muslims).13 Through aliran, conflicts between politically hostile parties in Jakarta flowed like a current down into the villages. Political divisions among villagers, therefore, followed patterns similar to those in national political circles. In his trichotomy of Javanese society (based on his study o f Pare), Geertz distinguished three groups with different worldviews and lifestyles. First were the priyayi, consisting mostly of bureaucrats and other state-affiliated employees and their families. They, he said, shared a secular orientation in their worldview and tended to affiliate with nationalist political parties. Second were the santri, a generic term for devout traditional Muslims; used by Geertz it referred to Javanese Muslims who mixed their religious practices with "local and indigenous" non-Islamic rituals. Members of this second group tended to affiliate with Islamic parties, particularly the Nahdlatul Ulama. The third category, abangan, characterized a part of Javanese society that displayed a secular orientation and lifestyle, and that was predominantly made up of commoners, the poor, and other marginal segments of the society; the abangan, said Geertz, derived their 12Clifford Geertz, The Religion o f Java (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960), p.6. I3Clifford Geertz, The Social History o f an Indonesian Town (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1965), p. 107. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 129] === 107 worldview from the pre-Islamic era.14 Clifford Geertz's conceptual propositions are much criticized, but they remain useful in describing key cultural variables in East Java, which became a theater of conflict just a decade after Geertz concluded his fieldwok.15 By the mid-1960s, Pare (and the Jombang-Kediri areas in general) was still largely an agricultural community, with its surrounding rice fields and cultural landscape not much changed from the 1950s. But due to its location on the busy road from Surabaya to the western parts of Java, the city o f Jombang had grown into a busy trading and transit post. Its strategic location made the city more open to outside influences; yet, at the same time, due to its livelier growth than Kediri, Jombang was more vulnerable to outside politicoeconomic influences. By contrast, Kediri was located in a more isolated position; it was fifteen miles north of the busy road line that links Jombang to Surabaya and Madiun in the western parts of East Java. Despite this, in addition to the existence of several large sugar plantations in the residency, Kediri also hosted the plants of PT Gudang Garam, Indonesia's largest clove (kretek) cigarette company. Clove cigarette production was one o f the biggest industries in the country. With tens of thousand workers, Kediri had its own dynamic economic life, despite its relative isolation. 14Clifford Geertz, Mojokuto: Religion in Java (Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Instutute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, June 1958), pp.208228. I5There are too many works to be mentioned here on the Clifford Geertz debates, and it is beyond this study to review them. For further discussion, see Dwight Y. King, Interest Groups and Political Linkage in Indonesia 1800-1965 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Special Report No. 20, 1982), esp. chapter II; Robert W. Hefner, "Islamizing Java? Religion and Politics in Rural East Java," Journal o f Asian Studies, 46 (1987), pp.533-554. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 130] === 108 2. Loji andpondok: initial encounters Economic and social relationships between sugar plantations and the pesantren have their roots early in this century and, in economic terms, reach back to the first half of the nineteenth century. As a result of the devastating Diponegoro War (or Java War) in 1825-1830, the Netherlands Indies Government applied a scheme called the "forced cultivation system" (cultuurstelsel).16 Under the scheme, the East Indies and Java in particular were exploited to pay off the losses that the Dutch had suffered in the war, primarily as a producer of agricultural products profitable on the world (European) market. The scheme officially started to operate in 1840, although it was introduced by Governor General van den Bosch in 1830 and technically was started in 1836;17 also, technically speaking, the scheme ended in 1870, although its legacy remains even today.18 Under the scheme, the Netherlands Indies government encouraged the development of extensive sugar plantations throughout Java, with some of them located in the Jombang and Kediri areas. At first, the government encouraged private Chinese companies to run the mills. But with an 8.19 percent annual increase in production, and 16CuItuurstelsel, a Dutch term, literally means "cultivation system." 17Fritjof Tichelman, The Social Evolution o f Indonesia: The Asiatic Mode o f Production and Its Legacy (The Hague: Martinus NijhofF, 1980), pp.l 13-115. ,gFor the introduction and consolidation of the Cultivation System, see R.E. Elson, Village Java Under the Cultivation System, 1830-1870 (Sydney: Asian Studies Association of Australia in association with Allen and Unwin, 1994, pp.42-45; on sugar plantation, see pp.52-63; on the decline and restructurization of sugar industry, pp. 140152. On the Cultivation System in an East Java (Pasuruan) residency, see Elson's classic work, Javanese Peasants and the Colonial Sugar Industry: Impact and Change in an East Java Residency, 1830-1940 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1984), esp. pp.31101. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 131] === 109 with more effective land management-the annual increase mostly resulted from an increase of only 0.65 percent in cane field—during the cultivation system, the government was tempted to establish its own mills or take over the mills owned by Chinese entrepreneurs.19 In 1870, with the end of the cultivation system, the Netherlands Indies government enacted an Agrarian Law. Some provisions of this law prohibited the sale of land to non native subjects, and some regulated the land not owned by the natives. The latter was allotted to Dutch individuals living in the Netherlands Indies or Dutch companies operating in the Netherlands Indies, with a lease o f 75 years; the land was called erjpacht,20 In 1918, the law was revised as Grondbuur Ordonantie (land lease law), applied for Java-Madura excluding Yogyakarta-Surakarta. Under provisions of this law, sugar plantations reserved the right to rent land, either voluntarily or by force, from the peasants for the period of 21.5 years.21 Each plantation possessed a parcel of erfpacht as the core area for planting cane and supplemented this with rented land. But since cane growing was a process that quickly drained land of its fertility, the land could not be planted with sugar all year round; after a cycle of planting, the land had to be planted with other fertility-healing types of crops. 19Dibyo Prabowo, PT. Perkebuncm X X (Persero) dalcan Perjalanan Waktu (Surabaya: Airlangga University Press, 1992), p.6. 20"Sejarah Perusahaan Perkebunan dan Perkembangan Organisasi Karyawan/Buruh di Perindustrian Gula" (History of plantations and development of workers' organization in sugar industry), typescript found in the files of PG Meritjan, no publication data. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 132] === 110 This meant that the number of peasants involved in the business of cane growing was twice the number occupying or owning the land planted in any one season. Provisions of the law also regulated that once every two years the plantation was required to return the rented land to the owner for one season for their own use. The provision resulted in a further arrangement called glebagcm in which the land was divided into three parts: twothirds was supposedly planted by the peasants and one-third used by the plantation. But since the one-year growth cycle of sugar is longer than that of rice, plantations tended to occupy two-thirds of the land much of the year anyway.22 Until the 1960s, all sugar plantations controlled the growing process of cane that was planted on their own land or rented land. All sugar plantations supplied their mills with sugar cane that had been harvested from their own fields or from the fields they rented from villagers. The rent did not always benefit the peasants, so they often did not voluntarily give up their land. But since the sugar industry was a crucial enterprise for central government and an important source of revenue dating back to the Dutch colonial era, it enjoyed maximum political protection and assistance. During its golden years, in 1930-1931 for instance, there were 179 sugar plantations occupying 196,592 hectares with an average production of 14.8 tons/ha; with an annual export of 3 million tons sugar, the Netherlands Indies was the world's second largest sugar producer after Cuba.23 The PGs, with the support of local administration, routinely decided which land could be 22Ibid., p.8. 23I b i d p.9. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 133] === Ill rented and planted. It was not uncommon for fields to be rented over the objections of the owners. Thus, land was a source of enduring tension. By the end of the Dutch colonial era in 1942 and during the Japanese occupation o f 1942-1945, there were eight sugar mills in Jombang and six in Kediri. During the revolution o f 1945-1949, two in Jombang and six in Kediri were deliberately destroyed by Indonesian guerilla troops and the Dutch army. After the revolution, the rest o f the factories managed to survive and continued to operate under Indonesian authority but still run mostly by Dutch officials and technicians; indeed, legally speaking, they were still owned by the Dutch companies. In 1957, however, the government of the Republic of Indonesia decided to confiscate and nationalize all Dutch companies, including these sugar factories. The government then designated them as Badan Usaha Milik Negara, stateowned enterprises or BUMNs, and placed them under the authority of the Ministry of Agriculture. Within the ministry, they were placed under administration of the Directorate General o f Plantations, under which they were supervised by a special directorate in charge of state-owned plantations. Under this complicated scheme, in 1963 the plantations managed their own administrations as Perusahaan Perkebunan Negara XXI-XX3I (PPN XXI-XXH), or state run companies—later changed to Perusahaan Negara Perkebunan (PNP). Inside a PG, the structure of authority was as fixed as in any other "modem" company.24 At the apex was the administrator (administrator), later (starting in 1957 with 24The structure explained here was applied in 1964-1966; several changes have been made since then, although basically the same structure of power exists. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 134] === 112 the nationalization of sugar plantations) called the direktur (director). Under him were three department heads. The chef aanplant (CA), or plantation chief, was in charge of the fields and the plantation in general; the fabricatie chef (FC), or milling chief, was in charge of running the mills; and book houder (more popularly known as begower), or bookkeeper, was in charge of the plantation's financial and administrative affairs. The plantation chief also took the role of vice director. Under these three managers were several section heads, who in turn were in charge of the "staff." The staff was further divided into three slightly different layers and categories. Altogether, they comprised about 50-100 workers. They lived in a fenced, separate, guarded, and exclusive neighborhood called the loji, or kongsi, or rumah kong (the house of kong). The loji was surrounded by clusters of neigborhoods with some houses provided by the management for its second-class staff (not all of whom received housing, however). Beyond these areas lay additional residential clusters where semiskilled and unskilled workers lived. Their numbers reached to the tens of thousands. They were divided into those who worked in permanent jobs throughout the year and those who worked only during the harvesting season. The latter type of worker was called kampcmye\ among other tasks, his work included manual labor such as loading harvesting, loading and unloading canes, and all other non-technical jobs relating to the milling proccess.25 Seeding and planting sugar cane also required large numbers of kampanye, the number tripling during the harvest. This meant that the plantation had to employ some workers from one village or subdistrict (kecamatan) in other villages or subdistricts during 2SDibyo Prabowo, op.cit., pp. 161-162. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 135] === 113 the harvest season. Cutting cane, and loading it onto the lori (flatcar train), and taking it to the mill was an arduous and low-paying job—factors that made it not interesting to those who owned enough land to survive on their own. For this reason, it was often impossible for the management to hire "voluntary" labor without some cooperation from local authorities, particularly the subdistrict chief (camat) and village head (lurah). The authorities were needed to apply their coercive power to recruit labor. Hiring labor from an outside area was costly and inefficient. Local authorities and the management, therefore, developed mutual, structural relationships to benefit each other; the former received food rations in the form of monthly free sugar and rice, in addition to cash, in return for its assistance in land lease and labor recruitment. In the realm of political power, the management of the plantation in the colonial setting had direct access to the central government. This is understandable since a plantation always required a huge capital investment and had a strategic economic position not only for the central (colonial) government but also for the metropolitan country, the Netherlands. Indeed, since the introduction of the Cultivation System, the contribution to all forms of state revenues of the colonial sugar industry was always highest.26 To protect the state's interests, the central government provided the loji not only with formal authority but also with an enforcement apparatus. Until the end of the 1960s, for example, 26Scattered data (sugar and other world agricultural commodities) can be found in Sartono Kartodirdjo and Djoko Suryo, Sejarah Perkebunan di Indonesia: kajian sosialekonomi (Yogyakarta: Aditya Media, 1991), esp. pp. 107-117. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 136] === 114 waker,27 or plantation guards, were still allowed to carry guns and rifles.28 With their direct access to the central government, plantation authorities enjoyed real power; local (administrative) officials could barely touch them. During colonial times, therefore, local politics reflected the fact that the management of a plantation was a direct representation o f the powerful (Dutch) central government. Oral tradition said that there were cases when a plantation director actually shot a peasant because the latter did not bow low enough when the boss passed by.29 The director and all first-level staff lived in the plantation compound, or loji. Inside the loji, senior staffs and their families retained their own social structure, completely different from the one outside, just over the fence. Thus, a loji was a socio-cultural enclave. Prior to independence, the loji was totally a Dutch community. The employees were Dutch, with a small minority of educated Javanese. They were mostly Christian—or, in the case of Javanese employees, at least secular [abangan] in nature—which marked a complete separation from the surrounding communities. In the 1950s, up to 1957, the number of Dutch employees decreased. And after the nationalization of foreign companies in 1957, the majority of the employees became native Indonesians. 27From the Dutch term of wachter, guard. 28It should be noted, that except for military personnel, no one was permitted to have or carry a gun. interview, Yusuf Hasyim. He quoted the story in Bumi Manusia, a novel by Pramoedya Ananta Toer (Jakarta: Hasta Mitra, 1979) as a vivid example of the relationships between the administrators of the PGs and the surrounding peasants. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 137] === 115 Even so, the loji retained its previous characteristics. The senior staffs of the plantation, highly educated by local standards, were still considered Christians, or nominal, not devout Muslims; they gave a secular flavor to the life of the loji. With material comfort and modem facilities, the Indonesian senior staffs living inside the loji tended to become a sort of apolitical local bourgeoisie since their interests were protected by the national authorities. The second-tier staff, semiskilled workers, were caught between the senior staff (managers) and the unskilled workers. Members of this layer identified themselves and their lifestyles with the senior staff but lived physically as well as "culturally" closer to the unskilled, non-staff workers. Without the economic advantages of the senior staff, semiskilled workers had no chance of moving upward; rarely, if ever, was a semiskilled worker promoted to a senior staff position. Their economic base, however, was well above subsistence and secure as long as they had no conflict with the senior staff, the people who lived in the loji. Members of this layer were the most politically active among plantation workers. They were educated enough to have contacts with the outside world of ideas; they had some leisure time to be active in politics; and politics provided some power that they could not get from the loji itself. Since the first introduction of the ideals of communism, these semiskilled workers had been attracted to them; they came to form a core element of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). Class struggle was obvious in the everyday life of the plantation. The capitalist system of the sugar industry seemed to validate marxist R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 138] === 116 tenets for the local setting. The plantation worker unions therefore provided a fertile ground for communist recruitment. The cane fields were red. The presence of sugar plantations in Jombang and Kediri for over a century attracted a continuing influx of people; the "sweetness" of the plantations, it was said, attracted ants from everywhere. They came to work in the sugar plantations or factories or to work in related private businesses such as small cafes or restaurants for plantation workers. They filled the peripheral roles at the outer rings, such as working as kampanye workers, or vendors selling cigarettes, food, etc. Thus, there was a sharp contrast between life inside and outside the loji. While the management provided lucrative benefits for many of its staff and workers, thousands more lived in hard conditions, a common feature of capitalist settings. The uncertain cash economy itself and the vulnerability of workers to fluctuations of prices on the world market all contributed to the infamous everyday lifestyle of unskilled workers. This was generally a "secular life," focusing on today's needs rather than tomorrow's, and on gambling, prostitution, and other distractions. Plantation workers tended to form frontier communities, based on loose social cohesion. Plantation communities, then, with their secular and frontier characteristics, stood apart from the surrounding society. The "special" character of loji society could be seen during buka giling (opening of a milling period) festivals. Usually lasting a week or so, these festivals featured a number of "secular rituals" such as various kinds of ludruk,30 gambling games, 30A very popular all-male play, always associated with the commoners. The theater was later, prior to 1965, to become politicized; see chapter IV. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 139] === 117 free provision of liquor, gambyong (a traditional dance considered very sensual), free movies shown in open fields, and so on. During the Dutch period, some ulema, or Islamic scholars, who believed that they must spread Islam to the areas considered least religious, targeted these wild, frontier-type communities for special attention. Some of them moved into the area themselves and later founded pondok pesantren (PP). Pondok pesantren, more commonly simply called pesantren, established typical structures. The life of the pesantren centered on five pillars: the mosque, the pondok (dormitory for students), kiyai (an ulama teaching at a pesantren), santri (students studying at a pesantren), and the teaching of classical books of Islam.31 Tebuireng and Lirboyo, two influential pesantrens located in Jombang and Kediri respectively, illustrate the pattern of local pesantren history. Oral traditions among santris of Tebuireng say that when PG Tjoekir was established in 1884 by N.V. Kooy & Coster van Voorhout,32 the surrounding area became a frontier-type community.33 Hasyim Asy'ari, a young ulama, came to the adjacent place, Tebuireng—located just across the road from PG Tjoekir—and was determined to assume a 3,Zamakhsyari Dhofier, Tradisi Pesantren: Studi Tentang Pandangan Hidup Kiyai (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1982), p.44; also see, Mustofa Syarif, Administrasi Pesantren (Jakarta: 32Djasmin, Noer Soetomo, Harun Mustapa, "Data-data Tanaman Dari Tahun Tebang 1937 s/d 1941, 1954 s/d 1974 PG2/PTP.XXI-XXII (Persero)," typescript, internal report, Surabaya, 1974, Table III. In 1957 PG Tjoekir was taken over by NV Cultuur Maatschapij "Tjoekir." 33A comprehensive history of Tebuireng, in vernacular, is Heru Soekadri, Kiyai Haji Hasyim Asy’ari (Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, Pusat Penelitian Sejarah dan Budaya, Proyek Inventarisasi dan Dokumentasi Sejarah Nasional, 1979/1980). R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 140] === 118 mission civilisatrice through tabligh, or preaching; he started to build his house, the mosque, and the pondok, or dormitory in 1899, and received official recognition from the Dutch colonial government in 1906, two decades after the establishment of PG Tjoekir.34 He succeeded in overcoming threats from local criminals, and his physical prowess soon attracted many santris to study Islam under his guidance. For decades he built a reputation as a respected teacher of Islam and shifted his source of power from physical prowess to knowledge of Islam. His reputation resulted in a growing pondok pesantren. In 1924, to counter the emergence of modernist Muslims, he founded together with other ulama from several pesantrens in Jombang the Nahdlatul Ulama, or the Resurgence of the Ulama, later to become one of Indonesia's four largest political parties in the 1950s. His oldest son, Wachid Hasjim, was appointed as the first cabinet minister for religious affairs in the new Republic of Indonesia.35 Pesantren Lirboyo followed pattern similar to Tebuireng.36 Lirboyo was founded by Kiyai Abdul Karim in 1910, who had studied under Kiyai Cholil of Bangkalan, Madura. But Mahrus Aly, Abdul Karim's son-in-law, who replaced Karim as leader of the pesantren, was considered the real kiyai of the pesantren, or "Kiyai Lirboyo." A typical 340ral tradition, recorded in Team PDP, "Tebuireng dari Masa ke Masa," typescript, official publication of Pesantren Tebuireng (Jombang: Pondok Pesantren 33Wachid Hasyim died in a car accident in 1953, leaving a vacuum of leadership in Tebuireng. See Aboebakar, Sejarah Hidup K.H.A. Wahid Hasyim dan Karangan Tersiar (Jakarta: PanitiaBuku Peringatan Aim. K.H.A. Wahid Hasyim, 1957), p. 820ff. 36Data taken from 3 Tokoh Lirboyo: KH. Abdul Karim, KH. Marzuqi Dahlan, KH. Mahrus Aly (Kediri: BPK-P2L, 1995 edition). R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 141] === 119 santri, Aly was from Cirebon, a border area between Central and West Java that traditionally maintained intellectual and genealogy lines with pesantrens in East Java. He studied in several pesantrens, including Tebuireng. Under Aly's leadership, Lirboyo grew into a large pesantren and hosted strong, later radical, young santris who assumed leading roles in crushing the PKI after the Gestapu Affair. Lirboyo presented a direct moral (and physical) challenge to the "frontier culture" of PG Pesantren (Baru), which was founded by NV Javasche Cultuur Mij in 1912.37 The year seemed inconsistent with the existing pattern, but PG Pesantren was prepared years before starting its operation. The name PG Pesantren was taken from the name of the area, which was unofficially named because of the presence of Pesantren Lirboyo and other small pesantrens in the surrounding areas. In this cultural confrontation, Lirboyo was "helped" by another pesantren, Al-Falah (Ploso), which was founded in 1925.38 Thus, it was not a coincidence that near every major plantation there came to be a pesantren. Other supporting evidence included PG Jombang Baru, which was built in 1895 by Anemaat & Co (taken over by NV Perusahaan Perkebunan Djombang Baru in 1957), whereas PP Denanyar was founded in 1917, and PP Bahrul Ulum in Tambak Beras, another PP adjacent to PG Jombang Baru, was founded in 1938.39 In Kediri, PG Meritjan 37Djasmin, et.al. loc.cit. PG Pesantren was expanded and rename as PG Pesantren Baru (the New Pesantren) in 1949. 383 Tokoh Lirboyo, op.cit. 39Data complied from Djasmin, Noer Soetomo, Harun Mustapa, "Data2 Tanaman Dari Tahun Tebang 1937 s/d 1941, 1954 s/d 1974 PG2/PTP.XXI-XXII (Persero)," typescript, internal report, Surabaya, 1974, Tabel III and scattered pages. Data for pesantren are from Team Memory Panitia Akhir Study Siswa Tsanawiyah Tebuireng, R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 142] === 120 was built and owned in 1903 by Nationale Industrie en Landbouw Mij NV, with some small pesantrens located nearby. PG Ngadirejo, also in Kediri, was built in 1912 by NV Handels Vereeniging 'Amsterdam' in the area where PG Pesantren was built.40 It should be noted that all these pesantrens established intellectual and familial genealogy. There was no single pesantren without any link to another. Santri, or pupil or a kiyai, roamed from one pesantren to another to study under different kiyais. The term santri is widely used for a different conception. In its generic sense, a santri is a devout Muslim. But in a pesantren, the term refers only to a pupil. A teacher, or a kiyai, is never called a santri. Oral traditions conveyed several characteristics inherent in the development of a pesantren. First, there were elements of asceticism, perseverance, hard struggle, and humility in the founding of a pesantren. Second, there was a long line of genealogy, intellectually or biologically, among the pesantren leaders and founders, the kiyai. A common pattern was that a santri went to study under a known kiyai. After he finished his study, he moved to another pesantren and studied under another kiyai. The proccess could go on for decades, until the santri was considered by his kiyai (or himself), to have enough knowledge and ability to open his own (new) pesantren, or to inherit an old one. One striking element in oral histories of the pesantren is the presence of physical prowess as a supporting ingredient of success for the aspiring kiyai. This prowess was Madrasah Salajiyah Syafi'iyah Tingkat Tsanawiyah Pondok Pesantren Tebuireng: Memory (Jombang: Team Memory, 1991); Abdurrahman Wahid, Kiai Bisri Syansuri: Pecinta Fiqh Sepanjang Hayat (Jakarta: Amanah, 1989); 3 Tokoh Lirboyo: KH Abdul Karim, KH Marzuqi Dahlan, KH Mahrus Aly (Kediri: BPK-P2L, 1995 edition) R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 143] === 121 believed to be derived from their mastery of Islamic sufism and devotion to their teachers, the kiyais. It was believed that only Allah had control over someone's life. The santri in the pesantren measured the degree of someone's total submission to Allah by his ability to resist or repel physical threats, such as stabbings. (It was a common practice in the pesantren that santris played soccer games using a fireball made of coconut shell.) Someone would not be called a kiyai, or would not lead a pesantren, if he was not known as having some sort of supernatural power, ranging from clairvoyance to the traditional martial arts known as silal.*1Ultimately both physical and spiritual power was embodied in the hierarchy of authority inside the pesantren. In the words of a kiyai, "This is dictatorship being applied here. There should be no democracy. If we don't have absolute control over the students, we don't deserve to run pondok pesantren."42 In its relation with the plantations, a pesantren was at first placed in a weak position. The loji enjoyed protection from the Dutch colonial government; by contrast, the 4ITwo known examples are Kiyai (Gus) Maksum of Lirboyo, and Kiyai Abdul Latief of Kedunglo. In his 70s, Gus Maksum has a baby face and physical appearance several decades younger than his age; his long hair was believed to be the source of his prowess. Gus Maksum, who was believed to be invulnerable to bullets and knives, and has the ability to see the unforeseen, was one among a handful leaders of santri crushing the PKIs during the post-Gestapu Affair; see chapter V. Kiyai Abdul Latief of later generation boasted that when he took over the leadership of Kedunglo—a famous center of Shalawat Wahidiyah, a sufi school—he had to fight his contenders through supernatural fights; the fight resulted in broken legs and destroyed a bathroom, with no one touching another. "If we can't win the fight, we don't deserve to lead, let alone teach the santris," he confessed. Interviews. 42KH Abdul Latief of PP Kedunglo; interview. He added that one of the most respected aspects of kiyai-ness was the ability to control supernatural forces, as shown in overwhelming physical prowess—in fighting, for example. This ability was believed to be derived from the kiyai's closeness to Allah. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 144] === 122 pesantrens were always considered to be the centers of cultural resistance to the Dutch, as indeed they considered themselves to be. In general terms, the ulama, leaders o f the pesantrens, were subordinate to the political power of the loji. But the situation changed when the Republic of Indonesia was proclaimed. Suddenly, some ulama from the pesantrens became national leaders. K.H. Wachid Hasjim of Pesantren Tebuireng, Jombang—located just across the street from P.G. Tjoekir—was the first cabinet minister of religious affairs. Now the loji were obliged to respect its immediate orbit, the pesantren. Local authorities, who used to respect the loji (with some benefit in return), now had also to pay more respect to the pesantrens and the "kaum sarungan," or sarong people, meaning a kiyai and his students. Due to the religious flavor of their lives, the "kaum sarungan" were also associated with the color white, so the other generic term for them was "kaum putihan," or the whitish people. The pesantren, with the kiyai and his students, were regarded before by the local authorities as only a cultural enclave, not a political entity. The shifting balance of power made the local authorities prefer to stay away from the pesantren’s affairs. Entering the 1960s, the foundations of both the plantation and pesantren—and their relationship-had long since been Iain and one thing is clear: the social rifts between the two communities remained strong. The workers, drained by harsh conditions in the factories, were not only attached to the modem world economically but were socially closer to its secular world as well. By contrast, the elan of religious mission civilisatrice through labligh, or active preaching, had been constantly reinforced in the pesantrens by R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 145] === 123 generations of santris. To them, the loji became a symbol of an unholy way of life in contrast to their spiritual values. This occurred against the backdrop of the political tug of war between the plantations, pesantrens, and local authorities and the relationship of all three with the regional power in Surabaya and central powers in Jakarta. 3. Cooperation and confrontation In the 1950s, Jombang and Kediri hosted four distinctive clusters o f communities. First came the loji, with its contained, secluded, exclusive neighborhood. In terms of numbers this community was small, yet it enjoyed maximum political protection. Economic privilege and abundance made the community relatively apolitical. Although most of them tended to affiliate themselves with the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), they kept apart from overt local political activities. Even the most politically inclined directors, such as Kartawidjaja of PG Ngadirejo, kept their distance from local political activities.43 A few became political patrons of Kesatuan Buruh Gula (KBG) or the Sugar Workers Association, a PNI affiliate. This largely apolitical attitude made for a roomier political arena for members of the second cluster of community, the plantation workers. The loji retained feudalistic, with strong patron-client relationships linking senior staff and workers and local non-plantation communities, along with a distinctive cosmopolitian, secular culture. The loji not only had direct economic ties to plantation workers but served as their cultural patron as well. This explains why political 43Pipit Rochijat in an interview with Ben Abel, "Pipit Rochijat Tentang Pembunuhan Massal-65 (2)" in KdpNet, 22 Oct 1996. Kartawidjaja was Pipit's father. On this person and his allegedly political actions, see chapter IV.3. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 146] === 124 confrontations did not occur between members of the loji and members of the second cluster, even though the communities represented two potentially antagonistic socio economic classes from a marxist perspective. Therefore, class struggle against the supposedly oppressive bourgeoisie, the loji, as urged by the PKI, failed as a campaign theme for plantation workers. PKI's national campaign against the kapitalis birokrat (kabir) did not result in class conflict between the loji and plantation workers; instead, conflict erupted horizontally within the same economic classes, as will be shown below. The second cluster—from now on, the cluster of loji employees—of the plantation community consisted of two separate economic and social layers. The first included members of the second-class staff; the second was made up of common, non-staff workers. Economically, they were separate entities, but socially and politically they shared similar views. These loji employees were politically active, consolidating themselves into "leftist" workers union of Serikat Buruh Gula (SBG), or the Sugar Workers Union. While some loji employees affiliated themselves with the nationalist union workers (KBG), which often caused them to be called "opportunists" by SBG members, they mostly affiliated themselves with PKI. Some members of the second layer of the loji employees, such as kampanye workers, were also members of the fourth cluster, consisting of the peasantry. Abetted by the relatively apolitical attitudes of the loji, political activists from the loji employees were able to expand their influence outside the plantations and reach into the peasantry. An ex-member of the PKI recalled: I was a loji employee at PG Ngadirejo. PKI attracts me because the party sided with the poor. Many of my worker friends joined the party, so I just followed them. In the village R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 147] === 125 o f Branggahan, I became secretary of the Pemuda Rakyat. I was involved in rural campaigns against the landlords.44 Confrontations occured between loji employees as members o f this cluster with members of the similar economic class. In other words, conflicts occured horizontally instead of vertically. The pesantren was the core of the third community cluster. As a strong Islamic cultural enclave, the pesantren possessed its own distinctive features which were completely in contrast to the frontier characteristics of the second cluster. Like the loji, the pesantren kept its distance from local politics and especially from loji affairs. However, Islam was a world religion, with a weltanschaung reaching far beyond local politics. On the national stage, the pesantren played a significant role, resulting in high social and political status of their leaders in the local theater of power. Living in a secluded, often fenced compound, highly segregated from its physical surrounding, the kiyais enjoyed relative economic abundance, mainly from the land that they themselves or the pesantren controlled. The kiyai took a role as "cultural broker," linking the small world of his pesantren and the outer world.45 The kiyai controlled the processes of parochialization of universal values into the pesantren world and the universalization of local values into the outside world.46 “ Karjan, secretary of the Pemuda Rakyat in the village of Branggahan, Ngadiluwih, in 1965. Interview. 45A term coined by Eric Wolf and used by Clifford Geertz in "The Javanese Kijaji: the Changing Role of a Cultural Broker," Comparative Studies on Society and History, vol. 2, 1959-1960, p.229. *lhid., p.228. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 148] === 126 The santris, or students of the pesantren, enjoyed spiritual as well as political protection from their kiyais. Most of these santris came from other areas, as distant as Kalimantan and Sumatra. In daily activities, these santris spent most of their time studying in the pesantren compound. As an all-male institution, games considered "macho," such as soccer using fireball and the traditional martial arts called pencak silat were common.47 The santris defended the interests of the kiyais through a form of total devotion called tawadu' or taqlid. The authority of the kiyai was beyond question, and the santris devoted their lives to him.48 All pesantrens in Jombang and Kediri, except one, were NU strongholds. Although existing in a separate complex (like the loji), in an "immediate orbit" of the plantation, as a religious educational institution the pesantren had considerably influence over the surrounding population, a few of whom were plantation workers but most of whom were non-plantation peasantry. Many males spent at least a short time during their youth studying at the pesantren. These people constituted the fourth cluster, the "countiyside." They sought spiritual guidance from the pesantren and, at the same time, shared some economic entanglements with the plantations either as kampanye workers or as land owners. Parallel with their spiritual affiliations, they tended to be followers of NU and Masyumi. A few members of the countryside cluster were politically 47There is a few and insignificant all-female pesantrens; one of the largest was Seblak, run by Nyai Choiriyah, the daughter of Hasyim Asy'ari of Tebuireng. 48Subchapter IV.3 describes the santri's reactions when the land owned by their kiyais became the main target for PKI's unilateral actions during the landreform in the first half of 1960s. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 149] === 127 active in either NU or Masyumi, but mcst were relatively inactive although certainly not apolitical.49 These four worlds were linked in interactive economic arrangements. To run the plantations, the loji needed the semiskilled workers as loji employees and a great number of workers from the second world, as well as some kampanye workers from the countryside world. The loji employees, in turn, enjoyed social and economic benefits from the loji in its confrontations with the pesantren in the immediate orbit and with the countryside world. Similar relationships existed between the immediate orbit and the countryside. Members of the countryside world took shelter under the umbrella of the pesantren while seeking economic benefits from the plantations. In other realms of life, however, the two worlds—the loji employees and the countryside—were in direct and dangerous confrontation. Cultural orientation and social behavior became markers of group identity, and political rivalries became embedded in cultural divisions. While not a fixed pattern, it was generally true that each of the four clusters described above employed a different pattern of personal names. Rarely, for example, did members of the loji use names commonly used by lower (kromo or wong cilik, or "little people") levels of Javanese society—such as Radji, Mingan, Saman, Poniman, and Tukimin for males and Cikrak, Parmi, Ngalinem, and Paiyem for females.50Members of the loji would prefer the use of names such as Soejoso Wedyohardjono, Kodrat Soepeno, 49Clifford Geertz, Modjokuto: Religion in Java, op.cit., pp.292-320. 50See Appendices B-D for these male names. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 150] === 128 Haijoso, Gatot Soeprapto Satrodiwiijo, and Soenardi.51 Also both the loji and the loji employee clusters rarely used Arabic names, which was a common practice in pesantren circles and among some members of the fourth (countryside) cluster. Together with this distinction were certain "cultural" preferences such as in arts and stage performances. Z,wc//i/£—considered as a "not fine culture" by members of the loji and pesantren worlds—was one example, and gambling was another. For the loji employees and peasantry, Iudruk was a popular stage show. But when the PKI began using it for political confrontation, such as by staging a story considered offensive by the santris, ludruk came to be more associated with the loji employee culture rather than the countryside culture. Due to low wages, gambling was not a daily event, but it did take place when there were festive gatherings such as ludruk performances and (mostly) night fairs. In the years approaching 1965, moral issues became highly politicized; interestingly, both sides used them to show the other side's decadence. The four social clusters functioned collectively as a foundation supporting a local political superstructure. On the surface, political confrontations took the form of party rivalry, which reached a peak in the general elections of 1955. In Jombang, the PKI garnered 47,684 or 13.5 percent of the votes; NU 130,552 or 37.1 percent; Masyumi 25,253 or 7.2 percent; and PNI 98,035 or 27.9 percent. In the regency of Kediri, PKI garnered 143,789 or 31.2 percent of the votes; NU 92,551 or 20 percent; Masyumi 52,400 or 11.3 percent; PNI 90,766 or 19.6 percent. In the city of Kediri, PKI secured 23,252 or 32.1 percent of the votes; NU 11,803 or 16.3 percent; Masyumi 4,521 or 6.2 51See Appendix A. