Review essay by Justus M. van der Kroef (Pacific Affairs, winter 1970) surveying interpretations of the 1965 coup (Wertheim, Rey, the Cornell Report, Utrecht, Pluvier, Hughes, Nugroho/Saleh) from a pro-PKI-complicity standpoint. Several passages mention Gerwani members' role at Halim; he cites 'Mrs Djamilah's' confessi
Internet Archive compilation on the 1965 events whose main text is Anderson and McVey's Cornell 'Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965 Coup' (1971), with source documents. It says Gerwani and Pemuda Rakjat trainees at Lubang Buaya were drawn into the killings (pp. 22-23) while stressing the army-fed 'orgy' storie
Internet Archive compilation on the 1965 events whose main text is Anderson and McVey's Cornell 'Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965 Coup' (1971), with source documents. It says Gerwani and Pemuda Rakjat trainees at Lubang Buaya were drawn into the killings (pp. 22-23) while stressing the army-fed 'orgy' storie
Journal article by Reuven Kahane (Contributions to Asian Studies, vol. 5, 1974) giving a structural-sociological explanation of the 1965 coup and army dominance in Indonesia: religious-class polarisation, failing Sukarno-era control mechanisms, and the army's rise. Gerwani appears only in a footnote listing PKI-affilia
Critical review by Justus M. van der Kroef (Asian Affairs, Nov 1976) of the CIA's declassified 1968 report 'Indonesia-1965: The Coup That Backfired'. Takes issue with the CIA's claim that Lubang Buaya victims were not mutilated and that Gerwani/Pemuda Rakyat confessions were Army-contrived, quoting Gerwani member Djami
Journal article by Coen Holtzappel (Journal of Contemporary Asia, 1979) analysing the Untung and Njono trial records to argue the 30 September Movement was steered by Air Force and Army intelligence, with Sjam's Pringgodani group deliberately compromising the PKI and Aidit. Gerwani is mentioned only once, in a footnote
Published RIMA version (1998) of Wieringa's 1996 paper, revised after Suharto's fall: the New Order legitimated itself through the army's slander campaign against Gerwani, part of an 'extended coup' of Oct 1965-Mar 1967, with a compact Gerwani history. Companion to the 1996 draft.
McGregor and Hearman's 2007 article reading Sulami's and Sudjinah's memoirs as political rehabilitation: both arrested 1967, tried 1975 for subversion; they distance Gerwani from the PKI and answer the sexual slander. Second copy of the paper (South East Asia Research).
Yosef Djakababa's 2009 Wisconsin dissertation on how the New Order built the official Lubang Buaya narrative (PKI sole mastermind, spontaneous people's response) via army history, Mahmillub trials, the monument, Hari Kesaktian Pancasila and the film. Key study of official memory.
Katharine McGregor's 2009 article on NU's support for the 1965-66 killings (e.g. its 5 Oct 1965 call to ban the PKI, Gerwani and others), their celebration under the New Order and Syarikat's post-1998 reconciliation work. Context on religious-organisation role.
Seven-page summary (LIPI journal, 2010) of Djakababa's dissertation arguing 1 Oct 1965 was chaotic and the New Order turned it into a good-versus-evil narrative via trials, the monument, commemoration and the film. Short companion to the full thesis.
Pohlman's 2014 article arguing the 1965-68 killings were political genocide and that the military's post-coup propaganda, including fabricated stories, constituted incitement to genocide; critiques the exclusion of political groups from the Genocide Convention.
John Roosa's 2020 book, from nearly 400 interviews, arguing the typical 1965-66 killing was army execution of detainees (hence mass disappearance); dissects army propaganda including how Gen. Sugandhi sexualised Lubang Buaya from 9 Oct 1965. Key scholarship.