CIA 'Indonesian Situation' report no. 61, 14 November 1965: continuing anti-communist action and mass killings, Aidit's presumed whereabouts, and 1,000 women demonstrating in Jakarta for permanent dissolution of the PKI women's auxiliary. Records an early anti-Gerwani mobilisation.
UK Foreign Office file FO 371/180312 (1965), 'Internal political situation, Attempted coup against Sukarno [3]', a volume of Embassy letters and telegrams from Djakarta (Ambassador Gilchrist, S.J.G. Cambridge), February to April 1965. It includes Gilchrist's character notes on Subandrio, Aidit and the generals, the tak
The Hindustan Times, 8 Dec 1965, Dennis Bloodworth (Singapore), 'PKI Debacle I: The Masses Did Not Rise': analysis of why the PKI collapsed after the 1 Oct coup: overrated membership, reliance on Sukarno and on army and air force penetration, no general strike, SOBSI dissolving. It reports Untung's alleged claim that m
The Scotsman, 8 Dec 1965, Dennis Bloodworth, 'Army plans to kill PKI for ever': Suharto and Nasution press to destroy the PKI while Sukarno refuses to ban it; the article analyses the PKI's miscalculations. It repeats the slander that six generals were mutilated by 'doe-eyed girls' of the PKI's 'Gerwani' women's moveme
Evening Post (Wellington), 10 Dec 1965, commentary on the Indonesian Communists after the 30 September coup. It repeats the Lubang Buaya atrocity claim that six generals were 'horribly mutilated by doe-eyed girls' of the PKI's 'Gerwani' women's movement and thrown into a well, with Communist youth dancing at Halim; als
Headline-only clipping 'Sukarno the Key to Any Revolution in Indonesia' from the Evening Post of 10 Dec 1965; no further text. The full article repeats the Gerwani Lubang Buaya claim.
Standfirst clipping of the Evening Post article of 10 Dec 1965: the Indonesian Communists, 'almost overlords yesterday, almost outlaws today', miscalculated their moment, strength and strategy and the determination of the military and Muslims to wipe them out. Gerwani is not named in this fragment.
Clipping from the Evening Post of 10 Dec 1965: says Sukarno could not back the coup because of its brutality, and that six generals were 'horribly mutilated by doe-eyed girls' of the PKI's 'Gerwani' women's movement and thrown into a well, while Communist youth danced at Halim. This is the Lubang Buaya sexual-atrocity
Closing clipping of the Evening Post article of 10 Dec 1965: Nasution's escape over his garden wall and the murder of his five-year-old daughter; alleged PKI plans for arson and famine; the party's 'patriotic' image destroyed; Sukarno forced to appoint Suharto army chief while the Army mops up Communists in Central and
Article by Lucien Rey (New Left Review no. 36, March 1966) reconstructing the 1 October 1965 events as a plot by dissident Central Java officers, plus a translated Asahi Shimbun interview with PKI deputy chair Njoto. Says People's Youth and Gerwani auxiliaries trained at Halim took part in the generals' executions in r
The Scotsman, 29 Oct 1966, 'Not the old Subandrio': profile of Sukarno's former foreign minister, condemned to death by a military tribunal for treason and bearing 'heavy responsibility for the rise of the PKI'. It traces his career and notes he is a scapegoat the Suharto regime can blame while Sukarno is retained for
RAND memorandum RM-5753-PR (Feb 1969), Guy J. Pauker, 'The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Indonesia'. Argues, from trial records, that Aidit planned the 30 September action against the generals and traces PKI strategy, the Chinese turn, the agrarian 'unilateral actions' and the killings (up to 300,000), and th
Roger Paget's 1970 Cornell PhD thesis on how student and youth action groups, culminating in KAMI, emerged after 1 October 1965 and helped undermine Sukarno. Gerwani appears in several passages: action fronts demanded its banning (p. 44) and its offices were ransacked (p. 63); Herlina denounced it for not fighting Mala
Journal article by Reuven Kahane (Contributions to Asian Studies, vol. 5, 1974) giving a structural-sociological explanation of the 1965 coup and army dominance in Indonesia: religious-class polarisation, failing Sukarno-era control mechanisms, and the army's rise. Gerwani appears only in a footnote listing PKI-affilia
Journal article by Coen Holtzappel (Journal of Contemporary Asia, 1979) analysing the Untung and Njono trial records to argue the 30 September Movement was steered by Air Force and Army intelligence, with Sjam's Pringgodani group deliberately compromising the PKI and Aidit. Gerwani is mentioned only once, in a footnote