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 151] === 129 percent; and PNI 14,998 or 20.7 percent.52 For members of the local assembly, these numbers meant fifteen seats for PKI, six seats for NU, six seats for PNI, five seats for Masyumi, and one seat each for PSH (Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, or the Indonesian Islamic Association Party), Partai Katholik Indonesia or the Indonesian Catholic Party, and Partai Kristen Indonesia or the Indonesian Christian Party.53 The PKI's electoral success was so impressive that its strength came to be exaggerated.54 On the whole, these numbers show that, at least on the surface, Jombang and Kediri in the 1950s were fragmented into four political affiliations. This fragmentation reflected the social and economic cleavages of the local four socio-economic clusters and the confrontations among them. The banning of Masyumi in 1960 left the fragmented community with two dominant competing parties, PKI and NU, with the smaller PNI caught in the middle.55 On national scale, Kediri was the one of five residencies where PKI was the strongest party—the others were Semarang, Yogyakarta, Surakarta, and Madiun—in all of 52Calculated from raw numbers in Alfian, Hasil Pemilihan Umum 1955 untuk Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat (D.P.R.) (Jakarta: Leknas [Lembaga Ekonomi dan 53Data on seats from Syafii Soleiman; interviews. No written data available, but his information was reliable; he himself was member of local asembly and his personal notes on the votes are almost the same as numbers recorded in the above official source. 54Kiyai (Gus) Maksum of PP Lirboyo, Kediri, for instance, gave an exaggerated estimate of 10 to 1 in comparing the strength of PKI to NU. Interview. 55More in Robert Cribb and Colin Brown, Modem Indonesia: A history since 1945 (London and New York: Longman, 1995), pp.88-96. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 152] === 130 which the PNI was the second strongest party.56 Speculating on the nature of relationships between the parties at the time, Herbert Feith argued: All these are strongly abangan areas. What are the special social features of these areas and what relationships obtained there between the two abangan parties PNI and PKI? One hypothesis is that Communist strength was greatest in areas of extreme poverty, agricultural depression and population pressure.... Another interpretation stresses not poverty but detraditionalization. Its propounders point on the one hand to the decline in communal land ownership, to landlessness and increasing economic differentiation in the villages, and on the other hand to the ravages of the Japanese occupation and particularly of the Revolution, which not only wrought severe material and economic disruption and social dislocation but also created a large group of unaccommodated youths uprooted from village life and not fitted to find employment outside it. The result of all this, it is argued, has been to sharpen the class struggle in the village and provide political leaders for the poor peasants and landless laborers.57 The success of the PKI was a logical result of its efforts since 1952. The party's activities were concentrated on the proletariat in cities and towns and on plantations, on youth and veterans' groups. In addition, the PKI had made a new start with its work among the peasants, which had largely stopped after its crushing defeat in the Madiun revolt in 1948.58 An ex-PKI activist recalled, "we were told, that if PKI wins, the people will be welfare, there will be no gaps between the rich and the poor, for the state will take 56Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections o f1955 (Ithaca, New York: Modem Indonesia Project, Cornell University, Interim Reports Series, 1957), p.84-85. Feith's data differs from the above data presented by Alfian because Feith calculated per residency (karesidenan) instead of regency (kabupaten), with rough calculation (in 1000’s). Although his notes warn that his data were compiled from unofficial press reports and contained considerable inaccuracies, which was true for data on the regency level, the pattern of votes he postulates is similar to that in the city, Kopra (Kotapradja) Kediri, for which there is more convincing data. 57Herbert Feith, ibid., p.84. 58Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections o f 1955 (Ithaca, New York: Modem Indonesia Project, Cornell University, Interim Reports Series, 1957), p.9. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 153] === 131 care o f the lives of the people."59 By contrast, NU gained votes well above their expectations, considering the fact that the party had just split from Masyumi.60 Both parties utilized their youth wings to take aggressive action in inter-party confrontations. The PKI's youth wing was Pemuda Rakyat; NLTs was Pemuda Ansor, also popularly known as Banser (Barisan Serba Guna, or all-purpose front); and Masyumi was PII (Pemuda/Pelajar Islam Indonesia). In this period of political radicalization and polarization each party felt compelled to maximize its potential to the utmost, leading both to rhetorical extremism and physical confrontation. 59Poniran, Pemuda Rakyat activist in Bendoagung, Kampak, Trenggalek; interview. “ Syafii Soleiman, NU chairman in Kediri, admitted that they were surprised by the results of the elections. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 154] === CHAPTER IV MOTHERLAND IS PREGNANT: FROM CULTURAL CONFRONTATIONS TO VIOLENT POLITICAL CONFLICTS 1. Economic and cultural settings Entering the 1960s, sugar production was declining sharply. In 1959, domestic production was 849,479 tons, which decreased to 671,686 tons in 1960, 639,000 tons in 1961, and 584,000 tons in 1962. Even the increasing production in 1963 and 1964, with roughly equal figures of 650,000 tons for each year, and 750,000 tons in 1965 could not achieve the production figure of 1959.1This overall decrease resulted in dramatic pressure on the plantation, especially its management. Sixty-five sugar plantations, thirty three of which were located in East Java, contributed to these production figures, each controlling an average o f 40,000 hectares.2 In the Jombang-Kediri area, the management of the plantations (PPN XXI-XXH but excluding some plantations under the same management located outside the area) controlled only half the amount of land needed to supply cane; half of the supply (the lower grades) had to be bought from peasants. These plantations were pressured by the central authorities (minister of agriculture) to perform better to increase their productivity in order to meet national targets.3 This mediocre performance made the issue of sugar 'Calculated from data in HR 11-14-62; HR 08-07-65. 2HU 07-31-65 3General information and pattern drawn from detailed technical report in Djasmin, Noer Soetomo, Harun Mustapa, "Data2 Tanaman Dari Tahun Tebang 1937 s/d 1941, 1954 s/d 1974 PG2/PTP.XXI-XXII (Persero)," internal report, typescript, 1974. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 155] === 133 production very political. It developed into a heated topic throughout the first half of the 1960s, especially given the fact that many non-plantation factors—labor supply, cane supply and land acquisition, to name a few-played such a decisive role in a PG’s overall performance. Technical and natural cause as well as managerial one were cited for the decreasing production.4 In PG Meritjan, for example, flood and scarcity of rental land as well as other technical constraints were cited as the main causes for the decline in production.5For the PKI, the loji, with its relatively apolitical stance, was an easy target for placing blame. It was also possible to blame a higher level of management (the central management headquartered in Surabaya) although this was dangerous because many senior management positions (in Surabaya) were occupied by retired army officers who indeed did not possess managerial and technical skills.6 In fact, aside from technical causes, social and political factors contributed to the decline in production. At least four are relevant: (1) disputes over land lease contracts; (2) the supply of cane grown by peasants—popularly known as "people's cane";7 (3) the labor 4This was so ridiculous that even rats became scapegoats for falling production, although rats do not eat cane. See HR 08-07-65. internal report from PG Meritjan, signed on 23 July 1960, to the upper management of PPN XXI-XXH in Surabaya. 6HR 12-26-62 7From 1958 to 1960, PG Meritjan, for example, relied heavily on cane supply from this tebu rakyat, or "people's cane" that peasant grew by themselves and sold the harvested canes to the PG. But decreasing benefit from growing canes was expected to lower production that in the long run the plantation should grew more its own canes. An internal report from Adnan Thohier to the upper management in Surabaya: Rubriek K/Tan. No.6 R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 156] === 134 supply of kampanye or temporary workers, especially during the harvesting and milling seasons; and (4) political conflicts over membership in worker unions.® Forced now to deal with more social and political factors than in the previous decade, the loji incrementally lost its previous strength as a social and economic-political institution and became more vulnerable to outside pressures. It still maintained its relatively apolitical position and in general stayed out of politics; nevertheless, it had now to deal with non technical production factors never encountered before. Continuing decades of practice in supplementing its own fields with land rented from local landholders (mostly small landowners), the plantation now possessed less capital then before to negotiate for land leases. At the same time, national production targets forced the loji to acquire a certain land allotment, which was getting harder to acquire. To guarantee land to the sugar sector and regulate land leases, the government issued the land lease law in I960.9 Under provisions of this law, the plantation was guaranteed access to land, if necessary through the coercive force of local authorities. But the law also mandated a mediation process in cases when there was a dispute between the plantation and the landowner. Despite the issuance of this law, several conflicts were unavoidable, and forced contracts were common.10 Related to this problem was the loji's need for kampanye DDO 23/760. Company's document. ®Elaborated from HR 11-14-62 ^ndang-undang (UU) No.3 Prp 1960. l0HR 11-12-62 R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 157] === 135 workers during the harvesting season. The pattern o f acquiring workers remained similar to previous decades, with close cooperation between the loji and local authorities in coercing employment. Such were some of the burdens that the loji had to bear. In addition to technical skills, the director was therefore required to possess political capabilities. In the term of the times, they had to be mcmipolis.n But whereas in other areas there were demands to replace the directors of a plantation, there were only two such cases in Jombang-Kediri. One was a proposal by BTI, submitted in Jakarta, pressing the government to appoint the acting director o f PG Pesantren as permanent director. One reason cited for this proposal was that he was "revolutionary."12 Another was when 500 members of KBG (nationalist workers union affiliated with PNI), Sarbumusi (Muslim workers union affiliated with NU), and SBG (communist workers union affiliated with PKI) demanded that Kartawidjaja, director of PG Ngadiredjo, be discharged and Djokosudibjo, the former director, be reinstalled in his place.13 In general, however, the loji remained mostly intact, isolated, apolitical, and aloof from local politics. PKI's national strategy to place workers’ representatives in the Dewan “ Statement of a high ranking official of BPU PN Gula, central board of PG's management; SP 08-04-65. The term, manipolis, was one of so many political jargons of the time. The term derived from political manifesto, Sukarno's political agenda. In short, a manipolis should be revolutionary and politically conscious, rendered as taking sides with the proletariat instead of the capitalist. nHR 12-20-63. This director later, in post Gestapu, was allegedly taken by the military and never seen back. See chapter V. Interviews. 13HR 01-21-65; also "Pipit Rochijat tentang pembunuhan massal-65 (1)," an interview with Ben Abel, KdPNet, 22 Oct. 1996. Pipit Rochijat is Kartawidjaja's son. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 158] === 136 Perusahaan (DP), or company board, did gain some success in Jombang-Kediri. At least two representatives from the peasants (BTI) and the PKI’s workers (SBG union) occupied these titles.14But these representatives were still considered non-loji board members, although some o f them gained benefits such a promotion.15Another strategic failure was the effort to decentralize control over the sugar production process. The PKI demanded that decision making in production be decentralized to various levels, but the proposal was hindered because of the limited technical skills of the workers.16 The loji employees and part-time workers, by contrast to the senior staff, were now devoting more to political activities, despite the fact that their daily life was getting worse. Indeed, for most members, daily life was miserable; most if them lived in simple and indecent gedek, or houses made of bamboo.17 In 1960-1965 the inflation rate was so high, they couldn't even afford sugar. On average, living costs rose three to four times beyond people's regular salary.18By contrast, the general labor wage for half a day, from 14See, for instance, two names (#1 S. Kidjo and #7 Ramikir Prajitno) in Appendix 3, who were cited as members of DP (Dewan Perusahaan), or company's board. 15An example was Haryo, SBG representative in PG Ngadirejo under the directorship of Kartawidjaja; Haryo enjoyed the promotion from second class to first staff class, which was rare. See an illustrative description in Pipit Rochijat, an interview with Ben Abel, KdP Net, 25 Oct. 1996. 16Compiled from HR 11-26-62 and HR 12-27-62. l7Some informants referred to this condition. Ma'rufin, who was the chairman of Kediri Ansor recalled that he could only rent a small bamboo house. Interviews. ,8CalcuIated from data in HU 12-11-64. In January 1962, the price for sugar was Rp.7.50/kg, in February Rp. 12.50/kg, in August-September Rp.33.00/kg,[//7? 12-26-62; HR 07-23-63], Within half a year, the price rose to Rp. 130.00/kg, making it a hot political issue.[HR 08-28-63] In November 1964, it was Rp.220.00/kg, and by the end of that year R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 159] === 137 dawn till noon, was Rp. 10.00 plus breakfast, while the labor wage for cleaning out grass from the cane field was only Rp.7.50 without meal.19In Jombang, for the two year period of 1963-1965, prices for basic necessities such as food and clothing rose twofold.20 Even for the loji employees, rice was increasingly expensive and scarce. In early 1964, Kediri experienced a scarcity of rice stock, and the ration provided for private and state employees was distributed late. By the end of 1964, the bupati (regent) o f Kediri decided to supplement the rice ration with com, which was considered a second-class good compared to rice. The bupati also prohibited local food products from being sold outside the regency.21 Under these conditions, the appeal of communist ideas and slogans were greater, and the SBG recruited more followers. The frontier nature of this community remained as it had been in the previous decade.22 Economic poverty, however, did not prevent involvement in political activities even in activities that required economic resources such as cash contributions to the PKI's convention and a new it was Rp.260.00/kg. [//£/12-11-64] In mid-1965, the price was close to Rp.300.00/kg.[Calculated from data in H U 07-23-65], 19This was a comparative data from Sragen, an area near the Central-East Java “ Calculated from data in DP 09-27-65. 2lH U 0 1-20-64; HU Q1-27-64; HU 10-12-64 “ In November 1963, for instance, 13 prostitutes from Kediri were sent to a rehabilitation center in Situbondo, while there were many more still soliciting around the city. HU 11-22-63. R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 160] === 138 headquarters.23 An analysis of the amount they delivered as political contribution compared to the daily living cost shows that the percentage was enormous. The party successfully established its image as the party of the poor.24 The PKI and its SBG union, together with some members of the peasantry cluster, facilitated the spread of popular shows such as ludruk among this community.23 What was striking in these shows was the presence o f violent elements, especially one-on-one fights. Personal conflicts were prominent, and successes therein were even used as a measure of bravery, dignity, and "being somebody." Shows of physical strength and mental powers, such as telepathy demonstrations, were also common.26 With Lekra, the leftist cultural “ Scattered data can be found in HR. For BTI Congress in 1962, Ruslan from Kandat contributed Rp.200; Parto Sariman (Plemahan) Rp.75; BTI-SBG branch of PG Krebet Baru (Batulawang, Malang) Rp.100; HR 07-17-62. Other records showed that from Pare, contributions made by Kartodihardjo Rp.100, Septoadi Rp.100, Kasmiran Rp.100, Danuatmodjo Rp.150, Sopawiro Rp.150, Mangunsimun (unstated), Hardjodjamadi Rp.50, Darmodihardjo Rp.30, Panidjan Rp.40 [HR 07-20-62]. Next contribution came from SBG Tulangan Rp. 150 [HR 07-30-62]; Marimin and friends, (Kediri) Rp.60, SBG Djatiroto Rp.250 [HR 08-06-62]; Supardi Ngeklik (Pelem, Kediri) Rp. 100, Atmopawiro (Ringinbagus) Rp. 100 [HR 08-11-62], Contributions for building new PKI headquarters in Jakarta included from Munaris (Kediri) Rp.75 [HR 03-25-63], SBG Sarbupri Ngrakah (Kediri) Rp.30,000 [HR 04-08-64], SB Tulungredjo (Kediri) Rp.4,600, city of Kediri Rp. 12,470 [HR 06-03-64], and Sepda Tbg Jombang Rp.8,000 [HR 06-24-64], 24Karijan, interview. “ This to include other shows considered as native Kediri, such as reog jaran jowo, reog jaranan pego, jemblung, chadrog, jidor, templing, sandur, tiban, and some more popular shows such as shadow puppet, wayang orang, and wayang krucil.[/fl? 07-01-61] 26This characteristic was not a monopoly of the "secular clusters" but also common among the santri. On 1 June 1963, for example, there was a telepathy show in Setono Gedong, which in post-Gestapu affair was the "headquarters" of managing mass slaughter. HR 06-21-63 R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 161] === 139 association, inserting its political agenda into ludruk stories, these shows became an effective avenue for elevating individual propensities for violence into mass, collective actions. An exemplary ludruk story of the times was "Seven Devils." This rendered the national political agenda of the PKI in story from, marking seven groups of "people's enemies" supposedly based on marxian class analysis. For example, in "Seven Devils" an evil landlord used his bodyguards to seize a peasant's harvest.27 The landlord's son-in-law was a military officer so he could protect his interests. But the peasant's determination and bravery defeated the landlord and his bodyguards, making the ending a happy one for peasants.28 Theatrical troupes from Himpunan Seni Budaya Indonesia (HSBI), a leftist group, toured Kediri residency three times in 1963 staging this play.29 Such politically charged ludruk came to be associated with the secular life of many workers and some peasants, and detached itself from its more religious fans among the santri community inside the pesantren. Politicized ludruk also somewhat detached itself from the countryside cluster. Members of this cluster were divided into those who continued to enjoy ludruk and those who let this stage art slip away from their artistic interest. On the other hand, ludruk increasingly enjoyed a certain kind of "political protection" during fiestas for the loji employee cluster, such as during the opening or 27The term commonly used was lukcmg kepruk, literally means "the smasher"; it was a indeed a notorious term. 2tHR 08-02-64 19HU 12-30-63 R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 162] === 140 closing ceremony of a milling season.30 In other words, as cultural confrontation escalated into violent political conflict, ludruk became a symbol of cultural and political identity and played a part in defining their conflicting worldviews. At the same time, escalating tensions also prompted the Ansor youth to increase their physical strength for the expected fighting. A story told by Rusdi Anwar describes this: I remember somebody gave me an Ontokusumo jacket, which was said to make me invulnerable. Then another kiyai gave me manggo seed, which was supposed to make me stronger. Then I was brought by Kiyai Cholik to Kiyai Majidi, who was known as having a high level of spiritual power. Kiyai Majidi gave me some water, which made me felt much stronger. Coincidently, there was a landowner coming to me, telling me that the PKI robbed his ripened paddy. I went there on the next dawn, at 5 a.m., preparing to fight. They came, all 24 people in all, and I was alone. I challenged them all, but they had no guts, and they left. In this way, confrontations in cultural identity and orientation were increasingly being transformed into open conflicts. Violent clashes erupted here and there. On 16 January 1965, for instance, thousands of villagers ransacked the house of Sudarmadi, village head of Balongsari, Jombang. Sudarmadi, 60 years old and village head for 28 years, was accused of always protecting the "people who like to harass Islam."31 This incident was followed by a larger conflict, when a pasar malam, or night market, was held on the alun-alun, or public square, o f Jombang. One of the attractions at this festival was gambling. Alarmed, Kiyai Cholik from pesantren Tebuireng, which was located ten miles 30Pumama Djaja, a ludruk troupe, was invited to perform in a farewell party between temporary, kampanye, workers and permanent workers during the closing of milling season of 1962 in PG Pesantren. [HR 10-09-62] 3lHU 01-25-65 R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 163] === 141 from the festival, sent a letter to the regent asking him to close down the gambling site within two days. But the letter was sent at midday on Saturday, at the last minute before the regent's office closed.32 It was clear that the letter was sent only to prove that a warning had been given, while providing no chance for the regent to solve the problem peacefully. On Monday morning, some 5,000-7,000 people gathered from the villages of Ngoro, Diwek, Ploso, Mojowamo, Mojoagung, and Perak, and walked together ten miles to bum down the bamboo buildings used for the festival. Religious sentiments now entered the arena of conflict, even on the national stage. When Harian Rakjat, PKI's newspaper, published an article by Sukarno with the title "Islam Sontolojo (Batja: Islam Soontooloojoo)," local players from the pesantrens discerned the hidden message: an ultimate fight.33 In economic terms, non-plantation peasants did not live in better conditions than their plantation counterparts. Those who owned some small piece of land were at risk of being dragged into a forced lease with the plantation, or voluntarily grew cane in their own field and sold them freely to the mill they chose of their own, while those who did not possess any piece of land were forced to work fulltime for the landowner or take a part 320ffices were open fullday on Saturday, but have a long break on Friday to give a chance to do Friday prayer. 33HR 01-15-65. The term sontolojo (Javanese) roughly means "damn you." It was even harsher when written as soontooloojoo, giving more stress not only on the dissaproval, but also on humiliation to the opponent. The content of the article itself was not as strong as its impression on the title, but the chosing of this title was clearly made with a calculation on the effects of its publication. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 164] === 142 time job with the plantation. After 1957, the government encouraged peasants to grow their own cane, and many did. But instead of selling the cane to the plantation they processed the cane into brown sugar, or Java sugar. The process did not need high technical skills and small holders could reap profits as high as Rp.75/for cash kilogram of cane they processed, compared to the lower profits they could reap from selling raw cane to the PG. Tensions over selling and buying the cane sometimes erupted into open conflicts.34 Meanwhile, pesantren leaders continued to enjoy their important place on the national stage of politics. On 18 September 1965, Coordinating Minister for Security and Defense, General Abdul Harris Nasution, accompanied by East Java regional commander Major General Basuki Rachmad, visited pesantrens Tebuireng and Darul Ulum Rejoso Peterongan (adjacent to Jombang). He also declared the opening of Darul Ulum university, an Islamic university founded by several influential pesantrens around Jombang.35 Apparently, this visit motivated the generals to choose Jombang as the center for activities for the 1965 armed forces day in East Java.36 Intending to stage a "show off' parade, the choice of Jombang was a clear indication of two things. It was a token of close support from the armed forces, especially the army, to the pesantren's kiyais; it was also a warning sign to the PKI and its affiliates not to disturb the pesantren world. 3*HR 09-19-61. HR 09-28-61 reported this type of conflict in Surakarta, Central Java, between peasants and PG Tjolomadu. 3SHU 09-25-65 36SP 09-30-65 R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 165] === 143 2. Political groupings Clearer political markers between the four worlds were drawn in 1960-1965. Crosscutting economic and cultural clusters now also overlapped with political affiliations. The result was a resemblance of what Clifford Geertz termed as politik alircm, or the aliran pattern, where society is divided vertically into separate political currents and parties surrounded by a set of voluntary social organizations formally or informally linked to them.37 It was more than a society divided horizontally into cultural groupings such as the trichotomy of santri-priyayi-abangan.3* And it did not fit into the Indonesian vernacular rendition of marxian tenets, which taught that Indonesia was a transitional "semi-colonial, semi-feudal country" in which the workers would join hand-in-hand with poor peasants and agricultural laborers against the bureaucrat-capitalists controlling the plantations, the oppressive landlords, and the rich peasants.39 The society’s conflicts were continually shifting. It started with a marxian perception of class conflicts, in vertical (ordinal) lines, and moved toward a more 37Clifford Geertz, "The Javanese Village," in Local, Ethnic, and National Loyalties in Village Indonesia: A Symposium, edited by G. William Skinner (Yale University Cultural Report Series, Southeast Asia Studies, 1959), p.37. 39For a comparative short discussion of PKI's theoretical basis on the Indonesian society and peasantry, see Rex Mortimer, The Indonesian Communist Party and Land Reform 1959-1965 (Clayton, Victoria: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, Monash Papers on Southeast Asia No.l, 1972), pp.2-4. PKI's textual rendition of Marxism-Communism on the peasantry were, among others, D.N. Aidit's Masyarakat Indonesia dan Revolusi Indonesia (Jakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 196?), Revolusi Indonesia, Latar Belakang, Sedjarah dan Haridepannja (Jakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 1964), and Tuntutan untuk Bekerdja di Kalangan Kaum Tani (Jakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 1955). R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 166] === 144 horizontal pattern in nominal lines. But the process o f the shifting conflicts did not only go in a single direction, from vertical to horizontal landscaping of social and political relationships; it also moved from mass, national politics to smaller, fragmented, and even personalized tensions. The processes were dynamic in nature, and could be moved in the opposite direction, from horizontal and nominal lines toward vertical and ordinal relationships. The following diagram will show the existing pattern: diagram Central G o v ern m en t Second Stan Middle Range Peasant / Landowners. \ SGB\\ W orkprs 1Peasants Kampanye VW orkers (landless / small landowners) KBG Sarbumusi BTI R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 167] === 145 Both loji (PG) and pesantren (PP) continued to enjoy their relationships with local and central authorities. As it is clear from the diagram, the loji itself was much less political than its "second world," which was occupied by the loji employees. In addition to its exclusive and safe compound, local authorities also provided the loji with full security protection, including special security to protect the cane field from looting.40 The pesantren, as the loji's counterpart, enjoyed a similar position. Some members of the loji and its employees were members of Perkappen Soksi, without any apparent following among the workers. This was an affiliate organization of “functional group” Soksi, which was formed to counter the PKI but did not have a political strength to do that. At lower levels, members of the loji employees and layworkers were divided into two political groupings, the PKI affiliated Serikat Buruh Gula (SBG), or Sugar Workers Union, and, less significantly the PNI affiliated Kesatuan Buruh Gula (KBG), or the Sugar Workers Association. However, these two organizations did not fully control the domain where members of both the worker's and peasant's worlds overlapped (overlapping area on the diagram). The overlapping area was the arena of the most intense struggles for influence. By 1960, the SBG in PG Meritjan, for example, was so strong that even the director needed the union's written agreement to support 40On 8 November 1964 the bupati ofNganjuk (an adjacent regency of Jombang and Kediri) issued a letter to 5 subdistrict heads to form these security teams, covering the areas controlled by PG Lestari; letter No.P.K. 1020/1/BB, signed by R. Soemarsono. On 30 April 1965, the bupati of Kediri issued similar letter, covering all areas of cane field controlled by the PPN XXI-XXII in Kediri; letter signed by Bupati Achmad Soebari, no letter record available. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 168] === 146 production process during the milling season of I960.41 Together with KBG and SBG, other organizations also occupied this overlapping arena; those were Sarbumusi, BTI and Pertanu. The arena on the right cluster was occupied by Pertanu, (ex-) Masyumi, and mostly by NU/Ansor. Although flawed with some anomalies, this simplified pattern was generally applicable. Events flowed according to the above pattern. On 14-16 October 1961 NU of East Java conducted a regional conference in Kediri. Sensing the potential for increased violent conflict, the conference delegate agreed to offer a more compromising way of solving political disputes rather than using confrontative skills and force passe droit, might is right. In connection with this NU delegate walked way from the inaugural ceremony of the East Java regional house of representatives (DPRD-GR), because they felt that the PKI was using confrontational rather than consensual tactics.42 But NU could not avoid adopting more proactive policies itself as other political parties were pursuing aggressive campaigns. Approaching BTI's national convention on 23-29 July 1962, for example, the East Java BTI regional branch was conducting massive lectures and campaigns in Jombang, Ngawi, and Malang regencies.43These activities were followed in December of that year by an East Java regional convention to discuss the terms of contract in land leasing 41Signed on 21 March 1960 by H. Sumadi, secretary of SBG branch of Meritjan and Adnan Thohier, director of PG Meritjan. Company's document. nSP 11-08-65 nHR 07-05-62 R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 169] === 147 between peasants and the plantations for 1963/1964 season one of the decisions at that meeting was to demand that central government apply the new lease agreement retroactively to the previous season.44 This type of activity was in contrast to the characteristics ofpolitik aliran, which placed more emphasis on the impact of national politics on local settings. This was just the other way around rolling a local issue onto the national stage the nationalization of a local conflict. In this spirit, several BTI delegations went to Jakarta to bring complaints about unfair land lease arrangements and the use of intimidation and other types of coercion to suppress peasant's demands.45 By 1963, every belligerent party was starting to take more open and violent positions. Since early 1962, there had been a constant if not increasing number of incidents, mostly in the form of cane field burning. The scapegoat for these incidents was the BTI, but the organization denied responsibility, saying that the actual cause was economic deprivation.46 Another source of conflict which was now becoming violent was the economic disparity in the cities of Jombang and Kediri between the Chinese and Javanese residents. Traditionally, racial lines and religious affiliations coincided with the economic fortune of the Chinese. A classic communist reading of class struggle should place these Chinese borgeoisie as oppressors of the people; instead the PKI defended their position. It “HR 01 -04-63; HR 01 -24-63 *5HR 03-18-63 and HR 05-25-63 reported such delegations from Probolinggo (East Java) and Central Java. 46HR 08-14-62; HR 08-30-62 R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urth er reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 170] === 148 was reported that at a celebration of Hari Kebangkitan Nasional, or the national awakening day, on 20 May 1963, opponents of PKI wanted to detour heir parade through the downtown area of Kediri, which was the Chinese quarter. But PKI members managed to stick to the original plan and avoid thus, an anticipated riot in the downtown. Two weeks later, after a telepathy show in Setono Gedong, Kediri, on 1 June 1963, some fifty people allegedly moved to bum the Chinese shops of Hwa, Tjung, Merdeka, and Maju. Then they moved on the Chinese quarter but a truck of fully armed police and about 200 PKI members prevented their actions.47 (Again, this is proof that Marxian analysis of the PKI did not fit into reality). Anticipating political confrontations in Kediri, the provincial board of the PKI in East Java conducted its second regional conference on 7 July 1963. The conference was attended by 300 representatives from 37 regions. During the conference, it was evaluated that three years after the first conference in 1959 the party had made some progress. The conference targeted Masyumi and PSI as scapegoats for many political issues/problems; these two parties were easy prey since both were disbanded by President Sukarno. But no mention was made of NU as the party's strongest political opponent.48 Expecting more fatal incidents in East Java, particularly in Jombang, Kediri, Probolinggo, and Jember, the central board of BTI issued a statement that terror should be countered by mass action. Although it was stated clearly that "mass actions" should not be rendered as counter 47HR 06-21-63 4iHR 07-09-63 R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 171] === 149 terror, in the field violent actions were becoming commonplace.49 Political parlance at the national level was rendered as a policy to resort violence by the peasants and workers. In November 1964, the PKI repeated its previous strategy to attack the "weakest" opponent, the banned Masyumi. Twenty three branches and 4,000 members of the PKI from all around Kediri signed a petition that "members of the banned party" should be retul-tdso from their seats. It was clear that PKI targeted its efforts toward Masyumi dealt with NU very cautiously. PKI demanded that the Masyumi -- one was occupied by Basuki Nitirogo, who also held position as member of executive branch—be transferred to their representatives.51 At lower levels of confrontation, several incidents took place in the tumultuous month of November 1964. In the second week of November, five members of BTI Jombang were assaulted and two houses were burned down. On 17 November, Darsono, board member of BTI Gempol Legundi (Jombang), while riding his bike was attacked by a gang of youths using iron pipe and was hospitalized. Two days later, Ramelan, chairman of BTI Karakbelah, Mojoagung, was attacked also by a gang of some 20 youths. The two consecutive incidents were reported to the Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs A9HR 12-11-64 i0Retul or retool was a very popular political jargon at the time, meaning "to recall" someone from his/her position. SIHR 11-13-64; HR 11-21-64; HR 11-28-64. However, there was no proof or even a slight indication that ex-Masyumi members joined NU, as one scholar has speculated. See Iwan Gardono Sudjatmiko, op.cit., p.32. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 172] === 150 Sadjarwo when he visited Jombang at the end of December 1964.52 That a seemingly trivial case was reported to a cabinet minister, and received wide coverage, was a proof that the case was considered politically serious incident. Also in Jombang, on 19 December 1964, about two thousand people mourned Matali, chairman of BTI Jatiduwur, subdistrict of Kesamben, Jombang. A day before, 500 people threw rocks at his house; when he came out of the house he was stabbed to death. The attackers were allegedly hired by an absentee landlord living outside Java. Matali had revealed that the landlord was plotting to make a fake distribution of his land so that he wouldn't lose it under the Land Reform Law. What is interesting from this case is that the land was finally given to 12 of the landlord's tenants, eight of them members of the NU affiliated peasant organization, the Pertanu.53 A speculation may be made that, in this case, the conflict was more vertical (i.e., between classes) than horizontal, (among members of similar class of peasantry such as landless BTI and Pertanu). The news in the PKI’s media gave an impression that BTI also struggled for Pertanu members, but this was in fact unlikely to happen. What happened was that the BTI lost its struggle. The landlord made a strategic choice by distributing his land to Pertanu instead of BTI, considering the fact that Pertanu’s mass (who thronged at Matali’s house) was larger than the BTI. Entering 1965 dangerous confrontations and violent clashes continued to color political life in Jombang and Kediri. In early January, rallies with thousand participants in support of Sukarno's decision to quit Indonesia's membership in the United Nations. In the 52HR 12-04-64; HR 12-26-64 53HR 12-28-1964 R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 173] === 151 same rally, representatives of workers and peasants organizations demanded that the regent lower basic living costs. Another day, all representatives of political parties and mass organizations burned USIS books and a statue of Malaysian Prime Minister Tengku Abdulrachman on the alun-alun, the city's central open field; the local authorities witnessed this incident.54 These violent clashes peaked at an infamous incident known as the Kanigoro affair. In the second week of January, PH, or the youth wing of the banned Masyumi party, conducted a training course for its new cadres in the village o f Kanigoro, subdistrict of Kras, Kediri. The activity was called "mental training," and Kanigoro was chosen as a testing ground for the new members’ bravery, since the village was known as a PKI stronghold. Anis Abiyoso, leader of East Java PH, led the training.55 One of the lecturers was Samelan, a member of the banned party, who at the instigation of the local NU branch a year before, had been prohibited from lecturing at PII mental training by Kediri’s military command. Such on order was issued on 11 January 1965. The next day, however, Anis Abiyoso protested the decision and proceeded with Samelan's lectures. Members of BTI and Pemuda Rakyat than began preparing to attack the mosque and classrooms of the 5*HR 01-26-65; HR 01-30-65 55His perspective on the Kanigoro affair is from his personal account, Anis Abiyoso and Ahmadun Y. Herfanda, Teror Subuh di Kanigoro (Yogyakarta: Bentang, 1995). PKI’s perspective are taken from various sources as cited. Other perspective from the participants are taken from interviews with Kastolani, a participant, and Anshari Thayib, PII activist. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 174] === 152 madrasah being used as lodging.56 At dawn of January 13, about two thousand members of BTI and Pemuda Rakyat attacked the training center. Shouting "Bunuuuh! Bunuuuh! Ganyaang!" ("Kill! Kill! Crush!"), they went into the mosque with swords, knives, and sickles and dragged all 120 participants to the school yard where they lined them up and tied them together with a single rope. The attackers then escorted all male participants to the local police station, about seven kilometers from the mosque. Along the way through cane and rice fields the attackers shouted horrifying comments such as "Kill! Crush! Long live PKI! Crush Malaysia! Crush Nekolim! Slaughter them!" The commotion drew attention from the villagers; thousands soon gathered and some collected in front of the police station. The left wing youths and their captives arrived at the police station around 7.00 a.m, two hours after the attack. One participant wondered why the police chief was already present in full uniform as early as 6.00 a.m. and suspected that he had been aware of the incident beforehand or perhaps even instigated it.57 This suspicion strengthened the public perception that the police were inclined to the left.58 The police chief received complaints from the attackers that the organizer was conducting subversive activities. He then dismissed the crowd and training participants and detained only Anis Abiyoso. S6H U 02-09-65; HR 02-06-95; SP 02-09-65; Manifesto 02-09-65; HR 02-11-65; HR 02-13-65; HR 03-03-65. Madrasah is a formal Islamic schools, with an educational system parallel to the public school system. It is not a pesantren, although many pesantren in 1965 started to run the madrasah. 57Kastolani, interview. 58Soemitro, interview; HR 06-21-63; SP 08-30-65 R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 175] === 153 In his confession, Abiyoso said, he had seen one attacker take an Al-Qur'an, tear its pages, throw it on the floor and step on it, saying "Iki sing marakke gudiken!" (Javanese; "This is the one that causes mange!").59 While not everyone saw this incident,60 rumors spread the next day that an attacker had stepped on an Al-Qur'an, causing a surge of solidarity among Muslims all over East Java, regardless their political affiliation. Abiyoso was detained only in one day. The next day, he was invited to explain the situation at the mosque in Pare. Three days later, Ansor sent hundreds of its members by truck to Kanigoro.61 Within two weeks, news spread all over East Java and reached places as far as Banyuwangi on the eastern tip of the island. To control the situation, the authorities arrested Harsono and Suijadi, two leaders of the attackers. For three weeks after the incident, rallies and counter rallies took place almost everyday, with the largest on 1 February 1965, when hundreds of PH members throughout East Java gathered and paraded in Kras-Kanigoro, throwing rocks at the local office of CSS PKI. The next day, BTI and Pemuda Rakjat launched a counter demonstration, demanding the release of Harsono and Suijadi, and urging the authorities to arrest leaders of the previous demonstration on the charge of having no permit to conduct a rally. (The police had, in “ Kastolani, for instance, was not aware of this incident; he was not sure whether this had actually happened. It should be noted here that Anis Abiyoso's book is admitted by its author as "a historical novel" or a "true story" with literary content. 