Some Opinions on Why the G-30-S Failed, Seen from a Military Viewpoint (Supardjo, 1966)
Brig. Gen. Supardjo's 1966 analysis, addressed to 'comrade leaders', of why the 30 September Movement failed, published by John Roosa in 2008. The only first-hand assessment by a movement leader.
RAND memorandum RM-5753-PR (Feb 1969), Guy J. Pauker, 'The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Indonesia'. Argues, from trial records, that Aidit planned the 30 September action against the generals and traces PKI strategy, the Chinese turn, the agrarian 'unilateral actions' and the killings (up to 300,000), and th
Interpretations of the 1965 Indonesian Coup: a review of the literature (van der Kroef, 1970)
Review essay by Justus M. van der Kroef (Pacific Affairs, winter 1970) surveying interpretations of the 1965 coup (Wertheim, Rey, the Cornell Report, Utrecht, Pluvier, Hughes, Nugroho/Saleh) from a pro-PKI-complicity standpoint. Several passages mention Gerwani members' role at Halim; he cites 'Mrs Djamilah's' confessi
The Guardian (Weekend Guardian), 8 Sept 1990, p.A4, John Gittings, 'The black hole of Bali': long feature on the 1965 massacre (250,000 or more killed), how the killings were organised by the army under Suharto, the Aidit/PKI role, the US list of communists (Martens/Kadane) and US encouragement, survivors ('Tapols') an