Some Opinions on Why the G-30-S Failed, Seen from a Military Viewpoint (Supardjo, 1966)
Brig. Gen. Supardjo's 1966 analysis, addressed to 'comrade leaders', of why the 30 September Movement failed, published by John Roosa in 2008. The only first-hand assessment by a movement leader.
Analysis of Responsibility: Sudisman's Defence Speech before the Mahmillub, 1967 (Pamphlet, 1975)
English pamphlet (Melbourne, 1975, trans. Benedict Anderson) of PKI General Secretary Sudisman's final Mahmillub speech of 21 July 1967, 'Analysis of Responsibility'. A leader's self-critical account of the PKI and the 30 September Movement.
RAND memorandum RM-5753-PR (Feb 1969), Guy J. Pauker, 'The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Indonesia'. Argues, from trial records, that Aidit planned the 30 September action against the generals and traces PKI strategy, the Chinese turn, the agrarian 'unilateral actions' and the killings (up to 300,000), and th
Interpretations of the 1965 Indonesian Coup: a review of the literature (van der Kroef, 1970)
Review essay by Justus M. van der Kroef (Pacific Affairs, winter 1970) surveying interpretations of the 1965 coup (Wertheim, Rey, the Cornell Report, Utrecht, Pluvier, Hughes, Nugroho/Saleh) from a pro-PKI-complicity standpoint. Several passages mention Gerwani members' role at Halim; he cites 'Mrs Djamilah's' confessi
Archive of the Event of 1965 in Indonesia (compilation incl. Anderson and McVey, Preliminary Analysis of the October 1,
Internet Archive compilation on the 1965 events whose main text is Anderson and McVey's Cornell 'Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965 Coup' (1971), with source documents. It says Gerwani and Pemuda Rakjat trainees at Lubang Buaya were drawn into the killings (pp. 22-23) while stressing the army-fed 'orgy' storie
Archive of the Event of 1965 in Indonesia (compilation incl. Anderson and McVey, Preliminary Analysis of the October 1,
Internet Archive compilation on the 1965 events whose main text is Anderson and McVey's Cornell 'Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965 Coup' (1971), with source documents. It says Gerwani and Pemuda Rakjat trainees at Lubang Buaya were drawn into the killings (pp. 22-23) while stressing the army-fed 'orgy' storie
The 30 September Movement: a political movement of the armed forces or an intelligence operation? (Holtzappel, 1979)
Journal article by Coen Holtzappel (Journal of Contemporary Asia, 1979) analysing the Untung and Njono trial records to argue the 30 September Movement was steered by Air Force and Army intelligence, with Sjam's Pringgodani group deliberately compromising the PKI and Aidit. Gerwani is mentioned only once, in a footnote
The Guardian (Weekend Guardian), 8 Sept 1990, p.A4, John Gittings, 'The black hole of Bali': long feature on the 1965 massacre (250,000 or more killed), how the killings were organised by the army under Suharto, the Aidit/PKI role, the US list of communists (Martens/Kadane) and US encouragement, survivors ('Tapols') an