61It should be remember that Ansor was the non-intellectual youth wing of NU, while PII was the students wing of Masyumi, and NU had become Masyumi's opponent after the party split in 1953. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 176] === 154 fact, issued a permit for the rally however).62 Fearing a larger demonstration, the police declared Abiyoso as fugitive. The issue o f profaning Al-Qur'an was so sensitive and dangerous that it alarmed PKI leaders. Saidjan, PKI representative from the regency of Kediri, made a promise that any party member found guilty of this would be seriously punished, including being dismissed from party membership.63 On 12 February, Anis Abiyoso surrendered himself to the authorities in Malang, after having been a fugitive for a week during which time he successfully consolidated support from Masyumi circles and NU members throughout East Java.64 Without any party in a majority position, it was dificult for the local authorities to maintain tight control. Occasional joint initiaves by competing parties also complicated the matters. In the last week of September 1965, for example, PKI, NU, and PNI representatives held meetings and sent a joint delegation to the regent, to call for a more democratic process in the election of village heads; the delegation also attacked corruption in the local office of the Ministry of Forestry.65 (This joint action was not the first, since these usually-competing groups had cooperated in dealing with some national issues 62Manifesto 02-09-65 63HU 02-09-65 64Anis Abiyoso and Ahmadun Y. Herfanda, op.cit., pp.27-51. 65HR 09-28-65 R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 177] === 155 before).66 Then, on 29 September 1965, hundreds members o f Pemuda Rakyat, Gerwani, and PKI staged a mass rally in the city of Jombang, demanding that the bupati lower prices, especially rice prices and that he increase workers salaries. This rally was followed in the afternoon by a similar rally in the subdistrict of Mojowamo, where some 1,000 participant reportedly made similar demands.67 3. Land reform and unilateral actions In 1960 the government promulgated the Undang-Undang Pokok-Pokok Agraria (UUPA), or the Land Reform Law. As a party that basing its strength on the peasantry, the PKI stood to gain the most benefit from the law. Therefore, the party was not so patient with the slow adoption of the law. One year was spent just preparing for its implementation; moreover, there was not enough money to fund the program.6* Enacted together with this law was the Undang-Undang Pokok Bagi Hasil (UUPBH), or Sharecropping Law, governing the relationship between the landlords and their tenants. These laws represented a great PKI successes in national politics, but in their “ In late August 1963, for example, thirty representatives of political parties and mass organization from Kediri went to Jakarta to demand the invalidation of government decree of increased tranportation costs. The delegation, which mostly comprised of representatives of PKI and its affiliate organizations, included representatives from NU and Ansor. HR 08-03-65 61DP 09-29-65 6iHR 12-01-60 R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 178] === 156 implementation in regional and local settings they were a fiasco.69 As a result, hostile incidents between landlords and tenants occurred, especially in places where tensions were already high.70 One of the PKI's priorities was to target erfpacht lands (state-owned land, which according to the Land Reform Law could be distributed to the peasants). In East Java, in March 1960, BTI Banyuwangi branch demanded that erfpacht land be distributed to the peasants without delay.71 (PKI also demanded that land which had been tilled by peasants should not be converted to erfpacht status).72For other aspects of landreform such as distribution to peasants of land owned by absentee landlords as well as land owned by the village itself, the implementation was not easy. Initially, in November 1960, after the regent of Kediri formed subdistrict land reform committees, there were reports of some success in negotiations between landlords and their peasant tenants, as well as in the sharecropping arrangements as regulated by Sharecropping Law. In the village of Tawang, for example, there was an agreement between landlord Tjipto, who owned more than 10 hectares, and his eight tenants, and between landlord Sukamto, who owned 20 hectares and his thirteen tenants. Many of these tenants had tilled the land for 14-30 years. A week later, PKI noted that 11 villages 69011e Tomquist. Dilemmas o f Third World Communism: The Destruction o f the PKI in Indonesia (London: Zed Books, 1984), esp. pp. 191-200. 70In Bali, conflicts of this type were not rare, even before the promulgation of the two laws; see HR 01-19-60. nHR 03-12-60 nHR 09-07-60 R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 179] === 157 from 5 subdistricts of Kandat, Pare, Wates, Kepung, and Purwoasri had implemented the division of 50:50 in sharecropping as regulated by the Sharecropping Law. The agreement involved 19 landowners and 179 tenants and covered an area of 161 hectares. The PKI also reported that as a result of its efforts there had been an increase in daily wages in some places. In the village of Ringinpitu, there was an increase from Rp.15 to Rp.25 a day for example, and in the village of Wonokerto, daily wages for picking tobbacco leaves increased from Rp.7.50 to Rp. 10. In the villages of Kuwih and Seketi, wages for digging and planting also increased. Land lease "rents" between sugar plantations and small landowners also increased from Rp. 1,000 to Rp.2,000 in the 1961/1962 fiscal year.73 Other successes followed. In the village of Sekaran-Pagu, the village head and landlord Martodipuro agreed to sign contracts with their 22 sharecropping tenants. In Ringinpitu (Plemahan), some tenants succeeded in increasing the price of harvested rice up to 40 percent from the previously agreed upon price. In the same village, daily wages for digging cane field canals increased by 50 percent. In the village of Tawang (Wates), a peasant succeeded in repossessing his one-hectare piece of land that he had pawned to a moneylender.74 Despite these and other successes in the implementation of Land Reform Law and Sharecropping Law in Jombang-Kediri, on the whole PKI regarded the pace as too slow. Moreover, there were many failures and complaints. Nationally, the PKI urged its nHR 11-16-60;///? 11-25-60;///? 12-03-60 7*HR 07-22-61 R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 180] === 158 followers to take unilateral actions (aksi sepihak) to implement the laws. In Kediri, it insisted that the regent instruct village heads to expedite implementation o f the laws.7* A sensitive area of conflict in the land reform programs was land owned by kiyais and other ulama, or Islamic scholars. Most of the kiyais were wealthy landlords, partly because they controlled the pesantren and its institutional lands. The kiyai was the center of a pesantren's life, and it was hard to separate institutional assets from personal ones. In many, if not most, pesantrens, the students themselves tilled the kiyai's land in return for their tuition. In many cases, the kiyai or an outside contributor gave the land to be officially part of the pesantren; if so, the land was called wakaf. In practice, however, a piece of land owned privately by a kiyai was not distinguished from wakaf land. This mattered quite a lot since the Land Reform Law stipulated that land owned by religious institutions such as a pesantren or mosque was exempt from land reform. A important post-factum study asserts that many kiyais converted their private lands to wakaf lands as a strategy to avoid land reform. Others followed the common strategy o f splitting the acreage of their private land among relatives and friends.76 In general, however, the kiyais suffered the most from the land reform programs.77 Most, if not all, of them were NU members. Therefore, as political party, NU suffered the most from the unilateral actions; the party's core was comprised of ulama, many of whom 1SHR 08-26-61. In Nganjuk, a neighboring regency, BTI started a preemptive action concerning land lease; HR 09-16-61. 76011e Tomquist, op.cit., p. 193. 77Yusuf Hasyim, interviews. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 181] === 159 owned large areas of riceland. Many of their santri tilled the land, which often also became the only economic source for the santri. When PKI increased its actions, the East Java NU issued a strong political statement saying that unilateral actions were "counter revolutionary" and counter productive to the national goals as stated by President Sukarno. Moreover, by arguing that many of the victims of unilateral actions were NU members, the statement commented that the party still retained its patience even while being provoked by such actions. But the statement also sent a clear message that further provocations would result in counter actions by NU members.78 On this, Rex Mortimer has noted, "Almost from the outset, religious passions were injected into conflict over land. NU groups accused the PKI and the BTI of attacking religious schools and insulting Islam, while the Muslims in turn were alleged to inciting their followers to crush "the atheists" and defend their property in the name o f Allah."79 But the issue was much more complicated. Institutionally, a kiyai's wealth was inseparable from his pesantren. Often people donated something to the kiyai or the pesantren through the kiyai. Wakaf land was fully controlled by the kiyai; he made decisions about its management, such as lease time. Moreover, in many cases the kiyai used his own private land to support the pesantren. As mentioned above, the santri often worked for the kiyai's estate as free labor. Their relationship was stronger than an ordinary 7*SP 07-08-64 79Rex Mortimer, The Indonesian Communist Party and Landreform, 1959-1965 (Clayton, Victoria: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1972), p.48. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 182] === 160 patron-client relationship. A santri was supposed to maintain attitudes of taqlid or tawadhu toward the kiyai, meaning that he had to be obedient and submissive without reservation, even sacrifice his life for the kiyai. In its analysis of agrarian society, the PKI named the landlord as one of "seven village devils." As landlords themselves, the kiyais were therefore implicitly depicted as devils, which constituted a direct challenge to the santri and peasant communities that had relations with the kiyai and his pesantren. In their community, class consciousness never replaced the role of taqlid to the kiyai. Again, as in the case of political and social groupings, conflicts over land reform programs did not fall out vertically, between economic classes (as PKI's strategists said they should) but horizontally between members o f the same of economic classes. Two incidents with the nature of “devilish landlords” and his followers against the PKI followers occured in Kediri in June 1962. Encouraged by PKI's policy of unilateral actions, hundreds of PKI members seized a rice field in Grogol owned by Haji Syakur, who lived in Kaliboto (and who was therefore considered an absentee landlord). The second incident was the seizure of a rice field owned by Haji Samur in Kentjong. Both landlords were active members of NU and had close connections to pesantren Lirboyo, making the cases immediately incite larger involvement. After seizing the land, the peasants plowed it until hundreds of NU members arrived to seize back the field. The two incidents reveal some interesting facts. To become exempt from the provisions of Land Reform Law, Haji Syakur had already reclassified his first class field as wakaf: two hectares went to NU, two hectares to Muhammadiyah, one hectare to PPupa R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 183] === 161 (an Islamic institution which run an Islamic school), and one hectare to Syafii Soleiman, chairman of Kediri NU and a leading local political figure. Syafii Soleiman had then gone to the village and settled Haji Syakur’s problem with the local police chief and subdistrict chief. Haji Samur, by contrast, had "distributed" his land to his children and other family members, only to repossess it when the situation calmed down.80Both men were therefore legally exempted from the land reform program but the transfers were unnoticed by the attackers in the unilateral action. With these final results, these unilateral actions failed. But the news already spread to other PKI members, that their fellows were brave to fight the two devilish landlords. It did not matter whether finally they would not get the land. What matter more was that they opened a chance to get a piece of land for free. Another incident of much larger scale and political importance started several months earlier. This was not a typical landlord-peasant conflict, but one between a sugar plantation and peasants. The peasants in the village of Jengkol had tilled the abandoned land surrounding their village since post-war years.The land was owned by PG Jengkol but the mill had been destroyed during the struggle for independence. The area was nearly deserted and very poor, conditions that provided fertile soil for the seeds of simple communist class struggle. Jengkol became a stronghold of the BTI. In need of larger areas for its cane operations, PGNgadirejo in 1961 was granted the land by the government almost for free. A plan to compensate and relocate the “ Interviews, Syafii Soleiman and Mansur Adnan. The incidents were not reported in the newspapers. At this stage, PKI was still avoiding direct violent confrontations. As chairman of day-to-day body o f local administration, Syafii Soleiman was also member of local (regency of Kediri) committee for land reform. He admitted that Haji Syakur gave his land as a token of respect as well as to seek political protection. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 184] === 162 peasants who lived there failed. In November 1961, negotiations broke down and the plantation sent its tractors, guarded by military personnel from Kediri, into the fields and started to destroy everything, including the simple bamboo houses of the villagers. The villagers attacked the tractors and refused to leave. Major Hambali, the district commander, ordered his soldiers to shoot them. Ten to fifteen people were killed— including one women who was pregnant-and 24 were wounded, including another woman who was shot in the eye.81 Subsequent to this incident, three of the village protestors were found guilty of inciting a deadly riot and sent to jail for five to fifteen months. Over five hundred villagers were relocated to two new separate villages of Margourip and Margopatut, situated about 20 miles from Jengkol. The relocation process was rife with mismanagement and corruption, as was revealed two years later. The PKI accused Major Hambali of ordering his troops to shoot and of receiving money from the sale of the land. However, efforts to bring Hambali to court were not successful, despite the politicization and "nationalization" of the incident and a rally o f40,000 BTI supporters in the city of Kediri. Yet, the Jengkol Affair had a wide impact, in East Java as well as nationally. In 1962, thousands of BTI members came from as far as Madiun, Magetan, and Ngawi, located about 50 miles west of Kediri, to witness the trials. No incident occured between supporters of the two belligerent parties, but the confrontation was highly explosive. “ Data were taken from abstracted serial reports on the trials, published in HR throughout July 1962, and continued to be reported in HR 08-01-62; HR 08-10-62; HR 09-17-62; HR 03-29-63; HR 05-25-64; HR 05-27-64; HR 06-06-64; HR 07-28-64. There were inconsistencies of casualties; plaintiffs indictment cited 10 were fatally shot, while HR 07-23-62 reported 15 were killed. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 185] === 163 In March 1963, a delegation of 63 central board members of BTI visited the Ministry of Agriculture and the House of Representatives and submitted a proposal for the settlement of land disputes between state-owned plantations and the peasantry; the proposal was inspired by the Jengkol Affair.82The indirect impact lasted as late as July 1964, when the minister of agriculture issued a decree saying that forty four fields of exerfpacht in East Java, including those located in Jombang and Kediri, would be given to local land reform committees; the amount of land in Jombang-Kediri area was 23,026 hectares.83 After the Jengkol Affair, PKI members in Jombang and Kediri pursued more aggressive actions to disseminate knowledge about peasant rights and land lease issues. In a massive conscientization campaign, they raised issues such as minimum lease payment for the previous and upcoming milling seasons, incremental benefits if they agreed to a scheduled lease (the sooner to agree the better), negotiation procedures for failed lease contracts and the discrepancy between local lease payments of Rp. 12,000/hectare as compared to the national standard of Rp. 112,500/hectare.84 With an increasing awareness, the number o f disputes over land also increased. By the end of 1963, BTI reported that the turnover of state-owned land to the peasants who had tilled it for generations was flawed with injustice, since the tenants had to pay commercial rates for the land such as what happened in the village of Kasreman, *2HR 03-29-63 *3HR 07-28-64 MHR 09-17-63 R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 186] === 164 Kediri.®5 In its second conference at the end of 1963, East Java BTI reported on the difficult processes and results of the land reform program. From a record of 56,000 hectares to be distributed, up to September 1963, only 5,000 hectares (9%) had been distributed throughout all East Java. The projected acreage for conversion in JombangKediri up to the end of 1963 should be at 11,000 hectares, out of which only 1,700 hectares had been distributed.*6 Throughout 1964, confrontations and conflicts were increasingly violent and frequent. In March, a joint delegation of BTI Jombang and Kediri was sent to Jakarta to draw national attention to local issues, including land lease arrangements with the plantations, and land conversion fee.®7 This fee was an "administrative fee" for legal paperwork and official recording, but in practice it became a tool for extortion by local officials to use againts both sides-former landowners as well as peasants. In April, there was a report about disputes over land owned by an ex-rubber company in Jombang. Peasants in the area had reportedly tilled the land since independence and were now were demanding to possess the land.8®In Kediri, similar but tsHR 12-24-63 *6HR 11-09-63; official figures published in HR 02-06-64 was slightly higher, over 58,000 ha. ®7In the village of Keradjan, the fee was Rp. 10,000 for each conversion, while in the village of Kunir was Rp.3,000; HR 03-07-64; HR 03-10-64. Other cases included issue of conversion in the village of Gayam; HR 03-20-64. ®*The land was situated in Pangklungan (292 ha), Segunung (394 ha), Ubalan R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 187] === 165 smaller disputes took place in the same month.89 By this time, nationally recorded since the enactment of the Land Reform Law, 2,223 peasants had been arrested for their unilateral actions.90 Despite this, the PKI did not limit its attacks. In May 1964, hundreds of BTI members launched three unilateral actions in the subdistricts of Bareng, Kesamben, and Kedungbando in Jombang.91 One reason for the increasingly violent confrontations and conflicts was the PKI's revolutionary policies. Although the "revolutionary atmosphere" was fostered by every single party and mass organization during the Guided Democracy era, all but the PKI named foreign powers as their target. By contrast, the PKI spoke clearly of its domestic enemies, such as the seven village devils. Thus, it campaigned for revolutionary actions such as seizing land and incited its members to bravery and a readiness to resort to physical violence. This was a consistent theme in PKI's national campaigns during 1963.92 The theme of bravery in a larger context (but related to land seizures) was articulated by PKI-chairman Aidit's political report before the first plenary session of the Central 89In the village of Mojoroto, for example, dispute was over the fee; HR 04-14-64. 90Ibid 9lHR 05-23-64 ^Stories published in BM, PKI's official publication, often written in this spirit. "Pengadilan Tani" (peasant's trial) in BM 20, 1964, pp.87-99 narrated a trial of a peasant who committed unilateral action; BMs 1964 new year edition pp. 19-20 urged the peasants not to give harvested paddy to the landowner, or at least should hold 60 percent of the harvest. The article suggested that these actions should be taken immediately, entering the coming harvesting season in March-April 1964. This issue also became the main theme of the sixth national congress of BTI, which stated that unilateral actions were to "defend the tilled land from invader's seizures"; see HR 02-19-63. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 188] === 166 Committe of PKI in February 1963, entitled "Berani! Berani! Sekali Lagi Berani!" (Dare! Dare! and once more, Dare!). This slogan was used in various mass gatherings after this plenary session, including the PKI's 53th anniversary, held in a large ceremony three months later; the slogan was written on the stage screen with huge characters.93 Entering 1965, following the issuance of the Bogor Declaration—promulgated at a conference attended by representatives of ten political parties and convened by Sukarno in the Bogor presidential palace to declare that disputes over landreform should be settled by consensus rather than conflict—the PKI adopted calmer policies.94 Technically speaking, all parties in Kediri adopted the Bogor Declaration when they signed a joint statement on 23 February declaring that they would use consensual rather than confrontation in solving land disputes.95 But this national policy was far from the fact in Jombang-Kediri, and in East Java in general. Press reports from all areas in East Java showed there was no decrease in the number of incidents;96 even the number in the press was underreported, since fatal casualties in every incident sometimes sometimes reached as high as dozens.97 The police and local authorities, in most cases, could do nothing and, in fact, did nothing; 93HR 02-11-63; HR 05-23-63 94Rex Mortimer, The Indonesian Communist....op.cit., pp.56-58. 95HR 03-05-65 %Rex Mortimer, The Indonesia Communist... op.cit., pp.57-58 summarized these reports from East Java. 97Yusuf Hasyim; interview. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 189] === 167 they preferred to stay away from the violent political confrontations if possible.98 On paper, the Bogor Declaration also ended the landreform program. In East Java, the fate of 300 hectares of disputed land remained unresolved; the land was transferred to the landreform courts for a solution. Overall, the national figure for the period of 1960 to 1965 recorded that over 13,000,000 hectares of "oversize" land (i.e., larger than permitted by the Land Reform Law) had been distributed to 21,522 peasants; 1,708,324 hectares of absentee land had been given to 3,105 peasants; 55,558,234 hectares of plantation land had been transferred to 100,094 peasants; 6,320,166 hectares of private-agricultural land had been distributed to 4,172 peasants; 1,569,999 hectares of land previously owned by the state had been transferred to 1,299 peasants; in addition to uncited size of village land in 3,335 villages that were issued the titles by the Ministry of Agraria.99 Despite this seeming success story at the national level, however, the chairman of the advisory council of the land reform in East Java, Colonel (Police) R. Soemantri, stated that the adoption of land reform program in East Java was not smooth. Data from Kediri supported his statement. Oversize land o f 3,106,856 hectares had been distributed to unspecified number of peasants, but the landreform committee still controlled 1,665,334 hectares. For other types of land, including erfpacht, the committees had distributed 5,375,111 hectares to 12,229 peasants. But the regent of Kediri was alleged to be covering 34,571 hectares by his decrees to protect the interests o f landlords; meanwhile some other 66,044 hectares od oversize and absentee land remained in the hands of 9*Yusuf Hasyim; interview. 99SP 01-05-65; also published in HR 02-10-65. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 190] === 168 landlords.100 In short, land reform programs in East Java resulted in more grievances, dissapointment, and bloody confrontations that all were difficult to remedy. In August 1965, the situation in East Java was evaluated by the provincial police chief as scmgat gawat, a specific term referring to a very dangerous and nearlyuncontrollable situation.101 By the end of September, violent conflicts took place weekly. Serious incidents took place when hundreds of BTI members in the subdistrict of Pagu supported Djani, a peasant tilling land for landlord Sastraprawiro, to occupy the landlord's ricefield, all covering an area of 1,056 hectares. This unilateral action, launched after the Bogor Declaration, clearly indicated that the declaration almost had no impact at the grassroots. Another incident occured in Adan-Adan when “Guru” (Teacher) Giat, an elementary school teacher, led a unilateral action. The next day, thousands of armed NU and Ansor members pedalled their bicycles to the village. They burned down Guru Giat's house and some other houses of PKI members in the area. The commotion did not stop until the next day.102 This was followed by another similar large incident in the village of Tiru, Gurah, which was not reported in the press.103 Without proper channels of the news-radio was scarce, newspapers were limited—rumors was easily spread, bringing more feeling of hostilities rather than actual description of any incidents, especially those which took place in the remote areas. mHR 08-26-65; HR 09-14-65; HR 09-21-65 m SP 08-27-65 102HR 09-21-65; Syafii Soeleiman, Ma'roefin, interviews. I03Syafii Soeleiman, Mansur Adnan, Ma'roefin, Kastolani; interviews. R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 191] === 169 By the end of September 1965, "the motherland was pregnant, ready to deliver a revolution baby"—as a popular PKI phrase during this tumultuous period put it.104 Yusuf Hasyim recalls, "We were still fighting with each other when the Gestapu Affair broke out. Momentarily, we stopped fighting. Thus, it was a temporarily halted fight. When everything was clear, we resumed the fight, but now they lost their momentum."105 104"Ibu pertiwi hamil tua" (motherland was in advanced-stage of pregnancy) was a popular phrase during this tumultuous period. It functioned to enhance the spirit of the PKIs in their unilateral actions. The term appeared in many publications. 105Yusuf Hasyim, interview. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 192] === CHAPTER V SLAUGHTERING THE REVOLUTIONARIES PATTERNS OF KILLINGS 1. Gestapu and initial reactions The Gestapu Affair started in Jakarta on Thursday night—or more precisely early Jum'at legi, or Friday morning, believed by some as the night of the ghosts. The next morning, Saturday of 2 October 1965, some political leaders in Jombang and Kediri heard the news, which was barely a surprise since they had been living with severe political tensions for some years.1 On that day, a guest from Jakarta visited Rusdi Anwar, chairman of the Sarbumusi branch at PG Tjoekir; the visitor brought a newspaper with him, and told Rusdi that the PKI had killed the generals. As a political leader who had been directing his followers in violent conflicts with the PKI, and as someone who had also been familiar with political life in Jakarta, Rusdi did not doubt the news; yet, he did not understand the situation completely either. Non-PKI daily newspapers in Surabaya also carried news of Gestapu, but only published official statements by the governor of East Java and the commander of East Java Regional Military Command (the Brawijaya Division), both of whom lived in Surabaya. The two leaders stated that the Gestapu Affair was a "counter revolutionary" movement. This reflects the Department of the Army's official explanation from Jakarta, signed by 'None of my informants expressed their surprise receiving the news. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 193] === 171 Major General Suharto, that the Gestapu movement was counter revolutionary.2 On that same day, Harian Rakjat published in Jakarta an article entitled "Lieutenant Colonel Untung, the commander of Tjakrabirawa, saved the president and the Republic of Indonesia from a coup by the Council of Generals," with a subtitle: "Gestapu was an internal army affair."3 But there was no news from PKI-affiliated newspapers available for Rusdi and his Sarbumusi fellows in Jombang, so there was no alternative account of what had taken place. Rusdi decided to wait for some directions from leaders in Jakarta, especially from the central board of Sarbumusi and Ansor. These leaders previously maintained an interest in local politics and had frequent contacts with local leaders such as Rusdi. For several days, however, no satisfying news came to explain the situation.4 As almost no radio was available in Tjoekir, news tended to pass from mouth to mouth. Sensing danger, and without a clear picture of the situation, Rusdi made contact with members of Sarbumusi, Ansor, and santris from the surrounding areas. On Wednesday, 6 October 1965, about 150 people gathered at Rusdi's house, located about one mile from PG Tjoekir. They shared what limited news they had heard, analyzed the contents, and came to the conclusion that the PKI in Jakarta had attemped to launch a coup. Concluding that they could not rely on 2SP 10-02-65; HU 10-02-65; DP 10-02-65 3HR 10-02-65 4As chairman of Ansor and living in Jakarta, Yusuf Hasyim was busy and did not make his usual trips back and forth Jakarta-Jombang. Interviews. R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 194] === 172 the local authorities, even the military, to move against the PKI, they decided to launch a preemptive strike themselves. As a group leader who was considered physically and mentally superior, Rusdi reserved the right to lead the action. The group planned to attack PG Tjoekir. Rusdi told his fellows, "You must take action now! Kill, if necessaiy!" His main target was Sartono, considered the second most powerful man in PG Tjoekir, although he held only a lower position in the hierarchy of the senior staff of PG Tjoekir (in terms of occupation and job title) who lived in the toji. Rusdi's decision reportedly made some people ndredeg, or so frightened that even Ahmad Arief, his older brother, tried in vain to remind him not to kill people, especially people from the loji. Given the decades-long association of the loji with central government, the risk in attacking a loji compound would be very high. But Rusdi replied that he would be responsible for anything that happened as a result of his plan. Starting from that day on, he and his followers spent their nights at the mosque close to his house. Rusdi, who was better off than all other members, provided food and cigarettes for the group.5 Most of the "anak-anak," or “the guys,” were from the village of Njatirejo, with leaders such as Said, Muksin, and Ma'ruf.6 In terms of cohort and other group statistics such as occupation, this 5Rusdi recalled, "By that time, I was rich enough to feed those kids." He also had a car, considered a luxury by any standard of the time. Interview. 6This is a generic concept, from the word "anak-anak" which literally means "the kids." However, the term denotes an in-group social identity, and not merely an age group. The "kids" included older people who were still considered as members of a certain group. The term, in Indonesian or Javanese, was and is still widely used in this way (in Central Javanese, "bocah-bocah"; in East Javanese, "arek-arek"). The Indonesian term (continued...) R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 195] === 173 was a mixed group; Ma'ruf, for example, was older than the others and worked on the staff of the Department of Religious Affairs. But they also shared certain characteristics, most importantly a common cultural identity and a commond enemy. The attack started on that night, 6 October 196S and lasted for three days. During the ambush, some houses in the loji of PG Tjoekir were destroyed; the first fatality occured on Saturday night, 9 October 1965. The police came to investigate. They knew that Rusdi led the moves but made no attempt to arrest him; instead, they summoned to the police station and questioned Rusdi's righthand man and vice chairman of Sarbumusi, Muchidbullah Supri. During the interrogation, Supri insisted that he knew nothing o f the ambush. Meanwhile, feeling that the police were afraid of him, Rusdi boasted that he was untouchable. More people were joining his group. Confident that his position was strong enough to stand against the local police, Rusdi sent a courier to the police station to say that if they wanted to summon him, it should be done unofficially, surreptitiously, and without attracting attention from his following. There were only seven police officers on duty at the police station and Rusdi had hundreds of people behind him, many of whom believed they were invulnerable to bullets. Police still made no arrest, resulting in a still larger group collecting around Rusdi. Soon his house became the center of local "operations" where anti-leftist partisants gathered to hunt their enemies. The hunting now extended to the pro-communist union 6(... continued) anak-anak will be used in this study. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 196] === 174 SBG members in particular and rank and file workers of PG Tjoekir in general; later, it was to include all members of the PKI beyond the plantation's domain. In Kediri, the bloody days started later. However, skirmishes took place at about the same date as in Jombang, starting on 5 October 1965. Ma'roefin, chairman of the Ansor branch in Kediri, first received the news of Gestapu from his small Phillips radio on 1 October 1965. Several days later, he listened to an official announcement of the central board of Ansor, issued by Yusuf Hasyim and Chalid Mawardi, chairman and vice chairman of Ansor. The announcement said that the PKI was the mastermind behind the Gestapu Affair. This announcement boldly singled out the PKI as behind the affair in Jakarta. But several contrasting announcements, made before the army took control of the central radio station (RRI), and conflicting news about who was saving the country from whom, made for absolute confusion for the PKI members in Kediri. A survivor recalled, I was a member of the PKI board in Ngadiluwih, but I was shocked with the conflicting news broadcast through the radio. On one side, there was this news that Lieutenant Colonel Untung had saved the state from the Council of Generals, then he formed the Revolutionary Councils. On the other, there was that news that Lieutenant Colonel Untung was the one who launched a coup. I and my friends were completely confused with the situation.7 Meanwhile, Ma’roefin made some preparations. By that time, he had been married and had a son. Expecting a worsening situation, his father moved him from his bamboo hut house on Jambu street to the house of his extended family, a large brick and cement house located next to a mosque that two years earlier had been the site of the first 7Samikun, interview. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 197] === 175 confrontations.8 With his move, the local headquaters of Kediri Ansor moved too, since the Ma'roefin’s house served as Ansor's headquarters. Ma'roefin had agreed with his father's decision to move because he had received information that the house he currently rented would be burned down three days later if he didn't move. Considering previous tensions and confrontations, there was no reason not to believe even the slightest rumor. He had already experienced years of bitter fights with his local adversaries led by Umar Anjilin, an elementary school teacher.9 After moving, Ma'roefin consolidated a small group of Ansor members. During the three days o f 3-5 October 1965, at about 10.00 p.m. every night, this small group went to the front o f the CHH (Chung Hua Hoa) building, a strategic place where people passed by every morning to Pasar Panjonan, or the Panjonan market. Ma'roefin and Parkistomo, his second man in the group, painted the wall of CHH building to read: “Gerakan 30 September Didalangi PKI/BTI, Lekra, dan Pemuda Rakjat" (G-30-S was masterminded by PKI/BTI, Lekra, and People's Youth). With its strategic location, the passers by would easily notice and read the graffiti. By the next morning, the graffiti were gone; someone had repainted the wall. Later that night, Ma'roefin and Parkistomo repeated the action again; the next morning they found their slogan again painted over. On the third night, 5 October 1965, Ma'roefin and 8See chapter IV fii.18. Ma'roefin confessed that Umar Anjilin was later disukabumikan, or "to be sent to like the earth," a euphemistic term for slaughter—see later section of this chapter. Interviews. R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 198] === 176 Parkistomo brought some 200 Ansor members from Pesantren Lirboyo.10 They all wore black suites. This "uniform" was a symbol of readiness to fight and die, if necessary. The group caught someone driving a becak, or a tricycle, with a woman in it. The becak driver had an omplong, or a big can, and coconut fiber for repainting the wall. The Ansor youths chased after and caught the woman. "We caught one of them, we sickled her, send her to 'sukabumi.'11 Her body was plunged into the Brantas River and drifted. The becak rider was the first known victim of the Gestapu slaughters in Kediri.12 The next morning, passersby again read the Ansor graffiti. Being successful in the graffiti war, Parkistomo went out again on the night of 6 October. This time, he went by himself to Uwak, a wall at the bank of the Brantas River, an even more strategic location than CHH building for painting similar graffiti. Unfortunately for him, the military police caught him on the spot and arrested him. He was released the next day only after Ma’roefin sought some help from Syafii Soleiman, 1965," typescript, personal account and recollection, n.d. Ma'roefin said that he wrote this document as a prepared speech before an Ansor reunion in the early 1990s. See appendix “ Sukabumi is a double-coin term. It is a favorit city for retirement in West Java, but it also a compound word, 'suka' (to like) and 1)0011' (earth). The term was later infamous in its use as a verb "to send some one to like the earth"; an appeasing symbolism of slaughtering, since to go to Sukabumi (the city) also means "to retire"--in this sense, for good. “ This is from Ma'roefin’s typewritten account; it stated that the painter was the Gerwani. See appendix E. In his interviews, however, he said that the victim was the becak driver. Probably his memory has faded to remember exactly the gender of the victim. But probably his guilty feeling forced him to tell that the (male) becak driver was the victim. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 199] === Ill chairman of NU, and Anwar Zein, the mayor of Kediri. Anwar Zein then told the military police that Parkistomo was "one of our guys." Anwar Zein was a member of NU, and many military police personnel were NU sympathizers, in contrast to many police officers who were PKI symphatizers.13 After Parkistomo's arrest, no serious incident took place in Kediri. However, tensions were rising to a boiling point. Underneath the surface, everyone sensed a growing readiness to get involved in a massive clash. Every resident in the city of Kediri expected that the situation would be erupting any time soon.14 In this atmosphere, there came news that thousands of PKI members from other areas and cities were allegedly coming to Kediri to prepare for a mass rally on 16 October 1965. For Ma'roefin and his group, it was not important whether or not the PKI members would actually be preparing for a rally, or convening for another purpose, or even if they really came in thousands. Given their experience in the previous months and years, they prepared for a confrontation. On that same day, several key figures decided to hold an Apel Siaga, or allertness rally, purportedly to counter the expected PKI rally. The date was set for 13 October 1965. Ma'roefin recalled that the rally was instigated after Kiyai Syafii Marzuki, a respected ulama and political leader of Kediri, did an istiqarah, or a contemplating ritual, to receive God's guidance; the kiyai then ordered his santri to have a rally. After delivering the order, he himself moved to a safer place in Bandar. But there was no meeting of all- 13Syafii Soleiman, chairman of the NU, confessed that many military police were NU members. 14All informants believed that this was what happened. R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 200] === 178 East Java Ansor leaders and an agreement to hold “coordinated rallies” in a number of towns in the southern Brantas Valley (Kediri, Blitar, Trenggalek and others), as one account has stated.15 Also there was no name for the rally such as the “Vigilance Rally of Godly People.”16The decision to hold the rally was made only among a limited number of local Kediri members ofNU and Ansor.17 The alun-alun, a large public field in front of Masjid Jami1Kediri, or the main mosque of the city, was selected as the place for the rally; the route was to be determined later. Ma'roefin, the beloved nephew and adopted son of Kiyai Syafii Marzuki, and a confidant of Kiyai Machrus Aly, was given the order to prepare for the rally. As chairman of Kediri Ansor, no one else was better suited than Ma'roefin to conduct the rally. The task not only needed organizational skills but also physical and spiritual strength. Also, with the blessing of these two ulama, leaders like Ma'roefin felt empowered to fight to anyone who dared challenge them. In a separate and unrelated situation, Syafii Soleiman, the NU chairman of Kediri and chairman of the Front Pantjasila, was also trying to assess the new situation. Syafii was a man of politics, who had secured a seat in the Badan Pengurus Harian (BPH), or local house assembly. He heard the news over the radio when Untung delivered his first 15Kenneth R. Young, “Local and National Influences in the Violence of 1965,” in The Indonesian Killings, op.cit., p.79. l6Ibid„ p.80. 17Interviews: Gus Maksum, Ma’roefin, Syafii Soleiman. