Gerwani Archive
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GA-02589 1965-10-12 rel C

Telegram 971 to Secretary of State, 12 Oktober 1965

Telegram 971 to Secretary of State, 12 Oct 1965

US Embassy telegram 971, 12 Oct 1965: a German embassy source says the Army is considering overthrowing Sukarno and signalling Western embassies; Sukarno refused to read PKI-complicity papers. High-politics context; no Gerwani content.

GA-02594 1965-11-12 rel C

Telegram 1425: Joint Situation Report no. 51, 12 November 1965

Telegram 1425: Joint Situation Report no. 51, 12 Nov 1965

US Embassy Joint Situation Report no. 51, 12 Nov 1965: Army-Sukarno contest plus a security section on riots in Makassar, a massacre of 200 PKI prisoners in Bone and arrests in Jakarta. No Gerwani mention; shows how killings were framed as a 'security' item.

GA-02581 1965-12-06 rel C

Telegram 183A, US Consulate Medan, 6 Desember 1965

Telegram 183A, US Consulate Medan, 6 December 1965

US Consulate Medan telegram, 6 December 1965: after the PKI's 'virtual destruction' in Sumatra the Army extends control over civil service, press, youth, National Front and Hansip. Shows the institutional consolidation that followed the killings.

GA-02901 1974 rel C licensed

Social Conditions Leading to Military Dominance: The Case of Indonesia

Social Conditions Leading to Military Dominance: the case of Indonesia (Kahane, 1974)

Journal article by Reuven Kahane (Contributions to Asian Studies, vol. 5, 1974) giving a structural-sociological explanation of the 1965 coup and army dominance in Indonesia: religious-class polarisation, failing Sukarno-era control mechanisms, and the army's rise. Gerwani appears only in a footnote listing PKI-affilia

GA-03042 2023 rel C licensed

Fashioning Authoritarianism: Militarization of Society in Indonesia, 1930-1966

Fashioning Authoritarianism: Militarization of Society in Indonesia, 1930-1966 (Joshua, 2023)

PhD dissertation (Northwestern, 2023) by Norman Joshua on the militarization of Indonesian society, 1930-1966. It argues the Army intervened in non-military affairs through the 'twin logics' of emergency powers and counterinsurgency, culminating in the New Order. Gerwani appears only in passing: p. 428 gives its claime