John H. Sullivan's 1969 American University PhD in international relations traces US-Indonesian relations c. 1963-68 and the emergence of the New Order, covering the anti-American period, the 30 September Movement and its aftermath, and regional, communist-bloc and economic relations. It is diplomatic and political his
Journal article by Reuven Kahane (Contributions to Asian Studies, vol. 5, 1974) giving a structural-sociological explanation of the 1965 coup and army dominance in Indonesia: religious-class polarisation, failing Sukarno-era control mechanisms, and the army's rise. Gerwani appears only in a footnote listing PKI-affilia
De Tijd profile by Anton Koene (8 Feb 1974) of Ratna Sari Dewi Sukarno in Paris, who is serialising her memoirs to clear Sukarno's name over the 1 Oct 1965 coup, rebuts the Widjanarko report in Dake's book and criticises Suharto's regime. Gerwani and Gerwani women are not mentioned.
Journal article by Coen Holtzappel (Journal of Contemporary Asia, 1979) analysing the Untung and Njono trial records to argue the 30 September Movement was steered by Air Force and Army intelligence, with Sjam's Pringgodani group deliberately compromising the PKI and Aidit. Gerwani is mentioned only once, in a footnote
Joop Morriën's critical review in De Waarheid (6 June 1979, p.5) of Mochtar Lubis's illustrated history 'Het land onder de regenboog'. He faults its errors and 'virulent anti-communism', says it adopts Suharto's version of 1965, and notes the Madiun 1948 and 1965 killings of communists and Lekra artists' imprisonment.
Pravda, 30 Oct 1990, p. 5: full page with V. Shurygin's (Pravda-TASS) article 'Indonesia: strokes to a tragedy of 35 years ago', a Soviet correspondent's retrospective on the 1965 coup, Sukarno's choice at Halim, up to 500,000 communists killed, and slander-driven anti-communist propaganda. Gerwani appears once, listed
Iwan Gardono Sudjatmiko's 1992 Harvard sociology PhD thesis compares East Java and Bali to explain the PKI's destruction after 1965, arguing that it followed from the party's 1963 revolutionary strategy and that violence depended on public figures, army units and PKI size. It covers mobilisation, land reform and local
The Guardian, 23 May 1998, p.24, Martin Woollacott, 'Chaos at Crocodile Hole': comment on Suharto's fall, arguing it is no triumph and that his legacy of division (military vs Islamists, rich vs poor, ethnic and religious tensions) leaves the country fragile. It opens with the Crocodile Hole (Lubang Buaya) shrine, whos
Testimony of Dr Soebandrio, Sukarno's deputy prime minister, written after his 1995 release, arguing the 30 September Movement was a provocation exploited by Suharto's circle. Elite memoir; Gerwani is peripheral context.
Seven-page summary (LIPI journal, 2010) of Djakababa's dissertation arguing 1 Oct 1965 was chaotic and the New Order turned it into a good-versus-evil narrative via trials, the monument, commemoration and the film. Short companion to the full thesis.
Tempo piece (1 Oct 2012) explaining why West Java saw no mass killings: Siliwangi commander Ibrahim Adjie ordered detentions without violence (per Benedict Anderson via Umar Said), and RPKAD, whose arrival triggered killings elsewhere (Cribb, Anderson), did not enter. Notes Suharto's 2 Oct 1965 letter claiming to preve
PhD dissertation (Northwestern, 2023) by Norman Joshua on the militarization of Indonesian society, 1930-1966. It argues the Army intervened in non-military affairs through the 'twin logics' of emergency powers and counterinsurgency, culminating in the New Order. Gerwani appears only in passing: p. 428 gives its claime