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 201] === 179 announcement on the morning of 1 October. Without hesitating, he asked the Regent of Kediri, Ahmad Sobari, what was going on. The regent had not heard of the Gestapu Affair, so he quickly drove to Surabaya. He was not a PKI symphatizer, but his wife had once entertained Nafsiah, (PKI chairman) Aidit's wife and a national leader of communist women's organization Gerwani. Syafii then rushed to the Kodim headquarters and contacted Overste (Lieutenant Colonel) Mukadji, the local army commander. He also contacted Captain Umar Badjuri, head of the spiritual section o f Kodim. Syafii maintained close contact with Kodim from 1 October through 9 October. He was the only civilian political leader known to do so. Undoubtedly, Kodim worked closely with the Brigif 16, or the 16th infantry brigade stationed in Kediri. On 9 October, Colonel Sampumo, the Brigif commander, summoned Syafii. He asked Syafii to hold a mass rally, which would be scheduled later. This represents an explicit expression of support from the local military for Syaffi to take action.18 He asked, why should NU and not the military itself organize the rally? Sampumo replied, "In Jakarta, although the victims were army officers, the doers were also army men. We don't know who takes side sana, and who belongs to sini."19The military could not ask the nationalist party PNI, since the party was split into the rightist nationalist PNI- I8Interview. Syafii confessed that he was contented; he was not afraid, although a little confused. I9Quoted from interview with Syafii Soleiman. Sana (there) and sini (here) were political terms, from the era of the nationalist movement, to divide clearly between “our side” and “their side.” R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 202] === 180 Osa and leftist nationalist PNI-Asu, with the latter considered too close to the PKI.20 The commander of Kodim also gave his promise of support saying he would send his men in civilian clothes. But there was still someone that Syafii had to consult—Kiyai Mahrus Aly of Pondok Pesantren Lirboyo. As chairman of Kediri NU, Syafii could not move without a blessing from this respected kiyai. On that very day, Syafii went to see Kiyai Mahrus, who was also the Rois Syuriah (chairman of the highest governing board) of NU in East Java. Kiyai Mahrus Aly agreed to give his consent to a mass rally. It is not clear whether Kiyai Aly gave his order to Ma'roefin before or after his meeting with Syafii Soleiman. This was a crucial point for determining the degree of military involvement in subsequent events.21 Nevertheless, Kiyai Mahrus Aly, Syafii Soleiman, and Ma’roefin held a meeting, and it was decided that in the confrontation to come, Syafii Soleiman would take the role of "inspector of the ceremony" and Ma'roefin the role of "field commander of the ceremony." Their separate responsibilities were clear: Syafii was to be responsible for the whole play, while Ma'roefin would take care of the technical operations of the showdown. By implication—but without saying so openly—they agreed that the rally would conclude with physical attacks on the 20PNI-Osa was led by Osa Maliki, and PNI-Asu was led by Ali Surachman. The term “Asu” also means dog, so the acronym PNI-Asu was also referring to the “leftist dogs.” 21Syafii Soleiman suspected that Ma'roefin came later, but Ma'roefin believed that he talked to Kiyai Aly before Syafii reported to the kiyai. "Official history" of the Pesantren Lirboyo emphasizes the first version. See 3 Tokoh Lirboyo... op.cii., p.95. R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 203] === 181 PKI headquarters.22 After receiving the blessing o f Kiyai Mahrus, Syafii and Ma'roefin traveled around, visiting the Majelis Wilayah Taklim (MWT), or the local councils of NU, to prepare for the rally. On the night of 10 October, they held a hasty meeting at the Chasbullah tailor shop, which was the Kediri NU headquarters, located in front of the city's train station. Syafii told the participants of the meeting that he received credible information from Lieutenant Colonel Sampumo that on 15 October the PKI members would set Kediri on fire. Party members had already come from their bases in Lodoyo, an area of South Blitar and were staying in the houses of PKI members in Kediri. In the next two days, 11-12 October, Syafii and Ma'roefin led the NU and Ansor members to prepare the rally with a single, clear order, "Tumpas PKI!" (Crush the PKI!). The main target was the PKI headquarters in Burengan. To carry out the task, they needed strong men, kuat lahir batin, or physically and spiritually strong. They succeeded in bringing together forty strong pemuda leaders. Among them were Ubaidillah a.k.a. Ubed, Ibrahim Bintoro (from the village of Plemahan), Mashud (from Mojo), Abdul Malik, Mohammad Djamaluddin, and Hanafi (from Grogol). All were Ansor ring leaders and current (or former) santris at various pesantren, including Lirboyo, Tebuireng (Jombang), and Bendo. The core participants ("ring leaders") consisted of about 250 people, mostly from Plemahan; Plemahan kamituwo, or "guardian elder of the village," “ Kenneth Young also got this information; op.cit., pp.79-80. Interviews with Gus Maksum, Syafii Soleiman, and Ma’roefin show that none of them spoke openly about the “conclusion” of the rally, although everyone knew that passing by in front of the PKI headquaters only meant that they would attack the headquaters. R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 204] === 182 was among them. They came riding bicycle with dobong and obrok-obrok (tool boxes at the back o f a bike) with notes such as "watch out! glasses!" or "watch out! eggs, don't touch!"—while from the inside portruded the tips of their sharp sickles.23 On the night of 12 October, many of them were roaming the streets. Disguising themselves as ice vendors and other street merchants, they went to have a look around the PKI headquarters. The rally took place the next day. Before the opening ceremony at 9.00 a.m., the police asked Ma'roefin about the route the masses would follow. Ma'roefin told them that he could not remember without the map, and that Syafii Soleiman had the map. When they asked Syafii, they were told that the map was with Ma'roefin; in this way, the police were succesfully side-lined. About 30,000-100,000 people from forty seven political parties and mass organizations other than the PKI and its affiliates, attended the rally.24 As parade commander, Ma'roefin started the program by reporting on the number of participants and other technicalities; this was followed by a recitation from Al-Qur'an and speeches from dignitaries. The first to deliver a speech was Regent Ahmad Sobari. He was reportedly so nervous that he delivered his speech in a trembling voice. Syafii then invited the commander of Kodim to deliver the second speech. He refused and seemed “ The number for parties and organizations is from HU 10-21-65. Other details were collected from interviews. “ Interviews: Syafii Soleiman and Ma’roefin. No written source available, but they remember the number of political parties joined the rally because of their roles. In a typical ceremony or rally of this kind, a “komandan upacara,” or ceremony commander, reported to the “inspektur upacara,” or the ceremony inspector, the details of the ceremony, such as number of participants. The capacity of this field called alun-alun was over 30,000 people; it was full of that time. But the 100,000 people as Ma'rufin wrote in his account was definitely an exageration. See appendix E. R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 205] === 183 reluctant to be seen in the forefront of this direct confrontation with the PKI.25 When Syafii took his turn, he toid the crowds that the event taking place in Jakarta was a coup. He quoted the term "coup" from an explanation given by Subchan ZE, a national leader and NU politician who had explained the term over the radio, after Yusuf Hasyim and Chalid Mawardi’s announcement that PKI was the mastermind. Syafii said that he never heard the term from the military.26 About 5,000 of the participants marched through the designated route. The first place destroyed was a house near the alun-alun. The house had a nameboard o f a PKI branch. But it turned out that the house belonged to First Lieutenant Kamdi o f Brigif 16. The PKI sub-branch office itself was down the alley from Kamdi's house; the PKI had only used Kamdi's strategic wall.27 At the PKI headquarters in mBurengan, the rally goers found bamboo spears, arrows, knives, and bottles full of chilli water.28 There was an unverified claim that the attackers found documents showing that the communists had already prepared lists of their enemies, presumably for subsequent execution.29 With little resistance, the first PKI victim fell at this place, where about 100 bikes were also burned. “ Confession of Syafii Soleiman; interviews. “ Interviews. “ Later that night, Kamdi showed up at Setonogedong, brought an assault automatic gun with him, demanded a compensation. But Ma'roefin's kids stripped him off his gun. Ma'roefin then called the commander of the MP. The incident was solved with a compensation. “ Interviews: Ma’roefin, Kastolani. K enneth Young, op.cit., p.80. R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 206] === 184 Altogether, between fifteen and twenty four people were killed in the rampage; about 2,500 bikes were burned and destroyed.30 In addition to this, the headquarters of CSS PKI as well as the Sobsi, Gerwani and BTI headquarters were destroyed. Ma'roefin's account stressed the importance of gemblengan, or martial arts practice, in this first anti PKI violent mass action in the wake o f the Gestapu Affair. He boasted that the Banser/Ansor youths were invulnerable to any weapon. As a practical matter, moreover, the police could do nothing to stop mass slaughters, because the military seemed to support them. Indeed, Lieutenant Colonel Sampumo kept his word by sending militer men in civilian clothes to join the mobs. This incident was carefully planned and not a spontanous outburst. One supporting fact is that in addition to the advance preparations, Syafii and Ma'roefin drew a long parade route; from the alun-alun, the first assembly point to the PKI's headquarters, the distance was about four miles—more than two hours' walking-distance. Without careful planning, it would have been impossible to control thousands of participants marching that far. The core group from Plemahan had planned to stay overnight in the city, using Ma'roefin's family complex, including a mosque, as their base. But in the afternoon there were rumors that their families in Plemahan were in danger, and they returned in haste to their village, needlessly as it turned out—the rumors were false. After the rally, Kodim announced a nightly curfew to last from 13 to 15 October: from 9.00 p.m. to 5.00 a.m., no 30H U 10-21-65—this was the only newspaper report on the incident—reported casualties were 11 seriously wounded, four of them were later died, while Syafifi Soleiman gave the number of 15, Ma'roefin 24, and Kastolani (from rank and file's point of view) 6 casualties. Based on their positions at the time and details of other information they gave in the interviews, Syafii's number was probably the most acurate. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 207] === 185 gathering of more than five people was permitted. Only those with emergencies were excepted, and they were required to use a torch.31 The core group now gathered in Setonogedong and used couriers to report on conditions around the city/town. The next day, 14 October 1965, all senior members of the local administration and representatives of all political parties and mass organizations, including the PKI and its affiliates, met at the Regent of Kediri's residence. Considering their strength in Kediri's local assembly,32 it was impossible at that time to leave out the PKI representatives. But none of the PKI leaders would dare question the violent incident, at least openly. Led by the mayor, the meeting was also attended by the commander of the regional (Korem 081) military command Colonel Willy Soedjono. In the army's hierarchy, the Kodim 0809 of Kediri was under this Korem 081, stationed in the city o f Madiun, about 50 miles west of Kediri. Also attending was Resident Daruko, commander of Kodim 0809 Lieutenant Colonel Mukadji, and Police Chief Soeharso. In the meeting, Willy Soedjono stated that the so-called Council of Generals never existed. He also warned that every organization should control its members and no party should take revenge against another.33 The latter warning was an implicit threat that the PKI should not avenge the killings of the previous day. After the meeting, however, the military moved decisively. Feeling confident of PKI's plight, they arrested 40,000 alleged PKI members within the next two days. Those 3lDP 10-19-65; HU 10-21-65. 32See chapter IV. 33H U 10-21-65; DP 10-19-65. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 208] === 186 who were considered "clean" were then immediately released; still, large numbers were detained. Four days after the rally, on 17 October, Commander Mukadji summoned Syafii Soleiman. Captain Saad, chief of intelligence section of Kodim, accompanied Syafii. Both military officers complained to Syafii about how to feed 40,000 detainees, since Kodim had no money for such a purpose. Syafii also had no idea about how to solve the problem; NU had no money and could barely feed its own poor members. The meeting took two hours, with every proposal ending in a dead-end. Syafii proposed the only feasible solution, which was soliciting contributions from wealthy people in Kediri. Mukadji and Saad refused his proposal, arguing that Kodim would suffer a bad image if it asked for money directly from the wealthy. After a lengthy discussion, Syafii then proposed that those detainees should be disekolahkan, or "sent to school." Mukadji and Saad did not catch the message. Syafii elaborated, "Send them to school, to Sukabumi.... yes, kill them!" Mukadji and Saad did not catch the message. Syafii elaborated, "Send them to school, to Sukabumi.... yes, kill them!" Mukadji and Saad were perplexed, but after a moment of silence said, "But... how?" Syafii answered that it was easy to do, just so long as Mukadji and Saad agreed on the principle. The detainees were then divided into groups to be sent to lubang buqya, or "crocodile holes." The term "lubang buaya" was used on purpose, to remind people of the name of the well where the generals' bodies had been dumped in the vicinity of Jakarta. Executioners were contacted, some from Ansor, and some who were military men in civilian clothes. At night, about 15,000 of the prisoners were "sent to school. About R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urth er reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 209] === 187 25,000 more were released. Syafii and the Kodim called these operations operasi leratur, or "orderly operations." Syafii estimated that another 5,000 victims were casualties of other "disorderly" operations, bringing the total to 20,000 victims. It was difficult, if not impossible, to verify the total number of victims from the "orderly operation," since Syafii's account is the only information available.34 But there is little doubt that these "orderly operations" took place and resulted in a staggering number of casualties. "Disorderly operations," by contrast, occured in a different pattern. Since the curfew, Lieutenant Colonel Mukadji held nightly meetings with Ma'roefin and his group. Mukadji always came in civilian clothes. He asked some standard questions about the situation in the field and collected information from members of the group. Thus, every night, at about 8.30 p.m., he showed up at Setonogedong "to have a look around." The Brigif commander at that time was Lieutenant Colonel Sampumo, who gave Ma'roefin a Luger pistol~"made in Germany gun that should be cocked upward," recalled Ma'roefin. Sampumo also sent Lieutenant Badjuri, from Pusat Rohani (Pusroh), or the Spiritual Center Section of the Army, to guard Ma'roefin when he made his rounds. Badjuri's assault machine gun never left his side. The two men used Ma'roefin's brother-in-law's sedan, a Vauxhall, to visit the sub-branches of Ansor in Keras, Wates, and Pare subdistricts. 34Interview with Syafii Soleiman was the only confirmed information on this matter. No other informant was aware of this "orderly operation." My efforts to trace the military personnels were fruitless. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 210] === 188 2. The operations After the first attacks on PG Tjoekir, operations took place every night in Jombang. Sometimes the executioners went out to slaughter the victims during the day, as well. It was not a difficult task, since PKI had membership lists; guided by these lists, the killers dragged the PKI members from their houses and executed them in every possible place. However, a post-killing analysis posits that the military planted the lists, arguing that only the military had the ability to type and provide neat and complete lists. It was argued that the military intended to spark mass anger.35 In most cases, however, the vigilante groups needed no lists; they personally knew the "candidates" to become the next victims. The group with Rusdi in Tjoekir, for instance, knew PKI activists such as Kamin and Suroso in Seblak, a neighboring village. On one occasion, they met a PKI member in the midst of busy shoppers in the traditional market; they killed him right there. They did this and other show-off actions to inspire a horror so that other PKI members were afraid to take counter actions. For members of the vigilante groups, the situation was too black and white. It was a matter of kill or be killed—a theme that was always spoken out from every participant, and was believed by everyone considering the intense violent conflicts over the years. Yusuf Hasyim, chairman of Ansor, recalled, "For members of Ansor, there was no other choice, to kill or be killed. Of course, we chose to kill."36 It was also widely believed that the PKI 35Yusuf Hasyim, interview. He said that the lists were always neatly typewritten. But there was no cross-evidence to support this suspicion. 36Yusuf Hasyim, interview. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 211] === 189 had prepared some wells intendedly for burying bodies of the ulama; they were also believed to prepare a special tool for gouging out the eyes of the targeted people.37 There was a popular belief which remains unconfirmed and hotly contested that the military planted these evidence on purpose or not.38 Soon the house of Rusdi Anwar became the center of the activities in Jombang. For nearby operations, they used his car, a small Morric truck. The neighborhood later assumed that when the truck went away the group must run an operation. The largest operation took place on 25 October in Mlancu,39 a relatively remote and isolated area south of Kandangan, at the border of Jombang and Kediri. This particular episode lasted for one day, from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m., and took the lives of about 700 people. In this operation, a company of military men, wearing civilian clothes and led by Captain Mufti, guarded the vigilante group; they were watching but took no active role in the slaughters. This particular operation was not usual, since it was done during the day; the more commonly pattern was to hold operations at night. In his own words, Rusdi recalled: The captain and his troops followed my order. Then I told them all [including the civilian members], kill this, kill that! It lasted for the whole day, from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m. If I'am not mistaken, we got about 700 people. Some of them died instantly, some not; we just buried them all. My hands were sore because of the heavy sword that I used. In Mlancu, in 37All executioners swore that they indeed found such proofs: the wells. But only a few confessed that they themselves found the eye-gorging tools. It is difficult to assess the accuracy of this information. Only in one time I found a slaughtering place, that is in Ngrayut (to be discussed later), that resembles the "wells." 38See discussion in the next subchapter. 39None of the executioners remembers the exact date during the interviews. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 212] === 190 Mlancu mount."40 In the hinterland of Jombang, uncounted numbers of elementary school teachers were taken into the graveyards and killed. On one occasion, it was reported that Kiyai Ichsan of Mojowamo, considering the horrible situation, was trying to stop the slaughters; he told members of the vigilante groups to bring the PKI members to the court instead. But only a few listened to him. Feeling threatened, and branded as PKI, many workers and peasants fled to the house of Tachrip, a school teacher living in the village of Mojowamo. Recalling this, Tachrip said, "The real PKI member had no nerve to show up here."41 When the number grew, he sent them to Kiyai Ichsan. Many of them listed in PKI's membership, although in reality they did not fully understand their political affiliations. Many of them doing regular sembahyang, or five-time daily prayings, as required by Islamic tenets. The pattern of slaughters in Jombang was more subtle and surreptitious, with a smaller scale of operations than in Kediri. There was no other large operation other than the one done in Mlancu. For the smaller operations, the vigilante groups used Rusdi's open small Morris tmck. If they needed more cars, Rusdi would just go to PG Tjoekir and asked the transportation staff to provide a tmck or two. PG Tjoekir provided everything— gas, oil, driver—even for Rusdi's private car. The director, Seno, had no courage to refuse the demands, nor did any of the senior staff in the loji. Rusdi confessed that the 40Rusdi Anwar, interview. 41H. Tachrip, interview. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 213] === 191 relationships between the two were just like cat and dog. In some cases, Rusdi had to show his physical might. I liked to show off. I would knock down any crude person. I had studied this ability for a long time. Since the war, while my friends studied hard at schools, I only studied this physical might. I did only owatcm, or physical training. I always asked my older brother to take me to mighty kiyais to get their ilmu. I could do that because I did the amalan, or recitation to be physically mighty. Now, I lost that power, because there's no need to keep it. After the PKI's era, why should we ask for foes and enemies? But I was not a smart guy; all I know is how to fight.42 While later the military involvement in the Kediri operations was evident, their presence in the operations in Jombang was more obscure. There was an unverified rumor that General Nasution sent a radiogram conveying orders to the local military officers to protect the kiyais; as a result of this radiogram, military men guarded Kiyai Mbah Bisri Sansuri and Kiyai Wahab Hasbullah.43 Arifin Khan confessed that he led some operations in Jombang and Kediri as well, taking advantage of a gun he kept, given to him by the military authorities as a token of trust, or so he believed.44 But there was no other evidence that any civilian member of the vigilante group in Jombang had any gun or other military weapon. Yusuf Hasyim, on the other hand, as a retired first lieutenant in the army and as an active participant in politics in Jakarta, did have a gun. Members of the vigilante groups did not need guns anyway. There was a feeling 42Rusdi Anwar, interview. 43Interview with K.H. A.Z. Arifin Khan, an ulama in Jombang; no other sources could remember this information. ^Considering the surreptitious nature of the operations (will later be elaborately discussed), there is no reason not to believe his confession; but, I could not find other key informants to cross-examine his confession, since there is no supporting confessions from other participants. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 214] === 192 that holding a gun could mean someone was a coward, because using a pistol required less physical might and skills to finish off the enemies. Holding a gun also did not guarantee that someone could kill an enemy, for many believed that they were invulnerable to bullets. However, the leaders who held guns were respected because guns showed a recognition of their positions by the suprastructure. A pistol, therefore, was more a symbol of authority and official power of the state than a weapon for killing. One-to-one fighting was a common feature of the mass-scale conflicts. The use of personal weapons such as clurit (a large and open-mouthed sickle), sword, keris (a Javanese dagger), and other similar types of weapons was evidence that the players staged one-to-one fights. But such one-to-one fights were conducted on a mass scale. Thus, violent conflicts emerged in the form of massive killings, built on the edifice of personal confrontations and tete-a-tete politics. Therefore, the following accounts of very personal kesaktian, or supernatural power, should be understood in this pretext.4S After the initial reactions to the Gestapu Affairs in Jakarta, which culminated in the mass rally of 13 October, the joint forces of vigilante groups in Kediri put alertness as their first priority. During the three-day curfew, the situation was very quiet yet tense. The first slaughters took place after this curfew. Operations mostly took place on the west side of the Brantas River, in the subdistricts and villages of Mojo, Keras, Ngadiluwih, Grogol, mostly by Ansor vigilante groups, with the total number of participants of about 200 4SThere is no satisfying rendition of this Javanese concept. I would elaborate this concept mostly in the conclusion but also every here and there throughout this study. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 215] === 193 members. During the operations, they wore all black "uniforms," giving a mysterious and powerful psychological effect of fighting and killing. On 16 October 1965, once again Banser/Ansor held another rally; this time it was attended by a smaller number of Ansor activists and sympathizers. Held in Grogol, the rally was led by Iskanda, the area's chair of Ansor. After this time, operations reached far to the villages and subdistricts of Satang, Jengkol, Mbiro, and Bendosari. In the village of Kepang Pace, only one adult male survived; the rest of the adult males were killed. This meant that over one thousand adult males "went to sukabumi."46 With the increasing horror, after the curfew, many PKI members left their houses and moved to sleep in the front of the Wijaya movie theater, which was close to Kodim and police headquarters. They thought that by spending their nights at these places they would avoid the house-to-house search by the vigilante groups. But quietly, Kodim took hundreds of them to Sukosewu plantations, and sent them to "sukabumi." These operations seemed to be different and separate from other operations conducted by the vigilante groups. But the military would not start these operations until they felt confident of who belonged to sana (there) and who belonged to sini (here). It was said that there was an officer who had just moved from Pandegiling, West Java. He was a fierce killer; later, it turned out that he himself was allegedly a PKI sympathizer. Members of vigilante 46A small village in Java was normally inhabited by a population o f about 3,000. If the population of Kepang Pace at this time was 6,000-15,000 then the number of casualties could reach as high as 2,000. Data from interviews; it was impossible to arrive at an acurate number, since no statistics was available. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 216] === 194 groups believed that he was covering his past by his actions, hoping that no one would be suspicious. In practically every village, members of PKI gathered in their headquarters, making it easier to trap them. Those who were detained by the military, or who were caught alive but sent to the military prisons, or who voluntarily surrendered to the military to avoid the slaughter, all spent their nights together inside the prisons. But in some cases vigilante groups came and "borrowed" the detainees to be sent to sukabumi. It is difficult to judge whether the military actually invited the gangs to finish them off, or whether they simply relented out of fear of a mass reaction; the initiative might have come from both sides.47 Under the curfew, it seems that nothing happened. But once the curfew was over, the dramatic and orgiastic play was staged on the theater of personal outbursts and even vendettas. One of the first incidents took place in the village of Nyawangan. An executioner went wild. He ordered dozens of PKI members to lie down in line, altogether making a human chain of over a hundred feet. He started to execute them one by one while screaming loudly. News of this reached Ma'roefin and Anwar Zein, the mayor of Kediri. Off they went, only to find this algojo, or executioner, still going wild after "finishing the line," threatening to kill anyone approaching him. He yelled, "I don't need the Ansor chairman or even the mayor here! I want Kiyai Mahfud!" Kiyai Mahfud was one o f the respected kiyais from whom this man apparently sought to receive his physical power. Kiyai Mahfud was 47Interviewees mostly agreed with the second argument, that the military were afraid, while most written interpretation agreed with the first argument; see Pipit Rochijat, "Am I PKI or Non-PKI?" Indonesia, No.40 (October) 1985, p.41. R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 217] === 195 picked up from his house; he arrived, accompanied by a truck full of soldiers dispatched from Brigif 16. The kiyai calmed the executioner down, and put him under his control. The authorities and Ansor's group then drove back to Kediri without taking any action against the executioner. Ma'roefin confessed that during the operations, he never used his gun, except once.4*He joined the vigilantes in an operation to Keras. The PKI members resisted, using arrows; he shot at them, but he was not sure whether he hit anyone or not. Although every algojo, or executioner, referred to him as "manager of the algojos," he was never an algojo himself. He admitted that he recruited the groups, recruited additional groups from other places, if necessary, and sent them to various places to do the operations, but he did not admit to killing a single member of the PKI.49 Indeed, little evidence was found that leaders like him, or in positions of the authority like his, were involved directly as executioners. They stood at some distance from the executioners, yet still commanding authority. Their relatively distant positions gave enough room for the anak-anak to maneuver in their own search and executions. In several occasions the anak-anak even went to conduct their operations as if they were ordered by Kodim, or the district military command. 4*Ma'roefin recalled, he used to train his shooting skill at Klotok; he kept the gun until the general elections in 1971. 49During interviews, he strongly denied he killed any PKI. He said he would willingly do the killings but his children warned and insisted him not to do the slaughters himself. There is no reason not to believe his story; but it is also doubtful, considering his position as "manager" of the execution's groups. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 218] === 196 One incident took place when an Ansor youth by the name of Islam killed seven PKI members from the East City. Pretending as an agent from Kodim, he took them from their houses and finished them all. It turned out that one of them was a father of a captain with RPKAD, the army's special forces that led the movement to crush the PKI everywhere else. Later, this captain showed up at Kodim, heavily armed, and demanded the surrender of "Usman." Kodim then contacted Ma'roefin at Setonogedong, but Ma'roefin said that there was no one named of Usman. He permitted the Kodim's personnel to search for themselves. Ma'roefin immediately went to Syafii Soleiman to borrow his Vespa scooter, and took Islam to Pesantren Tebuireng in Jombang. The wrong reference saved Islam's life. Before and during the slaughters, there were two influential kiyais—KH Syafii Marzuki and KH Mahrus Aly—who maintained direct links to the vigilante groups in Kediri. The two had different views on the slaughters. Kiyai Mahrus argued that killing the communists was justifiable; however, it must be done respectfully. He was known to make an analogy that when slaughtering animals, the executioner should use a sharp knife or sword. At one and another times during the operations, he was reportedly furious over the anak-anak who cut their victims' ears first before slaughtering them, or to cut the litlle fingers off to be brought home as tokens of bravery. He also stated that if someone had recited syahadat (the fundamental two-sentence oath in Islam stating that Allah was the only God and that Muhammad is the Messenger of God), he or she should not be killed. Referring his view to the prophet's deeds, the kiyai asserted that fighting against the PKI was a battle against the infidels. Thus, when R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 219] === 197 someone who was allegedly suspected as standing on the other side as "infidel," turned out to be Muslim, it was not right to kill him or her. As a report showed, religious factor indeed played an important role in the slaughters, although there is no strong evidence to support the assertion that Mahrus Aly stated that the "killings were the will of God."50 But Kiyai Syafii was different. He argued that the Gestapu could not be related to the period of Muhammad. This Gestapu was a conflict between the government and rebels, taking place in a form that never happened in the prophet's time, so the religious laws being used and applied should be different. A rebel, even though he or she is not an infidel, should be killed; disobedience to the legitimate state should be punished. By contrast, an infidel who was not a rebel should not be killed, since the infidelity was his or her personal accountability to God. Rebellion and overt disobedient actions against the state were social actions disrupting the existing order. The anak-anak, or members of vigilante groups, understandably, peferred to apply Kiyai Syafii's argument rather than that of Kiyai Mahrus. This philosophical, and even theological, foundation sheds light on some cases when the would-be victim asked to do sholat, or to pray in the Islamic fashion before being killed; and they received permission to do so. This perception refutes the single interpretation that religious affiliation (Islam) was the only driving force for the killings. $0NYT 08-24-66. Contrary to popular belief that Machrus Ali and other ulama issued a statement that killing the Communists was a jihad or holy war, my informants, who worked closely with Machrus Ali during that time, confessed that he never issued a statement. I suspect that this sentence in NYTs report was taken out of context. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 220] === 198 There was no single pattern of slaughters, but generally the anak-anak came from both near and far. In Jombang, Rusdi's house was the center of activities. He received visitors from as far as Pasuruan and Bangil (about 50 miles east of Jombang), Bojonegoro (about 60 miles north of Jombang) and Madiun (about 40 miles west of Jombang), asking his help to crush the PKI in their respective areas. Rusdi, who acted as a kind of "manager," could only sometimes spare some anak-anak, since he needed the manpower. The operation in Kandangan, for instance, was requested by local people. In cases where Rusdi could not send the anak-anak, as orcmg kuat, strong man, he just gave his blessings and amulets. A similar situation was found in Kediri. Ma'roefin's house on Setonogedong soon became the center of operations, with him acting as the "manager" of the operations. The anak-anak gathered from around the city, and were on alert around the clock. Sometimes, if possible, like the situation in Jombang, they sent the anak-anak to help the operations as far away as Malang (about 60 miles southeast of Kediri). Some "supra local" leaders such as Yusuf Hasyim, chairman of Ansor, and local leaders who maintained contacts beyond regency's boundaries such as Syafii Soleiman, moved back and forth between Jombang and Kediri. Around the clock, the anak-anak received information from here and there about the names of suspected PKI members. Then they split into groups and went out when darkness came. The group could consist of as few as three members or as many as a couple dozens; the average size was six to ten people. Most wore black pants and shirts. They brought with them some weapons, with the short swords and sickles being the R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 221] === 199 favorites, although they also used various other weapons such as iron pipe. The types of weapons depended on availabity and effectiveness. Before leaving the “headquarters” they set up their targets: the names and houses. The victims were easy to find, for all of them lived in known neighborhoods. The gangs took the victims from their houses and brought them to the nearest place of execution. There was no pattern as to the number of victims slaughtered in one group. There could be as few as two or as many as twenty or thirty. Following the ambush on PG Tjoekir in Jombang on 6 October and the Apel Siaga in Kediri on 13 October, the operations were very frequent and the slaughtering places were scattered everywhere. The most common situation was for the “guys” to surround the house. One o f them knocked on the front or back door, calling the name of the would-be victim to go out. He was ready to fight. The rest of the group was waiting, ready to give help if the one who was calling got into trouble. Only in a very few cases did the assigned gang member get in trouble because the prey resisted “arrest.” In most cases, the victim just gave up and came out of his house. The “guys” then tied his hands, and together they moved to another house. This time, another gang member was assigned to call another victim and a similar process took place. When the group had arrested all it targeted victims, it went in a procession to the killing fields with all its victims tied with tree-bark rope. Each victim would be asked to kneel down, and the executioner would usually choose the nape of his neck as a target to swing the sword. If the weapon was an iron or steel pipe, the executioner would choose the upper part of the nape. It was said that the nape was the most effective target to send R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 222] === 200 the victim to “like the earth.” Seldom did the victim run or fight back. But if this happened, the executioner then attacked him at whatever target he could find on the victim's body. During the first 3-4 weeks of slaughters, however, the “guys” just slaughtered people in public places, or threw bodies of the victims into open fields, paddy fields, streets, local markets, and rivers. Many of these bodies were beheaded. In Jombang, often after finishing an operation, the “guys” brought home with them some "souvenirs": an ear or a piece of finger from each victim they slaughtered. In Kediri, the “guys” cut off the victim's penises and took them to a brothel house in Ngadiluwih, where they inserted them into the prostitutes' rooms. On the bodies that they sent to float in the Brantas river, they put PKI banners. The operations did not take place only at night. Many vigilante groups went out during the day. But these daylight operations rarely reached to households. The “guys” went straight to the locations thought to be the gathering places of PKI members, such as their headquarters and meeting houses. The “guys” also searched for PKI members in public places such as the markets and bus terminals. When they found PKI members in these places, they slaughtered them right there. They stopped the buses and asked the passengers to declare themselves Muslims or not. If the answer was yes, then the gang asked them to recite the syahadat. Rarely could someone not recite this sentence; if this happened, he was dragged out of the bus and finished right there. On one occasion, someone with a Chinese look was on a bus going to Kediri. He was asked whether he was Muslim or not; he said that he was a son of Kiyai Jampes, one of a very few kiyais known for their sufism (and therefore supernatural and physical power). The gang did not believe R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 223] === 201 him, and still asked him to recite the syahadat. He later complained to Ma'roefin, who was very grateful that the kiyai's son was not angry. If he had been, the incident could have been devastating for Ma'roefin's groups. In general, the “guys” tried to create a horrifying effect and they succeeded in doing so. There was no report of any major counter attacks by the PKI members. Occasionally, there were minor skirmishes, such as an incident that took place on 28 October, in the village of Karangredjo, a subdistrict of Ponggok, Srengat, Blitar (neighboring regency of Kediri), at 10.30 p.m. when a group of Pemuda Rakyat members attacked and killed Corporal Satidjo from the Puterpra 0808/7. Satidjo was patrolling the area when attacked and his assault gun was seized, although a counter military operation took back the gun.51 At about the same time, the military found about 500 members of Pemuda Rakyat wandering around in remote places of Plosoklaten (Kediri), in the vicinity of Mount Gong, and in the subdistrict of Maron in the border area between the regencies of Tulungagung and Blitar.52 "Why did we not fight back at that time?" a survivor answered his own question, "Because we did not know anything. We never received orders from the party leaders to fight back."53 51Explanation of Willy Sudjono in DP 01-04-66. This minor incident was used as a military propaganda, and received a special announcement. A propaganda tone was evident. 52Again, it is a propaganda. There is no reason to suspect that a band of exPemuda Rakyat members who were “just wandering around” was building a strength. They were quite probably at large, under an extreme fear, to avoid the slaughters. 53Samikun, interview. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 224] === 202 Following the “disorderly operations” of the last part of October, conflicts erupted into a month-long pattern of killings and slaughters during the month of November 1965. Members of the loji employee clusters fell victim almost everyday. Killings and other effects on the plantation's world could be exemplified by the situation in PG Meritjan.54 On 1 November 1965, three workers were reportedly "non-active." This meant that they were missing from their workplace and never showed up afterwards; this also meant that they had almost certainly been slaughtered. On the same day, five other loji employees were discharged. The director might have been responding to an increasing political pressure. But since the discharges were retroactively applied, the employees probably had died.55 On the following day, 2 November 1965, four loji employees were reported slaughtered. By 11 November, several more victims had fallen, either killed, discharged, or labeled "non-active" (meaning missing). On 17 November, six more were slaughtered; in this way victims fell throughout the rest of the month.56 Overall, forty seven were killed or missing, two of whom were not listed in the official report. A content analysis shows that only two people were members of the senior staff—in other words, members of the loji world. The loji employees suffered the most; they lost thirty three members. From the 540n this part and subsequent details, sources are documents attached as appendices 2 and 3, as well as interviews with Slamet and Nico. Unfortunately, no similar documents available for other PGs, although this one should be an exemplary picture. 55This should not be excluded as a strong probability, for the document was prepared and signed on 01-03-1966 56See details in appendix 3. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 225] === 203 lower ranks, only nine fell victim. From the kampanye, or temporary workers, only three fell victims. These facts alone provide at least two provisional yet significant conclusions. The lower their rank in the second world, the less they had been politically active and the less they fell victim to the conflicts. Further derivative from this fact was that economic conditions and deprivation were not the basis of the violent conflict. This was a denial of marxian treatments of the conflicts, and it was clear evidence of failure of a native rendition of marxism and communism as adopted nationally by the PKI. Further evidence in later years, and from a different plantations shows a pattern consistent with this conclusion.57 Amidst an uncertain situation, there were reports of sabotage on the sugar plantations every now and then. Although the operation of the mills was not much affected since the slaughters took place after the milling season of 1965, nevertheless there was an increasing number of cane thieveries, destruction of seedling fields, burning of cane fields, and so on.58 To control the situation, the central management in Surabaya on 15 November issued a manual on how to deal with sabotage prevention. The manual included how to move flammable waste from the mill, security measures for wharehouses, handling of oil and gas, with detailed description on sabotage prevention on milling instruments. Then, while admitted that the situation was difficult to handle since many of the workers were members of PKI or its affiliate organizations, the management of PPN XXI in Surabaya issued a letter on 15 November 1965, stressing that alertness and searching of 57See appendix 4 and its content analysis in chapter VI. 58Samsoeri, interview. R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 226] === 204 the alleged leftist workers were not enough.; to help remedy the situation the management suggested that the authority should adopted intensive campaigns to "contra brainwashing" of those workers.59 The letter further stated that those who were temporarily discharged were obliged to report to the closest Uterpra, or military station. It also regulated that workers who were detained but not yet indicted were temporarily discharged. If later they were found not guilty, they would be reinstalled in their previous positions; but if they were found guilty, they would be permanently discharged without honor. A week later, on 22 November 1965, the East Java regional military command issued a letter which said that the workers allegedly involved in the Gestapu Affair should be discharged or temporarily suspended; the actions should be approved first by the district military command (Kodim). For those who were temporarily suspended, they would receive only 50 percent of normal salary, either in cash or in natura (certain things as substitute for the cash), in addition to medical benefits for they themselves or their dependents to be decided by their employer.60 After mid-November, the operations became more subtle and calmer; yet, the scale of slaughters was still massive. People now rarely saw corpses in public places. The killing fields were now exclusively remote: in Jombang, places that looked eerie, such as under the bamboo trees or small bushes in the ricefields, far from the neighborhood; in Kediri, 59Letter signed by Liauw Kok Tjin, coordinator of production departments in East Java. 60Letter from East Java Pepelrada, signed by Lt. Col. Susilo, coordinating officer for sugar factories in East Java, no. AX-Sukep/65.027/Pepelrada, dated 22 November 1965. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 227] === 205 the gisikan, or the Brantas riverbanks. After beheading, the executioners could just throw the bodies into the river. Almost nightly, the vigilante groups came to the small bushes on these riverbanks. Wearing black or other dark clothing, they came in groups of five to ten. No one wore masks, and no one brought a gun. They brought with them various types of weapons, such as clurit (open-mouthed sickle), regular sickle used in the ricefield, sword, and iron pipe. The latter was a favorite, since a piece of iron pipe was an effective weapon to kill fast. Experience showed that the weakest and least hurt was the upper part of the nape of neck. Using sword or sickle, the weakest part was the upper part of the front neck.61 The groups brought with them some ten to twenty "candidates" or victims, herded and chained together their hands tied. During the processions, victims rarely resisted. A survivor recalled: I was arrested, together with my friends, by the military; we were detained at the police station. One night, we were taken to Nogosari, about 100 meters from the police station. They tied our thumbs with thread. There were some people already there, dozens of them, all wearing masks and bringing sword, clurit, and knives. They used torch to give a clear sight. Then, one by one my friends were killed. We were powerless. We could not fight back because we were outnumbered, and we did not have any weapon. Some were begging but they slaughtered them anyway. I was lucky. I was slashed with a sword, but I was invulnerable. I was pretending to be dead, then when the executioners left the place, I ran through the ricefield to my sister’s house at the Kampak marketplace. I was hiding in the room, never went out from the bedroom until the situation became safe in 1966.1 was lucky because the executioners thought I had died. One night, Pairan, my brother-in-law, took me with his bike to Trenggalek. From there, I went to Lampung and never returned until 1982.62 61Details were collated from interviews. 62Poniran, interview. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 228] === 206 The group usually went to their favorite spot on the riverbanks. On many occasions, on their way, they met with other executioner groups. Except in cases when they were from the same dispatching place, such as Rusdi Anwar's house or Ma'roefin's Setonogedong, these groups did not personally know each other, especially between those who were affiliated with different political or mass organizations. However, they recognized leaders and members of the other groups. On the spot alongside riverbanks, one by one the victims would be ordered to kneel down and be slaughtered. With dozens, sometimes hundreds o f bodies dumped into the river, the stench was awful and the Brantas river became a floating cemetery. No fisherman would go fishing, and no one wanted to consume fish from this particular river. It was said that some people who consumed the fish found human fingers inside the fish belly. Decomposed bodies reached Brantas' estuaries in Gresik and Surabaya, the capital city of East Java and the second largest city in Indonesia. Unconfirmed, unverified, and confusing reports, added by rumors, reached Jakarta, that the Brantas River was daily full of thousands of slaughtered bodies, mostly without heads. The issue was then brought into a limited meeting of Komando Operasi Tertinggi (KOTI), or the Highest Operational Command, the highest authority institution in the transitional period in Jakarta, held on the night of 26 December 1965. After the meeting, President Sukarno announced the formation of a "fact finding mission" to gather information from the field.63 Minister of Internal Affairs Dr. Soemamo Sosroatmodjo led the nine-member commission, and members included Cabinet Minister/Commander of the 63SP 12-28-65 R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 229] === 207 Police Inspector General Sutjipto Judodihardjo, Minister of Information Achmadi, Minister of Agraria Hermanses, State Minister Oei Tjoe Tat, Joint Chief V o f KOTI Colonel (MP) Sunarso, and three representatives from political parties (including Chalid Mawardi from NU, and Zaini Mansjur).64 In a post-meeting conference, Chief of Staff of KOTI Major General Suharto announced that members of the commision were chosen based upon political affiliationrepresenting Christian, NU, and Nationalist groupings. The commission would be visiting Central Java, East Java, Bali, and North Sumatra—provinces that had been reported as having suffered most in the post-Gestapu period—for two weeks of on-the-spot data collection. They would survey the number of victims and the causes of killings as an epilogue of the Gestapu Affair, and their findings would be reported collectively to the president. The commission was expected to submit recommendations to solve the problem. Since the existence of the commission was made public, and Chalid Mawardi was vice chairman of Ansor, news immediately reached Jombang and Kediri. Mayor Anwar Zein o f Kediri and a member of NU immediately called Ma'roefin; the mayor handed out Rp. 15,000 to cleanse up the Brantas riverbanks and other alleged slaughtering fields. Ma'roefin led his followers to the riverbanks and cleaned the area from the bodies. "We buried the bodies that were found on the riverbanks. We hooked the floating bodies to the ^Mansjur's political affiliation and the third person were not reported; SF s note was "the wire [of the reporting] was broken"; SP 12-28-65. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 230] === 208 riverbanks and buried them. Everything seemed clean and clear."65 The commission dispatched to East Java was popularly known in Jombang-Kediri as the Oei Tjoe Tat commission, although Minister of Information Achmadi actually led the team. In a two-day tour, on 11-13 November, they visited Bangil, Pasuruan, Kediri, Tulungagung, and Blitar. In Kediri, they found nothing. At a public conference, Achmadi announced that the situation was increasingly back to normal, and that the news reaching Jakarta was not based on reality.66 The commision went back to Jakarta, taking with them the count of victims based on "real facts," to be reported to the president and announced a week later. On 3 January 1966 Colonel Willy Soedjono repeated the statement, that the news about the wild slaughters and bodies floating on the Brantas River were not based on reality; the report had been exaggerated by "counter-revolutionary" forces.67 Indeed, the whole scene o f national theater of politics by this time had been completely changed. A CIA report noted: Although the PKI has not been banned throughout Indonesia, this action, for immediate practical purposes, would be largely a formality. Army commanders have on their own initiative outlawed the party in more than half the country's provinces. Although for the moment, the PKI clandestine apparatus is largely leaderless, it probably retains the capacity for at least limited sabotage. However, the army no longer fears a full-scale PKI insurgency. Repression of the PKI has led to large-scale defections from the party, and 6SMa'roefin, interview. 66SP 11-13-65 67The statement was headline of DP 01-04-66. This was the only published article linked directly to the slaughters. Other news or articles only vaguely referred to the killings. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 231] === 209 these are likely to continue. In addition, the slaughter of PKI members and sympathizers in North Sumatra, East and Central Java, and Bali is continuing.68 On 15 January, the President announced the commission's finding that 87,000 had been killed.69 All but a few hundred were said to have been Communists and their followers. The New York Times reported that the death toll was announced by President Sukarno almost in a whisper, after a cabinet meeting in Bogor.70 The president said that the toll "was bigger than that in the current Vietnam war." "Should the dead of the six generals be paid at this price," he asked. By this time, it was widely reported that the army joined hand-in-hand with local Muslim leaders to orchestrate the mass slaughters; the following report from the New York Times could serve as example of the news that reached the wider world: The Army was joined by Muslim mobs wielding long knives called parangs. Meanwhile, western diplomatic sources in close touch with Jakarta said most of the dead Communists, sympathizers and their families had been butchered by Muslim gangs avenging years in the political wilderness amid rising Communist influence. Several thousand Reds were believed to have been quietly executed by the army. A Muslim "holy war" against the Communists had been raging in the East Java since last spring, these informants said, and in the anti-Communist fervor following the unsuccessful coup attempt the bloodshed intensified and spread to other areas.71 68CIA Intelligence Memorandum, "The Changed Political Scene in Indonesia," 3 January 1966. Case #88-119, Doc. #114. This declassified CIA document, as other CIA documents used in this study, was heavily sanitized; parts that contained names are mostly blacked out or taken out. See chapter II. 69NYT 01-16-66. No Indonesian newspaper published the figure. 10Ibid. nIbid. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 232] === 210 Other than in places such as the Brantas riverbanks, many victims in Kediri were simply left where they were killed. But compared to the previous months of OctoberDecember 1965, the pattern o f slaughter was "more politely" drawn. Many more victims were not just left unburied; they were now buried or dumped in secluded areas, such as the one in Ngrayut. Located about one mile from the nearest neighborhood in Ngadiluwih, Ngrayut was an abandoned piece of land in the middle of ricefields and sugar cane fields. It was covered with thick bushes and some high, dense trees, making it look like a small, dense forrest. Between the trees there was a fifteen-foot deep ravine, making it look like a natural graveyard. Some of the 150 PKIs who were killed here were thrown into the ravine, but some were buried in the ten-foot deep holes they were ordered to dug themselves before the slaughters. Ngrayut was a typical slaughtering place in the late period of killing. There was less need to create a horror effect by leaving the bodies on the streets or even marketplace. The gangs now hunted down and slaughtered the alleged PKI members in a more systematic manner and pattern than in previous months. In all "disorderly operations," the military were passive. Ma'roefin recalled, "the military themselves were passive; they looked confused. The Brigif itself was passive. This is masses against masses. Finally, Willy Soedjono tried to stop the slaughters."72 (There is no verified information that Willy Soedjono was a brother of Major General Suprapto, one ^Interview. Apparently, Ma'roefin referred to events in 1966, since he recalled that Soemitro was the East Java regional commander. Ma'roefin forgot the chronology. R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 233] === 211 of the slain generals in Jakarta, a factor that was believed driving Willy Soedjono into a frenzy of killing the PKI members.73 Regardless of the disputes over the issues of how much was the role of the military in instigating the slaughters, and how seriously they were trying to stop the slaughters, this was a difficult time for decision making inside the army. In an instruction, Willy Soedjono as regional commander, or Danrem 081/Pepelrada 081, dated 12 February 1966 No.05/2/66, announced that wearing uniforms of mass organizations or political parties was not permitted.74 The instruction had twofold functions, to dissociate the army from the horror picture of the slaughters, and to apply a measured control over the conflicts. By dissociating itself from the role the executioners played, the army maintained relatively "clean hands" so that in cases when they had to make public statements this clean image would help. At the same time, prohibiting the wearing of uniforms was also meant to place the belligerent parties under control. As a result of the vigilante operations in Jombang and Kediri, most of the PKI leaders and members were gone by the end of August 1966. Only insignificant number managed to escape to other places. There are some explanations for this. Firstly, most of them were too poor to afford moving to another place. To move individually, they needed the money for transportation, food, and living costs in the new areas. To add to this almost impossible option was the responsibility that they had for their families. The 73John Hughes, op.cit., p. 185; also see explanation of generals Sumitro and Jassin in this study, chapter 1.2.3 footnote 16. 74Quoted from Kodam VIII Brawidjaja, Kodim 0809 Kediri, Pengumuman No.006/Peng./7/1966 dated 5 July 1966, signed by Lt. Col. Risbanten. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 234] === 212 Javanese live in an extended family system; many of the PKI members had these extended families to feed. Secondly, moving permanently to another place, for a typical Javanese family, was like being uprooted from their culture. It was beyond even the last resort. Moreover, without any other family members to visit, this option became no option at all; and even if they had family members somewhere else, there was no guarantee that those family members would accept them given the risks of harboring PKI people. A surveillance system, inherited from the Japanese during the war, was also in effect to prevent the movements of PKI members from Jombang and Kediri. This system is the neighborhood association, a cluster of several households to form a semi-formal "association." At the lowest level, the association is called RT (Rukun Tetangga, literally neighborhood association), usually consisting o f40-60 households. In turn, several RTs (from 6 to 25) would make a RW (Rukun Warga, residents' association). A chairperson of a RT would know in detail every person who lived in his or her RT. A visitor who spent a night, for instance, had to report his or her presence within 24 hours. Moving from one place to another could be as dangerous as staying at home. A new person, even a visitor, could not hide from this RT "surveillance system." Under the above conditions, arguments that the missing PKI people moved to other places are implausible. There were definitely some exceptions in which they managed to move and avoid being a victim of the slaughters, but the number was R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 235] === 213 insignificant. Survivors confessed that their cases were rare.75 The result was that in Jombang and Kediri, only unimportant members of the PKI survived the mass theater of slaughters. One witness believed that they who survived were only C-class political prisoners.76 Another expects that at least seventy five percent of members of PKI-affiliated boards from the village level and up had vanished.77 Following a strategy of measured control (by regulating the wearing of uniforms, for example), on 5 July 1966 Lieutenant Colonel Risbanten, commander of military district command or Kodim 0809 Kediri issued an instruction that regulated mass gatherings. First, to conduct any meeting or gathering, including religious meetings (pengajian) that were routine activities and did not in conflict with previous regulations such as the regulations for uniforms, the organizer should ask permission from the local police at least three days before the event. The organizer should bring the proposal by himself and not to be represented by someone else. Second, there were nine other types of activity that the organizer himself should asked permission seven days before the event. The activities included mass gatherings in open spaces, rallies, demonstrations, congresses, conferences, party lectures, and other non-specified activities; inviting speakers from outside Kediri areas; mass movements; wearing party or organizational uniforms; military training; posting posters, banners, 75Samikun, Kaijan, Poniran; interviews. 76K.H. Arifin Khan, interview. 77Kastolani, interview. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 236] === 214 pamphlets, and so on; moving party campaigns; raising organizational flags; and formation o f new bodies or organizations.7® The slaughters went on until August 1966, when national and regional political developments proceeded to a new path of social alignment. But the pace and intensity had declined sharply compared to their peak in late October 1965 to January 1966. Considering their intensities, the slaughters could be divided into the first stage covering the above period, and a second stage covering the period between January and August 1966. The first period was marked by intense operations with a high number o f casualties, and the second was less intense and more sporadic. During the second phase, many principal executioners stopped their operations, but many new executioners, mostly from a younger cohort, joined the vigilante groups. The killings now served as a rite of passage for youths to enter adulthood. 3. Politics, psychology, and personages o f the slaughters It is clear that there were at least three levels of decision making and organization guiding the slaughters. At the top, there were various groups. The first was the military circle, consisting of the highest local military officers—from the commanders o f Korem, Kodim, some of their staffs with strategic positions (especially officers from the intelligence sections) down to subdistricts and village levels of military command (Uterpra, now Koramil). These people were involved and to some degree instigated the slaughters. 7®Kodam VIII Brawidjaja, Kodim 0809 Kediri, Pengumuman No. 006/Peng./7/1966 dated 5 July 1966, signed by Lt. Col. Risbanten. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 237] === 215 But their actions were taken cautiously, by establishing contacts only with selected leaders of the vigilante groups. Very few joined the vigilante groups openly; if they joined, they disguised their army affiliations. There was no general rule, no guarantee at all, that military orders would be followed, however, and leaders of the vigilante groups were free to choose any action they wanted to pursue. The initiative by Syafii Soleiman and head of the intelligence section of Kediri military authorities, for instance, was known only to themselves and to less than a handful o f other people. Joining in the group of these people were political party leaders, and other local leaders, including some influential ulama. They maintained limited, yet intense, contacts among themselves. The result, among other things, was the adoption of "orderly operations" so surreptitiously conducted that many executioners that later joined the operations did not realize that such operations had ever occurred. At the second layer of decision making, there were people with some operational command down to the field operations. Most notable at this layer were leaders of youth organizations. These organizations were mostly radical youth wings of political parties, but also included intellectual (student) wings of political parties or mass organizations. Ansor, for example, was the non-intellectual, youth wing of NU. Ansor, better known as Barisan Serba Guna (multi purpose guard), or Banser, at the time,79 was founded by Mochammad Kayubbi. As a youth organization, it mostly consisted of youths with less 79There should be no confusion here about the name of the organization. Banser stands for "Barisan Serbaguna" (multi-purpose guard), was another name for Ansor. During the slaughters, the name of Banser was used more often than its official name of Ansor. However, after the realignment process, the term Banser was used only for "special troops" within Ansor. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 238] === 216 education and from lower class families. Their motto at the time was "kepruk dulu, persoalan belakang," or "crush first, and solve the problems later." Also, they shared a view that "you win, you get a flower necklace; you lose, you get a hanging rope."®0 This was an attitude that prioritized praise physical strength; with spiritual and religious values supporting this attribute; these kids would sacrifice their lives, if necessary, to defend their belief system. In the pesantren's traditions, olah kanuragan, or martial arts, added by owatan, or training in spiritual aspects (so that the practitioners could achieve the stage of invulnerability), had been widely practiced for a very long time, despite some efforts to redirect this practice into activities with an emphasis on fiq h, or legal aspects of Islam.81 Members of Ansor, in this sense, were at the opposite end of the spectrum from other Muslim student organizations such as Persatuan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (PMII, or the Indonesian Muslim Student Association), Pelajar Islam Indonesia (PII, or the Indonesian Muslim Association), and Ikatan Pelajar Nahdlatul Ulama (IPNU, or the Nahdlatul Ulama's Student Association). Disagreements among these organization was mostly about strategy and the use of coersion. "I often was in disagreement with Mansur Adnan, who was chairman of PMII; they were good in discussion, but no action," Ma'roefin contended.82 Officially, PMII did not indorse, nor was it involved in, the interviews: Rusdi Anwar, Syafii Soleiman, Mansur Adnan, Yusuf Hasyim, Ma'roefin. 81Abdurrahman Wahid, Kiyai Bisri Syansitri: Pecinta Fiqh Sepanjang Hayat interview. PMII stands for Persatuan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia, or an allIndonesia Muslim (university) Students Association; it was the young-intellectual wing of (continued...) R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 239] === 217 operations, but some of its members joined the vigilante groups and became executioners. The third layer was occupied by the "anak-anak" that did most of the killings. Included in this group were low ranking military personnel who joined the vigilante groups. Members of these groups were much fragmented, but playing the key role were local Ansor leaders such as Nachroni (from the village of Gurah), Cholil (Pagu), Bintoro, Gus Ubaid, Kamituwo (Plemahan), Chozin Hasan (central city of Kediri), Chanan and Wahab Hasbullah (Purwoasri), Mochammad Sokeh (Mojo), Bingan (Keras), Dardiri and Makmur (Gampeng Reja), Abdul Wahid (west city of Kediri), Muslim Muslam (Kandat). All o f them were familiar with the cultural battles and violent confrontations of the previous years before the killing operations. The gangs controlled by these ring leaders ranged from between dozens of followers to hundreds. Relationships between ring leaders were informal and personal. Ansor provided a strong sense of identity, however, despite its poor facilities. Kediri's Ansor headquarters, for instance, were officially attached to NU's headquarters, which was nothing more than a small tailor shop located in front of the train station, Pendjahit ChasbuIIah. Official meetings and organizational activities were often conducted at Ma'roefin's house. Thus, it is incorrect to assume that the massacre participants were tightly structured in an organizational hierarchy or that they were involved in a sophisticated pattern of operations. There relations were loosely structured, with gang members coming in and going out as they pleased. Yusuf Hasyim, the top leader of Ansor, 82(...continued) R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 240] === 218 found it difficult to maintain even minimum contacts with these local bands. Real authority seems to have rested with the local ring leaders themselves. Certainly what took place on the riverbanks seems to have been well beyond the control of the formal organizations. However, it is similarly misleading to underestimate the role of organizational networks in recruiting members of the vigilante groups and in guiding the operations. Two striking examples will serve in explaining these loose relationships. Many o f the gang members told similar psychological effects in their first experience slaughtering PKI members.83 Encouraged by peer pressure and spurred by curiosity-after following a ring leader hunting down the leftists for several times-they usually slaughtered one victim first. Afterwards, they felt dizzy, queasy, and almost blacked out. In some cases, other members of the gangs told them to lick the victim’s blood, which was believed to be an immediate way to relieve such feelings and an effective action to placate or render harmless the soul of the victim (since it was widely believed that the souls of slaughtered PKI members were wandering around as embittered ghosts). But what would follow after licking the blood was a desire to slaughter a second person, to be followed by a third, fourth, and fifth victim, on and on. The killers also sometimes chopped off the penises of their victims, or cut off their ears or fingers, in part to inspire terror, in part to bring back as tokens of their bravery. Not a single leader at the second or first layer of leadership agreed with these 83Stories collated from interviews. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 241] === 219 actions.84 First of all because they wanted to run clear, fast, and effective operations, and second because Islam does not tolerate consuming blood or mutilation.85 Some ulama, including Kiyai Mahrus Aly of Pesantren Lirboyo, repeatedly ordered field managers and leaders such as Syafii Soleiman and Ma'roefin not to let the killing bands do what they did during the executions, but the practice continued. The fact that orders from even the most respected leaders were not followed immediately or effectively illustrates the limits to which such leaders could control the whirlwind of violence that they had helped to unleash and legitimize. In the second period of slaughters, however, the role of organizations became stronger--not necessarily with respect to the slaughters but local politics generally. Leaders of student organizations such as Sekar Selastio, chairman of GMNI, and Mansur Adnan of PMII succeeded in enhancing their authority. Other less prominent leaders from the Indonesian Muslim Students Organization (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, HMI), the Muhammadiyah Student Association (Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah, IMM), the Chinese student association under Baperki (Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia Perhimi, led by Christian Tampayong), the Catholic Student Association (Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katholik Republik Indonesia, PMKRI, led by Damasus Porda), were also secured more control over their members. PMII was an interesting case. It had about 400 active members, who were known for their bravery. Mansur Adnan recalled, "GMNI has the 84All interviews with actors confirmed this information. 8SEating (cooked) blood was a common practice among secular Javanese, while the santris—according to Qur'an 5:3—considered blood as one thing that the Muslims were strongly prohibited from eating or drinking. R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 242] === 220 largest number o f members, but they have no guts to fight."87 If tension rose, PMII was usually the one to act. This new trend helped to shift the locus of (youth) politics from the killing fields to organizational competition. In 1966, the role of these student organizations became more critical for supporting the new regime, especially through the Action Front of Indonesian Students (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia, KAMI). In Kediri, KAMI was founded sometime in May 1966, during the second period of slaughters. First chairman of KAMI was Yasin Magaffir, who was vice chairman at PMII. The convention was that the chairman of the largest organization, PMII, could not himself be the chairman of KAMI, so Mansur Adnan had to send his vice chairman to this position.88 Maggafir was later replaced by Yatim Muljono, who was also from PMII. KAMI was officially recognized by the local authorities in May 1966. Colonel Willy Soedjono officially declared the establishment of the organization. After the ceremony, the students and members of youth organizations destroyed the shops on the Daha street and attacked Chinese quarters for a brief period. Also during this time, when the army special troop RPKAD seemed to gain a better position in its rivalry with the marines that they showed up in Kediri to help local military command to systematically 87In his own words, "Anak-anak GMNI jumlahnya paling banyak, tapi mereka gak wani gelut." Italics are Javanese words; these are a strong cynical comment of someone's not being brave enough to become "a man." 88Magaffir held the position for only several months. He was then sent to attend a journalism course in Jakarta and never returned to Kediri. Later, under a new name Acin Yassin, he led Jayakarta, a daily newspaper published by the Jakarta Military Command. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 243] === 221 crush the "remnants of the Old Order."®9 Since August 1966, RPKAD took over the spearheading role for cleansing the rest of the PKI through the operation of “New Orderization o f East Java.”90 Ulama of Jombang and Kediri played an important role in parochializing the national views about the tumultuous events in Jakarta. In contrast to this role, they also interpreted local events for the benefit of Jakarta's political elite.91 One such figure was Yusuf Hasyim, the national chairman of Ansor and heir of Tebuireng, who had been living in Jakarta since 1963. Another respected ulama, Kiyai Mbah Bisri Sansuri, often left his Pesantren Denanyar for NU headquarters in Jakarta, since he was the organization’s number two man. Bisri Sansuri had to assume the role of Kiyai Abdul Wahab, the most senior ulama o f NU, who was too old to take an active role for the organization.92 Not all kiyais took a role as “cultural broker,” however. Many of them had only limited contacts with the world outside their pesantren compound. And many o f this type of ulama knew more about physical might and “personal politics;” source of political 89Mansur Adnan, interview. Pipit Rochijat, in a personal recollection, remembered that some RPKAD soldiers, who were known for their skill in throwing knives, used to show off their martial skills. But many youths were not impressed. This showed that in contrast to other areas, RPKAD was not very respected in Kediri, particularly as compared to the marines. Pipit Rochijat, in an interview with Ben Abel, KdPNet, 23 Oct. 1996, illustrates when some RPKAD showed off in front of the Kediri theater many bystanders wooed them. ^Chapter VI will deal with this issue. 91See this concept of cultural broker in subchapter III. 3. 92Abdurrahman Wahid, Kiyai Bisri Sansiiri: Pecinta Fiqh Sepanjang Hayat (Jakarta?: Penerbit Majalah Amanah, n.d.), p.35. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 244] === 222 power for this local politics mostly came from personal charisma and prowess. One example o f this phenomenon from the years preceeding Gestapu was Kiyai Cholik of Tebuireng, who actively trained santri for potential struggles with the PKI.93 Bom under the name of Abdul Hafrdz Hasyim, Kiyai Cholik was described as an extraordinary person: tall (over 6 ft, which was very tall compared to the average height of Indonesians), big (over 250 lbs.), dark, and believed to radiate a frightening aura. He was said to eat two pounds o f meat everyday, an amount that was quite unsual by any standard in Indonesia. He was also known for his bravery. As a son of the most respected ulama before the war~ Hadratus Syekh Hasyim Asy'ari~and as the heir kiyai of the influential PP Tebuireng, Cholik was believed to master supernatural power. During the Japanese occupation, he became a daidancho (military officer) but was later considered a threat to Japanese authority; he was then arrested and discharged. He then joined a guerilla band during the struggle for independence. He took over the leadership ofPP Tebuireng in 1961. During his leadership, he weekly visited PP Kedunglo in Kediri, which was famous for its teaching o f tasam if (or mysticism,), the masters of which was related to enhancing physical prowess.94 Refraining his students from being first to attack, he nevertheless prepared them for the violent confrontations that seemed increasingly inevitable. For example, he ordered Mutamat and Muhtasam, two senior 93Information was collected from interviews. 94Romo Abdul Latief of Kedunglo; interview. The appelation of "Romo," instead of Kiyai, in Kedunglo showed the supernatural (tasawuf) quality of this pesantren; the term Romo which literary meant "father," was more commonly used among the Javanese Catholic priests. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 245] === 223 santri students from Sedayu and adepts of the martial arts, to train other youths. The training lasted for three months in late 1964 and continued intermittently until September 1965. Kiyai Cholik died at age 48 on 20 June 1965, leaving his youthful followers without their charismatic and terrifying kiyai to guide them in the maelstrom to come.95 If Kiyai Cholik typified a charismatic East Java kiyai who helped set the stage for the anti-PKI pogrom, Rusdi Anwar is an example of a “field commander” in the killings who had close links to the pesantren world. Bom in the late Dutch colonial era,96 Rusdi studied at PP Tebuireng. During the Japanese occupation, he joined a Peta battalion. During this period, Rusdi developed a close relationship with (later Kiyai) Cholik Hasyim, his commander, and later became Cholik's confidant. When Indonesia proclaimed its independence, Rusdi went back to Tebuireng. He spent six months at Tebuireng before he joined for a brief period with the Barisan Keamanan Rakyat (BKR), or the People's Security Guard, which became part of the national army. When his brother died with the rank of major in the Hizbullah, the Islamic guerilla troops, he joined the Hizbullah as a company commander. Years of guerilla battles taught him to seek spiritual support from Tebuireng. After the war, he left the army and moved to Jakarta. In Jakarta, he achieved modest success working for shipping companies, partly due to his activities in the workers union and partly due to his education and his physical strength and fighting prowess acquired during the war. After leading a successful workers strike in Jakarta in 1964 he returned home to 95Data from interviews and SP 06-22-65. ^Due to poor written document, many villagers do not know their birthdays. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 246] === 224 Tjoekir, Jombang, and was elected chairman of Sarbumusi, which at that time had only a handful members. His move was motivated by his anger that local Muslims were doing nothing to counter the PKI's unilateral actions and other confrontations with non-PKI workers’ unions.97 In Kediri, similar leader emerged in the person of Ma'roefin, who was referred to as the "manager of executioners." Ma’roefin was bom in 1935. Although his grandfather was a respected ulama, he did not study in a pesantren during his youth. Instead, he went to secular, public schools and graduated, at 23 years old, from high school in 1958.9* He then pursued a career within the bureaucracy, as one of only two high school graduates working as civil servant at the Kediri regency office. Ma'roefin was raised by his great uncle, Syafii Marzuki, who was also a respected ulama (with his last position as chairman of Syuriah NU Kediri) and high ranking local official. But his involvement with Ansor started when he was studying part time at PP Lirboyo. He then became a beloved santri of Kiyai Mahrus Aly; Ma'roefin also became a close confidant of Gus Maksum, Aly's brother who was famous for his supernatural power and who was the chief security guard of Lirboyo. Ma'roefin was appointed as secretary of Ansor branch of the city of Kediri in 1964; a year later, he was elected chairman, a position he held until 1971. 97He said that he was angry reading newspapers in Jakarta which reported that members o f Ikatan Buruh Nahdlatul Ulama (IBNU), or NU workers association, were attacked by PKI in PG Tjoekir and they could do nothing to resist. I could not verify the said newspaper report. 98He even went briefly to a Catholic school, so that he "could pray with a cross." R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 247] === 225 Many of the executioners started their operations by gemblengan, or training rituals to entrance physical prowess, such as eating eggs that had been inscribed with sacred Arabic words. They took wudhu, a ritual to cleanse one's body before doing sholat (Islamic prayer) which symbolized spiritual cleansing, before eating the raw eggs. In addition to the egg ritual, some received their spiritual (and finally physical) might by reciting "Ya Allah, ya Latief, ya Latief..." again and again. Such rituals were performed in pesantrens such as Purwoasri, Lirboyo, Bukaan (Kepuh), all known as the pesantrens led by ma'rifat kiyais, or kiyais who attained the highest spiritual wisdom. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 248] === CHAPTER VI COLLECTING THE SCATTERED BONES: REALIGNMENT PROCESS IN THE AFTERMATH (1967-1971) 1. Stopping the slaughters Although the number of victims was decreasing, the slaugthers did not end until August 1966. Under this situation, Major General Soemitro was assigned to assume his position as the new East Java regional commander in June 1966. Three goals he wanted to accomplish were: (1) introducing Suharto, a relatively unknown name for the East Javanese leaders; (2) balancing the power between the marines and the army from the Brawijaya division; and (3) stopping the mass slaughters.1Although he had disbanded the PKI and arrested most of its leaders when he was a regional commander in East Kalimantan prior to the Gestapu, Soemitro did not issue an order to crush the PKI in East Java. He realized, once he issued this order, the killings would increase. Soemitro recalled, "I was very upset that human beings were killed just like chickens. Since when do we, the Indonesian people, regard other Indonesians as chickens? It seemed to me that we were just behaving like animals." He then summoned Imam Munandar, the commander of Kodim Surabaya, to control the situation. Munandar proposed detaining all PKI members so that they would not be hunted down by the vigilante groups. Soemitro argued that Munandar might succeed in rounding up PKI ‘Soemitro, interview. Ma'roefin and other ring leaders recalled this order from Soemitro to stop the slaughters; interview. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 249] === 227 leaders, but the rank and file members would continue to be slaughtered. Despite his rejection of Munandar’s plan, however, Soemitro had no particular plan of his own. The problem was not resolved. But the situation was more complicated than Soemitro expected, especially with the return of troops from the confrontation with Malaysia. Most troops from East Java had been deployed in Kalimantan and Sumatra for the Dwikora operations, the code for confrontations with Malaysia. Every time they returned home, there was a danger of reprisals. Many of them were PKI members or sympathizers, and many more had family members associated with the PKI.2 Troops returning from a battlefront to find that their families had been slaughtered would be a disastrous situation for the new commander. Every time there were returning troops, Soemitro assembled them at the Gelora 10 November, a local stadium in Surabaya, with an order to restrain themselves from reprisals against the executioners. To calm those who lost their families, Soemitro made a promise to punish whoever was guilty; in fact, he never fulfilled his promise. To control the situation, Soemitro conducted weekly meeting to discuss the killings. On surface, it seems that Soemitro assumed his position with a good intention to stop the killings, and his order was in fact rather effective.3 But Soemitro came to East Java when the "cleansing ritual" had almost been finished. There are two objective reasons why his "sacred mission" to stop the killings (regardless of whether his confession is 2See subchapter 1.2.3. 3Syafii Soleiman, Ma'roefin; interviews. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 250] === 228 honest or not) was increasingly effective. First, he assumed his position in June 1966, or during the second stage of the killings. Only a few PKI members survived the first period (October 1965-January 1966). Only with extra efforts did the executioners still manage to find more victims. "Who else can we kill? They're all gone." The executioners had fewer victim to hunt, and many left the task they previously assumed to the "new executioners," mostly from the younger cohort/ Second, systematic cleansing of PKI members at the structural level had also been completed. On the latter, the following account of policies and actions provides a good picture. As early as in November 1965, when the killings were still at their peak, the military authorities instructed the plantations to form "screening teams."5 A screening team was a team that had the authority to "screen," that is, arbitrarily determine who was a PKI member and who was not. If someone was identified as a PKI member, the team would decide how deep was his/her involvement in the Gestapu Affair (however artificial this term was in a local setting). In PG Meritjan, the screening team consisted of R. Prajitno, acting director, Soenardi, B.A., administrative chief (begower), Soedarmanto BSc., milling chief (fabricatie chef and chairman of the sugar expert organization PAGI), Soejoso, field supervisor (sinder keburi) and chairman of the nationalist workers union KBG/FM, and interviews. 5The instruction was issued by Team P.A.N. Sub Kopur Siaga 1/9 Kotamadya/ Kabupaten Kediri. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 251] === 229 K.H. Ridwan Anwar, member of the company council and general chairman of the Muslim workers union Sarbumusi.6 By November 1966, this screening team of PG Meritjan had completed its task, although it had not been dissolved since the company anticipated further complications in workers relations. What was interesting in this composition was the presence of Ridwan Anwar, who became a member of the company's council as representative of Sarbumusi, although he was not a plantation employee or worker. This was similar to the role played by Rusdi Anwar in Jombang. As a direct result of his prominent role during critical times, Rusdi Anwar could exert his influence over the loji. He managed to place his followers in various positions at the plantation (PG Tjoekir). As a result of the new balance of power, the influence of people like Ridwan and Rusdi reached into the senior staff controlling human resources. At the local level, locus of power and authority now rested on provisional institutions such as this screening team. During its first weeks of operation, the screening team of PG Meritjan reported the dismissal of two senior staff members living in the loji since 1 November 1965. The two were Hardjosoemadi, assistant weight supervisor, and Peter Latupeirissa, assistant wharehouse supervisor. They were dismissed with the official charge that they were absent from the workplace without notice and their addresses were now unknown. The last reason, "unknown address," was a subtle acknowledgement that they both had been slaughtered. Considering their positions as members of the loji, one might assume that the 6A11 details on PG Meritjan are from "Kampanje/Jaarverslag Tahun-1966. PPN-Gula Meritjan," chapter 2 articles 22-26, chapter 3, esp. article 31. Company document. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 252] === 230 two were typical representatives of a politicized senior staff. However, a closer look will show that this was not the case. Although the two held positions as senior staff members, or in other words, members of the loji world, their positions were among the lowest in the group o f various occupations held by members of the loji. Although their positions were considered very high in the overall structure of employment—there were only about 100 senior staff members as compared to the thousands of workers they controlled—it was not high enough to make them fully respected members of the loji. Their positions were among a very few open for promotion from the ranks of semiskilled workers or second class staff Again, this fact strengthens the conclusion that most politically active workers were middle-class employees. In the lower levels of position in the plantations, the situation during the second stage of slaughters (January-August 1966) was still uncertain. The plantations suffered from the under recruitment of kampanye, or temporary workers. They also suffered from the still tense situation in the workplace, especially because of the screening team. In P.G. Meritjan, there was a record of 683 permanent workers. A year later, forty one had been "discharged without honor," and eighty six workers were punished with punishments such as a delay in periodic wage raise, in addition to requirement to undergo indoctrination. To replace the forty one discharged workers, the screening team employed twenty three retired military personnels, nine workers as representatives of Sarbumusi, and nine R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 253] === 231 workers as representatives of the nationalist union KBG/FM.7 The post Gestapu killings had a direct impact especially on sectors of cane harvesting and plantations, since the new workers did not have the skills that the killed workers had. These data are different from the data contained in another authoritative source (see Appendix A), but are used here because this source also provides data on job replacement. The data listed in Appendix A reported only forty seven workers missing, while the above internal report did not cite missing persons, although it cited the types of punishment. A similar source also noted that in 1966 and 1967, production effectivity and efficiency in every sector were the lowest compared to any other years since 1957 and throughout the 1960s.8 The management of the plantation (in Surabaya), and especially local management at the level of the senior staff, was now forced to increase its control over the workers. One of the policies adopted to control the workers politically concerned economic compensation. The (political) pressures imposed on the worker's lives were compensated for with new economic benefits. This proved to be effective, considering the fact that in 1966 the national economy still suffered from a high inflation rate. One of the national economic policies that had a direct impact on the life of the workers was the unpopular policy called sanering, or a cut of nominal value of currency with the ratio of 1,000 to 1. 7A11 data from "Kampanje/Javerslaag..." ibid. internal statistical record, P.G. Meritjan, typescript report, n.d. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 254] === 232 To catch up with rising prices and to compensate for the local consequences of sanering, the plantations in Kediri adjusted their worker's salaries every three months, starting from January 1966 and also applying the policy retroactively from December 1965. As a producer of sugar with a "tradition" of providing basic necessities for their workers in natura, or in the form of raw materials, instead of giving them the fluctuating cash currency, the plantations did not suffer from the ever-declining national economy. But even with these adjustments, the inflation rate rose to a degree that it was difficult for workers to keep up with the rising prices. However, these adjustments were compensating for and balancing political pressures in the immediate post Gestapu period. Thus, there was a shift of emphasis in the lives of the loji employees. As a logical consequence of their defeat in the struggle for power, politically they were now dead. In other words, there was a deliberate process of depolitization. At the same time, they enjoyed better economic security, which in turn strengthened the depolitization process. When the milling season in 1966 started, all plantations in the Jombang-Kediri area were suffering. PG Meritjan, for example, started its milling season on 5 June and ended on 6 September 1966~a short milling period, lasting only three months. External as well as internal factors were cited as causing a short milling period, which meant that total production was low. The first and foremost cause was the under supply of people's cane. As a plantation that relied for much of its operation on the supply of cane grown by peasants and landowners in its immediate orbit and that could not get it, PG Meritjan was an example of how the mutual economic interests of the four worlds also suffered from the killings. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 255] === 233 The political situation was not conclusive for a new season of cane growing, and the cane that had already been planted was not tended for about three months during the second stage of slaughtering period. As a result, the cane was of a poor quality when harvested for the 1966 milling season. Many kampanye workers did not seek jobs related to the plantations out of fear. This means that in a case where a mill could get cane from independent grower (people’s cane) there was not enough manpower to harvest and bring them to the mill. External factors included the difficulty in transportation and the unavailability of gas and other fuels needed for the mills. 2. Healing the wounds One year of slaughter undoubtedly left deep scars and wounds upon members of the four worlds in Jombang and Kediri. Although since August 1966 the slaughters only went on sporadically, the process of cleansing and adjustment went on. At the end of 1966, forty two workers and two members of the board of P.G. Meritjan who were allegedly involved in the Gestapu Affair were discharged. The official reason given was that they were discharged because of their absences from their jobs without notification.; quite probably they had been killed during the attacks. The director did make it clear that the two members of the board and six functionaries of the pro-communist union SBG/SOBSI were discharged because o f their clear involvement in Gestapu.9 9A complete list of names of the workers is attached to a letter from R. Prajitno, acting director of P.G. Meritjan, No. AX-INSIP/66.272 to the head of subinspectorate of farming for Kediri areas, dated November 18, 1966. R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 256] === 234 After Gestapu, all unions reorganized themselves; some were offically disbanded or simply dissolved. The most active pro-communist union, the Serikat Buruh Gula (SBG/SOBSI) branch of PG Meritjan, for example, was said to have "died" naturally or “had dissolved itself’ on 8 November 1965.10In all other plantations similar situation existed. The less active leftist union, the Joint Workers Union of Indonesia (Gabungan Serikat Buruh Indonesian^ GSBI) was not formally “frozen,” but the organization was now dead.11 The balance of political power had now shifted. With two of its members discharged, the board of PG Meritjan reorganized itself. The new Dewan Perusahaan (DP), or company board of PG Meritjan, now had five members: R. Pajitno (director of PG Meritjan), K.H.A. Ridwan Anwar (worker representative from Sarbumusi, the NU affiliated union), Moertadji (peasant representative from Pertanu, the NU affiliated peasant organization), Sadirin (worker representative from the nationalist worker union KBG/Marhaenis, a PNI affiliated union) and Tjokrowardojo (representing the local authorities).12 The member reflected the new political landscape more, perhaps, than the organizations they represented. They also reflected the balance of power as shown in the ,0The first term, “naturally died” was in a letter signed by R. Prajitno, acting director of PG Meritjan, No. AX-INSIP/66.016, 19 March 1966; the second, “had dissolved itself,” see Appendix A. "See Appendix A. "See Appendix A. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 257] === 235 structure of the screening team. Ridwan Anwar, as mentioned above, was an NU leader who had never been a plantation worker himself. NU’s position was unchallenged. In Kediri, an internal report of PG Meritjan showed that the NU affiliated union Sarbumusi now placed as the first-ranking worker union. The Sarbumusi, together with the nationalist worker union Kesatuan Buruh Gula/Front Marhaenis (KBG/FM), some senior staff from the loji, and military officers from Kodim, met regularly to recruit new candidates for replacing the discharged and killed employees.13 In addition to the old union Sarbumusi, the reorganized nationalist union KBG/FM, and the Association of Indonesian Sugar Experts (Persatuan Ahli Gula Indonesia, PAGI), now PG Meritjan hosted two more workers unions: the Ikatan Buruh Pantjasila, or the Pancasila Workers Association, and the Ikatan Karyawan Angkatan Darat, or the Army Employees Association. The army's workers union seemed odd. There was no report of army personnel being officially employed by senior staff at technical-level jobs (other than retired officers being placed in the higher levels of management in Surabaya), but it was just like in the old days, when Sarbumusi was active although many of its leaders were not plantation workers. Another nationalist union worker, the Association of Plantation Workers (Perkappen), which had never been very active in the pre-Gestapu period, still existed but 13Kampanje/Jaarverslag Tahun 1966 P.P.N.-Gula "Meritjan"" chapter 3 article 31 on worker unions, p. 10. Company's document. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 258] === 236 almost without any activity.14 After the killings subsided by the end of 1966, security concerns emerged over an increasing number of cane lootings, destruction of seedling fields, and the burning of cane fields.15 All these incidents were alleged by the management and authorities to be political unrest in the form of sabotages by PKI members.16 The crimes continued to occur intensely until 1968. Even when the situation finally became much calmer in 1969 and 1970, official reports of criminal actions at the sugar mills and plantations still cited political motivations and discontents. One of the reasons was that many plantation guards were accused of being former PKI members. To cleanse the guard forces, on 10 May 1969 PG Meritjan discharged twelve guards from their jobs, although there was no clear measurement of their involvement in the PKI’s activities.17Had they been “members” of PKI, they would have 14Data on workers unions are mostly taken from ibid. ISInterview, H. Nursidik, former director of P.G. Tjoekir; also, a report from PG Meritjan to the bupati of Kediri, CA-INSIP/66.251, 28 October 1966, signed by R. Prajitno, director. 16Letters No. EE-INSIP/68.096 dated April 12, 1968, from M. Nsd., acting director of P.G. Meritjan to Tjamat (the subdistrict head) Prambon, Nganjuk, on the lootings of canes; reports of the local authorities (camat, the subdistrict head; local police chief; local army officer; local security civil officer) on the arson of cane fields in the village of Patihan, district of Lotjeret, Nganjuk regency, July 5-6, 1969; police report No. 656/Int2/1970 by local police officer of Grogol, Kediri, dated August 6, 1970, on the throwing of rocks at the plantation guards. (continued...) R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 259] === 237 been killed. This case is an example, how the structural realignment was difficult among plantation workers. A false report by a fellow worker could result in losing a job or other serious implications. But criminal activities, whether political in nature or not, were barely new to the administration of plantation, especially since the takeover of the management from the Dutch hands by the end of the 1950s.1®Therefore, it is difficult to judge whether the lootings and other indicents were driven by political backlash or merely by economic or criminal factors. In any case, this situation forced the senior staff of the plantation management to provide more lucrative "facilities" to the local authorities who provided security. For example, the camat of Prambon, Kediri, sent a letter requesting that the plantation management supply sugar to the local officials at prices lower than normal (...continued) 17The twelve were Slamet (vice commander Rn I-Ton II), Tijan, Soepardi, Ponidjan (all members of Rn I-Ton I), Muljani, Soemani (members of Rn II-Ton I), Lamidjo, Parmidi, Moch. Roeba’i (members of Rn III-Ton I), Gondo (member of Rn II-Ton II), Soeradi, Dajat (member of Rn III-Ton II); all of them were members of local guard station called Matrik 1133/MT/I-PG Meritjan. As a consequence of the discharge, the twelve had to return all inventories belonging to the guard station, such as shirts, pants, caps, shoes, belts, at the latest on 20 May 1969. Internal report. 18Ten years earlier, Adnan Thohier, the director of PG Meritjan, in his written speech officiating the milling season of 1960, admitted that lootings and other crimes on the plantation resulted in some financial loss. Company's document. Two years later, R. Prajitno, director of PG Meritjan, reported annual records of looting and thieveries in a letter to the upper management in Surabaya, dated 30 November 1962. The company’s document shows detailed loss was between 15% to 26% of the total loss. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 260] === 238 market prices.19 The management had to agree due to its weakened bargaining power. Their previously apolitical position had resulted in an increasing number of PKI members among the loji employees, which in turn made the loji vulnerable to the charge of giving protection to communist employees in the post Gestapu period, if not being accused as PKI members themselves. From the perspective of the senior staff, fulfilling "political obligation" by giving bribes to the local officials was needed in return for security services. There is a tranforming nature of relationships between the two. In the fifties and before, the relationships were more economic, with the local authorities providing state power in kampanye workers recruitment in return for some economic benefits. Now, the relationships were political transactions, with the local authority applying subtle blackmailing in return for security services. In PG Pesantren Baru, alleged "political" unrest continued to spark every now and then, even until the mid-1970s. To overcome the situation, which was assumed to result from the killings and other political causes, sixty one workers were discharged in November 1973,20 followed by another policy, when forty four workers were discharged without honor, in addition to another forty four workers who were forced to enter early retirement in January 1974.21 Less than a year later, in December 1974, the plantation 19A letter from camat Prambon, Kediri, No. 436/30 dated April 25, 1966. “ Signed by Gunawan, junior administrator of PG Pesantren Baru. No original letter available; see Appendix D. (continued...) R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 261] === 239 management issued a decree to force 127 workers to enter early retirement, six of whom lost their rights to receive pensions.22 The plantation, which had such a strong position in the colonial era and which had its political power reduced in the early independence years, was now completely shaken. In addition to the increased pressures from the local authorities, ring leaders of the vigilante groups as well as kiyais and other ulama from the local pesantrens, could now dictate to the senior staffs of the plantation, mostly in terms of "channeling" the local youth from the countryside cluster to the loji for permanent employment. These jobs were all lower-level positions, previously filled by members of the leftist SBG union. No one was accepted at higher level position, which needed technical skills they did not possess. These lower positions, however, were still considered rewarding by local standards. Therefore, this was a great achievement for members o f the countryside cluster. The demand for employment was probably a continuation from previous demographic pressure; no statistics show any significant increase of population (and quite probably the population decreased slightly). It was also quite probably caused by a worsening economy. But one thing is clear, more members of the pesantreninfluenced countryside cluster now became members of the loji employee’s world. (...continued) 2ISigned by Bambang Soekamto H.; from the same source as in ibid., and no original document available. “ See Appendix C. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 262] === 240 This pattern did not last long, however. As soon as the central government took definitive control over the situation and the New Order regime had established more centralized authority, the pesantren orbit lost its domineering influence; the plantation and local authorities then succeeded in seizing more power as economic development and national security replaced political participation as national priorities under the New Order. Local officials were now strong enough to enforce coersive measures against the pesantren orbit, if necessary. In this way, the pesantren retreated to its position before independence. Local authorities now also had more influence over the loji. The loji returned to its role as an economic enclave, as opposed to a political enclave. It was strong enough again to resist political pressures from the pesantren, but not from the local authorities. Underneath the structural levels of reconstruction, families and individuals did what they could to adjust psychologically. At this more personal level, psychological destruction was difficult to heal, although some of the executioners perceived later that such a process had in fact occurred.23 In a few places, for example, when survivors knew the location of killing fields or mass graves of their family members, they started to visit and mark them with some subtle markers. In Ngrayut, families of the slaughtered leftists marked the killing grounds with palm bushes planted in a regular pattern. They also placed some bricks near two adjacent ad hoc graveyards, although not even the executioners were sure who was buried there. “ Interview, Kastolani. R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 263] === 241 Survivors and family members of the victims seemed to feel that the fates of those slaughtered had been determined by some kind of cosmic power that they did not dare to try to understand. Many of them became more devout Muslims; others chose to convert to Christianity; religion thus provided an avenue for mental and psychological escapism. In general, mass feelings seem to have been in a state of nerimo, a Javanese concept meaning that one accepts everything as granted or given. Yet, to forget the deceased was one of the biggest sins that a Javanese could commit. Therefore, it was necessary to hold spiritual ceremonies, as dictated by Javanese cultural imperatives, such as seribu d im (the thousandth night) and other smaller slameian,24 In accordance with nerimo behavior, mourners often invited the executioners to join the ceremonies. They seemed not to regard the executioners with hatred, at least on the surface.25 In national politics, the New Order incrementally consolidated its edifice in preparation for the 1971 general elections. In Jombang and Kediri, it seems that local actors of former influence were not only exhausted with politics, but that they were also caught unprepared for the new political game, which was dominated by the military. No less important now was the necessity to concentrate on economic survival; the political opponent was gone, in any case. It was not a perfect time to open a new conflict; it was a 24Slametan is a Javanese ritual to seek “security” both for the living persons and the deceased—the root is “slamet,” or safe. Often associated with the secular abangan Javanese (although traditional Muslims also practicing the ritual), slametan also serves as spiritual cleansing for the deceased. 25Interview, Kastolani. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 264] === 242 time of nglumpukake baiting Hang, or "to collect the scattered bones" and to forget the red-spotted past. In Javanese terms, this meant that one should search for members of one's big family, who had previously split or separated. Consolidation of a new regime was eased by depoliticized communities such as Jombang and Kediri. 3. Entering the 1971 general election Throughout 1967 Jombang and Kediri were in the final stage of social reconstruction and consolidation. Even so, considering the long-rooted confrontations and having just emerged from a deadly conflict, the realignment process was in no way easy. There were still deep resentments among family members of the victims, although none would dare to open a new front for confrontation. At the institutional level, the East Java military command (Brawijaya division) had almost completed its consolidation process by this time, so that Soemitro, the commander, could invite the dreaded army special troop RPKAD openly from their base in Central Java and Jakarta, without risking a confrontation with the marines (KKO).26 RPKAD, which was known for its military operations to crush the PKI in Central Java and Bali was now in East Java. But the showdown was over. The task of the armed forces, especially the army, now was to lay a stronger foundation for a new regime. On 15 May 1967, the Brawijaya division launched intelligence operations throughout the province, followed by similar joint operations with the RPKAD starting on “ Interview, Soemitro. For the confrontation between RPKAD and KKO in East Java, see subchapter 1.2.3. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 265] === 243 15 August 1967. The operation was officially called "The New Orderization of East Java."27 With this show of force, not a single person would be so foolish as to associate with the PKI or any of its affiliate organizations. The operation was primarily intended to sweep any potential resurgency by the ex-PKI members through arrests and probably killings.28 But the operation had far-reaching consequences other than elimination of the remnants of PKl's strength. It prepared the ground for a new, strong, state-centered regime that relied on an "apolitical" military-bureaucratic apparatus for maintaining order and that denounced politic-ism in favor of economic growth. At institutional level, the new regime adopted the policy of the "floating mass," which forbade the existence and operation of political parties in the villages. The idea was to depoliticize the masses so that in the future there would be no more conflict between at the villagers at the grassroot level. Nonetheless, it was almost impossible to move forward calmly after having just emerged from such a deep conflict. A few ex-PKI members moved to the southern part of Blitar, an regency adjacent to Kediri. The area was relatively remote, and one of the poorest areas in Blitar. Its nature and characteristics provided a good place for planting the seeds of communist activities. To this area came hundreds of communists. Its remote 27Interviews: Soemitro and M. Jassin. 28Interviews: Soemitro and M. Jassin. Both admitted the arrests but denied any more killings during this operation, although considering the situation of that time, it was almost impossible to avoid such killing. R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 266] === 244 location hindered news from outside reaching the residents there. It would be easier for the visitors to start "guerilla operations." However, military intelligence discovered the people at large. Lacking of money for a large-scale military operation, Major General M. Jassin, the new East Java regional commander, turned to Mohammad Noer, governor of East Java, asking for support. Noer gave Jassin 20 million rupiah, who in turn ordered Colonel Witarmin to lead sweeping operations.29 The Blitar Selatan (south Blitar) affair was yet another mass killing. However, the nature of conflict was different from the ones that took place in Jombang and Kediri in the preceding three years. The South Blitar affair was almost purely a military operation. There were thousand ex-members of vigilante groups from the regencies of Kediri, Blitar, and Trenggalek joined the army, but their role was minimum, as supporting forces in the back. Most of the ex-PKI members who set up their base there, or probably just wandering around being at large, were strangers to local people. The conflict was not between the two belligerent parties that had known each other for years or decades. This was also the only known concentration of the communists after the period of killings. During and after the operation, the military showed some evidence of PKI "weapons" being used, such as swords, arrows, knives, and several guns and rifles. But, it might be that such minimum information on the operations in south Blitar is mostly taken from The 8th Regional Military Command Brawijaya, Trisula Operation: smashing the communist threat in Indonesia (Surabaya?: Jajasan Taman Tjandrawilwatikta, first edition, 1972), and interviews with Lt. Gen (Ret.) M. Jassin. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 267] === 245 weapons were only for protection. It was impossible to start a guerilla war, as alleged, with those weapons. After the central government adopted a format it called an "orde pembangunan" (developmental order), local interests were completely absorbed into economic development efforts. Again, this was in accordance with the national outcry of "economic development first, political participation second." Yet, the new government needed political legitimation. Therefore, the 1971 was designated to implement national general elections, the first to be held in the "New Order" era. But the government faced a dilemma. It needed to create the appearance of political participation without permitting genuine political competition, for fear of unleashing the dangerous politics of the preGestapu period. Finally, it was decided that only ten political parties could compete in the general elections. In places where the conflicts and killings had been intense, and in the JombangKediri area in particular, the former actors were already exhausted with the old game. They were not interested in entering a new political game, while their economic needs took priority. In this atmosphere, the nationally adopted "floating mass" policy was smoothly implemented. Younger santri generations from the pesantrens were influenced by their kiyais to refocus their energies upon the ultimate goal of their institutions: learning the Qur'anic teachings. Moreover, many if not most of the santris who had been involved in the old NU-PKI conflict had already graduated. It was not a perfect time to open a new conflict by active involvement in the general elections. It was a time "to collect the R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 268] === 246 scattered bones." The general elections of 1971 were therefore an anti-climax for local communities. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 269] === CHAPTER VH CONCLUSION Where Jombang and Kediri are concerned, the generals’ night that broke out in Jakarta was only a triggering factor in pushing various sublevel strains and hostilities into more violent and deadly action. The following interpretations, which are based on this study and added by some inferences from previous studies, are offered as possible explanation to what might have contributed to the slaughters. Each interpretation cannot be read as exclusive from another; instead, various factors in one interpretation are intermingled to strengthen or weaken causative factors found in another interpretation. /. Amok, or Malay frenzy, and other cultural explanations. One of the cultural factors that entices scholars in their search for an explanation of the killings is that the killings were a kind of collective running amok, which incidentally is a Malay word.1 Amok has been present for five centuries in European vocabularies to explain certain behavioral patterns thought to be characteristic of Malayan societies (including Javanese and other western Indonesian people).2 Amok, as an element in Malay warfare, or as the outcome of an apparently sudden change in the behavior of a friendly and peaceful acquaintance or trusted servant, came to epitomize the enigmatic and ■Robert Cribb, "Introduction," op.cit., p.33. In Indonesian spelling, the root of the term is amuk and the verb is mengamuk. 2Robert L. Winzeler, "Malayan Amok and Latah as History Bound' Syndromes," in The Underside o f Malaysian History, edited by Peter Rimmier and Lisa Allen (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1990), p.214. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 270] === 248 dangerous side of Malay character.3 The concept has evolved from this classic interpretation to a psychiatric term to a social science describing a complex pattern of behavior. In its classic meaning, amok incidents involved temporary insanity due, almost always, to a severe physical malady.4 Symptoms of a true amok were: (1) a sudden paroxysmal homicide in the male, with evident loss of self control; (2) a prodromal period of mental depression; (3) a fixed idea to persist in reckless homicide without any motive; and (4) a subsequent loss of memory for the violent acts committed.5 In later usage, the term, defined as "senselessly killing or injuring relatives or others," came to describe a consistent pattern of behavior involving a much more complex variety of causes than psychiatric ones.6 In this broad interpretation, political, social and cultural factors were thus added to the explanation of amok. Amok, in its various adaptations, was popular among some writers immediately after the Indonesian slaughters of 1965-1966.7 C.L. Sulzberger wrote for The New York Times, "Indonesians are gentle and instinctively polite, but hidden behind their smiles is that strange Malay streak, that inner, frenzied blood-lust which has given to other lIbid. *Ibid., p.216. sIb id, p.217. Hbid R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 271] === 249 languages one of their few Malay words, amok."* Arnold Brackman argued, "Communists and non-Communists alike were massacred in reprisals as the country, in the literal sense, ran amok—a Malay word, incidentally, which originated in the islands to describe a nervous seizure which leads to murderous frenzy."9 He further argued, "the Indonesian massacre was more of a spontaneous reaction to the PKI involvement in the murder of the generals than an organized affair.... The massacre lacked the cold-blooded efficiency and intellectuality which characterized the savage butchery in the principal authoritarian states o f the twentieth century."10 This study shows that some characteristics of amok are found in the techniques of the killings, if they are examined as acts separate from the collective actions by vigilante groups. A striking case was the incident where an executioner lost control and killed his victims after lining them up on the road.11 Repeated and sometimes exaggerated stories during the slaughters, such as the cutting off penises, ears and fingers to be brought home as "souvenirs" also seem to fit into all or some characteristics of frenzy in amok. But except for a few cases, these actions were not executed by individuals in an altered mental state. Indeed, from a psychological perspective, their mental conditions had been prepared over a relatively long period; it was not an outburst and sudden explosion. 8C.L. Sulzberger, "Foreign Affairs: When a Nation Runs Amok," N YT04-13-66. 9Amold C. Brackman, The Communist Collapse in Indonesia, op.cit., p. 12. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 272] === 250 The concept of amok lacks the notion of longitudinal causation; instead, it describes a sudden spontaneous burst, which was not the case with these mass slaughters. Moreover, a classic amok would not go on for a relatively long period, such as one year. “Running amok” also denotes a "nervous seizure," which was not the case either. As this study shows, the slaughters were done in the context of careful calculation, although this calculation was a product of a limited number of "members" in the vigilante groups and often on an individual basis. At the individual level, the executioners were determined and coldly self-aware in their operations. For a limited usage than the above historical development of the concept of amok, Cribb has shown that the idea of amok" does not match what we now know of amok as a psychological phenomenon."12 He suggests that the two forms of amok-individual and collective—involve the redemption of honor by frenzied violence resulting in the death of the ammoker.13He further argues that “there is little in the character of the 1965-1966 killings which matches this description; with their death lists and clandestine killing grounds, and with clearly no suicidal motive, the killers have little in common with the typical amokker.”14 Another cultural explanation is drawn from the popular wayang, or shadow puppet show. In this show, the PKI's place on the political left put it also on the symbolic left; in the shadow puppet play, the left hand side of the screen is occupied by the Kurawa, 13Ibid {*Ibid., p.34. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 273] === 251 who are allegedly morally wrong and destined to lose in the drawn-out struggle with their Pandawa cousins o f the right side. As good Javanese, the communists merely submitted to the fate marked out for them since the beginning of time. But as Cribb has shown, "passivity is so frequently reported that it probably was indeed the typical response of victims, but the most plausible explanation is that the victims were paralyzed by that combination of uncertainty and vague hope which makes acquiescence right until the very last moment always seem wiser than resistance."15 This study shows that in terms of the cultural symbols used in Jombang and Kediri, it was ludruk, rather than wayang, that was more appropriate to interpret. Ludruk was much more popular than wayang, and it not only became a rhetorical tool of the PKI but also became a domain for confrontations. Ludruk adopted loose plots for its stories, making it easier to carry cultural markings and political messages that incrementally escalated the violent atmosphere. As an all-male stage show, ludruk also provided a macho environment that played a special role in times when the relaxation of conventional rules against violence perhaps allowed for some vicarious letting out of social tensions. Ludruk was only one cultural and (later) political, symbol that marked the four distinct worlds in Jombang and Kediri. Other markers that strengthened the cultural cleavages were occupation, world view and life style, and political affiliation. Seen from a cultural perspective, in various degree all these markers contributed to the intensity and scale of the killings. lsIbid., p.35. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 274] === 252 2. PKI provocation. Considering PKI provocations in the years prior to the Gestapu, some arguments assert that it was only a direct and logical consequence that PKI members suffered severely from reprisals by their former enemies. Applying a more subtle and lose term o f "mobilization," instead of provocation, Iwan Sudjatmiko has argued that the PKI's strategy of mobilization resulted in a polarization among the society and invited response from the non-PKI organizations--and providing a "better understanding" of the following violence that took place.16 Blaming the victim provocations is a common rationalization of victimizers. The nature of the charges laid against the PKI, which saw it challenging the property structure of the society, and the respect for the PKI as a highly skilled and disciplined organization, are the substance on which the rationalizations are based. The PKI was upsetting things; it proclaimed designs to change the structure of Indonesian society substantially. The killings were, therefore, a matter of “them or us.” Yet, the chronology of events in Jombang and Kediri prior to the Gestapu is too full of incidents that arose from active provocations to say that provocation alone was a logical cause of the killings. The central provocations of the PKI were those relating to land reform and sharecropping arrangements, which were increasingly violent toward the break of the Gestapu. The PKI itself acknowledged the social aggravations their unilateral actions in land redistribution were provoking by calling off the actions by the end of 1964. Indeed the violence surrounding the land reform issue was a direct prelude to the killings. 16Iwan Gardono Sudjatmiko, op.cit., p.233. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 275] === 253 One flaw of this explanation is that after adopting such highly active and deliberate provocations; why did PKI members surrendered so easily when the slaughters began. There are at least two answers to this. First, the PKI lost the initiative at the most critical moment. One week in Jombang and ten days in Kediri went without party directives, making PKI members an easy target for a preemptive strike. The "wait and see" policies adopted by the PKI national leadership proved to be a disaster for their followers in Jombang and Kediri. Secondly, the strength of the PKI and its strong affiliate organizations such as SBG/SOBSI, BTI, and Pemuda Rakyat, was based more on political jargon and rhetoric than on the apparatus and hierarchy of a revolutionary party. The two largest confrontations in Kediri—the Jengkol and Kanigoro affairs—showed that violent actions by the PKI's opponents could not be matched. In both cases, PKI leaders tried in vain to win over the situation. The high tide of political rhetoric at the national level was not complemented by real strength at the grassroots level. 3. Religious conflict and Muslim holy war. Religious conflict is one of the most popular explanations of the killings. That the greatest number of killers were young men who took their Islam more seriously than most in the society, and that their victims were largely non-practicing or nominal Muslims (if they were not avowedly anti-Muslim), would suggest that the santri youth saw their undertaking in terms of the Muslim concept of holy war against the infidel (jihad). Indeed, religion is often seen as the primary variable that underlay the killings. The New York Times reported, "There were religious as well as political motives for the population's R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 276] === 254 participation in the killings in Kediri, which is the center of Moslem religious instruction in East Java.... the killings were the will of God."17 In a similar tone, John Hughes wrote: For many of the killers, the purge of the Communists took on all aspects of a holy war. As they saw it, they were rooting out an unclean and impure ideology that threatened Islam's hold—this despite the very un-Communist concessions Aidit had made to religious observance by party members. Many Moslem leaders egged on their people against the Communists, justifying the killings as the "will o f Allah." By executing Communists, they told their followers, they were serving both Islam and the state.18 There is some problem with assigning religion such a central explanatory role. There was definitely an element of religious conflict here (or more precisely, a conflict over world views and cultural orientations) but simply equating religion with political identity is misleading. Many of the victims performed Islamic rituals such as sembahyang; also, there was a disagreement among the ulama over the "philosophical" base and technical adoption of the killings. In the larger picture, religious conflict was a less important variable in the killings in Bali (where both sides were mostly Hindus) and almost completely absent in Central Java.19 17NYT 08-24-66. 18John Hughes, Indonesicm Upheaval, op.cit., p. 192. I9On Bali, see Geoffrey Robinson, The Dark Side... op.cit, and Iwan Gardono Sudjatmiko, "The Destruction...," op.cit. On Central Java, see Dinas Sejarah TNI AD, "Crushing the G30S/PKI in Central Java," in The Indonesian Killings, op.cit, pp. 159-167. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 277] === 255 4. Class conflicts. This study shows that PKI used the political rhetoric of class conflict—an indigenous rendition of classic marxist tenets—which were at first effective in recruiting followers among the peasantry and sugar plantation workers. But as time went on, it is clear that the conflicts shifted into a more horizontal pattern, with the most tense situation developing between members of the (economic) middle classes. Irrespective of the extent of local village appreciation of the class character of PKI ideas and programs, and of the extent to which local peasants and workers were unambigously oppressed, wherever external authority dictated, victimization of the PKI ensued. Wherever local grievances were added—not all had to do with class consideration—the purge often spread beyond the PKI. Class character was present more as an ingredient of conflict during the earlier unilateral actions. The issues of “devilish landlords, blood-sucking money lenders, and bourgeoisie compradors,” all were effective in the first quarter of the 1960s. But by the mid 1960s they were waning as solidarity-making affiliations based on class consciousness. 5. Aliran conflicts Reflecting Clifford Geertz1trichotomy of santri-abangan-priyayi, and its derivative of politik aliran, Robert Jay wrote on the political cleavages in Pare, that "competing organizations at the national level have succeeded in organizing local rural branches in increasing number."20 20Robert R. Jay, Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java. Cultural Report Series No. 12, Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, 1963, p. 104. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 278] === 256 He then argued: The intensely hierarchical character of these organizations, patterned on the national bureaucracy, usually results in the rigid adoption by local branches of the public position of the parent organization. Hence relations, even personal ties, between competing local organizations become inhibited if and where the respective national positions are in conflict. The solidarity character of the small local community has made it the unit in political orientation.... such communities have become united by solidary [s/c.] political action directed from the national level.21 As far as Jombang and Kediri are concerned, there is absolutely no question about the role of political affiliations in propagating the killings. The accusation made to the victims during what we might call the "rite of trial" before they were killed or jailed was mostly in terms of their membership in or association with the PKI, or their participation in some local political dispute. Political marking of this kind was relatively new and this was a part o f politicization that encouraged partisanship, open confrontation and, in general, brought a number of "modem" ideas and behavior patterns, organizational forms and identifications, that had previously not been found in rural Indonesia. If this "modernization" of the organization and content of politics in rural Indonesia redefined social relationships—if it made people aware of their conflicting interests and forced them to express them openly-it may be a factor in explaining the killings. 6. Lacking o f national integration. A scholar notes, "The failure of national politics to provide workable and working institutions to fulfill the promises of independence threw the Indonesian people back on 2lIbid.pp. 105-106. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 279] === 257 loyalty to older social divisions which became polarized around Islam and Communism."22 The argument further asserts that the tensions led to massacres rather than to civil war partly because of the existing international environment.23 There is some truth in this argument, that a lack of workable state, political, and social institutions had resulted in a lack of national integration in general. Kenneth Young argued that "the patterns of conflict, and the blending of national with local influences probably had to produce very variable [s/c.] results from region to region because of the weakness of what might loosely be called 'national integration.1"24 He elaborated this cause: The State itself proved to be weak and, with the exception of the gathering strength of the army, a failing complex of institutions.... party competition at the local level was an uneasy combination of recently articulated conflicts given imprecise meaning by broad national symbols blended with older sources of intraregional tensions and their existing symbolic complexes. In these circumstances it is scarcely surprising that a crisis in central authority should precipitate patterns of action which owed as much to local influences as they did to conflicts of national scope.25 In Jombang and Kediri--Young also based his observation on Kediri—the lack of what he loosely termed "national integration" was apparent in political cleavages but not in state (political) institutions. Local authorities, plantation management, and the armed forces could not really be called a "failing complex of institutions." As state and business apparatuses, these institutions ran well. This is not to deny the fact that nationally, “ Robert Cribb, "Introduction," in The Indonesian Killings..., op.cit., p.27. ™Ibid., p.28. 24Kenneth R. Young, "Local and National..." op.cit., p.97. 25Ibid., pp.98-99. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 280] === 258 Young's argument is generally true. Also, it does not mean that the state in Kediri in 19651966 was unchallengeable and strong enough to move forward on its own interests. 7. Outburst o f economic pressures The scale of killings is clearly related to the downward trend of so many of Indonesia's economic indicators in the eight years or so before the coup, and particularly perhaps to the very rapid inflation of the 1961-1965 period. Economic decline did not produce economic collapse. But it did produce a situation in which more and more people, and not least more and more educated people, were unemployed, in which the government had to speak in ever shriller terms in its denunciations of external enemies, and in which the language of violence was very much to the fore. Hunger, insecurity and revolutionary agitation formed an explosive combination. Conflict over scarcity of economic resources was mostly apparent in land disputes. Two of the largest conflicts prior to the Gestapu Affair took place in two of the poorest areas in Kediri. From local statistics, there was no apparent pressure from overpopulation.26 But, considering fertility of the land, members of the countryside barely lived at subsistence level. New recruits and employment by the management of the plantation, that in most cases were patterned alongside political affiliations also provides another possibility of conflict over limited local economic resources. All these seems to fit into a pattern suggesting that economic deprivation was potentially explosive and a factor in the killings. But, a close look into the structure of the killers and the killed in Jombang 26For these statistics, see subchapter III. 1. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 281] === 259 and Kediri has revealed that this was not the case. Those deprived people were the victims, not the killers. And once again, both sides were mostly members of the middle strata of their community clusters. 8. Army revenge and state genocide. Many students of Indonesia believe that the mass slaughters were orchestrated by the army, in some areas in collaboration with the Muslim youth vigilante groups. Member’s of Indonesia’s younger generation also hold this view, proudly sharing the conviction that the army acted heroically by slaughtering the communists. The army claims to have led the "clean-up" operations. It began the purge by rounding up the junior officers and men who were involved in the Gestapu Affair, followed by massive military operations in Central Java. The initial thrust to avenge the killing of the generals gave way to a new, comprehensive authorization, disseminated from the center to the very edges of the society. But as this study shows, no single pattern of killing can be applied nationally. The killings in Central Java were primarily a result of military operations, not a violent outgrowth of social conflicts. Reports and studies from Bali reveal joint operations between the military and local youth groups. But the Jombang-Kediri areas demonstrate a third pattern. A relatively passive role taken by the military there provided a fighting ring for old political scores to be settled violently by local protagonists.27 The PKI was preempted and destroyed. Without a 27This is also a thesis proposed by Sudjatmiko, that the less the army was involved, the higher the number of casualties. See Sudjatmiko, op.cit. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 282] === 260 referee, these slaughters took place in an uncoordinated, random fashion as local Muslim youth bands, with the tacit approval of certain kiyai, seized the opportunity to murder their communist opponents. Thus, it is misleading to present the military as the single actor responsible for the killings, at least in Jombang and Kediri. But it is similarly misleading to conclude that the military was not involved. Without their consent—and a feeling by the participants that the army condoned and supported their actions—there would probably have been no mass slaughters. Related to the explanation emphasizing the role of the military is the argument that the killing was a state-sponsored genocide. Helen Fein defined a genocide as "a strategy that ruling elites used to resolve real solidarity and legitimacy conflicts or challenges to their interests against victims decreed outside their universe of obligation in situations in which a crisis or opportunity is caused by or blamed on the victim (or the victim impedes taking advantage of an opportunity) and the perpetrators believe that they can get away with it."2* Quoting Robert Cribb, Helen Fein stated that "The New Order, a regime which has suppressed both mass nonviolent and violent expression, began with mass killings which often relied on local antagonisms dividing killers and victims.”29 In a state-sponsored genocide, there should be a blueprint or systematic pattern of killing, executed by a state apparatus. From the findings in Jombang and Kediri, there is no 2*Helen Fein, "Revolutionary and Antirevolutionary Genocides: A Comparison of State Murders in Democratic Kampuchea, 1975 to 1979, and in Indonesia, 1965 to 1966," Contemporary Studies o f Society and History, Vol.35, No.4, October 1993, p.813. ™Ibid., p.804. However, Cribb does not imply this notion anywhere in the pages that Fein quoted (pp.23-28). R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 283] === 261 proof of any blueprint, and there was only minimum involvement of a state apparatus. However, the issue is more complicated than it seems. The killings should be seen in relation to the principal tensions of Jakarta politics in the post-Gestapu period, those between the army leaders and President Sukarno. The army leadership might have been expected to do more to stop or limit the scale of the killings (and particularly to prevent killing by groups o f civilian vigilantes); that it did not do more in this direction was a consequence of the fact that its consolidation from previous factionalism had yet to be finished, and because it needed a free hand to wipe out its enemies. State power was nowhere used to stop the killings until a great many PKI people were already dead. Although the slaughter was definitely not a state-sponsored genocide, some of its characteristics nevertheless resemble genocide. Not sponsored by the state, the killings in Jombang-Kediri were clearly sanctioned by its post-Gestapu military power holders. It is clear that all the above factors together contribute to the complexity of the killings. The presence of multiple variables defies a single explanation. But the case from Jombang and Kediri shows a clear pattern of longstanding social dislocations and rifts erupting into a violent and deadly conflict in the wake of a catalytic event, namely Gestapu. The pattern may have been similar in other areas of Indonesia as well. This study also demonstrated how what was a political-rhetorical confrontation at the national level led to physical conflict at the grassroots. When this happened, the PKI was completely unprepared. As a revolutionary party that based its strategy on conflict, the PKI under its national leadership espoused massive campaigns to recruit followers at the grassroots. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 284] === 262 They were enormously successful at this. Yet, by September 1965 at least, the party had not melded these followers into a strong and resilient organization. When its initiative was preempted following Gestapu, the party was revealed to be unarmed, unorganized, and helpless. This sad piece of Indonesia's missing history is part of a great watershed in the history o f the country. The Gestapu Affair has come to be seen as a cleansing ritual. Indonesian citizens are encouraged by their government to remember this ritual in the clear cut, black and white way it appears in the official history.30 In this official picture, the Gestapu Affair is centered on Jakarta, presented as an undotted white canvas. The postGestapu killings are not in the picture; they would disturb the official landscape. Thus, it is not surprising that a human event with hundreds of thousands of victims has been nearly forgotten in less than one generation. Many scars remain, however, and these scars, lying beneath the official history, are also part of the collective Indonesian experience. Like the official history, they too will shape the coming generations. 30See an elaboration of this "official history" in chapter II. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 285] === BIBLIOGRAPHY Note on Sources As mentioned in chapter n, only very limited sources are available in Indonesia, even to cover the Gestapu affair in the capital city. But, there are abundant materials held by various libraries in the U.S. This study particularly made use of materials in libraries of Cornell University, Ohio University, and Arizona State University. Not all sources listed below were used directly in the main text; many of them are only useful as background materials. However, the list should be useful for further research, such as research on the Gestapu affair in Jakarta. In general, sources are divided into the following categories: I. Gestapu affair: national level 1.1. Secondary sources: 1.1.a. Academic works such as books, theses or dissertations, monographs, journal articles, and others; 1.1.b. Published personal accounts, memoirs, reminiscences, autobiographies. 1.2. Primary sources: 1.2.a. Declassified U.S. government documents, including CIA reports and analysis. Unfortunately, many important documents and information are in desanitized forms; and many others are still classified. 1.2.b. Uncatalogued documents from Mahmillub trials, deposited at Kahin Center, Cornell University. 1.2.c. Microfiches of PKI-related documents, collected under the DDC Publications (Microform Publishers, Leiden, the Netherlands), under the heading of "South-East Asia," sub-heading of "Communist Party of Indonesia." 1.2.d. Other unpublished documents I personally gathered and collected. 1.2.e. Microfiches of the Indonesian newspapers from the time. 1.2.f. Informal interviews and personal correspondence with many key actors played at that time. II. Local affairs: the killings II. 1. Secondary sources: n.l.a. Very limited academic works and a number of graduate theses; II. 1.b. Official publications of various pondok pesantren; H.l.c. Official publications ofPTP XXI-XXII and of the Department of Agriculture; n.l.d. Articles from various journals, magazines and newspapers. H.2. Primary sources: 11.2.a. Interviews with actors in local levels. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 286] === 264 II.2.b. Documents and archives from various sugar factories found in their (mostly) unarranged and rottening conditions. n.2.c. Documents and archives from various pesantrens not included in the category of ILl.b. H.2.d. Personal notes, letters, and similar documents from some informants. All sources are arranged alphabetically, except a group of primary documents I personally holds, which are listed at the end of the bibliography. All other materials can be found in or located through various interlibrary loan systems. Alphabetical Listing Aidit, D.N. A Short History o f the Communist Party o f Indonesia. New Delhi: n.p. 1955. . The Birth and Growth o f the Communist Party o f Indonesia. Speech delivered by D.N. Aidit,General Secretary o f the C.P.I. on the occasion o f the 35th Anniversary o f the C.P.I., May 23rd, 1955. Jakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 1958. . Untuk Demokrasi dan Kabinet Gotong Royong: laporan umum Comite Central Partai Komunis Indonesia kepada Kongres Nasional ke VI. Jakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 1959. . Peladjaran dari Sedjarah PKI. Jakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 1960. . The Selected Works o f D.N. Aidit, 2 vol. Washington, D.C.: U.S. JPRS 6551 and JPRS 8886, 1961. . Ever Forward to Storm Imperialism and Feudalism. Jakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 1961. . Socialisme Indonesia dan Sjarat2 pelaksanaannja. Jakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 1962. . Dare, dare, and dare again! Political report presented on February 10, 1963, to the first plenary session o f the Seventh Central Committee o f the Communist Party o f Indonesia. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963; Indonesian original text first appeared as ''Berani, Berani, Sekali Lagi Berani!” Laporan Politik Aidit di depan Sidang Pleno ICC-PKI di Djakarta, 10-12 Februari 1963, published as serial article-report in Harian Rakjat, May 1963. . The Indonesian revolution and the immediate tasks o f the Communist Party of Indonesia. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 287] === 265 Set Afire the Bcmteng Spirit! Ever Onward! No Retreat! Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964. . Revolusi Indonesia, Latarbelakang, Sedjarah dan Haridepannja. Jakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 1964. Dengan Sastra dan Senijang Berkepribadian Nasional Mengabdi Buruh, Tani dan Pradjurit. Jakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 1964. . Kaum Tani Mengganjang Setan-setan Desa: laporan singkat tentang hasil riset mengenai keadaan kaum tani dan gerakan tani Djawa Baral. Jakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 1965. . Perhebat Ofensif Revolusioner Disegala Bidang! Laporan Politik Kepada Sidang Pleno ke-IV CC PKIjang Diperluas tanggal 11 Mei 1965. Jakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 1965. AD-ART (Konstitusi) PKI. Jakarta: Comite Partai Komunis Indonesia, 1964. Anderson, Benedict R.O'G. Java in a Time o f Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972. Anderson, Benedict R.'O.G. and Ruth T. McVey. "A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia," Interim Report Series, Modem Indonesia Project, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, 1971. Anonymous (Nugroho Notosusanto?). Fakta2 Sekitar Kup Berdarah Gestapu/PKI dari Diskusi2 Politbiro Hingga "Gerakan" di Djakarta Tumpas. Djakarta, 20 Desember 1965, 90 pp. Typewritten manuscript, held by Ohio University Library, SEA Collection. Asy'ariy, K.H.M. Hasyim. "Taburan Permata yang Indah Membahas Sembilan Belas Mas'alah." Diindonesiakan dan diberi Kata Pengantar oleh Moh. Tolchah Mansoer. Medan: Penerbit "Menara" Kudus, n.d. Aveling, Harry, ed. and trans. Gestapu: Indonesian Short Stories on the Abortive Communist Coup o f 30th September 1965. Southeast Asian Studies Working Paper No. 6, Reproduced by the Southeast Asian Studies Program, University of Hawaii, 1975. , ed. The Development o f Indonesian Society: from the coming o f Islam to the present day. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 288] === 266 Bass, Jerome R. "The PKI and the Attempted Coup," Journal o f Southeast Asian Studies, Vol.l, no.l, March 1970, pp.96-105. Belen KIJ, A. and B. D'icev. "Nebohorye oroki sobytijv Indonezii," Kommunist, no. 15, October 1968, pp. 110-123. [Indonesian translation in Abdurrachman Suijomihardjo] Benda, H.J. "Reflections on Asian Communism," in H.J. Benda, Continuity and Change in Southeast Asia. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1972, pp.253268; originally appeared in Yale Review, no.56, vol.l (October 1966). Benda, H.J. "Communism in Southeast Asia," in Southeast Asia: the Politics o f National Integration, ed. by J.T. McAlister Jr. New York:?, 1973, pp.423-431. Boerhan & Soebekti. Fakta dan Latar Belakang "Gerakan 30 September." Jakarta: Lembaga Pendidikan Ilmu Pengetahuan dan Kebudayaan Kosgoro, second revised edition, 1965. Brackman, Arnold C. Indonesian Communism: a history. New York: Praeger, 1963. . The Communist Collapse in Indonesia. New York: W.W. Norton, 1969. Indonesia: The Gestapu Affair. American-Asian Educational Exchange, 1969. Brands, H.W. 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Soemardjan, Selo. "Land Reform in Indonesia." Asian Survey, vol. I, no. 12, February 1962, pp.23-30. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 300] === 278 Soeryana. "Soedisman: the organisator and 'the king maker* that failed." Typescript, 1985. Sofyan. "KH. Abdul Wahid Hasyim (Peijuangan dan Pemikirannya)." Skripsi. Fakultas Ushuluddin, Institut Agama Islam Negeri Al-Jami'ah Al S-Islamiyah Al-Hukumiyah Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta, 1985. Stephen, Sloan. A study in political violence: the Indonesian experience. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1971. Sudiijo, Radik Utoyo (Penyusun). Kesaktian Pancasila diBumi Pertxwi. Jakarta: Badan Penyelenggara Penerbitan Kesaktian Pancasila, 1984. Sudisman. "Analysis of Responsibility: defense speech of General Secretary o f the Indonesian Communist Party at his trial before the Special Military Tribunal, Jakarta, 21 July 1967." Trans, with notes by B.R.O'G. Anderson (n.d.; Wason collection, Cornell U.) . Konsolidasi Kerapian dan Militansi Organisasi Partai: Singkatan Pidato di Konferensi Nasional ke-I PKI, diutjapkan pada awal Djuli 1964. Jakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 1964. . Berofensif Dibidang Pelaksanaan Plan 4 Tahun Partai: Pidato sambutan pada Sidang Pleno ke-IVCC PKI bulan Mei 1965. Jakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 1965. Sukarno (Bung Kamo). Subur, Subur, Suburlah PKI: Pidato Presiden Sukarno pada rapat raksasa Ulangtahun ke-45 PKI. Jakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 1965. Sulistyo, Hermawan. "Kepemimpinan di Pesantren: Studi Kasus Tebuireng." Skripsi Sarjana. Fakultas Ilmu-ilmu Sosial, Universitas Indonesia, 1983. Sumardi, Mulyanto, ed., et.al., Penelitian Agama: Masalah dan Pemikiran. Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1982. Sunardi I.D.M. Lecture on the September 30 Movement, the Indonesian Communist Party and the elimination o f o f the Communists in Indonesia. Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia, n.d. Supersemar: Surat Perintah 11 Maret dalam tulisan dan foto-foto. Jakarta: Badan Penerbit Almanak Republik Indonesia, 1977. Supriyono. "Laporan Praktek Keija Perkebunan," esp. Bab IV: Keadaan Umum P.G. Jombang Baru. Program Diploma III Produksi Tanaman, Fakultas Pertanian, Universitas Brawijaya, Malang, 1991. R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 301] === 279 Suijomihardjo, Abdurrachman (Koord.)- "Kesimpulan Beberapa Penulis Asing Mengenai G.30S." Typewritten manuscript, classified document, limited distribution, 1976; The conclusion and recommendation in a separate report entitled, "Laporan Kelompok Keija Penilaian Kepustakaan G.30S. Karya Para Penulis Asing." Suroso, J. "Indonesien nach der Konter-revolution," in Das Argument, 11, no.4, October 1969, pp.315-333. Suyanto. "Pentingnya Analisa Persediaan Bahan Baku yang Efektif untuk Meningkatkan Volume Produksi pada P.G. Jombang Baru' di Jombang," esp. Bab I. Skripsi, Universitas "Darul Ulum" Jombang, Fakultas Ekonomi, 1988. Syarif, Mustofa. Administrasi Pesantren. Jakarta: Badan Penerbit P.T. Paryu Barkah, 1979. Taintor, M.B. "An Ecological Model of Peasant Revolutions: The Indonesian Communist Experience, 1952-1965," PhD thesis State University of New York at Buffalo. University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1974. Tamim, Djamaluddin. Sedjarah PKJ, jilid I (typed as vol. Ill), typescript, 1957. Team Memory Panitia Akhir Study Siswa Tsanawiyah Tebuireng, Jombang, Periode 1990/1991, Madrasah Salafiyah Syafi'iyah Tingkat Tsanawiyah, Pondok Pesantren Tebuireng: Memory. 1991. Tesis 45 TahunPKI, 23 Mei 1920-23 Mei 1965. Jakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 1965. The Liang Gie. Pertumbuhan Pemerintahan Daerah di Negara Republik Indonesia, vols. IIm. Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1968. Thomson, Alan. "The Churches of Java in the Aftermath of the Thirtieth of September Movement." Southeast Asian Journal o f Theology, vol.9, no.3, January 1968, pp.7-20. Thurk, H., and D. Wiedemann. Indonesien ’65: Anatomie eines Putsches. Berlin: 1975. Tichelman, F. "The Communist Party of Indonesia. A Bibliographical Impression of the Main Trends." Occasional Paper No.6, James Cook University of North Queensland, 1980. Tjondronegoro, Sediono M.P. and Gunawan Wiradi. Dua AbadPenguasaan Tanah: Pola Penguasaan Tanah Pertanian di Jawa dari Masa ke Masa. Jakarta: Gramedia, 1984. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 302] === 280 Tomquist, Olle. Dilemmas o f Third World Communism: the Destruction o f the PKI in Indonesia. London: Zed Books, 1984. Usamah. "War and Humanity: Notes on Personal Experience," trans. by Helen Jarvis, Indonesia Ithaca: Cornell Modem Indonesia Project, no.9, April 1970, pp.89-99. Utrecht, Ernst. "Land Reform," Bulletin o f Indonesian Economic Studies, V, 3, November 1964, pp.71-88. Utrecht, Ernst. Indonesie's Nieuwe Orde. Ontbinding en Neokolonisatie. Amsterdam: VanGennep, 1970. "The Military Coup of October 1st, 1965 in Jakarta: a Report and Personal Account," Internationales Asienforum, vol.4, January 1973, pp.31-38. van der Kroef, Justus M. The Communist Party o f Indonesia: Its History, Program and Tactics. Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1965. "Sukarno's Fall," Orbis (Philadelphia), vol. 01, 1967, pp. 491-531. "Peasants and Land Reform in Indonesian Communism," Journal o f Southeast Asian History, vol.4, no. 1. "Dilemmas of Indonesian Communism," Pacific Affairs, vol.35, no.2. "Land Tenure and Social Structure in Rural Java," Rural Sociology, vol. 25, no.4. "Communist Policy and Tactics in Indonesia," Australian Journal o f Politics and History, November 1959. "The Vocabulary of Indonesian Communism," Problems o f Communism, vol. 14, May 1965, pp. 1-9. "Indonesia: the Mystique o f Permanent Revolution," The South Atlantic Quarterly, vol. 64 (Winter 1965), pp. 1-14. "Indonesia's Gestapu: the View from Moscow and Peking," The Australian Journal o f Politics and History, vol. 14, no.2, August 1968, pp. 163-176. "The Sino-Indonesian Rupture," The China Quarterly, January-March 1968; Reprint, American-Asian Educational Exchange Inc., n.d. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 303] === 281 . "Indonesian Communism since 1965 Coup," Pacific Affairs, vol.43, no.l, Spring 1970, pp.34-60. "Interpretations of the 1965 Indonesian Coup," Pacific Affairs, XLm, 4, Winter 1970-1971, pp. 557-577. "Origin of the 1965 Coup in Indonesia: Propalities and Alternatives," Journal o f Southeast Asian Studies, vol.3, no.2, Sept. 1972, pp.277-298. "Interpretations of the 1965 Indonesian Coup," Pacific Affairs, XLm, 4, Winter 1970-1971, pp.557-577. "Indonesian Communism and the Changing Balance of Power," Pacific Affairs, XXXVH, 4, Winter 1964-1965, pp.357-383. "Class Structure and Economic Development in Indonesian and Philippine Communist Theory: a Comparative Analysis," Asian Thought and Society, 1, No.3, Dec. 1976, pp.266-290. Vittachi, T. The Fall o f Sukarno. New York: Knopf, 1967. Wahid, Abdurrahman. Kiyai Bisri Syansuri: Pecinta Fiqh Sepanjang Hayat. n.p., 1989. Walkin, J. "The Moslem-Communist Confrontation in East Java, 1964-1965," Orbis 12 (1969), pp.822-847. Wann, K. "Indonesia: Interpreting the Coup," Australian Left Review, December 1970January 1971, pp.57-69. Ward, Ken. The 1971 Election in Indonesia: an East Java Case Study. Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University: Monash Papers on Southeast Asia— No. 2, 1974. Weatherbee, Donald E. Ideology in Indonesia: Sukarno's Indonesian Revolution. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966. "Interpretations ofGestapu the 1965 Indonesian Coup," World Affairs, vol. 132, no.4, March 1970, pp.308-316. Wertheim, W.F. "Indonesia Before and After the Untung Coup," Pacific Affairs, XXXIX, 1-2, Spring-Summer 1966, pp. 115-127. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 304] === 282 "From Aliran towards Class Struggle in the Countryside of Java," Pacific Viewpoint, 10, no.2, Sept. 1969, pp. 1-17. . "Suharto and the Untung Coup - the Missing Link," Journal o f Contemporary Asia, vol.l, no.2, Winter 1970, pp.50-57. . "Whose Plot? - New Light on the 1965 Events," in Journal o f Contemporary Asia, 9, no.2, 1979, pp. 197-215. "Sejarah tahun 65 yang tersembunyi: ceramah pada tanggal 23 September 1990 di Amsterdam," typescript. "A book review" on Robert Cribb's The Indonesian Killings 1965-1966: Studies from Java and Bali, in Journal o f Southeast Asian Studies, 24, 1 (1993), pp. 173177. Widjanarko, Bambang S. The Devious Dalang: Sukarno and the so-called Untung putsch: eye-witness report. Intro, by Antonie C.A. Dake, edited by Rahadi S. Kami. The Hague: Interdoc, 1974. Yusuf, Slamet Effendy, et.al., eds. Dinamika Kaum Santri: Menelusuri Jejak & Pergolakan Internal NU. Jakarta: CV Rajawali, 1983. Yayasan Pondok Pesantren Mamba'ul Ma'arif, "Panduan Santri Asrama Nur Khodijah III," 1992/1993. Journals, magazines, and newspapers Antara, October 1965-December 1965. (Asia Wason Film 1422, Cornell University) Berita Yudha Edisi Djawa, 15 January 1966-December 1967. (Asia Wason Film 1907, Cornell University).[In this dissertation, abbreviated as BY]. BintangMerah, 1964-1965. (Alden library, Ohio University). [Abbreviated as BM\. Bulletin media informasi P. T. Perkebunan XXI-XX1I (Persero). Bidang Pengkajian Sumberdaya, May 1993. Djawa Pos, 1963-1966 (Asia Wason Film 227, Cornell University). [Abbreviated as DP]. Gema Islam, July 1962 - April 1964. Harian Rakjat, January 1960-3 October 1965 (Asia Wason Films 113-116, Cornell University). [Abbreviated as HR]. Harian Umum (Surabaja), 1962-1966 (Asia Wason Film 226, Cornell University). Hikmah, February 1952- October 1955. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 305] === 283 Kompas, 1965-1971. (Alden library, Ohio University). Manifesto, November 1963-14 January 1966 (Asia Wason Film 1907; Cornell University). MimbarAgama, 17 November-17 December 1950. New York Times, January 1966-JuIy 1970. [Abbreviated as NYT\. SoearaMoeslimin Indonesia, magazine, January-October 1944. [Abbreviated as SMI]. Suara Partai Masjumi, No. 2, February 1952. Surabaja Post, 1 August 1962-30 June 1967 (Asia Wason Film 2225, Cornell University). [Abbreviated SP]. Swara Nahdlotoe’l [Nahdhatoe'l] 'Oelama, magazine, 1932. Tebuireng magazine, 1986-1987; 1990. Documents (declassified U.S. documents) CIA Intelligence Memorandum. "Leadership Prospects in Indonesia." 2 December 1965. Case #88-119, Doc.# 118. (Alden library, Ohio University) CIA Intelligence Memorandum. "The Changed Political Scene in Indonesia." 3 January 1966. Case #88-119, Doc.#l 14. (Alden library, Ohio University). CIA Intelligence Memorandum. "The New Indonesian Cabinet." 30 July 1966. Case #88118, Doc.#l 11 A. (Alden library, Ohio University) CIA Intelligence Memorandum. "Indonesia: Prospects for the Oil Industry." Dec. 1968. Case 88-120. (Alden library, Ohio University) CIA Intelligence Memorandum. "Indonesian Army Attitudes toward Communism." 22 November 1965. Case #88-119, Doc.#l 19. (Alden library, Ohio University). Other documents (in the author's possession, or held in libraries) Kopkamtib, "Pemberontakan G-30-S/PKI," a typewritten manuscript, document, n.d. Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa. PutusanNo: PTS-009/MBI/A/1966 tgl. 21 Februari 1966; related doc.: Surat Keputusan No: KEP-18/2/1966 tentang Fiat Executie, ttd. Menpangad selaku Panglima Ops. Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban tgl. 21 Februari 1966. Njono case. Uncatalogued document, Kahin Center, Cornell University. Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa. Putusan No: B-007/MLB-VI/66 tgl. 25 Juni 1966 (Peris Pardede). Uncatalogued document, Kahin Center, Cornell University. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 306] === 284 Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa. Putusan No. PTS-017/MLB-XTV/O.D./1966 tgl. 23-121966; related doc.: Surat Keputusan No: KEP-094/KOPKAM/12/1966 tentang Fiat Executie, Djakarta, 24 Desember 1966. Omar Dani case. Uncatalogued doc, Kahin Center, Cornell University. Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa dalam Perkara Supono Marsudidjojo alias Pono. Orang Kedua Biro Chusus P.K.I. dalam G.30S/P.K.I. serta Gerakan Landjutannja di Blitar Selatan dan Djawa Tengah, Djilid I,II,IE. Typescript transcript. Related doc.: Keputusan No: PTS-035/MLB-II/SM/1972. Uncatalogued doc, Kahin Center, Cornell University. The 8th Regional Military Command Brawidjaja, Trisula Operation: smashing the communist threat in Indonesia. Jajasan Taman Tjandrawilwatikta, first edition, 1972. "Muktamar Partai Nahdlatul Ulama ke-XXV di Surabaja, pada tanggal 20 s/d 25 Desember 1971." Keputusan Komisi B. Document held at Wason collection, Cornell University. Soegondo, D. [Col.]. "Membahas pokok-pokok peristiwa 'Gerakan 30 September"1naskah sementara, typewritten manuscript. Kopkamtib; n.d. U.S. Embassy Translation Unit Press Review: 1965-1966-1967. P.G. Pesantren Barn - Daftar karyawan terlibat (10 Aug. 1988) P.G. Meritjan - Daftar karyawan terlibat (18 Nov. 1966) P.G. Meritjan - Daftar karyawan terbunuh/terlibat (3 Jan. 1966) P.G. Pesantren - Daftar karyawan terlibat (31 May 1975) Kesimpulan Turba BPUPN Gula (April 1965) P.T. Perkebunan XXI-XXII (Persero) - Pabrik Gula "Pesantren" (undated, typescript). Susunan anggota Dewan Perusahaan P.N. Gula "Meritjan" (18 May 1966) P.G. Meritjan Selayang Pandang (brochure, Aug. 1992) P.G. Djombang Baru - Data produksi 1955-1971 (handwritten). R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 307] === 285 Laporan Tahunan 1967 - PPN Gula "Meritjan." Surat Perdjandjian Tebu Rakjat Luar Areal tahun panen 1965/1966. Miscellaneous: BPU-PPN Gula - BKS-SB2 Gula, Jakarta, 7-9 April 1965. P.G. Meritjan - Laporan tahunan 1965 dan Projeksi 1966. Miscellaneous: Labor conditions P.G. Meritjan, 1959-1960. Miscellaneous: P.G. Meritjan, 1959/1960. Miscellaneous: 1965. Miscellaneous: P.G. Meritjan, Kediri, 1966. Machmudi (informant) - personal data. Miscellaneous: 1962. Penjelasan Rencana Giling 1960 - S.F. Meritjan. P.G. Meritjan -Residen Kediri, persewaan tanah 1961/1962. Tebu Giling untuk P.G. Meritjan, 1960. Data dasar, P.G. Meritjan, 1962. Pemberhentian pegawai - P.G. Djengkol, 1957. P.G. Meritjan - peta 1955. S.K. Organisasi, Formasi, dan Tugas Pokok PTP XXI-XXII, 16 Feb. 1989. P.G. Djombang Baru - struktur organisasi (1993). P.G. Meritjan - jenis-jenis gula utama, dll. 1941-1971. Data Iahan/produksi P.G. Ngadiredjo, P.G. Meritjan, P.G. Pesantren, P.G. Tjoekir, 19371971. DataProduksi P.G. Djombang Baru, 1960-1966. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 308] === 286 "Sejarah P.G. Jombang Baru," 2 pp. typescript. "Sejarah Singkat P.G. Tjoekir," typescript. Data produksi P.G. Ngadiredjo, dll., 1969-1970/1971. P.G. Pesantren Baru. Brochure. Miscellaneous, August 1957. Sambutan Wakil Direktur Umum, Ijasah Kursus BI, C & D di Pasuruan, April 1965. "Outline Sejarah Hizbullah," typescript, n.d. Instruksi Menteri Kompaq, Oktober 1965. Miscellaneous, June 1965. Penjelasan Musyawarah BPU-PN Gula di Jakarta, August 1966. Pengumunan Ijin Kodim, 1966. Hansip & Eks G-30-S PKI, 1966. Memorandum DPRD-GR Kediri 1970 tentang Harga Gula. Instruksi PAM Tebu P.G. Lestari, 1964. Laporan Penebangan Tebu, 1966. Pendjagaan Tanaman Tebu PPN, April 1965. Kampanye - Jaarverslag 1966, P.G. Meritjan. Particuliere Landerijen, 1920-1934. Harga Beras, 1958. P.G. Meritjan - overwerk & upah buruh, 1958. K.H. Agus Makhsun - interview (handwritten). P.G. Meritjan - Laporan Tahunan 1970. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 309] === 287 P.G. Meritjan - Laporan Tahunan 1968. P.G. Meritjan - Laporan Tahunan 1971. Peraturan/Juklak dari Pusat/Kopkamtib, 1965. P.G. Meritjan - T.H.R. 1966. P.G. Meritjan - data produksi 1939-1973. Panitya Glebagan Desa dan Sewa Tanah, 1970. Labor situation, 1950. TurbaCamat, 1966. Pemecatan pegawai, 1952. Blanko Isian Buruh, Kodim, 1960. Bagan organisasi P.G. Meritjan, n.d. S.B.G. Meritjan, labor dispute, 1957. Ikhtisar angka-angka perusahaan, 1971. Kasus Djatiwangi (protes SBG Meritjan dan pesantren-pesantren), Redjosarie), 1957. Ringkasan angka-angka perusahaan - kampanye, 1960. Ikhtisar angka-angka perusahaan - kampanye, 1962. Kasus Jajasan Tebu Rakjat "Jatra" 1955. Catu gula, pemeriksaan, dll. PNP n, 1965. S.F. Meritjan - data lahan, 1950-1955. S.F. Meritjan - labor conditions, 1957. K.H. Wahab Hasbullah - biografi, Tebuireng magazine, No.5, September 1986. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 310] === 288 K.H. Abdul Karim Lirboyo - biografi, Tebuireng magazine, No. VII, November 1986. K.H. A. Wahab Hasbullah - typescript, n.d. Bahrul Ulum - typescript, n.d. Miscellaneous - Hizbullah, Tebuireng, 1986. P.G. Meritjan - Re. dansa-dansi, 1962. Situasi keamanan 1966-1970. Pengamanan pabrik, November 1965. Pepelrada - S.K. Terlibat, November 1965. Kampanye - verslag 1957. Djasmin, Noer Soetomo, Harun Mustapa (Eds), "Data-data tanaman dari tahun tebang 1937 s/d 1941; 1954 s/d 1974. PG2/PTP XXI-XXII (Persero)," internal report, typescript, 1974. Anonymous. "Konsep Buku Sejarah Hizbulloh." n.d. "Sejarah Perusahaan Perkebunan dan Perkembangan Organisasi Karyawan/Buruh di Perindustrian Gula," typescript, n.d. "Laporan Hasil Penelitian Tentang Pengaruh Pondok Pesantren Tebuireng Terhadap Struktur Sosial Masyarakat Sekitamya." Universitas Hasyim Asy'ari bekeija sama Antara Bagian Proyek Penelitian Perguruan Tinggi Agama Departemen Agama. Monograph, n.d. "Pondok Pesantren Tebuireng, Jombang, Indonesia," brochure, n.d. "Laporan Kelompok Keija Penilaian Kepustakaan G.30.S. Karya Para Penulis Asing," monograph, limited circulation. (Kopkamtib- Leknas/LIPI). Team PDP. "Tebuireng dari Masa ke Masa," typewritten manuscript. (P. Pes. Tebuireng, Jombang, 19?). R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 311] === 289 M. Asad Syahab. "K.H.M. Hasyim Asy'ari Peletak Pondasi Kemerdekaan Indonesia." Peneijemah Aydi Abdulbar. (typescript, 1993). H.R. Abduldjalal, Tri Khizbullah Berjuang (n.d; n.p.). Sejarah Hidup K.H.A. Wahid Hasjim dan Karangan Tersiar "Memory '93 Mass Tsanawiyah," Tebuireng, Jombang, 1993. Interviews (recorded only, excluding participatory contacts) Informant Location Time Syamsudin Cukir Jombang 06/18/93 Masyan Rozak Keras Jombang 06/18/93 H. Rusdi Latif Nglaban Jombang 06/18/93 06/26/93 Samsun Kais Jatirejo Jombang 06/18/93 Tarmuji Dluchan Nglaban Jombang 06/19/93 06/21/93 06/22/93 Muksin Tebuireng Jombang 06/19/93 H.M. Yusuf Hasyim Tebuireng Jombang 06/20/93 Ahmad Hamdani Cukir Jombang 06/20/93 R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 312] === Ma'ruf Muchamad Jatirejo Jombang 06/22/93 06/23/93 Jasari Watu Galuh Jombang 06/23/93 KHM Sholeh Abd. Hamid PP Bahrul Ulum Jombang 06/24/93 KHNasruUah Tambak Beras Jombang 06/24/93 H. Zaenal Abidin Cukir Jombang 06/25/93 H. Nursidik Jombang (city) 06/26/93 Soerodji Gudo (Jombang) 06/26/93 H. Tachrip Mojowamo Jombang 06/29/93 KH Ali Ahmad PP Darul Falah Jombang 06/29/93 H. Masjhudi Ali Cukir Jombang 06/30/93 K.H. A.Z. Arifin Khan PP Denanyar Jombang 07/01/93 K.H. Maksum Djauhari PP Lirboyo Kediri 07/01/93 Samsoeri Tjoekir Jombang 06/25/96 Rusdi Anwar Tjoekir Jombang 06/277/96 Ali Sofwan Kayangan Jombang 07/02/93 R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 313] === 291 KHM Shohib Bisri PP Denanyar Jombang 07/04/93 Tammunajat Tebuireng Jombang 07/05/93 Slamet & Nico Pesantren Baru Kediri 07/09/96 Kastolani Ngadiluwih Kediri 06/15/96 06/24/96 07/22/96 Mochlas Ngadiluwih Kediri 06/15/96 K.H. Abdul Latief PP Kedunglo 06/16/96 Syafii Soleiman Bangsongan, Kediri 06/22/96 Usman Yahya et.al. (collective) Univ. Tribakti Kediri 06/24/96 Anshari Thayib J1 Basuki Rahmat Surabaya 06/19/96 08/01/96 Cholil Bisri J1 Patiunus Ngawi 07/05/96 Samsul Bachri Desa Beran Ngawi 07/29/96 Ma'roefin Ngronggo Kediri 08/12/96 Lieutenant General M. Jassin Kebayoran Baru Jakarta 08/07/96 Mansur Adnan Kediri 08/13/96 General Soemitro Jl. Kemang Raya 8 Jakarta 08/19/96 R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 314] === 292 Samikun Ngadiluwih Kediri 03/—/97 Kaijan Branggahan Kediri 03/-/97 Poniran Bendoagung Trenggalek 03/-/97 Maskun Kediri 03/—/97 R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 315] === APPENDIX A NUMBER OF WORKERS BEFORE AND AFTER THE GESTAPU AFFAIR IN P.G. MERITJAN R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 316] === 294 Number of workers before and after Gestapu Affair in PG Meritjan1 PABRJX GULA "MERITJAN" AX-INSIP/66.016 To the chief of Directorate of Labor Relations Ressort 4/V Kediri in Kediri Dear sir, : REPORT.Your letter No. 19/P.U./II/66, dated 3-1-1966 Responding to your above stated letter, we are reporting as follows: I. Number of workers before and after "G.30.S." Affair, a. Before "G.30.S." Affair Staff" workers I Staff workers n 2 Permanent workers 468 people Temporary workers 169 people Kampanye 724 people Total 54 people 1,361 people 1,415 people 'This is a direct and word-to-word translation of a letter by the (acting) director of PG Meritjan; although sometimes seems odd, I leave the letter as it was, since even the original letter in Indonesian also seems odd. This letter is an example of how the slaughters in particular affected the workers ("content analysis" is in chapter V). Although in point V the letter stated that the company was not affected much because the milling season was over before the Gestapu Affair, nevertheless the missing number of workers was substantial. The impact was clearer when we look at the number of victims as translated in appendices 3 and 4. 2This is not to be confused with a more generic term of loji employees or "second class staff," which was only part of these "permanent workers" category that enjoyed housing facilities and other facilities close to those enjoyed by the "senior staff" living in the loji (here referred as "staff workers I"). R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 317] === b. After "G.30.S.HAffair Staff workers I Staff workers II Permanent workers Temporary workers Kampanye 52 people 435 people 160 people 721 people Total 1,316 people 1,368 people II. Workers unions existed in PG Meritjan (before "G.30.S") 1). Kesatuan Buruh Gula/Buruh Marhaenis Tjabang P.N. Gula Meritjan. 2). Serekat Buruh Muslimin Indonesia Tjabang P.N. Gula Meritjan. 3). Serikat Buruh Gula/SOBSI Tjabang P.N. Gula Meritjan. 4). Perhimpunan Ahli Gula Indonesia Tjabang P.N. Gula Meritjan. 5). Gabungan Serikat Buruh Indonesia Tjabang P.N. Gula Meritjan. Due to the "G.30.S." Affair, S.B.G./SOBSI had dissolved itself on 8 November 1965. While G.S.B.I. was not formally "frozen'Vdissolved/dispersing themselves, the organization is now already "dead." HI. Workers unions that now exist in P.N. Gula Meritjan. 1). Kesatuan Buruh Gula/Buruh Marhaenis Tjabang P.N. Gula Meritjan 2). Serekat Buruh Muslimin Indonesia Tjabang P.N. Gula Meritjan 3). Perhimpunan Ahli Gula Indonesia Tjabang P.N. Gula Meritjan All the above unions were previously formed. Board of members of Kesatuan Buruh Gula/Buruh Marhaenis Tjabang (branch of) P.N. Gula Meritjan, 1. Chairman I : Soejoso Wedyohardjono 2. Chairman II : Kodrat Soepeno 3. Chairman III : Sadirin 4. Secretary I : Haijoso 5. Secretary II : Gatot Soeprapto 6. Treasurer I : Sastrodiwiijo 7. Treasurer II : Hardi w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 318] === 296 Soenardi 8. Dept, of Organization 9. Dept, of Social-economics Johanes Maria E. Soenarko B.A. Moch. Affandi 10. Dept, of Development 11. Dept, of Information and 1. Djamali Propaganda 2. Kukuh 12. Dept. ofKebora 1. Soejoto 2. W. Soepardi Board of members of Sarbumusi Tjabang (branch of) P.N. Gula Meritjan. I. Pelindung R. Prajitno II. Advisor Hasjim Anwar B.A. III. Honorary chairman 1. Hani Achmad 2. Rusdi Arief K.H.A. Ridwan Anwar IV. Chairman Basoeki Chairman I Pamoedji Chairman II V. Secretary I Momok Nachroni Secretary II Soekiman B.Sc. Halim Sukur VI. Treasurer I Treasurer II S. Martono VII. Education section 1. Badrus Zaman Anwar 2. Soekiman B.Sc. 3. Achmad Soepribadi 4. Kiswojo B.Sc. Vni. Sports/Arts section 1. Momok Nachroni 2. Soenadji 3. Asmoeni 4. Toha IX. Social-economic section 1. Soeparman 2. Halim Sukur 3. Soekiman B.Sc. 4. Pamoedji X. P.R./Publications 1. S. Martono 2. Kiswojo B.Sc. 3. Soerono XI. Development 1. Soerono 2. Hadi 3. Asmoeni XII. Coordinator 1. Bibit Poerwanto 2. Hadi R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 319] === 297 Board of members P.AG.I. Tjabang (branch of) P.N. Gula Meritjan. Chairman : Soedarmanto Vice chairman : Soe'eb Joesfan Secretary I : Soenardi Secretary II : Ismoenardhi Treasurer : Halim Sukur IV. Actions taken on the workers regarding to the "G.30.S." Affair. V. Changes in worker/labor situation did not affect the company's performance or company's productivity. When the riots took place (so, in its "hottest" time) the mills had passed its milling season. VI. None. VII. Employee's allowances for the holidays (Hari Raja Lebaran thn. 1966, Christmas 1965 and New Year 1966). Our reply is attached. Hope this is sufficient. Sincerely, Perusahaan Gula Negara "Meritjan" (R. Prajitno) Acting Director R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 320] === APPENDIX B LIST OF WORKERS OF P.N. GULA MERITJAN THAT WERE KILLED, NON-ACTIVE, SUSPENDED, DISCHARGED R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 321] === 299 List of workers of P.N. Gula "Meritjan" that were killed, non-active, suspended, discharged1 Some notes on this document: 1. This document was found among a thousand other notes in an abandoned warehouse (officially called "archive" office) in PG. Meritjan. It was attached of document translated as Appendix 2. This is probably the only document of this kind that still exists. More comprehensive analytical treatment is in chapter V. 2. From the list, only two people were members of the "first class staff' (#30 and #35); however, in the rank o f loji, positions that these two people held were considered the lowest. It was a common practice that abbreviation H. in front of someone's name referred to Haji, a title socially assumed alter one made the pilgrimage to Mecca. Therefore, the title H. was always associated with non-PKI affiliate organizations, and more commonly associated with Islamic party such as NU. I could not verify whether H. as in #30's name was haji or an abbreviated first name. 3. Most positions in this list were from the "second class staff' category, further validating the argument that they were the most active SBG members and therefore suffered the most during the slaughtering period. These names comprised the core power of SBG, although many rank and file members and other sympathizers would fall victim much later, as shown in Appendix 4. 4. Following cultural patterns of the four clusters (chapter III), all names except three (#5, #8 and #18, although the latter name is not in its more commonly spelled, near-Arabic form, Marzuki) were considered names typical of members from the second cluster. These are those who were strongly associated with the "abangan" type of the Javanese worldview and lifestyle. One name (#35) was clearly an Ambonese. 5. For rules on Indonesian, especially Javanase names, see Glossary. Name 1. S.Kidjo 2. Tjiptomangun 3. Pardjan 4. Sahar/Poniran 5. Mardjoeki 6. Mukiran Position/title Killed Member of council of company Cane moving foreman Harvesting foreman Mill/neighborhood guard Plantation guard Retired 11-02-1965 11-02-1965 11-02-1965 11-02-1965 11-03-1965 11-04-1965 ‘Although there is a column for "suspended," none was in this category. For analytical purpose, I rearrange this list into a chronological list; the original list was written according the sections of their positions/jobs within the PG, and according their ranks. R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 322] === 300 7. Ramikir Prajitno 8. Mardjoeki 9. Radji 10. KarijoLahuri 11. Soeseno 12. Mingan 13. Saman 14. Poniman 15. Tukimin 16. Paing 17. Koesnan 18. Kamarudin 19. KaselanB. 20. Jososoemarto Member of council of company Chauffeur A Plantation guard Plantation guard 1st class office clerk Weight station attendance "Driver" of cane train "Driver" of cane train "Driver" of cane train 1st class craftsman Cashier Mill/neighborhood guard Plantation foreman 1st class office clerk 11-08-1965 11-08-1965 11-08-1965 11-08-1965 11-12-1965 11-13-1965 11-17-1965 11-17-1965 11-17-1965 11-17-1965 11-17-1965 11-17-1965 11-19-1965 11-30-1965 Position/titie Non-active 21. Partomihardjo 22. Darmo 23. Sudjud 24. Kaslan B.2 25. Darso 26. Lukito 27. Bandi Iskandar Chief of craftsmen Ass. "driver" of cane train Ass. craftsman Plantation foreman Plantation foreman 1st class plant craftsman Ass. office clerk 11-01-1965 11-01-1965 11-01-1965 11-10-1965 12-10-1965 12-10-1965 11-18-1965 Position/title Discharged 1st class craftsman Mill/neighborhood guard Weights supervisor Chauffeur A Train traffic controller Ass. plantation foreman 2nd class craftsman Warehouse supervisor Ass. paramedic Ass. office clerk Chief of office clerk 1st class office clerk 11-01-1965 11-01-1965 11-01-1965 11-01-1965 11-01-1965 11-05-1965 11-07-1965 11-08-1965 11-09-1965 11-09-1965 11-11-1965 11-11-1965 Name Name 28. Palilan 29. Langkir 30. H. Sumadi 31. Soekiran 32. Sariman 33. Djuremi 34. Kuwadi 35. Petter Latupeiressa 36. Sadiran 37. Isnar 38. Kasmin 39. Soewardi Sh. 2This might be the same person as #19. The name might appear from different reports. He could be absent from his job for nine days before finally was slaughtered on 11-19-1965. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 323] === 40. Sodjo 41. Warimin 42. Soedarsono 43. Sujadi 44. Kaseran 45. Suradi 1st class office clerk Ass. craftsman Plowing foreman 1st class craftsman Manual worker Ass. office clerk 1-11-1965 1-12-1965 1-12-1965 1-12-1965 1-15-1965 1-26-1965 R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 324] === APPENDIX C LIST OF WORKERS DISCHARGED DUE TO THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE GESTAPU R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 325] === 303 List of workers dicharged due to their involvement in the Gestapu Note: 1. This document is similar but revised version to the list attached as appendix 2. But the following list apparently is incomplete; the number of victims stops at 45, and there seems should not be ended here. 2. The list appeared as an attachment to a letter dated 18 November 1966, signed by R. Prajitno, acting director of PG "Meritjan" in a reply letter to an inquiry by the head of Sub inspectorate, Kediri Plantation Authority, in their letter No. 1730/SAF/Perb/Djatim/66, dated 14 October 1966. Name Working status (staff, employee, worker, etc.) Title/position in Company Organization 1. Ramikir Prajitno member of board of company 2. S. Kidjo ditto 3. Koesnan 4. Jososoemarto regular worker ditto 5. Soeseno 6. Kasmin ditto ditto 7. Soewardi S.H. ditto 8. Isnar 9. Sodjo ditto ditto 10. Soeradi 11. Bandi Iskandar 12. Mardjoeki 13. Soekiran 14. Mardjoeki ditto ditto ditto ditto ditto Additional Information not an em ployee representative The workers SBG/SOBSI (except 2 mem bers of board ditto representative o f company ofBTI and 6 mem cashier SBG/SOBSI bers ofboard 1st class secretary SOBSI branch ditto SBG/SOBSI of Meritjan), chief SBG/SOBSI all were dis secretary SBG/SOBSI charge for 1st class SBG/SOBSI being absent secretary SBG/SOBSI from the work ass. secretary SBG/SOBSI place without 1st class SBG/SOBSI permission so secretary SBG/SOBSI that they ass. secretary SBG/SOBSI might be sus ditto SBG/SOBSI pected as chauffeur SBG/SOBSI involved in ditto SBG/SOBSI the Gestapu. plantation SBG/SOBSI guard The two mem- R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 326] === 304 15. Radji 16. Karijo Lahuri 17. KaselanB. ditto ditto ditto 18. Tjiptomangun ditto 19. Pardjan ditto 20. Soedarsono 21. Djoeremi ditto ditto 22. Darso ditto 23. Mingan ditto 24. Sahar 25. Kamaruddin 26. Langkir 27. Saman ditto ditto ditto ditto 28. Poniman 29. Tukiman 30. Paing ditto ditto ditto 31. Sariman 32. Kaseran 33. Palilan ditto ditto ditto 34. Warimin 35. Kuwadi ditto ditto 36. Sujadi ditto 37. Partomihardjo ditto 38. Darmo ditto 39. Sudjud 40. Loekito ditto ditto 41. Mukiran 42. Sadiran ditto ditto ditto SBG/SOBSI bers of board ditto SBG/SOBSI of company plantation SBG/SOBSI and 6 mem foreman bers of board foreman, SBG/SOBSI ofSBG/ cane moving SOB SI branch harvesting SBG/SOBSI ofMeritjan foreman were immedi field counter SBG/SOBSI ately discharg ass. plantation SBG/SOBSI ed for they foreman could be sus plantation SBG/SOBSI pected as foreman directly plantation SBG/SOBSI involved in guard the Gestapu. ditto SBG/SOBSI ditto SBG/SOBSI ditto SBG/SOBSI train board of SBG/SOBSI operator ditto SBG/SOBSI ditto SBG/SOBSI 1st class SBG/SOBSI craftsman rail foreman SBG/SOBSI general worker SBG/SOBSI 1st class board of SBG/SOBSI craftsman ass. craftsman SBG/SOBSI 2nd class SBG/SOBSI craftsman 1st class SBG/SOBSI craftsman chief board of SBG/SOBSI craftsman ass. train ditto operator ass. craftsman ditto 1st class SBG/SOBSI craftsman retired SBG/SOBSI ass. policlinic SBG/SOBSI worker R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 327] === 305 43. H. Soemadi staff 44. Peter Latupeirissa staff weight supervisor warehouse supervisor board of SBG/SOBSI ditto R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 328] === APPENDIX D LIST OF WORKERS WHO WERE FELL VICTIM IN POST GESTAPU R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 329] === 307 List of workers who were fell victim in post Gestapu PG ’’Pesantren Baru" Notes on the document: 1. This document was found among abandoned archives in a "archival warehouse" of PG. Pesantren Baru. This letter was sent by the director (administrator) of PG Pesantren Baru, in response to a letter sent by local Kediri social and political office. This letter was sent on August 1988, using a document written in 1974.1 could not locate the original 1974 document that was issued as an attachment to discharge letters to the victims; a official letter of No. AD-PERPG/74.125/KPTS/TR.484/74 dated 20 December 1974, referring to the rules TR 484 and Instructions from the management of PTP XXI-XXII (Persero). 2. A glimpse at their names shows an indication that only five names had a strong association with "Muslim" names (#021, 030, 055, 063, 109). This technique o f social plotting might seem superficial, but it helps to reconstruct social groupings. 3. Again, as in appendix 3, this list shows clearly the social cluster of the victims. Only two of them reached the rank of IV-A, which was the highest rank in second class staff but not yet considered members of the loji. The rest were middle-ranking workers in the second (PG's) cluster. 4. There was no account of what happened to them politically, other than this forced retirement; I suspect that some were sent to jail. I also suspect that this was merely an official discharges/forced retirement; the process might have been going on for years before the discharge letter was issued in 1974. No.: AC-INSIP/88.141 Pesantren, 10 August 88 To the chief of social and political office The second level municipal city of Kediri Jalan Jendral Basuki Rachmad 15 Kediri List of former civil servants involved in G.30.S/P.K.I. Your letter No.= 720/377/441.53/1988 dated 08-03-1988 Referring to your above letter, here I am sending you a list of former civil servants involved in the G.30.S/P.K.I. in one copy. Please receipt of this letter. PT Perkebunan XXI-XXII (Persero) Pabrik Gula Tesantren Baru1 Soedarmanto Bsc. Administrator R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 330] === 308 PERKEBUNAN XXI-XXII Pabrik Gula 'Pesantren Baru' List o f employees who fell victim under the rule of TR.484 dated 12-20-1974 Pabrik Gula 'Pesantren Baru' Forced retirement with pension Name Classification Last address 001. Sudjono Banjaran-Kec. Kota Tengah 002. Supardjo Tugurejo-Kec. Gampengrejo 003. Rasim Dander Ketami-Kec. Pesantren 004. Kamin Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren 005. Sarip Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren 006. Kasijan Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren 007. Sujono Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren 008. Sudarman Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren 009. Trimo Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren 010. Suwito Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren Oll.Sangkreh Mojoroto-Kec. Mojoroto 012. Sardji Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren 013. Deno/Madeno Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren 014. Slametll Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren 015. Sukiman III Doko-Kec. Gampengrejo 016. Supangat Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren 017. Sardan Wonosari-Kec. Gurah 018. Sukarno Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren 019. Rupiani Banjaran-Kec. Kota 020. Giran-H/Sumito Tugurejo-Kec. Gampengrejo 021. Nachrowi/Narawi Bangsal-Kec. Pesantren 022. Aspah Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren 023. Kasidi Ketami-Dander-Pesantren 024. Tubi II Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren 025. Aspat Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren 026. Sugito Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren 027. Sadimun Mojoroto-Kec. Mojoroto 028. Wagiman Tugurejo-Kec. Gampengrejo 029. Muljani Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren 030. Muslimaz Ngletih-Kec. Pesantren 031. Sudjono Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren Last position garage foreman car mechanic car mechanic chauffeur chauffeur chauffeur chauffeur chauffeur train worker train station worker train station worker train station worker shop foreman shop worker shop worker craftsman craftsman craftsman telephone operator craftsman craftsman craftsman craftsman craftsman craftsman plant draftsman craftsman craftsman craftsman craftsman craftsman R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. IV-A III-A III-A III-A III-A III-A III-A III-A II-A II-A III-A II-A III-B III-A II-A II-A III-A IH-B II-A0 III-B II-A II-A II-A II-B HI-A IV-A II-A II-A II-A II-A II-B === [PDF page 331] === 309 032. Noor/Noorsijo Ketami-Kec. Pesantren craftsman 033. Supardi I Ngletih-Kec. Pesantren craftsman 034. Sukarmin Nggabru-Kec. Gurah craftsman 035. Suwandi craftsman Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren 036. Kasrip Sidomulyo-Kec. Wates craftsman 037. Sumadi II Bangsal-Kec. Pesantren craftsman 038. Basori Tugurejo-Kec. Gampengrejo craftsman 039. Yatin Ngletih-Kec. Pesantren craftsman 040. Tamirin Ketami-Kec. Pesantren craftsman 041. Djais Jabon-Kec. Mojoroto craftsman 042. Tarmo Ketami-Kec. Pesantren craftsman 043. Muljo I Balong Gogorante-Kec. Gampengrejo craftsman 044. Surip Ketami-Kec. Pesantren craftsman 045. Karto II Gogorante-Kec. Gampengrejo craftsman 046. Sumiran Ketami-Kec. Pesantren craftsman 047. Tamsiran II Ketami-Kec. Pesantren craftsman 048. Djumiran II Ketami-Kec. Pesantren craftsman 049. Murlan Dander Ketami-Pesantren craftsman 050. Sumadi HI Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren craftsman 051. Saiman Tugurejo-Kec. Gampengrejo craftsman 052. Seger-I craftsman Ketami/Dander-Kec. Pesantren 053. Somo III al. Gogorante/Balong-Kec. Gampengrejo craftsman Somoredjo 054. Miran-II Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren craftsman 055. Kadir Ketami-Kec. Pesantren craftsman 056. Misran Ketami/Dander-Kec. Gampengrejo craftsman 057. Jatiran Mojoroto-Kec. Mojoroto craftsman 058. Tamsiran I Tugurejo-Kec. Gampengrejo craftsman 059. Podo Semito Ketami-Kec. Pesantren craftsman 060. Niti-n Gurah-Kec. Gurah craftsman 061. Nasukan craftsman Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren 062. Sapari craftsman Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren 063. Mukhamat Gurah-Kec. Gurah craftsman 064. Birin Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren craftsman 065. Kamari Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren craftsman 066. Supardi U Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren craftsman 067. Misri Sb. Rejo-Kec. Wates craftsman 068. Trimo Ketami/Dander-Kec. Pesantren craftsman 069. Warimun Meritjan-Mojoroto craftsman 070. Warsidi craftsman Dander/Ketami-Kec. Pesantren 071. Ngatimin Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren ass. craftsman 072. Djiman Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren ass. craftsman 073. Saeran Betet-Kec. Pesantren ass. craftsman R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. III-A II-B II-A II-A II-A II-B II-A II-A II-B II-A II-A II-A II-A === [PDF page 332] === 310 074. Samiran Ngablak/Grogol-Kec. Gampengrejo worker 075. Midjan Bandung-Prambon/Nganjuk worker 076. Ahmad H Tugurejo-Kec. Gampengrejo craftsman 077. Muradji Ketami-Kec. Pesantren craftsman 078. Maskani Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren craftsman 079. Parian ass. craftsman Tugurejo-Kec. Gampengrejo 080. Sumarmin Tugurejo-Kec. Gampengrejo ass. craftsman 081. Supardji Kajen Kidul ass. craftsman 082. Suridjo Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren worker 083. Tukiran worker Janti-Wates 084. Seger-III Dander/Ketami-Kec. Pesantren ass. craftsman 085. Jusman Ketami-Kec. Pesantren ass. craftsman 086. Sumanto Ketami-Kec. Pesantren ass. craftsman 087. Giso Jamsaren-Kec. Pesantren craftsman II-A 088. Marijan Tugurejo-Kec. Gampengrejo ass. craftsman 089. Rebi Kleco/Jamsaren-Kec. Pesantren craftsman 090. Ngaiman Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren ass. craftsman 091. Amat Rubiono Mojoroto-Kec. Mojoroto ass. craftsman 092. Rochadi CT secretary Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren 093. Samiran-I Darungan/Pare ass. railway foreman II-A 094. Waridin Tugurejo-Kec. Gampengrejo ass. railway foreman n-A 095. Amat Rejo Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren ass. railway foreman n-A 096. Paeran Pakunden-Kec. Pesantren ass. railway foreman n-A 097. Maniran Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren ass. railway foreman n-A 098. Parto Suwito Turus-Gurah ass. railway foreman n-A 099. Keidyan Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren ass. railway foreman n-A 100. Sumadi Banjaran-Kec. Kota ass. railway foreman II-A 101. Mulyo P. Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren ass. railway foreman II-A 102. Suradi Gogorante-Kec. Gampengrejo ass. railway foreman II-A 103. Mustam Purworejo-Bangsal-Kec. Pesantren ass. railway foreman 104. Mursimin Purworejo-Bangsal-Kec. Pesantren ass. railway foreman 105. Samiran II Tempurejo-Kec. Pesantren ass. railway foreman 106. Sadiman Sambirejo-Kec. Pare plantation foreman 107. Parianto Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren clerk 108. Karmidi Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren ass. w.house foreman II-A 109. Moch. Jamil Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren guard 110. Ngatmijan Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren warehouse worker 111. Kaseri Kleco-Kec. Pesantren warehouse worker 112. Suraji Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren warehouse foreman in-B 113. Paimin Ngletih-Kec. Pesantren office boy 114. Dowi Sumandianto Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren office clerk II-B 115. Suwandi Banjaran-Kec. Kota office clerk II-B 116. Yatemo Tugurejo-Kec. Gampengrejo servant/maid R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 333] === 311 117. Subari 118. Tukiran Besuk-Kec. Gurah Ketami-Kec. Pesantren plant worker plant worker Discharged/forced retirement without pension 119. Karijadji 120. Suwarli 121. Sumadi 122. Djum 123. Saridjan 124. Supardi 125. Suharyo S. 126. Wakidjan 127. Wadi Bobang-Kec. Semen chauffeur Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren chauffeur Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren chauffeur Balong Gogorante-Kec. Gampengrejo chauffeur Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren chauffeur Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren mailman Pesantren-Kec. Pesantren chief of office clerk Kleco/Jamsaren-Kec. Pesantren warehouse worker Jeruk/Tugurejo-Kec. Gampengrejo warehouse worker R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 334] === APPENDIX E A PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF CHAIRMAN OF ANSOR/B ANSER KEDIRI R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 335] === 313 A personal account of chairman of Ansor/Banser Kediri Notes on the document: The following is a typwritten document, prepared by Ma'roefin, who was chairman of Ansor/Banser Kopra Kediri (the city o f Kediri) in 1965-1971, for a reunion meeting of Ansor members; the reunion was to be held in 1995, but never took place. This translation follows the structure of the original document, which sometimes seems odd and awkward, full of grammatical mistakes, and muddled meaning, even for Indonesian readership. Although I made some adjustments in its grammar and presentation, I tried as consistently as possible to the original document, including to leave muddled sentences as they are, in order to get a sense of insider's view on the killings. Remembrances of Ansor/Banser Kodya/Kab Kediri in the year of 1965 Prologue PKI: In early 1965, PKI indeed was warming up their affiliate organizations, such as BTI (Barisan Tani Indonesia, or the Indonesian Peasant Front), to launch their unilateral actions, while Lekra (their people's culture institution) to stage drama shows, ludruk. BTI with its unilateral actions conducted its actions during the harvest season on the land owned by the Muslims, when the harvest was to be done. Soybean, com, paddy, chilli pepper, and cassava were harvested by the masses of BTI at night. They brought the masses from other areas, on the land to be harvested, which was owned by members of NU. The next morning, the Muslim who owned the land would be stunned to find that his plants were flat on the ground. Feeling sad, the landowner would go home. The Lekra staged ludruk with titles such as Gusti Allah Mcmtu (God holds wedding for his daughter) and Kiyai Barhum. The two plays were set on purpose to make the Muslims angry, and indeed was to humiliate Islam. Many of these terrorized NU members reported their situation to NU and Ansor leaders of Kediri. Once in the subdistrict of Mojo, district of Kediri, Gus Mik (the son of Kiyai Zazuki al Magfurllah) there was an incident because in the afternoon there was a ludruk troupe in that place. The title was, of course, Kiyai Barhum. Barhum was depicted as drunken kiyai, who liked gambling, and who liked to make commotion in the neighborhood. The play was indeed to humiliate the Muslims. Gus Mik then in the afternoon went to the place and he threw creweng, or a piece of roof tile, with a magic formula (chizib). That night, heavy rain showered the place, strong wind blew, destroyed the stage and the gamelan music that had already been set up. Everything was scattered all around, blown by the wind, because of Gus Mik's creweng. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 336] === 314 The incident in the village of Ngetrep in the subdistrict of Papar, Kediri regency. Lekra staged a shadow puppet show. Of course, the title was humiliating Islam, that was Gusii Allah Mantu (God holds wedding for his daughter). Members of Ansor/Banser then reported to the branch, asking help to ban the show. Then members from the branch (of Ansor) went to Kiyai Abdullah, who was considered as ma'rifat and lived in the village of Sumber Lumbu, subdistrict of Kandat. The kiyai ordered them to take some clay from the someone's grave who died on Tuesday night.1The order was taken and done. The kiyai then gave his chizib or magic formula. At that night, the Ansor/Banser kids brought and threw the clay to the show. The oil lamp used for the show was dimmed, and some of the musicians were sleepy because of the clay but some others were not affected. The Ansor kids were not satisfied with the result, so they went back to the kiyai and reported what happened. The kiyai then ordered again to take the clay from the grave and now he gave more potent magic strength. Now this time it was very effective. The light at the show were dim and then went off, and all the musicians were drowsy and unconscious. The kids then finished them off, sent them to sukabumi (to like the earth), at midnight. The next morning, the villagers were in commotion, because the Lekra's puppeter and the musicians all lost their heads. Another incident. The incident in Kanigoro in the subdistrict of Keras, right in front of the parents of Gus Maksum, who was now the coach of East Java pencaksilat (martial art)??? In his village, at that time, there was a cadre training of PH (Pemuda Islam Indonesia, or the Indonesian Muslim Youth). The training was destroyed by PKI and its Pemuda Rakjat. There was even PKI/Pemuda Rakjat stepped on Qur'an. This was Ansor/Banser could not accepted. There was even a meeting with the Kodim (by that time was the late Lt. Col. Mukaji), Bupati Akmad Subari (now deceased), NU, PKI, all were called, that finally PKI apologized. They also in fact seized membership cards of NU. Therefore, PKI was caught in the act. Apparently, at that time, the local authorities hesitated with PKI's actions. Only commander of Brigif-16 backed NU/Ansor at that time. The commander at the time was Lt. Col. Sampuma. In the subdistrict of Plemahan there was an incident known as Peristiwa Perkebunan Begendul (the Begendul Plantation Affair). In the subdistrict of Wates there was an incident known as Peristiwa Kebun Satak/Sumber Lumbu (Satak Field/Sumber Lumbu Affair) and Kebun Rangkah Pawon (Rangkah Pawon Field) in the subdistrict of Plosoklaten, regency of Kediri. In Sumatra was known the Bandar Betsy Affair. •The Javanese believe that certain Tuesday night—Selasa Kliwon, complicatedly counted by five days a week in lunar calendar-is the most dreadful night. R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 337] === 315 An incident also took place in Adan-Adan, subdistrict of Gurah, regency of Kediri. At first, there was a village head got sickled by PKI/BTI, but fortunately he did not die. Apparently, he was just terrorized. Then he reported the incident to the leaders of Ansor/Banser Kediri, because Ansor/Banser also wanted to wanning up. This report was taken care, to place the incident justly, because beside the village head there was also a kiyai who got sickled. The kiyai was not hurt; only his fez got cut, because he was invulnerable. This incident made Ansor/Banser got angry, because their kiyai was attacked. In effect, Banser/Ansor were ready to attack the houses of PKI leaders in that area. Members from Purwa Asri, Papar, Gurah, Grogol, Pagu, Paree, and even Jombang joined them. In a minute, all houses of PKI leaders in the village of Adan-Adan were burned down, leaving only ashes. Just like being invisible, the Ansor/Banser kids disappeared, but Pemuda PNI (PNI Youth) who claimed as being responsible for the incident. They were arrested by the police and put in jail; Ansor/Banser were free. Epilogue of G-30-S/PKI After hearing from radio, central station, which broadcasted an announcement of PP Ansor (Ansor central board) that G30S/PKI killed 7 ABRI generals, Ansor/Kediri was in alert. By that time, Ansor headquarters was on Jalan Jambu, which was later moved to Setono Gedong in the city of Kediri. Indeed, there was an information that had they not moved, three days later the house would be burned by PKI. Their leader was Umar Anjilin, an elementary teacher who was now already being sent to sukabumi (to like the earth) by Ansor kids. At first, there was a graffiti by Ansor Kediri, written with capital letters, that G30S/PKI was mastermind by PKI/BTI, Lekra, and Pemuda Rakyat. The graffiti was written on a wall in front of Chung Hwa Chung Hui building, which was strategically located because people passing by to and from the Pasar Panjonan (Panjonan Marketplace) in the city of Kediri. It was written at 10.00 p.m. The next morning, it was already repainted, thus could not be read by the people of Kediri. It happened twice. Then Ansor investigated the incidents; it turned out that who repainted the graffiti was a hooker, member of Gerwani who was riding a tricycle. Then, for the third time, the leaders of Ansor/Banser took another initiative to paint again (Haji Parkistomo, who now held position as subhead of welfare division of the city council, painted the graffiti). This time, the graffiti was exactly the same one as the first graffiti, but now was guarded: across the street, on the west side of Dhoho street there were as many as 200 members of Ansor/Banser from Lirboyo, all wearing black uniform, just like Bang Miun from the Madurese Carok, bringing scary clurit with them.2 Finally, the Gerwani who wanted to repaint was caught by Ansor kids, and she was running away, begging not to be punished, 2The Madurese, or people from Madura, an island adjacent to East Java, were infamous for their ability in deadly duel. Carok was a typical Madurese deadly duel, using clurit (open mouthed sickle). Carok was often done to maintain someone's dignity. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 338] === 316 but finally was beheaded and her body was thrown into the Brantas River. Now in the next morning, the passing-by people of Kediri to and from Panjonan Marketplace, the city of Kediri, could read the graffiti. Then the ishtikaroh of the late K.H. Syafie Marzuki.3 Leaders o f Ansor/Banser was told to hold a huge mass rally of Ansor/Banser on 12 September 1965, about 11 days after G30S/PKI took place in Jakarta.4 Ansor/Banser prepared carefully the rally on 12 September '65. The night before Ansor sent its undercover agents, who pretended to be ice-lolipop vendors. Bringing thermos with them, they went to places where the offices of PKI/Lekra/Gerwani/BTI located, and drew sketches of the exact locations, such as on what street. In this mass rally, there had been a definitive plan laid out that night, to start the rally from aloon-aloon in front of the big mosque. The plan was to destroy PKI's headquarters with its affiliate organizations and to seize all available documents. Ansor by that time sent members of Ansor/Banser from Plemahan under the leadership of Bintoro, Gus Ubaid, Kamituwa, with their followers of about 200 people. They were all had been received spiritual drill, invulnerable of any weapon, bringing with them bike baskets with warning signs on them, "be careful, eggs, don't touch, will be broken." With these baskets they went to the aloon-aloon. But actually, inside the baskets were sharpened deadly clurit. The mass rally went exactly through the route, drawn the night before by Ansor agents. The targets were precise, all offices of PKI and its affiliate organizations were burned down and destroyed, making the police confused. The police dare not to take any action, since we got some backing from Brigif-16 Lt. Col. Sampuma. There were about 100,000 participants of the rally, making all buses were jammed on the streets for about 4 hours. When we arrived at PKI headquarters near the water reservoir at Paing Marketplace, there were hundreds of PKIs who had been prepared for 4 days with their arrows, chilli water, and bamboo spear. The fight went on, but because Ansor members were prepared before, they were invulnerable o f any weapon. PKI's knives, bamboo spear, chilli water, and other weapons were taken care easily by Ansor/Banser members. Anyone who dare to fight back was sent immediately to sukabumi. There were altogether 24 people who were sent to sukabumi, and 2,500 bikes were burned down, together with their headquarters. Now the headquarters became an automobile showroom. 3Ishtikaroh was a spiritual contemplation, done at night, to get a divine enlightenment to solve a certain problem. It only could be done by a kiyai. 4Ma'roefin made a mistake here, since the rally was actually held on 13 September 1965. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 339] === 317 The ishtikaroh of Kiyai H. Syafie Marzuki proved to be right If we did not hold the mass rally on 12 September 196S, the PKI and its affiliate organizations would have done a rally on 16 September 1965. Thus, there would be a reenactment of Madiun Affair in 1948, which we were preempted at that time. This was all with the blessing o f God. Then, on 16 September 65 there was a rally by sub-branch of Grogol under the leadership of H. Iskandar. The commotion was so hot that no Chinese and PKI managed to live in this area. In Gurah, the Ansor Banser leader was Nachroni; in Pagu, the Ansor Banser leader was H. Cholil; in Plemahan the Ansor Banser leaders were Bintoro, Gus Ubaid, and Kamituwa (the village elder guard); in the central city, the leader was Chozin Hasan; in Purwoasri, the leader were Chanan and Wahab Hasbullah (now H. Drs. Wahab Hasbolah, vice chairman of DPRD from P3); in Mojo was Moch. Sokeh; in Keras, the late Bingan; in Gampeng Reja were H. Dardiri and Makmur; in the west city was Abdul Wahid; in Kandat was the late H. Muslim Muslam; in other places throughout the regency of Kediri, I forgot the names. Let alone after hearing 7 generals were killed because of PKI's barbaric killings, Ansor/Banser Kediri run amok; about 85% of PKI leaders in the city and regency of Kediri were sent to sukabumi. Kediri was at the top, followed by Blitar, Tulung Agung, Nganjuk, Terenggalek, then Jember and Jombang, and East Java in general. The first leading figure to found Banser was Moch. Kayubbi, with his motto that every Ansor was Banser, and another motto, that "smash first, problems solved later." You win you get flower necklace; you lost you get hanging rope. Now, Banser has been replaced by a new generation. When the G30S/PKI broke out, some of today's Banser were only 5 years old. Now it has changed; therefore, the new generations of Banser should be more alert to any situation, because Banser has been drilled by history. Thus, today's Banser should coordinate better with the old Banser, who read much about its history. The principle are "to fight against bad deeds, and to be submissive to Allah, to deep bow, conaah, and istikomah and sincere without any interest." Remember the prophet's message: Qulil chaka walau kana murra, meaning "say the truth, although it taste bitter." Thus, this is the duty of Banser, because in this century, many hypocrite people, meaning that what they said were not same with what they acted. And even in this century corruption has been encultured, collusion and monkey relationships, political prostitution, and political manipulation, and many scapegoating the problems: A is said to be B, B is said to be C, black is said to be white, everything is turning down the truth. Many dajjal (demonic creatures, believed to appear befor the doomsday) are already around us: liars who lied a lot, in every field, economics, politics, finance. Thus, this generation of Ansor/Banser has never known the "politics of bamboo split." To play one againts another, doel heileg het meddelen, meaning that the goal justifies the R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission. === [PDF page 340] === 318 means. Therefore, you should come to pay a visit to the ulama/ma’rifat kiyai, who have the ability to see the future. My message is that Allah swt always gives his guidance to us; remember His message: A l haqqu min rabbikafallaa takunana minal mumtariin, meaning that the truth comes only from Allah swt. Therefore, do not be part of the hesitate people. There was an American coming to Indonesia, investigating why Communists in Indonesia have been destroyed, while in the world they have been always successful. For example the Soviet Union, where all small countries were invaded, Usbeskistan, Kurdistan, Cuba, North Korea, North Yemen, East Germany, PRC, Vietnam, except in Indonesia, with G30S/PKI was totally failed, although almost 90% were controlled. Why that American investigating, because NU was by that time the largest organization, but just like a swollen elephant, its finance was in array. Then why the Communist lost? Our answer: because of tahlilcm; tahlilan; tahlilan;5 this Communists were destroyed in Indonesia because the blessings o f Allah swt. Allahu Akbar, Allahu Akbar, Allahu Akbar (God the Greatest; God the Greatest; God the Greatest); Wabilahitaufik wal hidayah; wabil rida wal inayah; wassalamu allaikum wr. wb.6 We who wrote this article, Alumni Chairman of Banser the city/regency of Kediri the years of 1965-1971 sTahlilan is a specific recitation of Quranic verses. During this recitation, some were in tranced condition. 6This is a common sentence to end a speech, generally means to ask God's blessing for the audience. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. === [PDF page 341] === BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Hermawan Sulistyo was bom in Madiun, East Java (Indonesia), on July 4, 1957. He received his B.A. in Political Science from the University of Indonesia in 1979, and received his Drs. (Doctorandus/M.A. equivalent) from the same university in 1983. Then in 1986-1988, with a Fulbright scholarship, he studied at the Program for Southeast Asian Studies, Ohio University (Athens), but never completed his program; instead, he received his M.A. from the Department of History, Ohio University (Athens) in 1988. He went back to Indonesia before starting his study again to pursue a Ph.D. in History at Arizona State University (Tempe). While studying for his Ph.D., he received a certificate from the Scholarly Publishing Program, Arizona State University, in 1996. His other training included two years studying Nuclear Physics at the University of Indonesia; one year studying Philosophy at the Driyarkara Institute of Philosophy in Jakarta; a summer semester studying Burmese studies at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Northern Illinois University. His academic career to include as senior instructor at the National University (Jakarta) where he taught Sociology (1981-1993); senior instructor at Djuanda University (Bogor) where he taught Philosophy and Public Administration (1989-1992); Fulbright scholar-in-residence at the Contemporary History Institute, Ohio University (Athens, 1993); and teaching assistant for the class of Introduction to Southeast Asia at Arizona State University. Other professional career included as editor Gadis magazine, associate editor Mutiara magazine, managing editor/vice editor-in-chief TSM magazine, assistant editor-in-chief Jayakarta daily newspaper; pollster Suara Pembaruan daily newspaper, all in Jakarta; and U.S. based foreign correspondent for Surya daily newspaper in Surabaya. Have been publishing several books, he also worked as associate editor with various publishing houses in Jakarta. He received a Fulbright honor for academic achievement and for increasing mutual understanding between the peoples of Indonesia and America; a Ford Foundation individual grant for Ph.D. scholarship; various scholarships from Arizona State University. He works as a researcher at the Center for Political and Area Studies, the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) Jakarta since 1985. With this institution he helped to develop youth science programs which became nationwide adopted in almost all high schools around the country. 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